See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.

net/publication/229927533

The role of the professional planner

Article in Canadian Public Administration · January 2008

DOI: 10.1111/j.1754-7121.1984.tb00628.x

CITATIONS READS

8 13,880

1 author:

Thomas Gunton
Simon Fraser University
61 PUBLICATIONS 1,268 CITATIONS

SEE PROFILE

All content following this page was uploaded by Thomas Gunton on 03 May 2020.

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

Abstract: Planners normally perceive themselves as policy experts assisting
clients in the decision-making process. In recent years this conventional view
has been criticized as being superficial and inaccurate. The purpose of this paper
is to review these criticisms and t o identify alternative roles for planners. In all,
seven alternative roles are identified and evaluated. These include the role of
planners as technocrats, public servants, referees, advocates, bureaucrats, state
agents, social learners and social reformers. It is argued that although each of
these alternative roles offers important insights into the nature of planning and
policy-making, they all suffer from serious weaknesses. The failure to develop
an acceptable role definition, however, should be viewed positively, for it helps
guard against narrowed vision caused by the dominance of a single-role per-
spective. It is concluded that the search for a single role is, therefore, counter-
productive and that planners should concentrate on learning what roles should
be used in various situations.

Smmaire : Les planificateurs se considhrent habituellement comme des experts

en politique, dont le rble consiste A assister leurs clients dam le processus de prise
d e dkcision. Ces dernihres annkes, ce point d e vue conventionnel a 6th critique
et jug6 superficiel et inexact. Le prhsent article a pour but d’examiner ces criti-
ques et d’indiquer d’autres rbles possibles pour les planificateurs. Au total, sept
autres rbles y sont identifiks et kvaIuCs; on distingue ainsi des rbles de techno-
crates, de fonctionnaires, d’arbitres, de dhfenseurs de causes, de bureaucrates,
d’agents gouvernementaux, d’apprentis sociaux et de rhformateurs sociaux. L’au-
teur dkmontre ensuite que m&me si chacun de ces diffhrents rbles permet de
beaucoup mieux saisir la nature de la planification et de 1’6laboration des poli-
tiques, ces derniers cornportent tous d e skrieuses lacunes. Cependant, I’impos-
sibilitk d e parvenir A une definition de r6le acceptable pour les planificateurs
doit &tre considkrke comme un Clkment positif, car cela permet d’6viter l’htroi-
tesse d e vue que cause la prkdominance d’un rble particulier. L’auteur conclut
donc qu’il est vain de chercher ri dkfinir un rble unique pour les planificateurs,
et que ceux-ci devraient plutdt concentrer leurs efforts sur I’examen des rBles A
jouer dans diverses situations.

The author is assistant professor, Department of Geography and Natural Resource

Management, Simon Fraser University.

CANADIAN PUBLIC ADMINISTHATION / ADMINISTRATION PUBLIQI‘E DU CANADA

VOLUME 27, NO. 3 (FALL/AUTOMNE 1984 ), PP. 399-417.
 T.I. GWSTOS

In the earlv 1960s; Davidoff and Ileincr defined planning as “a process for
dcterniining appropriate future action through a sequence of clioices.’’l
The role of planners ~ v a sto assist clients in the decision-making process by
helping them clarify their goals and bv evaluating alternative means for
achieving desired ends.
While this \.iew of planning is still widely held, a number of alternative
v i e w of planning and the role of planners halve developed during the last
several decades. These alternative roles are summarized in Table 1. With
such a rangc of alternative roles the planning profession is incrcasiiigly con-
fused about the function that it is expected to play in the policy-making
process. The purpose of this article is to review this debate on the role of
planners in the hope of assisting planners to understand the range of alter-
native roles and the nature of their profession.

Planners as technocrats
Formal planning arose in respoiise to the ctevastating problems caused by
the rapid and chaotic gro\vtli of industrial cities in the nineteenth century.
The nature of these problems was all too evident and tlie solutions, such
as pro\iding hasic \r.ater and sewer se ri kc s and regulating the quality of
construction, \\’ere harclly contentious. Consequently, planners first viewcd
themselves as professional cym-ts above politics and ideology employing
objective, scientifi: k n o n k l g e to solve society’s problems. Their method
n-as to sur\.ey the problem, analyse the data and forniiilatc a plan of action.
Thc idea of conflicting interests and competing ends seemed conspicu-
ously irrelevant.
This perception of planners as scientists quickly gained ascendancy. It
was $\.en some force by the works of people such as Patrick Geddes and
Ebenezer H o v w d who attempted to dcvelop the “objective principles” on
n4iich planning should be b a s d TIierc was little disagreement with this
scientific view from the pul>lic health experts, engineers and architects
who formed the basis of the new profession and who had already been well
cxposed to the ideology of positivisni by virtue of their training.?
The .rie\t. of planners as technocrats gaincd increasing popularity with
tlw collapse of the prevailing order in the 1930s. In Europe, intellectuals
such as Karl ;\fannheim and Barbara \S’ootton advocated the imposition
of ccntral planning undertaken by independent experts as the only means
of maintaining social stability. In America, technocrats such as Rex Tug-
well, bnilcling on the traditions of planning as an activity undertaken by
lay comniissions a b o w politics, urged the acceptance of planning as a

1 P. Davidoff and T. Reinel-, “A Choice Theor!. of Planning,” Journal of fhe Amcricaii

Iiistitutc of P / m n i i i g (JAIP),28 (ICJGZ), 11. 103.
2 For a summary of tlie intellectual origins of planning, sec C . Cherry, Origins of
British Toicri P / u m i n g (London: Leonand Hill, 1974).

400 CAKADIAS PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIOX

 THE ROLE OF THE PROFESSIONAL PLANNER

“fourth estate” with independent powers similar to those of the j ~ d i c i a r y . ~

This tradition continued into the postwar period. Encouraged by the
work of people such as R.A. Walker, who argued in his seminal study that
planning was a professional activity that should be undertaken by a group
of experts in permanent government departments instead of by amateurs,
governments hired full-time planners.4 New university programs to train
planners were established, organizations which attempted to regulate the
profession sprang up, and numerous articles appeared in major journals
promoting the idea that planning was a profession which, like law or medi-
cine was based on a specialized body of scientific theory, was in the public
interest, had a clearly defined function and had explicit standards of ad-
mission and conduct. By virtue of these professional attributes, planners
had a long-range view which enabled them to have a better grasp of the
public interest than parochial politicians had.5
While this view is not as strongly held as it once was, some planners,
such as Eversley, have recently suggested that the planning profession
should become even more like medicine and law in order to shield itself
from growing criticism. Many theorists also maintain that the success of
planning still depends on the planners having their own vision of desired
ends and effective political skills to realize those ends.F

Plannersas public servants

While some planners still insist that planning is a value-free profession,
most have now accepted, at least in theory, that planning is comprised of
a normative component referred to as ends, as well as a scientific compo-
nent referred to as means.
This perspective emerged out of the critique of the postwar welfare state
by people such as Von Hayek and Popper. These authors maintained that
because planning was comprised of both ends and means independent
planners who were above politics and markets would simply be imposing
their own values on the rest of society.’ In one of the definitive articles on
3 K. Mannheim, Man and Society in the Age of Reconstruction (New York: Harcourt,
1949); K. Mannheim, Freedom, Pouer and Democratic Planning (New York: Oxford,
1950); B. Wootton, Freedom Under Planning (Chapel Hill: University of N.C. Press,
1945); R. Tugwell, The Industrial Discipline and the Gooernment Arts (New York:
Columbia, 1933).
4 R. Walker, The Planning Function in Urban Government (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1940).
5 For examples of these types of articles, see J. Howard, “Planning as a Profession,”
JAIP, 20 ( 19541, pp. 58-59.
6 D. Eversley, The Planner in Society: The Changing Role of the Profession (London:
Faber, 1973); Allan Jacobs, Making City Planning Work (Chicago: American Society
of Planning Officials, 1978).
7 F. Von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (London: Routledge, 1944); K. Popper, The
Open Society and its Enemies (London: Routledge, 1945).

401 ADMINISTRATION PUBLIQUE DU CANADA

Table 1. Altcrnative Rolcs for Plarincrs
Planning roles
Planning
Process Tcclinocrut Public scrc-ant Referee Atluocatc Brir~~uticrat Stugc a p t Sociul Zcarnc~ Sociul r(+rnw

( 1) set goals planner sets citizen provides god5 Rot i

~ ; j v l intcrcst fioal.; are not goals arc not >ill aspects of the the distinction
and goals politician with explicitly group provides cixplicitly explici 11) pro p1:inning process Iwtween p l y -
objectives goals and politi- iden tified goals to their provided vided are undertaken ners and clients
cinn provides own planner. on the basis of disappears as
planner with Planner lobbys an intimate dia- fundamental
goals. Planner politicians to logue between social reform
assists citizen accept go& planners and transfers power
and politician clients. Plan- f r o m profes-
in articulating ning is i i mutiid sional elites
goals learning process to citizens
( 2 ) identify planner planner assists citizens form each intiirest narrow interest dominant wcial
a1ternatiF.e identifies politician in interest groups group hires groups identify class identifies
means means identifying who lobby poli- planner to means which set of acceptable
means ticians to assist in identi- maximize their nicans
accept means fying alterna- utility and
tive means planners iden-
tify means
which maximize
the planner’s
power
Table 1 (concluded)
Planning roles
Planning
Process Technocrat Public servant Referee Advocate Bureaucrat Stage agent Social learner Social reformer

( 3 ) select planner politician politician and politician politician selects politicians, with
means chooses chooses means planner adjudi- adjudicates policies bene- advice of planners
means and planner cate between between interest fitting narrow select policies
advises poli- competing groups. Politi- interest groups. compatible with
tician on im- interest groups. cian selects Planners select the interests
pacts of alter- They select “best” plan policies which of the dominant
native means means which maximize class
maximize planners power
interest group
support. The
means selected
are normally a
compromise of
the various
means advo-
cated by the
most powerful
interest groups
( 4 ) implement planner controls politician orders politician orders politician orders politician orders politician orders
plan implementation bureaucracy to bureaucracy to bureaucracy to bureaucracy to bureaucracy to
implement implement implement implement. implement
Bureaucracy
controls imple-
mentation
( 5 ) review and planner reviews politician and interest groups interest groups interest groups dominant social
monitor citizen review review and their plan- and planners class reviews
plan ners review review
planxiins theory, Davidoff and Reiner acknowledged the validity of this
argument. They suggested that planning \vas a g e n c ~ a ldecision-making
proccss comprised of three corriponents : value formulation, means identi-
fication and effectuation. They argued that bccause “choice permeates the
\.ih~lcplanning sequence, a clear notion of ends pursued lies at the heart
of the planner’s task, aiid tlie definition of these ends must be given primacy
in thc planning process.”‘ Beca-use these ends reflected the preferences of
indi\.iduals, they ~ v c r cnot amenable to scientific verification. Planners,
then, should not be above politics. Instead, planners sliould play the role
of bureaucrats whose task in\ o l ~ ~ anal>.sing
cl the c>fficacy of available
means in achie\.ing tlie objectives of clients and in assisting clients in iden-
tifying their o\vn values.
llccording to this view, planning was a professional activity in the sense
that it involved cxpert nnalpsis of means-ends rclationships as well as a
political activity in the sense that it sought to realize specific cnds deter-
mined through a political process. Planners, however, Lvere still objective
analysts b t ~ n u s ethey \verc confined to the evaluation of mcans, *lot to the
cstal~lishmentof cnds. This perception of planning, which is still the most
popular vicmv, is more modest than the previous view of planning as a tcdi-
nical excrcise performed by a group of independent experts above politics. ~

Planners as referees
Daikloff and Reiner had helped rescue the profession from a difficult
dilemma. I-Ion; could planning b e 1)oth a technical exercise requiring the
services of professionals and a political exercise? The formal distinction
between ends being set by clients and means identified arid evaluated by
experts seeined to prolide a satisfactory solution, But just as this new view
was gaining popularity, attention was drawn to several case studies of
postxvar planning which raised increasing doubts about the nature of tlie
profession.
One case study by AIeyerson and Banfield examined planning in Chicago
during thc 1950s and discovered the reality of planning practice was far
different from the theories of planning developed by people such as David-
off and Reiner.!‘ Instead of being a rational activity managed by a group of
experts guided by a body of accepted scientific theory, planning was a
seemingly irrational process dominated by petty political concerns that
had nothing to do with science.
This conclusion was supliortecl by another major case study by Altshuler
in the 1 9 6 0 ~ .Hc
’ ~ discoxwed that the goals and objectives that were sup-

8 Da\.idoff and Reincr, “ A Choice Theory of Planning,” 13. 113.

9 51. lfcycrson and E. Banfield, P ! o t i i i i i i g , Politicy a i d the Public Interest ( Glencoe:
Free Prcss, 1955).
10 )I, rlltshuler, The City Plartttiiig Procen (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965).

404 CAS ADI AS PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

 THE ROLE OF THE PROFESSIONAL PLANSER

posed to guide the planning process were never well articulated and that
the decisions had little to do with expert advice. Further, Altshuler ques-
tioned whether planning could even be considered a profession. Its prac-
titioners did not appear to have a clearly recognized function nor a body
of scientific theory to guide their analysis.
Inspired by these and other case studies, American political economist
Charles Lindblom developed a new theory of planning which was not as
flattering to the profession as Davidoff and Reiner’s.ll Lindblom’s theory
was based on a view of society commonly known as pluralism. According
to this view, society was comprised of a small number of competing interest
groups who lobbyed government for certain policies. These interest groups
were often forced to forge certain alliances with each other and make trade-
offs in order to garner necessary support. The state, meanwhile, was sup-
posed to be an independent adjudicator seeking out compromises and
refereeing conflicts between competing interest groups. The electoral pro-
cess forced politicians to seek out compromises that pleased the greatest
number of interest groups thereby generating the greatest number of votes.
Lindblom maintained that it was through this seemingly chaotic process,
which he referred to as partisan mutual adjustment, that the public interest
could best be realized.
Public policy, then, was the outcome of a bargaining process between
interest groups mediated by the state. Planning, therefore, was an incre-
mental process of seeking compromises instead of a comprehensive rational
process based on technical analysis. Ideally, the planner would consider
only limited ends and limited means for realizing them. The ends would
normally consist of short-term problems and the means would differ only
marginally from existing programs and policies. This was realistic, argued
Lindblom, because politicians and interest groups would rarely accept
anything but minor change anyway. Further, minor changes would allow
planners to learn the implications of certain policies without making monu-
mental errors.
The evaluation of means would be based on the extent of agreement and
not on any rational effort to evaluate means in light of some specified ends.
Lindblom maintained that ends were implied in policies and therefore a
debate on appropriate policies was all that was necessary. Lindblom con-
cluded that this process of incremental planning was more democratic,
cheaper, more workable and more likely to lead to action than the compre-
hensive, rational theories proposed by people such as Davidoff and Reiner.
This theory of incremental planning demoted planners to the status of
11 C. Lindblom, “The Science of Muddling Through,” Public Administration Review
(Spring 1959), pp. 79-88; C. Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy (New York:
Free Press, 1965); C. Lindblom, The Policy-Making Process (Englewood Cliffs,
Prentice-Hall, 1968).

405 ADMINISTRATION PUBLIQUE DU CANADA

 T.I. G U S T O S

referees assisting intercst groups and politicians in reaching acceptable

compromises. It stripped planning of any pretence of objectivity. Planners,
feeling somewhat uncomfortable about this demotion, soon mounted a
counter-attack. Some planners attacked Lindblom for making an illogical
step in liis analysis.’? They agreed with Lindblom’s description of planning
as an incremental process. They admitted that comprehensive planning
was a utopian ideal that could nei’er be fully realized bccause of the diffi-
culties of identifying ends with which ever\.one could agree, the impossi-
bility of cvaluating all available means, and the inability to predict the
impact of means on the desired ends. But these planners criticized Lind-
blom for concluding that liecausc it was difficult to be comprehensive, plan-
ners should not at least attempt to be comprehensive. Instead of giving up
and undertaking onl!. partial analysis as Lindblom had proposed, these
critics urged planners to strive to make the process as rational and compre-
hensire as possible.
Slany planners seemed to agree, for it was not long before a new genera-
tion of planning tests appeared advocating lxrious types of comprehensive
approaches and illustrating n e techniques
~ that could help realize thc
goal of coinpreheiisi\.eness.‘~These tests, ho\rever, ignored one of Lind-
blom’s main points: thc costs OF being more comprehensive often exceed
the benefits.
This argument \vas dealt with in a third generation of planning texts
which ad\xwatcd a strategic approach to p1anning.l’ According to this
approach?planning should hc an iterativc process. During the first round,
planncrs would run through the ndiole process of setting ends and selecting
means in a Lwy quick and rough WI!~. This first run through the process
could solve the lxoblcm. If not, this first round would identify where more
analysis was required. Thc planners would then run through the process
again and again until the problem was solved. T h y would, then, start off
being incremental and beconic, increasingly comprehensive as the problem
required. This, it \\.as argued, \\.auld synthcsizc the strengths of both incrc-
mental planning and comprehr:nsi\-e planning while avoiding the defici-
encies of both.
A second attack on incrementalism challenged the very notion of plural-
ism on which the whole theory rested. These critics assembled substantial
13 .I,Etzioni, “lfixed-scanning: A Third Approacli to Decision-making,” Pzrblic Ad-
n~it~istrafiott Recictc. 97 ( 1967 ). pp 385-95; Y. l h r , “Slucldling Through - Science
or Inertia?” Pzrblic Atlrnitiirirofiori R ~ ci et c,24 ( 1961) pp. 153-57; A , Faludi, Plaming
Theory (Oxford: Pergainon, 1973).
13 See, for exnnq>le,J. B r i m ?rfcLoiighlin, Crrbati arid Regional Plannirig, A S!l.ytem.y
A p l ~ r o a ~( hLondon: Fnber, 1969).
14 See, for example, ,4. Hickling, Mutiaging Deciuiot~s:the Strategic Choice Approach
(Rugby: Slantec: 1974); F. Sttiart Chapin and E. Kaiser, Urban Land Use P h n i f l g
(Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1979).

406 CASADIAX PUBLIC ADAIINISTRATION

 THE ROLE OF THE PROFESSIONAL PLANNER

evidence showing that society was not comprised of a number of small

interest groups. Instead, it was dominated by certain groups where exces-
sive power made the contest of bargaining very unequal and undemocratic.
In Canada, it was pointed out that most sectors of the economy were con-
trolled by just a few large corporations. The four largest banks, for example,
controlled 80 per cent of the banking industry and 25 per cent of the total
directorships of the dominant corporations in the country. These corpora-
tions were controlled by the richest 1 per cent of the population which
owned 42 per cent of all the shares and by the less than one thousand men
who controlled the directorships. The state, meanwhile, was far from neu-
tral. According to one study, 25 per cent of the cabinet ministers in 1973
were from large corporations and 47 per cent of the controllers of the major
corporations had various advisory positions in government. This direct
representation was augmented by the substantial influence obtained by
donations to politicians. In 1974-75, the leading twenty-five corporations
gave $400,000 to the two major political parties.15
Lindblom himself was finally forced to acknowledge that society was
not pluralistic. In the most recent edition of his text on policy-making he
concluded that business indeed had an undue influence. In his words:
Business does not enter into these activities on a parity with other groups -
consumer, labour, professional and veteran’s groups among others. These other
groups depend on electoral activity as their main source of influence over gov-
ernment. For business people, electoral activity merely supplements the con-
trols they already exercise through their privileged position in government.1°
This concentration of power raises serious doubts about the role of plan-
ning and planners. If the state responds to public pressure and the most
effective pressure emanates from business, public planners must operate
disproportionately in the interests of business. More will be said about this
later.

Planners as advocates
Both Davidoff and Reiner and Lindblom’s theory of planning denied that
planning could ever be objective. Events in the 1960s seemed to confirm
this. Planning decisions involving the destruction of certain neighbour-
hoods or the building of infrastructure servicing particular groups clearly
revealed how political planning really was.
In an important article, Davidoff developed a theory of advocacy plan-
15 W. Clement, Canadian Corporate Elite: An Analysis of Corporate Power (Toronto:
McClelland and Stewart, 1975), pp. 19, 125-71; W. Clement, “The Corporate Elite,
The Capitalist Class and the Canadian State,” in L. Panitch, ed., The Canadian State,
Folitical Economy and Political Power (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977),
pp. 225-51.
16 Lindblom, The Policy-Making Process, p. 78.

407 ADMINISTRATION PUBLIQUE DU CANADA

 T.I. CIJSTOS

ning founded on the view that no aspect of the planning process including
the evaluation of alternative means could ever be value-free and few, if
any, major planning issues could ever be resolved by technical analy~is.’~
According to this theory, planners would become advocates for particular
interest groups. Each interest group would, with the assistance of the plan-
ner, develop its own plan and defend it in an open forum similar to judicial
hearing. By having the debate in the open instead of suppressing it under
the guise of objective analysis, tlie planning process would be greatly im-
proved. Government agencies would be forced to defend their proposals,
possible deficiencies n.ould be more readily identified, mole options would
be consiclered, critics would be forced to play a more constructive role, and
the bargaining process would be more equitable because weaker groups
w~ouldhave professional advocates.
Davidoffs theory of advocacy planning helped restore the status of the
profession. In addition to their traditional roles, planners could now be-
come rocial reformers using their technical skills to assist the disadvan-
taged. This vie\\, found increasing favour among the more progressive,
vounger members of the profession who advanced Davidoffs theory of
advocacy to the point where planning \vas equated with progressive re-
formism .I‘
Not all planners were satidkc1 with advocacy planning. Some prominent
planners, \vho did not nxnt to accept that planning was a partisan affair,
dcvcloped new, rnorc) sophi5ticated techniques of planning in the hope of
resurrecting thc profession to the status of independent experts instead of
a group of gunfighiers for hire. Others attacked ad\occicy on the grounds
that it assumed that arming disadvantaged groups with rational arguments
could change the decision.]!’ These critics emphasized that because of the
dominant role played by business, the state was not an independent adju-
dicator objectively aswssing all points of view in the manner of a judge or
jurv. Ultimately, the same people made the decisions regardless of the
participation of advocates and these decisions would still be biased to-
.rvards thc dominant groups. Further, advocacy planning could actually
reduce the power of the disadvantaged by channelling their efforts into the
relatikely futile task of preparing alternati\ve plans instead of engaging in
more effecti\ e political pressure. In the Ivords of David Harvey, advocacy
drew protest movements into a system where the rules had been defined by
the dominant interests. The participants ~voulclbe indoctrinated with pre-

17 P. Dayidoff, “Advocacy and Pluralism i n Planning,”JAZP, 31 ( 1965), pp. 331-38.

18 L. Peattic. “Reflections on Advocacy Planning, ”JAIP, 34 (19681, pp. 80-88; H.
Cans, People and Plans (London: Rasic Books, 1968).
19 D. Aiazziotti, “Underlying Assumptions of Advocacy Planning,” J A I P , 40 ( 1974),
lip. 38-47; P. Coodnran, After tlzc Platinem (Kew York: Simon and Schuster, 1971);
‘r.Blair, Tlie Powrty of Platitiitig (London: \facDonald, 1973).

408 CAKADIAS PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

 THE ROLE OF THE PROFESSIONAL PLANNER

vailing ideology and, in the end, the protest movement would be defused.20
Also, as other critics suggested, the disadvantaged would never be given
adequate resources by dominant interests if they successfully challenged
the distribution of power. As Robert Goodman concluded:
The poor could direct their own welfare programmes, have their own lawyers,
their own planners and architects, so long as the economic structure remained
intact - so long as the basic distribution of wealth and hence real power, re-
mained constant.21

Planners as bureaucrats
Over fifty years ago, the eminent social scientist Max Weber identified the
emergence of bureaucracy as one of the most important features of a
modern industrial society, For Weber, a bureaucracy was a complex, hier-
archical organization governed by a strict set of rules to which all members
submitted.
Since Weber’s time, the dramatic growth of public bureaucracy has been
the subject of continuing debate. As previously mentioned, conservatives
such as Von Hayek viewed bureaucrats as dangerous agents subverting
democracy by imposing their own values on society. Liberals and socialists
defended public bureaucrats from this attack by emphasizing that bureau-
crats simply identified appropriate means for implementing ends which
had been given to them by the politicians who were forced by the demo-
cratic process to act in the public interest.
During recent years, this rather simplistic model of politics adopted by
socialists and liberals has been subjected to a thorough critique. Liberals
such as Lindblom and Downs admitted that the dynamics of interaction
between the electorate and politicians were substantially more complex
than previous political theories had implied. However, they still concluded
that the democratic process was an adequate mechanism for ensuring that
the public policy was in the public interest.22
A number of other analysts disagreed. These critics, who have been re-
ferred to as neo-conservatives or public choice theorists, maintained that
the participants in public policy-making had to be analysed as individuals
maximizing their self-intere~t.2~ Beginning with this rather standard neo-
20 D. Harvey, “On Planning the Ideology of Planning,” R. Burchell and G. Sternlieb,
eds., Planning Theory in the 1980s: A Search for Future Directions (New Brunswick,
N.S.: Centre for Urban Policy Research, 1980), pp. 213-33.
21 Goodman, After the Planners, p. 141.
22 Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy; A. Downs, An Economic Theory of
Democracy (New York: Harper Row, 1957 ) .
23 See, for example, W. Niskanen, Bureaucracy and Representative Government
(Chicago: Aldine, 1971); A Breton, The Economic Theory of Representative Gooern-
rnent (Chicago: Aldine, 1974); M. and R. Friedman, Free to Choose (New York:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979 ).

409 ADMINISTRATION PUBLIQUE DU CANADA

 T.I. GUXTOU

classical assumption, the public choice theorists argucd that the democratic
intcrplay between interest groups, politicians and the bureaucracy is in-
capable of realizing the public interest. One problem is that the larger the
interest group and the Inore diversified its objectives werc, the less moti-
vated each individual n.ould be to participate. This is because the benefits
per participant would be small arid u~ouldaccrue to all members of the
group whether they participated or not. Thc result was what has been
termed the problem of concentrated benefits and diffused costs. It would
b e in the interest of each narro\v lobby group to force governments to
implemcnt programs whose cost would be horn by all taxpayers but whosc
benefits accrued to the special interest groups. Because the benefits per
lobbyist would be substantially greatcr than the costs per taxpayer, the
lobbyists would be very active while the general taxpayer ~ o u l have
d little
incentive to organize.
For esample, subsidies to the Arnerican merchant marine cost about $600
million per year or $3 per American. Few citizens are motivated to lobby
against this program to sa1.e $3. The recipients of the subsidy, however,
receive $lS:OOO per year per recipicnt and arc, therefore, highly motivated
to lobby for such a policy.”
Public choice theorists also emphasized that democratic elections do not
ensure that the politician is responsive to the public interest. Tullock and
Buchanan, for cJxamplc, pointed out in one of the definitive books on public
choice that elections siinply allow 51 per cent of the population to impose
their vien.s on 49 per cent.?; This “tyranny of the majority” is relevant to
planning where majorities have consistently frustrated public needs by
supporting restrictive regulations that prevent the construction of afford-
able housing for the poor. Further, because electorates can’t vote on each
issue but must accept a package of policies, because there are strong bar-
riers which restrict thc entry of neu~political parties and because the elec-
torate rarely undertakcs comprehensive analysis of party performance and
party platforms, politicians have some freedom to deviate from public
preferences. Overall, the rcsult is unsatisfactory. As Milton Friedman
concluded:
130th the fragmentation of power and the conflicting government policies are
looted i n the political realities of a democratic system that operates by enacting
detailed and specific legislation. Such a system tends to give undue political
p o v w to small groups that have highly concentrated interests, to give greater
\!,eight to ob\.ioiis, direct, and immediate effects of government action than to
possibly more important but concealed, indirect, and delayed effects, to set in
motion a process that sacrifices the general interest to serve special interests

24 Friedman, Free to Choose, pp. 292-93.

25 G. T~illockand J. Buchanan, C a h l t r s of Cotiretit (Ann Arbor: University of Michi-
gan Press, 1962 ) .

410 C:AKADIAK PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

 THE ROLE OF THE PROFESSIONAL PLANNER

rather than the other way round. There is, as it were, an invisible hand in politics
thal operates in precisely the opposite direction to Adam Smith's invisible hand.26
Even if the political process ensured that politicians represented the
public interest, the bureaucracy would prevent such ends from being real-
ized. For, as a number of authors have argued, planners are not simply
instruments following directives from politicians. In two particularly co-
gent books, American social scientists Breton and Niskanen identified the
goals of bureaucrats as prestige, income, security and power.27 To realize
these ends, bureaucrats attempt to expand their budgets, extend their regu-
latory controls and monopolize strategic information. Planners, then, are
self-serving individuals arbitrarily expanding their power by imposing un-
necessary and counter-productive regulations on society. As John Fried-
mann concluded after analysing his extensive planning experience:
. . . Planning is conservative, and planners are ordinary bureaucrats who crave,
as much as any official does, the security of a career, the promise of regular ad-
vancement, and the prospect of eventual pension. . . . It [planning] takes ac-
count of the public interest only to the minimum extent required for the mainte-
nance of the organization . . . . From the perspective of a planning office, the
view that planning is an instrument for bringing the historical development of
man under the guide and influence of rationally formulated and rationally
chosen goals appears sheer nonsense.28
Most public choice theorists have concluded that the solution to these
difficulties is to restrict the role of government and let private markets
allocate resources. Milton Friedman, for example, has proposed amending
the American constitution to legally prevent government from growing
beyond a particular size.

Planners as state agents

Liberal theorists such as Lindblom have portrayed the state as a neutral
referee adjudicating between the highly decentralized interest groups in
society. Conservatives such as Breton and Niskanen have attacked this
pluralist view on the grounds that bureaucrats have independent power
which they use to realize their own aspirations. Another critique of the
pluralist model has been made by what have been termed the neo-Marxists
who recently have made several major contributions to the planning theory
literature.2DAlthough there are significant differences between neo-Marxist
26 Friedman, Free to Choose, p. 292.
27 Niskanen, Bureaucracy and Representative Gouernment; Breton, Economic Theory
of Representative Government.
28 J. Friedmann, Retracking America, A Theory of Transactive Planning (New York:
Doubleday, 1973), p. 12.
29 See, for example, Chris Paris, ed., Critical Readings in Planning Theory (Oxford:
Pergamon Press, 1982).

411 ADMINISTRATION PUBLIQUE DU CANADA

 T.I. GUXTOS

authors, they begin with the assumption that the state and public policy
can only be understood by analysing it as a component of the society as a
whole. Central to this analysis is the observation that capitalist societies
arc characterized by increasing conccntrations of wealth and economic
power and by recurring periods of crisis.
The first obserjration, which has been convincingly substantiated by
Miliband and Clement among others, i m d i d a t c s the vicw that \Vestern
society is pliiralistic.30 Following from this, neo-Marxists such as Miliband
have maintained that the state is largely an instrument of the dominant
class. I t defends esisting social relations and supports private accumula-
tion by providing necessary infrastructure and subsidies. The election of
different governments has little impact on the state because the politicians
lack the power or knowledge to control the enormous bureaucracy or the
powerful private interests n4iic.h the bureaucracy serves. Miliband has
substantiated this by presenting evidence which shows that, despite the
tilection of socialist governments, the distribution of wealth, income and
polver has not changed.
Some neo-llarxists have suggested that this “instrumentalist” view of
the state as agents of capitalists is too simplistic. Poulantzas and O’Connor,
for example, have argued that the state is a complex organization embody-
ing the class conflicts that characterize society as a I t is not a
simple instrument of any one class but is, instead, a semi-autonomous insti-
tution that maintains social harmony, protects the status quo and expedites
economic expansion. The dilemina faced b!, the state is that these functions
arc often conflicting. The crises endemic to capitalism require constant
interjrentions that, at times, challenge the rights of private capital. In addi-
tion, the interest of various components of capital often conflict with each
other. These class conflicts require intervention by the state, which sup-
ports the interest of the dominant class but must, at the same time, appear
to be neutral. As O’Connor observes:
Our first premise is that the capitalistic state must try to fulfill two basic and
often contradictory functions - accumulation and legitimization. This means that
the state must try to maintain or create the conditions in which profitable accii-
mulation is possible. Ho\vever, the state also must try to maintain or create the
conditions for social harmony. A capitalist state that openly uses its coercive
forces to help one class accumulate capital at the expense of other classes loses
its legitimacy and hence undermines the basis for loyalty and support.3’

Planners, then, are inevitably forced to defend the status quo regardless
of their own political persuasion. The experience with urban renewal, hous-
30 R . ~liliband,The State i i i Capitalist Socief!/ (New York: Basic Books, 1969);
Clement, Canadian Corporate Elitr.
31 J. O’Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State (New York: St. Xlartin’s Press, 1973);
S . Poulantzas, Politico1 Poiccr a ~ Social
d Clays (London: Ncw Left Books, 1973).
32 O’Connor, Fiscal Crisis 01 flte State, p.6.

412 CANADIAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

 THE ROLE OF THE PROFESSIONAL PLANNER

ing subsidies, zoning and the provision of infrastructure to facilitate private

appropriation of land rents illustrates that there is some validity to this
view. As Robert Goodman has concluded after reviewing American plan-
ning practice: “At best we [planners] help ameliorate the conditions pro-
duced by the status quo; at worst we engage in outright d e s t r ~ c t i o n . ” ~ ~
Ironically, the neo-Marxist position shares some similarities with the
pluralist and conservative views. Both the pluralists and conservatives em-
phasize that public policy can only be understood as an outcome of politi-
cal and economic forces both within and outside the state. This is clearly
consistent with the neo-Marxist view. The difference, however, is that the
neo-Marxists have shown that power is not equitably distributed, but is
highly concentrated in the hands of powerful elites who have undue in-
fluence on policy. If the conservatives and liberals accepted the evidence
illustrating the high degree of concentration of power, they would be
forced by their analytic framework to come to similar conclusions. Lind-
blom’s recent conversion is a case in point.

Plannersas social learners

During the 1970s, it was increasingly difficult for planners to ignore the
mounting criticism. Inadequate technical skills, subversive interest group
behavior, self-serving bureaucratic tendencies and inequalities in the dis-
tribution of wealth and power appeared to make rational planning an
impossible dream. However, while the critics cogently attacked the rational
model of planning, they had not proposed much in the way of alternatives.
Consequently, one group of theorists developed an alternative which at-
tempted to overcome some of these problems.
The underlying theme of this alternative, which could be termed the
social learning approach is that theory based on past observations is an
inaccurate guide to action. Analysts such as Bolan, in a recent article on
planning theory, have concluded that because “every planning episode . . .
can be said to be unique in some measure,” it is simply impossible to ever
formulate general theories on the basis of practice.34 Instead, theory can
only be developed on the basis of each unique episode and must be
discarded when the event terminates. Practice and theory must be inte-
grated as one function and planners and clients must be united in a mutual
learning exercise instead of separated into distinct roles. Further, planners
and clients must get to know each other as complete people with emotions
and values instead of as simply clients and planners.
In this model, planners are expected to be expediters, helping clients to
set goals, develop plans and implement policy in the same way that a psy-
chiatrist assists his patient to understand himself. Advocates of this ap-
33 Goodman, After the Planners, p. 13.
34 Richard Bolan, “The Practitioner as Theorist: The Phemenology of the Professional
Episode,” JAPA, 46 (1980) pp. 261-74.

413 ADMINISTRATION PUBLIQUE DU CANADA

 T.I. GUSTOX

proach, such as Friedmann, Schon and Bolan, stress that the skills required
are communication and group tlynamic skills, not traditional technical
skills. Innovative institutions siich as small task groups and large assemblies
are proposed as means of achieitng this integration of roles and mutual
learning.

Plannersas social reformers

About the same time that the social learning model was being developed,
another group of theorists were formulating a more radical role for plan-
ners. Like the social learning theorists, the radical theorists accepted most
of the criticisms of the rational model. In particular, authors such as Illich,
Grabow and Heskin identified policy analysts as self-serving professionals
15.hosurreptitiously impose their values on society by defining problems in
a manner which discourages if not precludes broad participation.3z Pro-
fessionals cultivatc dependency in order to maintain power and prestige.
The solution does not lie in advocating “social learning” which merely
perpetuates the privileged position of the profession, nor reducing the role
of government without tackling problems of private concentration of
power, nor relegating planners to the role of referees in an unequal world.
Instead, planners must become social reformers committed to funda-
mental social change involving redistribution of power and wealth and the
rejection of self-serving technology and complexity that gives technocrats
power based on their superior knowledge. Planners engaged in social re-
form must create more decentralized and more self-sufficient social units
based on worker ownership and community cooperatives ancl communes
where professional planners are ultimately eliminated.

Reviewing the alternatives

As the foregoing discussion reveals, there arc now a number of alternative
planning roles, each of which has strengths and weaknesses. The view of
planners as technocrats niistakenly assumes that planning is an objective
exercise ancl that planners have superior values and goals. Recent theory
convincingly shows, however, that planning is by definition a political
exercise in the sense that it seeks certain ends which cannot be scientifically
verified. Hence, to advocatc a role for planners which is above politics is
totalitarian. Such a view proposes allowing a professional elite to impose
their values on society. Also, the empirical studies of planning practice
rcveal that this theory offers little insight into what function planners actu-
ally perform. Therefore, this theory fails as both a normative prescription
of what planners should do as well as an empirical description of what they
35 Iyan Illich, ed., Disabling Professionr (Don Xlills: Burns and MacEachern, 1977);
Stephen Grabow and Allan Heskin, “Foundations for a Radical Concept of Planning,”
JAPA, 39, (1973),pp. 108-11.

414 CANADIAS PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIOM

 THE ROLE OF THE PROFESSIONAL PLANNER

do. Nonetheless, research by Jacobs and Meltsner demonstrates that plan-

ning can be more effective if planners have a strong set of their own values
and political skills to implement it.36
The public servant theory is certainly the most popular description of
both what planners do and what they should do. The empirical studies,
however, show that it is rather an inaccurate description of the planning
process. Also, as a normative prescription it has a number of glaring weak-
nesses. Most importantly, it incorrectly assumes that existing political insti-
tutions provide appropriate ends and that public bureaucrats perform a
value-free role evaluating alternative means to achieve public ends.
The incremental theory of Lindblom is an accurate description of how
public policy is formulated. Also, although Lindblom incorrectly assumes
that because incrementalism is an accurate description of how planning
works it provides a guide to how planning should work, his theory still
offers several contributions to the search for a normative model. The idea
of planning as a bargaining process and the questioning of using compre-
hensive techniques regardless of the nature of the problem are particularly
important. However, as both the neo-Marxists and neo-conservatives have
illustrated, Lindblom’s theory has major weaknesses as both a normative
model and as an empirical description of how planning works. These weak-
nesses are a result of the pluralist assumption on which the theory is based.
The advocacy theory offers an attractive normative model of planning.
Most importantly, it emphasizes how value-laden planning is, even when it
focuses on just the evaluation of alternative means for realizing clients’
goals. However, in the form in which it is presented the theory suffers from
serious weaknesses. The rather naive assumption that the provision of
technical experts will provide weak groups with sufficient strength to com-
pete in the bargaining process is particularly suspect. Major planning de-
cisions are not made on the basis of rational debate. Also, as the neo-
conservatives point out, interest group bargaining is unlikely to operate
in the public interest. Therefore advocacy has failings as both a positive
and a normative model of planning.
The neo-conservative theories provide a powerful critique of the public
sector and public participation in policy-making. The view of planners as
self-serving bureaucrats with independent power and the counter-produc-
tive dynamics of interest-group behaviour are of particular significance.
However, neo-conservatives exaggerate the power of public bureaucracies,
particularly planners, and ignore the problems of corporate concentration.
The normative prescription of returning to private markets ignores the

36 J. Jacobs, Making C i t y Planning W o r k (Chicago: American Society of Planning

Officials, 1978); Allan Meltsner, Policy Analysis in the Bureaucracy (Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press, 1976 ).

415 ADMINISTRATION PUBLIQUE DU CANADA

 T.I. GUSTOS

problems of markct failure that forced the state to intervene in the first
place.
Like the neo-conservati\m, the neo-Marxists maintain that the role of
planners cannot be understood without examining the broader forces in
society. I\%le there is considerable evidence supporting neo-Marxists’
views regarding the bias of public policy, the categories used are too gen-
eral and provide little insight into why some nations such as Sweden have
been more interventionist than countries such as the United States. The
structuralists, in particular, underestimate the possibility of reform, thereby
discouraging organized pressure groups from acting. The neo-Marxists
also offer little in the way of a normative prescription of how planning
ought to be organized. As the experience in socialist societies reveals, this
is far from a facile question.“’
The social learning theorists accept the criticisms of the rational plan-
ning model. Unlikc other critics, ho\vever, they have put considerable
emphasis on devising an alternative normative model of how planning
should be organized. But while the model as developed by Friedmann has
attractive features, it is naively utopian in most respects. The “theory in
practice” emphasis of authors such as Bolan and Schon is devoid of any
real guide to action. Clients are unlikely to hire policy advisers who have
no real body of theory beyond the desire to become intimately connected
with their clients. Sonetheless, the social learning approach does empha-
size the importance of constantly re-evaluating theory in light of practice,
and in fully understanding clients’ needs.
Social reformers have also attempted to formulate an alternative norma-
tive model that mitigates the deficiencies in the rational model. The
strength of the social reformer role is that it recognizes that the success of
democratic planning depends on fundamental institutional changes, which
provide some semblance of equality in the bargaining process. However,
like the social lcarning theorists, the social change theorists suffer from
naive utopianism. As much of the research on planning practice shows,
planning is simply ineff ecti\.e 1% hen it proposes radical solutions. There-
fore, by ignoring the constraints on what is possible, social reformers will
tend to be relegated to the role of observers who have little influence on
policy.
In sum, none of the alternative theories on the role of planners offers a
valid description of how planning works or a normative prescription of
how it should work. II‘hile some planners may be disturbed by this, the
failure to identify an acceptable role should be viewed positively, for as
37 For a good critique of neo-lfarxkt planning thcory, see Clem r\lcDougnll, “Theory
and Practice: A Critique of the Political Economy Approach to Planning,” in Patsy
IIealy ct al., eds., Platining Theory: Prorpects for the 1980s (Oxford: Pergamon Press,
1982), pp. 2 3 - 7 2 ,

416 CAXADIAX PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

 THE ROLE OF THE PROFESSIONAL PLANNER

epistemologists such as Kuhn have emphasized, the existence of a domi-

nant paradigm can impose a set of blinkers impeding inquiry and restrict-
ing action.38 The broad range of alternative roles and approaches, then,
helps guard against narrow vision. In fact, because the alternative roles
are not mutually exclusive, planners can switch approaches depending on
the nature of the planning e n ~ i r o n m e n t . ~ ~
Any attempt to devise a new and comprehensive role for planners, or to
argue that one of the existing roles is superior, is, therefore, both counter-
productive and fruitless. Instead, planners should learn how to adapt their
roles to various planning environments in the same way they employ alter-
native techniques of analysis depending on the nature of the problem and
the availability of data.

38 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of

Chicago Press, 1970).
39 M.L. Vasu, Politics and Planning (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1979); F. Howe, “Role Choices of Urban Planners,”JAPA, 46 (1981), pp. 398-409.

417 ADMINISTRATION PUBLIQUEDU CANADA

View publication stats