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Author Illustrator D i s c o v e r m o r e a t w w w. o s p r e y p u b l i s h i n g . c o m
Dr Richard P. Hallion holds a Ph.D. in history from the Adam Tooby is an internationally renowned digital aviation
University of Maryland, and has completed specialized artist and illustrator. His work can be found in publications
governmental and national security programs at the Federal worldwide and as box art for model aircraft kits. He also
Executive Institute and the John F. Kennedy School of runs a successful illustration studio and aviation prints
Government. His many roles have included being a Curator business. To buy artwork, or contact the artist, visit either
at the Smithsonian’s National Air and Space Museum; the www.finesthourart.com or www.adamtoobystudio.co.uk
Harold Keith Johnson Chair of Military History at the Army
War College; the Charles Lindbergh Professor at the National
Air and Space Museum; The Air Force Historian; and a Senior
Issues and Policy Analyst for the Secretary of the Air Force.
He is a Fellow of the American Institute of Aeronautics and
Astronautics, the Royal Aeronautical Society, and the Royal
Historical Society, and an Honorary Member of the Order
of Daedalians, who has flown as a mission observer in a wide CAM No: 4 • ISBN: 978 0 85045 960 9 COM No: 69 • ISBN: 978 1 84603 181 6 COM No: 107 • ISBN: 978 1 78200 804 0
range of military aircraft, including the F-4, F-104, F-105,
and F-111 that flew in Rolling Thunder.
COM No: 108 • ISBN: 978 1 4728 0564 5 DUE No: 35 • ISBN: 978 1 84908 471 0 NVG No: 211 • ISBN: 978 1 78200 380 9
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ROLLING THUNDER
1965–68
Johnson's air war over Vietnam
RICHARD P. HALLION | I L LU S T R AT E D B Y A D A M TO O B Y
www.ospreypublishing.com
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be used or reproduced in any form, without
prior written permission, except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and
reviews. Inquiries should be addressed to the Publisher.
A CIP catalog record for this book is available from the British Library.
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charity. Between 2014 and 2018 our donations are being spent on their Centenary Woods
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To find out more about our authors and books visit www.ospreypublishing.com. Here you will
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Image credits:
DoD: Department of Defense
JFKL: John F. Kennedy Presidential Library
LBJL: Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library
LC: Library of Congress
NARA: National Archives and Records Administration
NHHC: Naval History and Heritage Command
NMUSAF: National Museum of the US Air Force
NWC: Naval Weapons Center China Lake
USAF: US Air Force
USMC: US Marine Corps
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 4
CHRONOLOGY 6
ATTACKERS’ CAPABILITIES 9
DEFENDERS’ CAPABILITIES 22
CAMPAIGN OBJECTIVES 32
THE CAMPAIGN 39
FURTHER READING 92
INDEX 95
INTRODUCTION
President Lyndon Johnson The phrase “Vietnam War” is a convenient shorthand for what was in reality a series
(center) and Secretary of interlinked conflicts. In the early 1960s, growing insurgencies in Laos and South
of Defense Robert
McNamara (to Johnson’s Vietnam triggered a steadily expanding US commitment to Southeast Asia (SEA) that
left) meeting with senior soon erupted into a full-blown war. Fighting raged over South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia,
staff to discuss Vietnam, and into Thailand. The supporters of South Vietnam (the Republic of Vietnam, or RVN)
July 22, 1965, two days
before the first loss of an included the United States, Australia, Canada, Britain, the Republic of China (ROC, now
American aircraft to a Taiwan), South Korea (the Republic of Korea, ROK), Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, the
Soviet Vympel S-75 Dvina Philippines, Spain, Thailand, and West Germany. North Korea (the Democratic People’s
(NATO SA-2 Guideline)
surface-to-air missile Republic of Korea, DPRK), the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Soviet Union
(SAM). (LBJL) (USSR), Czechoslovakia, Cuba, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania supported
North Vietnam (the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, or DRV) and aided Communist
insurgents in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.
US participation lasted 5,182 days: February 28, 1961 through May 7, 1975, over
14 years of continuous conflict – making it America’s longest 20th-century conflict,
exceeded only by the 19th century’s Native American wars, and by the unbroken succession
of counter-terrorism operations undertaken since September 11, 2001. To those who fought
in Vietnam, whether on land, sea or in the air, the war highlighted serious doctrinal, training,
force-structure, and technological deficiencies in America’s military machine. The war’s grim
calculus of loss, disappointment, and failure has furnished fodder for military staff colleges
and academies, and a plethora of postwar studies.
Just as there was no single “Vietnam war,” there was no single “Vietnam air war.” Rather,
South Vietnam, the United States, and their allies operated covert air missions over Laos
and Cambodia; a complex “in-country” air war across South Vietnam of reconnaissance,
aerial defoliation, air transport, helicopter-based troop-insertion and aerial fire-support
attacks, fixed-wing battlefield air interdiction (BAI) and close air support (CAS); a littoral
maritime and riverine air support war; and an on-and-off-and-on-again air war over
North Vietnam.
CHRONOLOGY
1964 April 9 USN F-4Bs tangle with Chinese J-5 (MiG-17)
August 2–5 DRV naval attack on USS Maddox triggers fighters off Hainan Island, losing one aircraft but
Pierce Arrow. claiming a J-5.
August Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) identify 94 key April 2–29 Rolling Thunder IX–XII, emphasizes
DRV targets. interdiction.
October Undersecretary of State George Ball reveals April 20 At Honolulu conference, McNamara criticizes
Johnson and senior officials are contemplating DRV road recce effort, stresses focused air attacks against
air attacks. logistics targets near Demilitarized Zone.
November 1 Bien Hoa air base attack. April 28 CIA Director John McCone resigns over
Rolling Thunder.
December 24 Saigon Brinks Hotel bombing.
May 6 McNamara rejects JCS recommendation to attack
1965 SAM sites.
February 7–8 Pleiku attack triggers Flaming Dart.
May 13–18 Bombing pause.
February 9–11 Quy Nhon quarters attack triggers
Flaming Dart II. June 11–17 Rolling Thunder XVIII extends operations
above 20 degrees North.
February 13 President Johnson approves Rolling Thunder.
June 15 McNamara again rejects SAM attacks fearing
March 2 Rolling Thunder V, first actual strike. provoking USSR.
March 6 President Johnson tells Senator Richard Russell June 17 First confirmed shootdown of VPAF MiG-17,
“There ain’t no daylight in Vietnam,” and Russell replies by USN F-4B.
“There’s no end to the road.”
June 25–July 1 Rolling Thunder XX, strikes Lines
March 8–10 Ambassador Maxwell Taylor criticizes of Communications (LOCs).
“timid” attacks to McNamara and JCS Chairman
Wheeler, calling them “a few isolated thunderclaps.” Early July First S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline) site
is operational.
March 14–15 Rolling Thunder VI by USAF–USN–
VNAF; USN first strike on March 15. July 1 Undersecretary of State Ball recommends
negotiating end to war.
March 26–April 1 Rolling Thunder VIII, targets radar
sites, barracks, and road recce. July 10 First shootdown of VPAF MiG-17 by
USAF F-4C.
March 29 Viet Cong bomb US Embassy in Saigon.
July 24 USAF F-4C downed by SA-2, first Southeast
April 3–4 VPAF MiG-17s enter combat, damage F-8E Asia SAM loss.
on 3rd, shoot down two F-105Ds on 4th.
July 28 First USAF counter-SAM strike costs six aircraft.
April 5 First S-75 (NATO SA-2 Guideline) SAM site
discovered. August 13 First USN counter-SAM strike costs
five aircraft.
September 2 JCS JCSM-670-65 recommends expanding December 31–January 1, 1967 Bombing pause:
Rolling Thunder; is rejected. New Year’s truce.
Late March McNamara finally recommends bombing February 27 First waterway mining.
petroleum–oil–lubricants (POL); LBJ defers three months.
March 10 First Thai Nguyen raid.
April 12 SAC B-52s strike Mu Gia Pass, first B-52 strike
in North Vietnam. March 20–21 Guam conference approves B-52
Thailand basing.
May 6 Administration advisor Walt Rostow recommends
a POL campaign. March 24 ADF-VPAF reorganizes regional air
defense commands.
June 29 Onset of Rolling Thunder Hanoi–Haiphong POL
campaign, with air strikes by the 355th and 388th Tactical April 1 Beginning of Rolling Thunder railroad and highway
Fighter Wings (TFWs), Constellation’s CVW-9, and interdiction effort.
Ranger’s CVW-14.
April 8 Rolling Thunder LV strikes Hanoi power
July 8 Honolulu conference reveals Johnson has designated and industry.
DRV POL as Rolling Thunder’s top targeting priority.
April 27 Westmoreland tells Johnson he is “dismayed”
July 24 CINCPAC Admiral Ulysses S. G. Sharp urges at prospect of halting Rolling Thunder.
attacking Phuc Yen and Kép airfields to expedite
POL campaign. May 12 CIA concludes Rolling Thunder has not
significantly eroded DRV morale or capabilities.
August 20 Admiral Sharp recommends against reducing,
pausing, or halting Rolling Thunder. May 19 VA-212 Walleye attack on Hanoi thermal
power plant.
August 29 Jasons advisory group recommends physical
barrier across the Ho Chi Minh Trail; McNamara May 20–October 17 JCS advocates attacking airfields,
subsequently concurs. ports, LOCs, and further mining.
October 23–25 Manila conference; General William August 9–25 Stennis Hearings bitterly criticize
Westmoreland, MACV, opposes curtailing Rolling Thunder. McNamara’s conduct of Rolling Thunder.
November 4 JCS JCSM 7-2-66 recommends continuing August 11 355th TFW drops Doumer Bridge.
Rolling Thunder.
October 2 In a private meeting, Colonel Robin Olds
December 24–26 Bombing pause: Christmas truce. advises Lyndon Johnson to “destroy [DRV’s] ability
to fight.”
October 21 50,000 war protestors march on Pentagon. March 31 Johnson announces bombing restrictions
and not seeking re-election.
October 24 First Phuc Yen raid.
April 1 US ends “all offensive air efforts north
November 28 McNamara resigns. of 20 degrees North latitude.”
December 22 Pope Paul VI calls for an end to bombing. April 3 Rolling Thunder restricted to Route Packs I,
II, and III.
December 24–25 Christmas truce.
May 23 MiG-21 destroyed by Talos fired by USS
December 31– January 1, 1968 New Year’s truce. Long Beach.
January 23 North Korean seizure of the USS October 31 Rolling Thunder ends.
Pueblo (AGER-2).
November 1 President Johnson halts all bombing
January 29 Tet truce. of North except “protective reaction” in defense of
reconnaissance missions.
January 31 DRV launches Tet offensive.
ATTACKERS’ CAPABILITIES
US Cold War air power
In August 1945, the age of atomic warfare dawned with the dropping of atomic bombs The eight-engine Boeing
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In June 1948, an ultimately unsuccessful Soviet blockade of B-52 Stratofortress
exemplified America’s
Berlin signaled the onset of the Cold War. Over 1949, the Soviet Union tightened its grip global nuclear reach; here
on Eastern Europe and detonated its first atomic bomb; China fell to Mao Zedong; and is a late production B-52H
insurgencies erupted in Greece, Malaya, and Indochina. In June 1950, North Korean troops (SN 60-0006) during
flight testing. (USAF)
invaded South Korea, subsequently saved through a combination of dogged resistance and
the United Nations coalition’s total air, materiel, and logistical superiority.
Though Western air power analysts studied Korea and other limited war contingencies,
soon conventional-style war would largely drop from American and European public and
policy consciousness, replaced by growing fears of global nuclear war. In 1953, the United
States Air Force had issued Air Force Manual 1-2 (AFM 1-2), which reaffirmed the central
role of strategic bombing in attacking an enemy’s heartland, and emphasized nuclear attack
in future wars. Between then and 1961, President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s administration
emphasized nuclear deterrence through a strategy of “massive retaliation.” Over Eisenhower’s
Presidency, the US Air Force and US Navy acquired sophisticated nuclear-armed fighters,
interceptors, bombers, and missiles; and the US Army deployed atomic cannon and ballistic
and surface-to-air missiles. The Soviet bomber threat – not as profound as initially thought
– drove development of an air defense network of radars, specialized jet interceptors, and
both surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles, some with atomic warheads. Air power was
NATO’s linchpin, with conventional ground forces effectively a “trip-wire” to trigger an
overwhelming USAF and Royal Air Force (RAF) nuclear response, assisted by attack aircraft
from US Navy and Royal Navy (RN) carrier strike forces and, later, from Polaris-launching
submarines operating deep at sea.
In February 1965, the United States Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps possessed over
23,500 aircraft. Of these, 371 fighters, bombers, and attack aircraft were available for Rolling
Thunder: 166 of the Pacific Air Force’s 2nd Air Division, based in South Vietnam and
Thailand, and 205 naval aircraft from Task Force 77 (TF-77) in the South China Sea.
Headquartered at Tan Son Nhut air base in South Vietnam and commanded by Major
General Joseph H. Moore Jr, the 2nd Air Division dated to World War II. So, too, did Rear
Admiral Henry L. Miller’s Task Force 77, the carrier striking force of the US Seventh Fleet.
Highly regarded by superiors and subordinates alike, both Moore and Miller had fought
with distinction as young officers in World War II. Moore shot down two Mitsubishi A6M
Type 0 “Zeros” over the Philippines before escaping to Australia. Miller taught Doolittle’s
Tokyo raiders how to fly their B-25s off the USS Hornet (CV-8), then commanded Carrier
Air Groups on the USS Princeton (CVL-23) and USS Hancock (CV-19). Moore’s and Miller’s
airmen were also combat-proven, having flown Laotian reconnaissance and some air strikes,
particularly after North Vietnamese MTBs attacked the USS Maddox (DD-731) on August
2, 1964 in the Tonkin Gulf.
Responding to Viet Cong and DRV aggression, the Air Force had deployed 54 North
American F-100D Super Sabres and 36 Republic F-105D Thunderchiefs; and 28 Martin
B-57B Canberras. These joined 48 Douglas A-1E Skyraider propeller-driven attack
aircraft operated by Air Force Air Commandos to support South Vietnam’s army. (Ten
Convair F-102A Delta Dagger interceptors deployed for air base defense but did not
count as offensive assets; neither did armed Farm Gate North American T-28 trainers
then in-country.) Embarked on the Ranger (CVA-61), Coral Sea (CVA-43), and Hancock
(CVA-19) were 205 fighter and attack aircraft: 36 McDonnell F-4B Phantom IIs; 36 Vought
F-8D/E Crusader fighters; 15 Douglas A-3B Skywarrior heavy attack aircraft; 82 Douglas
A-4C/E Skyhawk light attack aircraft; and 36 Douglas A-1H/J Skyraiders. TF-77’s air wings
also had detachments of reconnaissance, tanker, and electronic warfare aircraft, and search
and rescue helicopters.
PRINCIPAL LAND-BASED AND NAVAL STRIKE AIRCRAFT AT THE ONSET OF ROLLING THUNDER
Naval-Marine Aircraft
Type Speed1 (kts & Mach) Radius2 Cannon(s) Air-to-Air Missiles Air-Ground
Weapons3
A-1H 300kt; Mach 0.48 565nm 4× 20mm No 8,000lb
A-3B 530kt; Mach 0.83 912nm no no 12,000lb
A-4E 585kt; Mach 0.89 504nm 2× 20mm no 8,200lb
F-4B 1,290kt; Mach 2.25 563nm no4 4–6 AIM-7, 2–4 AIM-9 16,000lb
F-8E 973kt; Mach 1.70 394nm 4× 20mm 4× AIM-9 6,000lb
US Air Force Aircraft
Type Speed1 Radius2 Cannon Air-to-Air Guided Air-Ground
Weapons3
A-1E 270kt; Mach 0.44 522nm 4× 20mm no 8,000lb
B-57B 520kt; Mach 0.79 824nm 4× 20mm no 6,000lb
F-100D 740kt; Mach 1.30 311nm 4× 20mm 2–4 AIM-9 4,500lb
F-105D 1,192kt; Mach 2.08 506nm 1× 20mm M-61 2–4 AIM-9 12,000lb
Notes
1 Figures are for a “clean” airplane at its best altitude. In practice, drag of pylons and weapons greatly reduced speed.
Seeming inconsistencies in Mach number for close or identical kts reflect speed of sound variation with altitude.
2 In practice, all strike aircraft (excepting the A-1) could (and did) air refuel during combat sorties.
3 Such as bombs, bomblet dispensers, napalm tanks, rockets, rocket pods, guided missiles, and mines.
4 The F-4 lacked cannon, in the foolish expectation that all it needed were air-to-air missiles; in 1969 the USAF F-4E introduced
an integral 20mm M-61 in a redesigned nose; until the introduction of the F-4E, some USAF Phantoms occasionally carried
a M61 gun pod on the centerline stores station, though it added drag and had poor accuracy.
By summer 1968, the Air Force had expanded to 1,337 fighter and attack aircraft in
theater: 737 in Vietnam, at Bien Hoa, Cam Ranh, Da Nang, Phan Rang, Phu Cat, Tan
Son Nhut and Tuy Hoa; and 600 in Thailand, at Korat, Nakhon Phanom, Takhli, Ubon,
Udorn, and U-Tapao. The Navy had 16 attack carriers: Ticonderoga (CVA-14), Hancock
(CVA-19), Bon Homme Richard (CVA-31), Shangri-La (CVA-38), Oriskany (CVA-34),
Midway (CVA-41), Franklin D. Roosevelt (CVA-42), Coral Sea (CVA-43), Forrestal (CVA-
59), Saratoga (CVA-60), Ranger (CVA-61), Independence (CVA-62); Enterprise (CVAN-65),
Kitty Hawk (CVA-63), Constellation (CVA-64), and America (CVA-66). Given the Navy’s
global responsibilities, having just 16 taxed its ability to maintain three or four at sea
with TF-77, with three others in port at Yokosuka, Hong Kong, and Cubi Point. Carrier
Air Wings (CVWs) varied from 70 to over 100 aircraft, depending on the vessel. Patrol,
counterinsurgency, and support squadrons operated from shore and, in the case of seaplanes,
from moored tenders.
A Martin AGM-12B Bullpup As the DRV’s strengthened its defenses, signals intelligence and electronic warfare
A launched from a VP-23 (SIGINT-EW) assumed crucial significance. Electronic warfare and SAM-killers such as
Lockheed P-3B Orion. The
rocket-boosted command- the A-6B, EA-1F, EA-3B, EA-6A, EF-10B, EB-66B/C/E, EKA-3B, and F-100F and F-105F
guided AGM-12 Bullpup Wild Weasel deployed to Thailand, South Vietnam, or the Fleet. USAF, USN, USMC,
had an even smaller 250lb and CIA reconnaissance aircraft collected intelligence, vitally influencing decision-making
warhead and added
another deficiency: it and operations. These included Boeing RB-47H and RC-135Ms, Lockheed U-2s, A-12
required the pilot to steer and SR-71 Blackbirds, EC-121 Constellations, and EC-130 Hercules; McDonnell RF-101
it by watching a flare at the Voodoos and RF-4B/C Phantom IIs; Vought RF-8A/G Crusaders; North American RA-5C
rear of the missile and then
using a small joystick to Vigilantes; and Lockheed DC-130 Hercules air-launching Ryan 147 Firebee drones.
guide it into its target. But
since the Bullpup had at
best a range between 10
and 12 miles, this meant
Aircraft, weapons, and ordnance
following the missile on a Rolling Thunder’s principal attackers were the tri-service Navy–Marine–USAF F-4 Phantom
straight and predictable II; the Navy–Marine F-8 Crusader, A-4 Skyhawk, and A-6 Intruder; and the Air Force F-105
flight path that brought the
launch airplane ever closer Thunderchief. All had strengths and weaknesses reflecting doctrine, perceived operational
to the target – and ever needs, and the state of aviation design technology at mid-century.
closer to its antiaircraft The two-place twin-engine Mach 2-plus McDonnell F-4 Phantom II (formerly F4H prior
defenses. (NHHC)
to implementation of the McNamara-mandated 1962 redesignation scheme for all military
aircraft) was then the world’s most powerful and advanced fighter. It had an excellent radar,
carried a variety of air-to-air and air-to-surface weapons, and had great power enabling it to
fight in the vertical plane. Still, it had several weaknesses: it lacked any cannon (a deficiency
rectified with the introduction of the M61 20mm Vulcan-armed F-4E in late 1968); was
out-turned by the MiG-17 and (at lower speeds) by the MiG-21; lacked good rear visibility;
and its J79 engines generated a highly visible sooty trail, increasing its detectability.
The Vought F-8 (formerly F8U) Crusader proved a formidable dogfighter, armed
with Sidewinders and four 20mm cannon, though it, too, lacked good visibility aft. Its
strengths were good high-speed acceleration, roll, and turn rates, and its overall performance
closely matched the MiG-21F-13 (including comparable fuel usage), though with better
controllability and much faster low-altitude limitations. Like other early swept-wing
supersonic fighters such as the F-100 and F-105, it was unforgiving of pilot error, and,
again like the F-105, it had a hydraulic-boosted flight control system notoriously vulnerable
to shrapnel, with frequently catastrophic results.
The single- or-two-seat Republic F-105 Thunderchief was a supersonic low-level NATO
strike fighter designed to carry a nuclear bomb in an internal bomb bay. In Vietnam it flew
as a transonic level-and-dive bomber (and SAM-hunter) carrying performance-robbing
external bombs, rockets, and missiles. Once freed of its weapons, the “Thud’s” sleek shape
and powerful J75 engine ensured an astonishingly high egress speed, but even minor hits
to its hydraulic system often spelled disaster. “Thuds” flew 75 percent of Air Force Rolling
Thunder attack missions, becoming the service's iconic airplane.
The US Air Force, US Navy, and US Marine Corps had a commendable range of air-to-
air and air-to-ground ordnance, thanks to imaginative naval weapons initiatives over the
preceding two decades. These included a family of joint-service bombs and jettisonable
tanks – the 250lb Mark 81, 500lb Mark 82, 1,000lb Mark 83, and 2,000lb Mark 84,
and 150-, 300-, and 450-gal tanks – all employing the Navy–Douglas Aero 1-A low-drag
“scalable” shape. (The Korean War-vintage 750lb Mark 117 and 3,000lb Mark 118 were also
extensively employed, particularly by the Air Force.) While these bombs were all generally
satisfactory, the Department of Defense possessed too few for its Vietnam needs: by March
1966 the US Air Force in Southeast Asia was dropping 99,900 bombs of all types per month
on North and South Vietnam, and Laos, not counting those dropped by the Navy–Marine
Corps and RVN Air Force (RVNAF). (At one point, the US Air Force transferred 200 bombs
Republic F-105D
Thunderchief (SN
60-464), 44th TFS, 355th
TFW carrying six M-117
750lb GP bombs and two
Mk 82 500lb bombs. The
exceptionally sleek and
massive “Thud” bore the
brunt of the Air Force’s
war over the North, but at
a fearsome cost in lost
aircraft and airmen.
(USAF)
per month to the Navy to make up for its bomb shortfalls.) A bomb shortage across the
services that year forced the Johnson administration into an embarrassing (and expensive)
buy-back of 18,000 bombs sold to other nations for their use or for scrap.
Naval ordnance research after World War II produced a range of air-to-air, air-to-surface,
and surface-to-air weapons employed in Vietnam, including the radar-guided Raytheon
AIM-7 Sparrow and infrared-guided Raytheon Philco-Ford Aerospace AIM-9 Sidewinder;
the Martin AGM-62 Walleye television-guided glide bomb; the rocket-boosted command-
guided Martin AGM-12 Bullpup; and the unguided 2.75in Mighty Mouse and 5in Zuni
Folding Fin Aerial Rockets (FFAR). Naval vessels boasted three different surface-to-air
missiles, the rocket-propelled Convair RIM-2 Terrier and General Dynamics RIM-24 Tartar,
and the rocket-boosted ramjet-sustained Bendix RIM-8 Talos.
for the effort of the U.S. Government in South Vietnam,” Johnson wrote, adding “I wish it clearly
understood that this overall responsibility includes the whole military effort in South Vietnam and
authorizes the degree of command and control that you consider appropriate … This letter rescinds
all conflicting instructions to U.S. Officers in Vietnam.” [Emphasis added.]
Sharp subsequently enjoyed harmonious relations with Taylor, though in a Vietnam memoir
– tellingly entitled Strategy for Defeat – he warned that such “broad authority” worked only
because of both men’s similar backgrounds as career military professionals. If granted to an
individual lacking such a background, Sharp warned, ignoring chain of command risked
“being extremely disadvantageous to the efficient prosecution of military operations.”
At Rolling Thunder’s peak, “chain of command” ran from President Lyndon Johnson to
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara; down to General Earle Wheeler, USA, Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS); down from the JCS to Pacific Command (PACOM)
and its commander (CINCPAC, initially Admiral Ulysses Grant Sharp and then Admiral
John McCain, Jr); and thence to the commanders of Pacific Air Forces (CINCPACAF,
initially General Hunter Harris, Jr, followed by General John Ryan, and then General
Joseph Nazzaro), Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT, initially Admiral Thomas H. Moorer,
then Admiral Roy Johnson, followed by Admiral John Hyland), and Military Assistance
Command Vietnam (COMUSMACV, initially General William Westmoreland, USA, then
General Creighton Abrams, USA).
Contradictions abounded. For example, PACAF’s administrative and operational control
over Seventh Air Force in Vietnam and Thirteenth Air Force in the Philippines was more
complex than organization charts suggested, for it was split and shared in theater based on
geographic location. The Seventh AF had administrative control over Vietnamese-based
units, while Thirteenth AF had administrative control over those in Thailand. When
Seventh AF and Thirteenth AF operated over North Vietnam, their aircraft came under
PACOM via PACAF, but if they operated over South Vietnam (which the Seventh AF did
routinely, and the Thirteenth AF far less), they came under MACV. Duplicate command
posts existed in Saigon, one for “in-country” operations and the other for “out-country”
ones. Thai government officials insisted that higher operational command for aircraft flown
from Thai bases be located in-country, causing the Air Force to create a “dual-hatted”
Thai-based Seventh/Thirteenth AF Deputy Commander. Marines flew from Chu Lai
and Da Nang in South Vietnam, their squadrons controlled by four specialized Marine
Air Groups (MAG) of the 1st Marine Air Wing (1st MAW), the air component of the
III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF), under MACV. (One F-8 squadron served with
TF-77, aboard Oriskany.) In Laos, to the frustration of General Momyer, a succession of
American ambassadors ran its in-country air war, approving air strikes, choice of targets,
strike priorities, and rules of engagement, and referring Lao air support requests to the
Seventh AF, even though Seventh AF ostensibly controlled joint-service Laotian operations.
“Thus,” air power strategist Colonel Philip Meilinger wrote, “from one day to the next,
aircraft and their crews could fly against targets in three different countries, be controlled
by two different agencies, and receive targets from two other agencies. No one was in overall
charge. It was extremely confusing.”
Strategic Air Command (SAC) planning, targeting, or B-52 strike scheduling likewise
bypassed Seventh AF, being overseen by MACV’s Air Deputy and a SAC Advanced Echelon
(ADVON), in coordination with SAC Headquarters at Offutt AFB, and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. Even MACV’s Air Deputy had limited power, unlike a Joint Force Air Component
Commander (JFACC) in the 1990s. TF-77 coordinated operations with Seventh Air Force,
but otherwise operated independently. Each carrier had an Air Wing Commander (still
called “CAG,” a reference to the days of Carrier Air Groups) who led the Air Wing (CVW),
and reported to the ship’s captain, who might or might not be himself a naval aviator.
Given all these varied factors, a postwar RAND study concluded that Vietnam command
and control “would have led to disaster if US forces had faced a capable air opponent.”
PRESIDENT
SecDef CINCSAC
CJCS ADVON
Command
Coordination JCS
Administrative 8th AF
Wings
Squadrons
CINCPAC
Air Deputy
US Army USAVN
13th AF US Ambassador in Laos 7th AF
US Naval Forces VN
Fleet Marine
Force Pacific 7th AF/13th AF
USMC III MAF
Deputy Commander
Thai-based
USAF units
7th Fleet
RVN-based
USAF units
Rolling Thunder Air
TF 77
Coordination Committee
1st MAW
Squadrons Squadrons
Squadrons Squadrons
missiles. “SAC had extensive ECM [electronic countermeasure] equipment, but even though
SAMs had been in the Soviet air defense system for a number of years, we fighter people
were slow to accept the fact that it would take more than maneuverability and speed to
defeat a SAM defense system,” Seventh AF commander General William “Spike” Momyer
recalled. High initial losses forced development of new weapons, equipment, tactics, and the
formation of dedicated anti-SAM combat programs such as Iron Hand and Wild Weasel.
In sum, for all its apparent strengths, when America went to war in Vietnam, its military
forces were ill prepared to wage an extended Asian war mixing low-intensity conflict;
garrison and hamlet protection; mass force-on-force encounters across terrain far different
than that of Western Europe; maritime blockade, interdiction, and riverine operations;
sustained air support and supply; high-tempo air warfare in an intensive, dynamic, and
high-threat environment; all while being politically constrained far greater even than Korea
over a decade previously.
US NAVY PACIFIC FLEET (PACFLT) | PEARL HARBOR, HI | ADM ROY L. JOHNSON USN, COMMANDING
Seventh Fleet | Yokosuka, Japan | Vice Adm Paul P. Blackburn USN, commanding
Carrier Task Force 77 | In port, Cubi Point, Philippines; at sea, on Yankee Station, or at Dixie Station | Rear Adm Edward
C. Outlaw USN, commanding
Carrier CVW Aircraft
Bon Homme Richard (CVA-31) CVW-19 A-4C (30); A-1H/J (13); F-8E (22); RF-8A (3); E-1B (3, AEW/
C2); EA-1F (3, ECM/ECCM); EA-3B (3, SIGINT); UH-2A/B
(3, Plane Guard/CSAR)
Oriskany (CVA-34) CVW-16 A-4E (29); A-1H/J (12); F-8E (25); RF-8A (3) E-1B (3, AEW/
C2); EA-1F (3, ECM/ECCM); EA-3B (3, SIGINT); Type
Uncertain, likely USMC RF-8A (3, Reconnaissance); UH-2A /
UH-2B (3, Plane Guard/CSAR)
Midway (CVA-41) CVW-2 A-4C/E (28); A-1H/J (12); A-3B (9); F-4B (11); F-8D (12);
RA-3B (3); RF-8A (2); E-1B (4, AEW/C2); EA-1F (3, ECM/
ECCM); EA-3B (3, SIGINT); UH-2A (3, Plane Guard/CSAR)
Coral Sea (CVA-43) CVW-15 A-4C/E (27); A-1H/J (12); A-3B (9); F-4B (12); F-8D (14);
RA-3B (3); RF-8A (2); E-1B (3, AEW/C2); EA-1F (3, ECM/
ECCM); EA-3B (3, SIGINT); UH-2A/UH-2B (4, Plane Guard/
CSAR)
Independence (CVA-62) CVW-7 A-4E (27); A-6A (11); A-3B (3); F-4B (23); RA-3B (3); RA-5C
(4); E-1B (4, AEW/C2); EA-1F (3, ECM/ECCM); EA-3B (3,
SIGINT); UH-2A (3, Plane Guard/CSAR)
Other USN squadrons with land-planes supporting Rolling Thunder
Location Squadrons Purposes Aircraft Types No
NAS Agana, Guam VW-1 Weather Recon/AEW EC-121K 7
NAF Atsugi, Japan VQ-1 SIGINT EC-121M 4
US MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM (MACV) | SAIGON, RVN | GEN WILLIAM C. WESTMORELAND,
COMMANDING
III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) | Da Nang, RVN | MAJGEN Lewis W. Walt USMC, commanding
First Marine Aircraft Wing, Advance Echelon, 1st MAW (ADV) | Da Nang, RVN | BrigGen Keith B. McCutcheon USMC,
commanding
Base Group Purposes Aircraft Types No
Da Nang, RVN MAG-11 Fighter-Attack F-4B 30
Recon/ECM/ECCM RF-8A and 12
EF-10B
Chu Lai, RVN MAG-12 Attack A-4C / A-4E 38 / 20
Notes
Unless a campaign is relatively short, the initial order of battle naturally changes over time, reflecting the pace, intensity, and
consequences of combat operations. Rolling Thunder evolved from a pattern of retaliatory strikes, so the characteristic well-
considered build-up of military forces associated with the planning of a major campaign was absent. (This constituted one
of the first of many mistakes that would come to characterize Rolling Thunder.) Nevertheless, at the onset of Rolling Thunder,
the essential elements of the larger campaign, its force-structure, and the relative numbers (and types) of aircraft (both land-
based and sea-based) were present.
This “slice in time” of July–August 1965 includes all aircraft types routinely operated initially over the DRV. USMC aircraft
are often neglected when considering air operations “Up North,” but they played an important role, particularly in furnishing
electronic countermeasures (ECM) support and radar jamming for 2nd Air Division and TF-77 strike packages operating into
high-threat areas. The USAF Strategic Air Command’s B-52 force, deployed to Andersen AFB, Guam, and flying Arc Light
strikes over South Vietnam from mid-June 1965 and over Laos from mid-December 1965, is not included as it was not yet
striking targets in the North.
DEFENDERS’ CAPABILITIES
ADF-VPAF in the mid-1960s
The MiG-17F Fresco-C, In the early fall of 1964, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) hardly seemed able to
a remarkably agile and confront the United States in the air. The combined Air Defense Forces-Vietnamese People’s
dangerous fighter; this
example, in VPAF Air Force (ADF-VPAF), less than two years old, had approximately 1,425 light, medium,
markings, is at the and heavy antiaircraft guns – 12.7mm and 14.5mm heavy machine guns; rapid-fire 37mm
National Museum of the and 57mm light cannon, and small numbers of 85mm heavy flak guns – distributed among
USAF. Though not as fast,
well-armed or powerful as 14 antiaircraft regiments and a further 14 independent battalions. There were just under
American fighters, the 300 prepared AAA firing sites, only approximately 160 of which were active. As yet, the
MiG-17 well suited the ADF-VPAF lacked any surface-to-air missiles, and though it had three radar regiments,
VPAF’s needs. Light, small,
and armed with two it had only approximately 22 early warning radars and four fire-control ones. It thus
23mm and one 37mm lacked a well-integrated air defense network, with trained, experienced personnel operating
cannon and (rarely) rocket sufficient numbers of up-to-date early warning, height-finding, and fire-control radars. It
pods, it could out-turn any
American jet attack and possessed only three flying units: the 910th Training Regiment with Yak-18 piston-engine
fighter/interceptor aircraft trainers (NATO reporting name Max); the 919th Air Transport Regiment, operating a
until the advent of the F-15 mix of designs, the most advanced being twin-engine Ilyushin Il-14s (NATO Crate); and
and F-16 in the 1970s.
(NMUSAF) the 921st Sao Do (“Red Star”) Fighter Regiment, flying Soviet MiG-17 and Shenyang J-5
(Chinese-built copies of the MiG-17) fighters (both known in the West as the “Fresco”) and
MiG-15UTI (Shenyang JJ-2) two-place trainers (NATO Midget).
Early days
Yet, despite their force’s small size, inadequate structure, and equipment deficiencies,
the ADF-VPAF already had a legacy of tenacity under air assault. In January 1951, Vo
Nguyen Giap prematurely launched an offensive to seize Hanoi. At Vinh Yen, French
fighters and bombers caught the Viet Minh’s 308th Infantry Division in the open, killing
hundreds. Giap and his commanders thereafter returned to guerrilla warfare, biding their
time building strength and antiaircraft defenses, beginning with their first air defense
unit, the 612th Company, established in May 1951 with four Soviet 37mm M1939 light
cannon furnished by Mao Zedong.
From this small beginning, the Viet Minh’s antiaircraft strength, nurtured by the PRC,
steadily grew, enabling Giap to establish an antiaircraft regiment, the 367th, in April 1953,
commanded by Le Van Tri and assigned to the 351st Heavy Division. The 367th underwent
months of extensive training in China before returning to northwest Vietnam in time for the
pivotal siege of Dien Bien Phu in the spring of 1954. There, two of its battalions thwarted
French attempts to supply the encircled garrison. Flak from approximately 80 M1939
37mm light cannon and an estimated 100 DShK 1938 12.7mm heavy machine guns
downed 48 French Armée de l'Air and Aéronavale aircraft and damaged another 167.
Massive disparities in opposing artillery and troop strength made the fall of this ill-conceived
“Base Aéro-Terrestre” (“Air-Land Base”) a virtual certainty; but Viet Minh flak sealed Dien
Bien Phu’s fate.
In March 1949, at the instigation of then-President Ho Chi Minh, Giap had formed a
committee to begin shaping a Vietnamese air arm. After the Geneva Accords of 1954, the
newly independent DRV inherited former French airfields such as Bac Mai at Hanoi and
Cat Bi at Haiphong. Recognizing these as insufficient, planners envisioned up to 42 across
the North. In January 1956, the DRV received its first aircraft, Czech Aero Ae-45S light
twin-engine trainers and utility aircraft, from the PRC. On March 21, 1958, the DRV’s
Ministry of National Defense established a specialized Air Defense Command. Over the
next several years, the Ministry of Defense sent more than a hundred pilot candidates to
training in the PRC and Soviet Union, together with hundreds of other officers and soldiers
sent to bases across the USSR for specialist antiaircraft training. It established two flying
training schools in Vietnam, formed an Air Force administrative department, created its
first operational unit, the 919th Air Transport Regiment (equipped with a mix of single-
and-twin-engine Antonov An-2 biplanes, Lusinov Li-2s – a license-built copy of the DC-3
– and the more modern Ilyushin Il-14), and followed this with the formation of the 910th
Training Regiment and a central aviation technical training school at Cat Bi. The PAVN
sent student pilots to both China and the USSR. Washout-rates were high: on average, only
one in five satisfactorily qualified as jet fighter pilots.
By the summer of 1963, the PAVN had eight antiaircraft regiments possessing a mix
of 14.5mm, 37mm, 57mm, 85mm, and 100mm cannon. Structured along Soviet lines,
each 57mm, 85mm, and 100mm AA regiment typically had four firing batteries of six
Rouva Grunnet otti Kain syliinsä, pani hänen pienet kätensä ristiin
omien käsiensä lomaan ja sanoi vapisevalla äänellä:
Santarmit kulkivat pitkin teitä tuo lehti kädessä, jota ennen oli
pidetty niin suuressa kunniassa, mutta jota kaikki nyt halveksivat.
Borris pysähtyi.
"Niin, hän sanoi: 'Es sind lauter Lumpen!' [Ne ovat kaikki
roskaväkeä.]
Niin, minä en sitä sanonut, Winberg, vaan preussilainen nimismies."
"Winbergillä on saksalainen omatunto tanskalaisessa ruumiissa!"
naureskeli Madsen, joka astui ohi.
Hän ajoi aika ravia ja huomasi tiellä pienen pojan, joka käveli
kantaen koria, ja se oli yhtä suuri kuin poika itsekin ja näytti aivan
lintuhäkiltä.
"Kymmenen vuotta."
"Seis!" huusi Ebbe, jolle äkkiä tuli kova kiire. "Minä tahdon mennä
pois! Minä tahdon mennä pois! Minä tahdon pois!"
"Minä voin lyödä vetoa kymmenestä markasta, että tuo oli vanhan
Keldetin poika", naureskeli hän tyytyväisenä. "Sama huimapää kuin
isäkin!"
11.
Kun Bovlundin soma kirkko oli valmis (sittemmin kävi aivan samoin
Haderslevin kirkon!), niin virtasi sinne joka taholta seurakuntalaisia,
pyhävaatteissa ja juhlatunnelman vallassa, tanskalaiset virsikirjat
kainaloissa.
Hän rupesi niin kovasti kiirehtimään, ettei hän malttanut sitä edes
tarkastella.
Kellot vaikenivat.
Korkein tuomioistuin julisti tietysti, että kielto oli laiton, syystä ettei
asianomaisilla virkamiehillä ollut oikeutta sitä säätää.
Ja silleen se jäi.
"Das mag wohl sein" [Voihan tuo olla], huudahti rovasti kiivaasti,
"aber wir wollen es knechten!" [Mutta me tahdomme musertaa sen.]
"Der Kerl hat einen stolzen Kopf! Schade! Schade! Das haben ja
alle die Schleswiger!" [Mies on ylpeäluontoinen. Sääli. Sääli. Sitähän
kaikki slesvigiläiset ovat.]
13.
Karen saattoi niin hyvin käsittää, mitä hän kerran oli lukenut,
nimittäin että synnynnäiset asukkaat Borneon saarella eivät voineet
hengittää, kun vuoret olivat liian korkeat.
"Jumala tiesi", ajatteli hän, "miksi niin monet eivät huomaa, että
lakeuskin tai rannikko vei olla suurenmoinen, kun monet kädet
uskollisesti työtä tehden ovat sen raataneet ja kun se huojuu Luojan
siunauksen alla? Mutta sitä vastoin kun se on villinä,
viljelemättömänä arona ja ranta kivikkona, karuna ja
hedelmättömänä? Miksi sitä silloin sanotaan suurenmoiseksi? Onhan
merikin yhtä villi ja voimakas, lyököön sen aallot kiviä tai
hiekkasärkkiä tai multamaita vasten, ja suurenmoisin sentään
kaikesta se voitto, jonka ihminen saavuttaa raa'an luonnon yli.
Lannistaisivathan he sittenkin maan valtansa alle."
Olisi voinut luulla, että tuuli tai aurinko olisi antanut merkin, sillä
äkkiä tiheä, kullanpunertava pilvi kiiti ruispellon yli. Iltatuuli puhalsi
miljaardeja hedelmöiviä itiöitä, jotka pölähtivät tähistä sikiämiin.
Olihan hän aina kuullut puhuttavan, että nuori tyttö halusi tulla
äidiksi, että hän aavisti tätä pyhää salaperäisyyttä, lyhyesti: että
nainen rakasti lasta ennenkuin se oli syntynyt, ihaili sitä, eli sen
kanssa yhdessä sen vielä levätessä hänen sydämensä alla ja että
hän tunsi onnenhurmausta, kun hän vihdoin piteli sitä sylissänsä.
Mutta eikö sitä sanota vain sen vuoksi, että vanhan juutalaisen
määräyksen mukaan nainen tulee autuaaksi ainoastaan lapsen
synnyttämisen kautta?
Mitä oli rakkaus? Oliko se vain vietti, jonka tuli enentää sukua? Ei,
ei mitenkään! Se olisi sen halventamista, sillä eläimelläkin oli sama
vietti. Se, joka vain siihen tyytyy, ei tiedä mitä rakkaus on, ja vain
halventaa sitä. Mutta mitä se sitten oli? Niin, ajatteli Karen edelleen,
se on kaihoa ja halua päästä henkisesti ja ruumiillisesti yhdeksi sen
kanssa, jonka sielua ja ruumista rakastaa.
Eikä hänellä ollut aikaa ajatella syntymätöntä lasta, sillä hänellä oli
kylliksi työtä hoitaessaan taloa. Hänellä oli kädet täynnä työtä, eikä
pienokaisen vaatteiden valmistus tuottanut hänelle iloa eikä riemua,
se oli vain velvollisuus, joka oli omantunnonmukaisesti suoritettava.
Ei, jos hän tahtoi olla rehellinen, ja siitähän tässä nyt oli kysymys,
niin ei hän voinut sitä lainkaan sillä tavalla muistaa.
14.
Karen myönsi.
"Minä sano: hyvä on, te saada lupa pitä poika, mutta minä anna
yksi ehto."
"Että te sano ylös ensi kvartali 'Hejmdal' lehti ja abonnera sen sija
tämä lehti päälle."
Kun Karen tuli kotiin, niin hän otti vertavuotavin sydämin pojan
puheillensa.
Sitten hän sai hyvän aterian ja sekä Karen että Kai katselivat häntä
surumielin.
Kun hän läksi, niin hän katsoi pitkään taaksensa, niinkuin hän ei
sittenkään olisi tahtonut lähteä.
"Kas vain!" sanoi Klaus. "Hän tulee aikaa myöten aivan villakoiran
näköiseksi, samoin kuin hänen isänsäkin, kun Hänelle parta ensin
kasvaa. Hän on yhtä innokas toimessaan ja yhtä kepeäjalkainen."