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Summary
 "CRITICAL STUDY ALONG WITH TIME
COST OVERRUN ON SMART TUNNEL
CONSTRUCTION (USBRL PROJECT)
INDIA"

3
Sunil Kumar Thappa, Research Scholar, Civil Engineering Department, ITM University Gwalior,
Madhya Pradesh, India
Mukesh Pandey, Professor, Civil Engineering Department, ITM University Gwalior, Madhya Pradesh,
India
Aditya Sharma, Assistant Professor, Civil Engineering Department, ITM University Gwalior,
Madhya Pradesh, India
Shashank Gupta, Assistant Professor, Civil Engineering Department, ITM University Gwalior,
Madhya Pradesh, India
3
Farhan-Ul-Rahman, Lecturer, Civil Engineering Department, ITM University Gwalior,
Madhya Pradesh, India
Abstract

India is an agricultural country but civil industry helps to solve the biggest problem of unemployment by
providing two-square meals to 5 crore people. The entire civil sector has seen the worst time ever in the
history. The Covid-19 came as a deadly blow which crippled the civil construction by due sudden and
long lockdown.
4
The biggest drawback of construction industry is the delay and cost overrun.
5
This paper is based on the
desk study of the civil projects in India to investigate the actual causes of the time and cost overrun. The
success of the project is estimated on the basis of Iron triangle. The three sides of the triangle are time,
cost and the scope. The projects are driven by the national interest and the profit. It is in the national
favour to find out the cost of overrun in time and the cost. The projects are selected in the domain like
building construction, irrigation and transportation. The most of the research is conducted on the basis of
survey. The vital clues regarding the delay are identified. More than sixty causes for the delay are
discussed by one of the research scholar. The finance related issues are the root cause of the delays. Many
time the delay in the payment to contractors trigger the delay cycle. Most of the contractors are weak in
finance and they are not able to deliver the work as they do not have buffer finance. The telephonic
interviews were conducted and a set of questions was sent to different experts of the construction industry.
The solution to causes of overrun have been suggested and the risk of time delay and cost escalation can
be reduced by putting these suggestions in practice at the different stages of the project implementation.
The improper design, wrong estimation, poor planning and implementation, sluggish Supply Chain
management, improper choice of technology, low quality machines, inefficient human resources, illegal
management of labour, lack of facilities to work-force, strikes, demonstration, theft, natural calamities
like Covid-19 Pandemic are some of the factors which cause the delays and cost escalation.
The worldwide trend shows the enhancement in the construction of tunnels. The root cause is quick
expansion in the road network and railways in mountain region. The tunnel construction is gaining
popularity and there are many impediments in the progress. There is a lack of expertise and experience in
the Indian companies. Many a time this triggers the ripple of cost escalation and delays.
2
The success of the project depends on the proper selection of the contractors who have ample of
6
experience. The robust planning and estimation of the risk can help to complete the projects in time and
within the budget. The chief aim of this paper is to judge the risk involved in the project. The exhaustive
literature survey and telephonic interview of the experts has been made the basis of the research. These
experts were involved in the Case study of Udhampur-Srinagar –Baramulla _Rail Link (USBRL).
Keywords— Infrastructure, Budget Overrun, Cost overrun, Schedule Overrun, transportation
2
Construction Projects, Covid-19 Pandemic Risk Analysis, IMP.I, Risk Matrix, Risk Register,
Tunnelling Projects

I. INTRODUCTION
The transportation bridges and tunnels are essential component and the entire domain is vulnerable to
accidents. There always a high level risk to man-force, property which exists in the close vicinity of tunnel
site. The common phenomena is heavy cost escalation and ample of repeated time delays. This is mainly
due to lack of proper survey, soil and rock testing. The surveys are conducted aerially this leads to
unrealistic project planning and proves to be fatal for the projects. Most of the civil projects are delayed
and over delayed in India. There is a lack of expertise at managerial level. The project planning does not
consider the risk factors in factual manner. The technical errors can be guessed and eliminated at planning
level. There is need of identifying the non-technical risk factors like mismanagement, strikes, natural
disaster etc.
II. OBJECTIVES
The major aims of the project are:
 The objective is finding the factors responsible for the delay in tunnel construction
 To evaluate risk factors responsible for cost escalation
 To formulate the frame work for effective risk management
2
III. LITERATURE SURVEY
Rakhi Arora et al. (2016)The case study based work says that the ground truth is that the geological
survey is the most important and this is not done in most of the cases. This puts the projects in higher
risk.
Cagatay, (2015) The authors have supported the importance of the Hazard Analysis before applying
the Tunnel Boring Method (TBM). There be great risk due to weak rock, weak support and poor
geological conditions.
Vishal Kumar Gupta et al. (2017).The authors have conducted a case study for understanding the
risk involved in the tunnelling projects. The Indian companies suffer the losses triggered by the
improper estimation of the different type of risks. The Monte Carlo Simulation and the Judgemental
Risk Analysis methods have been tested.
Surabhi Mishra et.al. (2016)The work is based on the study of the different hazards which are
encountered while executing the tunnel projects. The technical risks can be estimated but non-technical
risks cannot
2
be estimated. Both the type of risks must be evaluated so as to nullify the negative impact
on the cost and time performance.
Soren Degn Eskesen et al. (2004)The work proposes the strict guidelines to manage the risk during
the execution phase the authors are of the opinion that the risk handling must be conceived at every
level including the design, tendering, award of contract and execution.
 IV. RISK MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
8
The transport infra-structure development needs the proper analysis of the risks involved in the
building of the subway. All the possible risks are estimated during the planning 10
phase and the
solution is guessed so that the corrective measures are taken at right time. The Risk management
process is schematically shown in fig.1.

FINDING THE RISK

2
RISK ANALYSIS

RISK RESPONSE PLANNING

RISK MONITORING AND CONTROL

Fig .1. Risk Management System

V. HAZARD DOCUMENTATION
2
The hazard finding is the process of locating negatives that affect the performance of the project at all
stages of planning, execution and control. This is initiated by planning team and further strengthened by
the stake holders of the project. In this work the causes of the hazard associated with the tunnel project
has been studied by telephonic interviews, literature survey of the similar projects and a case study of
2
USBRL Project. The risks recognized are shown in the Table 1.
VI. THE HAZARD ANALYSIS
The hazards are classified and listed in the order of their importance. The priority is fixed on the intensity
of the impact on the targets of the project. The Importance Index (IMP.I) is used here.
Feedback form Study
The feedback form method is used to study the project details. The experts related to the particular
projects are contacted and their opinion is evaluated on the merit basis.
 2
A total 25 query forms were sent and response from 15 experts were collected. as shown in the Table
VII below.

Table VII. WEIGHTAGE GIVEN TO THE FEEDBACK COLLECTED

SI. No of years Weightage No of
No of responses
experience
in the
construction
field
1 0-10 1 17
2 >10 2 28

B. Importance Index (IMP.I) Technique

The Importance Index mathematically estimated by the following formula.
2
Occurrence Index (O.I) (%) = ∑a(n/N) *100/5
4
a is the weightage allotted to reply (1 to 5) n is the occurrence of the reply, N is total replies. Sternness
2
Index: A formula used to rank risk based on the severity of incidence as recognized by the contributors.
Severity Index (F.I) (%) = ∑b(n/N) *100/5
2
b is the constant, stating weightage given to each reply (ranging 1to 5) n is the occurrence of response
and N is the total number of responses.
Implication Key: The Implication Key of each possibility is calculated as a function of both frequency and
severity indices. Importance Index (%) = (OI*SI)/100
The importance index helps us to find the level of hazard. The position of risks based on the impact on
cost and time are tabulated in Table VIII and Table IX
C. Risk Matrix
The hazard table make the probability of hazard visible. It helps in judging the span of the risk and its
occurrence.
2
Fig. 2 is an example of a typical risk matrix.
PR OBJECTIVE (cost/time)
OB
AB 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9
ILI
TY 0.1 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.09
0.3 0.03 0.09 0.15 0.21 0.27
0.5 0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.45
0.7 0.07 0.21 0.35 0.49 0.63
0.9 0.09 0.27 0.45 0.63 0.81
2
Blue: Low; Pink: Medium; Green: High; Yellow: Extreme
2
Fig. 2 Probability Impact Matrix (PMBOK)
 VII . RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

Dangerous hazards are those that have the uppermost influence indices. The Dangerous hazards as seen
from the Hazard Table are graphed in figures Fig.5 and Fig.6 as below:
The critical hazards have the negative impact on the time and cost escalation this is inference drawn from
the comparison of the two tables. There are minor reasons like policy reversals on the part of government
agencies, labour troubles, technical errors etc.

2
Fig. 3 Extreme risks affecting Project Cost

Fig.4 Extreme Risk causing slippage in schedule of the project

7
The most of the risk factors fall in the category of extreme risk. The success of the project is based on the
risk management.
VIII . CASE STUDY
2
The project is based on the tunnel construction projects including BMRCL tunnel Phase I, Atal Tunnel
and Kuthiran Tunnel.
1
The Udhampur-Srinagar-Baramulla-Rail Link (USBRL) This is one of the thrilling project of
Indian Railways. It is having the socio-economical importance. It has its importance from defence point of
view as well. It was declared as te project of national importance by then the Prime Minister Atal Bihari
Vajpayee.
1
The project is very challenging, considering that the terrain is difficult and hostile, the weather
conditions are tough, the security situation in the Valley is sensitive and the logistics support is not really
the best. Also, this is the first time that the Indian Railways has taken up the construction of an entirely
new line in an area which has not been mapped properly, does not have approach roads and where it would
be difficult to transport the required construction material, tracks and other equipment The project is
jointly financed by the Government of India and not only railways. The current expenditure anticipated for
this project is ` INR 19,5000 million.
1
Objectives Of The Project Are To:
 Strengthen the transportation network to the Kashmir valley by providing an efficient all
weather transportation channel that could function in adverse weather conditions and reduce the
travel time to various destinations in the valley considerably and Bring about combined social
and economic growth of the State of Jammu , Kashmir and Laddakh State
1
Appraised Cost of Project: The first appraised Cost of the project as mentioned in the DPR was
INR 15,000 Million. Year 2000, the cost was doubled and it was tripled by the year 2006. In
2012 the cost escalated to 195648.3 Million
Project Management: This Dream Project is being converted into reality by NRCO, KRCL and
IRCON. Each organization is1 constructing different segment of the track. IRCON is playing the
role of co-ordinator between other two companies and reports to the Railway Board. As per the
contract Railways Board was supposed to provide the technical guidance and provide the
finance through the Finance Ministry.

Fig.5 Organization hierarchy

11
Causes of the Time and Cost Overrun in USBRL Project
Poor Planning
1
1. The principal cause of delay in execution of the critical Udhampur- Qazigund section, in
our opinion, was the under-estimation of the challenging geological terrain of the chosen
alignment and the failure to carry out complete due diligence process1 , as laid down in the
Engineering Code of Indian Railways, before deciding on the gradient and the alignment.
2. The project estimates were given green signal and Feasibility Report was not considered.
The Project is complex due to varying nature of soil and hilly terrain. The area is prone to
seismic activity. The estimates were based on the aerial survey and actual field survey was not
conducted. The approach road of 300 km was not estimated.
3. No Feasibility Report was the blunder and shows the inefficiency and wrong intentions of
1
Railway Units. The actual local surveys were not conducted.
4. Difficulties have been encountered in the designing and construction of major bridges across
Anji and Chenab rivers on account of their inconvenient locations and instability and steepness
of the hill slopes abutting the rivers.
5. The alignment also needed building of 109 kilometres of tunnels (81) requiring 162 number of
tunnel doorways which posed problems of safety in terms of saving and assistance operations
and security of fittings.
6. These issues raised by the construction agencies involved in the execution of the work were
not properly resolved at the initial stage.
1
7. The lack of authoritative finding on the constructability of the alignment clearly had the
potential to create a discord between the construction agencies and Northern Railway that
eventually resulted in stoppage of work leading to a belated constitution of an Expert Committee
for reviewing the alignment.
1
8. Decision on the alignment on the western corridor was taken without conducting necessary
surveys and geo-technical studies.
1
9. Construction Strategy: The pre-construction surveys that should have preceded technical sanctions were
actually taken up after the commencement of works and proceeded hand-in-hand
1
10. The lack of authoritative finding on the constructability of the alignment resulted in discord
between the construction agencies engaged and the railway authorities on continuing
1
constructions on the pre-determined alignment.
11. Alternative proposed by KRCL and NR After a detailed study of the paper alignment provided
by Railways and based on its own experience of construction and operation of Konkan Railway
Project and opinion of expert agencies like Geological Survey of India and IIT Mumbai, KRCL
proposed (September 2003) a re-working of the alignment.
1
12. KRCL’s proposal was not agreed to by the Railway Board as it involved a steeper gradient.
KRCL, in its letter to the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO), NRCO in September 2003, suggested
setting up a Committee of Senior Experts to examine the alternative proposal and take a view in the
matter.
1
13. The Board was of the opinion that KRCL proposal did not represent the ground reality and
the gradient would actually be of the order of 1:30. Thereafter (2003), KRCL took up the assigned work
as per the original alignment given by the Railways.
1
14. Impact of inadequate studies: Preparation of designs and drawings of tunnel portals and
bridges was delayed and in some cases, the design had to be changed, leading to time and cost
over runs. Ten tunnels in KRCL jurisdiction and five tunnels in IRCON jurisdiction had to be
abandoned due to the alignment passing through thrust areas or parallel to thrust areas. Four
tunnel portals collapsed during construction. . The alignment from km 52 to km 62 had to be
changed in 2006 due to the enormity of the height of the bridges and long spans, thus rendering
an expenditure of ` 15.42 crore infructuous. With the change in alignment in this section once
again in 2009, the works already executed in tunnel No.9 have been abandoned, resulting in
infructuous expenditure of ` 3.70 crore. The changes in alignment, as a result of final decision
conveyed (Sep 2009) would also result in fresh acquisition of land on re-aligned stretches. The
actual area of land required and the expenditure involved can be assessed only after freezing the
alignment and issuing the final awards by the land acquisition authorities. Besides cost overrun,
further time overrun due to the land acquisition process cannot be ruled out.
15. Financial impact on account of suspension of works / foreclosure of contracts. Railways had
to suspend the work in the Katra-Banihal section for over a year (July 2008 to September 2009),
resulting in abandoning the executed works amounting to ` 226.39 crore. Due to midway
suspension of work, contractors have claimed damages on account of idle manpower/ machinery
and cost of financing etc. As of July 2012, claims amounting to ` 57.24 crore have been admitted.
Prolonged suspension period led to termination of contracts that had been awarded between 2003
and 2005. The extra financial impact in respect of six works, which were retendered during 2010
was ` 1097.34 crore. The actual cost and extra financial impact on remaining works will be
known only after these works are retendered1
and awarded afresh.
16. Land Acquisition/ Forest clearance: The terms of the contract between Railways and
KRCL/IRCON envisaged that land required for execution of the project was to be provided by
 the Railways to the latter. Further, where the acquired land belonged to the Forest department,
the necessary clearances were also to be obtained by the Railways. However, as seen from a
scrutiny of the records and execution of the contracts, there were huge delays in acquisition of
the required land for laying the line and carrying out the associated works like construction of
approach/feeder roads, buildings – both officers and staff quarters and other protection works. In
fact, non-availability of the required land and lack of the requisite clearances was one of the
primary reasons for termination/ foreclosure of contracts in Leg III (Qazigund Baraamullah). In
respect of Leg II (Katra-Qazigund), the problem had not yet been addressed adequately as of July
2012. Analysis

2
TABLE X. PROJECT RISK REGISTER
Risk Risk details Position Position Risk Response
Notation based on based on Owner Approach Particulars
cost Time
Poor site and
weak soil
R5 1 1 Owner Moderate Geological testing and reporting .

Price hike • Increase Clause

2
R3 2 4 Contractor Transfer
• Worth likelihood in the bid
• site selection intelligently
Eco based decision
Land
R4 3 3 Owner Circumvent Coordination among departments
litigation

• Talk to local crowd

• Provide shore up to avoid failure

Subway
R9 4 10 Contractor Circumvent • shear zone finding .
failure

Human • solve work force issues

R2 agitations 5 2 Owner Reduce
• linking the labour and the management
Deviation in • Emergency management
governing
Avoid political risk by guessing policies of
laws
government
R1 6 7 Owner Accept
Nice Public relations

• to be honest and respect culture

Water table •honest soil testing

disturbances
R6 7 9 Owner Reduce
• remove water

• quality monitoring

2 Owner - • coordination between the landlord and servicer

R14 Change order 8 12 Avoid
Contractor • change order implementation
•Correction and development in design
Natural • major risk organization
disasters

R7 9 13 Owner Transfer
• get Governments guarantees to adjust
 • Flexibility in the timeline.

2 Delay in • note causes of delay

R25 10 5 Owner/Contractor Circumvent
permits
• record RACI matrix
Design • ensure quality in work
flaws • Retention Bond
R8 11 11 Architect Reduce
• hire experts

Finance • Create a cash flow projection for the project so to

2 monitor well
R15 issues 12 6 Contractor Reduce

1
17. The audit revealed that, the time taken for obtaining forest clearance ranged from 10 to 56
months; due to delayed acquisition/forest clearance, contracts for 8 tunnels and 14 bridges in
IRCON portion had to be foreclosed and the progress of works at 12 tunnel sites and 8 bridge
sites in KRCL area was hampered by 9 to 35 months. due to non finalisation of Final Location
Survey in the stretch from Km 31 to 38, Km 53 to 56, Km 58 to 87 and Km 110 to 125, the land
requirement could not be identified.
1
18. As can be seen from the above illustrative instances, delay in decision making was one of the
important reasons for the delays in the execution of the USBRL project.

Present Status of USBRL Project

On October 11th, 2019, Hindustan Times revealed:

There were many geological changes and the lack of ground survey has the negative contribution. It is
extremely difficult to construct the long tunnels due to failure of rocks. The tunnel portals are inaccessible.
The long approach roads have constructed for the smooth construction. The weather conditions are very
difficult.
The 200 Km length approach roads have been completed which connects the surrounding villages.
Initially the Chenab Bridge was scheduled to be completed by December 2009. This bridge has been just
completed on 20th February 2021.

Fig.6 Steel Arch Assembling to bridge the Gap over the Chenab River Gorge 30 Month after
launching the first Arch Element November 2017; again the Works have come to a Halt, this
time due to COVID-19 Virus. The latest news is that the arch closure has just been finished on
20th February 2021.
 IX . HAZARD RESPONSE MONITORING AND CONTROL
9
The Hazard identification at early stage with remedial solution is very important for the project
development and success. The smart risk management is the key to success.

The Concluding Framework for the Tunnel Project on the basis of the study of the USBRL
Project

1. The Engineering Code of Indian Railways must be strictly followed and it should be updated with
the example designs of Steel Bridges, Tunnel Construction Procedure should be illustrated with
similar infrastructure already existing in the world. The Detailed Project Reports must be prepared
by competent Design Panels. The railways technical staff must be trained to conduct the actual
surveys like Pir Panjal Mountain Range and work order should be awarded without checking the
real work.
2. Railways do not seriously prepare the DPR. The simulation software’s must be used to simulate
the geological conditions of the site. The aerial surveys should be counter checked by conducting
field surveys. The concerned survey teams must be penalised for any gross errors.
3. The Project feasibility studies must be made before approving the alignments and actual
performance. The sample construction must be done before launching the actual work and
contractors must pass these tests.
4. The railways must R& D department and must work under the Civil Engineering Department eg .
IIT Roorkee. The Survey and designs must be counter checked by the experts form IITs.
5. The existing Gap between the Construction Agencies and Design experts must be resolved as soon
as possible. The responsibility should be fixed at every level to check the errors in the initial stage.
The scale down of the steel and RCC structures can be constructed at academic level. The
structures must be simulated using Software like Staad –Pro, Etabs, Sap2000 etc. and results must
be verified against the scale down model.
6. There should be conflict resolving system within the railways. The conflicts might arise between
Construction Agencies and the Division of Railways.
7. The folly on the part of any high official or team of officials must be penalised for breaking any
technical procedures eg. Passing the alignments without conducting the actual surveys.
8. The contracts must be awarded only after the completion of survey and the design work.
9. In case of the difference of opinion of the Railways Board and Construction Companies must be
resolved through a permanent Expert Committee. The consultancy of international consultants
must be considered instead of sitting on the problem
10. The financial impacts on the Railways can be reduced by modifying the contracts. The contracts
must address the problems like penalty for wrong designs, delays in the construction schedules, the
delays due to the Act of God like Covid -19 Pandemic must be borne by all the stake holders.
11. The proper designs must be supported by quality planning. The planning managers and team must
be experienced and they should plan the projects using Project Management Tools like MS Project
or Primavera as per the PMBOK guidelines.
12. One of the biggest source of delay like Land Acquisition can be expedited by using one window
concept. If necessary the Central Government can pass a law which will force the state
governments to provide the land for the Public Projects.

The external risk management is extremely important and this requires the proper risk transfer. The risk
management
2
should be include in the planning and should be scheduled and rescheduled as and when
required. The cost of avoiding the risk should be below the cost of the risk.
 The future work can be the inclusion of the quantitative analysis. There were many physical limitations
therefore, the proposed model could be verified on the ground. But personal visit of the site and the
discussion with the authorities supports many claims.

REFERENCES

[1] Rakhi Arora, Ujjwal Daga. (2016) "Problems faced in Tunnelling.” International Journal of
Engineering, Applied Science and Technology Vol 1 Issue 8 :2455-2143
[2] Pamukcu, Cagatay. (2015)"Analysis and management of risks experienced in tunnel construction."
Acta Montanistica Slovaca 20.4.
[3] Mishra, Surabhi, and Brajesh Mishra. (2016) "A study on risk factors involved in the construction
projects." International Journal of Innovative Research in Science, Engineering and Technology 5.2 :
11901196.
[4] Gupta, Vishal Kumar, and Jitesh J. Thakkar. (2018) "A quantitative risk assessment methodology for
construction project." Sādhanā 43.7 : 116.
[5] Eskesen, Soren Degn, Tengborg. (2004) "Guidelines for tunnelling risk management: international
tunnelling association, working group No. 2." Tunnelling and Underground Space Technology 19.3:
217-237. [6] Kožíšek, F., Weyessa Gari, D., Pumann, P., Runštuk, J., Šašek, J., Tuhovčák, L., ... &
Papírník, V. (2008). Risk assessment case study– Březnice, Czech Republic. Nieuwegein, the
Netherlands: TECHNEAU.
[7] Rajgor, M., Paresh, C., Dhruv, P., Chirag, P., & Dhrmesh, B. (2016). RII & IMPI: effective techniques
for finding delay in construction project. International Research Journal of Engineering and
Technology, 3(1), 1173-1177
[8] A Guide to the Project Management Book of Knowledge
[9] Zavadskas, Edmundas Kazimieras, Zenonas Turskis, and Jolanta Tamošaitiene. (2010) "Risk
assessment of construction projects." Journal of civil engineering and management 16.1 (2010): 33-46.
[10] Gafari, Mohammad Ali, and Rahim Aminzadeh. (2015) "Identify and Analyze the Risks Involved in
Tunnel Projects." Current World Environment 10 : 1102-1108.
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