Nelson Mandela and the Process of Reconciliation in South Africa

Author(s): Arvind Kumar Yadav

Source: India Quarterly , October-December, 2007, Vol. 63, No. 4 (October-December,
2007), pp. 49-84
Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.

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 Nelson Mandela and the Process
of Reconciliation in South Africa

Arvind Kumar Yadav*

Reconciliation is very important for democratic South

Africa because its whole communities suffered psychological
and material injuries as a result of the apartheid policy of
White minority regime. The term 'reconcile' means to restore
harmony or friendship; or to settle or resolve differences in
the society. The meaning of the term is traced to Christian
doctrine. The goal of national reconciliation is to restore
peaceful relations as between and among ethnic religious
and/ or political communities that have been in conflict.
National reconciliation is not unlike reconciliation between

individuals that have had a history of mutual hostility.

Through a programme of reconciliation, the source of their
conflict is examined; and the sense of injustice and desire
for vengeance are provided non-violent outlets. Whether a
programme of national reconciliation is successful in creating
an environment for peaceful coexistence can depend upon

* Lecturer, Department of Political Science, Deshbandhu College,

University of Delhi. The author received his Ph. D in African Studies
from the School of International Studies. Jawaharlal Nehru
University, New Delhi.

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Arvind Kumar Yadav

many factors, including the nature of the conflict, the strength

of the state's democratic and legal institutions, the will of
the state's leadership to a commit to a programme of national
reconciliation, and access to the international community's
peace-keeping and dispute resolution mechanisms. National
reconciliation is in large part a spiritual and psychological
process that seeks to encourage moral reflection, and
individual and collective repentance. Recently one of the
most ambitious efforts to promote national reconciliation is
underway in South Africa, which underwent a peaceful
transition from White minority to black majority rule under
the leadership of Nelson Mandela.

Contemporary South Africa is in a transition phase. Its

peaceful transition to democracy through a negotiated
settlement has been hailed as model for countries emerging
from authoritarian rule. An intractable problem facing
transition societies emerging from a dark and authoritarian
past is how to reckon with the legacy of that past. Dealing
with the past human rights violations is indeed a daunting
exercise for any nascent democracy. This challenge is
characterised by conflicting interests end considerations.1 The
nature of South Africa's transition, combined with the
inability of its criminal justice system to deal successfully
with those responsible for human rights violations, made it
necessary to develop a more creative approach to deal with
the past.

In the post-apartheid phase, as far as demographic and social

structure of contemporary South Africa is concerned, 82 per
cent are Black, 12 per cent White, and 2.5 per cent of its
population is of Asian or Indian origin; and rests are coloured
people.2 The total population of South Africa is about 46
million.3 Black people as well as Asians of South Africa were
the main victims of apartheid policy of minority government

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 Nelson Mandela and the Process of Reconciliation in South Africa

in South Africa. Post-apartheid, there are still racial problem

among South Africans. In the words of Earl Grey, "the Black
people are generally looked upon by the whites as an inferior
race, whose interests ought to be systematically disregarded
when they came into competition with their own, and should
be viewed mainly with a view to the advantage of the
superior race".

The repression that underpinned life in South Africa during

apartheid is well known; as is the resistance to it.4 From racial
oppression to torture and massacre to economic deprivation,
the violence suffered by the masses was upheld on economic,
political and judicial terms.5 Following the transition to
democracy, with the inauguration of Nelson Mandela as
president in 1994, South Africa has been faced with the task
of dealing with legacy of apartheid, as well as undertaking
some actions to deal with structural social injustice. The
centrepiece of the new government's reconciliation
programme was the establishment of the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission. The Commission, which has
been directed by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, a well regarded
civil rights activist and clergyman, was established pursuant
to a provision of the country's new constitution that
advocated "National Unity" and "Reconciliation between
the people of South Africa and the Reconstruction of Society".
National legislation gave the Commission broad powers to
investigate and report on crimes committed by all sides
during the apartheid era, including the power to subpoena
witnesses. Independent tribunal was given under specific
circumstances in exchange for unrestricted testimony.

The ability of South Africa to establish legal institutions to

promote national reconciliation is a testament to the strong
legal tradition that was to survive the apartheid era. Not to
be ignored, however, is that Nelson Mandela, who was

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Arvind Kumar Yadav

elected president of South Africa in 1994, W.F. de Klerk (last

president of the minority government) and many others
played important roles in promoting a transition to multi-
racial democracy within a legal framework that would
protect minorities, including the white minority, from
persecutions.

Appropriately therefore, in the following an attempt is made

to delineate and analyse the role of Nelson Mandela in the
process of reconciliation both during the apartheid and post-
apartheid era. A separate section highlights the functioning
and role of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in the

multi-racial, democratic South Africa. The penultimate

section discusses the challenges facing the reconciliation
process in contemporary South Africa; and the final section
presents by way of conclusion the present juncture and future
trajectory of reconciliation process.

Nelson Mandela's Leadership during

the Apartheid Regime
The name of Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela is synonymous with
the liberation struggle and process of reconciliation in South
Africa. It was under the apartheid regime that he had first
begun mooting the ideas of political reconciliation. It was in
1941 when Nelson Mandela, then aged twenty three, arrived
in Johannesburg from his village "Qunu" in search of
liberated life for the oppressed and isolated black majority.
In Johannesburg, Nelson Mandela met Walter Sisulu, several
years older than himself, who worked as a miner, a servant
and a factory worker, and who had educated himself and
had become a fighter against injustice. It was the beginning
of a remarkable friendship between the two. It was Sisulu
who arranged for young Mandela to study law. Meanwhile,
in the teeming black areas of Johannesburg, experiencing

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 Nelson Mandela and the Process of Reconciliation in South Africa

the War-time industrial boom, Mandela learned the facts of

life for urban Africans living under colour bar poverty,
exclusion from skilled work, over-crowded slums and
constant harassment by police under the pass laws.6

It was during his stay at Johannesburg and at the university,

that he felt the agony of racial discrimination and colour bar.
He saw men of his colour fighting for equal rights and
freedom of movement. It was at this time that he dedicated

his life to helping his people in their struggle for a fair deal.7
At the age of twenty-five in 1944, Mandela joined the African
National Congress (ANC), and together with Sisulu, Oliver
Tambo, Anton Lembede and other men and women, helped
to form its Youth League. To the ANC and its new young
recruit, Nelson Mandela, a new deal would only come with
a true form of power sharing; that is, the principle of one
person, one vote.

At the same time, Nelson Mandela was moving in other,

contradictory circles. Despite the restrictions on the social
life of black students at the University, he was meeting the
whites and Asians, whom the Youth League opposed. It was
a process of political learning; many of those he was opposed
to politically had good political ideas. He plunged into the
raging debate about how the majority in apartheid South
Africa could achieve freedom. By 1948, Mandela was a
recognised figure in the Youth League; and he was elected
to the very key position of general secretary. It was this Youth
League which was instrumental in getting the ANC to adopt
a 'Programme of Action' in 1949 which proclaimed that the
main content and the principal vehicle of the struggle against
the racist regime must be "immediate and active boycott,
strike, civil disobedience, non-cooperation and such other
means as they bring about the accomplishment and
realisation of our aspirations"8.

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Arvind Kumar Yadav

In 1948, the Afrikaner Nationalist Government came to

power with its policy of apartheid, under which increasingly
laws were introduced to separate and subjugate the black
population of South Africa. The system of apartheid and
racial discrimination adversely affected every section of the
non-white population in South Africa. It denied them all
those rights which they are, or should be, entitled to as
human beings. In essence, it was based on principles of gross
inequality and oppression. For instance, in 1950, the Group
Areas Act and the Population Act laid the foundation of
apartheid. These laws helped the Nationalist Government
to control non-whites in South Africa. The Group Areas Act
forced African who did not work for white to move to

segregated "homelands". Here, they lived in even greater

poverty than before. By 1980s, over 3.5 million non-whites
had been forced to relocate to segregated "homelands". The
Population Registration Act forced every one to register with
the government according to race. Under prime minister D.F.
Malan, the races were divided into at least fourteen different
groups. Family member were some times put in different
racial classifications, depending on how light or dark skinned
they were. Mixed marriages were outlawed. Black trade
unions were banned. Education was limited to "Bantu

Education", which ruled that teaching science and

mathematics to non-white was forbidden. The ruling
Nationalist Party refused to give a permit for higher
education unless the student promised to follow the rules of
apartheid and cleared government background. Many jobs
were classified for whites only. By 1950, any one who
disagreed with apartheid could be "listed" as communist
and banned. Banning orders could limit a person to a certain
town. Those listed as 'communists', both black and white,
were not allowed to attend public meetings. Apartheid called

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 Nelson Mandela and the Process of Reconciliation in South Africa

for the complete economic, educational and social

domination of whites over black.9

The ANC along with Indian Congress and other allies carried
its struggle against apartheid further in 1951 when it
embarked upon a massive campaign of defiance of apartheid
laws. Mandela was appointed national Volunteer-in-Chief;
his experience of working with other races had changed his
political outlook, broadening his hitherto rather narrow
nationalism. In a great surge of protest against selected unjust
laws, about 8,500 of its volunteers were jailed.10 Nelson
Mandela, along with other 20 leaders, was charged and
convicted at the end of 1952 for organising the Defiance
Campaigns. His contribution had been so impressive that
he was elected president of the Youth League. In the same
year, Mandela became president of the powerful Transvaal
Province, which had Johannesburg as its headquarters. At
national level, he was one of the four deputy presidents. In
response to his rising popularity, the white minority
government issued him on 11 December 1952 with a banning
order, prohibiting him from attending political gatherings
and confining him to Johannesburg. Other leaders were also
simultaneously banned. After some time, Mandela and
Oliver Tambo had set up legal practice in Johannesburg. Even
there, they were harassed; ordered to move their office to
the black location where they lived.

In 1955, the ANC called for 50,000 volunteers from all sections
of the South African society to go among the people and
collect "freedom demands" which were to be incorporated
into a common programme for South Africa. Mandela
supported this idea of ANC. These demands were later
incorporated into the Freedom Charter adopted by the ANC
on 26 June of the same year at its Congress held in Kliptown.
The Freedom Charter was later adopted in their national

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Arvind Kumar Yadav

conference by the South African Indian Congress, the

coloured people organisation, the South African Congress
of Trade Union and the Congress of Democrats. Thus
Freedom Charter became the common programme
enshrining the hopes and aspirations of all the progressive
people of South Africa. For the first time, the movement set
out the simple objectives for a future South Africa. The
charter read: "South Africa belongs to all who live in it black
and white". This showed that the ANC had accepted that
people who have made South Africa their home and have
helped to build its economy all are components of its
multinational population.
Mandela was certain that the ANC could not survive in that

form because the frequent police harassment would make it

impossible for it to continue long as a legal entity. He also
knew that the government would sooner or later ban it,
accusing it to be 'communist'. He was also aware that his
organisation was riddled with spies of the white regime
because all their secret activities were known to the security
forces before they were executed. Mandela drafted the "M
Plan", a simple commonsense plan for organisation on a
street basis so that ANC volunteers would be in daily touch
with the people, alert to their needs and able to mobilise
them. The proposal was accepted and was discussed at all
local, regional and national levels. It was first implemented
in 1953, immediately after the banning of the ANC.11 This
was most successful method of decentralising and
strengthening ANC organisation.

The white minority government was not slow to react against

the growing unity and militancy of the black people. Nelson
Mandela was among the 156 people, which included Chief
Lutuli, president-general of the ANC, Prof. Z.K. Mathews,
Oliver Tambo and Walter Sisulu, arrested on trumped up

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 Nelson Mandela and the Process of Reconciliation in South Africa

charges. In the famous Treason Trial, the essence of the case,

as the state put it, was the argument that the liberation
struggle was part of an 'international communist-inspired'
effort pledged to overthrow the government by violence.
Four and a half years were spent trying to prove this case.
The Programme of Action and Freedom Charter were key
documents presented as evidence. Nelson Mandela's
evidence partly reproduced in the court and his conduct
made a singular contribution. On the judgement day, the
court found the ANC and its allies working "to replace the
present form of state with a radically and fundamentally
different form of state". However, the charge of using violent
means had not been proved, nor was there proof that the
ANC had been infiltrated by 'International Communism'.
As a result, all the remaining accused were acquitted in 1961.

By 1960, virtually every anti-apartheid African leader was

muzzled and restricted by government decrees. They had
no right to organise the movement against the government.
In 1960, there were the anti-pass protests, called by the break-
away Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC). The peaceful gathering
at Sharpeville was machine gunned, killing 69 and wounding
176 persons. In response, the ANC called for a national
protest strike. The country answered that call. The ANC was
declared illegal, together with the PAC. During the five
month-long state of emergency, virtually every known
congressman was imprisoned. During the emergency, and
immediately thereafter, the ANC remained underground.
Some 2000 of its activists including Mandela was put behind
bars. It was then that Mandela's 'M Plan' came into its own.

Over the following months those detained were gradually

released, with Nelson Mandela himself coming out of jail in
1961. He was free to speak and organise again after some
nine months. It is to be noted that ANC under the guidance

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Arvind Kumar Yadav

of Nelson Mandela was not to give up the path of non-

violence, despite the Sharpeville tragedy.12

In May 1961, South Africa was declared a White Boer

Republic. There was a White referendum; and no Black
African was consulted. The African people decided to find
ways to register their opposition. A general strike would be
the answer. The strike was called in the name of Nelson

Mandela. From all over the country, African delegates, 1,400

of them, came together to confer at the specially convened
All-in African Conference at Pietermaritzburg. Unexpectedly
Mandela appeared to deliver the main speech. The effect on
delegates hearing Mandela's voice once more was electric.
People of South Africa elected him to lead their protests and
demanded for a truly representative National Convention
to establish not a white republic but a Union of all South
Africans. National Action Council was formed with Mandela

as its secretary. He left his home, his wife and children, to

live the life of a political outlaw. Here, thus began the legend
of the 'Black Pimpernel'. He lived in hiding, meeting only
his closest political associates, travelling around the country
in disguise, popping up here to lead and advise, disappearing
when the hunt became too hot.13 It should be clarified here

that the reason why the ANC opposed South Africa

becoming a White Boer Republic was that 70 per cent of the
population was without the right to franchise. The ANC
rightly thought that such a state was not entitled to call itself
a Republic.

Nelson Mandela's survival underground had an immensely

exhilarating effect on his people as police failed to capture
him. Then, early in 1962, he made a surprise appearance at a
Pan-African Conference in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. South
Africa, he told the continental delegates, "is a country torn
from top to bottom by fierce racial strife and conflict and

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 Nelson Mandela and the Process of Reconciliation in South Africa

where the blood of African patriots frequently flow. ... It is a

land ruled by the gun".14 He went on to visit heads of state
in various parts of Africa, met political leaders in London
and in Algeria, and took a course in military training. "For
the first time in my life, I was a free man", he said later.15 He
returned secretly to South Africa. On 5 August 1962,
seventeen months from the time that he had gone
underground. Soon, he was captured in Natal, apparently
on a tip-off by an informer. He was taken to the court and
charged with inciting Africans to strike in 1961 and with
leaving the country without valid travel documents. He was
sentenced in November to five year's hard labour.
Subsequently, the liberation struggle suffered a severe set
back in July the following year when Walter Sisulu and other
underground leaders were also arrested at Liliesleaf Farm
in Rivonia, an outlying suburb of Johannesburg. When the
Rivonia Trial opened in Pretoria on 9 October 1963, Nelson
Mandela was brought from prison to be with them. He was
Accused Number 1 and Walter Sisulu was Accused Number

2. Sisulu later declared in evidence that he was asked to testify

against his fellows, or give information confidentially under
threat of the death penalty.

During the trial, the state, after initially alleging 222 acts of
sabotage against Umkonto, reduced the number to 199, only
to have its indictment quashed at the request of the defence,
led by Abram Fischer, Q.C. Under the final indictment, the
accused were alleged to have recruited men for training with
the object of causing a violent revolution and assisting units
of foreign countries.16

The trial again focused the attention of the outside world on

developments in South Africa. The UN General Assembly
voted 106 to 1 in a resolution expressing its anxiety about
the safety and well-being of Mandela, Sisulu and others. The

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Arvind Kumar Yadav

international support had been partly achieved through the

lobbying of Oliver Tambo. Most white South Africans might
have seen the Rivonia accused as conspirators, the outside
world saw them as men driven to an extremity yet who even
then tried to act with restraint in the struggle for the birthright
of the African people. That almost all the whites named as
accused or co-conspirators of Umkonto were communists
on the whole is regarded as somewhat unfortunate but an
understandable factor emerging from South Africa's history
and policies of racial segregation and oppression.

In 1964, Mandela gave a statement to the court. In his

statement from the dock at the Rivonia Trial, he set out the
reasons which led him to do what he did; the lengths to which
the ANC had gone to avoid violence since its inception in
1912 and the repressive policies upholding apartheid which,
he argued, had finally forced upon them to a reactive
violence. He told the court that when the ANC had been

declared an unlawful organisation, it had refused to dissolve

and had gone underground. It was only after that, in June
1961, that he had come to conclusion that violence was
inevitable and that it would be unrealistic and wrong for
African leader to continue with a policy of non-violence
when the government had met ANC demands with violence.
Thereafter, it was decided that the ANC would no longer
disapprove of properly controlled sabotage, by which means
the economy would be damaged and international attention
attracted. He told the court that he remains deprived of his
liberty because he is not prepared to disavow that decision.
As he himself put it "I am in prison as the representative of
the people and the African National Congress, which was
banned". Further, in the life of a nation, Mandela pointed
out, "the times comes. . .when there remain only two choices
submit or fight. That time has now come to South Africa. . .."

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 Nelson Mandela and the Process of Reconciliation in South Africa

Umkonto, by its policy of controlled sabotage, hoped to bring

the government and its supporters to their senses before it
was too late. It hoped also to affect foreign trade. As for the
decision to send men out for military training, this had been
necessary so that a nucleus of trained men would be available
for guerrilla warfare started. He had some training while
briefly in Algeria as he wanted to be side by side with his
people. He spoke of the creed of the ANC being one of
African nationalism - a concept of freedom and fulfilment
for the African people in their own land but not of driving
whites into sea. "Our fight is basically against poverty and
lack of human dignity," he stated.17

Finally, on 11 June, 1964, judge de Wet gave his verdict.

Mandela was the prime mover in founding the Umkonto to
perform sabotage. The defence contention was accepted that
the leaders gave instructions that care should be exercised
that no person was injured or killed but they should have
contemplated that the saboteurs 'would probably get out of
hand'. The defence had conceded that more than 300 men

had left for military training outside the country. Walter

Sisulu's denial of membership of Umkonto was
unimpressive. On 12 June 1964, the court pronounced
sentences. At the conclusion of the trial, Mandela and seven
others - Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki, Raymond Mhlaba,
Elias Motsoaledi, Andrew Mlangeni, Aimed Kathrada,
Dennis Goldberg - were convicted. Mandela was found
guilty on four charges of sabotage and like others was
sentenced to life imprisonment. On 13 June 1964, Nelson
Mandela, Walter Sisulu and the other none-whites were sent
to Robben Island maximum security prison. Mandela's
testimony before the court was not only a brilliant attack on
apartheid, but an eloquent affirmation of a democratic non-
racist ideal.18 They did not appeal against their conviction;

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those who were leaders because they accepted full

responsibility for their acts, the others because they felt even
if they succeeded, they would be immediately detained.

Why did Mandela chose the path of violence? He was a

follower of Gandhian tactics of non violence. Mahatma

Gandhi had used the path of non-violence and satyagraha

during the twenty-one years he spent in South Africa. The
ANC, when it was formed in 1912, at first adopted Gandhi's
methods but South Africa was to be one of the countries

where police tactics were so repressive that the tactics of non-

violence failed. In the words of Mandela:

India, Gandhi had been dealing with a foreign

power that ultimately was more realistic and
fore-sighted. That was not the case with the
Afrikanes in South Africa. Non-violent

passive resistance is effective as long as your

opposition adheres to the same rules as you
do. But if peaceful prospect is met with
violence, its efficacy is at an end. For me, non-
violence was not a moral principle but a
strategy; there is no moral goodness in using
an ineffective weapon. But my thoughts on
this matter were not formed, and I had spoken
too soon.19

However, Mandela was a nationalist, not a communist. He

also took care to emphasise his desire for reconciliation across
the divided of colour. He described himself as a deeply
committed South African nationalist; but added that South
African nationalists belonged to various races and colour.
There were white people; and coloured people and Indian
diaspora who were also deeply committed South African
nationalists. He pledged himself now to work for a multi-
racial society in which all would have a secure place.

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 Nelson Mandela and the Process of Reconciliation in South Africa

From 1964 to 1990, South Africa had been rocked with

incredible violence in the black townships. The combatants
were mostly young people belonging to different political
parties. The worst violence occurred in Kawazulu-Natal, the
battle-ground of the most intense struggle between
Mandela's ANC and Buthelezi's Inkatha Freedom Party
(IFP). Buthelezi had formed Inkatha years earlier to ensure
that the Zulu people, a proud people with a rich history of
valiant nationalist resistance against white imperialism, were
given a prominent role in any post-apartheid dispensation.
He had played his cards well, serving as leader of a black
tribal homeland (kwa-zula) while on the pay-roll of the white
minority government, refusing to accept independence, and
insisting on Mandela's release from prison as a condition
for meaningful negotiations between the white leaders and
the black leaders.20

Most international observer knew that eventually the

apartheid system would collapse, but they did not expect it
to crumble when it did. It had gone on too long and had
enjoyed the tacit support of the western world at least
through trade and arms sales. As the campaign against
apartheid spread world-wide, the white power structure
resisted even more ferociously, conducting a reign of terror
on the ANC and the rival PAC in the neighbouring states
where these movements maintained their sanctuaries. As

change appeared on the horizon, most observers' fears

turned to the probability of a very bloody transition.
Attitudes had hardened on both sides of racial divide.

Apartheid had been a brutal system, maintained brutally

and justified on both political and (ideological) grounds. The
African struggle for freedom had been demonised as part of
a worldwide communist conspiracy intent on taking over
South Africa and enslaving the Christian, God-fearing, white

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Arvind Kumar Yadav

South Africans. Many of the people who killed and tortured

on behalf of the white minority government did not believe
they were doing anything wrong. A culture of violence had
been entrenched; indeed, violence had escalated from the
late 1980s and was at its peak from the time Mandela was
released from Robben Island prison in 1990 to shortly before
the elections in April 1994. The apartheid policy of white
minority government had been abolished in 1990. Mandela
became the first black president of South Africa in 1994. It
was suspected then that the violence between the ANC and
IFP was being instigated and financed by the white minority
government. Several investigatory commissions confirmed
suspicions that the white minority government had fomented
violence and mayhem in black townships in order to
convince the world that Africans were unfit and could not

be trusted to govern the country. It was hoped that the

violence would scare the African masses into withholding
their support from the nationalist groups. As the struggle
increased in intensity and international condemnation of
apartheid grew louder, groups of whites, principally the
descendants of the Dutch, German, and French immigrants,
realised that if a lasting and viable solution to the South
African conflict was to be achieved, both groups would have
to be accommodated in the new order.21

Mandela and the Process of Reconciliation in the Post-

Apartheid Era
As for the role of Nelson Mandela in the post apartheid
phase, it has been crucial in the process of reconciliation.
For most of the 27 years that he was in Robben Island jail, he
must have been thinking how the country would survive
this awful tradition of racial hate and bitterness. He raised
the issue of reconciliation soon after he was released, but
the issue was not seriously considered by the ANC. Many

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 Nelson Mandela and the Process of Reconciliation in South Africa

leaders felt that black people had been wronged so much

that it would a betrayal of their hard-won freedom to talk
about reconciliation. Life of Nelson Mandela itself shows that

it should not have come as a surprise for him to think of

reconciliation. There are several reasons for making this
inference.

Firstly, even though Mandela was in jail, he kept himself

abreast of political developments in African countries
through visits from his family and political figures,
particularly during the latter years of his incarceration. He
knew that many African countries had been wrecked with
internecine conflicts following independence. He was certain
that failure to reconcile the many races and ethnic groups in
South Africa would tear the country apart and nullify any
gains of independence.

Secondly, at his inauguration as the first African black

president of South Africa, the first thing he did was to walk
across the hall and embrace Chief Buthelezi, a man whom
many observers considered his political arch-enemy and one
who had done so much to obstruct a negotiated settlement
with the white minority government and caused so much
bloodshed. The gesture set the stage for Mandela's latter
reconciliation efforts.

Thirdly, both before and after the transition to democracy,

Mandela travelled all over the country meeting South
Africans. The Afrikaans-speaking whites were so fearful of
their position in the post-apartheid era that they kept
demanding their own homeland. Mandela did not dismiss
their demands outright. He told them that he understood
their fear about the future and assured by promising to set
up a commission to explore the issue following the transfer
of power. He kept his word. The interim constitution upon

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Arvind Kumar Yadav

which Mandela's government was based provided for a

commission to examine the feasibility of a white homeland.
No one in South Africa or abroad, except perhaps the
members of conservative groups such as freedom front,
thought there was even the remotest chance that such an
idea might be implemented.

Lastly, Mandela's first cabinet is illustrative of how

determined he was to convey to the white community that
they had nothing to fear. Of the 23 politicians who served in
the cabinet of the last president, F.W. de Klerk, four of them
retired, 15 were re-elected to the first parliament of a free
South Africa. One, a former law-and-order minister in de
Klerk's cabinet, was elected premier of the Western Cape
province (the only province won by de Klerk's National
Party); and three others ended up as ministers in the new
provincial governments. Furthermore, of the 15 who were
re-elected to the national parliament, six of them were
retained in Mandela's first cabinet. De Klerk himself became
one of the two deputy presidents, the other one being Thabo
Mbeki who succeeded Mandela to the presidency in 1999.
Retirement packages for member of the previous government
were extremely generous. This was a clear departure in
Africa, where those who lose an election lose everything.
The accent of the government of national unity was clearly
on reconciliation.

Formation of the Truth and Reconciliation

Commission (TRC)
In the post-apartheid phase, the South African government
under the leadership of Nelson Mandela was confronted with
the necessity of dealing with the atrocities that had happened.
It was convinced that the past could not just be done away
with, and the truth behind the apartheid regime had to be

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 Nelson Mandela and the Process of Reconciliation in South Africa

faced. Already, during the negotiation talks preceding the

1994 election, the ANC and NP had discussed the possibilities
available to confront the past. The NP favoured blanket
amnesty for the perpetrators of apartheid, but amnesty was
unacceptable to ANC, some members of which wanted
criminal trials to prosecute perpetrators. The NP could not
agree on this solution, nor could the nation's military leaders,
who still had a huge amount of power during the transition
period. The final, solution was to set up a Truth
Commissions; both parties had to give in a little, but in return
each agreed to work with the other in building a new and
peaceful future for South Africa.22

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission was established

on 15 December 1995, following the passage of the promotion

of National Unity and Reconciliation Act. No. 34 of 1995. Its
mandate, as set forth in the act, was ambitious; its objectives
were to promote national unity and reconciliation in a spirit
of understanding which transcends the conflicts and
divisions of the past by:

■ Establishing as complete a picture as possible of the

cause, nature and extent of the gross violations of human
rights which were committed during the period from
the 1st of March 1960 to the 5th of December 1994.

■ Facilitating the granting of amnesty to persons who

make full disclosure of all the relevant facts relating to
acts associated with a political objective and comply with
the requirement of this act.

■ Establishing and making known the fate or whereabouts

of victims and restoring the human and civil dignity of
such victims by granting them an opportunity to relate
their own accounts of the violations, of which they are

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Arvind Kumar Yadav

the victims, and by recommending operation measures

in respect of them.

■ Compiling a report providing as comprehensive an

account as possible of the activities and findings of the
commission contemplated in paragraph (a), (b) and (c)
and which contains recommendations of measures to

prevent the future violations of human rights.23

Crucial for the success of the Commission was the choice of

the commissioners. The selection procedure was democratic

and transparent, as the South African people themselves
were allowed to suggest candidates. A list of 300 people was
established, and members of the government and civil society
reduced this list to twenty-five. Finally, president Nelson
Mandela, in consultation with his cabinet, chose fifteen
commissioners from the list. To increase the representative
nature of the Commission, two additional commissioners
were added.24 Winner of Nobel Prize for peace, Archbishop
Desmond Tutu of South Africa, became Chairman of the
TRC, and his Vice-Chairman was the Methodist minister
Alex Boraine. The Commission was given 18 months to
complete its work and submit a report; later, the time was
expended to another six months. The TRC received an
impressive budget of 196 million rand; and its staff consisted
of 400 researcher and administrative personnel.

To assist in meeting these objectives, the legislation

established three committees within the TRC: the Human

Right Violations Committee (HRVC); the Amnesty

Committee; and the Committee on Reparation and
Rehabilitation. The TRC also had its own investigative unit
and witness protection programme.

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 Nelson Mandela and the Process of Reconciliation in South Africa

Human Rights Violations Committee (HRVC)

The HRVC is generally considered the most successful of
the committees. The HRVC was to investigate abuses which
occurred between March 1960 and May 1994. Why the TRC
chose such a long 34 years? Apartheid existed de jure since
1948; and de facto really from 1910 when Britain laid the
foundation for apartheid by granting political independence
to the local whites under terms which excluded Africans from

any share of power in South Africa. The year 1960 marks a

time when organised African political groups were legally
banned from the country and driven under-ground or into
exile. It also marks the beginning of the process of systematic
destruction of black political leadership within the country
opposed to apartheid and the speeding up of the process of
balkanising the country into tribal homelands on 13 per cent
of the territory. The goal was to create South Africa in which
whites constituted the majority and blacks were considered
"temporary sojourners" in the white country as workers. It
was the year that the white government made it clear that it
would not engage in dialogue with organised black groups.
HRVC's primary function was to gather information so as
to present as complete a picture as possible of past human
rights abuse. The committee had to find whether each
deponent should officially be declared a victim according to
the definition contained within the TRC act.25 The committee

invited victims of human right abuses to make statements

about their sufferings under apartheid. The statements were
then verified, corroborated, and the committee selected
which victims would be allowed to tell his or her story in
public. Public hearings started on 15 April 1996, and they
lasted for about two years. The committee provided a
platform for thousands of victims to talk about their
experience. Name and relevant information of the victims
were then forwarded to the Reparation and Rehabilitation.

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Arvind Kumar Yadav

Amnesty Committee
The aim of Amnesty Committee was to grant amnesty to
apartheid perpetrators, but under strict conditions; the crime
had to have been committed between 1960 and 1994; there
had to have been a political motive; and the perpetrator had
to disclose the full truth about the crime. The Amnesty
Committee included member from the TRC and the legal
applications. To qualify for amnesty, two basic preconditions
needed to be satisfied: the person's crime had to meet the
definition of acts associated with a political objective as
contained in the TRC Act; and the person had to provide
full disclosure of the act for which amnesty was sought.26
The TRC act specified several categories of people who might
apply for amnesty including members of political
organisations, liberation movements and members of state
security forces. It was further required that these protagonists
were engaged in a struggle against the state or a "former
state"27 or countered such acts of resistance.

Once a person was eligible for amnesty, the committee had

to consider the persons' motive as well as the nature and
context of the act. The TRC Act specifies that any person
who acted for personal gain would not qualify for amnesty,
except if that person received money or anything of value
for being an informer. Furthermore, a person who had
committed a crime motivated by personal malice, ill will or
spite was not granted amnesty. If the crime was a gross
violation of human rights, the amnesty committee had to
conduct a public hearing before granting amnesty.28

The amnesty committee received almost 7,200 applications,

but the vast majority were turned down. The granting of
amnesty was controversial, as it acquitted perpetrators from
further legal or civil prosecution. The TRC claimed that

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 Nelson Mandela and the Process of Reconciliation in South Africa

without this provision of amnesty, the perpetrators would

never have come forward, and they would never have
revealed the truth about their crimes.29

Reparations and Rehabilitation Committee

The main task of the committee on reparation and
rehabilitation was to evaluate the statement and applications
provided by the Human Rights Violation Committee and
the Amnesty Committee. Based on this material, it had to
formulate recommendations to compensate the victims. The
committee confronted major difficulties, because which
victims deserved compensation, and what the compensation
would consist of were not obvious. From the start, it was
clear that individual compensations would be difficult, as
the TRC did not have enough financial means. Therefore,
the committee recommended symbolic and collective
reparations, including memorials, monuments, and
collective improvements with regard to education or
infrastructure. The committee's recommendations were

supposed to be accomplished by the government, but the

huge expectations of the people have so far remained
unfulfilled.

Report of the Commission

Finally, on 29 October 1998, the chairperson of the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, Archbishop Desmond Tutu
submitted a final report to the president, Nelson Mandela.30
The Human Rights Violation Committee finished its work
in June 1998. On the basis of its findings, it presented an
interim report to president Mandela in October 1998. The
proceedings of the Amnesty Committee continued well into
2001, due to the overwhelming number of amnesty
applications. The TRC's final report was expected in the
winter of 200231 but was released only on 23 March 2003.

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Arvind Kumar Yadav

The Commission produced five massive volumes of

testimony of unspeakable suffering and depravity. As
Archbishop Desmond Tutu himself said: "We thought we
knew the extent of evil. . .in the dark days of oppression and
injustice. We have however, almost been overwhelmed by
depth of depravity and the ghastliness of it all in listening to
the harrowing stories of victims and survivors"32. Using
scholars and experts, the Commission has compiled a
tremendous amount of information on the racial history of
South Africa, going back to the first contact between the
white people and the indigenous people found in South
Africa.

The five-volume report details the nature and extent of gross

human rights violations that South Africa suffered from 1960
until 1994. The release of the report was preceded by disquiet
especially from political parties. The ruling ANC
unsuccessfully sought an indirect way to block the release
of the final report. The ANC argued that it fought a legitimate
war against a pariah state, so branded by the international
community for committing crimes against humanity and
therefore could not be on par legally and morally with the
apartheid state. However, the ANC lost the case against the
TRC. The former president F.W. de Klerk, successfully
sought an indirect from the High Court to instruct the
Commission to remove those sections of the report making
him an accessory after the facts to the bombing of Khosto
House in 1989.33

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission report detailed

the role played by the apartheid government through a
plethora of laws aimed at maintaining the policy of
apartheid. Although the Commission found that liberation
struggle such as the ANC, UDF and the PAC were also
responsible for gross human rights violations, the

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 Nelson Mandela and the Process of Reconciliation in South Africa

preponderance of responsibility rests with the apartheid

government and its agencies.34 For instance, the Commission
found that the IFP leader, Mangusothn Buthelezi,
collaborated with the apartheid government to attack
political opponents such as ANC and UDF; the former state
president P.W. Botha, was held responsible for bombing of
Khosto House; the apartheid government was held
responsible for destabilising neighbouring countries such
Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland
and the issue of Mrs. Winnie Madikizela-Mandela, who was
directly in control of the Mandela United Football Club which
branded those opposed to its activities and killed them, was
never dealt with by the ANC leadership. The Commission
had identified 213,000 victims. Its Amnesty Committee has
already granted 150 amnesties. The Commission has made
various recommendations, the most notable of which was
that political organisations implicated in gross violations on
human rights apologise to their victims or next of the kin.35
The Commission acknowledge that there was a need to
transform institutions such the health sector, security forces
and judiciary in order to create a culture of human rights.
On the economic front, public and private sectors need to be
transformed in order to alleviate economic disparity through
special funds. There should a special mechanism to improve
the economic condition of South Africa people because blacks
were under miserable condition in the apartheid regime.

Further, the Commission did not recommend lustration or

purging, procedure which was adopted by some European
countries like Czech Republic and Germany to bar people
implicated in human rights violations from public office. The
Commission concluded that such measures would be

inappropriate in South African situation, but did not expl

why this was so. In the context of perpetrators who refu

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Arvind Kumar Yadav

to apply for amnesty, the TRC recommended that National

Director of Public Prosecution should investigate and
prosecute them. Political leaders who were responsible for
human rights violation have not applied for amnesty. Any
attempt to prosecute them might result in a cycle of violence
and killings in their constituencies. Most of the leaders were
strong and popular in their constituencies. So prosecution
creates serious difficulties. The personal view of victims and
perpetrators alike was that reconciliation in the new South
Africa was not possible without forgiveness. The
Commission found the notion of reconciliation inextricably
linked to the African concept of Unbuntu and restorative
justice.36 In order for reconciliation to become a reality in
South Africa the Commission recommended that the

president of the country called a national conference o

reconciliation. The main objective of the conference would
be to facilitate the reconciliation process in contemporary
South African society.

According to the report of the Commission, the apartheid

policy was crime against humanity. The Commission ha
concluded that the victims of apartheid were not one race
and perpetrators of cruelty of the system another race. Eve
the world saw the people of South Africa in rather simplist
terms. Whites were oppressors and blacks were the victim
No one knew exactly where to place the other two groups
mixed race and Indians. In the preliminary report of th
Commission, Desmond Tutu said:

We have, at the same time, been humbled and moved by th

incredible nobility and generosity of sprit seen in the hearing.
People who have under gone untold suffering are willing
forgive. They refused to be embittered, being imbued wit
the sprit of 'unbuntu. Unbuntu is an African philosophy o
shared humanity, a philosophy that says 'I am human

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 Nelson Mandela and the Process of Reconciliation in South Africa

because you are. I enjoy my humanity because I honour,

affirm and defend your humanity; and that so long as your
humanity is violated, my humanity is diminished as well'.

After the demise of apartheid, amnesty was a difficult issue

in the democratic South Africa. Prosecution for those

responsible for gross human rights violations threatened a

peaceful transition to democratic rule. A compromise had
to made between the international demand for prosecution
of perpetrators of gross human rights violations and the
national appeal for peaceful transition, reconciliation and
social justice.

Challenges for Reconciliation in South Africa

Though, TRC was established for compromise between
whites and black community, basically main purpose of the
non-racial government was to maintain friendly relations
among all sections of society in post-apartheid South Africa.
Once the Truth and Reconciliation Commission drew to a

close, people started doubting the value of the whole process.

With little governmental concern to fulfil its promise of
reparational assistance for those directly victimised, broader
societal transformation that challenges inequalities became
a distant possibility. Scholar like Grybill argued that the
Commission had been worthwhile for the victims who had

testified, but the majority of apartheid survivors had not

benefited at all. Many saw the apartheid perpetrators as the
main beneficiaries: some of them had come forward and been

humiliated in public, but the majority had run the risk of

keeping quiet. The idea of the TRC process was that
perpetrators who did not come forward would be
prosecuted, but in reality the government did not take much
initiative with regard to further prosecutions.37 As a
dominant group during apartheid, they have not

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Arvind Kumar Yadav

acknowledged the links between violations and institutional

practices or structural conditions. Given this stance, they
have not pushed for change in the powerful worlds they
occupy; and such lack of action has been unchallenged by
the new ruling elite. Thus, the new 'petty bourgeois' have
also compromised opportunities for societal transformations,
making little attempt to radically alter forms official policy-
making.38

Truly speaking, those who experienced the day to day

brutality of apartheid do not disregard the connection
between personal experience and political policies so lightly.
The pass laws, curfews, forced removals, low wages, poor
living conditions and limited education have long-term
effects. As a result of the TRC's limited remit to examine

individual violation, these lasting forms of discrimination

and inequality were not readily emphasised in commission
hearings, but were neutralised in the collection of truth.

South African women played an important role in the

liberation struggle. The history of women's oppression is
worth noting not only for historical purposes but as a guide
for how to asses the TRCs treatment of women. Millions of

ordinary people, especially women, who suffered from the

structural violence of apartheid but who were not victims
under this narrow definition will not rec&ive any
compensation.39 Women's rights were violated. It was not
deeply examined by the Commission. This has raised
questions about the gendered truthfulness of the apartheid
history told through the report. Further, with women's
stories being negated and normalised, the patriarchal state
that has sustained inequality, powerlessness..and the
escalating 'continuum of violence' against women will not
be broken. In developmental terms, decisions for Societal

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 Nelson Mandela and the Process of Reconciliation in South Africa

transformation cannot ignore the gendered experience of

conflict and violence.

The report of the Amnesty Committee was also challenged.

For instance, in some cases involving 'necklace' murders and
mob violence, amnesty was granted on the basis of the
implied authority of political parties; yet in others, such as
the assassination of ANC and SACP leader Chris Hani by
two white right wingers, no political authority was found to
exist and therefore amnesty was refused. In some cases,
amnesty was refused on the grounds that money was paid
to the assassin of political opponents suggesting financial
motives that were personal, whilst in other cases it was held
that financial bonuses paid to state agents for their acts of
violence did not supersede their political motives.

Perhaps the most important contradiction that played itself

out in the findings of the Amnesty Committee was over the
question of racism as political motive for gross violations of
human rights. In some instances, racial motivation was
deemed to be "political" or in the name of a known political
organisation, whilst in others it was not resulting in some
being granted amnesty for such actions, whilst others were
denied it. The issue here is not whether the individual

findings were "fair" or not, but rather to pint out that in

"privileging" acts of political violence, the ironic effects was
in fact to denigrate and mask such issues as race, class, gender
as relevant and self-explanatory categories in understanding
the dominant pattern and experiences of gross violence
under apartheid.

During the first year of TRC's operation, the consequences

of amnesty were legally challenged as an unconstitutional
infringement of victims rights.40 This challenge was rejected
by the constitutional court which justified amnesty by

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Arvind Kumar Yadav

arguing that state indemnity was necessary to achieve the

objectives contained in the promotion of National Unity and
Reconciliation Act and the Interim Constitution, despite the
potential for re- victimisation of individual victims and /or
their families. The Court emphasised that the immunity
awarded to the state did not serve the same cardinal purpose
as that awarded to individual. In the latter case, amnesty
was essential in order to encourage perpetrators to reveal
the truth about past atrocities. These amnesties to
individuals, including the indemnity of organisations and
persons in respect of potentially massive claims for damages
based on vicarious liability, was necessary. Furthermore, it
was to allow both victims and culprits to cross the 'historic
bridge' to which the Interim Constitution referred. Without
the agreement of those victimised by abuse and those
threatened by the transition to a democratic society, the
erection of the 'historic bridge' would never have begun,
stated the then deputy president of the Constitutional Court
Justice Ismail Mohamed, in his landmark judgment.41

According to Rick de Satge, the tension between individual

and social/ national separation, which underlines the work
of the TRC and the whole reconstruction of South Africa,
arises from the limited separation and rehabilitation on offer
to the victims. Such an arrangement not only precludes the
criminal prosecution of (certain) individual wrongdoers, but
also deprives victims and their families of the state to make
good on losses suffered as a consequence of the crimes and
derelicts committed by employees of the state. Since racial
tensions and material inequalities did not seem to have
changed since. 1994, many people remained unconvinced that
the TRC had been valuable mechanism.42

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 Nelson Mandela and the Process of Reconciliation in South Africa

Conclusion

No gainsaying, Nelson Mandela played an important role

to eradicate racial discrimination in South Africa. He always
tried to develop the idea of reconciliation among various
sections of the South African society. From 1944 to 1964, he
organised the black people to fight against apartheid policy
of the minority government. He was the tallest leader of the
ANC. It was Nelson Mandela who had organised the South
African Youth League wing of ANC to fight against
apartheid system. His role in the management of Defiance
Campaign of 1952 and leadership of Umkhonto We Sizwe
(Spear of the Nation), for which he received life
imprisonment, together with the manner in which he carried
out the struggle, made him as a legend in his own life time.
Mandela's sole aim was to achieve a transition of state power
from whites to blacks. He started the black consciousness

movement to achieve freedom from white minority

government. Though Mandela was a follower of Gandhian
technique of non-violence, he also had taken training in
guerrilla warfare and became the leading light of the
Umkhonto wing of ANC. Its main objective was to carry out
an armed struggle against apartheid regime in South Africa.

Nelson Mandela was released from the Robben Island prison

in 1990. He established the first non-racial government in
South Africa in 1994. In the post-apartheid phase,
reconciliation in a multi-racial, -coloured and -lingual society
was essential for peace and democracy. For this purpose, he
established the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to

bring out the terrible truths of the apartheid regime. In its

report, the Commission had concluded that apartheid policy
of the white minority government was a crime against
humanity. It gave rise to the concern that persons who were
seen to have been responsible for apartheid policies and

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Arvind Kumar Yadav

practices might become liable to international legal actions.

To obviate such a possibility, the Commission itself sought
to deal appropriately with the matter of responsibility for
such policies.

In South Africa, violence is a big problem. Today, high profile

patterns of racially and ethically motivated hate crimes are
prevalent. So too are exclusionary politics and patterns of
violence based on growing xenophobia directed at
foreigners, which suggest that the nation-building endeavour
may well have operated with exclusive rather than inclusive
consequences, notwithstanding the efforts of the TRC. It
speaks of the limited success of truth and reconciliation
process as South Africa continues to experience dangerous
and damaging kind of rainbow nationalism. Discriminatory
social attitudes remain entrenched and indeed, the patterns
of violent crime that dominate the current South African

landscape have become new vehicles for re-racialising and

physically and emotionally re-dividing the new South Africa.
Processes of reconciliation initiated by various political
parties, rainbow nationalism and black economic
empowerment initiatives do not serve the impoverished
black under-class and others who went through a century
of apartheid marginalisation and exclusion. The
reconciliation process is only entrenching the new political
elite who is sustaining the race-based inequity than resolving
it. Similarly, the formal démocratisation of South African
politics, associated with the neutralisation of discriminatory
laws, is not enough to sustainable reconciliation, as it is based
on a narrow definition of political interest groups. Indeed,
despite the formal equality guaranteed within the
constitution, race-based inequality continues to be
perpetuated as an historical condition, and "neutral" laws

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 Nelson Mandela and the Process of Reconciliation in South Africa

and institutions would only serve to sustain rather than

redress such structural deprivation.

Endnotes

1. Phenyo Keiseng Raka te, "Dealing with the Past Hache of the
Past: A Critique of the South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission Report Indian Journal of International Law , (New
Delhi), vol. 40, no. 3, July-September, 2000, p. 147.

2. See for details, Africa South of the Sahara (London/ New York:
Europa Publication, 2005).

3. See for details, South Africa Year Book , 1997, (Cape Town,
Rustica Press), p.l.

4. See B. Monama, "A Case Study on Impurity, South Africa:

Consultative and Planning Meeting for a Campaign against
Impurity in Africa. (Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, 22-23 March
1996), unpublished paper.

5. See, S. Johns & R.H. Davis, Mandela , Tembo and the African
National Congress: The Struggle against Apartheid , 1948-1990
(London, Oxford University Press, 1991).

6. See for details, Nelson Mandela, The Struggle is My Life

(London: International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern
Africa, 1978).

7. See for details, Benyamin Pogrund, Nelson Mandela

(Hyderabad: Orient Longman, 1995).

8. S.C. Saxena, Political Conflict and Power in Africa (Delhi: UDH

Publishers, 1985), p.15.

9. Gini Holland, Nelson Mandela (Mumbai: Shloka Publication

Pvt. Ltd., 2004) p. 15.

10. S.C. Saxena, n.8, p. 18.

11. K.K. Virmani, Nelson Mandela and Apartheid in South Africa

(Delhi, Ralinga Publications, 1991) p. 18.

12. See for details, The United Nations and Apartheied , 1948-1994

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Arvind Kumar Yadav

(New York: Department of Public Information United

Nations, 1994), pp. 13-17.

13. Oliver Tambo, "On Nelson Mandela" in E.S. Reddy, ed., Oliver
Tambo and the Struggle Against Apartheid (New Delhi: Sterling
Publishers Private Limited, 1987), p.41.

14. Nelson Mandela, n.6, p. 7.

15. Ibid.

16. Mary Benson, South Africa: The Struggle for a Birth Right
(London, International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern
Africa, 1985), p. 253.

17. See for details, "Nelson Mandela's Statements in the Court:

Rivonia Trial Case" in C.S. Reddy, ed., Oliver Tanbo and the
Struggle Against Aparthied, n. 9, p. 62.

18. For complete text of Mandela's speech see, Donald Woods,

Bike (New York: Paddington, 1978), pp. 23-29.

19. Nelson Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom (London: Little Brown

& Company, 1994), pp. 146-47.

20. Heidi Holland, The Struggle: A History of the African National

Congress (New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1990).

21. Peter J. Schraeder, Africa Politics and Society : A Mosaic

Transformation (New York: Bedford /St. Martin's, 2000).

22. Asmal Kader, et. al., Reconciliation Through Truth (Cape Town:
David Philip Publications, 1997).

23. Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report

(London: Macmillan Reference Limited, 1999), p. 54.

24. Dorthy Sea, The South African Commission: The Politics of

Reconciliation (Washington D.C.: United State Institute of
Peace Pres, 2000), p. 25.

25. See for details, Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South

Africa Report , n. 15, p. 276.

26. Paul Van Zyl, "Dilemmas of Transitional Justice: The Case of

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 Nelson Mandela and the Process of Reconciliation in South Africa

South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission", Journal

of International Affairs (New York), vol. 52, no. 2, 1999, p. 655.

27. "Former State" refers to any state or territory that was

established by an act of Parliament or by proclamation in
terms of such act before the interim constitution took effect

and the territory of which now forms part of South Africa.

These "Independent State" created as part of the former
government's policy of separate development, were not
recognised by the international community and ceased to exist
after the interim constitution was adopted.

28. See, Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa

Report, Section 20 (3)(1).

29. Alex, Boraine, A Country Unmasked: Inside South Africa's Truth

and Reconciliation (Cape Town: Oxford University Press).

30. See for details, Truth and Reconcila tion of South Africa Report
vol. 5 (Cape Town, 1998).

31. Lyn S. Graybill, Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Miracle

or Model 9 (Boulder: Waarom Weze, 2002), p. 149.

32. Desmond Tuto, No Future without Forgiveness , (London: Rider

Books, 1999), p. 29.

33. See, Mail & Guardian (London), 30 October 1998, p. 3.

34. See for details, Truth and Reconciliation of South Africa,

Report, vol. 2.

35. Ibid, vol. 5, Chapter, 2 & 8.

36. Ibid, vol. 5, Chapter, 9.

37. Graybill, n. 27, p. 74.

38. See for details, P. Bond, Elite Transition (London, Pluto, 2000).

39. Lyn Graybill, "The Contribution of the Truth and

Reconciliation Commission toward the Promotion of

Women's Rights in South Africa" Women's Studies International

Forum, vol. 24, no. 1, 2001.

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Aruind Kumar Yadav

40. The Surplus Peoples Project estimated that about 3.5 million
people suffered from this aspect of institutional violence of
apartheid. See for detail statement to the TRC, 1996, 29-31.

41. Justice Ismail Mohamed has since been appointed Chief

Justice of the Republic of South Africa.

42. Verdoolaege, Annelies, "The Debate on Truth and

Reconciliation: A Survey of Literature on the South African
Truth and Reconciliation Commission" available at http://
african.rug.ac.be/texts/publication/anneliesonlineindex.htm

■ ■

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