IN THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

ON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF UNION OF INDIA

UNDER ART.136 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
SLP NO. __/2024

IN THE MATTER OF

MOOLCHAND ……………..APPELLANT

VS

BALDEV ………………RESPONDENT

WRITTEN SUBMISSION FILED ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

Name- Aryan Samgwan

1
Enrollment No. - 19SHVCBHHS000011
Exam Roll No. - 22309806160
 INDEX

S.NO TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE

NO.

1. LIST OF ABBREVATIONS 3

2. CASES REFFERED 4

3. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 5

I. STATUTES REFFERED 5

II. ONLINE SOURCES 5

III. BOOKS REFFERED 5

4. STATE OF JURISDICTION 6

5. STATEMENT OF FACTS 7

6. ISSUE RAISED 8

7. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 9-10

8. ARGUMENT ADVANCED 11-24

9. PRAYER 25

2
 LIST OF ABBREVIATION

ABBREVIATION EXPANSION

SC/ST(POA) Act, 1989 Schedule Caste/Schedule Tribe(Prevention of

Atrocities) Act, 1989
SCC Supreme Court Cases

SC Schedule Caste

Hon’ble Honorable

AIR All India Record

& And

V. Versus

Anr Another

Ors Others

@ Alias

CrPC, 1973 Criminal Procedure Code, 1973

3
 CASES REFERRED
S.NO LIST OF CASES CITATION

1. Ajay Pattanaik @ Ajaya Kumar vs State Of Odisha And Another CRLMC No.2636 of 2021

2. Daya Bhatnagar & Ors. v. State

2004 SCC OnLine Del 33 : (2004)
109 DLT 915

3. Swaran Singh & Ors v. State (2008) 8 SCC 435

4. Pradeep Kumar v. State of Haryana & Anr CRR No. 1354 of 2019 (O&M)

5. Senthil @ Senthil Kumar vs State Of Tamil Nadu Crl.O.P.No.936 of 2017

6. Asmathunnisa v. State of AP CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.766

OF 2011

7. Sri Rithesh Pais vs State Of Karnataka CRIMINAL PETITION

No.3597 OF 2022

8. Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala & Anr

2024 SCC OnLine SC 2249

9. State of MP & Anr v. Ram Krishna Balothia 1995 AIR 1198, 1995 SCC (3)
221

10. Daya Bhatnagar & Ors. v. State 2004 SCC OnLine Del 33 :
(2004) 109 DLT 915

11. State Of Haryana & Ors vs Ch. Bhajan Lal & Ors 1992 AIR 604, 1990 SCR SUPL.
(3) 259

12. Som Mittal v Govt. of Karnataka 2008 (1) SCC 586

13. State of Karnataka v. L.Muniswamy 1977 AIR 1489, 1977 SCR (3) 113

4
 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
I) Statutes Referred
1. The Constitution of India
2. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973
3. Schedule Caste/ Schedule Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989

II) Online Sources

1. indiankanoon.org
2. https://www.indiacode.nic.in
3. https://scc.duelibrary.in/
4. What Does ‘Any Place Within Public View’ Under SC/ST Act Mean? | NewsClick

III) Books Referred

1. VN Shukla's Constitution of India by Mahendra Pal Singh(13th Edition)

2. R V Kelkar’s Criminal Procedure

5
 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Respondent has approached this Hon’ble Supreme Court in response to the Special Leave
Petition under Article 136(1) of the Constitution of India sought by Appellant against the Judgement
passed by Allahabad High Court. This Article mentions the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court in regard to Criminal Matters by the way of Special Leave from High Court under its
jurisdiction who have reversed the judgement of Trial Court in a matter.

Article 136 (1):

Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special
leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter
passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India.

Subsequently the Hon’ble Supreme Court has admitted the same.

However, the Respondent seeks permission to contend the maintainability of the given petition.

6
 STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. Moolchand (Appellant) belonging to the reserved category of SC was elected as a Ward Member , in
the town of Rajpura, under the reserved seat for SC. Baldev(Respondent) a general category was the
chairperson of the respective ward.

2. Baldev sent Moolchand an invite for a meeting regarding cleanliness of the ward on Dec 4,2019 at
11:00 AM. Moolchand being busy that day saw the message at 11:30 AM and immediately called
Baldev.

3. Baldev being angry started shouting on him for being late making casteist and humiliating remarks to
Moolchand. When such telephonic conversation was happening a clerk was sitting in the chamber of
Baldev.

4. However even after such remarks made to Moolchand, he came to attend the meeting. Baldev after
seeing him again started shouting at him. In the process, saying “Get lost from my office, otherwise I
will make you clean the streets”. During this conversation, no third person was present in the office.

5. Moolchand rushed to police station for registering FIR. At the trial, Court framed charges against
Baldev under Section 3(r) and (s) of SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.

6. However, Baldev challenged such framing of charges in High Court of Allahabad. High Court reversed
the decision stating telephonic conversations or conversations without third person doesn’t constitute
offence of Defamation and no charges under SC/ST Act,1989 because remarks not made in public
view. High Court as well denied certificate to Appeal as provided uner Article 134A

7. High Court further stated that the Act is a penal statute which must be strictly construed.

8. Moolchand to such Decision appealed under Article 136 of Constitution.

7
 ISSUES RAISED

ISSUE 1- Whether the Act of Respondent at his office towards the Appellant constitutes an
offence under Section 3(1)(s) of the Schedule Caste and Schedule Tribe( Prevention of
Atrocities) Act,1989
1.1 That the remarks made by Respondent towards Petitioner were not castiest/abusive
remarks.
1.2 That the act of Respondent was not “within public view” to attract Section 3(1)(s)

ISSUE 2- Whether the telephonic conversation between Respondent and Appellant amounts to an
offence under Schedule Caste and Schedule Tribe( Prevention of Atrocities) Act,1989
2.1 That the remarks made on mobile phone does not constitute an offence under the
abovementioned Act
2.2 That the presence of clerk during the conversation is irrelevant

ISSUE 3- Whether there was dishonest intention of Respondent to insult/humiliate the

Appellant according to Section 3(1)(r) of the Schedule Caste and Schedule Tribe(
Prevention of Atrocities) Act,1989
3.1 That there was no dishonest intention of Respondent in any of the two situation

ISSUE 4- Whether the decision of Allahabad High Court by reversing the decision of Trial
Court is justified
4.1 That the quashing of framing of charges by High Court is justifiable
4.2 That the High Court justifiable in giving a strict interpretation to the SC/ST
(POA) Act, 1989
4.3 That the High Court Justifiable in denying the certificate of Appeal to the
Appellant.

8
 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ISSUE 1- Whether the Act of Respondent at his office towards the Appellant constitutes an
offence under Section 3(1)(s) of the Schedule Caste and Schedule Tribe( Prevention of
Atrocities) Act,1989
1.1 That the remarks made by Respondent towards Petitioner were not castiest/abusive
remarks.
The counsel of Respondent would like to contend that the remarks made at the office of the
Respondent when Appellant arrived were not in any way castiest or abusive remarks to directly
insult the Appellant on him being of Scheduled Community and were only made out of anger.
The remarks are not made directly towards Appellant being of Schedule Caste and therefore,
does not constitute an offence under SC/ST (POA) Act, 1989.
1.2 That the act of Respondent was not “within public view” to attract Section 3(1)(s)
The counsel of Respondent would like to contend that the remarks made at the office by
Respondent to the Appellant were not within the ambit of “Public View”, there was no presence
of a third person at the time the incident occurred, it happened at the office within the four walls
of the building. The absence of public view makes the basic ingredient to constitute the offence
under Section 3(1)(s) absent. Therefore, no offence under Section 3(1)(s) committed by
Respondent.
ISSUE 2- Whether the telephonic conversation between Respondent and Appellant amounts to an
offence under Schedule Caste and Schedule Tribe( Prevention of Atrocities) Act,1989
2.1 That the remarks made on mobile phone does not constitute an offence under the
abovementioned Act
The counsel of Respondent would like to contend that the remarks made by Respondent on the
mobile phone neither constitute an offence under sub section (r) nor sub section (s) of Section
3(1) of SC/ST (POA) Act, 1989 because the conversation firstly was not happening publicly and
thus, not within public view. And secondly, telephonic conversation does not constitute as an
offence under the SC/ST Act, 1989. Therefore, no offence made out by Respondent during
telephonic conversation.
2.2 That the presence of clerk during the conversation is irrelevant
The counsel of Respondent would like to contend that the presence of clerk at the office of
Respondent is irreleveant because a clerk being an employee working under Respondent does
not come under the ambit of “public view” and therefore, the view of clerk is irrelevant in this
case.
9
ISSUE 3- Whether there was dishonest intention of Respondent to insult/humiliate the
Appellant according to Section 3(1)(r) of the Schedule Caste and Schedule Tribe(
Prevention of Atrocities) Act,1989
3.1 That there was no dishonest intention of Respondent in any of the two situation
The counsel of Respondent would like to contend that the remarks made during both
the situation ie on the telephonic conversation and at the office of Respondent, were
made only out of frustration and anger towards Appellant not coming into the
meeting and in no way was made with the dishonest intention to insult or humiliate
the Appellant being of Scheduled Caste. Therefore, offence under Section 3(1)(r)
cannot be made out as the intention of Respondent was not dishonest.
ISSUE 4- Whether the decision of Allahabad High Court by reversing the decision of Trial
Court is justified
4.1 That the quashing of framing of charges by High Court is justifiable
The counsel of Respondent would like to contend that High Court was well within its
power to quash the framing of charges by exercising its inherent power under Section
482 of CrPC, 1973. High Court saw that no offence has been made out because basic
ingredients not present in the case and if the charges not quashed, this will lead to
abuse of process of court and miscarriage of justice to the Respondent.
4.2 That the High Court justifiable in giving a strict interpretation to the SC/ST
(POA) Act, 1989
The counsel of Respondent would like to contend that High Court is justifiable in
giving the statement “the Act is a penal statute which must be strictly construed”.
SC/ST(POA) Act,1989 should be constructed and applied by the court literally and
the law provided under it should be followed.
4.3 That the High Court Justifiable in denying the certificate of Appeal to the
Appellant
The counsel of Respondent would like to contend that High Court justified in
denying certificate of Appeal as provided under Articl 134A of Constitution
because there was no substantial question of law of any importance that is left
unanswered which is an essential factor for Certficate to be given and secondly, it is
the discretion of the court to grant or deny it by looking at the facts and
circumstancs of the case.

10
 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

ISSUE 1- Whether the Act of Respondent at his office towards the Appellant
constitutes an offence under Section 3(1)(s) of the Schedule Caste and Schedule
Tribe( Prevention of Atrocities) Act,1989
1.1 That the remarks made by Respondent towards Petitioner were not
castiest/abusive remarks.
The counsel of Respondent would like to contend that the remarks made by Respondent
towards Petitioner at his office were neither casteiest remarks nor abusive in language,
they were only few words that were uttered in anger. The offence which is charged on
Respondent of this act is Section 3(1)(s) of SC/ST (POA) Act,1989.
Section 3(1)(s) specifies that :-
Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe,
s) abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled
Tribe by caste name in any place within public view.
The provision specifies that there needs to be an abuse by a member not of scheduled
category by use of “Caste Name” towards member of scheduled category. Such a factor
is essential to establish the offence which prima facie was not present in this particular
scenario. The Respondent only made the statement “Get lost from my office, otherwise
I will make you clean the streets”, which doesn’t contain any caste name that is directly
linked to the Petitioner being of Schedule Caste. The words “I will make you clean the
streets” cannot be said to be a derogatory statement or intended caste based remarks. They
should not be read in a literal sense. The statement was made by the Respondent only in
fit of anger.
The High Court of Orissa in the judgement of Ajay Pattanaik @ Ajaya Kumar vs State Of
Odisha And Another1 observed that :-
“If someone is abused with the name of his caste or the
caste is uttered suddenly in course of events and during the incident, in
the humble view of the Court, by itself would not be sufficient to hold
that any offence under the SC and ST (PoA) Act is made out unless the

1 CRLMC No.2636 of 2021

11
 intention is to insult or humiliate the victim for the reason that he
belongs to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe is prima facie
established.”
Therefore, the statement made by the Respondent were not in any way used to insult the
Appellant by its caste name.

1.2 That the act of Respondent was not “within public view” to attract Section
3(1)(s)
The counsel of Respondent would like to further contend that the remark made by
Respondent at his office to the Appellant was not made within public view which is
important for the offence of “Atrocity” to be established under the SC/ST(POA) Act,1989.
Public view is regarded an essential ingredient for establishing an offence under Section 3
of the Act, it was inserted in the provision for the reason that a member of Schedule Caste
can register a false case on any member of the General category and for that reason,
legislature made it an essential for the remarks to be made “within public view”. The term
“within public view” was explained in the case of Daya Bhatnagar & Ors. v. State2 where
Hon’ble Justice VS Aggarwal held :-
“to bring a matter within the scope and ambit of expression
"public view" firstly the words must be uttered at a place which is within public
view and it is unnecessary that the number of public persons herein should be more
than one. Even if one or two members of the public hear and view, as the case may
be, the same and the other ingredients of section are satisfied, the case would fall
within the ambit of said provision”

Further, the term “any place” in the provision was defined in the judgement of Swaran
Singh & Ors v. State3, where the 2 Judge Bench of Supreme Court observed that :-
“a place can be either a private place or a
public place, but yet within public view. A common element is that
the alleged offence must occur “within public view”

In the present case, though the place in which the incident occurred was a public place

2 2004 SCC OnLine Del 33 : (2004) 109 DLT 915

3 (2008) 8 SCC 435
12
ie the office of the Respondent but the statement made by him cannot be said to be
within public view because for such element to be established there needs to be a
presence of atleast one person when any such incident is happening and there was no
other person present other than Respondent and Petitioner there.

Therefore, the Respondent should not be held liable under Section 3(1)(s) of the
SC/ST(POA) Act, 1989 because the statement made was only between the Appellant
and Respondent and there was no presence of public.

13
 ISSUE 2- Whether the telephonic conversation between Respondent and Appellant
amounts to an offence under Schedule Caste and Schedule Tribe( Prevention of
Atrocities) Act,1989
2.1 That the remarks made on mobile phone does not constitute an offence under the
abovementioned Act
The Counsel of Respondent would like to contend that the remarks made through mobile phone
towards the Appellant cannot be said to constitute an offence either under Section 3(1)(r) or under
Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST(POA) Act, 1989 because any such remarks if made over telephonic
conversation where there is no presence of a third party or done in a place not within public view,
the offence cannot be established against person making the remarks.
The issue of whether telephonic conversation amounts to offence under SC/ST(POA) Act, 1989 was
briefly discussed in the case of Pradeep Kumar v. State of Haryana & Anr 4 where Bench at Punjab
& Haryana High Court held that:-
“To constitute the offence under the Act, it must be alleged that the accused
intentionally insulted or intimidated with intention to humiliate a member of Scheduled Caste
or Schedule Tribe in any public place within public view. Once it’s admitted that the alleged
conversation over the mobile phone was not in a public gaze nor witnessed by any third party,
the alleged use of caste words cannot be said to have been committed within the public view.”
Applying the abovementioned case in the present case, it is to be seen that the conversation between
Appellant and Respondent are neither in a public gaze nor there was any presence a third party on
Appellant’s side to hear the remarks made by Respondent. The absence of a primary ingredient
makes the offence under Section 3(1)(r) & (s) on Respondent irrelevant over the conversation
between the two on mobile phone

A similar case on the present situation of the present case was of Senthil @ Senthil Kumar vs State
Of Tamil Nadu5 where Petitioner made a phone call to Respondent 2 and abused him in filthy
language, using caste name of Respondent 2 in the process. Madras High Court here observed that :-
14. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or intimidation in "any place within
public view". What is to be regarded as "place in public view" had come up for consideration
before this Court in the judgement reported as Swaran Singh & Ors. vs. State through Standing

4 CRR No. 1354 of 2019 (O&M)

5 Crl.O.P.No.936 of 2017
14
 Counsel & Ors. The Court had drawn distinction between the expression "public place" and "in
any place within public view". It was held that if an offence is committed outside the building
e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane
outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would certainly be place within the public view. On
the contrary, if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there
(not merely relatives or friends) then it would not be an offence since it is not in the public
view.

15. As per the FIR, the allegations of abusing the informant were within the four walls of her
building. It is not the case of the informant that there was any member of the public (not merely
relatives or friends) at the time of the incident in the house. Therefore, the basic ingredient that
the words were uttered "in any place within public view" is not made out. In the list of
witnesses appended to the charge-sheet, certain witnesses are named but it could not be said
that those were the persons present within the four walls of the building. The offence is alleged
to have taken place within the four walls of the building. Therefore, in view of the judgment of
this Court in Swaram Singh, it cannot be said to be a place within public view as none was said
to be present within the four walls of the building as per the FIR and/or charge-sheet.

In the present case, as well the telephonic conversation was given by the Respondent within the four
walls and heard by the Appellant within the four walls, thus, not establishing the basic ingredient of
“in any place within public view”.

Furthermore, Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgement of Asmathunnisa v. State of AP6 it was
observed that
“the words used in sub-section (r) are not "in public place", but "within public view"
which means the public must view the person being insulted for which he must be present”

Thus, it is a necessary factor that the castiest remarks are being heard by public (not being a relative
or friend) on the side of the listening party even though no one is present with the speaking party,
which as per the facts of the was no one was present with the Appellant while the incident over
mobile phone was happening, making it a private conversation.

6 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.766 OF 2011

15
 Therefore, based on the above cases and the reasoning it can be said that the remarks made by
Respondent towards Appellant does not constitute any offence under SC/ST Act,1989 because the
Appellant was neither visible nor audible to any third person while the telephonic conversation was
going on between them.

2.2 That the presence of clerk during the conversation is irrelevant

The counsel of Respondent would like to contend that the remarks made by Respondent towards
Appellant during the telephonic conversation does not come into public view, even though a clerk
was present in the office of Respondent while the incident was happening.
The presence of clerk during such conversation was irrelevant because a clerk being an employee
of the Respondent does not come under the ambit of “public view”, the Respondent and the clerk
have a professional relationship at the workplace and any such incident happening around the co-
employees cannot be said to be “within public view”
The abovementioned point was discussed and was affirmed in the decision of Sri Rithesh Pais vs
State Of Karnataka7, where the complainant belonging to schedule caste was working in a
construction building where Accused with 5 others abused complainant by using his caste name
whereby such complaint under Section 3(1) (r) and (s) of SC/ST (POA) Act, 1989 made by
complainant. Karnataka High Court here held that –
“If the complaint, summary of charge sheet and the statement of witnesses, CW-2
in particular, are read in tandem, it would unmistakably reveal that hurling of abuses
has happened at the basement where CWs-1 to 6 were working and in the basement, it
is not indicated, any other person was even present. Two factors would emerge from a
reading of the aforesaid statements - one being, the basement of the building was not a
place of public view and two, only persons who claim to be present were the
complainant/CW1 and other employees of Sri Jayakumjar R.Nair or friends of CW-1.
Therefore, hurling of abuses is clearly not in a place of public view or a public place
for the aforesaid provisions of the Act to be get attracted in the case at hand”

Similiary, in the present case, the incident happened in presence of clerk who is an employee
working with the Respondent( supervisor) and his view becomes irrelevant.

7 CRIMINAL PETITION No.3597 OF 2022

16
ISSUE 3- Whether there was dishonest intention of Respondent to
insult/humiliate the Appellant according to Section 3(1) (r) of the Schedule
Caste and Schedule Tribe( Prevention of Atrocities) Act,1989

3.1 That there was no dishonest intention of Respondent in any of the two
situation
The counsel of Respondent would like to contend that the remarks made by Respondent in
the two situation (ie the telephonic conversation and the conversation at the office of
Respondent) were only made out of frustration and anger, and not with the intention to
humiliate or insult the Appellant. There was no sign of dishonesty in Respondent to make
the statement only to make insult of Appellant being of Scheduled community.
Further, Section 3(1)(r) of the SC/ST(Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989 which specifies :-
(1)Anyone who not being a member of a scheduled caste or
scheduled tribe,
(r) “intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a
member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place
within public view,
provides that the Basic ingredients for the provision to apply are
a. Accused person must not be a member of the Scheduled Caste or
Scheduled Tribe
b. Accused must intentionally insult or intimidate a member of a Scheduled
Caste or Scheduled Tribe;
c. Accused must do so with the intent to humiliate such a person; and
d. Accused must do so at any place within public view
For the accused to be liable under this particular provision all the 4 ingredients needs to be
present. In the present case, however, all are not present. The Respondent is not a member
of Scheduled Community affirming point (a), but the statement made by him either on the
phone or at the office was never made with an intention to insult the Appellant. Intention as
defined by Black Law’s Dictionary means “Determination to act in a certain way or to do a
certain thing”. Respondent never had a determination to say the things he said, it was all
said because in first situation Appellant replied to his message way after the time the

17
 meeting started, as per facts of the case, Respondent messaged Appellant to meet at his
chamber at 11 AM to which Appellant replied half an hours later when the meeting was
scheduled to start at 11:30 AM, when Appellant called, Respondent made the remarks in
only anger and with no intention to insult Appellant of being of Scheduled Community.
Third ingredient is linked with that of second ingredient and it similarly talks about the
“intent”, the act done by person should be with an intent to humiliate such person to which
remarks made.
In the judgement of Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala & Anr8. , Supreme Court discussed
about the term “intent to humiliate” with reference to SC/ST Act and observed that :-
The words “with intent to humiliate” as they appear in the text of
Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 are inextricably linked to the caste identity of the
person who is subjected to intentional insult or intimidation. Not every intentional
insult or intimidation of a member of a SC/ST community will result into a feeling of
caste-based humiliation. It is only in those cases where the intentional insult or
intimidation takes place either due to the prevailing practice of untouchability or to
reinforce the historically entrenched ideas like the superiority of the “upper castes”
over the “lower castes/untouchables”, the notions of ‘purity’ and ‘pollution’, etc. that
it could be said to be an insult or intimidation of the type envisaged by the Act, 1989.
The idea of “humiliation” was further elaborated in the case of State of MP & Anr v. Ram
Krishna Balothia9 where the Supreme Court observed that :-
“that the offences enumerated under the Act, 1989 belong to a
separate category as they arise from the practice of ‘untouchability’ and thus
the Parliament was competent to enact special laws treating such offences
and offenders as belonging to a separate category. Referring to the
Statements of Objects and Purposes of the Act, 1989 it was observed by this
Court that the object behind the introduction of the Act, 1989 was to afford
statutory protection to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, who
were terrorised and subjected to humiliation and indignations upon assertion
of their civil rights and resistance to the practice of untouchability. For this
reason, mere fact that the person subjected to insult or intimidation belongs
to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe would not attract the offence under

8 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2249

9 1995 AIR 1198, 1995 SCC (3) 221
18
 Section 3(1)(r) unless it was the intention of the accused to subject the
concerned person to caste-based humiliation.”
Through the observation of above two judgements it can be said that the intent to
humiliate a scheduled community person arises when there is idea of superiority complex
in the mind of the general category person. Respondent, in the present case, never had
such an intent in his mind while making such remarks, it was only in the heat of the
moment that Appellant didn’t answer to Respondent’s invite and the fact that Appellant
arrived late that such a remarks were made. Therefore, both the ingredients (b) and (c)
cannot be established here.
Last Ingredient is “such remarks were to be made within public view”, which was not
there in both the situations. During the telephonic conversation though a clerk was sitting
there but as held by Allahabad High Court telephonic conversation doenot come in the
ambit of “public view” and therefore, doesnot constitute an offence under Section 3(1)(r)
of the Act.
In the case of Daya Bhatnagar & Ors. v. State10, High Court talked about the the people
that constitutes “Public View”, stating:-
“number of public persons does not matter, but they should be independent,
impartial and not interested in any of the parties. These persons must be
distinct and strangers to the parties, not sharing any close relationship or any
business, commercial or any other vested interests. If the persons have any
close relationship or connection, they will get excluded from this ambit.”
Therefore, a clerk being working under the Respondent is said to have a Master-Servant
relation and therefore, cannot come under the term “Public View”.
Further in the situation happened at the office there was not presence of a third person and
therefore statement made there cannot constitute an offence.
Therefore, the last three of the four imgredients doesnot apply in the two situations that
happened between Respondent and Appellant and no offence can be made out under Section
3(1)(r) of the SC/ST Act,1989.

10 2004 SCC OnLine Del 33 : (2004) 109 DLT 915

19
ISSUE 4- Whether the decision of Allahabad High Court by reversing the
decision of Trial Court is justified

4.1 That the quashing of framing of charges by High Court is justifiable

The counsel of Respondent would like to contend that the decision given by the High
Court for quashing the order of framing of charges, issued by Trial Court against
Respondent, is well within the power conferred to High Court under Section 482 of
CrPC,1973.
Section 482 of CrPC, 1973 provides for Saving Inherent Power of High Court stating as
follow :-
“Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the
High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this
Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice.”
The abovementioned provision does not grant any new power to the High Court but rather
preserve the inherent power of High Court to prevent misuse of process of court and to
ensure justice.
The three purpose for which High Court can exercise its power under Section 482 are:-
1. To Give effect to any order under CrPC, 1973
2. To prevent abuse of process of any Court
3. To secure ends of justice
In the present case, Allahabad High Court seeing that there is no prima facie case
established against the Respondent for the charges framed against him under Section
3(1)(r) & (s) of SC/ST (POA) Act, 1989 and quashed the same for preventing abuse of
process of Court which the Trial Court have done by wrongfully framing charges against
him.
In the case of State Of Haryana & Ors vs Ch. Bhajan Lal & Ors11, Supreme Court
enumerated various categories of cases by way of illustration wherein the inherent power
under Section 482 of the Code should be exercised by the High Court. The one which
applies in the present case is
“(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if

11 1992 AIR 604, 1990 SCR SUPL. (3) 259

20
 they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.”
Further, in the judgement of Som Mittal v Govt. of Karnataka12 the supreme court
observed regarding inherent power of High Court that –
“(10) In a catena of decisions this Court has deprecated the interference by the High
Court in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code in a routine
manner. It has been consistently held that the power under Section 482 must be exercised
sparingly, with circumspection and in rarest of rare cases. Exercise of inherent power
under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not the rule but it is an exception.
The exception is applied only when it is brought to the notice of the Court that grave
miscarriage of justice would be committed if the trial is allowed to proceed where the
accused would be harassed unnecessarily if the trial is allowed to linger when prima
facie it appears to Court that the trial would likely to be ended in acquittal. In other
words, the inherent power of the Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure can be invoked by the High Court either to prevent abuse of process of any
Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.”
Also in State of Karnataka v. L.Muniswamy13 Supreme Court gave an observation of the
nature of the Inherent Power of High Court and held that –
“In the, exercise of this. whole some power, the High Court is entitled to quash a
proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be
an abuse of the process of the Court or that the; ends of justice require that the proceeding
ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and
criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court
proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into weapon of harassment or
persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very
nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would
justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of
justice are higher than the, ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered
according to laws made by the, legislature”
Based on three judgements provided above, in the present case, Allahabad High Court
exercised its inherent power to quash the framing of charges because the complaint by

12 2008 (1) SCC 586

13 1977 AIR 1489, 1977 SCR (3) 113
21
 Appellant does not constitute any offence due to the conversation between them being
outside of public view and the trial court even after knowing such factor framed charges
against Respondent abusing the process of the court and causing miscarriage of justice for
the Respondent.
Therefore, Allahabad High Court justifiable in quashing the order of framing of charges.

4.2 That the High Court justifiable in giving a strict interpretation to the
SC/ST (POA) Act, 1989
The counsel of Respondent would like to contend that the statement “the Act is a penal
statute which must be strictly construed” by the Allahabad High Court in its judgement is
an observation that should be discussed properly in the present argument. The particular
statement talks about the strict interpretation of Penal Statute.
Strict Interpretation states that a statute must be interpreted literally, i.e the words in which
it is expressed, and should not go beyond the letter of the law. Strict interpretation limits
itself to the scope of the law. It only sticks to the literal rule where the law is interpreted in
the words it is expressed by taking into account the ordinary and natural meaning of those
words.
While constructing a provision in a penal statute if there appears to be a reasonable doubt
or ambiguity, it shall be resolves in favour of the person who would be liable to penalty. If
a penal provision rationally be interpreted in such a way that punishment can be avoided, it
must be construed in that way only.
As per the rule of Strict Interpretation, SC/ST (POA) Act, 1989 should be interpreted by
the courts literally and the provisions providing jurisdiction and imposing penalties should
be interpreted and construed strictly. The Act was introduced for abolishing the practice of
untouchability and caste discrimination which was a prevailing practice before
independence, though over time it has reduced the number of cases regarding caste
discrimination but many a times there is false case registered by the member of schedule
community just for harming the reputation of a member of non-schedule community. To
tackle such situation the court should apply the provisions as it is written and there should
be no construction other than the law provided.
In the present case, strict interpretation should have been given by the Trial Court which
they failed to follow. Trial Court missed an essential factor while interpreting Section
3(1)(r) & (s) of SC/ST (POA) Act, 1989. They were unable to literally interpret the law of
22
 the Act.
Therefore, Allahabad High Court was justified in giving such a statement. When the basic
ingredients of the offence are missing, then permitting such proceedings to continue and to
compel the petitioner to face the rigmarole of criminal trial would be totally unjustified,
leading to abuse of the process of law.
4.3 That the High Court Justifiable in denying the certificate of Appeal to
the Appellant
The Counsel of Respondent would like to contend that the Allahabad High Court is well
within its power in denying the certificate of Appeal before Supreme Court under Article
134A to the Appellant.
Article 134A of Constitution of India states -
Every High Court, passing or making a judgment, decree, final order, or sentence,
referred to in clause (1) of article 132 or clause (1) of article 133, or clause (1) of article
134-
(a) may, if it deems fit so to do, on its own motion; and
(b) shall, if an oral application is made, by or on behalf of the party aggrieved,
immediately after the passing or making of such judgment, decree, final order or sentence,
determine, as soon as may be after such passing or making, the question whether a
certificate of the nature referred to in clause (1) of article 132, or clause (1) of article 133
or, as the case may be, sub-clause (c) of clause (1) of article 134, may be given in respect
of that case.
Article 134A is not an independent provision under which a certificate can be issued, it is
ancillary to Article 132(1), 133(1) and 134(1)(c). The High Court can issue a certificate
only when it is satisfied that the conditions in Article 132 or Article 133 or Article 134 as
the case maybe are satisfied.
The clauses for which certificate of appeal can be granted are
132. Appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court in appeals from High Courts in certain
cases
(1)An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree or final order of a
High Court in the territory of India, whether in a civil, criminal or other proceeding, if the
High Court certifies under article 134A that the case involves a substantial question of law
as to the interpretation of this Constitution.
133. Appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court in appeals from High Courts in regard
23
to civil matters
(1)An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree or final order in a
civil proceeding of a High Court in the territory of India if the High Court certifies under
article 134A-
(a)that the case involves a substantial question of law of general importance; and
(b) that in the opinion of the High Court the said question needs to be decided by the
Supreme Court.
134. Appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court in regard to criminal matters
(1)An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, final order or sentence in
a criminal proceeding of a High Court in the territory of India if the High Court-
(c) certifies under article 134A that the case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court.

In the present case, none of the clauses has an application because the matter is not such
that have any substantial question of law, no case is made out here the essential factors for
the offence to be constituted does not exist. Further, High Court has the discretionary
power to certify the appeal if it deems fit which rightfully they didn’t, seeing that this
would lead to grave injustice on the Respondent.

Therefore, Allahabad High Court is justifiable to deny certificate of Appeal to appeal in

Supreme Court to the Appellant

24
 PRAYER

Where in light of issues raised, arguments advanced, and authorities cited, it is prayed that this
Hon’ble Supreme Court may be pleased to hold that:

 The Special Leave Petition filed under Article 136(1) of Constitution by

petitioner is not maintainable

 The Decision given by the Allahabad High Court to quash the framing of
charges to be upheld, and/or

 Pass any other order, direction, or relied that it may deem fit in the best interest
of justice, fairness, equity and good conscience.

Sd/-

(Counsel for the Respondent)

25
26