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Globalization in World History
In this fully revised fourth edition, this book treats globalization from several
vantage points, showing how these help grasp the nature of globalization both
in the past and today.
The revisions include greater attention to the complications of racism
(after 1500) and nationalism (after 1850); further analysis of reactions against
globalization after World War I and in the 21st century; more discussion of stu-
dent exchanges; and fuller treatment of developments since 2008, including the
role of the Covid-19 pandemic in contemporary globalization.
Four major chronological phases are explored: in the centuries after 1000 CE,
after 1500, after 1850, and since the mid-20th century. Discussion of each phase
includes relevant debates over the nature and extent of the innovations involved,
particularly in terms of transportation/communications technologies and trade
patterns. The phase approach also facilitates analysis of the range of interac-
tions enmeshed in globalization, beyond trade and migration, including disease
exchange, impacts on culture and consumer tastes, and for the modern periods
policy coordination and international organizations. Finally, the book deals with
different regional positions and reactions in each of the major phases. This in-
cludes not only imbalances of power and economic benefit but also regional styles
in dealing with the range of global relationships.
This volume is essential reading for undergraduate and postgraduate students
of world history, economic history, and political economy.
The Themes in World History series offers focused treatment of a range of human
experiences and institutions in the world history context. The purpose is to provide
serious, if brief, discussions of important topics as additions to textbook coverage
and document collections. The treatments will allow students to probe particular
facets of the human story in greater depth than textbook coverage allows, and to
gain a fuller sense of historians’ analytical methods and debates in the process.
Each topic is handled over time – allowing discussions of changes and continui-
ties. Each topic is assessed in terms of a range of different societies and religions –
allowing comparisons of relevant similarities and differences. Each book in the
series helps readers deal with world history in action, evaluating global contexts as
they work through some of the key components of human society and human life.
Peter N. Stearns
Designed cover image: MIAMI, USA - AUGUST, 2019: An Olympic
flag flutters above a red athletics track. Lazyllama/Alamy Stock Photo
Fourth edition published 2024
by Routledge
605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158
and by Routledge
4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group,
an informa business
© 2024 Peter N. Stearns
The right of Peter N. Stearns to be identified as author of this work has
been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright,
Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced
or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other
means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and
recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without
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Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks
or registered trademarks and are used only for identification and
explanation without intent to infringe.
First edition published by Routledge 2009
Third edition published by Routledge 2019
Acknowledgments vii
PART I
Context1
1 Globalization and the Challenge to Historical Analysis 3
2 Emerging Patterns of Contact, 1200 BCE–1000 CE:
A Preparatory Phase 14
PART II
Early Globalization, 1000–1450 CE33
3 The Birth of Globalization? 35
4 Transition: The Mongol Period 64
PART III
Protoglobalization69
5 The Main Features of Protoglobalization, 1500–1750 73
6 A Late-18th-Century Transition 103
PART IV
Modern Globalization, 1850–1945 113
7 The 1850s as Turning Point: The Birth of Modern Globalization 117
8 The Great Retreat, 1914–45, and a New Transition 153
vi Contents
PART V
Contemporary Globalization: The Most Recent Phase
and Its Backlash 161
9 Contemporary Globalization since the 1940s:
A New Global History? 165
10 A New Retreat?: The Signs of Disruption in the 21st Century 208
11 Conclusion: The Historical Perspective 221
Index 225
Acknowledgments
Though it seeks to complicate their approach, this book owes much to the New
Global Historians and the Toynbee Society in which they long participated, in-
cluding the late Bruce Mazlish, the late Raymond Grew, Wolf Schaefer, and
Akira Iriye. Various people have assisted in the previous editions, including
Craig Hamilton, Laura Bell, John Garnett, and Alexis Frambes. Three schol-
ars offered useful comments on the third edition, for which I am grateful. Spe-
cial thanks to Sinead Monaghan for assistance with this new edition, and to the
Routledge staff, Isabel Voice, and Allison Sambucini, for their combination of
encouragement and practical help. Finally, I am grateful to the many undergrad-
uate and graduate students at George Mason University who have participated
in discussions about the history of globalization and who have added both data
and perspectives.
Part I
Context
Globalization is one of those phenomena that begin well before they are clearly
named. The word globalization was first used in English in the 1930s, but its
meaning was not clear. It was mainly an English equivalent of a French term,
mondialisation, that had been introduced to describe the increased speed of
global communication and transportation after the mid-19th century. (A Japanese
word for the process was introduced in the 1960s.) In English, use of globaliza-
tion ticked up a bit in the 1980s, with some application to international busi-
ness, but its real birth was only in the 1990s. At that point, the term soared in
popularity, mainly to define the increased linkages of the post-Cold War world
that scholars and journalists thought, or hoped, were beginning to open up. By
the early 21st century, many Americans were familiar with the term and could
offer a reasonable definition, though they disagreed on whether they approved
or disapproved of the process it described.
This book focuses on the development of the framework for globalization,
arguably over a considerable span of time and in some fairly clear phases – but
including the 20th–21st century surge that the word itself was invented to de-
scribe. The argument is simple. Grasping the longer history of globalization,
and even spending a bit of time deciding when it “really” began, improves an
understanding of what the process is all about, why and how it is complicated by
different regional reactions, and why it continues to provoke considerable con-
troversy. Arguably, as some historians have contended, globalization has been
the most important single process in world history over the past decades or even
centuries, changing human life in many ways. Figuring out its dimensions goes
some way to grasping one of the basic characteristics of the modern world.
DOI: 10.4324/9781003439615-1
1 Globalization and the Challenge
to Historical Analysis
DOI: 10.4324/9781003439615-2
4 Context
****
Globalization has long been a subject for dispute. Some observers have seen it
as an engine for economic growth and prosperity, or a framework for the protec-
tion of human rights and even a peaceful global community. Others have blasted
it as a source of corporate control and impoverishment, a threat to cultural integ-
rity, a terrible and destructive force.
Specific debates also involve globalization’s regional impact in a “post-colo-
nial” but still very unequal world. From a British journalist, Martin Jacques: “At
the heart of globalization is a new kind of intolerance in the West towards other
cultures, traditions and values, less brutal than in the era of colonialism but more
comprehensive and intolerant.” From Tadashi Yanai, a Japanese businessman:
“Globalization is criticized from q Western perspective, but if you put yourself
in the shoes of people in the developing world, it provides unprecedented op-
portunity.” Here too, contradictory arguments flourish.
In recent years, hostile takes on globalization have been gaining ground
in many different countries and from many different angles. From the left:
globalization promotes economic and political systems that “threaten progres-
sive goals, and should be recognized as such and fought at every level.” “It
does not serve the interests of the vast majority of the people on the planet
and is both economically and environmentally unsustainable.” Its menace is
“self-evident.”
From the right: globalization has “left millions of our workers with nothing
but poverty and heartache” “We reject globalism” (Donald Trump). Globaliza-
tion tears down the precious values of the nation, making Europe, for example, a
“standardized cluster” open to influences from all over the world (Viktor Orban,
the authoritarian Hungarian leader): “Globalization, by aggravating the crisis of
meaning, has led to the enhancement of fundamentalist entities like the ISIS (ter-
rorist) group.”
From a variety of angles: globalization is “harming us more than helping us.
Why are so many horrors happening at once in the world?”
And finally, along with the attacking chorus, another important note.
While some people, whether for or against globalization in principle, argue
that the process is irresistible – as the Vietnamese president recently stated,
“rejecting globalization was like rejecting the sunrise” – critics now argue
that the process can be successfully opposed. The aura of inevitability may
have faded in favor of beliefs that new nationalism, or new radicalism, can
turn the tide.
Globalization and the Challenge to Historical Analysis 5
***
international corporation of the late 19th century, or indeed the international trad-
ing company of the 16th century? No one can contest that contemporary globali-
zation harbors unprecedented features – the Internet is purely and simply new;
the capacity for a quarter of the world’s population simultaneously to watch the
same sports event is purely and simply new. But claims about globalization as a
huge departure in the human experience go beyond these narrower examples, and
they should depend on a very careful analysis about how the recent globalization
process stacks up against earlier changes in contacts and their results.
The historical assessment becomes all the more crucial if we are in fact en-
tering a significant new globalization phase, in which resistance and retreat will
take center stage. How new is this kind of tension over globalization, and are
there any revealing precedents?
Evaluating the origins of globalization – when the process really began – also
opens the question of what caused it. Some discussions of globalization seem to
assume that it dropped out of the sky, with at most a few generalized references
to changes in technology. In fact, of course, a variety of human decisions are
involved, for example in determining not only what technologies to use (some
societies in the past have in fact resisted global devices) but how local policies
coordinate, or fail to coordinate, with larger global forces like epidemic disease
or the popularity of global sports. One way to ask about globalization’s origins,
in fact, is to determine the point at which the motivations to accelerate global
exchanges became so compelling that further expansion of actual contacts was
virtually assured. It’s at least possible that more careful attention to causes and
motivations must push chronology considerably back in time, without ignoring
the importance of more recent developments, like the Internet, in shaping an
additional stage in the globalization process. Root causes, in other words, may
pre-date important but more surface manifestations.
Clearly, globalization and its current uncertainties cannot be fully understood
without historical context that will trace when the various strands of the process
first took shape and why, and that will also evaluate results and resistances in the
past as well as the present. The goal is to use a discussion of how globalization
relates to prior patterns of interregional contacts to determine more precisely
what is really new about the recent developments, particularly beyond specific
technologies, and whether the current changes constitute in fact a huge jolt of
the unexpected or, rather, an acceleration of experiences to which many socie-
ties had already adjusted.
To be sure, historians (like most scholars) like to argue, and globalization
has already provoked some sharp debates. Thus, one group, calling themselves
the “new global” historians, urges that recent globalization is indeed a huge
change, perhaps one of the greatest in human history. The group tends to opt for
a slightly more generous time span than some non-historians prefer, pointing
back to the 1950s or so for the onset of the contemporary current. But they’re ad-
amant about seeing the phenomenon as a great gulf between present and future
Globalization and the Challenge to Historical Analysis 7
conditions, on the one hand, and the bulk of the human past on the other. Indeed,
they like to distinguish themselves from world historians, arguing that their
“global” history alone captures the uniqueness of recent change instead of bury-
ing it in the catalogue of centuries. Against this, though somewhat less fiercely,
another cluster of historians has begun to urge that it’s the later 19th century,
not the later 20th, that should be seen as the true globalization seedbed. Against
both, one eminent world historian, David Northrupp, contends that it’s around
the year 1000 CE that human history divides between largely separate or re-
gional experiences (before) and increasing contact, imitation, and convergence
(after); and if this is true, more recent changes associated with globalization
form merely the latest iteration of this basic and long-standing momentum. This
last approach calls attention to the contributions of major societies like China
or the Arab world in creating the initial conditions for globalization, rather than
placing disproportionate emphasis on Western initiatives.
Finally, and fairly recently, a number of historians have begun to argue that
globalization should be seen as emerging in phases (one of the major studies is
in fact entitled The Three Waves of Globalization), rather than trying to pinpoint
one burst of innovation. These books have the great merit of moving our vision
away from an exclusive focus on essentially contemporary developments, as in
the new global history approach. Whereas the globalization of sports clearly be-
gins in the late 19th century, the globalization of trade arguably goes back much
farther. We may be better able to evaluate the impacts of globalization on the
human condition more accurately if we look for a more gradual accumulation
of new patterns rather than just debating about the origins of the whole process.
***
This book rests on the claim that globalization has become one of the defining
features of world history – indeed, probably the most important single feature –
but that it emerges from a more complex and longer-standing process of change.
It picks up on the idea of stages or waves of particularly important change, but
adds careful attention to chronologically earlier precedents and to the idea of a
sequence of key steps. It also notes earlier patterns of resistance, which can place
current attacks in clearer perspective. In dealing with globalization historically,
the book also places the process, appropriately enough, in a clearly global con-
text. Modern globalization has been disproportionately connected to Western
norms, at least until very recently, but the basics clearly pre-date Western lead-
ership just as the process, today, is at least partially escaping Western control.
Finally, as against any single schema, the book urges the need to recognize the
complexities involved in figuring out how globalization has emerged over time.
Can a historical approach also help us sort out the advantages and disadvan-
tages of globalization, cutting through some of the passions about gains and
losses? Certainly, when globalization is seen unfolding over time, it is possible
to note changes in the winners and losers and in the aspects of the process that
8 Context
are most contestable. History does not say, conclusively, whether contemporary
globalization is on balance bad or good, but it can suggest why evaluation has
become so complicated and also why different regions, as well as various politi-
cal factions, take different positions on the subject.
East Africa, dispersion through migration developed quite quickly, as the species
moved not only to other parts of Africa but to the Middle East and thence to other
parts of Asia and Europe, to Australia (using a land shelf extending from South-
east Asia, that has long since been submerged but that for a time allowed a rela-
tively small journey over water), and (by 25,000 BCE) across the then-existing
land bridge between Siberia and Alaska and surprisingly rapidly onward to other
parts of the Americas. By 10,000 BCE, right before the advent of agriculture, the
roughly 10 million people in the world had populated virtually all inhabitable
areas. Several Pacific islands still lay vacant, including Hawaii; New Zealand was
untouched; Bermuda would not be discovered until European voyages in the early
modern centuries. But there were small bands of people almost everywhere else.
This meant, obviously, that huge distances began to separate different groups. A
few, like the Aborigines of Australia, would be cut off entirely from other popula-
tion centers until modern times. Others were less isolated, but could easily find
contacts with people outside a specific region unusual and possibly threatening.
The isolation emphasis should not, of course, be overdrawn. Few small hunt-
ing and gathering bands were entirely separated from larger regional networks.
While local languages might develop (there used to be far more different lan-
guages in the world than there are today), most of them related to larger language
groups, like Bantu, or Indo-European, which in turn meant that communica-
tion among many groups was not forbiddingly difficult. Within a single region,
certain hunting bands might regularly come into contact for purposes of self-
defense (or aggression), mate selection, or other social and trading purposes.
It remains true, however, that it is not entirely inaccurate to emphasize the
decisive quality of dispersion and differentiation of the world’s human popula-
tion on the eve of agriculture. Sheer distance was challenge enough, in the long
centuries when people could move about only on foot (even granting the superior
walking ability of earlier humans compared with their contemporary counter-
parts) or on crude boats. But distance also combined with dramatically different
habits, localized religions, and linguistic patterns to make contact and communi-
cation extremely difficult, often promoting proudly separate small-group identi-
ties and considerable fear of strangers as well. Larger contact networks – even far
short of globalization – would have to contend against these localizing factors.
In certain ways, agriculture could make aspects of these localizing tendencies
even worse, for it tied groups not just to a general locality but to very specific
property, often an individual village. Hunters and gatherers, after all, had to move
around at least within a circumscribed region, which could facilitate impulses
toward wider migration. Agricultural villagers, in contrast, were often linked to
specific properties passed from one generation to the next through inheritance and
a family cottage. Deep cultural attachments to particular villages could readily de-
velop, making even the next village down the road slightly suspect, and strangers
from greater distances truly ominous. To be sure, some villagers traveled at least a
bit in order to market some goods or seek temporary employment elsewhere; and
Globalization and the Challenge to Historical Analysis 11
when crowding impinged, some would move away altogether. It’s important not
to overdo the localized parameters. It remains true, even in the present day with
busses and other modern amenities facilitating travel, that some villagers (often,
particularly women) rarely if ever get more than a few miles from their home turf,
seeing no purpose and possibly some real threat in exploring further.
Scattered populations and highly regional habits and cultures could thus be
confirmed by the advent of agriculture. It would take much time and effort to
build regular contact networks simply within larger regions (like China’s ulti-
mately fabled Middle Kingdom or India’s subcontinent), not to mention inter-
regional connections. World history, in a real sense, began on a local level, and
even today has not entirely escaped these confines.
On the other hand, reasons for wider contacts existed early as well, and at
least some individuals pursued them even before we have any clear record of
how they moved around. At the most basic level: regional isolation never intro-
duced so many genetic modifications within the species Homo sapiens sapiens
that interbreeding could not occur, as happened with so many other species that
were more locally defined. We do not always know the nature or specific timing
of some early contacts – for example, when basic foods were exchanged from
one region to another – given lack of precise records, but it is clear that some
daring initiatives were involved.
The most obvious lure to pull people away from purely regional interactions
involved goods that could only be obtained through more distant ventures. Rare
decorative materials might be a lure, like gold or precious stones. The advent of
the use of bronze, after 4000 BCE, forced considerable travel in search of tin, one
of the key alloys of this composite metal. People in the Middle East ventured into
Afghanistan and possibly as far as Britain to seek regular supplies. Soon also,
knowledge of valuable spices that could only be obtained from certain localities
drove considerable long-distance trade. Once it was established that goods of this
sort were worth the risk and cost of travel, other specializations could develop,
including ultimately manufactured goods based on the traditions and ecologies of
particular regions, which would expand this motivation still further.
Contact could also generate knowledge of food products that might be im-
ported to the benefit of local populations. We know that somehow foods native
to parts of Southeast Asia (bananas, yams, and coconuts) were brought to Africa
very early in the agricultural phase of human history, and once planted in Africa,
possibly via Madagascar, they became vital food staples. This means that there
was some major interregional contact, at least occasionally, several thousand
years ago: precise dates and certainly precise mechanisms are unclear. Similar
kinds of benefits could result from learning about, and exporting, domesticated
animals. China’s knowledge of horses, and for a considerable time an ongoing
source of supply, came from contacts with Central Asia; a Southeast Asian pig
was brought to Madagascar. The opportunity to learn about basic goods, beyond
trade items, could easily spur a quest for wider ventures.
12 Context
Ultimately, it became obvious also that other kinds of learning could result
from long-distance ventures, when particular regions became known for par-
ticular kinds of cultural strength. It’s hard to pinpoint when student and schol-
arly travel began – and patterns would long involve only a few individuals, not
larger cohorts – but Greeks were visiting Egypt to learn about mathematics early
in Greek history, and it was not too long after that when individuals from places
like China began to go to India to seek Buddhist wisdom. Knowledge, in other
words, added to trade and products in motivating outreach.
Harder to calculate, but attached to these more specific spurs, could be sim-
ply a quest for adventure and new experience, without a precise calculus of
what social or personal gains would result. The confines of life in villages or
even early agricultural cities could seem limited, sometimes even stifling, and
a few individuals undoubtedly looked to wider horizons for personal reasons.
Details here are hard to come by, for almost none of the most ambitious early
travelers left any record of their motivations. We know, for example, that in the
5th century BCE a Phoenician named Hanno, with a crew, sailed through the
Mediterranean and down the first part of Africa’s Atlantic coast to Sierra Leone
and possibly as far as Nigeria – but we don’t know why he did it, and what kind
of personality would push him into what, for him, must have been the real un-
known. The fact that fanciful beliefs developed about many less familiar parts
of the world, populating them with mythical beasts and bizarre human habits,
might convince many people that it was best to stick close to home, but it might
also have challenged a few to go out and see for themselves.
Finally, of course, purely local conditions could generate pressures to reach
beyond conventional confines. Population crowding, exhaustion of local re-
sources, and military ambitions could push groups into patterns of migration or
invasion that, in some instances, could move them considerable distances and
produce a host of new (and often unwelcome) contacts for local populations.
Nomadic herdsmen from places like central Asia were often the sources of these
new connections, spilling over into incursions into the Middle East, India, China,
or Europe, as with the movement of Indo-European peoples into India and the
Mediterranean before about 1200 BCE or, a bit later, the surge of Slavic migra-
tions into Russia and east central Europe. These migrants might ultimately settle
down, but for at least a considerable time they would challenge existing cultural
and political conditions and provide new linkages with more distant regions.
Early contacts, whether for trade or scholarly discovery or adventure, could
easily begin to trigger other changes, which in turn would encourage additional
ventures to reach beyond the locality and region. This further process developed
slowly, however, as so many people were enmeshed in local concerns that the
motives and benefits of more extensive ventures remained simply out of reach.
It remains true that a real pull to develop some connections among relatively
far-flung parts of the world emerged early on, and it recurrently tugged against
the dispersion and localism of the initial world history framework. Neither the
motivations nor the institutions or technologies existed to create a truly global
Globalization and the Challenge to Historical Analysis 13
outreach through the initial millennia of human development, but they could
certainly produce experimentation and change. Localism long predominated,
but not without recurring and sometimes productive tensions with people who
saw benefits in exploring wider horizons. This was the context from which glo-
balization would ultimately emerge.
Further Readings
K. O’Rourke and J. Williamson, “When Did Globalization Begin?” European
Review of Economic History 6 (2002); Paul James and Manfred Steger, “A
Genealogy of ‘Globalization’: The Career of a Concept,” Globalizations 11
(2014); Adam McKeown, “Periodizing Globalization,” History Workshop
Journal 63 (2007); Jan Pieterse, “Periodizing Globalization: Histories of
Globalization,” New Global Studies 6 (2012); Frederick Cooper, “What Is
the Concept of Globalization Good For? An African Historian’s Perspective,”
African Affairs 100 (2001).
Excellent histories of globalization include A.G. Hopkins, ed., Globalization in
World History (New York, 2002); Bruce Mazlish, The Idea of Humanity in a
Global Era (New York, 2008) and A New Global History (New York, 2006);
Diego Olstein, Thinking History Globally (New York, 2008) and A Brief His-
tory of Now: the past and present of global power (New York, 2021); Robbie
Robertson, The Three Waves of Globalization (L: A History of Developing
Global Consciousness (London, 2003); Jurgen Osterhammel, Niels Peterson,
and Dona Geyer, eds., A Short History of Globalization (Princeton, 2005);
Jeffrey Sachs, The Ages of Globalization (New York, 2020).
See also Arjun Appadurai, ed., The Social Life of Things: commodities in cul-
tural perspective (Cambridge, 1986); Philip D. Curtin, Cross-Cultural Trade
in World History (Cambridge, 1985).
On world systems:
Robert, Denemark, J. Friedman, B.K. Gillis and G. Modelski, eds., World System
History: The Social Science of Long Term Change (London, 2000); Christo-
pher Chas-Dunn and Eugene N. Anderson, eds., The Historical Evolution
of World Systems (New York, 2004); and Andre Gunder Frank and Barry
K. Gillis, eds., The World System: Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand?
(London, 1993). See also Roland Robertson, Globalization: Social Theory
and Global Structures (Newbury Park, CA, 1992).
For an important alternative to a globalization approach to current history, Samuel
Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations? The Debate (New York, 1996)
On fairly recent patterns, Alfred Eckes and Thomas Zeiler, Globalization and
the American Century (Cambridge, 2003); and Akira Iriye, Global Commu-
nity: the role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contempo-
rary World (Berkeley, 2004); Barry Gills, ed., Globalization in Crisis (New
York, 2011); Quinn Slobodian, Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth
of Neoliberalism (Cambridge, MA, 2020).
2 Emerging Patterns of Contact,
1200 BCE–1000 CE
A Preparatory Phase
Historians take great delight in finding evidence that crucial aspects of the hu-
man experience started earlier than experts once thought. This is part of their
effort to bring the past alive by making it unexpectedly relevant to more re-
cent interests, and also to counter a modern tendency to exaggerate the extent
that most of what we see around us is brand new. Thus historians of medieval
Europe, intrigued by the popularity of the Renaissance, long ago began to find
“renaissances” in the 12th century. Modern mass consumerism, once thought
to be a product of industrialization later in the 19th century, turns out to have
started in Europe in the 17th–18th centuries, well before industrialization, and
now historians are discovering consumer revolutions as early as the 14th cen-
tury. The sexual revolution hailed or lamented in the 1960s turns out to have
started in the 1940s and 1950s – and so it goes. Even the industrial revolution
is now preceded by an “industrious revolution” that began more than a century
earlier (not only in Europe but possibly in Japan as well). The list of topics
where historians have revised initial beliefs about the origins of a phenomenon
is a long one. Sometimes the resulting findings are superficial or debatable;
sometimes (as with consumerism) they seriously reorient the ways we think
about the past and about the causation of major change.
It is not surprising, then, that a few historians have argued not only that glo-
balization is not brand new – many would agree here – but that it goes back as
far as 5,000 years ago, the point at which one scholar, Andre Gunder Frank,
has claimed to find the origin of the modern world economy. And indeed, soon
after the advent of agriculture, merchants from the Middle East or the Indian
subcontinent did begin to engage in some bartering, for example seeking pre-
cious stones; this was the case when tradesmen from Mesopotamia, in present-
day Iraq, reached out to their counterparts in what is now Pakistan. But to go
from firm evidence of an interest in trade to a claim of globalization is too far
a stretch – one that ignores those aspects of globalization that depend not just
on the existence of occasional exchange but on significant and regular levels of
trade and accompanying contacts even beyond trade.
DOI: 10.4324/9781003439615-3
Emerging Patterns of Contact, 1200 BCE–1000 CE 15
This chapter tackles the first set of issues in the effort to put globalization
into historical perspective: the distinction between undeniable and interesting
interregional contacts emerging early in the agricultural phase of human history,
and the fact that these contacts cannot be construed, by any plausible stretch of
the imagination, as constituting a preliminary form of globalization. If we push
globalization back to the first emergence of regular trading patterns, we risk los-
ing any distinctive meaning for the phenomenon – and that’s the case with the
undeniably interesting developments up to about 1000 CE. While hardly con-
stituting even a primitive form of globalization, early commerce did generate
important precedents and motivations that can provide a backdrop to the more
decisive changes that globalization involves, and these precedents form the fo-
cus of this chapter. Indeed, in discussing the important preliminaries that had
indeed been established early in the Common Era, we can also begin to clarify
what additional innovations globalization would involve.
World historians, with their deep and growing interest in contacts, have de-
voted impressive energies to uncovering and highlighting trade and other connec-
tions relatively early in human history. The effort can be complicated by problems
of evidence: we know about early contacts mainly on the basis of products from
one region that have been found in another. For example, cowrie shells collected
in the Indian Ocean as early as 1400 BCE have been found in China, where they
were greatly valued and ultimately used as a form of money. Less surprisingly,
a number of precious stones from India and Afghanistan, again dating well be-
fore the Common Era, have been unearthed along the Mediterranean coast of
the Middle East. So it is clear that trade was occurring, in some cases over fairly
long distances – but there is no real record beyond the remaining artifacts, which
inevitably raises questions about whether some other early trade patterns existed
but have yet to be discovered. Similar uncertainties are attached to the clear evi-
dence of food exchanges, where products native to one area – like present-day
Indonesia – were brought to places like Africa early on, and adopted into local
agriculture. We know this happened, but specifics are lacking.
By the 2nd century BCE, however, the situation clearly began to change, and
there is evidence to match. Long-distance trade started to occur with greater
regularity, leaving records not only through surviving products but also through
contemporary commentary on the delight that some exotic goods caused for
their upper-class consumers, along with some criticism of the waste and frivolity
involved. One trading artery has won particular attention: the Silk Road (more
properly, Roads), generating understandable fascination with the exchanges and
trade centers that linked producers in Western China with buyers ultimately as
far away as Mediterranean Rome. Indeed, the Silk Road has arguably won dis-
proportionate attention to the detriment of awareness of other, equally important,
contact routes that also sprang up well before modern times. Not surprisingly,
a few historians have gone on to argue that these early exchanges became so
16 Context
entrenched that they virtually guaranteed further and intensifying contacts later
on – in some cases suggesting that the result already added up to the first form of
globalization. Though more plausible than the claims of 5000 years of globali-
zation, this still goes too far, and can in fact be needlessly confusing. However,
the establishment of Silk Road trade but also regular exchanges in the Indian
Ocean did provide an active backdrop to what would later emerge as globali-
zation’s first definable phase, providing precedents and motives that would be
picked up and elaborated several centuries later. Without overdoing the range or
intensity of the contacts involved, the precedents do deserve a closer look.
The big challenge for most regions before 1000 CE, amid the predominant
localism of early agricultural societies, was to build networks within larger re-
gions – like the Mediterranean basin or the Middle East or China – that would
facilitate trade and cultural and political exchange. Efforts to reach beyond the
major regions, though they did exist, had virtually no significance for the vast
majority of the human population. The principal focus of the great classical
civilizations, like Persia, India, or Rome, centered on expanding internal re-
gional contacts, not in building connections further afield. These connections
did emerge, rather tentatively, but they must be sketched carefully, without ex-
aggerating their importance and without so eroding an understanding of later,
more decisive changes that globalization becomes a process virtually cotermi-
nous most of recorded world history. A case can be made that globalization was
becoming inevitable by 1000 CE (though even here there are serious objec-
tions), but not before. Indeed, a key reason to sketch previous patterns is to
provide a backdrop against which to measure later change, not to encourage a
premature identification of globalization.
Unlike early migration, trade, over any appreciable distance, whether for gift
exchange or for profit, did bring back and forth interactions. It is not entirely
clear when trade emerged beyond purely local contacts. Sea shells from the
Indian Ocean reached Syria by about 5000 BCE, probably constituting a gift
exchange for ornamentation and obviously suggesting some movement across
the Middle East from one coast to another – but we don’t know whether this was
a regular interaction or even whether any group or individual made the entire
trip or whether the shells passed gradually from one locality to the next. Trade
over a hundred to two hundred miles also developed, for example in east-central
Europe (in present-day terms, from Hungary to Poland), not only for precious
stones but for materials, like flint, important in making early tools and weap-
ons. The most venturesome early trade may have developed among peoples in
Southeast Asia, for example in some of the islands of present-day Indonesia,
where boats developed that were capable of navigating in sections of the Indian
Ocean. Primitive shipping also developed in the Persian Gulf region, by at least
4000 BCE, with efforts to take advantage of favorable winds during certain
months of the year to reach India and then return. Some of these Asian initiatives
clearly reached the east coast of Africa, explaining the crop exchange between
the two regions.
Crucial developments in the emergence of overland trade (including trans-
shipments of goods initially brought by sea, for example from Indian Ocean
ports in the Persian Gulf inland to the rest of the Middle East), involved the
domestication of pack animals. Donkeys were domesticated by the third millen-
nium BCE, presumably near their African place of origin. They spread widely
to other societies. Their capacity to carry relatively heavy loads over long dis-
tances, though slowly and sometimes reluctantly, was a crucial advance for land-
based travel. For certain regions, both in Asia and in Africa, the domestication of
the camel had similar significance. These were humble advances compared with
the later technologies of globalization, but they greatly furthered connections
among adjacent regions.
Several of the early river valley civilizations developed interregional trade. As
noted, Mesopotamia, at the mouths of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, exchanged
with Harappan society in northeastern India (today Pakistan). Not only goods but
also artistic symbols were part of this exchange, and there may have been cross-
fertilization in religious ideas as well. Egypt began to launch shipping in the Red
Sea by 2500 BCE, reaching the Arabian Peninsula (present-day Yemen) and also
farther down the Indian Ocean coast of Africa. Egyptians received gold, ivory, and
slaves from Ethiopia in exchange for manufactured goods. Trade with the Middle
East emphasized spices, some of which had been shipped over from India. Here
was an example of somewhat longer-distance trade that did not however involve
direct connections; that is, it operated in shorter interregional hops rather than
direct contact. Several centers in the Persian Gulf, notably an island complex
called Dilmun (present-day Bahrain), also served as transmission hubs for goods,
18 Context
process; on the other hand, many societies distrusted them because of their profit
motives and because they seemed to differ from the high-prestige aristocrats and
state officials. One result, for example in early Greece, was a heavy reliance on
foreigners to carry on the dirty business of commerce. But foreign-ness might
simply increase the stigma involved, and sometimes suggested real danger in
too much reliance on contacts outside one’s own society. An Indian political
handbook in the 4th century urged that trade should be promoted in order for rul-
ers to earn tax revenues and acquire materials for war, but also starkly insisted:
“Merchants … are all thieves, in effect, if not in name; they should be prevented
from oppressing the people.” Ambivalences of this sort did not stop interre-
gional exchange, but they suggested reactions that might constrain the whole
process. Correspondingly, most cities in early civilizations were in fact centers
for political and religious activities, with largely local trade and dependent on
taxing peasants; only a few urban areas really focused on the longer-distance
commercial opportunities.
It is true that some of the unevenness and hesitation over interregional con-
tacts still apply to globalization today: tension between local identity and self-
sufficiency, on the one hand, and wider outreach on the other builds on issues
that emerged quite early on. Concern about great and excess profit taken by
long-distance business leaders has a contemporary echo as well. But limitations
were far more marked in the early periods than today, and the impact of the con-
tacts that did develop was measurably less great, in all but a few trading centers
(Bahrain, for example), than would prove characteristic later.
One result of the narrow base and oscillation in interregional outreach was
the fact that some really promising projects had surprisingly little outcome. For
example, the famous 5th-century (BCE) Greek traveler, Herodotus, reported
that a Phoenician explorer deliberately went around the whole continent of
Africa, with the sponsorship of an Egyptian pharaoh, to see if it was surrounded
by water – the venture took 2 years. We cannot be sure if this actually occurred,
but it would certainly have been feasible, and marks exactly the kind of initiative
that one would expect of seafaring leaders like the Phoenicians – and exactly the
kind of initiative that could have led to a permanent advance in Asian-African
communications. But if it did occur there was no real result. No one else would
venture around Africa until 1498 CE, which meant that African links with other
parts of the world, though very important in the Indian Ocean and across the
Sahara, long were somewhat limited. Similarly, Phoenician expeditions into the
South Atlantic, reaching the Canaries and Azores island groups, had no after-
math, as these islands were subsequently isolated from any contact for another
2,500 years. In terms of relevant perspectives on globalization, it is vital to re-
member that contacts do not always pay off as against local preferences for
greater isolation.
On the other hand, the early patterns of interregional trading did begin to
establish the kinds of motivations for at least medium-distance exchange that
20 Context
would sustain more ambitious and consistent efforts later on. Various groups
developed a real stake in access to goods that could not be produced locally.
Spices are obviously a core example; they not only enlivened foods (in socie-
ties where variety and freshness of food constituted real challenges), but they
also contributed to other vital activities – cinnamon, for example, was used in
Egyptian preparations for embalming the dead. Various kinds of consumers and
producers, in other words, sustained this kind of trade even if they might not
always have been aware of the interregional contacts involved. Not only goods
but also other novelties attracted attention. Urban crowds in Mesopotamia, for
example, could enjoy elephants and apes brought in from Africa – one poem
wrote of “beasts from distant lands jostling in the great square”; and the role of
exotic animals in motivating interest in exchanges would be a sustaining factor
from this point onward. Governments and merchants had stakes as well, and they
were quite conscious of the external involvement. Merchants could obviously
win profits from distance trade. By the third millennium, clusters of foreign mer-
chants located in key cities, for example in the northern Middle East, obviously
both reflecting and encouraging awareness of the importance of commerce be-
yond the single society. Some merchant associations developed to help regulate
interregional trade, for example to handle issues like the exchange of payments
but also to help assure ethical standards. Governments played a vital role as well,
working to stimulate trade but also developing a clear interest in assuring and,
where possible, expanding its reach. They acted not only because of their own
interest in diversifying available goods, in some cases including materials vital in
the production of weapons, but also because of the taxes they could levy on ship-
ping and trade caravans. Egyptian rulers, for example, were quite aware of the
advantages Egypt gained from its access to the Indian Ocean and were eager to
make sure that no other society unduly interfered or competed. It has even been
argued that the Greek conflict with Persia, a bit later on (492–479 BCE), was less
a clash of civilizations or a quarrel over landed territory, but more a function of
Greek reluctance to accept a Persian capacity to cut off Greek contact with the
Indian Ocean and its commercial riches. Motives of this sort, and their variety,
suggest how trade-based contacts in early agricultural societies both reflected and
furthered the kinds of thinking that would feed later, more elaborate interregional
connections, ultimately including globalization itself.
various leaders – not just emperors but also venturesome merchants and cultural
emissaries – went into developing internal networks that would take advantage
of this new territory and work to integrate it into a (somewhat) coherent whole.
Chinese leaders, for example, worked very hard to link north and south China,
building canals to facilitate trade, sending colonists from the north to the south,
and promoting use of a single language, Mandarin, at least in the governing
class – despite or in fact because of the multiplicity of ethnic groups, languages,
and cultures of the mixture of peoples that now made up the Chinese empire. All
the classical empires fostered cultural systems – like Hinduism and Buddhism
in India, or Greek-derived architecture around the Mediterranean – that would
provide new links, not necessarily attacking more local systems but seeking to
supplement them with more over-arching styles and values. Trading activities
sought to take advantage of local specializations – like grain growing in North
Africa, in exchange for wines and olive oil from Italy and Greece within Medi-
terranean civilization – to promote greater efficiency and prosperity (and tax
revenues) and in the process create a more coherent overall economy. Common
social systems spread out, like patterns of slavery in the Mediterranean or the
caste system in India, another linking device. Finally, periodically at least, care-
fully constructed empires sought to provide political unity to all or at least major
parts of the major civilization areas.
These efforts were quite successful for many centuries, and in some cases,
particularly India and China, they created durable values and institutions that
would provide internal coherence and distinction from other major societies for
many centuries, well past the classical period itself and into our own day. Not
surprisingly, the efforts took a great deal of energy and focus, and could detract
from comparable interest in reaching outside the new regional civilizations. In-
deed, to the extent that integration efforts promoted core identities for many
people they could actually discourage wider contact and breed disdain for socie-
ties and regions outside the home base. Greeks and Chinese both began to refer
to peoples outside their own expanding orbits as “barbarians,” clearly inferior
and worth little or no attention when there were so many exciting opportunities
at home; the philosopher Aristotle in fact argued that it was “natural” for Greeks
to enslave any non-Greeks.
In sum, the great focus of the classical period in world history involved major
regional integrations that unquestionably cut into previous levels of local isola-
tion, even forging larger civilizational identities at least for the upper classes.
Equally obviously, the result was not globalization – even the great Roman and
Han Chinese empires were regional entities, not global ones. In some respects,
in fact, the new structures might distract from a deep interest in wider contacts.
At the same time, however, the classical civilizations did advance a some-
what larger interregional agenda in several ways, even though the agenda never
gained top priority. In the first place, the new empires brought in territories that
had not previously been regular parts of the patterns of exchange. The Roman
22 Context
Empire, for example, building around the entire Mediterranean basin, now in-
volved the whole of North Africa in regular contacts with southern Europe and
the Middle East. Phoenician outreach had launched this inclusion, but the new
Empire made it an established fact. North African regions periodically broke
off from larger political units – for example, from the later Arab Caliphate –
but they would from this point onward always be economically and culturally
linked at least to the Middle East. Rome’s Empire similarly involved new parts
of Europe, such as France, in extensive trade and cultural exchange. Each of the
classical civilizations was regional, but the region was now writ large, so that
internal contacts already constituted a significant reduction of local isolation.
This is why the creation of the great classical empires sometimes gets mentioned
as historical precedent for globalization.
There was even some tourism within the empires, beyond adventurers out on
their own. Some Romans began to travel to Greece and Egypt, and occasionally
into the Middle East, to see famous sights. The idea of “Seven Wonders of the
World,” like the Egyptian sphinx, originated in the classical period and helped
spur travel for pleasure within the Mediterranean-Middle Eastern regions –
another sign of the importance and widening reach of contacts within the huge
territories that were now seen as part of a coherent whole.
Furthermore, the empires created infrastructure that could facilitate even
wider outreach, by making trade and travel easier than ever before. Particularly
important here were developments in the Persian Empire and its later succes-
sors, given the geographic centrality of this region for potential contacts be-
tween Indian Ocean and Mediterranean networks. With conquests beginning in
556 BCE, the empire itself achieved great size at least for a century, stretching
from the northwestern part of the Indian subcontinent (the Indus river region)
to Egypt and Libya and the Mediterranean, though efforts to move significantly
into Europe, or further south in northeastern Africa, failed. Exchanges stretched
even more broadly, as Persian rulers at their height received gifts from sub-
Saharan Africa (including elephant tusks), India, and southern Arabia. The
imperial government built an impressive system of highways, stretching over
8,000 miles. The great emperor Cyrus also established a series of carefully-
spaced inns, to house merchants and travelers on their journeys, with water
reservoirs, and he set up the world’s first postal and message service. A Greek
later described the result: “With you [Persians], every way is easy, every river
is crossable, and there is no dearth of provisions.” The main purpose of all of
this, of course, was to facilitate communication and trade within the empire –
including the movement of military forces; as with the other classical civili-
zations, knitting the new, vast territory together and keeping it together was
a challenging task. But the same systems could help merchants and visitors
from other regions, moving through the territory; more than ever before, the
Middle East, including Persia, became an entrepot for exchanges between east
and west, a central point in interactions between much of Asia and key parts of
Emerging Patterns of Contact, 1200 BCE–1000 CE 23
Europe and North Africa. While the Persian Empire itself had a relatively brief
life span, its systems were preserved or revived by later rulers and regimes –
including Alexander the Great, the revived Persian regime under the Parthians,
and subsequent Arab caliphs.
Similar developments took place within the Roman and Chinese empires.
Chinese emperors began to build highways, at some points 50 feet wide, with
trees planted alongside for aesthetic reasons. An official described the result as
early as 178 BCE, noting that roads went “all over the empire … around lakes
and rivers, and along the coasts of seas, so that all was made accessible.” By
the time of the Han dynasty, 22,000 miles of highway were available in China,
providing internal linkages but also facilitating travel to the west, toward central
Asia. A postal system was also operative, with fresh horses for messengers every
ten miles. Rome constructed even more roads – 48,000 miles worth – and also
invested heavily in seaports along the Mediterranean, particularly for the ship-
ment of grain.
Finally, building on internal infrastructures for overland travel but also the
seaports in both the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean, classical civilizations
extended contacts with each other, which is the achievement world historians
have picked up on particularly in their legitimate eagerness to show the early
origins of inter-societal contacts.
The most famous linkage was the so-called Silk Road, which at its height
brought products from western China to the upper classes of the Roman Empire –
but also to elites in Persia and the Middle East and in India. Exchange of silk
from China westward began as a result of growing contacts and tensions with
nomadic peoples in western China/central Asia. Chinese officials and merchants
brought silk cloth beyond the country’s borders as gifts to conciliate potential
invaders but above all in exchange for horses, called “heavenly horses” because
of their superior qualities, which had a huge impact on the Chinese military and
on Chinese imagination more generally. Ultimately, the Chinese also imported
alfalfa seeds, which allowed them a better agricultural base for sustaining the
horses they were coming to depend on.
But for world history, the main point was the movement of Chinese manufac-
turing output toward other regions, stimulating not only new forms of trade but
new tastes which could sustain international commerce for centuries to come.
Nomadic leaders used the Chinese-exported silks for their own adornment, and
that of their families, but they simply could not consume all that the Chinese
provided, so they began to pass the products west. Small amounts of silk reached
the Middle East and even southeastern Europe by the 6th century BCE, but sig-
nificant exchange developed only late in the 2nd century BCE, around the year
130. Nomadic traders began to take Chinese products, headed by silk, and move
them through several overland routes through central Asia and then into Per-
sia, where other merchants would pick up the loads and use the excellent road
network to distribute the goods more widely – with some of them reaching the
24 Context
Mediterranean where other merchants might buy them for sale to North Africa
and southern Europe. Tastes for silk goods clearly expanded among upper-class
men and women alike, with silk sashes adorning Roman togas or silk banners
highlighting Persian military units. This was, in other words, a significant trade,
from the 1st century BCE until the political and economic deterioration of Han
China and the Roman Empire a few centuries later. Not only did silk move west-
ward, but obviously exchange depended on some two-way traffic that would
repay the merchants for their trouble and ultimately provide value for Chinese
producers as well; from the Middle East and the Mediterranean came various
precious stones, “the eggs of great birds” (probably ostriches), manufactured
carpets, furs, and even entertainers, as well as the horses the Chinese cherished
so greatly.
Silk Road trade linked East Asia with other parts of the continent and with
Europe for the first time, a major step beyond the more limited exchanges that
had described interregional contacts previously. At the same time, however, the
trade proceeded mainly through regional stages of a few hundred miles each
with re-exchange at several points, in regional hubs like the city of Samarkand,
rather than through direct long-distance exchange from producing to consum-
ing regions. Merchants, correspondingly, focused on a fairly narrow geography,
rather than directly connecting major civilization centers. In a larger sense, the
Silk Road routes built on regional systems that had long connected the northwest
part of the Indian subcontinent (today’s Afghanistan and Pakistan) to Persia and
the Middle East, or China to central Asia. It was also true that (central Asian
horses aside) the exchange goods that came into China were not as sought after,
not as capable of developing new consumer tastes, as silk was in Persia and the
Roman Empire; they tended to be seen as novelty items rather than staple luxu-
ries. Indeed, the Romans, who wrote widely about the importance of silk, were
not very clear at all about what they exported in return. This imbalance between
China and other parts of the world would long complicate long-distance trade,
and it certainly constrained activity during the classical period itself.
Another set of routes served, like the Silk Road, to link different parts of
Asia, Africa, and Europe over long distances, with new merchant activity and
new consumer tastes integral to the process. In this case, however, the sea –
the Indian Ocean – rather than land served as vehicle, and India, rather than
China, was the key player. Southeast Asia – what is now Malaysia, Vietnam, and
Indonesia – was heavily involved in this network as well, providing products
and merchants alike.
The quality of ships gradually improved by the first millennium BCE, though
boats made from leather, papyrus, and other materials continued to operate in
parts of the Indian Ocean. Navigators from Sri Lanka apparently learned how
to use birds, taking them on voyages and releasing the creatures so that they
could follow them to land. The Chinese invention of the rudder would ultimately
facilitate sea trade in a more systematic fashion. Sailors learned how to use
Emerging Patterns of Contact, 1200 BCE–1000 CE 25
monsoon winds to help move through various parts of the Indian Ocean in ap-
propriate seasons. A host of people were involved in trade: Arabs, Egyptians,
Greeks, Malays, as well as Indians and Chinese.
Spices constituted the core of the Indian Ocean trade. Chinese merchants
sought cloves and similar items from Southeast Asia and India, moving both
overland and from the Pacific coast into Indian waters. Pepper, produced in India
proper, became a crucial product. Greeks used it, partly for medicinal purposes,
and it became a vital cooking item during the Roman Empire. Spices, incense,
pearls, and other materials from East Africa and the Arabian Peninsula blended
into this trade as well, including African items like rhinoceros’ horn. Manufac-
tured products gained attention. Indian cotton cloth won popularity, though the
Roman Empire ultimately banned it because of its competition with woolen and
linen fabrics. India also became another transit point for silks imported overland
from China. The Chinese also had contacts with India by sea, at one point send-
ing an expedition to buy a rhinoceros for the emperor’s private zoo.
From the Mediterranean world, both merchants and government officials
worked actively to promote these valuable exchanges, particularly by the time
of the Roman Empire. Regular fleets set sail from the Red Sea coast of Egypt –
upward of 120 boats, complete with Roman archers to help repel pirates; and
small clusters of Roman merchants formed in several Indian cities. Roman ships
(staffed mainly by Greeks and Middle Easterners) also traded regularly with
Sri Lanka and the Middle East, again from the Egyptian coast. From the Red
Sea, goods were offloaded onto camels, which would carry them to the Nile and
thence to the port of Alexandria, where they could enter standard Mediterranean
trade. Romans, for their part, were able to put more items into this network
than was true for the Silk Road, because ships could carry heavier goods. Thus,
Roman tin was sent to India, along with linen cloth made in Egypt and other
products. Wine was particularly important, probably the most valued Mediter-
ranean item in play. But even with this, Romans faced a constant balance of
payments challenge, because the commodities they wanted from Asia exceeded
Asian interest in what they had to offer. Gold shipments were essential to correct
the imbalance, and Roman observers worried that too much of their wealth was
being siphoned off as a result.
Exchanges within Southeast Asia also linked into the Indian Ocean network,
often brokered by merchants from Malaysia or Indonesia. Interregional trade
was not new in this area, but the growing links with Indian and Chinese systems
gave it greater resonance. Raw materials were involved, including a number
of fine woods native to the region and esteemed for their decorative qualities.
But manufactured items were important as well, and some were now deliber-
ately adapted to fit into long-distance commerce. Producers in Indonesia and
Cambodia, for example, developed lower-cost incense candles or skin treat-
ments to compete with goods from the Middle East and the Mediterranean, par-
ticularly in Chinese markets. India exported to Vietnam cotton cloth, pepper, but
26 Context
also glass products and gold coins made in the Roman Empire; the Chinese sent
maritime expeditions down the Vietnamese coast looking for a route to India.
The Chinese also had active interest in unusual animals, such as elephants, from
the region. And again, regional products, including spices such as nutmeg, ex-
changed with Indian or Persian merchants, could make it all the way back to
Mediterranean consumers.
purely local attachments – not the narrower bridges among these civilizations
themselves.
The links that did develop, furthermore, centered for the most part on inter-
esting, certainly valued, but fairly superficial luxury products. Heavy materi-
als, goods used by large numbers of people for basic activities, moved within
regions or occasionally from one region to a neighbor – like the timber brought
several hundred miles from the interior to the Mesopotamian coast – but not
commonly in interregional trade. Expensive cloth – not the stuff of most peo-
ple’s clothing or daily wear – spices, and a few other decorative items clearly
helped develop new tastes but hardly worked into the essentials of life. A few
substances did become part of wider rituals or consumer interests – like the
spices used in Egyptian embalming, or the Roman tin imported in India – but
they were the exception, not the rule.
Trade was, of course, the centerpiece of the interconnections, and while ar-
guably this remains true with globalization, the narrowness of the trade impact
in the earlier period was noteworthy. Technological exchange, for example, did
not follow as clearly from commercial contact as might be expected. Chinese
advances during the classical period, like the invention of paper, simply did
not yet spill over to other societies, despite the expansion of access to Chinese
products and commerce. Apparently, connections were not yet regular enough
for people outside China to gain a sense of the obvious advantages of paper as
a writing material. The same kind of limitation applies to cultures and cultural
apparatus. Extensive trade with India did not lead any other society, at this point,
to realize the superiority of the Indian numbering system; separate numbering
procedures, like the cumbersome numerals of the Roman Empire, continued to
prevail. Religions and philosophical systems remained localized for the most
part, spreading within the new civilizations but not much beyond them. Artistic
influences were similarly limited, aside from some specific imitation of a few
designs. Artists in northwestern India copied Greek styles for a brief period after
Alexander the Great’s conquests brought Greek rule to the region – the results
were pictures of the Buddha dressed in Greek hair arrangements and costumes,
for a little over a century – but there was no durable result, no real combining
of styles. A few exceptions can of course be noted – Middle Easterners picked
up some Indian stories that later became part of popular literature, and the game
that ultimately turned into chess spread from India to the Middle East – but for
the most part the range of interactions that we associate with globalization sim-
ply had yet to develop.
Interregional knowledge was also limited, even where products moved over
great distances. The absence of direct travel, as opposed to shorter caravans
followed by trans-shipment to another merchant group, played a key role here,
along with the massive amount of time even a trip of a few hundred miles re-
quired. Chinese adventurers and emissaries went into central Asia and later
Chinese merchants and Buddhist students traveled to India; a limited number
28 Context
of Greeks and Romans moved through the Middle East and into parts of central
Asia, and also into a few sections of sub-Saharan Africa; and of course Roman
trade with India brought direct exchange. Persians and Arabs, who might ven-
ture both east and west, may have known a bit about Europe and India alike,
though the evidence is limited. But Mediterranean knowledge of China, and
vice versa, was exceedingly vague, because, as far as we can definitely know, no
Chinese ever ventured that far west, and at most one Roman group ever made
it to China (and we cannot be sure even of this). Roman aristocrats might love
silk, but they had little notion where it came from; their known world stopped
at India, and only a single Greek writer, who had traveled to India, makes even
a passing reference to “Thina” as a source of silk, adding “It is not easy to get
to this Thina: for rarely do people come from it …. ” Romans indeed believed
that silk came from plants or trees save for one writer who claimed it was pro-
duced by giant spiders. Chinese authors knew a bit more about Rome than vice
versa, describing it as a well-governed land with rich but honest merchants, but
claiming also that Rome was the source of products like an ointment that made
gold. Wild beliefs about regions that were vaguely known about but not directly
visited – including claims about cannibalism or bizarre sexual habits – showed
the extent of ignorance about even some neighboring regions, like central Asia
or parts of Africa; and the same beliefs could discourage actual contact. Globali-
zation, in contrast, while it still involves mutual prejudices, has greatly reduced
the amount of fanciful exaggeration.
Finally, even the amount of interregional trade that did develop spurred crit-
ics and skeptics – though arguably this has some echoes in diverse reactions to
globalization today. If products were demonstrably moving farther than people
did, this very fact created anxiety about the products as well. Roman moral-
ists wrote scathingly against the vanity and wastefulness embodied in imported
silks. Thus, Seneca, in the 1st century CE:
I see there raiments of silk – if that can be called raiment, which provides
nothing that could possibly afford protection for the body, or indeed mod-
esty, so that, when a woman wears it, she can scarcely … swear that she
is not naked.
direct but a more durable bond between East Asia and the Mediterranean, but
it was a testimony to mutual ignorance and the relatively slight importance of
most actual long-distance trade that nobody cared to follow up. The two regions
would remain without direct contact for another 1,200 years.
Not surprisingly, in this situation, the collapse of the great classical empires,
beginning with the fall of the Han dynasty in China in 220 CE, severely threat-
ened the interregional linkages that did exist. Overland travel became far more
dangerous because there were no strong states to protect against marauders, and
this came close to shutting the Silk Road down in favor of shorter-distance ex-
changes. Merchants from Rome and China withdrew from the Indian Ocean,
and while Indian traders took advantage of the opportunity to extend their efforts
to Southeast Asia, the range and volume of trade in this region also declined
for a time. Commerce would revive, of course, and the Indian Ocean continued
to attract attention, but there was no question that something of a crisis had
emerged by the 3rd or 4th century CE that significantly affected interregional
contacts for several centuries.
helped bring religious practices as they set up trading communities, and as their
commercial success might suggest the superiority of their religion over more
traditional local faiths and provide an additional motive for conversion.
Indeed, it can be argued that the unprecedented commitment to the idea of a
universal religion, valid for all people, was a revolutionary development whose
novelty reflected the experience of significant contact – creating a notion of a
common humanity arguably for the first time in human history. Early defenders
of the major world religions all debated this point – whether Buddhism as a re-
form movement directed at Hinduism should just be discussed in India, whether
Christianity was only for Jews, whether Islam should be for Arabs alone. Lead-
ers of the three faiths all ultimately decided, often after a period of hesitation,
that the response should be ecumenical, that unlike all earlier belief systems
the faiths should not apply to a single people or region alone but potentially to
humanity as a whole. And this in turn suggested an awareness spurred by a sense
of contacts among different regions and societies. The missionary religions were
not yet truly global – each had its own main regions – but they were the closest
thing yet to a global cultural force – obviously worth comparison to the newer
global cultural forces that receive so much emphasis today.
The same universal claims also generated further activity. The second point
about the new religions is the fact that they could encourage additional contacts
in turn. Belief in a single God or divine order, rather than divinities more specifi-
cally attached to a particular place, and the availability of doctrines and rituals
that were also not place-specific, could provide new assurance to individuals
moving out of their locality of origin, for whatever reason. The same faith that
worked at home would be equally valid thousands of miles away. Expanding
religions also provided new motives for travel, beyond the previous predomi-
nance of trade. Missionaries could be as eager as merchants to reach a distant
spot. Religious faithful might seek study opportunities near spiritual centers like
monasteries in India (for Buddhists) or hubs of religious scholarship like Cairo
or Baghdad in Islam. Larger numbers of religious individuals might simply want
to travel to holy sites, however distant – like Jerusalem for Christians, or even
more urgently like Mecca for Muslims.
The emerging religious map also, however, set up some new divisions,
among regions with different religious preferences – this was the final implica-
tion for patterns of contact. The world religions overcame narrower cultural
and political boundaries, but their variety, and in some cases mutual hostility,
very definitely challenged any idea of a single world. Wider contacts might be
impeded by religious fears or dislikes, to a greater extent than had been true
before, as new kinds of intolerance emerged. Individual travelers might hesitate
before going beyond their religious community, or feel uneasy if they tried.
The Mediterranean now divided between Christian and Muslim, and while the
result was not always belligerent intolerance, the religious rift set up cultural
barriers that have not been entirely overcome even in the present day. Certainly,
Emerging Patterns of Contact, 1200 BCE–1000 CE 31
when religious allegiances were at their height, the separate systems of beliefs
and practices seriously complicated larger patterns of exchange. Here is a final
reason to see the premodern centuries of the human experience, at least until
1000 CE or so, as contributing to, but measurably separate from, processes that
might be considered actual versions of globalization.
***
Overall, it remains true that most developments in the world history by the end
of the classical period and even slightly beyond were regional rather than tran-
sregional, emphasizing separate patterns more than contacts. Energies went into
discrete regional identities and internal connections more than into crosscutting
initiatives. The spread of religions modified this pattern in some important ways,
allowing some sense of a common humanity. But while the religions leaped over
some regional boundaries – this was particularly true for Islam’s spread into
several parts of Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, as well as Spain – they also created
some new barriers. Even within Christianity, the differences that developed be-
tween Western Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy could constrain interaction,
and the same would hold true to some extent for separate strands in Islam. Con-
tacts and shared processes – the features we properly associate with globaliza-
tion – had yet to gain the ascendant. We can look back and see innovations like
the Silk Roads (invoked today by China in its new effort at global leadership) as
a building block for later connections, but further change was essential before
the first identifiable form of globalization could emerge.
Further Readings
On debates over the effective origins of world trade and globalization, see Andre
Gunder Frank and Barry Gillis, eds., The World System: Five Hundred Years
or Five Thousand (London, 1993) and Oystein LaBianca and Sandra Shum,
eds., Connectivity in Antiquity: Globalization as Long-Term Historical Pro-
cess (New York, 2004); Karl Moore and David Lewis, Birth of the Multina-
tional: 2000 Years of Ancient Business History – From Ashur to Augustus
(Copenhagen, 1999).
For overviews, see Richard L. Smith, Premodern Trade in World History (New
York, 2008); Jerry H. Bentley, Old World Encounters: Cultural Contacts and
Exchanges in Premodern Times (New York, 1993); Stephen Gosch and Peter
N. Stearns, Premodern Travel in World History (New York, 2008); Milo
Kearney, The Indian Ocean in World History (New York, 2004).
On early trade patterns, see Maria Eugenia Aubet, The Phoenicians and the
West: Politics, Colonies and Trade, trans. Mary Turton (2nd ed., Cam-
bridge, 2001); Lionel Casson, Ships and Seafaring in Ancient Times (Austin,
TX, 1994); Karl Hutterer, Economic Exchange and Social Interaction in
Southeast Asia: Perspectives from Prehistory, History and Ethnography
32 Context
(Ann Arbor, MI, 1977); Samuel Mark, From Egypt to Mesopotamia: A Study
of Predynastic Trade Routes (College Station, TX, 1997); Shereen Ratnagar,
Encounters: The Westerly Trade of the Harappa Civilization (New Delhi,
1981). On trade during the classical period, see Raoul McLoughlin, Rome
and the Distant East: Trade Routes with the Ancient Lands of Arabia, India
and China (London, 2010); Vimala Begley and Richard D. De Puma, eds.,
Rome and India: The Ancient Sea Trade (Madison, WI, 1991); Linda Ellis
and Frank L. Kidner, eds., Travel, Communication and Geography in Late
Antiquity (Burlington, VT, 1994); Xinru Liu, Ancient China and Ancient
India: Trade and Cultural Exchanges (New Delhi, 1988); J.I. Miller, The
Spice Trade of the Roman Empire (Oxford, 1998); Yu Yingshi, Trade and
Expansion in Han China: A Study in the Structure of Sino-barbarian Rela-
tions (Berkeley, CA, 1967). See also Frank L. Holt, Alexander the Great and
Bactria: The Formation of a Greek Frontier in Central Asia (Leiden, 1989).
On migration patterns, see Peter Blackwood, ed., The Global Prehistory of
Human Migration (New York, 2015) and Patrick Manning, Migration in
World History (3rd ed., New York, 2020); on epidemic disease, see Samuel
Cohn Jr., Epidemics: Hate and Compassion from the Plague of Athens to
AIDS (Oxford, 2018).
On the missionary religions, see Roy Amore, Amir Hussain and Willard Oxroby,
eds., A Concise Introduction to the World Religions (4th ed., New York,
2016).
On the Silk Road, see Peter Frankopan, The Silk Road: A New History of the
World (New York, 2016); Valerie Hansen, The Silk Road: A New History
(Oxford, 2015); Susan Whitfield, Life Along the Silk Road (Berkeley, CA,
1999); and Frances Wood, The Silk Road: Two Thousand Years in the Heart
of Asia (Berkeley, CA, 2004). See also Christopher Beckworth, Empires of
the Silk Road: A History of Central Eurasia from the Bronze Age to the Pre-
sent (Princeton, NJ, 2009).
Part II
Early Globalization,
1000–1450 CE
By 1000 CE, the nature of interregional contacts linking many parts of Asia,
Africa, and Europe was being substantially transformed. Exchanges among re-
gions accelerated – not to modern levels, to be sure, but well beyond what had
occurred previously. Trade was the key connection, as the variety and impor-
tance of goods transported over considerable distances increased. But a new
range of technological and cultural exchanges occurred as well. For an interest-
ing handful of individuals, from several different societies, even international
travel proved to be a growing attraction, and the several travelers who wrote
about their experiences might inspire others.
The new patterns built in part on prior developments, though the number of
regions involved went well beyond any precedent. The Silk Roads were still in
play, though other routes often overshadowed their importance, particularly given
the growing vitality of Indian Ocean shipping. Some of the key export goods, like
silk and spices, were familiar as well. The role of the missionary religions, in mo-
tivating travel and inspiring a wider vision of humanity, was a crucial component.
But the ramifications of the new framework went well beyond previous levels,
bolstered as well by some important new technologies and commercial methods.
Historians and other social scientists have identified the innovations of this
interregional framework in several ways. David Northrup offers a striking claim:
before about 1000 CE, major regions operated largely separately, with mutual
contacts barely affecting their substantial divergence. After 1000, however, in-
creasing convergence became the norm, with regional societies functioning in re-
sponse to contacts, communications, and even deliberate imitations. Further, the
importance of linkages would simply expand over time, despite periodic setbacks,
meaning that the interconnected societies of today are direct heirs of the various
forces that created a more convergent world a bit more than a millennium ago.
Building on essentially the same point, other historians, like A.G. Hopkins,
have simply labeled the patterns that were emerging about 1000 CE “archaic
globalization” – globalization because of the new and durable linkages in-
volved, archaic because the specifics were very different from the globalization
that would unfold later on.
DOI: 10.4324/9781003439615-4
34 Early Globalization, 1000–1450 CE
Chapters in this section focus on the nature of this first globalization frame-
work, taking shape around 1000 (Chapter 3) but then adjusting and expand-
ing further with subsequent developments like the impact of the great Mongol
Empire that arose in the 13th century and a fleeting Chinese effort to create yet
another set of options (Chapter 4). At the same time, however, the chapters also
clarify the “archaic” point – the many ways that this framework differed from
what would come later, beginning with the vital fact that it was not yet fully
global, given the key regions that were still untouched.
Not surprisingly, data about patterns of exchange improve considerably for this
new period, compared to what went before. Among other things, travelers’ account
become not only more numerous but more accurate, less filled with bizarre exag-
gerations. Challenges remain, however. In some cases – like the presence of Arab
merchants in Scandinavia, or the activities of the Chinese on the East African
coast, we have only discoveries of old coins for evidence. There are no qualitative
data to give a fuller sense of the experience, or of local reactions. Were there other
contacts that left no records at all? It is tantalizing to wonder if Chinese voyagers
reached the southern tip of Africa as part of their 15th-century voyages, and at
least peeked at the Atlantic – but we do not know if they went that far. Evidence
gaps have generated some vigorous (and sometimes fanciful) debates – such as the
idea that one Chinese expedition actually crossed the Pacific, or that other routes
across the Pacific reached the Americas before the 15th century. Certainly, more
information may come to light in the future, for this crucial transitional period.
Exploration of early globalization establishes one other vital preliminary, this
one quite clear though possibly unexpected. The initial authors of a more vig-
orous interregional framework were not Europeans; Arabs played a key role,
joined by people from South and Southeast Asia. Western Europeans would
enter in as well, but as slight latecomers and with some initial disadvantages
compared to other regions involved. This disparity would play its own role in
the changes in globalization that would occur later on.
Further Readings
David Northrup, “Globalization and the Great Convergence: Rethinking World His-
tory in the Long Term,” Journal of World History 16 (2005); Ino Rossi, Frontiers
of Globalization Research (Berlin, 2008); Lula Martell, Sociology of Globalization
(London, 2010); C.A. Bagly, Birth of the Modern World (London, 2004); Janet
Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250 to A.D.
1350 (Oxford, 1989); A.G. Hopkins, Globalization in History (London, 2002).
For debates over whether Polynesians reached the Americas as part of their im-
pressive voyages in the Pacific, see David Lewis, We the Navigators. Land-
finding in the Pacific (Honolulu, 1994). For an absolutely false claim about
a Chinese voyage to the Americas, masquerading as revisionist history while
simply manufacturing evidence, see Gavin Menzies, 1421. The Year China
Discovered America (New York, 2003).
3 The Birth of Globalization?
DOI: 10.4324/9781003439615-5
36 Early Globalization, 1000–1450 CE