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Risk Communication for Farmers’ Adaptation to Climate Change: A New Task

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International Journal of Performability Engineering, Vol. 11, No. 6, November 2015, pp. 533-547.
© RAMS Consultants
Printed in India

Risk Communication for Farmers’ Adaptation to Climate

Change: A New Task for Agricultural Advisory Services
HOSSEIN MAHMOUDI*1,2 and ANDREA KNIERIM1,3
P P P P

1
P Institute of Social Sciences in Agriculture, University of Hohenheim, GERMANY
P

2
P Environmental Sciences Research Institute, Shahid Beheshti University, IRAN
P

3
P Leibniz Centre for Agricultural Landscape Research, Müncheberg, GERMANY
P

(Received on January 20, 2015, revised on July 05, 2015)

Abstract: Decision making in agricultural production is a complex process in which
many risks such as natural, economic and social ones need to be considered. Climate
change is one important example for complex risks causing ambiguities. How can farmers
be supported to pro-actively deal with and adapt to climate change? A comprehensive
answer to this question can create a good potential for an improved risk communication
and governance within agricultural sector. The aim of this paper is to conceptually argue
farmers’ risk perceptions, roles and tasks that intervention agents such as agricultural
advisory services may adopt in order to support farmers’ risk management and adaptation
to climate change. Two specific approaches namely ‘risk communication’ and ‘social
learning’ in the frame of risk governance were discussed followed by conclusions drawn
on cross-cutting insights and deficits in research and practice.
Keywords: Climate change, risk governance, cultural theory, ambiguity, social learning.

1. Introduction
Agriculture is particularly vulnerable to climate change. Higher temperatures due to
climate change can create a significant loss in the yield of many crops. For example,
cereal crops can be vulnerable to even minor changes in temperature [1]. At the same
time, agriculture also affects the climate and it is a major source of greenhouse gas
emissions [2]. For example, agriculture is responsible for up to half of all methane
emissions [3]. Furthermore, agriculture contributes negatively to human impact on
climate. The burning of biomass and the disposal of crop residues is a source of
atmospheric carbon dioxide as well as fertilizers and animal wastes create large emissions
of nitrous oxide and ammonia [3].
Projections to 2050 suggest both an increase in global mean temperatures and
increased weather variability, with implications for the type and distribution of
agricultural production worldwide [4]. Climate change can reduce agricultural yields and
raise the poverty levels for many poor farmers engaged in agricultural sector [5].
Accordingly, climate change has been considered as an important risk on farming
activities and events, thus contributing to farmers’ vulnerability [6].
Climate change has created a new challenge for agricultural and rural development [7,
8]. According to [9], one important element of sustainable agricultural and rural
development is to reduce the vulnerability of agricultural sector to adverse natural and
socio-economic risks, and strengthens self-reliance. Therefore, the adaptation of
agriculture sector to the adverse impacts of climate change will definitely be crucial [10]
as it can greatly reduce the adverse effects of climate change [11] by enabling rural
communities to adjust to climate change and variability, moderating potential damages
and helping them cope with adverse consequences [12].

____________________________________________
*Corresponding author’s email: [email protected] 533
534 Hossein Mahmoudi and Andrea Knierim

Climate change causes highly variable environmental conditions, including: “higher

temperatures and shift of seasons; changes in rainfall and subsequent variation in water
availability; extreme natural events, causing disasters; and change in atmospheric gas
composition” [13]. The fact that climate has changed in the past and will continue to
change in the future underlines the need to understand how farmers perceive and adapt to
climate change. Such information is necessary to guide future adaptation strategies.
According to [2], farmers perceive that climate is changing and access to information on
climate change through extension agents creates more awareness and favorable condition
for adoption of those farming practices that are suitable under climate change.
Given the above explanation, climate change does not seem a simple risk. In this
paper, we will explain climate change as a complex and systemic risk focusing on
ambiguity characteristics. The problems posed by this systemic risk could appropriately
be addressed by discursive strategies such as risk communication and social learning.
Intermediaries such as agricultural advisory services can be considered as key actors of
this issue for farmers’ adaptation to the climate change risk.
Here, we focus on agriculture, as successful adaptation to climate change is crucial for
global food security. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to clarify the role of agricultural
advisory services in adapting to climate change in the context of discursive management
strategies. The rest of the paper is divided into four parts. The first part gives a brief
conceptual overview of the relation of climate change and systemic risk. The second part
addresses strategies for the handling of risk of climate change. The third part explores the
roles and tasks of agricultural advisory services in adaptation to climate change. Finally,
we present conclusions for research and advisory service developments.
2. Climate Change Risk Perceptions: Conceptual Bases
Climate change is not a simple risk but rather falls within the systemic risk category [14].
One can talk about a ‘simple’ risk if the cause of a risk is well-known and its potential
adverse effects are predictable as well as the interpretation of such risks is not ambiguous
[15]. In contrast, systemic risks are characterized by a high degree of complexity,
uncertainty, and ambiguity [16]. Among these three components of a systemic risk, the
focus of this paper is to look closer at the ambiguity feature of climate change risk. These
components are not related to the inherent features of risks themselves but to the state and
quality of knowledge available about risks [16]. It means that climate change risk are not
induced intrinsically by ambiguity but it is related to the acceptibility of and reactions to
this risk.
As discussed in the following section, climate change can be the subject of intense
controversy. High levels of complexity and uncertainty of climate risk are explained in
some studies e.g., [17]. Beyond being complex and uncertain, climatic risks are also a
cause of ambiguity. This means that there are different viewpoints from which to evaluate
whether there are adverse effects and whether these risks are tolerable or even acceptable
[15]. In the literature on risk governance, the ambiguity is a result of divergent or
contested perspectives on the justification, severity or wider meanings associated with a
given threat. The ambiguity arises when risk information is interpreted differently by
different stakeholders in a society [18, 19]. Indeed, a condition of ambiguity appears
where the problem lies in the diversity of perspectives and interpretations based on
identical observations [20]. Therefore, ambiguity refers to the existence of multiple values
[15].
According to risk governance literature, there are two kinds of ambiguity namely
interpretative and normative ambiguity [21]. While the former is an evidence-based
 Risk Communication for Farmers’ Adaptation to Climate Change: 535
A New Task for Agricultural Advisory Services

ambiguity, the latter refers to the ambiguity on values but not on evidence [22]. It means
“ambiguity refers to different views related to: 1) the relevance, meaning, and
implications of the risk assessments for decision making (interpretative ambiguity); or 2)
the values to be protected and the priorities to be made (normative ambiguity)” [23, p:
597].
Global climate change is the subject of interpretative and normative ambiguity [22] as
explained in the following sections:
2.1 Perceived Interpretative Ambiguity
As [16] noted, human behavior is primarily driven by perception and not by facts or by
what is understood as facts by scientists. Many transition processes are hence fueled by
perceptions and worldviews independent of their correspondence with scientific insights
[24]. While climate change is widely considered a substantiated fact [cf. 25, 26] with
specific reference to the agricultural sector [4, 1], empirical studies in some parts of the
world revealed that farmers have high levels of skepticism about climate change [27].
According to the study by [28] in the US, fewer farmers believe that human activities
constitute the primary driver of climate changes. [29] surveyed 2000 farmers in Indiana
and found that 79% believed that climate change is a natural incident while only 45%
believed that it is a human induced phenomenon. The result of [30] showed that only 27%
believed that human activities contribute to climate change. In contrast, [31] reported that
the majority of Australian farmers stated a belief in human induced climate change.
However, as [27] argued, there is no clear border between skeptic and deniers views on
climate change in such studies. “Skeptics include those who do not accept that climate
change is human induced, whereas deniers are more likely to believe that climate change
is not happening at all” [27].
These examples show that some people cannot believe the risk of climate change and
ignore it. It is so-called ‘Cassandra syndrome or dilemma’ [32, 33] that refers to situations
where people ignore or do not pay enough attention to scientific prediction about risks and
hazards in the future [34]. In risk classification, the Cassandra risk class describes a
paradox: the probability of occurrence and extent of damage are known; but there is no
imminent concern because damage will only occur in the future. In this case, there is
considerable delay between the triggering event and the occurrence of the damage. The
delayed effect leads to a situation in which such risks are ignored or downplayed [35].
2.2 Perceived Normative Ambiguity
Cultural perspectives and values shape responses to climate change and form the reception
of climate information [36, 37]. In other words, cultural values and worldviews can affect
the risk perceptions of climate change. Different ways of life in society may evaluate
environmental risks (like climate change) differently [38]. This can be explained by
cultural theory of risk (CTR) [39]. CTR classifies people in four groups based on their
views and values: hierarchical, fatalistic, individualistic, and egalitarian (Figure 1).
Hierarchists think the world is controllable and the environment is stable, but
resources and actions should be managed by trustworthy institutions to avoid the point of
no return. Fatalists find neither rhyme nor reason in nature, and know that man is fickle
and untrustworthy. Fairness, in consequence, is not to be found in this life, and there
is no possibility of effecting change for reaching the better situation [40]. For
Individualists, nature is benign and resilient. They believe that no matter how nature
536 Hossein Mahmoudi and Andrea Knierim

profoundly disturbed, always returns to stability. Egalitarians feel the environment is

fragile, and man is essentially caring and sharing (until corrupted by coercive and in
egalitarian institutions: markets and hierarchies).

More social rules

FATALISM HIERACHY

Nature: Capricious Nature: Perverse/ Tolerant

Individualized Collectivized

INDIVIDUALISM EGALITARIANISM

Nature: Benign Nature: Ephemeral

Less social rules

Figure 1: Four Worldviews in Cultural Theory of Risk. Source: [48].

Depending on the socio-institutional context of the particular policy actor, each
worldview emphasizes different aspects of the climate change causes and effects [40].
CTR may explain how certain worldviews may shape the communication, information
gathering and interpretative aspects of climate change politics and science [41].
Hierarchists fear social deviance, which threatens the structure of status quo. They are
likely to trust climate scientists and those in authority. They will accept rules and state
interventions. They call for the active management of risk by ‘experts [41, 42].
Individualists are particularly concerned about problems that impinge upon their freedom
and autonomy (such as government regulation). They promote market-based strategies
(price reforming in order to consider environmental costs) that maintain their autonomy
and provide opportunities for personal gain [41, 42, 43]. Egalitarians, however, are
suspicious of anyone in authority. They are most concerned about injustice in the
distribution of risk costs and benefits. This perspective is evident in critiques of climate
change policy emanating from both developed world action groups, and developing world
NGOs. They often promote participatory, democratic, and consensus-based decision-
making that includes all affected parties as equals [41, 42]. In relation to climate change,
fatalists are mesmerized by uncertainty of the science.
Individualists are less likely to believe that average global temperature increases are
human-induced [44]. This group expect that climate change is less serious and its impacts
are less negative [45]. As a solution to climate change, individualists are more likely to
prefer nuclear energy. Egalitarians are the exact opposite of individualists [44, 45]. In
their opinion, climate system lies in a delicate balance and human insult can lead to
collapse [46]. According to [47] egalitarians are supposed to perceive high risk of climate
change. This value type are more likely to believe climate change is real, that humans
caused it, and that it is dangerous to both themselves and the broader society [44].
Hierarchists would be generally more similar to individualists than to egalitarians on
environmental issues [44]. This group would perceive climate change as an acceptable
and would consider regulation as a main management strategy [38]. As Fatalists perceive
 Risk Communication for Farmers’ Adaptation to Climate Change: 537
A New Task for Agricultural Advisory Services

nature as uncontrollable anyway, they may attach less importance to the risks of climate
change and therefore judge these as less risky [45].
3. Risk Governance Strategies for addressing Risk of Climate Change in
Agriculture
In risk governance literature e.g., [49], a risk informed and discourse strategy is suggested
for ambiguity induced risk problem like global climate change. This kind of governance
strategy focuses on dialogic communication with concerned actors, the integration of
stakeholder into deliberative and decision-making processes [50] and on joint societal
learning processes [51]. A broad and differentiated participation of citizens in deliberation
and decision-making is generally considered as a key constituent for societal adaptation to
climate change [52]. In addition, more specifically for addressing the related risks,
participatory approaches are necessary elements of the so-called ‘discourse-based
governance’ in the aim of seeking more public input and stakeholder involvement for
interpretative variability and normative controversy [20].
In the following, we specify how the discourse-based governance can be put into
practice in the agricultural sector. As an important actor group, agricultural advisory
services are identified which act as intermediaries between farmers and other societal
groups. Then, risk communication and social learning are characterized as two performing
approaches appropriate to integrate the above developed risk features and to reach farmers
effectively.
3.1 Agricultural Advisory Services as Communication Intermediaries
The roles and tasks of agricultural advisory systems in the world have undergone drastic
changes in the last decades. Three general policy trends can be discerned in this regard
that frame the conduct of the service provision: privatization, decentralization and
revitalization [53]. Hence, there is an organizational broadening towards a greater
institutional diversity and a functional diversification. While for many years the
conventional understanding of agricultural extension’s tasks was the diffusion of
agricultural innovations, in which technologies or new ideas and practices are passed from
scientists via extensionists to farmers [54], this traditional model of a unidirectional
transfer of knowledge or technology has been questioned over the last decades and the
diffusion concept has been transformed to a multi-lateral systemic communication and
interaction net – the agricultural knowledge and information system (AKIS) [55]. Such
systemic views [56] on the exchange and co-construction of knowledge and on the joint
generation, testing and adaptation of innovations are supported by the ‘agricultural
knowledge and innovation system’ (AKIS) and the ‘agricultural innovation system’ (AIS)
concepts which are now widely used the same understanding [57, 58, 59]. It is in this
realm that the term of ‘intermediaries’ has been coined and applied with an emphasis on
the economic, market related context [60]. Nevertheless, these authors also underline the
important role of those intermediaries in terms of overcoming system failures such as
cultural differences between actors [60, p: 262)].
Hence, although the number of actor groups involved in agricultural production
systems has considerably increased, the functions that traditionally were assured by
advisory services – such as the operationalization and dissemination of knowledge and the
facilitation of exchange, collaboration and learning among farmers and other actors - have
still to be fulfilled while new challenges like risk communication and integrative
538 Hossein Mahmoudi and Andrea Knierim

knowledge creation and learning arise. Thus, the main question that arises as: what are the
new roles and tasks of agricultural advisory services to deal with problems such as climate
change risks? In this sense, the two approaches namely ‘risk communication’ and ‘social
learning’ are highlighted and discussed.
3.2 Risk Communication
Risk communication is any purposeful exchange of information about risks between
interested parties [61]. However, risk communication is more than simply disseminating
risk information. It combines the elements of conflict resolution, public participation, and
two-way messages [62]. The ultimate goal of risk communication is to assist stakeholders
and the public in understanding the rationale of a risk-based decision, and to help all
affected parties make informed choices about matters of concern to them [63].
Communication has the principal function of enabling concerned citizens to make their
own risk-judgment [64].
Risk communication to agricultural sector with regards to climate change can be
considered as an adaptation option [1, 65-66]. For example, in Germany and the
Netherlands, the national governments state in their national adaptation program that they
will develop a national communication strategy on climate adaptation [67].
For effectiveness of risk communication, various subcultures within a society should be
taken into account. It is essential to tailor the content of the communication process to the
interests and concerns of the different social and cultural groups within society [63]. Risk
communication should be in line with the cultural orientation of the target group. People
tend to have more trust in risk communication if the message is in line with their cultural
preferences [38, 68]. The need for communication is highly heterogeneous. This means
that one must differentiate according to target groups [64].
As mentioned earlier, social groups belonging to the individualist prototype perceive
risk taking as an opportunity to succeed in a competitive market and to pursue their
personal goals. They are less concerned about equity issues and would like the
government to refrain from extensive regulation or risk management efforts. In contrast,
the egalitarian group emphasizes cooperation and equality rather than competition and
freedom. When facing risks, they tend to focus on long-term effects of human activities
and are more likely to abandon an activity, even if they perceive it beneficial to them, than
to take chances. They are particularly concerned about equity. The hierarchists rely on
rules and procedures to cope with uncertainty. They find that as long as risks are managed
by capable institutions and coping strategies have been provided for all eventualities, there
is no need to worry about risks. Hierarchists believe in the effectiveness of organizational
skills and practices. They regard a problem as solved when a procedure to deal with its
institutional management is in place. Fatalists who trust only themselves, are often
confused about risk issues, and are likely to take high risks for themselves, but oppose any
risk that they feel is imposed on them. At the same time, however, they see life as a lottery
and are often unable to link harm to a concrete cause [63].
According to [63], for practical purposes of preparing risk communication programs, it
is helpful to have a classification of potential audience (here farmers) at hand. The
classification that is offered here refers to two dimensions: the interest of the audience in
the subject and the type of arguments that different audience may find interesting. For
doing a proper risk communication, agricultural extension officers need to know how
different groups of farmers think about the causes of climate change. It is important
because people have different levels of acceptance of climate change as a real
phenomenon [69]. For example, according to [43], egalitarians believe that
 Risk Communication for Farmers’ Adaptation to Climate Change: 539
A New Task for Agricultural Advisory Services

overconsumption is the main cause of climate change. In their opinion, frugality would be
the appropriate remedy. Furthermore, the individualists believe the free use of natural
resources is the root cause. This group suggests market-based solutions. Moreover,
hierarchists suppose that over-population is the root cause. They think family planning
programs can be an appropriate response.
3.3 Facilitating Social Learning
The main goal of social learning is to improve the management of human and
environment interrelations. This important goal makes it appropriate to address challenges
of climate change [70]. Social learning is a collaborative learning and an approach for
improving public discussion in ecosystem-based management [71]. In other words, social
learning can be defined as collective reflection and action to improve the management of
human and environmental interrelations [70].
Experts [72, 73] pointed out that adaptation is fundamentally dependent on new forms
of learning, especially social learning. It is almost impossible for individuals and a single
group to understand the environmental problems (such as climate change) deeply and to
find proper resolutions. As [72] draw our attention, the participation of citizens, groups
and organizations in adaptation is an essential element to tackle climate change
effectively.
Social learning in adaption of climate change is fundamental because as some experts
[73, 74] noted, climate change is a wicked problem that generally, is difficult to define
and requires a good understanding. Therefore, adaptive approaches, with dynamic ways of
defining and understanding the world, are put forward as being better suited to managing
in a wicked world [73]. People learn from each other during the social learning process to
enhance socio-ecological outcomes [75, 73].
4. Agricultural Advisory Services and Adaptation to Climate Change
As argued above, agricultural advisory services can be considered as an effective actor for
facilitating social learning and risk communication among farmers in the context of
discursive management strategies. In this sense, agricultural advisory services should go
beyond their classical task and conventional way. Therefore, it is suggested that
agricultural advisory services should get involved in risk communication and social
learning regarding climate change risk. As awareness raising and capacity building is a
major pre-condition for encouraging adaptation implementation [76].
Information exchange, knowledge integration and social learning are important
adaptation objectives [77]. Among many sources of information available to farmers,
agricultural advisory and extension services are the most important for adaptation [78].
Access to information through extension services (climate information and production
technologies) increases the likelihood of adapting to climate change [79, 12, 78].
Reference [78] pointed out, based on the innovation-diffusion literature, it is
hypothesized that access to extension services is positively related to the adoption of new
technologies by exposing farmers to new information and technical skills. Specifically, in
case of climate change adaptation, access to climate information may increase the
likelihood of uptake of adaptation techniques.
Given the importance influence of having access to extension services on farmers’
decision to adapt, policy-makers should extend and improve upon such services [12]. [78]
confirmed that farmers who have access to extension services are more likely to be aware
540 Hossein Mahmoudi and Andrea Knierim

of changing climatic conditions and to have knowledge of the various management

practices that they can use to adapt to changes in climatic conditions. It appears that
extension messages emphasize risk spreading and farm- level risk management.
With regard to the importance of extension services to adaptation, [80] introduced
‘climate extension’. In this concept, climate outreach involves communicating
information on climate variability and change in ways that increase public understanding
of climate science and assisting stakeholders with integrating climate information into
decision-making processes. Extension services can help increase the adaptive capacity. It
means that it can lead to improve the ability of farmers to adapt to climate changes and
implementing adaptation decisions [1]. Adaptive capacity is shaped by interaction of
environmental and social forces, which determine exposures and sensitivities, and by
various social, cultural, political and economic forces [81].
Given the importance of extension services, some especial extension systems for
climate change problem are presented. For example, [82] explained about climate change
extension program established by the University of Florida. The main goal of this program
is to reduce climate change risks by adding seasonal climate variability as part of their
decision making process. [83] introduced a climate masters extension program in
Nebraska as a unique action-based climate change educational program. This program
focusing on climate science communication and trains community volunteers about
climate change. [84] stressed on abilities of extensionists in addressing climate
information needs and adaptation practices. Further, [85] and [86] found The cooperative
extension service ideally suited for climate change education and adapting to climate
change. [85], pointed out that extension services should provide climate science
information to early adopters and emphasize risk management to farmers focusing on
local solutions and familiar management tools.
In this sense, extension agents should facilities interaction between different cultural
groups (individualists, egalitarian and hierarchists) in order to improve social learning
regarding climate change issue. Cultural rhetoricians [40, 87] suggest a clumsy solution
for a wicked problem. “Clumsy solutions come about when multiple, diverse, perhaps
incompatible, perspectives are brought to bear on an issue, resulting in a settlement that is
inelegant from any single perspective, but robust because it relies on more than one
epistemological and ethical foundation” [88, p: 123). In the clumsy solution, none of the
voices of different groups is excluded [40].
Clumsy
Agricultural advisory services

Risk Increasing adaptive Solution

Communication capacity
Managing Ambiguity

Adaptation
Decreasing to climate
Social vulnerability change
Learning

Discourse-based Risk Management

Figure 2: The Role of Agricultural Advisory Services in Adaptation to Climate Change.

 Risk Communication for Farmers’ Adaptation to Climate Change: 541
A New Task for Agricultural Advisory Services

In other words, the clumsy solution is a flexible and creative way of organizing
institutional arrangements and processes that are inclusive of the various worldviews and
does not leave any group worse off [46]. [89] suggested clumsy solutions for multicultural
teams. In an effective social learning, team leaders and members can understand the social
construction of their problem.
Figure 2 illustrates the task and role of agricultural advisory services in adaptation to
climate change through increasing adaptive capacity and decreasing vulnerability of
farmers with especial consideration of different worldviews and cultures. Agricultural
advisory services is well suited to make a discourse in risk management of climate
change. Discourse-based risk management is essential in this approach for building up
consciousness and taking responsibility in tackling climate change. It demand
participative processing and will promote participatory approaches in agricultural
extension services to make it more responsive to local conditions.
5. Concluding Remarks: Resilient Risk Management
Agriculture is extremely interconnected with weather and climate [90]. Climate change is
expected to introduce new risks for agricultural production and to modify existing ones
[91]. As we discussed, climate change is a systemic risk that is highlighted in risk
governance. In this paper, we argued that agricultural adaptation to climate change is a
good example for a complex, multi-faceted risk governance approach in which its
essential features is not only valid for agricultural sector but can be adjusted to
specificities other societal and economic groups. Accordingly, agriculture must adapt to
climatic variability to deal with this systemic risk. In order to planning an effective
adaptation, extensionists should be able to know about different worldviews and culture of
farmers regarding the environment and nature. CTR is a useful concept to understand the
farmers’ risk perception of climate change. There are few studies in which CTR was
applied to understand the risk perception of climate change (e.g., [92] in Switzerland; [46]
in USA). Yet, to date there is no study focused on farmers’ perception of climate change
risk and CTR. Therefore, improving and expanding the provision of extension services
and the diffusion of climate information, appear to have positive effects on farmers [12].
In order to reduce climate change risk in agriculture, a resilient risk management is
needed. FAO and OECD suggested that one of the most effective ways for agriculture to
adapt to climate change could be to increase its resilience [93]. While the concept of
resilience has been adopted from the ecological aspect, this idea of resistance can also be
applied to social aspects in which the main focus is on organizational learning and
institutional readiness to cope with stress and disaster [94]. Resilience is usually defined
as the ability and capacity of groups, communities or households to cope with risk
resulting from social, political and environmental changes [95, 91, 96]. In a food security
context, however, resilience is defined as the ability of a household to keep at a certain
level of well- being (i.e., to remain food secure) by withstanding shocks and stresses. This
depends on available livelihood alternatives and on how well households are able to cope
with risks [95].
Risk communication and social learning for farmers can be considered as two main
strategies of resilient risk management that should be taken into account to increase the
capacity of adaptation. In the frame of risk governance, risk communication and social
learning are main elements. These elements is supposed to address the two major
challenges of risk governance: generating and sharing knowledge about the risk, and
542 Hossein Mahmoudi and Andrea Knierim

making decisions about how to manage it. As stakeholders involvement is a core feature
of risk governance, it should include and support some collective action and reflectivity
such as social learning and risk communicaton towards improving the risk management.
Successful adaptation to climate change should be linked by adaptive interventions of
extension services. Such interventions should help farmers to understand and effectively
tackle with climate changes and weather patterns. While the traditional task of extension
services are to transfer scientific and new knowledge to farmers through training, their
role should be widen to more focus on risk communication and social learning to cope
with the challenges posed by climate change. Without a doubt, farmers need help for
adaptation because of complexity of climate change problem. For more effective
adaptation, extensionists should know their target group and their role carefully. Given
that farmers form heterogeneous groups in perceiving the climate change risk, it is crucial
to ensure whether and how farmers perceive climate change risk. As well,
creating synergy between climate facts provided by experts and farmers’ perception could
be a main task and the same time a main challenge for extension services.
Taken together, it is important to categorize farmers based on their cultural
background and worldviews according to the CTR. This can help reduce ambiguity of
climate change risk. Subsequently, the extensionists need to make risk communication by
considering different risk perceptions because risk communication is community and
culture-dependent. Poor communication can turn an incident into a major disaster,
especially if decision makers act passively [14]. During facilitating social learning,
different groups can learn from each other to understand the climate change issue and
adaptation strategies in the context of clumsy solutions. In this sense, agricultural advisory
services can also make an effective atmosphere to let the climate change information be
shared between experts and farmers.

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Hossein Mahmoudi is a researcher in University of Hohenheim. His current research area

includes, risk assessment and social impact assessment.

Andrea Knierim holds the chair for 'rural sociology' at the University of Hohenheim and
is head of the research group 'social processes, communication and extension' at the
Leibniz Centre for Agricultural Landscape Research. Her research focus is on support of
voluntary change, knowledge systems and innovation processes in agriculture and rural
areas, making use of action and participatory research approaches.

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