ECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 239878. February 28, 2022 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN
(FIFTH DIVISION), ALFONSO SERVANA CASURRA, LEONARDO LUIB EDERA, JR., JOCELYN
ELEAZAR MONTEROS, MARIA SEPARA GEOTINA, ARMANDO MAPA ELUMBA, CARLO
REYNALDO FAROLAN LOZADA, JR., AND ROSEMARIE V. PALACIO, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
HERNANDO, J.:
This petition for certiorari1 assails the November 27, 2017 Resolution2 and April 18, 2018
Resolution3 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. SB-17-CRM-1669 for being issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Resolutions granted the
motion to quash information/dismiss the case4 and motion (A) to quash/hold in abeyance the
release of the warrant of arrest; and (B) to defer arraignment and other proceedings5 filed by
respondent Jocelyn Eleazar Monteros (Monteros), and the omnibus motion to quash information and
to defer arraignment6 filed by respondents Alfonso Servana Casurra (Casurra), Leonardo Luib
Edera, Jr. (Edera), Maria Separa Geotina (Geotina), and Armando Mapa Elumba (Elumba), as
adopted by respondent Carlo Reynaldo F. Lozada, Jr. (Lozada), resulting to the dismissal of the
criminal case for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019,7 otherwise known as the
"Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," against them.
The Factual Antecedents:
This case arose from a complaint8 filed by Task Force Abono, Field Investigation Office (Task
Force) of the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) against respondents local government officials of
Surigao City: Casurra is the city mayor, Edera is the city treasurer, Monteros is the city accountant,
Geotina is the city engineer and a member of the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC), Elumba is the
city general services officer and a BAC member, and Lozada is the city legal officer and a BAC
member.9 Respondent Rosemarie V. Palacio (Palacio) is a private individual who is the proprietress
of Rosa "Mia" Trading.10
The task force alleged that in early 2004, the Department of Budget and Management Office
issued a special allotment order amounting to P723,000,000.00 for the implementation of the Farm
Inputs and Farm Implements Program of the Department of Agriculture.11 Out of the amount, the
City Government of Surigao, Surigao del Norte received P5,000,000.00.12
Thus, the city, through respondents, entered into a contract with Palacio and Rosa "Mia" Trading
for the purchase of 3,332 kilograms of Elements 15-15-30+T.E. Foliar Fertilizer for P1,500 per
kilogram, or a total amount of 4,998,000.00.13 This was allegedly done without the requisite public
bidding under the procurement law.14 The city paid Rosa "Mia" Trading in two tranches.15
Subsequently, the Commission on Audit (COA) post-audited the transaction. It was discovered
that there is a variance between the cost of fertilizers procured and the cost of fertilizers locally
canvassed resulting to an overpricing.16
As a result, the COA issued on June 14, 2006 a Notice of Disallowance (NOD), which was
subsequently amended on March 19, 2007.17
Thereafter, on July 4, 2011, Task Force Abono filed the Complaint against respondents for
violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of RA 3019, Sections 10, 18, and 21 of RA 9184,18 otherwise
known as the "Government Procurement Reform Act," and its Implementing Rules and Regulations,
as well as administrative charges.19
The OMB issued a resolution dated October 5, 2016 finding probable cause for the filing of an
Information for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.20 This was approved by the Ombudsman on
March 22, 2017.21
On September 11, 2017, an Information dated May 2, 2017 was filed before the Sandiganbayan
charging respondents with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.22
Then on September 22, 2017, respondent Monteros filed a motion to quash information/dismiss
the case and a motion (A) to quash/hold in abeyance the release of the warrant of arrest; and (B) to
defer arraignment and other proceedings. Monteros claimed that her right to speedy disposition of
cases was violated because of the length of time that had passed from the COA investigation in
2006 to the filing of the Information before the Sandiganbayan in 2017.23 There was inordinate
delay of 11 years and three months on the part of the OMB.24 This delay, according to Monteros,
divested the OMB of the authority to file the case against her; the instant Information therefore is
void, and the anti-graft court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged.25 Monteros subsequently
moved to hold the release of the warrant of arrest and to defer arraignment and other proceedings
as a consequence of the pendency of the question on the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction.26
On September 25, 2017, respondents Casurra, Edera, Geotina, and Elumba filed their omnibus
motion to quash information and to defer arraignment. Respondent Lozada subsequently manifested
that he adopts this motion.27 Like Monteros, respondents claimed that there was inordinate delay
from the fact-finding phase up to the filing of the Information.28
To note, records show that respondent Palacio did not file a similar motion.
On October 19, 2017, the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed its consolidated
comment/opposition29 to the motions filed by accused. The prosecution countered that the delay in
this case is reasonable. Delay becomes inordinate if there are arbitrary, vexatious, and oppressive
actions or inactions that are attendant to the proceedings within the context of the particular
circumstances attendant thereto.30 The prosecution stressed that the instant case is part of the
controversial "Fertilizer Fund Scam" that involved high ranking officials of the government and
various non-governmental organizations; investigation the case thus requires diligence,
thoroughness, and necessarily, time.31
Ruling of the
Sandiganbayan:
In its November 27, 2017 Resolution,32 the Sandiganbayan granted the motions of respondents
and dismissed the criminal case against them. The anti-graft court confirmed that more than 11
years have passed from the COA's issuance of the NOD until the filing of the Information.33 It held
that the delay is not reasonable. The prosecution's excuse that the many layers of review and the
meticulous scrutiny that the case necessitates time, failed to convince.34 No other plausible reason
was provided to explain the delay of more than 11 years.35 Also, the delay cannot be attributed to
the accused as they have timely filed their affidavits and supporting documents with the OMB.36 The
anti-graft court added that the delay caused prejudice and anxiety to the accused.37 Resultantly,
respondents are acquitted.
The prosecution moved for reconsideration. In its April 18, 2018 Resolution,38 the
Sandiganbayan denied the motion. It added that respondents (being retired from service and
dependent on their pensions) suffered from public humiliation and embarrassment due to this
criminal complaint that dragged on for many years.39 The court likewise reiterated that the
prosecution failed to show that the delay was attributable to respondents.40
Further, the Sandiganbayan in its September 7, 2018 Resolution41 dismissed the criminal case
as regards Palacio as well.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.42 The prosecution ascribes grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the Sandiganbayan in granting respondents' motions and dismissing the criminal case. The
prosecution claims that the Sandiganbayan disregarded the doctrine of Balancing Test (in
determining violations of the right to speedy disposition of cases) when it resorted to a mere
mathematical computation of the period for fact-finding and preliminary investigation.43 The
prosecution then adds that the period for fact-finding investigation should not be added to the period
for preliminary investigation for purposes of computing length of delay.44
The prosecution also claims that the delay in this case is reasonable and warranted under the
circumstances.45 The OMB is deluged with cases filed before it; there is a steady stream of cases
reaching the office.46 The Sandiganbayan should not have "closed its eyes" to these factors in
determining inordinate delay.47
Next, the prosecution claims that respondents did not assert their right to speedy disposition of
cases at any time before the filing of the Information; in fact, they maximized the benefits of the OMB
processes.48 The right should be asserted at the first instance.49 Respondents, however, sat on
their right during the fact-finding and preliminary investigation; they did not initiate any move at the
OMB level to assert their right.50
Lastly, the prosecution avers that the prejudice claimed to have been suffered by respondents
has no factual support.51 The Sandiganbayan merely relied on bare allegations of prejudice as
respondents did not adduce any proof of actual prejudice resulting from the delay.52
Monteros, in her Comment,53 counters that the prosecution failed to show that the
Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the motions. Their right to speedy
disposition of cases has been violated since it took the OMB 11 years and three months to file an
Information against respondents54 The prosecution did not provide an explanation for the delay
given that the transaction were not complex and that the OMB should be accustomed to evaluating
such transactions as it was already conducting similar investigations on the "Fertilizer Fund Scam"
all over the country55 Monteros also reiterated that respondents suffered anxiety, humiliation, and
depression by reason of the length of time the case remained pending.56 As such, the petition
violates the prohibition on double jeopardy.57
Respondents Casurra, Edera, Geotina, Elumba, and Lozada likewise filed their joint
comment58 raising the same arguments as Monteros,59 but they cited the case of Cagang v.
Sandiganbayan60 (Cagang) in arguing that there was inordinate delay.
Palacio did not file a comment or any pleading before this Court.
The prosecution, in its reply,61 reiterated its arguments in the petition. Notably, it added that
based on Cagang as well, the fact-finding investigation of the OMB is not yet adversarial in nature,
thus, the period for it should not be counted in determining delay.62 The prosecution also
emphasized that there were cases where this Court ruled that the right to speedy disposition of
cases was not violated despite the lapse of a considerable amount of time during the investigation of
the OMB.63
Issue
The issue for resolution is whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the motions filed by respondents, which
resulted to the dismissal of the criminal case and their acquittal.
Our Ruling
The petition has no merit. The Court finds that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse
of discretion in dismissing the criminal cases.
At the outset, the Court emphasizes that the dismissal of the instant criminal case against
respondents constitutes acquittal. Thus, it may only be assailed through a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,64 as done here by the prosecution. Grave abuse of discretion must
be alleged in order for the petition to prosper.65 It must be shown that respondent court or tribunal
"acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its jurisdiction as to
be equivalent to lack or jurisdiction;"66 it must be "so patent and so gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law."67
In contention here is the Sandiganbayan's dismissal of the criminal cases against respondents
by reason of inordinate delay.
The Constitution guarantees every person's right to speedy disposition of cases. Article III,
Section 16 states:
Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases
before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
The Court, in Cagang v. Sandiganbayan,68 laid down the guidelines for determining if there is a
violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases:
First, the right to speedy disposition of cases is different from the right to speedy
trial. While the rationale for both rights is the same, the right to speedy trial may only
be invoked in criminal prosecutions against courts of law. The right to speedy
disposition of cases, however, may be invoked before any tribunal, whether judicial
or quasi-judicial. What is important is that the accused may already be prejudiced by
the proceeding for the right to speedy disposition of cases to be invoked.
Second, a case is deemed initiated upon the filing of a formal complaint prior to
a conduct of a preliminary investigation. This Court acknowledges, however, that the
Ombudsman should set reasonable periods for preliminary investigation, with due
regard to the complexities and nuances of each case. Delays beyond this period will
be taken against the prosecution. The period taken for fact-finding investigations
prior to the filing of the formal complaint shall not be included in the determination of
whether there has been inordinate delay.
Third, courts must first determine which party carries the burden of proof. If the
right is invoked within the given time periods contained in current Supreme Court
resolutions and circulars, and the time periods that will be promulgated by the Office
of the Ombudsman, the defense has the burden of proving that the right was
justifiably invoked. If the delay occurs beyond the given time period and the right is
invoked, the prosecution has the burden of justifying the delay.
If the defense has the burden of proof, it must prove first, whether the case is
motivated by malice or clearly only politically motivated and is attended by utter lack
of evidence, and second, that the defense did not contribute to the delay.
Once the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution, the prosecution must prove
first, that it followed the prescribed procedure in the conduct of preliminary
investigation and in the prosecution of the case; second, that the complexity of the
issues and the volume of evidence made the delay inevitable; and third, that no
prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result of the delay.
Fourth, determination of the length of delay is never mechanical. Courts must
consider the entire context of the case, from the amount of evidence to be weighed
to the simplicity or complexity of the issues raised.
An exception to this rule is if there is an allegation that the prosecution of the
case was solely motivated by malice, such as when the case is politically motivated
or when there is continued prosecution despite utter lack of evidence. Malicious
intent may be gauged from the behavior of the prosecution throughout the
proceedings. If malicious prosecution is properly alleged and substantially proven,
the case would automatically be dismissed without need of further analysis of the
delay.
Another exception would be the waiver of the accused to the right to speedy
disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial. If it can be proven that the accused
acquiesced to the delay, the constitutional right can no longer be invoked.
In all cases of dismissals due to inordinate delay, the causes of the delays must
be properly laid out and discussed by the relevant court.
Fifth, the right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial must be
timely raised. The respondent or the accused must file the appropriate motion upon
the lapse of the statutory or procedural periods. Otherwise, they are deemed to have
waived their right to speedy disposition of cases.69
Applying the guidelines in Cagang, the Court finds that there is a violation of respondents' right
to speedy disposition of cases.
Period for fact-finding
investigation not included in
the determination of
inordinate delay.
Initially, it is very clear in Cagang that the period taken for fact-finding investigations shall not be
included in the determination of whether there is inordinate delay; the period shall be reckoned from
the filing of a formal complaint.70 In other words, inordinate delay on cases filed with the OMB
primarily pertains to the period taken for preliminary investigation.
In this regard, the Sandiganbayan erred in including the period for fact-finding in its
determination of the period relevant to inordinate delay.
The Sandiganbayan summarized the dates relevant for inordinate delay:
1. July 4, 2011 - Task Force Abono filed a complaint before the OMB;
2. August 10, 2011 - an Order directing respondents (accused) to file their respective counter-
affidavits and supporting documents was issued;
3. September 14, 2011 - respondent Geotina filed her counter-affidavit;
4. September 20, 2011 - respondents Lozada, Monteros, and Casurra filed their counter-
affidavits;
5. October 18, 2011 - respondent Edera filed his counter-affidavit;
6. April 17, 2012 - respondents filed their supplemental counter-affidavits;
7. April 20, 2012 - an Order directing the parties to file their verified position papers was issued;
8. June 14, 2012 - respondents Edera, Monteros, Geotina, Elumba, and Lozada filed their
position paper;
9. November 4, 2013 - the case was submitted for resolution;
10. October 5, 2016 - the OMB issued a resolution finding probable cause for violation of Section
3(e) of RA 3016;
11. March 22, 2017 - the Honorable Ombudsman approved the resolution;
12. April 26, 2017 and May 2, 2017 - respondents filed their Motions for Reconsideration of the
October 5, 2016 Resolution of the OMB;
13. September 11, 2017 - an Information dated May 2, 2017 was filed before the Sandiganbayan
charging respondents with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.71
In fine, the OMB's preliminary investigation of the case started from the filing of the complaint on
July 4, 2011 and ended on the filing of the Information before the Sandiganbayan on September 11,
2017. Again, the period for fact-finding investigations shall not be included in the determination of
inordinate delay. Thus, it took six years, two months, and seven days for the OMB to conduct its
preliminary investigation. The question now is whether this amount of time constitutes inordinate
delay.
Prosecution bears the
burden of proof; it failed to
show that the delay was
reasonable.
Cagang states that the burden of proof to justify the delay shifts depending on when the right
was invoked. The defense bears the burden if the right was invoked within the periods prescribed by
this Court, the Rules of Court, or the OMB for the conduct of preliminary investigation; the
prosecution bears the burden if the right was invoked beyond the set periods, and it must show that
the delay was justifiable under the factors provided in Cagang.72
As the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman73 then in effect do not provide for
the period within which the preliminary investigation shall be concluded, the periods provided for in
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court shall have suppletory application.74 Applying Sections 3(f) and 4,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court,75 the graft investigation officer shall have 10 days after the
investigation to determine probable cause; then, he has five days from resolution to forward the
records of the case to the Ombudsman, who shall act upon the resolution within 10 days from
receipt.
