…………………………………………………………………………………………………

(ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT)

This is the Authors’ Original Manuscript in its final and definitive form. The Version of Record
can be found via the following reference: Brannagan, P.M. and Rookwood, J. Sport Mega-
Events, Soft Power and Soft Disempowerment: international supporters’ perspectives on Qatar
acquisition of the 2022 FIFA World Cup finals, International Journal of Sport Policy and
Politics.

Available at: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19406940.2016.1150868

…………………………………………………………………………………………………
Sports Mega-Events, Soft Power and Soft Disempowerment: international supporters’
perspectives on Qatar’s acquisition of the 2022 FIFA World Cup finals

Paul Michael Brannagan*

School of Sport, Exercise and Health Sciences, Loughborough University, Leicestershire, LE11 3TU, UK;
School of Sport, Exercise and Rehabilitation Sciences, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, B15 2TT, UK

Joel Rookwood

Health Sciences, Liverpool Hope University, Liverpool, L16 9JD, UK

Through conducting document analysis, field work, and semi-structured

interviews at five major tournaments in Asia, North America, Europe and South
America, the paper examines the perspectives of international football
supporters on the Fédération Internationale de Football Association’s (FIFA)
decision to award the 2022 World Cup finals to the State of Qatar. The paper is
separated into five sections. First we ground Qatar’s sporting strategy within the
concept of ‘soft power’, as well as pinpoint the negative consequences that have
manifest since the state’s acquisition of the 2022 finals. Second, we disclose and
defend our chosen data collection strategy. Third, we uncover and discuss our
results with reference to three key themes: the state’s suitability as a football
destination; the dubious awarding of the 2022 World Cup; and, Qatar’s cultural backdrop
and domestic policies. Fourth, we align our findings to Qatar’s foreign policy
intentions and ‘soft disempowerment’ consequences, locating in the process the
opportunities and challenges that accompany the state’s hosting of the 2022
finals. We conclude by reflecting upon the contribution we have made here, as
well as acknowledging the importance of Qatar for current and future sports
mega-event research.

Keywords: Qatar; soft power; global sport; football; sports fandom; sports
corruption

Notes on Contributors

Paul Michael Brannagan is a Doctoral Researcher of Sociology within Loughborough University’s

School of Sport, Exercise and Health Sciences, and a Teaching Fellow in Sport Policy and Politics at the
University of Birmingham’s School of Sport, Exercise and Rehabilitation Sciences. Paul’s research
predominantly focuses on the socio-political value of global sport for nation-states and national leaders. He
is one of the few scholars currently concentrating on the existing influence of modern sport in the Middle
East, with a particular emphasis on the State of Qatar and its acquisition of the 2022 FIFA World Cup
finals.

Dr Joel Rookwood is a Senior Lecturer in Sport, Culture and Management in the School of Health Sciences
at Liverpool Hope University. He has worked in numerous applied sporting contexts, notably sport-for-
development, international relations, performance analysis, coaching, and journalism. During the last fifteen
years he has researched and written on sports mega-events and football matches in eighty countries across
six continents.

*
Corresponding author: Email: [email protected]
Introduction

Over the previous decade, the State of Qatar has undeniably ascended to global prominence,
despite inhabiting a national citizenry of little over 250,000. This has been evident through the
state becoming the world’s third largest oil producer and principal supplier of liquefied natural gas;
positioning itself as a fundamental mediator between fractured groups across the Middle East; the
multinational reach of the media network, Al Jazeera; and via the Qatar Investment Authority,
which holds stakes in numerous leading corporations, notably Barclays Bank, Sainsbury’s and the
Harrods Group. Combined, these practices optimize Qatar’s long-term national commitment: ‘to
enhance competitiveness and attract investment [that] will be needed in a dynamic and increasingly
borderless international economy’ (General Secretariat for Development and Planning, 2008: 25).

It is, nonetheless, the role of global sport that has occupied the foremost interest of the Qatari
leadership in recent years. Alongside hosting the 2005 West Asian Games, the 2006 Asian Games,
the 2011 Asian Cup, and the 2015 Men’s Handball World Championships, the state annually stages
the Qatar Open Golf Masters, the ATP and WTA Tennis Championships, and the Doha stage of
the MotoGP World Championships; future events include the 2019 IAAF World Championships
in Athletics and football’s 2022 FIFA World Cup (22FWC). The acquisition of elite sporting
occasions is complemented by the organizing of numerous year on year sports conferences,
notably the Doha GOALS Forum and Securing Sport symposium; and Qatar Sports Investment’s
purchase of European football club, Paris Saint-Germain, as well as its role in securing the original
€150 million agreement between FC Barcelona and the Qatar Foundation (now Qatar Airways) –
the first commercial sponsor of the FC Barcelona shirt.

As argued in detail elsewhere (see: Brannagan and Giulianotti, 2014a; 2014b), we maintain here
Qatar’s increasing engagement with global sport rests on the desire to acquire ‘soft power’. The
concept of soft power was coined in 1990 by American political scientist, Joseph Nye. According
to Nye, in the contemporary epoch, political outcomes can be attained through a combination of
‘hard’ and ‘soft’ strategies (Nye, 1990; Keohane and Nye, 1998). On the one hand, leaders may
enforce forms of ‘hard power’, through, for example, offering economic incentive or drawing on
military means; on the other, leaders may indirectly adapt the political agenda in such a way which
shapes the preferences of others through, for instance, emulating one’s ‘soft power resources’:
approving values and ideologies, credible and prominent institutions and policies, and an attractive
culture (Nye, 2002; 2004; 2008). It is this latter approach which Nye calls ‘soft power’: ‘the ability
to achieve goals through attraction rather than coercion’ (Keohane and Nye, 1998: 98). Such
attraction converts into power outcomes when those on the receiving end of the soft power
strategy look to the state producing it for verification and leadership, or seek to imitate their
domestic and/or international accomplishments (Keohane and Nye, 1998).

The desire to acquire soft power forms arguably accounts, at least in part, for why national leaders
fiercely compete with one another to obtain hosting rights for sport mega-events (cf. Andreff and
Szymanski, 2006). With their unprecedented global appeal, ‘first order’ events, such as the FIFA
World Cup and Summer Olympic Games provide valuable opportunities for states to meaningfully
contribute towards globally showcasing their language, culture, heritage, and capabilities, and to
attract others through inbound tourism, increased trade, and a growing sense of national pride (cf.
Grix and Houlihan, 2013; Grix, 2014; Grix et al, 2015). In the case of Qatar, for example, we have
seen how in raising global awareness of the state’s socio-political supremacy, the hosting of sports
tournaments intend to be leveraged to showcase ideals of modernity, proficiency and innovation;
furthermore, in seeking to align itself to universal ideas of peace and security, and exhibit the state’s
differentiation from its Middle East neighbours who have experienced recent instances of socio-
political unrest, the staging of sports events are intended to frame the state as a cooperative,
responsive and friendly member of international society; and finally, we have witnessed how Qatari
authorities not only plan to engage with global sport for the sake of health and well-being per se,
but also understand the foreign policy returns on the creation of ‘positive’ sport policies and
‘world-leading’ institutions that validate the aptitude to successfully mitigate contemporary
challenges (Brannagan and Giulianotti 2014a; 2014b).

Nonetheless, simply having the ambition to be seen as attractive through the use of global sport
does not automatically lead to one becoming so in the minds of others. In fact, for states that
endeavour to improve their image through global sport and its subsequent mass-media exposure,
there is always the need to consider the potential for ‘soft disempowerment’, referring to ‘those
occasions in which you may upset, offend or alienate others, leading to a loss of attractiveness or
influence’ (Brannagan and Giulianotti, 2014a; 2014b: 12; cf. Giulianotti, 2015). Since being
awarded the rights to the 22FWC in 2010, Qatar’s soft disempowerment has been played out most
predominantly on four levels: first are continuous allegations of bribery and corruption
surrounding the acquirement of the 22FWC itself (cf. The Sunday Times, 1st June 2014); second is
the heightened international awareness of Qatar’s issues with human rights (The Guardian,
25th September 2013); third, trepidations have been expressed over the health and safety of players
and fans, particularly with regard to Qatar’s extreme climate and lack of freedom for women and
homosexuals (The Telegraph, 2nd December 2010; The Guardian, 8th September 2013); and finally, it
is perceived the sale of alcohol will be profoundly restricted in comparison to previous World Cup
destinations, suggesting supporters will be forced to heavily limit their consumption patterns, both
inside and outside of stadiums (The Telegraph, 17th March 2014).

In light of the state’s increasing sporting endeavours and resulting consequences, we attempt here
to fill a substantial gap vis-à-vis socio-political scholarship on Qatar and sport. Notable research
in this area includes: Amara’s (2005) exploration into the political discourses surrounding the 2006
Asian Games; Campbell’s (2011) study on the harvesting of athletic personnel to solidify
nationalism; Foley et al.’s (2012) investigation into the use of sport to project images of safety and
familiarity; Ginesta and San Eugenio’s (2013) evaluation of the significance of sport for place
branding; Rolim Silva’s (2014) analysis on the role of sport within historical pursuits of nation
building; and finally, Brannagan and Giulianotti’s (2014a; 2014b) examination of the soft power
intentions and consequences of Qatar’s global sports strategy. In providing a more fan-centred
approach, we offer the first academic account to focus on, and give voice to, the intersubjective
world of devoted international match-attending football supporters who perceive themselves to
be affected by the decision to award Qatar the 22FWC. Openly documenting and considering
these perspectives, we believe, is of upmost importance, as such supporters act as a key
stakeholders and consumers of football, without whom these mega-events would probably not
take place (Rookwood and Millward, 2011; Rookwood and Chan, 2011; Sutton and Rookwood,
2015).

The remainder of the paper is separated into four sections. First, we disclose the thinking behind
our chosen data collection strategy. Second, we reveal and discuss the results from our data analysis
with reference to three core themes. Third, we examine and ground supporters’ perspectives in
the context of soft power and soft disempowerment, highlighting the most significant
opportunities and challenges the state will face leading up to and during its hosting of the 2022
finals. We conclude by reflecting upon our contribution here, as well as identifying the significance
of Qatar for sport mega-event research.

Methods
In formulating our data collection strategy, we decided to adhere to that of ‘within-methods
triangulation’, referring to the use of multiple approaches within a given scientific paradigm
(Johnson et al., 2007; cf. Denzin, 1978). Drawing on this form of triangulation ensured we gathered
knowledge from comparative viewpoints, and were thus able to acquire greater confidence in our
findings (cf. Flick, in Flick et al., 2004). Consequently, the data presented here was collected in
three stages.

The first included the continual analysis of key documents since Qatar’s awarding of the 22FWC
in December 2010, most notably international media articles and related FIFA reports. This armed
us with key background information to ensure the central points were covered during each of our
discussions with supporters (cf. Bowen, 2009). The second stage included semi-structured
interviews, focus groups and participant observation at five major football tournaments in Asia,
North America, Europe and South America over the course of four years. In total, four focus
groups (each comprised of four to six people) and fifteen interviews were conducted at sixteen
games spread across the 2011 Asian Cup in Qatar, the 2011 Gold Cup in USA, the 2012 European
Championships in Poland, the 2014 World Cup in Brazil, and the 2015 Copa America in Chile.
Our inclusion criteria ensured all interviewees and focus group respondents were English speaking
and had previously attended at least one FIFA World Cup and one continental confederation event
prior to the respective competition where data was collected. Engaging with supporters directly
allowed us to examine the effect the media has on shaping various attitudes, as well as permitting
additional comment to surface. The final stage included field work undertaken through four visits
to Qatar in January 2011, May 2012, March 2013, and December 2013, during which we attended
various sport and cultural events, and visited key tourist sites that will play an essential role during
the hosting of the 22FWC. Experiencing Qatar first-hand allowed us to both question and relate
to data which emerged from our media analysis, as well as interviews, focus groups and participant
observation at various football events. All data was subjected to a thorough thematic analysis.

The 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar: supporters’ perspectives

Our thematic analysis indicated the central perspectives of football fans vis-à-vis Qatar’s awarding
of the 22FWC revolved around three key themes: the state’s suitability as a football destination; the dubious
awarding of the 2022 World Cup; and, Qatar’s cultural backdrop and domestic policies.

The State’s Suitability as a Football Destination

A prominent theme to emerge from our analysis centred on Qatar’s suitability as a football
destination. Most specifically, it became clear to us early on that many supporters held the opinion
that the state severely lacked the kind of football infrastructure needed to host the 22FWC.
Although Qatar is no stranger to staging ‘second-order’ sports events, supporters reminded us that
the World Cup will require far more infrastructure and expenditure. Acknowledging this, Qatar’s
World Cup bid proposed the inclusion of twelve stadiums in seven cities, eight of which are to be
constructed from scratch, with the other four requiring expansion. The building of eight new
stadiums solely for the 22FWC was questioned by many supporters who advocated that the
tournament should have gone somewhere with stadia already present: ‘Should it have gone to
England, where everything’s in place, or should it go to another country that needs to create
virtually everything from scratch?’ (interview 4, FIFA World Cup, Rio: 21st June 2014). While
FIFA’s embryonic policy to award football’s greatest spectacle to new destinations suggests
England were unlikely to emerge successful in any bid for this round of World Cups, numerous
international media sources have questioned the decision to award the 22FWC to a country with
such a lack of football heritage, strongly aligning with supporter opinion in this context: an article
in The Independent, for example, speaks of ‘a concern about a lack of infrastructure’, leading with
the title ‘Shock as Qatar win vote for 2022 World Cup’ (2nd December 2010); likewise, Dave
Jamieson of the Huffington Post declares FIFA’s pronouncement to award the 22FWC to Qatar as
‘shocking’ given ‘the lack of infrastructure in place’ (2nd October 2014).

Similarly, supporters made constant reference to Qatar’s absence of a strong football pedigree, and
subsequent lack of need for so many stadiums post-2022, as one fan proclaimed: ‘As if they need
all those soccer stadiums. What a waste…It’s such a small country, and not exactly a sporting giant.
Attendances even at the biggest club can’t be much. What are those guys thinking? (interview 6,
Gold Cup, Miami, 10th June 2011). Although we could dispute the notion that Qatar is not a
‘sporting giant’ – alongside hosting copious sports events, the state is also a highly sought-after
training destination for professional athletes and clubs, attracted in particular to the ASPIRE
Academy of Sporting Excellence (field notes, May 2012) - supporters referred more directly to the
relatively insignificant structural and cultural resonance of the state’s domestic football league:
‘Surely you can’t build a stadium just for a couple of World Cup games? There needs to be club
teams taking over grounds, and Qatar obviously doesn’t have that kind of demand. Waste of
money’ (respondent 3, focus group, European Championships, Warsaw: 16th June 2012). Although
clubs from the Qatar Stars League, the state’s premier domestic competition, received $10 million
each in 2003 from the Qatari Football Association to acquire some of the world’s leading players
(field notes, January 2011), including the likes of Pep Guardiola, Raúl González and Xavi
Hernández, the competition’s fourteen teams find it difficult to appeal to a sustainable number of
supporters, with some stadiums occupying capacities of up to 13,000 averaging only a hundred or
so citizens per match (cf. Brannagan and Giulianotti, 2014b).

In acknowledging their lack of a football pedigree, and in showcasing their subsequent desire to
overcome the prospect of ‘white elephants’, Qatar’s World Cup bid included the design of modular
tier stadiums to be deconstructed post-tournament. The ‘legacy’ intentions here are to effectively
donate much of the infrastructure used for the World Cup, including 170,000 seats and related
cooling technology, to form new arenas in developing nations who wish to advance their domestic
football but lack the resources to do so (Qatar Supreme Committee for Delivery and Legacy, no
date). Nevertheless, when raised during our interviews, it became clear that none of the supporters
we spoke to were conscious of such a strategy, and, upon being informed, responded in a
somewhat adverse manner, as demonstrated by one fan we interviewed in Brazil:

I’ve not heard anything about that, and I keep my ear to the ground. But that’s
ridiculous, surely. It costs a fortune to build a stadium, a fortune to take down,
a fortune to transport, and a fortune to put it back up again. And where would
they take them? Crazy idea. They’d alienate more people with that kind of waste
(interview 1, FIFA World Cup, Rio: 21st June 2014).

Although Qatari authorities see the exporting of stadiums as a significant component in the
development of world football (cf. Qatar Supreme Committee for Delivery and Legacy, no date),
to many of the supporters we engaged with, the need for such a policy was another reminder of
why the 22FWC should be hosted elsewhere. Specifically, as articulated above, some supporters
felt the overall cost of construction, deconstruction, transportation and reconstruction of stadiums
post-Word Cup was an unnecessary expense for a four week tournament, inferring that the finance
required to achieve such an ambitious strategy could be better spent on wider areas of development
if the tournament was hosted by an alternative country that could sustainably make use of so many
stadia. In a similar fashion, Qatar’s solution to overcoming climate concerns, the development of
environmentally-friendly, ‘innovative’ cooling technology to control temperatures inside stadiums,
training venues and fans zones acted as a further reminder amongst supporters of why the state
was an unsuitable destination (cf. Brannagan and Giulianotti, 2014b: 7):
 I’d never heard of the phrase ‘cooling technology’ until Qatar got the World
Cup… Imagine building twelve grounds you don’t really need long term, as well
as training facilities and fan parks, and making them all air conditioned in a
country that’s effectively a glorified dessert. Then imagine what you could do
with the money you would save if you had that World Cup in England. That is
frightening (interview 2, FIFA World Cup, Rio: 21st June 2014).

A further point raised by supporters we engaged with revolved around hosting the 22FWC in the
traditional summer period of June and July (which at the time of our data collection, was the most
likely future scenario). Average temperatures in Qatar’s capital, Doha, rarely drop below 40°C in
the hottest months, a significant rise on the 21°C experienced during the 2014 final in Rio de
Janeiro, the 13°C 2010 final in Johannesburg, and the 18°C 2006 final in Berlin (BBC, 25th February
2015). This has led to key football officials expressing their concern over the health and safety of
players and fans alike. Arguably most outspoken on the matter has been Greg Dyke, Chairman of
the English Football Association, who recently suggested that ‘we cannot possibly play in the
summer in Qatar, it would be ridiculous to play then…The best option would be to not hold it in
Qatar, but we are now beyond that…’ (The Guardian, 24th February 2015). However, although we
encountered some comparable opinions, in going against the current discourse, many supporters
we interviewed took a more balanced perspective: ‘We had altitude in Mexico in ‘86, we’ve had
humidity in Brazil. I guess we’ll have the heat now in Qatar’ (interview 1, FIFA World Cup, São
Paulo: 26th June 2014). Interestingly, our engagement with fans suggested that those who regularly
attend the World Cup and other international football tournaments in person would not be put
off travelling to Qatar due to climate concerns, regardless of what has been communicated by
senior officials of the game, with some even revealing their preference for a June-July World Cup:
‘Personally I’d keep it in the summer. It’s always been that way’ (focus group, European
Championships, Warsaw: 16th June 2012).

Nonetheless, many supporters did comment on how FIFA’s drawn out ‘indecision’ over the timing
of the tournament was, at the time, proving detrimental to the external perceptions of Qatar, as
one fan explained: ‘The indecision doesn’t make Qatar look very good. We don’t know if it’s going
to be in the summer or winter. It’s a long way off I know, but sooner or later they’re going to have
to decide’ (focus group, European Championships, Warsaw: 16th June 2012). Such negativity
relates directly to the extensive and continuous criticism from the media and senior officials around
the potential need for an unconventional winter World Cup in 2022. After more than four years
of extreme controversy, it wasn’t until 19th March 2015 that FIFA eventually confirmed the
22FWC would be held during the winter months, with the final to be played on the 18th December.
Subsequently, one interviewee stated ‘Finally we have a decision about the World Cup in Qatar
being in Winter. But the organisers and FIFA will be remembered for their indecision, as well as
the corruption – and indecisiveness and organisation do not go together, so it does not paint Qatar
or FIFA in a good light. But then, what about this World Cup bid has?’ (interview 3, Copa America,
Santiago: 29th June 2015)

The scheduling fate of the 22FWC has not only been a long drawn out process, as identified by
supporters, but has also caused significant concern amongst various football authorities, most
notably the European Club Association, who called on FIFA to provide compensation for the
financial losses of players clubs will suffer with this programing switch, a proposal initially rejected
by the world governing body’s secretary general, Jérôme Valcke. Three weeks later, however, it
emerged that FIFA had agreed to treble its payments to clubs for the 2018 and 2022 World Cups,
with club personnel also being allowed to have a significant say on changes to the international
calendar in accommodating a winter tournament (The Guardian, 27th February 2015; The Telegraph,
19th March, 2015; The Guardian, 20th March, 2015).
The final point raised in this regard centred on the safety of supporters themselves, with many
expressing their sincere concern over whether Qatari authorities would be able to effectively deal
with forms of hooliganism and crowd disorder. Among the teams who qualified for the 2011 Asian
cup were Lebanon, Syria, both North and South Korea – and Iran and Iraq, who faced each other
early on in the tournament. Although we saw every team play in the competition, we witnessed
limited examples of the participatory or disorderly behaviours often associated with football
fandom (field notes, January 2011). The problematic nature of spectatorship which presents
challenges to organisers of football mega-events is something supporters alleged Qatar had ‘no
experience of’, as one fan articulated: ‘The Asian Cup is one thing; the World Cup is something
else. Qatar has no experience of dealing with European fans or South American fans. I’m not sure
how they’ll cope’ (participant observation, Asian Cup, Doha: 8th January 2011); a further supporter
added: ‘…you need police with experience of dealing with football fans. You know, who
understand when it’s going off or about to go off, and when fans are just being rowdy’ (respondent
1, focus group, European Championships, Warsaw: 16th June 2012). Considering this, many
supporters felt the 22FWC may be better going to a country that had at least some experience of
dealing with football violence or crowd disorder – a point of great significance when we consider
the reduction of hooliganism at recent World Cups owes much to the introduction of effectively
monitored fan parks, a clear reflection of the experience needed to respond to the challenge of
hosting large numbers of football supporters (cf. Sutton and Rookwood, 2015).

Furthermore, in this context, some fans also expressed concern over the geographical scale of
Qatar, suggesting that the 22FWC should, at the very least, have been shared with neighbouring
states:

People moan about the size of Brazil, but you need the host nation to be a
certain size, to keep fans apart. Imagine if Bosnia and Serbia both qualify, not
to mention Israel and, well virtually anyone who hates them. And wouldn’t
everyone go through the capital? …They should have shared it with Dubai
(respondent 1, focus group, European Championships, Warsaw: 16th June
2012).

Central here were supporters’ feelings that given Qatar’s relative size, authorities would find it
impossible to maintain the necessary boundaries between rival supporter groups – predominantly
those from nations with a long history of demonstrating forms of hatred and animosity between
one another, either due to wider socio-political differences, or long-term football rivalries. Indeed,
Qatar will need to ensure that it either acquires or develops experienced law enforcers during the
tournament in 2022 if such issues of fan violence are to be prevented in the most effective way,
particularly when we consider that the majority of stadiums are to be located within a 25-30km
radius of one another (FIFA, no date). However, a further point of significance here relates to
how supporters will be treated under Qatar’s Shari’a law during the 22FWC. The Qatar legal system
differs greatly to the laws of many countries across Europe, America and elsewhere, with civil
rights for offenders severely restricted. Opportunities for free speech, for example, are extremely
narrow, with acts of proselytizing, swearing or insulting others in open spaces leading to
imprisonment. Additionally, it is illegal to be publically intoxicated in Qatar, to show forms of
intimacy in communal spaces, and the possession or use of illicit drugs can result in the death
penalty (field notes, December 2013).

The Dubious Awarding of the 2022 World Cup

The second theme to emerge from our analysis centred on the dubious relationship between
certain Qatari personnel and those at the helm of the world governing body of football. Dominant
to supporters we engaged with was the notion that Qatar’s acquisition of the 22FWC rested on a
great deal of dishonesty and untrustworthiness. This is not surprising given the plethora of media
commentators that have continuously questioned the integrity of Qatar’s right to host the 2022
finals, founded principally on accusations of bribery and corruption.

To several groups of supporters, the dubious nature of Qatar’s acquisition of the 22FWC started
with FIFA’s decision to award the state the tournament twelve years in advance, signifying the
beginning of a noticeably ‘unusual’ relationship between the world governing body of football and
Qatari personnel:

The first thing to note is that the World Cup was given to Qatar for 2022 in
2010. With that new rotation of World Cups there was so much competition in
Europe for 2018 it’s as if FIFA saw their chance to sneak 2022 in under the
radar. No one really spoke about how unusual or unnecessary it was to make
the announcement for it twelve years in advance. Particularly for a country that
changes so quickly. All the European focus was on 2018, and when England
lost out to Russia that became the focus. Meanwhile, it was casually announced
that this tiny oil-rich nation of Qatar would get the one after, no questions asked.
That’s how it came across (interview 2, 2014 FIFA World Cup, Rio: 21st June
2014).

In fact, many supporters felt the decision to award Qatar the 22FWC in December 2010 was
convenient at the very least, with some going further by suggesting the verdict was ‘a bit suspicious
even’ (interview 1, Asian Cup, Doha: 12th January 2011). The rationale amongst various fans here
related to the fact that FIFA’s decision to award a World Cup twelve years in advance is almost
unprecedented, with the majority of previous hosts being selected only six years prior to staging
the tournament - the exception being the twelve- and sixteen-year gap between FIFA’s 1966
decision to award the 1978 World Cup to Argentina and the 1982 World Cup to Spain. The
introduction of FIFA’s World Cup rotation policy for the 2018 and 2022 World Cups, as well as
the world governing body’s noticeable desire to take the sport to ‘new lands’, led to the underlying
assumption amongst many supporters that the decision to award Qatar the 22FWC was
manufactured prior to the official bidding process (cf. FIFA.com, 29th October 2007; The Guardian,
1st December 2010; The New York Times, 2nd December 2010).

In this regard, supporters’ continuously made reference to Mohammed bin Hammam, the Qatari-
born, former Asian Football Confederation President and FIFA Executive Committee member.
Although receiving two life bans from all football-related activities by the FIFA Ethics Committee
in July 2011 and December 2012 for charges of bribery and ‘conflicts of interest’, it has been the
Sunday Times’ exposé of bin Hammam in June 2014 that has been most damaging to Qatar’s right
to host the 22FWC. According to the Sunday Times, emails were leaked to the British newspaper
connecting bin Hammam with a number of corrupt actions vis-à-vis the 22FWC: first were
allegations bin Hammam paid £3m to FIFA officials to help secure support for Qatar’s 22FWC
bid prior to the official voting process; second, it is suggested bin Hammam used his contacts in
the Qatari government and royal family to organise a plethora of arrangements to secure the
tournament for Qatar; third, it is claimed bin Hammam enforced mutual agreements with Russian
president, Vladimir Putin, concerning the voting process for the 2018 and 2022 World Cups;
fourth, bin Hammam is alleged to have organised meetings with Thailand’s FIFA executive,
Worawi Makudi, in which World Cup support was exchanged for gas exports from Qatar to
Thailand’; and finally, bin Hammam is purported to have brokered numerous talks with UEFA
President, Michel Platini, and the Qatar bid team at UEFA headquarters in Nyon prior to the
awarding of the 2018 and 2022 finals (Sunday Times, 1 June 2014).
Interestingly, none of the supporters we interviewed questioned the legitimacy of the exposés
surrounding the 22FWC, with many fans expressing great faith in the research capabilities of the
media: ‘We’ve all read the papers. British journalists always find the smoke and can usually connect
it to the fire; (participant observation, FIFA World Cup, Brasilia: 23rd June 2014). Many supporters
went further by explaining how the heightened media coverage of the 22FWC had actively shaped
their understandings of the state, shedding light on how Qatar has been received by certain
members of the football community:

What you’re finding with FIFA and Qatar through the negative media coverage
though is unprecedented. Corruption is nothing new but this must run deep.
It’s not just a few journalists digging for dirt. Everyone’s talking about it and it’s
changing how the world sees Qatar. For countries that don’t know much about
them it’s not the best first impression. They made promises about taking the
game to new audiences and opening the Arab world, but the overriding thought
is that they’ve bought it, and paid people off. Their World Cup is so intertwined
with corruption in people’s minds and I don’t think the two will ever be split
(interview 1, FIFA World Cup, São Paulo: 26th June 2014).

As noted above, one of Qatar’s central endeavours is to leverage the 22FWC to open up the Arab
world to international audiences and create better understandings between East and West,
targeting, in the process, many of the cross-cultural misinterpretations and prejudices that are
alleged to exist with regard to treating the Middle East as a homogenous region and people (cf.
Brannagan and Giulianotti, 2014b); most specifically in this regard, Qatari authorities are actively
attempting to confront this misunderstanding through the endeavour to present Qatar to the world
as a progressive, forward-thinking state which vigorously adheres, in part, to forms of competence,
and integrity (ibid.). Nonetheless, the ‘unprecedented’ international media coverage of the bin
Hammam allegations appear to have introduced Qatar to various international supporters in a very
different light, relating more to notions of deceitfulness and incompetence. Important to note here
is that although it might seem necessary to differentiate between understandings of the 22FWC
and Qatar’s wider socio-political standing, supporters continuously discussed them
interchangeably, as one fan clearly articulated: ‘When you think of Qatar…you think of bribery.
They’re all virtually synonymous now in the eyes of most people’ (participant observation, FIFA
World Cup, Belo Horizonte: 24th June 2014).

Since the emergence of the Sunday Times’ exposé, the Qatar Supreme Committee for Delivery and
Legacy, the organization responsible for securing and successfully hosting the 22FWC, have
outright denied any wrongdoing, claiming such allegations are ‘baseless and riddled with innuendo’
(The Guardian, 15th June 2014). More specifically, Qatari authorities have endeavoured to distance
themselves from the shadow of bin Hammam, continuously suggesting the former Asian Football
Confederation President played no ‘official or unofficial role’ whatsoever in the state’s bid for the
22FWC (The Guardian, 3rd June 2014). Nonetheless, this has not stopped a number of FIFA’s main
sponsors registering their concerns over the negative publicity surrounding the 22FWC, with
Adidas, Coca-Cola, Sony, Visa and Hyandai/Kia all putting forward formal responses; an Adidas
statement, for example, read: ‘The negative tenor of the public debate around FIFA is neither good
for football nor for FIFA and its partners’; Coca-Cola responded by claiming: ‘Anything that
detracts from the mission and ideals of the FIFA World Cup is a concern to us’ (BBC, 9th June
2014). Most significant in this context, however, was the complete withdrawal in November 2014
of one of FIFA’s major sponsors, Fly Emirates, due to the growing international ‘poor image’ the
former held in connection with bribery and corruption claims surrounding the awarding of the
2018 and 2022 World Cups (Reuters, 3rd November, 2014).
Qatar’s Cultural Backdrop and Domestic Policies

The final core theme to emerge from our analysis revolved around Qatar’s socio-cultural backdrop
and domestic policies. Of significance here, given the continuous criticism the state has received
through the international media, was that the majority of supporters we spoke to were planning to
attend the 22FWC, with a great deal expressing their excitement in having the opportunity to
experience Qatar’s unique culture. This, it would appear, stemmed from fans desire to travel to
unexplored destinations, as one veteran World Cup supporter pronounced:

In England there was disappointment that 2018 went to Russia. But we’re
English and we’re more than happy with Russia. The last place we’d have
wanted it is England. Fans at home want it there, but those who travel want to
go to new places. And 2022 is perfect. How many people have been to Qatar?
(interview 1, Asian Cup, Doha: 8th January 2011).

This highlights the predominant view of hard-core supporters’ that the World Cup is not simply
about the football, but also presents opportunities to experience new settings. Specifically here, a
distinction was made by the supporter we spoke to above, who suggested that, although fans who
don’t attend international football tournaments in person may wish to welcome the World Cup to
their own lands, for veteran supporters who do, an essential factor when deciding to invest in
tickets, hotels and travel expenses was the prospect to experience those places across the globe
that are unique and exotic. Indeed, as a further veteran World Cup attendee explained to us: ‘Qatar
will be different, but that’s the beauty of the World Cup, and another reason to go’ (interview 2,
Gold Cup, New Jersey: 18th June 2011). As Qatar is the first Middle Eastern state to host the World
Cup, supporters emphasised their excitement towards having the opportunity to experience -
alongside the football - what Arabic culture has to offer. Although many supporters also suggested
that being the first Middle Eastern state to host a World Cup does put pressure on Qatar to
succeed, some offered words of support for the State: ‘I think they’ll get everything right, as they’ll
be desperate to show off and show the world what they’re capable of’ (interview 2, Gold Cup,
New Jersey: 18th June 2011).

Other supporters were, however, more sceptical of Qatar’s hosting of the World Cup, pointing
the state’s prejudice towards certain groups, particularly woman and homosexuals. The rights of
women and homosexuals in Qatar have been raised by numerous international media sources, as
well as many transnational non-governmental organizations. Human Rights Watch, for instance,
have highlighted the severe lack of freedom women enjoy in Qatar under martial law (World
Report 2014); this has led to numerous universal organizations calling for change: Philip Luther,
Director of Amnesty International’s Middle East and North Africa Programme, for example, has
called on Qatar to address the lack of rights and widespread discrimination women face under the
state’s current family regulations (Amnesty International, 7th May 2014). Furthermore, since the
decision to award Qatar the 22FWC, FIFA have been urged by the Gay Football Supporters’
Network (GFSN) to pressure the state over its discrimination towards homosexuality: at present,
Qatar is one of the few remaining countries where homosexuality remains illegal (The Guardian, 8th
September 2013)

Considering this, some supporters said they’d ‘give Qatar a miss, because it’s not worth the risk’
(participant observation, European Championships, Gdansk: 14th June 2012). With regard to
women’s’ rights in particular, many female supporters we engaged with sensed they’d not be
welcome in Qatar, and thus felt the best decision would be to stay at home during the 22FWC:
‘We travel with a group, with a couple of girls. Their reaction [to Qatar being awarded the 22FWC]
was, ‘Well, I’m not going there. They don’t want us in the stadiums.’ They’re worried about the
religion and how they dress’ (interview 1, European Championships, Gdansk: 14th June 2012).
Several female supporters we interviewed continuously referred to their uncertainty of Qatar’s
Islamic norms, and revealed how they did not want to unconsciously cause any offence through
the wearing of ‘inappropriate’ attire. The use of inappropriate dress by various Westerners living
in, and tourists travelling to, Qatar has been an issue raised by state authorities in recent years. In
seeking to clarify to those considering travelling to the 22FWC what is considered ‘appropriate’,
in June 2014 the Qatar Islamic Cultural Center launched its ‘Reflect Your Respect’ campaign.
Through the use of flyers and social media, the campaign is designed to get the message across
that one, regardless of gender, is required to cover up ‘from shoulders to knees’. Leading with the
title ‘If you are in Qatar, you are one of us’, the campaign advocates that short dresses, sleeveless
clothing and crop tops are not considered appropriate attire for woman in public spaces, while
men should refrain from the wearing of shorts and vest tops (The Telegraph, 27th May 2014; The
Telegraph, 3rd June 2014). In reacting to the campaign, some have advocated that this is a further
reason for the 22FWC to be held elsewhere, suggesting that, enforcing tourists to wear certain
attire will have a significant impact on the visible expression of nationalism found at previous
World Cups, thus limiting the overall carnivalesque atmosphere of the tournament (Huffington
Post, 2nd June 2014).

A further point raised by many more experienced supporters with regard to Qatar’s domestic
policies was somewhat unanticipated given the media hype around wider issues, but reflected the
appropriateness of not solely relying on media analysis. The issue revealed here revolved around
the state’s domestic organization of football events, and, most specifically, ticket availability, which
we found significantly shaped supporters’ perceptions of the host nation post-tournament. Indeed,
as one supporter advocated:

Going to a World Cup is one thing, but you have to get to the matches. When
you meet other fans, you talk about your journey, the weather, the people and
the tickets. Oh, and the football! I always associate Switzerland with me not
getting into any games at Euro 2008 (participant observation, Gold Cup, Miami,
10th June 2011).

The average attendance for Qatar’s four matches during the 2011 Asian Cup was 28,935, whilst
37,174 were at the final. Nonetheless, for those remaining 27 matches in which Qatar did not
feature, average audiences plummeted to a mere 9,324, with the lowest being 2,022. In a country
with among the highest gross domestic product per capita, ticket prices across the competition
ranged from the approximate equivalent of £2.40 to £24 (the latter a VIP ticket for the final),
which were sold at various locations in makeshift carts (field notes, January 2011). In a queue for
tickets for the opening ceremony, one observer noted: ‘They’re just printing these tickets here on
little machines. If this was the World Cup someone would pinch that machine and print their own
and sell them. They’ll need to sort this ticketing situation out for the World Cup’ (participant
observation, Asian Cup, Doha: 7th January 2011). The policy for selling tickets at the 2011 Asian
Cup was interpreted by supporters as Qatar’s relative inexperience of staging first-order sports
mega-events; as highlighted above, the World Cup will present Qatar with different challenges to
that of the 2011 Asian Cup, particularly as the demand for tickets will be far greater, and the state
will need to ensure that all measures are considered to prevent a logistical catastrophe and to
safeguard supporters’ positive experiences of the tournament in 2022.

Finally, it should be noted that the overwhelming majority of supporters we spoke to made little
reference to Qatar’s human rights violations, discussed continuously by media sources and non-
governmental organizations. Projected to the world in September 2013 via British newspaper, The
Guardian, it was revealed that thousands of Nepalese workers had died in Qatar due to ‘forced
labour’ in direct connection with 22FWC projects. The report exposed the conditions South Asian
expatriates face daily, documenting multiple forms of exploitation, abuse, lack of pay, little access
to food and free drinking water, and the seizing of passports, equating to forms of ‘modern-day
slavery’, and a clear illustration of ‘one of the richest nations exploiting one of the poorest to get
ready for the world’s most popular sporting tournament’ (The Guardian, 25th September 2013; The
Guardian, 27th September 2013). This has led to numerous commentators suggesting Qatar should
be potentially stripped of the 22FWC: Aiden McQuade of Anti-Slavery International has
previously called on FIFA to threaten Qatar with the removal of the 22FWC if migrant worker
violations are not sustainably overhauled (The Telegraph, 4th October 2013); similarly, Sharan
Burrow, General Secretary of the International Trade Union Confederation, has said that ‘FIFA
needs to send a very strong and clear message to Qatar that it will not allow the World Cup to be
delivered on the back of a system of modern slavery’ (The Guardian, 26th September 2013).

Upon questioning fans’ attitudes towards Qatar’s well-documented human rights issues, numerous
supporters revealed to us that this was in fact of minimal concern when deciding to attend the
22FWC, as one fan proclaimed: ‘You don’t really think of the workers. I know it sounds bad, but
you [the researcher] probably care more about that stuff. Once you’re there it’s party time’
(respondent 1, focus group, European Championships, Warsaw: 16th June 2012). This is not to
suggest that supporters we spoke to were unconcerned about said human rights violations, as one
supporter suggested: ‘Qatar has been accused of human rights violations in the construction of
different buildings. Blatter and other FIFA men should prevent this kind of thing, but they haven’t’
(respondent 1, focus group, FIFA World Cup, Rio: 20th June 2014); rather, the opinion of
supporters we spoke to was that, although issues of human rights violations should be addressed
by relevant academics, policy-makers and football officials, the fans themselves did not see the
need to directly concern themselves with such issues, and were more focused on the experience
of the World Cup itself, both with regard to football activities and the anticipated carnivalesque
atmosphere.

Looking Forward to Qatar in 2022

As previously mentioned, Qatari authorities intend to leverage the 22FWC for the pursuit of soft
power and foreign policy gains, yet to date, the attainment of football’s most global tournament
has brought a significant amount of perceived soft disempowerment for the state to confront. Our
analysis of international supporters’ perspectives encapsulates this, demonstrating that, for their
hosts, sport mega-events exert both ‘positive and negative outcomes that are empowering and
disempowering respectively’ (Brannagan and Giulianotti, 2014b: 4).

On the one hand, supporters do not appear to align to the ‘moral panic’ exerted by the media over
Qatar’s extreme climate or domestic treatment of expatriate workers, with the majority we engaged
with positively expressing their overall desire to visit the state in 2022. We argue that the apparent
aspirations of supporters to attend the tournament in person presents Qatar potential soft power
opportunities on two levels in particular. First, for a state that wishes to use the 22FWC to ‘create
better understandings between the East and the West’ in order to overcome forms of prejudice
and misconception (Brannagan and Giulianotti, 2014b: 6), thus further opening itself up to long-
term foreign investment and tourism, the direct presence of those from diverse backgrounds will
first of all need to be assured if any true exchange is to occur – solely relying on the media to
showcase one’s culture would, in this case, have certain limitations with regard to how much actual
‘exchange’ could materialize; furthermore, for a state that aspires to demonstrate to worldwide
audiences its aptitude to effectively handle the ‘massive responsibility’ of hosting and successfully
delivering one of the globe’s largest events (ibid.: 7), it will first of all need the 22FWC to echo the
kind of gigantism seen in previous tournaments, which, of course, can only be guaranteed if a
sufficient number of supporters are in attendance; an additional point to consider here is the soft
disempowerment that would occur if a distinct lack of support manifest in 2022, showcasing most
prominently the state’s unsuitability and unpopularity as a World Cup destination; the need for a
strong international presence during their tournaments is arguably essential for any host, but
particularly for Qatar, which not only has an extremely narrow population pool as it is, but has
also found the majority of its citizenry to be notably reluctant to attend sports events in person,
leading most recently to the state being heavily criticised for having to pay some of its migrant
workers £3.50 to appear at its hosting of the 2014 FIVB Beach Volleyball World Tour in order to
make empty stadiums look full (cf. The Guardian, 17th December 2014).

Second, welcoming significant numbers of people to Qatar in 2022 presents state authorities with
the potential to secure long-term tourism gains. As we have seen, holding the 22FWC in Qatar is
considered by many supporters to provide exciting opportunities to experience the state’s unique
Arabic culture. This, it would appear, acts as one of the prime factors amongst supporters when
deciding to invest in attending sport mega-events. For Qatar, we consequently suggest that if soft
power rests - at least in part - on the ability to entice others through one’s attractive culture, then
the 22FWC does indeed appear to offer the state a prime opportunity in which to leverage what
many international tourists (in this case sport-led tourists) are eager to experience, that is, its Arabic
distinctiveness, thus equating, in the process, to forms of what Nye refers to as ‘cultural-led
supremacy’. For Qatari authorities, therefore, successfully showcasing and maintaining this desired
uniqueness and exoticism to those attending the World Cup will be key if the state is to create any
knock-on effect in its tourist numbers post-2022, thus creating a much-needed alternative revenue
stream for when its fossil fuels diminish.

On the other hand, supporters were highly negative of what they considered to be Qatar’s
unfavourable and dubious ideologies and policies, equating, aligning with much of what has been
expressed via the international media. First, issues of corruption and bribery have introduced Qatar
to international supporters through what they perceive to be a detrimental light, with many
speaking of an inseparable link between the state and forms of deceitfulness and incompetence.
Second, supporters criticised the state’s policies for dealing with its perceived unsuitability to host
a World Cup: the construction of eight stadiums solely for a four-week tournament is seen as an
unnecessary and excessive strategy; this is exacerbated by Qatar’s relatively weak domestic football
league; the state’s solution towards overcoming its lack of need for so many stadiums post-
tournament – the dismantling and exporting of stadia to developing countries - is also seen as an
uninfluential policy, one that will alienate many via excessive financial expense that could be
disbursed on more sustainable developments elsewhere; the state’s strategy to overcome summer
temperatures with the use of environmentally-friendly cooling technology is also seen in a similar
light.

All of this does, of course, go against Qatar’s strategy to use the 22FWC to exert notions of
responsibility, capability, competence and veracity, as well as demonstrating the aptitude to
meaningfully confront contemporary challenges, all key features in the state’s soft power ambitions
(cf. Brannagan and Giulianotti, 2014b). Specifically, we can suggest that supporters’ perspectives
here relate to forms of soft disempowerment in two significant ways. First, rather than reflecting
the state’s suitability, capacity and skill to successfully and honestly acquire one of the world’s
largest sports events, the awarding of the 22FWC to Qatar was in contrast interpreted by
supporters to be a result of FIFA’s desire to take the World Cup to new lands, the organization’s
internal corruption, and, most specifically, Qatari personnel’s ability to turn their fortunate wealth
into various inducements. Second, and leading on from this, rather than seeing Qatar’s solution to
potential white elephants and souring climates as desirable and revolutionary policies, and for the
benefit of world football, such measures were seen by supporters as, once again, the state simply
drawing on its abundant wealth to gloss over the cracks of its unsuitability as a World Cup host.
In both cases, we see how supporters feel Qatar is drawing too much on its fortunate financial
wealth (hard power) to create outcomes that are based on either illegitimate means or narrowly
self-serving interests – thus severely prohibiting the manifestation of soft power forms (cf. Nye,
2008).

Finally, many supporters also questioned the effectiveness and suitability of the state’s domestic
proficiencies and values. For example, numerous supporters fear Qatar may not occupy the skill
and capacity needed to effectively deal with potential instances of violence and hooliganism that
have been present at prior World Cups. Due to the state’s relative size and lack of experience with
certain groups of supporters, central here was that the World Cup may pose certain health and
safety issues for those who make the journey in 2022. Furthermore, supporters also criticised the
state’s domestic policies towards women and homosexuality. In particular, female supporters we
engaged with were put off by the state’s strict adherence to ‘appropriate’ attire. And lastly,
supporters also criticised the state’s lack of experience and subsequent inadequate policies for the
sale of tickets at the 2011 Asian Cup, an issue yet to be discussed in this context until now. In all
such cases, it would appear that, as a World Cup host, Qatar’s abilities, policies and principles have
been interpreted by supporters with much cynicism.

Looking ahead to the World Cup in 2022, we can surely suggest that significant soft
disempowerment would occur if the state is unprepared to effectively deal with the many stresses
that accompany the hosting of sports events. We have seen, for example, how Delhi authorities
were severely criticised for their lack of ability to successfully plan and organize the 2010
Commonwealth games (Grix, 2013); furthermore, the Munich Massacre at the 1972 Olympic
Games, although an incident of extreme magnitude, is another example of where a sports event
exposed the inability of local authorities, in this case to plan and react in a meaningful way to a
terrorist threat, leaving many ‘calling into question…the whole mystique about German efficiency’
(Large, 2012: 223). For a state such as Qatar that positions global sport at the centre of its soft
power strategy, the need to demonstrate its organizational capabilities, foresight and proficiency
through the 22FWC is of upmost importance if it is to maximize its long-term propensity to attract
various overseas investors. One measure that might ensure the state minimizes the potential for
hooliganism and forms of violence, and thus demonstrate its foresight in identifying potential
hazards, would be to supplement their lack of experience by following French authorities and their
policy of working alongside overseas police during the 1998 World Cup (cf. Stott et al., 2001).
Either way, perhaps of greater significance is how Qatari authorities will deal with various
‘offenders’ during the tournament, and how its legal policies in this regard will be received by
international supporters and audiences. As mentioned, the state’s Shari’a laws differs greatly
compared to those found in some parts of the world, and if Qatari authorities are to maintain their
regulations during the 22FWC on matters such as swearing, insulting others in public, or
homosexuality - issues that are treated with relative ease in many Western countries - then the
tournament may simply heighten awareness of the state’s moral detachment from ‘prevailing global
norms’, a substantial hurdle for those wishing to acquire soft power in the eyes of international
audiences (Nye, 2002: 70). A final yet highly noteworthy policy issue here revolves around how
lenient the state will be with regard to the freedom of women and forms of ‘appropriate attire’. As
we have seen, the female supporters we spoke to made reference to their unease with the state’s
regulations concerning attire, which has, in many cases, led to their desire not to attend the 22FWC.
More broadly, for a state that wishes to use the tournament to increase its overall tourist base,
Qatari authorities’ adherence towards ‘modest dress’ and gender segregation leading up to 2022
may in the long-run be hugely significant, particularly when we consider the substantial and
increasing role of women in the family holiday decision-making process (cf: Barlés-Arizón et al.,
2013).
Conclusion

We have endeavoured here to add to the relative infancy of academic research on Qatar and global
sport by offering the first supporter-focused understanding of the state’s acquisition of the 2022
finals. Although we would agree that future scholarship focused towards classifying the
perceptions of international football supporters’ vis-à-vis Qatar’s forthcoming hosting of the
22FWC would be fruitful, our initial analysis here has raised a number of substantial arguments.
First, unlike previous research on Qatar and sport which has solely attempted to add some form
of theoretical analyses to the state’s acquisition of the 22FWC, we feel we have gone one step
further here by uncovering a number of significant points which would be meaningfully useful for
policy-makers in Qatar who are involved in the planning, organization and hosting of the World
Cup to consider leading up to the finals – supporters’ sizeable concerns around crowd safety and
the treatment of women and homosexuals, as well as the differences in domestic laws being cases
in point. Second, our contribution here has, on the one hand, shed light on the way international
football supporters do, in some cases, indeed align their opinions with popular media commentary;
yet, on the other, we have uncovered the fact that, at least in the case of the 22FWC, that the
‘pressing issues’ expressed by various media groups, politicians and human rights activists have, in
actual fact, been met by international football supporters with relative ease – the state’s summer
climate and issues around workers’ welfare being examples here. As researchers, this reminds us
of the need to go beyond purely top-down analyses and instead pay equal attention towards
bottom-up interpretations and understandings – in the context of acquiring soft power through
sport mega-events, this is vital, as it is those supporters who travel to tournaments in-person who
are arguably in the upmost position to judge the credibility, attractiveness and/or effectiveness of
a hosts’ culture (beliefs, morals, customs), policies (intentions, organization, management) and
institutions (cultural, medical, legal).

On the broader level, we would argue that, given the highly significant role of global sport to the
state’s soft power ambitions, as well as the increasing soft disempowerment that has manifest,
Qatar provides a compelling case study in which to investigate the substantial socio-political impact
of sports mega-events for nation-states, and would thus strongly encourage others to build on the
relative infancy of scholarship in this context. For future sports mega-event hosts, our contribution
here, for example, has shed-light on the superiority dedicated supporters place on travelling to new
destinations, and thus exposes the dire need for first-time hosts in particular to take all measures
necessary in ensuring the successful leverage and maintenance of those traits that make them
unfamiliar, intriguing and distinctive in the first place. We have also seen here how, at times, hosts
can be overambitious and sacrifice efficiency in the eyes of international supporters – Qatar’s
strategy for tackling its summer climates and lack of need for stadia post-2022 are examples in
point here; in fact, our engagement with international supporters sheds light on the fact that hosts
tend to be judged above all else on their capacity to successfully organize and oversee the purely
sporting side of the event as opposed to the achievement of wider social/cultural/political
outcomes - the availability of tickets being an example of the former here, yet one that has received
little attention in the wider sports mega-event literature.

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