THE PHILIPPINES DURING THE NEW COLD WAR:

BALANCING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND

NATIONAL SECURITY.
A Basis for Strategic Imperatives in Shaping National Security Policy
and Economic Resilience (2024).
The two countries have
disputes over the
sovereignty of some
islands and shoals in the
Spratly Islands.

These disputes are

linked to other disputes
in the South China Sea.

China conducts
grey-zone operations in
these waters.
 South China
Sea and
Geopolitics of
Islands
 Ancient Law of
Terra Incognita
A term used in cartography for
regions that have not been
mapped or documented. The
expression is believed to be first
In its ruling, the Arbitral Tribunal firmly rejected any People’s
Republic of China territorial or maritime claim to areas
determined by the Tribunal to be part of the Philippines'
exclusive economic zone and continental shelf.

As provided under the Convention, the 2016 arbitral decision

is final and legally binding on the PRC and the Philippines.
The Spratly Islands dispute is an ongoing territorial
dispute between China, Taiwan, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Vietnam and Brunei, concerning territorial
sovereignty over the Spratly Islands. This conflicting
territorial claim between these coastal parties is raising
tensions in Asia, so the settlement of this dispute is of
key importance for a peaceful atmosphere in the area.
The dispute is also significant in respect of being an
international geo-strategic, economic, political and legal
matter. After a 1988 armed conflict between
Vietnamese and Chinese forces, the claimants have
looked for approaches to solve the conflict peacefully
through different informal endeavors, but due to the
complexity of the dispute there are a number of barriers
to reaching a permanent settlement. This study puts
forward some potential approaches for resolving the
dispute, considering its complex nature, by evaluating
the six parties’ competing claims and analyzing the
legal soundness of their claims
Understanding
Duterte’s
Foreign Policy

RODRIGO ROA DUTERTE

President of the Philippines
2016 - 2022
 DUTERTE: Independent”,
Philippines Foreign Policy

Based on three principles:

1. To lessen the country’s dependence on

Duterte’s attempt to go beyond the Washington on particular issue areas,
political rhetoric: such as trade and commerce.

In 2016, he announced that the Philippines 2. To create a conducive political

would be separating from the US. environment in Manila’s geographical
periphery by stabilising relations with
Late in January 2020, he threatened to China and harnessing the latter’s
terminate the Visiting Forces Agreement growing material capabilities for the
(VFA) between the Philippines and the US, Philippines’ economic gains.
known as the pillar of the two countries’
Mutual Defence Treaty of 1951. 3. To explore new areas of strategic
cooperation with the Philippines’
non-traditional partners in Asia.
DUTERTE:
“Symbolizes Reinvigorated Bilateral”,
Zhao Jinhua

Remedy in the policy imbalance: improve ties with China. It had become the
Philippines’ largest trading partner, largest source of imports, and second largest
export market.

1. To add momentum to his ‘Build Build Build’ (BBB) program, a national

infrastructure development initiative. Beijing pledged US$24 billion worth
of deals in October 2016 to kickstart the BBB program.

2. December 2016, China provided US$ 14 million worth of small arms and
ammunition to improve Manila’s counterterrorism and anti-drug trafficking
operations.

3. Beijing donated US$7.3 million worth of small arms and ammunition to the
Philippines in June 2017.
DUTERTE:
Biased Transactional
approaches ──
Pro-China or Anti-US?

Contrary to common conception, his administration remained

transactional with both the US and China.

1. He shifted the focus of the Philippine military deeper towards maritime security,
which resulted in more frequent and expansive patrols in the West Philippine
Sea. From 2016 to 2021, Philippines lodged 231 diplomatic protests against
China’s provocative activities in the West Philippine Sea.

2. Expressed willingness to invoke its security guarantees under the defence treaty
with the US if China attacks any Philippine naval vessel or allow its assertion to
spill over into Philippine territory.

3. In 2022, the largest Balikatan bilateral exercise between the Philippines and the
US commenced. It emphasised that the US maintains its role as the Philippines’
most important and preferred partner. Philippines support for the strengthening
Y of the US ‘hub and spokes’ policy in the Indo-Pacific.
DUTERTE:
Diversification of Strategic Partners in Asia

Enhance the Philippines’ diplomatic connectivity and forge new defence

networks.

1. To invest in bolstering the Philippines’ defence cooperation with

non-traditional partners and Asian powers.

2. The signing of the BrahMos deal and the increased participation of

India in maritime exercises with the Philippines in the West
Philippine Sea.

3. To explore new opportunities for strategic collaborations with

Türkiye and Russia.
To position the Philippines at the centre of the power dynamics in a way that does not
consist of pure bandwagoning nor balancing.

It highlighted the continued relevance of the alliance and the US hub-and-spokes

network in the Western Pacific.

It remained in the bilateral relationship with China, including the delay in

materialising Chinese investments and the continuous assertiveness of the Chinese
Navy in the West Philippine Sea.

Placing the Philippines at the political intersection of the power dynamics also
allowed Manila to enhance strategic cooperation with non-traditional partners such as
India, which paved the way for the enhancement of Philippine defence capabilities
and security networks through diversification.

DUTERTE’S
FOREIGN POLICY
 Foundations of
Marcos Jr.’s
Doctrine in
Philippine Foreign
Policy

FERDINAND ROMUALDEZ MARCOS JR.

President of the Philippines
22022 - Present
MARCOS Jr’s:
Declaration,
Independent Approach

He aim for the Philippines to remain balanced in its strategic equations.

1. The role of the US and the treaty alliance will remain significant in
Philippine foreign and security policy under his leadership.

2. The ties with China will continuously be cultivated to avoid the

exacerbation of the already tumultuous security architecture of
Southeast Asia.

3. The need to prioritise diplomatic negotiations and consultations

with Beijing without directly involving Washington.

4. The continuity of strengthening strategic relations with

non-traditional partners and other key states of the Indo-Pacific
region.
 MARCOS Jr’s:
Keystones ── Foreign Policy

1. To consistently and vehemently safeguard the Philippines’ territorial integrity,

sovereignty, and sovereign rights, particularly in the West Philippine Sea and
uphold the 2016 arbitral award.

2. To continue the Philippine military modernisation programme to improve the

Southeast Asian state’s territorial defence and deterrence capabilities when
most of the external threats impacting the Philippines are emerging from the
maritime domain.

Operationalizing Foreign Policy Vision

1. To manage its relations with its traditional ally and its most
powerful immediate neighbour, the reality of systemic shifts in the
material distribution of power and the varied interests of
established and rising great powers often complicate the strategic
calculations of less powerful states.
MARCOS Jr’s:
Opportunities and
Challenges

To call out Beijing openly for its provocative manoeuvres in Philippine waters. Upon
the fresh incidents that took place early this year, the Philippines president summoned
the Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines and emphasised that such behaviour from
China ran contrary to the agreements he had with Xi in January.

remains steadfast in seeking to prioritise efforts to maintain peaceful relations with

Beijing, particularly in the economic realm. This can be seen through the carefully
crafted statement by the National Security Council regarding Manila’s unwillingness to
interfere in the Taiwan issue, which may exacerbate the US-China competition further.

emphasised that Manila has “not shifted away from China in any way” and while the
dispute remains, it is not the defining characteristic of the overarching bilateral
relationship.
MARCOS JR’S
FOREIGN POLICY
China-Philippines:
What’s the truth
behind “Ties”
US-CHINA POWER COMPETITION
Second point
https://ac.upd.edu.ph/index.php/news-
announcements/1175-download-free-p
owerpoint-presentations-from-ph-china
-relations-symposium-up-asian-center

https://www.orfonline.org/research/navi
gating-contemporary-philippine-foreign
-policy-under-marcos-jr
 REGIE ANARREDO FRANCISCO
Assistant Professor, English
College Faculty, General Education
STI Academic Center, Pasay EDSA
Philippine Academy of Technical Studies, Bataan