622 Malayan Law Journal [2021] 3 MLJ

Ong Leong Chiou & Anor v Keller (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors A

FEDERAL COURT (PUTRAJAYA) — CIVIL APPEAL NO 02(F)-23-03

OF 2019(W)
B
ROHANA YUSUF PCA, AZAHAR MOHAMED CJ (MALAYA) AND
NALLINI PATHMANATHAN FCJ
25 MARCH 2021

Companies and Corporations — Lifting of corporate veil — Piercing of corporate C

vei — Second appellant evaded legal obligation to pay for works through
interposition of third respondent by first appellant as controller — Applicability of
doctrine where it was alleged that there were joint tortfeasors and joint liability was
sought to be established — Whether single economic unit test confined to Industrial
Court matters D

The dispute between the parties centred around the construction of the
Melawati Mall project (‘the project’). The project was constructed vide a joint
venture company, Sime Darby Capitalmalls Asia (Melawati Mall) Sdn Bhd
(‘Sime Darby’). In 2013 Sime Darby appointed the second respondent/fourth E
defendant ie Bina Puri Holdings Bhd (‘Bina Puri’) as the main contractor for
the project. Bina Puri in turn appointed the second appellant/third defendant
ie Perfect Selection Sdn Bhd (‘Perfect Selection’) as the substructural works
contractor. The directors of Perfect Selection were the first appellant/first
defendant ie Ong Leong Chiou (‘Tony Ong’) and one Liew Pok Boon (‘Liew’). F
Perfect Selection in turn subcontracted the substructural works to the third
respondent/second defendant ie PS Bina Sdn Bhd (‘PS Bina’) which had three
directors and shareholders ie one Chang Sin Fei (‘Chang’), Tony Ong and Liew.
PS Bina then subcontracted the works out to the first respondent ie Keller (M)
Sdn Bhd (‘the plaintiff ’) which was the entity that carried out the actual works G
comprising contiguous bore pile (‘CBP’) works; foundation bore pile (‘FBP’)
works; and ground anchor (‘GA’) works. Prior to the incorporation of PS Bina,
the plaintiff was invited by Chang on behalf of CTF Build Sdn Bhd to quote
for the CBP and FBP works for the project. The plaintiff received two blank
bills of quantities and the second bill had a missing page stipulating that the H
empty bore works (‘EBW’) would not be paid for. The plaintiff was unaware of
this fact. Further to negotiations, a letter of award for the CBP works was issued
by the newly incorporated PS Bina to the plaintiff for a provisional sum of
RM17.6m. It was not the company that had invited the plaintiff to quote for
the works. The plaintiff ’s managing director met up with Tony Ong and Tony I
Ong made several representations which were untrue. Premised on these
assurances and representations the plaintiff signed the letter of award for CBP
works with PS Bina on the same day. The plaintiff also sent its quotation for the
FBP works to PS Bina. A second letter of award was issued by PS Bina to the
 Ong Leong Chiou & Anor v Keller (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors
[2021] 3 MLJ (Nallini Pathmanathan FCJ) 623

A plaintiff for the FBP works for a provisional sum of RM13.12m. PS Bina issued
a third letter of award to the plaintiff for the GA works for a provisional sum of
RM7.2m. Works under the FBP proceeded smoothly and the plaintiff was paid
against PS Bina’s certification of works done in the form of interim certificates.
However, problems began when the plaintiff found that PS Bina had reversed
B out a sum of RM4,520,824.21 for the EBW which meant the sum was
deducted. This was followed by a second reversal for the EBW for works
completed under the ninth interim certificate for works completed. The value
of works deducted under the ninth certificate coupled with the value of works
under the seventh certificate which was never certified amounted to
C RM7,448,469.67. Such decertification continued until the whole of the EBW
in the sum of RM7,462,720.19 was reversed out. After having benefitted from
the EBW carried out by the plaintiff, and for which the plaintiff was
deliberately not paid, the plaintiff discovered that Tony, Chang and Liew had
resigned as directors of PS Bina and replaced the company with persons who
D had no knowledge or comprehension of the company’s obligations to the
plaintiff. The plaintiff thus claimed to the nonpayment of work done in respect
of the EBW in the sum of RM7,462,720.19. The trial court arrived at the
conclusion that PS Bina, Perfect Solution and Tony Ong were jointly and
severally liable for to the plaintiff for the debt in relation to the performance of
E the EBW. The Court of Appeal affirmed and endorsed the findings of the High
Court in its entirety. It also agreed with the trial judge on the law and that it was
an appropriate case for the piercing of the corporate veil. Hence, this appeal
which sought to challenge the well-accepted principles as to the circumstances
in which the veil of incorporation could be disregarded. The issues for
F determination were: (a) the applicability of the doctrine where it was alleged
that there were joint tortfeasors and joint liability was sought to be established
(‘the first question’); and (b) whether the single economic unit test as
expounded in Law Kam Loy and Anor v Boltex Sdn Bhd & Ors [2005] MLJU
225 (‘Law Kam Loy’) was confined to Industrial Court matters (‘the second
G question’).

Held, dismissing the appeal with costs:

(1) As the trial judge found fraud to have been perpetrated, that in itself
H warranted the allocation of liability to the perpetrators of the fraud,
independently of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil. The finding
of fraud encompassed Tony Ong as well as the two companies which he
controlled, Perfect Solution and PS Bina. Liability was found against
Tony Ong and each of the companies by reason of the fraud alone,
I without the invocation of the doctrine of the piercing of the corporate
veil (see paras 55 & 59).
(2) There was an existing liability or obligation of Tony Ong to the plaintiff
based on his misrepresentations which caused them to enter into the
contract, followed by his inducements that they completed the works,
624 Malayan Law Journal [2021] 3 MLJ

knowing full well that such payments for the EBW would be reversed as A
there would be no payment forthcoming from Bina Puri for the EBW.
The plaintiff enjoyed a legal right against Tony Ong, who was in control
of PS Bina, which existed independently of the company’s involvement.
Perfect Solution was at all times the agent of Tony Ong that enabled Tony
Ong to benefit from the evasion of the debt due and owing to the B
plaintiff. PS Bina was formed so that its separate legal personality would
defeat or frustrate the plaintiff ’s rights against Tony Ong or frustrate the
enforcement of its debt. If so, then the court was entitled to pierce the
corporate veil. The trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeal, did not
err in piercing the corporate veil of PS Bina for the purpose, and only for C
the purpose of depriving Tony Ong and its agent, Perfect Solution of the
advantage they would otherwise had obtained by the utilisation of PS
Bina’s separate legal personality (see paras 63–65 & 67).
(3) The two questions of law were not material issues of law that surfaced in
D
the course of the case in the High Court or the Court of Appeal. The
court declined to answer the first question of law because it
miscomprehended, at best, and misstated at worst, the facts and the law
in relation to the appeal. The question was also predicated on an incorrect
comprehension of the law because it assumed that in a joint
E
tortfeasorship context, the piercing of the corporate veil must result in
liability devolving on only one entity or person, and not any other party
to the dispute because only one person was the alter-ego. This conflated
and misapprehended the position in law when the doctrine was applied.
On piercing, liability could devolve on more than one party to the
F
dispute. Further the proposition that the doctrine was incompatible in
law with joint tortfeasorship was erroneous and unsupported in law.
Most importantly, this entire argument was theoretical and unfounded
on the facts and the law. Any attempt to answer the first question would
result in a theoretical response with no bearing to the factual matrix or the
G
claim in law (see paras 100–110 & 112).
(4) In answer to the second question, the question misstated the relevant
findings of the trial court and sought to obtain an answer relegating Law
Kam Loy to the confines of the Industrial Court. That in itself was an
incorrect premise, as it was predicated upon a misunderstanding of the H
ratio in Law Kam Loy. However, the further point to be made was that the
Law Kam Loy was applicable in all courts, and was not to be confined to
the Industrial Court. To that extent the second question could not be
answered as framed, and the court declined to do so (see paras 124–126).
I
[Bahasa Malaysia summary
Pertikaian antara kedua-dua pihak berpusat di sekitar pembinaan projek
Melawati Mall (‘projek’). Projek ini dibina menerusi syarikat usaha sama, Sime
Darby Capitalmalls Asia (Melawati Mall) Sdn Bhd (‘Sime Darby’). Pada tahun
 Ong Leong Chiou & Anor v Keller (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors
[2021] 3 MLJ (Nallini Pathmanathan FCJ) 625

A 2013 Sime Darby melantik responden kedua/defendan keempat iaitu Bina

Puri Holdings Bhd (‘Bina Puri’) sebagai kontraktor utama projek ini. Bina Puri
seterusnya melantik perayu kedua/defendan ketiga iaitu Perfect Selection Sdn
Bhd (‘Perfect Selection’) sebagai kontraktor kerja substruktur. Pengarah Perfect
Selection adalah perayu/defendan pertama iaitu Ong Leong Chiou (‘Tony
B Ong’) dan seorang Liew Pok Boon (‘Liew’). Perfect Selection kemudiannya
membuat subkontrak kerja substruktur kepada responden ketiga/defendan
kedua iaitu PS Bina Sdn Bhd (‘PS Bina’) yang mempunyai tiga pengarah dan
pemegang saham iaitu seorang Chang Sin Fei (‘Chang’), Tony Ong dan Liew.
PS Bina kemudian membuat subkontrak kerja kepada responden pertama iaitu
C Keller (M) Sdn Bhd (‘plaintif ’) yang merupakan entiti yang menjalankan
kerja-kerja sebenar yang terdiri daripada kerja cerucuk bersebelahan (‘CBP’);
kerja cerucuk asas (‘FBP’); dan kerja jangkar tanah (‘GA’). Sebelum
penubuhan PS Bina, plaintif telah diundang oleh Chang bagi pihak CTF Build
Sdn Bhd untuk membuat sebutan harga untuk kerja CBP dan FBP untuk
D projek tersebut. Plaintif menerima dua bil kuantiti kosong dan bil kedua
mempunyai halaman yang kosong yang menetapkan bahawa kerja cerucuk
(‘EBW’) tidak akan dibayar. Plaintif tidak menyedari hakikat ini. Selepas
rundingan, surat anugerah untuk kerja CBP dikeluarkan oleh PS Bina yang
baru ditubuhkan kepada plaintif dengan jumlah sementara sebanyak RM17.6
E juta. Ianya bukan syarikat yang mengundang plaintif untuk menyebut harga
kerja tersebut. Pengarah urusan plaintif bertemu dengan Tony Ong dan Tony
Ong membuat beberapa pernyataan yang tidak benar. Berdasarkan jaminan
dan pernyataan ini, plaintif menandatangani surat anugerah untuk kerja CBP
dengan PS Bina pada hari yang sama. Plaintif juga menghantar sebutharga
F untuk kerja FBP kepada PS Bina. Surat anugerah kedua dikeluarkan oleh PS
Bina kepada plaintif untuk kerja FBP dengan jumlah sementara sebanyak
RM13.12 juta. PS Bina mengeluarkan surat anugerah ketiga kepada plaintif
untuk kerja GA dengan jumlah sementara sebanyak RM7.2 juta. Kerja-kerja di
bawah FBP berjalan lancar dan plaintif dibayar terhadap perakuan PS Bina
G terhadap kerja yang dilakukan dalam bentuk sijil interim. Namun, masalah
bermula apabila plaintif mendapati bahawa PS Bina telah mengeluarkan
sejumlah RM4,520,824.21 untuk EBW yang bermaksud jumlah tersebut
telah ditolak. Ini diikuti oleh pembalikan kedua untuk kerja EBW yang
disiapkan di bawah sijil interim kesembilan untuk kerja yang disiapkan. Nilai
H kerja yang ditolak di bawah sijil kesembilan ditambah dengan nilai kerja di
bawah sijil ketujuh yang tidak pernah disahkan berjumlah RM7,448,469.67.
Penolakan tersebut berterusan sehingga keseluruhan EBW berjumlah
RM7,462,720.19 dikeluarkan. Setelah mendapat manfaat daripada EBW
yang dilakukan oleh plaintif, dan yang mana plaintif sengaja tidak dibayar,
I plaintif mendapati bahawa Tony, Chang dan Liew telah meletak jawatan
sebagai pengarah PS Bina dan menggantikan syarikat itu dengan orang yang
tidak mempunyai pengetahuan atau pemahaman tanggungjawab syarikat
terhadap plaintif. Oleh itu, plaintif menuntut terhadap kegagalan untuk
membayar kerja yang dilakukan berkaitan dengan EBW berjumlah
626 Malayan Law Journal [2021] 3 MLJ

RM7,462,720.19. Mahkamah bicara sampai pada kesimpulan bahawa PS A

Bina, Perfect Solution dan Tony Ong bertanggungjawab secara bersama dan
berasingan kepada plaintif atas hutang berkenaan dengan pelaksanaan EBW.
Mahkamah Rayuan mengesahkan dan bersetuju dengan penemuan
Mahkamah Tinggi secara keseluruhan. Ia juga bersetuju dengan hakim bicara
mengenai undang-undang dan bahawa ia adalah kes yang sesuai untuk B
menembusi tirai korporat. Oleh itu, rayuan ini yang bertujuan untuk
menentang prinsip-prinsip yang diterima dengan baik mengenai keadaan di
mana tirai perbadanan dapat diabaikan. Isu-isu untuk penentuan adalah: (a)
kebolehlaksanaan doktrin di mana ia didakwa bahawa terdapat pelaku tort
C
bersama dan tanggungjawab bersama dipohon untuk dibuktikan (‘soalan
pertama’); dan (b) sama ada ujian unit ekonomi tunggal seperti yang dijelaskan
dalam Law Kam Loy and Anor v Boltex Sdn Bhd & Ors [2005] MLJU 225
(‘Law Kam Loy’) terbatas pada perkara-perkara Mahkamah Perusahaan
(‘soalan kedua’). D
Diputuskan, menolak rayuan dengan kos:
(1) Oleh kerana hakim bicara mendapati penipuan telah dilakukan, ia
dengan sendirinya menjamin peruntukan tanggungjawab kepada pelaku
penipuan itu, bebas dari doktrin menembusi tirai korporat. Penemuan E
penipuan merangkumi Tony Ong serta dua syarikat yang
dikendalikannya, Perfect Solution dan PS Bina. Tanggungjawab
ditemukan terhadap Tony Ong dan setiap syarikat dengan alasan
penipuan sahaja, tanpa permohonan doktrin menembusi tirai korporat
F
(lihat perenggan 55 & 59).
(2) Terdapat tanggungjawab atau kewajipan Tony Ong kepada plaintif
berdasarkan salah pernyataannya yang menyebabkan mereka memasuki
kontrak, diikuti dengan dorongannya bahawa mereka menyelesaikan
kerja-kerja tersebut, dengan mengetahui sepenuhnya bahawa G
pembayaran tersebut untuk EBW akan ditolak kerana ada tidak akan ada
pembayaran daripada Bina Puri untuk EBW. Plaintif menikmati hak
undang-undang terhadap Tony Ong, yang mengendalikan PS Bina, yang
wujud secara bebas dari penglibatan syarikat. Perfect Solution pada setiap
masa adalah ejen Tony Ong yang membolehkan Tony Ong mendapat H
keuntungan daripada pengelakan hutang yang perlu dibayar dan
ditanggung kepada plaintif. PS Bina ditubuhkan supaya personaliti
undang-undang yang berasingan akan mengalahkan atau menggagalkan
hak plaintif terhadap Tony Ong atau menggagalkan pelaksanaan hutang.
Sekiranya demikian, maka mahkamah berhak menembusi tirai korporat. I
Mahkamah bicara, seperti yang ditegaskan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan,
tidak salah menembus tirai korporat PS Bina untuk tujuan tersebut, dan
hanya untuk tujuan menghalang Tony Ong dan ejennya, Perfect
Solution daripada kelebihan yang mereka akan perolehi dengan
 Ong Leong Chiou & Anor v Keller (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors
[2021] 3 MLJ (Nallini Pathmanathan FCJ) 627

A penggunaan personaliti undang-undang yang berasingan PS Bina (lihat

perenggan 63–65 & 67).
(3) Kedua-dua persoalan undang-undang tersebut bukan isu
undang-undang material yang muncul dalam kes tersebut di Mahkamah
B
Tinggi atau Mahkamah Rayuan. Mahkamah enggan menjawab
persoalan undang-undang pertama kerana ia salah faham, paling tidak,
dan salah sebut, fakta dan undang-undang yang berkaitan dengan
rayuan. Persoalan itu juga didasarkan pada pemahaman yang salah
terhadap undang-undang kerana menganggap bahawa dalam konteks
C
pelaku tort bersama, penembusan tirai korporat harus mengakibatkan
tanggungjawab hanya terletak pada satu entiti atau orang, dan bukan
pihak lain dalam pertikaian itu kerana hanya satu orang adalah alter-ego.
Ini menggabungkan dan menyalahtafsirkan kedudukan dalam
undang-undang ketika doktrin itu digunapakai. Semasa penembusan,
D
tanggungjawab dapat ditanggung lebih dari satu pihak dalam pertikaian.
Selanjutnya kenyataan bahawa doktrin itu tidak sesuai dengan
undang-undang dengan pelaku tort bersama adalah salah dan tidak
disokong oleh undang-undang. Yang paling penting, keseluruhan
hujahan ini bersifat teori dan tidak berasas pada fakta dan
E
undang-undang. Sebarang percubaan untuk menjawab soalan pertama
akan menghasilkan jawapan teori tanpa kaitan dengan matriks fakta atau
tuntutan undang-undang (lihat perenggan 100–110 & 112).
(4) Sebagai jawapan atas persoalan kedua, persoalan tersebut salah
menyebutkan penemuan yang relevan daripada mahkamah bicara dan
F berusaha mendapatkan jawapan yang menjatuhkan Law Kam Loy ke
batas Mahkamah Perusahaan. Itu dengan sendirinya adalah anggapan
yang tidak betul, kerana didasarkan pada kesalahpahaman mengenai
ratio dalam Law Kam Loy. Namun, titik selanjutnya yang harus dibuat
adalah bahawa Law Kam Loy terpakai di semua mahkamah, dan tidak
G terbatas pada Mahkamah Perusahaan. Oleh itu persoalan kedua tidak
dapat dijawab seperti yang dirangka, dan mahkamah menolak untuk
melakukannya (lihat perenggan 124–126).]
Cases referred to
H A v A [2007] EWHC 99 (Fam) (refd)
Adams v Cape Industries Plc [1990] Ch 433, CA (refd)
Carlyle v Royal Bank of Scotland Plc [2015] UKSC 13, SC (refd)
Datuk Syed Kechik bin Syed Mohamed & Anor v The Board of Trustees of the
Sabah Foundation & Ors and another application [1999] 1 MLJ 257, FC
I (refd)
Gan Yook Chin (P) & Anor v Lee Ing Chin & Ors [2005] 2 MLJ 1; [2004] 4
CLJ 309, FC (refd)
Gencor ACP Ltd v Dalby [2000] 2 BCLC 734, ChD (refd)
Gilford Motor Company Ltd v Horne [1933] Ch 935, CA (refd)
628 Malayan Law Journal [2021] 3 MLJ

Gurbachan Singh s/o Bagawan Singh & Ors v Vellasamy s/o Ponnusamy & Ors A
[2015] 1 MLJ 773, FC (folld)
Henderson v Foxworth Investments Limited and Another [2014] UKSC 41, SC
(refd)
Jones v Lipman [1962] 1 All ER 442, ChD (refd)
Law Kam Loy and Anor v Boltex Sdn Bhd & Ors [2005] MLJU 225, CA (refd) B
Lazarus Estates v Beasley [1956] 1 All ER 341, CA (refd)
MMC Oil & Gas Engineering Sdn Bhd v Tan Bock Kwee & Sons Sdn Bhd [2016]
2 MLJ 428; [2016] 4 CLJ 665, CA (refd)
Persad v Singh [2017] UKPC 32, PC (refd)
Prest v Prest and others [2013] 4 All ER 673, SC (folld) C
Raphael Pura v Insas Bhd v Anor [2003] 1 MLJ 513, FC (refd)
Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22, HL (refd)
Solid Investments Ltd v Alcatel-Lucent (M) Sdn Bhd (previously known as Alcatel
Network Systems(M) Sdn Bhd) [2014] 3 MLJ 785, FC (refd)
Sun Life Assurance Co of Canada v Jervis [1944] 1 All ER 469, HL (refd) D
Takako Sakao (f ) v Ng Pek Yuan (f ) & Anor [2009] 6 MLJ 751; [2010] 1 CLJ
381, CA (refd)
Trustor AB v Smallbone [2001] 3 All ER 987, ChD (refd)
VTB Capital plc v Nutritek International Corp and others [2013] UKSC 5
(distd) E

Appeal from: Civil Appeal No W-02(C)(W)-375–02 of 2017 (Court of

Appeal, Putrajaya)
Malik Imtiaz (Peter Douglas Ling, Chan Wei June and Yip Yiu Junn Ivor with F
him) (Peter Ling & Co) for the appellants.
Leong Wai Hong (Richard Kok Chi Wei, Karen Tan Wee Sean and Tan Ko Xin with
him) (Rhiza & Richard) for the respondents.
Unrepresented for second and third respondents.
G
Nallini Pathmanathan FCJ:

INTRODUCTION

[1] The juristic principle comprising the bedrock of company law is the legal H
fiction that on incorporation, the corporate entity is clothed with a separate
and distinct personality. It is a legal person distinct from its members (Salomon
v A Salomon & Co Ltd (1897) AC 22 (‘Salomon v Salomon’)). There subsists
a ‘veil’ between the company and its members that separates them for purposes
of liability, property, capacity, and in relation to acts done or the acquisition of I
rights. The natural persons who are the incorporators are ignored.

[2] However the veil of incorporation is not entirely inviolable. One of the
well-recognised and accepted exceptions to the principle of the separate
 Ong Leong Chiou & Anor v Keller (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors
[2021] 3 MLJ (Nallini Pathmanathan FCJ) 629

A personality of a company is where the legal entity of a corporate body is utilised

for fraudulent, dishonest or unlawful purposes. Those seeds of limitation were
set out in the locus classicus of Saloman v Saloman itself by Lord Davey:
If … the company was formed for an unlawful purpose, or in order to achieve an
object not permitted by the provisions of the [Companies] Act, the appropriate
B
remedy (if any) would seem to be to set aside the certificate of incorporation, or to
treat the company as a nullity, or, if the appellant has committed a fraud or
misdemeanour … he may be proceeded against civilly or criminally …

C [3] In such circumstances the person or persons perpetrating such abuse

cannot hide behind the separate corporate personality. The courts will ‘break’
the shell of incorporation, by utilising the doctrine of the ‘lifting or piercing of
the corporate veil’. Our law journals are replete with case-law on this subject.

D [4] The instant appeal seeks to challenge those well-accepted principles as to

the circumstances in which the veil of incorporation can be disregarded. The
specific issues in respect of which leave was granted in this appeal include:
(a) the applicability of the doctrine where it is alleged that there are joint
E tortfeasors and joint liability is sought to be established; and
(b) whether the single economic unit test as expounded in Law Kam Loy and
Anor v Boltex Sdn Bhd & Ors [2005] MLJU 225 (‘Law Kam Loy v
Boltex’) is confined to Industrial Court matters.
F
[5] At the outset it should be highlighted that the two questions of law did
not feature in any material, substantial or significant manner in the parties’ case
either in the High Court or the Court of Appeal. In order to appreciate this
fact, it is necessary to consider the factual background of the case.
G
SALIENT BACKGROUND FACTS

[6] The factual background has been comprehensively set out in the
judgment of the trial court as well as the submissions of the appellant and the
H first respondent, and I summarise the facts salient to this appeal from those
sources.

THE PARTIES

I [7] The first appellant, Ong Leong Chiou (‘Tony Ong’) was the first defendant
in the trial court and was found to be the ‘mastermind’ or ‘puppeteer’ behind
the second appellant, Perfect Selection Sdn Bhd (‘Perfect Selection’) as well as the
third respondent company. Perfect Selection was the third defendant in the
trial court.
630 Malayan Law Journal [2021] 3 MLJ

[8] The third respondent, PS Bina Sdn Bhd (‘PS Bina’) was the company that A
entered into contracts for the earthworks with the plaintiff. It was the second
defendant in the trial court. It did not participate in this appeal, as the judg
ement granted against it was not disputed by the appellants.

[9] The two appellants and the third respondent above were found to be B
jointly and severally liable for the monies claimed by the plaintiff in the suit.

[10] The first respondent, Keller (M) Sdn Bhd (‘plaintiff ’) was the plaintiff in
the trial court. The second respondent, Bina Puri Holdings Bhd (‘Bina Puri’) was C
the fourth defendant in the trial court, and did not participate in this appeal.

THE FACTS LEADING UP TO THE DISPUTE

[11] The dispute between the parties centres around the construction of the D
Melawati Mall Project (‘the project’), a ten storey shopping mall and business
complex. The project was constructed vide a joint venture company, Sime
Darby Capitalmalls Asia (Melawati Mall) Sdn Bhd (‘Sime Darby’). In 2013
Sime Darby appointed Bina Puri as the main contractor for the project.
E
[12] Bina Puri in turn appointed Perfect Selection (the second appellant here)
as the substructural works contractor. The directors of Perfect Selection are
Tony Ong and one Liew Pok Boon (‘Liew’) each enjoying a 50% shareholding
in the company.
F
[13] Perfect Selection in turn subcontracted the substructural works to PS Bina.
PS Bina is a company which was incorporated on 4 October 2013. At that time
it had three directors and shareholders in the following proportions: one Chang
Sin Fei (‘Chang’) who held 30%; Tony Ong who held 40% and Liew who held G
30%.

[14] The plaintiff ’s involvement with the project is that it carried out the
actual works comprising:
H
(a) Continguous Bore Pile (‘CBP’) works;
(b) Foundation Bore Pile (‘FBP’) works; and
(c) Ground Anchor (‘GA’) works.
I
[15] The plaintiff was the entity to which PS Bina subcontracted the said works.

[16] The overall picture is that Bina Puri, the contractor, contracted the works
out to Perfect Solution who in turn subcontracted it out to PS Bina, who in turn
 Ong Leong Chiou & Anor v Keller (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors
[2021] 3 MLJ (Nallini Pathmanathan FCJ) 631

A subcontracted the works out to the plaintiff. The plaintiff is the entity that carried
out the actual works.

[17] It is of relevance that Perfect Solution deliberately subcontracted the works

out to PS Bina, rather thandirectly to the plaintiff. The common nexus between
B Perfect Solution and PS Bina was Tony Ong and secondarily Liew.

[18] On 13 September 2013, prior to the incorporation of PS Bina, the

plaintiff was invited by Chang on behalf of another entity, CTF Build Sdn Bhd
C to quote for the CBP and FBP works for the project. It is important to
highlight that the plaintiff received two blank bills of quantities. The second bill
had a page missing. This is relevant because that missing page stipulated that Empty
Bore Works (‘EBW’) would NOT be paid for. So the plaintiff was unaware of this
fact. This is relevant because the entire claim in this case relates to non-payment
D of work done by the plaintiff in respect of these Empty Bore Works in the sum
of RM7,462,720.19.

[19] Further to negotiations, on 21 October 2013, a Letter of Award for the

CBP Works was issued by the newly incorporated PS Bina to the plain tiff for a
E provisional sum of RM17.6m. It was not the company that had invited the
plaintiff to quote for the works. Up to this time PS Bina had never been
mentioned. The plaintiff was uncomfortable and conducted a company search
on PS Bina. The recent date of incorporation, the lack of assets and a track
record worried the plaintiff. As such, the plaintiff decided not to return the
F
letter of award for the CBP Works until they had met with representatives from
PS Bina.

[20] Prior to the meeting, as of 30 October 2013, Perfect Solution which was
G run by Tony Ong, was aware from the Bill of Quantities supplied by Bina Puri,
the contractor, that Earth Bore Works or EBW would not be paid for. This was
in direct conflict with the letter of award sent out to the plaintiff, which
represented that EBW would be paid for.

H [21] On the same date, 30 October 2013, the plaintiff also wrote to PS Bina
to state that the estimated costs of the EBW would be RM4.8m. Again, the trial
court found that Tony Ong was in direct control of PS Bina.

Findings by the trial court of misrepresentations made by Tony Ong

I
[22] On 4 November 2013, Ir Yee Yew Weng (‘PW1’), the plaintiff ’s
managing director met up with Tony Ong. The trial court found that Tony
Ong made several representations which were untrue, and which I summarise
for ease below:
632 Malayan Law Journal [2021] 3 MLJ

(a) Tony Ong was close to one Tan Sri Tee, a major shareholder of the main A
contractor, Bina Puri. He implied that he could utilise his friendship to
influence Tan Sri Tee for purposes of procuring the subcontract, and that
was how he had procured the job for the project;
(b) Tan Sri Tee had a vested interest in PS Bina; B
(c) PS Bina was under Tony Ong’s control. He was also the managing
director; and
(d) Tony would procure a guarantee from the main contractor Bina Puri, for
the costs of the earthworks to be carried out by the plaintiff. C

CBP works (contiguous bore pile works)

[23] Premised on these assurances and representations the plaintiff signed

the letter of award for CBP Works with PS Bina on the same day. D

FBP works (foundation bore pile works)

[24] It also sent its quotation for the FBP works to PS Bina for the attention
of Tony Ong whom they understood to determine all matters in relation to PS E
Bina. On 12 November 2013 a second Letter of Award was issued by PS Bina to the
plaintiff for the FBP works for a provisional sum of RM13.12m. At all times the
plaintiff had made it clear in its proposal and the letter of award that EBW
would be payable despite the fact that the quantities were not captured in the
Bill of Quantities. In keeping with Tony Ong’s representation at the 4 F
November 2013 meeting, the plaintiff inserted a further term namely that the
main contractor, Bina Puri would provide a guarantee to the plaintiff for the
works done. This guarantee was stated to be a condition precedent to the contract
and to be provided within 14 days. How ever, such a guarantee from Bina Puri was
never provided. Nonetheless the plaintiff proceeded with the Works. G

GA works (ground anchor works)

[25] On 7 February 2014, PS Bina issued a third letter of award to the plaintiff
for the GA works for a provisional sum of RM7.2m. As with the FBP contract H
cl 26 provided that the main contractor, Bina Puri would provide a guarantee
for the plaintiff ’s work.

Events after the plaintiff commenced performance of the works

I
[26] Works under the FBP proceeded smoothly and the plaintiff was paid
against PS Bina’s certification of works done in the form of interim certificates.
However, problems began with the sixth interim progress certificate. On
receipt of this certificate some 15 days later, on 5 September 2014, the plaintiff
 Ong Leong Chiou & Anor v Keller (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors
[2021] 3 MLJ (Nallini Pathmanathan FCJ) 633

A found that PS Bina had reversed out a sum of RM4,520,824.21 for EBW. It meant
that the stated sum was deducted.

[27] This was the first reversal and it was followed with a second reversal for
EBW on 22 September 2014 for works completed under the ninth interim
B certificate for works completed in July 2014. The value of works deducted under
the ninth certificate coupled with the value of works under the seventh certificate
which was never certified amounted to RM7,448,469.67.

C [28] Such decertification continued until the wh ole of the EBW in the sum
of RM7,462,720.19 was reversed out on 17 October 2014. The trial court
found that such decertification had been so timed as to ensure that the EBW was first
completed, otherwise it might have hindered the progress of works, which would
have precluded Perfect Solution from claiming and benefiting from works act uall
D y undertaken by the plaintiff. The plaintiff subsequently discovered that in the
primary contract between Bina Puri and Perfect Solution, it was expressly
stipulated that Perfect Solution would not be paid for EBW.

[29] It was a finding of the trial court that Perfect Solution and PS Bina knew
E that the plaintiff would not be entitled to payment for EBW and Tony Ong was in
control of both these companies. He had determined, overseen and issued the
letters of award to the plaintiff and was at all times fully aware that EBW would
not be paid by Bina Puri, the main contractor, to Perfect Solution.

F [30] Despite this, Perfect Solution agreed to enter into a contract with a
newly incorporated company with no assets, PS Bina, who in turn contracted
with the plaintiff to pay a sum in excess of RM7m for EBW under the FBP
contract. In point of fact PS Bina was created or interposed by Tony Ong to
evade the liability for the EBW or earth bore works, which should have been
G borne by Perfect Solution. Put another way, D3 evaded the legal obligation to
pay for the EBW through the interposition of D2 to evade such liability. This
is borne out, inter alia, by the evidence and findings of the trial court as set out
below.
H Post-reversal of the sum of RM7.46m in respect of EBW completed by the plaintiff

[31] After having benefitted from the EBW carried out by the plaintiff, and
for which the plaintiff was deliberately not paid, the plaintiff discovered that
both the shareholding and directorships of PS Bina were altered irrevocably.
I The shareholding of PS Bina was transferred to a foreign national who was a
construction work er of Bangladeshi origin and a local person of Chinese
origin. They were also named as the directors of PS Bina. Tony Ong, Chang
and Liew had resigned as directors and replaced the company with these
persons, who clearly had no knowledge or comprehension of the companies’
634 Malayan Law Journal [2021] 3 MLJ

obligations to the plaintiff. This was a clear indication of evasion of liability for A
the debt PS Bina incurred in relation to the EBW.

THE FINDINGS OF THE HIGH COURT

[32] In arriving at the conclusion that PS Bina, Perfect Solution and Tony B
Ong were jointly and severally liable for to the plaintiff for the debt in relation
to the performance of the EBW, the trial court made the following relevant
findings:
(a) in relation to PS Bina, which had contracted directly with the plaintiff, C
the tri al judge found that PS Bina was liable to the plaintiff for the EBW.
However, he allowed a counterclaim for rectification works. This is not in
dispute here. Liability for breach of contract was therefore established
and is also not in dispute in this appeal. This means that the quantum of
the debt is not in issue. The primary basis for the appeal is in law in D
relation to the finding of a joint and several liability against Tony Ong
and Perfect Solution;
(b) the trial judge found it incredulous that Tony Ong, Perfect Solution and
PS Bina could claim ignorance of the terms of the Bill of Quantities or the E
contract for the provision of the earthworks, particularly given the size of
the contract. He concluded tha t the defendants, through Tony Ong were
aware that the EBW would not be paid for by the main contractor, Bina
Puri. This was corroborated by the deliberate failure to provide the
plaintiff with the relevant page of the Bill of Quantities which stipulated F
clearly that the main contractor would no t be making any payment for
EBW;
(c) the trial judge further found that Tony Ong and Perfect Solution knew
that PS Bina would not be paid by Perfect Solution for the EBW, and that G
Perfect Solution would not be paid by Bina Puri for the EBW prior to,
and after issuance of the letters of award to the plaintiff. He further found
that despite knowing this fundamental fact which would affect the
plaintiff adversely, Tony Ong, Perfect Solution and particularly PS Bina
made no such disclosure to the plaintiff. None of them disputed, H
objected to or rebutted the term in the initial proposals or the final letter
of award to the effect that the plaintiff would be paid for EBW. On the
contrary Tony Ong gave numerous assurances to the plaintiff that he
knew Tan Sri Tee and could secure payment for the EBW;
(d) significantly, the trial judge found that Tony Ong’s ‘fingerprints’ were all I
over Perfect Solution and PS Bina being companies and ‘vehicles’
controlled by him for the purposes of the project. He was the Managing
Director of both companies and a majority shareholder. He was the one
who had met with the plaintiff and made all the representations on behalf
 Ong Leong Chiou & Anor v Keller (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors
[2021] 3 MLJ (Nallini Pathmanathan FCJ) 635

A of both Perfect Solution and PS Bina, not to mention assurances in

relation to the main contractor, Bina Puri;
(e) the trial judge found deceptive conduct on the part of Tony Ong on
behalf of PS Bina in that when the plaintiff wrote on 30 October 2013 to
B advise that there was in the region of RM4.8m of EBW to be carried out.
This was met with complete silence. That silence was not broken even
after Perfect Solution executed its contract with the main contractor,
Bina Puri on 9 December 2013 where it was expressly stipulated that no
monies would be paid by Bina Puri for EBW;
C (f) the trial judge found that such deliberate concealment was undertaken to
ensure that the plaintiff would continue with, and complete the works;
(g) the trial judge rejected the appellants’ contention that the plaintiff ought
to have stopped work and refused to continue when no guarantee was
D forthcoming. He found that it would have been extremely difficult for
the plaintiff to do so when workers, machineries and piles had all been
positioned at the site, ready to undertake the works. Instead he accepted
and found as a fact that Tony Ong had pleaded with, and persuaded the
plaintiff to continue with the works giving the assurance that the
E guarantee would be procured. This meant that any waiver on the part of
the plaintiff was irrelevant and that Tony Ong’s conduct was material for
the purposes of ascertaining liability on the part of Tony Ong himself and
Perfect Solution for the debt created in favour of the plaintiff;
(h) in evaluating the entirety of the evidence, the fact that Tony Ong, Perfect
F Solution and PS Bina knew that the plaintiff would never be paid for the
EBW, that Bina Puri would not guarantee any such payment, that despite
this Tony Ong continued to persuade the plaintiff to complete the works,
that the reversals and decertification only took place after the completion
of the FBP works, that Tony Ong and the other two directors resigned
G and transferred their shareholding to wholly unconnected persons all led
to a clear finding that Tony Ong, Perfect Solution and PS Bina had
defrauded the plaintiff in relation to the EBW;
(i) PS Bina was a mere facade and sham utilised by Tony Ong to shield
H Perfect Solution from having to pay out for the EBW. In short Tony Ong
had interposed PS Bina as a corporate entity with a view to ensuring that
the plaintiff carried out the EBW and to protect Perfect Solution from a
suit in contract for non-payment for the EBW carried out by the plaintiff;
(j) the trial judge found that the semblance of separate subcontracts being
I entered into by Perfect Solution with PS Bina and PS Bina with the
plaintiff was a ‘creation’ as both entities were operating as a single
economic unit under the control of Tony Ong. This is the onl y context in
which the trial judge utilised the term ‘single economic unit’. In finding that
both companies were utilised interchangeably by Tony Ong, the trial
636 Malayan Law Journal [2021] 3 MLJ

judge relied on a plethora of evidence including the fact that numerous A

payments were made by Perfect Solution directly to the plaintiff, rather
than PS Bina, if indeed the subcontracts were genuine. The trial judge
found that the entities were utilised by Tony Ong to practise fraud or equitable
fraud on the plaintiff. This is important because the trial judge did not utilise
the single economic unit in itself to justify disregarding the corporate veil. B
Rather, his finding was that the operation of Perfect Solution and PS Bina
interchangeabl y, by Tony Ong to perpetrate a fraud or an equitable fraud,
justified the disregarding of the corporate veil; and
(k) the High Court found that in light of fraud or equitable fraud it was only C
right that the corporate veils of Perfect Solution and PS Bina be lifted,
thereby establishing liability against all three defendants, jointly and
severally.

THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEAL D

[33] The Court of Appeal affirmed and endorsed the careful and thorough
findings of the High Court in its entirety. It also agreed with the trial judge on
the law and that it was an appropriate case for the piercing of the corporate veil.
E
THIS APPEAL

[34] The appellants, notwithstanding the legal questions put forward at the
leave stage, have sought in their submissions to try and have the findings of fact
made at the trial stage revisited, but there is clearly no basis for this court to do F
so. Firstly, the findings of fact made at the trial stage have been made only after
a thorough examination and analysis of the evidence on record. It cannot be
said that the trial judge was ‘plainly wrong’. This phrase was defined by Lord
Reed in the English Supreme Court case of Henderson v Foxworth Investments
Limited and Another [2014] UKSC 41 to mean ‘one that no reasonable judge G
could have reached’. The cases discussing principles of appellate intervention
have been set out at length in MMC Oil & Gas Engineering Sdn Bhd v Tan Bock
Kwee & Sons Sdn Bhd [2016] 2 MLJ 428; [2016] 4 CLJ 665 (‘MMC Oil &
Gas’) (paras 5–19). We do not propose to repeat the same here, save to point
out the passage from the UK Supreme Court in Carlyle v Royal Bank of Scotland H
Plc [2015] UKSC 13 cited in para 9 of MMC Oil & Gas which disapproved of
re-opening all questions of fact for redetermination on appeal having regard to
the advantage and role which the first instance judge has in determining the
facts (see also Gan Yook Chin (P) & Anor v Lee Ing Chin & Ors [2005] 2 MLJ
1; [2004] 4 CLJ 309). In any event it would be improper and erroneous in law I
for the appellants to seek to invalidate, annul or undo those well-predicated
findings of fact at this appellate stage.

[35] The primary focus at this apex stage is to examine the law with a view to
 Ong Leong Chiou & Anor v Keller (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors
[2021] 3 MLJ (Nallini Pathmanathan FCJ) 637

A examining a novel point or to clarify the law relating to the doctrine in issue, if
required. Having examined the record of evidence, I am of the view that there
is no basis to depart from the clear findings of fact. To that extent the appellants’
submissions effectively inviting a reversal of the trial judge’s findings are firmly
rejected. Before examining the questions of law before us, I turn first to
B consider the position in law in relation to the disregarding of the corporate veil.

The position in law in relation to disregarding the corporate veil

[36] It is necessary, in the context of this appeal, to turn to a consideration of

C the law relating to the disregarding of the corporate veil, often referred to
variously and interchangeably as ‘lifting’ and ‘piercing’.

[37] This is both necessary and important because in the present appeal, the
appellants have further submitted that the law in this area is confused. It is
D
further contended that the trial judge and the Court of Appeal conflated the
various bases on which the corporate veil may be disregarded. It has also been
submitted that clarification is warranted on the nomenclature relating to the ‘li
fting’ and ‘piercing’ of the corporate veil. Are they synonymous teams or is
there a difference?
E
[38] As such, clarification is necessary in relation to the doctrine of piercing
the veil of incorporation of a company. This is particularly so in light of the
relatively recent decision of the English Supreme Court decision of Prest v Prest
F and others [2013] 4 All ER 673 (‘Prest’). What is the extent of its application
and ought it to be applied or adopted in this jurisdiction?

The law on the disregarding of the corporate veil

G [39] In the course of their submissions the appellants contended the

following, which warrants examination and analysis:
(a) the piercing of PS Bina’s corporate veil, even if based on a proper finding
of fraud, cannot result in a finding of joint and several liability,
particularly against both the appellants together;
H
(b) the trial court and the Court of Appeal confused joint tortfeasorship
and/or single economic unit elements with corporate veil piercing
principles in arriving at joint and several liability; and
(c) the appellants here contend that the trial judge in ‘piercing’ the corporate
I veil erred in law in that he failed to comprehend the distinction between
‘lifting’ and ‘piercing’ the corporate veil. This error, they maintain, if
corrected, would result in this court concluding that both the courts
below erred because these courts applied the doctrine of lifting the
corporate veil to establish joint liability on the basis of joint
638 Malayan Law Journal [2021] 3 MLJ

tortfeasorship, which is wholly incorrect in law. This in turn is because A

corporate veil piercing is incompatible with joint and several liability.

[40] Accordingly it is submitted that both judgments are flawed and ought
to fall. These contentions are put forward on the basis of the appellants’
counsel’s reading of when the corporate veil may be lifted along the lines B
prescribed in Prest, a decision of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom.

[41] The leading judgment in Prest was delivered by Lord Sumption where
the legal rationale for the doctrine of lifting or piercing the corporate veil was C
dissected and analysed in considerable detail. It is important to bear in mind
that of the seven judges who heard this appeal, Lord Sumption and Lord
Neuberger were in agreement, while the other judges had caveats to add to
Lord Sumption’s legal analysis of the doctrine.
D
[42] In order to assess the accuracy of the appellants’ submissions that even
in the face of a finding of fraud, the trial court was not entitled to look behind
or pierce the corporate veil, it is necessary to consider the judgment in Prest in
its entirety, rather than to attempt to comprehend it on the basis of piecemeal
passages. E

[43] Lord Sumption, while embracing the juridical basis for, and the
concept of a separate legal personality, accepted that the strict confines of the
corporate personality ‘will not necessarily apply’ if the dealings of persons
F
natural or artificial are not honest or if the corporate personality is abused (see
para 18). He reiterated and affirmed Denning LJ’s famous statement in Lazarus
Estates v Beasley [1956] 1 All ER 341 (‘Lazarus v Beasley’) at p 345:
… No court in this land will allow a person to keep an advantage which he has obtained
by fraud . No judgment of a court, no order of a Minister can be allowed to stand if it has G
been obtained by fraud. Fraud unravels everything . The court is careful not to find
fraud unless it is distinctly pleaded and proved; but once it is proved, it vitiates
judgments, contracts and all transactions whatsoever … (Emphasis added.)

[44] I refer to the foregoing because in the instant appeal the trial court H
found clear instances of dishonesty culminating in a finding of fraud,
warranting the lifting or piercing of the corporate veil.

[45] Lord Sumption went on to hold that there are limited circumstances in
which the use of a company as a means of evading the law is dishonest for this I
purpose. At para 27 of the judgment in Prest, Lord Sumption expressed his view
that the court may be justified in piercing the corporate veil if a company’s
separate legal personality is being abused for the purpose of some relevant wrong
doing. In the seminal paragraph of his judgment which is most often quoted,
 Ong Leong Chiou & Anor v Keller (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors
[2021] 3 MLJ (Nallini Pathmanathan FCJ) 639

A para 28, he states:

The difficulty is to identify what is a relevant wrongdoing. References to a ‘facade’
or ‘sham’ beg too many questions to provide a satisfact ory answer. It seems to me that
two distinct principles lie behind these protean terms, and that much confusion has been
caused by failing to distinguish between them. They can conveniently be called the
B concealment principle and the evasion principle. The concealment principle is legally
banal and does not involve piercing the corporate veil at all. It is the interposition of a
company or perhaps several companies so as to conceal the identity of the real act ors
will not deter the courts from identifying them, assuming that their identity is
legally relevant. In these cases the court is not dis regarding the ‘facade’ but only
C looking behind it to dis cover the facts which the corpora te structure is concealing.
The evasion principle is different. It is that the court may disregard the corporate veil if
there is a legal right against the person in control of it which exists independently of the
company’s involvement, and a company is interposed so that the separate legal personality
of the company will defeat the right or frustrate its enforcement. Many cases will fall into
D both categories but in so me circumstances the difference between them may be
critical … (Emphasis added.)

[46] I comprehend this paragraph as stating that:

(a) the company’s veil of incorporation might be lifted if it is being utilised
E
for some relevant wrongdoing;
(b) the first step is to identify such relevant wrongdoing. In this context the
interchangeable use of ‘facade’ and ‘sham’ is too vague and gives rise to
confusion;
F
(c) two distinct principles lie behind the terms ‘facade’ and ‘sham’ respectively;
(d) where the wrongdoing relates to the abuse of the corporate personality as
a ‘facade’ the principle to be applied is that of concealment. This principle does
not entail the piercing of the corporate veil. The interposition of a company or
G perhaps several companies so as to conceal the identit y of the real actors will
not prevent the courts from identifying the real actors. There is no piercing
because the court is not disregarding the facade but looking behind it to
discover the facts which the corporate structure is concealing;
(e) where the wrongdoing relates to the abuse of the corporate personality as a
H
‘sham’ the principle to be utilised is that of evasion. In evasion the court
may disregard the corporate veil if there is a legal right against the person in
control of it which exists independentl y of the company’s involvement and a
company is interposed so that the separate legal personality of the company
will defeat the right or frustrate its enforcement; and
I
(f) many cases will fall into both categories.

[47] The judgment in Prest then went on to consider a series of cases with a
view to explaining how many of them did not entail the piercing of the
640 Malayan Law Journal [2021] 3 MLJ

corporate veil but which could be resolved by the utilisation of other traditional A
concepts of law such as principal and agent or the use of trusts.

[48] These included Gilford Motor Company Ltd v Horne [1933] Ch 935
which Lord Sumption decreed was a correct application of the evasion
principle, warranting piercing. Less so in Jones v Lipman [1962] 1 All ER 442. B
Similarly he was of the view that in Gencor ACP Ltd v Dalby [2000] 2 BCLC
734 and Trustor AB v Smallbone [2001] 3 All ER 987 there was confusion
between the two principles as these cases more properly fell within the
concealment principle, as the evasion principle was not engaged. This was C
because neither of the protagonists in these cases had utilised the company’s
separate legal personality to evade a liability they would otherwise have had.

[49] Their liability to account was more properly explained by the true facts
that the companies in question had received monies as their respective agent or D
nominee. Lord Sumption concluded (at para 35) by summarising that there is
a limited principle of English law which applies when a person is under an
existing legal obligation or liability or subject to an existing legal restriction
which he deliberately evades or whose enforcement he deliberately frustrates by
interposing a company under his control. The court is then entitled to pierce E
the corporate veil for the purpose of depriving the company or its controller of
the advantage they would otherwise have obtained by the company’s separate
legal personality. But if some other legal relationship may be utilised to resolve
the matter, then piercing the corporate veil ought not to be the recourse.
F
[50] The consequences of applying the concealment and evasion principles
in relation to the wrongdoing in issue also gives rise, theoretically at least, to
different consequences in law. When the concealment principle is applicable to
a particular wrongdoing, it follows that the court may disregard the corporate
shell or pers onality to enable it to look behind the facade and determine the G
true facts that were being concealed by the use of the corporate personality. The
latter does not preclude the court from determining the truth of the matter in
issue. However, no piercing of the corporate veil is involved when applying the
concealment principle to enable the court to look behind the facade of the
corporate personality. The facade is disregarded in order to enable the court to H
look at the real facts behind the corporate struct ure. Or which have been
hidden behind the corporate structure. Neither does it follow that liability is
necessarily visited upon the corporate personality or the controller of the
company
I
[51] The evasion principle however, is only applicable if there is a legal right
available against the controller of the company, independently of the
company’s involvement. The company is interposed to frustrate the
enforcement of the right or to defeat the legal right.
 Ong Leong Chiou & Anor v Keller (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors
[2021] 3 MLJ (Nallini Pathmanathan FCJ) 641

A [52] When applicable to a particular wrongdoing, it enables the court to pierce

the veil and impose liability against the controller, the company, or both. Imposition
of liability follows from the application of the evasion principle. It is therefore
apparent that liability candevolve upon more than just the actor who is the alter-ego
of the company or series of companies. Liability candevolve on other related parties
B too.

[53] However, in Prest, the Supreme Court noted and accepted that there is
a body of ca se law that allows the corporate personality to be disregarded when
C
there is fraud. It must be borne in mind that the present appeal deals with
findings of fraud by the trial judge which have not been impeached.

Disregarding the corporate personality by reason of fraud — An entrenched

principle outside of the doctrine of piercing of the corporate veil
D
[54] It is important to note that the case-law in both this jurisdiction and the
common law position in the United Kingdom recognises that there subsists a
well-established principle that if a company’s separate legal personality is being
abused for the purpose of wrongdoing, the court is justified in disregarding the
E corporate personality of the company. The substantial body of case-law in
favour of this pro position is considerable and even Lord Sumption in Prest
stated that he ‘would not for my part be willing to explain that consensus out of
existence’. That is evident in the leading case of Saloman v Saloman itself. It is
also clear that where there is fraud, that fraud unravels everything as alluded to
F earlier (see Denning LJ in Lazarus v Beasley).

[55] Therefore it is readily apparent in the instant case that as the trial judge
found fraud to have been perpetrated, that in itself warrants the allocation of
liability to the perpetrators of the fraud, independently of the doctrine of
G piercing the corporate veil as espoused by Lord Sumption. The finding of fraud
encompassed Tony Ong as well as the two companies which he controlled,
Perfect Solution and PS Bina. The companies were ‘utilised’ by Tony Ong to
enable the debt due to the plaintiff to be evaded by Perfect Solution which
enjoyed the profits of the FBP Contract paid by Bina Puri, without paying for
H the EBW carried out by the plaintiff, and which was a pre-requisite for the
payment for the rest of the FBP works. PS Bina was utilised as a ‘sham’
company interposed between Perfect Solution and the plaintiff, to ensure that
no effective enforcement could be taken by the plaintiff to recover the debt,
which was deliberately contracted by Tony Ong with the plaintiff. The person
I in control who engineered the fraud was Tony Ong. Perfect Solution was the
recipient of the benefit gained from the fraud so perpetrated, because it
received payment from Bina Puri while being held insulated from the debt due
and owing for the EBW, which comprised a part of the FBP contract. It is in
this context that the trial judge ordered that all three of them, Tony Ong and
642 Malayan Law Journal [2021] 3 MLJ

the two companies were jointly and severally liable. The fraud could not have A
been perpetrated without any one of the three entities.

[56] The view that fraud enables the court to disregard the corporate
personality of a company is fortified by the judgment of Lord Neuberger in
Prest, who pointed out (at para 83) that: B

… this limited doctrine may not, on analysis, be limited to piercing the corporate
veil. However, there are three points to be made about that formulation. In so far as
it is based on ‘fraud unravels everything’, as discussed by Lord Sumption at [18], the
formulation simply involves the invocation of a well-established principle which exists C
independently of the doctrine … (Emphasis added.)

[57] In other words, the ability of a court to unravel transactions by reason of

fraud is independent of the doctrine of piercing the veil.
D
[58] And in Lord Sumption’s own speech at para 18, he dealt with the
situation of fraud. He accepted that there subsists a broad principle governing
cases in which a benefit has been obtained by dishonesty. In these limited cases
the law treats the use of a company as a means of evading the law as dishonest.
And that is precisely the situation here, warranting the court disregarding the E
corporate personality of:
(a) PS Bina, which was created as a ‘sham’ to defraud the plaintiff;
(b) the use of Perfect Solution to evade payment of a debt and enforcement
of the same, by ensuring that this entity was utilised to contract with Bina F
Puri, such that monies received were placed beyond the reach of the
plaintiff;
(c) the perpetration of the scheme by the main controller of the two
companies or puppeteer, Tony Ong; and
G
(d) the companies were utilised as Tony Ong’s agents to perpetrate the fraud
against the plaintiff and evade liability for the debt. To that extent the two
companies were utilised as engines of fraud.

[59] So the application of this broad principle founded on the finding of H

fraud, in itself warrants the corporate personalities of the companies being
disregarded. In other words, liability was found against Tony Ong and each of
the companies by reason of the fraud alone, without the invocation of the
doctrine of the piercing of the corporate veil.
I
Application of the evasion principle in relation to the wrongdoing in the context of
the present factual matrix

[60] Learned counsel for the appellants contends that the trial court was
 Ong Leong Chiou & Anor v Keller (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors
[2021] 3 MLJ (Nallini Pathmanathan FCJ) 643

A wrong to effectively ‘pierce’ the corporate veil because Lord Sumption’s test in
Prest, predicated on the evasion principle, is inapplicable in the context of the
present appeal. It is contended that the plaintiff enjoyed no legal right against
Tony Ong, independently of the corporate personality, which justified the
piercing of the corporate veil.
B
[61] Even if the evasion principle is sought to be applied, alternatively to the
finding above that fraud allows for the disregarding of the corporate
personality, the following consequences would ensue in law:
C (a) Tony Ong is the ‘controller’ of both Perfect Solution and PS Bina. This
was a finding of fact by the trial judge;
(b) Tony Ong procured the contract for the performance of earthworks for
the project with Bina Puri, utilising Perfect Solution. Accordingly, Perfect
D Solution was the company that entered into the contract as subcontractor
with Bina Puri to carry out the earthworks;
(c) Tony Ong knew that Perfect Solution could not carry out the earth works
contract itsel f and that it would have to be subcontracted out. The
plaintiff had the requisite expertise and reputation to carry out the
E earthworks;
(d) Tony Ong was aware from the terms of Perfect Solution’s contract with
Bina Puri, that the latter would not make any payment for EBW;
(e) Tony Ong and two others incorporated PS Bina, a shelf company with no
F
assets and no track record, to be the entity to enter into a subcontract
with the plaintiff. PS Bina was incorporated, specifically for the purpose
of contracting with the plaintiff, and interposed between Perfect Solution
and the plaintiff;
G (f) this was a deliberate act of interposing a ‘sham’ company between Perfect
Solution and the plaintiff;
(g) Perfect Solution agreed to complete the earthworks namely the CBP, FBP
and GA. For the FBP contract Perfect Solution, and its controller, Tony
H Ong, was aware at all times that it would not be paid for EBW;
(h) Tony Ong personally induced the plaintiff to enter into the subcontract
with the sham company PS Bina. Tony Ong deliberately misrepresented
that the EBW would be fully paid for by Bina Puri and thus, PS Bina. A
I
guarantee from the main contractor was also promised as a condition
precedent. The plaintiff would not have entered into the contract with PS
Bina but for Tony Ong;
(i) the plaintiff carried out the entirety of the works believing it would be
paid for the earthworks under the FBP contract. Initially it was paid in
644 Malayan Law Journal [2021] 3 MLJ

full by PS Bina, but subsequently the entire sum for the earthworks was A
reversed out leaving a debt due and owing to it;
(j) the plaintiff suffered the detriment of carrying out works for which Tony
Ong, Perfect Solution and PS Bina knew the plaintiff would never be
paid. The relevant information was deliberately suppressed from the B
plaintiff and inducements were made in the form of dishonest
misrepresentations from Tony Ong coupled with payments for the EBW,
which were subsequently reversed. The payments had been made initially
to ensure that the plaintiff carried out the works in their entirety, allowing
Perfect Solutio n to receive payment from Bina Puri; C
(k) PS Bina further served to preclude enforcement by the plaintiff of its debt
because it was a shell company with no assets;
(l) Perfect Solution enjoyed the benefit of monies for earthworks completed,
under its contract wi th Bina Puri, which it could not have enjoyed, D
unless and until the EBW works were completed by the plaintiff; and
(m) it is apparent from the foregoing that Perfect Solution, evaded its legal
obligation to pay the debt for the EBW, through the interposition of PS
Bina by its controller, Tony Ong. E

[62] Given this factual matrix, can the evasion principle be applied to pierce
the corporate veil? From Prest, it is clear that it is essential to keep in mind the
particular purpose for which it is desired to pierc e the corporate veil. The
evasion principle identifies the company with the shareholder or controller for F
a particular purpose; that purpose must necessarily relate to an existing liability
or obligation of the shareholder or controller, with which liabili ty or obligation
the company is sought to be identified. Only then is the veil being pierced to
prevent the abuse of the corporate legal personality.
G
[63] Therefore the key question in applying Lord Sumption’s evasion
principle for the purposes of ‘piercing the corporate veil’ is this: Is there an
existing liability or obligation of Tony Ong with which liability or obligation
the company PS Bina is sought to be identified? The answer is that there is an H
existing liability or obligation of Tony Ong to the plaintiff based on his
misrepresentations which caused them to enter into the contract, followed by
his inducements that they complete the works, knowing full well that such
payments for the EBW would be reversed as there would be no payment
forthcoming fr om Bina Puri for the EBW. I

[64] Put another way, the plaintiff enjoyed a legal right against Tony Ong,
who is in control of PS Bina, which exists independently of the company’s
involvement. Perfect Solution was at all times the agent of Tony Ong that
 Ong Leong Chiou & Anor v Keller (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors
[2021] 3 MLJ (Nallini Pathmanathan FCJ) 645

A enabled Tony Ong to benefit from the evasion of the debt due and owing to the
plaintiff.

[65] PS Bina was formed so that its separate legal personality would defeat or
frustrate the plaintiff ’s rights against Tony Ong or frustrate the enforcement of
B its debt. If so, then the court is entitled to pierce the corporate veil.

[66] Finally it is worth noting that in summarising the test for the piercing of
the corporate veil, Lord Sumption held at para 35 of Prest that:
C … The court may then pierce the corporate veil for the purpose, and only for the
purpose, of depriving the company or its controller of the advantage that they
would otherwise have obtained by the company‘s separate legal personality.

[67] Applying the same to the present factual matrix it follows that the trial
D
court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeal, did not err in piercing the corporate
veil of PS Bina for the purpose, and only for the purpose of depriving Tony Ong
and its agent, Perfect Solution of the advantage they would otherwise have
obtained by the utilisation of PS Bina’s separate legal personality. In this context
E it is important to note that it is the piercing of PS Bina’s veil that is of
significance.

[68] The advantage enjoyed by Perfect Solution and its controller Tony
Ong, was the evasion of a debt lawfully due and owing to the plaintiff by both
F Perfect Solution and Tony Ong. Perfect Solution was liable for the debt due to
the plaintiff on two bases:
(a) Tony Ong was in control of, or the alter-ego or the directing mind of
Perfect Solution according to the trial judge, and the court was to that
extent entitled to look behind the facade of the corporate personality
G
(under the concealment principle) to ascertain the true facts, and then
impose liability on it on the basis of agency principles; and
(b) it was the entity that Tony Ong utilised to benefit from the creation of the
‘sham’ PS Bina to deflect or avoid liability for the debt. The net result is
H that Tony Ong and Perfect Solution are also liable for the debt due to the
plaintiff.

[69] I am fully aware that the trial judge did not express his legal rationale in
this manner. But that cannot be faulted because his conclusion in law for
I imposing joint and several liability against the three entities was fraud and/or
equitable fraud premised on the basis that the three ‘actors’ participated in a
scheme devised by Tony Ong against the plaintiff. The doctrine of piercing the
corporate veil in accordance with the test prescribed by Lord Sumption in Prest
did not come into play by reason of the fraud, which in itself allows for the
646 Malayan Law Journal [2021] 3 MLJ

lifting or disregarding of the corporate veil independently of the doctrine. A

[70] The foregoing exercise of applying the doctrine as enunciated was

undertaken to apply the evasion principle. It comprises an alternate rationale
for imposing liability on the three parties, Tony Ong, PS Bina and Perfect
Solution. B

[71] Therefore it follows that it was not incorrect for the trial court to pierce
the corporate veil of PS Bina and impose liability on Tony Ong, Perfect
Solution and PS Bina jointly and severally, because PS Bina was created C
specifically to evade a debt properly due to the plaintiff from Perfect Solution
and its controller, Tony Ong, who had devised the scheme.

[72] It should also be borne in mind that the present factual matrix is
complicated by the fact that two corporate entities are involved. The D
applicability of the doctrine is focused primarily on PS Bina, the ‘sham’
company that was created to deflect and evade liability for the debt. Vis a vis
Perfect Solution and Tony Ong, the finding of the trial judge that Tony Ong
was the controller of Perfect Solution is more compatible with the concealment
principle, in that its corporate facility was used as a facade for the scheme. That E
did not preclude the court from looking behind the facade to determine the
true facts behind the entire series of transactions. Ultimately liability against
Perfect Solution, applying the test in Prest, would turn on the application of the
substantive law principles of principal and agent.
F
The other members of the English Supreme Court bench in Prest

[73] It is equally important to appreciate in relation to this relatively recent

analysis by Lord Sumption of the characterisation of wrongdoing justifying the
piercing of the corporate veil, that not all of the seven member bench of the G
Supreme Court accepted the analysis in its entirety. Only Lord Neuberger did,
without qualification.

[74] Lady Hale SCJ (later President), with whom Wilson SCJ agreed, held at
para 92 of the judgment that she was ‘… not sure whether it was possible to H
classify a ll of the cases in which the courts have been or should be prepared to
disregard the separate legal personality of a company neatly into cases of either
concealment or evasion. They may simply be examples of the principle that the
individuals who operate limited companies should not be allowed to take
unconscionable advantage of the people with whom they do business. But what I
the cases do have in common is that the separate legal personality is being
disregarded in order to obtain a remedy against someone other than the
company in respect of a liability which would otherwise be that of the company
alone (if it existed at all). In the converse case, where it is sought to convert the
 Ong Leong Chiou & Anor v Keller (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors
[2021] 3 MLJ (Nallini Pathmanathan FCJ) 647

A personal liability of the owner or controller into a liability of the company it is

usually more appropriate to rely upon the concepts of agency and of the
‘directing mind’.

[75] Lord Mance, while agreeing in principle with the analysis by Lord
B Sumption on the doctrine of the piercing of the corporate veil, qualified that
agreemen t by stating that it would be ‘dangerous to seek to foreclose all
possible future situations which may arise …’ and that he would not wish to do
so.
C
[76] Similarly Lord Clarke, while agreeing generally with the doctrine,
demurred from complete agreement for the reason that the distinction between
the concealment and the evasion principles in relation to categorising the type
of wrongdoing had not been discussed in the course of argument and therefore
D ought not to be definitively adopted until full submissions had been heard on
the issue.

[77] Lord Walker held that he did not consider the ‘piercing of the corporate
veil’ to be a doctrine at all in the sense of a coherent principle or rule of law.
E Instead he viewed it as a label to describe the disparate occasions on which
exceptions to the principle of the separate personality of a company come into
play. He effectively rejected the doctrine.

[78] The point to be made is that there was no complete consensus on the
F
analysis by Lord Sumption that the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil only
ar ose when the wrongdoing in question fell within the ambit of the ‘evasion’
principle as defined by him. It would therefore appear that the doctrine has not
been definitively accepted as being the last word on the subject in the United
G Kingdom itself. This is borne out, inter alia, by its consideration in subsequent
cases.

[79] Subsequent case-law has not resolved the difficulty of utilising the test
specified in Prest. It is a complex test and confusion/uncertainty can ensue
H when determining whether the concealment or the evasion principle more
properly applies to the wrongdoing in question. The distinction between the
two principles can be difficult to discern and as stated by Lord Sumption
himself in Prest, often both principles may be applicable.

I [80] Finally the end result is often similar, in that liability ensues against the
relevant actors, whichever principle is utilised.

VTB Capital plc v Nutritek International Corp and others [2013] UKSC 5 (‘VTB
Capital’)
648 Malayan Law Journal [2021] 3 MLJ

[81] Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that VTB Capital which A
was a judgment of the UK Supreme Court, handed down prior to Prest, was
wholly relevant to the present case. Lord Neuberger delivered the leading
judgment there. The facts were that VTB Capital, an English bank entered into
a facility agreement with a Russian company (‘RAP’), pursuant to which funds
were advanced to RAP to enable it to purchase certain dairy companies from B
Nutritek. RAP defaulted on the loan. VTB Capital considered the security
provided for the loan to be worth significantly less than the funds advanced.
Subsequently it was discovered that RAP and Nutritek were under the
common control of an individual, Mr Malofeev, through his interests in two
C
intermediary companies. VTB Capital claimed that it was falsely induced to
enter into the facility agreement by misrepresentations relating to the fact that
RAP and Nutritek were under the common control and about the value of
security given for the loan. The defendants named were Nutritek, Mr Malofeev
and the two intermediary companies through which Malofeev controlled RAP D
and Nutritek. The defendants resided in Russia.

[82] VTB obtained permission to serve the defendants out of the

jurisdiction in respect of their claim which was founded on tortious
misrepresentation and made in England. The defendants subsequently applied E
to set aside the service. VTB Capital responded by applying for leave to amend
its claim to add a contractual claim based on piercing RAP’s corporate veil.
VTB Capital claimed that Mr Malofeev and the two companies he used to
control RAP and Nutritek, though not parties to the agreements ought
nevertheless to be held jointly and severally liable with RAP under the facility F
and related agreements. The application by VTB Capital to amend its
particulars of claim so as to include the veil piercing claim was refused at all
three tiers of the UK Courts.

[83] In the English Supreme Court, the nub of Lord Neuberger’s refusal to G
allow the amendment of the claim to include the piercing of the veil is
encapsulated in para 142 of the judgment where he stated:
[142] Quite apart from this, it seems to me that the facts relied on by VTB to justify
piercing the veil of in corporation in this case do not involve RAP being used as ‘a
H
facade concealing the true facts’. In my view, if the corporate veil is to be pierced, ‘the
true facts‘ must mean that, in reality, it is the person behind the company, rather than the
company, which is the relevant actor or recipient (as the case may be). Here, on VTB’s
case, ‘the true facts’ relate to the control, trading performance, and value of the Dairy
Companies (if one considers the specific allegations against Mr Malofeev), or to the
genuineness of the nature of the underlying arrangement (which involves a transfer of I
assets between companies in common ownership). Neither of these features can be said to
involve RAP being used as a ‘facade to conceal the true facts. (Emphasis added.)

[84] Unlike VTB Capital, it is evident that in the instant appeal, the findings
 Ong Leong Chiou & Anor v Keller (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors
[2021] 3 MLJ (Nallini Pathmanathan FCJ) 649

A of fact by the trial judge bear out that the ‘true facts’ in reality are that it is the
person behind the company PS Bina, namely Tony Ong, rather than PS Bina
itself, who is the relevant actor or recipient.

[85] It is Tony Ong who interposed PS Bina between Perfect Solution and
B the plaintiff to ensure that the debt to the plaintiff would not be paid. The
factual matrix in the instant appeal discloses a deliberate and flagrant attempt
to procure the EBW to be performed without any intention of reimbursement
for such work, by the interposing of a ‘sham’ company to evade the debt due to
the plaintiff for the EBW.
C
[86] It is quite different from the VTB Capital case where the ‘true facts’
sought to be relied on to justify the piercing of the corporate veil did not involve
the debtor company RAP being utilised as a facade to conceal the true facts.
D
[87] It should also be borne in mind that VTB Capital was a case involving
an interlocutory application on amendment of the claim. In our case there have
been sound findings of fact made by the trial judge which comprise the basis for
the plaintiff ’s seeking to pierce or lift the corporate veil for the purpo se of
E recovering a debt which the relevant parties sought to evade by fraud or
equitable fraud.

[88] In any event, VTB Capital pre-dates Prest where the distinction between
the nature of the wrongdoing warranting the application of the concealment
F principle (which does not involve piercing the corporate veil) and the evasion
principle (which does) had not been determined. As such I am not persuaded
that the decision in VTB Capital alters the legal reasoning and analysis we have
adopted.

G OTHER JURISDICTIONS

[89] The analysis has not been accepted in its entirety in other jurisdictions.
Most jurisdictions have preferred not to confine the disregarding or lifting of
the corporate veil too rigidly.
H
The position in Malaysia

[90] It was also submitted by counsel for the appellants that the law on the
piercing of the corporate veil in Malaysia was in somewhat unclear and
I confused in that the case-law utilises a range of criteria for the lifting of the
corporate veil. An examination of recent case-law on the subject does not bear
out such a description.

[91] As is the case in the United Kingdom, it is an accepted position in law

650 Malayan Law Journal [2021] 3 MLJ

in Malaysia that the court will lift the corporate veil if a company was set up for A
fraudulent purposes. The ‘fraud unravels all’ principle expounded in Lazarus v
Beasley is applied. That is the primary and relevant principle that is applicable
in the instant case. This position has been, with respect, correctly set out by this
court in Gurbachan Singh s/o Bagawan Singh & Ors v Vellasamy s/o Ponnusamy
& Ors [2015] 1 MLJ 773 (‘Gurbachan Singh’) where Richard Malanjum FCJ B
(later CJ) stated:
[96] But in the event that we should, we are of the view that it is now a settled law
in Malays ia that the court would lift the corporate veil of a corporation if such
corporation was set up for fraudulent purposes, or where it was established to avoid C
an exist ing obligation or even to prevent the abuse of a corporate legal personality
(see: Prest v Petrodel Resources Limited and others [2013] UKSC 34).
…
[97] As to what constitutes fraudulent purposes it has been described so as to
D
include actual fraud or fraud in equity (see Law Kam Loy & Anor v Boltex Sdn Bhd
and others ). And fraud in equity occurred in ‘… Cases where there are signs of
separate personalities of companies being used to enable persons to evade their
contractual obligations or duties, the court would disregard the notional
separateness of the companies … (see Sunrise Sdn Bhd v First Profile (M) Sdn Bhd &
Anor [1996] 3 MLJ 533 per Chong Siew Fai FCJ (as he then was) … E

[92] After setting out the doctrine of the separate corporate personality as
prescribed in Salomon v Salomon, this court reiterated and quoted from Lord
Halsbury LC’s well-known holding on when the veil of incorporation may be F
lifted, namely when there is fraud or an agency relationship or if the company
is a myth or fiction. In such an instance the doctrine of the corporate
personality does not insulate the shareholders or directors from being ‘assailed
directly’.
G
[93] And in Takako Sakao (f ) v Ng Pek Yuan (f ) & Anor [2009] 6 MLJ 751;
[2010] 1 CLJ 381 the court speaking through Gopal Sri Ram JCA held that a
litigant who seeks the court’s intervention to pierce the corporate veil must
establis h special circumstances showing that the company in question is a mere
facade concealing the true facts. H

[94] Although this concept of the ‘facade’ is now considered as a basis for
looking behind the corporate personality to ascertain the true facts, rath er than
piercing the corporate veil by virtue of the new definition afforded in Prest, it
captures the point that the corporate personality is disregarded where it is I
utilised to conceal the true facts of a matter.

[95] This court went on to consider the principles set out by Lord Sumption
relating to the manner of ascertaining whether a particular wrongdoing fell
 Ong Leong Chiou & Anor v Keller (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors
[2021] 3 MLJ (Nallini Pathmanathan FCJ) 651

A under the concealment principle or the evasion principle. In these

circumstances it is apparent that this court considered Prest and did not dis
approve it.

[96] The thrust of the decisions of the higher courts of the superior judiciary
B in this jurisdiction have tended to seek to restrict the disregarding of the
corporate personality and only doing so in the face of actual fraud or fraud in
equity as clearly stipulated by Gopal Sri Ram JCA (later FCJ) in Law Kam Loy
v Boltex. This is clear from the decision of this court in Solid Investments Ltd v
Alcatel-Lucent (M) Sdn Bhd (previously known as Alcatel Network Systems(M)
C Sdn Bhd) [2014] 3 MLJ 785.

[97] As discussed earlier, Law Kam Loy v Boltex adopted the position in the
UK as set out in Adams v Cape Industries Plc [1990] Ch 433 (‘Adams v Cape’)
where the wide and somewhat vague test of lifting the corporate veil ‘in the
D interests of justice’ was expressly overruled. The test became one of ‘special
circumstances which would include actual fraud at common law or some
inequitable or unconscionable conduct amounting to fraud in equity …’.

[98] The concept of lifting and piercing were and continue to be utilised
E
interchangeably in this jurisdiction. However, in this appeal, I have considered
in greater detail the differences in the principles underlying the principle of
‘piercing’ the corporate veil as enunciated by Lord Sumption. I am of the
considered view that it would be appropriate to adopt the analysis put forward
by Lord Sumption in Prest, but as agreed by the majority of the Bench in Prest,
F
the analysis ought not to be applied too rigidly. It would be premature to bar or
foreclose the categories of cases in which the corporate personality may be
either disregarded or the veil ‘pierced’.

G [99] The following conclusions may be drawn in relation to the disregarding

of the corporate veil:
(a) there subsists a long line of authority over the years in Malaysia which
recognises that fraud, whether common law fraud or fraud in equity
permits the court disregarding of the corporate personality. This body of
H law as adopted from the United Kingdom takes its line of reasoning from
the ‘fraud unravels all’ principle as expounded by Denning LJ in Lazarus
v Beasley. That body of law remains correct and relevant and ought not to
be lightly tampered with. It is reflective of the position in law recognised
in Salomon v Salomon. It is moreover, with respect, entirely legally
I coherent because the theoretical conc ept of the separate corporate
personality was founded to enable business to be conducted. It is the
essence of incorporation that the shareholder/controller of the company
limits his liability in respect of the future conduct of the company’s
affairs. Ther e is nothing wrong with that. Advantage is taken of limited
652 Malayan Law Journal [2021] 3 MLJ

liability to avoid personal liability if things go wrong (see Persad v Singh A

per Lord Neuberger [2017] UKPC 32).
However, the limitation of liability envisages that such future conduct of
the company’s business is to be conducted honestly and with integrity —
the law is predicated on that assumption. Once honesty is abandoned
B
and the company is utilised as a vehicle for dishonest conduct, or fraud,
or unconscionable conduct, then the basis for th e separate corporate
personality is jeopardised and undermined. It no longer serves the
purpose it was intended for. As such it is only correct that a court
investigating the injury or loss suffered by reason of the wrongful C
utilisation of the corporate personality, or the abuse of the corporate
personality, is allowed to both look behind the facade to ascertain the
true facts and also impose liability against the persons perpetrating such
wrongdoing as is required on the facts of a particular case. This body of
law relating to fraud subsists outside of the doctrine of ‘piercing’ the D
corporate veil as explained in Prest;
(b) I would respectfully concur with the legal rationale prescribed by Lord
Sumption in Prest, which explains that in order to ascertain whether the
veil of incorporation ought to be ‘pierced’, the nature of the wrongdoing
E
in issue ought to be anal ysed to ascertain whether it falls within the
purview of the ‘concealment’ principle or the ‘evasion’ principle. To this
end, the distinction between the two principles of concealment and
evasion are of importance and benefit to enable a court to analyse with
greater accuracy the basis on which the corporate personality is being F
disregarded. It also results in different consequences as explained earlier.
Concealment Principle
(c) the analysis in Prest, namely that the concealment principle does not in
reality pierce the veil of incorporation, but allows the court to disregard
G
or look behind the corporate personality to ascertain the true facts, ought
to be considered for use and application in this jurisdiction. The reason is
because after ascertaining the true facts concealed behind the corporate
personality, it will enable a court to determine which legal principle of
substanti ve law it will then utilise to determine whether liability subsists, H
or does not subsist, against a party to the dispute, on a given set of facts.
This may involve the utilisation of the principles of agency or trusts or
some other area of the law. Such ap plication allows for a greater analysis
of the basis on which liability is imposed, rather than simply stating that
the corporate veil has been lifted and imposing liability on a party I
without explaining the legal basis for doing so. It is also important to note
that it does not engage the evasion principle such that the corporate veil
is not pierced;
Evasion Principle
 Ong Leong Chiou & Anor v Keller (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors
[2021] 3 MLJ (Nallini Pathmanathan FCJ) 653

A (d) if the wrongdoing warrants the application of the evasion principle, the
consequence is that the corporate veil is pierced, so as to enable liability to
imposed on a person, seemingly unconnected to the transaction in
dispute. First it is necessary to asce rtain if there is a legal right against the
person in control of a company which exists independently of the
B company’s involvement, and a company is interposed such that the legal
personality of the company defeats the legal right or frustrates its
enforcement. This is a considerable obstacle to overcome, and it is only
rarely that an appropriate set of facts will allow for such ‘piercing’.
Ultimately the narrow and rigid test ensures that the corporate
C
personality is not lightly disregarded.
Even when the facts of a particular case warrant invoking the evasion
principle enabling the corporate veil to be pierced, the court may only apply
the doctrine to deprive the company or its controller of the advantage that
D they would otherwise have obtain ed by the company’s separate legal
personality.
If there subsists a legal relationship between the company and its controller it
might not be necessary to pierce the corporate veil, in which event it ought
not to be pierced;
E
Conclusions
(e) in many instances, the facts will not allow for a clean and clear application
of either one of these principles. Both principles might come into play. It
F has also been demonstrated that the application of these different
principles might well give rise to the same result. This is a practical reality
that should be borne in mind when analysing the particular factual
matrix. It has also been reported that there has been a degree of
misunderstanding in the application of these two principles.
G It is in this context that the comments of the rest of the Bench in Prest are
most relevant. Baroness Hale, quite correctly, questioned whether all cases
would fall neatly into cases of either concealment or evasion. (see para 92).
Her comment that where the doctrine is sought to be utilised to convert the
liability of the controller of the company to the company itself, the utilisation
H of the agency concept and the ‘directing mind’ would be more appropriate
than the doctrine of piercing of the veil. I would respectfully concur with
these statements;
(f) having reviewed some of the relevant case-law in this jurisdiction, I
conclude, with respect, that there has been no confusion in the
I application of the principles. Firstly all relevant principles in keeping
with the law throughout the Commonwealth has been adhered to. This
is marked by the move from the general and somewhat amorphous test of
‘in the interests of justice’ in earlier case-law to the clear boundaries
drawn in Law Kam Loy v Boltex (above) where disregarding the corporate
654 Malayan Law Journal [2021] 3 MLJ

veil was stated to be applicable when there was evidence of actual fraud at A
common law or unconscionable or inequitable conduct amounting to
fraud in equity. This position in law was then expanded in Gurbachan
Singh where the test and rationale expressed in Prest was considered. In
the present appeal I have sought to clarify the position in law further as
above. Having examined the law in this field and the propositions put B
forward by the parties, I now turn to answer the questions of law before
us.

THE QUESTIONS OF LAW

C
[100] From the recitation and perusal of the factual matrix as well as a
consideration of the law on this subject, the unmistakeable conclusion that I
reach is that the two questions of law are not material issues of law that surfaced
in the course of the case in the High Court or the Court of Appeal.
D
First question of law

‘The applicability of the doctrine where it is alleged that there are joint
tortfeasors and joint liability is sought to be established’ E

[101] This question purports to consider the applicability of the principle of

the disregarding of the corporate veil in a situation where there are ‘joint
tortfeasors’ and ‘joint liability’ is sought to be established under what must
amount to a ‘tort’. Otherwise the parties cannot be ‘joint tortfeasors’. However, F
no tort was pleaded nor tortious relief sought as a matter of fact or law in the
instant case.

[102] The nub of the appellants’ submissions is that the trial judge
apparently lifted the corporate veil of PS Bina premised on the tortious G
principle of joint liability amongst joint tortfeasors. A reading of the judgment
however discloses no such finding in law. The trial judge found joint and
several liability but did not find that the actors, namely Tony Ong, PS Bina and
Perfect Solution were joint tortfeasors. So the basis for this submission is
misconceived. It is further submitted that on ‘piercing’ the corporate veil, any H
liability should only be visited on Tony Ong, as all three entities are one and the
same. Again there is no legal basis for such a proposition in law.

[103] It was also submitted that the doctrine of the piercing of the corporate
veil and joint tortfeasorship are incompatible because joint tortfeasorship I
implies that each tortfeasor is a separate legal personality whereas on piercing
the veil of incorporation, the parties are somehow condensed into one true
actor. This in turn it is submitted precludes the application or finding of joint
tortfeasorship.
 Ong Leong Chiou & Anor v Keller (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors
[2021] 3 MLJ (Nallini Pathmanathan FCJ) 655

A [104] This is a misapprehension of the entire appeal for two reasons:

(a) the plaintiff ’s claim is not founded in tort; therefore there is no concept
of tortfeasorship that ever came into play; and
(b) secondly, it cannot be said that the principle of piercing the corporate veil
B can never apply in a tortious claim. The conclusion that upon application
of the doctrine, all liability devolves on one party who is the ‘alter-ego’ is
an incorrect understanding of the law. As stated earlier, on the rare
occasions on which the corporate veil is pierced, liability may well
devolve on more than one entity, depending on the facts of the case. So a
C categorical statement that the doctrine cannot subsist alongside a finding
of joint tortfeasorship is flawed in law. Such a claim does not arise before
the court in this appeal.

D [105] A perusal of the pleadings on which the plaintiff ’s claim is brought

discloses that the claim is premised on fraud and the lifting of the corporate veil
in that context. The claim of fraud may be deduced from the entirety of the
factual matrix pleaded together with the clai m for the lifting of the corporate
veil. More pertinently, nowhere is there any mention of any claim premised on
E tort. No tort can be deduced from the factual matrix either. Neither does the
question of law specify the precise tort that the appellants allege subsists, which
warrants the imposition of liability on ‘joint tortfeasors’.

[106] The claim in point of fact seeks to make Perfect Solution and Tony
F Ong liable for the debt Tony Ong engineered to be created between PS Bina
and the plaintiff. To that extent it is premised entirely on fraud or equitable
fraud and unconscionable conduct. As against PS Bina there is a primary cause
of action for breach of contract. But neither of these causes of action gives rise
to a tortious claim nor liability visited upon ‘joint tortfeasors’.
G
[107] The mere use of the term ‘jointly and severally liable’ does not convert
a liability premised on fraud and/or equitable fraud into a claim in tort. In the
instant appeal, it appears that the appellants have conflated the findings of joint
and several liability by the trial judge against Tony Ong, Perfect Solution and
H PS Bina with liability under a joint tortfeasor claim.

[108] The appellants also appear to be under the impression, clearly

erroneous, that the claim was founded on conspiracy which they submit was
found but not pleaded. Again, a perusal of the claim discloses that the
I corporate personalities of Perfect Solution and PS Bina were utilised by Tony
Ong to induce and defraud the plaintiff into carrying out the EBW, knowing
full well that there would be no payment forthcoming to it from PS Bina, as
Bina Puri had made this clear from the outset. Again the use of the words by the
trial judge that Tony Ong, PS Bina and Perfect Solution acted in concert does
656 Malayan Law Journal [2021] 3 MLJ

not alter the claim to one in conspiracy because conspiracy was not pleaded. A
Instead, fraud and equit able fraud was. The findings were consonant with the
pleadings and the evidence adduced.

[109] I would also concur with the submissions of learned counsel for the
plaintiff that this court is being asked to consider an issue which was not B
determined by the High Court and the Court of Appeal. Neither does it relate
to the facts of the case or the law either. As such it is an academic question with
no real nexus to the case and therefore does not warrant consideration (see
Raphael Pura v Insas Bhd v Anor [2003] 1 MLJ 513 at pp 545 and 547–548;
C
Datuk Syed Kechik bin Syed Mohamed & Anor v The Board of Trustees of the
Sabah Foundation & Ors and another application [1999] 1 MLJ 257 per Edgar
Joseph Jr FCJ at p 264 citing Sun Life Assurance Co of Canada v Jervis [1944]
1 All ER 469 at p 470). On this basis it would therefore appear that there is no
basis for this question of law.
D
Conclusion on the first question of law

[110] For the reasons set out above, I decline to answer this question of law
because it miscomprehends, at best, and misstates at worst, the facts and the law in
E
relation to the appeal before this court.

[111] The question is also predicated on an incorrect comprehension of the law

because it assumes that in a joint tortfeasorship context, the piercing of the corporate
veil must result in liability devolving on only one entity or person, and not any other F
party to the dispute because only one person is the alter-ego. This conflates and
misapprehends the position in law when the doctrine is applied. On piercing,
liability candevolve on more than one party to the dispute. Further the proposition
that the doctrine is incompatible in law with joint tortfeasorship is erroneous and
unsupported in law. Most importantly, this entire argument is theoretical and G
unfounded on the facts and the law.

[112] Finally, it has no effect on the outcome of the appeal in view of its
miscomprehension of the law. Any attempt to answer this question would result in
a theoretical response with no bearing to the factual matrix or the claim in law. H
The second question of law

‘Whether the single economic unit test as expounded in Law Kam Loy and Anor
v Boltex Sdn Bhd & Ors [2005] MLJU 225 (‘Law Kam Loy’) is confined to I
Industrial Court matters’

[113] The appellants argue vigorously that the single economic unit
principle is not a part of the corporate veil lifting principle in commercial cases,
 Ong Leong Chiou & Anor v Keller (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors
[2021] 3 MLJ (Nallini Pathmanathan FCJ) 657

A and invite this court to hold that it is only applicable in the Industrial Court.
This would, as the respondent states, be an entirely academic exercise. As set
out earlier, the High Court did not utilise the single economic unit test in itself
to justify the lifting of the corporate veil. It is clear beyond dispute that the trial
court utilised fraud and equitable fraud to do so.
B
[114] And the operation of Perfect Solution and PS Bina interchangeably as
one single unit operated by Tony Ong was a finding of fact which supported the
conclusion that he was the alter ego of these companies. It further supported
the finding that he utilised the corporate entities, particularly PS Bina, to
C
defraud and evade liabilities due to the plaintiff vide their corporate
personalities. The Court of Appeal similarly made no such finding. The
appellants appear to have deviated tangentially in their submissions into topics
and fields unsupported by the factual or legal matrix of this matter.
D
[115] It is true that in their pleadings the plaintiff did set out, amongst
several other pleas, that the two companies operated as a single e conomic unit.
This is a question of fact. A finding that Tony Ong utilised and operated Perfect
Solution and PS Bina interchangeably does not in itself warrant the application
E of the ‘single economic unit’ test. There is a distinction between utilising the
single economic unit test to conclude that the corporate veil ought to be
disregarded, and making a finding that two companies operate as if they were
a single economic unit, and then utilising this finding for the purposes of
establishing fraud. It is th e latter that prevailed in this case. So it is incorrect to
F suggest that the corporate veil in the instant appeal was pierced simply on the
basis that PS Bina and Perfect Solution operated as a single economic unit.

[116] This test was, in any event, overruled in Adams v Cape in the United
Kingdom and the legal reasoning there adopted in this jurisdiction vide Law
G Kam Loy v Boltex. However in the instant case, it is reiterated that the finding
relating to the operation of the two companies was relevant to the finding of
fraud or equitable fraud, rather than the operation of a series of companies as
one economic whole, for the purposes of lifting of the corporate veil.

H [117] And as stated by learned counsel for the respondent the Court of
Appeal in Law Kam Loy did not, in any event, find that the single economic
unit test was sufficient to justify the lifting of the corporate veil. On the
contrary, Gopal Sri Ram JCA (later FCJ) stated:

I … In my judgment, in the light of the more recent authorities such as Adams v Cape
Industries Plc, it is not open to the courts to disregard the corporate veil purely on the
ground that it is in the interests of justice to do so. It is also my respectful view that
the special circumstances to which Lord Keith referred include cases where there is
actual fraud at common law or some inequitable or unconscionable conduct
amounting to fraud in equity. The former that is to say, actual fraud, was expressly
658 Malayan Law Journal [2021] 3 MLJ

recognised to be an exception to the doctrine of corporate personality by Lord A

Halsbury in his speech in Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22, the seminal
case on the subject …

[118] This pronouncement on the law was expressly approved by this court
in both Solid Investments Ltd v Alcatel-Lucent (M) Sdn Bhd (previously known as B
Alcatel Network Systems (M) Sdn Bhd) [2014] 3 MLJ 785 and Gurbachan
Singh.

THE PLEADINGS – WAS FRAUD PLEADED?

C
[119] It is true that fraud was not pleaded in the form prescribed in
textbooks with a formal plea of fraud followed by the particulars. However, a
perusal of the substance of the statement of claim inexorably points to a plea of
fraud. D

[120] This is evident from para 37 onwards where under the heading of
‘Lifting of the Corporate Veil’ the plaintiff pleads, inter alia, of Tony Ong’s
dishonest and fraudulent conduct and the series of events inducing the plaintiff
to enter into a contract with PS Bina. Tony Ong, who utilised PS Bina as a E
sham and Perfect Solution to devise and carry out the scheme, it is pleaded, was
fraudulent in that he knew that the plaintiff would not receive payment for the
EBW. The other salient facts pointing to fraud and/or equitable fraud have
been set out comprehensively above, and more pertinently, in the judgment of
the trial judge. The fact that a claim has not been pleaded in the formally F
accepted form, does not mean that fraud has not been pleaded. This is just such
a case.

[121] As such it is incorrect and improper for the appellants to maintain

G
that:
(a) fraud was not pleaded at all;
(b) the claim was premised on tort; and
(c) the judge relied on the single economic unit test to justify lifting the H
corporate veil when the judge in point of fact made clear findings of fraud
and/or equitable fraud, after examining and analysing the evidence in
great detail.

[122] As stated at the outset, the second question, particularly in relation to I

the application of the single economic unit test being relegated solely to the
Industrial Court does not therefore fall for specific consideration in the instant
appeal.
 Ong Leong Chiou & Anor v Keller (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors
[2021] 3 MLJ (Nallini Pathmanathan FCJ) 659

A [123] However, it is important to emphasise that the relevant legal principles

which have to be applied are the same whether in the High Court in civil cases,
or in the Industrial Court in relation to industrial law claims. This is because it
cannot be said that there is one law of ‘sham’ for the purposes of evading legal
obligations in the High Court for civil matters and another law of ‘sham’ for the
B purposes of evading legal obligations in the Industrial Court. There is only one
law which is to be applied equally in all courts, because there is only one set of
principles in relation to fraud, unconscionable conduct and abuse of corporate
personality so as to determine whether or not it is appropriate to look behind
or pierce the corporate veil. (see Munby J in A v A [2007] EWHC 99 (Fam)).
C
Answer to question 2:

[124] Therefore in answer to the second question, I state once again that the
question misstates the relevant findings of the trial court and seeks to obtain an
D answer relegating Law Kam Loy to the confines of the Industrial Court. That in
itself is an incorrect premise, as it is predicated on a misunderstanding of the ratio
in Law Kam Loy v Boltex.

[125] However, the further point to be made is that Law Kam Loy v Boltex is
E applicable in all courts, and is not to be confined to the Industrial Court.

[126] To that extent the question cannot be answered as framed, and I decline to
do so.
F
[127] Justice Rohana Yusuf, the President of the Court of Appeal and Justice
Azahar Mohamed, the Chief Judge of Malaya have read this judgment in draft
and concur. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is dismissed with costs.

Appeal dismissed with costs.

G
Reported by Nabilah Syahida Abdullah Salleh