TRANSFORMING TRANSFORMING

RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS
TRANSFORMING FOR STABILIZATION AND
FOR STABILIZATION
AND RECONSTRUCTION FOR STABILIZATION
OPERATIONS
Including chapters on lessons learned, force sizing, organization, AND RECONSTRUCTION
active and Reserve components, military culture, technological
support, interagency coordination, and international capabilities
OPERATIONS

E d i t e d b y

H A N S B I N N E N D I J K a n d

BINNENDIJK and JOHNSON

S T U A R T E. J O H N S O N

The National Defense University established the Center for Technology and National Security
Policy to study the implications of technological innovation for U.S. national security policy and
military planning. The center combines scientific and technical assessments with analyses of
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of focus include military transformation, science and technology policy, life sciences, homeland
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analysts and technologists and is led by two senior analysts who hold the Roosevelt Chair of Center for Technology and National Security Policy

National Security Policy and the Edison Chair of Science and Technology. National Defense University
Transforming for Stabilization and
Reconstruction Operations
Transforming for
Stabilization and
Reconstruction
Operations

edited by Hans Binnendijk and

Stuart E. Johnson

PUBLISHED FOR THE CENTER FOR TECHNOLOGY

AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
BY NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY PRESS
WASHINGTON, D.C.
2004
 Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Transforming for stabilization and reconstruction operations / edited by

Hans Binnendijk and Stuart E. Johnson.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 1–57906–066–8
1. United States—Armed Forces—Civic action. 2. United States—Armed
Forces—Operations other than war. I. Binnendijk, Hans. II. Johnson, Stuart
E., 1944–
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2004049863

First Printing, April 2004

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Contents

Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii

Chapter 1

Learning from History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Chapter 2

New Strategic Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Chapter 3

Scenarios for Force Sizing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Chapter 4

Organizing for Stabilization and

Reconstruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Chapter 5

Rebalancing the Active/Reserve Mix . . . . . . . . . 71

Appendix I—Inventory of Core S&R Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Appendix II—S&R Support and Services Units . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Appendix III—Combat Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Appendix IV—Two Active Component/National Guard
Integrated Divisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

vii
viii

Chapter 6

Broadening Military Culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

Chapter 7

Supporting Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

Chapter 8

Interagency Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

Chapter 9

International Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

About the Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

Illustrations
Figures
1. Historical Pattern of Combat and S&R Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . xiv
2. New Challenges: Preemption and RDOs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv
3. Transformed S&R Capability: Bridge to Nation-Building . . . . . . . . xvi
4. Today’s World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5. Key Determinants of Force Requirements for S&R Missions . . . . . . 43
6. Illustrative Decision Tree for S&R Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
7. Distribution of Size and Likely Conditions for Scenarios . . . . . . . . 47
8. How Options Meet the Strategic Space of Requirements . . . . . . . . 49
9. S&R Joint Command Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
10. S&R JCOM Headquarters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
11. U.S. Army S&R Force Types in Theater at the End of
Major Combat Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
12. A Full-Spectrum NATO Force. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126

Tables
1. Historical Case Studies Post-Conflict Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Key Country Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3. Dedicated S&R Force Requirements for Multiple
Contingencies (Illustrative) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4. An Illustrative S&R Joint Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
5. Required and Existing S&R Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
6. Regional Distribution of Foreign Area Officers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
7. Reserve Component Contribution to S&R Force Types in Iraq . . . . . 79
8. American Efforts at Nation-Building, 1898–2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
9. Leading Foreign Contributors to UN Peacekeeping Operations . . . . 121
10. Contributions to Major Multinational Peace Operations . . . . . . . . 122
11. Potential Niche Capability Contributors to Multinational
S&R Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

ix
Acknowledgements

T
his volume reports conclusions and recommendations on military
requirements for the stabilization and reconstruction phase of mil-
itary operations. It is based on numerous studies, internal discus-
sions, external briefings, and scholarly research. As always with a collabo-
rative product, so many colleagues helped in large and small ways that
acknowledging all of them by name is impractical. Suffice it to say here
that their help was unstinting and invaluable.
The bulk of the writing of this volume was done by staff of the Center
for Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense Uni-
versity. The principal contributors were: Michael Baranick (Learning From
History), Charles Barry (Organizing for Stabilization and Reconstruction
and Rebalancing the Active/Reserve Mix), Hans Binnendijk (Executive Sum-
mary), Lee Blank (Interagency Capabilities), Daniel Burghart, (International
Capabilities), Leigh Caraher (Broadening Military Culture), Joseph Eash
(Support Technologies), Stuart Johnson (Organizing for Stabilization and
Reconstruction), Erik Kjonnerod (Interagency Capabilities), Richard Kugler
(Scenarios for Force Sizing), Douglas Macgregor (New Strategic Concepts),
Larry Wentz (Learning From History), and Elihu Zimet (Supporting Tech-
nologies). In addition to contributing a chapter, Leigh Caraher provided
diligent and thoughtful research and editorial support throughout the entire
project, and William Bode assisted with the editorial development and pro-
duction.
The editors especially would like to thank Vice Admiral Arthur K.
Cebrowski, USN (Ret.), Director of the Office of Force Transformation,
for his intellectual contributions to the concepts advanced here and for his
overall support for this project.

xi
Executive Summary

R ecent military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq were character-

ized by the rapid defeat of enemy military forces, by relatively small
deployments of American forces, and by a very limited destruction
of the critical civilian infrastructure. This success can be credited in large
part to the ongoing transformation of the U.S. military evident in its ef-
fective use of information superiority, precision strike, and rapid maneu-
ver on the battlefield.
The Armed Forces were not nearly as well prepared to respond
promptly to the lawlessness, destruction of the civilian infrastructure, and
attacks on coalition forces that followed hard on the defeat of the Iraqi
military. This has set back plans to restore essential services and to pass the
reins to a representative Iraqi government. Moreover, the failure to estab-
lish security concurrently with the defeat of the Iraqi military may well
have emboldened those who oppose the United States, United Kingdom,
and even United Nations presence.
It is precisely the success of the U.S. military in transforming its forces
to execute rapid decisive operations that makes it imperative to transform
how it prepares for and executes stabilization and reconstruction (S&R)
operations. The very rapid defeat of the enemy military means the United
States must be ready to field the resources needed to secure stability and
begin the reconstruction process promptly—ideally concurrently—with
the end of major combat. This can only be done if planning for the stabi-
lization and reconstruction operations is integrated into planning for the
conflict from the beginning and if the right skills are in theater to begin op-
erations concurrently with the surrender or collapse of the enemy military.
The changed operational environment that U.S. forces face when
combat ceases are illustrated by figures 1–3. They indicate a need to close
the gap between the end of major combat operations and the point at
which the nation-building mission is up and running.
Traditional military operations have been characterized by planning
for combat and a relatively long buildup of forces, as illustrated in figure 1.
xiii
xiv

Figure 1. Historical Pattern of Combat and S&R Missions

Intensity

Major
Combat
Nation-
Mission
Building
Mission

Duration
Planning Slow Long Force Long
for Buildup War Available Term
Combat for Occupation (Civilian Lead)

When the United States had assembled sizable forces in the theater, then,
and only then, would it launch offensive operations. The conflict would
typically last for months or years and end with the negotiation of enemy
surrender or an extended ceasefire. Because conflict was protracted and in-
volved large forces, enemy resistance was pretty much eliminated, and there
were sizable U.S. and allied forces in theater at the end of the conflict. More-
over, the relatively long duration of major combat operations allowed time
to plan for stabilization and reconstruction operations and to begin them
as the conflict wound down.
In the past decade the United States has been transforming its mili-
tary forces and adopting new concepts of combat operations that have led
to a pattern of conflict illustrated by figure 2. The focus has been on rapid
and decisive operations and, more recently, on preemption. The conflicts
in Afghanistan and Iraq are good examples. The United States did not
wait until it had deployed large forces to the theater before beginning
combat. The time spent planning the operation and deploying forces was
compressed. In lieu of overwhelming forces in theater, the military em-
ployed a variety of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems
and Special Forces to gain an accurate, real- or near-real time picture of
enemy force deployments. It used this information to strike high leverage
targets with precision and in a timely fashion. The result was a collapse of
the enemy military much more quickly than had been typical of combat
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY xv

Figure 2. New Challenges: Preemption and RDOs

Intensity

S&R
Nation-
Major Mission
Building
Combat Gap
Mission
Mission

Duration
Planning Fast Short Few Forces Long
for Buildup War Available Term
Combat for S&R (Civilian Lead)

operations. But the United States was caught without a mature plan for
post-conflict operations and without an adequate complement of the
skills needed to begin reconstruction promptly. The resultant gap left U.S.
forces without an adequate response to the disorder that followed the de-
feat of enemy forces.
Figure 3 illustrates a new concept of operations that is described in
detail in this study, which proposes a way to plan and organize for stabi-
lization and reconstruction operations that targets the gap between the
end of major combat operations and the beginning of nation-building. It
illustrates the proposal that planning for the S&R mission begin concur-
rently with planning for major combat, and that S&R operations begin
concurrently with the defeat of the enemy military. With stability estab-
lished and reconstruction underway, the important process of nation-
building can proceed. It also proposes steps to enhance civilian nation-
building capabilities, which should shorten the duration of the S&R phase
of operations. Without this process in place, the United States may win the
war, but lose the peace.
The capability to provide stabilization and reconstruction must not
be relegated only to post-conflict situations. Indeed, the nature of the
world and the tasks ahead may dictate that the United States and its allies
prevent rather than preempt whenever possible. The capabilities discussed
in this study are equally applicable to conflict prevention and resolution.
xvi

Figure 3. Transformed S&R Capability: Bridge to Nation-Building

Intensity

Nation-
Major S&R Building
Combat Mission Mission
Mission

Duration
Planning for Fast Short Prompt Long
Combat Concurrent War S&R Term
and Buildup Operations (Civilian Lead)
S&R

The following chapters examine the various elements of the stabi-

lization and reconstruction capabilities needed by the U.S. military. They
address systematically the range of issues that must be resolved to trans-
form S&R operations, including military strategy, organization, technol-
ogy, personnel, and education. A brief précis of the findings of each chap-
ter is presented below.
Chapter 1 reviews recent cases in which the United States has partic-
ipated in S&R operations, sometimes with allies, sometimes alone. Insights
from that review include:
■ Successive post-Cold War U.S. interventions have become increas-
ingly more ambitious.
■ Regime change and S&R missions can be successful in different cul-
tures.
■ But the risks and costs are high.
■ Previous political and economic conditions are key uncontrollable
factors.
■ Controllable factors include level and duration of effort in terms of
troop levels and financial resources.
■ Five to seven years is the historic duration of successful nation-
building.
■ Rapid and decisive military victory does not guarantee a peaceful
post-conflict stabilization environment.
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY xvii

■ A secure environment is a necessary, but not sufficient criterion for

success.
■ Multilateral involvement contributes to legitimacy and burden
sharing, but does not guarantee success.
Chapter 2 proposes strategic concepts to guide the United States in
planning S&R operations. These include an integrated war-winning and
peace-winning strategy, unity of effort, a compelling and consistent strate-
gic message, integrated planning of combat and S&R operations, concur-
rent combat and S&R operations, precision targeting of rejectionist ele-
ments, good understanding of the indigenous culture, early and
demonstrable success, early introduction of local capabilities, and modu-
lar, adaptive S&R capabilities.
Chapter 3 analyzes the range of potential conflict scenarios in which
the United States might be involved that would require a competent S&R
capability. Examination of the trade space between size (and therefore
cost) of the S&R capability and risk yields the conclusion that:
■ DOD needs to establish analytical standards for determining the
size and design of S&R forces.
■ S&R forces should be sized to cope with one large S&R operation or
two medium-size operations. Preliminary analysis indicates that
DOD should aspire to field two S&R division-equivalents with joint
assets.
■ S&R forces will need substantial assets in such key categories as mil-
itary police, construction engineers, and civil affairs, and in most
cases will need associated combat forces.
Chapter 4 proposes an organizational model for these two S&R Joint
Commands. One would be composed primarily of units on active duty
from both the active and reserve components. The second could consist
mostly of forces from the reserve component. Both headquarters would be
staffed by personnel on active duty either from the active component or
activated reservists. During peacetime, the headquarters would plan for
S&R operations, monitor the status of S&R forces, develop doctrine, over-
see training, and conduct exercises. These would be mainline units, not
combat service support units that are embedded in division or corps com-
bat units. The S&R Joint Commands are organized to ensure that they are
flexible, modular, and scalable force multipliers. They should be organized
to ensure that S&R forces are available to deploy concurrently with com-
bat units. Light combat units could be attached to the S&R force to pro-
vide it the capability to operate autonomously in a hostile environment.
xviii

The S&R force, or elements of it, could also be attached to larger combat
forces if the situation demanded it.
Chapter 5 analyzes the units in the current force that are needed for
S&R operations and concludes that the problem is not a serious lack of the
required skills, but that those skills reside in units that are scattered
throughout the force. The units need to be pulled together and organized
systematically. This in turn would create synergies and training opportu-
nities that should dramatically improve performance. In addition, rebal-
ancing will be needed between the active and reserve components to en-
sure the prompt availability of S&R units to deploy concurrently with the
combat units. Some civil affairs, military police, medical, and engineering
units now in the reserve component would have to be shifted from the re-
serve to the active component.
Chapter 6 explores the need for a shift in military culture that may
be needed to make the proposed S&R forces successful and recommends
changes in professional military education to help bring about cultural
changes. Specifically:
■ PME institutions should incorporate more courses and lectures on
stabilization and reconstruction operations, civil-military coopera-
tion, interagency planning, media relations, and negotiations.
■ Instructors from the interagency community with a background in
sociology, law, history, and experience in S&R operations should be
added to the faculties.
■ The personnel system must reward language and negotiations skills
and interagency experience.
■ S&R groups should train as a unit. The training should include per-
sonnel from key agencies that will be in the field with it (for exam-
ple, State, Justice, Treasury).
Chapter 7 identifies key technologies that could enhance the capabil-
ities of S&R forces. The technologies cited are either mature and could be
deployed promptly or need more research but promise a high impact pay-
off if the research succeeds. They are grouped into three categories:
■ Security technology, including non-lethal weapons, biometrics,
communications, and body armor.
■ Infrastructure technology, including training packages and collab-
orative planning tools.
■ Technology for human relations, including language translators,
and record generation and storage management tools.
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY xix

Chapter 8 reviews interagency contributions to S&R capabilities and

concludes that a much greater level of interagency cooperation will be re-
quired both in Washington and in the field to assure policy success. It also
proposes organizational changes to enhance civilian capability in the sta-
bilization and reconstruction mission:
■ Creating a National Interagency Contingency Coordination Group
(NIACCG) as a planning component of the National Security
Council structure. Responsibilities of the NIACCG would include
planning for post-conflict operations.
■ Resourcing the Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs)
to embed interagency capabilities at the combatant command and
S&R headquarters levels.
Chapter 9 discusses the pros and cons of a U.S.-supported Interna-
tional Peacekeeping Force and highlights the imperative to plan exten-
sively during peacetime and then early on with coalition members as a
conflict emerges. The U.S. should look first to the well equipped and well
trained forces for the more demanding job of stabilization and recon-
struction. These will mostly be forces from NATO allies. A reorganization
of NATO forces similar to that proposed for U.S. forces in chapter 4 would
be necessary to optimize NATO ability to execute S&R missions. Forces
from less advanced countries would benefit from a U.S. role in training
and equipping an International Peacekeeping Force. This effort could in-
clude the establishment of regional training centers, involving both U.S.
active duty and reserve forces.
A concluding section distills this analysis into ten recommendations
that establish a framework for reorganizing and planning for transformed
stabilization and reconstruction operations.
Transforming for Stabilization and
Reconstruction Operations
Chapter 1

Learning from History

A
merican involvement in stabilization and reconstruction (S&R)
operations has grown in frequency and scope. During the Cold
War, the United States averaged one major intervention about
every 10 years. In the decade following the end of the Cold War, there was
an intervention about every two years. Within the last 18 months, there
have been two—Afghanistan and Iraq. The current operation in Iraq is the
most complex and challenging stabilization and reconstruction operation
undertaken by the United States since the post-World War II occupations
of Germany and Japan. Improvements in the U.S. ability to conduct stabi-
lization and reconstruction operations have not been commensurate with
this experience, however. While dramatic improvements have been made
in U.S. warfighting capabilities over the past decade, there have not been
comparable improvements in post-conflict S&R capabilities of either the
military or civilian elements.
Historical case studies ranging from the post-World War II occupa-
tions of Germany and Japan to the present operation in Iraq were exam-
ined to identify common factors that contribute to success in stabilization
and reconstruction operations. The studies were also helpful in under-
standing the implications of possible capability gaps for rapid, decisive,
and preemptive military operations in the future. The RAND publication
America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq and the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace policy brief “Lessons from the Past:
The American Record on Nation-Building” were important sources for the
lessons described in this chapter. Other studies, articles, reports, and in-
terviews with experts were used as well.1

Background
Various terms have been used to describe post-conflict operations.
Germany and Japan were called occupations. Somalia, Haiti, and the
3
4

Balkans were called peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations. Oper-

ations in Afghanistan and Iraq are called stabilization and reconstruction.
In each of these cases, the military instrument of national power was used
to underpin a process of building a stable peace. Using Germany, Japan,
Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq as historical case stud-
ies, this chapter examines factors that influence the relative ease or diffi-
culty of conducting post-conflict operations and contribute to the success
or failure of an operation. The results are summarized in table 1.
The post-World War II occupations of Germany and Japan were
America’s first experiences with the use of military force in the aftermath
of a conflict to support rapid societal change. These efforts set the stan-
dards for successful post-conflict nation-building. During the Cold War,
U.S. military power was employed to preserve the status quo, not to alter
it, and to manage crises, not to resolve underlying problems. American in-
terventions usually were undertaken to overthrow hostile regimes and re-
install friendly ones. Following a rash of nation-state failures after the end

Table 1. Historical Case Studies Post-Conflict Assessment

Germany Japan Somalia

Military Mission Regime Change, Partial Regime Humanitarian
Security, Change, Aid, Regime
HA/Refugees/DP, HA/Refugees/DP, Change
Reconstruction Reconstruction

Previous State of Society/Economy/ Developed Developed Chaotic, Violent,

Political Structure Dysfunctional

Damage Caused by Military Action Devestating Devestating Some

Continuing Hostile Activities Low Low High

Post-Conflict Duration 7 years 7 years 2 years

Troop Strength Per Capita High Modest Modest

Foreign Aid/Investment High Low Low

Multilateral Involvement Limited None Medium

Degree of Success High High None

 LEARNING FROM HISTORY 5

of the Cold War, the United States intervened not simply to police cease-
fires or restore the status quo, but to try to bring about more fundamental
transformation of war-torn or oppressed societies. In most of these cases,
the United States was able to secure broad international support.
Each successive post-Cold War intervention has generally been
more ambitious than its predecessor. Somalia started as a humanitarian
operation and expanded to an attempt to establish democracy. In Haiti,
forces restored a democratically elected president and built security insti-
tutions. The mission in Bosnia was creation of a multiethnic state. In
Kosovo the international community has worked toward the establish-
ment of a democratic polity and market economy. In Afghanistan, the
United States and its allies focused on the removal of the Taliban and es-
tablishment of a democratic government. The operation in Iraq has taken
on a scope comparable to the transformational attempts still underway in
Bosnia and Kosovo and on a scale comparable to the occupations of Ger-
many and Japan.

Impact
Haiti Balkans Afghanistan Iraq on Success
Regime Change, Stop Ethnic Regime Change, Regime Change, Regime Change
Stabilization, Cleansing, Stabilization, Stabilization, can be
Reconstruction Stabilization, Reconstruction Reconstruction successful
Reconstruction

Fragile Unstable to Dysfunctional Totalitarian, High

Dysfunctional Unstable

Very little Moderate, Mostly Some Limited, Most due Medium

warring factions to neglect

Low Medium High High High

2 years Bosnia: 7 + years 2 + years 6 + months Needs at least

Kosovo: 3 + years 5 years

Modest High Low Low High

Low High Low Increasing High

Medium High Medium Limited Medium

Low Medium TBD TBD

6

There are clear examples of successes in these case studies in differ-

ent cultural environments. However, the costs and risks associated with
reconstruction and nation-building remain high, and the overall low suc-
cess rate is a reminder of the difficulties of such operations. The post-
Cold War efforts have not matched the success of the post-World War II
occupations of Germany and Japan. Efforts by the United States to win
the peace have been problematic, as evidenced by failures in Somalia and
Haiti, moderate success in the Balkans, and yet to be determined out-
comes in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Discussion
The following lessons emerge from these case studies.
Lesson 1: Controllable factors for success are the level and duration of
effort of the United States and its coalition partners as measured in
terms of manpower, time, and money invested.2
A strong correlation can be seen between resources committed and
success. Considerable resources were invested in ensuring stabilization, re-
construction, and nation-building in Germany and the Balkans. By con-
trast, a thin deployment of forces for limited time and a lack of resource
investments contributed to the failures in Somalia and Haiti. In
Afghanistan, the low investment of money and multinational forces has
resulted so far in limited improvement in overall security, slow progress in
democratization and limited economic growth. The correlation is not per-
fect, however. Reconstruction of Japan succeeded with a modest commit-
ment of occupying forces and a relatively low level of foreign aid.
The RAND report on nation-building suggests that higher force lev-
els for longer durations promote success. It notes that where large num-
bers of U.S. forces were deployed for long periods of time, as in Bosnia and
Kosovo, operations have been successful or are making progress. This was
not the case in the Somalia and Haiti operations, which were not success-
ful. The report also describes a correlation between levels of casualties and
level of U.S. troops per capita. Only when the number of stabilization
troops has been low in comparison to the population, such as, in Somalia,
Afghanistan, and now Iraq, have U.S. forces suffered significant casualties.
In Somalia, increased combat deaths prompted the early withdrawal of
U.S. forces that contributed to the failure of the overall mission. By con-
trast, in Germany, Bosnia, and Kosovo, where troop levels were high, U.S.
forces suffered few post-conflict combat-related deaths. Supplementing
military forces with U.S. and international civilian police (CIVPOL) to
 LEARNING FROM HISTORY 7

provide civil security, as was done in the Balkans, also contributes to suc-
cess. It should be noted that it could take a year or more to build up and
deploy a CIVPOL force once combat has ended.
The remaining factor that can be controlled is the time the United
States and its partners devote to stabilization and reconstruction and then
to nation-building. The cases studied differed in duration and expecta-
tions for departure. Haiti began with clear departure deadlines that were
adhered to. Germany, Japan, Somalia, and Bosnia began with short time
lines but saw them extended. Iraq started with expectations for a short du-
ration but is now viewed as a longer-term effort. Kosovo and Afghanistan
began without any expectations of an early exit. Staying around for a long
time does not guarantee success, but leaving early ensures failure, such as
in Somalia and Haiti.
History suggests that about five years is the minimum time needed
to cultivate an enduring transition to democracy. The transitions in Ger-
many and Japan, for example, took seven years. Setting departure dead-
lines can unintentionally create expectations of imminent withdrawal or
of a shallow commitment. In Bosnia, IFOR’s one-year timetable and polit-
ical discussions surrounding SFOR’s end date made stabilization and re-
construction difficult, because belligerents planned to wait out the inter-
national community’s intervention. Greater progress was made after the
United States announced that military forces would stay in Bosnia as long
as needed to ensure a successful transition.
Other important but uncontrollable factors for success are the target
nation’s internal characteristics and the convergence of the geopolitical in-
terests of outside powers and the target nation.3 These were contributing
factors to the successes in Germany, Japan, and the Balkans.
Lesson 2: A rapid and decisive conventional military victory does not
guarantee a peaceful post-conflict stabilization environment and
indeed could make the S&R mission more challenging.
The U.S. military transformation effort, which is focused on enhanced
military capabilities to conduct rapid decisive warfighting operations with
speed, precision, and smaller force packages on the ground, could have un-
intended consequences for S&R operations. As combat subsided in past op-
erations, the larger combat force transitioned to support resource-intensive
S&R operations. It was augmented with additional military police, civil af-
fairs, PSYOP, engineers, and medical capabilities. This arrangement worked
reasonably well for slow transitions from combat to stability operations.
Under the improved force package arrangements, there are fewer forces and
8

capabilities available on the ground to conduct these operations. The tran-

sition is also much quicker.
The S&R operations studied in this chapter experienced varying lev-
els of violence following the end of combat, depending on how the con-
flict concluded and the intervening troop strength. Germany, Japan, and
the Balkans did not experience major post-conflict hostilities. Germany
and Japan surrendered. Formal ceasefire agreements such as the Dayton
Peace Accords in Bosnia and the Military Technical Agreement in Kosovo
set the initial conditions for the cessation of hostilities. In the Balkans, the
security challenge was difficult, but it was related to ethnic revenge and not
directed at U.S. military forces, whose security effort was largely focused
on protecting ethnic minorities and enclaves. In Somalia, UN and U.S.
forces were unable to cope with urban warfare. In Afghanistan and Iraq,
the United States did achieve a rapid and decisive victory in the conven-
tional phase of conflict, but soon those victories morphed into guerrilla
wars. In the end, the situations in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq had more
in common with each other than with the other cases—a most challeng-
ing security environment.
Lesson 3: A secure environment is a necessary precondition for
successful nation-building.
Establishing a safe and secure environment is the primary mission
of the military in stabilization and reconstruction operations. Security is
a precondition for economic development, building democratic institu-
tions, and the rule of law. According to the Center for Strategic and In-
ternational Studies Post-conflict Reconstruction project, “security as a
concept addresses all aspects of public safety, particularly the establish-
ment of a safe and secure environment and the development of legitimate
and stable security institutions.” 4 Civil unrest and the willingness of mil-
itants to continue fighting were concerns for intervening forces in each of
the case studies.
Military police played an important role in helping maintain law and
order and in training civilian police to assume these responsibilities, but in
many cases there were not enough to perform the mission needs. In Ger-
many, a U.S. military-led constabulary force was created to fill the law and
order gap. In the Balkans, the United Nations provided international
police to train the local police force. A constabulary force composed of
Italian Carabinieri and French Gendarmerie bridged the civil and military
security activities and provided crowd control capabilities.
 LEARNING FROM HISTORY 9

Augmentation of the military force by civilian law enforcement

(including forensics) became increasingly important in addressing civil
security needs.5 In recent operations, organized crime was a major chal-
lenge that had to be addressed as part of the security operation. In the
Balkans, the United Nations provided a multinational specialized police ca-
pability to address organized crime. Terrorism has also emerged as an im-
portant area of concern. Afghanistan and Iraq have experienced more ter-
rorist related incidents than the Balkans. Specialized civil-military
counter-terrorism Joint Task Force capabilities have been employed as part
of the global war on terrorism. These capabilities are an additional capabil-
ity to force packages normally used to support combat and S&R operations.
A legitimate and functioning penal system is also an important part
of the security equation. In several case studies, judicial teams of prosecu-
tors, lawyers, judges and corrections officers were used to establish court
and prison systems.6 In Haiti, the inability to develop sustainable security
institutions led to the eventual failure of the international operation.
Without a safe and secure environment, humanitarian relief, assis-
tance to refugees and displaced persons, restoration of basic services, and
reconstruction of institutions and infrastructure are more difficult. It has
become increasingly important for these activities to begin concurrently
with the establishment of a safe and secure environment. In recent case
studies, the military was required to provide security and humanitarian re-
lief, governance and other assistance until a permissive environment could
be created to allow a transition to civilians. The military, in particular MPs,
civil affairs, engineers, and medical teams, facilitated the transition to civil-
ian authorities and became important players in these activities.
Lesson 4: Combat operations and stabilization and reconstruction
operations must be planned concurrently and as interdependent
elements within an overall strategy for winning the peace.
The ability of the U.S. military to defeat enemy forces rapidly and
decisively with a reduced combat presence on the ground has signifi-
cantly reduced planning time for the post-conflict phase. Thus, planning
for stabilization and reconstruction must take place concurrently with
planning for the war. Both combat and S&R are critical for success. Ex-
periences in Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated that the local pop-
ulation and the international community at large have grown less toler-
ant of delays in reconstruction.
Because of the complex nature of stabilization and reconstruction,
an integrated approach to winning the peace is needed. The civil-military
10

planning process builds trust among key players, clarifies and establishes
roles and responsibilities, helps identify and resolve inconsistencies and
gaps, and helps to synchronize overall civil-military activities. History
suggests that a comprehensive integrated plan spanning the continuum
from war to combat termination to a transition to civilian control to a
well-defined end state seldom exists. In Afghanistan coordination be-
tween civil, economic, and military functions was fragmented, resulting
in limited economic and civil progress. In Bosnia these functions were
initially fragmented, while in Kosovo they were reasonably well coordi-
nated. Iraq policy was heavily focused on combat operations, with S&R
operations taking a backseat. The Office of Reconstruction and Humani-
tarian Assistance/Coalition Provisional Authority (ORHA/CPA) has been
slow to produce results, in large part because of the delay in planning and
execution and a lack of adequate field authority, personnel, and resources.
Strong U.S. leadership and a policy focused on managing civil, economic,
and political change and maintaining a military presence over a long pe-
riod of time were fundamental to success in Germany and Japan.
Lesson 5: Multilateral operations contribute to legitimacy, burden
sharing, and staying power. They are more difficult than unilateral
operations but cheaper for any one nation and more durable.
Multilateral operations do not, however, guarantee success.
History suggests that multilateral stabilization and reconstruction
operations and nation-building are more complex and time-consuming
than unilateral efforts; however, they can be considerably less expensive
and can produce more thorough societal transformations. Multilateralism
has drawbacks, such as complexity in coordination and burdensome bu-
reaucracy, yet history suggests that multilateralism helps manage risk
while unilateralism invites it. In spite of the limitations, international in-
volvement is important for helping achieve success. For example, UN-
sanctioned operations garner more international legitimacy, help distrib-
ute the costs (manpower and money) more widely, and provide a hedge
against the huge risks of failure. They also provide a means to encourage
staying power to see operations through to a successful outcome.
International involvement has been mixed for the case studies exam-
ined and, though a useful contributor, does not guarantee success. Soma-
lia was the first post-Cold War attempt by the United States to support a
multinational nation-building effort. The effort failed due to the inability
to establish and staff an international structure to fill the governance gap
and begin reconstruction. In Haiti, the U.S.-led multinational military
 LEARNING FROM HISTORY 11

effort successfully restored President Aristide to power, but U.S. and inter-
national elements departed before a competent administration could be
created, self-sustaining democratic structures could be put in place, and
lasting economic reforms could be instituted.
Other multilateral S&R operations experienced varying levels of suc-
cess. Since the occupation of Germany, the largest international effort has
occurred in the Balkans. In Bosnia and Kosovo, NATO led a multinational
military effort of forces from member nations and non-NATO countries.
There was also significant participation by the UN, the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the European Union
(EU), which were responsible for such nation-building tasks as civil ad-
ministration and policing, elections monitoring, and economic develop-
ment. While military unity of command was achieved through NATO,
civilian unity of command was established under UN auspices in Kosovo.
In Bosnia, civilian unity of command was more difficult to achieve be-
cause international responsibilities were more fragmented. As a result,
Bosnia has made political and economic progress but is not yet a self-sus-
taining political and economic entity. Kosovo has been somewhat more
successful because of the high degree of collaboration and burden sharing
among the multilateral participants, though progress has been hindered
because its final status in the international community has not been re-
solved. With the exception of Germany, Kosovo has enjoyed the most rapid
economic recovery among the cases studied. Multilateral involvement has
been considered a major factor in the relative ongoing successes in Bosnia
and Kosovo in particular.
Involvement and support of regional players is also important be-
cause neighboring states can exert significant influence to help achieve the
desired outcome, as was the case in Germany. Neighboring states also can
work at odds, as was the case in Bosnia. Consequently, it is necessary to
both constrain and engage neighboring states. International participation
can contribute to producing greater regional reconciliation, as was the case
in Germany, Bosnia and Kosovo.
Lesson 6: Embedding civilians with reconstruction specialties into the
warfighting force can facilitate planning and coordination.
Experiences in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq suggest that it may
be appropriate to embed civilians in the deploying force to address plan-
ning for civil security and administration, restoring essential services and
other reconstruction needs, and facilitating the transition to the civilian
authority responsible for conducting the longer-term nation-building
12

effort. This was the intended role of Task Force IV and the ORHA in Iraq.
The overall effectiveness has been slow in maturing because planning for
this capability started late, and staffs were not deployed soon enough,
given proper field authority, or adequately resourced to do the jobs they
needed to do upon arrival in country.
Lesson 7: Unity of effort depends heavily on a shared vision and the
ability to shape the response of multilateral participants.
Diverse players are involved in stabilization and reconstruction op-
erations—international and regional organizations, nongovernmental or-
ganizations, U.S. government and other foreign government agencies, and
coalition militaries. Broad multilateral participation is compatible with
unity of effort if the major participants share a common vision and can
shape international institutions accordingly, as in Kosovo with the UN,
OSCE, EU, NATO and contributing nations. Close coordination built on
this shared vision and unity of effort is important in building a stable
peace and for preventing partners from unintentionally working at cross
purposes. In multinational operations, the U.S. military can find itself in a
lead nation role or in a support role, where U.S. military units report to a
non-U.S. commander (for example, KFOR in Kosovo) or multinational
units report to a U.S. commander (for example, the U.S. led MND–North
in Bosnia and MNB–East in Kosovo). In these circumstances unity of
command becomes critical.
In Bosnia and Kosovo, NATO was effective in ensuring broad multi-
national military participation and unity of command. On the civilian side
the record was mixed. The Office of the High Representative (OHR) in
Bosnia was fragmented among competing civil agencies, and there was lit-
tle coordination between OHR and NATO at the beginning of the opera-
tion. In Kosovo, on the other hand, multinational unity of effort was
achieved under UN auspices, and there was good coordination between
NATO and the UN.
Lesson 8: Information operations require a comprehensive and
integrated strategy from the inception of the operation through
stabilization and reconstruction and nation-building to the desired end
state. IO needs to shape and influence the information environment.
Information operations (IO) are more than leaflet drops and Com-
mando Solo broadcasts, especially in the new world of global information
and the 24/7 international media cycle. They can help to establish legiti-
macy for the operation, win the hearts and minds of the local population,
gain regional and international support, and influence an adversary’s
 LEARNING FROM HISTORY 13

decisions. Communication with the local population is critical for manag-

ing expectations, allaying fears and suspicions, helping establish legitimacy
and support for the operation, and minimizing public unrest and possible
interference with the operation.
The United States has not done that well in understanding its target
audience and waging the information war. For example, the IO campaign
in Iraq was inadequately integrated with the overall political-military ef-
fort. It was also slow to respond to threats and failed to utilize the most
common venue accessible to Iraqis—the printed word. In many of the case
studies, the product development, testing, and approval cycle was cumber-
some and lacked timeliness. In the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq, it also
proved difficult to measure the effectiveness of the information campaign
and to make definitive judgments because there were no agreed measures
of performance or effectiveness to support planning and assessment.
Lesson 9: Collaborative information environments facilitate civil-
military coordination and information sharing.
Communications and information systems supporting past S&R op-
erations were stove-piped and had limited coverage and capacity and little
connection between military and civilian systems. This contributed to
problems in civil-military coordination and information sharing in several
cases. Tactical military systems primarily supported the warfighting mili-
tary command and control needs and provided only limited service to de-
ployed national government agency elements. Deployed government
agencies, IOs, and NGOs used indigenous commercial telecommunica-
tions systems or contractor provided capabilities that were not directly
linked with the military networks. Some progress has been made in devel-
oping collaborative information environments for military operations, but
none exist for civil-military operations in S&R environments.

Conclusions
● History teaches that regime change operations can be successful in

various cultural settings, but the record is mixed and the price high.
● There are numerous uncontrollable factors that affect the out-

come, especially the nation’s political, social and economic past.

● But there are controllable factors that can help determine the out-

come, such as the level of effort and time the United States will contribute.
● A stable security environment is a necessary, but not sufficient in-

gredient for success.

14

●Another necessary ingredient is broad unity of effort within the

U.S. government.
● Taken together, the case histories studied make a strong argument

for creating a standing stabilization and reconstruction force as part of the

U.S. military.

Notes
1 Sources included interviews of senior personnel such as Ambassadors Robert B. Oakley and

James Dobbins, literature searches, and review of findings from studies by the National Defense Uni-
versity, U.S. Army War College, U.S. Institute of Peace, ASD C3I Command and Control Research Pro-
gram, Institute of Defense Analyses, RAND, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Association
of the United States Army, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Government Accounting
Office, Open Society Institute, and UN Foundation.
2 James Dobbins, America’s Role in Nation-Building From Germany to Iraq, RAND, 2003.

3 Minxin Pei and Sara Kasper, “Lessons from the Past: The American Record on Nation-building,”

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003.

4 Scott Feil, “Building Better Foundations: Security in Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” white paper

for the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project prepared by the Center for Strategic and International
Studies and the Association of the U.S. Army, September 22, 2002, 1, accessed at <www.csis.org/isp/
pcr/securitypaper.pdf>.
5 “Establishing the Rule of Law in Iraq,” USIP, 2003.

6 Robert Perito, “The American Experience with Police in Peace Operations,” Pearson Peacekeeping

Center, 2002.
Chapter 2

New Strategic Concepts

S
ecuring the peace in the aftermath of conflict depends on many fac-
tors: how much damage is inflicted on a region’s infrastructure, how
many civilians unconnected to the local regime are killed or injured,
and how much regional instability a long military campaign creates all
shape the prospects for success in the post-conflict environment. Conse-
quently, planning for military operations must begin with a clear, attain-
able, political-military objective that includes an understanding of what
the postwar setting must look like when combat operations end and post-
conflict operations begin.
In 1956, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden concluded that
Egypt’s new president, Gamal Abdul Nasser, was a dangerous fascist riding
the wave of Arab nationalism to greater and greater heights of power.
When Egypt took over the Suez Canal from Britain, Eden saw Nasser as
another Hitler and decided that any policy but direct military action
would amount to appeasement. French Premier Guy Mollet shared this
opinion and agreed to join Britain in an attack on Egypt to remove Nasser.
For Eden, the removal of Nasser seemed to be enough to rationalize the
use of British military power, but Eden’s military commanders needed
more, as Geoffrey Regan recounts:
Field Marshal Montgomery, soon after he heard that Eden planned a
strike against Egypt, asked him what was his object. Eden apparently
replied that it was to “knock Nasser off his perch.” Montgomery says
that he told Eden this was not good enough and that his generals
would need to know what the political aim was after Nasser was top-
pled, in order to plan the right kind of operation.1

* Thanks to Dr. James Kurtz, Institute for Defense Analysis, for sharing his work on the British
Army experience and its application to the U.S. Army in the new strategic environment.

15
16

The rest of the story is too well known to repeat here. Suffice it to say
that Nasser’s influence in the Arab world was enhanced by Britain’s mud-
dled intervention.2 In the end, it was Eden who was removed from office,
and British prestige was severely damaged.
Eden’s failure to answer the question of what came after Nasser was
partly responsible for the operation’s disastrous outcome. If the effect
Eden wanted was the removal of Nasser, what were the steps that had to be
taken, and did those steps promise to achieve the political goals without
unnecessary risk or without other, unintended consequences in the after-
math of conflict? Was the cause-effect chain clear and logical to others (for
example, Montgomery)? The answers to these questions indicate serious
flaws in Eden’s planning.
Military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq once again have plunged
Western armies into the chaos and disorder of the Islamic World, a region
where the problems of maintaining order and creating prosperity seem in-
tractable.3 In the Islamic World, as in many parts of the developing world,
long-established social structures and belief systems are crumbling under
the crushing weight of global change, and the people whose lives depended
upon the old structures are seeing their worlds disintegrate.4 The challenge
to America and her allies is gradually to bring such areas of the world that
exist beyond the pale of the globalized world into the modern, integrated
structure of planetary civilization.
Understanding this aspect of stabilization and reconstruction opera-
tions is important; some of America’s adversaries in the non-globalized
world may conclude that it is possible to sap America to the point where it
allows the world to be changed for the worse.5 That is certainly the goal of
the smartest of these adversaries. Sadly, America’s ignominious withdrawal
from Somalia confirmed them in their judgment of American weakness.
Thus, military power is crucial to the maintenance of American self-con-
fidence in conflict and post-conflict operations. If conflict and post-con-
flict operations look hard, America may deter itself from taking action in
its own interest. Indeed, self-deterrence is one of the greatest dangers
America faces today. Deciding whether to take military action that in-
cludes post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction operations should be
based not on whether the operations look easy or hard, but on whether
they are essential to the security interests of the United States and its allies.
Keeping in mind that conflict and post-conflict periods overlap, this
chapter examines what needs to happen in the broader context of strate-
gic planning before, during, and after the conduct of military operations
 NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPTS 17

in conflict or crisis. The key to success in post-conflict settings is under-

standing two interrelated points: that no military solution is possible ab-
sent a political and economic solution, and that persistent conditions of
insecurity prevent enduring, positive, political and economic develop-
ment. For the American and British Armies, addressing the range of diffi-
culties that can obstruct post-conflict stability and grasping the strategic
imperatives of post-conflict planning are essential to the creation of con-
ditions conducive to the emergence of a new, prosperous, and more hu-
mane society.

Background
Today, most of the tensions in the international arena stem from the
impact of globalization and the resulting forces of ethnic, tribal and reli-
gious hatred. Terrorism is the latest manifestation of the intersection of
these forces and signals that the international system is in a period of re-
adjustment as much of the developing world copes with the forces of un-
even change. American military action will occasionally be unavoidable as
states and regions of the world that fail to integrate into or fall out of the
global economy threaten American and allied access to vital resources or
create refugee flows. In some cases like, such as Afghanistan, countries can
become sanctuaries for terrorism, organized crime, and narcotics traf-
ficking. In nearly every case, they become catalysts for regional conflict
and instability.
At the same time, most of the social, economic, and military struc-
tures in the areas where U.S. and allied forces are likely to operate are
weakened from years of economic stagnation, internal corruption, and, in
some cases, international sanctions. These fragile structures can be ex-
pected to break relatively quickly under resolute American military as-
sault. This means that American military operations will almost certainly
result in some form of power vacuum that American forces will have to
fill. In other words, if the United States and its allies disarm a country and
remove its government from power, the United States and its allies take on
the obligation to defend it.
The effect of these events on the Armed Forces is that they confront
more complex tasks; they will be employed more often, more quickly, and
in a greater diversity of strategic settings than ever before. The leading
force in land warfare, the U.S. Army, must be ready to perform tasks from
humanitarian aid to regime removal and post-conflict reconstruction.
Fulfilling this role, however, requires a fresh analytical approach.
18

Discussion
With these points in mind, a more coherent framework to guide
planning and thinking must emerge. This suggests the need for some lim-
ited, but useful generalizations that can be developed to serve as the con-
ceptual basis for thinking and planning future military operations with
post-conflict requirements in mind. The point of this approach is simple:
Once the right questions are asked, answers can be provided and action
can be taken to address the identified requirements.
Coherent War-Winning and Peace-Winning Strategy
No one doubts the importance to the success of a military campaign
of a viable political strategy with attainable political-military objectives,
but devising such a strategy is harder than is generally recognized. In con-
flict and post-conflict settings, strategy involves the art of controlling and
managing all the resources of a nation or a coalition of nations, including
armed forces, to the end that vital interests shall be effectively promoted
and secured against enemies, actual, potential, or merely presumed. This
approach is in fact the highest form of strategy, because it integrates mili-
tary power with diplomacy, economic development, and political interests
and results in policies that operate for decades or even centuries. In post-
conflict planning, a strategy that does not spread American and allied mil-
itary resources too thinly but instead links military capabilities to other
governmental and non-governmental agencies is essential.
Of course, agreement on political-military goals is always difficult to
reach, but agreement on what counts constitutes the foundation for strat-
egy in military operations. Non-governmental actors are usually very
knowledgeable about an area and its inhabitants. They can help refine ap-
proaches that require military attention. However difficult it may be to ar-
ticulate them, understanding the interests of all actors involved in the con-
duct of conflict and post-conflict operations is the true wellspring of valid
objectives that define what a nation or coalition of nations is trying to do.
As always, the most compelling interests relate to survival, but no interest
exists in a vacuum. Hardly anyone is neutral. Even seemingly innocuous
interests can cause conflict.
These observations suggest that regardless of how much American
military commanders know about their opponents and their military ob-
jectives, given the unstructured nature of U.S. national strategy since the
end of the Cold War, it is almost certain that military operations will de-
velop in parallel with evolving policy goals. This means that commanders
must exercise initiative and think through the consequences of their
 NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPTS 19

actions, whether or not they are told specifically what to do in varying cir-
cumstances. Inevitably, this recognition imposes the minimal requirement
to plan for the use of facilities that are specifically excluded from destruc-
tion and for rules of engagement, humanitarian assistance, power genera-
tion, if needed, and local law and order in the aftermath of conflict.
As the Russians discovered in Chechnya, military occupation does
not automatically equal a political solution. Augmenting and staffing land
component command headquarters with the expertise and talent to com-
pensate for what the commander does not know or has not studied in the
context of stabilization and reconstruction operations is crucial. Planning
ahead will never be enough. Unanticipated requirements will always de-
velop. Military leaders charged with executing military action need to un-
derstand the limits of what they can accomplish while reacting to the
sometimes open-ended missions that they are occasionally instructed to
execute. In post-conflict settings, commanders must anticipate the need
for a different mix of capabilities and incorporate them into force plan-
ning. If disaffected enemy military formations are inclined to cooperate,
this too must be considered as a means of maximizing resources in the
conflict region to shorten warfighting operations and improve the
prospects for stability in the post-conflict environment. In sum, by asking
the right questions in the context of post-conflict needs, it is possible for
commanders to discern what is essential to link tactical actions directly to
strategic goals and to discard what is unimportant or counterproductive
before, during, and after combat operations.
Unity of Effort
Integrating the diverse military and civilian agencies operating in
the post-conflict environment is important but not easy. Without a
shared strategic vision, there is always a real danger that various actors—
civilian and military—will cling tenaciously to their own policy views and
strategic orientations, unwilling or unable to integrate their perceptions
with the perceptions of others. Unity of command and broad participa-
tion may occasionally be at odds if the lead nation adopts a policy posi-
tion that other participants cannot accept. Thus, the need to balance in-
stitutional and local interests in the context of policy making and
implementation is critical.
The effective use of military capabilities in conflict and post-conflict
environments demands the reconciliation of political ends and military/
civilian means. Without this reconciliation, clear attainable objectives
based on a sound political vision will not emerge and unity of effort will
20

be sacrificed. Somalia demonstrated conclusively the importance of unity

of effort. At one point, there were three separate command arrangements
in Somalia. Often this resulted in at least one organization not knowing
what the others were doing. Somalia also showed the need to realistically
match the political mandate for intervention to the existing capabilities—
in Somalia the mandate actually grew as the force structure declined.
Ideally, all lines of authority would lead unambiguously and directly
to and through a single headquarters combining civilian and military ex-
pertise in a clearing-house for decisionmaking. The authority of the indi-
vidual in charge, whether civilian or military, over civil and military or-
ganizations of power and influence is essential to the establishment of an
integrated, interagency response in support of a coherent strategy for sta-
bilization and reconstruction.
Compelling and Consistent Strategic Message
Knowledge of the historical record should teach us “how to think,
not what to do.” Clearly, post-conflict planning and implementation
strategies demand an understanding of more than the right weapon for
the right target set. What general insights can we draw from experience?
When Field Marshal Sir Gerald Templer arrived in Malaya 6 to assume
command of all British military and civilian elements of the on-going
counter-insurgency campaign, he focused intently on the message that he
wanted insurgents, soldiers, and civilians to hear and understand. Knowing
that he was addressing a diverse audience of Chinese, Malay, Indian, and
British citizens, he was particularly interested in disarming his opposition
while reassuring Britain’s supporters. Ultimately, he composed his essential
strategic message along the following lines: First, Britain would leave
Malaya; Britain had no intention of colonizing Malaya in the postwar pe-
riod or keeping forces in Malaya. Second, although there was no timetable
for British military withdrawal, the removal of British forces would depend
on specific conditions. These conditions entailed, for example, the estab-
lishment of local law and order, a functioning judiciary and penal system to
support law and order, unimpeded movement of all people and goods
across the country, and the creation of a national army that would be the
guarantor of Malaya’s independence and freedom. Faced with the con-
straints that a diminished British Empire imposed on his operations, Field
Marshal Templer insisted that he would make do with the 33 British in-
fantry battalions in the brigade battlegroups he had on hand and told
British authorities, “The answer lies not in pouring more troops into the
jungle, but in the hearts and minds of the people.” 7
 NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPTS 21

British authorities made clear their intention to depart Malaya once

conditions of political and economic stability returned to the peninsula.
Conditions was the operative term. In time, because the Malayan populace
took seriously British public statements expressing Britain’s intention to
leave Malaya once internal stability existed, the resulting misery that ter-
rorism inflicted on the population actually undermined the communist
insurgency. Malayans, Chinese, and Indians who sympathized in any way
with the insurgency saw no reason to support it when it became clear that
the British had no intention of remaining indefinitely. Coupled with the
inability of communist insurgents to move from opportunistic terrorism
to a sustained and effective military campaign against the British, terrorist
actions built support in the population for the British-led military cam-
paign against the communists.8
Britain’s success against the insurgency in Malaya is not a perfect
analogy for American and allied operations today in Southwest Asia, but it
does provide evidence that a uniform, consistent message that supports a
political strategy with attainable political-military objectives is vital. In ad-
dition, Field Marshal Templer’s message was no less important to the
British military authorities. Thanks to the clarity of the message, they, too,
understood as clearly as their Malayan counterparts what had to be done
to facilitate Britain’s withdrawal from the region. Today, what American
and allied soldiers and civilians say and do make a difference. The Sergeant
on patrol must understand and convey the same message that the Joint
Force Commander or his civilian counterparts disseminate.
Full Spectrum Planning
Post-conflict planning evolves in parallel with the war plan. It
equates to planning backward from victory.9 This kind of thinking re-
quires that the joint force keep the final objective in mind while following
promising intermediate paths to the final objective before, during, and
after the conflict ends.
Entailed in reaching this objective is the systematic calculation of the
value, as well as the risk and cost, of attacking specific enemy vulnerabili-
ties or strengths based on the effect produced by their physical or func-
tional destruction, neutralization, denial, exploitation, or manipulation
through all available means, direct and indirect.10 Facilities that offer ca-
pabilities in the post-conflict environment to advancing American and al-
lied forces need to be spared. For instance, Yugoslav military barracks were
nearly all destroyed during the Kosovo air campaign, with the result that
entirely new facilities had to be built for arriving NATO troops when the
22

Yugoslav forces withdrew. In addition, the decision to destroy the com-

munications infrastructure made it very tough in the first few weeks of
NATO’s occupation to disseminate critical information to all of the re-
gion’s inhabitants.
Operations necessary to sustain American influence when the fight-
ing ends are no less important than the combat operations themselves are
to victory. Having won the war, it is vital to win the peace. In strategic
terms, this requires the coherent and continuous application of national
and alliance elements of power through effects-based processes to ac-
complish strategic objectives. In practice, this may involve the need to
front-load critical civil order and humanitarian assistance capabilities im-
mediately behind advancing combat troops. This was done in Kosovo,
with the result that the civilian population suffered minimally. In some
settings, the need to incorporate disaffected enemy civil and military au-
thorities and their supporting elements should be considered early in the
post-conflict process.11
This recognition implies early planning for the combination of
American and allied military forces with U.S., allied, and international
civilian capabilities, including governmental, international, and non-gov-
ernmental organizations and private contractors. This planning process
should include identification and development of these resources and
planning for their initial combined utilization and the subsequent devolu-
tion from military to civilian operations. This is a very important consid-
eration, whether the activity is relief, stabilization, or reconstruction. It is
essential, even in the early stages with a weak initial civilian capability. It
can be much more effective if the civilian capability to influence recon-
struction is better developed early in the planning process.
Concurrency of Operations
As noted earlier, the American political goal in post-conflict settings
is to create the conditions conducive to the emergence of a more humane
government on the local and national levels that is democratic in character.
The operative word here is conditions, because the strength and presence of
U.S. and allied military power is really dependent on specific conditions,
not on timetables for withdrawal devised in isolation from developments in
the post-war region. Success in stabilization and reconstruction operations
depends on the mobilization of capabilities during and after conflict that
are essential to the maintenance of order and the restoration of normal eco-
nomic activity. All of these points suggest straightforward military tasks
that ultimately drive conditions in the post-conflict environment.
 NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPTS 23

Task 1. Suppress, defeat, or destroy those elements that resist the

emergence of a new society or simply promote anarchy. As will be seen,
these operations involve much more than conventional military power.
They require the tight integration of small, effectively led conventional
army and marine units with Army Special Forces, intelligence, counter-
terrorist, and local police elements.
Task 2. Establish law and order. These activities require a mix of spe-
cialized military and police units with the skills and the judicial authority
to impose a new, effective, and legitimate political order.
Task 3. On an emergency basis, repair damage to infrastructure that
is essential to the emergence of a new social and political order. Army en-
gineer units working with civil and indigenous authorities target critical
infrastructure for power regeneration, transportation, sanitation, commu-
nication, and education.
Task 4. Rapidly establish an effective interim government constituted
from the indigenous population. U.S. and allied military and civil author-
ity must simultaneously create the conditions for the growth of local self-
rule and economic prosperity, often in the context of serious internal eth-
nic and sectarian tensions.
All four tasks must be tackled simultaneously because they are inter-
dependent. U.S. Joint Forces Command argues that for any current or fu-
ture joint force to discharge the tasks of stabilization and reconstruction
with success requires significant coordination across service and govern-
mental boundaries. No doubt this is true, but the force mix that is de-
ployed to the warfight must already contain some of the capabilities that
will be needed in those areas where fighting has ended and reconstruction
has begun.
Precision-targeting of Rejectionist Elements
As Sir Winston Churchill said of Field Marshal Montgomery’s
lethargic and ponderous advance against the out-gunned and out-
manned combined German and Italian force at El Alamein: “When you
are winning a war almost everything that happens can be claimed to be
right and wise.” The opposite also holds true in post-conflict settings. If
the perception grows that security is poor, that law and order are unen-
forceable, then almost everything that happens is criticized. If security de-
grades, the pressure to withdraw U.S. and allied forces grows, as the
American experience in Somalia demonstrated. Among those who resist
American military intervention and the forces of globalization that inter-
vention brings with it, the hope is that, like the Soviet military in
24

Afghanistan, the American military will respond with indiscriminate

crackdowns and violence. Terrorist or insurgent elements are always en-
gaged in obtaining popular support on their home ground and abroad by
attacking American military targets in areas where Americans are in-
tensely unpopular.
This was true in Somalia and it is likely to be the case wherever
American soldiers and marines serve. It is the unavoidable price of super-
power status. Terrorists know that the people most likely to render aid and
assistance to them will be those who lose friends, relatives, and parents to
American military action. In Afghanistan, for instance, the code of con-
duct known as the Pushtunwaldi stresses, besides other things, blood
vengeance (badal).12 As a result, finding and defeating or co-opting rejec-
tionist elements that violently oppose U.S. and allied intervention is criti-
cal to mission success. Success in this arena is critical if military problems
are to be converted to police problems—the real purpose of counter-in-
surgency operations.
In exclusively military terms, this means that the best way to inflict
serious losses on the terrorists is to locate them without being seen, to de-
ploy ambush parties and launch small, but deadly assaults with standoff
attack weapons in support. With dramatic improvements in precision,
advanced command and control systems, and the growing transparency
provided by an evolving intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
grid, the tactical use of small Army and Marine elements against discrete
targets is more achievable today than ever before. But to be effective the
civilian, military, and intelligence resources must be interconnected or
netted, as well as jointly commanded. Ideally, what one part of this inte-
grated organization sees, all parts must see; what one part thinks, all parts
must think.13
The collection, processing, analysis, fusion, and dissemination of
timely information and intelligence must be addressed in an integrative
setting. Feedback to every level, civilian and military, is critical. Soldiers
who apprehend suspects who are subsequently transported to higher
headquarters for more thorough interrogation must know the results of
the interrogation to more effectively target suspects in the future.
This tactic necessitates the use of small detachments of American
and allied soldiers that are not much larger than the enemy concentration
they are attacking. For one thing, most enemies in the post-conflict
environment will deliberately avoid direct combat with regular Army and
Marine combat forces, preferring instead to emphasize offensive action
 NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPTS 25

against smaller, lightly protected and equipped U.S. ground elements, par-
ticularly at night. To avoid losses to superior American firepower, terror-
ists and insurgents must remain dispersed and strike unexpectedly. In the
post-conflict environments of today’s world, there is no distinction be-
tween front and rear, with the added disadvantage that American artillery
is of limited utility in a setting where fighting is close and sudden. As a re-
sult, accurate, devastating direct fire from close range and from standoff
distances is the key in these encounters. But the real ingredient for success
is initiative, and initiative requires freedom of action.
If American ground forces are subject to attack when and where they
are unprepared for terrorist action, they will lose the initiative. Tactical in-
dependence of small units along with the use of reaction forces that in-
clude AH64Ds on routine patrol overhead or on strip alert, and un-
manned combat aerial vehicles are part of the answer, but surveillance
platforms with the capacity for sustained coverage in areas where terrorist
activity is highest are vital if American military power is to be selectively
and effectively applied against the armed enemy.
Accurate, devastating firepower is not the only variable in this com-
plex equation. Education of officers to understand and perform these tasks
is equally, if not more critical. Military force is credible only to the extent
that the will that uses it is credible. However, military power employed in
isolation from a psychological program designed to undermine the rejec-
tionists’ legitimacy will not work. Sporadic acts of terror or violence per-
sist as long as there is a support base within the population that tolerates
or accepts the legitimacy of the insurgent cause.14
Improved Cultural Intelligence
What is required for the difficult and complex job of winning hearts
and minds is something General Anthony Zinni, USMC (Ret.), former
Commander, U.S. Central Command, calls cultural intelligence. Zinni has
his own short list of questions to this end: “What I need to understand is
how these societies function. What makes them tick? Who makes the de-
cisions? What is it about their society that’s so remarkably different in their
values and the way I think in my western, white-man mentality?” 15
Geared to fight traditional wars against conventional enemies, sol-
diers must now make significant and, in some cases, radical changes in
the way they think about warfare and the conduct of stabilization and re-
construction operations in the post-conflict environment. The Army is
experiencing major changes in size, composition, mission, and technol-
ogy. The number and variety of operations are increasing with far greater
26

emphasis on joint and multinational operations, while new technology is

simultaneously changing the nature of warfare.16 Box-to-box connectiv-
ity is worthless without brain-to-brain connectivity, and the required in-
tellectual connectivity comes with education and experience.17 Brigadier
General David Grange, USA (Ret.), summed up the challenge very well:
A transformed mindset is one that can handle the chaotic and uncer-
tain situations created by the collapse of political, economic, and se-
curity systems. Leaders must be able to operate in countries that have
no effective governments, where the enemy and front lines are not
easily identifiable, and rules of engagement are conflicting. Our forces
are expected to deal with terrorists, drug traffickers, warlords, militant
fundamentalists, and paramilitary units—and still be able to over-
come large maneuver formations and formidable defense systems.18
Military educational institutions, however, lost their monopoly as
providers of knowledge and understanding long ago. A good plan for offi-
cer development that emphasizes the criticality of teaching leaders how—
as opposed to what—to think is the first step. To cope with the complex
challenge of joint expeditionary warfare and stabilization and reconstruc-
tion operations, officers will increasingly need the educational background
found only in major universities. Thus, the second step involves selecting
officers willing to participate in rigorous graduate education programs.
Assuming the background for stabilization and reconstruction exists,
the analytical framework for understanding the adversary in the field be-
gins with the over-arching concept of foreign internal defense (FID), which
is defined as participation by civilian and military agencies of a government
in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and
protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.19 These ac-
tivities include the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its
growth and to protect itself from subversion as it develops. FID focuses
specifically on building viable institutions (political, economic, social and
military) that respond to the needs of a developing society.
The use of incentives—including actions ranging from the provision
of specific human services and the repair of damaged infrastructure by
Army engineers and technical units to the targeted delivery of hard cash
into the right hands—must animate the behavior of military leaders at
every level. This low-level excursion by U.S. and allied forces into the post-
conflict society is critical to the development of a sophisticated capability
to conduct military operations based on human intelligence (HUMINT).
Black and White Special Forces operatives armed with good HUMINT
 NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPTS 27

operating from within the communities themselves can help guide and
shape the actions of conventional Army ground forces. In time, this ap-
proach will produce critical information that can be used quickly and ef-
fectively to destroy the terrorist or insurgent. In time, the insurgent’s fear
of betrayal from within his small group becomes a paranoia that dissolves
the group and leads to defeat of the larger insurgency.
Early Demonstrable Success in Key Areas
Early success in three key areas—security, power, and jobs—is essen-
tial in any post-conflict setting. Where local law and order have disinte-
grated, security is immediately at risk. Where water and energy services are
interrupted, daily life for the inhabitants quickly becomes intolerable.
And, where jobs have vanished with the regime that created them, thou-
sands of disgruntled former employees provide fertile recruiting ground
for insurgency and terrorism. Presumptions of American success in con-
flict or post-conflict environments should not ignore these facts.
Consider the security problem first. If striking at small, local enemy
concentrations and fixed targets becomes the sole objective, future stabi-
lization and reconstruction operations will soon falter. Appropriately or-
ganized, equipped and trained ground combat forces drawn from the local
population or the cooperative elements in the existing military establish-
ment must be on hand to work closely with U.S and allied forces to pur-
sue insurgents into their sanctuaries and destroy them in detail. Thus,
friendly indigenous forces must be given the opportunity to demonstrate
that they are professionally trained as police or soldiers and that they can
move quickly and decisively against any resisting enemy. This means ade-
quately arming the local police and giving them the authority to arrest
and, if necessary, kill their opponents.
Organized crime always flourishes in post-conflict settings where
local order has collapsed. Only armed policemen who speak the local lan-
guage, know the inhabitants, and are familiar with the area can cope with
the challenge of organized crime. The military can support and reinforce
their activity, but the investigative capabilities of the American and allied
military establishments to root out and destroy organized crime are lim-
ited. All too frequently, criminal elements and organized political opposi-
tion are linked. Finding ways to separate the two sides of this equation is
important, because political opposition feeds on the illicit funds provided
by organized criminality.
During the planning for the introduction of NATO forces into
Kosovo, teams of military police and engineers were assembled and
28

incorporated into the force packages that entered Kosovo immediately

after Yugoslav forces withdrew. This action ensured that both local secu-
rity concerns and the need for the rapid regeneration of electric power
would be addressed in the first days of NATO occupation. NATO forces
were lucky insofar as power was concerned. In most cases, connectivity to
power sources in surrounding countries could be restored with relatively
little difficulty. However, in some cases, military units provided large gen-
erators with the capacity to provide power for local clinics and hospitals
until connections to better sources were restored.
Providing jobs is a much tougher challenge. For example, the United
Nations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo have created false economies
of dependency by hiring local national labor to support a variety of UN
initiatives. But far too little attention has been focused on the introduction
of commercial firms through the loosening of restrictions in customs and
cross-border traffic. Nascent capitalism often is lumped together with or-
ganized crime, particularly in countries where there is little or no history
of a viable free market. Distinguishing one from the other is essential,
however, if a new economic structure is to emerge that does not depend
on foreign donors for survival. Developing internal markets linked to
food, shelter, and clothing are attainable near-term goals, but not enough
to sustain long-term economic growth. Because no one country can de-
velop in isolation from its surroundings, true economic development al-
ways requires a regional strategy that links development to the larger mar-
ket forces of the region.
When conditions are not secure, it is always difficult to entice capital
investment. Despite the violence in Gaza and the West Bank, the Palestin-
ian Arab private sector—spearheaded by the Palestinian diaspora and the
support of the European Union—has had some success in creating new
banking systems, venture capital funds, and a mechanism for the privati-
zation of telecommunication and other industries. American business,
however, has been understandably reluctant to invest in the area, and the
continuous breakdown of civil order in the Palestinian areas makes it un-
likely that this condition will change soon.20
Early Introduction of Indigenous Capabilities
In the complex environment of postwar stabilization and recon-
struction, legitimacy, consent, and the use of force are inextricably inter-
twined. Without the help of the people who already live in the region
where the conflict occurred, it is simply not possible to restore normalcy
in public order or economic terms. It is important to understand that
 NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPTS 29

there are large numbers of targets for insurgents or terrorists to choose

from and that defending them all demands infinite U.S and coalition re-
sources that will not be provided. Nearly one-third of occupying forces are
normally engaged in protecting specific sites, lines of communication, and
strong points. These static guard missions should be the first tasks to pass
rapidly over to local citizens.
As noted earlier, the first place to start is to create local police and mil-
itary establishments staffed by indigenous people. Making the training and
formation of local citizens as police is a top priority in any post-conflict en-
vironment. The faster this process occurs, the more successful the larger
stabilization and reconstruction operation is likely to be and the sooner
U.S. and allied military forces can withdraw. As the British Army discovered
the hard way in Ulster, it was a serious mistake for British troops to conduct
house-to-house searches of Irish homes. Local police drawn from the pop-
ulation were much better at the job and they evoked a much less hostile re-
sponse from the Irish population than the British Army did.
Identifying American citizens with skills of importance to the oper-
ation and linking them through the Internet to operations on the ground
is another way to encourage greater local participation. During the early
phases of American military operations in Afghanistan, Afghans living in
the United States provided enormously important insights and support to
U.S. and allied forces trying to establish a rapport with the indigenous
population. Bringing former citizens of a country ravaged by war and
under U.S. and allied occupation to the county in question can be help-
ful—if they are not inserted immediately into positions of authority, but
used instead as a kind of positive fifth column to build support for the
larger reconstruction effort.
These points notwithstanding, there can be serious obstacles to co-
operation with the people whom soldiers and marines are trying to help
in the post-conflict environment. In a very different strategic setting, Gen-
eral Sherman made similar observations in the context of southern recon-
struction after America’s Civil War:
No matter what change we may desire in the feelings and thoughts of
the people of the South, we cannot accomplish it by force. Nor can we
afford to maintain there an army large enough to hold them in sub-
jugation. All we can, or should attempt is to give them rope, to
develop in an honest way if possible, preserving in reserve enough
military power to check any excesses if they attempt any.21
30

Lego-like S&R Capabilities

The use of force must be agile, responsive, and suited to the specific
environment. For instance, soldiers with small arms in soft-skinned vehi-
cles are not capable of coping with terrorists or insurgents armed with
armor-piercing weapons, such as rocket-propelled grenades or command-
detonated anti-tank mines. At the same time, tanks are not well suited for
crowd control or urban policing. This means that different types and lev-
els of force will be required within the post-conflict region depending on
local conditions. Understanding this point influences the development of
force packages that contain capabilities both for warfighting and for pro-
vision of humanitarian assistance and civil order.
What is required is the ability to organize core military capabilities
into specialized modules of mission-focused combat power for integration
as needed into post-conflict operations. Transforming ground forces into
mission-focused force packages—the military equivalent of “Legos” that
can be assembled into larger joint operational forces—is applicable to post-
conflict operations as well as to combat. In practice, this scheme depends
on evolving joint systems and a technical architecture (a set of building
codes) for successful aggregation. The U.S. Army already has most of the
capabilities needed for stabilization and reconstruction operations, if it is
willing to organize them appropriately.
Military organizations for stabilization and reconstruction opera-
tions should bring specific capabilities to the post-conflict environment
ranging from bridge reconstruction to water purification. However, these
modular organizations should be self-contained both tactically and in re-
gard to command systems to ensure they can be independently deployed
for long periods. This feature of self-containment reduces the need for
communication and information processes both within the modular for-
mations and between them and their higher joint headquarters.
It is vital to apply limited U.S. and coalition military resources when
and where they will have the greatest effect. The key step involves consti-
tuting Army formations from the capabilities that are required for the mis-
sion. One way to create the Lego-like capability is to view Army forces as ca-
pability packages organized for mission effectiveness. Regardless of the
scale of the contingency, Army forces will be required to provide some level
of support to U.S. government agencies, non-governmental organizations,
international organizations, and host-nation agencies.22 The Army should
organize to fulfill the mission.
 NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPTS 31

As in other military operations, standards of training, readiness, and

discipline must be very high. Soldiers must understand that whatever tac-
tic or operational technique worked 10 years ago, 2 days ago, or even 50
miles away may not work again, and they must be prepared to adopt what-
ever tactic does work.23 In this sense, the creation, and the regular em-
ployment, of superior joint tactical forms ought to be the Army goal.

Conclusions
● The importance of establishing attainable political-military objec-

tives to the successful implementation of a war and peace winning strat-

egy cannot be overstated. It is dangerous for American military or civilian
leaders to entertain dreams of social and political structures in any coun-
try that cannot be sustained because the cultural and economic conditions
will not support it.
● Grand designs for nation-building fail when they are conceived in

isolation from conditions in societies that Americans do not understand.

Whatever emerges in the post-conflict environment of American and al-
lied military intervention must reflect the preferences and ideas of the
people that live there.
● What the Army and Marine Corps can do in the post-conflict en-

vironment is no less important than what they do in war. What soldiers

and marines say and do matters to the people under occupation. Their
message must be consistent with the guidelines established at the highest
levels. A failure of understanding makes a coherent strategic message in-
effective. The British experience in Malaya is instructive.
● Advanced technologies are enablers in achieving success, but ulti-

mately it is military organization, training, and thinking on the ground that

will make the difference. Soldiers and marines have the skills, and both
services already have a high percentage of the capabilities that are needed.
What is needed is a new philosophy of military leadership and education
designed to prepare officers and soldiers for post-conflict operations.
● One way to address the diversity of capabilities required in stabi-

lization and reconstruction is to consider the bulk of Army forces as inher-

ently capable of meeting some or most of the post-conflict operational re-
quirements. In practice, Army forces should be viewed as capability
packages organized for mission effectiveness. Army forces have responded
with agility to unanticipated missions before. The use of field artillery units
from Fort Sill, Oklahoma is one example. That said, a policy of reorienting
non-infantry units to perform light and motorized infantry-type missions
32

entails some risk if a joint rotational readiness system is not adopted by the
U.S. Army. Without rotational readiness and unit replacement, formations be-
come very difficult to retrain and refocus on warfighting missions after long
periods of employment in missions other than war.
● The global war on terrorism presents the Army, in particular, with

the opportunity to reevaluate its role in stabilization and reconstruction

missions in a way that will guide Army transformation along new paths to
future operational success. As Field Marshal Rommel said: “Mortal danger
is an effective antidote for fixed ideas.” This necessitates the transforma-
tion of Army thinking and culture into a force organized, trained, and pos-
tured for global joint expeditionary warfare that will include post-conflict
activities, such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Notes
1 Geoffrey Regan, Great Military Disasters: A Historical Survey of Military Incompetence (New York:

Barnes and Noble Books, 1987), 279.

2 James Webb, “Heading for Trouble,” The Washington Post, September 4, 2002, D7. Webb’s com-

ments on the nature of an Iraqi operation are insightful: “The connotations of ‘a MacArthurian re-
gency in Baghdad’ show how inapt the comparison is. Our occupation forces never set foot inside
Japan until the emperor had formally surrendered and prepared Japanese citizens for our arrival. Nor
did MacArthur destroy the Japanese government when he took over as proconsul after World War II.
Instead, he took pains to preserve the integrity of the Japanese imperial family and to work his changes
through the government. Nor is Japanese culture in any way similar to Iraq’s. The Japanese are a ho-
mogeneous people who place a high premium on respect, and they cooperated fully with MacArthur’s
forces by order of the emperor.”
3 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002), 4.

4 Brink Lindsey, Against the Dead Hand: The Uncertain Struggle for Global Capitalism (New York:

John Wiley and Sons, 2002), 211.

5 Jack Shanahan, Chet Richards, and Franklin Spinney, “Bury Cold War Mindset: Fourth-Genera-

tion Warfare Rewrites Military Strategy,” Defense News, August 5–11, 2002, 11.
6 Malaya commonly is confused with Malaysia. On July 9, 1963, Malaya joined with North Bor-

neo, Sarawak, and Singapore to form the Federation of Malaysia. Singapore withdrew August 9, 1965,
and the federation became simply Malaysia.
7 Margaret Shennan, Out in the Midday Sun: The British in Malaya 1880–1960 (London: John

Murray, 2000), 321.

8 Bard E. O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare (Washington,

DC: Brassey’s, 1990), 80–81.

9 Again, according to U.S. Joint Forces Command, effects-based planning (EBP) is an operational

planning process to conduct EBO within rapid decisive operations (RDO). EBP is results-based vice
attrition-based. EBP closely mirrors the current joint planning process yet focuses upon the linkage of
actions to effects to objectives. EBP changes the way we view the enemy, ourselves, and what is in-
cluded and emphasized in the planning process. EBP uses a flexibly structured battle rhythm that
leverages a collaborative knowledge environment and capitalizes on the use of fewer formal joint
boards. It employs virtual, near-simultaneous planning at all echelons of command.
10 C.J. Heatley III, “The Rapid Dominance Concept,” unpublished paper provided to the Office of

Net Assessment by the Defense Group, Inc., Alexandria, VA, January 7, 2000.
 NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPTS 33

11 Mark Fineman, Warren Vieth, and Robin Wright, “Dissolving Iraqi Army Was Costly Choice.

The masses of enlisted men could have been used for reconstruction and security. Now the U.S. faces
terrorism and building a new force,” The New York Times, August 24, 2003, 5.
12 Bard E. O’Neill, 81.

13 Kenneth Watman, “Global 2000,” Naval War College Review 54, no. 2 (Spring 2001), 76.

14 Michael Ignatieff, Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond (New York: Picador, 2001), 203.

15 Anthony C. Zinni, “Non-Traditional Military Missions: Their Nature, and the Need for Cultural

Awareness and Flexible Thinking,” June 4, 1994, reproduced in Joseph Strange, Capital “W” War: A
Case for Strategic Principles of War (Quantico, VA: Defense Automated Printing Service, 1998), 267.
16 Gary Yukl, “Leadership Competencies Required for the New Army and Approaches for Devel-

oping Them,” in Out of the Box Leadership: Transforming the Twenty-First-Century Army and Other
Top-Performing Organizations, ed. James Hunt, George E. Dodge, and Leonard Wong (Stamford, CT:
JAI Press, 1999), 255.
17 Clayton Christensen makes this same point about businesses in The Innovator’s Dilemma: When

New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1997), 209.
18 David L. Grange, “Transforming Isn’t Chanting Slogans,” Proceedings 128, no. 8 (August 2002), 2.

19 See U.S. Special Operations Command Web site, “Terms and Definitions,” for the definition of

Foreign Internal Defense from which this paragraph was extracted.

20 Allan Gerson, “Peace Building: The Private Sector’s Role,” The American Journal of International

Law, 95, no. 1 (January 2001), 109.

21 General William T. Sherman, on the subject of reconstruction in the South after the American

Civil War, 1861–1865.

22 Joint Operations Concept, JROC draft, March 7, 2003, final draft, 27.

23 William Donohue Ellis and Thomas J. Cunningham, Jr., Clark of St. Vith, The Sergeants’ General

(Cleveland: Dillon/Liederbach, 1974), 56, 57, 166, 167.

Chapter 3

Scenarios for Force Sizing

H ow many military forces should the United States possess in

order to perform post-war S&R missions? More fundamentally,
how should it go about making calculated decisions in this
arena? What analytical standard should DOD employ to size its S&R forces
for this purpose? Likewise, what analytical standards should DOD employ
to design its S&R forces in ways that shape their internal characteristics and
performance capabilities? This paper addresses these questions in prelim-
inary ways that can help set the stage for further research and analysis.
With S&R missions now gaining greater urgency, these thorny issues
demand careful attention. S&R forces start functioning after U.S. combat
forces have succeeded in occupying enemy territory. Their purpose is to
carry out S&R missions that arise during war-termination and in the
often-difficult stages that follow before lasting peace is established. For
the most part, forces in the form of major S&R units do not now exist as
organized entities, but many of the components for them are scattered
throughout the force. The recent Iraq experience suggests that U.S. strat-
egy will need them in the years ahead. DOD will not be able to make sen-
sible decisions about how to prepare S&R forces until it has analytical
standards for sizing and designing them. But what should these standards
be? Because these major S&R formations do not now exist, they will have
to be assembled.

Background
This chapter examines scenarios in which U.S. forces might have to
perform S&R missions. The analysis of scenarios and related force plan-
ning considerations is preliminary. It is intended to establish a strategic
framework that will be used to conduct further investigation and does not
pretend to report final results of thorough deliberation. Even so, it offers
suggestive insights on the force planning calculus for S&R missions and
35
36

how scenario analysis fits into this calculus. Basically, the scenarios con-
sidered here support the judgment that the U.S. military needs significant
S&R forces. Determining the exact size and composition of these forces is
a complex enterprise that is best approached by considering multiple op-
tions and weighing their effectiveness in the S&R mission.
As experience shows, scenarios are notoriously bad at predicting
events. Typically the events that they foresee never happen, and they fail to
forecast the surprising contingencies that actually occur. But when used as
analytical tools rather than crystal balls, scenarios can shed light on force
sizing and designing in a generic sense. This chapter takes an initial look
at twelve illustrative S&R scenarios that address the key regions of the
world and help cover the spectrum of future events in terms of size, diffi-
culty, and unique features. The results put forth here are tentative, and will
be developed further as additional research is performed.

Discussion
Clearly the U.S. military needs forces for performing S&R duties. The
Iraq experience has cast a bright spotlight on this new reality. But how
many such forces will be enough? Will DOD need a small S&R force, a
medium-size force, or a large force? This question demands a sensible an-
swer. Today, S&R forces are in great demand. Their responsiveness and ca-
pabilities need to be enhanced, and some argue that they need to be in-
creased in size as well.
Determining how many S&R forces to deploy for a particular con-
tingency is not the same as determining how many forces to deploy for the
purpose of war-termination and post-war occupation. The latter function
typically is performed by combat forces, whose missions and tasks are dif-
ferent from those of S&R. Thus, S&R forces are normally a subset of total
deployments, and they perform missions within their bailiwick. The size
of S&R forces, however, might be large if their missions are demanding.
Depending upon the situation, S&R forces might match or even outnum-
ber occupation combat forces. Moreover, they remain in the occupied
country for a considerable period after most occupation forces have been
withdrawn.
Addressing the S&R force-sizing issue is anything but an exercise in
the obvious. When the Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 and the Defense
Planning Guidance (DPG) were published, they created a “4–2–1” standard
for sizing the overall conventional posture. This standard implied that the
U.S. military should have enough forces to occupy an enemy country the
 SCENARIOS FOR FORCE SIZING 37

size of Iraq or North Korea after an MTW conflict. Today, however, the
United States finds itself actually occupying Iraq while also performing
two small-but-demanding S&R missions in the Balkans (Kosovo and
Bosnia) and Afghanistan. To the extent the current situation is prologue, the
implication is that DOD will need enough S&R forces to handle more than
one concurrent contingency.
Maybe the 4–2–1 standard should be applied to the S&R posture.
The 4–2–1 standard addresses concurrent requirements in flexible ways. It
says that U.S. combat forces should always be prepared for two MTWs, but
in ways that permit them to wage a single MTW while using the remain-
der to handle lesser conflicts and carry out smaller crisis interventions. If
this standard were applied to sizing S&R forces, DOD presumably would
create enough forces for two-MTW-size S&R missions. But it would enjoy
the flexibility to use them for a wide range of lesser contingencies, while
always holding an S&R capability for a single MTW in reserve.
Would this amount of forces be about right, or too much, or too lit-
tle? Nobody knows the answer because nobody can predict the future. Ten
years ago, few people could have imagined U.S. military forces performing
S&R duties in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq at the same time. What
can be said is that no analytical standard will be able to identify a single
point of requirements above which safety and success are ensured, and
below which insecurity and failure are guaranteed. Compared to today’s
minimal posture, more S&R forces will always be better, and fewer forces,
always worse. The real issue is one of confidence levels: How much capa-
bility and insurance does the United States want to possess in an uncertain
world where S&R situations seem to be proliferating?
In the past, DOD has normally tried to answer this question by in-
vesting in additional assets to the point where the so-called “knee of
curve” is reached on a curve of diminishing marginal returns. This is the
point where additional investments provide only small incremental re-
turns that presumably are not worth the added expenses, and where the
marginal costs thus exceed the marginal benefits. If the knee-of-curve
standard is applied to S&R sizing, it might suffice as a general yardstick.
But finding where the knee of the curve resides in the S&R world is a
complicated matter. Will a two–MTW S&R force fall at the knee of the
curve? Will creating it be worth the possible tradeoff of having to sacri-
fice some combat forces? These are questions for analysts to address and
decision-makers to contemplate.
38

The issue of force-design is no less important. Even if the U.S. mili-

tary possess enough S&R forces in aggregate, it can fail to perform key S&R
missions if these forces do not possess the proper assets and capabilities. S&R
missions typically require that a number of different tasks be performed.
The U.S. forces deployed must have enough assets in each category to per-
form all of these tasks at the required level of intensity. S&R situations,
moreover, do not come in a single mode. Indeed, they can generate a wide
range of differing force requirements. Whereas one mission might place a
premium on disarming a defeated enemy military as part of war-termina-
tion, another mission may call for controlling massive immigration and
feeding a desperate population. Still another situation might call for U.S.
forces to suppress looters, rebuild bridges and buildings, restore electrical
power and plumbing, and reconstitute a local police force. The great vari-
ety of such situations suggests that S&R forces should have a wide range of
assets, and should possess the flexible capacity to be packaged and repack-
aged in different ways attuned to the shifting needs at hand.
This need for flexibility and diversity can have an elevating effect on
force requirements because of the requirement for multiple modular
packages, each of which itself must be sized for adequacy. For example, the
U.S. military must possess enough military police, construction engineers,
and civil affairs experts. The act of adding up potential needs in each of
these categories can elevate total force requirements above what normally
might seem adequate. In any event, a more fundamental truth applies: The
United States likely will be better off with a medium-size S&R posture that
has a sensible internal mix of assets than with a large S&R posture that
lacks the necessary array of diverse, well-prepared, and properly balanced
assets. The bottom line is that effective force sizing and force design both
matter in equally important ways that affect each other. If they are to be
performed properly, both require well-construed analytical standards of
the sort that an appraisal of potential scenarios can help bring to life.
Strategic Sources of S&R Scenarios
S&R scenarios may gain frequency owing to changes taking place in
global security and economic affairs. As many observers have noted, glob-
alization and other information-era dynamics are altering the modern
world and creating fast-paced transformations toward unclear destina-
tions. A decade ago, a common hope was that an era of growing prosperity
and tranquility lay ahead, but the post-Cold War world has proven to be
chaotic and dangerous in surprising ways. The result has been a growing
 SCENARIOS FOR FORCE SIZING 39

number of situations requiring the use of U.S. military forces. Today’s

world can be divided into three separate zones, as visualized in figure 4.
The first zone is the “democratic core,” which includes the wealthy
democracies of North America, Europe, and Asia plus parts of Latin
America. For the most part, this zone is not only democratic, but also
prosperous and secure. Composed of about 1.8 billion people and pos-
sessing about 70 percent of the world’s wealth, this zone is a major benefi-
ciary of globalization, new-era regional security affairs, and other positive
trends. The second zone is the “transitional zone.” Numbering over 2 bil-
lion people, this zone includes China, India, Russia, and other key parts of
Central Asia and Asia. While this zone is not wealthy or fully democratic,
many of its countries are making steady progress toward prosperous mar-
ket economies and representative governments.

Figure 4. Today’s World

Democratic
Core

Transitional
Zone

Outlying Endangered Zone:

Focus of Failing States and Ethnic
S&R Rivalries,
Missions Rogue States, Tyrants,
Terrorists, and WMD
Proliferators
40

The third zone is the outlying “endangered zone,” which is profiting

from neither globalization nor new-era security affairs. Straddling the
“southern strategic arc of instability” from the Balkans to the East Asia lit-
toral, this zone includes much of the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, North
Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa plus pockets of instability elsewhere. It to-
tals about 2 billion people. While countries and regions there differ appre-
ciably from each other, they have in common great chaos, turbulence, and
instability. Many countries there pose no military threats to their neigh-
bors, but this zone houses most of today’s failing states, ethnic rivalries,
rogue states, tyrants, terrorists and WMD proliferators. Future S&R sce-
narios come from this zone.
Preliminary Insights from Twelve Illustrative Scenarios
Obviously the continuing occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan,
which could last for some time, will have implications for U.S. force needs
in the S&R arena. But other contingencies also could erupt as the future un-
folds. Total requirements for S&R forces will depend upon decisions re-
garding whether and to what degree the United States should be prepared
for simultaneous contingencies. But in equally important ways, they also
will depend upon the requirements posed by individual contingencies. Sce-
nario analysis can help shed insights on such demands. The twelve scenar-
ios considered here include S&R missions in the Middle East (Iran, Syria,
and Yemen), Asia (North Korea and Indonesia), South Asia (Pakistan), the
Caucasus (Georgia), North Africa (Libya), Sub-Saharan Africa (Liberia and
Sudan), and Latin America (Colombia and Cuba). These are not the only
countries that could be considered, but they form a representative sample
of the total. Key features of these countries are noted in table 2.
By comparison, Iraq has 22 million people, a per capita income
(PCI) of about $2,500, a desert climate, and 375,000 troops under arms.
Afghanistan has 23 million people, and Bosnia about 4 million people. At
its peak, the operation in Bosnia required commitment of approximately
20,000 U.S. personnel, supplemented by 40,000 troops from our NATO al-
lies. Over time, it settled down to become a brigade-size operation for the
United States. Iraq turned out to be a large S&R operation. But it is a coun-
try of only 22 million, and if a special S&R force had been deployed there,
it likely would be division-size. For these reasons, Iraq is best interpreted
as a medium-size S&R operation: for example, smaller than what could be
needed in Iran or other large countries.
S&R scenarios in these countries are purely hypothetical and have
been chosen to illustrate the wide range of geographic diversity and unique
 SCENARIOS FOR FORCE SIZING 41

Table 2. Key Country Characteristics

Population Per Capita Military
Country (millions) Income Terrain Personnel

Colombia 48 $6,200 Jungle/Mountains 158,000

Cuba 11 2,600 Mixed 35,000
Georgia 5 5,300 Mountains/Plains 17,000
Indonesia 216 4,000 Jungle/Forests 300,000
Iran 68 7,400 Desert 325,000
Liberia 3 600 Jungle 11,000
Libya 6 6,200 Desert 76,000
North Korea 24 1,000 Mountains/Plains 1,000,000
Pakistan 162 2,400 Desert 620,000
Sudan 30 1,700 Desert 112,000
Syria 16 7,000 Desert 215,000
Yemen 19 1,500 Desert 50,000

characteristics that would be encountered. While Syria and Yemen are

smaller than Iraq, Iran is three times as populous. Its combination of a large
population and an Islamic culture could make an S&R mission there highly
demanding. An S&R mission in North Korea, after state failure, presumably
would be aided by South Korean troops, yet would be demanding for rea-
sons of its own: a large military to be disarmed, a destitute economy, and a
stultified society. An intervention in Indonesia most likely would be con-
ducted for humanitarian purposes at the request of the government, but
could encounter local resistance, and the large size of the population could
create sizable demands on S&R forces if large portions of the country re-
quired American assistance. An S&R mission in Pakistan presumably
would be a byproduct of chaos caused by collapse of governmental control
or an outgrowth of an Indo-Pakistani war.
An S&R mission in Georgia—a small country—is a surrogate for a
larger number of scenarios that could take place in the Caucasus or Cen-
tral Asia. For Africa, Liberia serves as a surrogate for S&R scenarios in a
number of small West African countries that can be accessed by the sea. By
contrast, Sudan is an East African country that is far harder to access, and
it has more people than Iraq. In the western hemisphere, the scenarios of
42

S&R missions in Colombia and Cuba presumably would occur for differ-
ent reasons. Intervention in Colombia, a large country of 48 million, pre-
sumably would be an outgrowth of drug-trafficking issues and at the re-
quest of the Colombian government. A Cuban S&R mission might take
place if the communist government collapses.
The exact degree of difficulty encountered by U.S. forces is a variable,
not a constant, and would depend upon the situation of the moment. S&R
missions in Islamic countries (that is, seven of the countries on this list)
could be quite difficult for reasons of culture and religion alone. Interven-
tions in small countries outside the Middle East (for example, Georgia or
Colombia) could be easier because the culture is more receptive to West-
ern values. Intervention in a chaotic Pakistan could be extremely difficult.
But even this scenario would be less demanding than two much larger sce-
narios not considered here because they are so implausible: a big S&R mis-
sion in South Asia after an Indo-Pakistan nuclear war, or an S&R mission
in China. In any event, none of these scenarios would be pushovers: all
would require serious force preparations.
The countries range in size: three are large, five are medium-size, and
four are small. Their economies are mostly poor, but vary from Middle
Eastern countries with PCIs of $6,000 or so to poverty-stricken countries
with PCIs of $2,000 or less. Their terrain conditions also vary greatly,
ranging from deserts to jungles, with few offering established infrastruc-
tures of roads and rail similar to Europe. Their military forces also vary
considerably in size, but North Korea aside, none are modern power-
houses. Yet most of them possess ample weapons and trained military peo-
ple to carry out guerilla warfare against U.S. forces.
Thus, a key judgment advanced here is that there is no standard model
of an S&R scenario upon which to base U.S. force planning. Instead, U.S.
force plans will need to consider a wide spectrum of scenarios that vary
greatly in the environments that they create. Moreover, there is no stan-
dard model of how an S&R scenario might unfold in its operational char-
acteristics. In each of these countries, an S&R mission could range from a
relatively short and simple enterprise to one that is long and difficult.
Much would depend upon the situation that gave rise to war and inter-
vention and on the political-military conditions when U.S. S&R forces ar-
rive. For example, it is possible to imagine U.S. forces intervening in Cuba
to restore order following collapse of Castro’s government, and being wel-
comed as liberators. It also is possible to imagine U.S. forces encountering
a hotly unstable situation and being treated as hated invaders. The same
 SCENARIOS FOR FORCE SIZING 43

applies to most of these countries. This observation reinforces the judg-

ment that U.S. forces for S&R missions should be highly flexible and
adaptable, capable of handling a broad spectrum of challenges and oper-
ating environments. The United States should not only be prepared for
S&R missions in a wide variety of countries of differing sizes and condi-
tions, but should also be prepared to intervene in each country in a vari-
ety of different ways, depending upon the conditions of the moment.
Together, these scenarios suggest that requirements are heavily a func-
tion of two primary variables: 1) The magnitude of the S&R operation that
must be mounted, which is largely determined by the size of the country being
occupied, and 2) The difficulties encountered in carrying out the operation.
As figure 5 shows, targeted countries come in small, medium, and large
sizes. Likewise, operations can be easy, or moderately difficult, or very dif-
ficult. Force requirements will grow as the size of the country and the dif-
ficulty of occupying it increase. Conversely, the capability of any given
posture will decline as the degree of difficulty grows. The distance between
requirements and capabilities measures a gap in U.S. preparations.
Operating conditions can vary widely not only from country to
country, but within a single country. Operating conditions among and
within many countries are products of multiple contributing variables

Figure 5. Key Determinants of Force Requirements for S&R Missions

Large
Force requirements
Force capability
Size of Country

Gap in capabilities
Medium versus requirements

Small

Easy Moderately Very

Difficult Difficult
Operating Conditions
44

that interact. Their effect is to reinforce the judgment that operating con-
ditions can vary across a wide spectrum:
The characteristics of the country can matter. An occupied country
with a prosperous economy, an integrated society, and a functioning ad-
ministrative structure will be easier to stabilize and reconstruct than a
country that is poverty-stricken, socially chaotic, and poorly governed.
Likewise, a country that has been only moderately damaged by the war will
be easier to handle than a country that has been badly damaged. A well-off
country will require fewer U.S. forces than a weak, destroyed country.
The degree to which peace and security already exist also matters. A
country that is already peaceful and accepting of U.S. occupation will be
easier to handle than a country in which wartime fighting is ongoing, anti-
American violence is endemic, and the entire population faces fears about
safety and security. Ethnic strife is a key factor determining security. If eth-
nic groups or rival factions are waging war against each other, this will cre-
ate very difficult conditions for U.S. forces. A secure setting reduces U.S.
force requirements; an insecure setting elevates them.
The ambitiousness of U.S. goals is a key consideration. An S&R opera-
tion can be relatively easy to carry out if U.S. goals are modest: for exam-
ple, only to restore peace and a functioning government. But if the goal is
to reconstruct a badly damaged economy and to replace authoritarian rule
with a functioning democracy, the S&R mission can be considerably more
demanding. The more ambitious the U.S. goals, the greater will be S&R
force requirements.
The nature of the S&R tasks to be performed is important. One security
task is to disarm an enemy military and take possession of WMD; another
is to suppress local opposition and guerilla attacks; a third is to establish
policing and law-enforcement functions. Economic tasks include rebuild-
ing damaged roads, rail lines, bridges, buildings and telecommunications;
restoring electrical power grids, health services, and sewage; and creating
the conditions under which markets can function in ways that permit a
country-wide flow of goods and services. Political tasks include disman-
tling authoritarian institutions, restoring normal administrative functions
(such as schools, welfare payments, and public information), writing a
new constitution, organizing elections, and creating new or reconfigured
government departments. As the number of tasks to be performed grows,
and as the demanding nature of each of them rises, U.S. force require-
ments also grow.
 SCENARIOS FOR FORCE SIZING 45

The nature of the terrain and communications infrastructure matter in

the force calculus. Desert climates with existing roads (for example, Iraq)
mean that U.S. military forces can travel by truck and other ground vehi-
cles. Jungle terrain (for example, Colombia) with few roads means that
U.S. forces will need to use helicopters and boats on rivers. This has im-
plications for the type of S&R forces deployed to a country, especially the
need for military aviation units.
The presence or absence of competent allies is a key consideration.
When competent allied military forces are deployed to perform S&R
functions, U.S. force requirements decrease. Also important is whether
the occupied country’s own military forces can be used for S&R missions.
After the United States occupied Iraq, it promptly dissolved the profes-
sional Iraqi Army. The decision was made necessary by exigent circum-
stances, but it meant that units of that army could not be used in the S&R
mission. The same applied to Iraqi police forces, which dissolved on their
own. The effect was to confront the United States with a lengthy process
of rebuilding.
Accompaniment by U.S. combat forces may be necessary. If sizable
combat forces are present, they can perform key security functions. If not,
S&R forces will have to perform them, thereby elevating requirements. The
duration of the intervention is a key factor in determining U.S. force require-
ments. A brief occupation of three to six months can be performed by the
forces sent in the initial stages. But longer durations are the rule and will
require rotation of forces by individual or unit replacement policies. A
two-year occupation, for example, could require rotating forces fully four
times. Some units might have to deploy to the country twice.
Other variables can enter the equation directly or indirectly. These fac-
tors include: the motivations of neighboring states, the presence or absence
of internal ethnic or tribal conflict, local attitudes toward the U.S. military,
and the presence or absence of strategic consent to the S&R process. These
variables can make an S&R operation either more or less difficult.
Using Decision Trees to Gauge Force Requirements
Requirements for S&R missions thus must take into account the
unique features of each individual country. Because so many variables must
be considered, moreover, the act of gauging force requirements is not an ex-
ercise in single-point calculations. For any single country, requirements
could range across a wide spectrum depending upon the situation encoun-
tered. Decision trees that employ branches and sequels can help scope the
range of potential requirements. Figure 6, for example, employs one chance
46

Figure 6: Illustrative Decision Tree for S&R Requirements

Chance Node Decision Node U.S. S&R Troops Needed

20,000
O 18,000
16,000

14,000
O O 12,000
10,000

8,000
O 5,000
2,000

node (the degree of difficulty facing the operation) and one decision node
(ambitiousness of U.S. goals and multiplicity of S&R tasks) to display nine
different branches, and a resulting range of requirements from 2,000 to
20,000 troops.
An analysis of potential requirements for all twelve countries could
get quite complicated. It could require filling in fully 108 cells of a matrix
(twelve countries multiplied by nine branches for each country). Once re-
quirements for individual countries are calculated, multiple contingencies
must then be considered. For these twelve countries, two concurrent con-
tingencies could occur in fully 132 different ways, and three contingencies
could happen in 1,320 ways.
Complex, full-spectrum calculations of this sort are best left to the
Joint Staff and Combatant Commanders. Some simplifying observations,
however, can be offered. Figure 7 provides an initial best-estimate por-
trayal of the size and likely conditions for each scenario. Together, these
scenarios cover the strategic space with clustering in the middle: medium-
sized countries presenting moderately difficult or worse conditions.
As a general rule, concurrent S&R contingencies are likely to come in
varying doses, requiring either a brigade-size S&R team of joint forces
 SCENARIOS FOR FORCE SIZING 47

Figure 7: Distribution of Size and Likely Conditions for Scenarios

Large
Pakistan
Indonesia
Iran
Size of Country

Medium Colombia
Sudan
North Korea
Yemen

Small Cuba
Georgia Liberia Libya
Easy Moderately Very
Difficult Difficult
Degree of Difficulty

(4,000–5,000 troops) for a small contingency in moderately difficult con-

ditions, or a division-size team (12,000–15,000) for a medium-size con-
tingency, or two division-equivalents (20,000–30,000) for a large contin-
gency, or a full corps of three to four divisions (45,000–90,000) for a very
large contingency. Using these planning factors, table 3 shows how aggre-
gate force requirements for multiple contingencies can vary greatly as a
function of the number of contingencies and the characteristics of each.

Table 3: Dedicated S&R Force Requirements for Multiple

Contingencies (Illustrative)
Contingency Personnel Requirements

Two small contingencies 5,000 + 5,000 = 10,000

Three small contingencies 5,000 + 5,000 + 5,000 = 15,000
One small, one medium contingency 5,000 + 15,000 = 20,000
Two medium contingencies 15,000 + 15,000 = 30,000
One small, two medium contingencies 5,000 +15,000 + 15,000 = 35,000
One medium, one large contingency 15,000 + 30,000 = 45,000
Two large contingencies 30,000 + 30,000 = 60,000
Two very large contingencies 60,000 + 60,000 = 120,000
48

Employing Force Structure Options to Gauge Capabilities

A simplified approach to gauging requirements and priorities is first
to identify a spectrum of options for S&R force-sizing, then to determine
what aggregate capabilities each option would provide, and then to offer
judgments about the level of confidence that each option would provide.
While all options should be posed in terms of joint forces involving some
air and naval assets, most S&R missions will be dominated by ground
forces (Army and Marine Corps). The following four options employ
ground units as the measure of merit to arrive at aggregate capabilities:
■ Brigade-size S&R Force: Can handle one small contingency.
■ Division-size Force: One medium event or three small events.
■ Two division-equivalents: One large event, or two medium events.
■ Corps of 3–4 division-equivalents: One very large event or two
large events.
Given the complexity of the subject, it is impossible to judge any of
these options adequate or inadequate. What these options provide are as-
cending levels of capability, and thus a growing capacity to cover the
“strategic space” of potential requirements. Figure 8 helps illuminate this
relationship by showing, illustratively, how much coverage of strategic
space is provided by each option. The force performance line measures
the capability of each option; above the line is a remaining zone of risk,
which shrinks as the postures grow larger. In essence, all options leave a
measure of risk, but progressively bigger options enlarge the coverage of
strategic requirements and reduce the remaining risk.
For example, if the U.S. military can field a single S&R division-
equivalent, as opposed to one brigade, this will enlarge its capacity to cover
the strategic space by providing a capacity to handle a single medium-size
contingency at moderate difficulty (for example, Iraq) or a number of
smaller events. By comparison, a second division-equivalent would further
enlarge the zone of coverage by providing a capacity to handle two
medium-size events at moderate difficulty (see dashed lines to this force
and associated capability). Two division-equivalents would ensure that
U.S. capabilities could not be overpowered by concurrent contingencies. A
corps-size force of three to four division-equivalents would yield greater
coverage: for example, the capacity to handle three medium-size (with
three division-equivalents) or two large events (with division-equiva-
lents). The result is an even smaller zone of risk. The central issue is this:
how much confidence does the United States want in its S&R forces? How
much of a price in money and manpower is it willing to pay? How much
 SCENARIOS FOR FORCE SIZING 49

Figure 8: How Options Meet the Strategic Space of Requirements

2 Large and
Number and Size of Contingencies

Force Performance Line

1 Medium
4 Divisions
2 Large Zone of Risk
3 Divisions
1 Large and
1 Medium
2 Divisions
1 Large or
2 Medium Program Target
1 Division
1 Medium

1 Brigade

Easy Moderately Very

Difficult Difficult

Difficulty of Operations

risk is it willing to run in order to avoid the opportunity cost of investing

in ever-larger S&R forces?
How do these options stack up in terms of national defense priori-
ties? The circled area on the chart helps answer this question by suggesting
a program target for DOD planning that focuses on concurrent contin-
gencies and moderately difficult conditions. In this context, a brigade-size
force is a bare minimum but will be too small if tomorrow’s world is as
turbulent as today’s. A corps-size force is close to ideal, but may be more
than the traffic will bear. A two division-equivalent force would provide a
solid range of capabilities and a relatively high level of insurance, includ-
ing a capacity for medium S&R missions following two MTWs. A force of
one division-equivalent could handle a single MTW under moderately de-
manding conditions and would provide moderate insurance.
The bottom line is this: if the traffic will bear two division-equivalent
S&R commands, fine. If not, one division-equivalent S&R command is a
good place to start. Major new capabilities are not created overnight, but
instead evolve in phases. DOD could start by seeking to create a brigade-
size S&R force quickly in the near-term, then field a full S&R command
within the Future Years Defense Plan or sooner. In the longer term, it could
50

field a second S&R command if the initial effort proved successful, re-
quirements remained high, and the necessary resources were available.
Designing S&R Capabilities
Because future contingencies could impose such a diverse array of
conditions and unique requirements for capabilities, U.S. forces should
have a diverse set of assets capable of performing a wide variety of S&R
functions. They should also be modular, flexible, and adaptable so that
they can be combined and recombined to create different packages tai-
lored to each situation. While creating such forces is a complicated task
that requires detailed planning, table 4 illustrates a notional S&R com-
mand that would provide a healthy portfolio of assets for most situations.
It contains some combat forces (a Stryker brigade augmented with an at-
tack helicopter battalion) for demanding security tasks. The core forces for
the S&R mission are four battalions of military police, construction engi-
neers, civil affairs, medical support, psychological operations, and other
assets that commonly are needed for S&R tasks. Total manpower for the
S&R forces of the command would be about 11,300 personnel, but com-
bat and logistics combat service support (CSS) assets could elevate the
total deployed force to more than 18,000 personnel. This is merely one
idea to be taken as a reference point in designing future S&R structures,
but it is suggestive of the type of capabilities that often will be needed.
Such an S&R joint command might be organized into three or four
brigade-size task forces for S&R missions, a combat brigade, and divi-
sional-level CSS assets. Its S&R brigades could be detached to assist com-
bat divisions or be kept under the S&R command. The command and its
brigade-size sub-elements would be equipped with employment concepts
tailored to the goals and operations of the S&R mission. A main advantage
of this S&R command is that it could perform demanding S&R missions
at far less manpower than a force of combat formations that would lack
the appropriate numbers and combinations of S&R units. This S&R com-
mand is a natural complement to transformed Army forces that focus on
high-tech strike operations in expeditionary warfare and whose lean sup-
port structures may lack some traditional CSS assets.
Two S&R joint commands not only would double the total assets for
S&R missions, they would create additional flexibility and adaptability for
tailored commitments. For example, a scenario might call for commit-
ment of only one S&R command, but with six construction engineer bat-
talions. The relevant engineer battalion from the second command could
be cross-attached to the first S&R command. Such flexibility would apply
 SCENARIOS FOR FORCE SIZING 51

Table 4: An Illustrative S&R Joint Command

Manpower
Units Manpower (w/o combat, CSS)

Headquarters (all) 725 725

Notional TFC: Stryker Brigade w/Atk Helo 3,937 –
Military Police Battalions (4) 2,164 2,164
Civil Affairs Battalions (4) 584 584
Construction Engineer Battalions (4) 2,692 2,692
Area Medical Battalions (4) 1,442 1,442
PSYOP Battalions (4) 1,000 1,000
ISR Battalion 421 421
Communications Battalion 454 454
Combat Aviation Battalion 315 315
Medium Truck Battalion 517 517
EOD Battalion 100 100
Chem/Bio Company 175 175
Training and Security Assistance Battalion 500 500
Special Forces Battalion (OPCON) 225 225
Support Command (S&S/Maint/Trans/Ord) 2,959 –
Totals 18,210 11,314

across-the-board for all specific capabilities. A second S&R command also

would provide a rotational base when one command is deployed. These
S&R commands would be manned mostly by Army troops, but, to the ex-
tent they are joint, the Marines could contribute sizable numbers, and the
Navy and Air Force could contribute in niche areas. Joint formations, of
course, would help add further flexibility and adaptability to S&R forces.
If only one command is deployed, a strong case can be made for
having it entirely or mostly composed of active-duty troops in order to
ensure prompt deployability. If a second command is deployed, consider-
ation can be given to have it partly structured with RC forces. What
should be avoided, however, is an RC S&R command of low readiness,
similar to that of today’s National Guard combat divisions. A cadred ap-
proach to the second S&R command might provide a workable solution.
52

For example, 33 percent of its personnel could be active-duty, the other

67 percent, reserve component, but trained at high readiness and legally
capable of being called to active duty and deployed quickly. A better
model, of course, would be 67 percent active and only 33 percent reserve.
But this may be more than the traffic will bear. Regardless of the exact
AC/RC mix chosen, the Army’s two fill-out divisions (7th and 24th) could
provide active-duty headquarters and developable foundations for one or
two S&R commands. The effect would be to elevate the Army to eleven to
twelve active division-equivalents: ten combat divisions and one to two
S&R commands.
How can such S&R assets be created? While some S&R assets that do
not now exist would have to be created, many relevant assets already exist
in the Army. Reorganization and reassignment of those assets could help
meet emerging S&R requirements. In today's active Army, many of these
units are standard issue in varying amounts to the ten active divisions and
four corps. If some assets could be transferred from their parent units,
they could be assigned to S&R commands. Whether such a transfer (up to
20 percent of existing assets) can safely take place without unduly dam-
aging the combat readiness of the parent unit is unclear. If this step is pro-
hibited, reserve component formations are an obvious source of assets:
Army reserve CS/CSS units and Guard divisions possess sizable numbers
of these units. But would they possess adequate readiness? If not, they
may have to receive added funds for extra training and equipment, or
even be transferred to the active structure, a step that would require funds
and manpower.

Conclusion
● DOD needs stronger S&R forces, but it also needs analytical stan-

dards for determining their size and design.

● Scenario analysis suggests that multiple, different S&R contingen-

cies could occur in future years in all regions and can vary greatly in size
and difficulty.
● S&R forces for one medium-size contingency similar to Iraq likely

will not be enough. Bigger contingencies than Iraq could occur. Also, mul-
tiple contingencies could occur—in fact, are occurring now.
Chapter 4

Organizing for Stabilization

and Reconstruction

T
his chapter describes how DOD can organize to plan and train for
stabilization and reconstruction operations to ensure they begin
promptly as U.S. forces rout or destroy enemy military capacity.
The resultant capability will fill a gap in post-conflict operations that is
critical to the new U.S. strategy of preemption and rapid decisive opera-
tions. The following proposal builds on the preceding chapters that de-
scribed past U.S. S&R operations and projected operations that U.S. forces
could face in the future.
Under its new transformed strategy, the United States will employ
smaller joint force packages equipped with advanced technology wea-
ponry and organized for combat operations that lead to rapid defeat of
enemy forces. However, this strategy results in far fewer forces in theater
for the critical, labor-intensive business of post-conflict stabilization. To
ensure a smooth—ideally, rolling—transition to stabilization and recon-
struction, the United States needs to have better capabilities to plan and
conduct comprehensive post-conflict operations concurrent with the new
style of combat operations. The two operations, combat and post-conflict,
are equally important to strategic victory and must be closely integrated,
especially in terms of planning, exercising, and adequate resource alloca-
tion. In order to execute the post-conflict plan successfully, combatant
commanders need a new capability embodied in another joint force
specifically tailored and equipped with the requisite technologies to suc-
ceed at post-conflict operations.

Background
Recent U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq were charac-
terized by rapid success in deposing the enemy’s standing military forces.
53
54

However, in both theaters U.S. combat forces were required to pursue sub-
stantial enemy forces that remained at large at significant cost in terms of
local and regional stability. In both cases, a relatively modest-size force,
backed by the latest military technology, gained dominant battlefield
knowledge and defeated the enemy by bringing lethal firepower to bear
promptly on high leverage targets. But when the enemy dispersed, the de-
ployed U.S. force was not prepared to prevent widespread looting, lawless-
ness, and destruction of critical civilian infrastructure, particularly in Iraq.
Failure to establish area security concurrent with destruction of enemy
control set back plans to restore essential services and emboldened oppo-
nents of U.S. occupation.
Current doctrine calls for combat commands to turn to S&R opera-
tions once combat operations have subsided. Even in Iraq, S&R operations
are performed by combat units augmented with additional civil affairs, mil-
itary police, engineers, medical, and other critical capabilities. However,
these capabilities are brought to the fore only after combat missions are on
the ebb or over. That clear-cut operational sequence worked in conflicts
that progressed less rapidly and where a much larger force was employed
and available for stabilization as combat subsided. It does not work today,
because the S&R task has become more critical and the forces and time
available to execute it are much constrained.
The requirement to master post-conflict operations, to provide
stability, and lay the groundwork for reconstruction of a defeated coun-
try, calls for transforming how we organize, plan, and conduct S&R oper-
ations. They cannot be deferred until combat operations have been
concluded. Plans to defeat the enemy and to initiate S&R operations must
be addressed simultaneously as interdependent parts of the overall cam-
paign. Demarcating between combat and post-conflict phases does not
reflect what takes place on the ground, where both capabilities are needed
simultaneously. The combatant commander needs a distinct post-conflict
planning and executing capability, organized to plan and conduct S&R
operations alongside combat forces. That organization should be com-
posed of S&R capabilities and not be part of a combat corps or division.
It should be a brigade- or division-size unit capable of planning, devel-
oping doctrine, and exercising. It should have some combat power so that
it can operate autonomously in a post-conflict environment marked by
residual, low-level hostilities.
 ORGANIZING FOR STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 55

Discussion
The doctrine of relying on combat units for S&R operations as they
complete their combat missions served us well in the past, but for rapid
decisive operations it is an unsatisfactorily sequential and largely ad hoc
approach, too disconnected from combat operations. Combatant com-
mands need a dedicated command, tailored specifically for post-conflict
operations, that is readily deployable and available for planning, training
and exercising. The operational concept for such a force would be to exe-
cute stabilization and reconstruction operations concurrently with com-
bat units, moving in to establish control and security as combat units
move forward, foreclosing the emergence of lawlessness and anarchy. The
most ready forces should be in the active component to overcome the
longer lead times required to mobilize and deploy reserve component
units. Organizing such a force should not be a major end strength issue, as
almost all the capabilities required are present within the existing force
structures, either active or reserve.
The new force should be joint. All services have some of the required
capabilities in their force structure. However, most of the assets are in the
Army, and in some deployment schemes all the elements could be Army.
Still, it would be neither practical nor wise to place the entire post-conflict
stabilization and reconstruction mission on the Army. In light of the long-
term rotational requirements, it will be imperative to draw on the re-
sources of all services.
Ideally the new command would be co-located on a single base so
that it could engage in frequent integrated training and develop strong, co-
hesive capabilities. This may be a long-term goal given the cost of reloca-
tion. However, to the extent possible, the brigade- or division-level joint
command should be located as close as possible to its initial ready forces,
and at least one integrated subordinate command should be located close
to the joint command.
The proposal is for a flexible but standing high readiness joint force
of modular design that is scalable and addresses two key transformational
imperatives:
■ Integration from the outset of planning for stabilization and recon-
struction operations into exercise plans and war plans.
■ Ensuring that the requisite forces are in place to initiate stabiliza-
tion and reconstruction operations concurrently with the collapse
of enemy authority in any locale, a concept we call “rolling stabi-
lization.”
56

Based on the analysis in previous chapters, two S&R Joint Command

(JCOM) forces should be organized to conduct core stabilization and re-
construction operations across a theater of operations. One would be
composed primarily of active component (AC) units. The second would
be in the Reserve componens (RC), but with an active headquarters and
active key cadre at the next lower commands (S&R Group).
The S&R JCOM would not require permanently assigned sub-units
(at least not initially), except for its immediate subordinate S&R Group
headquarters and its special staff. However, specific battalion-equivalent
units of each type would be designated as S&R units by priority mission
and in operational plans (OPLANS) and must be ready for immediate de-
ployment. Additional units from all services would participate in subse-
quent rotations and be maintained at appropriate readiness levels for
S&R missions.
Two Alternative Models
The S&R JCOM could be designed in either of two ways. The first de-
sign focuses on theaters where U.S. forces are already present as a result of
U.S. combat operations. In such theaters a mature logistics support system
and a large number of U.S. combat forces would be in place as the opera-
tional-strategic context for post-conflict operations. An S&R JCOM de-
signed for these scenarios would be tailored to current doctrinal methods of
logistics support and security protection for rear area operations. That
means that the S&R JCOM would rely primarily on external area logistics
support, as other non-combat forces do. It could also be given operational
control of a modest-size combat force provided by the combatant com-
mand, should security remain a concern. This would be typical of deploy-
ment following combat operations similar to those in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The second design relates to S&R operations in theaters where U.S.
forces are not deployed, as in the case of Haiti in 1994. The S&R JCOM
would require its own tailored logistics and combat capability, similar to a
combat division, but needing no more than a brigade-size combat force
within its organic structure. Unlike other non-combat units, this force
would not rely on area support logistics or require attachment of combat
forces from the combatant commander, in most situations.
Other factors also bear on which design is appropriate to the partic-
ular situation.
Logistical support for the S&R JCOM is a special consideration.
Should it be like a combat division with its own organic support command,
or like a non-combat unit, plugging into area support groups positioned
 ORGANIZING FOR STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 57

across the area of operations? Including organic logistics would make the
command less of a burden on the host combat unit. It also would allow
more freedom of action in situations where area support is sparse or unre-
liable. However, adding a logistics command to the S&R JCOM design sig-
nificantly increases strength requirements (a typical division support com-
mand is almost 3,000), adds cost, increases lift requirements, and slows
deployment times. Moreover, with many other units still reliant on area
support, no economy of effort would be realized by investing in a support
command for the S&R JCOM.
The Army will also have to decide whether combat forces should be
organic to the S&R JCOM. A full brigade of approximately 3,500 may be
required only when deploying as a separate task force, yet having some or-
ganic force always available may be wise. Current doctrine calls for a Tac-
tical Combat Force (TCF) to be to placed (usually under operational con-
trol or OPCON) with rear area commands only as required and sized
appropriately to the mission. In most scenarios the JCOM can expect to
have a combat force readily available from in-theater forces. Such a force
would be provided to the JCOM by the combatant commander as neces-
sary. If the JCOM has its own TCF it need not worry about availability or
responsiveness. However, like the support command, a TCF will increase
the JCOM’s cost and deployment times. Perhaps a larger issue will be the
steady diversion of staff and commander from S&R matters as the JCOM
tends to manning, training, and equipping its TCF.
The need to establish a rotation pattern is another factor in deter-
mining whether to invest in dedicated organic combat formations that are
necessary only in limited scenarios. If an S&R mission were to last a year
or more, sub-units would be subject to unit rotation within six to twelve
months. Hence, the S&R JCOM staff must be able to maintain operational
effectiveness supported by a system of rotating sub-units, including com-
bat and logistical forces.
The S&R JCOM also must be capable of deploying as a separate Joint
Task Force to theaters where conflict has not broken out, or where conflict
between combatants other than the United States has taken place. In these
scenarios a theater support command would not be in place, and U.S. com-
bat forces would not be present. Therefore, the S&R JCOM commander
and staff must be capable of command and control of combat operations
as well as logistics operations. When deployed as a separate task force, the
S&R JCOM would need to be augmented with a combat force as well as a
tailored Area Support Group. The responsible combatant commander
58

would provide both these assets under current Joint doctrine. The Tactical
Combat Force (TCF) included in the task force could be a Marine or Army
ground force, or a joint-combined force, supported by Navy and Air Force
firepower and all-service special operations forces.
In a combat theater where American forces are present, they would
still engage in S&R operations as they do now. Combat forces would pro-
vide security and continue combat operations while coordinating S&R op-
erations with S&R JCOM operations within their areas of operation. This
could be through direct interface as well as by coordination at the com-
batant command or Combined Force Land Component Command
(CFLCC) level. Although combat forces focus first on combat operations
and the S&R JCOM on stabilization and reconstruction operations, they
would work in tandem, especially as combat operations begin to subside
and stabilization and reconstruction becomes the primary goal. Ulti-
mately, S&R JCOM operations should emerge as the main effort, allowing
for earlier redeployment of combat forces.
A notional organization of an S&R JCOM is at figure 10. As the dia-
gram illustrates, the command could deploy with up to four multi-capa-
ble S&R Groups and other specialized units. Although scalable, the no-
tional size of the S&R JCOMs would be approximately 11,300 personnel,
not including combat forces or support units that would be attached for
independent operations as a separately deployed S&R Joint Task Force. In
such scenarios the overall S&R force could be as high as 18,200.
S&R JCOM Characteristics
The main characteristics that the proposed S&R JCOM organization
adds to U.S. capabilities are:
■ Modular in design; scalable in size
■ Tailorable to mission requirements
■ Digital in C 4ISR
■ Capable of controlling limited combat operations
■ Joint and potentially multinational
■ Trained in regional and linguistic expertise
■ Embedded with interagency, civil-military, and contractor capabil-
ities
■ Responsible to combatant commands for peacetime planning and
exercises
■ Organized for functionally integrated S&R operations
■ Capable of C2 over independent theater operations
 ORGANIZING FOR STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 59

Figure 9: S&R Joint Command Organization

XX

SSE TM HQ Special Staff S&R JCOM Civil-Military Action Cell (C–MAC)

X II X X X X X
SUPPORT TRNG & Joint Joint Joint Joint
TCF
COMMAND SEC ASST S&R GRP S&R GRP S&R GRP S&R GRP
II II II II II II
AREA
CS AVN MP MP MP MP MANEUVER
SUPP BN
II II II II II
II II
COMM CA CA CA CA
TRANS (Digital Bridge) RECON
II II II II II
I II
Mortuary ISR ENG ENG ENG ENG ARTY
I II II II II II II
Chem/Bio MEDIUM ATK HELO
MED MED MED MED
TRUCK
II II
II II II II II
SF DS BN
(OPCON)
EOD PSYOP PSYOP PSYOP PSYOP

The active component S&R JCOM must achieve and sustain a readi-
ness posture equivalent to early-deploying combat forces. The RC S&R
JCOM should be deployable within three months of mobilization. The RC
command could relieve the AC command on a planned rotation cycle or
be employed in a second contingency operation. These requirements jus-
tify an AC headquarters for the RC S&R JCOM as well as an active cadre
in S&R Group command and staff positions.
Most subordinate S&R units exist in the active and reserve compo-
nents of the services but must be mission designated and ready to deploy.
These units will have other missions as well (most units do); however, when
required for training, exercises, or operations, the S&R mission must have
priority. As sub-units rotate, the S&R Group headquarters provides for
continuity of operations and the integration of efforts across all S&R func-
tions—MPs, CA, medical, engineers, information operations, and other
areas. All services, especially the Army, must review mission requirements
of existing units and determine if additional units are required in the active
structure to meet the S&R requirement. In most cases, current forces
should be adequate; these same units are performing the S&R mission in
Iraq today, albeit under an ad hoc concept of operations belatedly executed.
However, some rebalancing to the AC–RC mix would be necessary.
60

The S&R JCOM is responsible for planning stabilization and recon-

struction operations in coordination with the regional combatant com-
mands, CENTCOM, EUCOM, PACOM, NORTHCOM, and SOUTHCOM.
One S&R JCOM has a representative team embedded at each combatant
commander’s headquarters. This team participates in contingency planning
and provides the combatant commander’s staff with information on the ca-
pabilities and availability of forces for S&R operations. The team feeds back
information on requirements to its home headquarters. Subordinate Joint
S&R Groups specialize in a particular region and sustain skills in a second-
ary region to give the JCOM added employment flexibility.
During exercises or preparation for operations, the S&R JCOM com-
mander supports the combatant commander and staff in the development
of war plans. He augments his planning team at the combatant command
headquarters and participates fully in OPLAN development. He consults
the combatant commander on tailoring the Time Phased Force Deploy-
ment List (TPFDL) or other deployment plans so that S&R forces arrive in
theater as needed to fit the combatant commander’s overall plan.
The S&R JCOM commander deploys with the combatant commander
to the theater of operations with appropriate staff. He is responsible to the
combatant commander for employment of Joint S&R Groups or allocation
of Groups to subordinate combat commands of the CFLCC, usually at the
Army division or Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) level. He also ensures
continuous S&R planning, civil-military interface, force debarkation, ac-
climatization, operational readiness, coordination with support and security
forces, and ultimate employment of S&R Groups. In short, the S&R JCOM
commander wears a second hat as the principal advisor on stabilization and
reconstruction to the combatant commander, as well as his primary respon-
sibilities as overall commander of S&R forces in theater and source of the-
ater-wide S&R plans. The responsibilities that fall to this joint headquarters
require that the commander be a general/flag officer, depending on the force
composition and theater, of one to three-star rank.
The S&R JCOM headquarters develops joint and combined doc-
trine and training standards and is responsible for the training, manning,
and readiness of the force. On a regular basis, the headquarters brings
together forces from all services, both active and Reserve components, in-
cluding the forces needed for initial S&R operations. In addition to inter-
agency partners and representatives from allied militaries, and interna-
tional and nongovernmental organizations, exercises should include a
mix of force capabilities:
 ORGANIZING FOR STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 61

■ Military Police (Combat Support, Internment/Relocation Units

and Criminal Investigators)
■ Civil Affairs
■ Psychological Operations (PSYOP)
■ Medical
■ Engineer (Combat Support and Construction)
■ Training and Security Assistance
■ Intelligence and Surveillance
■ Transport and Support units
■ Combat forces of all services and selected Allies
■ Interagency Representatives
■ EOD and De-mining Units
■ WMD detection teams
■ Sensitive Site Exploitation teams
■ Mortuary Affairs
■ Logisticians
Stabilization and reconstruction exercises should be conducted
within the context of broader combat exercises to accustom staffs at the
theater, joint, service, and interagency levels to devoting resources to post-
conflict operations concurrent with the conduct of combat operations.
Regular exercises ensure that a basic S&R force capability package always
is ready to deploy as part of a contingency operation. Just as important,
they ensure that commanders and staffs at all echelons of participation
plan for and critically examine post-conflict requirements alongside com-
bat planning.
Adjustments by Combatant Command and Joint Staffs
This concept will require some realignment of the combatant com-
mand staff. The S&R joint commander would appoint a staff representa-
tive to each of the combatant command’s principal staff to plan and co-
ordinate S&R operational requirements. This would be particularly
important in the J-2, where the S&R command would have essential ele-
ments of information (EEI) in, for example, the area of cultural intelli-
gence. The J-3 would be the logical staff to include the S&R commander’s
personal representative as the combatant commander’s principal advisor
for S&R operations. The broader J-5 policy focus is another area where
the S&R staff would have to invest in personnel capable of planning and
coordinating joint staff actions. Other adjustments should be considered.
62

Combatant commanders and subordinate combat commanders will

also have to think differently about war planning and the integration of
S&R planners into their headquarters teams. In particular, planners will
have to accommodate the flow of troops for S&R operations within a de-
ployment plan that typically is focused on combat forces in the opening
weeks of a deployment.
S&R JCOM Headquarters Staffs
As depicted in figure 10, the S&R JCOM headquarters is similar to an
Army divisional echelon. Creating them, however, would not require ad-
ditional divisions. As noted above, most of the required units already exist
in either the AC or the RC. Two active S&R JCOM headquarters could be
created by reconfiguring existing headquarters or activating new head-
quarters. One option would be to create the JCOMs by reorganizing the
Army’s two active component/Reserve integrated divisions, the 7th In-
fantry Division (Light) and the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) as
S&R JCOMs; one would be a rapidly deployable active force and the other
a fully active headquarters with cadred subordinate commands.
Principal Staff. The principal staff sections of the S&R JCOM would
be doctrinal joint staff elements, J-1 through J-6 and J-SOF. The responsi-
bilities for each section would relate to new doctrine for joint S&R opera-
tions. A crucial feature of the principal staff is that it must have the nor-
mal skills to plan and conduct multifaceted operations, including combat
operations of limited size. This means that the J-3 (Operations) staff must
include a fire support section. Moreover, all principal staffs should have of-
ficers experienced in combat operations, as well as sufficient officers spe-
cialized in all stabilization and reconstruction areas of expertise. The J-2
will have not only typical intelligence expertise but unique capabilities to
gather and analyze intelligence peculiar to S& R operations: political, eth-
nic, cultural, religious, social, and economic. Due to this requirement, the
J-2 staff should be larger than that of a combat command, and the intelli-
gence battalion will have added capabilities.
Civil-Military Action Cell. The Civil-Military Actions Cell
(C–MAC) is envisioned to be especially robust. It will coordinate for the
JCOM commander with personnel from international organizations,
nongovernmental organizations, and local and national civilian govern-
ments as necessary. Even when the JCOM is not the senior U.S. military
command in theater, or when the S&R JCOM is subordinate to a U.S.
government civilian representative (for example, a U.S. ambassador), the
C–MAC responsibilities for coordinating U.S. military stabilization and
 ORGANIZING FOR STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 63

Figure 10: S&R JCOM Headquarters

XX
SSE Spec. Staff S&R JCOM C-MAC

NGO/PVO
POLAD
J-1 J-2 J-3 J-4 J-5 J-6 J-SOC UN/IOs
Legal
CA Local groups State/AID
Int’l Law
MP Key security Interagencies
Contracting
ENG Train Military Local Civil
Func./Regional
Experts MED Contractors
Econ Advisor Info Ops
Stratigic S&R
CBT Ops
Cultural Intel U.S.–Local Policy
Fire Support
Economic Intel Policy
COCOM Liaison Implementation
Social Intel
Multinational
Religious Intel Forces Liaisons

reconstruction support will be far-reaching, multifunctional, and con-

tinuous. The C–MAC will also coordinate with other U.S. government
agencies operating in theater, serving as the S&R link to interagency sup-
port and requirements. Interagency liaisons will be a part of the C–MAC,
except for intelligence agency liaisons, which will coordinate directly
with the J-2.
Special Staff Sections. The special staff section may be as large as
the C–MAC. Special staff representatives must include a legal counsel
staff, including international law and war crimes counselors. Another
special staff will be a Political Advisor (POLAD) section capable of advis-
ing the commander on religious and cultural issues as well as political fac-
tors. The command will also have appropriate translation technologies
and capabilities (oral and written)—not only at the JCOM level but all
the way down to front line elements. Other special staffs are those typical
of civil affairs operations, such as experts in power plant operations,
postal systems, local government administration, judicial affairs, water/
waste management, and nuclear energy, among other specialties.
A contracting office and a budgeting section will be particularly
critical to S&R JCOM mission duration. These staff sections must have
64

personnel, funding, and authorization to get permanent reconstruction

underway rapidly and decisively. The JCOM can reestablish only imme-
diate and temporary services and infrastructure. Commercial contractors
accomplish permanent reconstruction of power grids, road networks,
telecommunications, and other infrastructure. For that reason the link-
ages and staff coordination with civilian contractors is especially crucial.
The S&R JCOM must optimize as well as expedite the employment of
civilian contractors for reconstruction. Post-conflict S&R operations
should be planned and conducted so as to initiate a handoff to civilian
agencies in charge of nation-building, commercial reconstruction opera-
tions, and local government administration (especially police and judicial
functions) as soon as possible. This handoff should mirror the handoff
that occurs between combat and S&R forces and should lead to the draw-
down of the S&R force as expeditiously as possible.
Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE) Team. S&R missions might involve
the search for weapons of mass destruction or the investigation of war
crimes. The SSE team will have to work closely with the command’s intel-
ligence and security forces to locate, secure, and investigate suspect and
sensitive sites. The team includes weapons, scientific, or criminal investi-
gators and works closely with other special units, such as Chem/Bio detec-
tion teams and military police.
S&R JCOM Sub-Units
The Four S&R Groups. The core capability of the S&R JCOM resides
in four multi-functional S&R Groups composed of: military police, civil
affairs, engineers, medical services, and information operations elements.
Commanded at the colonel or brigadier level, S&R Groups will conduct
operations in sector so as to effect stabilization and reconstruction over an
assigned area of responsibility. If that area coincides with the combat AOR
of a larger unit (for example, an Army division or Marine Corps MEF), the
S&R Group would probably be in direct support of that command. S&R
Groups are scaleable and can command all or part of any type unit, de-
pending on the situation. For small-scale operations, an S&R Group can
be task organized to deploy by itself as an S&R Task Force.
Regional and linguistic expertise. Regional and linguistic skills are
most important for the S&R Group headquarters staffs. In addition,
translation technologies will be critical to training, and equipment in-
vestment, and readiness criterion. Each of the four subordinate S&R
Group headquarters of a JCOM will specialize in a geographical region,
similar to the practice of U.S. Army Special Forces Groups, with each S&R
 ORGANIZING FOR STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 65

Group being designated as having one primary and one back-up region
of expertise. Regional expertise must also be closely integrated with cul-
tural intelligence gathering so that regional knowledge grows over time to
form a sound basis for informed planning and operations.
Group Headquarters. The Joint S&R Group HQ is organized
around the basic structure of a brigade-level headquarters staff, with pri-
mary staff sections capable of planning and executing operations for all
types of subordinate units, including logistics support, force protection,
intelligence, and personnel management. One option for organizing four
Joint S&R Group HQs from existing resources is to select an MP, Engi-
neer, Medical and CA brigade headquarters to transform into a Joint S&R
Group HQs. This would afford the JCOM commander a senior officer in
each functional area who can advise the JCOM on matters such as train-
ing, personnel readiness, logistics, and equipment that are particular to
each function. Each Group must have integrated capabilities across all
S&R missions and functions.
Composite MP Battalion. The MP battalion is a composite battalion
consisting primarily of combat support MPs, plus some internment and
resettlement MPs. In addition, each battalion includes criminal investiga-
tion teams to deal with the potential for criminalized power structures and
organized crime.
CA Battalion. The CA battalion provides general CA expertise at the
local level, such as government administration and services plus basic in-
frastructure operations expertise. Although these missions are analogous
to current CA missions the battalion’s future operations will be more
closely integrated with other units and new operational concepts for CA
will be needed.
Construction Engineer Battalion. The Engineer battalion’s primary
mission is reconstruction of basic infrastructure. These missions call for
construction engineers. Combat engineers also have capabilities that could
be utilized. Engineer battalions could be composites of existing units.
Area Medical Battalion. The medical battalion is similar to a U.S.
Army Area Support Medical Battalion. Its primary missions are humani-
tarian assistance, indigenous emergency/first responder medical training,
food and water decontamination, and other health services.
Training and Security Assistance (TSA) Battalion. This is a new unit
concept with a unique and crucial mission: to work with local security
authorities to rebuild the national and local police forces and to train and
operationalize a reconstituted national military. In these missions the
66

TSA battalion will work closely with the SF battalion, but its tasks would
last longer. Ideally, the TSA battalion will contain a large cohort of senior
noncommissioned officers (NCOs), junior officers, and qualified police
instructors.
Combat Support Aviation and Medium Truck Battalions. These
units will afford the JCOM with the means to transport needed supplies
and equipment quickly throughout the operational area without vying for
assets needed by combat units. In theaters where U.S. forces are already de-
ployed, resources from combat units might augment these assets. In envi-
ronments where roads are poor or insecure, helicopter transportation may
have to be increased or augmented by larger medium helicopters.
Signal Communications Battalion. The model for these units is the
4th Infantry Division (Mech), the Army’s first digitized division. Its digital
communications are highly capable internally but have to communicate
with many external analog systems. The solution is to employ a “digital
bridge” automation suite to link digital and analog systems. Given the im-
portance of the S&R mission to overall success, it is imperative that it be
built from the beginning with the most modern communications capabil-
ities. To realize this objective the S&R JCOM will also require a digital
bridge element.
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Battalion. The
ISR battalion is another unit with unique S&R missions. It should include a
counter-intelligence company and robust human intelligence (HUMINT)
resources that focus on detection and identification of resistance groups,
guerilla operations, and organized criminal elements. It will also need a
significant ground, airborne, and communications surveillance capability.
Because the operating concept for the S&R JCOM is to employ its rela-
tively small force to maximum effectiveness, knowing where enemy ele-
ments and potential risks are emerging is crucial. Technology will offer
force multipliers in UAVs, communications intercept, and advanced unat-
tended sensors. These systems will afford early detection of threats to
pipelines or power stations, for example, without the need for a large se-
curity force. Sophisticated all-weather cameras should also be in the bat-
talion equipment list.
The most unique capability of the ISR battalion will be its focus on
“cultural intelligence” issues—religious, political, ethnic—as much as
overt security risks. The ISR battalion will also work closely with the MP
battalion’s criminal investigators as well as Group and JCOM staffs to an-
alyze information in the area of criminal intelligence.
 ORGANIZING FOR STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 67

Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Battalion. A battalion-size

EOD unit is recommended for the S&R JCOM because it may be respon-
sible for overseeing rapid and multifaceted EOD operations. EOD teams
will work closely with other JCOM forces, especially the MPs and engineer
elements, to advise and conduct EOD operations. These will include bomb
disposal, unexploded ordnance removal, weapons collection and disposal,
and mine clearing (roads, ports, etc.) and minefield removal. In some ge-
ographical areas, such as where opening harbors is critical to reconstruc-
tion, the EOD battalion may need augmentation by Navy underwater
EOD teams.
Special Forces Battalion. An Army Special Forces battalion or com-
parable Marine unit should be under the operational control of the S&R
JCOM in order to develop the local situation and begin to rebuild selected
indigenous security capabilities. The SF battalion will have special cultural
and language skills that will help them embed their teams in the local pop-
ulation, determine their security force potential, and take steps to reestab-
lish order. In longer-term S&R operations, the continuous inclusion of an
SF battalion in the JCOM may not be necessary.
Tactical Combat Force (TCF). When deployed as a separate joint
task force, the S&R JCOM will include a TCF to provide military security
beyond the capabilities of the assigned MP battalions. The TCF would be
tailored to the operational environment. It could be a Stryker brigade or a
light or heavy infantry brigade task force. The size of the TCF will depend
on the enemy situation. In some situations the TCF could be a division or
larger size force. In those cases, a higher JTF headquarters could be de-
ployed, with the S&R JCOM as one subordinate command and the TCF as
a separate command.
Area Support Group (ASG). The ASG’s tailorable organization and
support concept is consistent with prevailing Army doctrine. It includes
an Area Support Battalion (ASB) for each S&R Group capable of pro-
viding supplies and services. The medical battalion (including an air am-
bulance detachment) mission is to support the medical needs of the
command while the medical battalions of the S&R Groups provide civil-
ian medical support. The transport battalion mission is to provide all
transport needs of the JCOM, including fuel, water, and bulk cargo.
Other units are tailored under the ASG as required.
S&R Stockage Requirements. The S&R JCOM logistics concept
should encompass the establishment of pre-packed and/or pre-positioned
stocks of emergency equipment, in particular, a requisite fleet of power
68

generators, water purifiers, pipeline, fuel storage, bridging, shelters, and

other stocks that will be in urgent demand as conflict abates. These stocks
must be readily transportable and either pre-positioned or sent forward
early to be available to lead S&R forces.
S&R JCOM Concepts of Employment
The S&R JCOM employment context and concepts are summarized
below.
Strategic Employment Context. The United States deploys highly
flexible, maneuverable JTFs composed of smaller, lighter but, more lethal
high-tech combat forces to conduct counterforce operations rapidly. The
JTF’s area occupation capabilities are limited. Therefore, an S&R JCOM
deploys with the combat forces and operates in close coordination to take
over rapidly from advancing combat forces as the battle progresses.
S&R JCOM Ops Employment Concept. U.S. combatant commands
integrate S&R JCOM elements in the combat force deployment flow so they
are in position to take immediate control of liberated areas. S&R JCOM es-
tablishes stability and begins initial infrastructure reconstruction under the
JTF or its land component command. An S&R JCOM is supported and sus-
tained by the JTF Theater Support Command. S&R JCOM security needs
are met by main JTF combat forces. S&R JCOM can also deploy as a sepa-
rate JTF, with its own security and support force augmentation.
S&R JCOM Tactical Employment Concept. An S&R JCOM is organ-
ized with four subordinate JTF commands—combined capabilities teams
capable of area/sector stabilization and reconstruction—supported by
S&R JCOM and JTF assets. Subordinate Joint S&R Groups are normally
OPCON to combat commands in assigned sectors, but may operate under
overall S&R JCOM control, depending on the combatant commander’s
scheme of maneuver.

Conclusions
● There is a pressing need for transforming the way the U.S. military

organizes for stabilization and reconstruction operations from a second-

ary, separate, and ad hoc operation into a co-equal operation in tandem
with combat.
● The concept described above provides the outline of an urgently

needed capability. It ensures that there is a capable staff that can integrate
into the combatant commander’s headquarters to plan stabilization and
reconstruction operations and to manage the training and readiness of the
forces. It also ensures that a significant pool of forces needed for S&R
 ORGANIZING FOR STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 69

operations is well-trained, appropriately organized, and ready to deploy

on timelines similar to combat forces.
● The modular nature of the proposed joint organization provides

the flexibility to generate virtually any S&R force package with the scale,
configuration, and readiness posture appropriate to any contingency.
Chapter 5

Rebalancing the
Active/Reserve Mix

P
ost-conflict operations require specialized forces that are just as
ready to deploy as combat forces. If the United States has been en-
gaged in combat, the security and support required for S&R opera-
tions will already be in theater as components of the fighting forces. These
forces would shift to providing security and support to post-conflict mis-
sions and work with other forces (for example, civil affairs units) special-
ized in post-conflict operations. If U.S. forces are not present, a post-con-
flict joint task force must be constituted and must include its own
sustainment and security forces.
Although S&R operations will include forces from all services in op-
erational, critical support, or security enforcement roles, the predomi-
nant force requirements are for land component forces and fall on the
Army. Based on recent experience and the expected duration of future
missions, several critical Army capabilities are insufficient in the active
component. The most salient active force shortfall has been in civil af-
fairs, followed by military police, engineers, medical, and psychological
operations units. In rebalancing the force, more of these capabilities
should be in the active force, and should be organized in a structure spe-
cially designed for S&R operations.
This chapter identifies current units of the four services that consti-
tute specific capabilities for S&R operations. Almost all of the core S&R
forces are in the Army. However, all services are examined to address the
full support capability of the U.S. military for these operations. Typically,
S&R operations last months or even years longer than combat operations.
That fact increases the demand for these units in terms of rotation policies
commensurate with an all-volunteer force, as well as the reality that these
71
72

units are not solely for S&R operations but have essential combat support
and combat service support roles as well.

Background
Immediate post-conflict requirements in any scenario include both
stabilization operations and reconstruction of destroyed infrastructure.
Stabilization involves the immediate establishment of positive control over
activities in areas occupied by U.S. forces. Law and order is the most im-
portant requirement, including the prevention of looting and other crimes
against population and property.
Without reconstruction there will be no enduring stability. Military
units must be able to engage simultaneously in restoration of order and
limited immediate reconstruction of essential infrastructure. For example,
military resources can rapidly restore power generation to key facilities,
such as hospitals, using military generators. Military engineers can rebuild
selected roads and maintain them for basic use for a limited time. However,
it is important to emphasize that these measures are only expedient fixes
both in quantity and quality. Permanent reconstruction of roads, pipelines,
power grids, and other infrastructure requires expert contractors. Con-
struction contractors should come in on the heels of the S&R force and
begin work in a coordinated fashion towards permanent reconstruction.
Stabilization and reconstruction tasks have historically been per-
formed by combat forces in theater when major combat operations ended.
But combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq were carried out with
smaller, high-tech forces in rapid counterforce operations against an
enemy that was modest in size but difficult to fix and destroy. Smaller U.S.
combat forces have fewer troops to divert from combat to immediate S&R
operations. Without that capability, unrest and disorder are inevitable.
The United States needs to consider reorganizing military forces to address
the gap in capabilities that has opened with the move toward expedi-
tionary warfare. One analytical step is to identify what types of units are
needed to perform S&R missions and determine where these units are in
the AC/RC structure.

Discussion

Two Types of Stabilization and Reconstruction Scenarios

There are two broad classes of scenarios under which the United
States might deploy S&R forces.
 REBALANCING THE ACTIVE/RESERVE MIX 73

One scenario occurs when the United States has been engaged in
combat operations and needs S&R forces to flow in immediately, even be-
fore combat operations completely subside.
In this environment the S&R force would be slimmed down, com-
prising only those assets needed to conduct stabilization operations. The
reason for this is that the military theater logistics and security infrastruc-
ture will already be in place. The Theater Support Command can readily
include support for stabilization forces alongside combat forces in its the-
ater concept of area support logistics operations. As operations transition
from combat to post-conflict, theater support and services are maintained
and tailored to the requirements of the post-conflict forces, increasingly
stabilization forces but with requisite combat forces. Operation Iraqi Free-
dom is an example of this scenario.
The second scenario occurs when the United States deploys for S&R
operations to a theater where either hostilities have not broken out or an
earlier conflict did not involve U.S. combat forces and no U.S. logistics
support forces or combat forces are on the ground.
In this scenario the deploying S&R force must be further task or-
ganized to include requisite support elements to provide all classes of
supply, service and transport. It will also require an appropriate security
force composed of at least light combat forces beyond its organic military
police units. Depending on the situation, either the S&R force com-
mander or the combat force commander would be designated the overall
task force commander.
These two basic scenarios drive the following inventory groups and
methodology.
Inventory of U.S. Forces Available for S&R Operations
The inventory below is broken into three force groups indicated by
unit type. The first group lists core S&R units. The second identifies serv-
ice/support units required for S&R operations. The third shows combat
forces that might be needed to ensure security for an S&R operation when
U.S. combat forces are not already in theater. Each group is divided into
active and Reserve component assets.
Assets that are organic to a larger committed unit (truck companies,
lift helicopters, etc.) are not listed separately from the parent organization.
These assets are not really available for external missions but are essential
to the unit’s ability to perform its own mission. Hence, there will be a lot
of equipment in theater dedicated to support of U.S. (and sometimes al-
lied) forces that is suited to S&R operations.
74

Unit Types
Core Stabilization and Reconstruction Force Units
Civil Affairs Battalions PSYOP Groups
Engineer Battalions Medical Battalions
Military Police Battalions

Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations Support and Services Units

Joint/Combined Command and Explosive Ordnance Groups
Control HQs Aviation Brigades (Lift)
Theater Support Commands Sealift
Corps Support Groups/Commands Airlift
Transportation Groups/Commands Airborne ISR (including UAVs)
Quartermaster Groups Security Force Units
Signal Brigades/Commands

Combat Units
Combat Divisions Attack Aviation Brigades
Infantry Stryker Brigades Air Defense Brigades
Separate Combat Brigades Military Intelligence Brigades
Heavy/Light Armored Cavalry Air Force Close Air Support
Regiments Naval Air/Surface Fire Support
Artillery Brigades

Core Units Required for S&R JCOM

The left-hand column of table 4 shows the numbers and types of
units required to constitute the two S&R JCOM sub-units, one composed
of active and one of RC units, as proposed in chapter 4. The right-hand
column shows the number of units in the Army AC/RC structure above di-
vision level. Similar units in the other services should also be considered,
especially for multiple rotations.
The comparison between units in the structure and what is required
to organize the proposed structure is important for several reasons. First,
numbers alone do not tell us if there are ample units available to populate
the proposed commands.
All units, active and reserve, have specific missions within approved
national security OPLANS. The services, Office of the Secretary of De-
fense, and Congress have reviewed these requirements. Whether current
assets are adequate to create S&R JCOM capabilities can only be deter-
mined by an analysis of the impact on existing missions, some of which are
exactly the S&R missions being proposed for the new commands. More
forces of some types may be needed, even though adding force structure
and increasing end strength is recognized as costly and must be closely ex-
amined. Although current forces are stretched thin now, bringing more
 REBALANCING THE ACTIVE/RESERVE MIX 75

Table 5: Required and Existing S&R Units

Actual
Proposed (above division level)
AC/RC Bns AC/RC Bns

Military Police 4/.4 12/.14

Civil Affairs 4/.4 1/.28
Construction Engineers 4/.4 7/.33
Area Medical 4/.4 4/.6
Psychological Operations 4/.4 5/.8
Training and Security Assistance 1/.1 0/.0

units into the active structure has to be justified based on future require-
ments. Prominent among them will be long running S&R operations,
from small scale contingencies, such as Panama, to large operations, such
as Iraq. In short, the S&R mission may warrant more active S&R forces of
some types than are now available.
Finally, most relevant units from both the active and Reserve com-
ponents have performed S&R operations in Afghanistan and Iraq as one
of their current missions. Therefore, reorganizing them under an S&R
JCOM is both a force management issue and an end strength and force
structure issue of rebalancing the active and reserve forces. The Army and
the other services need to examine whether, if this concept is adopted, the
units to be mission-tasked to the S&R Command constitute a realign-
ment of existing resources, additional resource requirements, or some of
both. Some metrics for examining the adequacy of the on-hand unit
types listed above are:
Military Police. The requirement is shown for four active and four
reserve composite combat support/internment and resettlement battal-
ions augmented with criminal investigation teams (a different organiza-
tion than exists now—see chapter 4). Far more MP resources than these
eight battalions are already in Iraq and Afghanistan, which speaks to the
scalability required for planning and conducting large operations. Al-
though the Army has many non-divisional MP battalions in the force
(12/14), many deployments other than S&R operations (homeland secu-
rity, etc.) have increased the demands on these units. MPs from the reserve
components are not the most frequently activated units but in recent years
76

they have been consistently among those in high demand, indicating more
are needed in the active force.
Does the United States need a new type of military police capability?
The question is outside the scope of this study but deserves serious consid-
eration. Other countries field national police forces (French Gendarmerie,
Spanish Guardia Civil, Italian Carabinieri, Dutch Royal Marechaussee) that
bridge a gap between their civilian police and their military forces. The
United States fills that gap with military police that are organized, trained,
and equipped to accompany military units to establish security in environ-
ments that range from quiet to hostile. However, they do not focus mainly
on civil law enforcement missions, as do the Gendarmerie.
Civil Affairs Battalions. The one area where the Army clearly has
significant AC limitations is civil affairs. Moreover, experience going back
to the Gulf War indicates that civil affairs are an enduring high demand re-
quirement. Moreover, surge requirements are getting longer while periods
of low utilizations are shrinking. There is little doubt the trend will con-
tinue. Not only does the Army need more active CA units for operations,
they also need to be integrated fully with other S&R forces and combat
forces during training, exercises, and operations.
Construction Engineers. Another group subject to high RC activa-
tion rates in recent operations is construction engineers. The Army has a
significant number of these units in the RC. However, unless rotation
management is a problem, there may be no need to increase the AC con-
tingent of engineers. This is an area where both the Navy and Air Force
have units that should be considered as part of the rotation mix for longer-
term operations.
Area Medical Battalion. As with construction engineers, RC medical
units are more in demand than military police in terms of activation for
deployment. The numbers above (4/6) indicate that this will be an area of
concern for which rotation planning has to be considered. The first re-
course should be to draw on other service assets. Another place to look for
these types of units is in allied forces, especially those with extensive hu-
manitarian operations experience. Ultimately, the United States may find
the best strategy is to employ U.S. medical units early in the post-conflict
phase and move quickly to allied or even contractor units.
Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Battalion. Indications are these
units have the highest recent deployment tempo of all Army units. This is
a likely unit type to consider for rebalancing by moving some additional
 REBALANCING THE ACTIVE/RESERVE MIX 77

capability into the active force. A broader issue for analysis is whether
DOD needs more of these units overall.
Training and Security Assistance Battalion. The mission of this new
unit, to train a new indigenous military and police force, is essential to the
eventual draw down of U.S. security forces and should begin immediately
as combat operations subside. In the past this has been a typical Army Spe-
cial Forces mission. However, the high demand on SOF units and the
greatly increased need for police and military training both argue for cre-
ation of a distinctly different capability, one that can gather the remnants
of indigenous capabilities and achieve momentum quickly toward a new
force. As noted elsewhere, this mission may ultimately be a candidate for
contractual solutions. However, that cannot be assumed as either the im-
mediate or the long-term answer without more rigorous analysis of the al-
ternatives. This should be a military unit in the S&R JCOM and a new
force structure requirement.
Foreign Area Officer Expertise Among the Services. Each of the four
services maintains a cohort of officer personnel trained as regional and
linguistic experts. The Air Force and Navy programs are developmental
and focus on identifying officers who already possess some level of foreign
area expertise. The Army program is the oldest and most advanced. The
Army program, begun in the 1940s, has been overhauled several times.
Since 1996, officers have been able to specialize as Foreign Area Officers
(FAO) as a single career track. At present, four years are needed to com-
plete the three-phase FAO qualification regime, which includes language
training, an advanced degree in regional studies, and a regional tour. The
Marine Corps program is a smaller version of the Army program, as Ma-
rine FAO requirements are far fewer.
Army FAOs are organized into nine regions. The regional distribu-
tion of FAOs (see table 6) does not reflect a changed security environ-
ment. A rebalancing is needed to develop more FAOs with North
Africa/Middle East expertise. As with other capabilities, regional expert-
ise should be pursued in all services and not limited to the Army alone.
At present there is a serious shortfall across all services, although the
Army program provides a good model for the other services to follow.
Stabilization and Reconstruction Forces in Iraq. Early data from
Operation Iraqi Freedom illustrates the availability of S&R force types
within current force inventories. U.S. Army data regarding forces in the-
ater on May 1, 2003, the date generally regarded as the transition from
major combat operations to post-conflict operations, reveals the Army
78

Table 6: Regional Distribution of Foreign Area Officers

Country/Region Number

China 41
Eurasia 184
Europe 195
Latin America 189
North Africa/Middle East 140
Northeast Asia 71
South Asia 35
Southeast Asia 64
Sub-Saharan Africa 83

forces available for stabilization and reconstruction operations shown in

figure 12.
Stabilization and reconstruction forces from the U.S. Army alone
were nearly 25 percent of the overall U.S. strength of 150,000, and deploy-
ments continued through late June/early July. Other American services
and the British contingent also included S&R forces. Planners had seen to
it that these forces were in theater or on their way early on. What was lack-
ing was dedicated command and control for the post-conflict mission and
plans for the rapid, integrated employment of such forces at likely points
of instability. A rolling application of stabilization forces needed to unfold
as combat forces removed the control of the Iraqi regime. The immediacy
of the stabilization mission meant it could not be handed to combat com-
manders still engaged in major operations, as had been done in traditional
large force operations.
Another important feature of the Army’s S&R in-theater force pro-
file in May 2004 was the large RC contingent, as shown in table 7.
The active component of these resources, in particular engineers,
medical, and military police, were organic to combat formations, such as
divisions. Following doctrine, they were assigned stabilization missions as
secondary to their primary combat support role. Therefore, the major
tasks of stabilization and reconstruction were carried primarily by the Re-
serve component.
This does not necessarily suggest the need for greater troop
strength to add S&R forces to the inventory, though force planners may
 REBALANCING THE ACTIVE/RESERVE MIX 79

Figure 11: U.S. Army S&R Force Types In Theater at the End of Major
Combat Operations (May 1, 2003) Total: 37,350

Civil Affairs (1,800)

Military Police
(10,400) Engineers (17,230)

Medical (7,280)
PSYOP (640)
Source: Information derived from the Army Mobilization Deployment Information System.

Table 7: Reserve Component Contribution to S&R Force Types in Iraq

(May 1, 2003)
Type Percent RC

Military Police 59
Civil Affairs 98
Engineers 46
Medical 35
PSYOP 98

conclude that some adjustment is warranted. Rather, early indications

from Operation Iraqi Freedom experience buttress the two main argu-
ments of this paper. First, that dedicated command and control of S&R
forces and missions has emerged as an imperative of rapid decisive op-
erations called for by U.S. military strategy. Second, that there is a need
to reexamine the balance of active and reserve S&R forces for the future.
These are twin arguments to better organize available resources to serve
80

the combatant commander at the point where major combat operations

transition into post conflict operations, when instability threatens suc-
cess even while commanders continue their focus on combat mission.
Organizing, planning, and conducting integrated post-conflict opera-
tions for the future require a different approach to the employment of
S&R forces already being deployed.

Conclusions
This preliminary analysis suggests several conclusions:
● Substantial S&R forces exist in the active and reserve forces, but

there are too few active CA and PSYOP units based on the high demand
the United States experienced in the 1990s.
● The demand for additional active component medical, intelli-

gence, engineer, mortuary affairs, air traffic control, and military police
forces became clear in recent operations. Sustained future demands in all
these areas should be examined.
● Rebalancing AC/RC forces is primarily but not exclusively an Army

issue. In particular, the Marine Corps which relies on Army CA assets in

Iraq has identified the need for more CA and MP units. Making S&R
forces truly joint and addressing the issue of long-term operations also re-
quires the Navy and Air Force to examine their assets, particularly in force
protection (Shore Police and Air Police), construction engineers, and
medical specialties.
● The Army conducted a service-wide trimming of its administrative

(non-operational organizations) structure in 1999 and moved many

spaces into operational units to bring them up to full strength. Another
review may be warranted.
● Some Army support functions or even whole units could be con-

sidered for transfer to RC status, conversion to DOD civilian manning, or

contracting out to minimize growth in active strength.
● The Army FAO program is well established but needs to be

realigned. The other services have not invested adequately in regional

expertise.
 REBALANCING THE ACTIVE/RESERVE MIX 81

Appendix I: Inventory of Core S&R Units

Army
Civil Affairs Battalions/Groups
Active Component—1 CA Battalion
Reserve—6 CA Brigades
Engineer Groups/Brigades
Active Component—5 Combat Engineer Groups/Brigades
Reserve—3 Engineer Brigades/Commands
National Guard—5 Engineer Brigades/Groups
Military Police Brigades
Active Component—5 MP Brigades (CBT SUPT)
Reserve—2 MP Brigades (I&R), 1 MP Brigade (CBT SUPT)
National Guard—3 MP Brigades (CBT SUPT)
Psychological Operation Groups
Active Component—1 PSYOP Group
Reserve—2 PSYOP Groups
Medical Brigades
Active Component—4 Medical Brigades/Commands
Reserve—7 Medical Brigades/Commands

Marine Corps
Two Reserve Civil Affairs Groups; four Reserve Military Police Companies

Navy
Naval Mobile Construction Battalions (NMCB)
Active Component—8
Reserve—12
Naval Construction Regiments (NCR)
Active Component—2
Reserve—4

Air Force
Air Force Security Forces
Many units beyond those organic to active Wings exist in the Air Force Reserve and
Air National Guard
Air Force Engineer Units
Active Component Red Horse Squadrons
Reserve Component Red Horse Squadrons
82

Appendix II: S&R Support and Services Units

Army
Theater Support Commands
Active Component—3 TSC (all at reduced manning)
Reserve—1 TSC, 3 TSC Augmentations (for Active TSCs)
Corps Support Group/Command
Active Component—3
Reserve—1
Transportation Groups/Commands
Active Component—2 Commands
Reserve—1 Command/3 Groups
National Guard—1 Brigade
Quartermaster Groups
Active Component—1
Reserve—1
National Guard—1
Signal Brigades/Commands
Active Component—11
Reserve—3
National Guard—3
Explosive Ordnance Groups
Active Component—1
National Guard—1
Aviation Brigades (Lift)
Active Component—3
Reserve—1
National Guard—3

Navy
Sealift
Active Component—8 Fast Sealift ships and 3 Cargo ships
Naval Reserve Fleet
Afloat Force Cargo/Prepositioning Ships
Active Component—39 (supporting all services)
Reserve—Ready Reserve Force transport ships

Marine Corps
Force Service Support Groups
Active Component—3 FSSG
Reserve—1FSSG
 REBALANCING THE ACTIVE/RESERVE MIX 83

Air Force
Support forces include mission support for airlift and airborne platforms for intelligence, re-
connaissance, and surveillance (including UAVs). The Air Force also must provide Tactical Air Control
Party (TACP) personnel to ground units and Airlift Control Element (ALCE) personnel for terminal
airport control. Airfield operations, including air traffic and instrumented airspace control, also are re-
quired. Finally, the service will have to provide Medical Evacuation aircraft to the operation. Through
the Air Force Component of U.S. Transportation Command, Military Airlift Command, the Air Force
also is responsible for commercial contract air support.
84

Appendix III: Combat Units

Army
Combat Divisions
Active Component—10
National Guard—8 [Note: under reorganization—new mix of 5 divisions by 2010]
Infantry Stryker Brigades
Active Component—1 operational ready, 4 others proposed
National Guard—1 proposed
Separate Combat Brigades
Active Component—2 INF
National Guard—1 ARM, 1 INF, 1 Scout Brigade
Enhanced Readiness NG Brigades—7 LGT INF, 5 MECH INF, 1 ARM, 1 CAV
Heavy/Light Armored Cavalry Regiments
Component—1 ACR, 1 ACR (LGT)
National Guard—1 Enhanced Readiness ACR
Artillery Brigades (155mm, MLRS)
Active Component—6
National Guard—17
Attack Aviation
Active Component—3 Brigades (2 battalions each)
National Guard—2 (3 battalions total)
Air Defense Brigades
Active Component—5
National Guard—1
Military Intelligence Brigades
Component—3
Reserve—1
National Guard—1 (linguist)

Navy
Aircraft Carriers (CAS)
Active Component—13
Reserve—none
Surface Combatants: cruisers/frigates/destroyers (Naval Gunfire ashore)
Active Component—27/35/59
Reserve—none
Patrol Craft (Coastal Security Operations)
Active Component—13
Reserve—none [Note: the Navy also operates numerous harbor security boats]
 REBALANCING THE ACTIVE/RESERVE MIX 85

Marine Corps
Marine Divisions
Active Component—3 (operationally organized into 3 MEFs and 2 MEBs)
Reserve—1
Marine Special Operations Forces
Active Component—4 MEB (Anti-Terrorism); 2 Force Reconnaissance Companies; Marine
Contingent U.S. Special Operations Command
Reserve—2 Force Reconnaissance Companies

Air Force
Combat units provide close air support to ground security forces and to the stabilization force
as required, including suppression of enemy air defense. Platforms that may be called upon include all
fighter/attack aircraft, fighter/bomber aircraft, and bombers with PGM capability.
86

Appendix IV: Two Active Component/National Guard

Integrated Divisions
(Activated in June 1999)

7th Infantry Division (Light)

Fort Carson, CO (Forward Element at Fort Polk, LA)

Active Component. Division Headquarters Company (-), about 150 personnel. These person-
nel are responsible for planning and for coordination of training for subordinate units. Most are also
dual slotted in garrison support positions at Fort Carson. For example, the Division Commander is
also the installation commander of Fort Carson, and the Division Operations Officer (G-3) is also the
post Director of Plans and Training (responsible for range/training area management, budgeting etc.).
Supported Fort Carson AC units include the 3rd ACR, 3rd Brigade, 4th ID, and a battalion of the 10th SF
Group.
The AC 7th ID HQ (-) is regarded by subordinate National Guard brigades as a major source of
assistance in planning and executing their Enhanced Light Infantry Brigade training.
National Guard. All other division units, including three Enhanced Light Infantry Brigades.
[Note: two of these brigades—the 30th and 39th —will deploy to Iraq in 2004 for a year.]

24th Infantry Division (Mechanized)

Fort Riley, KS (Forward Element at Fort Jackson, SC)
Active Component. Division Headquarters Company (-), about 150 personnel. These person-
nel are responsible for planning and for coordination of training for subordinate units. Most are also
dual slotted in garrison support positions at Fort Riley. For example, the Division Commander is also
the installation commander of Fort Riley, and the Division Operations Officer (G-3) is also the post
Director of Plans and Training (responsible for range/training area management, budgeting, etc.).
Supported Fort Riley active units include the 3rd Brigades of both the 1st Armored Division and the 1st
ID in Germany.
The AC 24th ID HQ (-) is regarded by subordinate NG brigades as a major source of assistance
in planning and executing their Enhanced Mechanized Infantry Brigade training.
National Guard. All other division units, including three Enhanced Mechanized Infantry
Brigades.
Chapter 6

Broadening Military Culture

D
espite a long history of involvement in stabilization and recon-
struction operations, the U.S. military has more recently viewed
these activities as separate and detracting from its primary
warfighting mission. When it has engaged in stabilization and reconstruc-
tion operations, the U.S. military often has raised concerns about a pro-
longed engagement and focused on an exit strategy and on working in
parallel with civilian organizations. The result has been an inability to
train, equip, and plan for these operations properly. This cultural mindset
could reduce the military’s effectiveness in addressing complexity on the
battlefield and in adapting to changing situations. Recognizing that any
cultural change requires training, education, and clear intent from the
leadership, this chapter will focus on the role professional military educa-
tion can play in adapting military culture and how training can better pre-
pare military personnel for stabilization and reconstruction operations.

Background
Since the early 1990s, the U.S. military has resisted prolonged in-
volvement in S&R operations for reasons ranging from concern for the
degradation of combat readiness and diversion of limited resources to a
belief that these operations are not the role of the military. Military lead-
ers feared that training, equipping, and planning for S&R operations
would detract from warfighting capabilities. These concerns stem from
Vietnam and were reinforced by problems with peace operations in the
1990s, especially Somalia.
Failure in Somalia had a profound impact on the American military
and political psyche: no longer would the United States use the military to
do nation-building. In the future, the United States would require clearly
stated, achievable objectives before conducting any peace or humanitarian
operation, and its role would only be to provide security. Another side
87
88

effect of the U.S. experience in Somalia was the growing notion that the
military’s primary mission should always be to fight and win the Nation’s
wars, rather than become embroiled in difficult, prolonged peace and sta-
bility operations. Despite a cultural reluctance to participate in peace and
stability operations, the U.S. military found itself doing just that through-
out the 1990s, which reinforced antipathy to such operations.
An example of this cultural resistance is the Army’s 2003 decision to
close the U.S. Army War College Peacekeeping Institute, the only DOD or-
ganization dedicated to the study of these types of operations, as part of a
money-saving initiative. In the wake of the Iraqi operation the decision
drew criticism and the institute was reconstituted.
The U.S. military focuses financial and human resources on training
and equipping for the warfighting mission. Participation in S&R opera-
tions often is seen as diverting limited resources and degrading combat
readiness. A unit is required to train to mission essential task lists
(METLs).1 Because no METL exists for peace operations, units are pre-
vented from training for these missions until three to four months before
deployment. Training, therefore, focuses on core competencies, such as pa-
trolling and crowd control, leaving little time to acquire negotiating skills
or learn the cultural or historical context of a missions. For crises that arise
rapidly, even less time is available to train troops in the skills needed for
stabilization and reconstruction.
In 1999, the Army reported that two of its ten divisions were no
longer combat ready to fight in a major theater war because of deploy-
ments to peace operations. Unit readiness is in part measured by the num-
ber of training hours flown, miles driven, or hours steamed. When a unit
is deployed or is training in preparation for deployment to a peace opera-
tion, it is unable to hone its combat skills. These measures of readiness do
not take into account enhancement of other important skills—small unit
action, working with local populations, increased unit cohesion—many of
which are important for future S&R and/or major combat operations.
The United States has a long history of conducting stabilization and
reconstruction operations, from the Indian Wars in the 19th century to op-
erations in Afghanistan and Iraq in the 21st, and the new strategic envi-
ronment ensures more such commitments. Military personnel must be
properly trained and equipped to engage effectively in these operations.
This will require cultural change to overcome resistance to S&R opera-
tions. It also will require increased understanding of and ability to adapt
 BROADENING MILITARY CULTURE 89

to a highly complex and constantly changing strategic environment. Pro-

fessional military education can play a central role in both.

Discussion
Not only did Iraq demonstrate the capabilities of a transforming U.S.
military, it revealed the need for a new cognitive paradigm for engaging in
S&R operations. Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have driven home the
national security and international political imperatives that became evi-
dent after September 11 to build a stable peace in countries torn by con-
flict and have underscored the importance of establishing security as a
prerequisite for political and economic development. More important, it
has heralded a new strategic era in which the lines between conflict and
peace are blurred and complexity rules the battlefield. Across the board in-
tegration of these concepts into professional military education will help
prepare military personnel for the new strategic environment while at the
same time adapting its military culture for stabilization and reconstruc-
tion operations.
New strategic environment
The new strategic environment in which the U.S. military finds itself
is simultaneously complex and highly constrained. Any future use of mil-
itary force will likely occur within a limited war or a military operation
other than war, and winning the peace will be as important as winning the
war.2 Because S&R operations will likely take place in a politically charged
environment, victory on the battlefield could end in strategic failure if po-
litical objectives are not achieved. Building a stable peace means address-
ing the underlying sources of a conflict, not just its symptoms. Complex-
ity will increase with the presence of an array of partners including
coalition forces, interagency players, international organizations, non-
governmental organizations and local officials. Operations probably will
occur in populated urban areas, resulting in greater interaction with local
populations and increased demand for interpreters. For local populations
and the media, U.S. servicemen will be the face of U.S. policy, so tactical
decisions and individual actions can have strategic implications. Current
efforts in transforming the U.S. military will further shape this strategic
environment. With more agile and dispersed forces, small, independent
operations will become the rule rather than the exception.
90

Concepts of conflict and post-conflict

Traditionally, the United States has considered combat and post-con-
flict operations as two distinct phases, conceptualized as a linear progres-
sion from conflict to post-conflict to peace. As the U.S. experience in Iraq
illustrates, however, stabilization and reconstruction operations will likely
occur in environments where the mix between conflict and peace shifts
back and forth. As one U.S. officer with experience in stabilization and re-
construction operations put it, “it’s not post-conflict when you’re getting
shot at.” A more fluid, non-linear concept of conflict must be articulated
and incorporated into professional military education.
Interdependence of reconstruction tasks
A stable peace is built on four pillars: security, social and economic
well-being, justice and reconciliation, and governance and participation.
Although success in each area depends on the effective integration and in-
teraction across them, security (encompassing both collective and individ-
ual security) is the precondition for achieving successful outcomes in the
other pillars.3 A country plagued by internally or externally imposed con-
flict often lacks the mechanisms or institutions to provide for its own se-
curity, uphold the rule of law, or address human rights abuses; its govern-
ment may be nonexistent or too weak to provide services to its citizenry or
improve their socio-economic livelihoods. The U.S. leadership must ap-
proach stabilization and reconstruction as a national, governmental mis-
sion, rather than as solely military or civilian, to enable the military, diplo-
matic, economic, and informational instruments of national power to be
harnessed and integrated effectively.
Critical skills set for stabilization and reconstruction
Stabilization and reconstruction operations typically take place in
complex, fluid environments that require not only physical stamina, but
also mental agility, intellectual capability, and a skill set different from that
of conventional warfighting. The following list of skills needed to be effec-
tive in these environments was derived from a United States Institute of
Peace report based on interviews from senior leaders in Bosnia.4 Profes-
sional military education should develop each of these skills, with greater
emphasis on the last six.
■ Warfighting skills in the event conflict escalates and to avert poten-
tial conflict
■ Courage to take risks
■ Confidence to delegate authority and the need for trust
 BROADENING MILITARY CULTURE 91

■ Confidence in crisis decisionmaking and in doing things that have

never been done before
■ Increased decisionmaking skills
■ Ability to adapt or adjust to a new environment
■ Adherence to principle and the ability to maintain fairness and
evenhandedness for all parties
■ Vision of the politico-military environment
■ Ability to interact with those outside the military and build con-
sensus
■ A broad intellectual background
■ Interpersonal skills
■ Understanding historical and cultural contexts
Probably the two most critical skills needed in S&R operations are
knowledge and understanding of historical and cultural contexts and the
interpersonal skills to exploit that understanding. Insensitivity to cultural
differences can contribute to tensions between locals and military forces
and reduce the effectiveness of the operation.5 Moreover, understanding
the cultural context of a country aids in formulating effective strategies for
addressing the underlying sources of a conflict. Interpersonal skills are es-
sential for building cooperation among disparate partners and trust
among the local population. They can make the difference between
progress and stalemate or, worse, regression.
Negotiating skills have been cited as critical in recent U.S. military in-
terventions, and for the future. General Anthony Zinni once said, “always
consider negotiations as a great alternative to violence.” 6 Down to the pla-
toon level, officers and troops will engage in direct negotiations to quell
angry crowds, determine how to distribute relief supplies, or settle quar-
rels between warring factions with local leaders, belligerent parties, and
the general population.7
The employment of smaller, more dispersed units calls for improved
decisionmaking skills. “Junior leaders must be confident and competent to
make quick, hard decisions . . . [The] decisions had to be made while op-
erating relatively independently and out of communication range with
their superiors.” 8 Based on their own experiences in peace operations,
commanders recognize that the success of an S&R operation depends on
the vigilance, mental alertness, and responses of the most junior soldier
and his noncommissioned officer.
Mission requirements and political objectives for S&R operations are
tough to define and may change often. This puts military commanders in
92

a difficult position as they try to translate strategic objectives into opera-

tional and tactical tasks.9 An understanding of the larger strategic envi-
ronment and an ability to adapt as it changes are keys to success in any
military operation; they are particularly important in the complex envi-
ronments in which S&R operations take place. As an operation matures
and the security situation on the ground stabilizes, an ability to adjust to
the new environment is critical to success.
Role of Professional Military Education
Professional military education can play a central role in changing
the military’s cultural mindset and in developing the broad intellectual
framework necessary for these demanding, complex, and multidiscipli-
nary situations. The first step in achieving a change in culture is to demon-
strate the importance of S&R operations in American national security
strategy through courses or lectures and by emphasizing these themes
throughout the curricula. While the content of courses certainly con-
tributes to a student’s knowledge base, the structure and the composition
of the faculties and student bodies also shape the intellectual development
of the military professional.
Because stabilization and reconstruction operations have often been
viewed as separate and detracting from the military’s primary warfighting
mission, PME curricula have dedicated limited time to its study, even
though peace operations have been identified as a “special area of empha-
sis.” 10 An independent study conducted in 2001 at the National Defense
University found that many core courses included peace operations as one
two-hour lecture that focused on service or joint doctrine. Elective courses,
on the other hand, spent 24 to more than 30 hours on peace operations, but
these had limited participation due to class size constraints. At the U.S.
Army War College, for example, only 14 percent of the Class of 2001 was
enrolled in the elective “Peace Operations Issues: Policy and Practice.” For
the most part, electives focused on the role and policy of the United States,
the United Nations, and nongovernmental organizations. They had less in-
struction on sources of conflict or post-conflict reconstruction.
Since September 11 and the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, in-
struction on nation-building and the new strategic environment has been
added to the PME curriculum. For example, the National War College now
offers a core course lecture titled “Peacekeeping and Nation-building.” The
Marine Corps has done an excellent job in providing the cultural capacity
to adapt to a complex and changing environment. The Expeditionary
Warfare School (formerly the Amphibious Warfare School) offers a 10-day
 BROADENING MILITARY CULTURE 93

course on military operations other than war (MOOTW). In 2001 ap-

proximately 90 percent of all captains received instruction in MOOTW.
These are important first steps, in recognizing the importance of
these operations, but more courses and lectures are needed to effect real
change. Further instruction is also needed in civil-military cooperation,
interagency planning, media relations, and negotiations. Additional classes
are not enough, however, if few students are enrolled in them. Instruction
related to stabilization and reconstruction operations should be incorpo-
rated at all levels of PME, from officer basic courses through senior-level
war colleges, as well as noncommissioned officer education, service acad-
emies, and ROTC programs. Students need to be exposed to these topics
from the beginning of their careers to build the appropriate mindset and
necessary skills.
The structure of a course or academic program can impact the
preparation of military personnel as much as content. As described above,
interpersonal skills to work with those outside the military, the broad in-
tellectual background to understand cultural and strategic contexts, and
the mental agility to adapt to a constantly changing environment are crit-
ical skills for effective engagement in S&R operations. Working with coali-
tion forces, interagency partners, and international and nongovernmental
organizations requires an ability to understand perspectives different from
the military’s. One easy step to bring different perspectives into the class-
room is to invite guest speakers to describe their roles and unique cultures.
Interacting with students from other countries or other federal agencies in
class discussions, assignments, and exercises also helps build interpersonal
skills. Students reported that the participation of international students
and guest speakers were critical to their better understanding and appreci-
ating civilian and international partners.
Tabletop exercises and computer simulations are excellent tools in
sharpening decisionmaking skills and illustrating complex situations or
concepts. Students in the Industrial College of the Armed Forces stated
that one of the most valuable aspects of their elective was the final exer-
cise, which illustrated the complexities of a peace operation. Most, if not
all, PME schools include small- and large-scale exercises in the curricula;
using scenarios that reflect an S&R environment can further illustrate and
integrate complex concepts. Computer simulations can also enhance de-
cisionmaking skills by demonstrating to students how certain decisions
may impact a situation or produce unintended consequences. Also, exer-
cises and simulations provide indirect experience in stabilization and
94

reconstruction operations and are essential to sound analysis, planning,

and action in the future.11
To operate effectively in the new strategic environment, the United
States needs military and civilian professionals who understand the his-
torical and strategic contexts of areas throughout the world, the cultural
and religious influences that guide popular thinking, and the nature of
human conflict, past and present. The U.S. military will continue to be
called on to engage in combat, so honing warfighting skills and other core
competencies must not be neglected. The model of an applied liberal arts
education would supplement instruction in doctrine and core competen-
cies with culture, sociology, psychology, history, language, international
and domestic law, ethics, and media and negotiations skills—all important
subjects for developing the intellectual skills and capability to deal with a
complex and changing strategic environment.
Professional military education, however, is often considered a zero
sum game. Per the law of diminishing returns, there is a point beyond
which there will be only incremental improvements in core competencies
for the amount of training invested, but investment in cultural under-
standing, however modest, will yield significant returns. A debate on the
level of proficiency required for this strategic environment should take
place, and an appropriate investment in other “liberal arts” made. Ideally,
this would include all subject areas listed above, but sociology, law, and ne-
gotiations should be emphasized.

Training S&R Forces

Training also has an important role to play in adapting military cul-
ture and in preparing military personnel for operations. Current peace op-
erations training can provide some insight into the military’s approach to
training. Cultural reluctance to peace operations has created a “just-in-
time” philosophy for training for these missions. A unit switches from
training for war to training for peace operations only three to four months
before deployment. Training occurs at the individual, unit, and leader lev-
els. Unit training culminates in a mission rehearsal exercise (MRE) at the
Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk or the Combat Ma-
neuver Training Center in Hohenfels, Germany. MREs are scenario-driven,
replicating a spectrum of contingencies a unit might encounter, including
situations involving civilians, hostile crowds, and adversarial forces.
Several studies and after action reviews have concluded that just-in-
time training provides inadequate preparation for the political-military
 BROADENING MILITARY CULTURE 95

and civil-military aspects of peace operations. Although no units failed to

carry out their mission in the Balkans, units and staffs needed several
weeks to achieve a level of proficiency once deployed in theater. PKI’s
after-action review on Kosovo acknowledged that more peacetime train-
ing in peace operations requirements was necessary.12 Peacetime training
can develop a baseline understanding of missions, tasks, and the complex
operating environment so that units can become more proficient faster.
Future requirements for rapid deployment and the synergies re-
quired for stabilization and reconstruction necessitates regular peacetime
training for the S&R forces described in chapter 4. All elements of an S&R
unit must train and exercise together periodically to build important link-
ages and relationships. Individual, unit, and leader training should high-
light critical stabilization and reconstruction skills, such as negotiations,
small unit decisionmaking, and interaction with U.S. interagency players,
NGOs, foreign militaries, and the local population. It is therefore impor-
tant that representatives from these communities participate in training
exercises. Facilities should be made available in the near term for training
for S&R Groups, building toward the capability to host an exercise involv-
ing a full S&R JCOM exercise in the future. Training technologies like
those described in chapter 7 could also be utilized.

Conclusion
● Because of its cultural ethos, the U.S. military believed throughout

the 1990s that it should not engage in prolonged S&R activities because
they degraded its ability to fight and win the Nation’s wars.
● Given our experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq and the new strate-

gic environment, operations have become a national security and interna-

tional political imperative for the U.S. military.
● Professional military education and training must now adapt mil-

itary culture and prepare military personnel to engage in S&R operations

effectively.
● S&R operations will require greater understanding of local histor-

ical and cultural contexts, interpersonal skills to work with partners and
local populations, and an ability to adapt to rapidly changing and complex
environments.
● All elements of S&R forces, including representatives from the in-

teragency community, nongovernmental organizations, and coalition mil-

itaries, should train and exercise together periodically.
96

Notes
1 Mission essential tasks are those tasks that must be performed with the utmost effectiveness to

succeed on the battlefield.

2 John R. Boulé, II, “Operational Planning and Conflict Termination,” Joint Force Quarterly, 29

(Autumn/Winter 2001–02), 102.

3 Scott Feil, “Building Better Foundations: Security in Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” white paper

for the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project prepared by the Center for Strategic and International
Studies and the Association of the U.S. Army, September 22, 2002, 1, accessed at <www.csis.org/isp/
pcr/securitypaper.pdf>.
4 Howard Olsen and John Davis, “Training U.S. Army Officers for Peace Operations: Lessons from

Bosnia,” U.S. Institute of Peace Press, October 1999, 5–7.

5 Michael J. Hardesty and Jason D. Ellis, “Training for Peace Operations: The U.S. Army Adapts to

the Post-Cold War World,” U.S. Institute of Peace Press, February 1997, 9.
6 Anthony C. Zinni, as quoted in Kenneth C. Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned (Wash-

ington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1995), 71.

7 Hardesty and Ellis, 15.

8 Ibid, 12.

9 Ibid, 9.

10 Special Areas of Emphasis highlight the concerns of OSD, the services, combatant commands,

defense agencies, and Joint Staff regarding coverage of specific joint subject matters in the PME col-
leges. Colleges will evaluate each SAE for inclusion in their curricula; however, inclusion is not re-
quired.
11 Robert H. Dorff, “Professional Military Security Education: The View from a Senior Service Col-

lege,” Educating International Security Practitioners: Preparing to Face the Demands of the 21st Century
International Security Environment, ed. James A. Smith et al. (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College,
2001), 30.
12 Brent C. Bankus, “Training the Military for Peace Operations: A Past, Present, and Future View,”

paper delivered to U.S. Institute of Peace Symposium on best practices for peace and humanitarian op-
erations, June 26, 2001, 27–29.
Chapter 7

Supporting Technologies

T
he abrupt transition from active combat to post-combat stabiliza-
tion and reconstruction in Iraq has resulted in a problem filled
transition period for U.S. and coalition forces. The military has
been thrust into non-traditional roles for which it has been neither trained
nor equipped. In addition, it appears that the military will continue to be
called upon to deal with an environment in which the transition between
war, stabilization and reconstruction, peacekeeping, and renewed conflict
will be fast, localized, and unpredictable. Thus, the military, particularly
the Army, will of necessity be engaged in S&R until an orderly transition
to civilian leadership is achieved. In addition, globalization has opened
world markets for a wide variety of lethal weapons and information tech-
nology that are available to insurgent, guerrilla, terrorist, and criminal
forces. American forces will continue to confront rocket propelled
grenades (RPG), mines, mortars, and even artillery and anti-tank
weapons, as well as small arms wielded by assailants connected by the In-
ternet. New technologies and equipment are needed for military opera-
tions in the post-conflict state.

Background
During the interval between stabilization and reconstruction and
nation-building, the military could be required to perform the roles of civil
government. The primary S&R role is security, which includes the protec-
tion not only of our own troops but of the civilian population, along with
other law enforcement responsibilities. A second military S&R role is the
maintenance of the civilian infrastructure both for subsistence and basic
services. Finally, the military must maintain positive human relations with
the indigenous population and our own troops in an environment of dan-
ger, economic dislocation, cultural differences and mistrust. Perhaps most
importantly, the military force—as the surrogate for civilian authority—
97
98

must demonstrate concern for the indigenous population while still facing
personal dangers. As in diplomacy, the primary agent of positive change is
built upon a foundation of trust.
While the issues clearly transcend technological solution, we must
adapt current military technology and develop new technologies to pro-
mote successful civil-military operations during the post-direct-combat
phase of the joint campaign. This chapter will describe some of the tech-
nology solutions that could augment military capability for expanded re-
sponsibilities during stabilization and reconstruction. The technologies
are discussed in the framework of post-conflict military roles and needs.
Four overarching areas where technology can play an important role in
military S&R are training (including pre-packaged expert tool sets), com-
munications, specialized offensive and defensive weapons systems, and
modeling and analysis. For the military, deployed, focused mission-train-
ing packages are required for personnel to acquire the required skill sets
they need for security, infrastructure maintenance, and human relations
they have not received before being deployed. While the military is devel-
oping networked communications for intra-military operations, the abil-
ity to couple the military network with the civilian communications sys-
tem is essential for S&R operations. Weapons systems, such as non-lethal
weapons for crowd control, are needed to augment combat systems. Fi-
nally, the military needs specialized software tool kits to prioritize work in
reestablishing civilian infrastructure functionality. While opposition and
criminal threats remain, vital infrastructure must be protected.

Discussion

Security
During the period of post-conflict stabilization, the military provides
for its own security and is responsible for civilian security and for reconsti-
tuting a civilian police force and national military. The most challenging
and resource intensive security environment is within population centers.
Security needs
Counter-guerrilla/sniper. A sniper attack in an urban environment is
nearly impossible to prevent, as evidenced by the sniper killings in Wash-
ington, D.C. during the fall of 2002 and the current attacks in Iraq. As also
witnessed in Iraq, the attacker has the advantage of initiative, unpredictably
choosing the time and place of an attack. It is impossible for U.S. troops to
be on full alert always and everywhere. Technology is needed to correlate
 SUPPORTING TECHNOLOGIES 99

intelligence information and rapidly identify and neutralize threats; tech-

nologies are also needed to harden vehicles, buildings, and individuals
against attack. The population will lose confidence in the authority of the
military force if this force appears vulnerable.
Ordnance/mine detection and neutralization. Mines or bombs can
be triggered autonomously with sensors or by remote control. For com-
bat operations, military organizations use very heavy equipment such as
flails to clear safe paths in minefields. Individual mine detection is a very
slow step-by-step procedure with short-range detectors. These ap-
proaches have limited utility in an urban environment where freedom of
movement is paramount.
Crowd control. Military weaponry is optimized for maximum lethal-
ity and, therefore, is inappropriate for crowd control. Leading combat or-
ganizations, the first into population centers, are not equipped or trained
sufficiently in crowd control. These operations are made much more dif-
ficult when language and cultural barriers exist. Crowd control requires
specialized communications, defensive equipment, and non-lethal
weapons. A new area for work is intelligence for “preventive crowd con-
trol.” This is similar to civilian police intelligence to identify leadership in
agitation groups.
Border/perimeter security. Local civil security demands security from
external threats to both the civilian population and military formations. Se-
cure international borders must be established and maintained to prevent
entry of foreign insurgents and the flow of weapons. To reduce military lo-
gistics burdens, border security requires surveillance and intelligence.
Survivable transport vehicles. A large number of combat casualties
in Iraq have been in Humvees. The proliferation of such weapons as RPGs
makes these vehicles vulnerable. They are also vulnerable to the mine
threat. Transport vehicles need to be made more survivable with enhanced
armor and improved sensors with embedded networked intelligence.
Intelligence. Local intelligence, from multiple sources, is the key
enabler to security. In particular, intelligence is required to detect and
track hostile individuals and organizations, find arms caches, and track
down criminals. Tools are required to speed processing and assessment
of field HUMINT. Included is the need to predict actions, conduct pro-
files, and identify key leaders or influence agents. Efficient and relevant
intelligence requires distributed and networked surveillance sensors to
augment HUMINT.
100

Technology for Security

Distributed mission training for security. Conventional classroom
and facility training is giving way to distributed training utilizing interac-
tive software packages and virtual training facilities with model-based
simulations. Group training is also possible by networked systems. Net-
working permits the linking of multiple distributed training sites in the
United States to distributed sites in an occupied country. As the skill de-
mands for the military shifts from combat to providing security, the train-
ing packages must be provided immediately after hostilities subside. Tech-
nologies include public security mission training packages, portable
simulation centers, and equipment.
Civil-military communications interoperability. While still incom-
plete, military communications technology has provided considerable
capability for joint service interoperability. However, little if any priority
has been given to the need for connectivity to and within civilian commu-
nications networks. To operate effectively with an indigenous communi-
cations infrastructure, bridges such as analog to digital converters will
need to be developed as deployable sets. In some cases the military may
even need to have analog radio stocks if the military-civilian interfaces
cannot be handled by software. Technologies include wireless and wired
networks, software protocols for network management, and civil-military
interfaces. Antennas, both mobile and quick-erecting, are needed as re-
placements for losses and breakdowns.
Distributed and networked surveillance sensors. Security is heavily
dependent on knowledge of the location and movement of individuals and
vehicles of interest. The urban environment is a particular challenge due to
the concealment provided by buildings, underground utility tunnels, and
other infrastructure “terrain features.” Sensors can be mounted on build-
ings, fly in UAVs, be in unattended ground systems, or be carried by people.
Some level of sensor coverage already exists, such as security cameras in
banks. Technology is needed to network dissimilar sensors to provide a
broad area of coverage and to provide an integrated picture. In some cases,
tasking tools are required to direct overhead sensors to fill in holes in cover-
age. A particular need is for sensors to detect mines and remotely fired
explosives while on the move. Technologies include cameras, infrared detec-
tors, acoustic detectors, radars, metal detectors, and chemical detectors.
Network counter-terrorist analysis tools. Networks are used by ter-
rorist and insurgent groups to establish organizational cohesion while re-
maining physically dispersed until a decisive point in time and action.
 SUPPORTING TECHNOLOGIES 101

Technologies including network monitoring, intercept and analysis soft-

ware tools, and intelligent agents are needed to probe networks and data-
bases to permit decisionmaking relative to insurgent planning and location.
Counter-sniper system. Counter-sniper systems fall into two cate-
gories. Detection of the sniper prior to firing and response systems that im-
mediately return fire guided by the sniper weapon signature. Optical detec-
tors are needed that can distinguish between sniper sighting technologies
and media or private camera lenses. Other technologies include optical
augmentation from the sniper weapon, electromagnetic detection, flash de-
tectors, acoustic arrays, and automated cueing of a response weapon.
Lightweight and flexible body armor. More improvements are
needed to provide greater body area coverage while retaining freedom of
movement for the wearer. Body armors are needed that provide protection
and can be concealed to promote confidence of security in the protected
populations. Technologies include lighter weight, flexible ballistic clothing
ensembles. Future developments will incorporate embedded sensors, an-
tennas and “Combat ID” and will reduce signatures.
Vehicle tagging and tracking. Approximately 2,500 U.S. vehicles in
Iraq were provided with the Cobra Blue Force Tracking system, which
transmits ID and position information at less than a watt of transmitted
power. Comprehensive tracking of civilian as well as military vehicles
would require many more systems that are easy to install. Information
from the tags transmitted to the intelligence network would provide a
comprehensive tactical picture.
Biometrics. Biometrics is an emerging technology that uses unique
human characteristics, such as retinal patterns, facial recognition, and
even characteristic walking patterns to identify wanted individuals in
groups or as individuals passing through a checkpoint. In order to be op-
erationally effective, biometric identification must be done remotely and
rapidly in a cluttered background and against camouflage and disguise.
The technology requires specialized sensors and processing algorithms.
Biometrics can be used to confirm individual identity as well as be a reli-
able independent source of identification, such as when fingerprints at a
crime scene identify the criminals. In this later case the FBI fingerprint file
is also a good example of how biometric databases can be used globally
through networking databases.
Penetrating radar. Military and civil law enforcers need to “see
through walls” when searching a building. Instead of x-rays, the most
promising technology is low frequency radar. Current systems have limited
102

range and resolution but still provide useful capability at close range.
Higher power transmitters and advanced signal processing technologies
will improve these systems.
Non-lethal weapons. While the military has maintained a joint office
with the Marine Corps as executive agent, little priority has been given to
non-lethal weapons within service development programs because of lim-
ited utility in major combat operations. Law enforcement authorities as
well have not developed a cohesive program to develop these weapons.
However, for S&R operations, non-lethal weapons have significant poten-
tial utility for riot and crowd control and in situations where combatants
and civilians are intermingled. Directed energy systems such as lasers and
millimeter radio frequency weapons could play a significant non-lethal
role in crowd dispersal. Two systems under investigation are the Airborne
Tactical Laser ACTD and the Air Force developed millimeter wave Active
Denial System.
Unmanned vehicles for surveillance and threat neutralization. In
Iraq two levels of UAV systems were used to advantage, the high altitude
Global Hawk and the medium-altitude Predator. Further deployment of
distributed low-level UAVs is required for detailed local surveillance. This
class of unmanned systems includes small UAVs, such as Dragon Eye, and
unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) yet to be developed. Forces need to go
into buildings and caves using on-board sensors for immediate intelligence
as well as employment of leave behind unattended sensors. Wide area cov-
erage is also needed that can reduce manpower requirements. The systems
can be armed to defeat threats while reducing risks to friendly personnel.
Technologies include electro-optic and infrared cameras and acoustic de-
tectors, networked into the intelligence grid. Long dwell medium- and
high-altitude UAVs and airships will add to an integrated sensor grid.
Defensive information operations. A major insurgent tool is the
spreading of misinformation to damage the credibility of the stabiliza-
tion and reconstruction or enforcement powers. An additional threat is
the corruption of our friendly information systems and the possible
clandestine introduction of false information into our own networks.
Technologies include network intrusion detection, mitigation and dam-
age assessment software, user authentication techniques, and encryption
technologies and methodologies.
Infrastructure
In the period following conflict and occupation the military has the
immediate responsibility for providing the basic services necessary to
 SUPPORTING TECHNOLOGIES 103

start the process of reconstruction. The military needs the tools to assess
which elements of the infrastructure are most essential for reconstruction
and protection based upon the politico-military situation. User friendly,
portable planning tools are needed to enable soldiers with limited civil
engineering background knowledge such as restoring power plants to
some limited capability before permanent repairs can be made. Profes-
sional Army Civil Engineering training needs to include skills in large city
utility operations.
Infrastructure needs
Collaborative planning tools. Netcentric warfare planning tools for
distributed decisionmaking have been under development for military
planning and operations. In stabilization and reconstruction, collaborative
planning tools are needed by the military to collaborate with civilian or-
ganizations, including U.S., international/foreign, and indigenous.
Civil Engineering. The S&R force must have the tailored equipment
sets with technology to manage civil functions with the fewest number of
people to reduce our logistics and political footprint. However, there is a
non-synergistic issue created by inserting modern technology in countries
that have relied upon low cost manpower—the most efficient solutions
can create high unemployment and contribute to instability.
Food and Health Services. Military field hospitals and medical
support should augment and support local medical facilities until they
can be supported with indigenous capabilities. Bare-bones, in-theater
medical support requires information and physical “reach-back” capa-
bility to U.S. facilities for corrective care and databases for diagnostic
and treatment support.
Civil government. Civil functions, such as fire fighting, law enforce-
ment, and social services, need to be reestablished and in some cases cre-
ated. These essential functions will have to be protected to promote trust
and confidence in U.S. goals for post-combat operations.
Infrastructure technologies
Civil infrastructure simulations. The military employs simulations
and decisionmaking tools for combat in mission planning and target se-
lection. In rebuilding infrastructure it is necessary to do mission planning
and select which parts of the infrastructure or which facilities need to be
addressed first for reconstitution and protection. This is somewhat the in-
verse of target planning, in which the target is now the element of critical
infrastructure. Simulation tools for this prioritization planning need to be
104

developed or modified from existing planning tools such that targeting as-
sets could be transformed from “find it and destroy it” to “find it and un-
derstand it.”
Education and training packages. Software training packages and
mobile or virtual training centers are required for tailored training in en-
gineering, services, and civil administration. Training must be sensitive to
the significant religious, cultural, historical, and environmental factors
that define a country.
Infrastructure equipment. Construction, water purification, and
sanitation equipment is required to repair and maintain systems that may
be archaic or incompatible with existing repair parts. Deployable equip-
ment is required to provide water and sanitation while the permanent in-
frastructure is being renewed. High-density, lightweight electric power
supplies such as fuel cells and compact fuel oil generators can supply
emergency power during power interruptions. Emergency medical treat-
ment equipment and transportable field hospitals may be required to sup-
port both the military and civilian populations.
Human Relations
Human relations are key to winning the peace. To be successful the
United States must gain trust and create a state in which the citizens of an
occupied nation feel that their condition is improved and that they have
hope for the future. Rebuilding the infrastructure is a large part of this ob-
jective but other human relations aspects, such as communications and
job creation also build morale. Technology can also contribute to the well
being of our own troops, mostly through connectivity to the continental
United States.
Human relations needs
Civilian communications. Communications between coalition
forces and the local population are required to bridge cultural differences,
establish trust, deliver our message, and counter disinformation about
our intent.
Civilian job creation and training. Long-term self-viability for an
occupied country is the ability to take over and manage their own affairs.
The United States needs to further this with job creation and training at
both the blue-collar and white-collar levels.
Record generation, storage, and management. It is significant that
insurgent efforts to destabilize Iraq have focused on the destruction of
records that are essential for stabilization, which requires accurate records
 SUPPORTING TECHNOLOGIES 105

of property, contracts and general information. Records are also needed to

track the demobilized military and refugees.
Troop morale and welfare for extended tours. Extended tours ap-
pear to be inevitable in such operations as Iraq. U.S. troops are currently
operating in a harsh and threatening environment with few of the ameni-
ties associated with deployments at home or in Europe.
Technology for human relations
Public information sources. Public information, including television,
radio and newspapers, needs to be utilized to advantage U.S. goals. The
United States should develop tailored messages for the local population on
such topics as “this week’s progress in providing reliable electrical power,”
or “the interim government’s weekly message on free vaccinations,” which
would provide a continuous flow of public service announcements.
Training tools for culture, linguistics. Skills in culture and language
are not quickly acquired. However, software, pamphlets, and videos can be
tailored to specific topics such as cultural dos and don’ts in everyday life or
roles of religious leaders in secular life.
Mobile, real-time language translators. The long-term goal of a ma-
chine translator is to match the capability of a human translator. This re-
quires not only vocabulary and syntax but also sensitivity to inflection,
idiom, and nuance for oral translation. Machine translation has pro-
gressed significantly in translating text but is in its infancy in rapid accu-
rate oral translation.
Elite modeling. The United States needs to develop the set of char-
acteristics of indigenous potential leaders to determine whom it can work
with and who are the leadership’s friends and enemies. Modeling based
on human factors and required skills needs to be developed to augment
this profiling.

Conclusions
● While a high level of technology characterizes the U.S. military,

gaps exist in its capabilities and equipment to perform stabilization and

reconstruction in a post-conflict environment such as in Iraq.
● Most of this technology and equipment was optimized for profes-

sional military formations. However, since nations are controlled from

cities, our military technology for S&R operations needs to be optimized
for urban terrain.
● In Operation Iraqi Freedom, the lack of a functioning civil infra-

structure frustrates our ability to achieve a satisfactory S&R end state.

106

● As in combat operations, success depends on knowledge of the

enemy. Technology to identify, track, and eliminate threats to civil author-
ity is fundamental to S&R success. At the same time, conventional military
power must be visible enough to deter organized military resistance.
● Such military systems as communications devices, vehicles,

weapons, surveillance systems, and planning tools should be enhanced to

operate in a civilian environment.
● In addition, the military should directly use or modify equipment,

such as body armor and non-lethal weapons, originally developed for po-
lice, SWAT teams, and riot control.
● Finally, there are areas where new technologies such as robotics,

non-lethal weapons, and language translators can provide high-payoff re-

sults to both the military and to civilian police forces.
Chapter 8

Interagency Capabilities

T
he evolving nature of conflict is such that no one department or
agency has sufficient resources, expertise, or authority to respond
unilaterally to all of the requirements for a return to stability when
the fighting stops. The reconstitution of the infrastructure of a society fol-
lowing extensive military conflict requires the involvement of multiple ac-
tors due to the confluence of a variety of considerations—including gov-
ernance, economic growth, essential services, and security. During
conflict, the Department of Defense is responsible for the establishment of
a secure environment to facilitate the restoration of civil order. However,
there are many tasks required to rebuild the national infrastructure and
society for which executive departments other than DOD have the neces-
sary expertise. The deeper the interagency cooperation during planning
and execution of stabilization and reconstruction operations, the sooner
the military will be able to pass responsibility to civilian agencies to begin
the nation-building mission.
Many non-DOD departments and agencies possess the knowledge
and skill sets, if not resources, necessary to supplant or augment military
capabilities in situations where DOD resources are already sufficiently en-
gaged or security related concerns are of a higher priority. These situations
include humanitarian and refugee assistance, establishment of new politi-
cal institutions, reconstitution of a national financial system, reformation
of the judicial process and component elements, and introduction of eco-
nomic recovery initiatives, including significant rebuilding of national
commercial, transportation, and sanitation/health infrastructures. The in-
volvement of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and international
organizations (IOs) is also necessary to ensure that the full spectrum of re-
quirements for post-conflict reconstruction efforts is addressed. More
than ever, interagency cooperation, within the USG as well as between the
USG and other actors, is critical for effective post-conflict reconstruction.
107
108

Two different initiatives are needed to accomplish this task. First, sig-
nificant improvements must be made to the interagency decisionmaking
process. Second, civilian agencies need new structures and programs to
harness and deliver their capabilities better.

Background
The tragic deaths of U.S. military personnel in Somalia was a water-
shed event in uncovering the failure of the interagency community to plan
effectively and share information. These lapses in marshalling the power of
the Executive Branch were recognized at the highest levels, and the Na-
tional Security Council (NSC) staff initiated steps toward corrective ac-
tion. Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD–56) attempted to institu-
tionalize a procedure for interagency planning and management of
complex contingency operations. The intent was to achieve unity of effort
within departments and agencies and to develop realistic missions and
tasks. Under PDD–56, the Deputies Committee (DC) would establish an
Executive Committee (ExComm), to oversee the efforts of an Interagency
Working Group (IWG) in developing a political-military plan, supervising
its rehearsal, and completing an after-action review to institutionalize the
lessons learned for future planning.
While PDD–56 increased awareness of the need for interagency co-
ordination, it fell short of its original intent and was rarely invoked other
than as an internal tool by the NSC staff. There was no enforcement mech-
anism to ensure that departments and agencies adopted a planning
process for complex crisis operations or institutionalized lessons learned.
Regrettably, PDD–56 did not have the powerful impact on the interagency
planning process that it might have due to the absence of assertive NSC
staff oversight and resistance from various federal departments. Neverthe-
less, the desire to achieve a more comprehensive level of integration in the
planning for complex crises was shared by the majority of those Federal
officials who underwent the training and education programs developed
and executed by the National Defense University, the U.S. Foreign Service
Institute, and the U.S. Army War College. This troika of academic institu-
tions established a program of Interagency Transformation, Education
and After Action Review (ITEA) which conducted six large-scale educa-
tional events for Deputy Assistant and subordinate level officials over three
years and measurably enhanced the understanding of the planning process
required to integrate interagency operations at strategic levels.
 INTERAGENCY CAPABILITIES 109

A complicating factor in this equation is that the number of players

has multiplied substantially since the end of the Cold War. What had been
a fairly simple organizational structure to manage before (Defense, State
and NSC) became a far more difficult maze of competing and conflicting
entities, each with its own culture, organization, orientation and desire to
shepherd their resources in fulfillment of their parochial needs. As the
number of players has grown, so has the complexity of coordinating and
managing their capabilities. The absence of efficient and integrated plan-
ning only compounds this situation.
The Bush Administration revisited the issue of interagency coordi-
nation in its first National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD).
NSPD–1 revised the structure of the National Security Council System.
While it does not apply directly to crisis situations, NSPD–1 is intended to
improve the interagency structure, thereby addressing some of the short-
comings of previous attempts to institutionalize interagency coordination.
Regrettably, the structural aspects of interagency coordination were not
matched by a procedural directive resulting in a situation where there was
form but little management application within which the elements of ex-
ecution could effect realistic planning. An attempt was made to correct
this oversight by the drafting of what became known as “NSPD XX,” but
this directive was shelved.
The inclusion of a dedicated unit in S&R JCOM headquarters to
develop strong liaison with civilian agencies can provide an important
complement to military capabilities, which are more focused on combat
operations and post-conflict security. This is an important issue to re-
solve. Civilian agencies bring critical skill to the field that the military
cannot duplicate. Hence, the need for a well-staffed C-MAC within the
S&R JCOM to develop and maintain strong liaison with civilian agencies
as they arrive in theater. Many civilian departments have the functional
expertise necessary for a comprehensive USG response in a post-conflict
environment. Inclusion of these agencies helps to ensure that military ac-
complishments are not jeopardized by the lack of an integrated plan that
addresses the difficulties of post-conflict reconstruction, such as the col-
lapse of the political system, the loss of law enforcement capabilities, the
breakdown of basic infrastructure, and the emergence of a humanitarian
crisis. While the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is
the most prominent partner in stabilization and reconstruction, other
agencies with critical expertise include:
110

■ Forward deployed elements of the Department of State, which can

provide timely assistance to local leadership on the reestablishment
of a basic political framework for a stable government and also
work with their military counterparts as counsel on various politi-
cal-military issues that must be immediately addressed.
■ The Department of Justice Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Devel-
opment, Assistance and Training (OPDAT), which has unique ca-
pabilities for international training and criminal justice develop-
ment.
■ The Department of Justice International Criminal Investigative
Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) can provide much valued
assistance based upon its extensive experience in supporting for-
eign governments in the establishment of civilian law enforcement
capabilities.
■ The Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) of the Department of Agri-
culture, which is equipped to increase income and food availability
by mobilizing expertise for agriculturally led economic growth.
■ The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) field office team
should also be part of the proposed S&R JCOMs, because of the ur-
gency for making funds available to operational elements.

Discussion

Improving Interagency Coorination

While both PDD–56 and NSPD–1 address the issue of interagency
coordination at the strategic level, more needs to be done. The creation of
a National Interagency Contingency Coordinating Group (NIACCG) has
been suggested to fill the need for a national level group to plan and co-
ordinate post-conflict operations. The group would be chaired by the
NSC and consist of representatives from the departments that are critical
to the mission, including Defense, State, Justice, Treasury, Commerce, and
Agriculture. The body would meet on a regular basis to review lessons
learned from past operations and develop strategic guidance for agencies
that have a role in post-conflict operations. When planning begins for
major combat, this group would be responsible for providing strategic
guidance and coordinating planning among the departments involved in
post-conflict operations.
The guidance from the NIACCG would be implemented at the oper-
ational level by chiefs of mission and by combatant commanders. To
establish the same unity of effort at this level, a vehicle for coordinating
 INTERAGENCY CAPABILITIES 111

and managing interagency planning is required. The linkage between these

two levels of engagement has been bridged by the development and de-
ployment of Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) to each of
the regional commands, and funding initiatives are currently under con-
sideration to institutionalize this experiment as a permanent component
on command staffs. These coordinating mechanisms, once formally estab-
lished and manned, will provide combatant commands in-house counsel
and expertise of civilian agencies. The concept for this novel organization
provides for a broader advisory capacity to enable a threefold mission: to
reach forward to other departments and agencies that are represented on
country teams, to reach back to parent agencies to facilitate coordination
and provide additional explanation of national policy guidance to the
commands, and to reach horizontally across the combatant command
staffs to educate these military elements on the capabilities, resources, and
limitations of the civil departments and agencies. JIACGs, however, are not
policymaking bodies and do not have the direct authority to commit their
agencies to forward deployed operations.
Due to the complexity of tasks in a post-conflict environment, a
greater depth of planning and coordination is needed, even below the
combatant command level. Personnel from key civilian agencies need to
be forward deployed with stabilization and reconstruction units so that
operations are enhanced by the full range of capabilities resident in the
USG. While there are inherent dangers and incurred risks associated with
any deployed force, whether civilian or military, capabilities for opera-
tions within major deployed forces should be linked to capabilities that
exist within the strategic and theater strategic levels. In order to accom-
plish this objective, civilian agency representation should be a part of the
select S&R units.
Strengthening Civilian S&R Capabilities
The key goal of stabilization and reconstruction operations is to
establish stable conditions in theater so that civilian agencies of the U.S.
government or a multinational organization can take control and begin
the process of nation-building.
This is illustrated by figure 3 of the Executive Summary. As major
combat operations end, control could pass to the commander of the S&R
forces. The combat forces would swing into a supporting role in the S&R
operations. As stability takes root, combat forces could begin to be with-
drawn. When the theater is stable enough, control could pass from the mil-
itary S&R commander to civilian authorities from the State Department
112

or to a UN representative responsible for the nation-building mission. The

sooner this handoff takes place, the sooner the military can begin to draw
down its forces in theater, and civilian personnel with skills appropriate to
nation-building tasks can take over the evolving mission.
With this in mind, the United States should focus on ways to ensure
that the handoff of control takes place as soon as feasible and therefore
that the expertise for the nation-building mission is in place as promptly
as possible. A two-step process to achieve this is described below.
● Create a standing interagency S&R team that could deploy to the the-

ater promptly with the skills needed to prepare for nation-building.

This would be a standing team of several hundred people at most.
They would be deployed to the theater as soon as major combat operations
had ended and stabilization and reconstruction operations had begun.
They would lay the groundwork for the nation-building mission, includ-
ing preparing for the arrival of additional personnel from federal govern-
ment agencies, contractors, and others involved in nation-building. When
in theater, they could deploy with the C–MAC.
The interagency team would include, at a minimum, personnel from
the State Department, the Agency for International Development, Justice,
Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture. A commitment to be “on call” to
deploy to the theater on relatively short notice would be part of their job
responsibilities. During peacetime they would meet periodically with
planners from the S&R JCOM to review and update plans for the integra-
tion of the S&R mission with the initiation of the nation-building mission.
When deployed to theater, they would typically work with the J-10 in the
combatant commander’s headquarters to plan for the transfer of author-
ity from the military to the State Department.
● Develop an on-call civilian crisis management corps that has a reser-

voir of expertise for the nation-building mission.

The key cause of delay in transferring control from the military to
civilian authorities is likely to be the time it takes to get personnel with the
skills needed for the nation-building mission into theater. It would be pro-
hibitively expensive to have an organization staffed with skilled personnel
full-time during peace, but this is not necessary. Considerable untapped
skills needed for nation-building exist in the private sector, particularly in
the medical, legal, language, and law enforcement fields. The U.S. govern-
ment, with State Department in the lead, could establish a civilian crisis
management corps. The corps would contract with personnel or organi-
zations to commit to deploying to a theater promptly upon being notified.
 INTERAGENCY CAPABILITIES 113

This cadre could be drawn from state and local governments as well as the
private sector. They, along with additional personnel from the federal gov-
ernment and from contractors, could join the early deploying interagency
team to begin the nation-building mission promptly.

Conclusions
● During post-conflict S&R operations, when chaos, ambiguity, and

uncertainty dominate the environment, the failure to appreciate the need

for interagency cooperation can lead to duplication of effort, gaps in the
provision of goods and services, and added tension among stakeholders.
● Even while DOD works to accomplish its primary goal of estab-

lishing basic security, there are a number of issues that must be addressed
simultaneously for successful post-conflict reconstruction. These issues
include the alleviation of suffering through humanitarian assistance, the
establishment of a stable political system, the maintenance of law and
order, including the training of law enforcement personnel, the promo-
tion of economic growth, and the reestablishment of basic infrastructure
and services.
● While DOD may still have a role in these issues, the bulk of these

tasks will fall upon their civilian counterparts, such as the Departments of
State, Justice, Commerce, Agriculture, and Energy and USAID. Although
these agencies do not have the resources and personnel that are found
within Defense, they possess a refined knowledge of specific functions that
fall outside the scope of security operations.
● In order to achieve objectives in post-conflict reconstruction, de-

partments and agencies need to work in conjunction with one another, in-
cluding the ambassador/country team, and with NGOs and IOs.
● Achieving this degree of coordination requires a planning capabil-

ity that is initiated early, developed in a coordinated manner, and contin-

ued throughout the multiple phases of the operation. This multi-agency
engagement is important at the strategic and operational levels, but is even
more vital in its implementation, where minor setbacks can have an im-
mediate and lasting impact on the entire operation.
● If specially equipped and trained S&R units are tasked with key re-

sponsibilities for post-conflict reconstruction, civilian departments and

agencies should be represented in these organizations to bring about more
effective planning and implementation. New governmental structures will
be needed to accomplish this.
Chapter 9

International Capabilities

R
ecent events in Iraq have highlighted the need for stabilization and
reconstruction operations to solidify the military gains U.S. forces
have achieved. While much discussed, achieving a stable environ-
ment has proved difficult, not only because of the conditions encountered,
but because combat operations and S&R operations are different, requir-
ing different types of forces, with different training and equipment, and
even different mindsets. American combat forces have proven to be very
good at combat, but have come up short in S&R operations. Though U.S.
forces have been gaining experience in peace operations and missions
other than war, these types of operations traditionally have been shunned
and seen as detracting from combat readiness. Major General William
Nash, USA (Ret.), former commander of U.S. forces in Bosnia, once said
that the U.S. military, in their heart of hearts, feels very strongly that they
do not want to be peacekeepers, and who can blame them, because fight-
ing is what they do.
Still, because failure to secure the peace negates gains made through
combat, new attention is being paid to S&R operations. Senior defense of-
ficials are considering the creation of some type of international peace-
keeping force that the United States would train and equip. This force
would be a mix of American troops and foreign/regional forces. Though
originally conceived for peace operations, this force should also contain
personnel appropriately trained for S&R operations. American personnel
committed to this force might be assigned on a long-term basis, thus al-
lowing them to develop institutional expertise in the unique nature of these
types of missions, and in working with the associated foreign members.
Training and equipping such a force in advance of deployment would re-
duce problems with coordination and interoperability that have plagued
other multinational peacekeeping efforts. With proper preparation and ad-
vanced planning, such a force would be able to react quickly to situations,
115
116

such as the recent crisis in Liberia, by minimizing the problems that have
slowed other such deployments.
The viability of this concept depends on several factors, a critical one
being the willingness of foreign nations to contribute to such a force. Even
if donors can be found, could such a force truly be effective? What steps
would have to be taken to create it? What would be its status under inter-
national law? The underlying question is, is it realistic for the United States
to rely on the international community to provide forces in support of sta-
bilization and reconstruction operations?

Background

Recent Nation-building Efforts

The history of American involvement in stabilization and reconstruc-
tion operations, followed by nation-building, is one of mixed success as il-
lustrated by table 8. An examination of these efforts indicates the value of
involving the international community. In a recent study, the Carnegie En-
dowment for International Peace concluded that multinational participa-
tion leads to a higher probability that democracy will take root.1 Whether
the presence of multinational forces is a key determinant for success may be
debated, but there can be little question that the involvement of foreign
peacekeeping/stability forces decreases the burden on American forces.
Afghanistan offers an example of how a multinational effort can be
used to bolster S&R operations following a conflict. The International Se-
curity and Assistance Force (ISAF) is composed of 33 countries operating
pursuant to a UN mandate. NATO assumed control of the force in August
2003. In what must still be considered a hostile environment, security has
been established in and around Kabul. Since that time, the UN has ex-
panded the ISAF mandate to provide security to areas outside Kabul and
its environs. Though reports from the field have cited difficulties in coor-
dinating what, in many ways, had initially been an ad hoc force, they also
have emphasized the contributions that coalition forces continue to make
toward improving the situation in the country.
Operations in Iraq have cast into sharp relief some of the problems of
putting together a multinational S&R force after the fact. Without a firm
commitment based on a broad consensus of an alliance or the UN, the
United States has encountered difficulties lining up foreign forces to take
over some of the burdens in post-conflict Iraq. Aside from Britain, foreign
contributions have been minimal, with only three nations contributing
over 1,000 troops. (As of summer 2003, Poland had committed 2,300,
 INTERNATIONAL CAPABILITIES 117

Table 8: American Efforts at Nation-Building, 1898–2003

Type Successes Failures Ongoing

Unilateral Panama (1989) Cambodia (1970–73)

Grenada (1983) Vietnam (1964–73)
Dominican Republic
(1964–65)
Japan (1945–52) Cuba (1917–22)
Dominican Republic
(1916–24)
Haiti (1915–34)
Nicaragua (1909–33)
Cuba (1906–09)
Panama (1903–36)
Cuba (1898–1902)

Multilateral Germany (1945–49) Haiti (1994–96) Afghanistan

(2001–Present)
Kosovo* (1999–Present)
Bosnia-Herzegovina*
(1995–Present)

* Though not examined in the Carnegie Study, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo are both multilateral efforts that are ongoing.

Ukraine 1,800 and Spain 1,300, with Bulgaria, The Philippines, Romania,
Latvia, Nicaragua, Slovakia, and Lithuania all contributing substantially
less.) Many nations have been unwilling to participate without a UN man-
date in what is viewed as a conflict initiated by America. Other nations have
indicated a willingness to participate, but have attached unacceptable con-
ditions; as an example, Fiji has said it would send 700 troops, but refuses to
have them serve under the Polish general who commands the foreign con-
tingent in Iraq.
The Need for an Organizing Principle
Though it is apparent that multinational peacekeeping/stability op-
erations have certain advantages, involving many nations in these efforts is
no guarantee of success. While the United Nations has conducted 56
peacekeeping missions since its inception (13 of which are currently ac-
tive), its record is mixed. The reasons for failure are many and varied.
However, commonly cited difficulties include disagreements among the
participating members as to the mission and how it is to be accomplished
and difficulties in integrating diverse units with varying capabilities. The
118

UN has achieved greater success in places where it has partnered with re-
gional organizations, such as with NATO in Kosovo. In such cases, the UN
has focused its efforts on political or reconstruction tasks while a regional
organization or lead nation has provided security.
NATO has fared better, primarily because participation was viewed
as being in the best interest of the alliance and its members. Member na-
tions are accustomed to working together and already share common doc-
trine, procedures, and equipment. In Afghanistan, NATO assumption of
ISAF responsibilities has been hailed as an example of how an alliance can
be used in this type of role. Still, it cannot be assumed that an alliance with
the competence of NATO will exist in all cases or, if one did exist, that the
member states would be willing to support a specific mission.
What is apparent is that there must be a reason, or an organizing
principle, for the participating nations to band together in these efforts.
The legitimacy given by a UN mandate is critical to gaining support
from most nations, but even that may not suffice to convince members
of the international community to participate. National interest is a
strong motivating factor, but care must be taken in offering this incen-
tive, lest such interests override the nature of the mission. Thomas
Barrett argues that, because of the benefits to be had from stability in a
region, all of the developed and many of the developing nations of the
world should be willing to participate in these types of operations.2 In a
globalized world, it is in the interests of both developed and developing
states to bring about conditions that will encourage further development
and a stable security environment. Failure has too many consequences,
from the dangers posed by rogue states with access to weapons of mass
destruction, to the adverse consequences of migration and refugee flows,
to the creation of fertile ground for terrorist activities. Thus, nations that
do not believe so already must be convinced that the benefits of a safe
and secure global environment far outweigh the costs involved in achiev-
ing it.
This is not to say that every nation will be willing to participate in
every case. It may be far easier to recruit countries to participate where
they see a direct impact on their own region, or where they have cultural
or economic ties. The EU assumption of duties from NATO in Macedonia
is a case in point. There, the desire for regional security caused the EU to
take on its first such mission. A feeling of involvement or ownership is es-
sential if these types of missions are to succeed, and this can only be
achieved where the member nations feel that they are an integral part of
 INTERNATIONAL CAPABILITIES 119

the process. According to James Dobbins, former U.S. envoy to Somalia,

Bosnia, and Afghanistan, it is necessary that member states feel they have
a stake in the management, as well as the risks and the costs.

Discussion

The Nature of an International Peacekeeping Force

The problem in Iraq, and to varying degrees elsewhere, is that multi-
national S&R operations have been more or less an afterthought and not
organized or coordinated in advance. As described by one senior govern-
ment official just returned from Iraq, the United States failed to line up
potential coalition members for post-conflict S&R operations, failed to de-
termine the size or makeup of such a force, and failed even to specify how
long the donor nations might expect their forces to serve. Many countries
were unwilling to sign up for an open-ended commitment. With the lack
of a UN mandate, still others were concerned with the domestic backlash
they might face for supporting what was perceived by many as an unjusti-
fied exercise in American adventurism.
To address these types of concerns, an International Peacekeeping
Force is envisioned that would call on nations to commit to providing
forces, when needed, for future stability operations. Troops so designated
would receive special training in these types of operations. Training
prior to deployment would be tailored to specific conditions, while
maintaining a pool of units to choose from would allow organizers to
customize the force to meet the nature of the mission. Deployment of
this force ideally would have a UN mandate, though, depending on the
situation, this might not be a necessary precondition. In return for com-
mitting to support such efforts, the donor nations could receive equip-
ment and training for the designated units, logistics support, and finan-
cial assistance.
While the exact U.S. role in this effort is currently under discussion,
indications are that DOD would be willing to establish and support sev-
eral training centers for these forces in the United States or elsewhere.
Standardizing training and equipment would reduce problems with com-
mand, control, and interoperability that have plagued previous multina-
tional operations. American involvement would insure that certain stan-
dards of training would be met, especially in such areas as civil-military
affairs and human rights. The United States also could provide logistics
support to deploy this force and maintain it in the field. Finally, the United
States probably would be a major contributor to such a force, because, as
120

noted by one senior DOD official, the United States can only expect to
maintain its credibility as leader in such situations if it demonstrates the
willingness to commit its own forces. This does not exclude the possibility
of other nations taking the lead role in a specific situation, as Australia did
in East Timor. However, even when the United States plays the leading
role, as in Iraq, the existence of a viable international peacekeeping force
would do much to reduce the burden on American resources.
Donor Populations
For an international peacekeeping force to be viable, there must be
enough other countries willing to contribute to it. Historically, countries
have contributed forces to international peacekeeping efforts for reasons
ranging from altruism to regional self-interest and expectation of material
gain. In August 2003, 89 UN members contributed over 36,000 military
and civilian police to ongoing UN peacekeeping operations (See table 9 for
major contributors).3 Whether countries would be willing to commit to a
pool that would support future peacekeeping or stabilization and recon-
struction operations as part of an international force, and under what cir-
cumstances, would have to be determined. However, based on experience,
some projections can be made.
European militaries, especially NATO members, often make signifi-
cant contributions to multinational peacekeeping operations (see table 10).
These troops pay their own way, tend to be well trained and well equipped,
and maintain a degree of autonomy. Though these countries sometimes
have interests that preclude contributing, they can still be counted on where
they have regional concerns, or where their interests and those of the
United States coincide.
A second group of poorer and less developed nations has tradition-
ally provided willing contributors to S&R operations. These nations see
participation in these operations as a means of financing and obtaining
equipment and training for their militaries. Their forces typically require
training, transportation to the theater, and substantial logistical and tech-
nical support, once deployed. Still, once trained and deployed, these forces
have performed acceptably.
A third group, falling somewhere between the first two, has taken
on new significance in the post-Cold War world. These are nations, pri-
marily from the old Eastern Bloc, that have small yet capable militaries
and do not really require extensive training and equipment. However,
they lack the logistics and technical means required to support long-
term or distant deployments. Examples of this group are the Czech
 INTERNATIONAL CAPABILITIES 121

Table 9: Leading Foreign Contributors to UN Peacekeeping Operations

Civilian Military
Number Country Police Observers Troops Total

1 Pakistan 200 75 3,905 4,180

2 Bangladesh 91 63 3,771 3,926
3 India 360 39 2,534 2,933
4 Ghana 74 45 1,908 2,027
5 Uruguay — 62 1,740 1,802
6 Kenya 55 62 1,674 1,791
7 Nigeria 60 54 1,630 1,744
8 Jordan 434 57 1,088 1,579
9 South Africa — 7 1,409 1,416
10 Ukraine 195 31 832 1,058
11 Nepal 72 39 811 922
12 Zambia 18 38 832 888
13 Australia 59 18 794 871
14 Poland 124 16 597 737
15 Portugal 42 1 656 699
16 Morocco — 1 657 658
17 Slovakia — 4 603 607
18 United Kingdon 148 25 430 603
19 Argentina 149 7 401 557
20 Thailand 18 11 508 537
Source: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, August 31, 2003.

Republic, Poland, and Romania, all of which have deployed forces to

Afghanistan and Iraq. Countries such as Argentina and Brazil might also
be considered to be in this category. These countries are sufficiently large
and technologically advanced to provide substantial contingents of rela-
tively skilled forces, with U.S. or other assistance, for participation in
out-of-sector deployments. At least in the immediate future, these coun-
tries are less likely to have policy interests that would conflict with U.S.
goals or adversely affect their ability to participate.
122

Table 10: Contributions to Major Multinational Peace Operations*

Country Personnel

Germany 6,841
France 6,624
Italy 6,295
United Kingdom 3,554
Turkey 2,731
Spain 2,180
Poland 1,575
Canada 1,457
Greece 1,382
Netherlands 1,348
Portugal 1,048
Norway 994
Australia 950
Denmark 869
Belgium 682
Japan 680
Hungary 668
Czech Republic 604
Source: Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense 2002.
* Data includes forces committed to United Nations and other multilateral peace operations.

Niche Capabilities
As noted earlier, in addition to manpower, foreign militaries can
provide unique capabilities that enhance the likelihood of success of
S&R operations. Multinational units, like the Baltic Peacekeeping Battal-
ion (BALTBAT), have been created specifically for peacekeeping opera-
tions and have been equipped and trained in the skills needed for these
types of missions. Other skills important for success in these operations
can be found in national forces and represent capabilities U.S. forces
lack. This is especially the case in constabulary and domestic police
forces, such as the French Gendarmerie and Italian Carabinieri. Other
 INTERNATIONAL CAPABILITIES 123

skills or niche capabilities could include linguist support, CBRN (chem-

ical, biological, radiological, nuclear) detection and decontamination
units, civil and public affairs detachments, engineer support, medical,
and intelligence and informational assets.
A partial list of potential contributors, based on current deploy-
ments or offers of support, indicates that there is a wide range of coun-
tries and skills that can be drawn upon (see table 11). Difficulties that
arise in bringing together and integrating forces from various nations can
be alleviated to a large degree through careful planning, coordination,
and training. The key to success, as seen in Kosovo, is to anticipate the use
of these forces far enough in advance of deployment that the difficulties
inherent in such multinational operations do not detract from the mis-
sion itself. As seen in the example of NATO, multinational training and
operational experience can overcome differences in language and na-
tional orientation. In sum, the advantages to having a wide range of
forces, with unique skills and capabilities, far outweighs the difficulties
involved in managing such a force.
A NATO S&R Capability
As NATO allies transform their combat forces and focus increasingly
on operations beyond Europe, they too will need to transform their force
structures to achieve strengthened, deployable S&R forces. The reorgani-
zation will have to be done in concert with two other major force devel-
opment projects underway in Europe: the NATO Response Force (NRF)
and the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF). These forces and the S&R
contingents could relate to one another as illustrated in figure 13.
NATO is in the process of standing up the NATO Response Force,
about 21,000 troops, which will focus on demanding expeditionary oper-
ations. Concurrently, the European Union is developing a European Rapid
Reaction Force that, when fully assembled, could number up to 100,000
troops to address peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, prima-
rily in and on the periphery of Europe.
In addition to the NRF and ERRF, NATO should create a new S&R
capability that mirrors the American S&R force proposed in chapters 4
and 5. This would build upon NATO’s already significant peace operations
experience. As with the NRF, the NATO S&R Force would gain from reor-
ganization and focused training and equipment. The proposed NATO
S&R Force could deploy behind the NRF and pick up the stabilization and
reconstruction missions in the wake of successful NRF action. The NATO
S&R Force would draw from the same pool of European forces to be used
 124
Table 11: Potential Niche Capability Contributors to Multinational S&R Operations

Military Civil
Police/ Civilian Affairs/ Strategic
Constabulary Police Engineer CIMIC Medical EOD Transport Lift ISR Logistics
Argentina X X X
Armenia X X X
Australia X
Austria X
Azerbaijan X
Belgium X X X
Bulgaria X
Canada X X X
Czech Republic X X X X
Denmark X X X X X
Estonia X
Finland X
France X X X X X X
Georgia X
Germany X X X X X X
Ghana X
Hungary X X
India X
Italy X X X X X X X X
Jordan X
Lithuania X
Kazakhstan X X
Kenya X
Kyrgyzstan X
Morocco X
Nepal X
Netherlands X X
Nigeria X
Norway X X X X X
Pakistan X
Philippines X
Poland X X
Portugal X X X
Romania X X X
Slovakia X X X X

INTERNATIONAL CAPABILITIES
Slovenia X
Spain X
Sweden X X X
Switzerland X X X
Tajikistan X
Turkey X X X
Ukraine X X X X X X X
United Kingdom X X X X
Uzbekistan X

125
Source: Compiled from the KFOR website and interviews with senior defense analysts.
126

Figure 12: A Full-Spectrum NATO Force

NATO European Union

NATO Response
Force

European Rapid
Reaction Forces

NATO S&R Forces

(proposed)

for the ERRF, but its missions would not necessarily be the same. The NRF
and S&R Force would give Europe the full spectrum of capabilities to wage
modern war and win modern peace. It would also give Europe a stronger
and more versatile ERRF over time, plus the choice to use NATO or the EU
as a policy instrument.
Many will question whether NATO can create a new S&R Force so
soon after the birth of the NRF. Two arguments favor the proposition.
First, NATO now has considerable peace operations experience on which
to base this reorganization. Second, NATO officials estimate that existing
European force structure can be cut by thirty to forty percent because of
its Cold War orientation. Savings from these reductions could be spent to
improve the NRF and create a new NATO S&R Force.
Pros, Cons, and a Caveat
Aside from the obvious benefit of sharing the burden of such de-
ployments with members of the international community, there are other
advantages to an international peacekeeping force. Based on the niche
capabilities of national forces, organizers could customize an S&R opera-
tions package. The use of international forces would lessen the U.S. foot-
print in deployments and give them greater legitimacy. Training and
deploying such forces would build cooperation and understanding be-
tween U.S. and participating forces, as well as develop an experience
factor that might be of use in the future. Finally, use of international
forces would help ameliorate the lack of U.S. sensitivity to foreign cul-
tures and religions, and could even be of benefit when the countries
 INTERNATIONAL CAPABILITIES 127

participating share a common language, background, or heritage with the

area to which they are deployed.
At the same time, some of these perceived advantages could become
disadvantages, depending on the situation and circumstances. The par-
ticipation of certain members of a peacekeeping force in a region where
there are existing national or cultural animosities could increase regional
tensions. Sunni Muslims being deployed into a predominantly Shi’a area
is one example. Even though trained and equipped by the United States,
national forces can be expected to remain loyal to their country, which
might have interests that conflict with those of the United States. In such
cases, the United States may find itself at odds with the nations them-
selves, creating frictions that otherwise might not exist. Just as the United
States disagreed with other members of NATO over Iraq, membership in
an international peacekeeping force is no guarantee that there will not be
disagreements between the United States and other members.
Finally, there are legal issues that must be addressed. Deployment of
a peacekeeping force under UN auspices carries the weight of the backing
of a majority of the international community, but will deployment of a
multinational peacekeeping force without UN sanction carry the same
weight? If major powers are at odds over the use of the force, will there be
an arbitration mechanism, or do members of the force, and by extension
their nations, put themselves at risk of being caught in a great power dis-
pute? Who bears responsibility for damages or injuries suffered during
such deployments? How does the use of such a force coincide with inter-
national law? Such questions must be addressed if such a force is to
become a reality.

Conclusions
● The past has proven the value of coalition warfare, and a strong ar-

gument can be made for the value of coalitions in stabilization and recon-
struction operations.
● The United States stands to gain through international burden

sharing, in terms of the costs involved and the commitment needed, both
of which would be greater if the United States chose to go it alone.
● However, there are other, less tangible benefits to be had, not the

least of which might be the lessening of the negative perception of the

United States as a unitary actor that tends to go its own way without tak-
ing into consideration the concerns of other nations.
128

●The United States has repeatedly demonstrated its military

prowess in war but has yet to establish a winning record in maintaining the
peace. Enlisting the aid and experience of other nations may be a way of
improving that record. As one commentator has noted, “Winning the
peace is as important as winning the war, only harder.”
● Much work will have to go into the development of an interna-

tional peacekeeping force or a new NATO S&R force. The costs involved
may be high, but far less than the cost of failing to establish a lasting peace
in places such as Iraq.

Notes
1 “From Victory to Success: Afterwar Policy in Iraq,” a special report by The Carnegie Endowment

for International Peace with Foreign Policy (2003).

2 Tom Barnett and Henry H. Gaffney, Jr. “Global Transaction Strategy,” Military Officer, May 2003,

68–77.
3 “Monthly Summary of Contributors,” UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, August

2003.
Recommendations

This report lays out a framework for reorganizing and planning for
transformed stabilization and reconstruction operations. Under this
framework, we recommend that the Administration:
● Create two joint military headquarters to organize units critical to

the S&R mission (S&R JCOMs). The headquarters would be responsible

for monitoring the status of the units, overseeing training and exercising,
developing doctrine, and planning for S&R operations.
● Field two S&R division-equivalents with joint assets. The first divi-

sion-equivalent should be mostly active personnel; the second division-

equivalent can include a large component of reserve personnel.
● Organize each division-equivalent to be flexible, modular, scalable,

and rapidly deployable with four brigade-size S&R Groups that include
Military Police, Civil Affairs, Engineers, Medical, and PSYOP supported by
a tactical combat capability.
● Develop new strategic concepts for future S&R missions. Key ex-

amples are concurrent planning for major combat and S&R missions and
concurrent deployment of combat and S&R forces.
● Designate an adequate number of ready units for S&R missions by

rebalancing the AC/RC mix. Enough units are needed in the overall S&R
force to sustain a rotation basis.
● Revise PME curricula to include more instruction in stabilization

and reconstruction operations, civil-military cooperation, interagency

planning, media relations, and negotiations. Add instructors with a back-
ground in sociology, law, and psychology; and especially with experience
in stabilization and reconstruction operations.
● Develop systems and technologies to support S&R operations.

High-priority examples are wireless and land-based communications for

civilian/military interoperability, expert S&R-tailored mission-training
packages for security and infrastructure, unmanned systems, non-lethal
weapons, detection devices for urban operations, and course-of-action
analysis and planning tools.
129
130

● Establish a process for more efficient multi-agency planning, co-

ordination and engagement for S&R operations. Create a National Inter-
agency Contingency Coordination Group (NIACCG) under the National
Security Council with responsibility for planning. Create Joint Intera-
gency Coordination Groups (JIACG), counterpart organizations in the
combatant commands and the S&R JCOMs, with representatives from
other federal agencies embedded in a J-10 directorate and C–MAC.
● Establish a multi-agency civilian rapid response capability to de-

ploy with S&R forces and prepare for the transition from S&R operations
(military control) to the nation-building mission (civilian control).
● Strengthen international stabilization and reconstruction efforts

by identifying countries with niche capabilities, training and equipping an

international peacekeeping force, and encouraging NATO to develop an
independent S&R force that mirrors the proposed U.S. force.
About the Contributors

Michael J. Baranick (chapter 1) is Executive Director of CTNSP and

a senior research scientist for modeling and simulation technology. Previ-
ously, he was chief of the Modeling and Simulation Branch at the NDU
War Gaming and Simulation Center (now the National Strategic Gaming
Center [NSGC]) and held policy and technical advisory appointments in
the Army. He earned a doctorate in systems planning and development
from The Pennsylvania State University.

Charles L. Barry (chapters 4 and 5) is a Washington-area consult-

ant specializing in information technologies, strategic management,
transatlantic relations, and defense transformation. He has lectured and
published extensively on these topics since 1984 as an editor, contribut-
ing author, and author of numerous books, articles, and monographs.

Hans Binnendijk (executive summary) holds the Roosevelt Chair of

National Security Policy at NDU and is Director of CTNSP. He has served
on the National Security Council as Special Assistant to the President and
Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control (1999–2001), and as
Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National
Defense University (1994–1999) and Principal Deputy Director of the
State Department Policy Planning Staff (1993–1994). Dr. Binnendijk is a
graduate of the University of Pennsylvania and received a doctorate in in-
ternational relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy,
Tufts University (1972). He is author or co-author of about 100 publica-
tions and reports.

Jonas L. Blank (chapter 8) is a senior analyst in the National Strate-

gic Gaming Center. Before joining the NSGC, Mr. Blank, he was the
chairman of the Department of Military Strategy and Operations at the
National War College. Previously, he was assigned to the Joint Staff as
Chief of the Strategy Division (J–5) where he was involved with national
131
132

security strategy formulation and other interagency working group is-

sues, particularly those related to operations other than war. His combat
experience includes special operations flying units in Vietnam and
F–111F operations in Desert Storm.

Daniel L. Burghart (chapter 9) is a specialist in Russian and Central

European affairs who joined CTNSP as a senior research fellow upon re-
tirement from the United States Army. He has extensive experience in the
former Soviet Union, especially in Central Asia. He holds a B.A. in political
science from Illinois, a dual Masters degree in political science and Russian
area studies from University of Wisconsin, and a Ph.D. in Russian and in-
ternational studies from the University of Surrey. His publications include
Red Microchip: Technology Transfer, Export Control and Economic Restruc-
turing in the Soviet Union (Dartmouth, 1992).

Leigh C. Caraher (chapter 6) worked at the Atlantic Council of the

United States, a foreign policy research institute in Washington, D.C., before
joining CTNSP as a research associate. Her research areas include peace
operations, professional military education, and military transformation.
Ms. Caraher is a graduate of the University of Virginia.

Joseph J. Eash, III (chapter 7) is a CTNSP distinguished fellow on an

Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA) detail from Georgia Tech Research
Institute. He is the program manager for the Pre-Conflict Management
Tools project. Before joining CTNSP, he was Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Advanced Systems and Concepts, in which capacity he was re-
sponsible for oversight of advanced concept technology demonstrations.
He has 45 years of experience in managing high technology programs in
the military and industry.

Dr. Stuart E. Johnson (chapter 4) is a CTNSP distinguished research

professor. He has extensive experience in DOD and at NATO Headquar-
ters as a defense planner and policy analyst. He earned a B.S. degree in
chemistry from Amherst College (1966) and a Ph.D. in physics from the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1971) and did post-doctoral work
in physics at the University of Leiden, Netherlands, 1971–72. His most re-
cent book is New Challenges, New Tools for Defense Decisionmaking
(RAND 2003).
 ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS 133

L. Erik Kjonnerod (chapter 8) is a senior fellow and supervisory chief

of the NSGC Security Strategy and Policy Division and Director of the
NDU Interagency Transformation, Education, and After Action Review
Program. An adjunct professor at George Washington University and the
Foreign Service Institute, he lectures frequently on politico-military affairs
and crisis decision-making processes. He is a noted Latin American civil-
military specialist who has served in military and diplomatic postings
throughout the Americas. He earned a B.A. degree from Rutgers (1967), an
M.A. from the University of Illinois (1974), and will receive a doctorate in
education from George Mason University at the end of his current
academic program.

Richard L. Kugler (chapter 3) is a distinguished research professor

in CTNSP. A former senior executive in OSD and director of the DOD
Strategic Concepts and Development Center in the 1980s, he is a defense
planner and strategic analyst with over 30 years of experience in DOD
and RAND. His specialties are U.S. defense strategy, global security af-
fairs, and NATO. An operations research analyst and political scientist, he
holds a Ph.D. from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is the
author of many studies and journal articles and 15 books on defense and
security issues, including The Global Century: Globalization and National
Security, Vol. 1 and 2 (National Defense University Press, 2001), co-edited
with Ellen Frost.

Douglas A. Macgregor (chapter 2) is a colonel in the U.S. Army and

a senior research fellow in CTNSP. He has served in a variety of command
and staff assignments, including command of a division cavalry squadron
in the 1st Infantry Division (Mech). During Desert Storm, Colonel Mac-
gregor was awarded the bronze star with "V" device for valor while leading
combat troops of the 2nd Squadron, 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment in
the battle of the 73 Easting. He was commissioned in the U.S. Army in
1976 upon graduation from West Point and holds an M.A. in comparative
politics and a Ph.D. in international relations from the University of Vir-
ginia. His publications include The Soviet-East German Military Alliance
(Cambridge University Press, 1989), Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design
for Landpower in the 21st Century (Praeger, 1997), and Transformation
Under Fire: Revolutionizing How America Fights (Praeger, 2003).
134

Larry K. Wentz (chapter 1) is a research scientist at the George

Mason University (GMU) Center of Excellence in C3I and an independ-
ent consultant. Before joining GMU, he was the director of the lessons
from Kosovo study sponsored by the ASD (C3I) Command and Control
Research Program (CCRP). Mr. Wentz has extensive experience in civil-
military support to peace operations and U.S., Coalition JTF, and NATO
C2 and C4ISR research, architectures, systems, operations and exercises,
and training. Mr. Wentz has a B.S.E.E from Monmouth College (1965)
and an M.S. in systems engineering and operations research from the
University of Pennsylvania Moore School of Engineering (1968). His
publications include Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience (CCRP,
1997) and Lessons from Kosovo: The KFOR Experience (CCRP, 2002).

Elihu Zimet (chapter 7) is a CTNSP distinguished research profes-

sor on an IPA detail from the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies. He has
directed basic research, applied research, and advanced development pro-
grams in missile, gun, and directed energy weapons, aircraft avionics and
propulsion, and low observable and counter low observable technologies.
He holds a B.S. degree in mechanical engineering from the Polytechnic
Institute of Brooklyn (1962) and a Ph.D. from Yale University (1969).
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TRANSFORMING TRANSFORMING

RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS
TRANSFORMING FOR STABILIZATION AND
FOR STABILIZATION
AND RECONSTRUCTION FOR STABILIZAT
OPERATIONS
Including chapters on lessons learned, force sizing, organization, AND RECONSTR
active and Reserve components, military culture, technological
support, interagency coordination, and international capabilities
OPERATIONS

E d i t e d b y

H A N S B I N N E N D I J K a

BINNENDIJK and JOHNSON

S T U A R T E. J O H N S O N

The National Defense University established the Center for Technology and National Security
Policy to study the implications of technological innovation for U.S. national security policy and
military planning. The center combines scientific and technical assessments with analyses of
current strategic and defense policy issues for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff,
military services, defense laboratories, Congress, and other government agencies. Major areas
of focus include military transformation, science and technology policy, life sciences, homeland
security, and computational social science modeling. The center staff is comprised of defense A Publication of the
analysts and technologists and is led by two senior analysts who hold the Roosevelt Chair of Center for Technology and National Security Policy

National Security Policy and the Edison Chair of Science and Technology. National Defense University

Cover 1—Score covers 1 & 4 no more than 3/16” from the bind—
Cover 4—Bleeds 3 sides, butts to Cover 1 (Covers 2 and 3 Blank)