On Appaya Dīkṣita’s Engagement

with Vyāsatīrtha’s Tarkatāṇḍava

Jonathan DUQUETTE1

1. Introduction
The leading 2 role played by the South Indian intellectual Appaya Dīkṣita (c.
1520-1593) in the development of 16th-century Sanskrit scholarship has received
increasing attention from scholars in recent years. It is by now fairly well-known
that Appaya innovated in an unusually wide range of disciplines. He was also a
brilliant polemicist in his own right, as shows his harsh criticism of the Dvaita
Vedānta school in works such as the Madhvatantramukhamardana (‘‘Grinding the
Face of Madhva’s School’’), in which Appaya severely criticizes Madhva, the
founder of the school, for having falsely fabricated śruti and smṛti passages in
support of his own interpretation of the Brahmasūtras (BS hereafter) (Mesquita
2000: 30-32; Okita 2016). By Appaya’s time, the Dvaita Vedānta school had
already begun to establish itself as a major force in South India, both in terms of
its sociopolitical prominence and intellectual reach. One key figure in this
remarkable development was the 16th-century scholar Vyāsatīrtha (c. 1460-1539),
traditionally considered, together with Madhva and Jayatīrtha (c. 1365-1388), as
one of the three great ‘‘sages’’ (munitraya) of the Dvaita tradition. It is well known
that Vyāsatīrtha was instrumental in promoting Dvaita Vedānta within the wider
Vijayanagara cultural and socio-religious milieu of his time, through his relations
with the Vijayanagara court (in which he was active from 1499 until his death) as
well as his cultivation of its patronage (Stoker 2011).
In a recent publication, McCrea has proposed to explore further Vyāsatīrtha’s
pioneering intellectual work in order to deepen our understanding of the dramatic
rise of Dvaita in this period and its impact on the broader development of South
Indian Sanskrit scholarship. He suggests, for instance, that Vyāsatīrtha’s
historically nuanced engagement with Advaita views in his celebrated Nyāyāmṛta
may have inspired Appaya Dīkṣita’s own efforts as a doxographer of Advaita

1 Marie-Curie Fellow, University of Oxford, United Kingdom.

E-mail: [email protected].
2 A previous draft of this paper was presented at the Association for the Study of the History of

Indian Thought Annual Conference at Kyoto University (December 2014). Generous support
for this research was received from the Japanese Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS
Postdoctoral Fellowship, 2013-2014). I wish to thank Diwakar Acharya and Lawrence McCrea
for their feedback on sections of this paper, as well as Somdev Vasudeva, Yuko Yokochi and
Krishnamurti Ramasubramanian for the enjoyable time spent in reading Navya-Nyāya works.
2 Journal of Indological Studies, Nos. 28 & 29 (2016–2017)

Vedānta and his brand of historicist scholarship, which is known to have provided
a model for several ‘‘new’’ intellectuals after him (McCrea 20151: 99). As a matter
of fact, Appaya was not only aware of Vyāsatīrtha’s work and influenced by it,
but he also engaged it forefront.3 In the following, I discuss Appaya’s engagement
with the Tarkatāṇḍava (hereafter TT), Vyāsatīrtha’s remarkable treatise of
epistemology and logic, in two of his works: the Upakramaparākrama, a treatise
on Mīmāṃsā hermeneutics in which Vyāsatīrtha is set as the main target of
Appaya; and the Śivārkamaṇidīpikā, Appaya’s magnum opus of Śivādvaita
Vedānta, where he silently quotes Vyāsatīrtha in a pūrvapakṣa on the question of
Īśvara’s inferability from a Navya-Nyāya perspective. By means of this textual
analysis, I aim to provide a clearer picture of the intellectual relationship between
Appaya and Vyāsatīrtha―two great luminaries of 16th-century Sanskrit
scholarship in South India―and shed additional light on Appaya’s scholarly
practice in engaging with other scholars.

2. Appaya’s Upakramaparākrama: A polemical attack of Vyāsatīrtha

Appaya Dīkṣita’s Upakramaparākrama (‘‘The Might of the Initial Statement,’’
hereafter UP) deals with the following hermeneutical question: which portion of
a scriptural text (or textual section) is actually the most important when it comes
to resolve apparent contradictions in the text (or textual section)―its beginning
(upakrama, which I will translate hereafter as ‘‘initial statement’’) or its
conclusion (upasaṃhāra, which I will translate hereafter as ‘‘final statement’’)?
In general, Mīmāṃsakas have held the view that the initial statement has greater
importance than the final statement in such an interpretive context. When the two
statements do not apparently harmonize with each other, the meaning of the final
statement (upasaṃhāra) should be considered invalid and reinterpreted so as to
be in agreement with that of the initial statement (upakrama), a general principle
I will refer to here as upakramanyāya. The underlying assumption is that in case
of conflict the initial statement has a greater ‘‘hermeneutical power’’ than the final
statement. One reason adduced in support of this claim (at least from Kumārila
onwards) is that at the time of apprehending the initial statement’s meaning, no
contradictory cognition can take place for the knowledge of the final statement’s
meaning has not yet arisen. But in a situation of inevitable conflict, contradiction
occurs as soon as the final statement is apprehended, which makes it ‘‘weaker,’’

3 At the time of submitting this article to the Journal of Indological Studies, I came to know
that Lawrence McCrea (Cornell University) and Yigal Bronner (Hebrew University of
Jerusalem) were also submitting articles on the upasaṃhāra-upakrama controversy involving
Appaya and Vyāsatīrtha. The interested reader might consult their articles in the Journal of
Hindu Studies : Bronner 2015, McCrea 20152.
 On Appaya Dīkṣita’s Engagement (Jonathan DUQUETTE) 3

in a hermeneutical sense, than the initial statement. As we shall see, Śabara adopts
this principle as do Kumārila and other Mīmāṃsakas.
Advaitins too have long been concerned with similar hermeneutical
questions due to their same insistence on the primacy of textual knowledge.
Typically, they hold that six ‘‘indicators’’ or ‘‘marks of intention’’ (tātparyaliṅga)
are required in order to determine or ascertain the underlying intention or meaning
(tātparya) of a text or textual section: 1. the concordance between the initial and
final statements (upakramopasaṃhāraikya); 2. the repetition or recurrence
(abhyāsa) of the subject under discussion; 3. the novelty (apūrvatā) of the subject
(i.e., typically the subject should not be knowable through other pramāṇas than
śruti); 4. the clear mention of an independent result (phala) associated with the
subject; 5. the mention of subordinate statements of praise (arthavāda) related to
the subject; and 6. the logical justification (upapatti) of the subject.4 Among these
principles of textual interpretation, the first―namely, the concordance between
the initial and final statements―is most crucial for Advaitins as they rely on it to
ascertain the meaning of large sections of Upaniṣads and to demonstrate that their
import as a whole is to teach the non-dual Brahman, the knowledge of which is
considered to lead to spiritual liberation.
Appaya’s contention in the UP is with those who uphold the view that in case
of interpretive conflict―that is, in cases where the concordance (aikya) between
the two statements cannot be achieved―the final statement should prevail over
the initial statement. His opening verse reads:

upakramasya prabalatvam ūcire yayopasaṃhāravirodhino budhāḥ |

pratiṣṭhitāṃ tām iha tarkasaṃtatiṃ prabodhayāmaḥ pratikūlajalpitān ||
(UP, p.1)

4 These six marks appear in this order in the following formula, oft-quoted in Advaita works:
upakramopasaṃhārāv abhyāso ’pūrvatā phalam |
arthavādopapattī ca liṅgaṃ tātparyanirṇaye ||
While this formula appears in the works of several late Advaitins, I have not been able to trace
it, at least in the exact same form, in early Advaita works. Śaṅkara does not mention the six
marks explicitly, although he relies on them in the course of his exegesis, particularly in his
commentary on the sixth chapter of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad (cf. Hirst 2005: 62-63, who relies
on de Smet’s unpublished thesis on Śaṅkara (1953)). Prakāśātman mentions the six marks in
almost the same versified form as the above-mentioned formula―upakramopasaṃhārāv
abhyāso ’pūrvatā phalam | arthavādopapattī ca yato jīvas tataḥ paraḥ (Śābdanirṇaya, kārikā
69). Whether he relies or not on a pre-existing list, I do not know, but I tend to agree with
McCrea that he may have been the ‘‘first real theorist of the tātparyaliṅgas’’ (McCrea, personal
communication on 12/01/2015). Madhva, in his Brahmasūtrabhāṣya ad BS 1.1.4, ascribes the
formula to the Bṛhatsaṃhitā (dated c. 6th century AC). For a standard treatment of the six marks
from an Advaita perspective, see Sadānanda’s Vedāntasāra (beginning with liṅgāni
tūpakramopasaṃhārābhyāsāpūrvatāphalārthavādopapattyākhyāni; v.183ff.).
4 Journal of Indological Studies, Nos. 28 & 29 (2016–2017)

Appaya’s intention is to make one aware of that firm (pratiṣṭhita) line of reasoning
(tarkasaṃtati) thanks to which the wise ones (budha), being opposed to the view
that the final statement should prevail in case of conflict, have established that the
initial statement has greater strength (prabala) than the final statement. His
designated audience are the pratikūlajalpita, those who have literally blabbered
the opposite line of reasoning (pratikūlatarka). Nowhere does Appaya state
explicitly who are these, but that he has Dvaitins right in sight is obvious. The
opposite view in question is hinted at by Madhva himself in his Brahma-
sūtrabhāṣya ad BS 1.1.4 (tat tu samanvayāt), which discusses the manner in
which Brahman should be established through proper exegesis (samyag anvaya
iti samanvaya). In the very first sentence of his commentary, Madhva glosses
anvaya in the sūtra with upapattyādiliṅga, a direct reference to the above-
mentioned list of tātparyaliṅgas which he probably imports from Advaitins. In his
Tattvaprakāśikā, Jayatīrtha interprets this gloss to mean that Madhva considered
the order of tātparyaliṅgas featuring in the list as one of ascending ‘‘strength’’ or
importance. This is implied, he says, by the way in which Madhva places upapatti
at the head of the list:

While [using the expression] upapattyādi [in order to refer to] the initial
statement, etc., [Madhva] intends to say in his commentary that [the initial
statement, etc.] have increasing strength. This is the case since [he] declared
[in his Anuvyākhyāna] that ‘‘each mark, beginning with the initial statement,
is indeed stronger than the previous one.’’5

When it comes to determine the import of a text or textual passage, continues

Jayatīrtha, repetition should therefore prevail over the concordance between
initial and final statements. Similarly, novelty should prevail over repetition. In
the end, it is the way in which the subject under discussion is logically brought
about that stands as the strongest criterion of interpretation.6
One direct implication of the principle of ascending strength is that the final
statement (upasaṃhāra) should have primacy over the initial statement
(upakrama) whenever both statements cannot be harmonized, since the former

5 upakramādīnām upapattyāditvena bhāṣyaṃ teṣām uttarottaraprābalyābhiprāyam,

‘‘upakramādiliṅgānāṃ balīyo hy uttarottaram’’ ity ukteḥ (Tattvaprakāśikā, p.2). The full verse
of the Anuvyākhyāna (3.4.181) reads: upakramādiliṅgānāṃ balīyo hy uttarottaram | śrutyādau
pūrvapūrvaṃ ca brahmatarkavinirṇayāt.
6 upapattes sarvamūlatvena sarvataḥ prābalyam (ibid., p.3). As far as I know, Madhva does

not make use of this principle of ascending strength. Viṣṇudāsācārya (c. 1390-1440), who
comes shortly after Jayatīrtha, does not use this principle either, at least in connection with the
initial and final statements.
 On Appaya Dīkṣita’s Engagement (Jonathan DUQUETTE) 5

follows the latter in the list. Jayatīrtha further explains, based on Madhva again,
that this is logically justifiable inasmuch as the final statement stands as an
explanation (vyākhyāna) of the initial statement:

Since it would [undesirably] follow that an initial statement in contradiction

[with a final statement] is not authoritative, [the final statement must be]
stronger than [the initial statement] inasmuch as it consists in an explanation
(vyākhyānarūpa) [of the initial statement].7

Jayatīrtha seems content with this explanation, but it will prove insufficient to
counteract effectively the long-standing position held by Śabara, Kumārila and
others. As we shall see, it will be left to Vyāsatīrtha to strengthen the Dvaita
position by attacking, for the very first time, the Mīmāṃsakas on their own
ground.8

2.1 Appaya’s pūrvapakṣa in the UP

Having stated his intention, Appaya then provides an outline of the
upakramanyāya upheld by Mīmāṃsakas through explaining their interpretations
of specific sections (adhikaraṇa) from the Mīmāṃsāsūtras (MS hereafter). This
preliminary discussion is meant as an introduction to the pūrvapakṣa to be refuted
later in the work, as the latter is precisely built around the refutation of these
interpretations. Appaya ascribes this pūrvapakṣa to ‘‘recent’’ (arvācina) scholars
who hold the view that the final statement is stronger than the initial statement
‘‘because the former consists in an explanation of the latter (tadvyākhyāna-
rūpatvāt).’’9 This makes clear that Appaya is addressing recent Dvaitins in the
UP. In the following, we will see that Vyāsatīrtha, who precedes him of two
generations or so, was indeed Appaya’s target in the UP. For the sake of brevity, I
shall discuss only Vyāsatīrtha’s treatment of the vedopakramādhikaraṇa in the TT
with a view to clarify Vyāsatīrtha’s approach to the upakramanyāya problem.

2.1.1 Śabara on the vedopakramādhikaraṇa

This adhikaraṇa (MS 3.3.1-8) concerns a particular sentence from the Maitrāyaṇī

7 upasaṃhārasya vyākhyānarūpatvena tadvirodhyupakramāprāmāṇyāpattes tasya tato ’pi

prābalyam (ibid., p.2).
8 Viṣṇudāsācārya pioneered the application of Mīmāṃsā principles of textual interpretation in

the exposition of Dvaita positions and refutations of other systems. But, as far as I know,
Vyāsatīrtha was the first Dvaitin to systematically refute the Mīmāṃsā formulation and
hermeneutical application of this principle.
9 atra kecid arvācināḥ kalpayanti―upakramād upasaṃhāro balīyān, tadvyākhyānarūpatvāt

[...] (UP, p.6). The pūrvapakṣa ends at p.17 of the edition I used; no other pūrvapakṣa is
presented in the work.
6 Journal of Indological Studies, Nos. 28 & 29 (2016–2017)

Saṃhitā that occurs in connection with the jyotiṣṭoma soma sacrifice, in which
stalks of the soma plant are pressed at precise times, offered to various deities and
then drunk by the priests. The sentence in question, found towards the end of
Maitrāyaṇī 3.6.5, is ‘‘The ṛc is recited loudly, the yajus in a whisper [and] the
sāman loudly’’ (uccair ṛcā kriyate, upāṃśu yajuṣā, uccaiḥ sāmnā). The doubt
(saṃdeha) here is whether the words ṛc, yajus and sāman denote hymns, prose
passages and melodies respectively, or rather the Vedas themselves, namely the
Ṛgveda, Yajurveda and Sāmaveda. In the first alternative, it would be enjoined,
for instance, that all individual hymns, irrespective of the Vedas to which they
belong, should be recited loudly. In the second alternative, only those hymns
compiled in the Ṛgveda would be recited loudly while those from the Yajurveda
would be recited with a low voice.
The pūrvapakṣa (MS 3.3.1: śruter jātādhikāraḥ syāt) presented by Śabara in
his bhāṣya is that these words refer to the ‘‘types’’ of composition (jāti, i.e., hymns,
prose passages, etc.) because it is taught so in the śruti. In other words, we
understand that the type is meant merely by hearing the words ṛc, yajus and sāman
in the Maitrāyaṇī sentence. 10 In his first siddhānta (MS 3.3.2: vedo vā
prāyadarśanāt), Śabara explains that the three words―ṛc, yajus and
sāman―must refer to the corresponding Vedas because the entire ‘‘passage’’
(vākya) in which those words are found deals chiefly (prāya) with the Vedas. This
is obviously a statement about what is the main theme or intention of a textual
passage. In order to prove his point, Śabara has recourse to the upakramanyāya.
The sentence from the Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā (‘‘uccair ṛcā kriyate, upāṃśu yajuṣā,
uccaiḥ sāmnā’’) occurs at the end of the passage in question, which makes it the
final statement (upasaṃhāra). Śabara traces the actual beginning (upakrama) of
the passage to an earlier statement declaring that the Ṛgveda, the Sāmaveda and
the Yajurveda originate from Agni, Āditya and Vāyu respectively ([tebhyas] trayo
vedā asṛjyanta―agner ṛgvedo, vāyor yajurveda, ādityāt sāmaveda). On this basis,
he then argues that since these three words denote the Vedas at the beginning of
the passage, then it must be the case that the three words in the concluding portion
also refer to the three Vedas. Śabara concludes by saying that if this were not so,
the interpretation of the entire passage could not be construed correctly:

Since we find [the words ṛc, yajus and sāman] in the final statement
(upasaṃhāra) of the [entire] passage (vākya), [the words] ṛc, etc. in the final
statement should have the sense of [the three] Vedas, [it being the case] that

10 tatra saṃdehaḥ―kiṃ ṛgādijātim adhikṛtyaite śabdāḥ pravṛttāḥ, uta vedam adhikṛtyeti? kiṃ
tāvat prāptam? jātādhikāraḥ syāt. kutaḥ? śruter, eṣāṃ śabdānāṃ śravaṇād eva jātiṃ
pratipadyāmahe (Śābarabhāṣya ad MS 3.3.1).
 On Appaya Dīkṣita’s Engagement (Jonathan DUQUETTE) 7

Vedas should be recited in a whisper, etc. inasmuch as they are produced [by
the deities]. Otherwise, the [entire] passage itself could not be construed
correctly, [and the three words] in [the passage] would have no purpose.
From this it follows [that the three words should] refer to [the three] Vedas.11

Kumārila confirms Śabara’s interpretation. In his Tantravārttika (ad MS 3.3.2) he

explains that by the time the reader has read the three words in the concluding
portion of the passage, his mind is already pervaded by the mental impressions
produced by the notion of the Vedas (vedabuddhijanitasaṃskāravyāpt[a])
acquired while reading the beginning of the passage, where the three Vedas are
declared to originate from the three deities. Thus the words ṛc, yajus and sāman
naturally have as their referent the three Vedas. This typical example shows how
Mīmāṃsakas may proceed to settle the interpretation of a difficult scriptural
passage on the basis of upakramanyāya. Firstly, two passages are linked within a
larger textual unit or ‘‘passage’’ (vākya) as the latter’s initial (upakrama) and final
statements (upasaṃhāra). Secondly, the final statement is reinterpreted so as to
agree with the initial statement based on the principle that the initial statement has
a stronger hermeneutical power than the final statement.

2.1.2 Vyāsatīrtha on the vedopakramādhikaraṇa

The Tarkatāṇḍava (TT) criticizes and refutes views associated with the Nyāya
school. Vyāsatīrtha directs his criticism especially towards the 11th-century
Naiyāyika Udayana and leading Navya-Nyāya scholars such as Gaṅgeśa (c. 14th
century) and some of his commentators in Mithilā. Incidentally, the TT also
provides detailed critiques of Pūrvamīmāṃsā positions, and it is with his critique
of their usage of the upakramanyāya that we are concerned here. Vyāsatīrtha
discusses this issue in the second pariccheda, in the section entitled balābalavāda.
As he makes clear at the outset, his purpose in this section is to refute the
Mīmāṃsā position according to which the initial statement has a greater
hermeneutical power than the final statement (atha mīmāṃsakoktasyopa-
saṃhārād upakramaprābalyabhaṅgaḥ), and thereby to corroborate the Dvaita
position on this issue first put forward by Madhva and Jayatīrtha.12 However, he

11 vākyopasaṃhāre śrutatvāt, yasmād ita ete vedā jātās, tasmād etair upāṃśvādi kartavyam iti
ṛgādibhir api vedavacanair evopasaṃhāreṇa bhavitavyam. itarathā vākyam eva nāvakalpeta,
tatrānarthakā eva bhaveyuḥ. tasmād vedādhikārā iti (Śābarabhāṣya ad MS 3.3.2).
12 Before introducing the Mīmāṃsaka pūrvapakṣa, Vyāsatīrtha briefly summarizes the views

of Madhva on the superiority of upasaṃhāra presented in his Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, Anu-

vyākhyāna and Nyāyavivaraṇa as well as those of Jayatīrtha in his Ṭīkā on the Nyāyavivaraṇa
(TT3, p. 280). He does not, however, offer any justification of this principle from the standpoint
of Dvaita metaphysics and epistemology, or cite any evidence as to how this principle has been
applied before him by Dvaitins in specific argumentative contexts.
8 Journal of Indological Studies, Nos. 28 & 29 (2016–2017)

does not directly refute the interpretations of adhikaraṇas arrived at by

Mīmāṃsakas on the basis of this principle. While discussing the
vedopakramādhikaraṇa for instance, he neither refutes the validity of the
upakramanyāya defended by Mīmāṃsakas nor Śabara’s conclusions; he offers a
different way of interpreting adhikaraṇas that makes no use of this principle of
textual interpretation. A similar strategy is used by Vijayīndra, Vyāsatīrtha’s
grand-disciple,13 in his rejoinder to Appaya’s UP, the Upasaṃhāra-vijaya.
In the vedopakramādhikaraṇa, as we recall, Śabara holds that the words ṛc,
yajus and sāman in the Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā sentence ‘‘The ṛc is recited loudly,
the yajus in a whisper [and] the sāman loudly’’ (uccair ṛcā kriyate, upāṃśu yajuṣā,
uccaiḥ sāmnā, 3.6.5) refer to the three corresponding Vedas. The first reason
(hetu) he provides to this effect, in MS 3.3.2, is prāyadarśanāt―because these
three words are found in a context dealing chiefly with the Vedas. To justify that
the context is indeed about Vedas, Śabara traces the beginning (upakrama) of the
entire passage (vākya) to an earlier arthavāda passage where the three Vedas are
said to be created out of Agni, Vāyu and Āditya, and then applies upakramanyāya.
The first move of Vyāsatīrtha is to deny that Śabara’s explanation is required by
the context. In fact, he says, that the three words must refer to Vedas is already
obvious from the Maitrāyaṇī sentence itself:

And the [conclusion reached in the] vedopakramādhikaraṇa is not

contradicted in this way. For in this [adhikaraṇa], the words ṛc, etc. found in
the final statement ‘‘The ṛc is recited loudly, the sāman loudly [and] the yajus
in a whisper,’’ do not refer to the Vedas inasmuch as the word veda is found
in the initial statement [beginning with] ‘‘The three Vedas were created [out
of Agni, etc.].’’ Rather, [they refer to Vedas] because [the clause] ‘‘The
sāman [is recited] loudly’’ [occurs] after the word ṛc [in ‘‘uccair ṛcā
kriyate’’]. If the word ṛc were referring to hymns [and not to the Ṛgveda],
then [the clause] ‘‘The sāman [is recited] loudly’’ would be useless because
loudness follows directly from [the clause] ‘‘The ṛc [is recited] loudly’’ also
in the case of hymns which are substrata of melodies (sāman), because ṛc
and sāman are inseparable from each other [according to the śruti passage]
‘‘The sāman is sung as resting upon the ṛc.’’14

13 I am grateful to Lawrence McCrea for drawing my attention to evidence that convincingly

suggests that Vijayīndra was not the direct disciple of Vyāsatīrtha, as has been suggested
elsewhere (e.g., Sharma 1981: 394), but rather the disciple of Surendratīrtha, Vyāsatīrtha’s
disciple.
14 na caivaṃ vedopakramādhikaraṇavirodhaḥ. na hi tatra ‘‘uccair ṛcā kriyate, uccaiḥ sāmnā,

upāṃśu yajuṣe’’ti upasaṃhārastho ṛgādiśabdas ‘‘trayo vedā asṛjyante’’ty upakramasthād

vedaśabdād vede lākṣaṇikaḥ. kiṃ tu ṛkchabdād api caramād ‘‘uccaiḥ sāmne’’ty asmāt. yadi
 On Appaya Dīkṣita’s Engagement (Jonathan DUQUETTE) 9

If the word ṛc in the Maitrāyaṇī sentence refers to hymns (mantra) in general, and
not specifically to the Ṛgveda, then the injunction to recite sāmans loudly
(‘‘uccaiḥ sāmnā’’) would not be required since it is well-known that hymns are
also the ‘‘substrata’’ (ādhāra) of melodies (sāman), i.e., the actual content of what
is sung in sāmans. When we are told to recite ṛc loudly, it is implied that we should
also recite sāmans in the same way. In order to avoid that the injunction be useless,
we are compelled to interpret the three words to have Vedas as their referent, and
thus it is not compulsory to invoke the greater strength of the initial statement in
this context. Moreover, notes Vyāsatīrtha, the same argument based on the need
to avoid uselessness regarding the injunction to recite sāmans loudly, is given in
the fourth sūtra of the same adhikaraṇa (dharmopadeśāc ca na hi dravyeṇa
sambandhaḥ, MS 3.3.4); the reason for this is obviously that the reason previously
given in MS 3.3.2 (vedo vā prāyadarśanāt) was not totally satisfying (aparitoṣa)
to the sūtrakāra.15
Vyāsatīrtha’s second argument does not make explicit use of the Dvaita
thesis that the final statement should prevail in case of interpretive conflict, but it
still turns the table in favour of Dvaitins by arguing that ‘‘repetition’’ (abhyāsa)
should be considered the main criterion of interpretation in the present context:

Moreover, the word veda in the initial statement is repeated [in the passage]
‘‘The three Vedas were created—The Ṛgveda from Agni, the Yajurveda from
Vāyu [and] the Sāmaveda from Āditya.’’ By this, it follows that repetition
(abhyāsa) is stronger [as a mark of intention] than the final statement too.
And thus, just like in [sūtras] such as prāye vacanāc ca [MS 2.2.12], etc. in
the present case too, let ‘‘abundance’’ (bāhulya) be the meaning of the word
prāya in the sūtra [MS 3.3.2]; and let not the word ‘‘prāya mean priority’’
(prāthamya) by means of an unnatural interpretation in the manner stated in
Śabara’s commentary, namely [an interpretation which takes] vedaprāya [in
the sense of] vedopakrama.16

ṛkchabdo mantraparaḥ syāt, tadā ‘‘ṛcy adhyūḍhaṃ sāma gīyata’’ iti ṛksāmayor aviyogāt
sāmādhāramantre ’py uccaiṣṭvasya ‘‘uccair ṛce’’ty anenaiva prāptatvād ‘‘uccaiḥ sāmne’’ty
asya vaiyarthyaṃ syāt (TT3, pp. 291-92).
15 ata eva ‘‘vedo vā prāyadarśanād’’ iti sūtrokte prāthamyarūpaprāyadarśane ’paritoṣād

‘‘dharmopadeśāc ca na hi dravyeṇa sambandha’’ iti sūtre idam eva hetūkṛtam (TT3, p. 292).
16 kiṃ copakramastho vedaśabdas ‘‘trayo vedā ajāyanta—agner ṛgvedo, vāyor yajurveda,

ādityāt sāmaveda’’ ity abhyastaḥ. abhyāsaś copasaṃhārād api prabala iti tenānusṛtaḥ. evaṃ
ca ‘‘prāye vacanāc ce’’tyādāv ivātrāpi sūtrasthaprāyaśabdasya bāhulyam artho stu, na tu
vedaprāyo vedoprakrameti śābarabhāṣyoktarītyā kliṣṭakalpanayā prāthamyaṃ
prāyaśabdārthaḥ (TT3, pp. 292-93).
10 Journal of Indological Studies, Nos. 28 & 29 (2016–2017)

As we recall, according to Dvaitins, the list of tātparyaliṅgas enumerates the

liṅgas in an ascending order of strength. Accordingly, the repetition (abhyāsa) of
the subject under discussion is a stronger mark of intention than the concordance
between, or relative superiority of, the initial and final statements. In the present
case, we notice that the word veda is repeated in the initial statement although this
is not a priori necessary: the expression trayo vedā already makes it clear that the
three Vedas are meant here. Yet the word is repeated, which suggests that
repetition is stronger than the initial statement itself. By implication, since
upasaṃhāra follows upakrama in the list, repetition should also be stronger than
the final statement. Therefore, continues Vyāsatīrtha, the word prāya in the sūtra
should not be interpreted in the way Śabara takes it, namely in the sense of
‘‘priority’’ (prāthamya) [i.e., the passage treats chiefly of the Vedas], but rather in
the sense of ‘‘abundance’’ (bāhulya) [i.e., the passage deals with Vedas because
the word veda is repeated]. Although Vyāsatīrtha essentially agrees with Śabara’s
conclusion, he finds unnatural (kliṣṭa) his explanation of the sūtra based on the
upakramopasaṃhāra criterion, and opts for a simpler solution that relies solely
on the criterion of repetition. It is revealing that Viṣṇudāsācarya (c. 1390-1440),
in stark contrast with Vyāsatīrtha of whom he is the predecessor, positively relies
on Śabara’s use of the upakramanyāya in the vedopakramādhikaraṇa to defend
his own view that saguṇa teachings (i.e., teachings that describe God as endowed
with qualities) prevail over nirguṇa teachings (i.e., teaching that describe God as
having no qualities) in śruti (Vādaratnāvalī: 179-80).

2.1.3 Appaya’s concluding statement

The two aforementioned arguments offered by Vyāsatīrtha in the TT are identical
to those found in Appaya’s pūrvapakṣa on the vedopakramādhikaraṇa in the UP.17
A closer analysis of the UP shows that each section of Appaya’s long pūrvapakṣa
either summarizes or rewords Vyāsatīrtha’s position. There should be no doubt,
therefore, that Vyāsatīrtha was indeed the ‘‘recent’’ scholar Appaya had in sight in
the UP. I shall not discuss here the counter-arguments offered by Appaya in

17 For the sake of comparison, here is Appaya’s pūrvapakṣa on the vedopakramādhikaraṇa: na

caivaṃ vedopakramādhikaraṇavirodhaḥ. na hi tatropakramānurodhena svarāṇāṃ veda-

dharmatvaniścayaḥ. kiṃ tu tasya ṛgādidharmatve ‘‘ṛcy adhyūḍhaṃ sāma gīyata’’ iti vacanād
ṛgādhāragītirūpe sāmny apy uccaiṣṭvam ‘‘uccair ṛcā kriyata’’ ity ata eva siddhyatīty ‘‘uccaiḥ
sāmne’’ty asya vaiyarthyāpatteḥ paścāttanatadvidhyanurodhena. ata eva ‘‘vedo vā prāya-
darśanād’’ iti sūtre prāthamyarūpaprāyadarśane ’paritoṣeṇa ‘‘dharmopadeśāc ce’’ti sūtra idam
eva hetūkṛtam. kim copakrame vedaśabdas ‘‘trayo vedā ajāyanta—agner ṛgvedo, vāyor
yajurveda, ādityāt sāmaveda’’ ity abhyastaḥ. abhyāsaś copasaṃhārād api prabalo,
bahubādhasyānyāyyatvād iti tata eva nirṇayo stu. evaṃ ca ‘‘prāye vacanāc ce’’tyādāv iva
sūtrasthaprāyaśabdasya bāhulyam artho labhyata iti na prāthamyaṃ kliṣṭatayā tadartha iti
kalpanīyam (UP, p.9).
 On Appaya Dīkṣita’s Engagement (Jonathan DUQUETTE) 11

response to Vyāsatīrtha.18 The point I want to make rather concerns Appaya’s

attitude towards Vyāsatīrtha. Prior to Vyāsatīrtha no one had ever criticized in
detail the traditional position of Mīmāṃsakas on the relative superiority of the
initial and final statements. Undoubtedly, Vyāsatīrtha’s refutation represented a
true challenge for Mīmāṃsakas, but that it was equally challenging for Advaitins
is obvious from Appaya’s concluding statement in the UP:

Therefore, the superiority of the initial statement is intact and not looked
down in Uttaramīmāṃsā too. And it is established in this way that the
inversion (vyatyaya) of the initial and final statements in terms of their
strength—[inversion] which goes against the scholarly practice of all
Mīmāṃsakas [and] which has been postulated by recent [scholars] who are
totally ignorant of the way [of doing] hermeneutics (naya) [only] for the sake
of displaying how their views differ from others—should, just like the
inversion, taught by Muslim teachers, of the action of going to the toilet and
the washing of one’s face in terms of their priority and posteriority, be
discarded by philosophers.19

Leaving aside the complex question as to how Appaya exactly conceived the
relationship between the two Mīmāṃsās and the problem of their unity
(aikaśāstrya)―a long-standing debate among Advaitins and Viśiṣṭādvaitins prior
to Appaya and which he engages in particular in his Pūrvottaramīmāṃsā-
vādanakṣatramālā, ‘‘The Milky Way of Discourses on Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta’’
(cf. Pollock 2004)―we get the clear impression here that he understands
Vyāsatīrtha’s refutation as a potential threat for all Mīmāṃsakas―Pūrva-
mīmāṃsakas as well as Advaitins, the Uttaramīmāṃsakas par excellence. Appaya
besides devotes the last section of his UP to demonstrating how the upa-
kramanyāya has been used consistently in Advaita Vedānta, or Uttaramīmāṃsā as
he calls it.20 Appaya’s concluding statement also makes clear that in his view,
Vyāsatīrtha has no understanding whatsoever of the proper manner in which

18 For an appraisal of these arguments, see Bronner 2015.

19 tasmād uttaramīmāṃsāyām apy upakramaprābalyam avikalam avigītaṃ ca. evaṃ ca
sakalamīmāṃsakavyavahāraviruddho nayasaraṇigandhānabhijñair arvācīnaiḥ svamata-
syetaramatavailakṣaṇyaprakaṭanāya kalpitopakramopasaṃhārabalābalavyatyayo yavana-
gurūpadiṣṭaśaucamukhaprakṣālanapaurvāparyavyatyāsavad upekṣaṇīyaḥ prāmāṇikair iti
siddham iti (UP, p.72).
20 In this context at least, ‘‘Uttaramīmāṃsā’’ is a synonym for Advaita Vedānta, as shows

Appaya’s introductory statement at the beginning of this section: evaṃ pūrvamīmāṃsāyāṃ

vyavasthitam upakramaprābalyam urarīkṛtyaivottaramīmāṃsāyām api bhagavatpādais tatra
tatrārthanirṇayāḥ kṛtā dṛśyante (UP, p.58). It is well-known that Appaya usually refers to
Śaṅkarācārya as bhagavatpāda.
12 Journal of Indological Studies, Nos. 28 & 29 (2016–2017)

scriptural texts have to be interpreted, that is, of the kind of hermeneutics practiced
by Mīmāṃsakas at large. Not only is Vyāsatīrtha’s inversion of the well-attested
superiority of upakrama over upasaṃhāra only a way for him to show off how
his views differ from others; by doing so, Appaya says, he also acts no better than
the Muslim teacher who teaches one to ‘‘clean his face’’ before going to the toilet
(possibly a reference to the morning ablution done by all Muslims). In other words,
on the Mīmāṃsaka hermeneutical territory, Vyāsatīrtha is an uncultured barbarian,
an outsider.

3. Appaya’s Śivārkamaṇidīpikā ad BS 1.1.3:

A silent quotation of Vyāsatīrtha on the question of Īśvara’s inferability
In the Śivārkamaṇidīpikā (hereafter SMD), Appaya engages the TT in a more
subtle manner, namely through silently quoting a long passage from the
īśvarasyānumānikatvabhaṅga (‘‘Refutation of Īśvara’s Inferability’’) section of
his TT. This section aims to refute the Naiyāyika thesis that Īśvara’s existence can
be established through inference (anumāna), an assertion that overtly contradicts
the claim in Vedānta that Īśvara’s existence is established through śruti alone, not
by means of other āgamas or means of knowledge such as inference. Prior to
Vyāsatīrtha, one of the most thorough defenses of Īśvara’s inferability is found in
Udayana’s (c. 11th century) Nyāyakusumāñjali, where some twenty different types
of inference are put forward and discussed in detail. Udayana’s work partly
responds to Buddhist logicians such as Dharmakīrti and Jñānaśrī who call into
question the very possibility of establishing the existence of Īśvara by means of
arguments; thus the important shift in this work towards proving the existence of
Īśvara on a sound logical basis (Chemparathy 1972: 78). But it is really Gaṅgeśa
(c. 13th century) who offers, in the wake of Udayana’s work,21 the most elaborate
defense of this inference in the īśvaravāda section of his celebrated
Tattvacintāmaṇi. His detailed treatment of this inference, formulated in the idiom
of ‘‘new logic’’ (navyanyāya), soon became standard among Naiyāyikas. It was
commented upon by all the major Naiyāyikas from Mithilā, namely Yajñapati
Upādhyāya, Pakṣadhara Miśra (alias Jayadeva), Pragalbha Miśra (all three
belonging to the second half of the 15th century) and Rucidatta Miśra (beginning
of the 16th century), as well as by the Bengali scholar Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma
(late 15th century).

21 Gaṅgeśa also relies considerably on the work of Śaśadhara (fl. 1300, Western India?),
particularly his Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa. There are striking similarities between their respective
formulations of pūrvapakṣas and siddhāntas in the īśvaravāda in particular. For Śaśadhara’s
date (concerning which there has been a controversy as to whether he precedes Gaṅgeśa or not),
see Matilal 1976: 9-11.
 On Appaya Dīkṣita’s Engagement (Jonathan DUQUETTE) 13

What makes Vyāsatīrtha’s treatment of the Nyāya inference in the TT

particularly significant is its almost entire focus on the Navya-Nyāya formulation
of this inference. In Vyāsatīrtha’s time, the tools and techniques of Navya-Nyāya
were not widely spread in the South and were just beginning to get integrated into
the works of South Indian scholars. 22 If Vyāsatīrtha probably did not himself
introduce these techniques in the South, he was surely one of the first Vedāntins,
if not the ‘‘first intellectual in South India’’ (Williams 2014), to offer a serious
intellectual response to Navya-Nyāya. He was well-versed in its terminology and
methods, and particularly familiar with the works of Mithilā-based Naiyāyikas. In
all evidence, his pioneering critique of Gaṅgeśa’s inference could hardly have
escaped the attention of his contemporaries and prominent scholars to come in
South India, among whom Appaya was.

3.1 Appaya’s quotation

The īśvarasyānumānikatvabhaṅga section begins with a long pūrvapakṣa stating
and explaining in detail each successive component of Gaṅgeśa’s inference of
Īśvara (see Table 1). Appaya silently quotes almost literally an important portion
of this pūrvapakṣa in his Śivārkamaṇidīpikā, his monumental subcommentary on
Śrīkaṇṭha’s Śaiva commentary on the BS, the Brahmamīmāṃsābhāṣya. It appears
in his subcommentary on BS 1.1.3 (śāstrayonitvāt). This sūtra aims to establish
that Brahman, or Īśvara, defined in the previous sūtra (BS 1.1.2) as the sole
independent cause of the creation, etc. of the world (jagajjanmādikāraṇa), is not
knowable through any other source of knowledge than śāstra, i.e., Vedic śruti.23

22 The Naiyāyikas Cennu (or Cinnam) Bhaṭṭa (c. 1390) and Nārāyaṇācārya (c. 1420?), both
hailing from South India, know well Udayana but show no awareness of Gaṅgeśa’s work (or
Śaśadhara for that matter). According to Matilal, Gaṅgeśa’s fame still remained confined to
Mithilā and Bengal at the beginning of the 15th century (1976: 23). More recently, it has been
claimed that ‘‘the usage of Navya-Nyāya terminology and style of analysis appears to gain
ground [in the South] in the Advaita writings at the end of the fifteenth and in the sixteenth’’
(Diaconescu 2012: 271). We know for sure that Nṛsiṃhāśramamuni (fl. 1555), the teacher of
Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (fl. 1570) whose expertise in Navya-Nyāya is well-known, was among
the first scholars to make use of Navya-Nyāya terminology in his Vedānta works. But as far as
I know, he does not engage with Navya-Nyāya logical and epistemological issues in detail. It
has been claimed that Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma (c. 1490), who is acknowledged to have
introduced Navya-Nyāya in Bengal, ‘‘may well have been the first Advaitin thoroughly trained
in Navya-Nyāya’’ (Bronkhorst et al. 2013: 80). In this context, his possible role in consolidating
Navya-Nyāya in the South has also been alluded to, an hypothesis which remains to be
examined. Viṣṇudāsācārya, Vyāsatīrtha’s predecessor, had apparently an ‘‘acute interest in the
pariṣkāra style of the Nāvya Nyāya [sic]’’ (Vādaratnāvalī: vii) but again, he does not deal with
issues internal to this tradition. According to Bhattacharya, Vyāsatīrtha is the first South Indian
scholar to show acquaintance of Gaṅgeśa’s Mithilā-based tradition in his TT (Bhattacharya
1958: 102), and as far as I can see, possibly the first to engage it in great detail.
23 Appaya, following Śrīkaṇṭha, analyzes śāstrayonitvāt as a bahuvrīhi compound: Brahman

has śāstra as its source (yoni), i.e., śāstra is the [only] means of knowing (pramāṇa) Brahman.
14 Journal of Indological Studies, Nos. 28 & 29 (2016–2017)

The quotation is found more specifically in Appaya’s pūrvapakṣa on this sūtra,

where he introduces the views of Naiyāyikas who hold that Īśvara’s existence can
be inferred. He begins by stating a slightly modified version of Gaṅgeśa’s
inference, which closely follows Vyāsatīrtha’s own formulation.

Gaṅgeśa24 Vyāsatīrtha25 Appaya26

pakṣa adṛṣṭādvārakopādānago- adṛṣṭādvārakasvopādā- adṛṣṭādvārakasvopā-
carajanyakṛtyajanyāni nagocarajanyakṛtijanya- dānagocarajanyakṛti-
samavetāni janyāni bhinnāni samavetāni janyabhinnāni
janyāni samavetāni janyāni
sādhya 1 adṛṣṭaprāgabhāvavyāpya- svajanyādṛṣṭaprāgabhāva- Not mentioned in the
prāgabhāvāpratiyogyupā- vyāpyaprāgabhāvaprati- initial formulation of
dānagocarāparokṣajñā- yogibhinnopādānagoca- the inference, but
nacikīrṣākṛtimajjanyāni rāparokṣajñānacikīrṣā- revised in the course
kṛtimajjanyāni of Appaya’s
commentary.
sādhya 2 svajanakādṛṣṭottaropādā- svajanakādṛṣṭottaropādā- svajanakādṛṣṭotta-
nagocarāparokṣajñāna- nagocarāparokṣajñāna- ropādānagocarāpa-
cikīrṣākṛtimajjanyāni cikīrṣākṛtimajjanyāni rokṣajñānacikīrṣā-
kṛtimajjanyāni
sādhya 3 aparokṣajñānacikīrṣāpra- aparokṣajñānacikīrṣāpra- Not discussed
yatnaviṣayībhavadupādā- yatnaviṣayībhavadupādā-
nāni nāni
hetu samavetatve sati samavetatve sati bhāvakāryatvāt
prāgabhāvapratiyogitvāt prāgabhāvapratiyogitvāt
bhāvakāryatvād vā

Table 1: Gaṅgeśa’s inference of Īśvara in the īśvaravāda section of the Tattvacintāmaṇi,

together with Vyāsatīrtha’s and Appaya’s formulations of the same in the Tarkatāṇḍava and
the Śivārkamaṇidīpikā, respectively. The underlined words/compounds in Vyāsatīrtha’s
formulation are either not found in Gaṅgeśa’s formulation or worded differently. These same
words are also found (and underlined) in Appaya’s formulation.

The inference naturally consists of three components: the inferential subject

(pakṣa), the inferred property (sādhya) and the inferential mark (hetu). The
inferential process must establish successfully that the inferred property is found

24 Tattvacintāmaṇi, pp. 16-18.

25 TT1, īśvarasyānumānikatvabhaṅga (pp. 286-88).
26 SMD ad BS 1.1.3 (vol. 1, p. 138).
 On Appaya Dīkṣita’s Engagement (Jonathan DUQUETTE) 15

in the inferential subject (pakṣadharmatā) through ascertaining that: 1. the

inferential mark is present in the inferential subject; and 2. the inferred property
is appropriately related to the inferential mark, roughly such that wherever the
inferential mark is present, so is the inferred property (what we call ‘‘pervasion’’
or vyāpti). An example (dṛṣṭānta) is also adduced in which both the inferential
mark and inferred property must be present together. Gaṅgeśa’s inference of
Īśvara is based on the old Naiyāyika theistic argument that things such as earth,
sprouts, etc. have Īśvara as their agent (kartṛ) because they are effects (kārya) that
can only be produced by Him. The things in question are stated in the inferential
subject. They should be: a) produced (janya); b) inherent (samaveta) in something
else; and c) distinct from things produced through an effort (kṛti) which is itself
produced, which has as its scope the material cause (upādāna) of these things, and
which things are not produced by means of invisible merit (adṛṣṭa). This
definition is deviced in such a way as to exclude all human-based products and
include only those products, such as earth, sprouts, etc., that can only be produced
by a non-human agent. As to the agent, it is defined in the inferred property in
three alternative ways. Essentially, the agent is someone who can act (i.e., who
makes an effort, kṛtimat), who desires to act (cikīrṣāmat) and who has direct
knowledge (aparokṣajñānamat), which three characteristics relate to the material
cause of the things defined in the inferential subject. Like the potter who works
upon clay in order to produce a pot, the agent works upon the material cause of
the things he produces.
The formulation of the inference is intricate and calls for a systematic
explanation of its different components. To this effect, Appaya closely follows
Vyāsatīrtha’s own analysis, in which each qualifier (viśeṣaṇa) of each component
is successively justified on the basis that if it were not included, the inference
would suffer from a particular fallacy (bādha, siddhasādhana, āśrayāsiddhi, etc.).
Like Vyāsatīrtha, Appaya begins with the analysis of the inferential subject and
ends with that of the inferred property, and analyzes each component backwards,
i.e., starting with the last qualifier (e.g., for the pakṣa: samaveta, janyabhinna,
janyakṛti, svopādānagocara up to adṛṣṭādvāraka). When the wording in Appaya
is not exactly the same as in Vyāsatīrtha, Appaya most often gives more detail
such as longer or additional compounds that clarify Vyāsatīrtha’s thought. In rare
cases, he adds a full sentence in order to clarify a specific point. He sometimes
uses different markers of relation (evam api instead of tāvaty ukte, etc.), or
interchanges words that have the same function in the argument (e.g., instead of
taking earth as an example of inferential subject like Vyāsatīrtha does, he takes
sprouts, or vice-versa). In some cases, he also adds on or refines the Navya-Nyāya
terminology used by Vyāsatīrtha.
16 Journal of Indological Studies, Nos. 28 & 29 (2016–2017)

Appaya’s quotation ends at a specific point in Vyāsatīrtha’s pūrvapakṣa

where the exclusion of posterior absence (dhvaṃsa, i.e., the absence of a thing
somewhere after it has been destroyed) from the inference is discussed.
Vyāsatīrtha explains in this passage that the words samaveta, upādānagocara and
bhāva are used in the inferential subject, inferred property and inferential mark
respectively, so as to ensure that posterior absence does not have an agent
(sakartṛkatva). 27 The point here is to exclude posterior absence from the
inference inasmuch as it has no material cause. Since the inferred agent is assumed
to act upon the material cause of the things it produces, just like a potter acts upon
clay to produce pots, it cannot produce posterior absence. It must be emphasized
that this is not an original idea of Vyāsatīrtha but one whose logical justification
is already found in Gaṅgeśa’s Tattvacintāmaṇi.28
This issue proves to be of great relevance to Appaya as the remaining part of
his pūrvapakṣa in BS 1.1.3 depends on it. His view is that one needs to ensure
that posterior absence is included in the inferential subject. Otherwise, the
coherence of the Naiyāyika pūrvapakṣa cannot be maintained. As he explains:

What must be proved in this [inference] is that to have an agent is precisely

co-occurent with [i.e., includes] posterior absence. For otherwise, the
pūrvapakṣa that śruti―[which holds that Īśvara, i.e., Śiva, is] the cause of
the creation, maintenance and dissolution of the world―[merely] repeats the
meaning [already] established in the inference [of Īśvara’s existence], cannot
reach its fulfillment.29

In a Śivādvaita context, the agent with regard to the world is none other than Śiva,
the creator and destroyer of the world. If posterior absence is not associated with
an agent, then the inference cannot successfully establish Śiva as the destroyer of
the world. Taking his cue from Vyāsatīrtha’s remark, Appaya puts forth a long

27 atra ca bhāṣyādau sakartṛkatvaniruktāv upādānapadaprakṣepād dhvaṃsavyāvṛtta-

sakartṛkatvasiddhyarthaṃ pakṣasādhyahetuṣu samavetopādānabhāvapadāni prayuktāni (TT1,
p. 293).
28 Following his formulation of the inference (see Table 1), Gaṅgeśa puts forth an alternative

view: yad vā—pakṣe hetau ca na samavetatvaṃ viśeṣaṇam. tena dhvaṃso ’pi pakṣaḥ. sādhye
ca upādānapadaṃ kāraṇamātraparam, anupādeyam eva vā (Tattvacintāmaṇi, p.20). If one
wishes to introduce posterior absence into the inferential subject, one may remove the qualifier
‘‘samavetatva’’ from both the inferential subject and inferential mark, and either take the word
‘‘upādāna’’ in the inferred property to mean ‘‘cause’’ in general (and not strictly material cause)
or simply remove it from the expression of the inferred property. The logical implication is that
one needs to include these words in the formulation of the inference in order to exclude posterior
absence from the inferential subject.
29 dhvaṃsasādhāraṇam evātra sakartṛkatvaṃ sādhyam. anyathā jagajjanmasthitilayakāraṇa-

tvaśruter anumānasiddhārthānuvādakatvapūrvapakṣānirvāhāt (SMD, vol.1, p. 141).

 On Appaya Dīkṣita’s Engagement (Jonathan DUQUETTE) 17

vicāra on this question, in the course of which a number of qualifiers from

Gaṅgeśa’s inference are either discarded or considerably abbreviated. The
outcome is a substantially revised and considerably simplified version of
Gaṅgeśa’s inference. 30 As far as I know, Appaya’s take on the inclusion of
posterior absence in the inference has no precedent among Gaṅgeśa’s
commentators. As such, it is a valuable contribution to Navya-Nyāya, one that
should be noted especially given the scarcity of Navya-Nyāya material in this
period in South India.

3.2 Motives of the quotation

Nowhere in his treatment of Gaṅgeśa’s inference does Appaya mention
Vyāsatīrtha. However, the formulation and subsequent analysis of this inference
is clearly borrowed from Vyāsatīrtha, so that we are justified in calling this
quotation a ‘‘silent’’ one. Now, the reuse of texts in the form of quotations, silent
or not, is far from being uncommon in Sanskrit philosophical literature. But that
does not make this phenomenon trivial or uninteresting. The study of textual reuse
can help us in important ways to shed light on a particular author’s intellectual
biography, both in terms of his intellectual and historical relation to the quoted
author(s) and the modalities of his own literary practice. In the present context,
the problem might be stated in the following manner: why is Appaya silently
quoting Vyāsatīrtha? What are his motives in doing so? Why did he not simply
formulate a new pūrvapakṣa of his own? Why this reuse, especially when we
know that Vyāsatīrtha ought to be a natural adversary?
In her study of textual reuse in Indian philosophy (Freschi 2015), Freschi
identifies three common motives behind reuse. One author may quote another:

1) in order to add authority to his/her statement;

2) in order to elaborate on a preceding and well-known text;
3) in order to present an objection.

I think we can dismiss the third motive at the outset: Appaya is not reusing
Vyāsatīrtha’s text in order to present an objection to it. Firstly, what is quoted is
not Vyāsatīrtha’s own thesis (siddhānta) but his presentation and descriptive
analysis of a pūrvapakṣa. Secondly, although it indeed presents an objection, the
vicāra following the quotation is not directed to Vyāsatīrtha but ultimately to
Gaṅgeśa and his commentators who hold the view that posterior absence should

30 Compare Appaya’s revised inference with Gaṅgeśa’s original one: adṛṣṭādvārakajanya-

kṛtyajanyāni janyāni [=pakṣa] adṛṣṭādvārakāparokṣajñānacikīrṣākṛtimajjanyāni [=sādhya]
janyatvāt [=hetu] (SMD, vol.1, p. 142).
18 Journal of Indological Studies, Nos. 28 & 29 (2016–2017)

be excluded from Īśvara’s inference. In attacking Gaṅgeśa, Appaya in effect

shares the same interest as Vyāsatīrtha: both Vedāntins agree that the proof of
Īśvara’s existence rests exclusively upon śruti and thereby wish to refute the
Naiyāyika argument. Even when Appaya is refining on Vyāsatīrtha’s presentation,
it is never, it seems to me, with an intention to dismiss or correct something wrong.
To the contrary, we get the impression that Appaya relies closely on his text
because it is useful for him to do so. This brings us to the second motive.
A reused text can also be chosen because it is well-written and convenient,
or because the quoted author said something very significant on a subject that can
hardly be ignored. This might well be the case here. As I noted earlier, Vyāsatīrtha
was a forerunner in South India as far as his critique of Navya-Nyāya
epistemology and methods is concerned. Arguably, his comprehensive treatment
of Gaṅgeśa’s inference established a certain standard for those desirous to address
the Naiyāyika position on this issue: no one after him could easily disregard his
contribution. Because of this implicit authority, and also in view of the fact that
Navya-Nyāya techniques were not so widely used in South India at that time, it
was somewhat natural and indeed convenient for Appaya to reuse Vyāsatīrtha’s
analysis. Most importantly, the reuse of Vyāsatīrtha’s text opened up new horizons
for Appaya himself, which brings us to the first motive, that of authority. While
appropriating and refining on Vyāsatīrtha’s presentation, Appaya was not only in
a good position to display his own expertise in Navya-Nyāya; through introducing
a long vicāra on a point apparently left undiscussed by Vyāsatīrtha (yet hinted at
by Gaṅgeśa himself), he was also able to highlight his own excellence and
capacity for innovation in this area. If Appaya’s reuse appears to be, prima facie,
a passive acknowledgement of Vyāsatīrtha’s views, it can also be seen as an
effective way for Appaya to formulate, with the seal of Vyāsatīrtha’s authority as
it were, his own original take on Gaṅgeśa’s inference.

4. Conclusion
This brief study of Appaya’s engagement with the TT supports the emerging
consensus that Vyāsatīrtha had a significant impact on Appaya’s scholarship. The
manner of this engagement, at least in light of the two cases discussed here,
confirms something we already know of Appaya as a scholar, namely that he was
above all a man of learning, a broadminded intellectual who was more interested
in truth than in polemics for the sake of it. As we have seen, Appaya severely
criticizes Vyāsatīrtha’s views on the upakramanyāya in the UP, and even seizes
this opportunity to insult him rather harshly. In the SMD, however, he relies on
Vyāsatīrtha’s analysis of Gaṅgeśa’s inference in the TT while refuting the
Naiyāyika thesis of Īśvara’s inferability. Assuming that both works were
 On Appaya Dīkṣita’s Engagement (Jonathan DUQUETTE) 19

composed roughly during the same period, this apparently ambivalent attitude
towards Vyāsatīrtha corroborates Appaya’s well-known idiosyncratic intellectual
and sectarian freedom.31 It is not because he strongly disapproves the views of
Vyāsatīrtha on his treatment of the upakramanyāya problem that he cannot
approve at the same time, albeit implicitly, his authority on Navya-Nyāya matters.
A similar attitude is also reflected, for instance, in Appaya’s lifelong emulation of
Vedāntadeśika, the 14th-century theologian whom Appaya greatly admired for his
polymathy and intellectual freedom in spite of the fact that he was a Śrīvaiṣṇava
(Bronner 2016, Rao 2016).
The ambivalence in question should also be linked to the nature of the
problems tackled in the UP and the SMD. The debate on Īśvara’s inferability is
clearly not as sensitive an issue for Appaya as the debate on upakramanyāya. If
only from a historical standpoint, the Advaitins’ argument with the Naiyāyikas
had already begun to fade away by Appaya’s time. Pairing with Vyāsatīrtha on
this issue was probably not a problem for him, and as I stressed earlier, the reuse
of Vyāsatīrtha’s work had its own intrinsic advantages. Another important factor
to consider is the audience. While the UP, like other anti-Dvaita works by Appaya,
actively informs local Dvaita-Advaita sectarian controversies, the SMD is
directed mostly to a Śaiva audience. On a doctrinal level, what stands out in the
SMD is not so much the defense of a single age-old tradition, be it Advaita or
Mīmāṃsā, as the elaboration and promotion of a new doctrinal stand in which
Advaita and Śaiva doctrine are reconciled (Duquette 2016). In this work of great
philosophical and exegetical creativity, polemical interests are present but not to
a high degree. That being said, Appaya’s severe attitude towards Vyāsatīrtha in
the UP may also reflect deeper social and political realities. Vyāsatīrtha was

31 To assume that both works were composed roughly during the same period is to assume that
Appaya composed them more or less under the same external circumstances, and that the
ambivalence in question is a feature of his scholarly practice. Although I have not been able so
far to settle with certainty the problem of these two works’ relative chronology, I have good
reason to think that both works were not so separated in time. We know that Appaya composed
the SMD under his second patron Cinnabomma, his only Śaiva patron. It is during this period
(1549-1578) that Appaya produced his key Śaiva works, some of which were polemical in
nature. It is likely that he composed his anti-Dvaita works, also polemical in nature, under the
same patron. However, I do not exclude the possibility that some of these works could have
been composed at the same time he was composing his Vaiṣṇava works such as his commentary
on the Yādavābhyudaya (under his first patron, Cinnatimma of Trichy) or his Sanskrit praise
poem dedicated to Viṣṇu, the Varadarājastava (under his third and last patron, Veṅkaṭa II).
These two works are clearly linked to the Śrīvaiṣṇava Vedāntadeśika (see Rao 2016 for
Appaya’s patterning of the Varadarājastava on Vedāntadeśika’s Varadarājapañcāśat), and
Śrīvaiṣṇavas were competing with Mādhvas in this period. Nonetheless, given that the height
of Mādhva influence at Vijayanagara was arguably during Vyāsatīrtha’s time, who died in 1539,
I would tend to think that Appaya’s anti-Dvaita works would at least have been composed later
in his career, either under his second or third patron.
20 Journal of Indological Studies, Nos. 28 & 29 (2016–2017)

deeply involved in the intensified Vaiṣṇava influence at Vijayanagara, and

benefited greatly in the course of his career from his influence over two of
Vijayanagara’s most influential kings, Kṛṣṇadevarāya and Acyutarāya (Rao 2011,
Stoker 2011). In Appaya’s time and place, Vyāsatīrtha’s influence was still being
felt in the person of Vyāsatīrtha’s grand-disciple, Vijayīndra, who himself was an
influential Vaiṣṇava figure in Tañjāvūr. In this wider context of Śaiva-Vaiṣṇava
conflict, Appaya worked at the other end of the spectrum, trying hard to defend
Śaiva views and preserve Śaiva beliefs and institutions in the South, always
without a patron of imperial caliber.
Our analysis also sheds light on Appaya’s acute historical sensibility while
approaching the Dvaita ‘‘problem.’’ After all, Appaya’s portrayal of Vyāsatīrtha
as an ‘‘outsider’’ on the Mīmāṃsā hermeneutical territory is historically grounded:
except for Viṣṇudāsācārya, no Dvaita scholar prior to Vyāsatīrtha had ever tried
his hand on the application of Mīmāṃsā principles of interpretation in the
exposition of Dvaita positions. As for Appaya, he was a recognized expert on
Pūrvamīmāṃsā and an active contributor to Advaita Vedānta, in which Mīmāṃsā
principles have always played a foundational role in the exegesis of śruti. The
tension is palpable and reflects itself in the clearly polemical tone of the UP.
Appaya’s claim that Vyāsatīrtha just ‘‘shows off’’ how his views on
upakramanyāya differ from others might not be off the mark either. Although the
position defended by Vyāsatīrtha can be traced back, at least in its seminal form,
to Madhva and Jayatīrtha, I have not been able to identify a single instance in
Dvaita philosophical literature where the principle of ascending strength (and its
implication that upasaṃhāra is superior to upakrama) is applied to defend a
specific Dvaita position.
Above all, Appaya’s mode of engagement with the TT shows how
stimulating this remarkable Dvaita work would have been for him. Not only did
it compel him to elaborate a systematic critique of Dvaita views on an important
topic of Mīmāṃsā hermeneutics, a critique which exerted a significant influence
of its own; it also catalyzed Appaya’s own engagement with the broader Navya-
Nyāya tradition, the development of which he arguably pioneered together with
Vyāsatīrtha in South India.
 On Appaya Dīkṣita’s Engagement (Jonathan DUQUETTE) 21

Abbreviations

BS: Brahmasūtras
MS: Mīmāṃsāsūtras
SMD: Śivārkamaṇidīpikā
TT: Tarkatāṇḍava
UP: Upakramaparākrama

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