ORAL TRADITION IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE:

A CRITIQUE OF SOPHIE OLUWOLE'S ACCOUNT

By

Fayemi, Ademola Kazeem (Ph.D)

Abstract
This paper seeks to discuss the place of orat tradition in African pt,ilosophical
discourse. In doing this, the nature of oral tradition as well as its forms is critically
discussed taking into cognizance Sophie Oluwole 's scholarship on oral tradition
in African philosophy. Oluwole defends the thesis that oral tradition almost
invariably contains criticisms, analysis, and rational justifications. As a
consequence, she argues that one of the most acceptable ways of actually
showering ancient African philosophy is direct dependence on the actual oral
texts and tradition of the people. This paper exposes some of the problems in her
positions and challenges, critically, the cogency of relying on oral tradition as an
index of a people's philosophy. In spite of the various problems and limitations of
oral traditions, this paper defends the position that oral tradition_s still offer
valuable literature as philosophy, and materials for philosophizing in the African
context, and elsewhere.

Introduction
In recent times, several African scholars have attempted to docµment their 1,6cal philo;op~,Y
entrapped in oral tradition. When the issue of oral tradition and philosophy arises, several
fundamental questions arise: can oral tradition pass muster as philosophy? Can there be philosophy
in oral tradition? In what ways can we use oral. tradition in philosophizing? Can knowledge derived
from oral tradition be relied on as a base for philosophy? In answering questions of this type, one is
also implicitly raising another as to the dichotomy between orality and writing and the extent to w·hich
one can stretch the strength(s) and limits of the place of orality in philosophy. This paper engages in a
critical examination of the foregoing questions focusing on the account of Sophie Oluwole in the
context of African philosophy.
This paper is organized in five sections. The first section provides a conceptual elucidation of
oral tradition. The second section discusses the role of oral tradition in philosophy by distinguishing
between the styles in oral tradition and the content of oral tradition in relation to pnnosophy. The third
section explores Oluwole's discourse on oral tradition in African philosophy. A critical evaluation of
Oluwole's scholarship in oral tradition in African philosophy is attempted in the fourth section. The last
section homes in the concluding remarks.

The Idea of Oral Tradition

The term oral tradition is seen in different· perspectives. Vansina (1985: 12) describes oral
tradition as "the testimony of the past which are transmitted from mouth to mouth." This connotes that
oral tradition must necessarily be of the past, and transmitted through spoken words from one
generation to the other. Basically, the term means the transmission of facts, values and fiction through
oral means. It would not be termed "tradition", however, if it were just a momentary and temporary
method of approach to historical knowledge. It is a tradition simply because it is widely understood
and practiced in a society and handed down for at least a few generations, with certain level of
persistence, and sometimes, dynamism . The term is therefore used by the observer- the scholar- to
refer to the source of his/her knowledge of a people's history and culture (Gbadegesin,
http://yoruba.org/Magazine/Summer97/F4.htm I: para. 2) .
Ozumba (1997: 72) tells us that "orality refers to all kind of unwritten communication of
intellectual significance." Perhaps, it may be added that oral tradition is an indispensable source of
history, indicator of deep thought, and transmitter of cultural and religious values and a testimony of
material, symbolic and intellectual aspects of culture. _Orality presents to us the ideology that radiate
among a people, contra individual thought.
From the foregoing, the expression "oral tradition" applies to a process as well as to its
products. The process is the transmission of such messages by word of mouth over a long period of
time. The products are mainly oral messages based on previous oral messages which are at least a

Sophia: An African Journal of Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 15, No. 1, Sept., 2014 pp 101-112

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generation old . Oral tradition entails "the process of using speech rather than writing for the reciting,
chanting and discussing all extant works in our heritage" (Ajikobi, 1998: 6). It does involve unwritten
past events or cultural values transmitted through the words of mouth. Oral tradition is a source of
history, religion, philosophy, and even culture. This point is underscored in the words of Akinyoola,
Akana and Oyatowo (2009):
Oral tradition to the peoples in pre-literate societies, is many things rolled into
one, including religion , knowledge, the natural science, apprenticeship in craft,
history, etc, with a view to re-enactin g the past. (p. 187)

"Oral tradition provides the most important source of data for any serious study of the cultural
beliefs and practices" (Omolafe, 1996: 1). We need to note that it is not all aspects of oral tradition
that are originally motivated by the urge to record history. Folktales , proverbs, songs and chants may
serve the people primarily as means of entertainment and expressing their ideas of ultimate reality
and meaning, though these forms may also serve scholars as a means of understanding their history.
The most important defining features· of oral tradition are its oral nature and the fact that it is a medium
for cultural continuity (Gbadegesin, http://yoruba.org/Magazine/Summer97/F4.html: par. 2).
Having considere.d the meaning of oral tradition, it is pertinent to examine what oral tradition
consists of. Uduigwomen (2002: 39) itemizes its composition to include: myths, fable, legends, stories ,
proverbs, beliefs , folk tales, songs and dances, liturgies and rituals, pithy sayings, riddles and adages,
ideas , social attitudes , conventions, institutions and customs. All these are som,e of the ways by which
thoughts and cultural heritages of a people are presented to posterity.
Oral tradition through its various media has helped in the tra-nsmission of knowledge from one
epoch to another. It has assisted humanity in general to preserve their thoug t;its and cultlk~s. In this
sense, the historical relevance and import of oral tradition is incontrovertible., Akinyoola··~ef<al rightly
noted this when they write that "history is firmly rooted in the human memory, and tt;ijs , is really
understandable since no formal means existed by which to document, in a chronological order, the
sequence of events right from the time the people originated" (Akinyoola et al, 2009: 187). But it may
be asked, if granted the above, one important question that agitates the mind is, what is the place of
oral tradition in philosophy? There is serious acrimonious debate on this as opposed to the pivotal
and undisputed place of oral tradition in historical incursions. But what could have accounted for this
doubt with reference to philosophy? Without pretension to cultural nostalgia, what exactly is the role
or place of oral tradition in philosophy?

Oral Tradition and Philosophy

In order to expose the role played by oral tradition in philosophy, I shall consider a possible
distinction between the styles in oral tradition and the content of oral tradition. In respect to style,
some scholars have claimed that literature is essentially philosophy, and given the fact that oral
tradition constitutes oral literature, which is a literature, therefore, in style, oral tradition is philosophy.
Philosophy is essentially literature. In understanding what literature is, two definitions suffice. The first
is a common and popular view that literature is "everything in print" while the second definition is
particular to Curtis (1990) (as quoted in Flack, 1996) who defines literature as:
A transmission of power; textbooks and treatises, dictionaries and
encyclopaedias, manuals and books of instruction - they are communications;
but literature is a power line , and the motor, mark you , is the reader. (p. 118)
These two definitions of literature are erroneous because they do not give room for the
literature in non-literate societies ; they base their judgments on the literate society without considering
the unlettered society. But this is not all there is to literature. There is no doubt that Literature has its
foundation in oral tradition. It is in the recognition of this point that Ajikobi (1999: 2) avers "any
coherent idea of literature ... must include 'oral literature' which is not only in popular demand by the
people in rural societies but also exists as a 'universal phenomenon' in every culture worldwide."
True to Ajikobi's view, oral literature plays a significant role in the transmission of ideas in a
literate world. Generally, we cannot supplant writing with oral literature, as writing has its base in oral
tradition and it is meant to corroborate it and not to unseat it. Therefore, if oral tradition is literature
and literature is phi!osophy, it can be concluded that oral tradition qualify as phil9sophy. But there is a
caution here: should we say that philosophy will just be attached to anything spoken? A consideration
of this question leads us to the second dimension on the content of oral tradition. The important
question here is what considerations are most fundamental in assessing the content of oral tradition in
order to be classified as philosophy?

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 'fhere are divergent views on the above question. These views can be broadly classified into
th ree . One is the view that oral tradition as it were can only serve as source materials for
philosophizing . One finds p'Bitek (1970) , Gyekye (1987) , Ozumba (1997) , Kimme rle (1997) , lmbo
(2002) and Adegbindin (2010) in this category of opin ion . Second is the view that certain aspects of
oral tradition constitute philosophy in themselves. Here I find Oluwole as foremost ardent defender of
th is view. A loose position on oral tradition as ph ilosophy is maintained by lhuah (1999: 136), who
says that there is "authentic philosophy expressed in all African oral texts : names , proverbs , folktales
and songs amongst others ." The third view on the relation between philosophy and oral tradition is an
outright denial of the theses of the first two views by scholars such as Hountondji and Ong.
p'Bitek (2002 : 68) maintains that "it is more fruitful to realize that the oral traditions are just a
means of transmitting the culture's rigorous intellectual traditions . Philosophy is the extraction of
meaning from the accounts of the oral traditions. " Therefore , if we are to examine the philosophy of a
people, the myths that exist in such culture are ready made materials that assist us in understanding
the philosophy of such people . Proverbs , myths etc. , which exist in oral literature are rich in content of
the people's worldview and as such , can serve as a source material for the professional philosopher
to work on by applying the essential tools of philosophy to them. Therefore, without resorting to any
equivocation , oral tradition has significant role to play in the evolution of authentic African philosophy.
Okot p'Bitek is not alone in this orientation . lmbo in supporting p'Bitek'~ view mutatis mutandis
postulates that "it is more fruitful to realize that the oral stories are just a means of transmitting the
culture's rigorous intellectual traditions . Philosophy is the extraction of mean ing from ·the accounts of
the oral traditions. That extraction is made richer by the admission of ora~traditions as texts" (lmbo,
2002 : 68) . '\
Ozumba also holds sim ilar view. According to him , in non -literatu re soc~ty, peopTe &re
consci ous of preserving th eir cultu re, history, occurrence, religion, philosoph y etc in the ri ght way. to
achieve this, they use differe nt method which makes it easy for members of the society to reta in -!,u_ch
thought and pass it through posterity. Myth is one of such ways. It is mostly transmitted to posterity ln
form of entertaining the younger ones. Myth, present to us stories about the people of the past, event
in the past, ideas of the past etc. Myth present the thinking of our tore-fathers on issues in form of
fiction, in these stories wisdom are embedded in it. It is now left for us to have the ability and
understanding of myth in order to extract such wisdom or philosophy. Ozumba (1997) quoted Vico's
words when he said:
It follows that the first science to be learned should be mythology or the
interpretation of fables, for all histories of the gentiles have their beginning~ ,in
fables ... By such a method the beginnings of the sciences as well as the nations
are to be discovered. (p. 80)

It is important to note at this point that mythology is not just the coinage of some people. It is
the real ity that radiates among a people. and their beliefs about certain occurrence. 'We must not
discountenance the truth that there is no myth without a basis in reality. And conversely there is no
sophisticated knowledge without its mythical basis" (Ozumba 1997: 80) .
Gyekye (1984: 200) informs that in Africa, a great deal of philosophical system has remained
oral for a long time. He sees philosophical materials embedded in the proverbs, myths, folktales ,
folksongs, rituals, beliefs, customs and the traditions of the African people. In establishing the truth of
this claim , Gyekye (1984: 200) analogically notes that "the Vedas were handed down from mouth to
mouth from a period of unknown antiquity .... When the Vedas were composed, there was probably no
system of writing prevalent in India ... " The point here is that it was through oral tradition that the
philosophies contained in the Vedas were preserved. So also is the case with the philosophy of
Socrates .
I now turn to the second strand of viewing the relationship between oral tradition and
philosophy. If one construes philosophy as the love of wisdom, and accepting the role of proverbs in
the preservat ion of a people's wisdom and worldview, then it opens one to the conclusion that oral
tradition , which proverb is subset, is philosophy. Without necessarily oblivious to the fallacy of
composition involved in this reasoning, and let us take for granted the misunderstanding of the
phrase, 'love of wisd9m' in the context of the above argument, one finds S\JCh reasoning in
Akporobaro (2001) and Obiechina (1975). Seeing proverb as a community thought, Akporobaro
(2001) says:
A collection of the proverbs of a community or a nation is in a real sense, an
ethnography of the people which if systematized can give penetrating picture of

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 the people's way of life, their philosophy, th eir moral truth and social values. (p .
10)

Corroborating this view, Obiechina (1975) contends that:

Proverbs are the kernel which contains the wisdom of the traditional people . They
are philosophical and moral expositions shrunk to a few words , and they form a
mnemonic device in societies in which everything worth knowing and relevant to
everyday life has to be committed to memory. (p. 156)

The soundness of the above view finds expression in Aristotle's view of proverb, who as
quoted by Momoh (1989: 232), says that "a proverb is a remnant from old philosophy, preserved amid
countless destruction by reason of its brevity and fitness for use."

Sophie Oluwole's Discourse on Oral Tradition

In her book , Philosophy and Oral Tradition, Oluwole aims at establishing the existence of an
ancient tradition of African philosophy. She exposes the false distinctions between orality and literacy
on the one hand and the relationship between philosophy and oral tradition on the other hand. She
sees philosophy as the critical examination of ideas, beliefs and principles of human existence. For
her, philosophy presupposes the existence of human critical thinking in a particular language. This is
so because philosophy is expressed in words, and words are expressed in language.
Thus, when talking of the existence of ancient African philosophy, we are simply referring to
its existence within the gamut of a particular language. By ancient African philosophy, sh\ \. does not
mean one monolithic philosophy for the whole of Africa. In other words, it is not ~ single me~physical
and/or epistemological point of view shared by every African just as ancient Greek, C'b_i~ se and
Indian philosophers we re not. Rather, she means different classical ph ilosophical accou nts Eti;id views
as expressed in different African languages and cultures. '
Just as the terms 'Greek" and Chinese each refers to the thoughts of different philosophies,
which share some literacy form and style of expression as well as some particular intellectual
orientations, the term 'African' is also a family similarity that justifies the classification of several
African languages and ethnic groups into one cultural group. In her attempt to discover an instance of
an ancient African philosophy, she explored the oral tradition of the Yoruba. Before considering her
analysis of the conceptual structure and philosophical cogency of the oral text she presented, it is
important to first examine her arguments on the dichotomy between orality and writing, and the
im pl ications of such analysis on the possible existence of ancient African philosophy.
One of the major arguments upon which the non-apologists prem ised their claims on the
denial of ancient African philosophy has to do with the issue of writing as a necessary condition of
philosophy. For Oluwole, there are no 'a priori' rules against the adequacy of presenting a philosophic
treatise in any specific literary form . There are no un iversal paradigms, wh ich all form s of thought
must adopt.
In other words, critical or strict philosophy can occur whether in the oral or written form. She
argues that the history of Western philosophy itself does not justify that oral tradition is anti-intellectual
and that it cannot contain philosophy. For instance, Plato's predecessors used aphorism, imagery and
tales to formulate critical philosophy. While Plato himself used this style, modern philosophers like,
Nietzsche and Schopenhauer also wrote strict philosophies using image and aphorism. The point
Oluwole is making is that tales, aphorisms, proverbs, folklore, among others which are all part of oral
tradition can entail philosophy. Contrary to the claim that philosophy is best promoted in the written
form, she argues that "it is not impossible that philosophers who codify their works in writing
sometimes produce irrational and inconsistent thesis" (Oluwole , 1999: 15).
Kimmerle shares the view of Oluwole on the dichotomy between writing and orality, but differs
from Oluwole on oral tradition as philosophy. Kimmerle maintains that it is wrong to speak of an
opposition between oral and literate. This is because there are elements of writing in a mainly oral
tradition and elements of orality in a mainly literate tradition. Following Jacques Derrida's
Grammatology, Kimmerle argues against the hierarchic thinking that writing is superior to orality.
Construing writing as the production of readable traces and signs connected with human behavior of
any kind (such as alphabetic signs, graphics, pictures on the body, traces in the sand, etc.), Kimmerle
(1997: 43) hammers that the opposition between literate cultures and oral cultures has to be avoided
because both are of the same age. None is either "higher or lower in any sense, but just different"
(Kimmerle, 1997: 44) . This position of Kimmerle notwithstanding should not be misconstrued to mean

, 104
that she agrees with Oluwole (1999: xv) that some oral texts passes muster as strict philosophy in
themselves . Kimmerle (1997) is explicit on this below:
Ethnophilosophy is constituted by two different instances: the myths, proverbs
and language structures on the one hand , the authors, who make a philosophical
text of them , on the other hand. Only when both instances do exist together,
ethnophilosophy emerges. Myth , legends or proverbs are not already philosophy
by themselves . And also the opposite is true: the authors who conceptualize
ethnophilosophical texts do not take them out of their own ideas . The former
belong to the spoken language , which is for all kinds of philosophy (that is to say:
not only for ethnophilosophy, for it, however, in a very specific way) a constitutive
starting point of philosophizing. The latter produce written texts , which become
part of the history of continuous interpretation and critique. Ethnophilosophy is
constituted commonly by spoken language and written texts . From the interaction
of both instances, ethnophilosophy emerges as philosophy. (p. 47)

Obvious from the above is the claim that Kimmerle's interest lies in the dissolution of the
opposition between oral and written literatures, and not in the discovery of philosophy out of oral
literature as Oluwole is primarily concerned.
Cognizant of the distinction between oral expression and written expressions, Oluwole (1999)
harps that:
Spoken words .. .exist only for a very limited time and can travel on their
own only within the limited distances. Because of this very short spatio-temporal
existence, oral tradition in a substantial sense, is quite ephemeral. .. The iniherent
dual short comings o(oral expressions, that is, the limitations of time and ,space,
can be greatly reduced through the use of human memory. Yet, memory is never
a perfect way of recording or transmitting thought because lapses do occur
through normal and accidental conditions. (p. 3).

The point in the above excerpt is that oral tradition has some limitations. Memory is an
important aspect of oral tradition. Without memory no person can lay claim to an iota of knowledge or
possession of oral tradition. Russell (1963) avers , "memory is the source of all our knowledge
concerning the past." Any time we are revealing a myth, folklore, proverbs etc it comes from our
memory. Memory serves the bi-function of storing information and synthesizing them for future use. In
fact, "oral texts cannot perform without the aid of memory" (Oluwole, 1999: 3).
However, memory is unreliable. As its own arbiter, memory is consigned to the private realm;
"it is subject to forgetfulness, discordance of information, misrepresentation, opacity and
miscontextualism" (Ozumba, 1997: 75). The use of memory "is never a perfect way of recording or
transmitting thoughts because lapses do occur through normal and accidental conditions. Damage to
the brain, forgetfulness, and the most permanent of them all - death - may occur without notice. In
such a situation, brilliant and important ideas may be lost forever" (Oluwole 1999: 3). These are
accidental events that can occur to the memory which prevent it from being a perfect way of
preserving the knowledge of a people. The memory" makes a man the source of a people's knowledge
and if such man eventually dies, it is similar to a burnt library. This is one of the critiques brought
against oral tradition through memory.
Also, oral tradition is said to be confirming what has been revealed to one from an aged
scholar who might not necessarily be the most informed person. "The oldest may not be the most
informed , the popular may not be the most versatile in thought, the mellifluous may not be the one
with the most authentic information" (Ozumba, 1997: 79). Another critique that can be leveled against
oral tradition is that many of the knowledge brought about by oral tradition are related by old men and
women. And it is a truism that old age brings forgetfulness and senility is the disease of the old which
has no cure. The simple implication of this is the skepticism on the reliability of oral tradition as a
source of knowledge. This point becomes more sacrosanct especially when we bear in mind such
problems as: "the progressive breakdown of the transmission of oral tradition from one generation to
another, the mortal nature of informants as well as th~ir motives and changeability, the difficulty of
separating the past from the present, selectivity and , the lack of chronology'' (Mugaju, 1990: 32) in
oral tradition.
In the words of Ajayi (1981: 2) "oral traditions are sometimes subject to additions,
subtractions, exaggerations and distortions. Consequently, it is difficult to separate truth from fiction. "

105
 Because of the possibilities of distortions in the original ideas when passed through oral trnditi on , from
one generation to the other as well as other short comings of oral tradition, Oluwole observed that
writing must have evolved to come as a rescue to all the undesirable limitations of oral expression.
The most fundamental feature of writing is according to her, that of being a means of
producing readable signs and symbols for the purpose of external communication. And by implication ,
writing does not refer to the thought documented or recorded. Once such signs and symbols are
conventionally learnt and understood, it conveys similar meanings to the sender and receiver. And in
this way, writing bridges tim.e and space in communication with least distortion . This is the advantage
writing has over oral. tradition ..
On the basis of the, abqve analysis, Oluwole notes that thought occurs, first, in the mental
realm just before or during the act of oral expressions, and that writing comes third in the process,
because it is only a means of documenting and transmitting thought, words and ideas through visible
signs. By implication therefore, literary styles and context of human thought cannot be said to have
been created through writing. Indeed, while oral expression may occur independently of writing, the
reverse. may not be possible. This is because it is difficult and even impossible to write without
reflecting, without pronouncing each word, without making of inaudible sound. As Akinjobi (1998: 5-6)
correctly observes, 'Without oral traditions, we could know very little about the past of large parts of
the world. Writing art cannot possibly subsist without the speaking art." The existence of writing
the~efore depends on the existence of oral performance: "on the reflection that goes on in the mind at
the time of writing" (Oluwole, 1999: 5). This means that oral performance precedes writing and writing
has it source in oral art.
Drawing further on the distinction between oral and writt(:ln texts, Olt;wole writes (2n the act of
thinking. This is because the later depends on the former. While thinking, is an art, ··wrnph may be
learnt and which greatly depends on a thinker's natural capacity, writing is a craft, w~iG;h must be
learnt both by the highly gifted and the man of average intelligence. The teaching of a persqn •with low
intelligence the techniques of writing will not necessarily make him or her gifted thinker. According to
her, merely knowing the technique of writing will not make fool a genius. On the contrary however,
ingenuity may be expressed in the oral form by thinkers who have never learnt the art or writing. On
this showing therefore·, ,oral tradition is the creation of individual minds ; though the ideas , beliefs an d
principles expressed in them later become the accepted norms by the society. Writing only perform s a
supplementary function of helping people to memorize and know what has been said orally.
Oluwole quite believes that writing has its own advantages. One, when used to document
individual thought, writing provides immense opportunity for clearer explanations, analyses and
criticism , which may arise at the level of discussion. It allows a thinker to be cautious of and avoid
self-contradiction and other fallacious thinking. Writing allows for making work available to wider
audience and this promotes a better opportunity for corrections of views and idiosyncrasies in human
thoughts. In spite of all these merits of writing, Oluwole said that writing can also lead to narrow-
mindedness, inward looking and parochialism in individual thinkers. It sometimes hinders the initiation
of novel theories. Also, since writing has to be produced in specific forms, it tends to lack the kind of
rapturous immediacy and spontaneity of expression (Oluwole, 1999:16). Scholles & Kellog (1978) in
their book, The Nature of Narrative, notes the shortcomings of writing by recounting the view of the
historical Tham us. Tham us, the primordial king over all Egypt, expressed a great fear when Thoth, the
Egyptian god of wisdom and magic invented writing. Thoth had come to inform King Thamus how
writing would increase both the memory and wisdom of the Egyptians, but Tham us exclaimed thus:
O most ingenious Thoth, one man has the ability to develop a new skill, but
another to judge whether it will be a curse or blessing to its users. Now you, the
father of letters, through your affection see in them the opposite of their true
power. For this invention (writing) will cause those who use it to lose the learning
of their minds by neglecting their memories; since , through this reliance on letters
which are external and alien to the mind, they will lose the ability to recall things
within themselves. You have invented not a medicine to strengthen memory but
an inferior substitute for it. You are providing your students with a way of seeming
wise without true wisdom; for they will appear to have learned without instruction;
they IA'.ill seem to know a good deal while they are really ignorant qf many things;
and they will become public nuisance, these men who look wise but lack wisdom
(Scholes & Kellogg, 1978: 19)

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 Given the above critical analysis of the short comings of writing as a necessary condition of
philosophy, a position defended by the non-apologist of ancient history of African philosophy,
Oluwole's position is that there were ancient Africans whose thoughts were rational and critical, even
though these have been transmitted from generation to generation through the medium of oral
tradition. Accordingly, she is of the view that the acts of reflection , criticism, analysis, arguments and
discussion can all be carried out in a purely oral form without writing. And since the formulation of
poetry, discursive prose, verse, narrative, etc., did not depend on the art of writing , the creation of
these literacy styles and structures cannot be said to depend on the mastery of writing (Oluwole ,
1999: 6)
In effect, Oluwole's position is that the non-apologists failure of recognizing the literary
qualities of oral tradition is as a result of their misconception of Western science and written literature.
Contrary to their positions , she holds that oral literature almost invariably contains criticisms, analysis,
and rational justifications (Oluwole, 1999: 6) . But the difficulty in identifying all these intellectual
compositions in African oral literature and appreciate their distinctive literary style is because of
ignorance and incompetence of many African scholars and understanding oral texts in the indigenous
language. According to her;
Many can neither speak nor read in African languages. Those who can
were never taught how to analyze, understand and interpret African thought
within its own conceptual structure. (Oluwole, 2007:13-14).

It is arguable to posit contra Oluwole that the alleged ignorance of African languag~s as
expressed in the people's oral tradition is a consequence of the many factors; mosi importan.t is,,. the
contents of oral traditions which are often expressed in cryptic languages that are highly complexiind
of such depth and obscurity that comprehension becomes rather difficult if not impossible (Om~l~fe,
1996: 4). This excuse may not be genuine and satisfactory to Oluwole. ' '\
This is understandable because of her quest to defend the ancient existence of Afric'an
philosophy, which she thinks can only be discovered in oral traditions. Oluwole believes that .Africa
must have had her own Socrates, Plato, Pythagoras, etc. though most of their names are now lost in
memory. She therefore sees as imperative, the crucial task of interpreting their ideas (as domiciled in
oral tradition) in contemporary medium for easier understanding and critical examination. She objects
the insistence of members of the school of professional philosophers (e.g., Peter Bodunrin, Paulin
Hountondji, Kwasi Wiredu, among others who are for the most part, the non-apologists of the
existence of ancient African philosophy) on their position that ancient Greek thought is scientific,
critical and rational, and that these intellectual qualities are absent in oral tradition, which she
presented as ancient African philosophy.
Hountondji for instance, dismisses not only the use of oral tradition as a source material for
philosophizing, he rejects also the claims of scholars like Oluwole who claim that oral text is
philosophical. For Hountondji (1983: 101 ), oral literature by its very nature, prohibits criticism, tends to
perpetuate a conservative and anachronistic tradition which is backward and unscientific. Philosophy
in Hountondji's (1976 :106) thinking "begins at the precise moment of transcription." Sharing the view
of Hountondji, Ong (1986) says without writing there can be no philosophy. He maintains that:
\We know that all philosophy depends on writing because all elaborate; linear, so-
called "logical" explanation depends on writing. Oral persons can be as wise, as
wise as anyone, and they can of course, give some explanation for things. But
the elaborate, intrincate, seemingly endless but exact cause-effect sequences
required by whc;J.t we call philosophy and by extended scientific thinking are
. unknown by oral people. (p. 43)

Both Ong's and Hountondji's perception of oral tradition as anti-intellectualism and enclave of
mysticism has been criticized by Oluwole. She does not take Hountondji seriously because he is seen
to have accepted Western paradigms without question. Her point in this regard is that Hountondji
failed to realize that intellectual features do not occur in same literary form and conceptual genres in
all traditions of human thought (Oluwole, 2007:13).
In pursuing the logical_ conclusion, her belief in the existence of ancient African p_hilosophy,
Oluwole said that one of the most acceptable ways of actually showering ancient African philosophy is
direct dependence on the actual oral texts. These oral texts are different African languages in most
ancient African societies. A careful study of these oral texts, she believes, will reveal the reflections of

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ancient African thinkers on the mysteries of the universe , natu re, human experience, and oth er
fundamental themes of philosophical relevance . In her words:
Research into oral literature is justified on the assumption that some rational
principles must have guided traditional African thinkers in the past. Present day
African intellectuals have lost contact with their forebears as we·II as with one
another. Colonial education did not bequeath to Africa only new systems of
government, education etc. , it replaced African traditional principles of thought
with foreign ones. Worse still , it gave Africa several alien languages that cut their
intellectuals from their base. (Oluwole, 1997: 34)

The above call to hermeneutically research into oral tradition by Oluwole aims basically
therefore to discover principles that underlie traditional African thought. The idea is not to bring back
specific views, beliefs or values from ancient African societies. Rather, the reason d'etre, according to
her, is that "we will never have valid grounds for comparing African thoughts with Western alternatives
if we fail to grasp the basic principles under whose guidance African intellectuals operated" (Oluwole,
1997: 35) . Furthermore, it is doubtful if Africans will ever be sure of what to retain or jettison from their
traditional thoughts so long as they continue to be apathetic toward~ a rigorous hermeneutic study of
oral literature from Africa. On the imperativeness of studying oral tradition, Oluwole (1997) notes:
We cannot legitimately dismiss oral literature as a reliable source of· discovering
an authentic African intellectual culture if our genuine aim is to compare and if
possible promote inter-cultural understanding. African tradition of thought, as a~
ancient intellectual culture, must have principles which have existed, long before ~
modern times . And to have a full grasp of the present day line of thought we need 1
a good understanding of each cu lture. For if we are not fu lly conscious of what we··'(
were, hardly can we really understand who we are now and how we can have a ;
clear vision of what we ought to be. (p. 40)

Contrary to the view of philosophers like Hountondji, Mudimbe, and Appiah, who believe that
'strict' philosophy cannot exist in oral texts, Oluwole illustrated the existence of explicit philosophy in
oral text, using the Yoruba example. In doing this, she allowed the oral texts to account for their own
existence as philosophy. For instance, in her article, "African Philosophy as illustrated in /fa Corpus",
she showed how 'oyeku meji' and 'owonrin', which are verses in /fa literary corpus, each passes
muster as critical philosophy in spite ofthe fact that they were preserved and transmitted in the oral
form. She argues that there is a distinctive literary tradition identifiable in /fa literature, where
proverbs, aphorism , metaphor, tale as well as imagery are freely used. The two texts on 'oyeku mej i'
and 'owonrin meji' qual ify as an instance of ancient African philosophy because they contain
argum ents, criticisms and justification of the ideas expressed.

A Critical Evaluation of Oluwole's Scholarship on Oral Tradition

One possible criticism that might be leveled against Oluwole's attempt is that she is only
trying to create new philosophies from the texts, especially with her translations. However, a counter
response to this charge is that professional philosophers trac;Jitionally engage themselves in the
analysis, explanation, criticism and/or justification of the works of different philosophers without
thereby creating new philosophies out of them (Oluwole, 1997: 40). Her intention is to discover cogent
philosophical principles and treatise , inherent in these indigenous oral texts . She agrees with
Kimmerle (1997), who also defends this approach of studying oral tradition as a way of discovering
different ways for expressing philosophy, which will avoid the Western opposition paradigm , in which
difference is necessarily regarded as evidence of inferiority. More fundamental, her goal is to initiate
the process of putting an end to the dominant imperialistic thinking, which has over the years, unduly
influenced Africans in despising and ignoring their oral tradition as a primitive and inadequate heritage
for modernist living.
Another possible criticism that might be posed against Oluwole's attempt to showcase oral
tradition as ancient African philosophy is that what has been presented is nothing short of Yoruba
(African) worldview, mysticism, religious system, _rather than philosophy. This is because individual
authors of the ideas, beliefs and thoughts so expressed are not known by name. A counter
reaction/response to this criticism , as given by her is that classical philosophies, in almost all cultures,
existed as religious systems . This is true of ancient Indian philosophy and ancient Greek philosophy.
What qualifies them as philosophy is that critical reflections were carried out in them. It is , therefore

108
 "an error to declare a thought system non-philosophical just because it uses religious terms to explain
knowledge and human experiences" (Oluwole, 2007: 26) .
Though , while it is true that some of the accounts given or presented as an ancient African
philosophy may be intuitive, bold and unscientific, those of several ancient Greek and Chinese
philosophies were not free of this same charge. Besides, there are many ideas, beliefs and values in
ancient African worldview that can be adjudged rational. And for this reason, it becomes important
that texts in the language of thinkers are studied so as to expose their philosophical meanings, their
critical strength and/or weaknesses. These oral literatures are in themselves texts on ancient African
philosophy.
It must be pointed out at this point that for Oluwole, it is not the analysis per se that will make
any of the oral texts philosophy. What qualifies them as philosophy must already be inherent in them.
But the critical assessment of such text would be a work in contemporary African philosophy. In other
words, when we formulate some philosophy from oral texts, we are engaged in contemporary African
philosophy rather than studying ancient African philosophy. On the charge of anonymous and
unknown names, this is a criticism equally applicable to many texts in classical Greek philosophy. For
instance, many of the sayings accredited to Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle have been argued to be
popular mythology - "they said, he/she said". And strictly speaking, the fact that the authors of the
oral text are mostly unknown by name does not destroy the cogency of the text as philosophy.
Another possible criticism against the apologist position of 01uwole on the existence of
ancient history of African philosophy as explicit in oral tradition is that many of the media of oral
tradition, for instance, proverbs, are short and crisp, and as such, cannot constitute philosophy, which
by standard entails justificatory explanations. As a counter response, it is arguable to sqx_ !hat the
shortness of a literary piece does not necessarily deprive it of being philosophiclP-1. Classica.l~hinese
and Indian philosophies were crisp and appeared mystical and intuitive. Even ; many of the ilncient
' I
Greek philosophers like - Thales and Heraclitus were initially short and crisp before they were later
developed into elaborate theories by their later disciples. · •., .
Arguably, this call by Oluwole on the need for serious studies of African oral literature can be
said to be a plea for a wholesale return to things African just in the name of propagating unwarranted
uniqueness and distinctiveness. But then, this critique can only be a product of the illusionary thinking
that culture, in its different ramifications, is an ancient, traditional, changeless and hermeneutically
sealed heritage which can be preserved intact (like virginity) more or less forever. In defense of
Oluwole, one can refute this charge of philosophical study of oral tradition as a path to anachronism
by arguing that a genuine call for adequate research into African oral heritage does not necessarily
entail "romantic vision of the past" for the sake of carving unique African intellectual identity. Oral
literature does not establish a dead form of thought. It is generative in nature and can still be
developed and explored for modern use. ·•

Conclusion
On the whole, Oluwole is a strong proponent of the view that there was ancient history of
African philosophy and that the ideas of these ancient thinkers could be found in our African oral
tradition in their varieties. With her emphasis on oral tradition as philosophy as a distinctive African
literary thing, one is likely to criticize her silence ori written traditions of the Egyptian and Ethiopian
civilizations, which are also part of Africa. Without recognition of the historical root of ancient African
philosophy in these civilizations, her account is at best, biased and myopic.
Well, arguably, Oluwole is not totally incognizant of the existence of written traditions of Egypt
and Ethiopia; only that she does not regard the account of ancient history of African philosophy in
these civilizations as entirely an indigenous creation of black Africans (Oluwole, 1999:21 ). This is
because of the influence of both Islam and Christianity on the philosophical ideas of the ancient
Egyptian and Ethiopian thinkers. Whether this quest for authentic and purified or unadulterated
intellectual heritage is in itself justified and possible is a different question entirely.
However, in the main, it is conclusive to note that although oral tradition is not without its own
shortcomings. In spite of the various limitations of oral traditions identified in this paper, I am of the
view that oral traditions still offer valuable literature as philosophy, and materials for philosophizing.
Mythi_cal narratives, legends, personal poems and testimonies, proverbs, and maxims, drum texts and
art motifs, which form the core of African oral tradition have a basis in historical reality and are at the
same time explorations of the possibilities of group and individual thoughts and views about their
intellectual heritage, historical experiences and philosophical thoughts. Since every philosophy is
cultural conditioned and historically influenced, oral literature cannot be swept under carpet in

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4M

philosophical matters. I need to re-state that written literature cannot supplant oral tradition for they
both have their merits and demerits.
In conclusion, I do not say that oral tradition should be placed above writing . The fact remains
that both belong to literature. They are both forms of transmitting the philosophy of a people to the
unborn generation and have their advantages and disadvantages respectively. Philosophy being the
child in the bath water of oral tradition should not be thrown away with the bath water. Therefore,
there is a need for us to consider thoroughly our oral tradition in order to uproot the philosophy
inherent in it.

I
Ii

110

1 f I
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