Analysis - Search + Seizure
Analysis - Search + Seizure
4. PROBABLE CAUSE
5. WHAT INFORMATION MUST BE INCLUDED IN THE WARRANT APPLICATION?
a. Must specifically describe the person or property to be searched or seized or incorporate supporting documents with
those descriptions → Groh v. Ramirez
b. A warrant must be issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, based upon probable cause, supported by an oath or
affirmation, and it must describe the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized → Lo-Ji Sales v. New
York
c. FRCrP 41- warrant requirements
i. The magistrate judge or a judge of a state court of record must issue the warrant to an officer authorized to execute
it.
ii. Warrants must identify the person or property to be searched, identify any person or property to be seized, and
designate the magistrate judge to whom it must be returned. The warrant must command the officer to:
1. Execute the warrant within a specified time no longer than 14 days;
2. Execute the warrant during the daytime, unless the judge for good cause expressly authorizes execution at
another time; and
3. Return the warrant to the magistrate judge designated in the warrant.
7. WHAT ARE THE REQUIREMENTS POLICE MUST FOLLOW IN EXECUTING THE WARRANT?
a. How May Police Treat Those Who Are Present When a Warrant Is Being Executed?
i. FRCrP 41: The warrant must command the officer to "execute the warrant during the daytime, unless the judge for
good cause expressly authorizes execution at another time." Defines daytime as 6am-10pm.
1. BUT, no special showing of need necessary to authorize night search for narcotics 21 U.S.C. §879
ii. When there is a search of a residence, those present at the time of the search may be detained. Allowing this
detention serves the purposes of preventing flight by the individual in case incriminating evidence is found,
minimizing the risk of harm to the police, and helping police complete the search in the event that questions
arise → Michigan v. Summers
1. BASIC RULE: Can detain persons present at the time of search
iii. Officers may detain innocent occupants of a home in which a search warrant is being executed for the
duration of the search. → Muehler v. Mena
1. An officer's questioning of a detainee about a matter unrelated to the alleged crimes covered in the search
warrant is not an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
2. Applied Michigan v. Summers rule
3. BASIC RULE: Can detain, handcuff, and interrogate persons present at the time of search
iv. Police conducting a valid search of a home may not detain a person for the sole purpose of preventing him from
interfering in the search if he is outside the immediate vicinity of the home. Declined to apply Mena/Summers rule
to outside the immediate vicinity of the home → United States v. Bailey
1. “Immediate Vicinity” Factors:
a. Lawful limits of property
b. Within sight
c. Ease of reentry
b. Do Police Have to Knock and Announce Before Searching a Dwelling?
i. Absent exigent circumstances, the police must knock and announce their presence before entering a residence to
execute a search warrant
ii. Wilson v. Arkansas →The knock and announce principle must be factored into the reasonableness inquiry
under the Fourth Amendment. But, not a categorical rule. Exceptions:
1. Circumstances presenting threat of physical violence
2. When a prisoner escapes and retreats to his dwelling
3. When police have reason to believe evidence may be destroyed if advance notice were given
iii. Police entering a home must knock and announce their identity and purpose before attempting forcible entry,
unless exigent circumstances exist and to do so would undermine law enforcement interest. Declined to apply
a blanket exception to the knock and announce requirement for felony drug cases, which WI had as a law →
Richards v. Wisconsin
iv. In the absence of exigent circumstances, after announcing their presence in the execution of a search warrant,
law enforcement must wait until the occupant has had a reasonable amount of time to get to the door.
However, exigent circumstances may exist for forced entry after a given amount of time. (i.e. they had reason
to believe waiting longer would give Δs opportunity to destroy evidence) → United States v. Banks
v. The exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence gained after police violate the knock and announce
requirement→ Hudson v. Michigan
c. What If There Are Unforeseen Circumstances or Mistakes While Executing a Warrant?
i. A warrant’s legitimacy must be assessed in light of the information reasonably available to the officers and the
judge at the time of issuance. A search made under an otherwise valid warrant containing a mistake does not
violate the Fourth Amendment if the police acted reasonably → Maryland v. Garrison
ii. In executing a search warrant, law enforcement officials may take reasonable steps to ensure the search is
completed safely and efficiently. The test for validity under the Fourth Amendment is whether the officers’
actions were objectively reasonable. Unreasonable actions = excessive force, restraints causing pain or imposed
for a prolonged period of time→ Los Angeles Cnty. v. Rettele
1. BASIC RULE: When officers execute a valid warrant and act in a reasonable manner to protect themselves
from harm (like the possibility of Δ sleeping with a gun), there’s no 4th Amendment violation
8. WHEN IS A WARRANT (NOT) REQUIRED?
a. Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, but there are exceptions
b. Exigent Circumstances → An emergency situation justifying warrantless activity, with probable cause. Exception lasts
only as long as the “exigency”
i. Declined to apply a blanket warrant exception to murder scenes → Mincey v. Arizona
ii. Hot Pursuit
1. EXCEPTION: The Fourth Amendment permits officers in hot pursuit of a fleeing felon to enter a
home, into which the suspect had fled, and search the home without a warrant → Warden v. Hayden
2. LIMIT: Police cannot enter a home without a warrant to make a routine arrest → Payton v. New York
3. LIMIT: Absent exigent circumstances, police cannot enter a home without a warrant in pursuit of a
fleeing misdemeanant. Exigent circumstances are determined on a case-by-case basis and include, but
are not limited to, situations in which police need to immediately follow a suspect into a home→ Lange
v. California
a. To prevent destruction of evidence;
b. To prevent imminent violence;
c. To prevent the suspect from fleeing the home; or
d. In hot pursuit of a fleeing felon.
BASIC RULE: The hot-pursuit exception does not apply to fleeing misdemeanants.
iii. Safety
1. Police may enter a home without a warrant if there is an objectively reasonable basis for believing an
occupant is injured or in immediate danger → Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart
iv. Preventing Destruction of Evidence
1. The exigent circumstances exception justifies a warrantless search when the conduct of the police
preceding the exigency is reasonable in the same sense. When the police did not create the exigency by
engaging or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment, warrantless entry to
prevent the destruction of evidence is reasonable and allowed → Kentucky v. King
a. BASIC RULE: Exigent circumstances exception applies when police do not gain entry to the premises
by means of actual or threatened violation of the Fourth Amendment
v. Limits on Exigent Circumstances
c. Plain View
i. Plain View Doctrine→ Coolidge v. NH
1. First, police may search the area in the possession or under the control of a person arrested incident to that
lawful arrest. The search must be contemporaneous with the arrest and limited to the “immediate vicinity.”
2. Next, a police officer may search an automobile if he stopped the car on the highway and had probable cause
to believe the car had contraband concealed inside.
3. Lastly, the plain-view doctrine allows police who are somewhere they are lawfully permitted to be to
legitimately seize inadvertently found evidence of another crime, which comes within plain view.
a. This is true whether the officer is in “hot pursuit” of a suspect, conducting a search incident to arrest,
or otherwise in a lawful vantage. The invasion of privacy must have been authorized on other grounds.
b. The doctrine only applies to evidence found inadvertently and will not justify seizure of evidence
police expected to be found in advance.
c. The Warrant Clause requires probable cause and specificity about the persons or property to be
searched or seized to protect against unnecessary government intrusions. If the plain-view doctrine
applies, the intrusion has already occurred. The accidental discovery of evidence does not turn a
legitimate search into a general one.
d. The substantial benefit to law enforcement outweighs the relatively small threat to privacy. Requiring
police to obtain a warrant for accidentally found evidence would be unduly burdensome.
d. Automobile Exception
i. Exception + Rationale
1. Developed in 1925 in Carroll v. U.S.
a. Exigency is the car’s mobility
b. Must have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence of the crime in the automobile
c. Includes search of entire vehicle (including trunk)
2. Scope
a. Covers motorhomes California v. Carney
b. Cover cars no longer mobile Chambers v. Maroney
c. Covers parked cars
d. Does NOT cover parked vehicles on the home driveway that is within the curtilage of the house
Collins v. Virginia
ii. Searches of Containers in Automobiles
1. U.S. v. Chadwick→ Police had probable cause but no warrant to search footlocker– need warrant unless
exigent circumstances (like a bomb)
a. Arkansas v. Sanders→ Need warrant to search container places in trunk of a taxi– had probable
cause for container but not for the taxi
b. U.S. v. Ross→ If probable cause for the car, no warrant necessary to search a container found in the
car
2. California v. Acevedo→ The Fourth Amendment permits warrantless searches of containers found in
automobiles provided the police have probable cause that the container contains contraband.
a. If police have probable cause to search the car, they can search containers and entire car
i. Provided they have probable cause to believe the container could hold the evidence sought
b. Overturned Arkansas v. Sanders
3. Searching a passenger’s property→ also covered by automobile exception (Wyoming v. Houghton)
a. Ownership is not determinative
4. SUMMARY: If probable cause that contraband is in the car, police can search the entire vehicle where the
contraband could be hidden (including containers/trunk)
iii. Searches Incident to Arrest of Automobile
1. New York v. Belton SEE SLIDES
2. What if you are arrested outside of a car?
a. Thornton v. U.S. → Belton rule applies to “recent occupants” of car
3. Arizona v. Gant
a. Backed away from Belton rule
b. Search of passenger compartment permitted IF:
i. Arrestee, unsecured and within reach of car (Chimel)
ii. OR
iii. Reason to believe evidence of crime arrest in car (Scalia theory from Thornton)
e. Searches Incident to Arrest
i. Person
1. Rationale
a. Protects officer safety
b. Safeguards from destruction of evidence
2. Allows search of person and “grab” area
a. Person
b. Containers on person
c. Per se rule no matter what kind of crime
d. For weapons and evidence
3. Incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search of the area in possession and control of the person under
arrest is permissible under the Fourth Amendment→ Chimel v. California
a. Searching the entire house after arresting someone at their house is unreasonable. Only area within
possession and control of the person being arrest can be searched without a warrant or
exception/exigent circumstances
b. Trying to draw a line between what police should be able to do to protect themselves/evidence and not
allowing them to do a general search of the entire home
4. What is a “grab” area?
a. At time of arrest, not search
b. Can be a stretch
c. Can follow Δ into different rooms
d. Flexible timing
5. Standard
a. Only grab area or where they may locate Δ can be searched
b. Need not show actual threat of danger or destruction of evidence (U.S. v. Robinson)
c. Must be a lawful arrest
6. Does the exception apply even when its rationale does not?
a. Yes→ Robinson
i. Search incident to arrest applies even to arrests for expiration of driver’s licenses
ii. Can search person and grab area
7. Must actually be an ARREST
a. The “search incident to arrest” exception to the Fourth Amendment does not authorize the full
search of a car after the issuance of a citation → Knowles v. Iowa
b. BRIGHT LINE RULE
ii. Cell Phones
1. Under the Fourth Amendment, the government may not conduct a warrantless search of the contents of
a cell phone seized incident to an arrest absent exigent circumstances→ Riley v. California
a. Exigent circumstances = kidnapping, detonating a bomb, etc.
f. Inventory Searches
i. If property is lawfully in possession of the police, they may inventory the contents to protect the owner’s property
while it’s in police possession
ii. South Dakota v. Opperman
1. Police may conduct an inventory search of the contents of a vehicle lawfully held in police possession.
a. Vehicles are “effects” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Automobiles do not carry the same
expectation of privacy as a home or office, because automobiles are subject to heavy governmental
regulation and travel by car is inherently public. Police as caretakers may legitimately take possession
of an illegally parked vehicle and may inventory the contents of the vehicle once impounded.
b. Purpose/rationale
i. Protects the vehicle owner’s property
ii. Protects police against false claims of damage or loss of property
iii. Protects police from harm.
c. The probable cause and warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment are inapplicable to
noncriminal inventory searches of vehicles lawfully in police custody. Cady v. Dombrowski, and other
cases have repeatedly affirmed the right of police to perform inventory searches on impounded
vehicles without a warrant in order to secure the vehicles’ contents.
2. Okay if routine, but must be pursuant to a policy of the police department
iii. Illinois v. Lafayette
1. Applies to arrested persons and their belongings
2. Must be part of standard procedure of police department
iv. Main point
1. All about being routine and standard procedure that every officer performs
2. Takes away discretion from officer
a. If policy leaves it to discretion of officer, need objective reasons enumerated in policy, no blanket
language leaving the decision entirely to officer choice
g. Protective Sweeps
i. When the police arrest a person, they may conduct a protective sweep of the premises if they have reasonable
suspicion that a person might be there that poses a threat to them
ii. Maryland v. Buie
1. Incident to an arrest, the police may conduct a protective sweep of a premises based on reasonable suspicion
that other people who pose a threat are in the building, provided the search is limited to those areas where a
person may be hiding.
a. Incident to a lawful arrest, and without probable cause or even reasonable suspicion, the police may
search areas of the premises immediately adjoining the place of arrest where someone posing a risk to
the police could be hiding.
b. A more extensive search is permissible only when there is reasonable suspicion based on articulable
facts.
c. Michigan v. Long→ Officers can do a protective sweep of a passenger compartment with
reasonable suspicion of danger
iii. A search is permissible without a warrant or even probable cause if there is voluntary consent
1. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte
a. The court must look at the totality of the circumstances in order to determine whether consent to a
warrantless search absent probable cause was freely and voluntarily given.
i. Although knowledge of the right to refuse to give consent is one factor of many to consider, it
is not a prerequisite to proving that consent was given voluntarily.
ii. The totality of circumstances surrounding the consent must be analyzed to determine if
consent to search was voluntarily given without police coercion.
iii. If no presumption arises that the questioning is inherently coercive, then no knowledge of the
right to refuse is necessary.
iv. The prosecution need not prove that the person giving consent knew of his right to refuse.
b. Reaffirmed in:
i. Ohio v. Robinette→ A person lawfully stopped by the police, but free to leave, does not
need to be informed by the police of their ability to leave
ii. US v. Drayton→ The police may request consent to search a person, even if they have no
basis for suspecting that individual of illegal activity, and the citizen is not subject to a
Fourth Amendment seizure if a reasonable person would feel that he is free to leave.
(Totality of the circumstances)
h. Consent
i. US v. Matlock→ One occupant of a residence may give consent if the other is not present
ii. Georgia v. Randolph→ The police may not enter a home without a warrant to search for evidence where they
obtain consent from an occupant but a co-occupant is present and objects to the search.
1. Co-occupants can generally give consent→ actual and apparent authority
2. In Matlock, the primary assumptions at issue involved the equal authority of all of the occupants and the
assumption of risk when living with others.
a. Here, the primary assumptions again include the equal authority of all of the occupants but also
assumptions about how people act in light of this equal authority: a guest is unlikely to enter when
invited by one occupant but expressly told to stay away by another.
3. Furthermore, Minnesota v. Olson holds that an overnight guest has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
house in which he is staying because his host is unlikely to invite someone into the home over his objection.
This Fourth Amendment right easily transfers to co-inhabitants when they are present and expressly objecting
to someone’s entry. In such situations, one occupant has no authority over the other to demand a resolution in
his own favor.
a. Therefore, when one occupant who is present expressly objects to a police search, the consent of
another occupant actually provides no additional authority to the police to enter absent a warrant or
exigent circumstances.
iii. Georgia v. Randolph was limited by Fernandez v. California
1. One occupant’s consent to search a premises is effective under the Fourth Amendment as long as no other
occupant who objects to the search is physically present.
i. Searches When There Are “Special Needs”
i. “Special Needs”
1. Suspicionless, warrantless searches permitted to further legitimate governmental needs
2. Not primarily for criminal investigative purposes
3. But for other legitimate governmental needs:
a. Health and safety, borders and checkpoints, schools, government employees, jails and prisons, parolees
and probationers, inventory searches are closely aligned
b. Can result in a criminal prosecution
4. Conducted by other public officers, usually not by law enforcement
5. No individualized suspicion required
ii. Administrative Searches
1. Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco
a. Search by inspector of the Division of Housing Inspection, occupant said he needed a warrant
b. Court held that administrative searches of this nature are significant intrusions
c. Companion case→ See v. City of Seattle, applied holding to nonresidential commercial property
2. New York v. Burger
a. Junkyards subject to certain regulations, have to have license and keep thorough records for search at
any time
i. Δ didn’t have license or records, police found stolen property
ii. Purpose for regulations was bc NY was having issues with selling stolen car parts
b. RULE→ Warrantless searches of businesses operating in heavily regulated industries are reasonable
under certain conditions.
i. The inspection program must serve a substantial governmental interest.
ii. The inspections must be necessary to serve that interest.
iii. The authorizing statute must serve as a substitute for a warrant.
1. This means that the statute must provide notice to business owners of the scope of the
inspection scheme and specifically limit the authority of inspectors.
3. City of Los Angeles v. Patel
a. The warrantless search of hotel records for general inspection purposes does not fall under the
administrative-search exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
b. This Court held in Camara v. Municipal Court that business owners cannot be subject to this choice of
compliance or criminal charges without a precompliance review.
i. An owner must be afforded the opportunity to have an officer’s demand reviewed by a neutral
authority before the owner may be penalized for failure to comply.
ii. This requirement likely could be satisfied by the officer obtaining an administrative subpoena
without requiring probable cause. If the owner objects, an administrative judge could decide
the matter.
4. Hypos
a. Child prn
i. 1st paragraph: Not a problem, alone in the house, has an arrest warrant
ii. 2nd: Okay, beyond grab is okay, rationale is protective sweep
iii. 3rd: Not okay, didn’t have a search warrant
b. Border
i. Search was constitutional if government is able to establish Klein had reasonable suspicion to
do a body cavity search
c. Border w/ child prn
i.
iii. Border Crossing
1. Chief executive (pres) has plenary power to protect nation’s borders
2. Suspicionless, warrantless searches permitted
3. Customs officials have more than law enforcement role- also protect country from harm- disease, narcotics,
explosives
4. Applies to physical borders, fixed checkpoints, and customs at airports
iv. Checkpoints
v. Schools
1. School searches: reduced 4th Amendment rights for students
2. TLO v. New Jersey
a. 4th amendment applies to both civil and criminal authorities
b. Greater government need to protect students vs. less privacy for students
c. Individualized searches: only need reasonable suspicion, not probable cause
i. I.e. backpacks
3. Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding
a. Searched bra and underwear of student for ibuprofen
b. RULE: Under the Fourth Amendment, a school official cannot strip search a student without a specific
suspicion that the student is hiding evidence in intimate places
vi. Government Employment
1. City of Ontario v. Quon
a. Searched police officer’s pager bc he continually went over allotted amount of messages, found
sexually explicit messages and few related to work
b. RULE: A government employer’s intrusion on an employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy does
not violate the Fourth Amendment if it was for non investigatory, work-related purposes and
reasonable under the circumstances.
vii. Drug Testing
1. Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton
a. Students participating in athletic programs may be drug tested without a warrant or suspicion.
2. Board of Education of Independent School Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls
a. Students who participate in extracurricular activities may be subjected to drug testing without a
warrant or individualized suspicion.
3. Ferguson v. City of Charleston
a. A state hospital may not drug test pregnant women without a warrant or informed consent for law
enforcement purposes under the Fourth Amendment.
viii. Searches in Jails and Prisons
1. Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Burlington (2012)
a. Government interests
i. Diseases
ii. Gangs
iii. Contraband
b. Broad exception permitting strip searches of all detainees without a warrant or even suspicion
regardless of charge
ix. DNA testing of those arrested
1. Maryland v. King (2013)
a. Took DNA sample of arrestee
i. May the police take DNA from those arrested for the purpose of investigating crimes other
than the one for which the person was arrested?
b. Legitimate government interest in the need for law enforcement in a safe and accurate way to process
and identify the persons and possessions they must take into custody
i. Balance
1. Intrusion on right of privacy
a. Limited use of information
b. Mere swab of mouth
c. Limited loci
2. Gov need for search (legitimate gov interests)
3. Establishing identity
a. Danger?
b. Right person?
c. Solving cases?
2. United States v. Knights (2001)
a. On probation
b. Reasonable suspicion sufficient, No warrant required
c. As a probationer, he is deprived of some freedoms
d. Purpose of order was to rehabilitate defendant while protecting the public
3. Samson v. California (2006)
a. On parole
b. Must submit to search at any time with or without cause
i. Court says ok
1. No suspicion needed
2. Need to know suspect on parole
3. One step short of a prisoner on continuum of state-imposed punishments
7. A stop or an arrest?
a. Dunaway v. NY→ Station house detention = arrest
b. Florida v. Royer→ removal from public to private office = arrest
c. Hayes v. Florida→ Station house fingerprinting = arrest
d. U.S. v. Place→ 90 minute detention of luggage = arrest
e. U.S. v. Sharpe→ 30-40 min wait for DEA agent = stop, but there is a limit
8. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District of Nevada (2004)
a. RULES re stops:
i. Police officers can ask for ID
ii. Limited intrusion of suspect
iii. Reasonably related to purpose of the Terry stop
k. Terry and Reasonable Suspicion
i. No bright line rule for what reasonable suspicion is, and court hasn’t defined- just in certain contexts
ii. Generally
1. United States v. Arvizu
a. RULE: An officer may stop a car if there is reasonable suspicion of criminal activity based upon all of
the relevant facts and circumstances. Assessing reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment requires
balancing an individual’s privacy interests against the achievement of legitimate government needs.
i. Relevant facts: at shift change, taking back roads to avoid checkpoints, roads known for drug
trafficking, kids knees high, weird waiving from kids
iii. Stopping a Car
1. Kansas v. Glover
a. RULE: Reasonable suspicion can be based on reasonable inferences drawn from known facts.
i. General principles of reasonable suspicion:
1. Particularized and objective basis
2. More than a hunch but “considerably less than preponderance”
3. Common sense and officer experience
4. Perfection is not required
iv. Based on Informant’s Tips
1. Alabama v. White
a. RULE: To determine whether an informant’s tip provides reasonable suspicion, the totality of the
circumstances must be analyzed, with attention given to the veracity, reliability, and basis of
knowledge of an informant.
i. Court put emphasis on knowledge tipper would have to have to know Δ’s itinerary = more
reliable
2. Florida v. J.L.
a. RULE: An anonymous tip that a person may be carrying a gun does not justify a stop and frisk under
the Fourth Amendment unless there is additional corroboration to ensure that the tip has "sufficient
indicia of reliability" to create reasonable suspicion justifying a stop.
3. Navarette v. California
a. RULE: An anonymous tip of reckless driving can support the reasonable suspicion necessary for a
traffic stop if the tip is accompanied by adequate indicia of reliability.
v. Based on a Person’s Avoidance of Police
1. Illinois v. Wardlow
a. RULE: A police officer may stop and frisk a citizen on the street when he has reasonable suspicion that
the person is armed and may pose a threat to the officer.
i. Presence in a high crime area and flight can be enough for reasonable suspicion for stop
1. Flight PLUS high crime area could = RS, but disagree on whether that happened here
vi. Based on Profiles
1. United States v. Sokolow
a. RULE: The fact that an individual fits the profile of a drug courier does give rise to reasonable
suspicion justifying a Terry stop.