ARHEOLOGIJA I

PRIRODNE NAUKE

ARCHAEOLOGY
AND SCIENCE
 Center for New Technology
Institute of Archaeology Belgrade

ARCHAEOLOGY
AND SCIENCE
11
2015

Belgrade 2016
 Centar za nove tehnologije
Arheološki institut Beograd

ARHEOLOGIJA I
PRIRODNE NAUKE
11
2015

Beograd 2016.
 Published:
Center for New Technology Viminacium
Institute of Archaeology Belgrade
Kneza Mihaila 35/IV
11000 Belgrade, Serbia
e-mail: [email protected]
Tel. +381 11 2637191

For the publishers:

Miomir Korać
Vladimir Miletić

Editor-in-chief:
Miomir Korać

Editorial Board:
Roksana Chowaniec, University of Warsaw, Institute of Archaeology, Warsaw
Gianfranco Cicognani, Central European Initiative (CEI-ES), Trieste
Rosemarie Cordie, Archäologiepark Belginum
Eric De Sena, John Cabot University, Rome
Snežana Golubović, Institute of Archaeology, Belgrade
Natalia Goncharova, Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow
Gisela Grupe, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, München
Michaela Harbeck, Staatssammlung für Anthropologie und Paläoanatomie, München
Lanfranco Masotti, Universita’ di Bologna, Bologna
Žarko Mijailović, University of Belgrade, Faculty of Mathematics, Belgrade
Živko Mikić, University of Belgrade, Faculty of Philosophy, Belgrade
Milan Milosavljević, University of Belgrade, Faculty of Electrical Engineering, Belgrade
Dragan Milovanović, University of Belgrade, Faculty of Mining and Geology, Belgrade
Zoran Obradović, Temple University, Philadelphia
Zoran Ognjanović, Mathematical Institute, Belgrade
Marco Pacetti, Universita’ Politecnico delle Marche, Ancona
Slaviša Perić, Institute of Archaeology, Belgrade
Milica Tapavički-Ilić, Institute of Archaeology, Belgrade
Dejan Vučković, University of Belgrade, Faculty of Mining and Geology, Belgrade
Zsolt Zolnai, University of Wisconsin - Madison, Madison
Olivera Ilić (secretary), Institute of Archaeology, Belgrade

Translation:
Milica Tapavički-Ilić

Lecturer:
Dave Calcutt

Graphic design:
Nemanja Mrđić

Print:
Digital Art Company Beograd

Printed in:
500 copies

ISSN 1452-7448
 Izdavači:
Centar za nove tehnologije Viminacium
Arheološki institut Beograd
Kneza Mihaila 35/IV
11000 Beograd, Srbija
e-mail: [email protected]
Tel. +381 11 2637191

Za izdavače:
Miomir Korać
Slaviša Perić

Urednik:
Miomir Korać

Uređivački odbor:
Đanfranko Čikonjani, Centralnoevropska inicijativa (CEI-ES), Trst
Roksana Hovanjec, Univerzitet u Varšavi, Arheološki institut, Varšava
Erik De Sena, Džon Kabot Univerzitet, Rim
Snežana Golubović, Arheološki institut, Beograd
Natalija Gončarova, Moskovski Državni Univerzitet Lomonosov, Moskva
Gizela Grupe, Ludvig-Maksimilians-Univerzitet, Minhen
Mihaela Harbek, Zbirka za antropologiju i paleoanatomiju, Minhen
Rozmari Kordi, Arheološki park Belginum
Lanfranko Masoti, Univerzitet u Bolonji, Bolonja
Žarko Mijailović, Univerzitet u Beogradu, Matematički fakultet, Beograd
Živko Mikić, Univerzitet u Beogradu, Filozofski fakultet, Beograd
Milan Milosavljević, Univerzitet u Beogradu, Elektrotehnički fakultet, Beograd
Dragan Milovanović, Univerzitet u Beogradu, Rudarsko-geološki fakultet, Beograd
Zoran Obradović, Univerzitet Templ, Filadelfija
Zoran Ognjanović, Matematički institut, Beograd
Marko Paćeti, Politehnički univerzitet Marke, Ankona
Slaviša Perić, Arheološki institut, Beograd
Milica Tapavički-Ilić, Arheološki institut, Beograd
Dejan Vučković, Univerzitet u Beogradu, Rudarsko-geološki fakultet, Beograd
Zolt Zolnaj, Univerzitet u Viskonsinu - Medison, Medison
Olivera Ilić (sekretar), Arheološki institut, Beograd

Prevod:
Milica Tapavički-Ilić

Lektor:
Dejv Kalkat

Dizajn i tehničko uređenje:

Nemanja Mrđić

Štampa:
Digital Art Company Beograd

Tiraž:
500 primeraka

ISSN 1452-7448
 CONTENTS / SADRŽAJ

Rasprave i članci
Treatises and Articles

Bebina Milovanović A New Find of Lead Mirror Frames from Rit (Viminacium)..........9-22
Milica Marjanović
Ivana Kosanović

Radmila Zotović Jupiter’s Cult at the Territory of Viminacium.................................23-30

Olivera Ilić Finds of Roman Agricultural Tools on the Danubian Limes in Upper
Moesia as Indicators of Agricultural Development in the Area of
Military Camps...............................................................................31-42

Mirjana Vojvoda Signis Receptis as a Reverse Motive on Roman Imperial Coins...43-52

Mirjana Vojvoda Concept of Providentia Deorum Within the Imperial Cult and Propa-
ganda on Roman Imperial Coins During the Principate...................53-62

Jelena Anđelković Grašar Female Power that Protects: Who is the Woman who Takes Care of the
City? Goddess Protectresses on the Territory of the Central Balkans in
Late Antiquity.................................................................................63-72

Richard Vallance Janke The Decipherment of Supersyllabograms in Linear B..................73-108

Miomir Korać Archaeological Park of Viminacium: Beautifying a Community with

Emilija Nikolić Culturral Heritage.......................................................................109-126
Milica Tapavički-Ilić

Manousos Kambouris Thermopylae Revisited...............................................................127-144

George Hliopoulos
Spyros Bakas

Manousos Kambouris Greco-Macedonian Influences in the Manipular Legion System..145-154

George Hliopoulos
Spyros Bakas

Snežana Golubović Results of Archaeological-Anthropological Studies of Mass Burials in

Živko Mikić Viminacium – Grave G-769/ the Pećine Necropolis..................155-166

C. Scott Speal A Paleodemographic/Mortuary Study of Graves from the Eastern

Necropolis at Roman Viminacium.............................................167-186

Ilija Mikić Biomechanical Changes in the Neck Joints in Individuals with Artificially
Ricardo Ortega-Ruiz Deformed Skulls from Mediana.................................................187-198

7
 Ilija Mikić Paleopathological Analysis of the Individual 1226-D from the Necropolis
Ricardo Ortega-Ruiz of Više Grobalja: Osteomyelitis Along with Greenstick Fractures and
Surgical Antemortem Activities..................................................199-206

Natalija Gončarova Greek Faces. Anthropological Analysis of Ancient

Anton Belikov Greek Sculpture...........................................................................207-220

Vanja Korać Ransomware Threat to Information Systems..............................221-230

Zoran Davidovac
Dragan Prlja

Vanja Korać Privacy Control on Windows 10.................................................231-242

Milan Todorović
Dragan Prlja

Prikazi
Reviews

Nikola Crnobrnja Mirjana Vojvoda, Nemanja Mrđić, NALAZI NOVCA SA VIMINACI-

JUMSKE NEKROPOLE VIŠE GROBALJA I NJIHOVA ULOGA U
POGREBNOM RITUALU / COIN FINDS FROM THE VIMINACI-
UM NECROPOLIS OF VIŠE GROBALJA AND THEIR ROLE IN
FUNERARY RITUAL. Arheološki institut, Beograd 2016...............243

Guidelines for Submitting Manuscripts for the Periodical Arheologija i

prirodne nauke (Archaeology and Science).......................................247

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Kambouris et al. - Thermopylae Revisited...(127-144) Archaeology and Science 11 (2015)

MANOUSOS KAMBOURIS 355.48(38:355)”-0480”

The Association of Historical Studies COBISS.SR-ID 228051724
KORYVANTES,
Athens, Greece Original research article
[email protected] Received: May 8th 2016
Accepted: June 20th 2016
GEORGE HLIOPOULOS
The Association of Historical Studies
KORYVANTES,
Athens, Greece

SPYROS BAKAS
The Association of Historical Studies
KORYVANTES,
Athens, Greece

THERMOPYLAE REVISITED

ABSTRACT

The battle which defined our understanding of the Greco-Persian wars and classical warfare has
numerous hidden or obscure issues, which escape standard scholarship and may be enlightened by
careful observation, reading and deduction. Who really were Leonidas’ 300? The Phocian wall is
usually thought to cut the passage of Thermopylae. However, this would have cut the best commercial
road. Most probably it was nearby, an open circuit stemming from the rock, not cutting off the traffic
but allowing control and perhaps interdiction by missiles.
The Persians, after being victorious, never passed through the pass but chose another route making
the reason of the battle obscure; it was more a show of prowess than a real operational need. The Greek
tactics mentioned by Herodotus imply both a universal drill in hoplite armies of passing units through
each other’s lines and also a Spartan darting tactic, more or less similar to Ekdromi attested later
by Xenophon (Hellenika Book IV.5), although executed in inversed spatial terms. Last, but not least,
Herodotus’ day politics most probably do not allow neither the Spartans to speak of the night raiding
in the Persian camp, mentioned by Diodorus, nor himself to state that the true reason of the Phocian
contingent failure to keep their position was that once caught unawares they preferred to cover the
passage to Phocis, their homeland, than the rear of Leonidas.

KEYWORDS: THERMOPYLAE, LEONIDAS, SPARTA, ANCIENT GREEK TACTICS, SPECIAL

OPERATIONS.

INTRODUCTION line infantry. Up to that point, the 2 only Greek

land victories, had been the result of surprise.
Thermopylae is the battle of redefinition of the The first was an ambush near Pedasa at c 496 BC
Greek-Persian military balance, as its outcome by the Carian rebel forces of the Ionian Revolu-
defined the subsequent Persian moves. The Greek tion; there, a Persian army was annihilated at a
hoplite infantry was pitted for the first time suc- night action (Her V.121). The second was in an
cessfully against a royal Persian army-or even unorthodox, though open combat: a more or less

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Archaeology and Science 11 (2015) Kambouris et al. - Thermopylae Revisited...(127-144)

Fig. 1 The wall of the Phocians- standard view. The Diateichismos cuts the traffic. At the narrowest, only one
cartwagon can be accommodated, thus the gate must be that wide at least, to allow peacetime traffic, travel and
commerce, leaving little room for actual wall. In less narrow positions, the whole idea becomes nullified.

sudden (maybe not surprise) attack, and the tacti- a vast royal army, definitely twice or thrice the size
cal novelty of a storming charge combined with of the Greeks united. The numbers of the latter
differential pressure to isolate and then encircle/ must not be dismissed with only three score city-
flank Persian line infantry. This victory, scored at states rallying to defend the motherland, in Pla-
Marathon, in 490 BC (Her VΙ.112-115) was most taea, in 479 BC more than 30.000 hoplites were
decisive but also indicative of tactical flair from present, and a total of 100.000 battle-ready troops
the more robust mainlanders, where the Persian (Her IX.30).MedisingGreeks were not to be ex-
threat had been expected for the last 30 years and cluded, as potential enemies, since Greeks had a
basic measures taken in the form of athletic train- name for untrustworthiness towards the Persian
ing and tactical dispositions. In a pitched format, throne (Athenians 510 BC, Ionians 500 BC etc).
without imaginative tactics and surprise, a draw This royal army moves in mainland routes- one
was the best result, scored at Malene, 493 BC, till or more- leaving the coastal areas to the amphib-
the Persian cavalry tipped the scales (Her VΙ.29). ious component of the royal fleet. From Therme
it advances through the mountains, circumventing
the first Greek defense in Tempe, then follows the
MAIN UNSETTLED ISSUES: easy coastal road from Thessaly to Malis (Her
VII.196-201).
I) Opposing armies The Greek contingent comprised two ele-
ments: the local and neighboring communities
A crushing show of force, combined with the sending their entire forces -more or less- and the
ambition to conquer Europe (Her VII.8,3), implies expeditionary forces sent as reinforcements for

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Kambouris et al. - Thermopylae Revisited...(127-144) Archaeology and Science 11 (2015)

Fig. 2 The wall of the Phocians: open circuit. The wall stems from the sheer rock, allows control of the road by
missiles from its top and sallies from the gates. Peacetime traffic is unhindered.

the projection of advanced defense by distant have been the entire hoplite levy.1 The Phocians
southern Greek states. The latter were more or sent an expeditionary force of 1000 Hoplites, the
less token forces, according to politics. A strong Locrians their whole army (Her VII.203), which
commitment implied tactical levies, a half-heart- was a meager 1000 hoplites (Diod XI.4, 7).
ed one was obvious by sending small, standing The Spartans were in the middle. Herodotus
units (brotherhoods-in-arms) of the respective mentions only the 300 crack Spartan troops (Her
poleis, similar to the 300 Spartan Hippeis. Thus, VII.202). These are easily identified as the Hippeis/
instead of some thousands, the medizing Thebans Knights (Thuc V.72,4), drafted in a yearly basis
dispatched 400 (Her VII.202), possibly a special by three appointed officers, the Hippagretae, also
unit ancestral to the Sacred Band (Plut Pelopidas of yearly commission (Xen Lak Polit IV.3), each
XVIII.1). This is very likely as their command- Hippagretas drafting 100 adolescents, obviously
ing officer is the father of the commander of an- from each of the 3 Dorian tribes. But Herodotus
other 400-strong Theban unit which, in 431BC, also mentions Lakedaimonians when narrating
infiltrated in pure Special Operations mission to the battle (i.e. Her VII.208, 211), a far wider term
occupy Plataea (Her VII.233). historically encompassing Spartans and Perie-
The stout Thespians, of the very few Boeo- koi. He also makes clear that the Spartans, not,
tians not to medize, sent 700 troops (Her VII.202), stayed to die with the King (Her VII.220); so the
which might have been their entire hoplite army survivors of the rest of the Lakedaimonians were
(perhaps at 2/3, expeditionary strength). Still, in 1 Herodotus in IX.30 counts them as combat troops, not
later action, in Plataea, 479 BC the city is men- logistics personnel and explicitly states they had no hopla,
tioned as having no hoplites due to their annihi- thus making obvious the origin of the word Hoplite, con-
trary to the beliefs of many modern scholars as Lazanby-
lation at Thermopylae (Her IX.30), so 700 must and Whitehead, 1996.

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Archaeology and Science 11 (2015) Kambouris et al. - Thermopylae Revisited...(127-144)

Fig, 3 The routes for a Special Operations squadron sent to assassinate Xerxes. The sea-river route is longer and takes
the party in front of the whole camp. The mountain route allows better cover and access near the Royal Tent.

sent back, probably as the only Laconian troopers tent with Greek practice and Spartan population
with live experience of the Persian war making. abundance before the catastrophic earthquake of
Diodorus directly enumerates a thousand Lake- 464 BC. As Plutarch points out, the strength of
daimonians and 300 Spartans (Diod XI.4, 5), but Morae is mentioned as anything between 600 and
the Greek is unclear and may be translated as both 1000 men (Pelopidas, XVII) and such differenc-
“and” or “including”. The latter is preferable; a es might stem from different manning /mobiliza-
bit previously (Diod XI.4, 2)the full strength of tion levels or different ceilings in different times/
the force, has been set to 1000, as correctly no- generations. A 1000-strong territorial division is
ticed by Flower, 1998. Should 1000 be the total, perfectly compatible with the Spartan army of the
the 700 missing in Herodotus’ account might period. This line of thought can be expanded to
have been another Laconian unit mobilized and identify this Mora as the Skiritae, renown to later
deployed, most probably not comprised (entire- military authors for their prowess in security, ir-
ly) of Peers. This leads to a division-size (Mora) regular warfare, and reconnaissance (Xen Lac Pol
unit of 1000, standard in most of Greece. A Mora XII.3 & XIII.6). If such practice can be retro-pro-
situated or stationed north of Sparta, mobilized jected, Skiritae, who are Lakedaimonians but not
at short notice and manned to 2/3, the standard Spartans, nimble and good on mountain warfare
expeditionary strength as Thucidydes says of the were an excellent choice both for the terrain in
Peloponnesian armies invading Attica (II.10,2) Thermopylae and for the Special Operations un-
fills the bill. This 1000-man total strength is much dertaken (see below).
more than for Morae in the age of Xenophon and On the other hand for such a forced march and
as described by him (Xen Hell IV.5), but consis- in view of the terrain and the nature of the fight-

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Kambouris et al. - Thermopylae Revisited...(127-144) Archaeology and Science 11 (2015)

Fig. 4-5 Feigned flight, standard execution.

All phalanx troops turn on their heels where they stand (A) and flee in full face and proximity of the enemy (B) with
the rear ranks –usually veterans-slowing down the front ones, usually faster and younger in age. Even if they make
good their escape, they have the enemy at their heels (C) and about-facing, regrouping and dressing the line (D) almost
simultaneously, to shove the enemy off is extremely difficult

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Archaeology and Science 11 (2015) Kambouris et al. - Thermopylae Revisited...(127-144)

ing, Leonidas might have taken with him a unit of not very common at the era, and thus we cannot
1,000 young troops from the whole realm. These deduce if the sum of the expeditionary forces was
troops may be the ones sent as advance-guard following the 2/3 rule or other arrangements were
to Megara in 479 BC while the rest of the Spar- made, as in imperial Athens (Thuc I.105, 3-4) and
tan-and Allied- Army were stationed in Isthmus 4th century Sparta (Xen Hellenica VI.4).
(Her IX.14), and the ones executing the bait-re- Herodotus never mentions the 2/3 rule -but
treat plan in the battle of Platea (Her IX.57, IX.85). he also fails to mention that the 300 Spartans are
They should have been the youngest, and Plutarch Knights/Hippeis; arguably, this rule seems valid:
(Apoph. 225e) mentions unmarried youngsters the Spartan Peers are 8000 according to Demara-
sent home by Leonidas as couriers to the Ephors. tos (Her VII. 234) and at Plataea the expeditionary
Althoughfor this campaign Leonidas had enrolled force has a core of 5.000 Peers (Her VIII. 10), a
fathers of male kids to ensure the survival of the 0.62 compared to the 0.66 which equals the 2/3.
bloodlines (Her VII.205), Spartans married young It is possible that the implementation of case 1
and were encouraged, if not pushed, to sire just instead of 3 by the Spartan state was causing con-
as young (Xenophon Lac Pol I.6) but exceptions sternation to allies and allowed to Thebes to recip-
would always present, especially in a territorial rocate by sending 400 men. Spartans served from
division and/or a young age-class. 20 to 60 years of age, and the ones from 20 to 30
Practically, the usual Greek expeditionary were permanently on alert, sleeping in barracks
drafting practice seems to fall under three possible (Plut Lycurgus XV. 4 & XXV. 1). Their number
mobilization quota: adjusted for the total levy is 2000, coincidental-
1. The dispatch of the standing armies, elite ly the number of the expedited reinforcements to
groups of different stock and origin in each city- Marathon in 490 BC (Her VI.120). By compari-
state, usually called “Logades” by Herodotus son, the Athenian naval contingent in Artemisium
(IX.21), to indicate they were under oath. Such was 120 triremes (Her VIII.1) with no less than
groups were of standard strength for each city- 170 sailors, oarsmen and marines for a total of al-
state, but standardization did not occur among most 20000, a 2/3 rate at the very least.
different states. This corresponds well with the re-
nowned “Sacred Band” of Thebes (Plut Pelopidas
XVIII.1) through the expanded similar corps of II) Battlefield-fortifications
late 5th-early 4th centuries (“Logades” of Argos in
Thuc V.67,2;“Epilektoi” (Elites of Phliousin Xen The straight of Thermopylae is one of a sys-
Hellenica VII.2,10; “Epilektoi” of Arcadia Diod tem of 3 straights leading from Malis to southern
XV.67,2 & XV.62,2); it also links with the past, Greece proper. The position taken by Leonidas
as the Trojan War was possible due to the suitors’ cuts the coastal road along the Euboan Gulf, a
oath before Helen’s choice of Menelaus. route ill suited for a massive army as far as pro-
2. The mobilization of their whole levy (Pan- visions are concerned, but rather smooth. After a
demei) for short duration and, preferably, with distance and deep in Epiknemidian Lokrian terri-
the opponent nearby (Her VII. 206, Diod XI. 4, tory, the road branched to the coastal way proper
4).Thespiae clearly implemented this quotum, as and to a SE-direction, the main route into Boeo-
did other states as the Locrians (Her VII. 203). tia through Elateia, and, along the Kephisusriver,
3. The draft of the majority of the full levy, to Thebes. It was a logical choice. Moreover, it
by age criteria (Her IX. 12). This most probably was useful for combined army-navy operations,
was following a 2/3 ratio for the expeditionary and if followed throughout its length by coast (the
force (ThucII.10, 2). Multiple expeditions were Persians used parallel routes of advance) allowed

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Kambouris et al. - Thermopylae Revisited...(127-144) Archaeology and Science 11 (2015)

6-7-8. Feigned flight, executed as

Reverse Ekdromi.
Slower, veteran troops of the
rear ranks turn in their heels (A)
and retire (B) as fast as possible
unnoticed by the enemy as the front
ranks, with the youngest and fleetest
troops stand fast and obstruct the
view. Having thus gained a distance,
the veterans turn and reform while
the front ranks suddenly break and
run at full speed, unhindered by
rear ranks (C). After a moment’s
startle, the enemy follow hot at
their heels, without making visual
contact with the regrouped veterans.
The fleeing youngsters retire among
the veterans’ files (D). With the
breathless youngsters to their rear,
the veterans close ranks (E) to face
the pursuing, disorganized enemy
with dressed line and compact,
dense formation. Having caught
their breath (F) the younger hoplites
regroup and join the files of the
veterans to reinforce the phalanx
and add momentum to the shove.

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Archaeology and Science 11 (2015) Kambouris et al. - Thermopylae Revisited...(127-144)

to support the fleet from ambushes with missile reconditioned and used (Her VII.176) is usually
weapons in a steadily narrowing environment, thought of as a vertical wall sealing off the road,
near the straits of Eurippus, as Xerxes guides something very like the doors or Mordor in The
would have let him know. Lord of the Rings. Indeed such works were used
The second approach was the Asopos gorge by the Greeks to cut off enemy forts and cities sit-
following the Anopaia pathway and branching to uated on promontories and were called Diateichis-
Phocis and back at the coastal road, behind Ther- moi. The fortification in Isthmus, progressing in
mopylae and Leonidas’ rear, a very steep road and the earnest at the same time (Her.VIII.71 & IX.8-
utterly unsuitable for alarge army and its trans- 9) and performed both before, by the Mycene-
ports (Her VII.216). The third road, starts again ansunder Atreus, and after, during Epameinondas’
from the Asopos gorge near Trachis, but cuts incursions (Diod XV.68,3) had been such cases.
south through Doris and then offers three choic- But there is absolutely no need toenvision it thus,
es: Phocis to Boeotia (Her VII.199 and VIII.31- as there would have been very little room for pil-
33), the way Xerxes did select to move, or west lars and a door capacious enough to allow a laden
to Delphi, or South to Amphisa in Ozolian Lokris chart to pass (for peaceful times), plus parapets
and at the north coast of the Gulf of Korinth. It for an adequate defense force. It may very well
was at first steep road through ravines, possibly have been an open circuit, both edgesattached on
unsuitable for a large army’s transports, but lead- the sheer rock of the mountain, allowing the sta-
ing promptly to friendly and well-provisioned, tioning of a friendly garrison. This garrison may
hospitable Boeotia, after a brief incursion to the attempt pitched battle cutting off the road in the
heart of Greece-orultimately to the north of the face of the enemy, then fall back through the gates
Gulf of Korinth. The same network was used later of the circuit, and continue to gravely harass the
by the warring factions ofGreek civil wars (Xen- enemy by missiles from the wall. Both Xerxes’
HellenikaVI.4; Paus Boeotika XV.2) and by the and ancient Thessalians’ cavalry and any trans-
Romans (Paus Achaika XV.3) in their expeditions portation using draught animals would have been
between Southern and central Greece. unable to pass, even if competent infantry might
The area Leonidas occupied was something of do using skillfully their shields.
a tourist attraction (Her VII.176). It is difficult to Herodotus writes-and presents in ominous
envisage the terrain: the narrowest (only onecar- times, when Athens and Sparta are already at log-
wagons wide: Her VII.200), even if as narrow as gerheads, although not in the deadly entanglement
Herodotus states, is unclear in nature. One side is of the Great Peloponnesian War. Phocians are al-
a steep rock face of the mountain. What is there lies to Athens (Thuc I. 107,2), and Thessalians
from the other side? Most probably the sea. This are traitorous enemies (Thuc I. 107,7). Thus he
might be non-negotiable for commercial traf- remains very considerate towards the former. The
fic, but assault infantry would have negotiated a little plateau entrusted to them, more than any way
detour by plunging up to the chest in the sea to to the rear of Leonidas, offers an inroad to Pho-
outflank an enemy, as happened some months lat- cis. By being at that point the Phocian contingent
er in Potidaea (Her VIII.129). No such issue, no protects both the rear of the defenders of Thermo-
similar action has been described. Thus one has pylae and the approach to the motherland. Once
to understand that at the time the road is consider- taken by surprise they do not take a last stand po-
ably higher than the sea level, so as not to permit sition under panic, but form their phalanx at the
flanking, and rather precipitous: troops fallen to point which allows interdiction to any move to-
the sea are mentioned as fatalities (Her VII.223). wards Phocis. Only under this light is understand-
The Phocian fortification repaired, rebuilt, able the absurd notion of the Persian task force

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Kambouris et al. - Thermopylae Revisited...(127-144) Archaeology and Science 11 (2015)

not engaging them and they being steady at their inthe first place and engaged in a stupidly bloody
position (Her VII.217): the Phocians do not en- action? Additionally why did he not do it after the
danger their primary mission, the defense of their first two days, when direct assault seemed a com-
territory by engaging away from their command- plete failure and a thrust to this direction would
ing position (the hill they assembled on, after two have broken the deadlock? It would have been
or more days of inspecting the surroundings, had bad for his army’s morale, but there was no rea-
they to do so. And the Persians, seeing them out son to get despaired-or even frustrated- as Hero-
of position and defending another branch of the dotus says (and has been told by the Greeks of his
crossroads, simply bypass to their mission as well. court, or rather their descendants, interviewed by
him). Could there be a strong and determined gar-
rison at this point also, which Herodotus knows/
THE UNEASY QUESTIONS says nothing about, and most probably coming
from a native population not very friendly to
The Persian army emerged from east-north the Athenians in Herodotus’ days? May it be the
east having skirted the west coast of the Pagasitic Malians, prominent as 1000 troops in Diodorus
gulf southwards, a rather easy landscape, and then (Diod XI.4,7) but missing in Herodotus account
turned westwards to skirt the Malaic gulf to the (Her VII.203), either for the above reasons or be-
plain and valley of Spercheios. This area is Hellas cause they were posted far from the Thermopylae
proper (in Homeric geography – Iliad II. 681-5). position? Both Green, 1970 and Bradford, 1980
Since Leonidas had been there first, so as to repair support such an eventuality.
the fortification and establish acenter of support
operations (Her VII. 176), an incursion to the Ma-
lian Plain, in order to deprive the invader of food, OPPOSING MOTIVES-PLANS
shelter and fodder was the most logical thing to
do (Green, 1970), and easily doable by an army The Greek plan should have been a war of at-
only marginally short of 10,000 (Her VII. 202-3). trition. Killing enough opponents would not have
The mention of Polyaenus (I.32, 3) of an incur- been a viable option, but straining the logistics
sion carried out with extreme efficiency and skill and draining the supplies of a vast army boxed
by Leonidas most probably refers to this operation among mountains was another thing altogether.
in the eve of the Battle of Thermopylae. The Troizen-decree (Jameson, 1960- EM 13330,
The questions start from the moment Xerxes Epigraphical Museum, Athens) reveals that the
arrives and encamps. Why waiting for some four real intension of the abandonment of Athens, a
days (Her VII. 210) and does not engage at once, meticulously preplanned massive operation was
to startle opponents up to this point elusive and to entrap the huge Persian army in Attica and de-
otherwise unwilling to engage, as demonstrated stroy its fleet, thus aggravating a supply problem
in the thessalian-macedonian border at Tempe forecasted months before by Artabanos (Her VII.
where they promptly retreated before any action 49). In this light the campaign at Thermopylae
had started (Her VII.173)? Moreover, why to en- aimed at boxing the Persian Army away from
gage them and not bypass them through the other the supplies of the fleet to wear it down, if not
straight, to Doris as he eventually did? After all, to stop it altogether. It was a different plan from
once the battle was done and he emerged victori- the purely interceptive campaign at Tempe, a land
ous, he never led his army through the conquered campaign were the Greek fleet was a mere means
pass. He went through the gorges to Doris straight of transportation (Her VII. 173). In Thermopylae
south (Her VIII.31). So, why had he not done it

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Archaeology and Science 11 (2015) Kambouris et al. - Thermopylae Revisited...(127-144)

9. Territorial map of the area of operations in Thermopylae by Map_greek_sanctuaries-en.svg: Marsyas, available at:
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ancient_Regions_Mainland_Greece.png.

it was a predominantly naval campaign2, as the Some bloody failures and their fragile morale,
expeditionary land force was a mere 4,000 (Her rooted on idolizing the King of Kings’ power, mil-
VII. 202 & Diod. XI. 4,5) compared to 10,000 at itary prowess and diplomatic efficiency (Polyaen
Tempe (Her VII.173). VII. 15,1) would be undermined, and the same
The same is true for sapping the morale of the goes with the authority of the King of Kings fig-
enemy, especially the non-Persian subject troops. ure, an almost divine one.
2 The Spartan reservations, due to the danger of both oper- Still, given enough time the positions may be
ational (by secondary routes and alternate passes) and stra- breached, either by sheer exchange rate of casu-
tegic (by deep sea raids at the rear) flanking dictated the
commitment of limited forces, and this agreed with The-
alties, or by flanking, thus three successive ones
mistocles’ wish, and need to use the navy he created (Her were selected: Tempe, Thermopylae and Isthmus.
VII.144) as the primary arm against the Persians, commit- After all, despite at some points being a one-sid-
ting thus most of the full manpower of Athens (38,000 out
of perhaps 40-42,000) against the enemy, instead of the ed carnage, the battle, fought undermost favor-
20-25% which were the Hoplites (10,000).

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10. Perhaps the best geophysical map of the Central Greece comes from
P. Connolly’s “Greece and Rome at War” London: Greenhill.

able terms for the Greeks, had a 5:1 exchange to the extreme rear, to guard against insurrections
rate, with some 20000 Persian versus 4000-odd and also flanking, as the bitter lesson in Tempe
Greek fatalities (Her VIII.24-5); such rate was had shown the Persians capable of. At this stage
unsustainable for the long haul and far below the the main arm was the navy. If the imperial navy
30:1 in Marathon (Her VI.117). But time was of could be kept out of reach of the army resupply
essence. Leonidas’ was really a holding force, to would be a vital issue. The navy had no unlim-
be reinforced as required but the main forces kept ited supplies, it was vulnerable to storms and to

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surprise attacks in unknown coastlines. Practi- More impressive is the “feigned flight”of the
cally, the Greeks had to intercept one of the two Spartans (Her VII. 211). Contrary to the Hero-
branches of the Persian War machine to win. If dotus account, it should have been, more or less,
the Greek fleet kept its own, the Persian could similar to Ekdromi attested much later by Xeno-
not outflank Thermopylae. If Thermopylae held, phon (Hellenika Book IV.5), although executed
the royal army could not threaten Euboea and in inversed spatial terms. The engaged line can-
the mooring base of the Greek fleet. Moreover, not retreat in the face of the enemy-especially
the Greek fleet of some 270 vessels (Her VIII.2) of a more numerous and lightly clad enemy- en
could easily embark the whole of Leonidas’ army bloc without suffering casualties. Thus the less
of 7000 (Her VII. 202-3) by adding 25 men in fleet portion, the veterans, posted in the rear
each vessel, and land them near the Persian moor- ranks, retreat first, at a double, unnoticed by the
ing, thus eliminating the fleet at the beach, before enemy and reform at a distance but promptly. In
the Persians establish communication between such cases the original battle order cannot be rec-
army and navy. This is why Xerxes attacked. He reated and one should fight next to any random
simply did not want the Greeks there. The passage comrade, something that “only troops drilled un-
was of little consequence. The comparative posi- der Lycurgus’ laws can do” (Xen Lac Polit IX.7).
tions and forces though made the mix extremely Subsequently, the fleetest troops, who must have
flammable. Waiting for 4 days (Her VII. 210) was remained engaged with the enemy, must brake at
not just to muster his lumbering, gigantic army, once and gain some strides-four to six- while their
which took days to concentrate to a position. He opponents are startled. After that, since they were
was also waiting for his fleet. Not seeing it rang a not facing missile troops but shock infantry, they
bell and the assault to eliminate the land element must keep and even open the distance and cover
of the Greek resistance was a reflex reaction from their back with the shield for fear of the occasion-
the Persian High Command. Still, their instincts al javelin or stone. Bringing on the enemy hot on
were true. With Leonidas gone, the whole defense their heels, they cannot instantly regroup and turn,
plan was shattered: the Greek navy with drew, the even if perfectly trained. It is much more likely to
Persian navy made contact with the army normal- retire through the files of a line formed by the ones
izing supplies and the pass to Doris was free. who retired first and are unnoticed by the pursu-
ers. After they pass through the spaces between
files, the line will be sealed in less than 3 seconds,
TACTICS the running troops regroup and catch a breath be-
hind the last rank of the line and then join the files
The Greek tactics mentioned by Herodo- to reinforce it.
tus imply a universal drill in hoplite armies of Herodotus has no idea of Special Opera-
passing units through each other’s lines in order tion sand cannot even imagine them. He is nar-
to rotate them in combat (Her VII. 212). This is row-minded. Speaking of the diver Skyllias, he
easily done in exercise and is the logical solution disapproves of the lore of him swimming a great
for such problems since the invention of trained distance without coming to surface as impossible
infantry. But it establishes that the Hoplite infan- (Her VIII.8). He never wonders if a very human
try of many Greek states, not only Sparta, had the device, like a combination of straw (as snorkel)
ability of drilling -and under pressure at that. Not and stones (as weights) might make him stay un-
only they were able to execute under pressure, but dersea, without being seen, which was the mean-
paired to other similar troops, with whom they ing of the lore: nobody counted his breaths. They
had never trained before. simply had not been able to spot him on the sur-

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face. In such a set of mind, the notion of Skyllias- king’s tent is always upriver, to water with clear
cutting the anchor ropes of the Persian fleet and and pure water.
thus maximizing the disastrous effect of the storm As it is a clandestine operation and the instiga-
(Paus Phocika XIX. 2), is unthinkable. tor perished, we may never learn the exact facts,
It is no great wonder then that he says nothing but it is very conceivable that the lore is some-
on the assassination attempt mentioned by other what distorted. A just as clandestine and faster ap-
historians (i.e. Diodorus XI.10). It was very Spar- proach, straight to the tent of the king, would have
tan, and very possible to try such an act; it was been by marching the opposite way than that of the
also Spartan not to talk about it (Thuc V.68,2), es- flanking force of the Persians (Her VII.215-21). In
pecially at a time when previous friends became the dead of night the two groups might have lost
mortal enemies and any detailed account for past each other easily-or rather the Persians the sneaky
battles might be used to deduce their current oper- Greeks, especially if the latter are acknowledged
ating procedures and modus operandi. Assassina- “Special Operators”, as Skiritai might have al-
tions and Special Operations were an integral part ready been (Xen XII.3 & XIII.6; Thuc V. 67,1)
of ancient Greek politics. Trained professionals or members or Krypteia surely were (Plut Lycur-
were available, although not in abundance. Espe- gus XXVIII.1). This version explains very well
cially the Spartans had a name for such attempts why Leonidas did not try to intercept the flank-
and skills due to Krypteia (Plutarch Lycurgus XX- ing force, although he was informed early enough
VIII.1), in some cases even involving the kings (Her VII. 219). He did not want to have any noise
themselves as operators (Paus Messeniaka IV.3). or commotion in that area, so as to keep the guard
Flower, 1998 noticed the Krypteia connection but of the Persian camp down. The attempt was made
fails to mention that the 300 Knights in this season and had some Persian officials killed, such as the
are older, more experienced and perhaps selected two brothers of Xerxes (HerVII.224), who cannot
with this chapter of their CV in mind, as well. But be explained as casualties in any other way. Nei-
the story of Diodorus (XI.10) is not satisfactory. ther the attrition approachnor the assault attempts
The tent of the king would have been as far as of the Persian army included risking higher offi-
possible from the line of access of the enemy. The cials, much less princes. The late time of the as-
two armies were distant enough for the sentries sault of Xerxes at the pass (Her VII.223) the third
to detect a massive approach, even as clandestine day implies that the camp was in an uproar which
as Diodorus tries to make it (Diod XI.10, 1). The delayed the usual early dawn onset of hostilities
version of the crack unit sent, not led, by Leoni- by the Persians. Otherwise he would have at-
das, is a much better bet-and here Diodorus (in XI. tacked as early as possible to pin the Greeks and
9,2) might have had it right, concerning the num- make retreat impossible, and also to take their
ber of raiders involved: 500. The lore3wants it to attention away from the flanking force. Leonidas
swim from the Greek position, from someplace advance in the open (Her VII.223), might thus
with smooth shoreline so as to enter with the nec- be explained as trying to give a final blow to the
essary gear, walk-swim the distance to the river, Persians, in case the King had been incapacitated,
then upriver to the tent of the King. Still, although and once that failed, he fell back. But this is hard-
clandestine enough, the distance and time start to ly believable: in such a case he would have cov-
become an uneasy factor, and the task force has to ered his rear with the rest of the army guarding the
move upriver throughout the Persian camp, as the narrowest part inversed, to pin the flanking force,
and he would have thrust his meager force in deep
3 P. Green in Xerxes at Salamis 1970; but previously, the and compact formation to pierce as deep as possi-
movie “The 300 Spartans” of 1962 shows a seaborne night ble into the Persian camp and lines. But Herodo-
raid.

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tus, explicitly states that he had his line extended cozy American Headquarters (especially General
(Her VII. 223) and sent the rest of the army away Headquarters, like of Eisenhower)? Moreover, no
(Her VII. 222). The latter might have been deser- such establishments are mentioned for any sub-
tion. The key factor, though, that weighs against ordinate commanders, who also take part in the
desertion is the deployment to an extended line. battle; Datis and Artaphrenes are shown in Poi-
This serves one purpose only, to expose as many kileStoa in Athens engaged in Combat, Mardo-
troops to enemy contact so as to maximize enemy nios was Killed-in-Action in Plataea (Her IX. 64)
engagement and casualties in shock action. This as were other Persian commanders in Mycale (Her
assassination attempt, along with the carnage and IX.102) and Admirals in Salamis (Her VIII. 89).
consternation of the two previous days, the loss of Thus there simply was one more level of Com-
his relatives and the old case of murder of the Per- mand in the Persian structure, reserved for the
sian embassy (Her VII.133) allowed, or imposed King-of-Kings. This might be the true meaning
to Xerxes the ill-treatment to the corps of Leo- of Xerxes thinking that his troops in Artemisium
nidas (Her VII.238), considered at the same time fared ill due to the lack of his presence (Her VIII.
sacrilegious, criminal and blasphemer to Gods 69). It may have been not just the watchful eye of
and Humans. the King, to deal rewards and punishments (Diod
There is also another issue, little noticed but of XI. 8,1), but also of the High-Command, to direct
paramount importance: the method of command. It the battle against a sneaky enemy. This of course
is often discussed but rarely, if ever, well under- meant that the Greeks did not need to fool the Per-
stood in technicality and detail and compared to sians; it was enough to fool Xerxes, as supposedly
later and modern practice. The Greek way was to happened in Salamis (Her VIII. 75).
lead, and the commander, once the order was set In Thermopylae, this concept is obvious: The
and the missions delegated (if any) took his posi- Persian High Command, despite the dismal bat-
tion in the line to fight. In some cases, as in Mara- tlefield performance, never lose control of their
thon and Plataea, a degree of overview and control troops and the battle. Always at the ready, reserves
was secured by the Commander-in-Chief in order lined up and sent as required (Diod XI.7,2), retreat
to intervene and orchestrate more elaborate actions, allowed (Diod XI. 7,4) or denied (Diod XI. 8,3),
and in Thermopylae the exchange of detachments panic waves contained (Her VII.212) and, most of
(Her VII. 212) show such a Command and Control all, adaptability: from the decision to attack with
function properly exercised by Leonidas. the elite troops in the first day (Her VII. 211), to
But what about the Persians? They are often take defenders unawares, to the change of meth-
ridiculed for ERECTING, manning and operating od. The storm tactics of the first day (more than
a lavish observation platform, at a proper, com- one- Her VII. 211) to the attrition attempt of the
manding feature of the landscape, for Xerxes (the second day (Her VII. 212) to the holding action
Commander-in Chief), with every possible com- and flanking of the third (Her VII.213 & 223).
fort and luxury as mentioned for both Thermopy- Xerxes throne and observation post in Ther-
lae and Salamis (Her VII. 212 and VIII. 90 respec- mopylae should have combined view of the pro-
tively). There are royal scribes, taking notes (Her spective battlefield with security and safety. One
VIII. 90). Really, one can wonder what difference could thus deduce that it should have been posted
is there between Xerxes establishment and 19th over the first gate, high up for better view but not
century observation position for commanders on the main ridge; should the main ridge were at-
and staff, or even 20th century. Is there a concep- tainable by that position, his troops would have
tual difference to the Persian establishment and flanked the position of the Greeks.
the well provided, guarded, conditioned ad even

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OPERATIONS al after the victory, to good effect and expand the

occupation footprint. The western Greece, west of
The Persian army was able to divide and fol- Pindus, was not into the operational planning of
low parallel routes. After crossing at Europe in the Persians, although it was important enough a
the Hellespont, but definitively from the muster front in the Peloponnesian War. It is plausible that
and inventory count at Doriskos all the way to the operations in that area were meant to take place
Chalcidian peninsula,it is explicitly stated that it after the subjugation of Peloponnesus, with the
advanced in three routes (Her VII.121), although fleet moving northwards into the Ionian Sea. The
there is enough uncertainty as to these itinerar- Persian high command knew the geography of
ies, as Herodotus is not very clear. From Therme, Greece due to the expatriates, and most of all due
present day Thessaloniki the army follows, up to to Demaratos of Sparta (Her VII.209). This one
Thermopylae, one route and this route is always must surely have informed Xerxes that his own
away from the sea (Her VII.131 and VII. 196- ancestors, the Dorians, failed to invade Pelopon-
198). The army is not moving along the coast for nesus through the heavily fortified Isthmus (Her
mutual support with the fleet, a fact unforeseen by IX.26), but succeeded by emerging at the north
the Greek army of 10.000 who tried to intercept of the Gulf of Patras and crossing at Rio, by ships
it before it enters into Thessaly, at Tempe (Her built in Naupaktos, nearby (Paus Phocika XL-
VII.173). Very probably it enjoys fleet transporta- VIII.10). Given that this area, NW Peloponnesus
tion for replenishing provisions. (Achaea) was medizing heavily (Paus Achaika
The expeditionary Standard Operating Proce- VI.3), it was natural to attempt a crossing there, es-
dure is for the fleet to subdue the coastal areas by pecially after the varnage at Thermopylae, which
landing infantry and cavalry parties (Her VIII.23) could get worse at Isthmus. Thus, the Persian
and the army to strike inland. Rendez-vous points army once in Boeotia should have sent a division
are established for provisioning, in a way very of some strength south-westto subjugate western
similar to the operation planning of Alexander the Phocis and Aetolia and cross into Peloponnesus
great 1.5 centuries later in which case two pos- with ships to friendly territory, thus flanking the
sible meeting areas are obvious from special and defenses at Isthmus. The rest of the army could
remporal parameters, Alos in Pagasetic Gulf and advance to Athens to deliver punishment.
the Maliac Gulf. Thus the Persians did not follow Although we do not fully appreciate it, this is
the coastal routes neither to enter Thessaly from exactly what happened! The abortive Persian raid
Northern Greece, nor after Thermopylae to enter to Delphimight have not been a plundering oper-
southern Greece (Her VIII.31). These areas, along ation, as Herodotus thought. Plunder was within
with the island of Euboea and the east and south the scope, but not really the objective: Herodo-
coastline of Attica were delegated to the fleet tus states that at Panopeus, a crossroad, the army
which carried a landing force of more than 40.000 divided in two, and the larger part continued to
troops (1200 capital vessels with 40 marines per Boeotia and Attica, and the lesser part towards
ship –Her VII.184- as this was the number en- Delphi (Her VIII.35). Thus the two parts were
countered and impressing the Persians in the na- unequal, but not vastly. It is not a group or some
val battle of Lade in 494 BC in the Chiantriremes units dispatched, it is a hefty part of the army. This,
– Her VI.15). according to previous practice means following
After Thermopylae, the Persian army was re- two itineraries, with two separate objectives. The
ally vast for the mission at hand. It was a waste of second force, moving westwards through, and
resources and a bad practice logistics-wise not to not to, Delphi, intended to crossto Peloponnesus
put this numerical superiority, and the high mor- in Achaia, thus outman oeuvring the Greek army

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at Isthmus, as had happened in Tempe and even- sions, leaving a much decreased, but fully capa-
tually at Thermopylae.This course of action may ble occupation army way back, in Thessaly (Her
have been decided after Thermopylae, at the staff VIII.113), north of Thermopylae, to re-establish
meeting (Her VII.234-235) where Demaratus pro- the imperium to the areas he had retreated from.
posed landing at Kythera. So, a change of plans The invasion of Peloponnesus was not forthcom-
is possible after Thermopylae: south through ing-and history proved him right. Thermopylae
Asopos gorge to Doris and Phocis, with the main and Delphi won the war for the Greeks long be-
body turning SE to Boeotia and Attica and anoth- fore rams and oars got blooded in Salamis.
er body dispatched to a western campaign. Other
combinations of itineraries were possible, but the
route chosen offered the best combination of secu- BIBLIOGRAPHY
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demoralized and pushed back this force to the Homer Iliad
rest of the army, did not just save the temple, Pausanias ElladosPeriegesis/ Achaika
but actually won the campaign. This corps after Pausanias ElladosPeriegesis/ Boeotica
Delphi would have emerged to the north shore of Pausanias ElladosPeriegesis/ Korinthiaka
the gulf of Korinth, easily occupying the coast- Pausanias ElladosPeriegesis/Messeniaka
al towns and commandeering vessels to cross to Pausanias ElladosPeriegesis/ Phocika
Peloponnesus in Rio, a replay of the invasion of Plutarch Bioi/ Pelopidas
the Dorians, with no Greek fleet to counter, nor Plutarch Bioi/Lycurgus
any hostile coastal state to resista disembarkation Plutarch Apophthegmata Laconica
as in Marathon. Polyainus Strategemata
This prospect coming to null, Xerxes had to Thucydides Histories
opt either for an assault in Isthmus, or for a na- Xenophon Hellenika
val victory to be able to cross by sea to Eastern Xenophon Lakedaimonion Politeia
Peloponnesus, where Argos, bitterly hostile to
Sparta, offered a safe bridgehead (Her VII.149).
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operations in Greek waters was running thin and esbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag.
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Archaeology and Science 11 (2015) Kambouris et al. - Thermopylae Revisited...(127-144)

REZIME Persijanci nakon pobede nikad više nisu prošli

PONOVO O TERMOPILIMA ovim klancem, već su birali druge pravce, što se
kosi sa logikom izbora za mesto bitke; izgleda da
KLJUČNE REČI: TERMOPILI, LEONIDA, je ona pre bila demonstracija moći, nego istinska
SPARTA, STARA GRČKA, RATNA TAKTIKA, potreba u sastavu ratne operacije. Grčka taktika,
SPECIJALNE OPERACIJE. o kojoj piše Herodot, ukazuje kako na uobičaje-
nu vežbu hoplitskih jedinica, a koja se sastojala
Bitka koja je presudno uticala na naše poima- od njihovog jedinica kroz bojne redove, kao i na
nje grčko-persijskih ratova i antičkog vojevanja spartanski taktiku bacanja projektila, manje ili
još uvek sa sobom nosi brojne skrivene ili nera- više sličnu Ekdromiju, o kojem je kasnije pisao
zjašnjene podatke. Oni se ne uklapaju u domen Ksenofon (Hellenika, knj. IV, 5), doduše izvedenu
uobičajenih tumačenja, a mogu se objasniti samo obrnutim redosledom. Na kraju, politika iz vreme-
nakon pažljivog posmatranja, čitanja i zaklju- na Herodota svakako nije dopuštala da se govori
čivanja. Ko su zaista bili Leonidini vojnici, njih o noćnom napadu Spartanaca na persijski logor, o
300? Uobičajeno je mišljenje da je Fokidski zid kojem je kasnije pisao Diodor, niti o pravim razlo-
pregrađivao Termopilski klanac. Međutim, on bi zima zbog kojih fokidske jedinice nisu uspele da
ujedno presecao i najbolju moguću saobraćajnu zadrže svoje položaje. Zatečeni, oni su radije bi-
komunikaciju. Najverovatnije je da se nalazio u rali da prepreče Persijancima put ka Fokidi, njiho-
blizini, otvoren kružni put koji se spušta sa ste- voj domovini, nego ka Leonidi i njegovoj vojsci.
na, ne ometa saobraćaj, ali omogućava kontrolu i
možda presretanje projektila.

144
CIP - Katalogizacija u publikaciji
Narodna biblioteka Srbije, Beograd

902/904

ARHEOLOGIJA i prirodne nauke =

Archaeology and Science / glavni i odgovorni
urednik Miomir Korać. - 2015, No. 11-
Beograd : Centar za nove tehnologije :
Arheološki institut, 2016- (Beograd :
DigitalArt). - 28 cm

ISSN 1452-7448 = Arheologija i prirodne

nauke
COBISS.SR-ID 136747788