ISSN: 2535-3241 Vol. 6, No. 2 (2022): 1-20 https://doi.org/10.5617/jea.

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Article

Covid-19 and the Future of Work

From Emergency Conditions to Regimes of Surveillance,
Governance and Optimisation

Anthony Lloyd
Teesside University

Abstract
This paper offers a critical reflection on the impact of Covid-19 and government public
health measures on patterns of work in the UK. This paper will focus specifically on
remote or home workers as this generates myriad questions about the future of work and
employment, particularly in the context of advances in digital technology and the growing
emphasis on environmental inequality, the spectre of climate change and a green
revolution. If the laptop class work from home, they can help control the spread of
Covid-19, tackle climate change and rebalance their lives – we were told. Reflecting on
the pandemic, an assumption of harmlessness underpins home working. Then I look
towards the future and raise questions about the role of digital technology, algorithmic
governance and surveillance in our working lives. As more of us are encouraged to utilise
the latest digital technologies in our working lives, it is crucial to look critically at these
developments and their implications for workers. Working practices deemed necessary to
tackle the pandemic are now part of a long-term future which requires further
interrogation as to whether the short-term and long-term changes associated with digital
technology, algorithmic governance and surveillance also make hidden assumptions of
harmlessness.

Keywords
Covid-19, work, technology, surveillance, algorithmic governance, optimisation, harm

Two years into the Covid-19 pandemic, it is surely uncontroversial to suggest that
patterns of work have changed significantly, even on a temporary basis. As
countries around the world imposed various non-pharmaceutical interventions to
control the spread of disease this included full and partial national lockdowns,
social distancing measures, work from home orders, and business closures (Briggs
et al 2021). In the UK, the government response to these measures included
business loans, a furlough scheme to pay 80% of employees’ salaries, a universal
credit uplift, deferred VAT payments and a self-employment income support
scheme (Hick and Murphy 2021). Other countries provided similar measures with

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varying degrees of efficacy or success (Briggs et al 2021). Temporarily, at least, this

changed where and how people worked and earned a living.

It is possible to divide the UK labour force into five distinct groups who
experienced working through the pandemic in different ways: key workers such as
health care staff, emergency services, transport workers and those working in food
services who continued to work in-person albeit with some restrictions in place
such as social distancing; home workers who transitioned their work online via digital
technologies to work remotely; furloughed workers who were unable to work but were
sent home and paid 80% of their salary until businesses reopened or they were
laid off; newly unemployed who lost jobs due to business failure in the face of
lockdown policies; and self-employed who had variable experiences depending on
their business and government restrictions but were eligible for government
support at the start of the pandemic. This distinction demonstrates the emergence
of inequalities and diverse experiences of working through the pandemic. This
paper intends to focus specifically on remote workers. Although I focus on the UK
here, many of these themes are visible in other contexts. In the first part of the
paper, I will reflect critically on the experience of home working and ask questions
about work-life balance and the use of technology. In the second part of the
paper, I look towards the future of work. The rapid expansion of digital
technologies into our working lives accelerated processes already in motion (Lyon
2018, Susskind and Susskind 2017). It is necessary to think about the role of
technology in our working lives, particularly as we emerge from the pandemic into
new forms of ‘hybrid’ working, with some businesses signalling an intent to close
physical office space and remain online indefinitely (Whitfield 2021). This section
will discuss the role of digital technology at work as a tool of surveillance (Lyon
2018), of governance (Kalpokas 2019), and a broader neoliberal preoccupation
with optimisation (Schildt 2020). Finally, the paper will reflect on the work-life
balance issues of homeworking and look forwards to the technologically-driven
future with a question about the assumption of harmlessness (Raymen 2021).
Essentially, the laptop class was sent home in order to avoid the harms of Covid-19
but the experience of working remotely has not been adequately problematised in
relation to harm. Zemiology and critical criminology have debated social harm for
more than two decades (Hillyard and Tombs 2004; Kotzé 2018) and argued
persuasively that a range of entirely legal processes can have harmful
consequences for individuals, communities and beyond (Scott 2017; Pemberton
2016). Raymen (2021) has recently indicated an assumption of harmlessness
present within our current socio-economic configuration. Much of the debate on
technology and work focuses on how to improve processes, increase efficiency and
optimise performance while seemingly assuming these developments are harmless.
This negation allows various potentially harmful practices to go unchallenged. In
exploring the literature from a critical perspective, this paper challenges that
assumption of harmlessness. The future of work is set to be shaped by digital
technology and key questions about harm remain to be asked. First, we turn to the
impact of the pandemic on the UK workforce.

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Working Through the Pandemic

When the UK entered its first national lockdown on 26th March 2020, patterns of
work and employment were fundamentally upended. The week prior to the
lockdown announcement, Prime Minister Boris Johnson had already urged the
curtailment of non-essential travel and contact while those who could work from
home were encouraged to do so in order to prevent transmission of this novel
coronavirus. From this point forward, one’s experiences of work during the
pandemic differed depending on job role, with different rules and restrictions in
place according to labour market sector (Briggs, Telford, Lloyd and Ellis 2021).
Broadly speaking, the closure of large sections of the UK economy had the effect
of shrinking the overall size and output of the UK economy in ways that
inevitably impacted upon jobs and livelihoods, regardless of how well-intentioned
those policies may have been. GDP in the UK fell by 9.4% in 2020 as the
economy contracted dramatically but grew by 7.5% in 2021 as the vaccination
programme led to the curtailment of Covid-19 restrictions and the associated
spend on support schemes (ONS 2022a). The UK employment rate going into the
pandemic was a record 76.6%, falling to 75% in March 2021 before rising to
75.5% in December 2021 (ONS 2022b). These figures may seem small
percentage-wise but they represent people and jobs and the dip in employment
during the pandemic has a real impact on lives. The current unemployment rate,
3.6% in late 2022, is below pre-pandemic levels but the overall employment
picture over the last two years has been turbulent.

If we examine our five distinct groups of workers, key workers were asked to
continue working due to the ‘essential’ nature of their roles. Emergency services,
health care workers, logistics, delivery, food services and retail, transport, and some
teachers were asked to continue working in-person and were exempt from
lockdown rules. Although some workplaces were reconfigured to comply with
social distancing rules and face covering mandates, this group were able to
continue working as close to ‘normal’ as possible. Home workers were subject to both
lockdown and work-from-home mandates and asked to transition their work
online where possible. This included much of what has now come to be termed
the ‘laptop class’, comprising many working in education, legal, administrative
and service occupations. Those who saw their sector closed due to Covid-19
restrictions and were unable to transition online were supported via the
government introduction of a furlough scheme. The furloughed worker was sent
home and paid 80% of their salary until either their employer – usually leisure,
hospitality, retail, and cultural sectors – reopened or laid them off. The economic
churn resulted in significant business failure which created the newly unemployed;
those who were made redundant due to lockdown policies and low demand when
the economy restarted. The final group, the self-employed, had variable experiences
depending on the nature of their business. Some worked from home, some
continued as normal, others were sent home and, eventually, supported with an

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income support scheme of up to £7,500 and deferred VAT payments. Each group
represents a different set of experiences of working through the pandemic and
although these categories allow us to identify patterns, there will be many people
who cut across categories or experienced cycles of work, furlough, unemployment,
and so on. Two years into the pandemic and after repeated rounds of restrictions,
lockdown and economic reopening, it is likely that some people have experienced
more churn and turbulence than others.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to deliberate the rights and wrongs of
government intervention at various stages of the pandemic. Instead, we should
consider the impact and future implications of those decisions. The purpose of
this paper is to focus on those who worked from home. The rationale for the work-
from-home order is clear; transmission of a virus can be reduced if people reduce
their number of daily contacts. Working from home reduced the risk of catching
and transmitting Covid-19. The World Health Organization’s (2019) guidance on
‘non-pharmaceutical interventions’ in the event of an influenza pandemic
suggested that workplace safety measures or closures were extraordinary steps that
could produce significant disruption and should only be considered once the costs
of such measures were weighed against the impact. In the UK, the Office for
National Statistics (2020) used an online Labour Force Survey to measure home
working in the first months of the pandemic. 46.6% of those surveyed were in
employment and did some work from home in April 2020, with 86% of those
doing so as a result of Covid-19 and the government work from home order.
Slightly more women than men worked from home (47.5% compared to 45.7%)
with one-third working more hours than normal but one-third working fewer
hours than normal. A year later, the ONS (2021) released further data that showed
an overall 10% increase in homeworking compared to pre-pandemic working
practice. 37% of working people worked from home in 2020, compared to 27% in
2019. Overall, a quarter of businesses that had been able to continue trading
throughout the pandemic intended to use increased homeworking in the future
although this varied by sector. For example, almost half (49%) of businesses in the
Information and Communication industry expected to use increased
homeworking in the future. 85% of workers wanted a ‘hybrid’ or flexible
approach to working post-pandemic, combining home and office. In terms of job
advertisements, three times as many adverts mentioned homeworking in May
2021, compared to February 2020.

The transition to greater remote working raises several important questions.

Homeworking existed in sectors long before the Covid-19 pandemic (Wheatley
2021) and research has often highlighted issues related to work-life balance (see
Crosbie and Moore 2004, Wattis, Standing and Yerkes 2013). Work-life balance is
a contested concept, but research suggests that inequalities in gender, class and
professional status all create challenges in finding an appropriate balance (Gregg
2011); homeworking adds to that complexity as the transition from ‘work’ to
‘home’ becomes blurred. Certainly, during periods of lockdown the balance
between work and home became more problematic, particularly in relation to

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home-schooling and adequate physical space. As work encroached on personal

time, gendered inequalities around caring responsibilities emerged as women
juggled multiple roles and found the balance between work and home life difficult
to negotiate (Crosbie and Moore 2004). Work-life balance is a fluctuating and
intangible process that requires continuous negotiation between work and family
and greater appreciation of differing needs (Yerkes, Standing, Wattis and Wain
2010). The differences in professional status and skill level are important in
understanding the dynamics of homeworking. During Covid-19, that balance was
often problematic, particularly in the case of working mothers (Clark et al 2021).

Furthermore, digital inequalities characterised the requirement to stay home

during the pandemic (Van Lancker and Parolin 2020). Primarily this focused on
educational opportunities (Van Lancker and Parolin 2020) and isolation or
exclusion of the elderly (Xie et al 2020). However, digital inequality or the ‘digital
divide’ is also linked to wider forms of inequality that include access to technology
and, critically, adequate broadband connectivity (Cullinan et al 2021, Reddick et
al 2020, Riddlesden and Singleton 2014). While much of the research on
broadband access, speed and connectivity relates to students in higher education,
the same issue stands for those working from home. Employers may have provided
equipment and software to facilitate home working, but poor connectivity is
connected to a range of socio-economic factors that impact on the ability to work
remotely. Connectivity is also an issue in a different way: the connection felt
between teams and co-workers. The ONS (2021) reported the biggest issue with
remote working reported by workers during the pandemic was the challenge of
collaboration when working remotely. Interactions in corridors, offices and ‘water
cooler conversations’ disappeared. Although the technology facilitates interaction,
the organic nature of office environments was missing which made teamwork and
collaboration more difficult to navigate, particularly in those sectors unused to
remote working. The risks posed by working remotely include a sense of isolation
that employers must work hard to avoid. Indeed, in an Italian study, Toscana and
Zappala (2020) found a relationship between increased stress and decreased
productivity and work satisfaction. However, their analysis indicated that worry
about the coronavirus was a mediating factor which seems to suggest that the
absence of concern for the virus, and lockdown restrictions, may improve the
relationship between remote work and productivity.

However, while we have highlighted work-life balance as a challenge, some

reported that home working provided an opportunity to find a better balance
(ONS 2021). Additionally, some firms reported that productivity increased when
employees transitioned online at the start of the pandemic. Ozimek (2020)
analysed surveys of hiring managers before and during the pandemic and
reported that those directly responsible for decisions on remote working believed
the ‘remote work experiment’ had gone better than expected and predicted
businesses would significantly increase plans for remote work in the future. A
McKinsey report by Andrea Alexander and colleagues (2021) found that
productivity had increased significantly where remote working had been

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implemented, but so had stress and risk of burnout. Productivity gains are likely to
be offset by anxiety which reduces job satisfaction. However, studies in the
sociology of work have routinely demonstrated the prioritisation of productivity
over worker well-being or satisfaction (Wallace et al 2000, Lloyd 2013). When
push comes to shove, will firms dismiss productivity gains in favour of employee
well-being? Although ‘the great resignation’ appears to indicate workers voting
with their feet in a labour market more favourable to the employee, the demands
of capital have, under neoliberal conditions, always taken precedence (Harvey
2010, Streeck 2016). Indeed, some firms have begun long-term planning for post-
pandemic conditions that include ‘hybrid’ ways of working (Alexander et al 2021)
while others have started to downsize their office space in anticipation of the
continued use of remote work (Whitfield 2021). It appears there have been
positives and negatives to remote working during the pandemic, not least the
belief that home working reduces the environmental pollution associated with the
daily commute (Crowley et al 2021). However, it is arguable that lockdown and the
shift to remote working would not have been possible without digital technology
which had already begun to shape our working lives and promised alternative
futures (Ford 2016). The pandemic may have accelerated trends already on the
way. This section shows positive and negative factors associated with home
working and while we could perhaps identify ways in which harm may manifest it
is clear that, within the context of the pandemic, working remotely was seen as
harmless and benign in comparison with the harm associated with coronavirus.
We now turn to some key features of those technologies and begin to think
critically about the implications for a technology-assisted remote work future.

Technological Futures
Technology companies have done well from the pandemic. Amazon, Apple,
Microsoft, Google and Facebook increased their market share by over 50% in
2020 (Calcea 2021). Zoom’s pre-tax profits increased by 4,000% during the
pandemic (Massie 2021). Technology allowed us to stay in touch, entertain
ourselves and work in ways that, for many, eased the burden of lockdown (Briggs
et al 2020) whilst enriching the companies that provided us with platforms and
streaming services. However, a significant stream of critical literature had, pre-
pandemic, raised crucial questions about digital technology and its impact on our
lives, culture and relations (Lyon 2018, Susskind and Susskind 2017, Schildt 2020,
York 2021, Kalpokas 2019, Flyverbom 2019, Benanav 2021, Pasquale 2015,
Zuboff 2019). Of particular interest here are the use of technologies to monitor
workers (Pasquale 2015, Lyon 2021, Brayne 2021), new forms of governance
informed by algorithms (Kalpokas 2019) and the use of data to ‘optimise’ the
individual worker (Schildt 2020).

Workplace surveillance is not new. From physical surveillance and monitoring on

the assembly line using Taylorist principles of scientific management (Lloyd 2013)
to the use of digital technology to monitor performance in the call centre (Bain
and Taylor 2000, Townsend 2005), the nature of workplace surveillance has

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evolved. Lyon (2021) points out that electronic monitoring of workers grew
dramatically from the end of the 20th century through software that is often
hidden and susceptible to abuse. However, with the rapid expansion of a
‘distributed workforce’ as the pandemic and government restrictions kicked in,
many companies sought additional controls to ensure that workers remained
productive (Blum 2022). Woodcock (2022) indicates a 58% increase in demand for
employee surveillance software such as Teramind or Hubstaff while Blum (2022)
notes 60% of companies with 1,000 or more employees responded to an
unpublished survey with confirmation that they had adopted these technologies by
2021. Lyon (2021) suggests that US managers using forms of ‘bossware’ for
remote monitoring had increased from 10% to 30%. Although the figures indicate
differences in survey methodologies, what is clear is the overall increase in use of
intrusive and non-intrusive employee monitoring software (Drapkin 2022).
Electronic surveillance software can track the time one takes to complete a task
but, more invasively, can remotely monitor emails, website use, keystrokes and
mouse movement, take randomised screenshots, as well as tracking location and
recording biometric data (Ball 2010). Managers may make parallels between in-
person surveillance or monitoring in the office; supervisors could see workers
making calls, performing tasks, and so on. The difference with intelligent
surveillance systems is one of potential overreach: is there a difference between
looking over an employee’s shoulder while they complete a task and being able to
trawl through millions of data points to retrospectively see which website someone
was browsing at 11:23 on Thursday last week?

David Lyon’s (2018) ‘culture of surveillance’ is useful here. Lyon argues that
surveillance capitalism is not simply a ‘top down’ imposition of surveillance onto
an unsuspecting public. We actively participate in our own surveillance. First, user
generated content represents value to technology companies who have
commodified metadata as a revenue stream. Our active engagement online creates
value for companies who can use that data in whatever way they want. We never
read the terms and conditions. We often simply accept cookies when we log onto
websites. As Lyon points out, the familiarity and ease of use that we find online,
along with the fun that comes from our engagement, often trumps questions of
digital justice or ethics. More crucially, we have become a society of watchers
(Lyon 2018) where we actively participate in surveillance ourselves. We reproduce
surveillance through our compliance with, for example, airport security, but we
also use smartphone GPS technology to locate others, we check on friends and
neighbours’ activities through social media, we install nanny-cams and doorbell
cams, we check our children’s browsing histories, and we Google potential
colleagues or partners. Surveillance is a part of our lives.

A standard response is often, ‘well, if you are doing your job properly, what does it
matter?’ which is similar to the broader surveillance riposte: ‘well, if you have
nothing to hide then what does it matter?’ In relation to work, employees are often
unaware that they are the subject of remote management surveillance (Pasquale
2015). Since the commodification of metadata, user generated content is collected

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by companies and used to generate revenue without the generator of that

metadata knowing what is collected, who it is sold to and how it is used. This leads
to what Flyverbom (2019) calls a ‘digital prism’ and Pasquale (2015) refers to as a
‘black box society’. The use of our data is opaque and often collected without our
knowledge or permission. It is also used in ways we do not understand with
potential consequences we cannot foresee. This is what Zuboff (2019) refers to as
‘surveillance capitalism’ and in the expansion of remote working and employee
monitoring software, it appears to be a significant element in disciplining a
distributed workforce spread further afield due to the pandemic. The
accumulation of data on workers – keystrokes, screen shots, website visits, task
completion times, downloads, and more – provides a wealth of information with
which to both monitor performance in real time but also retroactively piece
together a digital narrative about a worker. The critical questions, crucial for ideas
of workplace democracy and employer-employee relations, are whether or not
workers are aware of the systems of surveillance in place; how this data is stored
and used; and its potential impact on the worker. When we translate this into a
discussion of remote working and working from home, workers encouraged to
work remotely for a variety of reasons now invite surveillance and monitoring
mechanisms into their own private spaces (Lyon 2021). Laptops, tablets, and
smartphones provided by an employer are likely to come with surveillance
software already embedded but workers using their own equipment – a home PC
or laptop, for example – often have to download different software packages in
order to complete their work and this could result in personal files, photographs
and documents being subject to an employer’s ‘bossware’. Remote working
potentially involves the increased surveillance of home lives by management,
further blurring the lines between work and non-work.

The employer will make a simple claim at this point: intelligent surveillance is
associated with workplace governance and effective performance, particularly in
an era where a distributed workforce is more commonplace. We turn to
governance first as this increasingly centres around the use of algorithms, data
analytics and machine learning. More broadly, automation has been identified as a
threat to a range of job roles and labour market sectors (Ford 2016, Mueller
2021). However, it is also true to say that machine learning and automation
changes job roles, organisational logic, and leadership. Bullock (2019) suggests that
bureaucracy and discretion within organisations change via technology. ‘Street-
level’ bureaucracy sees discretion rest with people who dealt with others face-to-
face. This shifts towards ‘screen-level’ bureaucracy where ICT becomes more
prominent and while discretion is still a human decision, it is more impersonal.
The final phase – ‘systems-level’ bureaucracy – utilises ICT not just to register and
store data but also to execute and control the whole process. Cases and issues are
now often handled without human input or interference so expert systems replace
professional workers. Gusterson notes,

The operators of the system, supposedly its masters, are

disempowered, and it becomes hard to find anyone who has

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the authority to override the system’s flaws. The algorithmic

processes that underlie it take on a life of their own, and the
distribution of responsibility between actors who do not
coordinate with each other obstructs adjustment of the
apparatus to instances that do not conform to stereotyped
scenarios. The common sense and situational logic of humans
is displaced by and subordinated to the logic of automation
and bureaucracy (Gusterson 2019, 2)

Algorithmic governance, the capacity to collect as much data as possible in order

to establish robust connections, moves towards a society of control whereby code
and data determine what is measurable and predictable (Kalpokas 2019). In
general, algorithmic governance can lead to what Pasquale (2015) calls ‘cascading
disadvantages’ whereby digital data points are connected by non-human actors,
the intelligent machine, to create a ‘digital double’ that has analogue reality. If an
algorithm produces a negative credit score, the cascading disadvantages across
other digital systems can reproduce those inequalities. In the workplace,
algorithms are increasingly making decisions on hiring and firing, on performance
and other aspects of working life such as shift patterns (Schildt 2020). As Schildt
identifies, more and more people are working in ‘Uberfied’ jobs without a human
supervisor or manager to report to. According to Medwell (2022), algorithmic
HRM systems have resulted in underpayment of workers, arbitrary terminations,
and in-built biases in hiring yet the ‘black box’ technology remains opaque.
Algorithms are proprietary technology and therefore transparency on how
algorithms are programmed or deployed is often denied (Pasquale 2015,
Flyverbom 2019). Decisions on people’s working lives are often delegated to
algorithms in the name of efficiency without oversight, scrutiny or, at times, even
the ability of a human manager to override.

There are two factors to consider here. First, algorithms are not unbiased but are
instead created by humans with their own biases, prejudices and class positions
(Pasquale 2015, Lyon 2018). Algorithms are deployed by companies engaged
within a capitalist political economy and therefore work towards a particular set of
interests (Timcke 2021). The subject at the end of an algorithmic equation may be
disadvantaged, fired, denied credit, evicted from their home, and the response is a
technocratic one – we need to improve the technology – rather than a political
question – in whose favour do these technologies work? (Timcke 2021). Secondly,
the algorithm can only support by processing vast amounts of data and therefore
the type of information fed into this process is crucial. In workplaces, what is
measured becomes a critical question of management and governance (Schildt
2020). As Gusterson (2019) notes, job roles change through ‘roboprocesses’ that
can automate tasks in ways that require workers change to suit the algorithm,
rather than the other way round. Banks and call centres reconfigure the labour
process around digital prompts provided by algorithms. The more predictable a
work routine or process, the easier it is to apply an algorithm and measure that

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task. The more autonomy and variance in a role, the harder it is to measure or
predict an outcome; workplaces keen on performance, productivity and efficiency
must rationalise work processes to fit the forms of algorithmic governance on offer,

Digitalization, understood from a sociological perspective,

involves the deliberate shift in the organization, where
managers seek to replace the reliance on human knowledge,
intuition, and skilful actions with the use of digital data,
algorithmic processing, and automated control of the
‘programmable world’. (Schildt 2020,179)

This leads us to consider efficiency, optimisation, and performance. Ultimately,

algorithmic governance and intelligent surveillance software provide organisations
with the tools to ensure greater performance and efficiency (Schildt 2020, Lyon
2018). If this requires the reconfiguration of both organisational leadership,
employer-employee relations, and the practicalities of job roles and tasks, so be it.
Performance management and the achievement of targets has a long history in
the sociology of work and organisations (Braverman 1998, Lloyd 2013) and the
crucial input into those metrics is data with which management can measure
performance and determine success or failure. The quest for efficiency through
performance management and targets is a key feature of neoliberal governance
(Power 1999, Lloyd 2018). We assume that we just need more data with which to
make the right decisions, that data doesn’t lie and that we can make objective,
rational calculations on the back of a robust evidence base. So, organisations
install processes and systems of monitoring designed to collect the data required to
optimise performance (Schildt 2020). In previous work, I have outlined how this
works in call centres (Lloyd 2013, 2016). The call centre acts as a good example
where ‘traditional’ regimes of physical workplace surveillance exist alongside more
recent technological forms of optimisation and surveillance through digital
monitoring and performance metrics. However, this technocratic form of
management extends to a wide range of sectors including health care, education,
retail, accountancy, government services and more (Susskind and Susskind 2017).
For example, teachers will worry about test scores as the metrics or targets are the
‘key performance indicators’ that matter, rather than the support and progress that
each pupil requires; as Engle Merry (2019) points out, numbers can provide a
distorted picture due to limited or inaccurate data, trying to count things that are
not easily quantifiable and the inability to include wider contextual factors.
Instead, the data paints a picture, and the algorithm increasingly makes a
judgement or decision on the worker.

The ‘digital double’ created by the various metrics that measure performance
presents a picture of a worker that managers can then use to either discipline or
improve. Workplaces that increasingly rely on data to demonstrate ‘value’ become
‘optimal performance centres’ (Besteman 2019) and reflect the neoliberal belief in

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efficiency and productivity. Ultimately, managers seek the optimisation of the

worker in the same way that the neoliberal belief in individual advancement
compels each of us to be the best version of ourselves: is this not also a process of
subjective optimisation? Schildt (2020) demonstrates that algorithmic management
geared towards worker optimisation can be problematic: companies that use
Percolata’s advanced algorithmic management system find that higher
performance results in workers being awarded more hours whereas failure to sell
enough products in store results in the algorithm cutting hours. Performance is
measured based on factors identified by management and algorithms are created
based on the needs of the employer; a ‘good’ worker is therefore dispassionately
identified according to certain metrics and rewarded on those terms alone.
Percolata, for example, takes into account a range of variables to optimise work
schedules, pairing sales personnel for maximum output. The entire system is set up
to make maximise the worker’s performance in service of the employer without
considering workers’ needs. That much of this is increasingly automated raises
questions about governance and accountability that should be considered further
if organisations are going to increasingly rely on machine learning to monitor and
optimise an increasingly distributed workforce.

Managers can use data to discipline workers but also to coach or improve
employees. AI also provides firms with coaching capacity (Amar et al 2022). One
utility firm found that behavioural nudges through smart AI coaching improved
performance results, including an 8-10% increase in productivity and a 20-30%
reduction in rework (Amar et al 2022). Ultimately, the technology is geared
towards optimisation of worker output and while the recommendation was for the
technology to work alongside traditional coaching and mentoring, it is worth
asking whether or not managers rely solely on the metrics and not in combination
with their own judgement. This trend towards subjective optimisation through
‘metric power’ (Beer 2016) and machine learning reflects the neoliberal imperative
towards maximisation of one’s potential; now we have the tools and data to
monitor ourselves. While some firms utilise wearable technologies to monitor
employee performance (Lyon 2018) this has also become a routine part of our
lives through fitness trackers, GPS watches and so on. We monitor our activity,
calorie intake, and sleep with the underlying aim of self-improvement. We identify
optimal performance, for example, 8 hours of sleep per day, 10,000 steps, or
burning 2,000 calories and we track our progress through these devices. Individual
optimisation based on performance normalises the use of data, tracking, metrics
and monitoring in our lives, revealing David Lyon’s ‘culture of surveillance’.
Furthermore, Kalpokas (2019) argues that optimisation creates new hierarchies
and subjects individuals to a process of relentless self-improvement, status work
and competition; striving for quantifiable perfection is ultimately ideological in the
sense that ultimate human emancipation comes not from being more perfect than
everyone else but precisely in our imperfections. We have the right to be imperfect
but in a work context being suboptimal or non-fully efficient can be hugely
problematic. These trends in workplace governance and technological
development raise significant questions that will intensify in a future labour market

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characterised by greater use of distributed workforces, home or remote working,

and algorithmic management. This leads us to consider the utility of a social
harm perspective.

Assumptions of Harmlessness
Raymen (2021) suggests that liberal capitalism operates under an assumption of
harmlessness. Yes, we regularly cite the iniquities associated with the worst excesses
of our system – rampant inequality, hunger, and so on – but we often act,
individually and collectively, in ways that dismiss or ignore many of the harms
endemic to our political economic system. We can acknowledge that a certain
degree of harm is necessary within our system but that is often wrapped up in
sentiments such as ‘the price of freedom’ or ‘it was worse under different regimes’.
Dupuy (2014) notes that the violence of capitalism is somewhat ‘necessary’ in that
it prevents greater harms such as economic collapse. The ‘good’ harms keep the
‘worse’ harms at bay. In a sense, this allows us to disavow knowledge of a range of
harms that occur on a daily basis; we know these things happen, but we act as if they
do not (see Fisher 2009; Pfaller 2017; Kuldova 2019; Žižek 1989). This assumption
of harmlessness is embedded in our everyday language and subjectivities and is
visible in commonplace assertions such as ‘what’s the harm?’ or ‘there’s no harm
in that’ (Raymen 2021). Framed negatively, ‘why shouldn’t managers use
intelligent surveillance to monitor their workers at home?’ There is a fundamental
assumption within liberal capitalism that certain practices or processes are
harmless and therefore should be allowed to continue without any critical
questioning in relation to whether these practices are reflective of social roles
oriented towards individual and collective notions of a ‘good life’ (Raymen 2019).

When we consider remote working from this assumption of harmlessness, it raises

questions about what happened during the pandemic and where we are going
post-pandemic. Without reiterating the ‘balance of harm’ argument (see Briggs et
al 2021) in relation to work from home orders, there is an assumption of
harmlessness that underpins the injunction to work remotely. Effectively, the risk
of Covid-19 was so significant that working from home is less harmful and
therefore the right thing to do. That may indeed be the case. However, we must
interrogate the assumption of harmlessness in relation to remote working during
the pandemic; work-life balance, as noted above, is a significant challenge for
remote workers in normal circumstances, without adding lockdown rules, caring
responsibilities, home schooling, the existential threat of a global pandemic and, at
times, hysterical media commentary. No doubt, many people have adapted to
working from home and have found many positives. This will not be the case for
everyone, and it is important to recognise that fact. When we look ahead to the
future of work, this assumption of harmlessness persists. As discussed above, the
pandemic has created greater calls for the use of remote work and distributed
workforces at the same time as organisations imposed heightened systems of
intelligent surveillance, algorithmic governance, and data-driven worker
optimisation. In whose interests and to whose benefit is worker optimisation and

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data-driven performance management? If algorithmic governance and intelligent

surveillance are created and utilised by organisations, rather than a benign set of
tools deployed by managers, are they shaped by existing inequalities and biases,
opaque in terms of how they operate, and able to create cascading disadvantage,
either intentionally or unintentionally? It is problematic to simply assume they are
harmless processes.

The assumptions of harmlessness extend further. Living space was hastily

reconfigured to accommodate remote working during the pandemic but
emergency conditions may not be workable as a long-term normality. Also, as
noted earlier, broadband connectivity represents infrastructural inequalities that
may impact upon the sustainability of consistent patterns of remote work. While
managers may see productivity increases as a driver for downsizing office space
and moving online, it may lead to scenarios where some workers are
disadvantaged. This does not stop with the ‘laptop class’ either but instead
represents the wider labour market inequalities highlighted by the pandemic.
Businesses may choose to transition online because it is more efficient and cost-
effective but only workers in those roles will make that transition. What happens to
support staff such as cleaners, catering, security, and those other roles that cannot
be done online? Finally, the wider economic effects of shrinking office space is a
significant issue for town and city centres seeking to recover from the pandemic;
reduced footfall through absent office workers has a knock-on effect for a range of
retail, leisure, hospitality, and transport sectors as workers are not present to buy
lunch, go for a drink after work or commute home (Hambleton 2020).

Remote work is also increasingly tied to the development of green technologies

and the challenge of environmental harm. Working from home during the
pandemic reduced daily commutes for millions of workers, with apparent benefits
to the environment (Crowley et al 2021). The green revolution, now linked to
various governments’ ‘build back better’ strategies, assumes that digital technology
has a significant part to play in the future of work. This may be the case. However,
we must bear in mind that the digital technologies that allow many of us to work
remotely are dependent on the microchips, processors and nanotechnologies that
rely on Rare Earth Elements (REE) that need to be extracted from the ground in
energy intensive processes that are not ‘clean’ (Pitron 2020). Pitron argues that we
are swapping one pollution-creating process for another and that the clean energy
is a fallacy. The shift towards a digital revolution requires a huge material
infrastructure which will further contribute to environmental pollution. Are we
again making assumptions of harmlessness? Most REE are extracted overseas and
the Chinese control much of this market. The energy and digital transformation
means trading oilfields for rare metal deposits and would still require mining and
refinement processes; a technological world is not necessarily a greener world
(Pitron 2020, Raymen and Smith 2021).

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Anthony Lloyd – Covid-19 and the Future of Work

Conclusion
This paper has, hopefully, raised several critical issues in relation to remote
working. Although remote working predates the pandemic, it became an
increasing necessity for millions as government-imposed work from home orders
as part of a suite of public health measures to tackle Covid-19. The rapid
transition online and the movement of work into living spaces and the home
environment raise questions about work-life balance and well-being that must be
considered. Meanwhile, the pandemic could be seen to accelerate trends already
developing in relation to work and technology. Here, this paper has considered
intelligent surveillance, algorithmic governance and data-driven optimisation that
preceded the pandemic which have implications for employer-employee relations,
workplace democracy, and the balance between work and home life. If employee
surveillance software, performance metrics, datafication and algorithmic forms of
management and governance are increasingly central to the operation of
workplaces – either in person or remote – there are questions that we must ask
about the impact on the worker. If the shift towards more remote working and
distributed workforces is part of the future of work, we can anticipate the
continuation of trends towards surveillance, machine learning and optimisation.
As Schildt (2020) notes, algorithmic management does not have to be a blind force
that dehumanizes workers. Yet, in an age of ‘surveillance capitalism’ (Zuboff
2019), optimistic notes on the future of work may require a touch of caution.
While social harm is a contested field (see Canning and Tombs 2021, Pemberton
2016, Kotzé 2018), it does provide a useful perspective from which to consider
many of the issues noted above. However, Raymen (2022) asks a fundamental
question that we must consider in relation to remote work and the future of work:
how can we know, with confidence, that someone or something is harmed or that
someone or something is harmful? This paper does not necessarily offer an answer
but as we continue to exit the pandemic and consider how patterns of work and
employment will change in our digital future, we must come back to this question
instead of assuming that these developments are harmless.

Author Bio
Anthony Lloyd is Associate Professor in Criminology and Sociology at Teesside
University. He is a critical criminologist with research interests in the effects of
labour market transformation, workplace harm and illegal forms of work. He has
also researched and written about international migration as well as the
experiences and impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic. His most recent books
include The Harms of Work (Bristol University Press), Lockdown: Social Harm in the
Covid-19 Era (Palgrave) and Making Sense of Ultra-Realism: Contemporary Criminological
Theory Through the Lens of Popular Culture (Emerald). He is part of the Algorithmic
Governance Research Network and is currently working on the DigiWork project
which investigates the Nordic model of workplace democracy and digital
transformations of work.

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Anthony Lloyd – Covid-19 and the Future of Work

Funding
This paper is part of the Digital Prism and the Nordic Model of Workplace Democracy
Under Pressure (DigiWORK) project, funded by the Research Council of Norway
(Project Number: 314486)

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