ATINER CONFERENCE PRESENTATION SERIES No: POL2020-0192

ATINER’s Conference Paper Proceedings Series

POL2020-0192
Athens, 26 August 2020

Do “Disloyalty” and Opposition to the State in Africa Translate

to Poor and Inequitable Access to Public Goods and Services
for “Dissident” Communities? Evidence from Kenya, with
Special Reference to the Luo, 1963–2003
Albert Omulo

Athens Institute for Education and Research

8 Valaoritou Street, Kolonaki, 10683 Athens, Greece

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 ATINER CONFERENCE PRESENTATION SERIES No: POL2020-0192

ATINER’s Conference Paper Proceedings Series

POL2020-0192
Athens, 07 September 2020
ISSN: 2529-167X
Albert Omulo, Postdoctoral Fellow, University of the Western Cape, South
Africa.

Do “Disloyalty” and Opposition to the State in Africa Translate to

Poor and Inequitable Access to Public Goods and Services for
“Dissident” Communities? Evidence from Kenya, with Special
Reference to the Luo, 1963–2003
ABSTRACT

Scholarly discourse on socioeconomic development in Africa is replete with suggestions

that “disloyalty,” perceived or real, and opposition to the state hamper access to public
goods and services for “dissident” communities. However, few studies present empirical
evidence to substantiate or refute this widely held assumption. With the objective of
bridging this gap, this study examines the Kenyan case, with special reference to the Luo
community, which has consistently opposed the country’s post-independence governments.
It poses the following question: how have antagonistic relations, between the governments
of independent Kenya and the Luo, influenced the socioeconomic development of the
country, in general, and that of the Luo community in particular? Based on Michel
Foucault’s concept of “archaeology of power,” it derives evidence from Kenya’s budget
speeches, statistical abstracts and economic surveys, to establish socioeconomic
development outcomes in the country. Concerned with equity, it examines public provision
trends regarding the following four indicators of socioeconomic development: education,
healthcare, housing, and rural water supplies. It finds that marginalization in the
provision of public goods and services is not always factual; accordingly, it partly
concludes, to avoid ethnic animosity, bitterness, and anti-state feelings by disenchanted
citizens, African states should ensure inclusivity and representativeness in government.

Keywords: Socioeconomic development, Africa, Kenya, Ethnicity; Public

goods and services, Luo.

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Introduction

Of the numerous devastating legacies bequeathed to independent Africa by

European colonizers, perhaps the most prominent and durable one has been the
ill-informed, egregious idea that governance and economic development policy
and practice should be chauvinistically linked to ethnic and racial identity, the
latter of which are more often than not socially constructed, ideologically-
ensconced and, therefore, fluid, completely unjustified, ludicrous and most
definitely lacking in substance. Indeed, European colonial domination and
practice across Africa was characterized by what Nyabira and Ayele (2016,
132) have described as ―divide and rule … policy, [in which the authorities]
chose individuals from specific ethnic communities, to the exclusion of others
to allow access to the [particular] country‘s political and administrative
institutions, as a reward for this collaboration.‖ About Kenya, Shutzer (2012,
348) states that:

[t]o implement their policies, the colonial government appointed ‗chiefs‘, whose
authority had pseudo-traditional power. With the help of these ‗Loyalists‘, a small
settler population was able to coerce labour and control the best land in the
colony. … For their services, these chiefs received access to land in the native
reserves, and other incentives that would distinguish them from the impoverished
majority.

Undoubtedly, discriminatory forms of governance were considerably

birthed and nurtured in the colonial era; the painful reality, however, is that it
seems that skewed allocation of state resources, now largely conducted along
the lines of ethnicity, persists in the cradle of humankind more than half a
century after the exit of the colonialist and in a world in which the universally
accepted fact, at least on paper, is that all humans are created equal. As argued
by Ilorah (2009, 698), ―[s]ince the independence of new nation-states, Africans
have simply continued with the same politics of extraction and divide-and-rule
rather than with good investment and the unification of diverse ethnic groups.‖
This phenomenon, responsible for ―caus[ing] resentment among marginalised
ethnic groups, fuell[ing] conflicts and sometimes wars, and discourag[ing]
investments, retarding growth and development prospects,‖ (Ilorah 2009, 696)
appears to cut across Africa and prevails in countries such as Ghana, Nigeria,
Zimbabwe and Côte d'Ivoire (see Achimugu, Ata-Agboni, & Aliyu 2013;
Attafuah 2009; Muzondidya & Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2007; Ogwang 2011).
In the case of Kenya, whose independence ushered in an era of resource
distribution that was dependent on politics and ethnicity (Throup 1987), recent
studies have suggested that, among the Luo, there is a strong feeling that the
community has been discriminated against by the country‘s central
government, with regard to the allocation of the national largesse, owing to
consistent opposition politics in the independence era (see Omulo 2018; Omulo
& Williams 2018). These findings appear to support the sentiments of Megan
Shutzer (2012), above, that there is a direct correlation between ―loyalty‖ to the
state in Africa, or lack thereof, and socioeconomic development or well-being.

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But are these findings factual or are they mere exaggerations and self-indulgent
opinions?
With the objective of certifying the validity of the aforementioned
sentiments of the Kenya‘s Luo community, this study, which is inspired by
Foucault‘s (1972) concept of ―archaeology of power,‖1 looks to independent
Kenya‘s historical records—budget speeches, economic surveys and statistical
abstracts—to establish the proportions and outcomes of public investment
undertaken by the Government of Kenya (GoK) in the country‘s eight
provinces from 1963–2003. The study poses the following research questions:
how have antagonistic relations, between the governments of independent
Kenya and the Luo, influenced the socioeconomic development of the country,
in general, and that of the Luo community in particular? What are the specifics
of the negative socioeconomic consequences of political marginalization within
the Kenyan context? The analysis presented here is centred on four areas of
public provision, as follows: education, healthcare, housing, and rural water
supplies. It is divided into four sequentially presented historical phases,
namely: i) 1963–1973: The Era of Squatter Settlement and Debt Accumulation
in Kenya; ii) 1973–1983: The Era of the Exposure of the Uncertainties of
Capitalism in Kenya; iii) 1983–1993: The Era of Export-oriented
Industrialization and Rationalization of Expenditure in Kenya; and iv) 1993–
2003: The Era of Neoliberalism in Kenya. The study concerns itself with
equity—in terms of equality of access to opportunity, equality of participation
in the opportunity, and the outcome of equal participation (see Mészáros
2001a; Mészáros 2001b; Mészáros 2010). It is hoped that the findings of this
study will contribute towards the increasingly important discourse on the
correlation between identity politics and socioeconomic development in the
cradle of humankind.

Contextual Background, Methodology, Research Scope, and Limitations

Kenya consists of over 40 ethnic groups, ―of which the Kikuyu are the
largest, comprising between 17 and 20 per cent of the population. The Luhya,
Luo, Kalenjin and Kamba each represent between 10 and 14 per cent of the
population (Burchard 2015).‖ The country has had four presidents so far, as
follows: Jomo Kenyatta a Kikuyu (1963–1978); Daniel arap Moi a Kalenjin
(1978–2002); Mwai Kibaki a Kikuyu (2002–2013); and Uhuru Kenyatta a
Kikuyu and son of Jomo (2013 to date). According to Burchard (2015, 334),
―[i]t has been alleged that Kenyatta demonstrated ethnic favouritism in
appointing cabinet members, staffing bureaucracies, allotting desirable plots of
land, and in securing business contracts.‖ Moi, ―much like his predecessor,
favoured his co-ethnics (Burchard 2015, 334).‖ And, ―Mwai Kibaki …was no
exception to this since, having assumed the presidency after Moi, he also
1
In his approach to writing history, Foucault begins by identifying the problem. He then works
through historical archives of particular societies to disclose the discursive formations (or
events) that have led to the field of inquiry (problem).

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increasingly preferred his Kikuyu kinsmen in political appointments (Nyabira

& Ayele 2016, 133).‖ The genesis of the animosity between the Luo and the
GoK was as explained below:

Jomo Kenyatta (a Kikuyu), Kenya‘s founding father, was capitalist-oriented and

his leadership style largely favored local and international elites. In contrast, his
deputy, Jaramogi (a Luo), was a socialist-leaning, populist politician whose
approach and vision prioritized the welfare of the Kenyan masses. Because of
their ideological differences and ensuing power struggles, Kenyatta frustrated
Odinga politically by masterminding the creation of eight posts of party vice-
chairman within the ruling party, Kenya African National Union (KANU), in
1966. With his powers clipped, for the position of vice-chair had hitherto been
exclusively his, Odinga resigned and ventured into opposition politics. This
separation set in motion the fierce Kikuyu-Luo rivalry that characterizes
contemporary Kenyan society and politics. During Kenya‘s 2017 presidential
elections, Jomo‘s son, Uhuru Kenyatta, ran as the incumbent and Raila Odinga,
Jaramogi‘s son, was his main challenger. (Omulo 2018, 301–302)

The country, which is now administratively divided into 47 counties, each

under the leadership of a governor, has historically, up to 2013 when Kenya‘s
new constitution was operationalized, comprised eight provinces, viz.: Central
(Kikuyuland), Coast, Eastern, Nairobi, North Eastern, Nyanza (Luoland), Rift
Valley (Kalenjinland) and Western. These provinces were essentially the result
of European colonial mapping and land policy which ―most decidedly
intersected with the creation of ‗native reserves‘, a concept that embedded
ethnic identity in geographical space, assigning specific parts of the country to
specific ethnic groups‖ (Shutzer 2012, 348).
This study analyses the following historical records from independent
Kenya: Budget Statements for the fiscal years 1962–1963 to 2001–2002;
Statistical Abstracts (Statistical Abstract 1963 to Statistical Abstract 2002) and
Economic Surveys (Economic Survey 1963 to Economic Survey 2002); these
documents provide public provision statistics, for the aforementioned eight
provinces, and, despite a few inconsistencies, they make for a pretty decent
source of data, through which narratives as to ―how‖ and ―why‖ economic
marginalization of the Luo might have occurred from 1963–2002 can be
constructed. The study‘s main limitation is the fact that the figures provided for
Nyanza Province, in the statistical abstracts and economic surveys, have been
taken to wholly represent Luo interests when, in fact, the province is also home
to the Kisii and Kuria ethnic groups. The findings, however, can still be largely
relied upon for the Luo are overwhelmingly predominant in this province and
Luo Nyanza forms a considerable part of it. The research findings should,
therefore, proffer crucial erudition with respect to the effects of governance
formations on the lives of ordinary citizens at the grassroots level of society in
the African country. Furthermore, the research strategy espoused in this study
may be employed in other contexts for the purpose of examining socioeconomic
development in Africa.

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Theoretical Framework

This study is mainly guided by the proposition advanced by Ilorah (2009,

695), who has argued that ―[t]he leadership in many African countries, with
their ethnic diversities, is characterised by ethnic bias and favouritism, and
citizens are thus treated unequally in many respects, particularly when it comes
to national resource allocation.‖ From Ilorah‘s premise, we can draw the
following inferences about ethnicity and development in Africa: i) that
whoever lacks political power cannot chart their own economic destiny and is
at the mercy of the custodian of the state; ii) that political power is a vehicle to
prosperity in the continent; and iii) that there is a strong link between
opposition politics and dwindling socioeconomic fortunes in Africa. However,
owing to the fact that there is no agreement regarding how to understand the
ethnicized politics in Kenya, various rival explanations of the Kenyan case
have emerged to elucidate uneven and/or unequal development in the Kenyan
state vis-à-vis its Luo community. This phenomenon can best be explained by
the certitude that ethnicity is an emotive issue. Analysts, therefore, sometimes
fail the test of neutrality and/or objective description. This study considers the
arguments and theoretical propositions of Oloo (2004) and Kuria (2011)
equally important in the examination of Kenya‘s socioeconomic development
because case study research methodology involves identifying rival
explanations at the outset of the research process and considering these rival
explanations during the interpretation of a study‘s findings. Since Oloo‘s
(2004) arguments are based on the Theory of Uneven Development, I‘ll
introduce this theory first, before examining the analyst‘s contentions.
The Theory of Uneven Development was first propounded fully by Lenin
in 1915; its precepts derive from the works of Marx—Capital and Grundrisse
(Bond 1999). It is founded on Marx‘s argument that ―capitalism … [leads to]
the simultaneous emergence of concentrations of wealth and capital (for
capitalists), on the one hand, and poverty and oppression (for workers), on the
other (Bond 1999, 1198).‖ The emergence of the phenomenon (uneven
development), which can be associated with ―differential growth of sectors,
geographical processes, classes and regions at the global, regional, national,
sub-national and local level‖ (Bond 1999, 1198) has been explained in various
ways by different scholars: whilst Smith (2010) attributes it to rampant
development of division of labor, Mandel (1962, as cited in Bond 1999)
perceives it as the result of variation in finesse amongst distinct producers in a
given community, prolificacy differences amongst animals and soils, and
fortuitous happenings in life and nature.
Basing his arguments on the Theory of Uneven Development, Oloo (2004)
contends that poverty in Luo Nyanza can be explained by the fact that:

[C]apitalism develops in contradictory ways both within the boundaries of a

single country, across regions and a global scale. Well known examples include
South Africa under apartheid where you basically had two nations and two
economies co-existing within the confines of a single racist state; some have cited

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the North/South divide within Nigeria, Uganda, Italy, Sudan and other parts of
the world. (para. 1)

According to Oloo (2004), the colonial history of Kenya depicts a situation

in which the British pursued a policy of uneven development flagrantly and
unashamedly. Infrastructure growth and expansion was carried out in
correspondence with colonial economic concerns, pursuits and investments.
The reason for ―the social and economic disparities between towns and the
countryside, various districts and provinces and even within individual towns,
districts and provinces (Oloo, 2004, para. 4),‖ lies in this phenomenon.
Therefore, impoverishment in any region of the country can neither be
attributed directly to the inhabitants nor to superficial ethnic rivalry amongst
various ethnic groups (Oloo, 2004).
Another rival explanation on the economic state of Luo Nyanza is based
on the concept of poor leadership. Kuria (2011, para. 2) argues that ―since
independence, the political leadership of the region has held the people hostage
to a self-defeating ideology of blaming everybody except themselves for the
region‘s woes.‖ According to him, underdevelopment in the traditional
homeland of the Luo community is as a result of the culture of overdependence
on the government and lack of personal initiative. He suggests that the region
needs to make the fishing industry its focal point and modernize it—proceeds
from which would uplift the locals. If deployed for irrigation purposes, he
argues, Luo Nyanza‘s plentiful water sources could transmute the region into
the country‘s new bread basket. He also advocates for the resuscitation of
industries such as Kisumu Cotton Mills (KICOMI), which slumped in 1999.

Results

1963–1973: The Era of Squatter Settlement and Debt Accumulation in Kenya

The period 1963–1973 was largely one in which the newly independent
nation of Kenya accumulated debt for the purposes of resettling its landless
squatter population and meeting its usual recurrent and development
expenditures. Nevertheless, this historical phase will go down as a glorious
decade when compared to others that followed it; the country‘s Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) growth was both stable and consistent, as depicted in
figure 1 and table 1 below.

Table 1. Kenya’s Economic Performance, 1963–1973

YEAR 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
GDP GROWTH (%) 6.5 5.3 0.8 10.4 4.7 6.6 5.6 6.3 5.7 6.9 6.5
Source: Republic of Kenya Economic Surveys, 1963–1973.

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Figure 1. Kenya’s GDP Growth Rate, 1963–1973

12

10

8
GDP growth (%)

0
1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974

Year
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya‘s Economic Surveys, 1963–1973

The highest GDP growth rate was recorded in 1966 and the decade‘s
average GDP growth rate—approximately six percent—was impressive.
Although borrowing for purposes of development was intense at this time, the
GoK seemingly struck a good balance between proposed development projects
and programmes, and its spending capacity. The outcomes of public investment
instigated at the national level of government with a focus on four areas of
public provision— education, health services, housing, and water supplies—is
examined next.

Education Outcomes, 1963–1973

The outcome of GoK public investment in primary school education was
as depicted in figure 2 below; the GoK provides figures of enrolment in
primary school, from the year 1965, which serves as the beginning point in the
analysis of this particular public provision.

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Figure 2. Primary school enrolment by province, 1965–1973

500000
Central
Coast
Eastern
Nairobi
400000
N. Eastern
Nyanza
R.Valley
Number of pupils enrolled

Western
300000

200000

100000

0
1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974

Year
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1965–1973

The outcome of GoK investment in primary education shows that the

greatest beneficiary was the president‘s backyard—Central Province—which
experienced a continuous steady rise in enrolment figures. Eastern was second,
followed by Nyanza, the ancestral homeland of the Luo, Rift Valley, and
Western, in that order. Coast, Nairobi and North Eastern were sixth, seventh
and eighth, respectively. Although Nyanza witnessed a general growth in
primary school enrolment over this historical phase, continuous stable progress
was not witnessed in the province until after 1970. This is unlike Central and
Eastern, whose figures show stable growth throughout this historical phase. A
vast majority of the country‘s school-going population lives in the rural areas
of the country; this largely explains the poor performances of Nairobi and
Coast Provinces, which are home to some of the country‘s largest metropolitan
areas. North Eastern, on the other hand, is a very sparsely populated arid area.
The enrolment outcomes at the secondary school level were as shown in figure
3 below.

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Figure 3. Secondary school enrolment by province, 1968–1973

45000
Central Coast Eastern Nairobi
40000 N. Eastern Nyanza R.Valley Western

35000
Number of pupils enrolled

30000

25000

20000

15000

10000

5000

0
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973

Year
Source: Constructed from Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1968–1973.

In a trend similar to the one depicted in the primary school category, the
president‘s backyard led in the secondary school enrolment numbers, which
were characterized by a steady rise throughout the period 1968–1973. It is
striking that the other provinces, especially Eastern, Nyanza, Rift Valley and
Western, which performed well in enrolment at a primary level, did not witness
the same success in this category. The fact that Nairobi, which enrolled far
fewer pupils at the primary level, consistently recorded greater numbers at the
secondary level than the aforementioned four provinces, shows that transition
rates to secondary school in the rest of Kenya were very poor. This indicates
that the Luo and other non-Kikuyu Kenyan ethnic groups did not have equality
of participation in secondary education during the first decade of independence
in Kenya. The dismal figures recorded by the North Eastern Province can be
explained by the fact that it is a very sparsely populated region because of its
unfavourable semi-arid climate. The outcomes of public provision in health
services are examined next.

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Health Provision Outcomes, 1963–1973

As early as the 1970s, Kenya had established a national family planning
programme aimed at providing free services for patients who desired to plan
their families. This programme, besides providing family planning services,
targeted maternal and child health and was aimed at combating malnutrition.
Family planning centers were run, mainly, from provincial and district
hospitals. Mobile clinics were also operationalized for this purpose. The figures
for attendance at these family planning clinics, which the GoK started to
provide from the year 1970, were as depicted in figure 4 below.

Figure 4. Attendance at family planning clinics by province, 1970–1973

1973

1972
Year

1971

Western
R.Valley
Nyanza
Nairobi
1970
Eastern
Coast
Central
0 20000 40000 60000 80000 100000

Number of attendants
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1970–1973.

The evidence clearly shows that the greatest beneficiaries of this public
provision were the capital, Nairobi, and Central, the president‘s turf. They were
followed by Eastern, Coast and Rift Valley Provinces, respectively. Perhaps
owing to a combination of religious-inspired negative attitudes towards the
practice and the nomadic lifestyle of most of its largely Muslim pastoralist
inhabitants, this service was not accorded to the North Eastern Province.
However, it is important to note that, historically, the region has been at

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loggerheads with the Kenyan state and this could also be a factor behind its
neglect. The figures for Nyanza Province, wherein lies Luo Nyanza, were
dismal; in fact, Nyanza was consistently amongst the two worst performers,
alongside Western Province, during this first historical phase, indicating a lack
of equality of access to these crucial services. These findings suggest that there
was a strong link between a community‘s posture, perceived or real, and access
to health services during the first decade of independence in Kenya. The
figures for hospital beds and cots, by province, during this historical phase of
the study, which the GoK also began to provide from 1970, were as depicted in
figure 5 below.

Figure 5. Hospital beds and cots by province, 1970–1973

1973

1972
Year

1971

Western
R.Valley
Nyanza
N. Eastern
Nairobi
1970
Eastern
Coast
Central

0 1000 2000 3000 4000

Number of beds and cots

Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1970–1973.

Again, Nairobi, the capital, was dominant as a beneficiary in this category

of public provision. It was closely followed by Rift Valley, Central and Eastern
in that order. Coast, Nyanza, Western and North Eastern were fifth, sixth,
seventh, and eighth, respectively. Based on these figures and patterns, it is
difficult to create a case for politically-instigated sabotage in the provision of
health services with the number of beds and cots as indicators; however, it is
clear from figure 5, above—particularly with reference to Nairobi and North

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Eastern Provinces—that capitalism leads to uneven development across regions

at the nation-state level. Nairobi, the greatest beneficiary, happens to be the
country‘s industrial, commercial and political capital; North Eastern, on the
other hand, owing to its unfavourable climate and soils, has historically been
economically overlooked by Kenyan authorities since the advent of
colonialism. The outcome of public provision with regard to housing is
examined next.

Housing Provision Outcomes, 1963–1973

The National Housing Corporation (NHC), a GoK statutory body
established in 1953, has continuously been tasked with the provision of
affordable, decent housing for Kenyans. Its figures for houses completed, by
province, from 1968 to 1973, were as captured in figure 6 below.

Figure Error! No text of specified style in document.. No. of houses completed

by NHC by province, 1968–1973

1973

1972

1971
Year

1970

Western
1969 R.Valley
Nyanza
N. Eastern
Nairobi
Eastern
1968
Coast
Central

0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600

Number of house units
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1968–1973

NHC figures, as depicted in figure 6 above, show that during the first
decade of Kenya‘s independence the corporation paid no heed to equity in its
attempts to provide low-cost housing to Kenyans. The amalgamated outcome

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of the units of houses constructed to accommodate low-income earners during

the historical phase 1963–1973 shows that Nairobi got the lion‘s share,
percentagewise, at 58.72, followed by Coast (12.66), Rift Valley (12.65),
Central (6.02), Nyanza (3.75), Western (3.82), Eastern (2.01) and North
Eastern (0.36). The major determinant factor behind the provision of affordable
housing by the NHC during the period 1963–1973 seems to have been logic,
suitability and practicality. Owing to its more sophisticated infrastructure and
its choice as a destination for employment seekers, presumably, it made more
sense for the GoK to apply this provision to the city‘s dwellers, as opposed to
the nomads of the North Eastern Province, for instance. Urban areas were, thus,
prioritized; this posture can be directly linked to the uneven development that
inevitably accompanies capitalism as a mode of production. Water supply
outcomes for period 1963–1973 are discussed next.

Water Supply Outcomes, 1963–1973

The GoK started providing figures for the amounts spent on rural water
schemes, by the Ministry of Agriculture‘s Water Development Division, from
the year 1971. Results of the GoK‘s efforts towards the provision of this
essential commodity, during this historical phase of this study, 1963–1973,
therefore, begin from 1971 and were as captured in figure 7 below.

Figure 7. Cost of operational rural water schemes by province, 1971–1973 (K£)

1973
Year

1972

Western
R.Valley
Nyanza
1971 N. Eastern
Eastern
Coast
Central

0 50000 100000 150000 200000 250000

Amount (K£)
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Economic Surveys 1971–1973.

As depicted in figure 7 above, the GoK‘s effort towards provision of rural

water supply during the historical phase 1963–1973 was acutely lopsided,
especially in favour of Eastern, Central and Coast Provinces. As of 1973, the
percentage proportions of government expenditure towards this cause were as

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follows: Eastern (31); Central (23); Coast (21); Western (13); Rift Valley (six);
North Eastern (four); and, lastly, Nyanza (two). Nyanza Province got the least
amount of government funding with regard to provision of rural water supplies
during this historical phase of this study; the Water Development Division did
not pay any heed to equality of access to opportunity. There is a very strong
possibility that opposition politics played an immense role in the dismal
allocations to Nyanza Province, where the Luo reside. The subsequent
historical phase of this study, 1973–1983, is examined in detail, next.

1973–1983: The Era of the Exposure of the Uncertainties of Capitalism in Kenya

The period 1973–1983 was a very uncertain one for Kenya, owing to
protracted periods of drought, its overdependence on coffee and tea for foreign
exchange and the volatility of the prices of its most vital import, oil, in the
world market. During this historical phase, which was also characterized by a
precarious balance of payments position, the country began to restructure its
economy in a bid to lessen its reliance on imports. It is also during this
historical phase that Moi ascended to the leadership of the country, following
the demise of Jomo Kenyatta. Table 2 and figure 8, below, depict the
performance of Kenya‘s economy, in terms of GDP growth, during the period
1973–1983.

Table 2. Kenya’s Economic Performance, 1973–1983

YEAR 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
GDP GROWTH (%) 6.5 3.6 1.0 5.0 7.3 5.7 3.1 2.4 4.5 3.3 3.9
Source: Republic of Kenya economic surveys, 1973–1983.

Figure 8. Kenya’s GDP growth rate, 1973–1983

8

6
GDP growth (%)

0
1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984

Year
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya economic surveys, 1973–1983

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The ups and downs experienced by developing economies, owing partly to

external circumstances, are clearly discernable from table 2 and figure 8 above.
This particular decade was relatively poor, in terms of economic performance,
in comparison to the preceding historical phase. The decade‘s average growth
rate was lower at slightly above four percent. The highest GDP growth rate was
recorded in 1977 when coffee prices in the world market skyrocketed. All the
borrowing the GoK engaged in during the preceding historical phase of this
study did not translate to the envisaged economic growth. An analysis of the
outcomes of public investment in this particular historical phase focusing on
the four socioeconomic indicators—education, health, housing, and water
supplies—follows.

Education Outcomes, 1973–1983

The outcome of the GoK investment in primary education during the
historical phase 1973–1983 was as shown in figure 9 below.

Figure 9. Primary school enrolment by province, 1973–1983

1000000
Central
Coast
Eastern
Nairobi
800000 N. Eastern
Nyanza
R.Valley
Number of pupils enrolled

Western

600000

400000

200000

0
1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984

Year
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya statistical abstracts 1973–1983

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Several noteworthy trends emerge from the 1973–1983 outcome: first,

towards the twilight years of Jomo Kenyatta, enrolment figures in Nyanza and
Western Provinces took a dip; secondly, after Moi ascended to power, from
1978, there was a remarkable increase in enrolment numbers at primary school
level across Kenya‘s eight provinces; third, Rift Valley Province, which
became the new turf of the president, Moi, rose dramatically from position four
to take the lead, country-wide, in terms of primary school enrolment in Kenya;
fourth, Central Province, Kenyatta‘s backyard, which was at the helm in 1973,
stood at position four in 1983, despite also witnessing a steady increase in
enrolment numbers. From these findings, the following conclusions can be
drawn: first, in comparison to his successor, Moi, Kenyatta was more
unfavourably disposed towards the Luo; second, there is certainly a link
between state control and access to education at primary level; third, the
Kenyatta Administration policies had favoured the Kikuyu to the point where
the advantage they yielded from control of state power vis-à-vis primary
education, had reached an optimum point—this explains their dwindling
dominance in primary school enrolment despite continual steady growth in
Central Province; and, fourthly, Moi made sure, within the first five years of
his tenure, that equality of access to the opportunity of primary education
translated into equality of participation in primary education for other Kenyans
not of Kikuyu descent. The enrolment figures at the secondary school level
over the same period were as depicted in figure 10 below.

Figure 10. Secondary school enrolment by province, 1973–1983

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Central
120000 Coast
Eastern
Nairobi
N. Eastern
100000 Nyanza
R.Valley
Number of pupils enrolled

Western
80000

60000

40000

20000

0
1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984

Year
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya statistical abstracts 1973–1983
Throughout the historical phase 1973–1983, Kenyatta‘s home area, Central
Province, recorded the highest enrolment numbers at secondary school level.
This situation prevailed even after the demise of Kenya‘s founding father.
Apparently, it would take a relatively longer period of time for Moi to beget a
semblance of equality of participation in the opportunity of secondary
education for non-Kikuyu Kenyans, compared to primary education. By the
end of the historical phase 1973–1983, Nyanza stood second in enrolment at
the secondary education level; it was followed by Eastern, Rift Valley,
Western, Nairobi, Coast and North Eastern in that order. Notably, whilst
Nairobi stood at position two in the previous historical phase of this study, it
was ranked sixth by the end of 1983. This means that during the historical
phase 1973–1983, parents all over Kenya had realized the importance of
secondary education as a precondition for advancement in life and were
making greater efforts towards securing it for their children. Nairobi‘s
stagnation and dwindling fortunes can also be explained by the fact that the
city lacks the boarding school facilities that most parents desire at this level of
education. The health provision outcomes for historical phase 1973–1983 are
examined next.

Health Provision Outcomes, 1973–1983

Figure 11. Attendance at family planning clinics by province, 1973–1983

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Central Coast Eastern Nairobi

N. Eastern Nyanza R.Valley Western
160000

140000

120000
Number of attendants

100000

80000

60000

40000

20000

1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984

Year
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya statistical abstracts 1973–1983.
The outcome of family planning clinic attendances, depicted in figure 11
above, shows a great lack of adherence to the principle of equality of access to
opportunity; there are huge disparities in favour of Nairobi and Central
Provinces as opposed to the rest of Kenya. Nairobi‘s prominence as the
commercial and industrial capital undoubtedly explains its appearance at the
top of almost every socioeconomic outcome. If Nairobi is put aside, and North
Eastern ignored (owing in part to religious reasons for shunning the practice),
the two protagonists in the Kenyan story—Kikuyus (Central) and Luos
(Nyanza) appear at the two extreme ends of the outcome of healthcare
provision with regard to family planning services. Central‘s prominence in this
statistic may well mean that family planning services were readily available to
the Kikuyu; on the other hand, Nyanza‘s position suggests that access to these
services during this historical phase was difficult for the province‘s inhabitants
due to ―half-hearted‖ commitment by the responsible government department.
Again, it would seem, regions that oppose the state are considered last when it
comes to the provision of services, whilst those that support it come first. GoK
provision of hospital beds and cots, by province, during the period 1973–1983,
is as depicted in figure 12 below.

Figure 12. Hospital beds and cots by province, 1973–1983

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6000
Central Coast Eastern Nairobi
N. Eastern Nyanza R.Valley Western

5000
Number of beds and cots

4000

3000

2000

1000

0
1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984

Year
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1973–1983
Although Nairobi, Rift Valley and Central, in that order, dominated the
scene in terms of the number of beds and cots per province as of 1983, the
greatest growth in capacity during this historical phase of this study was
exhibited by Nyanza. This could be taken to mean that, at least in terms of
providing hospital bed capacity to its citizens, the GoK paid no heed to the
political inclination of Kenyans, generally, and to that of the Luo, in particular.
Housing provision outcomes are examined next.

Housing Provision Outcomes, 1973–1983

NHC figures for houses completed, by province, from 1973 to 1983 were
as captured in figure 13 below.

Figure 13. No. of houses completed by NHC by province, 1973–1983

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3500
Central
Coast
3000 Eastern
Nairobi
N. Eastern
2500 Nyanza
R.Valley
Number of house units

Western
2000

1500

1000

500

1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984

Year
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya statistical abstracts 1973–1983

Of the total of 20,710 units constructed to provide affordable housing to

low-income earners, Nairobi got a significant percentage allocation of 45; it
was followed by Rift Valley (19), Western (13), Coast (eight), Central (five),
Nyanza (four), Eastern (three), and North Eastern (0.2), respectively. Although
equality of access to the opportunity of affordable housing was gravely lacking,
it does not seem like politics had anything to do with the apportionment of
limited government resources towards the provision of this essential social
good—houses appear to have been provided in accordance with relevance and
need. Indeed, Nairobi is the greatest employer of Kenyans who would fall
under the targeted category of low-income-earning citizens. A look at water
supply outcomes, during historical phase 1973–1983, follows next.

Water Supply Outcomes, 1973–1983

GoK expenditure on rural water schemes, by province, progressed as
depicted in figure 14, below, during the historical phase 1973–1983.

Figure 14. Cost of operational rural water schemes by province, 1973–1983 (K£)

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10000000
Central
Coast
Eastern
8000000 N. Eastern
Nyanza
R.Valley
Western
6000000
Amount (K£)

4000000

2000000

1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984

Year
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya economic surveys 1973–1983.

Figure 14, above, shows great disparities and lack of equity in the
allocation of funding for rural water supply during phase 1973–1983. Central
Province, Jomo Kenyatta‘s turf, consistently received steady funding, whilst
the investments in Rift Valley, Coast and North Eastern virtually stagnated
throughout this historical phase. Perhaps a calmative pointer to the ardent Luo
activist, it is noteworthy that the outcomes of rural water supply during the
second decade of Kenya‘s independence show an overwhelming percentage
increase in the GoK investment in Nyanza Province. Indeed, the greatest
beneficiary, in terms of growth, was Nyanza: it is safe to say that during the
period 1973–1983, when the Water Department made amends for what seemed
to be outright discrimination of the Luo in the provision of rural water supply
during the first phase of this chapter, 1963–1973. The third historical phase of
this study, 1983–1993, follows next.

1983–1993: The Era of Export-oriented Industrialization and Rationalization

of Expenditure in Kenya

Owing to the volatility inherent in the global capitalist system witnessed in

the preceding historical phase of this study—that featured seasons of boom
with inflation succeeded by stabilization and recession—Kenya, during the
period 1983–1993, adopted more fundamental structural changes geared
towards steadying its economy and positioning it for the desired domestically-
driven growth. The objective was to gain control of its destiny by shifting focus
from production for import substitution to production for export. Accordingly,

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besides loosening the protection accorded to producers, providing credit

facilities to exporters, and adjusting its currency‘s exchange rate, the GoK
established Export Processing Zones (EPZs). These measures were supposed to
loosen dependence on imports to create more room for the repayment of both
domestic and external debts. Noteworthy, as a complementary measure to its
export-oriented industrialization programme, the GoK, during the period 1983–
1993, embarked on a drive to rationalize its expenditure in order to improve
productivity and renew economic growth. Table 3 and figure 15, below, depict
Kenya‘s economic performance from 1983 to 1993.

Table 3. Kenya’s economic performance, 1983–1993

YEAR 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
GDP GROWTH (%) 3.9 0.9 4.1 5.7 4.8 5.2 5.0 4.5 2.2 0.4 0.1
Source: Republic of Kenya economic surveys, 1983–1993.

Figure 15. Kenya’s GDP growth rates, 1983–1993

6

4
GDP growth (%)

1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994

Year
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya economic surveys, 1983–1993.

Although 1984 recorded a very poor performance, owing largely to a

dismal, drought-related agricultural output, Kenya‘s strategy appears to have
been working from 1985 to 1990, before it was suddenly brought to a halt by
global events, beyond its control, such as the disintegration of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and the Gulf War I, which conspired to
ripen and arrange the stage for the ushering in of neoliberalism. An
examination of the outcome of Moi‘s efforts, with regard to education, health,
housing, and rural water supplies, during the period 1983–1993, follows next.

Education Outcomes, 1983–1993

The outcome of public investment by the GoK with regard to primary
school enrolment during period 1983–1993 is captured in figure 16 below,
which also compares the situation in 1983 with that in 1993.

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Figure 16. Primary school enrolment by province, 1983–1993

Central Coast Eastern Nairobi
N. Eastern Nyanza R.Valley Western

1200000

1000000
Number of pupils enrolled

800000

600000

400000

200000

0
1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994

Year
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya statistical abstracts 1983–1993

As of 1993, figure 16 above shows, Rift Valley, Nyanza (of which Luo
Nyanza is a large component), Eastern and Central Provinces led in terms of
primary school enrolment in that order. Regarding the rate of growth of
primary school enrolment, which is crucial for this study, North Eastern
Province led from the front, whilst Nairobi brought up the rear. Notably, the
remaining six provinces do not show any appreciable growth difference; this
suggests that there was stability and equity in terms of access to the
opportunity of primary education. In this regard, therefore, the Luo are not
justified to cry foul—at least not during this particular historical phase. The
provincial figures for secondary school enrolment, by province, during the
years 1983 and 1993 are given in figure 17, below.

Figure 17. Secondary school enrolment by province, 1983–1993

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Central Coast Eastern Nairobi

N. Eastern Nyanza R.Valley Western

140000

120000
Number of pupils enrolled

100000

80000

60000

40000

20000

0
1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994

Year
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya statistical abstracts 1983–1993

Overall, figure 17, above, shows that there was a minimal increase in
enrolments during the decade 1983–1993, indicating that, although the GoK‘s
efforts to provide its citizens with a better education were bearing fruit, the
introduction of neoliberalism was somehow taking its toll on the parents of
Kenya. Whilst there were enrolment increases in Coast, Eastern, Rift Valley
and Western, the other four provinces, Nairobi, North Eastern, Central and
Nyanza recorded declines. The biggest enrolment gain was recorded in Rift
Valley (state power) whilst the largest drop was recorded in Nairobi (lack of
adequate boarding schools prompting many to study upcountry in other
provinces). The greatest transition rate from primary to secondary school was
recorded in Central Province (bastion of capitalism from colonial times) whilst
the least was in North Eastern (shunned by colonial administrators and
successive Kenyan Governments owing partly to its unfavourable climate and
soils) underlining Oloo‘s (2004) argument that capitalism, by its very nature,
has led to unequal development in Kenya. Noteworthy is the fact that the
immense advantage held by Central Province in the previous historical phases

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of this study—1963 to 1973 and 1973 to 1983—was greatly eroded during

Moi‘s first fifteen years in power. In this sense, there was greater equity, in
terms of participation in the opportunity of secondary education, during the
historical phase 1983–1993. Health Provision outcomes during this particular
historical phase are discussed next.

Health Provision Outcomes, 1983–1993

Figure 18. Attendance at family planning clinics by province, 1983–1987

1987

1986
Year

1985

Western
1984 R.Valley
Nyanza
N. Eastern
Nairobi
Eastern
1983
Coast
Central

0 200000 400000 600000

Number of attendants
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya statistical abstracts 1983–1987.

The health provision outcomes, in terms of family planning services,

during this historical phase of this study, were as depicted in figure 18, below.
The GoK provides statistics on this socioeconomic indicator only to the year
1987; accordingly, this marks the end of the analysis of family planning as a
mechanism of gauging health provision outcomes in this study.
Nevertheless, of the total number of first time visits and revisits recorded
(3,395,756) during the period 1983–1987, Central Province was dominant
percentagewise at 25.5, followed closely by Rift Valley at 24.0; Nairobi (18.1),
Eastern (13.8), Nyanza (6.8), Western (6.0), Coast (5.7) and North Eastern
(0.1), followed in that order. Evidently, there was no adherence to equality of
access to this important GoK provision—the turfs of communities that have
held power in Kenya benefited the most. The statistical progression of hospital

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beds and cots by province, during this historical phase of the study, was as
given in figure 19 below.

Figure 19. Hospital beds and cots by province, 1983–1993

8000
Central Coast Eastern Nairobi
N. Eastern Nyanza R.Valley Western
7000

6000
Number of beds and cots

5000

4000

3000

2000

1000

0
1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994
Year
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya statistical abstracts 1983–1993.

The country recorded a total growth of 30.2 percent in its number of beds
and cots from 1983 to 1993, indicating notable progress on the part of the GoK
in its efforts towards providing healthcare services to its citizens. Moi‘s health
policies, it would seem, were more favourable towards the historically
marginalized North Eastern Province, where the greatest growth rate (240.2
percent) in the number of hospital beds and cots was recorded; North Eastern
was followed by Western (74.0), Rift Valley (45.6), Eastern (24.9), Coast
(19.1), Central (17) and Nyanza (13.6), respectively. Nyanza‘s poor
performance, in this regard, could partly be explained by the fact that this
historical phase succeeded the botched coup attempt of 1982, which was
largely a Luo affair. It is possible that the GoK became reluctant to expand
socioeconomic services to the Luo in the aftermath of that significant event. A
look at housing provision outcomes during this historical phase, 1983–1993, is
next.

Housing Provision Outcomes, 1983–1993

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The GoK housing provision outcomes for the period 1983–1993 were as
depicted in figure 20 below.

Figure 20. No. of houses completed by NHC by province, 1983–1993

Central
Coast
2000 Eastern
Nairobi
N. Eastern
Nyanza
R.Valley
Western
1500
Number of house units

1000

500

0
1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994
Year
Sources: Constructed from Republic of Kenya statistical abstracts 1983–1993.

Throughout the period 1983–1993, a total of 8,575 housing units were

constructed by the NHC. Nyanza Province was the greatest beneficiary, for it
got 26.4 percent of this provision. The rest of this housing provision—
percentagewise—was apportioned as follows: Nairobi (21.1); Rift Valley
(19.6); Central (11.7); Eastern (8.5); Western (7.3); Coast (three); and North
Eastern (2.5). If we assume that the NHC housing units apportioned for Nyanza
Province were constructed in Luo Nyanza, then political inclination did not
play a role in determining access to low-cost housing provision during this
historical phase of the study. Water supply outcomes for period 1983–1993 are
examined next.

Water Supply Outcomes, 1983–1993

From 1985, the GoK stopped issuing statistics on numerical and cost
distribution of rural water supply schemes, which have been very crucial thus

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far in the comparative analysis of the outcome of public investments, with

regard to water, opting instead for an amalgamated form of reporting
expenditures and inputs under the title ―Development expenditure on water
supplies and related services.‖ In view of that fact, no comparative analysis
shall be made of the outcomes of water provision for the period 1983–1993;
suffice it to say that ―[b]etween 1990/91 and 1994/95, the Ministry [of Water
Development] had implemented and/or rehabilitated 1,579 water projects,
11,389 boreholes, 916 dams and 448 pans.‖2 The succeeding historical phase of
this study, 1993–2003, is examined next.

1993–2003: The Era of Neoliberalism in Kenya

During the period 1993–2003, Kenya would be forced to yield to calls for
privatization by both bilateral and multilateral donors and replace its homespun
export-oriented industrialization blueprint with the complete liberalization of
its economy. The fiscal discipline imposed upon Kenya during this particular
phase would cause tremendous hurt and pain in the lives of many ordinary
Kenyans for it was accompanied by reforms in the civil service, through which
many civil servants were retrenched. Table 4 and figure 21, below, depict
Kenya‘s economic performance from 1993 to 2003.

Table 4. Kenya’s economic performance, 1993–2003

199 199 199 199 199 199 199 200 200 200 200
YEAR 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3
GDP GROWTH
(%) 0.1 3.0 4.9 4.6 2.3 1.8 1.4 0.3 1.2 1.1 1.8
Source: Republic of Kenya Economic Surveys, 1993–2003.

2
Republic of Kenya. Economic Survey 1995 (Nairobi: Central Bureau of Statistics, Office of
the Vice-President and Ministry of Planning and National Development, 1995), 124.

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Figure 21. Kenya’s GDP growth rates, 1993–2003

4
GDP growth (%)

1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004

Year
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya economic surveys, 1993–2003.

Overall, the figures depicted in table 4 and figure 21, above, show no
superior performance when compared to those of the preceding historical
phases examined in this chapter; in fact, the figures are relatively dismal.
Notably, the economy seemingly takes a hit during election time—financial
years 1992–1993, 1997–1998 and 2002–2003—lending credence to the
thought that multiparty democracy is problematic for Africa. The outcomes of
GoK public investment, during this particular historical phase, are examined
next.

Education Outcomes, 1993–2003

Enrolment figures and patterns at the primary school level during the
period 1993–2003 were as depicted in figure 22 below.

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Figure 22. Primary school enrolment by province, 1993–2003

1800000 Central Coast Eastern Nairobi

N. Eastern Nyanza R.Valley Western

1600000

1400000
Number of pupils enrolled

1200000

1000000

800000

600000

400000

200000

0
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004

Year
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya statistical abstracts 1993–2003.

As shown in figure 22, above, the dominance of Moi‘s Rift Valley

Province continued in earnest, reinforcing the supposition in the theoretical
framework that political power is a vehicle to prosperity in Africa. By the time
Moi was abdicating power at the end of 2002, Central Province, which is home
to the Kikuyu who, alongside the Luo, were staunch advocates of return to
multiparty democracy in 1991, had been overtaken by Western Province and
stood at position five, overall, in terms of enrolment. This indicates, as
surmised in the theoretical framework, that there is a strong link between
opposition politics and dwindling socioeconomic fortunes in Africa. It should
be noted, however, that what appears to be inequality in terms of access to the
opportunity of primary education, such as the huge disparity between
enrolment figures in Rift Valley and North Eastern, has to do with
demographics; whilst the former is Kenya‘s most populous province, for
instance, the latter is the country‘s least populated region. Enrolment levels at
secondary school level, during period 1993–2003 were as shown in figure 23
below.

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Figure 23. Secondary school enrolment by province, 1993–2003

200000 Central
Coast
180000
Eastern
Nairobi
N. Eastern
160000
Nyanza
R.Valley
Number of pupils enrolled

140000 Western

120000

100000

80000

60000

40000

20000

0
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004

Year
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya statistical abstracts 1993–2003.

There was a steady rise in enrolment figures over the decade for all
provinces except Nairobi, which, as indicated earlier in this article, is often
unsuitable for seekers of boarding schools at this level for it largely lacks such
facilities. This outcome indicates that there was equality in terms of access to
the opportunity of secondary education during this historical phase of this
study. It is also noteworthy that by the time Moi was preparing to hand over
power to Kibaki, his Kikuyu successor from Central, the enormous advantage
that the new president‘s province had wielded since independence over the rest
of Kenya in terms of secondary school enrolment had been substantially
eroded. In fact, there was not much difference between Rift Valley, Central,
Eastern and Nyanza—the four leading provinces—as Kibaki took over the
reins of power in 2003. Apparently, Moi‘s policies of instituting special
programmes, especially bursaries for fees in secondary schools for children of
poor parents, had succeeded in establishing and ensuring equity. Health
provision outcomes are discussed next.

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Health Provision Outcomes, 1993–2003

Figure 24. Hospital beds and cots by province, 1993–2003
14000
Central
Coast
Eastern
12000 Nairobi
N. Eastern
Nyanza
10000 R.Valley
Number of beds and cots

Western

8000

6000

4000

2000

1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004

Year
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya statistical abstracts 1993–2003.

Figure 24 above shows that there was an exponential increase in the

number of hospital beds and cots in Nyanza Province, where the greatest
growth over the period 1993–2003 was witnessed. Moi‘s Rift Valley also
experienced impressive growth rates, albeit to a lesser extent. Modest growth
was witnessed in all the other provinces, an indication that the funding that Moi
provided for the enhancement of healthcare service at both local and district
levels was meeting its objective in a non-partisan manner. As of 2003, Rift
Valley held a narrow edge over Nyanza in terms of this public provision;
Central, Nairobi, Eastern, Western, Coast and North Eastern followed in that
order. Housing provision outcomes are discussed next.

Housing Provision Outcomes, 1993–2003

The NHC investment in the provision of affordable housing for Kenyans
during the period 1993–2003 was as captured in figure 25 below.

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Figure 25. No. of houses completed by NHC by province, 1993–2003

Central
1000 Coast
Eastern
Nairobi
N. Eastern
800 Nyanza
R.Valley
Number of house units

Western

600

400

200

0
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Year
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya statistical abstracts 1993–2003.

A paltry 1,643 housing units were developed by the state corporation over
a period of ten years, indicating that, in addition to the scarce resources
available for this venture, neoliberalism had annihilated the GoK‘s aspiration
to improve its effort in this regard, for external forces had imposed upon Kenya
the ideology of profit-oriented real estate development. Eastern, North Eastern
and Nyanza got no allocations whatsoever during this particular historical
phase of the study: the greatest beneficiary was Nairobi (80 percent of the total
housing units provided), followed by Central (8.1), Coast (6.8), Western (3.7)
and Rift Valley (1.5). When all factors are considered, however, it is difficult
to find evidence of corruption on the basis of political inclination. Water
supply outcomes are examined next.

Water Supply Outcomes, 1993–2003

As this particular historical phase of the study came to an end, ―about 75.0
per cent of the urban population and nearly 50.0 per cent of rural population

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had access to safe drinking water.‖3 During the period 1993–2003, in keeping
with the tenets of neoliberalism, the GoK began to embrace the
commercialization of the delivery of essential services such as clean drinking
water. As a result, individuals and companies started to dominate the water
sector in the urban areas, as the GoK‘s policy regarding this public provision in
rural areas ―shift[ed] towards low cost community based water projects that
w[ould] in future be initiated and managed by local communities.‖4
Accordingly, the GoK, in collaboration with other stakeholders, turned its
water provision efforts to the establishment and maintenance of water
purification points (WPPs) and drilling of boreholes across the country. Figure
26, below, gives the provincial breakdown of borehole provisions from 1996 to
2003.

Figure 26. Number of boreholes drilled in rural areas by province, 1996–2003

100
Central
Coast
Eastern
N. Eastern
Nyanza
R.Valley
Western
No. of boreholes drilled

50

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Year
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1996–2003.

3
Republic of Kenya. Economic Survey 2004 (Nairobi: Central Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of
Planning and National Development, 2004), 138.
4
Republic of Kenya. Economic Survey 1997. (Nairobi: Central Bureau of Statistics, Office of
the Vice-President and Ministry of Planning and National Development, 1997), 138.

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Of the combined total of 1,338 boreholes provided by the GoK from 1996
to 2003, the apportionment, in terms of percentages, from the greatest
beneficiary to the least, was as follows: Rift Valley (32.2); Eastern (23);
Central (14.9); Nyanza (14.5); Coast (8.2); North Eastern (5.3); and, Western
(1.9). Besides being the largest in terms of area, the former Rift Valley was the
most populous province in Kenya; it is, therefore, injudicious to reflexively
conclude that it was favoured. On the other hand, North Eastern, which is by
far the driest area of Kenya, was definitely in need of more boreholes. It is not
clear what criterion the GoK and its partners employed in according this
provision to rural Kenyans. However, one thing is indisputable: neoliberalism
hurt the aspirations of the common citizen in Kenya insofar as the right of
access to clean drinking water was concerned, by shifting the responsibility
from the GoK to the largely uncontrolled and unaccountable private sector. The
conclusion of this article, which comprises a general summary of the findings,
on public provision in relation to state power and opposition politics, and vis-à-
vis the theoretical framework outlined above, follows next.

Summary of Findings and Conclusions

Pertaining to the outcomes of the GoK‘s investment in education from

1963–2003, the findings of this study strongly support the theoretical
proposition that political power is a vehicle to socioeconomic prosperity in
Africa, since whoever controls the state decides how scarce resources will be
allocated. This study finds that before the introduction of free primary
education by Kibaki in 2003, there were very strong links between state control
and access to education at both the primary and secondary levels of education
in Kenya. From 1963–1973, when Jomo Kenyatta was in power, his home
province, Central, enjoyed a healthy lead over the rest of Kenya in primary
school enrolment. Over the same period, Central Province‘s participation in the
opportunity of secondary school education was also overwhelmingly dominant
over the rest of Kenya. In the decade that Moi took over the reins of power,
1973–1983, his home province, Rift Valley, rose, appreciably, to top the
enrolment rankings. Rift Valley‘s dominance in primary school enrolment
would continue consistently to 2003 and coincided with dwindling fortunes in
Central, which no longer wielded state power. The fortunes of Rift Valley
Province, vis-à-vis secondary education, also improved significantly when Moi
rose to power; during the period 1973–2003, the province would come to
achieve parity with Central in this sphere and would finally surpass the latter in
2003. Opposition politics does not appear to have played a significant role in
determining education outcomes with regard to the Luo, for Nyanza was
consistently in the top half in both categories during the period under study.
With regard to the correlation between healthcare provision, state power
and opposition politics, the findings of this study regarding the family planning
services component of healthcare are in congruence with the following two
propositions, which are outlined in the theoretical framework: first, that

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political power is a vehicle to socioeconomic prosperity in Africa; second, that

the ethnic groups that control state power, owing to the politicization of
ethnicity in Africa, do not allocate the dominated groups an equitable share of
the national resources. During the historical phase 1963–1973, this study
shows, there was a strong link between state control and access to family
planning services; President Jomo Kenyatta‘s homeland, Central, was the
greatest beneficiary of this state provision if Nairobi is not considered. During
the same period, Nyanza, home to the Luo ―dissenters,‖ performed dismally,
appearing in the bottom two in consistent fashion. In the succeeding historical
phase of this study, 1973–1983, the two protagonists, Central (Kikuyu) and
Nyanza (Luo) appear at the two extreme ends of the outcome of this crucial
healthcare provision component, underlining the link between political
inclination and access to state healthcare services. The findings on the hospital
bed and cot component of healthcare provision largely support the Theory of
Uneven Development, which argues that capitalism leads to simultaneous
concentrations of wealth and capital, on the one hand, and poverty and
oppression on the other. With particular reference to Nairobi and North
Eastern, the period 1963–1973 was one in which the number of hospital beds
and cots in the two provinces showcased the fact that capitalism leads to
uneven development across regions at the nation-state level. Although,
generally, the study shows that there was no strong link between political
inclination and the provision of hospital beds and cots, the period 1983–1993 is
an exception: in what could be interpreted as a result of the botched coup
attempt of 1982, Nyanza witnessed the least growth in this category over the
decade, amongst all of Kenya‘s provinces, lending credence to the proposition
that opposition politics has hampered economic development in Luo Nyanza.
The story of the GoK‘s provision of affordable, decent housing for
Kenyans totally supports the Theory of Uneven Development, especially as
espoused by Mandel (1962, as cited in Bond 1999) who has argued that skewed
socioeconomic development associated with capitalism is partly the result of
prolificacy differences amongst animals and soils, and fortuitous happenings in
life and nature. It is about strategy, logic and suitability, and has nothing to do
with state-instigated political machinations and/or opposition politics. Nairobi
was absolutely dominant, as a recipient of this awfully scarce GoK provision,
not least because it is the nation‘s industrial and commercial centre. Logically,
a gigantic portion of the country‘s low income earners work in the city—these
are the ones to whom affordable housing is mostly targeted. There is no way in
which a province, like North Eastern, an unattractive region characterized by
unfavourable climate and soils, and mostly the abode of nomadic pastoralists,
would have been prioritized in the allocation of this GoK provision, amid the
reality of scarce state resources. Certainly, throughout the period 1963–2003,
political inclination and state power did not determine the allocation of this
state provision; apportionment of this woefully limited resource was heavily
dependent on relevance and strategy. If anything, Nyanza, an opposition
stronghold, was the greatest beneficiary during the historical phase 1983–93 of
this study. Noteworthy, after the forceful introduction of neoliberalism, the

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GoK seemingly lost its zeal and desire to provide this service: the magnitude of
this provision dwindled drastically from 8,575 housing units during 1983–1993 to
a paltry 1,673 in phase 1993–2003, Kenya‘s first decade under neoliberalism.
The findings of this research also suggest that there was a strong link
between politics and access to rural water supply funding, with reference to the
Luo, in historical phase 1963–1973. In the period after the Odinga-Kenyatta
fallout, Nyanza received the least amount of funding from the GoK‘s
Department of Water. This supports the proposition that ethnic groups that
control state power, in Africa, do not allocate the dominated groups—the
―rebellious‖ ones—an equitable share of the national largesse. From this
summary of findings, we can draw the conclusion that, even though there is
adequate evidence to support the hypothesis that ―disloyalty‖ and opposition to
the state in Kenya have translated to poor and inequitable access to public
goods and services for the Luo community during the period under study, this
situation appears not to be as profound or as dire as the sentiments raised by
members of the community in earlier studies. Certainly, members of Kenya‘s
Luo community, alongside others, should refuse to unquestioningly bow to
oppressive socioeconomic-political orders and continue pushing for more
reforms geared towards further devolution of state resources. However, whilst
they might not want to accede to Kuria‘s (2011) posture, which seemingly
defines a progressive community as one that ―suffers peacefully,‖ they will
remain susceptible to prejudiced labels such as those of ―poor leadership‖ and
―aimless whining‖ fronted by the analyst if they fail to embrace what Atieno-
Odhiambo (2002, 241) referred to as ―individual enterprise and personal
virtue‖ more profoundly.
So what other key take-away points can we derive from this study? First,
from the outcome point of view, marginalization in the provision of public
goods and services in Africa is not always factual; sometimes, it is an imagined
reality occasioned partly by lack of ethnic and regional balance in public
appointments. Accordingly, to avoid ―breed[ing] resentment and creat[ing]
conditions for an ultimate rejection of the state by the frustrated and politically
conscious masses,‖ (Ilorah 2009, 695) African governments should strive to
ensure inclusivity and representativeness in their composition. Second,
notwithstanding the politically-instigated ethnic violence that accompanies
elections in Africa, regime change, often a result of democracy, can indeed
lead to socioeconomic development; in the case of Kenya, it is evident that, in
comparison to Jomo Kenyatta, Moi‘s government adopted and implemented
more inclusive programmes and ideas whose positive effects were enjoyed by a
larger portion of the population including communities that were unfavourably
disposed before power changed hands. Third, poorly managed democratic
processes, especially elections, lead to erosions in economic gains. Resulting
conflict hampers economic activity and associated growth. African countries
should therefore strive to ensure that elections are fully compliant with the law
and are seen to be free, fair and credible by all concerned stakeholders,
especially their citizens.

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Acknowledgments

This work was supported by the National Research Foundation (NRF) of

South Africa under grant number 120684. Opinions expressed, and conclusions
arrived at, are those of the author and are not necessarily to be attributed to the
NRF.

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