China’s Double Game in Myanmar’s Rakhine State

Supporting the Arakan Army against Tatmadaw

Background

 The Arakan Army (AA) is being supported by China as a matter of policy in line with
its support to the other groups e.g. UWSA, KIA etc.

 The nature of support to the AA comprises finances, uniforms, weapons,

ammunition and other war like stores including shoulder fired SAMs (FN - 6).

 The supply of weapons and ammunition continues till this day and so does the
supply of money. AA has apparently also received money to ensure they do not stray
towards the Kyuakphyru Deep Sea Port.

 The supply of weapons comes from the NORINCO factories in Yunnan. All weapons
reaching AA from NORINCO may not have been sourced for delivery to AA, i.e. the
NORINCO has a reputation of being managed by ‘rogue’ PLA generals who are purely
commercial in outlook without any concern for misuse of the weapons. Thus we
have a situation where PLA leadership in some cases may not aware or not
concerned that weapons are going into the hands of the Tatmadaw adversaries.

 China is a major supplier of arms to the well equipped UWSA. The Chinese
government seeks to maintain centralized control of the arms to the ethnic armed
groups by sending weapons only to UWSA. In an upgrade to the Wa’s military
capability, China reportedly shipped tank destroyers and several helicopters armed
with air-to-air missiles to the Wa indirectly via Laos in 2013. In turn, the UWSA,
which has its own arms factories, supplies Chinese-style arms to other members of
the FPNCC, including the Northern Alliance.i

 Further raw materials for drug manufacturing are sourced from China via the UWSA
controlled areas in Shan State. Reports mention that AA has managed to ensure a
secure route for drug-smuggling by exploiting the corruption and inefficiency of
Myanmar’s law enforcement agencies. The AA uses heavy weapons, IEDs and
landmines, with sources confirming that the group is currently receiving weapons
from China through the UWSA.ii

 This strategy of supporting the AA has enabled the Chinese to expand its area of
influence towards Western Myanmar i.e. the India Myanmar border.
 However, now it has come to haunt the Chinese as the AA seem to have developed a
mind and a strategy of their own, which may end up impacting the Kyaukphyru Deep
Sea Port project.

 This is because while the AA has been incubated by the Chinese using the KIA as an
incubator, the fact is that the political cause of the AA remains valid and infact has
grown stronger over the years. The Rakhine sentiment is strong, valid…and if you
see the actions of the Myanmar Government in the region, prima facie it is justified.

Recent Major Seizuresiii

 In November 2018 in Namhsan township a weapons cache included a Chinese FN-6
surface-to-air missile, an ominous development which Min Aung Hlaing reportedly
raised in a meeting in early December with China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi.

 The Tatmadaw’s public relations wing ensured that the “discovery” of a rebel cache
of Chinese munitions made on January 15 in Hsenwi township in northern Shan
state received wide media publicity. Images released by the Tatmadaw did not fail to
highlight production batch markings of “2018” stamped on the 107mm surface-to-
surface rockets, indicating an arms pipeline that has been recently active and does
not rely on legacy stocks.

 In Xi’s China, “other ways” almost certainly do not include purportedly out-of-
control corruption among “rogue generals” of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
stationed in Yunnan province bordering northern Myanmar.

 Contrary to years of speculation and rumor in Myanmar and beyond, today’s PLA is
a modern and disciplined force that does not allow surface-to-air missiles, wheeled
artillery and container loads of modern small arms to be slipped out of its arsenals
and across international borders in exchange for brown envelopes.

 In the real world, the primary, if not sole, conduit for arms reaching northern ethnic
armed organizations in Myanmar runs through the Special Division administered by
the United Wa State Army (UWSA), a powerful, well-organized ethnic force in a long-
standing ceasefire with the Tatmadaw and with historic ties to Beijing.

Modus Operandi

 Over the last decade, the UWSA has reportedly sold a variety of munitions to allies of
the so-called Northern Alliance comprised of the Myanmar National Democratic
Alliance Army (MNDAA), the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), the Arakan
Army (AA) and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA).
 In recent months, Asian intelligence officials and well-placed ethnic sources have
confirmed to Asia Times that much of the Chinese weaponry purchased by the
UWSA since 2011 has been channeled through neighboring Laos.

 Official end-user certificates (EUCs) issued to cover exports by state-run

manufacturers such as North China Industries Group Corporation (NORINCO) and
China National Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation (responsible for FN-
6 foreign sales) have listed the Lao Defense Ministry as the recipient, the same
sources say.

 In Laos, “grey zone” trading takes over: the munitions are understood to be trucked
through the northwest of the country, across the Mekong River to the port of Sop
Lui, and into Wa-controlled territory via Special Region 4 run by the National
Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), or Mong La group, an UWSA neighbor and ally
also observing a ceasefire with the Myanmar military.

 Whether the role of the Lao and Mong La authorities is compensated in cash or kind
is, like much else in the illicit trade, opaque.

 To the extent that the Lao connection has emerged as the major conduit in providing
Beijing plausible deniability for arms sales to non-state actors in Myanmar, it
appears unlikely that Chinese weaponry is still crossing the China-Myanmar border
directly, as in the days of Beijing’s support for the defunct Communist Party of
Burma and through into the 2000’s.

 The NSCN-IM, an Indian insurgent group, had also approached TCL, and paid USD
1,00,000 in 2007. The money was paid through a Thai arms dealer Wuthikorn
Naruenartwanich alias Willy. The deal did not materialise due to the ‘disturbed
situation’ in Bangladesh where the consignment was meant to be delivered. The
National Investigation Agency has electronic receipt of the payment. A definite
money trail exists as payment to the Chinese firm was made through normal
banking channels via a leading private bank's branch in an African country. NSCN (I-
M), according to the MHA, has parked its funds in bank accounts across several
African nations. What is clear is the Chinese link in weapons supply to rebels in
Northeast India.

Recent Supply of Arms to AA (Feb ~ Mar 2020)

 TCL, a NORINCO front owned by a retired Maj Gen Xin Ling of PLA, registered in
Macao, loaded the consignment on a fishing trawler at Heibei, a small shipping port
in South China in the early part of February.
 A TCL manager Lin, who is a Thai national based in Hongkong, who also goes by the
name of Yuthna, was instrumental in loading the cargo on the trawler. This trawler
moved the cargo to Ranong port in Thailand where it was transhipped onto other a
Thai vessel under the arrangements of another retired Maj Gen Samreet of the
Thailand Armed Forces.

 After the consignment landed at Monakhali beach in Bangladesh, it was carried into
the Sandak (Mro) base near Thanchi, in small batches on the Thanchi-Naikhong-
Farua-Parva-Paletwa route.

 It is not clear whether the AA has paid TCL or whether the Chinese intelligence
would have organised covert payment.

 The AA is said to have strong links with China since its formation in Kachin in 2009.
Its spokesman Khaine Tukkha recently said “China recognises us while India does
not.” Which explains why AA does not disturb the Chinese deep sea port at
Kyaukphyu but kidnaps and badgers Indian construction workers involved in the
Kaladan project.

A Rationale for Status Quo

 A Chinese arms cut-off would arguably only encourage the Tatmadaw to ramp up its
campaign of bludgeoning minorities into submission, thereby inviting further
instability, conflict and refugee flows along Myanmar’s northern borders with China.

 And that would effectively put on hold indefinitely Beijing’s strategic plans for
advancing China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) ambitions that seek to give
China a strategic opening on to the Bay of Bengal.

 China’s willingness to supply MANPADS to the UWSA, East Asia’s largest military
non-state actor, reflects two different facets of the situation in northeast Myanmar.
First has been the “special relationship” the Wa have enjoyed with China’s military
since the days when they formed the bulk of the forces of the Communist Party of
Burma (CPB), which Beijing supported throughout the 1970s and for much of the
1980s. The second has been a related but more recent need to ensure the Wa
establish an unambiguous level of deterrence in the face of Tatmadaw ambitions to
integrate recalcitrant cease-fire groups.iv

{I am including three quotes from various articles I have written, if appropriate, you
can quote from them}
Quote 1

In an unprecedented development, Xi Jinping was in effect chastised by the

Myanmar Armed Forces Commander during his maiden visit to Myanmar as the
President, on 17 – 18 January 2020, for providing arms and ammunition and MANPADS
to EAOs in Myanmar:-

… Myanmar’s confidently candid approach to expose the Chinese policy of playing

both sides and arming the Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) operating in
Myanmar, has put the Chinese on the back foot. Recent major arms recoveries by
Myanmar including recovery of Chinese manufactured FN-6 shoulder fired anti-
aircraft missiles has seen a flurry of nationalist outrage, underscoring the shadowy
role of China.v In the meeting with Myanmar Defence Services Commander in Chief,
Chinese President Xi Jinping has had to deny that his country was supplying arms to
EAOs in Myanmar, as per a press release by Tatmadaw (Defence Services) as quoted
by Mizzima Media. President Xi has been quoted saying, “We categorically deny
allegations of supplying arms to ethnic armed organizations in Myanmar but they
can acquire these arms by other means, so that we will look into this issue
thoroughly to resolve it.”

Quote 2

In the brouhaha over the bans, a statement by the Arakan Army

(AA) on 18 July 2019, went largely unnoticed. In this the AA stated that
they welcomed foreign investors including the Chinese investments in the
Rakhine region and would support all those who wanted to work for
mutually beneficial multisectoral projects in the regionvi. The media
savvy AA is likely to be playing the China vs India hand in the region as it
struggles to consolidate its gains and take the discourse towards a
political fructification of its Arakan Dream 2020. The AA has also
disclosed that it does not intend to participate in peace talks so long as
the open lawsuitsvii against its leaders exist in Myanmar. The statements
of the AA have to be seen in the context that this group, amongst the
ethnic Myanmar groups, is one that directly affects Indian interests in
Myanmar. The progress of the Kaladan Multi Modal Transit Transport
Project is directly affected by the belligerence of the AA and hence
neutralisation of this group is expected to be high on the India’s wish list.

Quote 3
…there is a distinct southward shift in extent of operations with
encounters being reported from close to Ann, the headquarters of the
Western Command, the regional command leading operations in
Rakhine. This has two implications; it threatens the headquarters and
also threatens Kyaukphyu and the associated Chinese economic
infrastructure, which has major economic, diplomatic and international
ramifications. This turns the wheel full circle, as the weapons supplied by
the Chinese to the ethnic armed groups in Myanmar are now coming to
bear on them.viii
i
https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2018-09/ssg-report-chinas-role-in-myanmars-internal-conflicts.pdf
ii
https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/icpvtr/arakan-army-myanmars-new-front-of-conflict/
iii
https://asiatimes.com/2020/01/chinas-loose-arms-still-fuel-myanmars-civil-wars/
iv
https://asiatimes.com/2019/11/chinas-mobile-missiles-on-the-loose-in-myanmar/
v
https://www.asiatimes.com/2019/11/article/chinas-mobile-missiles-on-the-loose-in-myanmar/
vi
Mizzima Myanmar News Report, http://www.mizzima.com/article/aaula-welcomes-chinese-investment-
rakhine (Accessed on 4 Aug 2019)
vii
News report in Irrawady.com https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/open-lawsuit-kept-aa-leaders-from-
govt-peace-talks.html (Accessed on 4 Aug 2019).
viii
https://www.eurasiareview.com/24032020-myanmars-rakhine-conflict-threatens-regional-peace-analysis/