Danish Institute for International Studies

Report Part Title: Arctic security, climate change and sovereignty

Report Title: PERSPECTIVES ON SECURITY IN THE ARCTIC AREA
Report Author(s): Annika Bergman Rosamond
Danish Institute for International Studies (2011)

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep15639.6

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms

Danish Institute for International Studies is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and
extend access to this content.

This content downloaded from

157.39.16.47 on Wed, 27 Nov 2024 03:47:28 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 DIIS REPORT 2011:09

PART TWO. Arctic security, climate change and

sovereignty

What follows below is a concise discussion of a select number of security develop-

ments that are worth exploring in the context of the Arctic region, with emphasis
upon such things as climate change and sovereignty claims, which are closely con-
nected in the High North.

A few introductory remarks on Arctic security

Since the early 1990s, the Arctic has experienced the positive effects of the
processes of demilitarisation, global governance and institutionalisation which
replaced the hostilities of the Cold-War era. Palosaari and Möller (2003: 255)
nonetheless argue that ‘the Arctic story is one of marginality, centrality, secu-
ritisation and desecuritisation, militarisation and demilitarisation’ all taking
place simultaneously. They maintain that militarisation remains a key concept
in the Arctic even though the majority of security challenges to the region are
of a non-military character. Despite the widespread institutionalisation of the
Arctic, the region has not entirely escaped geopolitical tensions emerging from,
for example, the competition for natural resources and sovereignty claims. There
are also some signs that the Arctic coastal states are exploring ways of enhanc-
ing their military presence in the circumpolar north. Russia, for example, will
be positioning an Arctic brigade on the Kola peninsula to protect its oil and gas
interests in the region (The Daily Telegraph, 31 March 2011). It has also reached
an agreement with the multinational British Petroleum to start drilling for oil
in the Arctic. The connection between climate change and attempts to extend
sovereignty is at the heart of Arctic security debates. This relationship forms
the basis of the discussion below, and there is an attempt to refute the common
position put forward by some that the Arctic is a potentially perilous conflict
zone riddled by Realpolitik rather than global governance and cooperation, as
has been suggested above.

Climate Change and the Arctic

The majority of the world’s leading politicians, policy-makers and scientists are now
convinced that changes in the expected weather patterns of the globe are anthropo-
genic (i.e. man-made) causing rising sea levels, melting ice and glaciers, and threats

37

This content downloaded from

157.39.16.47 on Wed, 27 Nov 2024 03:47:28 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 DIIS REPORT 2011:09

to flora and fauna, as well as to the livelihoods of indigenous communities. In very

simple terms climate change is caused by such activities as the burning of fossil fuels
and the clearing of land, which lead to higher levels of carbon dioxide, methane and
greenhouse gases that pollute the atmosphere. The Arctic is one of the areas most
affected by climate change, if not the most affected. It is estimated that the ice cover-
ing the Arctic Ocean has been reduced by half in the past fifty years, with important
implications for the environment and the populations of the Circumpolar North.
The Arctic Climate Impact Assessment Report (2004: 8), commissioned by the
UN, argues that ‘climate changes are being experienced particularly intensely in the
Arctic. Arctic average temperature has risen at almost twice the rate as the rest of
the world’ and ‘melting glaciers and sea ice and rising permafrost temperatures’ are
key to these warming effects. In addition the World Meteorological Organisation
(WMO) has testified that:

the rate of ice loss from Greenland is increasing … in the Arctic, during the
summers of 2007 and 2008, the minimum extent of year-round sea ice decreased
to its lowest level since satellite records began 30 years ago. International
Polar Year expeditions recorded an unprecedented rate of sea-ice drift in the
Arctic as well. Due to global warming, the types and extent of vegetation in
the Arctic shifted, affecting grazing animals. (WMO, State of Polar Research
Press Release, 2009)

Climate change is strongly linked with ‘the new scramble for territory and resources
among the five Arctic powers’ (Borgerson, 2008: 63), leading some newspapers to
depict the Arctic as a potential hotspot for increased tensions and possible conflicts
(see, for example, Politiken 15 July 2009; the Guardian 13 May 2009; Rusnet 31
March 2009; Reuters UK 13 May 2009; Barents Observer 29 March 2009c; New
York Times 28 March 2009; Daily Telegraph 14 August 2007). This should be seen
against the backdrop of the vast unclaimed oil and gas resources yet to be discovered
in the Arctic. As the US Geological Survey (2008: 1) has estimated, ‘the extensive
Arctic continental shelves may constitute the geographically largest unexplored
prospective area for petroleum remaining on Earth.’ In addition, climate change
has led to the emergence of new and until recently inaccessible sea routes opening
up new patterns of trade and international commerce, as well as competition for
them. Recently two commercial vessels belonging to the German Beluga shipping
company successfully completed the Northeast Passage from Asia to the West,
demonstrating the reality of new sea routes emerging. From a Russian perspective
this means the possibility of utilising the passage ‘as a reliable shipping route’ – a

38

This content downloaded from

157.39.16.47 on Wed, 27 Nov 2024 03:47:28 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 DIIS REPORT 2011:09

route that is considerably shorter than those in the Southern Hemisphere (New
York Times, 11 September 2009).

Climate change has also led to greater availability of certain fish stocks, including
cod and herring, while freshwater fish are likely to decline (Arctic Climate Impact
Assessment, 2004: 17). However, there is also evidence to suggest that a warmer cli-
mate will lead to ‘agricultural opportunities’ brought about by ‘a longer and warmer
growing season’ (ibid.). The economic advantages of such discoveries could impede
upon international efforts to fight climate change because some people will benefit
from the increased availability of fish stocks. What follows below is a brief account
of the relationship between climate change and issues related to claims to sovereignty
in the Arctic.

Climate change and sovereignty

Climate change has not only been depicted as the source of economic problems and
opportunities but has been defined by some as a potential catalyst for a Cold War-like
remilitarisation of the Arctic. Borgerson (2008: 65) is at the forefront of this debate,
and his message is rather bleak: he defines the Arctic as a ‘coming anarchy’ and thus
advocates a realist-inspired analysis of the far north. He contends that the supposedly
anarchic situation in the Arctic can be explained by the absence of an international treaty
that ‘guarantees an orderly and collective approach to extracting the region’s wealth’
(Borgerson 2008: 67). However, Coalter G. Lathrop (2008) argues that Borgenson
is wrong in depicting the Arctic as a lawless region because it is ‘a region governed by
international law … specifically by the international law of the sea’. According to the
Swedish defence analyst Niklas Granholm (2009: 20) there is growing opposition to
the ‘alarmist’ narratives favoured by Borgerson, particularly in Denmark.

The Arctic is nonetheless faced with many challenges, including issues relating to air
surveillance, sea security and the prevention of international organised crime, all of
which top international summits and agendas (Danish Ministry of Defence, 2009).
Furthermore, the five Arctic coastal states have sought to extend their continental
shelf in the Arctic Ocean in an effort to lay claim to the natural reserves that might
be discovered either above or below the seabed, which is a security issue that will be
discussed below.

There are, of course, differing viewpoints as to the severity of such security

challenges. The media tend to emphasize, or some might say overemphasise,

39

This content downloaded from

157.39.16.47 on Wed, 27 Nov 2024 03:47:28 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 DIIS REPORT 2011:09

territorial disputes between the Arctic states by portraying their actions in old-
style realist language (see, for example, Politiken 15 July 2009, The Guardian 13
May 2009; Rusnet 31 March 2009; Reuters UK 13 May 2009; Barents Observer
29 March 2009c; New York Times 28 March 2009; Daily Telegraph 14 August
2007). A rather typical media representation reads as follows: ‘Russia, the United
States, Canada, Denmark and Norway are all locked in a race to grab a slice of
the northern wilderness after US researchers predicted that global warming
might leave the area ice-free, and therefore more easily navigable and explored, as
early as 2030’ (The Daily Telegraph 31 March 2011). The Economist (8 October
2009), on the other hand, points out that, although ‘military types mention the
possibility – though not the likelihood – of a new sort of cold war’, this is not
an inevitable development.

The five states that are at the centre of most Arctic debates are Canada, Denmark,
Norway, Russia and the USA, all of which are coastal states with significant security,
energy and sovereign interests in the Circumpolar North. In 2008 the Danish Defence
Commission (Ministry of Defence 2009: 78) observed that the Arctic coastal states
have ‘already started to position themselves’ in relation to one another to secure their
national interests. Despite having geographical possessions, Finland, Iceland and
Sweden have not been involved in this power political game, which can be explained
by their lack of Arctic coastal borders. What follows below is a brief summary of some
of the territorial security dilemmas currently facing the Arctic and how they broadly
relate to climate change. The focus is on the five Arctic coastal states, starting with
Russia’s strategic interests in the Arctic.

Russia
Russia is generally viewed as a key actor in the Arctic, particularly when it comes to
claims to sovereignty. It is instructive to analyse briefly some key events in Russian
foreign policy to gain an insight into the overall security situation in the Arctic. In
2007 Russia planted its nation’s titanium flag on the Arctic seabed in 2007 as way
of staking out its claim to resources in the Arctic, an action that international media
outlets have at times used to illustrate the geopolitical situation in the Circumpolar
North. The relevance of the act is mainly symbolic, but was nonetheless perceived
as provocative by the other Arctic nations. In March 2009 Russia revealed its plans
to deploy a dedicated military force to patrol the Arctic and safeguard its interests in
the area. Russian border guards are also expected to take part in such exercises (The
Guardian, 28 March 2009).

40

This content downloaded from

157.39.16.47 on Wed, 27 Nov 2024 03:47:28 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 DIIS REPORT 2011:09

This was followed by the release of a new security strategy entitled ‘Principles
for Russian Politics in the Arctic in the period to 2020…’, in which the country
warned that the vast oil and gas resources in the Arctic could lead to conflicts
and that ‘military force cannot be ruled out’ (cited in The Times, May 14
2009a). The chief foreign commentator of The Times, Bronwen Maddox, has
described this turn of events as a ‘stunt’ designed to make other states ‘tremble
and surrender their claims’, and she rightly observes that ‘to talk of war is to
ignore the vast legal effort under way to settle just those questions’ (The Times,
May 14, 2009b). The language used by the journalist in question to describe
Russian foreign policy in the Circumpolar North is perhaps somewhat exag-
gerated in that there is also evidence to suggest that Russia is, like its Arctic
neighbours, attempting to make a positive contribution to Arctic developments.
An instructive example here is Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s statement at
the 2009 AC meeting in Tromsø, that ‘We … are not planning to increase our
military presence in the Arctic and to deploy armed forces there’ (Ria Novosti,
24 April 2009).

A year later, in 2010, Russia and Norway managed to settle their differences with
regard to their respective geographical and natural reserve claims in the Barents
Sea (New York Times 27 April 2010). Moreover, Prime Minister Putin announced
that ‘it is imperative to keep the Arctic as a zone of peace and cooperation’ and that
international disputes can be resolved by the application of international law (cited
in Deutsche Welle 23 September 2010). This has nonetheless not prevented Russia
from creating an Arctic brigade for the purpose of defending its natural reserves in
the High North. The brigade is expected to be fully operational in 2011 (The Daily
Telegraph, 31 March 2011).

The Kremlin has also claimed ownership of the Lomonosov Ridge, an underwater
ridge that runs for 1800 km across the Arctic Ocean. In 2010, in an effort to con-
vince the United Nations that Russia is the rightful owner of a large proportion of
the Lomonosov Ridge, the country sent a research vessel called Akademik Fedorov
to the Arctic to collect scientific data to prove its claims to the continental shelf. It
is expected that Russia will submit an application to the UN Commission for the
Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) in 2012 to extend its continental shelf
to include a large proportion of the Lomonosov Ridge and the natural reserves
within that area. The situation has been further complicated by Canada making
similar claims to the Lomonosov Ridge. However, in 2010 the two countries agreed
that the UN should settle their dispute over the ‘resource-rich underwater Arctic

41

This content downloaded from

157.39.16.47 on Wed, 27 Nov 2024 03:47:28 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 DIIS REPORT 2011:09

mountain range … Lomonosov Ridge’ (BBC News 16 September 2010). As will

be discussed below, Denmark and Norway are also seeking to extend their part of
the Lomonosov Ridge.

A final point here is that, although Russia is seeking to extend its sovereign territory,
it is unlikely that it would instigate a conflict in the Arctic, since this would impede
upon its future trade and commercial interests by making the circumpolar north an
unstable region.

Map 2. The Lomonosov Ridge

������
�������������� ���
�����

��� ������ ��
��
������ �� ��
���
��

��������
������ ��� ���������������
�����������������
���������
�����

�������
�����

������
������ ����������
���

��������� �������
�������� ���

��������

������

���������
���
�������

��������������� �������
����� ������
������

http://www.russiablog.org/lomonosov-ridge-map.jpg

42

This content downloaded from

157.39.16.47 on Wed, 27 Nov 2024 03:47:28 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 DIIS REPORT 2011:09

The USA
Shortly before leaving office, President George W. Bush identified a set of American
national security and homeland security interests that could be affected by future
developments in the Arctic. The official position of the Bush administration was
that ‘human activity in the Arctic region is increasing and is projected to increase
further … This requires the United States to assert a more active and influential
national presence to protect its Arctic interests to project sea power throughout
the region’ (Security Presidential Directive and Homeland Security Directive,
2009: 2). Bush thus steered the US towards a potentially more muscular Arctic
policy, in particular if its national interests were to be challenged. The strategic
interests that were given priority in Bush’s Security Directive included ‘missile
defence and early warning; deployment of sea and air systems for strategic sealift,
strategic deterrence, maritime presence, and maritime security operations; and
ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight’ as well as ‘fundamental homeland
security interests in preventing terrorist attacks and mitigating those criminal or
hostile acts that could increase the United States’ vulnerability to terrorism in the
Arctic region’ (ibid.).

The Bush regime thus called for a range of military measures to meet the chal-
lenges of the Arctic area. However, such things as environmental protection and
the conservation of natural resources were also given attention. The document
underlines the centrality of both ‘international organisations and bilateral contacts’
in dealing with US interests in the Arctic and as such opts for an approach that is
not solely based upon bilateralism. In line with this position, the Bush administra-
tion committed the USA to signing the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
to safeguard US national interests by ensuring ‘US mobility of our Armed Forces
worldwide’ (2009: 3).

In 2009, one of the key authors of the US security directive, David A. Balton, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental
Scientific Affairs, U.S. Department of State, told an audience at the Carnegie Endow-
ment for International Peace that the Obama administration would be likely to stick
to the Bush security directive. In his judgement the USA should go ahead and ratify
the Law of the Sea Convention. He also argued that cooperation with regard to Arctic
matters is fully feasible between the USA and Russia. This line of thought is supported
by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who has stated that the US will implement its
Arctic policy on the basis of international cooperation (Barents Observer, 2009b).
The US has hitherto not ratified the Law of the Sea Convention.

43

This content downloaded from

157.39.16.47 on Wed, 27 Nov 2024 03:47:28 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 DIIS REPORT 2011:09

The US security directive of 2009 was criticised by Canadian newspapers, which

objected to what they saw as attempt to assert US national interests in the Arctic.
The Calgary Herald (31 January 2009), for example, defined Bush’s policy as ‘another
forceful rebuttal of Canada’s claims of sovereignty over the Northwest Passage’ and
argued that it served to undermine ‘Canada’s claim of sovereignty over what is emerg-
ing as a major global shipping route because of the shrinking polar ice cap’.

Since the 1970s, Canada and the USA have diverged on how to carve up the
Beaufort Sea, which is situated off the coasts of Alaska and the Yukon (see Map 3
below). The situation has been complicated by the potentially rich natural reserves
yet to be explored in the Beaufort Sea. The dispute led the former Secretary General
of NATO, de Hoop Scheffer (2009: 1), to criticise NATO’s Arctic members for
their military activities in the Circumpolar North. He described them as a direct

Map 3. The Beaufort Sea

������������

�����
������� ������
��� ��������
���
��������
����

���������
���

���
������ ������
������

���
������ ����
����
������ �����
����� �����������
�����������
��� �����������
���������

http://www.worldatlas.com/aatlas/infopage/beaufortsea.htm

44

This content downloaded from

157.39.16.47 on Wed, 27 Nov 2024 03:47:28 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 DIIS REPORT 2011:09

response to ‘the changing environment’ in the Arctic and argued that, ‘although the
long-term implications of climate change and the retreating ice cap in the Arctic
are still unclear, what is very clear is that the High North is going to require even
more of the Alliance’s attention in the coming years.’ Some efforts have been made
on the part of both governments to settle the dispute in a neighbourly manner,
with the former Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lawrence Cannon, being
particularly keen to come to some form of agreement through bilateral dialogue
(Cannon, 2009; Menasborders 2010).

One of the key challenges of the Obama regime has been whether to allow new forms
of coastal natural gas and oil drilling in US offshore areas. After initial scepticism
about such drilling, the Obama administration decided to allow it in certain areas,
but to protect Bristol Bay in Alaska from new kinds of exploration. However, the
Beaufort Sea could be subjected to drilling, which might add force to the energy race
in the Arctic. Barack Obama himself justified his decision by arguing that:

this announcement is part of a broader strategy that will move us from an

economy that runs on fossil fuels and foreign oil to one that relies more on
homegrown fuels and clean energy. And the only way this transition will
succeed is if it strengthens our economy in the short term and long term.
To fail to recognize this reality would be a mistake. (Obama cited in Market
News 2010)

Rather surprisingly, the National Security Strategy, a sixty-page long report, only
contains the following paragraph on the Arctic, which appears at the very end of the
document. In the words of the White House, ‘ the United States is an Arctic Nation
with broad and fundamental interests in the Arctic region, where we seek to meet
our national security needs, protect the environment, responsibly manage resources,
account for indigenous communities, support scientific research, and strengthen
international cooperation on a wide range of issues’ (The White House 2010: 50).
As emerges here the key objectives of American foreign policy in the High North
are quite similar in character to the stated objectives of many of institutions that we
have examined above.

Canada
So far Canada’s disagreements with the USA and Russia have been discussed in
the context of the other two countries’ Arctic policies. Below, Canada’s dispute

45

This content downloaded from

157.39.16.47 on Wed, 27 Nov 2024 03:47:28 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 DIIS REPORT 2011:09

with Denmark regarding the small Hans island will be covered. It is nonetheless
worth mentioning that Canada has been party to some verbal disputes with Rus-
sia. For example, in 2009 the Canadian government criticised Russia for flying
bombers too close to Canada’s Arctic airspace (Calgary Herald, 31 March 2009).
The Russian Defence Minister, Anatoliy Serdyukov, responded by saying that
Canada’s harsh tone in relation to Russia ‘is weakening the good relationship
between our two countries by demonising Russia’ (ibid.) It should be noted that
the Canadian government has declared its own intention to establish a military
base in the Northwest Passage area as a way of enhancing its military presence
in the Arctic. In the words of the former Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Lawrence Cannon (2009: 5):

Activity in the Arctic lands and waters is increasing, and so has our capacity
in the North. Our first duty as Canada’s national government is to exercise,
responsibly, Canada’s sovereignty in this region … to further demonstrate
Canada’s sovereignty in the North, and progress on these initiatives is well
underway: the establishment of a Canadian Forces Arctic Training Center in
Resolute Bay; the expansion, currently underway, of the size and capabilities
of the Canadian Rangers; and the development of a deepwater Arctic docking
and refuelling facility in Nanosivik.

At the launch of Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy in August 2010, Cannon’s message was
somewhat less focused on hard security developments and more on Canada’s Arctic
identity and support for multilateralism and global governance (Cannon, 2010: 1-3).
A key idea developed by Cannon is that the Canadian ‘exercise’ of sovereignty in the
Arctic should be combined with ‘good governance’ (2010: 2). Moreover, the AC and
indigenous communities are viewed as central elements in the ‘shaping’ of ‘Canadian
foreign policy on Arctic issues’ (2010: 3). In sum, Canadian Arctic policy is shaped
by a dual commitment to national sovereignty and global concerns regarding the
future prosperity and sustainability of the High North.

Norway
‘The High North’ is one of the key priorities of Norway’s security policy, which is
hardly surprising considering the country’s geographical position and vast oil and
natural gas reserves. The Norwegian government has identified a strong link between
climate change and ‘opportunities to exploit formerly inaccessible resources’ but warns
against extracting such reserves without caution and scientific expertise (Gahr Støre,

46

This content downloaded from

157.39.16.47 on Wed, 27 Nov 2024 03:47:28 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 DIIS REPORT 2011:09

2009: 2). The former Norwegian Minister of Defence, Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen

(2009: 4-5), has argued that these can only be resolved through ‘solid international
cooperation and commitment’. She identified a set of key challenges to security in
the High North, including ‘conflicts of interest’ that could lead to instability in that
region, Russian strategic developments, ‘the Northern Fleet’s continued role in the
Russian nuclear triad and the sheer weight of the Kola military infrastructure’, all
of which ‘are of vital strategic importance to Russia’ (ibid). Furthermore she shed
light on the fact that ‘the Barents Sea continues to be a training ground for military
forces and a test bed for new weapon systems’ (ibid.). However, as we have seen above
and will note again below, Norway and Russia have managed to reach agreement on
their differences over the Barents Sea, which may make some of Norway’s concerns
regarding Russian behaviour abroad redundant.

From a Norwegian perspective, it is crucial that NATO be used as provider of stability

in the Arctic area and that there is a good relationship between the former and other
‘organisations like the Arctic Council, the UN, the International Maritime Organi-
sation (IMO) and the EU’ (ibid.). Furthermore, the official government position
is that specific challenges facing the Arctic should be dealt with through extensive
multilateral cooperation and dialogue across borders, as well as a recognition that the
Arctic is a ‘multicultural and multiethnic mosaic’ (Gahr Støre, 2009: 4).

In 2007 the UN approved Norway’s application to the UN Commission for the

Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) to extend its continental shelf by 235,000
square kilometres from its coast and more importantly giving it a right to claim the
natural resources within that area. This was a ground-breaking victory for Norway,
and has been noted above, in 2010 Russia and Norway found a solution to their
disagreement over the Barents Sea by deciding to divide the Sea into ‘clear economic
zones extending to the edge of Europe’s northern continental shelf ’, thus opening up
for new forms of oil and natural gas exploration (New York Times 27 April 2010). In
the words of the Norwegian Prime Minister, Jens Stoltenberg, ‘this is a confirmation
that Norway and Russia, two large polar nations, do not have a policy about racing,
but a policy about cooperation’ (New York Times 27 April 2010), which sustains the
argument developed here that the Arctic is in the main a story about cooperation
rather than conflict. The decision by the Norwegian and Russian foreign ministers
to publish a joint article sustains this claim further. They argue that ‘the Arctic can
be used to demonstrate just how much peace and collective interests can be served
through the implementation of the international rule of law’ (cited in The Independ-
ent, 23 September 2010).

47

This content downloaded from

157.39.16.47 on Wed, 27 Nov 2024 03:47:28 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 DIIS REPORT 2011:09

Denmark
Denmark’s Arctic policy will be addressed below at some length, so this section
of the report will only address a set of issues in relation to sovereign develop-
ments. The draft version of the forthcoming document, ‘Denmark’s Strategy for
the Arctic 2011-2020’, which was officially launched on the 24th of August 2011,
states that Denmark will approach its sovereign claims in a cooperative and legal
fashion (Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011b: 13). The strategy also confirms
Denmark’s intention to submit an application to the CLCS in 2012 to extend
its continental shelf to include five specific areas, all situated around Greenland
and the Faroe Islands, including part of the North Pole itself (Danish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, 2011b: 14).

In 2007 a group of Danish scientists set off on an Arctic expedition to gather evidence

that would support the claim that the 1,200-mile long Lomonosov Ridge is part of
the Greenland territory. Hence, ‘Danish scientists hope to prove through hi-tech
measurements that Greenland’s continental socket is attached to a huge ridge be-
neath the floating Arctic ice, the Associated Press reports’ (BBC NEWS 5 October
2004a). The Danish Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation has launched
a continental shelf project aiming at gathering, interpreting and documenting data
that will constitute the basis for Denmark’s CLCS application (Danish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, 2011b: 14). In the words of the Associated Press, ‘Denmark plans
to lay claim to parts of the North Pole and other areas in the Arctic, where melting
ice is uncovering new shipping routes, fishing grounds and drilling opportunities
for oil and gas’ (Associated Press, cited in New York Times, 17 May 2011). The
Danish government has confirmed the accuracy of this information with Foreign
Minister Lene Espersen expressing support for the forthcoming application to
the UN , which is also a position shared by the former Social Democratic Foreign
Minister, Mogens Lykketoft (Information 17 May 2011). In short, the majority
view would seem to be that Denmark should exercise its sovereign rights in the
Arctic (ibid.). However, the Greenlandic Premier, Kuupik Kleist, is reportedly
more sceptical, his personal view being that the North Pole does not belong to any
given state, but to humanity at large, which is a somewhat different view from the
more dominant one (ibid.).

Finally, Denmark has an outstanding disagreement with Canada with regard to Hans
Island, a small unpopulated island of 1.3 square metres located between Greenland
and the Ellesmere Islands of Canada. Denmark has planted its national flag on Hans
Island to claim this territory. The dispute remains unresolved, although relations be-

48

This content downloaded from

157.39.16.47 on Wed, 27 Nov 2024 03:47:28 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 DIIS REPORT 2011:09

tween Denmark and Canada are solid in other respects (Danish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs 2011b: 15)

The Illulissat Declaration

So far the sovereign claims of the five coastal states have been outlined. Here I
shall briefly examine the efforts on the part of the five to find a resolution to their
disagreements through the application of international law. In May 2008 an Arctic
Ocean Conference in Illulissat was organised by the Danish Foreign Minister and
the Greenlandic Premier , to which the other four Arctic coastal states were invited,
while the non-coastal states, Finland, Iceland and Sweden were not. The need to reach
a common position on such things as melting ice, the retreat of glaciers, competi-
tion for oil and gas exploitation, sovereign disputes and new sea routes prompted
this initiative. The conference could be seen as a way of ‘marketing Denmark as an
active international actor both generally with respect to peaceful international crisis
management … and concretely with respect to Arctic challenges’ (Petersen, 2009:
56). The meeting led to the joint Ilulissat Declaration (2008: 1-2), which promised
the following:

By virtue of their sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in large areas

of the Arctic Ocean the five coastal states are in a unique position to address
these possibilities and challenges. In this regard, we recall that an extensive
international legal framework applies to the Arctic Ocean as discussed between
our representatives at the meeting in Oslo on 15 and 16 October 2007 at the
level of senior officials. Notably, the law of the sea provides for important
rights and obligations concerning the delineation of the outer limits of the
continental shelf, the protection of the marine environment, including ice-
covered areas, freedom of navigation, marine scientific research, and other uses
of the sea. We remain committed to this legal framework and to the orderly
settlement of any possible overlapping claims.

The Danish Foreign Minister viewed the declaration as a way of dismissing ‘all myths
about a race for the North Pole’ (The Guardian, 29 May 2008). Undoubtedly, an
agreement to abide by international law is a step in the right direction towards Arctic
stability, peace and good governance, even though the Ilulissat declaration has not
been without criticism. More specifically, environmentalists have protested against
what they see as the misconstruction of the use of the law of the sea. In the words of
Mike Townsley, a Greenpeace spokesperson:

49

This content downloaded from

157.39.16.47 on Wed, 27 Nov 2024 03:47:28 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 DIIS REPORT 2011:09

It’s clear what’s going on. They are going to use the law of the sea to carve up
the raw materials, but they are ignoring the law of common sense – these are
the same fossil fuels driving climate change in the first place … The closed door
nature of this is doubly troubling. It’s clear they know what they’re trying to
do is unacceptable. (cited in The Guardian 29 May 2008)

The latter observation refers to the decision to exclude some actors from the Ilulissat
meeting, including, Finland, Iceland and Sweden, environmental NGOs and Inuit
representatives, which could be seen as being inconsistent with the multilateral ethos
of the AC and other circumpolar institutions.

A few summarising reflections

There is an emerging link between climate change and the possibility of geopolitical
instability in the Arctic, but this should not be overstated since there are also many
signs of regional governance and cooperation. Still, there is a general tendency among
the Arctic coastal states to seek the extension of their national territories in the High
North. Too much emphasis on national interests and sovereign gains is, however,
inconsistent with the wider processes of globalisation, ethical foreign policy-mak-
ing and liberal internationalism, all of which advocate the need to think beyond the
nation state and to consider one’s own national interests in relation to those of one’s
partners. Given this, it might be counterproductive to overemphasise the territorial
disputes played out in the Arctic, when there is evidence to suggest that the region is
deeply embedded within multiple governance systems (Lathrop, 2008). For example,
a group of American diplomats and researchers have challenged the commonplace
position that the security situation in the Arctic is ‘heating up’ (Yalowitz, Collins
and Virginia, 2008: 15). In their words ‘security concerns and issues seem not to be
the pressing factor driving Arctic policy … overblown press coverage of Arctic secu-
rity issues appears to be in the inverse relationship to security realities. There are no
large geopolitical fault lines, and no resource wars are anticipated’ (ibid.: 17). This is
a view supported by Holtsmark and Smith-Windsor (2009: 25), who underline the
importance of avoiding ‘alarmism’ in conceptualising Arctic security. In their words,
‘all actors … should be aware of the need to avoid unfounded alarmism in discussions
of High North security issues. All Arctic powers … have expressed their full support
for existing legal regimes and governance structures’ (ibid.). DIIS Senior Researcher
Svend Aage Christensen concurs by arguing that the agreement between Norway
and Russia testifies ‘that there is no risk of … conflicts in the area around the Arctic’
(cited in Norden, 2010: 1, my translation).

50

This content downloaded from

157.39.16.47 on Wed, 27 Nov 2024 03:47:28 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 DIIS REPORT 2011:09

The argument that there is an imminent threat to stability in the Arctic can thus be
challenged on many grounds, not the least because it is inconsistent with the Arctic
states’ images of themselves as law-abiding collaborative actors with a dual commit-
ment to transnational stability in the Arctic and what they see as their national legal
entitlements to the natural riches of the area. The argument pursued here is that
negative media representations can be unnecessarily provocative and damaging to the
stability of the Arctic. As we have seen above, positive developments have taken place,
with Norway and Russia having paved the way to Arctic stability. A three-pronged
approach is proposed here:

1. The Arctic coastal states might wish to re-examine their largely Westphalian
conception of sovereignty in favour of a cosmopolitan approach that is inclusive
and does not rest solely on the rights of the nation state, but on universal entitle-
ments and duties, whereby states have duties to their own citizens and non-citizens
alike. The sovereign disagreements that in part define the Arctic, though not of a
military kind, are inconsistent with the broader ethos of contemporary ethically
inspired foreign and security policies (Chandler, 2003; Dunne and Wheeler,
2001, Dunne, 2008, Bergman and Phythian, 2011, Aggestam, 2008), as well as
the multilateral interests of the Arctic institutions.
2. Abiding by international law should be seen as a universal duty rather than some-
thing that states do to maximise their territorial extent and national interests.
3. It is crucial that national agencies operating in the Arctic – non-military and military
alike – work in tandem with indigenous communities, NGOs and governmental
civilian agencies. The involvement of a wide array of actors helps to ensure that
the Arctic does not experience power political disagreements between the coastal
Arctic states. As Holtsback and Smith-Windsor (2009: 27) have argued, ‘think-
ing about High North security must be guided by a firm intent to avoid a return
to the zero sum chess-board reasoning of the Cold War, which presupposed that
only one winner would be left on the field.’ This position would seem to be both
sensible and also in line with the founding values of the Arctic institutions.

51

This content downloaded from

157.39.16.47 on Wed, 27 Nov 2024 03:47:28 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms