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Tugas 9&10

soal tugas managerial economics

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16 views2 pages

Tugas 9&10

soal tugas managerial economics

Uploaded by

jambumbek
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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MM FEB-UGM

MAN 5007 (PRA-MBA)


Managerial Economics
Hengki Purwoto

TUGAS KELOMPOK V

Bab 9

1. Analysts have estimated inverse market demand in a homogeneous-product Cournot


duopoly to be P = 200 − 3(Q1 + Q2). They estimate costs to be C1(Q1) = 26Q1 and C2(Q2) =
32Q2.
a. Determine the reaction function for each firm.
b. Calculate each firm’s equilibrium output.
c. Calculate the equilibrium market price.
d. Calculate the profit each firm earns in equilibrium.

2. The inverse demand for a homogeneous-product Stackelberg duopoly is P = 16,000 − 4Q.


The cost structures for the leader and the follower, respectively, are CL(QL) = 4,000QL and
CF(QF) = 6,000QF.
a. What is the follower’s reaction function?
b. Determine the equilibrium output level for both the leader and the follower.
c. Determine the equilibrium market price.
d. Determine the profits of the leader and the follower.

3. Consider a Bertrand oligopoly consisting of four firms that produce an identical product at
a marginal cost of $140. Analysts estimate that the inverse market demand for this product
is P = 400 − 5Q.
a. Determine the equilibrium level of output in the market.
b. Determine the equilibrium market price.
c. Determine the profits of each firm.

Bab 10

1. In a two-player, one-shot, simultaneous-move game, each player can choose strategy A or


strategy B. If both players choose strategy A, each earns a payoff of $400. If both players
choose strategy B, each earns a payoff of $200. If player 1 chooses strategy A and player 2
chooses strategy B, then player 1 earns $100 and player 2 earns $600. If player 1 chooses
strategy B and player 2 chooses strategy A, then player 1 earns $600 and player 2 earns
$100.
a. Write this game in normal form.
b. Find each player’s dominant strategy, if it exists.
c. Find the Nash equilibrium (or equilibria) of this game.
d. Rank strategy pairs by aggregate payoff (highest to lowest).
e. Can the outcome with the highest aggregate payoff be sustained in equilibrium? Why or
why not?

2. Use the following normal-form game to answer the following questions.


a. Identify the one-shot Nash equilibrium.
b. Suppose the players know this game will be repeated exactly three times. Can they
achieve payoffs that are better than the one-shot Nash equilibrium? Explain.
c. Suppose this game is infinitely repeated and the interest rate is 6 percent. Can the players
achieve payoffs that are better than the one-shot Nash equilibrium? Explain.
d. Suppose the players do not know exactly how many times this game will be repeated, but
they do know that the probability the game will end after a given play is . If  is
sufficiently low, can players earn more than they could in the one-shot Nash equilibrium?

3. Consider a two-player, sequential-move game where each player can choose to play right or
left. Player 1 moves first. Player 2 observes player 1’s actual move and then decides to move
right or left. If player 1 moves right, player 1 receives $0 and player 2 receives $25. If both
players move left, player 1 receives –$5 and player 2 receives $10. If player 1 moves left
and player 2 moves right, player 1 receives $20 and player 2 receives $20.
a. Write this game in extensive form.
b. Find the Nash equilibrium outcomes to this game.
c. Which of the equilibrium outcomes is most reasonable? Explain.

ENJOY

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