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Transatlantic relations are often reduced to security matters. This book responds to the need for more
An intellectual gold mine for scholars and practitioners alike, this book unlocks the full complexity of
Transatlantic relations. Breaking down policy silos, it goes beyond the diplomatic tip of the Transatlantic
iceberg to shed light on the submerged processes, actors and institutions that structure this cooperative,
competitive and conflictual relationship.
Jean-Baptiste Velut, Université Sorbonne Nouvelle, France
With this seminal work Elaine Fahey assembled an impressive selection of authoritative voices on Transatlantic
relations from both sides of the pond who delivered rigorous, original, and thought-provoking contributions
providing a consistent narrative on a crucial relationship that has been and will remain difficult before, during,
and after President Trump.
Professor Martin Trybus, University of Birmingham, UK
In an increasingly bipolar world, the US-EU relationship should be one of strength and coherence. Yet, as the
Handbook vividly shows, this relationship remains unstable and multifaceted. New crises and actions by a
plurality of transatlantic actors are constantly re-shaping the balance of powers in diplomacy, policy, and law
across the Atlantic.
Fernanda G. Nicola, Washington College of Law, American University, USA
The Routledge Handbook on Transatlantic Relations is an essential and comprehensive reference for the
regulation of transatlantic relations across a range of subjects, bringing together contributions from scholars,
policy makers, lawyers and political scientists. Future oriented in a range of fields, it probes the key technical,
procedural and policy issues for the US of dealing with, negotiating, engaging and law-making with the EU,
taking a broad interdisciplinary perspective including international relations, politics, political economic and
law, EU external relations law and international law and assesses the external consequences of transatlantic
relations in a systematic and comprehensive fashion.
The transatlantic relationship constitutes one of the most established and far-reaching democratic alliances
globally, and which has propelled multilateralism, trade regulation and the EU-US relationship in global
challenges. The different contributions will propose solutions to overcome these problems and help us
understand the shifting transatlantic agenda in diverse areas from human rights, to trade, and security, and
the capacity of the transatlantic relationship to set new international agendas, standards and rules.
The Routledge Handbook on Transatlantic Relations will be a key reference for scholars, students and
Elaine Fahey is Professor of Law at the City Law School, City, University of London.
of Transatlantic Relations
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND LAW
ISBN 978-1-032-25556-9
www.routledge.com
9 781032 255569
Edited by Elaine Fahey
Routledge titles are available as eBook editions in a range of digital formats
THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK
OF TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS
Elaine Fahey is Professor of Law at the City Law School, City, University of
London.
ROUTLEDGE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOKS
DOI: 10.4324/9781003283911
Typeset in Bembo
by MPS Limited, Dehradun
CONTENTS
List of Figures ix
List of Tables x
List of Contributors xi
Acknowledgements xvii
Introduction 1
Elaine Fahey
SECTION I
EU and US Intra-Organisations Relations 15
v
Contents
SECTION II
Trade, Investment and Cooperation in Transatlantic
Relations 125
vi
Contents
SECTION III
Norm Promotion Practices of the EU and US in the
Digital Age 219
SECTION IV
The Political and Economic Character of Transatlantic
Relations 277
vii
Contents
Index 366
viii
FIGURES
ix
TABLES
x
CONTRIBUTORS
xi
Contributors
EP and the US Congress, since 1 October 2019. Earlier, Dunne was a senior
resident fellow at the German Marshall Fund in Washington DC and a visiting
fellow at the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason
University. Up to that time, he was a director in the European Parliament
Research Service.
Michelle Egan is professor and Jean Monnet Chair Ad Personam in the School of
International Service American University DC, US. Egan focuses on comparative
politics and political economy. She works on Europe and the United States, with
a focus on issues of federalism, trade, governance and law. Egan is co-director of
the Transatlantic Policy Center with Professor Garret Martin.
Elaine Fahey is professor of law at City Law School, City, University of London,
UK and visiting professor at American University, Washington College of Law.
She held a Jean Monnet Chair in Law and Transatlantic Relations from 2019-
2022. She is co-director of the Institute for the Study of European Law (ISEL).
Her research interests include the relationship between EU law and global
governance, international relations, trade and technology and transatlantic
relations.
Robert G. Finbow is Eric Dennis Memorial Professor of Political Science and deputy
director of Jean Monnet European Union Centre of Excellence, Dalhousie
University, Canada. Finbow’s current research focuses on the socially responsible
elements of trade agreements, especially labour and social issues in NAFTA and
the EU. His focus recently has been on the Canada-European Economic and Trade
Agreement (CETA), especially the implications for social policy and federalism.
Karsten Friis is a senior research fellow and head of the Norwegian Institute of
International Affairs’ (NUPI’s) Research Group on Security and Defence. Friis’
main area of expertise is security and defence policies, international military
operations, civilian-military relations, Nordic security, cyber security, as well as
the Western Balkans.
xii
Contributors
Jenya Grigorova is dispute settlement lawyer at the WTO. Her research interests
include international trade law, in particular WTO law, issues related to energy
regulation on both international and regional levels, international investment law
and environmental law. Grigorova has published on various pressing issues in
international trade relations, concerning trade in the energy sector, as well as on
specific aspects of EU law, relating to EU restrictive measures and to EU
environmental policy measures.
Davor Jancic is senior lecturer in law at Queen Mary University of London, UK.
His research interests include EU institutional law and governance, comparative
regional integration and regional organisations, democracy and legitimacy
beyond the state. He has dedicated a large portion of his research output to
national parliaments in the EU, the European Parliament and EU foreign affairs
(e.g. with the US and China), parliamentary diplomacy and so forth.
Maria Kendrick is senior lecturer in law at City, University of London, UK. Her
research areas cover tax law and EU law, including integration, differentiated
integration and tax. Dr Kendrick’s research also covers the subject of Brexit.
Maria is also, by invitation, on the Editorial Board of Kluwer Law International’s
Regulating for Globalization Blog and Global Trade and Customs Journal.
xiii
Contributors
Sara Poli is professor of EU law at University of Pisa, Italy. She is currently member
of the Jean Monnet networks EUDIPLO and EUCTER. She has held a Jean
Monnet Chair between 2013 and 2016. She has carried out research with the
support of the DAAD short term fellowship, Robert Schuman fellowship (EUI),
the Marie Curie fellowship (EUI), the Fulbright-Schuman fellowship and the
Belgian ‘Vlac fellowship’.
xiv
Contributors
and privacy law and policy issues. Privously, he was director of trade policy for
The Software Alliance (also known as BSA), an association of major software
companies and served as legal counsellor at the US Mission to the EU, where he
led US government’s engagement with the EU on digital and privacy law and
policy, and participated in US-EU trade negotiations.
Fabien Terpan is Jean Monnet Chair in EU Law & Politics and senior lecturer at
Sciences Po GrenobleUGA, France. He is the deputy director of the Centre
d’Etudes de la Sécurité Internationale et des Coopérations Européennes
(CESICE). His research focus lies on the EU’s common foreign and security
policy, international security policy and the interplay between law and politics in
the European Union.
Maria Tzanou is a senior lecturer in Law at Keele University Law School, UK.
Tzanou’s research focuses on European constitutional and human rights law,
privacy, data protection, surveillance, the regulation of new and emerging
technologies and the inequalities of data privacy law and how these affect
vulnerable groups.
xv
Contributors
xvi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This publication was produced with the support of the Erasmus+ Jean Monnet
Chair grant (2019–2022) Decision No. 2019- 1794-001-001. I am very grateful to
Ivanka Karaivanova for stellar research assistance and support for the project at
various stages and to Eve Poyner for research support.
Special thanks are due to Andrew Taylor for his support to the project and patience
with its development and thanks also to Sophie Iddamalgoda and Meghan Flood.
Thanks to all of the authors of this project who participated in multiple events online
and eventually in person in preparation for this project over a number of years.
Thanks to the following who graciously read draft chapters and supplied many
useful comments and suggestions or inputted into the publication in other ways of
significance to merit acknowledgements: David Collins, Sabrina Cuendet-Robert,
Daniel Francis, Mauro Gatti, Anna-Louise Hinds, Szilárd Gaspar-Szilagyi, Leigh
Hancher, Kristina Irion, Imelda Maher, Isabella Mancini, Eva Pander Maat, Jed
Odermatt, Wyn Rees, Ryan Stones, Martin Trybus, Guillaume Van de Loo, Eva
Van der Zee, Declan Walsh and Philippa Watson.
Elaine Fahey
London, 26 September 2022
xvii
INTRODUCTION
Elaine Fahey
CITY LAW SCHOOL, CITY, UNIVERSITY OF LONDON
A landmark relationship
The relationship between the European Union (EU) and United States (US), as
will be developed in this handbook), tends to be complex and multifaceted.
Relations are variously depicted as cyclical, intergovernmental and fundamental to
multilateralism and crisis-driven. They are driven also by and tend to ‘ignite’
geopolitics, as much as complex domestic issues and themes. EU-US relations are
the foundation of the theoretical ‘West’. In practical terms, they form the key
plank currently and for some time of international economic law, culture and
finance. More recently, they are centrally placed in the regulatory playing-field
of big tech and global data flows (Gardner, 2020). As will be explored here, a
broad range of attempts at transatlantic governance have been characterised as
unsuccessful in scholarship. They raise the seemingly eternal question as to what
the history of transatlantic governance indicates to us in terms of the expectations
and realities of transatlantic cooperation in view of its breadth and distinctiveness,
as much as the reach of the cooperation (Nicolaidis, 2005; Pollack, 2005; Young,
2009; Petersmann, 2015; Smith, 2019). Views on transatlantic cooperation and
their potential have arguably retreated substantially in the post–World War
II (WW2) years from calls for communities of law and transatlantic institutions
(e.g. Stein and Hay, 1963).
The transatlantic partnership may well be an iconic partnership for a long time,
fundamental to the global economy and world security. Yet, it has long been one of
the ‘problem children’ of international economic law for over decades (Petersmann,
2003). Moreover, the EU and US have consistently shaped international approaches
to public international law, albeit distinctively and differently (Dunoff and Pollack,
2013). The role of the US in crafting the global order after WW2 was decisive,
including the active promotion of European integration yet patterns of change
thereafter a complex to map. Over the next 60 or so years, the transatlantic part-
nership was central to global events through the building of the Western liberal
order and all the institutions that went with it. It has for many years been evidenced
by the un-equalness or un-equilibrium of power. For much of the 20th Century, the
US was evidently the stronger partner both militarily and economically. Even as
Europe grew into a larger and more cohesive economic and normative power, its
heavy reliance on the US security umbrella gave the US the upper hand particularly
DOI: 10.4324/9781003283911-1 1
Elaine Fahey
post 9/11 (O’ Sullivan, in this volume). In contemporary times, however, the EU
and US constitute two of the leading global figures in trade, economics, agriculture,
security and as bulwarks of the liberal global legal order post-WW2, at least until
recently. The EU supported fully the US pivot to mega-regionals to exclude China
and pivot away from the World Trade Organization (WTO) framework, in par-
ticular, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which quickly
stalled with the advent of a new administration but which afforded the EU the
change to align its post-Lisbon Trade agenda with more gusto (De Ville and Siles-
Brügge, 2015; Griller et al., 2017). It spurned a subsequently complex period for EU
trade policy, which has framed itself as being based upon ‘free and open’ trade and
competition but has been stymied by a defensive turn to a lexicon of strategic
autonomy, digital sovereignty and multiple trade defence instruments. The Ukraine
crisis has strengthened relations between the allies. At the same time, however, both
structural (the rise of China) and domestic (eg ‘America first’ policy or the strategic
autonomy of the EU) factors suggest that the EU-US relationship will weaken over
time due to the impact of such factors, in particular on US foreign policy prefer-
ences, especially where the EU is strengthening its own foreign policy, including in
the area of security and defence (Riddervold and Newsome, 2019). Yet the metrics
of the relationship are often shifting across political scientists, political theory and
political economy trade and data lawyers and governance scholarship, where the
calibration between convergence and divergence has been complex. Within a
political cycle, significant variations on the state of transatlantic relations have also
followed as well as their analysis. Transatlantic relations as a regional genre have
undoubtedly shown themselves to be a vibrant source of dynamic theorisation. The
place of actors, powers, competences and institutions form pivotal concepts but also
far from objective ideals, imbued often with constructivism. Conflict as much as
contestation and convergence is easily overplayed or overanalysed. Although a thirst
for international cooperation, standards and institutionalisation is seen globally as
pivotal to the success of the international economic order, such efforts arguably have
often been stymied at transatlantic or domestic level. This handbook explores many
of these themes, isolating these questions in this landmark relationship.
2
Introduction
3
Elaine Fahey
2001). Whether they generate higher standards for the other party or not is arguably
less of the focus for some time, more the conflict, convergence and contestation
processes (Bermann et al., 2000; Scott, 2009). Whether they have contributed to the
worsening of global governance through, for example, the dominance of big busi-
ness instead of civil society concerns remains to be proven, but increasingly sensitive
in the era of big tech. Many other formal law-making processes take place against this
difficult backdrop (Fahey, 2014; Jančić, 2015). It can be easily suggested that the
history of transatlantic relations shows a fine line between cooperation and conflict,
although the forum for both is similar. One of the most significant sites of trans-
atlantic ‘law-making’ has been until recently at the WTO. Yet it is here also where
the EU and US have displayed their starkest differences as to the rule of law,
interpretive legitimacy and the place of dispute settlement and courts. Most disputes
between the EU and US have taken place before the WTO Dispute Settlement
Body (DBS) in recent times, until at least the demise of the WTO DSB in late 2020
(Pollack and Shaffer, 2009; Petersmann, 2015). There, the EU and US have his-
torically been involved in most disputes and have arguably contributed to its
legalization, downfall and legitimacy deficit.
4
Introduction
between the EU and US as to the balance between security, surveillance and privacy
(Cole et al., 2017; Terpan, 2018; Farrell and Newman, 2019; Fabbrini et al., 2021).
In the post-9/11 period, the place of civil liberties in Europe have been understood
to have been adversely affected by the transatlantic relationship and the norm
promotion it generated (Cremona et al., 2011; Mitsilegas and Vavoula, 2021).
Transatlantic relations may have entered a new era after the CJEU decision in
Schrems II (CJEU, 2020) propelling a new Transatlantic Privacy Framework resulting
in a Transatlantic Data Review Court and binding standards, yet its execution will
be far from straightforward.
Chapters in this handbook across sections traverse directly and indirectly a vast
scholarship on the mutual and external influence of transatlantic standards and of the
directions of transatlantic law-making, also demonstrating global effects and signif-
icance for law and governance scholarship as well as the study of integration and
transnationalism (e.g. Shaffer, 2000; Scott, 2009; Vogel, 2012; Bradford, 2020).
The project views ‘framing’ here thus also as a multidisciplinary exercise in order
to frame shifts in law-making, governance and norms.
5
Elaine Fahey
‘Transatlantic Civil Society’ to be forged between the EU and US. Such entities
have been mooted with a view to creating a transatlantic polity of sorts, inter alia for
economic, political and even socio-cultural reasons (Fahey and Curtin, 2014). The
lack of Transatlantic Institutions, from a court to a legislature or political union or
sorts has long been a lament of many commentators (Stein and Hay, 1963). The
possibility of a Transatlantic Data Review Court or Transatlantic Parliament or
Political Union is discussed by many in this handbook (Fahey and Terpan, in this
volume; Dunne, in this volume; Jančić, in this volume, who consider in part how
these developments link to past and present institutional and other actors).
In the early 2000s when the EU and US appeared disinterested in alternatives to
dispute settlement outside of the WTO and form of judicalisation or oversight,
Petersmann wrote:
6
Introduction
7
Elaine Fahey
(IV) The political and economic character of transatlantic relations. The span of the
chapters thus takes into account a vast array of fields. The selection thus of four
themes is also rather arbitrary but hopefully the reader will agree that the themes span
the conceptual and practical core functioning and locus of the transatlantic part-
nership – a complex study of global governance; also a study of the world‘s largest
economic area and key drive of the digital economy.
In Part I, EU-US intra-organization relations, the section takes a span of pol-
icymakers and theorists, which is ‘structuralist’ in its focus but also focusing on how
the EU and US have addressed global challenges separately and also together.
Dunne in ‘Connecting the US Congress and the European Parliament: The Work
and Role of the EP Liaison Office in Washington DC’ outlines the evolving role and
historical context of the European Parliament Liaison Office (EPLO) in Washington
DC as a vivid work in progress from the perspective of a policy-maker. He shows how
the EPLO has added an important ‘hard’ dimension to institutionalising the EU-US
inter-parliamentary relationship. An array of factors – the huge boost given to EU-US
relations as a result of the Ukraine crisis, which slowed down the policy ‘pivot to Asia’
and brought the European Union into sharper focus; a new realisation of the
importance of the European Parliament in influencing and delivering privacy, climate,
digital, antitrust and online platform regulation emanating from the EU, the ex-
ponential development of virtual interactions during and since the COVID-19 pan-
demic, and the increasing intensity of parliamentary contacts – are all combining to
change traditional attitudes in the Congress. O’ Sullivan in ‘EU-US Relations in a
Changing World’ drawing from practice outlines the many diplomatic challenges of
the diplomatic organisation, content and actions of the EU engaging with the US.
When it speaks and decides with one voice, it can have huge influence, such as when it
adopted EU regulations on data privacy which have become the de facto global
standard. But, as often as it speaks with one voice, the EU can end up speaking with the
voices of its 27 members. This is confusing for friends and adversaries alike. He argues
that few in Washington, beyond specialists and policy wonks, really understand how
the EU works and how to deal with it and yet the legal and policy outcomes have
evolved immeasurably across administrations, at least until the Trump administration.
Propp exposes deftly in ‘Negotiating with the European Union – A US Perspective’
the complexity of negotiating with the EU from a US perspective in practice.
Relations between the US and the EU on law enforcement and security matters have
come to be grounded in a series of binding international agreements. US negotiators,
he maintains, remain frustrated by the obscurity of mixed competence, but they have
persevered where the practical benefits of proceeding with Brussels are clear. A lin-
gering US preference for bilateralism nevertheless sometimes comes to the fore.
In ‘Transatlantic Parliamentary Cooperation at Fifty’, Jancic outlines how the
transatlantic relationship furnishes an enduring space for parliamentary diplomacy,
norm entrepreneurship and coalition building. It enables EU and US parliamen-
tarians to discuss legislative, regulatory and general political developments; debate
their respective approaches to bilateral initiatives (like the TTC) and shared inter-
national challenges (like Russia’s invasion of Ukraine); and to identify divergences
and consider ways to address them. Roger in ‘The Rise of Informal International
8
Introduction
Organizations’ using a substantial data set argues that the shift towards informality in
international organisations has primarily been a product of changing cooperation
problems and two major domestic shifts that have subsequently projected outwards
and reshaped the Transatlantic order. Van Elsuwege and Szep then in ‘The Revival
of Transatlantic Partnership? EU-US Coordination in Sanctions Policy’ show how
both the EU and US increasingly use sanctions as an important foreign policy tool
and aim to reinforce the impact of their measures on the basis of close coordination.
Significantly, this coordination is not based on formal legal or institutional structures
but is essentially informal and political. Whereas the existence of geopolitical threats
such as Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine and new security challenges from
emerging powers such as China and India stimulates a revival of the transatlantic
partnership, leading to increased sanctions coordination, frictions about the extra-
territorial application of unilateral sanctions cannot be excluded. Poli in ‘The EU and
US Global Human Rights Sanction Regimes: Useful Complementary Instruments to
Advance Protection of Universal Values? A Legal Appraisal’ outlines how the EU has
been far more selective in using restrictive measures than the US in the case of human
rights breaches. In contrast to the US Global Magnitsky Programmes, the EU scheme
can be considered residual with respect to third country sanctions regimes. Poli shows
how the two Global Human Rights Sanction programmes are useful legal instruments
that complement other diplomatic tools used by the US and EU to reinforce respect of
human rights. Finally, in Part I, Bolstad and Friis argue persuasively in ‘NATO and
Transatlantic Security Relations’ that a combination of strong US engagement and
leadership with a broadly shared threat perception among Allies (primarily towards
Russia) is the combination that continues to make NATO a significant embodiment of
transatlantic security relations.
Part II sets out many key questions of the partnership relating to trade, arguably,
the high-water mark of cooperation.
Petersmann in ‘Transatlantic Economic and Legal Disintegration? Between
Anglo-Saxon Neo-Liberal Nationalism, Authoritarian State-Capitalism and
Europe’s Ordo-Liberal Multilevel Constitutionalism’ argues that path-dependent
value-conflicts among Anglo-Saxon neo-liberalism, authoritarian state-capitalism,
Europe’s multilevel constitutionalism and ‘third world conceptions’ of regulation
will continue to distort ‘regulatory competition’. The geopolitical rivalries impede
transatlantic leadership for protecting the universally agreed sustainable development
goals. Thereafter, Grigorova in ‘Reverberations of the CJEU Achmea B.V. Decision
in The Transatlantic Space’ analyses and categorises the different approaches
adopted. Focusing on the cases recently decided by US courts, the chapter also
tentatively assesses the issues raised before these courts, as well as the potential rel-
evance of the practice on this issue in other jurisdictions. Through this analysis, the
chapter aims at drawing more general conclusions as to the relevance accorded to
EU law by investment tribunals and by US courts, and as to the potential theoretical
and practical implications of these decisions. Verellen next in ’Executive
Accountability in Unilateral Trade Policy. A Transatlantic Perspective’, by means
of a comparative analysis of executive accountability in unilateral trade policy
in the US and the EU, describes this transformation of executive power in
9
Elaine Fahey
the EU and the accountability gaps it risks amplifying. Dekeyrel in a highly topical
piece ‘Transatlantic Energy Relations: A Brief History and a Tentative Outlook’
analyses the evolving dynamic of EU-US energy relations through the lens of secur-
itisation theory. It considers how transatlantic energy realities diverged in the 2000s as
the American shale revolution transformed the US from the world’s largest importer of
oil into an energy-exporting powerhouse, while the EU’s supply picture gradually
worsened as its relations with Russia deteriorated. Secondly, it studies transatlantic
energy relations during the 2010s, analysing Europe’s attempt to emulate the US shale
boom, the birth and expansion of transatlantic gas trade as well as US support for EU
diversification and opposition to Nord Stream 2. Thereafter, it analyses the secur-
itisation and paradigm shift in EU energy policy following Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine, and explores its implications for transatlantic energy relations. Next, Egan in
‘Taking Back Control: The Political Economy of Investment Screening in US and
EU’ highlights the sectoral and geographic scope of foreign direct investment, the
different investment policy responses across two economic crises, and the efforts to
work together through the new Transatlantic Trade and Technology Council. It
assesses whether there is an opportunity to further align the U.S.-EU partnership and
learn to cooperate to deal with threats posed to both their national security and stra-
tegic economic interests.
In Part III, the handbook considers a range of themes as to the digital area and
cooperation in this context, often plighted by complex global governance.
Terpan and Fahey in ‘The Future of the EU-US Privacy Shield’ outline how soft
law and its complex enforceability, construction and classification is a thorny one
and EU-US relations have contributed to many of these challenges through an
evolving variety of increasingly complex, novel or simply hybrid transatlantic
instruments. The chapter discusses whether a solution is possible to frame and sta-
bilise the transfer of data between European Union and the US. For this, we will
come back to the Safe Harbour and the Privacy Shield, in a first section, to get a
clear view of why these arrangements were deemed inadequate. A second section
will explain the situation created by the ruling in Schrems II while a third one will
explore the possible evolutions of the data transfer regime, considering the ongoing
discussions between EU and US authorities. Kendrick in ‘The EU and US
Transatlantic Agendas on Taxation’ considers both EU and US transatlantic agendas
on ‘fair’ corporate taxation in a digitalised economy. What will become apparent is
that both the EU and the US are trying to ensure that their own transatlantic agendas
on taxation become the basis of the new norms of the digital age. Both the EU and
US transatlantic agendas on taxation therefore demonstrate a desire to harmonise
corporate tax to make it ‘fair’ in order to facilitate new norm promotion practices in
the digital age, but according to their own agendas. Kowalski in ‘Transatlantic
Regulation of Digital Platforms’ Anticompetitive Unilateral Behaviours: The
“beneficial” Divergence between EU and US Antitrust Law’ explores the concept of
‘beneficial divergence’ between EU and US antitrust and whether at least some of
these features can serve as a ‘development platform’ to improve EU antitrust
law. The chapter examines recent case law concerning digital platforms and
looking features characterising the different analytical frameworks and, therefore,
10
Introduction
11
Elaine Fahey
primary and secondary income – is far better suited to assess economic ties between
countries than the sole focus on merchandise goods trade including all its sub-
accounts. Transatlantic trade policy is characterized by notable attempts to liberalize
trade in the 1990s and 2010s, which ultimately have failed. Recent developments
such as the set-up of the Transatlantic Trade Council (TTC) suggest that EU-US
trade policy is increasingly shaped by geopolitical considerations. Next, Finbow in
‘Asymmetry and Civil Society Backlash: Changing European Calculations in Trans-
Atlantic Investment Relations from CETA to TTIP and Beyond’ examines
the recent history of EU’s transatlantic investment relationships with Canada and the
US. It compares the provisions in the Canada-European Union Comprehensive
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with the EU’s proposals for a TTIP with
the US. It is based on background interviews, official policy statements, ratified
agreements, draft texts, and academic analyses. It considers stakeholder and official
views of the benefits, costs, and controversies of an investment chapter. Last but not
least, Riddervold, Newsome and Didriksen in ‘Transatlantic Relations in a
Changing World’ drawing from a range of studies discuss the factors that contribute
to explain a stable or changing relationship in the transatlantic context and synthesise
well the broader debates that the final section of the handbook seeks to capture. It
finds that EU-US relations are robust in many contexts and settings. It is obvious
that the Russian invasion of Ukraine has helped to enhance relations between the
allies. However, at difference to previous periods in the relationship, domestic and
structural factors suggest a longer-term weakening of the relationship.
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Bermann, G., Lindseth, P., and Herdegen, M. (eds.). 2000. Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation.
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Bradford, A. 2020. The Brussels Effect: How the European Union Rules the World. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Burghardt, G. 2015. New Transatlantic Agenda Celebrates 20th Anniversary! [online].
3 December. AmCham EU. https://www.amchameu.eu/news/new-transatlantic-agenda-
celebrates-20th-anniversary. Accessed 30 September 2022.
CJEU. 2020. Judgement in Case C-311/18 Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook
Ireland Limited, Maximillian Schrems (Schrems II) EU:C:2020:559.
Cole, D., Fabbrini, F., and Schulhofer, S. (eds.). 2017. Surveillance, Privacy and Trans-Atlantic
Relations. Oxford: Hart Publishing.
Cremona, M. et al. (eds.). 2011. The External Dimension of the European Union’s Area of Freedom,
Security and Justice. Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang.
De Ville, F. and Siles-Brügge, G. 2015. TTIP: The Truth about the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership. Oxford: Wiley.
Dunoff, J. and Pollack, M. 2013. Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and
International Relations: The State of the Art. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Fahey, E. 2014. On The Use of Law in Transatlantic Relations: Legal Dialogues Between the
EU and US. European Law Journal, 20, 368.
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Introduction
Fahey, E. and Curtin, D. (eds.). 2014. A Transatlantic Community of Law: Legal Perspectives on
the Relationship between the EU and US legal orders. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fahey, E. and Terpan, F. 2021. Torn between Institutionalisation and Judicialisation: The
Demise of the EU-US Privacy Shield. Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 28, 205.
Fabbrini, F., Celeste, E., and Quinn, J. (eds.). 2021. Data Protection Beyond Borders: Transatlantic
Perspectives on Extraterritoriality and Sovereignty. Oxford: Hart Publishing.
Farrell, H. and Newman, A. (eds). 2019. Of Privacy and Power: The Transatlantic Struggle over
Freedom and Security. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Gardner, A. 2020. Stars with Stripes: The Essential Partnership between the EU and US. Cham:
Palgrave Macmillan.
Griller, S., Obwexer, W., and Vranes, E. (eds). 2017. Mega-Regional Trade Agreements: CETA,
TTIP, and TiSA: New Orientations for EU External Economic Relations. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Jančić, D. 2016. Transatlantic Regulatory Interdependence, Law and Governance: The
Evolving Roles of the EU and US Legislatures. Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal
Studies, 17, 334. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/jcms.12345
Krisch, N. 2010. Pluralism in Post-national Risk Regulation: The Dispute over GMOs and
Trade. Transnational Legal Theory, 1, 1–29.
Mitsilegas, V. and Vavoula, N. 2021. Surveillance and Privacy in the Digital Age: European,
Transatlantic and Global Perspectives. Oxford: Hart Publishing.
Nicolaidis, K. 2005. A Compact Between The United States and Europe. Brookings Institute.
Nicolaidis, K. and Shaffer, G. 2005. Transnational Mutual Recognition Regimes: Governance
without Global Government. Law and Contemporary Problems, 68, 263.
Pollack, M. and Shaffer, G. (eds). 2001. Transatlantic Governance in the Global Economy.
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Pollack, M. 2005. The New Transatlantic Agenda at Ten: Reflections in an Experiment in
International Governance. Journal of Common Market Studies, 43, 899.
Pollack, M. and Shaffer, G. 2009. When Cooperation Fails: The International Law and Politics of
Genetically. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Petersmann, E.-U. and Pollack, M. (eds). 2003. Transatlantic Economic Disputes: The EU, the
US, and the WTO. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Petersmann, E.-U. 2015. Transformative Transatlantic Free Trade Agreements without
Rights and Remedies of Citizens? Journal of International Economic Law, 18, 579.
Petersmann, E.-U. and Mayr, S,. 2017. CETA, TTIP, TiSA, and Their Relationship with EU
Law. In: Griller, S., Obwexer, W. and Vranes, E. (eds.), Mega-Regional Trade Agreements:
CETA, TTIP, and TiSA: New Orientations for EU External Economic Relations. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Riddervold, M. and Newsome, A. 2019. Introduction: Transatlantic Relations in Times of
Uncertainty: Crises and EU-US Relations. In: Riddervold, M. and Newsome, A. (eds.),
Transatlantic Relations in Times of Uncertainty Crises and EU-US Relations. Abingdon,
Oxfordshire: Routledge.
Scott, J. 2009. From Brussels with Love: The Transatlantic Travels of European Law and the
Chemistry of Regulatory Attraction. American Journal of Comparative Law, 57, 897.
Shaffer, G. 2000. Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU and International
Rules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy Standards. Yale Journal of International Law, 25, 1.
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Riddervold, M. and Newsome, A. (eds.), Transatlantic Relations in Times of Uncertainty
Crises and EU-US Relations. Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Routledge.
Stein, E. and Hay, P. 1963. Cases and Materials on the Law and Institutions of the Atlantic
Area. In: Stein, Eric and Hay, Peter (eds.), Ann Arbor: The Overbeck pany.
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One? European Papers, 3, 1045.
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Elaine Fahey
Vogel, D. 2012. The Politics of Precaution: Regulating Health, Safety, and Environmental Risks in
Europe and the United States. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Young, A.R. 2009. Confounding Conventional Wisdom: Political not Principled Differences
in the Transatlantic Regulatory Relationship. The British Journal of Politics and International
Relations, 11(4), 666.
14
SECTION I
EU and US Intra-Organisations
Relations
1
CONNECTING THE US
CONGRESS AND THE
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
The Work and Role of the EP Liaison
Office in Washington DC
Joseph Dunne
DIRECTOR, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LIAISON OFFICE IN WASHINGTON D.C.
DOI: 10.4324/9781003283911-3 17
Joseph Dunne
A house in Washington
As early as 1984, in the first term of the directly elected Parliament, the EP
adopted a resolution1 tabled by the MEP, and later President, Klaus Hänsch,
whose para. 42 ‘hoped’ that the Parliament could arrange to ‘be represented in its
own right at {the Commission’s] delegation in Washington’.
The landmark reports tabled by Elmar Brok MEP and Erika Mann MEP in 2006
(European Parliament 2006a, 2006b) went a step further and secured full EP
approval, with 470 votes in favour out of 617 votes cast, for the idea of a permanent
EP presence in Washington DC. The plenary resolution called for ‘the necessary
funds for establishing a permanent EP official post in Washington DC that ensures
proper institutionalisation of Parliament’s own activities and allows for improved
liaison between the EP and the US Congress’. The Internal Market Committee
(IMCO) input specified that ‘the opening of a permanent EP liaison office in
Washington is overdue, as it would provide a key means of strengthening contacts
between the EP and TLD on the one hand, and Congress, on the other’. (IMCO,
2006) Progress in creating the office was nonetheless slow, and in 2009, the
Parliament invited its secretary general to proceed ‘as a matter of the utmost urgency’
with the deployment of an official to Washington as Liaison Officer (European
Parliament 2009).
The EPLO Washington DC office was duly established on 29 April 2010 with a
small staff - three policy professionals and two administrative staff – ‘co-located’ in the
EU Delegation, the EU’s Embassy to the US. The creation of the liaison office has
been interpreted by some observers (Farrell and Newman 2019) as being linked to the
then-prevailing conflict over privacy and data protection as well as being a way of
combatting the perception that ‘structural inequalities between the power and political
role of EU parliamentarians and US members of Congress meant that the latter did not
really recognize the former as peers’. It was, at the very least, felicitous that the creation
of the office coincided with the Parliament’s new co-legislative powers under the
18
Connecting the US Congress and the EP
19
Joseph Dunne
retrace the developments that began some 40 years ago. The first steps in inter-
parliamentary contacts were in fact taken at the initiative of the US Congress in
January 1972. A Congressional Delegation (‘CoDel’) led by the Chair of the Europe
Subcommittee, Rep. Benjamin Rosenthal, visited Luxembourg, and, coincidentally,
a delegation of the Ways and Means Committee visited Brussels at the same time.
According to the Congressional reports, with the arresting titles ‘The European
Community and the American Interest’ and ‘A Growing Bond: the European
Parliament and the Congress’, these visits marked ‘the beginning of an effort to
establish parliamentary ties with an institution representing the increasingly effective
economic and political integration of Europe’. The Congressmen were ‘greatly
impressed by the development of a European political consciousness’ and by ‘the
political development at the European Parliament and by its important future role in
the European Community’ (Tulli 2017). The US side hoped to set ‘a style and
pattern of meetings’ twice a year, alternately in Washington and in Europe, for
‘carefully planned and comprehensive’ political and economic discussions, ‘con-
ducted with informality and candor’.
The two visits from the US House of Representatives triggered an immediate and
enduring response from MEPs in May 1972, led by EP Vice-President Schuijt. The
vice-President reported to the plenary on 31 May:
Above all, we wish to open a dialogue that will not end when we leave the
United States but may be continued at regular intervals and developed fur-
ther in a spirit of mutual understanding. This is not merely a diplomatic or
even a governmental concern. But it should be … a matter of permanent
preoccupation for the elected representatives of our peoples.
(Tulli 2017)
The foundational documents for the EU-US inter-parliamentary relationship are the
Transatlantic Declaration on EC-US Relations of 1990 and the New Transatlantic
Agenda (NTA) of 1995. Both explicitly mentioned parliamentary cooperation. The
NTA stressed the importance of ‘enhanced parliamentary links’. Parliamentary frus-
tration at the lack of progress on this NTA commitment (CRS 2013) gave rise to the
TLD. Thus, on 15 January 1999, during the 50th inter-parliamentary meeting in
Strasbourg, 27 years after the bi-annual meetings set in train by Rep Rosenthal and EP
Vice-President Schuijt, the EP and the US House of Representatives formalised their
institutional cooperation in a ‘Strasbourg Declaration’, into a framework they named
the ‘Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue’.
In order to overcome the difficulty of maintaining in-person contact caused by the
cost, time and effort of travelling and organising the bi-annual meetings, early and
pioneering recourse was had to video conferences. This was one of the practical measures
enumerated in the ‘Strasbourg declaration’ creating the TLD, along with the convening
of a Steering Group and special working groups on subjects of mutual interest. The EP
20
Connecting the US Congress and the EP
delegates had in fact ‘jumped the gun’ in terms of top-level support for the initiative,
announcing the initiative before securing the full agreement of the leadership, but the
necessary authorisations were nevertheless duly granted. Despite these good intentions,
and political endorsement, however, video-conferenced meetings never really caught on
and remained an occasional exception to the regular in-person meetings. The COVID-
19 pandemic later brought about a major, albeit temporary, change.
Parliament’s continued frustration at the lack of progress in EU-US relations, and
particularly at its weak institutionalisation, came to a head in the early 2000s. A
reflection paper of the Transatlantic Policy Network (TPN 2003) with EP and
Congressional, as well as academic and think tank input, noted that ‘Americans are
seen to value institutions for what they can do, Europeans for their durability and
continuity’. The TPN report saw the solution to the slow pace of transatlantic
cooperation in deeper political dialogue, and advocated building on the TLD and
‘active consideration’ of a ‘Transatlantic Assembly’ of legislators.
Impatient at the lack of ‘the necessary conviction and determination’ on the part of
other EU institutions, the EP adopted the 2006 resolutions referenced earlier, on
‘improving EU-U.S. relations’. As well as providing the mandate for the creation of
EPLO, as we have seen, they echoed the TPN recommendations, calling for an up-
grade of the TLD and for a Transatlantic Assembly. The advent of the Obama
administration brought new hope for closer cooperation. In 2009, the EP called yet
again for a Transatlantic Assembly, making far-reaching proposals on deepening the
institutional structures to harness ‘the current momentum’ and ‘to improve and renew
the framework of the transatlantic relationship’. The Transatlantic Assembly itself
would serve ‘as a forum for parliamentary dialogue, identification of objectives and
joint scrutiny’. It ‘should meet in plenary twice a year and be comprised on an equal
basis of both Members of the European Parliament and Members of both Houses of
the US Congress’. The resolution was followed by the publication in 2009 of a study
by the Atlantic Council and other think tanks, putting forward even wider-ranging
recommendations on ‘forging a strategic US-EU partnership’. These proposals were
then reprised and strengthened in a TLD Joint Statement in December of that year.
The momentum was channelled into the negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade
and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and eventually dissipated by its failure in 2016.
The demise of TTIP and the new Trump administration in the White House did not
however cause the EP to abandon its calls for ‘a structured and strategic dialogue on
foreign policy at transatlantic level, also involving the European Parliament and the
US Congress’. Its 2018 resolution recalled an earlier ‘suggestion to create a
Transatlantic Political Council (TPC) for systematic consultation and coordination
on foreign and security policy’. It welcomed ‘the ongoing and uninterrupted work
of the TLD in fostering EU-US relations through parliamentary dialogue and
coordination on issues of common interest’, and welcomed ‘the relaunch of the
bipartisan Congressional EU Caucus for the 115th Congress’, asking ‘the European
Parliament Liaison Office (EPLO) and the EU delegation in Washington to liaise
more closely with [the Caucus]’.(European Parliament 2018).
Following the change of administration in the US with the election of President
Biden, the EP adopted a new report on EU-US relations in 2021, with rapporteur
21
Joseph Dunne
Tonino Picula MEP. This resolution echoed the approach of the 2009, Obama-era,
report, seeking to harness the favourable impetus generated by the successful EU-US
Summit of 15 June 2021. It returned to the idea of a Transatlantic Assembly, albeit
sotto voce. Instead, it focussed on the possibly more achievable goal of greater in-
stitutionalisation of the TLD, noting: ‘that raising the awareness of structures such as
the Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue and organising more regular meetings and
visits … would restore confidence in and the durability and efficiency of transatlantic
cooperation’. The resolution even went as far as urging the US Congress to ‘enhance
the Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue by authorising it as a formal body with
permanent membership’, that is, with the appointment of designated members, as
opposed to the ad hoc membership of the US delegation to the TLD (European
Parliament 2021).
There is a marked difference in institutional structure between the EP and the
House of Representatives in how they deal with delegations in the context of
foreign relations. As Šabič (2015) notes, interparliamentary groups for the UK,
Canada, Mexico and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) exist in statute,2 and include both House and Senate membership. The
NATO PA Parliamentary Group, on the other hand, has a separate legal base,3 as
does the Security and Cooperation in Europe, or ‘Helsinki’, Commission.4 A variant
is the bipartisan ‘House Democracy Partnership’, a House-only entity, which is not a
statutory body but features in the Rules of the House of Representatives.5
Congress has shown little receptivity to the EP’s calls to give such a statutory or
Rules-based foundation to the TLD, despite - so far unsuccessful - efforts on the part
of Co-Chair Rep Jim Costa (H.R. 4105 in the 116th Congress and H.R. 6624 in
the 117th) to include the Senate in the TLD and to give the TLD a basis in statute.
While the House is thus highly selective in the number of interparliamentary
bodies, the EP, by contrast, has a comprehensive, worldwide network of delegations
covering every region provided for in its Rules of Procedure (Title VIII, Chapter 2).
The EP delegation to the TLD is part of this organisational structure, led by its
Delegation for relations with the United States of America (D-US), comprising 64
members and currently chaired by Radosław Sikorski MEP, a former Polish defence
and foreign minister who is well-known and widely respected in Washington. Their
US counterparts are the TLD co-chairs appointed by the Speaker of the House in a
bipartisan arrangement, currently Congressman Jim Costa (Democrat-California)
and Congresswoman Ann Wagner (Republican-Missouri). The US meeting parti-
cipants are chosen on a volunteer basis.
The asymmetric nature of this TLD structure stems, at least in part, from a tradi-
tional reluctance on the part of the Congress to go beyond the small number of existing
formal and institutionalised relationships with other parliamentary bodies, detailed
above, some of which were created in the late 1950s and the most recent (the British-
American Interparliamentary Group) in 1991. In 2013, the assessment of the CRS was
that there were enough skeptics that doubted the utility or need to establish a stronger
relationship between the U.S. Congress and the European Parliament … that Congress
as a whole seems to be at best ambivalent to such efforts and has not demonstrated as
much enthusiasm as the EP about forging closer relations.
22
Connecting the US Congress and the EP
23
Joseph Dunne
which involves members from national parliament, EP and Congress, parliaments are
in fact generating layers of ‘legislative networks’ of the kind envisaged by Šabič
(2016).
A joint virtual meeting, mediated by EPLO, between the Helsinki Committee
in Congress (the joint Congressional/Executive commission for the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe, OSCE) and the EP’s Human Rights
Subcommittee in September 2020, was a high-water mark in inter-parliamentary
cooperation on human rights during the COVID-19 pandemic. The unanimity of
viewpoints was striking.
Issues touching on trade and economic relations are more complicated and
controversial. It might appear self-evident that the EU and US, with the largest
trade-flow in the world, and with the largest combined market and investment pool,
would want to align or converge legislation, regulatory policy and standards so as to
avoid the creation of non-tariff barriers and obstacles to mutually-reinforcing eco-
nomic growth. This was the avowed purpose of legislative cooperation called for in
the EP resolutions described earlier, and the ‘early warning system’ so earnestly
wished for, to alert legislators to legislation or draft legislation which would nega-
tively affect the transatlantic market and common interest. The hope was that an
early warning system would obviate unpleasant surprises like the disagreements over
privacy legislation, and develop a ‘barrier-free’ internal market between the EU and
the US.
Even if the push for regulatory convergence ultimately failed with the demise of
TTIP, the concept certainly incentivised committee-to-committee cooperation from
2008 onwards, with a noticeable intensification after the establishment of EPLO. In
2010, alone there were visits to the US by delegations from the Special Committee on
the Financial Crisis and from a majority of the legislative committees – the Committees
on Civil Liberties, Transport (twice), Internal Market and Consumer Protection, Legal
Affairs and Economic and Monetary Affairs (twice). The Committee on Foreign
Affairs (AFET), the subcommittees on Security and Defence (SEDE) and Human
Rights (DROI), and the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) were
equally active. So marked was the development that the 2013 CRS report ‘Evolving
Transatlantic Legislative Cooperation’ focussed on improving direct committee-to-
committee contact and strongly suggested a coordination role for the TLD as the best
achievable outcome from the European perspective.
Parliamentary Committees have thus always accounted for the majority of inter-
actions between the EP and the US Congress, while the TLD meetings have taken
centre-stage as the ‘official’ locus of EP-Congress relations. As Table 1.1 shows, the
intensity of the relationship has remained surprisingly stable over the years, with only a
loose link to the political ‘colour’ (red or blue) of the US Administration.
Once reduced travel opportunities in EP election years, and the pause caused by
the COVID-19 pandemic, are factored in, the level of engagement can be con-
sidered fairly constant, with a slight rise as the overall long-term trend.
An average of 100 MEPs have visited the US Congress each year since the es-
tablishment of EPLO. The large number of virtual meetings in 2020/2021, when
in-person meetings were not possible, is particularly noticeable, and reinforces the
24
Connecting the US Congress and the EP
2010 10 5 1
2011 5 14 1
2012 9 21 1
2013 13 22
2014 ∗ 1 15 1
2015 10 15 1
2016 11 17 1
2017 19 16 1
2018 17 7
2019 ∗ 6 9 1
2020-(pre-Covid) 3 1
2020 (Lockdown) 14
2021 (post-Covid) 7 2 33
2022 (end July) 10 17 1 4
TOTAL: 121 ∗∗ 161 9 ∗∗∗ 51
25
Joseph Dunne
has steadily increased. For the most part, the meetings are with individual members
of Congress, but often they can take the form of in-person, committee-to-
committee meetings, notably for the International Trade Committee (INTA) in
2020 and 2022, but also for other committees, such as the Committee on Culture
and Education (CULT) in 2022. In 2021, a visit from the Special Committee on
Artificial Intelligence in a Digital Age (AIDA) prompted a first meeting of the
Congressional Caucus on AI.
While the larger flow has been in the direction of Europe to America, traffic has
not been one-way only. Congressional delegations, or ‘CoDels’, visiting the EP, are
a regular feature and are increasing in frequency (Lazarou 2020). A delegation of the
Select Committee on Modernization and the Rules Committee in 2022, which,
rather unusually, dedicated its full visit to the EP, presages greater exchange in the
future.
With a helping hand from the pandemic lockdown, and the new acceptability of
‘zoom’ meetings, the number of committee-to-committee dialogue streams, or
‘parliamentary conversations’ mediated by EPLO has increased exponentially. Some
twenty-one parliamentary dialogues during the lockdown held out the promise of
genuine transatlantic parliamentary exchange on legislative issues before respective
positions have solidified. The end of the pandemic brought a restoration of the
primacy of in-person meetings but virtual meetings can add the consistency of
contact that the TLD always sought (and failed) to obtain with video-conferencing.
The depth of the virtual dialogue and the intensity of the in-person contacts since
the pandemic has coincided with, and been framed by, the era of global challenges.
The EU has forged ahead with attempts to regulate the digital economy, manage the
climate transition and energy crisis and to restore multilateral trade mechanisms.
EP-Congress dialogue has brought a new level of understanding, but it is not an
inevitably convergent process: the objections of the House of Representatives and
the Senate to what they perceived as discrimination against US companies by
European legislators in the Digital Markets Act (DMA)6 is a case in point, as one
legislature realises the risk of being subjected to a ‘Brussels’ or a ‘Washington effect’
from the other. At the same time, members of parliament borrow concepts and
regulatory ideas from each other in a symbiotic process.
Common ground is also being found on the need to deal with the increasing
assertiveness of authoritarian actors and on how to deal with existential threats to
parliamentary and democratic legitimacy. The way has opened for transatlantic
parliamentary cooperation to boost democracy at home and abroad, a priority of the
Biden administration and a key concern that now lies at the base of EU-US relations.
The EP and the Congress have a new opportunity to work together and learn from
each other, this time to unravel and disarm the developing threats posed by
cyberattacks, disinformation and dark money, all intertwining with the regulation of
online platforms.
It was always understood that, important as the step was, the establishment of an EP
office in Washington DC could never, of itself, comprehensively cater for the
dynamic, multi-dimensional, multi-stakeholder information flow across the Atlantic.
EPLO accordingly partners with bodies channelling stakeholder and business views,
26
Connecting the US Congress and the EP
such as the Transatlantic Business and Consumer Dialogues, many of which were
created in the lead up to the TTIP negotiations as contributors to the Transatlantic
Economic Council, active from 2007 to 2016. As the momentum for regulatory
cooperation has receded, the associated bodies have lost salience. Nevertheless the
work with stakeholders continues, and involves business interests, non-governmental
organisations, consulting groups and the Chambers of Commerce. Among these sta-
keholder organisations, the Transatlantic Policy Network retains its specificity of
seeking to blend and synergize the business-oriented and the parliamentary dialogues.
Most recently, the US-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC), launched at the
June 2021 U.S.-EU Summit, holds out the promise of successful executive-to-
executive cooperation in key areas.
In this respect, the question posed by Raube (2022), and Thiel (2022) of the
complementarity of ‘EP diplomatic action’, including the establishment of EPLO, and
the public diplomacy of EU delegations, is relevant to Washington DC. EPLO works
in close coordination with the EU Delegation at all operational levels, and all incoming
parliamentary delegations are systematically briefed by the EU Ambassador.
A parliamentary vehicle intended to support the EP-Congress relationship,
created largely at the initiative of EPLO, is the EU Caucus in the House of
Representatives. The first Caucus was officially launched in the 115th Congress by
Rep. Gregory Meeks (Democrat-New York) and Rep. Joe Wilson (Republican-
South Carolina), with the message that ‘the European Union plays a significant role
in safeguarding and promoting our shared values of freedom and … Our shared
aspiration for enduring European peace and prosperity is undoubtedly in the interests
of the United States’. The EU Caucus has been renewed in each Congressional
session since even if it has not, like many others, been noticeably active.
Outlook
EPLO has developed an increasingly influential role over the years. As the involve-
ment with Congress widens and deepens, there can be at least a modest expectation of
sooner or later reaching the critical mass and leading the Congress to adapt its struc-
tures, thereby achieving greater balance in the TLD relationship. At the same time, by
connecting the committees on new legislative challenges, the traditional conundrum
of where to look for the ‘early warning’ appears to have resolved itself.
Legislators on both sides of the Atlantic understand that regulatory approaches
to global problems (from climate change and a form of Cross Border Carbon
Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) to antitrust and ‘big tech’ regulation, to whether
and how to converge on the regulation of the digital economy; to the taxation of
multinational firms, how to regulate cryptocurrency, to artificial intelligence) could
clearly benefit from a common or concerted approach. The US is holding back and
has been generally unwilling to go down the regulatory path in some of these areas.
Attempts at dialogue have been driven from the European side but are recognised on
the US side to be necessary. Non-traditional and difficult areas of policy are no
longer exempt from discussions, as women’s’ issues, gender equality and agriculture
policy become subjects of open dialogue.
27
Joseph Dunne
The Members of Congress involved now range across many committee forma-
tions, a far cry from the limited pool of the past. Closer cooperation brings ‘socia-
lisation’ and mutual trust, building up over time as the broader legislative partnership
is strengthened and a wider cross-section of Members of Congress become involved
in the committee-to-committee dialogue.
Despite the Congressional leadership’s reluctance to date to endorse a more per-
manent or embedded status to parliamentary dialogue with the EU, it seems con-
ceivable that the US-EU convergence brought about by the war in Ukraine will, in
due course, bring new impetus to proposals for a dedicated body in Congress. It could
take the form of a Congressional Commission on the EU, as originally proposed in
2010, or more diffuse or specialised arrangements such as a Congress-Parliament
Working Group on China to complement the IPAC network, as was suggested in a
Hearing of the Europe Subcommittee in the House of Representatives.7
Both legislatures, EP and Congress, are searching for broader forms of cooper-
ation and parliamentary diplomacy in support of democracy. EPLO is seeking to play
its part in facilitating a new and higher level of connection. Changing attitudes in the
Congress and a growing understanding of the global nature of legislative challenges
and of the need to keep the executive accountable, enabled by the new possibilities
afforded by vsirtual meetings, have transformed the prospects for future cooperation
for the better.
Notes
1 Official Journal C 127/94 of 14 May 1984.
2 Title 22, Chapter 7 of the U.S. Code.
3 Title 22 § 1928a, U.S. Code.
4 Title 22 §3001 to 3009, U.S. Code.
5 § 1125 f., Rules of the House of Representatives of the United States, 117th Congress.
6 Hon Suzan DelBene Letter dated February 23, 2022 to President Joseph R. Biden. https://
delbene.house.gov/uploadedfiles/eu_digital_markets_act_letter.pdf
US Senators Ron Wyden, Mike Crapo, Letter dated February 1 to President Joseph
R. Biden. https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2022.02.01%20Wyden-Crapo
%20Letter%20to%20POTUS%20on%20DMA%20DSA.pdf
7 Statement of Dr. Karen Donfried President, German Marshall Fund of the United States,
to the Subcommittee on Europe on ‘The Importance of Transatlantic Cooperation During
the COVID-19 Pandemic’ July 14, 2020.
References
Congressional Research Service (CRS) 29 July 2013 The US Congress and the European
Parliament: Evolving Transatlantic Legislative Cooperation.
Congressional Research Service (CRS) 2014 The European Parliament and U.S. Interests, K
Archick, last updated May 6, 2022.
Davidson, R. and Oleszek, W. et al. 2022 ‘Congress and its Members’ 18th Edition, CQ
Press, SAGE Publications.
European Parliament resolution (P6_TA(2006)0238) of 1 June 2006 on improving EU-US
relations in the framework of a Transatlantic Partnership Agreement.
28
Connecting the US Congress and the EP
29
Joseph Dunne
30
2
EU-US RELATIONS IN A
CHANGING WORLD
David O’Sullivan
The role of the US in crafting the global order after World War II was decisive,
including the active promotion of European integration. Over the next 60 or so
years, the transatlantic partnership was central to global events through the building
of the Western liberal order and all the institutions that went with it. It was never an
equal partnership. For much of the period, the US was by far the stronger partner
both militarily and economically. Even as Europe grew into a larger and more
cohesive economic and normative power, its heavy reliance on the US security
umbrella gave the US the upper hand. Although the US was generally supportive of
greater integration in Europe, it often found the emerging structures and institutions
bewildering.
The EU is an unusual political animal in international relations, an ‘unidentified
political object’, as President Jacques Delors (1985) once said. It is not a country. But
neither is it a mere international organisation. In some areas (trade, market regulation)
it has real federal powers. It has (for 19 countries at least) a single currency. It has a
consolidated legal order. When it speaks and decides with one voice, it can have huge
influence, such as when it adopted EU regulations on data privacy which have become
the de facto global standard. But, as often as it speaks with one voice, the EU can end
up speaking with the voices of its 27 members. As Kenneth Propp points out in his
excellent chapter ‘Negotiating with the European Union – A U.S. Perspective’, this
can be very confusing for friends and adversaries alike (Propp in this volume).
Few in Washington, beyond policy wonks, really understand how the EU works
and how to deal with it. There is a strong lobby for NATO in Congress. The
significance of the EU for US security, economic and value interests has yet to find a
coherent voice. However, in the coming great power confrontation of the 21st
century, the EU arguably holds more of the levers than NATO. Kinetic military
power will remain important, but the real challenges will be economic, techno-
logical, cyber, and informational. In these areas, it is the EU as a bloc rather than
individual member states which yields the real power.
DOI: 10.4324/9781003283911-4 31
Exploring the Variety of Random
Documents with Different Content
“It is doubtful whether anyone has brought the same amount and
quality of tourist information into so compact space before.”
Reviewed by E. S. Bogardus
“Its contents, far from being prosy or dull to any but the mother or
nurse, are, on the other hand, most interesting to any reader who has
in him a trace of the antiquary.”
+ Springf’d Republican p8 My 18 ’20
200w
“Dr Dunn has burrowed with great industry and good results
among old and sometimes scarce books and pamphlets; and the light
and airy style in which he starts writing must not prejudice us
against his work.”
When Wat Lyman died, he left behind him the secret of a gold
lode. But he was canny enough to divide his secret among three,
Healy, an ex-gambler, “Lefty” Larkin, an adventurer, and Stone, an
American temporarily down on his luck. Each of these three knew
one-third only of the directions necessary to locate the gold, which,
when found, was to be divided equally with Lyman’s daughter, who
also had to be found. By their common sharing of the secret, the
three prospectors were kept together all through the first part of their
hunt. Exciting experiences in the Arizona desert, and with the
Apache Indians almost lead to failure. But eventually they find their
lode, only to have Healy turn traitor and try to cheat the other two
out of their share. How the girl comes into it and saves their lives and
the gold is the close of the story.
Because he had once struck his brother with murder in his heart,
King Howden had determined never to fight again, and because of
that resolution he was held to be something of a coward in the
frontier country where he lived a rather solitary life. And then one
day he met Cherry McBain, a girl worth fighting for. She was the
daughter of old Keith McBain, the construction boss of a new
railway. And she had an enemy in the person of Big Bill McCartney,
her father’s foreman, who was determined to win her by fair means
or foul and regardless of her wishes in the matter. The situation
certainly offered grounds for the fight that eventually came, leaving
King with his reputation vindicated, and Cherry free to bestow her
heart where she chose.
A new edition brought down to date to 1920. “The original text was
translated by Mr Cary, and edited and continued down to the year
1890 by Dr J. Franklin Jameson. It has now been continued up to the
present year by Mabell S. C. Smith, author of ‘Twenty centuries of
Paris,’ and other historical studies. The original plan and
arrangement have been maintained in this appendix, which begins in
point of time with the Dreyfus case, includes the famous separation
of church and state, the Fashoda incident, the Agadir incident, and
other events leading up to and including the world war.” (Publisher’s
announcement)
The range of the stories comprises most of the earth and their
flavor, too, is outlandish and full of whimsical humor. The title story
takes the reader to Persia where a young Englishman in a motor-boat
encounters a pompous native barge on a river in Luristan, upon
which an alleged Brazilian is disporting himself as the Emperor of
Elam. At Dizful the Englishman inadvertently discovers that the
Brazilian is a German secret agent of his government. The war breaks
out and in the course of events the would-be Emperor of Elam finds
himself alone on board of the motor-boat with its French chauffeur,
whom he has pressed into his services. With their countries at war,
they recognize themselves as enemies and after a tense encounter of
words and deeds the Frenchman sees but one weapon left to him
with which to serve his country: he blows up the boat. The stories
have appeared in the Century, Scribner’s, Smart Set, Short Stories
and other magazines.
Mr Dyer has made Paul Revere the hero of this story for boys. He
has introduced a few fictitious characters and incidents, but in the
main has held to the facts of history. The story begins in 1847 when
Paul was a boy of twelve and it follows the course of events that led
up to the revolution, introducing Sam Adams, John Hancock, Joseph
Warren and others. The author looks on Paul Revere as “one of the
most picturesque and lovable characters of his time,” and regrets
that little is known of him aside from the one incident celebrated in
Longfellow’s poem. He shows him to have been a many-sided man,
of broad interests and sympathies and artistic ability, and a man of
the people.
“The book spiritedly sketches the history of the period and makes
one feel the impulses then animating the people of Boston.”
Reviewed by L. L. Bernard
“A book very well worth writing and, what is more, worth reading
afterwards.”
“The quality of the volume suggests that stronger work may follow.
More experience should confirm that individual quality already
described, and may help to put a curb on an exuberance of sentiment
which is at present Miss Easton’s chief weakness.”
“He has written of the birds and animals of the Berkshires with an
accuracy perfected by long observation and with a sympathy arising
from sincere affection.”
The first of these “tales of our wild animal neighbors” is the story
of a lone timber wolf who strayed into western Massachusetts where
his species is supposed to be extinct. The scene of the other stories is
also the Berkshire hills, where, on the authority of the author and
others, wolves, foxes, deer, moose and other animals still survive,
The titles are: “The return of the native”; Big Reddy, strategist; The
Odyssey of old Bill; The life and death of Lucy; General Jim; The
mating of Brownie; The taming of ol’ Buck; Red slayer and the terror;
Rastus earns his sleep; “The last American.” The illustrations are by
Charles Livingston Bull.
“The present work is written for the general reader, and through
elimination of the less important and by judicious distribution of
emphasis he has produced a book which is likely to be widely read
with both interest and profit. Though written in a language
intelligible to the business man quite as much as the student, it is
perhaps most of all important through its judicious criticism of the
traditional and orthodox viewpoint of the economist.” W: H. Hobbs
“To the present generation the name of Miss Eden conveys little or
nothing. As the sister of Lord Auckland, who held office in the reform
ministries of the early years of last century, and who became
governor-general of India in 1835, she was well known in London
society under William IV; and during her later life she published
some novels and books of travel which were not without merit, but
had not sufficient distinction to preserve them from oblivion. But her
abiding claim to the notice of posterity was her talent for friendly
letterwriting. Her most intimate friend, Pamela, daughter of Lord
and Lady Edward FitzGerald, had an equally marked gift for talking
with the pen, and perhaps greater vivacity and humour; and the
correspondence between these two brilliant women is preserved in
the present volume.”—Spec
“If she has no ideas about things in general, she has a perpetually
renewed interest in the immediate; it is this, with the firm, easy
texture of her style, and a delicate oddity of perception, which makes
her letters so eminently readable. It is this, but something more; for
of all the qualities named she is perhaps fully conscious; but she
appears admirably unconscious of the qualities of heart and
character she has.” F. W. S.
“She had the true note of colloquial ease which few people ever
achieve in their letters, and still fewer retain. She gossips
charmingly; her observations on her friends and acquaintances are
not the mere threadbare inanities which can interest only those who
know the persons concerned, but real characteristic illuminative
things which are nearly as pleasant to read now as they were when
they were written eighty or ninety years ago.”
“The author tells the first part of her story with much realistic
detail and with color and vivacity.... The story is the expression of a
purely material and selfish ideal of life.”
Reviewed by R. F. Clark
“The excerpts and reprints are skilfully grouped, so that the reader
—for the book can be read as well as consulted—can grasp the
material handily. The selections are made without prejudice.”
“In this symposium one gets many and variously colored and
confusing glimpses of industrial and social movements, but no
comprehensive view of any single subject and no consistent
coördination or interpretation.” J. E. Le Rossignol
+ − Review 3:504 N 24 ’20 300w
+ Survey 44:312 My 29 ’20 280w
“Paris, ever fascinating and ever fresh, was seen in the days before
the war from a new angle, by a delightful young couple, with a thin
family purse. An income of 350 dollars a year sufficed their needs.
Where they lived, and how they lived is told by the feminine half of
this pair of adventurers. The young couple attended the Sorbonne.
Sundays and holidays are treated in an account of how Paris amuses
itself. All these happenings, and many others, fill the space of two
years, and the pages of the book, up to the eventful day when Richard
receives his title, ‘Docteur de l’Universite de Paris.’”—Boston
Transcript