The Next Frontier in Cloud Computing 1724630683
The Next Frontier in Cloud Computing 1724630683
computing: Decentralization
as a catalyst for disruption
July 2024
Mahesh Ramakrishnan
Escape Velocity
The story of David vs. Goliath resonates deeply, epitomizing a recurring motif in human
history: the unexpected triumph of smaller, innovative forces over formidable giants.
This narrative is strikingly relevant in the history of corporate strategy, where the winds of
creative economic disruption have consistently overturned established regimes and
reshaped the competitive terrain. In cloud services, we are potentially witnessing the
Christopher Jensen emergence of another pivotal confrontation.
Director of Research
Franklin Templeton Digital Assets
The cloud services industry boasts a small number of extremely powerful scale econo-
mies, as Telecom Giants (AT&T, T-Mobile) and Web2 incumbents (Amazon, Microsoft)
have created infrastructure monopolies, taking advantage of a historically low cost of
capital and robust government subsidies. These oligopolies can use their infrastructure
advantages to king-make companies in areas of emerging technology, the strength of
which was exemplified by Microsoft’s investment in OpenAI, a generational technological
asset. In a break from traditional investments and mergers, OpenAI accepted $10 billion
Co-sponsor
Prof. Jorge Tamayo of compute credits and infrastructure support from Microsoft in return for 49% of the
Harvard Business School company, an unprecedented deal both in terms of size and structure.1 How does one even
begin to compete?
But before we can analyze the opportunity for disruption, we must first understand what
has driven incumbents’ competitive advantages. In short, it’s the combination of scale
advantages, regulatory barriers, and strategic market control—these incumbents also
influence downstream players reliant on their rails and use their scale to stifle competition.
The high barriers to entry for new market participants are considerable, characterized
by high capital costs, entrenched supplier relationships, and steep startup costs. However,
as traditional monetization models face growing challenges, the opportunity for chal-
lengers with better unit economics is growing.
Economic change has weakened the business model of incumbents. Traditionally, cloud
service firms are optimized through software-as-a-service (SAAS) frameworks allowing
high utilization levels on their modular architecture. These “one size fits all” subscription
economics, however, don’t always make the most sense for the end customer. Driven by
increasing data intensity of products, clients are pushing the market towards a pay-as-
you-go model for digital infrastructure and providers have had to respond by evolving the
SAAS model to one driven more by metered usage, termed infrastructure-as-a-service
(IAAS). 2 The IAAS model, while convenient for the customer, reintroduces uncertainty that
complicates unit economics by removing the key fourth step of the SAAS process (illus-
trated below). Higher uncertainty inevitably leads to price competition and a need to
recoup outlays through volumes quickly. Margins are driven lower by this, and growth is
stifled as uncertainty increases financing frictions. A new way to monetize customers
requires a new strategy, with a refocused plan around marketing, sales, etc. The compar-
ison between these business models is laid out below in Exhibit 1.
Exhibit 2: Market
Considerations 1 2 3
People are in possession of more The size of the internet has Composable software powered
powerful hardware, and software 100×’d, leading to an explosion in by blockchain allows trustless
has become an increasingly the amount of data available, and collaboration among parties that
crucial driver of infrastructure computation to make stored data may not work together otherwise
efficiency and service quality more valuable
Cryptoeconomic networks can offer better cost, security,3 and product quality than
incumbents. While Bitcoin, the earliest cryptoeconomic network, organized big groups of
machines to collaborate, it didn’t focus on output beyond hashing—thus while Bitcoin
controls one of the biggest supplies of compute in the world, that computer is not opti-
mized to be economically useful other than validating the network to process payments.
The next network to reach scale, Ethereum, incentivized the creation of useful services,
allowing developers to access compute power they could source from peers to build
apps. Filecoin has gone a step further, creating a blockchain-based protocol geared
toward making it easy for anybody to sell storage services to clients, with a transaction fee
model ideal for constant-use IAAS use cases. Moreover, because Filecoin is an open-
source, distributed network, hundreds of developers have built tools and services that
make provision of storage services to clients extremely easy for businesses with excess
resources. Filecoin incentivizes SPs to participate in the network: SPs earn the blockchain’s
native coin, ($FIL), for doing business on the Filecoin network, further accelerating SP
economics and driving down service price. Without a similar scale of upfront infrastructure
costs, and being able to use Filecoin’s payment network, these SPs can provide storage
services just like AWS at a far cheaper cost.
Mining—i.e., joining the network as a SP—is largely carried out by businesses with excess
capacity, and groups of individuals co-locating hardware: There are ~2,800 distinct SP
systems on the network today providing storage services. Some of the biggest SPs on the
network include Seal Storage, 1475, Holon, DCENT, and Greater Heat, who have onboarded
significant network capacity and serve multiple enterprise clients. Seal, as an example,
is focused on onboarding high-density academic research and has historically optimized
their platform around long-term storage of that data. Holon focuses on cutting-edge,
1 2 3 4
User pays storage Storage provider The network constatly User pays storage
provider to store commits publicly via verifies that storage provider to retrieve
their file Filecoin’s blockchain providers are storing their file back again
to storing the file files correctly
Source: Reidhead, Kyle. “Is Decentralized Cloud Storage the Next Big Web3 Industry?.” Web3 Academy. February 20, 2023.4
eco-friendly storage mechanisms combined with edge computing. Each SP can decide
what tradeoffs they support, the specific nature of the service they intend to provide and
build a custom service delivery plan around it. They transact mainly in $FIL and receive an
incentive for doing business on the network as well as payment from the client. While
enterprise-grade SPs may build out a whole support infrastructure, many of the SP busi-
nesses are fewer than 20 people and are taking advantage of excess hardware they
already own as part of a bigger business.
Organizations across the Filecoin ecosystem have also invested significant resources over
the last two years to dramatically increase Filecoin’s usability—an essential component
for Filecoin to become truly enterprise-grade and enterprise-ready. With this influx of
network orchestration capabilities, the network is primed for more sellers and users as the
network’s value is more easily realized and demonstrated. Since November 2023, the
ecosystem has welcomed multiple new data onboarding software platforms into the
community with more still planned to go live later this year. In response, the proportion of
big datasets stored by SPs has rapidly increased, with only ~50% of capacity being
used for small projects (0–10 terabytes) today vs. 90% two years ago. This suggests SPs
are attracting higher-quality institutional clients as Filecoin’s UX improves. How the
Filecoin model creates a ripe environment for SP businesses to drive value is laid out
below in Exhibit 4.
Exhibit 4: Strategy
Considerations 1 2 3 4
Storage providers with Limited opportunity cost Filecoin banner allows Scale of Filecoin further
hardware can’t compete to join the Filecoin SPs to weird purchasing reduces barriers to new
with AWS/Azure pricing network, offering power of a scaled player SPs joining the network
at scale, leading to immediate monetization when negotiating deals in a virtuous cycle
excess capacity of excess capacity
Source: “The Release of Filecoin Could Mean Product Shortages in the Semiconductor Industry.” Fusion Worldwide. December 11, 2020.5
The Filecoin network is extremely scalable and doesn’t bear any of the operating costs of
the SPs themselves. It offers an avenue by which SPs are brought together on a common
platform, allowing them to benefit from network effects and offer products that compete
with Amazon on the price they charge for a unit (GB) of storage. Most big, centralized SPs
like AWS will store a set number of copies of your data on their closed systems (usually
three copies). But on the Filecoin network, users can choose to store many copies of their
data—in whole or in part—encrypted or non-encrypted—across many nodes on the
network. Therefore, if one node fails, the data persists.
Data verifiability differentiates Filecoin from other centralized SPs whose solutions present
more like a black box. When dealing with confidential data, provenance is increasingly
important. Because all information is transparently stored in highly secure places that
clients can verify themselves, Filecoin is well suited for high-sensitivity datasets that
can’t afford data loss/modification. According to DeStor’s Filecoin Network Data Client
Explorer,6 major storage clients range from The Starling Lab and the Internet Archive to the
Web3 platform OpenSea and the Layer-1 network Solana, which stores its entire block
history on Filecoin. We also see it commonly used to store large research datasets for
universities, as well as highly sensitive medical and genetic record data due to the security
Filecoin’s fee-based transaction model also makes it uniquely suited to serve pay-as-
you-go IAAS use cases, which are better aligned to its business model than that of
centralized giants. Today Filecoin generates fees7 (~$23 million in 2023 at the current token
price)8 from clients to SPs. These clients are typically paying for storage in $FIL directly,
but also have the capability to pay in stablecoins. SPs and storage clients negotiate
deals for duration, amount, and price directly. Fees can be inherently seasonal for large
clients who store big troves of data where they typically pay storage and transaction
fees upfront and annually.
The majority of Filecoin’s costs are paid through token emissions, meaning Filecoin mints
new tokens to distribute. This also means that most costs aren’t paid for in cash and
that protocol revenue is actually used to buy and burn tokens thereby reducing net new
emissions, a mechanism similar to a buyback. Filecoin’s structure follows Chris Dixon’s
model for Overcoming the Bootstrapping Problem:9 Token holders bear the costs of
Filecoin’s growth as it scales, expecting that ecosystem growth will result in bustling
economic activity that makes the protocol valuable.
Below (Exhibit 6) we show how Filecoin’s cash flow generation would change if the
revenue the protocol generated 50×’d overnight to illustrate how scalable the model is.
If revenue 50×’d, miner incentivization costs would remain the same (the subsidy isn’t
scaled as a function of revenue as it’s programmatically encoded), as would Filecoin’s
R&D costs. The only cost that would increase would be its sales and marketing costs
from additional headcount. As such, as Filecoin significantly increases revenue, it also
swings to being cash flow positive. Note that because Filecoin conducts economic activity
in their $FIL token, this analysis is priced in millions of $FIL to elucidate some of the
mechanics at play and intends to show how viral adoption of the new products coming to
market might affect unit economics. Simply put, new demand on Filecoin generates
cash flow at a rapid rate.
Conducting the analysis in Exhibit 6 in $FIL terms illustrates how much operating leverage
there is within the Filecoin system. The Filecoin network is just software—there isn’t a
10,000-person team somewhere managing this—there is no central team at the core.
Other than marketing, costs don’t really increase even as revenues scale 50 times—EBITDA
margin swings as high as 59% with this increase and could go as high as 85% as revenues
scale further. Most costs today are incentives to help SPs compete on the network but
should the network scale massively, one would imagine you’d need fewer incentives to
keep suppliers engaged. As the network scales revenue by bringing productive storage
onto the network, the fees earned directly remove $FIL tokens from circulation and deliver
greater ownership to token holders.
There is a reflexivity piece to consider here as well: because Filecoin’s costs are paid in
$FIL tokens, an increasing token price can increase costs to the network. The same
number of tokens is paid to SPs, but the dollar value of those tokens is higher. Below
(Exhibit 8) we present an illustrative analysis of what the cash flow generated by the
Exhibit 8 (Millions Filecoin 2023 50× Pre-Buyback ($MM) Filecoin 50× ($MM) Post-Buyback
of Dollars): Revenue 1,102.5 1,102.5
Conservatively assume revenue
Filecoin Buyback – Labor Cost of Running Data Centers 0.0 doesn’t increase with token price 0.0
– Miner Incentivization Costs (223.7) (447.3)
Illustrative analysis does not consider taxes and assumes the buyback of tokens has caused price to double to $9/FIL
Source: EV3 and Franklin Templeton Analysis.11
Using this analysis, we can clearly see that while reflexivity leads to higher headline costs
for the Filecoin network, those costs are non-cash costs that don’t affect the cash genera-
tion of the protocol. Free cash flow is still ~$900 million in either case.
Next in Exhibit 9, we compare what a scaled Filecoin would look like compared to a Web2
competitor like AWS in US dollar terms. Note this isn’t a perfect comparison (comparing
a company vs a protocol), as AWS has hardware expenses and a full organization behind it,
and Filecoin’s incentives are a non-cash expense. The most important difference to
call out immediately here is the difference in fixed costs: while Amazon has signicant fixed
costs, Filecoin has none. The largest difference is capital expenditures: while Amazon
spent $22 billion on hardware capex to create and scale datacenters and another
$22 billion on operating costs of those datacenters (real estate, energy), Filecoin has no
such comparable costs. Filecoin covers this by directly incentivizing SPs, who themselves
spend the capex to buy hardware with storage capacity and keep the machines running.
Illustrative analysis does not consider taxes and assumes the buyback of tokens has caused price to double to $9/FIL
Source: EV3 and Franklin Templeton Analysis.
In Exhibit 9 on the previous page, we allocate token emissions to Filecoin cost buckets as
mapped by the whitepaper and show illustrative EBITDA on a comparable business to
what Amazon lays out for AWS in its filings. To take a snapshot here, we assume an initial
fixed price of $4.5 per Filecoin ($FIL) token that doubles because of the buyback. Finally,
we illustratively assume, like we did above, that any sales/marketing expense Filecoin
bears is paid in cash.
Once Filecoin is at scale, as fixed token emissions don’t really change, revenue scales
massively. As such, Filecoin can produce higher margins at scale than Amazon, and
explosively so in cash terms. This analysis also hits home the value of Filecoin’s incentive
structure on decentralizing capex, a massive contributor to cash burn for Web2 busi-
nesses: the network benefits from scaling usage without scaling fixed costs. Overall,
Filecoin’s structure at scale is significantly more flexible and profitable than AWS, which
suggests that should it get to scale, it could be a runaway winner.
While the potential for Filecoin to dominate the cloud services markets clearly exists, one
must question why it hasn’t happened: after all, Filecoin has been around since 2014. Part
of the answer relates to technological progress. The largest technical challenge in
Filecoin’s early days related to latency: consensus mechanisms require high download
speeds and low latency to coordinate across geographically dispersed machines.
Without high speeds, the performance of Filecoin significantly lacks central providers with
private networks as slower consensus drives slow service speeds around storage and
retrieval. Filecoin requires today’s mobile infrastructure (which have 10×’d data speeds in
the last decade12) as a baseline to enable performance in line with AWS. Similarly, the
nature of computation capable devices has rapidly accelerated: an iPhone today has
transistor density 171,000 times (!) greater than a supercomputer in 1980, and 90× greater
than an Apple Macbook Pro in 2010. The proliferation of compute-capable devices has
increased the pool from which Filecoin can pull storage capacity, resulting in higher
quality capacity, and better service (more available devices to store results in faster
retrieval and proximate caching).
However, even with these improvements, worryingly, utilization of the network remains
low at ~18%. We suspect three causes: a combination of initial oversupply of capacity,
tough business development tradeoff choices going after cold storage which drove
a UX problem with data retrieval being a clunky process, and the fact that we’re super early
and compute-over-data is just taking off, as we highlight below. On the demand side,
protocol revenue has also been extremely volatile due to early storage products on
Filecoin not finding product market fit themselves. While storage is a commodity (like oil),
how it is delivered varies depending on the data type and end use in computation
(similar to how there are multiple ways to refine oil). With an initial gearing toward cold
storage, the teams building on the network underinvested in easy-to-use retrieval for
the data they stored. This led to a clunky user experience, where people would find it easy
to store data, but hard to retrieve what they needed instantaneously. As such, early
clients were limited to those focused more on provenance and less on accessibility.
Trust is also important to address. One of Filecoin’s core innovations is verified storage:
All data stored on Filecoin’s network is verifiable by the client at any given time which
should make for a higher trust solution. However, blockchains and crypto are still broadly
misunderstood. Incidents like FTX’s bankruptcy have continued to contribute to a
perception around lack of safety with these platforms; many corporations have blanket
policies not to work with crypto-enabled platforms for fear of regulatory retribution.
Like the scaling of technological architecture mentioned above, the trust issue is also one
that will inevitably be solved by time. While politics can be uniquely tribal, technology
is not—over time the market will be able to differentiate between issues caused by human
action (FTX fraud, hacking accounts) and technology.
“Compute-over-data and the launch of FVM is Filecoin’s steam engine moment and will
allow developers to use stored data in dynamic ways to create brand new services and
primitives. FVM makes Filecoin the destination for any project experimenting with
AI-driven insights from large datasets. It’s not even going to be close on a cost basis versus
centralized providers of storage and compute.”
As demand for cloud services surges, it is anticipated that scaling Filecoin’s compute
infrastructure will prompt a swift and competitive response from the industry. Unlike
traditional industries with simple corporate structures, differences between Filecoin’s
decentralized architecture and AWS/Azure’s centralized structure will take traditional
mergers off the table. This leaves two options more likely than any other:
1. Price competition: Given Filecoin’s cost structure is flexible and driven by non-cash
token emissions, price wars would just lead to significantly deteriorating margins for
incumbents making them unlikely to engage
2. Collaboration: More likely as incumbents can use the Filecoin network, and capture
pricing differences themselves
Collaboration is a more likely outcome than price competition: structural cost advantages
of Filecoin make it infeasible for big tech giants to compete at scale. We note how
the earliest disrupted incumbents in crypto have responded to the challenge to global
payments driven by stablecoins. Notably, incumbents such as PayPal13 understand the
value proposition as so differentiated as to risk regulatory interference in their core
business to participate. It makes far more sense to collaborate with crypto incumbents
(in this case Paxos) to drive better products for consumers.
A very similar situation to Filecoin, one can look at what’s happening in the telecom/
bandwidth space, where a similar idea, Nova Labs has already struck an agreement to use
Helium14 with a national incumbent (T-Mobile) to support the T-Mobile network, and
another with Telefonica for international roaming. Facing a very similar paradigm around
cost disadvantage, T-Mobile decided that leveraging Helium to offer collective phone
plans was the most economically efficient move. Helium Mobile has since launched
its service nationwide and is able to price their unlimited data phone plan at ~$20/month
(vs. competitors who charge more than 8 times that).15 With the Telefonica deal,
Helium Mobile will additionally be able to offer their low cost offering in Mexico, and allow
Telefonica clients to roam onto their US network.
The next few years will yield several partnerships, as incumbents realize the cost advan-
tages of these networks can be leveraged for their own use. Customers, at the end
of the day, are still king, and big tech has a better stranglehold on its customers than any
set of companies in history. The growth of these networks also gives some hope to other
big tech incumbents without cloud services engines; no doubt Apple, Meta, and others
will do everything they can to break the Amazon-Azure duopoly, especially as the power of
that infrastructure begins to affect their ability to compete. Collaboration will likely be
the long-term outcome as cloud-based SPs can use Filecoin as backend infrastructure
and capture the spread from providing storage directly to customers. Doing so can be
20
15
10
5 $4.00
Source: Kassab, Sami; Bloomber, Seth; Grigore, Mihai. “The Essential Guide to Decentralized Storage Networks.” Messari. January 12, 2023.
DePIN truly has the ability to eat infrastructure the way software ate most of commerce.
Cloud services is a winner take all market, as the end resource is often commoditized and
therefore the markets depend on who can sustain the lowest price for the resource they
offer. This goes to production cost, and areas that DePIN wins are those where incentivized
communities can greatly lower production cost by contributing excess capital/labor like
spokes around a central hub of revenue-driving infrastructure. The fact that they are
winner-take-all markets further justifies the win-at-all-cost strategy that token incentiviza-
tion champions. That token incentivization can then drive a MOAT. The Lindy effect
holds as true in crypto as most internet-native markets. One of the lessons we’ve learned
the hard way with DePIN is that the first company to earn real revenue gets way ahead,
because that revenue is useful to sustain the network and back the token in the early
days by supporting SPs. At minimum scale, token value accrual is a big barrier to entry,
as once the flywheel is going, the token allows the network to borrow forward resources in
ways that allow faster growth through incentivization of the right partnerships and
suppliers in equity-like form. Getting this token economy going allows you to incentivize
at scale without a centralized step. As an example, Uber scaled significantly by raising
billions centrally and distributing cash as incentives to drivers. DePIN models would
allow direct incentivization of the end party which gives the network unbelievable access
to the end labor supply and allows companies to experiment with equity incentivization
in contribution for work, which we believe is a stickier and fairer prospect for storage
providers. Other upstarts continue to iterate on this model. Moving away from
Filecoin’s programmatic token incentive structure, Helium and Nova Labs have begun
experimenting with targeted incentivization, driving the ability to price discriminate:
varying incentives based on service quality. By specifically incentivizing the highest
value service, these dynamic models let networks better optimize exactly who they deliver
incentives to. We suspect over time Filecoin’s token structure may evolve to include
this powerful mechanism.
Endnotes
1. Hamilton, B. (2023, November 15). The Clever Crafting of Microsoft’s Open AI Deal. Medium. Available at: https://medium.com/@brooks.hamilton/the-clever-crafting-of-microsofts-
open-ai-deal-4b54eaf0be86
2. ARK Invest. (2022, November 18). PaaS: The Goldilocks of IaaS and SaaS. ARK Invest. Available at: https://ark-invest.com/articles/analyst-research/paas-goldilocks-iaas-saas/
3. ThoughtWorks. (2021, November 21). Decentralized Security. ThoughtWorks. Available at: https://www.thoughtworks.com/en-us/insights/decoder/d/decentralized-security
4. W3Academy. (2024). Is Decentralized Cloud Storage the Next Big Web3 Industry? W3Academy. Retrieved from: https://w3academy.io/is-decentralized-cloud-storage-the-next-big-
web3-industry/
5. Fusion Worldwide. (2024). The Release of Filecoin Could Mean Product Shortages in the Semiconductor Industry. Fusion Worldwide. Retrieved from: https://info.fusionww.com/blog/
the-release-of-filecoin-could-mean-product-shortages-in-the-semiconductor-industry/
6. Destor. (2024). Filecoin Network Client Explorer. Destor. Retrieved from: https://destor.com/en-us/filecoin-network-client-explorer/
7. Filecoin’s protocol revenue represents the sum of: Base fees—Determined by blockspace congestion and required by any storage proof. Batch fees—Used for bundling storage proofs.
Overestimation fees – Required to optimize gas usage. Penalty fees—Collected for storage provider failures.”
8. Messari. (2023, January 15). State of Filecoin Q4 2023. Messari. Available at: https://messari.io/report/state-of-filecoin-q4-2023
9. Dixon, Chris. (2024). Read Write Own. Random House. p 131.
10. Messari. (2023, January 15). State of Filecoin Q4 2023. Messari. Available at: https://messari.io/report/state-of-filecoin-q4-2023
11. Amazon. (2024). Form 10-K. BAMSEC. Retrieved from: https://www.bamsec.com/filing/101872424000008?cik=1018724
12. https://kenstechtips.com/index.php/download-speeds-2g-3g-and-4g-actual-meaning
13. PayPal. (2023, November 15). PayPal Cryptocurrency—PYUSD. PayPal. Available at: https://www.paypal.com/us/digital-wallet/manage-money/crypto/pyusd
14. CoinDesk. (2022, November 15). Nova Labs says T-Mobile to cover 5G dead spots in Helium network. CoinDesk. Available at: https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2022/09/20/
nova-labs-says-t-mobile-to-cover-5g-dead-spots-in-helium-network/
15. HelloHelium. (Date, November 15). Hi5 Unlimited. HelloHelium Blog. Available at: https://blog.hellohelium.com/hi5unlimited/
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