COVER STORY

Safety culture:
The ultimate goal

Investing in safety Professor Patrick Hudson when there seems no obvious reason to do this.

S
afety management systems can make a big What is needed is a safety culture that supports
management yields difference to any business. The benefits of
taking a systematic approach to safety are
the management system and allows it to flourish.
The bad news is that creating a healthy safety
many rewards obvious: the hazards of the business are known,
understood and demonstrably controlled.
culture and keeping it alive requires effort. The
good news is that less effort is required in smaller
However, the possession of a safety manage- organisations, and safety cultures are worthwhile,
ment system, no matter how thorough and both in terms of lives and profits.
systematic it may be, is not sufficient to guar- Safety for profit: There is considerable evidence
antee sustained safety performance. that the most safety-minded companies are also
To proceed further it is necessary to develop amongst the most profitable.
organisational cultures that support higher Safety cultures are characterised by good
processes such as “thinking the unthinkable”and communication between management and the
being intrinsically motivated to be safe, even rest of the company. This not only enhances

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 COVER STORY

safety, but can elevate morale and in some cases, about doing things round here”. believe those procedures are critically important
productivity. As communication failures are In one sense, safety always has a place in an to their jobs or the operation.
always identified as a source of problems for organisation’s culture, which can then be referred • Proactive: The organisation has systems in place
organisations, having a definitive focus for to as the safety culture, but it is only past a certain to manage hazards and staff and management
improving communication can only result in stage of development that an organisation can be have begun to acquire beliefs that safety is
improved performance at all levels. said to take safety sufficiently seriously to be genuinely worthwhile.
The other main reason why safety cultures labelled as a safety culture. • Generative: Safety behaviour is fully integrated
make money lies in the fact that, if one has the into everything the organisation does. The value

“
safety enhancement that an effective safety system associated with safety and safe working is
culture can provide, then one can devote What costs money is not fully internalised as beliefs, almost to the point
resources more effectively and take (profitable) of invisibility.
risks that others dare not run. safety but bad safety A safety culture can only be considered seri-
What costs money is not safety, but bad safety ously in the later stages of this evolutionary line.

”
management. Once the management of an management. Prior to that, up to and including the calculative
organisation realises that safety is financially stage, the term safety culture is best reserved to
rewarding and that the costs incurred have to be “describe formal and superficial structures”
seen as investments with a positive return, the From worst to best: Organisations can be distin- rather than an integral part of the overall culture,
road to a full safety culture is open. guished along a line from pathological to gener- pervading how the organisation goes about its
What is a safety culture? Every organisation has ative: work. In the early stages, top management
some common characteristics we call its “culture”. • Pathological: The organisation cares less about believes accidents to be caused by stupidity, inat-
These characteristics have often become invisible safety than about not being caught. tention and, even, wilfulness on the part of their
to those inside, but may be startling to outsiders • Reactive: The organisation looks for fixes to employees. Many messages may flow from on
coming from a different culture. The notion of accidents and incidents after they happen. high, but the majority still reflect the organisa-
an organisational culture is difficult to define. I • Calculative: The organisation has systems in tion’s primary production goals, often with “and
take a very general approach and see the organi- place to manage hazards, however the system is be safe” tacked on at the end.
sational culture as, roughly: “Who and what we applied mechanically. Staff and management A true safety culture is one that transcends the
are, what we find important, and how we go follow the procedures but do not necessarily calculative level. Even so, it is at this stage that the
foundations are laid for acquiring beliefs that
safety is worthwhile in its own right.
GENERATIVE
By constructing deliberate procedures, an
Safety is how we do
organisation can force itself into taking safety
business round here.
seriously. At this stage the values are not yet fully
internalised, the methods are still new and indi-
INCREASINGLY PROACTIVE vidual beliefs generally lag behind corporate
INFORMED We work on the problems
intentions. However, a safety culture can only
arise when the necessary technical steps and
that we still find.
procedures are already in place and in opera-
tion.
CALCULATIVE An organisation needs to implement a
managed change process so it can develop along
We have systems in place to
manage all hazards. the line towards the generative or true safety
cultures. The next culture defines where we want
to go to, the change model determines how we
REACTIVE get there. (See “Change, for safety’s sake”, page
31.)
Safety is important, we do a lot
everytime we have an accident. A cultural change is drastic and never takes
place overnight. If a safety champion leaves,
INCREASING there is often no-one to take up the fight and
PATHOLOGICAL the crucial top-down impetus is lost. But even
Who cares as long as
TRUST without a personnel change there are two threats
we’re not caught to the successful transition to a higher level of
safety culture. One is success, the other failure.
It’s a long way to the top: The evolution of a safety culture.

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 COVER STORY

In the case of success, effective processes, tools

and systems may be dropped, because the
problem is perceived to have gone away. In the
case of failure, old-fashioned approaches may
be retrieved on the grounds that they worked
before. But in both of these cases, the new, and
often fragile, beliefs and practices may not have
become sufficiently internalised to survive
changes at the top.
Management has to be truly committed to the
maintenance of an advanced culture in the face
of success and/or failure, and such commitment
is rare. have to trust the pro, do the work and be organisations are hard to move because they
Change is hard: One final underlying reason patient. (One advantage of this metaphor is are comfortable, even if they know that
why cultural change often fails to succeed is that that managers often play golf and can transfer improvement is possible. Large organisations
the new situation is unknown to the partici- their experience of learning a new swing to will inevitably be heavily calculative unless
pants. If this is added to existing beliefs, such as learning to manage an advancing culture. active steps are taken to counter that tendency.
the belief that the current situation is as good Change agents are like golf professionals: they Small organisations are more likely to be
as it gets, then there is little real need to change can help develop a person's game, but they able to develop past the calculative stage and
and failure is almost certain. If these failures can't play it for them.) become generative. The greatest single barrier
are at the level of the workforce, then strong Not too difficult: Given the financial induce- to success for smaller organisations however,
management commitment may save the day. ments, why don't organisations try and develop is the belief that it is too difficult. On the
If the problems lie with management, then the most advanced forms of safety culture? The contrary, in the long term, it is more difficult,
there is little hope because they will enforce the answer seems to be contained in the type of and dangerous, not to.
old situation, which feels most comfortable, on culture the organisation has at the time.
the most proactive of workforces. Pathological organisations just don't care. Professor Patrick Hudson is recognised inter-
A colleague has likened this to learning a Reactive organisations think that there is nationally for his work on safety management
new golf swing by changing the grip and the nothing better and anyone who claims better systems. He is based at Leiden University in
stance. At first the new position is uncomfort- performance is probably lying. They do what Amsterdam and is an active member of the ICAO
able. However, to improve your swing you they feel is as good as can be done. Calculative Human Factors Awareness Group.

Change, for safety’s sake

The following model was developed for managing successful change who have succeeded.
within organisations. Its strength comes from the fact that it is intended • Personal vision: Definition by those involved of what they expect the
to change both the individuals and the organisations they constitute, change to be.
and realises that changing one without the other is impossible. The Planning
model puts together the requirements for change of individual beliefs that • Plan construction: All people involved in the change create their own
are so crucial in cultural development. It can apply to safety, but it can action plan.
also apply to any other desirable development in an organisation. It gives • Measurement points: Indicators of success in the process are defined.
substance to the oft-heard cries for workforce involvement and shows • Commitment: Staff and management sign up to the plan.
where and why such involvement is crucial, especially in the later stages Action
of evolution towards a full safety culture: • Do: Start implementing action plans.
Awareness • Review: Progress is reviewed with concentration upon successful
• Awareness: Knowledge of a better alternative than the current state. outcomes.
• Creation of need: Active desire to achieve the new state. • Correct: Plan is modified where necessary.
• Making the outcome believable: Believing that the state is sensible for Maintenance
those involved. • Review: Management reviews change process at regular (and defined
• Making the outcome achievable: Making the process of achieving the in advance) intervals.
new state credible for those involved. • Outcome: Checks to see whether new values and beliefs have become
• Information about successes: Provision of information about others second nature.

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