Technological Forecasting & Social Change 197 (2023) 122848

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Technological Forecasting & Social Change

journal homepage: [Link]/locate/techfore

Infrastructural or organizational decentralization? Developing a typology

of blockchain ventures
Chloé Ipert *, René Mauer
ESCP Business School - Heubnerweg 8-10, 14059 Berlin, Germany - Jean Baptiste Say Institute for Entrepreneurship

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: Blockchain technology, an institutional innovation, has been a growing research area in recent years, especially
Blockchain within the information system literature. If it brings along opportunities for entrepreneurs, there is no such thing
Entrepreneurship as a theory of blockchain ventures yet. Blockchain technology drives the emergence of unprecedented types of
Decentralization
ventures, with varying degrees of decentralization, both from an infrastructural and organizational perspective.
Typology
Organizations
However, there is no consistency regarding the definitions and labels used to refer to blockchain ventures. This
paper proposes a definition of blockchain ventures and provides a typology distinguishing four ideal types of
blockchain ventures. Our findings reveal that blockchain ventures do not inherently entail either organizational
or infrastructural decentralization. They contribute to a better understanding of the diverse nature of blockchain
ventures and their implications.

1. Introduction new costs, such as inflexibility costs. Blockchain paved the way for
Web3, an emerging market whereby users exchange value without
In 2009, the pseudonymous Satoshi Nakamoto published a white­ trusted intermediaries through blockchain-based protocols (Potts and
paper titled “Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system” (Nakamoto, Rennie, 2019). While Web2 applications function with servers owned by
2019), giving birth to the Bitcoin cryptocurrency. If Bitcoin has emerged specific organizations, Web3 applications use the ledger as the backbone
as the first and foremost cryptocurrency, this is because a major tech­ and applications interact with a combination of public and private
nological innovation lies within its underlying architecture: the so- networks. Thus, Web3 technological stack includes decentralized cloud
called blockchain technology or distributed ledger technology (DLT) solutions to achieve in a decentralized manner file sharing, computing,
(Centobelli et al., 2021). Blockchain technology has been considered metadata, databases, and front-end Web3 applications interacting with
variously as a General Purpose Technology, bearing the potential for the blockchain through a wallet (Voshmgir, 2020).
“broad transformative application across many sectors of the economy Chalmers et al., 2019, 2021 state that technologies, such as artificial
and contribute to multifactor productivity growth” (Bresnahan and intelligence, blockchain and quantum computing impact the design, the
Trajtenberg, 1995; Lipsey et al. 2005), an exchange technology, development and the scaling of ventures. To that extent, these ventures
lowering transaction costs (Catalini and Gans, 2020), and as an insti­ “can grow rapidly without encountering many of the constraints or
tutional technology, offering a “new way of coordinating economic challenges new ventures traditionally face” (Chalmers et al., 2021, p.
activity” (Davidson et al., 2018; Allen et al., 2020; Lumineau et al., 13). Although Web3 bears many entrepreneurial opportunities (Chen,
2021). Blockchain's decentralized transactions processing reduces ven­ 2018), a clear definition and an eventual categorization of blockchain
tures' financing costs (Ahluwalia et al., 2020), which led multiple ven­ ventures are lacking. While major research (Fisch, 2019, Murray et al.,
tures to fundraise “on the blockchain” through token sales (Fisch, 2019; 2019, Momtaz, 2020) provides the basis for initial attempts to define,
Kher et al., 2021). Besides, blockchain alters contracting in the market develop, and differentiate blockchain organizations, each has
and within the organization, enabling emerging decentralized gover­ approached the subject from a different perspective, leading to more
nance models (Murray et al., 2019, Lumineau et al., 2021). Hence, the divergence. As a result of this confusion, theorists have referred to
use of self-autonomous smart contracts impacts organizational trans­ blockchain in a variety of ways: (a) an enabler of new ventures ideas
action costs, notably by reducing existing agency costs and introducing (Chalmers et al., 2019), (b) a disruptor for traditional businesses

* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: cipert@[Link] (C. Ipert), rmauer@[Link] (R. Mauer).

[Link]
Received 1 March 2022; Received in revised form 31 May 2023; Accepted 9 September 2023
Available online 28 September 2023
0040-1625/© 2023 Published by Elsevier Inc.
C. Ipert and R. Mauer Technological Forecasting & Social Change 197 (2023) 122848

(Friedlmaier et al., 2018; Schuelke-Leech, 2018; Frizzo-Barker et al., have the same signaling effects as traditional ventures: patents do not
2020; Chen and Bellavitis, 2020), (c) an institutional innovation spur­ constitute effective signal, while a public technical whitepaper and high
ring new types of organizations and governance modes (Davidson et al., quality code do, in the distributed funding context. In the same vein, the
2018; Murray et al., 2019; Allen et al., 2020), (d) a fundraising mech­ study from Albrecht et al. highlight a positive correlation in between the
anism for entrepreneurs (Fisch, 2019; Kranz et al., 2019; Momtaz, 2020; level of interactivity of a blockchain venture with its Twitter based
Ahluwalia et al., 2020), (e) technology dedicated to networked busi­ community and the amount raised via distributed financing mecha­
nesses (Bons et al., 2020), and (f) a combination of the above (Chen, nisms, thereby highlighting the importance for such ventures to reduce
2018). information asymmetries by utilizing signaling mechanisms on Twitter
This paper aims to clarify what constitutes a blockchain venture by (Albrecht et al., 2019). These positive network effects might not account
displaying a typology of blockchain-enabled ventures. First, we adopt a for blockchain ventures relying upon traditional financing mechanisms.
definition of blockchain venture by drawing on the work by Shane Occasionally, authors use nuances to distinguish varying forms. Friedl­
(2003). We propose that a blockchain venture is an “entrepreneurial maier et al. (2018) describe blockchain ventures as “blockchain-based
venture involving the discovery, evaluation, and exploitation of op­ startups”, referring to ventures which secured venture-capital funding
portunities brought about by blockchain technology to introduce new and “blockchain protocols” typically illustrated by Bitcoin and Ether­
goods and services, ways of organizing, markets, processes, and raw eum. In their study, they removed from the dataset “any ecosystems
materials through organizing efforts that previously had not existed”. classified as cryptocurrencies or digital currencies, as they are not pure
Since blockchain's effect on entrepreneurship is multifaceted, we further blockchain startups but rather different blockchain protocols with little
highlight within a typology four ideal types of blockchain ventures, market capitalization and, by nature of blockchain protocols, are not
provide an adapted characterization and illustrate each of the ideal startups” (Friedlmaier et al., 2018). Protocols have differing character­
types. In sum, the paper makes three main contributions to the litera­ istics as their access can either be regulated for the private blockchains
ture. First, it answers the call for blockchain-related concepts definitions (O'Leary, 2017) or permissionless for the public blockchains (Pereira
pinpointed in an editorial from Electronic Market (Bons et al., 2020) by et al., 2019). They can be open source or private (O'Leary, 2017).
providing a generic definition of blockchain ventures and a typological Chalmers et al. (2019), conducted a qualitative study aiming at
framework. As noted by Bons et al. (2020), the unclarity of concepts analyzing the desintermediation of music industry through blockchain
employed hinders a broader understanding of the technology. In the ventures, and excluded “general blockchain-enabled exchange systems”
same vein, Pereira et al. (2019) remark that the coexistence of various from their analysis, based upon the criteria that they are working across
types of blockchain tokens results in a lack of knowledge when selecting multiple industry context rather than featuring one potential application
the most appropriate incentives system according to the nature of for the music industry. Chalmers et al., while analyzing ventures aiming
blockchain activities and goals. Secondly, our article aims at explaining at disintermediating the music industry, recognize that Blockchain is a
practically the different ways in which blockchain technology can be technological enabler, whose role is both triggering and shaping ven­
leveraged within ventures. Furthermore, Kher et al. (2021) outline that tures itself. In the case of ventures analyzed by Fisch (2019), mostly
blockchain knowledge-based is fragmented and offers little cross- exploring ventures relying on blockchain technology for financing pur­
disciplinary integration while Centobelli et al. (2021) note that block­ poses, blockchain's role would rather be triggering but not shaping.
chain literature predominantly belongs to the IT stream. Lastly, we Murray et al. (2019) analyzed the implications of blockchain on
contribute to the entrepreneurship literature by offering a typology of governance - notably through the use of smart contracts - and offered
blockchain ventures, with four distinct archetypes, bridging existing IT two labels “blockchain-enabled firms” and Decentralized Autonomous
and organizational governance literature. Organizations (DAO). If DAOs do have fully decentralized governance
mechanisms, “blockchain-enabled firms” find themselves along the
2. Theoretical background continuum of governance concentration. They precise that there is a
foundational difference in terms of conflict resolution, in between
In the emerging blockchain entrepreneurship literature, there is a traditional firms using blockchain and relying upon a centralized
variety of constructs inconsistently used to depict blockchain organi­ governance and the ones obeying to a shared decentralized governance,
zations. We will explore the areas of divergences and areas of conver­ such as DAOs. Additionally, Murray et al. note in the extreme case of
gence, and the four convergent sub-dimensions found in the literature: decentralized governance - DAO - multiple shareholders might have
decentralized consensus system, trust, financing, and governance. These more access to the operations of an organization.
subdimensions will serve as the basis for the typology presented in the While Albrecht et al. depict blockchain ventures as relying on
results section. distributed funding instruments, Kranz et al. (2019), focus on distrib­
uted funding mechanisms (“token sales”), noticing that “common
2.1. Areas of divergence misconception about Token sales is that it is a new funding mechanism
only for start-ups based on blockchain technology.” (p.6). In the same
Blockchain Platforms (Pereira et al., 2019), blockchain-enabled vein, Hackober and Bock (2021) underlines that blockchain-technology
ventures (Chalmers et al., 2019) blockchain ventures (Albrecht et al., based ventures might not exclusively leverage decentralized and
2019), distributed ledger ventures (Fisch, 2019), blockchain centralized financing instruments. Lastly, if there is a clear distinction
technology-based ventures (Park et al., 2020; Hackober and Bock, 2021) between traditionally centralized financing instruments and their
decentralized autonomous organizations (Buterin, 2014; Murray et al., emerging alternatives, authors do not employ consistently the same
2019), decentralized applications (Glaser and Bezzenberger, 2015), label. Some of them refer to distributed funding instruments (Albrecht
have all been used to label blockchain native organizations. However, et al., 2019; Chalmers et al., 2019; Fisch, 2019), others use the term
their inconsistent use leads to overlapping constructs and diverging in­ decentralized financing (Chen, 2018; Chen and Bellavitis, 2020; Hack­
terpretations. The following are examples of this. ober and Bock, 2021; Momtaz, 2020).
Within the literature, the term blockchain venture is employed to
describe distinct phenomena: ventures relying on distributed funding 2.2. Areas of consensus
instruments (Albrecht et al., 2019; Fisch, 2019; Chen, 2018), ventures
using blockchain infrastructure as the underlying of their product We first acknowledge that there might be several types of blockchain
(Ahluwalia et al., 2020; Park et al., 2020), or ventures using a decen­ ventures as this variety is mentioned in various articles and outline the
tralized governance framework (Murray et al., 2019). As noticed by consistent definitions we were able to find within the literature. Then,
Fisch (2019), ventures relying on distributed funding instruments do not we adopt a more fine grained approach by highlighting areas of

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consensus both from an infrastructural and organizational perspective, purely digital exchange and a decentralized network that cannot be
which will serve later on as the foundational dimensions for the typol­ controlled (Lee, 2019, Table 1). Gandal & Halaburda describe crypto­
ogy. From an infrastructural perspective, we identify consensus around currencies as decentralized systems, with no central authority validating
the usage of a decentralized consensus system and trust and from an transactions. Hence, they solely rely on cryptography and an incentiv­
organizational perspective, financing and governance. ization system to “control transaction, manage the supply and to prevent
fraud” (Gandal and Halaburda, 2016, p.3). We gathered the consistent
2.2.1. Consistent definitions constructs used within the literature and displayed them in Table 1.
The label Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) is uni­
formly used, consistently with Buterin's initial definition, “featuring 2.2.2. Decentralized consensus system
automation at the center and humans at the edge” (Buterin, 2014). There is a consensus on the importance of system decentralization,
Often, authors employing the label DAO, distinguish with another form and more precisely the decentralization and distribution of the under­
of blockchain organization. While Murray et al. (2019) makes the lying database (Glaser and Bezzenberger, 2015; Voshmgir, 2020; Beck
distinction with blockchain-enabled platforms, involving a certain de­ et al., 2018). Bitcoin cryptocurrency, the first occurrence of blockchain
gree of decentralized governance, Pereira et al. (2019) use the label technology, provides a payment network enabling online payments to be
blockchain platforms to describe decentralized crypto assets infra­ sent from one party to another without relying on intermediaries,
structure such as Bitcoin or Ethereum. Beyond DAOs, another term is guaranteeing system resilience through network decentralization
used in a consistent manner: decentralized application (Dapp). Jonshton (Nakamoto, 2019). Glaser and Bezzenberger (2015) elaborated a tax­
et al. (2014) states that Dapps must be open source and autonomous. In onomy of decentralized consensus systems, emphasizing that the tax­
fact, Voshmgir (2020) underlines that decentralized applications do not onomy is usable “for any conceptual level objects of the domain and is
require running upon an blockchain network, but simply upon a relying on the infrastructure of a decentralized consensus system”
decentralized network (p.30). In the blockchain context, Dapps consist (Glaser and Bezzenberger, 2015, p.12). While the underlying consensus
of a backend, smarts contracts interacting with the blockchain, and a mechanism of a decentralized cryptocurrency is the consensus of the
frontend interface including images, videos, and photos, hostable on protocol itself, the underlying of Dapps, DAO & DAC (Decentralized
decentralized storage networks such as IPFS (Interplanetary Files Sys­ Autonomous Corporation) is the metacoin, which is itself relying upon
tem) (Voshmgir, 2020; p.30; Nizamuddin et al., 2018). Lastly, the term an altcoin, itself relying upon the decentralized cryptocurrency. Pereira
cryptocurrencies depicts software enabling decentralized and disinter­ et al. analyze the boundary conditions of “blockchain-based platforms”,
mediate online transactions using distributed ledger or blockchain as decentralized platforms – such as Bitcoin – versus centralized plat­
technology (Hsieh et al., 2018). Lee characterizes cryptocurrencies by forms, like Amazon or Google (Pereira et al., 2019). They depict
the absence of government or third party monitoring exchanges, a blockchain-based platforms as relying upon a distributed and public

Table 1
Definitions of basic blockchain-concepts usable for organizational purposes.

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access data infrastructure. The drawback of such a decentralized Chalmers et al., 2019; Fisch, 2019) and decentralized (Chen, 2018; Chen
consensus system being its slowness and inefficiency, multiple storage and Bellavitis, 2020; Momtaz, 2020) are both used to depict blockchain
points instead of a central point, these networks might adopt varying related fundraising. Thus, varying degrees of automation might exist,
degrees of decentralization (Voshmgir, 2020). There is a further depending on whether the procedure is fully decentralized and auto­
distinction to be made in between varying types of blockchain protocols mated with smart contracts or distributed when it requires third party
(Beck et al., 2018). While public permissionless blockchain protocols – intervention, as an example, to execute KYC (Know Your Customer)
alike bitcoin network- enable anyone to access, read, edit, and validate procedures.
transactions, public permissioned blockchains require a specific access When the fundraising procedure is automated with smart contracts,
to validate transactions. On the other end, private permissioned block­ there shall be no cost of verification, transportation, tracking, replica­
chains require specific access authorization to edit, read and validate tion, and issuing contracts, and reduced opportunism and environ­
transactions (Beck et al., 2018). In the same vein, Lee differentiates mental uncertainty (Ahluwalia et al., 2020), Lastly, the use of smart
public, private, and consortium blockchains, for which only a defined contracts favors asset specificity as defined assets can be assigned to
group of users can access (Lee, 2019). Hence, the degree of consensus tokens (Ahluwalia et al., 2020). In the distributed funding context, in­
system decentralization of public blockchains tends to be much higher vestors are given tokens in exchange for their investment (Momtaz,
than private, consortiums or public permissioned blockchain. Accord­ 2020) and make their investment decision based upon publicly available
ingly, depending upon the use case, a specific degree of decentralization pieces of information (Fisch, 2019). The tokens are units of value
will be more appropriate. To illustrate, storing customers' financial data functioning as utility or securities (Sameeh, 2018; Voshmgir, 2020).
will require a certain level of privacy, and therefore, a private block­ Token financing, a subtype of crowdfunding usable for certain entre­
chain will be more suitable (Beck et al., 2018). preneurial projects (Bogusz et al., 2020), resolves some crowdfunding's
challenges as tokens can carry ownership stakes (Ahluwalia et al., 2020)
2.2.3. Trust and bypass countries and jurisdictions (Bogusz et al., 2020). However, if
In 2015, The Economist magazine, qualified blockchain as a “trust success factors such as higher technological capabilities (Fisch, 2019)
machine” (October 2015). In the same vein, scholars such as Schmeiss social network interactions (Albrecht et al., 2019) are positively corre­
et al., stated that “BCT-enabled platform ecosystem actors do not lated to the fundraising success, capabilities' exaggeration are also
necessarily have to trust each other with sensitive information but can positively influencing funding success (Momtaz, 2020). The absence of
rely on a single source of truth that is embedded into the technical ar­ institutions (Domingo et al., 2020) verifying signals sent by entrepre­
chitecture of the ecosystem” (Schmeiss et al., 2019, p. 136.). The notion neurs may induce moral hazard in signaling, leading to investors'
of trust is made explicit by Centobelli et al. (2021), advocating block­ disappointment once the fundraising is over and thus increase the
chain as a promising technology for traceability, transparency, tracking, probability of the project's failure (Momtaz, 2020). Entrepreneurs
and trust. The trust dimension relates both to the tamper-proof, trans­ within the blockchain sphere do not rely exclusively on token sales but
parent, and irreversible aspects of the blockchain ledger as well as the might receive investments from established investors simultaneously or
autonomous contracting enabled by smart contracts. As noted by exclusively. Moreover, securing a venture capital investment is a strong
Notheisen et al. (2017), assets can be transacted over a blockchain signal of quality that has a positive effect both on token sales and the
ledger with limited transaction risk, and by mitigating adverse selection mid-term success of the startup (Hackober and Bock, 2021). Conse­
effects in lemon markets reducing fraud risk (Notheisen et al., 2017). quently, multiple modes of pursuing financing might be pursued by
Automatic contracting within blockchain-related ventures (Murray entrepreneurs, in a decentralized, distributed or centralized manner.
et al., 2019; Pereira et al., 2019) enforces contracts, which are translated
in programming language, and automatically executed. While smart 2.2.5. Governance
contracts can mitigate agency and transactional costs, they also generate The last prominent dimension differentiating blockchain ventures
inflexibility costs arising from the need to input third party-information from traditional ones appears to be governance (Buterin, 2014; Murray
through oracles and the autonomous execution of the contracts (Murray et al., 2019; Lumineau et al., 2021). In opposition to centralized plat­
et al., 2019). There are different types of oracles. Software oracles input forms, Bitcoin, and Ethereum are relying upon decentralized decision-
data from online sources, and hardware oracles acquire data from the making and transactions approval, and permissionless entry rules (Per­
physical world through Internet of things devices. Inbound oracles eira et al., 2019). Blockchain is considered as an emerging way to
obtain data from the external world while outbound oracles enable data organize collaborations, to achieve both cooperation and coordination
to be transmitted to the external world. Lastly, consensus-based oracles due to a self-contained and autonomous system of rules (Lumineau et al.,
produce data out of human consensus and prediction markets (Voshm­ 2021). This autonomous system of rules is usually enclosed within
gir, 2020). Finally, automatic contracting comes with the cost of pro­ “smart contracts” (Murray et al., 2019). Hence, regulatory principles are
cessing contracts through the decentralized network. Some agreements inscribed within the protocols and the code, and rules enforcement is
exist that a distinction must be made between automatic contracting in automatically handled by smart contracts, interacting directly with the
the market versus contracting within the organization (Murray et al., ledger. Therefore, the typical contractual governance is translated into
2019; Bons et al., 2020), thereby implying that blockchain bears the programming language (Lumineau et al., 2021). Transactions automa­
potential to alter contracting and trust both for organizational and tion mitigates cooperation failure and potential opportunism (Wil­
market scopes. Hence, the usage of blockchain technology can foster liamson, 1985). Blockchains' immutability allows for the tracking of
trust both at the transaction and the asset levels. transactions and thus favors the elimination of ex-post opportunistic
behavior and ex-ante adverse selection risk through credible reputation
2.2.4. Financing systems (Lumineau et al., 2021). However, they introduce their own set
[Link] literature compares decentralized of costs. The “oracle cost” refers to the need for third party data input,
financing models implying “token sales” or “Initial Coin Offering” (ICO) and leads to information asymmetry Murray et al. (2019). This is why
with traditional venture capital financing (Fisch, 2019; Kher et al., blockchains enable the mitigation of both ex-ante and ex-post oppor­
2021). A notable difference between venture capital financing and tunism, usually salient within typical contractual governance (Lumineau
decentralized financing lies within control rights. While traditional in­ et al., 2021). In addition, blockchain facilitates procedural coordination
vestors have some rights to control or influence the veneers they staked with seamless communication as well as enabling structural coordina­
in, decentralized funding does not automatically deliver such control tion between transacting parties since it is implemented within machine
rights to retail investors (Chod and Lyandres, 2021). Additional varia­ consensus (Hsieh et al., 2018). Similarly, Murray comments that
tions might exist as the words distributed (Albrecht et al., 2019; blockchains alter the typical contracting environment of a firm and lay

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the promise of reducing costs both within the firm and with the market went back to the literature to search for existing definitions and illus­
through the use of smart contracts (Murray et al., 2019). Beck et al. trate each of these archetypes. Having specified each archetype, we
highlighted three main governance dimensions: accountability, decision echoed the discussion of Suddaby (2010) on construct clarity, who
making, and incentives (Beck et al., 2018). Even though smart contracts stated that “theoretical construct has no value if it is not reducible to
bring decentralized governance mechanisms opportunities, Beck et al. specific observations” (p.590), by observing living examples of block­
(2018) observe that there is still a high degree of centralized decision chain ventures. Subsequently, to illustrate the archetypes, we combined
making in the blockchain economy. Accountability is a priori enforced data from secondary sources, such as ventures' internet websites, fund­
technically with smart contracts instead of the institutional methods ing data from Crunchbase or [Link], ventures' communication
employed in traditional organizations. However, if disputes arise, their material, exploratory interviews conducted with blockchain entrepre­
resolution would mostly be achieved within an institutional environ­ neurs, on top of the academic articles.
ment. While having the rules encoded within smart contracts and
decision-making being handled via these smart contracts enable “on- 4. Results
chain” governance, rules and procedures can also be implemented “off-
chain” (Reijers and Coeckelbergh, 2018). “Off-chain” governance en­ We display a typology of blockchain ventures, define and illustrate
compasses both rules potentially adopted by a reference community for the four ideal types: infrastructure-consortium (i), decentralized
the development of a blockchain-based system, as well as rules imposed autonomous organizations (ii), private ledger ventures (iii), and trust-
by third parties -such as standards or laws (Reijers and Coeckelbergh, enhanced ventures (iv).
2018). While Reijers et al. conclude that “off-chain” rules may usurp the
governance system, they may prove particularly useful during the state 4.1. Typology of blockchain ventures
of exception. This state of exception is depicted by the authors through
the illustration of the DAO attack - when the DAO community has been The typology is based on these two distinct dimensions: infrastruc­
asked to either fork and erase the fraudulent transactions or switch to ture decentralization and governance decentralization (Fig. 1). As a
the ETHclassic blockchain protocol, which still contains the attack’ grand theoretical assumption, we emphasize the fact that each of the
transactions (Reijers and Coeckelbergh, 2018). ideal types displayed in the typology (Fig. 2) is optimizing its use of
We first highlighted the divergences found in the literature and then blockchain technology, either for its infrastructural or organizational
the areas of convergence. We have emphasized decentralized consensus decentralization purposes. Further sub-dimensions related to the tech­
systems and trust as two inherent features of blockchain technology, and nological architecture and the organizational logics are explained in
outlined that governance and financing could be two dimensions upon Table 2 and the archetypes illustrated.
which entrepreneurs are able to leverage blockchain for their organi­
zational scope. 4.2. Ideal types

3. Methodology The typology highlights four distinct ideal types of blockchain ven­
tures: infrastructure-consortium (i), decentralized autonomous organi­
As outlined by Doty and Glick (1994), “typologies have proved to be zations (ii), Private Ledger Ventures (iii), and trust-enhanced ventures
a popular approach for thinking about organizational structures and (iv). Each ideal type is illustrated with actual venture cases.
strategies”, particularly as they allow us to identify organizational ideal
types, considering multiple characteristics simultaneously, and enabling 4.2.1. Infrastructure-consortium
us to move beyond the limitations of empirical observations. Hence, it Infrastructure-consortiums tend to have a decentralized governance
aims at combining existing constructs taken from various literature model - spread among multiple organizations and a rather centralized
streams “into a coherent and explanatory set of types” (Cornelissen, architecture. Indeed, they are usually using private types of blockchain
2017, p.3). Since we were aiming at building a typology of blockchain protocols, whose access is not open and partially controlled. While
ventures, we started by adopting Shane's (2003) definition of an entre­ public blockchain have a distributed storage process, private blockchain
preneurial venture and adapted it to the scope of blockchain, in order to have a centralized storage process, only appointed entities can update
have a consistent and coherent understanding of which organizations the ledger and eventually, customers and partners can produce data
would fit into our typology and conducted exploratory interviews with (Ølnes et al., 2017, Table 2). In the infrastructure-consortium context,
blockchain entrepreneurs - aiming at understanding the rationale nodes are accepted based on consensus, blocks are validated according
behind their use of blockchain technology. We reviewed the literature in to specific rules and read rights can be public or restricted to predefined
an attempt to find consensual dimensions, identifying potential attri­ nodes (Lee, 2019). Usually, infrastructure-consortiums emerge from the
butes and collecting a representative set of definitions of various types of alliance of several organizations, sharing a common scope to create and
blockchain ventures (Podsakoff et al., 2016). These consensual di­ a partially centralized blockchain infrastructure to exchange value. The
mensions were subsequently used as the foundational dimensions for protocol generally incorporates a native token, which does not neces­
our typology. We built upon the dimensions found in the literature - sarily bear the functionality of currency. Instead, the native token is
organizational and infrastructural decentralization - as well as four sub- tailored for a specific use case or industrial need. Even though their level
dimensions - governance, financing, consensus system, trust- and we of infrastructural decentralization is residual, they are governed in a
derived four ideal types based upon these overarching and sub- decentralized manner, either on-chain or off-chain, and eliminate the
dimensions. need for a trusted intermediary among those organizations.
Our typology follows the recommendations of Doty et al. (1993), Infrastructure-consortiums result in an enhanced trust and lower
Doty and Glick (1994) and Cornelissen (2017). We made the grand transaction costs at the inter-organizational level. Additionally, the
theoretical assertion explicit, these ideal types aiming at optimizing lower level of decentralization of their technical infrastructure, partic­
their use of blockchain technology and their degree of decentralization, ularly when compared to public and permissionless blockchain en­
either through organizational or infrastructural decentralization. Addi­ hances the speed of transactions and resolves scalability issues (Lee,
tionally, our typology defines the set of ideal types, providing a complete 2019). For infrastructure-consortiums, funding might be needed and
description of each of the ideal types while using the same set of di­ gathered amid the concerned stakeholders, in a more centralized
mensions, and explicitly stating the assumptions about the theoretical manner or distributed, through the use of a token bearing utility, secu­
importance of each construct used to describe the ideal type (Doty and rity or ownership value (Voshmgir, 2020).
Glick, 1994). Once we outlined the ideal types' major characteristics, we We will illustrate with the successful example of the R3 consortium,

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Fig. 1. Representation of the dimensions and sub-dimensions, own conception.

which built Corda permissioned protocol. R3 consortium was launched each of them pegged to a distinct currency (Pilkington, 2022). In 2021,
in 2014, as a cooperation amid banks and financial players with the aim US senators turned down the Diem project, due to Facebook mis­
of creating a permissioned blockchain architecture tailored to proceed demeanors in terms of data privacy. This final regulatory rebuttal led, in
inter-banking transactions. Originally, R3 emerged from the partnering early 2022, to the collapse of the initiative, the sale of its existing assets
of 42 banks and counts as of today over 400 partners. Funding wise, R3 and investors' refund.
received over 112 million dollars from various financial stakeholders
across the globe, such as Natixis, Société Générale, Barclays, ING 4.2.2. DAO
(Crunchbase). Since 2014, R3 developed two main products: Corda, a Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) live upon block­
private distributed ledger technology platform, and Conclave, a chain protocols. The rules of such organizations are encoded in smart
computing platform for multi-party data sharing. The Corda protocol is contracts (Murray et al., 2019) and feature automation at the center and
equipped with a contractual hierarchy made of several layers. At the humans at the edges (Buterin, 2014). Early on, Beck et al. (2018)
core of its network, Corda obeys specific terms of use and includes identified DAOs as “new organizational design” offering different deci­
governing documents. On top of the Corda network, there is a business sion rights, accountability and incentives characteristics when
network rulebook and smart contracts. Corda tokens are used to trans­ compared with traditional organizations. DAOs are pinpointed by
form legal agreements into contractual code. Corda's framework paves Lumineau as the extreme case of blockchain ventures as they facilitate
the way to a “self-contained governance model”, ensuring that trans­ coordination without the implication of any human manager (Lumineau
actions among several identifiable parties are contractually binding, and et al., 2021). Thus, DAOs specify their decisions rights within smart
the related material terms included in related contracts. By contrast, the contracts, which are then automatically applying the “rules”. If disputes
Libra project, initiated by Facebook in 2019, originally gathered 28 arise, there is the possibility of duplicating the blockchain and adapting
founding members, such as Mastercard and Paypal, and ended up un­ it, known as “forking” (Beck et al., 2018). Accountability of each
successfully. The first version of the project envisioned a stablecoin stakeholder is also specified in the network and “delegated to and by the
pegged to a multi-currency basket, but faced strong regulatory opposi­ blockchain” (Beck et al., 2018, p. 26.). Furthermore, DAOs offer a range
tion due to its resemblance to a private global currency. At that point, of incentives to reach technical consensus, maintain and develop the
seven core partners, including Paypal, Stripe, and Ebay, withdrew from system, for users and token holders (Beck et al., 2018). Decentralized
the initiative. In December 2020, the project was rebranded under the Applications (Dapp) are decentrally developed, open access, and
name Diem and offered a different technical setup. Instead of relying controlled by its users (Glaser and Bezzenberger, 2015). They are able to
upon a unique stablecoin, Diem was composed of several stablecoins, redistribute “currency-as-commodity” within a system (Swan, 2015).

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C. Ipert and R. Mauer Technological Forecasting & Social Change 197 (2023) 122848

Fig. 2. A typology of blockchain ventures, own conception.

Table 2
Characteristics of the ideal types, own conception.

While DAOs use tokens as a means of transaction, Dapps use tokens to 2019). The organization raised over 150 million dollars through a token
verify certain conditions and execute commands (Glaser and Bezzen­ sale and suffered from an attack which led to the theft of over 50 Million
berger, 2015). If DAOs communities are generally tiered with various Dollars (Mehar et al., 2019). After the attack, the Ethereum community
types of stakeholders, Dapps communities are completely flat and do not voted to take a decision on whether to cancel the fraudulent transactions
differentiate several types of users. Cryptocurrencies are similar to DAOs from the blockchain. This led to the “fork” of the protocol, hence, the
as they also have a tiered community, but their service focus differs as it duplication of the Ethereum blockchain into two distinct blockchains.
is a token rather than an application (Glaser and Bezzenberger, 2015). Ethereum Classic, the original, includes fraudulent transactions, while
The first DAO attempt was launched in April 2016, under the name Ethereum, the duplication excludes fraudulent transactions. In contrast,
The DAO, aiming at being a decentralized investment fund, giving de­ Ethereum Name Service (ENS), is a distributed, open, and extensible
cision making rights to its stakeholders. Through token ownership, in­ naming service based upon the Ethereum blockchain, which started in
vestors would decide on projects' deal flow worthiness (Murray et al., 2016, as a domain name management system for Ethereum domain

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C. Ipert and R. Mauer Technological Forecasting & Social Change 197 (2023) 122848

names. Based upon an auction principle, ENS was not originally gov­ 4.2.4. Trust-enhanced ventures
erned in a decentralized manner but turned into a DAO in November Trust-enhanced Ventures' products usually rely upon a decentralized
2021 with the implementation of governance token. Token holders are permissionless blockchain protocol. They leverage blockchain to
then able to actively participate in the DAO governance, by voting on enhance trust within the market and offer a service or product tailored
proposals. Since then, ENS is governed by the ENS DAO, whose gover­ for specific purposes, capitalizing upon blockchain protocols' trustless
nance rules are ratified into a specific constitution covering name aspects. From an organizational perspective, they behave in a rather
ownership, incentivization mechanism, incomes, technical integration. centralized manner. Hence, they prefer traditional financial mechanisms
Any modification requires a two-thirds majority approval by at least 1 % -such as venture capital or angel investing- upon distributed funding
of all tokens participating. Token holders can also suggest technical or methods. Finally, they have a centralized governance model in the sense
social modifications which will be executed either on-chain or off-chain. that they don't rely upon smart contracts for organizational logics and
As of today, ENS counts over 64,000 governance token holders and on are rather hierarchically managed. If they aim at using blockchain to
average, each proposal gets 1945 voters ([Link]). [Link], an provide “trustless” systems, it is sometimes by acting themselves as the
online listing gathering existing DAOs, counts over 2360 organizations “trusted intermediaries”. While the Private Ledger Ventures use tokens
(accessed 21.05.2023). Among these organizations, 168 exceed the to engage stakeholders (such as investors, potential customers and de­
threshold of 1 million dollars of Asset Under Management (AUM), 79 velopers), trust-enhanced ventures often use tokens to represent tangible
exceed 10 million dollars and 23 are above the threshold 100 million assets, such as cars, raw materials or digital assets. These tokens serve as
dollars. When it comes to the number of governance token holders - proof of ownership or accountability methods. Assets tokenized can be
stakeholders able to participate within the DAO governance, 294 orga­ either digital or material. In the latter case, an oracle has to input data
nizations gather more than 100 token holders, 210 over 1000 and 101 from the physical to the digital world, thereby generating informational
over 10,000 governance token holders. asymmetries (Murray et al., 2019). Trust-enhanced ventures provide an
added value service built upon public blockchains, which makes them
4.2.3. Private Ledger Ventures rather similar to proprietary software companies building upon open
Private Ledger Ventures have a low degree of decentralization since source infrastructures - such as Red Hat (Lerner and Tirole, 2002). Even
they use blockchain either for financing purposes, or are just belonging though they might have open source components, such as the underlying
to the broader blockchain ecosystem without really using blockchain. architecture of their service or even contribute to the development of an
When they use blockchain for financing purposes, they generally offer open source project, they are not completely open-source. Since they
utility tokens (Voshmgir, 2020) in exchange for distributed investments. mostly offer products and services for commercial or private entities,
The funding process is not managed only through smart contracts and private data tends to be stored “off-chain”, therefore not onto the
might require interactions, such as verifying retail investors' personal blockchain. Private data is linked to “on-chain” data, stored on the
information, known as KYC process. Private Ledger Ventures are pub­ blockchain. As illustrated by Hasan et al. (2020) in their prototype for
licly signaling their capabilities through information publicity (Fisch, the traceability of industrial digital twins, such solutions combine on-
2019). Therefore, patents are almost nonexistent and investors would chain data and off-chain data stored upon IPFS with the use of smart
rather look at their GitHub open source code repositories (Fisch, 2019) contracts. While the pieces of information stored “on-chain” are read­
or ventures' social activities (Albrecht et al., 2019). If theoretically this able and accessible to anyone, the access to “off-chain” pieces of infor­
type of fundraising reduces investors' uncertainty and informational mation -the information which matters for the customers- is restricted.
asymmetries, the absence of institution verifying endogenous signals By combining both types of storage “different privacy levels are realized
might generate moral hazard (Momtaz, 2020). Hence, entrepreneurs through user-specific interfaces” (Notheisen et al., 2017, p.8.).
were revealed to exaggerate their capabilities (Momtaz, 2020), leading As an example, Minespider is a venture connecting companies
to a plethora of unsuccessful projects (Kher et al., 2021) and subsequent working along the supply chain to track the provenance of raw mate­
investors' disappointment. Later on, alternative forms of token sales rials. Their blockchain-based solution aims at reinforcing traceability
emerged such as Security Token Offering, Initial Exchange Offering, and preventing reputational risks for companies working with a multi­
according to different rights or features to their stakeholders and with tude of suppliers. Minespider provides to its customers an API (Appli­
varying regulatory processes (Voshmgir, 2020). cation Programming Interface), composed of two layers. The certificate
Santiment, a Swiss venture based in Zug, is an example of a suc­ layer stores data of authorizations, certificates of origin, transfers and
cessful private ledger venture. The venture was launched in 2017 and production limits while the blockchain layer records the amount of
raised 12,2 million Euros through an ICO, giving out SAN utility tokens metal produced by responsible sources and who owns it ([Link]).
to investors in exchange for their financing. The venture provides data- Hence, anonymized data are encaptured within the transactions stored
driven insights on cryptocurrency networks, blockchain based projects, upon the Ethereum blockchain, while private pieces of information are
crowd sentiment, and market behavior. Santiment has two products: the stored off-chain. Since its creation, Minespider raised 2.9 Million Euros
Sanbase, offering on-chain metrics and daily insights on the crypto­ (Crunchbase), from accelerators as well as European institutions
currency market, and SanAPI, providing pricing and development in­ (EASME, H2020) and involved partners such as Volkswagen, Google, or
formation on over 2000 coins. The SAN tokens are utility tokens and can Cisco. The startup Ascribe appeared in 2013, starting from the assess­
be used to have access to the Sanbase platform as well as a reward ment that digital files can be easily copied. Ascribe launched in 2014 a
mechanism for crowdsourced data insights provided by third parties. beta version aiming at monetizing and proving the unicity of digital
Customers include Bloomberg, Bitfinex, Cointelegraph. Lastly, we would assets, and raised 2 million Euros in 2015 from venture capital investors
give another example of this archetype by including a venture belonging such as Earlybird Ventures, Freelands ventures and Digital Currency
to the Web 3.0 ecosystem. Berchain aims at strengthening the Berlin- Group. However, the venture quickly realized that existing blockchain
based blockchain community by monitoring the ecosystem. To do so, protocols were not scalable enough compared to the volume of digital
they maintain a Slack community with vertical channels and fostering files circulating. Hence, the team simultaneously started the develop­
online discussions within these sub-communities, organize events dur­ ment of a blockchain database infrastructure, BigChainDB, and aban­
ing which the community can physically mingle and occasionally pub­ doned after a while Ascribe as they were not able to focus on both
lish news related to the blockchain ecosystem. Berchain was launched in projects at the same time.
January 2019 and is registered as a tax-exempt not-for-profit organi­
zation in Germany. They live through donations of their members as
well as their involvement into the community.

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C. Ipert and R. Mauer Technological Forecasting & Social Change 197 (2023) 122848

5. Discussion makes sense what your customers and see where you take it”.
From a technical perspective, several modes of consensus co-exist as
5.1. Theoretical & practical implications pictured by Mingxiao et al. (2017). While the Bitcoin consensus mech­
anism - Proof of Work - ensures an extreme degree of security and
Blockchain has a multifaceted impact on entrepreneurship, enabling decentralization, it is energy intensive and has low scalability.
decentralization both at the infrastructure and organization levels, Consensus mechanisms such as Proof of Stake, feature a lower level of
thereby generating multiple organizational forms. While each archetype decentralization since a restricted set of stakers can validate trans­
corresponds to an ideal type and depicts its most prominent character­ actions, but guarantee energy efficiency and higher transaction
istics, there is a continuum along the axis of each dimension and throughput. In November 2020, the Ethereum protocol, which used to
blockchain ventures find themselves somewhere along these axes. Some function with Proof of Work, launched a Beacon chain obeying a Proof of
ventures are centrally operated even though they are dependent on a Stake consensus. If the Ethereum main chain and the beacon chain were
partially decentralized technical architecture such as Minespider, one of running in parallel, with bridges between the two chains, the two chains
the examples presented for the trust-enhanced ventures, some might use merged over the course of September 2022 ([Link]). Addition­
a combination of token sales and traditional financing options. As out­ ally, technical solutions to improve scalability exist such as state chan­
lined by Doty et al. (1993), in an article aimed at analyzing audience’ nels, sidechains, and sharding systems (Voshmgir, 2020). Hence, as
understanding of Mintzberg and Miles and Snow typologies, common pictured by the evolution of Ethereum, the technical architecture -
misconceptions include that every real organization in a sample needs to blockchain protocol - upon which ventures are relying might itself
be classified into one of the nominal groups identified in the theory. change over time, Proof of Stake being slightly less decentralized than
Ideal types are seen as singular and discrete phenomena rather than the original Proof of Work protocol used.
mere nominal categories. Therefore, empirical testing of typologies
should employ a multivariate approach and aim at measuring the degree 5.2. Limitations & avenues for further research
of deviation between each real organization and the ideal types (Doty
et al., 1993). As for the limitations, since blockchain is a complex emerging
DAOs rely upon a decentralized architecture and have decentralized technology, it has various impacts, at the infrastructure, and organiza­
organizational logics. Infrastructure-consortiums rely on a substantial tion levels. It should also be noted that blockchain is still an emerging
level of organizational decentralization even though their underlying technology and the phenomenon of blockchain ventures is constantly
infrastructure is rather centralized. Private ledger ventures have both evolving. As suggested in the precedent section, real blockchain orga­
centralized infrastructure and organizational architectures, even though nizations might not match exactly the presented archetypes, any
they can optionally use distributed fundraising mechanisms. Finally, empirical testing of our typology would require to rate real organiza­
trust-enhanced ventures offer decentralized services and products, tions along the given axes and measure their deviation from the arche­
relying upon a decentralized architecture, while their organizational types. The multivariate approach should involve a variety of criteria
design is centralized. Trust-enhanced ventures quality's signal lies in the depicting the axes. As an example, the number of people owning
investors supporting them and the market traction of their products. governance tokens and the average number of stakeholders voting for
They do not generate moral hazard since they do not rely upon governance-related proposals might be taken into account for the axis of
distributed financing mechanisms. Conversely to Private Ledger Ven­ organizational governance, as well as the type of financing and even­
tures, they might offer investors' control rights by offering equity shares. tually the type of fundraising tokens used. Quantitative studies could
However, they do not reduce uncertainty or opportunism from a also apply longitudinal research methods to explore the evolution of
financing perspective as they do not use blockchain and smart contracts blockchain ventures over time and attempt at spotting some evolu­
for their fundraising. They have a traditional hierarchical organization tionary patterns.
as only their products rely upon decentralized blockchain protocols. Further quantitative studies could also be conducted, gathering a
They do not feature any decentralized incentivization model – such as broad enough sample of blockchain organizations to apply organiza­
tokens to engage stakeholders and create network effects. While their tional management taxonomy methods (Pinder and Moore, 1980). As
underlying blockchain protocols are open source, trust-enhanced ven­ pointed out by Rich (1992) in its overview of the classification process
tures do not usually divulge customers' or partners' data since they build (Fig. 1, p.766), while typologies start with a theoretical or traditional
complementary and on-top services (Lerner and Tirole, 2002) upon lens, taxonomists start with empirical observations and then either
these protocols. If on-chain information storing enables traceability and define a classificatory theory or universe of characters (Rich, 1992). A
accountability (Hasan et al., 2020), off chain resources access is taxonomy would lead to identify empirically aspects and attributes of
controlled. Lastly, if open source is omnipresent within organizationally blockchain organizations which might differ or comply with the ar­
and infrastructural decentralized ventures, such as DAOs, the newness chetypes presented in our results. Additionally, particular attention can
and complexity of the technology creates new principal-agent problems be given to failing ventures in an attempt to uncover variable influ­
as it requires a minimal understanding of blockchain protocols and encing success or failure of blockchain ventures. Lastly, further research
related programming languages. Even though blockchain technology can aim at predicting which type of blockchain ventures would prevail
advocates for decentralization, how to deal with knowledge centrali­ in the future, and hence a Delphi method as suggested by Okoli and
zation? (Voshmgir, 2020). Pawlowski (2004) could be used to do forecasting.
Also, it is worth adding that ventures may evolve over time, partic­
ularly since blockchain is an emerging technology, in continuous 6. Conclusion
development. As an example, Ethereum Name Service became a DAO in
2021, even though the ENS project started in 2016. In 2021, ENS created Conversely to Web2 “internet startups”, which are all based on the
ENS DAO, decentralizing its governance process with governance to­ same infrastructure (i.e., the World Wide Web), Web3 blockchain ven­
kens. This has been highlighted by Centobelli et al. (2021), who tures are blockchain-specific. Since blockchain protocols have a broad
distinguished three stages of evolution - blockchain 1.0, blockchain 2.0 range of non-exclusive features, resulting blockchain ventures can
and blockchain 3.0. Therefore, blockchain ventures might start with embrace multiple forms and governance designs. This article has
very little decentralization to progressively go towards decentralized attempted to define the construct of a blockchain venture to enable
forms of governance and financing. As one of the interviewees further theoretical research. It contributes to the field of emerging
mentioned during our exploratory interviews “the biggest mistake is to try technology use within entrepreneurial ventures by crafting a typology of
to decentralize everything at once. Just start somewhere. And then see if it blockchain ventures and identifying four ideal types of blockchain

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one of which is the expert network Effectuation Intelligence that he is a partner of.
Chloé Ipert is a PhD candidate which holds a Master's degree from ESCP Business School,
with an entrepreneurship and innovation specialization. She has been exploring

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