Lawyers League for a Beter Philippines v.

Aquino

• • G.R. Nos. 73748, 73972 & 73990

May 22, 1986

[G.R. No. 73748. May 22, 1986.]

LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES AND/OR OLIVER A. LOZANO, pe��oner, vs.PRESIDENT CORAZON C.
AQUINO, ET AL., respondents.

[G.R. No. 73972. May 22, 1986.]

PEOPLE'S CRUSADE FOR SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION, ETC., pe��oner, vs.MRS. CORY AQUINO, ET
AL., respondents.

[G.R. No. 73990. May 22, 1986.]

COUNCILOR CLIFTON U. GANAY, pe��oner, vs.CORAZON C. AQUINO, ET AL., respondents.

Gentlemen :

Quoted hereunder, for your informa�on, is a resolu�on of the Court En Banc dated May 22, 1986.

"G.R. No. 73748, Lawyers League for a Beter Philippines and/or Oliver A. Lozano vs. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.;
G.R. No. 73972, People's Crusade for Supremacy of the Cons�tu�on, etc. vs. Mrs. Cory Aquino, et al.; and G.R. No.
73990, Councilor Cli�on U. Ganay vs. Corazon C. Aquino, et al.

In G.R. No. 73748, Lawyers League for a Beter Philippines vs. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al., G.R. No.
73972, People's Crusade for Supremacy of the Cons�tu�on vs. Mrs. Cory Aquino, et al., and G.R. No. 73990, Councilor
Cli�on U. Ganay vs. Corazon C. Aquino, et al., the legi�macy of the government of President Aquino is ques�oned. It is
claimed that her government is illegal because it was not established pursuant to the 1973 Cons�tu�on.

As early as April 10, 1986, this Court* had already voted to dismiss the pe��ons for the reasons to be stated below. On
April 17, 1986, Aty. Lozano as counsel for the pe��oners in G.R. Nos. 73748 and 73972 withdrew the pe��ons and
manifested that they would pursue the ques�on by extra-judicial methods. The withdrawal is functus oficio.

The three pe��ons obviously are not impressed with merit. Pe��oners have no personality to sue and their pe��ons
state no Cause of Ac�on. For the legi�macy of the Aquino government is not a jus�ciable mater. It belongs to the realm
of poli�cs where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgement; they have
accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effec�ve control of the en�re country so that it is
not merely a De Facto government but is in fact and law a De Jure government. Moreover, the community of na�ons has
recognized the legi�macy of the present government. All the eleven members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn
to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under her government. DHITCc

In view of the foregoing, the pe��ons are hereby dismissed."

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) GLORIA C. PARAS

Clerk of Court
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

G.R. No. 76180 October 24, 1986

IN RE: SATURNINO V. BERMUDEZ, pe��oner.

R E S O L U T IO N

PER CURIAM:

In a pe��on for declaratory relief impleading no respondents, pe��oner, as a lawyer, quotes the first paragraph of
Sec�on 5 (not Sec�on 7 as erroneously stated) of Ar�cle XVIII of the proposed 1986 Cons�tu�on, which provides in full
as follows:

Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 elec�on is, for
purposes of synchroniza�on of elec�ons, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.

The first regular elec�ons for the President and Vice-President under this Cons�tu�on shall be held on the second
Monday of May, 1992.

Claiming that the said provision "is not clear" as to whom it refers, he then asks the Court "to declare and answer the
ques�on of the construc�on and definiteness as to who, among the present incumbent President Corazon Aquino and
Vice-President Salvador Laurel and the elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice-President Arturo M. Tolen�no
being referred to under the said Sec�on 7 (sic) of ARTICLE XVIII of the TRANSITORY PROVISIONS of the proposed 1986
Cons�tu�on refers to, . ...

The pe��on is dismissed outright for lack of jurisdic�on and for lack for cause of ac�on.

Prescinding from pe��oner's lack of personality to sue or to bring this ac�on, (Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677), it is
elementary that this Court assumes no jurisdic�on over pe��ons for declaratory relief. More importantly, the pe��on
amounts in effect to a suit against the incumbent President of the Republic, President Corazon C. Aquino, and it is equally
elementary that incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their
incumbency and tenure.

The pe��on furthermore states no cause of ac�on. Pe��oner's allega�on of ambiguity or vagueness of the aforequoted
provision is manifestly gratuitous, it being a mater of public record and common public knowledge that the
Cons�tu�onal Commission refers therein to incumbent President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H.
Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides for the extension of their term to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of
synchroniza�on of elec�ons. Hence, the second paragraph of the cited sec�on provides for the holding on the second
Monday of May, 1992 of the first regular elec�ons for the President and Vice-President under said 1986 Cons�tu�on. In
previous cases, the legi�macy of the government of President Corazon C. Aquino was likewise sought to be ques�oned
with the claim that it was not established pursuant to the 1973 Cons�tu�on. The said cases were dismissed outright by
this court which held that:

Pe��oners have no personality to sue and their pe��ons state no cause of ac�on. For the legi�macy of the Aquino
government is not a jus�ciable mater. It belongs to the realm of poli�cs where only the people of the Philippines are the
judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino
which is in effec�ve control of the en�re country so that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de
jure government. Moreover, the community of na�ons has recognized the legi�macy of tlie present government. All the
eleven members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under her
government. (Joint Resolu�on of May 22, 1986 in G.R. No. 73748 [Lawyers League for a Beter Philippines, etc. vs.
President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.]; G.R. No. 73972 [People's Crusade for Supremacy of the Cons�tu�on. etc. vs. Mrs.
Cory Aquino, et al.]; and G.R. No. 73990 [Councilor Cli�on U. Ganay vs. Corazon C. Aquino, et al.])

For the above-quoted reason, which are fully applicable to the pe��on at bar, mutatis mutandis, there can be no
ques�on that President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel are the incumbent and legi�mate
President and Vice-President of the Republic of the Philippines.or the above-quoted reasons, which are fully applicable
to the pe��on at bar,

ACCORDINGLY, the pe��on is hereby dismissed.

Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Alampay and Paras, JJ., concur.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:

FELICIANO, JJ., concurring.

The pe��oner asks the Court to declare who are "the incumbent President and Vice President elected in the February 7,
1986 elec�ons" as stated in Ar�cle XVIII, Sec�on 5 of the Dra� Cons�tu�on adopted by the Cons�tu�onal Commission of
1986.

We agree that the pe��on deserves outright dismissal as this Court has no original jurisdic�on over pe��ons for
declaratory relief.

As to lack of cause of ac�on, the pe��oner's prayer for a declara�on as to who were elected President and Vice
President in the February 7, 1986 elec�ons should be addressed not to this Court but to other departments of
government cons�tu�onally burdened with the task of making that declara�on.

The 1935 Cons�tu�on, the 1913 Cons�tu�on as amended, and the 1986 Dra� Cons�tu�on uniformly provide 'that
boards of canvassers in each province and city shall cer�fied who were elected President and Vice President in their
respec�ve areas. The cer�fied returns are transmited to the legislature which proclaims, through the designated
Presiding Head, who were duty elected.

Copies of the cer�fied returns from the provincial and city boards of canvassers have not been furnished this Court nor is
there any need to do so. In the absence of a legislature, we cannot assume the func�on of sta�ng, and neither do we
have any factual or legal capacity to officially declare, who were elected President and Vice President in the February 7,
1986 elec�ons.

As to who are the incumbent President and Vice President referred to in the 1986 Dra� Cons�tu�on, we agree that there
is no doubt the 1986 Cons�tu�onal Commission referred to President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice President Salvador H.
Laurel.

Finally, we agree with the Resolu�on of the Court in G.R. Nos. 73748, 73972, and 73990.

For the foregoing reasons, we vote to DISMISS the instant pe��on.

CRUZ, J., concurring:

I vote to dismiss this pe��on on the ground that the Cons�tu�on we are asked to interpret has not yet been ra�fied and
is therefore not yet effec�ve. I see here no actual conflict of legal rights suscep�ble of judicial determina�on at this �me.
(Aetna Life Insurance Co. vs. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227; PACU vs. Secretary of Educa�on, 97 Phil. 806.)
 EN BANC

[A.M. No. 90-11-2697-CA. June 29, 1992.]

LETTER OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE REYNATO S. PUNO of the Court of Appeals dated 14 November 1990.

RESOLUTION

PADILLA, J.:

Pe��oner Associate Jus�ce Reynato S. Puno, a member of the Court of Appeals, wrote a leter dated 14 November 1990
addressed to this Court, seeking the correc�on of his seniority ranking in the Court of Appeals.

It appears from the records that pe��oner was first appointed Associate Jus�ce of the Court of Appeals on 20 June 1980
but took his oath of office for said posi�on only on 29 November 1982, a�er serving as Assistant Solicitor General in the
Office of the Solicitor General since 1974. 1

On 17 January 1983, the Court of Appeals was reorganized and became the Intermediate Appellate Court pursuant to
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 en�tled "An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary. Appropria�ng Funds Therefor and For Other
Purposes." 2 Pe��oner was appointed Appellate Jus�ce in the First Special Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate
Court. On 7 November 1984, pe��oner accepted an appointment to be ceased to be a member of the Judiciary. 3

The a�ermath of the EDSA Revolu�on in February 1986 brought about a reorganiza�on of the en�re government,
including the Judiciary. To effect the reorganiza�on of the Intermediate Appellate Court and other lower courts, a
Screening Commitee was created, with the then Minister of Jus�ce, now Senator Neptali Gonzales as Chairman and
then Solicitor General, now Philippine Ambassador to the United Na�ons Sedfrey Ordoñez as Vice Chairman. President
Corazon C. Aquino, exercising legisla�ve powers by virtue of the revolu�on, issued Execu�ve Order No. 33 to govern the
aforemen�oned reorganiza�on of the Judiciary. 4

The Screening Commitee recommended the return of pe��oner as Associate Jus�ce of the new Court of Appeals and
assigned him the rank of number eleven (11) in the roster of appellate court jus�ces. When the appointments were
signed by President Aquino on 28 July 1986, pe��oner’s seniority ranking changed, however, from number eleven (11) to
number twenty six (26). 5

Pe��oner now alleges that the change in his seniority ranking could only be atributed to inadvertence for, otherwise, it
would run counter to the provisions of Sec�on 2 of Execu�ve Order No. 33, which reads:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

"SECTION 2. Sec�on 3, Chapter 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, is hereby amended to read as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 2. Organiza�on. — There is hereby created a Court of Appeals which shall consist of a Presiding Jus�ce and fi�y
Associate Jus�ces who shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines. The Presiding Jus�ce shall be so designated
in his appointment and the Associate Jus�ce shall have precedence according to the dates of their respec�ve
appointments, or when the appointments of two or more shall bear the same date, according to the order in which their
appointments were issued by the President. Any Member who is reappointed to the Court a�er rendering service in any
other posi�on in the government shall retain the precedence to which he was en�tled under his original appointment,
and his service in the Court shall, for all intents and purpose be considered as con�nuous and uninterrupted." 6

Pe��oner elaborates that President Aquino is presumed to have intended to comply with her own Execu�ve Order No.
33 so much so that the correc�on of the inadvertent error would only implement the intent of the President as well as
the spirit of Execu�ve Order No. 33 and will not provoke any kind of cons�tu�onal confronta�on (between the President
and the Supreme Court). 7

Pe��oner points to the case of Jus�ce Oscar Victoriano, former Presiding Jus�ce of the Court of Appeals who, according
to pe��oner, was transferred from his posi�on as Jus�ce of the Court of Appeals to the Ministry of Jus�ce as
Commissioner of Land Registra�on and in 1986 was reappointed to the Court of Appeals. Pe��oner states that his
(Victoriano’s) s�nt in the Commission of Land Registra�on did not adversely affect his seniority ranking in the Court of
Appeals, for, in his case, Execu�ve Order No. 33 was correctly applied. 8

In a resolu�on of the Court en banc dated 29 November 1990, the Court granted Jus�ce Puno’s request. 9 It will be
noted that before the issuance of said resolu�on, there was no writen opposi�on to, or comment on pe��oner’s
aforesaid request. The disposi�ve por�on of the resolu�on reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"IN VIEW WHEREOF, the pe��on of Associate Jus�ce Reynato S. Puno for correc�on of his seniority ranking in the Court
of Appeals is granted. The presiding Jus�ce of the Court of Appeals, the Honorable Rodolfo A. Nocon, is hereby directed
to correct the seniority rank of Jus�ce Puno from number twelve (12) to number five (5). Let copies of this Resolu�on be
furnished the Court Administrator and the Judicial and Bar Council for their guidance and informa�on." 10

A mo�on for reconsidera�on of the resolu�on of the Court en banc dated 29 November 1990 was later filed by Associate
Jus�ces Jose C. Campos, Jr. and Luis A. Javellana, two (2) of the Associate Jus�ces affected by the ordered correc�on.
They contend that the present Court of Appeals is a new Court with fi�y one (51) members and that pe��oner could not
claim a reappointment to a prior court; neither can he claim that he was returning to his former court, for the courts
where he had previously been appointed ceased to exist at the date of his last appointment. 11

The Court en banc in a resolu�on dated 17 January 1992 required the pe��oner to file his comment on the mo�on for
reconsidera�on of the resolu�on dated 29 November 1990.

In his Comment, pe��oner argues that, by virtue of Execu�ve Order No. 33 read in rela�on to B.P. Blg. 129, his seniority
ranking in the Court of Appeals is now number five (5) for, though President Aquino rose to power by virtue of a
revolu�on, she had pledged at the issuance of Proclama�on No. 3 (otherwise known as the Freedom Cons�tu�on) that
"no right provided under the unra�fied 1973 Cons�tu�on (shall) be absent in the Freedom Cons�tu�on." 12

Moreover, since the last sentence of Sec�on 2 of Execu�ve Order No. 33 virtually re-enacted the last sentence of Sec. 3,
Chapter 1 of B.P. Blg. 129, statutory construc�on rules on simultaneous repeal and re-enactment mandate, according to
pe��oner, the preserva�on and enforcement of all rights and liabili�es which had accrued under the original statute. 13
Furthermore, pe��oner avers that, although the power of appointment is execu�ve in character and cannot be usurped
by any other branch of the Government, such power can s�ll be regulated by the Cons�tu�on and by the appropriate
law, in this case, by the limits set by Execu�ve Order NO. 33 14 for the power of appointment cannot be wielded in
viola�on of law. 15

Jus�ces Javellana and Campos were required by the Court to file their reply to Jus�ce Puno’s comment on their mo�on
for reconsidera�on of the resolu�on of the Court en banc dated 24 January 1991.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

In their Reply and Supplemental Reply, Associate Jus�ces Javellana and Campos submit that the appeal or request for
correc�on filed by the pe��oner was addressed to the wrong party. They aver that as pe��oner himself had alleged the
mistake to be an "inadvertent error" of the Office of the President, ergo, he should have filed his request for correc�on
also with said Office of the President and not directly with the Supreme Court. 16 Furthermore, they point out that
pe��oner had indeed filed with the Office of the President a request or pe��on for correc�on of his ranking, (seniority)
but the same was not approved such that his recourse should have been an appropriate ac�on before the proper court
and impleading all par�es concerned. The aforesaid non-approval by the Office of the President they argue, should be
respected by the Supreme Court "not only on the basis of the doctrine of separa�on of powers but also their presumed
knowledge ability and even exper�se in the laws they are entrusted to enforce" 17 for it (the non-approval) is a
confirma�on that pe��oner’s seniority ranking at the �me of his appointment by President Aquino was, in fact,
deliberate and not an "inadvertent error" as pe��oner would have the Court believe. 18

The resolu�on of this controversy is not a pleasant task for the Court since it involves not only members of the next
highest court of the land but persons who are close to members of this Court. But the controversy has to be resolved.
The core issue in this case is whether the present Court of Appeals is a new court such that it would negate any claim to
precedence or seniority admitedly enjoyed by pe��oner in the Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court
exis�ng prior to Execu�ve Order No. 33 or whether the present Court of Appeals is merely a con�nua�on of the Court of
Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court exis�ng prior to said Execu�ve Order No. 33.

It is the holding of the Court that the present Court of Appeals is a new en�ty, different and dis�nct from the Court of
Appeals or the Intermediate Appellate Court exis�ng prior to Execu�ve Order No. 33, for it was created in the wake of
the massive reorganiza�on launched by the revolu�onary government of Corazon C. Aquino in the a�ermath of the
people power (EDSA) revolu�on in 1986.

A resolu�on has been defined as "the complete overthrow of the established government in any country or state by
those who were previously subject to it" 19 or as "a sudden, radical and fundamental change in the government or
poli�cal system, usually effected with violence or at least some acts of violence." 20 In Kelsen’s book, General Theory of
Law and State, it is defined as that which "occurs whenever the legal order of a community is nullified and replaced by a
new order . . . a way not prescribed by the first order itself." 21

It was through the February 1986 revolu�on, a rela�vely peaceful one, and more popularly known as the "people power
revolu�on" that the Filipino people tore themselves away from an exis�ng regime. This revolu�on also saw the
unprecedented rise to power of the Aquino government.

From the natural law point of view, the right of revolu�on has been defined as "an inherent right of a people to cast out
their rulers, change their policy or effect radical reforms in their system of government or ins�tu�ons by force or a
general uprising when the legal and cons�tu�onal methods of making such change have proved inadequate or are so
obstructed as to be unavailable." 22 It has been said that "the locus of posi�ve law-making power lies with the people of
the state" and from there is derived "the right of the people to abolish, to reform and to alter any exis�ng form of
government without regard to the exis�ng cons�tu�on." 23

The three (3) clauses that precede the text of the Provisional (Freedom) Cons�tu�on, 24 read:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREAS, the new government under President Corazon C. Aquino was installed through a direct exercise of the power
of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines;

"WHEREAS, the heroic ac�on of the people was done in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Cons�tu�on, as amended;

"WHEREFORE, I, Corazon C. Aquino, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the sovereign
mandate of the people, do hereby promulgate the following Provisional Cons�tu�on."25cralaw:red

These summarize the Aquino government’s posi�on that its mandate is taken from "a direct exercise of the power of the
Filipino people." 26

Discussions and opinions of legal experts also proclaim that the Aquino government was "revolu�onary in the sense that
it came into existence in defiance of the exis�ng legal processes" 27 and that it was a revolu�onary government
"ins�tuted by the direct ac�on of the people and in opposi�on to the authoritarian values and prac�ces of the
overthrown government." 28

A ques�on which naturally comes to mind is whether the then exis�ng legal order was overthrown by the Aquino
government. "A legal order is the authorita�ve code of a polity. Such code consists of all the rules found in the
enactments of the organs of the polity. Where the state operates under a writen cons�tu�on, its organs may be readily
determined from a reading of its provisions. Once such organs are ascertained, it becomes an easy mater to locate their
enactments. The rules in such enactments, along with those in the cons�tu�on, comprise the legal order of that
cons�tu�onal state." 29 It is assumed that the legal order remains as a "culture system" of the polity as long as the later
endures 30 and that a point may be reached, however, where the legal system ceases to be opera�ve as a whole for it is
no longer obeyed by the popula�on nor enforced by the officials. 31

It is widely known that Mrs. Aquino’s rise to the presidency was not due to cons�tu�onal processes; in fact, it was
achieved in viola�on of the provisions of the 1973 Cons�tu�on as a Batasang Pambansa resolu�on had earlier declared
Mr. Marcos at the winner in the 1986 presiden�al elec�on. 32 Thus it can be said that the organiza�on of Mrs. Aquino’s
Government which was met by litle resistance and her control of the state evidenced by the appointment of the Cabinet
and other key officers of the administra�on, the departure of the Marcos Cabinet officials, revampt of the Judiciary and
the Military signalled the point where the legal system then in effect, had ceased to be obeyed by the Filipino.
The Court holds that the Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court exis�ng prior to Execu�ve Order No. 33
phased out as part of the legal system abolished by the revolu�on and that the Court of Appeals established under
Execu�ve Order No. 33 was an en�rely new court with appointments thereto having no rela�on to earlier appointments
to the abolished courts, and that the reference to precedence in rank contained in the last sentence of Sec. 2, BP Blg. No.
129 as amended by Execu�ve Order No. 33 refers to prospec�ve situa�ons as dis�nguished from retroac�ve ones.

But even assuming, arguendo, that Execu�ve Order No. 33 did not abolish the precedence or seniority ranking resul�ng
from previous appointment to the Court of Appeals or Intermediate Appellate Court exis�ng prior to the 1986
revolu�on, it is believed that President Aquino as head of then revolu�onary government, could disregard or set aside
such precedence or seniority in ranking when she made her appointments to the reorganized Court of Appeals in 1986.

It is to be noted that, at the �me of the issuance of Execu�ve Order No. 33, President Aquino was s�ll exercising the
powers of a revolu�onary government, encompassing both execu�ve and legisla�ve powers, such that she could, if she
so desired, amend, modify or repeal any part of B.P. Blg. 129 or her own Execu�ve Order No. 33. It should also be
remembered that the same situa�on was s�ll in force when she issued the 1986 appointments to the Court of Appeals.
In other words, President Aquino, at the �me of the issuance of the 1986 appointments, modified or disregarded the
rule embodied in B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by Execu�ve Order No. 33, on precedence or seniority in the case of the
pe��oner, for reasons known only to her. Since the appointment extended by the President to the pe��oner in 1986 for
membership in the new Court of Appeals with its implicit ranking in the roster of jus�ces, was a valid appointment
anchored on the President’s exercise of her then revolu�onary powers, it is not for the Court at this �me to ques�on or
correct that exercise.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court GRANTS the Mo�on for Reconsidera�on and the seniority rankings of members of the Court of
Appeals, including that of the pe��oner, at the �me the appointments were made by the President in 1986, are
recognized and upheld.

SO ORDERED.

Paras, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

FELICIANO, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I agree with the conclusion reached in the majority opinion writen by my learned brother, Padilla, J. In par�cular, I agree
that the Court of Appeals established by Execu�ve Order No. 33 is a new court, and was not merely the old Intermediate
Appellate Court with a new label.

If one examines the provisions of B.P. Blg. 129, known as "The Judiciary Reorganiza�on Act of 1980," rela�ng to the old
Intermediate Appellate Court, it is quite clear that the previously exis�ng Court of Appeals was abolished and a new
court, denominated the Intermediate Appellate Court, was created. Thus, Sec�on 3 of B.P. Blg. 129 reads as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sec. 3. Organiza�on. — There is hereby created an Intermediate Appellate Court which shall consist of a Presiding
Appellate Jus�ce and forty-nine Associate Appellate Jus�ces who shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines.
The Presiding Appellate Jus�ce shall be so designated in his appointment, and the Associate Appellate Jus�ces shall have
precedence according to the dates of their respec�ve appointments, or when the appointments of two or more of them
shall bear the same date, according to the order in which their appointments were issued by the President. Any member
who is reappointed to the Court a�er rendering service in any other posi�on in the government shall retain the
precedence to which he was en�tled under his original appointment, and his service in Court shall, to all intents and
purposes, be considered as con�nuous and uninterrupted." (Emphasis supplied)

Sec�on 44 of the same statute provided as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sec. 44. Transitory provisions. — The provisions of this Act shall be immediately carried out in accordance with an
Execu�ve Order to be issued by the President. The Court of Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal
Courts, the Juvenile and Domes�c Rela�ons Courts, the Courts of Agrarian Rela�ons, the City Courts, the Municipal
Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts shall con�nue to func�on as presently cons�tuted and organized, un�l the
comple�on of the reorganiza�on provided in this Act as declared by the President. Upon such declara�on, the said
courts shall be deemed automa�cally abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office. The cases pending
in the old Courts shall be transferred to the appropriate Courts cons�tuted pursuant to this Act, together with the
per�nent func�on, records, equipment, property and the necessary personnel.

x x x

(Emphasis supplied)

Execu�ve Order No. 33, promulgated on 28 July 1986, provided in part as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sec�on 2. Sec�on 3, Chapter I of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, is hereby amended to read as follows:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library

‘SEC. 3. Organiza�on — There is hereby created a Court of Appeals which shall consist of a Presiding Jus�ce and fi�y
Associate Jus�ces who shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines. The Presiding Jus�ce shall be so designated
in his appointment, and the Associate Jus�ces shall have precedence according to the dates of their respec�ve
appointments, or when the appointments of two or more of them shall bear the same date, according to the order in
which their appointments were issued by the President. Any member who is reappointed to the Court a�er rendering
service in any other posi�on in the government shall retain the precedence to which he was en�tled under his original
appointment, and his service in the Court shall, for all intents and purposes, be considered as con�nuous and
uninterrupted.’" (Emphasis supplied)

Although Execu�ve Order No. 33 spoke of amending Sec�on 3, Chapter 1 of B.P. Blg. 129, it will be seen that what really
happened was the re-enactment of said Sec�on 3, Chapter 1 of B.P. Blg. 129. In other words, much more happened than
simply the renaming of the old Intermediate Appellate Court into (once again) Court of Appeals. If all that Execu�ve
Order No. 33 wanted to achieve was the relabeling of the old Intermediate Appellate Court into the "Court of Appeals,"
there was no need to amend or re-enact Sec�on 3 of B.P. Blg. 129. For Sec�on 8 of Execu�ve Order No. 33 provided as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 8. The terms ‘Intermediate Appellate Court, Presiding Appellate Jus�ce and Associate Appellate Jus�ce(s)’ used
in the Judiciary Reorganiza�on Act of 1980 or in any other law or execu�ve order shall herea�er mean Court of Appeals,
Presiding Jus�ce and Associate Jus�ce(s), respec�vely."cralaw virtua1aw library

Thus, President Aquino was quite free, legally speaking to appoint to the new Court of Appeals whoever in her judgment
was fit and proper for membership in that new court in an order of precedence that she was just then
establishing.chanrobles law library

The sentence found in Sec�on 3 of B.P. Blg. 129 as amended or re-enacted through the medium of Sec�on 2 of Execu�ve
Order No. 33 —

"Any Member who is reappointed to the Court a�er rendering service in any other posi�on in the government shall
retain the precedence to which he was en�tled under his original appointment, and his service in the Court shall, for all
intents and purposes, be considered as con�nuous and uninterrupted."cralaw virtua1aw library

which my dis�nguished brother in the Court, Gu�errez, Jr., J., very heavily stressed, contemplates in my submission the
situa�on of a member of the new Court of Appeals accep�ng appointment to some other department or branch of
government, outside the Judiciary, and who later receives an appointment once again to that same Curt of Appeals. But
Mr. Jus�ce Reynato S. Puno was not in such a situa�on. The last preceding appointment to the Judiciary of Mr. Jus�ce
Reynato S. Puno was to the then Intermediate Appellate Court newly created by B.P. Blg. 129. In 1984, he le� that court
to become Deputy Minister in the Ministry of Jus�ce. His next appointment to the Judiciary was not to the old
Intermediate Appellate Court, which by that �me had passed on to history. His appointment dated 28 July 1986, was, in
my view, as already noted, to the new Court of Appeals established by Execu�ve Order No. 33. Thus, the last sentence of
Sec�on 3 of B.P. Blg. 129 (before re-enactment by Execu�ve Order No. 33) afforded no basis for a claim to the same
numerical precedence in the new Court of Appeals that he would have been en�tled to had the old Intermediate
Appellate Court not gone out of existence. It is difficult for me to understand how a claim to a par�cular posi�on in an
order of precedence can be made where the court itself, to which the new appointment is made, is a new and dis�nct
court.

I vote to grant the Mo�on for Reconsidera�on.

BELLOSILLO, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I agree with the ponencia of Mr. Jus�ce Padilla, so I vote to grant the mo�on for reconsidera�on of Our Resolu�on of
November 29, 1990. I am for respec�ng the seniority ranking of the Associate Jus�ces of the Court of Appeals at the �me
they were appointed by the President on July 31, 1986.

I must admit that, like Mr. Jus�ce Gu�errez, Jr., and Mr. Jus�ce Padilla, it was not easy for me to decide to par�cipate in
the delibera�ons in this case considering that it involves esteemed colleagues in the Court of Appeals. As such, when
subject Resolu�on was promulgated, I did not react despite the proddings of well-meaning friends. It refused to be
dragged into the "fray" in deference to Jus�ce Reynato S. Puno who would be adversely affected. I remained firm in my
resolve to stay away from the controversy. It was to me a personal privilege so to do, which i could waive, as I did.

But circumstances have changed; not that I no longer revere my friendship with Jus�ce Puno, but as a member now of
this Court it has become my duty — no longer a mere privilege, much less a right — to aid the Court in resolving this
controversy in the fairest possible way, a responsibility I find no jus�fica�on to shirk.

On August 1, 1986, at the oath-taking ceremonies for the newly-appointed members of the Court of Appeals at
Malacañang, when I no�ced Jus�ce Puno take a seat on my right, 1 I asked him to transfer to the le� where our senior
jus�ces were assigned. I was assuming that he should be on the le� because he was appointed to the old Appellate
Court ahead of me. But he showed me the list where he appeared as No. 26, Jus�ce Lising, No. 25, and I was No. 24.
Since he appeared perturbed with his new rank, I suggested to him to seek the help of then Jus�ce Secretary Neptali A.
Gonzales, Chairman of the Screening Commitee that processed the appointments of the new members of the Court of
Appeals, and who was then just a meter and a half in front of us. But a�er talking to Secretary Gonzales, Jus�ce Puno
returned to his original assigned seat. When I asked him what happened, he simply shrugged his shoulders. Obviously, he
failed in his bid.

We then took our oath in the order we were ranked in the list.

Some two (2) months or so later, in an En Banc session back in the Court of Appeals, as we were seated side by side with
Jus�ce Puno, 2 I inquired again from him as to what happened to his request with Malacañang conveyed through the
Presiding Jus�ce for the correc�on of his ranking. Jus�ce Puno told me it was not granted.

The leter of then Presiding Jus�ce Emilio A. Gancayco dated August 7, 1986, which was his second in fact on the subject,
addressed to Execu�ve Secretary Joker P. Arroyo, is enlightening and informa�ve —

"Dear Sir:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

In rela�on to my leter of August 5, 1986 informing you of the possible over-sight in the ranking of Mr. Jus�ce REYNATO S.
PUNO in his reappointment as member of this Court, I am furnishing you a cer�fica�on of the Clerk of Court to the same
effect, and also in rela�on to the ranking of Messrs. Rodolfo A. Nocon and Jorge A. Coquia who in accordance with their
original appointment to this Court are more senior than Mr. Jus�ce Oscar R. Victoriano in the said order.

If Her Excellency President Corazon Aquino should decide to rearrange the ranking of the incumbent jus�ces of this Court
in accordance with the provisions of Sec�on 2, Execu�ve Order # 33 their proper ranking should be as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

No. 3 — Mr. Jus�ce Rodolfo A. Nocon;

No. 4 — Mr. Jus�ce Jorge A. Coquia;

No. 5 — Mr. Jus�ce Oscar R. Victoriano; and

No. 11 — Mr. Jus�ce Reynato S. Puno."cralaw virtua1aw library

While this leter perhaps did not elicit the desired response from Execu�ve Secretary Arroyo as his answer did not
squarely setle the issue, the message is clear, i.e., Malacañang did not grant the request for correc�on of what was
perceived to be a "possible oversight", even a�er it was twice brought to its aten�on. Here I am reminded of the
principle in procedure that a mo�on that is not granted, especially a�er an unreasonable length of �me, is deemed
denied, and the lapse of more than four (4) years before Jus�ce Puno finally came to Us 3 is reasonably unreasonable.

The leter-appointment of President Corazon C. Aquino addressed to then Chief Jus�ce Claudio Teehankee dated July 31,
1986, in fact categorically specifies the order of seniority of her appointees, thus —

"Dear Mr. Chief Jus�ce.

I have appointed the Presiding Jus�ce and the Associate Jus�ces of the Court of Appeals under the following order of
seniority:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. Hon. Emilio A. Gancayco, Presiding Jus�ce . . .

3. Hon. Oscar R. Victoriano, Associate Jus�ce

4. Hon. Rodolfo A. Nocon, Associate Jus�ce

5. Hon. Jorge A. Coquia, Associate Jus�ce . . .

12. Hon. Jose C. Campos, Jr., Associate Jus�ce . . .

16. Hon. Luis A. Javellana, Associate Jus�ce . . .

26. Hon. Reynato S. Puno, Associate Jus�ce . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

x x x"

Considering the circumstances herein narrated, I find it difficult to yield to the proposi�on that an error was commited
through inadvertence by Malacañang in the ranking of the jus�ces appointed to the Court of Appeals on July 31, 1986.

The above-quoted leter of President Aquino also brings to focus the ranking of Jus�ce Oscar R. Victoriano who was
junior to Jus�ces Nocon and Coquia in the old Court, as reflected in the leter of Presiding Jus�ce Gancayco. However, in
the leter of the President, Jus�ce Victoriano was ranked No. 3, while Jus�ces Nocon and Coquia were ranked No. 4 and
No. 5, respec�vely. Hence, it is not accurate to say that Jus�ce Victoriano was reinstated to his former rank in the old
Court, but was even given a rank higher than Jus�ces Nocon and Coquia. This "possible oversight" was also brought to
the aten�on of Malacañang but, like the case of Jus�ce Puno, no correc�on was made.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

All these clearly support the view of Mr. Jus�ce Padilla in his ponencia, as well as of Mr. Jus�ce Feliciano in his concurring
opinion, that the present Court of Appeals is an en�rely different court, dis�nct from the old Intermediate Appellate
Court or the former Court of Appeals, with a new members although some were drawn from the now defunct
Intermediate Appellate Court, and that the "error" referred to by Jus�ce Puno could not have been only through
"inadvertence" but deliberate, otherwise, Malacañang could have readily effected the correc�on?

But whether the "error" was deliberate or commited through inadvertence, is Our Court the proper venue for the
correc�on? Can We now correct this alleged error of the appoin�ng authority? Worse, can We direct the Office of the
President to do what is exclusively within its preroga�ve?

This brings me to the final point which bothers me s�ll further. If We sustain the claim that the present Court of Appeals
is merely a con�nua�on of the old Intermediate Appellate Court, or of the old Court of Appeals, then We may be
swarmed with requests not only for re-ranking but also for reinstatement of those who were not reappointed on July 31,
1986, but against whom no charges have been filed. For then, should they not be allowed to enjoy their security of
tenure as civil servants under the Cons�tu�on?

In the case of Jus�ce Jorge S. Imperial, he was a member of the old Intermediate Appellate Court who was not
reappointed to the new Court of Appeals on July 31, 1986. There was no charge against him. He was later reappointed
but only on January 2, 1987. Should We also order that he be reinstated to his former rank in the Intermediate Appellate
Court? Then, We may have to dislodge some of the present division Chairmen of the Court of Appeals to accommodate
him. That would be unsetling, disturbing, and disrup�ve of the present system. I do not think We wish this to happen.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissen�ng:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I regret that I have to differ from the posi�on taken by Mr. Jus�ce Padilla regarding the seniority ranking of Jus�ce
Reynato S. Puno in the Court of Appeals.

I agree that the resolu�on of the controversy is not a pleasant one for us since it involves persons who are close to the
members of this Court. For me, the task is par�cularly difficult because apart from close personal rela�onship, I also
highly respect the par�es’ considerable talents, abili�es and qualifica�ons. I have known Jus�ce Jose C. Campos, Jr. since
my student days and as a junior member of this Court, I once urged his nomina�on for appointment to the Supreme
Court even before he started to serve in the Court of Appeals. Jus�ce Luis A. Javellana was my colleague in the Social
Security System while Jus�ce Reynato S. Puno and I worked together in the Office of the Solicitor General.

I believe, however, that we can resolve the issues on the basis of the facts and the applicable law, in the same way that
we reverse or affirm the par�es’ respec�ve ponencias disregarding personal feelings or close associa�on.

The applicable provision of law in this case was introduced into the Judiciary Act of 1948 by Rep. Act No. 5204 on June
15, 1968 when it amended the first paragraph of Sec�on 24 to read:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x x x

"Provided, however, that any member of the Court of Appeals who has been reappointed to that court a�er rendering
service in any other branch of the government shall retain the precedence to which he is en�tled under his original
appointment and his service in court shall, to all intents and purposes, be considered as con�nuous and uninterrupted . .
."cralaw virtua1aw library

This provision was reiterated in all subsequent repealing or amendatory acts and con�nues to the present. It is found in
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Sec�on 3 and in Execu�ve Order No. 33 under President Corazon C. Aquino reorganized the
Court of Appeals.

I respec�ully submit that from 1968 to 1992, there was no single moment when this provision ceased to exist. It was
never repealed and never disappeared from the law. Everybody, including the appoin�ng power is, of course, bound by
the law.

I agree with Jus�ce Padilla’s discussion of President Aquino’s powers in a revolu�onary government, a government
revolu�onary in the sense that it came into existence in defiance of the exis�ng legal processes.

I, however, believe that the appointments of the Jus�ces of the Court of Appeals in 1986 were not a personal act of a
revolu�onary President. Far from it.

First, President Aquino’s government ceased to be revolu�onary on March 25, 1986 when she promulgated Proclama�on
No. 3, which she called the Freedom Cons�tu�on. Her government became a cons�tu�onal one bound by the Freedom
Cons�tu�on and the execu�ve orders issued under its authority.

Second, one significant provision of the Freedom Cons�tu�on states that "all elec�ve and appoin�ve officials and
employees under the 1973 Cons�tu�on shall con�nue in office un�l otherwise provided by proclama�on or execu�ve
order or upon the designa�on or appointment and qualifica�on of their successors, if such appointment is made within a
period of one year from February 26, 1986." (Sec�on 2, Ar�cle III, Emphasis supplied).

Third, the President implemented the above provision of the Cons�tu�on on July 28, 1986 when she issued Execu�ve
Order No. 33 which amended B.P. 129. As earlier stated, Execu�ve Order No. 33 reiterated verba�m the provision of B.P.
No. 129 which provided for reten�on of precedence of a member who is reappointed a�er a s�ng in another posi�on in
the government.

President Aquino was bound by the provisions of Execu�ve Order No. 33 because it is a law enacted pursuant to
cons�tu�onal authority. She could no longer act as a revolu�onary President because there was a Cons�tu�on, and
there were statutes under that Cons�tu�on, in existence.
More important, Execu�ve Order No. 33 was enacted precisely to provide for the reorganiza�on of the Intermediate
Appellate Court into the Court of Appeals. The President intended that every provision of Execu�ve Order No. 33 should
be followed precisely for the purpose for which it was enacted, namely, reorganiza�on of the appellate court. I cannot
understand the reasoning which says that all provisions of Execu�ve Order No. 33 must apply in the reorganiza�on of the
Court of Appeals except the provision on reten�on of seniority by a reappointed member which must be for the future
only.

Even assuming that this one sentence of Execu�ve Order No. 33 was intended to be prospec�ve, then the President has
to follow B.P. No. 129 because Proclama�on No. 3, Ar�cle IV provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 1. All exis�ng laws, decrees, execu�ve orders, proclama�ons, leters of instruc�on, implemen�ng rules and
regula�ons, and other execu�ve issuances not inconsistent with this Proclama�on shall remain opera�ve un�l amended,
modified, or repealed by the President or the regular legisla�ve body to be established under a New Cons�tu�on."cralaw
virtua1aw library

For us lawyers, there is one signal feature of President Aquino’s six years in the presidency and this is her dedicated
personal observance of the rule of law. Even when some of our decisions nullified her favorite projects, she
unhesita�ngly ordered compliance with our interpreta�on of the law. I cannot believe that the President would
knowingly violate one provision of a law she promulgated even as she complied with ever other provision of that same
law.

Not only the law but also the facts support the correctness of our November 29, 1990 resolu�on.chanrobles law library :
red

We stated in our resolu�on:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Following this specific provision on seniority, the Screening Commitee recommended the return and reappointment of
Jus�ce Puno as Associate Jus�ce of the New Court of Appeals. He was assigned the seniority rank of number eleven (11)
following Associate Jus�ce Vicente V. Mendoza who was given the seniority rank of number ten (10). Unfortunately,
however, due to a mistake which can only be inadvertent, the seniority rank of Jus�ce Puno appears to have been
changed from number eleven (11) to number twenty six (26), a�er the appointments in the new Court of Appeals were
signed by President Aquino. Through his leter, Jus�ce Puno prays for the correc�on of his seniority ranking alleging that
he should now be given the seniority rank of number five (5) instead of number twelve (12) in the Court of Appeals.

We find the pe��on for correc�on of ranking by Jus�ce Puno to be meritorious. The mistake in the ranking of Jus�ce
Puno from number eleven (11) to number twenty six (26) in the 1986 judicial reorganiza�on has to be corrected,
otherwise, there will be a viola�on of the clear mandate of Execu�ve Order No. 33 that ‘any member who is reappointed
to the Court a�er rendering service in any other posi�on in the government shall retain the precedence to which he was
en�tled under his original appointment, and his service in the court shall, for all intents and purposes be considered as
con�nuous and uninterrupted.’ In fine, the execu�ve service of Jus�ce Puno as Deputy Minister of Jus�ce should not
adversely affect the con�nuity of his service in the judiciary upon his return and appointment thereto on July 28,1 986.
Otherwise, the salutary purpose of Execu�ve Order No. 33 which is to atract competent members of the judiciary to
serve in other branches of the government without fear of losing their seniority status in the judiciary in the event of
their return thereto would be defeated . . ." (Res. dtd. 11-29-90, pp. 2-3)

Nobody disputes the fact that the Screening Commitee headed by the then Secretary of Jus�ce Neptali Gonzales and a
member of which was our own Jus�ce Leo D. Medialdea ranked Jus�ce Reynato S. Puno as No. 11 in their
recommenda�on.

When the appointments came out, Mr. Puno was No. 26. This, of course, violates not only Execu�ve Order No. 33 but
also the laws on the same subject which preceded it.

That the President never intended to violate a key provision of law is shown in the September 17, 1986 leter of
Execu�ve Secretary Joker P. Arroyo, appended to the Reply submited by Jus�ces Campos and Javellana. The explana�on
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"17 September 1986

Hon. Emilio A. Gancayco

Presiding Jus�ce

Court of Appeals

Manila.

Sir:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

In reply to your enclosed leter of August 7, 1986, please be informed that the President had nothing to do with the
order of seniority. The list and order of seniority was submited by a screening commitee and passed on to the Supreme
Court for review.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) JOKER P. ARROYO

Execu�ve Secretary"

When Secretary Arroyo states that the President had nothing to do with the order or sequence of seniority, it means that
she just followed the recommenda�ons of her own Screening Commitee, which recommenda�ons had already been
reviewed by the Supreme Court. She did not select any recommendees her own. She never deviated from the
recommenda�ons because everybody recommended was appointed. The change from No. 11 to No. 26 could not have
been a deliberate act of the President as she had nothing to do with the order of seniority of the Jus�ces she was
appoin�ng. The change could only have been an inadvertence because it was viola�ve not only of the law but also of the
recommenda�ons of her Screening Commitee.

There are other maters raised in the leter and reply of Jus�ces Campos and Javellana which have been answered by
Jus�ce Puno in his Comment. I find no need to comment on them at this �me.

I regret if my answer to the query of Jus�ce Campos led him to be lulled into inac�on. Jus�ce Campos called me up over
the telephone inquiring about the pe��on of Jus�ce Puno before I was aware that there was such a pe��on. I try to read
all pe��ons filed with the court en banc but I do so only a�er they are placed in the agenda and are in the next order of
business of a par�cular session. My staff never places a copy of any pe��on on my desk un�l it is entered in the agenda.
It is unfortunate that Jus�ces Campos, Camilon, dela Fuente, Javellana, Purisima, de Pano, and Bellosillo were not
furnished copies of the leter-pe��on of Jus�ce Puno but this is for then Chief Jus�ce Marcelo B. Fernan and Clerk of
Court Aty. Daniel T. Mar�nez to explain.

Jus�ces Campos and Javellana state that "Jus�ce Puno is 50 years old and to put him in No. 5 will destroy the chances of
those displaced by him who are older than he to aspire for promo�on."cralaw virtua1aw library

The fears of the good Jus�ces are unfounded. Except for the Presiding Jus�ce, a greater number of "junior" Jus�ces have
been appointed in the past ten years to the Supreme Court from the Court of Appeals, than the most senior Jus�ces of
that Court. In other words, there has been more by passing of senior members than adherence to the seniority lis�ng. In
fact, the latest nomina�ons of the Judicial and Bar Council for posi�on to which Jus�ce Bellosillo was appointed, included
Jus�ce Campos and excluded Jus�ces Kapunan and Puno. I understand that in the past few vacancies in this court, Jus�ce
Campos has been nominated more o�en than Jus�ce Puno.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

Our resolu�on dated November 29, 1990 correc�ng the seniority ranking of Jus�ce Puno was a unanimous decision of
this Court except for Mr. Jus�ce Padilla were discussed and fully deliberated upon. Since our resolu�on is based on both
the facts and the law, I see no reason why we should modify or set it aside.

I, therefore, vote to reiterate the Court’s resolu�on dated November 29, 1990.

Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Medialdea and Nocon, JJ., concur.

CRUZ, J., dissen�ng:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I join Mr. Jus�ce Gu�errez in his dissent, with these brief addi�onal remarks.

Sec. 3 of BP 129 laid down the original precedence rule applicable to members of the Intermediate Appellate Court. This
was embodied in Sec. 2 of EO 33 without change except as to the name of the court. The first provision was not
repealed. As Mr. Jus�ce Feliciano points out, it was merely "re-enacted."cralaw virtua1aw library

I do not think the re-enacted rule was intended to operate prospec�vely only. I believe it con�nues to be available to the
former members of the Intermediate Appellate Court no less than to the members of the Court of Appeals.

It is a well-known canon of construc�on that apparently conflic�ng provisions should be harmonized whenever possible.
The ponencia would instead revoke Sec. 3. of BP 129 even though Sec. 2 of EO 33 has not repealed but in fact re-enacted
it. I would reconcile the two provisions and give effect to both.

Significantly, Sec. 8 of EO 33 provides that "the term Intermediate Appellate Court . . . shall herea�er mean Court of
Appeals."cralaw virtua1aw library

Narvasa, C.J., concurs.

Endnotes:

1. Rollo, p. 10.

2. B.P. Blg. 129 was passed by the Batasang Pambansa on 10 August 1981 and signed into law by President Ferdinand E.
Marcos on 14 August 1981.

3. Rollo, p. 4.

4. Execu�ve Order No. 33 was issued on 28 July 1986 by President Corazon C. Aquino.

5. Rollo, p. 2.

6. Rollo, pp. 5, 5-A.

7. Ibid., p. 5-A.

8. Ibid.

9. Rollo, pp. 1-3.

10. Ibid., p. 3.

11. Ibid., p. 18.

12. Rollo, pp. 28-29. Remarks of President Corazon C. Aquino at a media briefing announcing the promulga�on of a
transi�on Cons�tu�on (otherwise known as the Freedom Cons�tu�on) at the Freedom Hall, Malacañang, March 25,
1986.

13. Rollo, pp. 26-27. See also Alcantara, Statutes, 1990 ed., p. 164 ci�ng Crawford: Statutory Construc�on and Agpalo,
Statutory Construc�on, 1990 ed., p. 304 ci�ng American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 101 Phil. 386.

14. Rollo, p. 41.

15. Ibid., p. 42.

16. Rollo, pp. 47-50.

17. Cuerdo v. Commission on Audit, 166 SCRA 657 ci�ng Tagum Doctors Enterprises v. Gregorio Apsay, Et Al., G.R. No.
81188, August 30, 1988.

18. Rollo, p. 49.

19. Kitlow v. Kiely, 44 F. Ed. 227, 232.

20. State v. Diamond, 202 P. 988, 991.

21. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (1946), p. 117.

22. H. Black, Handbook of American Cons�tu�onal Law II, 4th edi�on, 1927.

23. Poli�cal Rights as Poli�cal Ques�ons. The Paradox of Luther v. Borden, 100 Harvard Law Review 1125, 1133 (1987).

24. Proclama�on No. 3 (1986).

25. Ibid.

26. Proclama�on No. 1 (1986) and Proclama�on No. 3 (1986).

27. J. Bernas, Proclama�on No. 3 with Notes by Joaquin Bernas, S.J. 3 (1986).

28. Address by U.P. President, now Senator Edgardo Angara, Bishops-Businessmen’s Conference, March 21, 1986, 27 U.P.
Gazete 28, 29.

29. Fernandez, Law and Polity: Towards a Systems Concept of Legal Validity, 46 Phil. Law Journal, 390-391 (1971).

30. Id., at 422.

31. Fernandez, supra note 29.

32. 1973 Cons�tu�on, Art. VII, Sec. 5.

BELLOSILLO, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. As prearranged by the Protocol Officer, the newly-appointed Jus�ces were assigned seats according to seniority from
le� to right, so that when called to take their oath they would only have to rise, move forward, turn around, and face the
President, as well as their families and friends, for their oath-taking so that seniority ranking would automa�cally be
observed in reverse, from right o le�.

2. In En Banc sessions, even numbers are assigned consecu�vely on one side and odd numbers on the other side, and
Jus�ce Puno and myself were ranked No. 26 and 24, respec�vely.

3. The leter-request of Jus�ce Puno to this Court is dated November 14, 1990, while the reply of Execu�ve Secretary
Joker P. Arroyo which did not grant the request, is dated September 17, 1986.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 78059 August 31, 1987

ALFREDO M. DE LEON, ANGEL S. SALAMAT, MARIO C. STA. ANA, JOSE C. TOLENTINO, ROGELIO J. DE LA ROSA and JOSE
M. RESURRECCION, pe��oners,
vs.
HON. BENJAMIN B. ESGUERRA, in his capacity as OIC Governor of the Province of Rizal, HON. ROMEO C. DE LEON, in
his capacity as OIC Mayor of the Municipality of Taytay, Rizal, FLORENTINO G. MAGNO, REMIGIO M. TIGAS, RICARDO
Z. LACANIENTA, TEODORO V. MEDINA, ROSENDO S. PAZ, and TERESITA L. TOLENTINO, respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

An original ac�on for Prohibi�on ins�tuted by pe��oners seeking to enjoin respondents from replacing them from their
respec�ve posi�ons as Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Municipality of Taytay, Province
of Rizal.

As required by the Court, respondents submited their Comment on the Pe��on, and pe��oner's their Reply to
respondents' Comment.

In the Barangay elec�ons held on May 17, 1982, pe��oner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain and the
other pe��oners Angel S. Salamat, Mario C. Sta. Ana, Jose C. Tolen�no, Rogelio J. de la Rosa and Jose M. Resurreccion, as
Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as the
Barangay Elec�on Act of 1982.

On February 9, 1987, pe��oner Alfredo M, de Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but signed by
respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designa�ng respondent Floren�no G. Magno as
Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. The designa�on made by the OIC Governor was "by authority of the
Minister of Local Government."

Also on February 8, 1987, respondent OIC Governor signed a Memorandum, antedated December 1, 1986 designa�ng
respondents Remigio M. Tigas, Ricardo Z. Lacanienta Teodoro V. Medina, Roberto S. Paz and Teresita L. Tolen�no as
members of the Barangay Council of the same Barangay and Municipality.

That the Memoranda had been antedated is evidenced by the Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor, the per�nent
por�ons of which read:

xxx xxx xxx

That I am the OIC Governor of Rizal having been appointed as such on March 20, 1986;

That as being OIC Governor of the Province of Rizal and in the performance of my du�es thereof, I among others, have
signed as I did sign the unnumbered memorandum ordering the replacement of all the barangay officials of all the
barangay(s) in the Municipality of Taytay, Rizal;

That the above cited memorandum dated December 1, 1986 was signed by me personally on February 8,1987;

That said memorandum was further deciminated (sic) to all concerned the following day, February 9. 1987.

FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NONE.

Pasig, Metro Manila, March 23, 1987.

Before us now, pe��oners pray that the subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be declared null and void and that
respondents be prohibited from taking over their posi�ons of Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen, respec�vely.
Pe��oners maintain that pursuant to Sec�on 3 of the Barangay Elec�on Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of office
"shall be six (6) years which shall commence on June 7, 1982 and shall con�nue un�l their successors shall have elected
and shall have qualified," or up to June 7, 1988. It is also their posi�on that with the ra�fica�on of the 1987 Cons�tu�on,
respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace them and to designate their successors.

On the other hand, respondents rely on Sec�on 2, Ar�cle III of the Provisional Cons�tu�on, promulgated on March 25,
1986, which provided:
SECTION 2. All elec�ve and appoin�ve officials and employees under the 1973 Cons�tu�on shall con�nue in office un�l
otherwise provided by proclama�on or execu�ve order or upon the designa�on or appointment and qualifica�on of
their successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one year from February 25,1986.

By reason of the foregoing provision, respondents contend that the terms of office of elec�ve and appoin�ve officials
were abolished and that pe��oners con�nued in office by virtue of the aforequoted provision and not because their
term of six years had not yet expired; and that the provision in the Barangay Elec�on Act fixing the term of office of
Barangay officials to six (6) years must be deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent with the aforequoted
provision of the Provisional Cons�tu�on.

Examining the said provision, there should be no ques�on that pe��oners, as elec�ve officials under the 1973
Cons�tu�on, may con�nue in office but should vacate their posi�ons upon the occurrence of any of the events
men�oned. 1

Since the promulga�on of the Provisional Cons�tu�on, there has been no proclama�on or execu�ve order termina�ng
the term of elec�ve Barangay officials. Thus, the issue for resolu�on is whether or not the designa�on of respondents to
replace pe��oners was validly made during the one-year period which ended on February 25, 1987.

Considering the candid Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor, we hold that February 8, 1977, should be considered as the
effec�ve date of replacement and not December 1,1986 to which it was ante dated, in keeping with the dictates of
jus�ce.

But while February 8, 1987 is ostensibly s�ll within the one-year deadline, the aforequoted provision in the Provisional
Cons�tu�on must be deemed to have been overtaken by Sec�on 27, Ar�cle XVIII of the 1987 Cons�tu�on reading.

SECTION 27. This Cons�tu�on shall take effect immediately upon its ra�fica�on by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous Cons�tu�ons.

The 1987 Cons�tu�on was ra�fied in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, therefore, the Provisional
Cons�tu�on must be deemed to have been superseded. Having become inopera�ve, respondent OIC Governor could no
longer rely on Sec�on 2, Ar�cle III, thereof to designate respondents to the elec�ve posi�ons occupied by pe��oners.

Pe��oners must now be held to have acquired security of tenure specially considering that the Barangay Elec�on Act of
1982 declares it "a policy of the State to guarantee and promote the autonomy of the barangays to ensure their fullest
development as self-reliant communi�es.2 Similarly, the 1987 Cons�tu�on ensures the autonomy of local governments
and of poli�cal subdivisions of which the barangays form a part, 3 and limits the President's power to "general
supervision" over local governments. 4 Relevantly, Sec�on 8, Ar�cle X of the same 1987 Cons�tu�on further provides in
part:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elec�ve local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be
three years ...

Un�l the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by law, therefore, the term of office of six (6) years
provided for in the Barangay Elec�on Act of 1982 5 should s�ll govern.

Contrary to the stand of respondents, we find nothing inconsistent between the term of six (6) years for elec�ve
Barangay officials and the 1987 Cons�tu�on, and the same should, therefore, be considered as s�ll opera�ve, pursuant
to Sec�on 3, Ar�cle XVIII of the 1987 Cons�tu�on, reading:

Sec. 3. All exis�ng laws, decrees, execu�ve orders, proclama�ons leters of instruc�ons, and other execu�ve issuances
not inconsistent, with this Cons�tu�on shall remain opera�ve un�l amended, repealed or revoked.

WHEREFORE, (1) The Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Governor on February 8, 1987 designa�ng respondents as
the Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen, respec�vely, of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal, are both declared to be
of no legal force and effect; and (2) the Writ of Prohibi�on is granted enjoining respondents perpetually from proceeding
with the ouster/take-over of pe��oners' posi�ons subject of this Pe��on. Without costs.

SO ORDERED.

Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, CJ., concurring:

The main issue resolved in the judgment at bar is whether the 1987 Cons�tu�on took effect on February 2, 1987, the
date that the plebiscite for its ra�fica�on was held or whether it took effect on February 11, 1987, the date its ra�fica�on
was proclaimed per Proclama�on No. 58 of the President of the Philippines, Corazon C. Aquino.

The Court's decision, with the lone dissent of Mr. Jus�ce Sarmiento, holds that by virtue of the provision of Ar�cle XVIII,
Sec�on 27 of the 1987 Cons�tu�on that it "shall take effect immediately upon its ra�fica�on by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose," the 1987 Cons�tu�on took effect on February 2, 1987, the date of its
ra�fica�on in the plebiscite held on that same date.

The thrust of the dissent is that the Cons�tu�on should be deemed to "take effect on the date its ra�fica�on shall have
been ascertained and not at the �me the people cast their votes to approve or reject it." This view was actually proposed
at the Cons�tu�onal Commission delibera�ons, but was withdrawn by its proponent in the face of the "overwhelming"
contrary view that the Cons�tu�on "will be effec�ve on the very day of the plebiscite."

The record of the proceedings and debates of the Cons�tu�onal Commission fully supports the Court's judgment. It
shows that the clear, unequivocal and express intent of the Cons�tu�onal Conunission in unanimously approving (by
thirty-five votes in favor and none against) the aforequoted Sec�on 27 of Transitory Ar�cle XVIII of the 1987 Cons�tu�on
was that "the act of ra�fica�on is the act of vo�ng by the people. So that is the date of the ra�fica�on" and that "the
canvass therea�er [of the votes] is merely the mathema�cal confirma�on of what was done during the date of the
plebiscite and the proclama�on of the President is merely the official confirmatory declara�on of an act which was
actually done by the Filipino people in adop�ng the Cons�tu�on when they cast their votes on the date of the
plebiscite."

The record of the delibera�ons and the vo�ng is reproduced hereinbelow: 1

MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, may we now put to a vote the original formulation of the committee as indicated in
Section 12, unless there are other commissioners who would like to present amendments.

MR. DAVIDE. Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.

MR. DAVIDE. May I propose the following amendments.

On line 2, delete the words "its ra�fica�on" and in lieu thereof insert the following-. "THE PROCLAMATION BY THE
PRESIDENT THAT IT HAS BEEN RATIFIED." And on the last line, a�er "cons�tu�ons," add the following: "AND THEIR
AMENDMENTS."

MR. MAAMBONG. Just a moment, Madam President. If Commissioner Davide is going to propose an addi�onal sentence,
the commitee would suggest that we take up first his amendment to the first sentence as originally formulated. We are
now ready to comment on that proposed amendment.

The proposed amendment would be to delete the words "its ra�fica�on and in lieu thereof insert the words "THE
PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT THAT IT HAS BEEN RATIFIED." And the second amendment would be: A�er the word
"cons�tu�ons," add the words" AND THEIR AMENDMENTS,"

The commitee accepts the first proposed amendment. However, we regret that we cannot accept the second proposed
amendment a�er the word "cons�tu�ons" because the commitee feels that when we talk of all previous Cons�tu�ons,
necessarily it includes "AND THEIR AMENDMENTS."

MR. DAVIDE. With that explana�on, l will not insist on the second. But, Madam President, may I request that I be
allowed to read the second amendment so the Commission would be able to appreciate the change in the first.

MR. MAAMBONG. Yes, Madam President, we can now do that.

MR. DAVIDE. The second sentence will read: "THE PROCLAMATION SHALL BE MADE WITHIN FIVE DAYS FOLLOWING THE
COMPLETION OF THE CANVASS BY THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS OF THE RESULTS OF SUCH PLEBISCITE."

MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, a�er conferring with our chairman, the commitee feels that the second proposed
amendment in the form of a new sentence would not be exactly necessary and the commitee feels that it would be too
much for us to impose a �me frame on the President to make the proclama�on. As we would recall, Madam President, in
the approved Ar�cle on the Execu�ve, there is a provision which says that the President shall make certain that all laws
shall be faithfully complied. When we approve this first sentence, and it says that there will be a proclama�on by the
President that the Cons�tu�on has been ra�fied, the President will naturally comply with the law in accordance with the
provisions in the Ar�cle on the Execu�ve which we have cited. It would be too much to impose on the President a �me
frame within which she will make that declara�on. It would be assumed that the President would immediately do that
a�er the results shall have been canvassed by the COMELEC.

Therefore, the commitee regrets that it cannot accept the second sentence which the Gentleman is proposing, Madam
President.

MR. DAVIDE. I am prepared to withdraw the same on the assump�on that there will be an immediate proclama�on of
the results by the President.

MR. MAAMBONG. With that understanding, Madam President.

MR. DAVIDE. I will not insist on the second sentence.

FR. BERNAS. Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Bernas is recognized.

FR. BERNAS. I would ask the commitee to reconsider its acceptance of the amendment which makes the effec�vity of
the new Cons�tu�on dependent upon the proclama�on of the President. The effectivity of the Constitution should
commence on the date of the ratification, not on the date of the proclamation of the President. What is confusing, I think,
is what happened in 1976 when the amendments of 1976 were ra�fied. In that par�cular case, the reason the
amendments of 1976 were effective upon the proclamation of the President was that the dra� presented to the people
said that the amendment will be effec�ve upon the proclama�on made by the President. I have a suspicion that was put
in there precisely to give the President some kind of leeway on whether to announce the ra�fica�on or not.
Therefore, we should not make this dependent on the action of the President since this will be a manifestation of the act
of the people to be done under the supervision of the COMELEC and it should be the COMELEC who should make the
announcement that, in fact, the votes show that the Cons�tu�on was ra�fied and there should be no need to wait for
any proclama�on on the part of the President.

MR. MAAMBONG. Would the Gentleman answer a few clarificatory ques�ons?

FR. BERNAS. Willingly, Madam President.

MR. MAAMBONG. The Gentleman will agree that a date has to be fixed as to exactly when the Cons�tu�on is supposed
to be ra�fied.

FR. BERNAS. I would say that the ratification of the Constitution is on the date the votes were supposed to have been
cast.

MR. MAAMBONG. Let us go to the mechanics of the whole thing, Madam President. We present the Cons�tu�on to a
plebiscite, the people exercise their right to vote, then the votes are canvassed by the Commission on Elec�ons. If we
delete the suggested amendment which says: "THE PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT THAT IT HAS BEEN RATIFIED,"
what would be, in clear terms, the date when the Cons�tu�on is supposed to be ra�fied or not ra�fied, as the case may
be?

FR. BERNAS. The date would be the cas�ng of the ballots. if the President were to say that the plebiscite would be held,
for instance, on January 19, 1987, then the date for the effec�vity of the new Cons�tu�on would be January 19, 1987.

MR. MAAMBONG. In other words, it would not depend on the actual issuance of the results by the Commission on
Elec�ons which will be doing the canvass? That is immaterial Madam President

FR. BERNAS. It would not, Madam President, because "ra�fica�on" is the act of saying "yes" is done when one casts his
ballot.

MR. MAAMBONG. So it is the date of the plebiscite itself, Madam President?

FR. BERNAS. Yes, Madam President.

MR. MAAMBONG. With that statement of Commissioner Bernas, we would like to know from the proponent,
Commissioner Davide, if he is insis�ng on his amendment.

MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I am insis�ng on the amendment because I cannot subscribe to the view of
Commissioner Bernas, that the date of the ra�fica�on is reckoned from the date of the cas�ng of the ballots. That cannot
be the date of reckoning because it is a plebiscite all over the country. We do not split the moment of cas�ng by each of
the voters. Actually and technically speaking, it would be all right if it would be upon the announcement of the results of
the canvass conducted by the COMELEC or the results of the plebiscite held all over the country. But it is necessary that
there be a body which will make the formal announcement of the results of the plebiscite. So it is either the President or
the COMELEC itself upon the comple�on of the canvass of the results of the plebiscite, and I opted for the President.
xxx xxx xxx

MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Nolledo is recognized.

MR. NOLLEDO. Thank you, Madam President. I beg to disagree with Commissioner Davide. I support the stand of
Commissioner Bernas because it is really the date of the casting of the "yes" votes that is the date of the ratification of
the Constitution The announcement merely confirms the ratification even if the results are released two or three days
a�er. I think it is a fundamental principle in poli�cal law, even in civil law, because an announcement is a mere
confirma�on The act of ratification is the act of voting by the people. So that is the date of the ra�fica�on. If there should
be any need for presiden�al proclama�on, that proclama�on will merely confirm the act of ra�fica�on.

Thank you, Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Does Commissioner Regalado want to contribute?

MR. REGALADO. Madam President, I was precisely going to state the same support for Commissioner Bernas, because
the canvass therea�er is merely the mathematical confirmation of what was done during the date of the plebiscite and
the proclamation of the President is merely the official confirmatory declaration of an act which was actually done by the
Filipino people in adopting the Constitution when they cast their votes on the date of the plebiscite.

MR. LERUM. Madam President, may I be recognized.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Lerum is recognized.

MR. LERUM. I am in favor of the Davide amendment because we have to fix a date for the effec�vity of the Cons�tu�on.
Suppose the announcement is delayed by, say, 10 days or a month, what happens to the obliga�ons and rights that
accrue upon the approval of the Cons�tu�on? So I think we must have a definite date. I am, therefore, in favor of the
Davide amendment.

MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Maambong is recognized.

MR. MAAMBONG. With the theory of the Commissioner, would there be a necessity for the Commission on Elec�ons to
declare the results of the canvass?

FR. BERNAS. There would be because it is the Commission on Elections which makes the official announcement of the
results.

MR. MAAMBONG. My next ques�on which is the final one is: A�er the Commision on Elec�ons has declared the results
of the canvass, will there be a necessity for the President to make a proclama�on of the results of the canvass as
submited by the Commission on Elec�ons?

FR. BERNAS. I would say there would be no necessity, Madam President.

MR. MAAMBONG. In other words, the President may or may not make the proclama�on whether the Cons�tu�on has
been ra�fied or not.

FR. BERNAS. I would say that the proclama�on made by the President would be immaterial because under the law, the
administra�on of all elec�on laws is under an independent Commission on Elec�ons. It is the Commission on Elec�ons
which announces the results.

MR. MAAMBONG. But nevertheless, the President may make the proclama�on.

FR. BERNAS. Yes, the President may. And if what he says contradicts what the Commission on Elec�ons says, it would
have no effect. I would only add that when we say that the date of effec�vity is on the day of the cas�ng of the votes,
what we mean is that the Cons�tu�on takes effect on every single minute and every single second of that day, because
the Civil Code says a day has 24 hours.So that even if the votes are cast in the morning, the Constitution is really effective
from the previous midnight.

So that when we adopted the new rule on ci�zenship, the children of Filipino mothers or anybody born on the date of
effec�vity of the 1973 Cons�tu�on, which is January 17, 1973, are natural-born ci�zens, no mater what �me of day or
night.

MR. MAAMBONG. Could we, therefore, safely say that whatever date is the publication of the results of the canvass by
the COMELEC retroacts to the date of the plebiscite?
FR. BERNAS. Yes, Madam President.

MR. MAAMBONG. I thank the Commissioner.

MR. GUINGONA. Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is recognized.

MR. GUINGONA. Men�on was made about the need for having a definite date. I think it is precisely the proposal of
Commissioner Bernas which speaks of the date (of ra�fica�on that would have a definite date, because there would be
no definite date if we depend upon the canvassing by the COMELEC.

Thank you,

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Concepcion is recognized.

MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Madam President.

Whoever makes the announcement as to the result of the plebiscite, be it the COMELEC or the President, would
announce that a majority of the votes cast on a given date was in favor of the Cons�tu�on. And that is the date when the
Cons�tu�on takes effect, apart from the fact that the provision on the dra�ing or amendment of the Cons�tu�on
provides that a cons�tu�on becomes effec�ve upon ra�fica�on by a majority of the votes cast, although I would not say
from the very beginning of the date of elec�on because as of that �me it is impossible to determine whether there is a
majority. At the end of the day of election or plebiscite, the determination is made as of that time-the majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite held on such and such a date. So that is the time when the new Constitution will be considered
ratified and, therefore, effective.

THE PRESIDENT. May we now hear Vice-President Padilla.

MR. PADILLA. Madam President, I am against the proposed amendment of Commissioner Davide and I support the view
of Commissioner Bernas and the others because the ra�fica�on of the Cons�tu�on is on the date the people, by a
majority vote, have cast their votes in favor of the Cons�tu�on. Even in civil law, if there is a contract, say, between an
agent and a third person and that contract is confirmed or ra�fied by the principal, the validity does not begin on the
date of ra�fica�on but it retroacts from the date the contract was executed.

Therefore, the date of the Constitution as ratified should retroact to the date that the people have cast their affirmative
votes in favor of the Constitution.

MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Maambong is recognized

MR. MAAMBONG. We will now ask once more Commissioner Davide if he is insis�ng on his amendment

MR. DAVIDE. In view of the explanation and overwhelming tyranny of the opinion that it will be effective on the very day
of the plebiscite, I am withdrawing my amendment on the assump�on that any of the following bodies the Office of the
President or the COMELEC will make the formal announcement of the results.

MR. RAMA. Madam President, we are now ready to vote on the original provision as stated by the commitee.

MR. MAAMBONG. The commitee will read again the formula�on indicated in the original commitee report as Sec�on
12.

This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for
the purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions.

We ask for a vote, Madam President.

VOTING

THE PRESIDENT. As many as are in favor, please raise their hand. (Several Members raised their hands.)

As many as are against, please raise their hand. (No Member raised his hand.)

The results show 35 votes in favor and none against; Section 12 is approved. 2

The Court next holds as a consequence of its declara�on at bar that the Cons�tu�on took effect on the date of its
ra�fica�on in the plebiscite held on February 2, 1987, that: (1) the Provisional Cons�tu�on promulgated on March 25,
1986 must be deemed to have been superseded by the 1987 Cons�tu�on on the same date February 2, 1987 and (2) by
and a�er said date, February 2, 1987, absent any saying clause to the contrary in the Transitory Ar�cle of the
Cons�tu�on, respondent OIC Governor could no longer exercise the power to replace pe��oners in their posi�ons as
Barangay Captain and Councilmen. Hence, the atempted replacement of pe��oners by respondent OIC Governor's
designa�on on February 8, 1987 of their successors could no longer produce any legal force and effect. While the
Provisional Cons�tu�on provided for a one-year period expiring on March 25, 1987 within which the power of
replacement could be exercised, this period was shortened by the ra�fica�on and effec�vity on February 2, 1987 of the
Cons�tu�on. Had the inten�on of the framers of the Cons�tu�on been otherwise, they would have so provided for in
the Transitory Ar�cle, as indeed they provided for mul�farious transitory provisions in twenty six sec�ons of Ar�cle XVIII,
e.g. extension of the six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes
of synchroniza�on of elec�ons, the con�nued exercise of legisla�ve powers by the incumbent President un�l the
convening of the first Congress, etc.

A final note of clarifica�on, as to the statement in the dissent that "the appointments of some seven Court of Appeals
Jus�ces, 71 provincial fiscals and 55 city fiscals reported extended (by) the President on February 2, 1987 . . . could be
open to serious ques�ons," in view of the provisions of Sec�ons 8 (1) and 9, Ar�cle VIII of the Cons�tu�on which require
prior endorsement thereof by the Judicial and Bar Council created under the Cons�tu�on. It should be stated for the
record that the reported date of the appointments, February 2, 1987, is incorrect. The official records of the Court show
that the appointments of the seven Court of Appeals Jus�ces were transmited to this Court on February 1, 1987 and
they were all appointed on or before January 31, 1987.3 (Similarly, the records of the Department of Jus�ce likewise
show that the appointment papers of the last batch of provincial and city fiscals signed by the President in comple�on of
the reorganiza�on of the prosecu�on service were made on January 31, 1987 and transmited to the Department on
February 1, 1987.) It is also a mater of record that since February 2, 1987, no appointments to the Judiciary have been
extended by the President, pending the cons�tu�on of the Judicial and Bar Council, indica�ng that the Chief Execu�ve
has likewise considered February 2, 1987 as the effec�ve date of the Cons�tu�on, as now expressly declared by the
Court.

CRUZ, J., concurring.

In her quiet and restrained manner, Jus�ce Herrera is able to prove her point with more telling effect than the tones of
thunder. She has writen another persuasive opinion, and I am delighted to concur. I note that it in effect affirms my
dissents in the De la Serna, Zamora, Duquing and Bayas cases, where I submited that the local OICs may no longer be
summarily replaced, having acquired security of tenure under the new Cons�tu�on. Our difference is that whereas I
would make that right commence on February 25, 1987, a�er the deadline set by the Freedom Cons�tu�on, Jus�ce
Herrera would opt for February 2, 1987, when the new Cons�tu�on was ra�fied. I yield to that beter view and agree
with her ponencia completely.

SARMIENTO, J., Dissen�ng.

With due respect to the majority I register this dissent.

While I agree that the one-year deadline prescribed by Sec�on 2, Ar�cle III of the Provisional Cons�tu�on with respect to
the tenure of government func�onaries, as follows:

SECTION 2. All elec�ve and appoin�ve officials and employees under the 1973 Cons�tu�on shall con�nue in office un�l
otherwise provided by proclama�on or execu�ve order or upon the designa�on or appointment and qualifica�on of
their successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986.

was cut short by the ra�fica�on of the 1987 Cons�tu�on, I entertain serious doubts whether or not that cut-off period
began on February 2, 1987, the date of the plebiscite held to approve the new Charter. To my mind the 1987 cons�tu�on
took effect on February 11, 1987, the date the same was proclaimed ra�fied pursuant to Proclama�on No. 58 of the
President of the Philippines, and not February 2, 1987, plebiscite day.

I rely, first and foremost, on the language of the 1987 Charter itself, thus:

Sec. 27. This Cons�tu�on shag take effect immediately upon its ra�fica�on by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous Cons�tu�ons.

It is my reading of this provision that the Cons�tu�on takes effect on the date its ra�fica�on shall have been ascertained,
and not at the �me the people cast their votes to approve or reject it. For it cannot be logically said that Cons�tu�on was
ra�fied during such a plebiscite, when the will of the people as of that �me, had not, and could not have been, vet
determined.

Other than that, pragma�c considera�ons compel me to take the view.

I have no doubt that between February 2, and February 11, 1987 the government performed acts that would have been
valid under the Provisional Cons�tu�on but would otherwise have been void under the 1987 Charter. I recall, in
par�cular, the appointments of some seven Court of Appeals Jus�ces, 71 provincial fiscals, and 55 city fiscals the
President reportedly extended on February 2, 1987. 1 Under Sec�ons 8 (1) and 9, Ar�cle VIII, of the l987 Cons�tu�on, as
follows:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 8. (I)A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief
Jus�ce as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Jus�ce, and a representa�ve of the Congress as ex oficio Members, a
representa�ve of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a re�red Member of the Supreme Court, and a representa�ve of
the private sector.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of
at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy, Such appointments need no
confirma�on.

xxx xxx xxx

such appointments could be open to serious ques�ons.

Since 1973, moreover, we have invariably reckoned the effec�vity of the Cons�tu�on as well as the amendments thereto
from the date it is proclaimed ra�fied.

In Magtoto v. Manguera, 2 we held that the 1973 Cons�tu�on became in force and effect on January 17, 1973, the date
Proclama�on No. 1102, "Announcing the Ra�fica�on by the Filipino People of the Cons�tu�on Proposed by the 1971
Cons�tu�onal Conven�on," was issued, although Mr. Jus�ce, now Chief Jus�ce, Teehankee would push its effec�vity date
further to April 17, 1973, the date our decision in Javellana v. Executive Secretary, 3 became final. And this was so
notwithstanding Sec�on 16, Ar�cle XVII, of the 1973 Cons�tu�on, thus:

SEC. 16. This Cons�tu�on shall take effect immediately upon its ra�fica�on by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
called for the purpose and, except as herein provided, shall supersede the Cons�tu�on of nineteen-hundred and thirty-
five and all amendments thereto.

On October 27, 1976, then President Marcos promulgated Proclama�on no. 1595, proclaiming the ra�fica�on of the
1976 amendments submited in the plebiscite of October 16- 17, 1976. The Proclama�on states, inter alia, that.

By virtue-of the powers vested in me by law, I hereby proclaim all the amendments embodied in this cer�ficate as duly
ra�fied by the Filipino people in the referendum- plebiscite held Oct. 16-17, 1976 and are therefore effec�ve and in full
force and effect as of this date.

It shall be noted that under Amendment No. 9 of the said 1976 amendments.

These amendments shall take effect a�er the incumbent President shall have proclaimed that they have been ra�fied by
a majority of the votes cast in the referendum-plebiscite.

On April 1, 1980, the then Chief Execu�ve issued Proclama�on no. 1959, "Proclaiming the Ra�fica�on by the Filipino
People of the Amendments of Sec�on 7, Ar�cle X of the Cons�tu�on" (lengthening the terms of office of judges and
jus�ces). The Proclama�on provides:

[t]he above-quoted amendment has been duly ra�fied by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite held, together
with the elec�on for local officials, on January 30, 1980, and that said amendment is hereby declared to take effect
immediately.

It shall be noted that under Resolu�on No. 21, dated December 18, 1979, the proposed amendment shall take effect on
the date the incumbent President/Prime Minister shall proclaim its ra�fica�on.

On April 7, 1981, Proclama�on No. 2077 was issued "Proclaiming the Ra�fica�on in the Plebiscite of April 7, 1981 of the
Amendments to the Cons�tu�on Embodied in Batas Pambansa Blg. 122 and Declaring Them Therefore Effec�ve and in
Full Force and Effect." The Proclama�on, in declaring the said amendments duly approved, further declared them
"[e]ffec�ve and in full force and in effect as of the date of this Proclama�on," It shall be noted, in this connec�on, that
under Resolu�ons Nos. I and 2 of the Batasang Pambansa, Third Regular Session, Si�ng as a Cons�tuent Assembly,
which parented these amendments, the same:

. . .shall become valid as part of the Cons�tu�on when approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to be held
pursuant to Sec�on 2, Ar�cle XVI of the Cons�tu�on.
On the other hand, Batas Pambansa Blg. 122, "An Act to Submit to the Filipino People, for Ra�fica�on or Rejec�on, the
Amendment to the Cons�tu�on of the Philippines, Proposed by the Batasang Pambansa, Si�ng as a Cons�tuent
Assembly, in its Resolu�ons Numbered Three, Two, and One, and to Appropriate Funds Therefore," provides, as follows:

SEC. 7. The Commission on Elec�ons, si�ng en banc, shad canvass and proclaim the result of the plebiscite using the
cer�ficates submited to it, duly authen�cated and cer�fied by the Board of Canvassers of each province or city.

We have, finally, Proclama�on No. 2332, "Proclaiming the Ra�fica�on in the Plebiscite of January 27, 1984, of the
Amendments to the Cons�tu�on Embodied in Batasang Pambansa Resolu�ons Nos. 104, 105, 110, 111, 112 and 113." It
states that the amendments:

....are therefore effec�ve and in full force and effect as of the date of this Proclama�on.

It carries out Resolu�on no. 104 itself (as well as Resolu�ons Nos. 110 and 112 and Sec�on 9, Batas Blg. 643), which
states, that:

The proposed amendments shall take effect on the date the President of the Philippines shall proclaim that they have
been ra�fied by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite held for the purpose, but not later than three months from
the approval of the amendments.

albeit Resolu�ons Nos. 105, 111, and 113 provide, that:

These amendments shall be valid as a part of the Cons�tu�on when approved by a majority of the votes cast in an
elec�on/plebiscite at which it is submited to the people for their ra�fica�on pursuant to Sec�on 2 of Ar�cle XVI of the
Cons�tu�on, as amended.

That a Cons�tu�on or amendments thereto take effect upon proclama�on of their ra�fica�on and not at the �me of the
plebiscite is a view that is not peculiar to the Marcos era.

The Resolu�on of Both Houses (of Congress) in Joint Session on the March 11, 1947 plebiscite called pursuant to
Republic Act No. 73 and the Resolu�on of Both Houses (of Congress) adopted on September 18, 1946, was adopted on
April 9,1947. The April 9, 1947 Resolu�on makes no men�on of a retroac�ve applica�on.

Accordingly, when the incumbent President (Mrs. Corazon C. Aquino) proclaimed on February 11, 1987, at Malacanang
Palace:

... that the Cons�tu�on of the Republic of the Philippines adopted by the Cons�tu�onal Commission of 1986, including
the Ordinance appended thereto, has been duly ra�fied by the Filipino people and is therefore effec�ve and in full force
and effect. 4

the 1987 Cons�tu�on, in point of fact, came into force and effect, I hold that it took effect at no other �me.

I submit that our ruling in Ponsica v. Ignalaga 5 in which we declared, in passing, that the new Charter was ra�fied on
February 2, 1987, does not in any way weaken this dissent. As I stated, the remark was said in passing-we did not resolve
the case on account of a categorical holding that the 1987 Cons�tu�on came to life on February 2, 1987. In any event, if
we did, I now call for its re-examina�on.

I am therefore of the opinion, consistent with the views expressed above, that the challenged dismissals done on
February 8, 1987 were valid, the 1987 Cons�tu�on not being then as yet in force.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, CJ., concurring:

The main issue resolved in the judgment at bar is whether the 1987 Cons�tu�on took effect on February 2, 1987, the
date that the plebiscite for its ra�fica�on was held or whether it took effect on February 11, 1987, the date its ra�fica�on
was proclaimed per Proclama�on No. 58 of the President of the Philippines, Corazon C. Aquino.

The Court's decision, with the lone dissent of Mr. Jus�ce Sarmiento, holds that by virtue of the provision of Ar�cle XVIII,
Sec�on 27 of the 1987 Cons�tu�on that it "shall take effect immediately upon its ra�fica�on by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose," the 1987 Cons�tu�on took effect on February 2, 1987, the date of its
ra�fica�on in the plebiscite held on that same date.

The thrust of the dissent is that the Cons�tu�on should be deemed to "take effect on the date its ra�fica�on shall have
been ascertained and not at the �me the people cast their votes to approve or reject it." This view was actually proposed
at the Cons�tu�onal Commission delibera�ons, but was withdrawn by its proponent in the face of the "overwhelming"
contrary view that the Cons�tu�on "will be effec�ve on the very day of the plebiscite."

The record of the proceedings and debates of the Cons�tu�onal Commission fully supports the Court's judgment. It
shows that the clear, unequivocal and express intent of the Cons�tu�onal Conunission in unanimously approving (by
thirty-five votes in favor and none against) the aforequoted Sec�on 27 of Transitory Ar�cle XVIII of the 1987 Cons�tu�on
was that "the act of ra�fica�on is the act of vo�ng by the people. So that is the date of the ra�fica�on" and that "the
canvass therea�er [of the votes] is merely the mathema�cal confirma�on of what was done during the date of the
plebiscite and the proclama�on of the President is merely the official confirmatory declara�on of an act which was
actually done by the Filipino people in adop�ng the Cons�tu�on when they cast their votes on the date of the
plebiscite."

The record of the delibera�ons and the vo�ng is reproduced hereinbelow: 1

MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, may we now put to a vote the original formulation of the committee as indicated in
Section 12, unless there are other commissioners who would like to present amendments.

MR. DAVIDE. Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.

MR. DAVIDE. May I propose the following amendments.

On line 2, delete the words "its ra�fica�on" and in lieu thereof insert the following-. "THE PROCLAMATION BY THE
PRESIDENT THAT IT HAS BEEN RATIFIED." And on the last line, a�er "cons�tu�ons," add the following: "AND THEIR
AMENDMENTS."

MR. MAAMBONG. Just a moment, Madam President. If Commissioner Davide is going to propose an addi�onal sentence,
the commitee would suggest that we take up first his amendment to the first sentence as originally formulated. We are
now ready to comment on that proposed amendment.

The proposed amendment would be to delete the words "its ra�fica�on and in lieu thereof insert the words "THE
PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT THAT IT HAS BEEN RATIFIED." And the second amendment would be: A�er the word
"cons�tu�ons," add the words" AND THEIR AMENDMENTS,"

The commitee accepts the first proposed amendment. However, we regret that we cannot accept the second proposed
amendment a�er the word "cons�tu�ons" because the commitee feels that when we talk of all previous Cons�tu�ons,
necessarily it includes "AND THEIR AMENDMENTS."

MR. DAVIDE. With that explana�on, l will not insist on the second. But, Madam President, may I request that I be
allowed to read the second amendment so the Commission would be able to appreciate the change in the first.

MR. MAAMBONG. Yes, Madam President, we can now do that.

MR. DAVIDE. The second sentence will read: "THE PROCLAMATION SHALL BE MADE WITHIN FIVE DAYS FOLLOWING THE
COMPLETION OF THE CANVASS BY THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS OF THE RESULTS OF SUCH PLEBISCITE."

MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, a�er conferring with our chairman, the commitee feels that the second proposed
amendment in the form of a new sentence would not be exactly necessary and the commitee feels that it would be too
much for us to impose a �me frame on the President to make the proclama�on. As we would recall, Madam President, in
the approved Ar�cle on the Execu�ve, there is a provision which says that the President shall make certain that all laws
shall be faithfully complied. When we approve this first sentence, and it says that there will be a proclama�on by the
President that the Cons�tu�on has been ra�fied, the President will naturally comply with the law in accordance with the
provisions in the Ar�cle on the Execu�ve which we have cited. It would be too much to impose on the President a �me
frame within which she will make that declara�on. It would be assumed that the President would immediately do that
a�er the results shall have been canvassed by the COMELEC.

Therefore, the commitee regrets that it cannot accept the second sentence which the Gentleman is proposing, Madam
President.

MR. DAVIDE. I am prepared to withdraw the same on the assump�on that there will be an immediate proclama�on of
the results by the President.

MR. MAAMBONG. With that understanding, Madam President.

MR. DAVIDE. I will not insist on the second sentence.

FR. BERNAS. Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Bernas is recognized.

FR. BERNAS. I would ask the commitee to reconsider its acceptance of the amendment which makes the effec�vity of
the new Cons�tu�on dependent upon the proclama�on of the President. The effectivity of the Constitution should
commence on the date of the ratification, not on the date of the proclamation of the President. What is confusing, I think,
is what happened in 1976 when the amendments of 1976 were ra�fied. In that par�cular case, the reason the
amendments of 1976 were effective upon the proclamation of the President was that the dra� presented to the people
said that the amendment will be effec�ve upon the proclama�on made by the President. I have a suspicion that was put
in there precisely to give the President some kind of leeway on whether to announce the ra�fica�on or not.
Therefore, we should not make this dependent on the action of the President since this will be a manifestation of the act
of the people to be done under the supervision of the COMELEC and it should be the COMELEC who should make the
announcement that, in fact, the votes show that the Cons�tu�on was ra�fied and there should be no need to wait for
any proclama�on on the part of the President.

MR. MAAMBONG. Would the Gentleman answer a few clarificatory ques�ons?

FR. BERNAS. Willingly, Madam President.

MR. MAAMBONG. The Gentleman will agree that a date has to be fixed as to exactly when the Cons�tu�on is supposed
to be ra�fied.

FR. BERNAS. I would say that the ratification of the Constitution is on the date the votes were supposed to have been
cast.

MR. MAAMBONG. Let us go to the mechanics of the whole thing, Madam President. We present the Cons�tu�on to a
plebiscite, the people exercise their right to vote, then the votes are canvassed by the Commission on Elec�ons. If we
delete the suggested amendment which says: "THE PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT THAT IT HAS BEEN RATIFIED,"
what would be, in clear terms, the date when the Cons�tu�on is supposed to be ra�fied or not ra�fied, as the case may
be?

FR. BERNAS. The date would be the cas�ng of the ballots. if the President were to say that the plebiscite would be held,
for instance, on January 19, 1987, then the date for the effec�vity of the new Cons�tu�on would be January 19, 1987.

MR. MAAMBONG. In other words, it would not depend on the actual issuance of the results by the Commission on
Elec�ons which will be doing the canvass? That is immaterial Madam President

FR. BERNAS. It would not, Madam President, because "ra�fica�on" is the act of saying "yes" is done when one casts his
ballot.

MR. MAAMBONG. So it is the date of the plebiscite itself, Madam President?

FR. BERNAS. Yes, Madam President.

MR. MAAMBONG. With that statement of Commissioner Bernas, we would like to know from the proponent,
Commissioner Davide, if he is insis�ng on his amendment.

MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I am insis�ng on the amendment because I cannot subscribe to the view of
Commissioner Bernas, that the date of the ra�fica�on is reckoned from the date of the cas�ng of the ballots. That cannot
be the date of reckoning because it is a plebiscite all over the country. We do not split the moment of cas�ng by each of
the voters. Actually and technically speaking, it would be all right if it would be upon the announcement of the results of
the canvass conducted by the COMELEC or the results of the plebiscite held all over the country. But it is necessary that
there be a body which will make the formal announcement of the results of the plebiscite. So it is either the President or
the COMELEC itself upon the comple�on of the canvass of the results of the plebiscite, and I opted for the President.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Nolledo is recognized.

MR. NOLLEDO. Thank you, Madam President. I beg to disagree with Commissioner Davide. I support the stand of
Commissioner Bernas because it is really the date of the casting of the "yes" votes that is the date of the ratification of
the Constitution The announcement merely confirms the ratification even if the results are released two or three days
a�er. I think it is a fundamental principle in poli�cal law, even in civil law, because an announcement is a mere
confirma�on The act of ratification is the act of voting by the people. So that is the date of the ra�fica�on. If there should
be any need for presiden�al proclama�on, that proclama�on will merely confirm the act of ra�fica�on.
Thank you, Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Does Commissioner Regalado want to contribute?

MR. REGALADO. Madam President, I was precisely going to state the same support for Commissioner Bernas, because
the canvass therea�er is merely the mathematical confirmation of what was done during the date of the plebiscite and
the proclamation of the President is merely the official confirmatory declaration of an act which was actually done by the
Filipino people in adopting the Constitution when they cast their votes on the date of the plebiscite.

MR. LERUM. Madam President, may I be recognized.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Lerum is recognized.

MR. LERUM. I am in favor of the Davide amendment because we have to fix a date for the effec�vity of the Cons�tu�on.
Suppose the announcement is delayed by, say, 10 days or a month, what happens to the obliga�ons and rights that
accrue upon the approval of the Cons�tu�on? So I think we must have a definite date. I am, therefore, in favor of the
Davide amendment.

MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Maambong is recognized.

MR. MAAMBONG. With the theory of the Commissioner, would there be a necessity for the Commission on Elec�ons to
declare the results of the canvass?

FR. BERNAS. There would be because it is the Commission on Elections which makes the official announcement of the
results.

MR. MAAMBONG. My next ques�on which is the final one is: A�er the Commision on Elec�ons has declared the results
of the canvass, will there be a necessity for the President to make a proclama�on of the results of the canvass as
submited by the Commission on Elec�ons?

FR. BERNAS. I would say there would be no necessity, Madam President.

MR. MAAMBONG. In other words, the President may or may not make the proclama�on whether the Cons�tu�on has
been ra�fied or not.

FR. BERNAS. I would say that the proclama�on made by the President would be immaterial because under the law, the
administra�on of all elec�on laws is under an independent Commission on Elec�ons. It is the Commission on Elec�ons
which announces the results.

MR. MAAMBONG. But nevertheless, the President may make the proclama�on.

FR. BERNAS. Yes, the President may. And if what he says contradicts what the Commission on Elec�ons says, it would
have no effect. I would only add that when we say that the date of effec�vity is on the day of the cas�ng of the votes,
what we mean is that the Cons�tu�on takes effect on every single minute and every single second of that day, because
the Civil Code says a day has 24 hours.

So that even if the votes are cast in the morning, the Constitution is really effective from the previous midnight. So that
when we adopted the new rule on ci�zenship, the children of Filipino mothers or anybody born on the date of effec�vity
of the 1973 Cons�tu�on, which is January 17, 1973, are natural-born ci�zens, no mater what �me of day or night.

MR. MAAMBONG. Could we, therefore, safely say that whatever date is the publication of the results of the canvass by
the COMELEC retroacts to the date of the plebiscite?

FR. BERNAS. Yes, Madam President.

MR. MAAMBONG. I thank the Commissioner.

MR. GUINGONA. Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is recognized.

MR. GUINGONA. Men�on was made about the need for having a definite date. I think it is precisely the proposal of
Commissioner Bernas which speaks of the date (of ra�fica�on that would have a definite date, because there would be
no definite date if we depend upon the canvassing by the COMELEC.

Thank you,

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Concepcion is recognized.

MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Madam President.

Whoever makes the announcement as to the result of the plebiscite, be it the COMELEC or the President, would
announce that a majority of the votes cast on a given date was in favor of the Cons�tu�on. And that is the date when the
Cons�tu�on takes effect, apart from the fact that the provision on the dra�ing or amendment of the Cons�tu�on
provides that a cons�tu�on becomes effec�ve upon ra�fica�on by a majority of the votes cast, although I would not say
from the very beginning of the date of elec�on because as of that �me it is impossible to determine whether there is a
majority. At the end of the day of election or plebiscite, the determination is made as of that time-the majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite held on such and such a date. So that is the time when the new Constitution will be considered
ratified and, therefore, effective.

THE PRESIDENT. May we now hear Vice-President Padilla.

MR. PADILLA. Madam President, I am against the proposed amendment of Commissioner Davide and I support the view
of Commissioner Bernas and the others because the ra�fica�on of the Cons�tu�on is on the date the people, by a
majority vote, have cast their votes in favor of the Cons�tu�on. Even in civil law, if there is a contract, say, between an
agent and a third person and that contract is confirmed or ra�fied by the principal, the validity does not begin on the
date of ra�fica�on but it retroacts from the date the contract was executed.

Therefore, the date of the Constitution as ratified should retroact to the date that the people have cast their affirmative
votes in favor of the Constitution.

MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Maambong is recognized

MR. MAAMBONG. We will now ask once more Commissioner Davide if he is insis�ng on his amendment

MR. DAVIDE. In view of the explanation and overwhelming tyranny of the opinion that it will be effective on the very day
of the plebiscite, I am withdrawing my amendment on the assump�on that any of the following bodies the Office of the
President or the COMELEC will make the formal announcement of the results.

MR. RAMA. Madam President, we are now ready to vote on the original provision as stated by the commitee.

MR. MAAMBONG. The commitee will read again the formula�on indicated in the original commitee report as Sec�on
12.

This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for
the purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions.

We ask for a vote, Madam President.

VOTING

THE PRESIDENT. As many as are in favor, please raise their hand. (Several Members raised their hands.)

As many as are against, please raise their hand. (No Member raised his hand.)

The results show 35 votes in favor and none against; Section 12 is approved. 2

The Court next holds as a consequence of its declara�on at bar that the Cons�tu�on took effect on the date of its
ra�fica�on in the plebiscite held on February 2, 1987, that: (1) the Provisional Cons�tu�on promulgated on March 25,
1986 must be deemed to have been superseded by the 1987 Cons�tu�on on the same date February 2, 1987 and (2) by
and a�er said date, February 2, 1987, absent any saying clause to the contrary in the Transitory Ar�cle of the
Cons�tu�on, respondent OIC Governor could no longer exercise the power to replace pe��oners in their posi�ons as
Barangay Captain and Councilmen. Hence, the atempted replacement of pe��oners by respondent OIC Governor's
designa�on on February 8, 1987 of their successors could no longer produce any legal force and effect. While the
Provisional Cons�tu�on provided for a one-year period expiring on March 25, 1987 within which the power of
replacement could be exercised, this period was shortened by the ra�fica�on and effec�vity on February 2, 1987 of the
Cons�tu�on. Had the inten�on of the framers of the Cons�tu�on been otherwise, they would have so provided for in
the Transitory Ar�cle, as indeed they provided for mul�farious transitory provisions in twenty six sec�ons of Ar�cle XVIII,
e.g. extension of the six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes
of synchroniza�on of elec�ons, the con�nued exercise of legisla�ve powers by the incumbent President un�l the
convening of the first Congress, etc.

A final note of clarifica�on, as to the statement in the dissent that "the appointments of some seven Court of Appeals
Jus�ces, 71 provincial fiscals and 55 city fiscals reported extended (by) the President on February 2, 1987 . . . could be
open to serious ques�ons," in view of the provisions of Sec�ons 8 (1) and 9, Ar�cle VIII of the Cons�tu�on which require
prior endorsement thereof by the Judicial and Bar Council created under the Cons�tu�on. It should be stated for the
record that the reported date of the appointments, February 2, 1987, is incorrect. The official records of the Court show
that the appointments of the seven Court of Appeals Jus�ces were transmited to this Court on February 1, 1987 and
they were all appointed on or before January 31, 1987.3 (Similarly, the records of the Department of Jus�ce likewise
show that the appointment papers of the last batch of provincial and city fiscals signed by the President in comple�on of
the reorganiza�on of the prosecu�on service were made on January 31, 1987 and transmited to the Department on
February 1, 1987.) It is also a mater of record that since February 2, 1987, no appointments to the Judiciary have been
extended by the President, pending the cons�tu�on of the Judicial and Bar Council, indica�ng that the Chief Execu�ve
has likewise considered February 2, 1987 as the effec�ve date of the Cons�tu�on, as now expressly declared by the
Court.

CRUZ, J., concurring.

In her quiet and restrained manner, Jus�ce Herrera is able to prove her point with more telling effect than the tones of
thunder. She has writen another persuasive opinion, and I am delighted to concur. I note that it in effect affirms my
dissents in the De la Serna, Zamora, Duquing and Bayas cases, where I submited that the local OICs may no longer be
summarily replaced, having acquired security of tenure under the new Cons�tu�on. Our difference is that whereas I
would make that right commence on February 25, 1987, a�er the deadline set by the Freedom Cons�tu�on, Jus�ce
Herrera would opt for February 2, 1987, when the new Cons�tu�on was ra�fied. I yield to that beter view and agree
with her ponencia completely.

SARMIENTO, J., Dissen�ng.

With due respect to the majority I register this dissent.

While I agree that the one-year deadline prescribed by Sec�on 2, Ar�cle III of the Provisional Cons�tu�on with respect to
the tenure of government func�onaries, as follows:

SECTION 2. All elec�ve and appoin�ve officials and employees under the 1973 Cons�tu�on shall con�nue in office un�l
otherwise provided by proclama�on or execu�ve order or upon the designa�on or appointment and qualifica�on of
their successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986.

was cut short by the ra�fica�on of the 1987 Cons�tu�on, I entertain serious doubts whether or not that cut-off period
began on February 2, 1987, the date of the plebiscite held to approve the new Charter. To my mind the 1987 cons�tu�on
took effect on February 11, 1987, the date the same was proclaimed ra�fied pursuant to Proclama�on No. 58 of the
President of the Philippines, and not February 2, 1987, plebiscite day.

I rely, first and foremost, on the language of the 1987 Charter itself, thus:

Sec. 27. This Cons�tu�on shag take effect immediately upon its ra�fica�on by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous Cons�tu�ons.

It is my reading of this provision that the Cons�tu�on takes effect on the date its ra�fica�on shall have been ascertained,
and not at the �me the people cast their votes to approve or reject it. For it cannot be logically said that Cons�tu�on was
ra�fied during such a plebiscite, when the will of the people as of that �me, had not, and could not have been, vet
determined.

Other than that, pragma�c considera�ons compel me to take the view.

I have no doubt that between February 2, and February 11, 1987 the government performed acts that would have been
valid under the Provisional Cons�tu�on but would otherwise have been void under the 1987 Charter. I recall, in
par�cular, the appointments of some seven Court of Appeals Jus�ces, 71 provincial fiscals, and 55 city fiscals the
President reportedly extended on February 2, 1987. 1 Under Sec�ons 8 (1) and 9, Ar�cle VIII, of the l987 Cons�tu�on, as
follows:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 8. (I)A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief
Jus�ce as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Jus�ce, and a representa�ve of the Congress as ex oficio Members, a
representa�ve of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a re�red Member of the Supreme Court, and a representa�ve of
the private sector.

xxx xxx xxx

2Sec. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of
at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy, Such appointments need no
confirma�on.

xxx xxx xxx

such appointments could be open to serious ques�ons.

Since 1973, moreover, we have invariably reckoned the effec�vity of the Cons�tu�on as well as the amendments thereto
from the date it is proclaimed ra�fied.

In Magtoto v. Manguera, 2 we held that the 1973 Cons�tu�on became in force and effect on January 17, 1973, the date
Proclama�on No. 1102, "Announcing the Ra�fica�on by the Filipino People of the Cons�tu�on Proposed by the 1971
Cons�tu�onal Conven�on," was issued, although Mr. Jus�ce, now Chief Jus�ce, Teehankee would push its effec�vity date
further to April 17, 1973, the date our decision in Javellana v. Executive Secretary, 3 became final. And this was so
notwithstanding Sec�on 16, Ar�cle XVII, of the 1973 Cons�tu�on, thus:

SEC. 16. This Cons�tu�on shall take effect immediately upon its ra�fica�on by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
called for the purpose and, except as herein provided, shall supersede the Cons�tu�on of nineteen-hundred and thirty-
five and all amendments thereto.

On October 27, 1976, then President Marcos promulgated Proclama�on no. 1595, proclaiming the ra�fica�on of the
1976 amendments submited in the plebiscite of October 16- 17, 1976. The Proclama�on states, inter alia, that.

By virtue-of the powers vested in me by law, I hereby proclaim all the amendments embodied in this cer�ficate as duly
ra�fied by the Filipino people in the referendum — plebiscite held Oct. 16-17, 1976 and are therefore effec�ve and in full
force and effect as of this date.

It shall be noted that under Amendment No. 9 of the said 1976 amendments.

These amendments shall take effect a�er the incumbent President shall have proclaimed that they have been ra�fied by
a majority of the votes cast in the referendum-plebiscite.

On April 1, 1980, the then Chief Execu�ve issued Proclama�on no. 1959, "Proclaiming the Ra�fica�on by the Filipino
People of the Amendments of Sec�on 7, Ar�cle X of the Cons�tu�on" (lengthening the terms of office of judges and
jus�ces). The Proclama�on provides:

[t]he above-quoted amendment has been duly ra�fied by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite held, together
with the elec�on for local officials, on January 30, 1980, and that said amendment is hereby declared to take effect
immediately.

It shall be noted that under Resolu�on No. 21, dated December 18, 1979, the proposed amendment shall take effect on
the date the incumbent President/Prime Minister shall proclaim its ra�fica�on.

On April 7, 1981, Proclama�on No. 2077 was issued "Proclaiming the Ra�fica�on in the Plebiscite of April 7, 1981 of the
Amendments to the Cons�tu�on Embodied in Batas Pambansa Blg. 122 and Declaring Them Therefore Effec�ve and in
Full Force and Effect." The Proclama�on, in declaring the said amendments duly approved, further declared them
"[e]ffec�ve and in full force and in effect as of the date of this Proclama�on," It shall be noted, in this connec�on, that
under Resolu�ons Nos. I and 2 of the Batasang Pambansa, Third Regular Session, Si�ng as a Cons�tuent Assembly,
which parented these amendments, the same:

... shall become valid as part of the Cons�tu�on when approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to be held
pursuant to Sec�on 2, Ar�cle XVI of the Cons�tu�on.

On the other hand, Batas Pambansa Blg. 122, "An Act to Submit to the Filipino People, for Ra�fica�on or Rejec�on, the
Amendment to the Cons�tu�on of the Philippines, Proposed by the Batasang Pambansa, Si�ng as a Cons�tuent
Assembly, in its Resolu�ons Numbered Three, Two, and One, and to Appropriate Funds Therefore," provides, as follows:

SEC. 7. The Commission on Elec�ons, si�ng en banc, shad canvass and proclaim the result of the plebiscite using the
cer�ficates submited to it, duly authen�cated and cer�fied by the Board of Canvassers of each province or city.

We have, finally, Proclama�on No. 2332, "Proclaiming the Ra�fica�on in the Plebiscite of January 27, 1984, of the
Amendments to the Cons�tu�on Embodied in Batasang Pambansa Resolu�ons Nos. 104, 105, 110, 111, 112 and 113." It
states that the amendments:

....are therefore effec�ve and in full force and effect as of the date of this Proclama�on.
It carries out Resolu�on no. 104 itself (as well as Resolu�ons Nos. 110 and 112 and Sec�on 9, Batas Blg. 643), which
states, that:

The proposed amendments shall take effect on the date the President of the Philippines shall proclaim that they have
been ra�fied by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite held for the purpose, but not later than three months from
the approval of the amendments.

albeit Resolu�ons Nos. 105, 111, and 113 provide, that:

These amendments shall be valid as a part of the Cons�tu�on when approved by a majority of the votes cast in an
elec�on/plebiscite at which it is submited to the people for their ra�fica�on pursuant to Sec�on 2 of Ar�cle XVI of the
Cons�tu�on, as amended.

That a Cons�tu�on or amendments thereto take effect upon proclama�on of their ra�fica�on and not at the �me of the
plebiscite is a view that is not peculiar to the Marcos era.

The Resolu�on of Both Houses (of Congress) in Joint Session on the March 11, 1947 plebiscite called pursuant to
Republic Act No. 73 and the Resolu�on of Both Houses (of Congress) adopted on September 18, 1946, was adopted on
April 9,1947. The April 9, 1947 Resolu�on makes no men�on of a retroac�ve applica�on. Accordingly, when the
incumbent President (Mrs. Corazon C. Aquino) proclaimed on February 11, 1987, at Malacanang Palace:

... that the Cons�tu�on of the Republic of the Philippines adopted by the Cons�tu�onal Commission of 1986, including
the Ordinance appended thereto, has been duly ra�fied by the Filipino people and is therefore effec�ve and in full force
and effect. 4

the 1987 Cons�tu�on, in point of fact, came into force and effect, I hold that it took effect at no other �me.

I submit that our ruling in Ponsica v. Ignalaga 5 in which we declared, in passing, that the new Charter was ra�fied on
February 2, 1987, does not in any way weaken this dissent. As I stated, the remark was said in passing-we did not resolve
the case on account of a categorical holding that the 1987 Cons�tu�on came to life on February 2, 1987. In any event, if
we did, I now call for its re-examina�on.

I am therefore of the opinion, consistent with the views expressed above, that the challenged dismissals done on
February 8, 1987 were valid, the 1987 Cons�tu�on not being then as yet in force.

Footnotes

1 Topacio, Jr. vs. Pimentel G.R. No. 73770, April 10, 1986.

2 Sec�on 2, BP Blg. 222.

3 Ar�cle 11, Sec�on 25 and Ar�cle X, Sec�ons 1, 2, 14, among others.

4 Ar�cle X, Sec�on 4.

5 Sec�on 3, BP Blg. 222.

Teehankee, C.J., concurring:

1 Volume Five, Record of the Cons�tu�onal Commission Proceedings and Debates, pages 620-623; emphasis supplied.

2 The en�re dra� Cons�tu�on was approved on October 12, 1986 forty forty-five votes in favor and two against.

3 The seven Court of Appeals Jus�ces referred to are Jus�ces Alfredo L. Benipayo, Minerva G. Reyes, Magdangal B. Elma,
Cecilio PE, Jesus Elbinias, Nicolas Lapena Jr. and Justo P. Torres, Jr., and their appointments bear various dates from
January 9, 1987 to January 31, 1987.

Sarmiento, J., dissen�ng:

1 Manila Bulle�n, Feb. 3, 1987, p. 1, cols. 6-7 Philippine Daily Inquirer, Feb. 3,1987, p. 1, cot 1; Malaya, Feb. 3, 1987, p. 1,
col. 1.

2 Nos. 3720102 March 3, 1975, 63 SCRA 4 (1975).

3 Nos. L-36142, March 31, 1973, 50 SCRA 30 (1973).

4 Proclama�on No. 58 (1987).

5 G.R. No. 72301.