Rahimal Bathu
Rahimal Bathu
with Fathima Beevi, the husband of the first defendant, namely, Khaja
Mohideen, got a gift-deed executed in his favour from Fathima Beevi on
24.04.1982; the said gift-deed was obtained by exercising undue
influence and coercion and was never acted upon and is therefore a
nullity. In the alternative, it was pleaded that, if the gift-deed is
accepted, since the husband of the first defendant died on 31.05.1988
(i.e., before the death of his mother Fathima Beevi), Fathima Beevi had
one-sixth share in the property which would come to the plaintiff under
the sale-deed dated 14.11.1990.
5. The appellants, who were defendants in the suit, contested the
suit on various grounds. On the pleadings of the parties, inter alia,
following issues came up for consideration:
(i) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to ownership and possession of
the entire second schedule property or only a one-sixth share
therein?
(ii) Whether the gift-deed, dated 24.04.1982, was fraudulently
obtained from Fathima Beevi and never acted upon?
(iii) Whether the sale-deed dated 14.11.1990, executed by Fathima
Beevi in favour of plaintiff, valid?
(iv) Whether the property described in the second schedule belonged
to Fathima Beevi on the basis of a Hiba executed by her father?
6. The trial court held that,— the property concerned was gifted to
Fathima Beevi by her father; the gift-deed dated 24.04.1982 executed
by Fathima Beevi in favour of Kaja Mohideen (first defendant's
husband) is invalid; the sale-deed dated 14.11.1990 in favour of the
plaintiff is valid; and that the plaintiff is entitled to one-sixth share in
the second schedule property. In terms thereof, the suit was decreed
for one-sixth share in the suit property.
7. As the trial court found the gift-deed dated 24.04.1982 invalid
and sale-deed dated 14.11.1990 valid, the plaintiff filed a review
application (I.A. No. 207 of 2001), inter alia, claiming that the suit
ought to have been decreed in its entirety and not for mere one-sixth
share. This review application was rejected on merits by the trial court
vide order dated 20.12.2006.
8. Aggrieved by rejection of the review application, the plaintiff (i.e.
the respondent herein) filed civil revision before the High Court under
Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (in short, ‘the CPC’).
9. The High Court entertained the revision and, by the impugned
judgment and order dated 12.09.2017, allowed it. The High Court not
only set aside the order of the trial court rejecting I.A. No. 207 of 2001
but it also allowed the review application and modified the decree dated
21.11.1996 in terms prayed for in the review application. In
consequence, the decree of the trial court, which was in respect of one-
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sixth share only in the second schedule property, was extended to the
whole of it. The operative portion of the impugned order is extracted
below:
“…consequently, the judgment and decree, dated 21.11.1996,
passed in O.S. No. 276 of 1992, on the file of the Ist Additional Sub
Court, Tirunelveli, are modified to the effect that the plaintiff is
entitled for declaration that the second schedule property belongs to
her absolutely and consequently, she is entitled to recover the
possession of the same from the defendants…”
10. Aggrieved by the judgment and order of the High Court, the
defendants are in appeal.
11. We have heard Mr. A. Sirajudeen, learned senior counsel for the
appellants and Mr. V. Prabhakar, learned counsel, for the respondents.
Submissions on behalf of the appellants
12. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted:
(i) The High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by entertaining a revision
against an order which declined review of an appealable decree;
(ii) Assuming that the revision was maintainable, High Court could
not on its own modify trial court's decree which was not the
subject matter of challenge before the High Court;
(iii) If the trial court had committed any jurisdictional error in
rejecting the review application, the High Court should have
remitted the matter back to the trial court for a fresh
consideration of the review application;
(iv) If the High Court's order is allowed to stand, defendants' right of
an appeal under Section 96 of the CPC would get affected as the
trial court's decree would get merged in the decree modified by
the High Court.
13. On the strength of the aforesaid submissions, the learned
counsel for the appellants prayed that the judgment and order of the
High Court be set aside and if the plaintiff-respondent has any
grievance against the judgment and decree of the trial court, she may
take recourse to the remedy of an appeal under Section 96 of the CPC.
Submissions on behalf of the respondent
14. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted:
(i) Against an order rejecting a review application, no appeal lies
(See Order XLVII, Rule 7(1) of the CPC). The term “Case”, used in
Section 115 of the CPC, is a word of comprehensive import and
includes civil proceedings other than the suit, therefore, there can
be no legal bar in entertaining a revision against rejection of a
review application;
(ii) The Explanation to Section 115 of the CPC makes it clear that
“any case which has been decided” includes any order made, or
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5
(v) Kalpataru Agroforest Enterprises v. Union of India . Herein, this
Court found Rule 32 of the Railway Claims Tribunal (Procedure)
Rules, 1989, to the extent it restricted the scope of power of
review vested under Section 18(3)(f) of the Railways Claims
Tribunal Act, 1987 to non-appealable orders, violative of statutory
provision and, therefore, bad.
(vi) The Managing Director (MIG) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. v. Arijit
6
Prasad Tarway . In this case it was held that the High Court had
no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the first appellate
court while exercising power under Section of 115 of the CPC. It
was observed that the order of the first appellate court may be
right or wrong; may be in accordance with law or may not be in
accordance with law; but it had jurisdiction to make that order,
therefore, the High Court could not have invoked its jurisdiction
under Section 115 of the CPC.
(vii) Prem Bakshi v. Dharam Dev7. In this case it was held that an
order by trial court holding it has no jurisdiction to proceed, or
that suit is barred by limitation, would amount to a final decision
and as such revisable.
(viii) Rajender Singh v. Lt. Governor; Andaman & Nocobar Islands8.
In this case it was observed that the power of judicial review of its
own order inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent
miscarriage of justice; and courts should not hesitate to review
their own earlier order when there exists an error on the face of
the record and the interest of justice so demands.
(ix) Punjab National Bank v. Shri U.P. Mehra9. In this case the order
of which review was sought had the effect of closing defendant's
evidence. The review was dismissed. Challenging the aforesaid
two orders, revision under Section 115 of the CPC was filed which
was dismissed upon finding that there was no jurisdictional flaw
in the order of the trial court.
10
(x) B. Subbarao v. Yellala Maram Satyanarayana . In this case the
plaintiff sought permission to sue as a pauper. On rejection of his
prayer, he filed a review application. Against rejection of that
review application, he filed a revision under Section 115 of the
CPC. While rejecting the objection that revision is not
maintainable against an order rejecting a review application, the
High Court held that as there is no right of an appeal against
rejection of a review application, the jurisdiction under Section
115 of the CPC can be invoked.
11
(xi) Arya Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Lala Channoolal . In this case it was
held by the Allahabad High Court that the CPC does not provide
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as to whether the suit was maintainable. The said issue was tried as a
preliminary issue. The trial court held the suit not maintainable. Against
the order of the trial court, a revision was preferred before the High
Court under Section 115 of the CPC. The High Court of Punjab set aside
the order and directed that the suit shall be heard and disposed of
according to law. Aggrieved by the order of the High Court, a Special
Leave Petition was filed before this Court. Before this Court it was
urged : (a) that the order under challenge before the High Court did
not amount to “a case which has been decided” within the meaning of
Section 115 of the CPC; (b) that the decree which may follow would be
subject to an appeal to the High Court therefore, the power of the High
Court was, by the express terms of Section 115 of the CPC, excluded;
and (c) that the order did not fall within any of the three clauses (a),
(b) and (c) of Section 115 of the Code. In that context, this Court
observed:
“6……………The validity of the argument turns upon the true
meaning of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which
provides:
“The High Court may call for the record of any case which has
been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in
which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate Court
appears—
(a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or
(b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or
(c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with
material irregularity, the High Court may make such order in
the case as it thinks fit.”
The section consists of two parts, the first prescribes the
conditions in which jurisdiction of the High Court arises i.e. there is a
case decided by a subordinate Court in which no appeal lies to the
High Court, the second sets out the circumstances in which the
jurisdiction maybe exercised. But the power of the High Court is
exercisable in respect of “any case which has been decided”. The
expression “case” is not defined in, the Code, nor in the General
Clauses Act. It is undoubtedly not restricted to a litigation in the
nature of a suit in a civil court : Balakrishna Udayar v. Vasudeva
Aiyar [(1916-17) 44 IA 261]; it includes a proceeding in a civil court
in which the jurisdiction of the Court is invoked for the determination
of some claim or right legally enforceable. On the question whether
an order of a Court which does not finally dispose of the suit or
proceeding amounts to a “case which has been decided”, there has
arisen a serious conflict of opinion in the High Courts in India and
the question has not been directly considered by this Court. One
view which is accepted by a majority of the High Courts is that the
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that stage, when the review application was rejected, the aggrieved
party had a right to question the decree of the trial court in an appeal.
In these circumstances, the question that needs determination is,
whether, against an order of the Subordinate Court rejecting on merits
an application for review of an appealable decree, a revision be
entertained.
13
24. In DSR Steel Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan , this Court had the
occasion to examine different situations which may arise in relation to
orders passed in a review petition. While dealing with those situations,
it was observed:
“25.1. One of the situations could be where the review application
is allowed, the decree or order passed by the court or tribunal is
vacated and the appeal/proceedings in which the same is made are
reheard and a fresh decree or order passed in the same. It is
manifest that in such a situation the subsequent decree alone is
appealable not because it is an order in review but because it is a
decree that is passed in a proceeding after the earlier decree passed
in the very same proceedings has been vacated by the court hearing
the review petition.
25.2. The second situation that one can conceive of is where a
court or tribunal makes an order in a review petition by which the
review petition is allowed and the decree/order under review is
reversed or modified. Such an order shall then be a composite order
whereby the court not only vacates the earlier decree or order but
simultaneous with such vacation of the earlier decree or order,
passes another decree or order or modifies the one made earlier. The
decree so vacated reversed or modified is then the decree that is
effective for the purposes of a further appeal, if any, maintainable
under law.
25.3. The third situation with which we are concerned in the
instant case is where the revision petition is filed before the Tribunal
but the Tribunal refuses to interfere with the decree or order earlier
made. It simply dismisses the review petition. The decree in such a
case suffers neither any reversal nor an alteration or modification. It
is an order by which the review petition is dismissed thereby
affirming the decree or order. In such a contingency there is no
question of any merger and anyone aggrieved by the decree or order
of the Tribunal or court shall have to challenge within the time
stipulated by law, the original decree and not the order dismissing
the review petition. Time taken by a party in diligently pursing the
remedy by way of review may in appropriate cases be excluded from
consideration while condoning the delay in the filing of the appeal,
but such exclusion or condonation would not imply that there is a
merger of the original decree and the order dismissing the review
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petition.”
(Emphasis supplied)
25. What is clear from the above observations is, that where the
review is allowed and the decree/order under review is reversed or
modified, such an order shall then be a composite order whereby the
court not only vacates the earlier decree or order but simultaneous with
such vacation of the earlier decree or order, passes another decree or
order or modifies the one made earlier. The decree so vacated, reversed
or modified is then the decree that is effective for the purposes of a
further appeal, if any, maintainable under law. But where the review
petition is dismissed, there is no question of any merger and anyone
aggrieved by the decree or order of the Tribunal or Court shall have to
challenge within the time stipulated by law, the original decree and not
the order dismissing the review petition. Time taken by a party in
diligently pursuing the remedy by way of review may in appropriate
cases be excluded from consideration while condoning the delay in the
filing of the appeal, but such exclusion or condonation would not imply
that there is a merger of the original decree and the order dismissing
the review petition.
26. Apart from above, there is another reason also for a revisional
court not to entertain a revision against an order rejecting on merits an
application for review of an appealable decree, which is, if the revisional
court sets aside or modifies or alters a trial court's decree, the decree of
the trial court would merge in the one passed by the revisional court. In
consequence, the right of the party aggrieved by the trial court's decree
to file an appeal would get affected. Further, there may be a case where
a person is aggrieved by a finding of the trial court on any issue, even
though the trial court's decree may be in its favour. In that scenario, if
there is an appeal by a party aggrieved by the decree, that person
would have a right to take an objection against the adverse finding with
the aid of the provisions of Order XLI, Rule 22 of the CPC, but in the
event of there being no appeal against the decree, such a person would
lose its right to take an objection, under Order XLI, Rule 22 of the CPC,
against that adverse finding.
27. No doubt revisional powers may be available on limited grounds,
primarily to correct jurisdictional errors, but still it is a part of the
general appellate jurisdiction of the High Court as a superior court. In
Shankar Ramchandra (supra), this Court observed:
“6. Now when the aid of the High Court is invoked on the
revisional side it is done because it is a superior court and it can
interfere for the purpose of rectifying the error of the court below.
Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure circumscribes the limits of
that jurisdiction but the jurisdiction which is being exercised is a
part of the general appellate jurisdiction of the High Court as a
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ought not to have been entertained by the High Court. The appeal is,
therefore, allowed. The impugned judgment and order of the High Court
is set aside.
31. However, this will not affect the right of the plaintiff/respondent
to file an appeal against the decree of the trial court along with an
application to condone the delay, if any, in filing the appeal. Parties to
bear their own costs.
———
1
AIR 1964 SC 497
2
(1969) 2 SCC 74
3
(1987) 3 SCC 711
4
(1998) 8 SCC 312 : AIR 1999 SC 462
5
(2002) 3 SCC 692
6
(1972) 3 SCC 195
7
(2002) 2 SCC 2
8
(2005) 13 SCC 289
9
AIR 2004 Del 135
10
AIR 1961 AP 502
11
AIR 1957 All 400
12
AIR 1956 Raj 113
13
(2012) 6 SCC 782
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