4G & 5G CN Unit 3,4 & 5
4G & 5G CN Unit 3,4 & 5
PART-A
1. What is 5G?
The primary goal of previous mobile network generations was to offer fast, reliable mobile
data services to network users. 5G has broadened this scope to offer a wide range of
wireless services delivered to the end user across multiple access platforms and multi-layer
networks.
Using wireless transmitters, 5G will be able to transfer data to mobile devices, and many of
these transmitters will connect to the internet through fibre optic cable. Fibre will allow you
to enjoy the full experience of 5G which includes the provision of secure, scalable, reliable
connectivity transmitting massive loads of data at enhanced speeds.
This network, as with the current 4G LTE network, is OFDM (orthogonal frequency-
division multiplexing)-based and operates on the same mobile networking principles.
However, the new 5G NR (New Radio) air interface will enhance OFDM for more
flexibility and scalability.
While the 5G network brings with it many benefits – particularly high speed – it will take
some time before it can rival the existing fibre networks. Fibre will remain the predominant
form of communication for the majority of businesses, but 5G will play an important role in
the Internet of Things.
As the latest mobile network support, 5G will allow for the connection of a wide variety of
devices beneficial for personal and business use.
The 5G network brings with it enhanced performance, efficiency and cost, effectively
redefining industries from retail through to entertainment – and everything in between.
8. What is 3GPP?
MEC Orchestrator.
MEC Platform.
MEC Platform Manager.
Virtualization infrastructure.
MEC Application Services.
Proximity
Ultra-low latency
High bandwidth
Virtualization
Edge computing is about bringing the services closer to the location where they are
to be delivered.
PART-B
The 5G architecture has gone through a major facelift compared to any of the
previous mobile communications generations. Many new concepts will be
introduced, from which the most significant ones are the network virtualization and
edge computing, whereas the radio interface will be built newly via more advanced
modulation schemes and advanced multi-array intelligent antenna solution.
NG:
It is the abbreviation of Next Generation.
NG-RAN:
Next Generation Radio Access Network provides both NR and LTE radio access. The
NG‐RAN provides both an LTE radio interface and a 5G‐NR radio interface. The NG‐RAN
node is responsible for managing radio resources, controlling the radio bearer establishment
of the user plane and managing mobility during the session.
gNB:
Next Generation Node B is radio node which is equivalent of eNB in 4G architecture. The
gNB allows 5G UE to connect with 5G NG core using 5G NR air interface. The gNB
provides 5G NR User Plane and Control Plane terminations towards UE. It connects with
NG-Core via NG interface.
gNB-CU:
gNB-Central Unit provides support for the higher layers of the protocol stack such as
SDAP( Service Data Adaptation Protocol), PDCP (Packet Data Convergence Protocol) and
RRC(Radio Resource Control) while DU(Distributed Unit) provides support for the lower
layers of the protocol stack such as RLC(Radio link control), MAC (Medium Access
Control )and Physical layer.
gNB-DU:
gNB-Distribution Unit is able to support one or more cells, so one gNB can control
hundreds of cells unlike the 4G BTS.
Xn-C:
Xn-C stands for Xn Control Plane interface.
3GPP has considered the final architecture and the respective evolution plan leading into the
NR and core architecture. The development path of 5G radio access network (RAN) as well
as core network requires a phased approach. There will be two parallel versions of the radio
technologies:
BTS:
A base transceiver station (BTS) is a fixed radio transceiver in any mobile network. The BTS
connects mobile devices to the network.
RNC:
The RNC is a functional element of the UMTS RNS (Universal Mobile Telecommunications
System Radio Network System) which controls a number of Node BS. Responsibilities of the
RNC includes radio resource management and control, air interface security, mobility procedures
and system synchronization.
SGSN:
SGSN stands for Serving GPRS Support Node. It is a core network element that handles the
mobility management, session management, and authentication of GPRS users. It also forwards
and receives data packets between the GPRS users and the GGSN (Gateway GPRS Support
Node).
GGSN:
GGSN stands for Gateway GPRS Support Node. It is another core network element that acts as a
gateway between the GPRS network and external networks such as the Internet, intranets, or
other mobile networks. It also performs IP address allocation, charging, and policy enforcement for
GPRS users.
BSC:
The BSC forms part of the BSS (Base Station Subsystem) and controls a number of BTS (Base
Transceiver Stations). In this role, the BSC is responsible for activities such as radio control,
timing advance and handovers.
HSS:
Home Subscriber Server (HSS) is the main database of the current generation's cellular
communications systems. It contains subscriber-related information, such as the authentication
information and the list of services to which each user is subscribed.
PDN:
In LTE and 5G networks, a PDN (Packet Data Network) connection is established between the
device and the network to allow the device to access data services. When the device tries to
establish a PDN connection, the network may reject the request for various reasons.
MME:
MME (Mobile Management Entity) is the boundary between E-UTRAN and EPC and is
responsible only for the control plane. It transmits the signaling that enables low-level
connection management.
S-GW:
SGW (Serving Gateway) is the boundary between E-UTRAN and EPC. SGW transfers data from
the eNodeB to the PGW.
P-GW:
PGW (Packet Network Data Gateway) is the boundary between the EPC and the external
packet network (Internet). PGW is responsible for assigning IP addresses to terminals, filtering /
inspecting packets, supporting selected functionalities in the network and charging for their use.
The scenarios representing the standalone LTE/EPC and standalone NR/NGCN architectures are
depicted in Figure:3.3.As an additional solution in the interim phase of 4G EPC support for the
initial 5G deployments, the Serving Gateway (S-GW) and Proxy Gateway (P-GW) functions have
been broken into two parts:
User plane (UP)
Control plane (CP).
Figure 3.3 depicts some of the most important new 5G-specific elements:
MME:
With the functionality of the 4G Mobility Management Entity (MME) now decomposed,
the 5G Core Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF) receives all connection
and session related information from the User Equipment (UE) (N1/N2) but is
responsible only for handling connection and mobility management tasks.
eNB:
An eNB (Evolved Node B) is a type of cellular base station used in LTE (Long-Term
Evolution) networks. It provides wireless broadband access to mobile devices, such as
smart phones, laptops, and tablets, and is the key component of LTE infrastructure that
provides radio coverage and connectivity.
AMF:
The Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF) is one of the control plane network
functions (NF) of the 5G core network (5GC).
SMF:
The Session Management Function is the control function that manages the user sessions
including establishment, modification and release of sessions, and it can allocate IP
addresses for IP PDU sessions.
NF:
The NF (Network Function) Repository Function is related to the 3GPP 5G
Architecture. This supports the service discovery function.
A specific network slice is identified by a parameter called S-NSSAI, short for “Single
Network Slice Selection Assistance Information” and consisting of two sub parameters the
Slice/Service Type (SST) and the optional Slice Differentiator (SD).
SD is used to differentiate between multiple slices of the same type, hence having the same
SST. The radio network serving the device will use one or more S-NSSAI (SINGLE-
Network Slice Selection Assistance) values requested by the device to do the initial
selection of AMF (Access and Mobility Management Function).
The selected AMF will either decide to serve the specific device or make a new slice
selection itself, or it may use the Network Slice Selection Function (NSSF) for this. The
NSSF has as its single role to support the selection of network slices based on a
combination of S-NSSAI values defined for the network, requested by the device and
allowed in the subscription.
The RAN in-turn may be divided into control plane and user plane. The configuration
policies for a network slice will provision and activate services in both the control and user
planes.
There are three distinct layers to be managed for a network slice:
Service instance layer - This layer consists of instances of services that are
either exposed to customers or business partners of the service provider. For
example, IOT services, Video streaming services and AR/VR services. The services
can be created/managed by a network operator or a third party service provider.
Network Slice instance layer – This layer consists of both the RAN slice instance and
the Core Network slice instance. This layer provides the network characteristics
required by a service instance. A network slice instance may get shared across one or
more service instances.
Resource layer - This layer consists of the actual physical or virtual network
functions that are used for creating a network slice. There are scenarios where
the resources for a network slice may span across multiple operator domains
Today, Mobile Virtual Network Operator (MVNO) services (letting other wireless
service providers share the network infrastructure) require complex manual pre-
provisioning of network infrastructure.
Allows service providers to monetise the network infrastructure - not just based
on bandwidth consumed, but also based on other parameters such as latency, quality of
service, energy consumption and number of connections
The initial use cases of MEC were very specific to mobile networks and hence it was
called as Mobile Edge Computing (MEC). However, later on, the industry
acknowledged the general applicability of MEC for both wireless and wired networks
and hence renamed it to Multi-Access Edge Computing.
Need for MEC:
Compute infrastructure for application services were existent in some form, even in 4G
and 3G networks. For example, video transcoding, WAN optimization, Content
Delivery Network (CDN) and transparent caching services were running previously in
the service provider’s core network in purpose built network equipment.
However, with the growth in the number of mobile devices connecting to the
network and the explosion of data consumption, it is impossible to offer such
application services from a centralized location, without impacting the user
experience.
Growth in the volume of data generated by the Over the Top (OTT) applications such as
social media, video streaming and online gaming.
Need for distributing the infrastructure where the application services are hosted in a
service provider network, to improve the application performance and the user experience.
Need for running application services in multiple locations to increase the reliability of
the services.
Need for virtualizing the application services and eliminate the dependancies with
purpose-built hardware to simplify the management and orchestration of multi-vendor
functions.
Dramatically reduce the network latency to support new use cases such as
Autonomous Cars, Virtual Reality, Augmented Reality and Robotic Surgeries.
MEC Architecture:
MEC architecture resembles NFV architecture. The MEC architecture consists of the following
functions:
MEC Orchestrator
MEC Platform
MEC Platform Manager
Virtualization Infrastructure
MEC Application Services
Fig: 3.8.MEC System Architecture.
Networks Orchestrator:
MEC Orchestrator is a centralized function and has the complete view of the multi-
access edge systems including the topology, available resources in the virtualized
infrastructure, available applications and services running on the virtualized infrastructure.
MEC Orchestrator triggers the life cycle management of the applications and services
running on the virtualized infrastructure, including service instantiation, service termination
and service relocation. It also selects the right set of resources for running the applications and
services, to meet the latency requirements.
MEC Platform:
MEC platform provides an environment where applications can discover, advertise, consume
and offer mobile edge services. It receives regular updates from the MEC platform manager and
the various applications or services running in the virtualized infrastructure.
Some of the updates received by the MEC Platform include activation and deactivation of
traffic rules and DNS records. For example, MEC Platform would work with the data plane
to establish the traffic path for the various applications.
MEC Platform uses the DNS record updates to configure the DNS proxy or server in the
network. Thus, DNS records can be used to redirect traffic to a specific application running on the
MEC host.
Virtualized Infrastructure:
Manager Virtualized Infrastructure Manager manages the infrastructure resources
required for the various applications and services hosted on the MEC host.
It partitions the physical resources and make them available as multiple tenant spaces for
hosting the MEC applications and services.
A MEC application can belong to one or more network slices that have been configured in the
5G core network
MEC Uses:
Enterprise services
Internet of Things (IOT) services
Third party services
Benefits of MEC:
The end to end (E2E) 5G network architecture is composed of a next-generation radio access network
(NG-RAN), multi-access edge computing (MEC), virtual evolved packet core (vEPC), a data network
(DN) and a cloud service.
Network slicing (NS), network function virtualization (NFV), NFV Management and Orchestration (MANO)
and software-defined networking (SDN) are also important techniques for achieving 5G network
architectures.
Fig:3.9 5G E2E Network Architecture: the components of 5G are NG-RAN, MEC and vEPC.
The 5G E2E network architecture is illustrated in Fig.3.9 which provides an overview of 5G E2E networks.
SDN controller provide flexible management and router selection for all radio access network (RAN)
to core network connection, where the core network of the SDN controller is made up of two main parts,
as unified control entity (UCE) and unified data gateway (UDW).
NFV MANO:
Management and orchestration (MANO) is a key element of the ETSI network functions virtualization (NFV)
architecture. MANO is an architectural framework that coordinates network resources for cloud-based
applications and the lifecycle management of virtual network functions (VNFs) and network services.
6. Service continuity:
Service Continuity is the availability of suitable arrangements allowing alternate air navigation
services (ANS) services of an agreed quality of service to be readily activated when a long-term
disruption of normal service provision is anticipated. Service Continuity is also characterised by
containing the impact and duration of disruption of ANS critical services and the ability to
restore a defined service level (capacity) with due priority.
The term Service Continuity (SC) in networks refers to the continuity to receive of the same
service/session e.g., online streaming, voice/video call, without any interruption or with the
minimum disruption while switching from one AP to the other. Nowadays, users expect to have
high-quality video streaming while they are in car, train or as a general; move from one place to
another. Improving SC is one of the high priority factors, especially due to the dynamic nature of
this ubiquitous environment that needs constant monitoring and handover management scheme.
The below figure illustrates the concept of SC while the user moves between two different
networks.
7. Relation to EPC:
When radio access technologies that connect with the 5G Core Network instead of to an
existing EPC network start to be deployed, initial geographical coverage will be quite
limited for two main reasons. Firstly, it takes time to build coverage, so in the initial phases
of a service launch the coverage of the new radio technologies can be assumed to be quite
spotty. Secondly, new radio technologies such as 3GPP NR are in many cases deployed on
higher frequency bands than existing radio technologies, both due to the fact that new
spectrum made available for mobile services are typically in higher frequency bands than
existing bands, but also as these higher frequency bands provide superior network capacity
as there is more spectrum available. However, as the ability to cover a given geographical
area with a given base station output power quickly decreases with higher frequencies,
coverage will be limited. Simply put, the gain in increased data capacity achieved with
moving to the higher spectrum is balanced against much less coverage. For users that want
wide-area mobility while retaining stable IP addresses, the solution is to rely on other radio
access technologies when out of coverage of the new access technology served by 5GC. A
stable IP anchor point is kept while the access network being used at a specific location and
time is changing depending on mobility patterns, coverage of different technologies, and
operator policies. This requires connectivity between some of the EPC and 5GC network
elements coverage of different
Fig: 3.11 Options for connecting 2G/3G/4G/5G radio networks to EPC and/or 5G Core
Technologies and operator policies. This requires connectivity between some of the EPC and
5GC network elements.
In theory any combination of the technologies shown in Fig 3.11 could apply, but it is unlikely
that a typical service provider deployment would have all of the variants we have illustrated.
Let us simplify the architecture a bit so we can focus on the 4G–5G interworking case,
illustrated in Fig.3.12. Here we assume that LTE has overlapping coverage with NR and that
users would best be served by NR when in coverage of both technologies. Devices that are in
areas covered by NR access are served by 5GC, but they will need to be served by LTE and
hence EPC when they are or move outside of the NR coverage area.
Fig: 3.12 Simplified architecture for interworking between EPC and 5GC.
8. Edge Computing:
Edge computing is about bringing the services closer to the location where they are to be
delivered. A service here includes computing power and memory needed for e.g. running a
requested application.
Edge computing therefore aims to push applications, data and computing power (services)
away from centralized points (central data centers) to locations closer to the user (such as
distributed data centers). The goal is both to achieve a lower latency and to reduce transmission
costs.
Applications that use high data volumes and/or require short response times, e.g. VR gaming,
realtime facial recognition, video surveillance etc. are some candidates that could benefit from
Edge computing. A lot of work in the industry around Edge computing has been done on the
application platform for edge applications and related APIs, e.g. by an ETSI Industry
Specification Group called MEC (Multi-access Edge Computing).
In 3GPP however, the focus when it comes to edge computing has so far been concerned with
the access and connectivity aspects. This may change in the future releases as new work is
started 3GPP does not specify any special solutions or architecture for Edge computing.
Instead 3GPP defines several general tools that can be used to provide an efficient User Plane
path. These tools, most of which have already been described earlier in this chapter, are not
specific to Edge computing but they can be used as enablers in deployments of Edge
computing. The main tools for UP path management are listed below:
UPF selection
Selective traffic routing to DN
Session and Service Continuity
AF influence on traffic routing
Network capability exposure
LADN
9. 5G protocols: 5G NAS:
The full form of NAS is 5G Non-Access Stratum. AS denotes the main Control Plane protocols
between the UE and the core network.
The main functions of NAS are:
Handling of UE registration and mobility
Support of Session Management procedures to establish and maintain PDU Session
connectivity and QoS for the User Plane between the UE and the DN.
General NAS transport between UE and AMF to carry other types of messages that are
not defined as part of the NAS protocol.
NAS consists of two basic protocols to support the functionality. They are
The 5GMM protocol runs between the UE and the AMF and is the basic NAS protocol used for
handling UE registrations, mobility, security and also transport of the 5GSM protocol as well as the
general NAS transport of other types of messages. The 5GSM protocol runs between UE and SMF
(via the AMF) and supports management of PDU Session connectivity. It is carried on top of the
5GMM protocol as shown in Fig 3.13
Fig: 3.13 NAS protocol stack with NAS-MM and NAS-MM protocols
The NAS messages are transported by NGAP between AMF and the (R)AN and by access
specific means between (R)AN and UE. The 5G NAS protocols are defined as new
protocols in 5G but they have many similarities with the NAS protocols used for 4G/EPS
and also the NAS protocols defined for 2G/3G/GPRS.
The NGAP protocol is designed for use on the N2 interface between the (R)AN and
AMF. It can be noted that the 3GPP RAN groups have given the name NG to the RAN-
AMF interface that in the overall system architecture is called N2.
The protocol name NGAP is thus derived from the interface name NG with the addition of
AP (Application Protocol), which is a term that has been used many times by 3GPP to
denote a signaling protocol between two network functions.
NGAP supports all mechanisms necessary to handle the procedures between AMF and
(R) AN, and it also supports transparent transport for procedures that are executed
between the UE and the AMF or other core network functions. NGAP is applicable
both to 3GPP access and non-3GPP accesses integrated with 5GC. This is a key difference
to EPC where S1AP was designed for use only with 3GPP access (E-UTRAN) and not non-
3GPP accesses.
The NGAP interactions between AMF and (R)AN are divided into two groups:
NG (i.e., N2) interface management functions, for example initial NG interface setupas well
as Reset, Error Indication, Overload Indication and Load Balancing.
Initial UE Context Setup functionality for establishment of an initial UE context in the
(R)AN node.
Provision of the UE capability information to the AMF (when received from the UE).
Mobility functions for UEs in order to enable handover in NG-RAN, e.g., Path Switch
request.
Setup, modification, and release of PDU Session resources (User Plane resources)
Paging, providing the functionality for 5GC to page the UE.
NAS signaling transport functionality between the UE and the AMF.
Trace of active UEs.
UE location reporting and positioning protocol support.
Warning message transmission.
The two main components of GTP are the Control Plane part of GTP (GTP-C) and the
User Plane part of GTP (GTP-U). GTP-C is the control protocol used in 3G/GPRS
and4G/EPS to control and manage PDN Connections and the User Plane tunnels that buildup
the User Plane path. The GTP-U uses a tunnel mechanism to carry the user data traffic and runs
over UDP transport.
In 5GS, GTP-U has been re-used to carry User Plane dataover N3 and N9 (and N4).GTP-U
tunnels are used between two corresponding GTP-U nodes to separate traffic into different
communication flows. A local Tunnel Endpoint Identifier (TEID), the IP address, and the UDP
port uniquely identify a tunnel endpoint in each node, where the TEID assigned by the
receiving entity must be used for the communication. In 5GC, GTP-U tunnels are established
by providing GTP-U TEIDs and IP addresses between (R)AN and SMF.
This signaling is carried by HTTP/2 between SMF and AMF and by NGAP between AMF and
(R)AN. There is thus no use of GTP-C in 5GC to manage GTP-U tunnels.
The user plane protocol stack for a PDU Session is shown in Figure 3.14.
A GTP path is identified in each node with an IP address and a UDP port number. A
path may be used to multiplex GTP tunnels and there may be multiple paths between two
entities supporting GTP.
The TEID that is present in the GTP-U header indicates which tunnel a particular payload
belongs to. Thus, packets are multiplexed and DE multiplexed by GTP-U between a given
pair of Tunnel Endpoints. The GTP-U header is shown in below figure 3.15.
The IPsec security architecture is defined in IETF RFC 4301. The set of security services
provided by IPsec include:
Access control
Data origin authentication
Connection-less integrity
Detection and rejection of replays
Confidentiality
Limited traffic flow confidentiality.
By access control we mean the service to prevent unauthorized use of a resource such as a
particular server or a particular network. The data origin authentication service allows the receiver
of the data to verify the identity of the claimed sender of the data. Connection-less integrity is the
service that ensures that a receiver can detect if the received data has been modified on the path
from the sender.
However, it does not detect if the packets have been duplicated (replayed) or reordered. Data origin
authentication and connection-less integrity are typically used together. Detection and rejection of
replays is a form of partial sequence integrity, where the receiver can detect if a packet has been
duplicated. Confidentiality is the service that protects the traffic from being read by unauthorized
parties.
The mechanism to achieve confidentiality with IPsec is encryption, where the content of the IP
packets is transformed using an encryption algorithm so that it becomes unintelligible.
Limited traffic flow confidentiality is a service whereby IPsec can be used to protect some
information about the characteristics of the traffic flow, e.g., source and destination addresses,
message length, or frequency of packet lengths. In order to use the IPsec services between two
nodes, the nodes use certain security parameters that define the communication, such as keys,
encryption algorithms, and so on. In order to manage these parameters, IPsec uses Security
Associations (SAs).
A SA is the relation between the two entities, defining how they are going to communicate using
IPsec. A SA is unidirectional, so to provide IPsec protection of bidirectional traffic a pair of SAs is
needed, one in each direction. Each IPsec SA is uniquely identified by a Security Parameter Index
(SPI), together with the destination IP address and security protocol (AHor ESP).
The SPI can be seen as an index to a Security Associations database maintained by the IPsec nodes
and containing all SAs.As will be seen below, the IKE(Internet Key Exchange) protocol can be
used to establish and maintain IPsec SAs. IPsec also defines a nominal Security Policy Database
(SPD), which contains the policy for what kind of IPsec service is provided to IP traffic entering
and leaving the node. The SPD contains entries that define a subset of IP traffic, for example using
packet filters, and points to a SA (if any) for that traffic.
12. GRE (Generic routing encapsulation):
The GRE is a protocol designed for performing tunnelling of a network layer protocol over
another network layer protocol. It is generic in the sense that it provides encapsulation of one
arbitrary network layer protocol (e.g., IP or MPLS) over another arbitrary network layer
protocol.
GRE is also used for many different applications and in many different network deployments
outside the telecommunications area.
The basic operation of a tunnelling protocol is that one network protocol, which we call the
payload protocol, is encapsulated in another delivery protocol. It should be noted that
encapsulation is a key component of any protocol stack where an upper layer protocol is
encapsulated in a lower layer protocol.
This aspect of encapsulation, however, should not be considered as tunnelling. When tunnelling
is used, it is often the case that a layer-3 protocol such as IP is encapsulated in a different layer-
3 protocol or another instance of the same protocol.
Fig: 3.17 Example of GRE tunnel between two network nodes with IPv4 delivery protocol.
GRE is specified in IETF RFC 2784. There are also additional RFCs that describe how GRE is
used in particular environments or with specific payload and/or delivery protocols. One
extension to the basic GRE specification that is of particular importance for EPS is the GRE
Key field extension specified by IETF RFC 2890.
Fig: 3.18 GRE header format including the basic header as well as the key and sequence
number extensions.
The C flag indicates whether the Checksum and Reserved1 fields are present. If the C flag is
set, the Checksum and Reserved1 fields are present.
In this case the Checksum contains a checksum of the GRE header as well as the payload
packet. The Reserved1 field, if present, is set to all zeros. If the C flag is not set, the Checksum
and Reserved1 fields are not present in the header. The K and S flags respectively indicate
whether or not the Key and/or Sequence number is present.
The Protocol Type field contains the protocol type of the payload packet. This allows the
receiving endpoint to identify the protocol type of the DE capsulated packet. The intention of
the Key field is to identify an individual traffic flow within a GRE tunnel. GRE in itself does
not specify how the two endpoints establish which Key field(s) to use.
This is left to implementations or is specified by other standards making use of GRE. The Key
field could, for example, be statically configured in the two endpoints, or be dynamically
established using some signaling protocol between the endpoints.
In 5GS the key field is used between UE and N3IWF to carry the QFI value and the RQI. The
QFI takes 6 bits and RQI a single bit out of the available 32 bits in the key field.
UNIT IV DYNAMIC SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT AND MM-WAVES
Mobility management, Command and control, spectrum sharing and spectrum trading,
cognitive radio based on 5G, millimeter waves.
PART-A
1. What is Mobility management?
Mobility management is one of the major functions of a GSM or a UMTS network that
allows mobile phones to work.
The aim of mobility management is to track where the subscribers are, allowing calls,
SMS and other mobile phone services to be delivered to them.
The general principles for Mobility Management in 5GS are similar as for previous 3GPP
systems but with some key differences.
Mobility Management is required to ensure the following:
The above is ensured by establishing and maintaining connectivity between the UE and the
network through mobility management procedures. The Mobility Management functionality
enables the possibility for identification of the UE, security, and serves as a generic message
transport for other communication between the UE and the 5GC.
5G Mobility Management (5GMM) related procedures are divided into three categories. They
are
Common procedures
Specific procedures
Connection management procedures
Idle-mode Mobility Management for 5GS using NR and E-UTRA is built on similar concepts
to LTE/E-UTRAN (EPS), GSM/WCDMA(Global System for Mobile
Communication/Wideband Code Division Multiple Access), and CDMA. Radio networks are
built by cells that range in size from tens and hundreds of meters to tens of kilometers. It
is not practical to keep track of a UE in idle mode every time it moves between different cells
due to the amount of signaling it would cause, or to search for a UE across the entire network
for every terminating event.
When the UE reselects a new cell and realizes that the broadcast TA ID is not in the list of TAs in the
RA, the UE initiates an MRU procedure to the network, the NG-RAN routes the MRU to an AMF
serving the new area. Upon receipt of the MRU message from the UE, the AMF checks if a context for
that particular UE is available; if not the AMF checks the UE’s temporary identity (5G-GUTI) to
determine which AMF keeps the UE context. Once this is determined the AMF asks the old AMF for
the UE context. The old AMF transfers the UE context to the new AMF.
Once the new AMF has received the old UE context, it informs the UDM that the UE context has now
moved to a new AMF by registering itself to the UDM, subscribing to being notified when the UDM
deregisters the AMF and as well to get the subscriber data for the UE from the UDM. The UDM de-
registers the UE context (for 3GPP Access Type) in the old AMF. The UDM acknowledges the new
AMF and inserts new subscriber data in the new AMF. The new AMF informs the UE that the MRU
was successful and the AMF supplies a new 5G-GUTI (Global Unique Temporary Identifier).
The traditional method used for allocation of spectrum is known as Command and Control.
The Command and Control management approach is the one currently employed by most regulators
around the globe. This approach advocates that the regulators be the centralized authorities for
spectrum allocation and usage decisions.
The allocation decisions are often static in temporal and spatial dimensions, meaning that they are
valid for extended periods of time (usually decades) and for large geographical regions. The usage is
often set to be exclusive; each band is dedicated to a single provider, thus maintaining interference free
communication.
Fig: 4.2 Commands and Control Attack
The attacker starts by establishing a foothold to infect the target machine, which may sit behind
a Next-Generation Firewall.
The attacker now has complete control of the victim’s computer and can execute any code. The
malicious code will typically spread to more computers, creating a botnet a network of infected
devices. In this way, an attacker can obtain full control of a company network.
Command and control is one of the last stages of the kill chain (coined by Lockheed Martin). It occurs
right before threat actors complete their objectives. This means that the attacker has already bypassed
other security tools that may have been in place. Thus, it is critical for security professionals to quickly
discover and prevent C2.
The command and control management model dates back to initial days of wireless
communications, when the technologies employed required interference-free mediums for
achieving acceptable quality. Thus, it is often argued that the exclusive nature of the command and
control approach is an artifact of outdated technologies.
In The command and control approach, the government may do all or some of the following:
Decide the number of players,
Select them though an administrative procedure, fix a subsidized price for the license and
spectrum(which Is often bundled with the license),
Determine specific technologies and services for spectrum use,
Put in place ‘use--‐it—or--‐lose--‐it’ Rollout obligations under which the promoter’s stake
cannot be sold till time--‐bound network deployment does not take place,
Tie the assignment of incremental spectrum to achieving subscriber milestones,
Put in place a usage charge regime that increases with the amount of spectrum held, and
impose a universal service obligation.
The above table shows the aspects of command and control. The Command and control approach is
useful for achieving early roll--‐out and rapid growth.
The Low price of license and spectrum is believed to keep prices of basic voice telephony low and
promote diffusion. The Stipulations on spectrum use and rollout are meant to ensure efficient use of
spectrum in the context of spectrum scarcity and the low number of operators.
The Command and control regime begins to fail in the face of several new developments:
Growth Of advanced services in new spectrum bands.
Growth Of advanced technologies in old spectrum bands.
Convergence Of services.
Growing Maturity of competition
Advantage:
3. Spectrum Sharing:
5G-NR with the adoption of massive MIMO will boost DL throughput at both cell center and cell edge
with affordable complexity. Beamforming can be used to reach similar coverage as the LTE
network deployed at 1.8 GHz band. However, due to limited transmit power at terminal and limited
UL transmission slots; it’s difficult for 5G-NR to improve its UL coverage only based on C-Band TDD
carrier.
Accordingly, 4G/5G spectrum sharing, also called as LTE/NR coexistence, was proposed to reuse
the UL spare resources in the lower frequencies already licensed for mobile use (e.g., 700, 800,
900, 1,800, and 2,100 MHz) as the coverage compensation to 5G-NR network, scheduled as a
supplementary UL in combination with 3,300–3,800 MHz 4G/5G sharing allows operators to benefit
from faster and cost-efficient deployment of C-band (can expand to SDL and mm-wave in the future),
and thus delivers enhanced capacity without incurring network densification costs.
Fig 4.3 shows how we can share the same spectrum between LTE and NR 'Dynamically'. Conceptually
it would be simple and anybody would come out with this type of logic. Following illustration shows
some of the possible options.
The first option is the case where the Network schedules both LTE and NR in the same time period in
different frequency location. Since the frequency domain location of LTE and NR does not collide
each other, both technologies can coexists.
The second option is the case where the Network schedules NR only in the time period.
The third option is also the case where the Network schedules NR only in the time period. The
difference between the option 2 and option 3 is that option 3 cases the time period is in a special called
'MBSFN'(Multiservice Broadband Network).
The fourth option is the case where the network schedules NR only, but it does not take all the time
domain resources. It uses only a small portions time domain resources (i.e, only a small numbers of
OFDM symbols).
Fig: 4.3 Spectrum Sharing
5G-NR were developed for supporting diverse services, such as enhanced mobile broadband
(eMBB), massive machine type communication (mMTC) and ultra-reliable low latency
communication (URLLC). The new spectrum released for 5G deployments, primarily above 3 GHz,
unfortunately has a relatively high path-loss, which limits the coverage, especially for the uplink (UL).
The high propagation loss, the limited number of UL slots in a TDD frame and the limited user-power
gravely limit the UL coverage, but the available spectrum bandwidth is very rich. Moreover, the
stringent requirements of the 5G diverse applications lead to a number of 5G challenges, such as
ensuring seamless coverage, high spectrum efficiency, and low latency.
4. Spectrum trading:
Spectrum trading allows spectrum licenses to be traded between market players, meaning that
spectrum 20 usage rights are transferred from one party to another in a ‘secondary’ market. The
economic significance of this is that, apart from confronting the cost of acquiring spectrum through an
auction, the licensee also needs to address the cost of retaining its spectrum.
In order to have more flexibility in spectrum management, under the spectrum trading concept, it is
argued that markets should become the primary means to attribute spectrum among uses and users. At
this point, the general idea is that the rights generally granted to licensees should be broadened,
permitting flexible use of the allocated spectrum and eliminating all licensing requirements that are not
related to interference or anti-competitive concentration.
The ideas of introducing secondary markets have led to proposals for developing markets for spectrum
property rights akin to those in place for most other industries. A licensee would have exclusive and
transferable rights to use specified frequencies within a geographic area, with flexible rights of
use governed primarily by technical rules to protect against interference.
Licensees would be free to sell, lease, divide, and aggregate spectrum parcels without limitation as to
uses or technologies other than to comply with interference and competition rules. Other prospective
users of these frequencies would need to obtain the licensee’s approval and agree on terms and
conditions. Spectrum trading creates transparency regarding the value of spectrum. This transparency
in market enables market players to have greater awareness of market entry opportunities and have the
knowledge of the true costs as trading will provide information on potential market value.
With a shared access authorisation regime, spectrum is shared but only by authorised users and subject
to strict requirements. There are multiple sharing schemes: authorised shared access (ASA), licensed
shared access (LSA) and spectrum access system (SAS).
LSA and ASA were developed to allow spectrum to be licensed for international mobile
telecommunications (IMT), while ensuring continuation of the incumbent use in the same spectrum
band. Theoretically, this would increase the use of the radio spectrum by allowing ‘shared access’
where and when the primary licensee is not using its designated frequencies.
Cognitive radio (CR) is a form of wireless communication in which a transceiver can intelligently
detect which communication channels are in use and which ones are not. The transceiver then
instantly moves into vacant channels, while avoiding occupied ones.
These capabilities help optimize the use of the available radio frequency (RF) spectrum. It also
minimizes interference to other users. And, by avoiding occupied channels, it increases spectrum
efficiency and improves the quality of service (QoS) for users. The allocated (licensed) spectrum is not
always used optimally.
As a result, some bands are overcrowded (e.g., GSM cellular networks), while others are relatively
unused (e.g., military). This spectrum inefficiency limits the amount of data that can be transmitted to
users and lowers service quality. As the number of connected devices in use continues to grow, this
limited resource is fast becoming a scarce resource. Cognitive radio is an efficient way to use and
share this resource intelligently, optimally and fairly.
Primary network.
Secondary network.
The primary network owns the licensed band and consists of the primary radio base station and users.
The secondary network shares the unused spectrum with the primary network. It consists of the
cognitive radio base station and users.
The two main facets used in CR are spectrum sensing and spectrum database.
Spectrum Sensing:
CR devices track the spectrum bands in their neighbourhoods to identify users licensed to operate in
that band. They also look for unused portions of the RF spectrum known as white spaces or spectrum
holes. These holes are created and removed dynamically and can be used without a license.
Spectrum sensing may be cooperative or non-cooperative. In the cooperative method, cognitive radio
devices share spectrum information, while in the non-cooperative method, each CR device acts on its
own.
Spectrum database:
TV stations update their next week’s use of the RF spectrum in a database that the FCC maintains.
Cognitive radio devices can seek information about free spectrum from this database, so they don’t
have to rely on complex, time-consuming and expensive spectrum sensing techniques.
The drawback of this method is it’s difficult for the database to update dynamic spectrum activity in
real time. As a result, CR devices may miss out on opportunities to access unused spectrum.
To support the growing number of devices that use the RF spectrum, a combined approach is useful. It
ensures that devices can quickly and accurately detect unused spectrum and so improve QoS.
The three key capabilities that differentiate cognitive radio from traditional radio are:
Cognition:
CR understands its geographical and operational environment.
Reconfiguration:
According to this cognitive knowledge, CR can decide to dynamically and autonomously
adjust its parameters.
Learning:
CR can also learn from the experience, and experiment with new configurations in new
situations.
Heterogeneous.
Spectrum-sharing.
Heterogeneous Cognitive Radio:
In heterogeneous CR, operators run several radio access networks (RANs) using the same or
different radio access technology (RAT) protocols. Heterogeneous cognitive radio uses a
network-centric approach, and the frequency bands allocated to the various RANs are fixed.
In spectrum-sharing CR, several RANs share the same frequency band.
They also coordinate with each other to use unoccupied sub-bands intelligently and optimally. In
both CR types, radio resources are optimized, and the QoS is much better than it would be with
traditional radio. Another way of categorizing CR is as full cognitive or spectrum sensing. Full
cognitive CR takes into account all parameters that a wireless node or network can be aware of.
Spectrum-sensing CR detects channels in the RF spectrum.
Depending on transmission and reception parameters, there are two main types of cognitive
radio:
Spectrum mobility: Process by which a cognitive-radio user changes its frequency of operation.
Cognitive-radio networks aim to use the spectrum in a dynamic manner by allowing radio
terminals to operate in the best available frequency band, maintaining seamless communication
requirements during transitions to better spectrum.
Spectrum sharing: Spectrum sharing cognitive radio networks allow cognitive radio users to
share the spectrum bands of the licensed-band users. However, the cognitive radio users have
to restrict their transmit power so that the interference caused to the licensed-band users is kept
below a certain threshold.
If the licensed users are not using the bands, cognitive radio users will transmit over those
bands. If the licensed users are using the bands, cognitive radio users share the spectrum bands
with the licensed users by restricting their transmit power.
6. Millimetre waves:
More people and devices are consuming more data than ever before, but it remains crammed on
the same bands of the radio-frequency spectrum than mobile providers have always used.
That means less bandwidth for everyone, causing slower service and more dropped
connections.
One way to around that problem is to simply transmit signals on a whole new swath of the spectrum,
one that’s never been used for mobile service before. That’s why providers are experimenting with
broadcasting on millimeter waves, which use higher frequencies than the radio waves that have long
been used for mobile phones.
Millimeter wave (MM wave), also known as millimeter band, is the band of spectrum
with wavelengths between 10 millimeters (30 GHz) and 1 millimeter (300 GHz). It is also known as
the extremely high frequency (EHF) band by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). The
term “millimeter wave” is also shortened to “mm wave”.
Fig: 4.7 Frequency Spectrum of Electromagnetic Frequency
Broad range of products and services, such as high-speed, point-to-point wireless local area
networks (WLANs) and broadband access.
Wide bandwidth and High Data rates.
Low Latency.
Small Antennas.
Increased Resolution.
Limited Range, Reflection, and Penetration.
Increased Resolution.
Millimeter waves are absorbed by gases and moisture in the atmosphere, which reduces
the range and strength of the waves.
Rain and humidity reduce their signal strength and propagation distance, a condition
known as rain fade.
Applications:
Used in Radar.
Telecommunication.
Security Scanner.
Radio astronomy.
Soil moisture evaluation.
Weather Mapping.
Medical Treatment
UNIT V SECURITY IN 5G NETWORKS
Security features in 5G networks, network domain security, user domain security, flow
based QoS framework, mitigating the threats in 5G.
PART –A
When designing the 5G system, 3GPP (Third Generation Partnership Project) agreed on overall
security requirements for the 5G standard. These include overall requirements on the system to
support e.g., authentication and authorization of subscribers, usage of ciphering and
integrity protection between the UE and the network etc.
There are also security requirements on each entity such as the UE, base station (NB,gNB, eNB)
etc., and these include requirements for secure storage and processing of subscription credentials
and keys, support for specific ciphering and integrity protection algorithms etc.
Ciphering and integrity protection serve different purposes and the need for ciphering and/or
integrity protection differs depending on what traffic it is.
Ciphering protection, we ensure that the information transmitted is only readable to the
intended recipients.
6. Define integrity protection.
Integrity protection, on the other hand, is a means of detecting whether traffic that reaches the
intended recipient has or has not been modified, for example by an attacker between the sender
and the receiver.
Privacy protection is another important security feature. By privacy protection we mean the
features that are available to ensure that information about a subscriber does not become
available to others. For example, it may include mechanisms to ensure that the permanent user
ID is not sent in clear text over the air link.
8. List out the 3GPP TS 33.501 divides the security architecture into different groups or
domains.
Groups 1–4 and 6 are very similar to corresponding groups for 4G/EPC.
Group 5 is however new compared to 4G/EPC.
Mobile networks contain many Network Functions and reference points between them. Network
domain security refers to the features that allow these Network Functions to securely
exchange data and protect against attacks on the network between the Network Functions,
both between NFs within a PLMN (Public land mobile network) and in different PLMNs.
10. Write short notes on Network Domain Security for IP based communication.
The NDS/IP (Network Domain Security / IP Security) key management and distribution
architecture is based on the IPsec IKE protocol.
Internet Key Exchange (IKE) is a standard protocol used to set up a secure and authenticated
communication channel between two parties.
A Security Gateway (SEGs), also called a Data Guard or Information Exchange Gateway, is a
device that controls, validates, and filters the information exchange that takes place between
different security domains.
12. Write the Security aspects of Service Based interfaces.
SEG-SEG interface covers all NDS/IP traffic between security domains. The SEGs use IKE to
negotiate, establish and maintain a secure ESP tunnel between them.
NE-SEG / NE-NE interface is located between SEGs and NEs and between NEs within the
same security domain. These is optional for implementation. If implemented, it shall implement
ESP+IKE.
User domain security refers to the set of security features that secure the physical access to
terminals. For example, the user may need to enter a PIN code before being able to access the
terminal or before being able to use the SIM card in the terminal.
It refers to the security features that provide a user with secure access to the network. This
includes mutual authentication as well as privacy features. In addition, protection of signaling
traffic and User Plane traffic in the access is also included. This protection may provide
confidentiality and/or integrity protection of the traffic.
Employees that fail to lock their computers when getting up from their desks.
Employees that leave sensitive company information on their desks.
Limited IT security knowledge by employees can lead to the introduction of malware
Digital security controls include such things as usernames and passwords, two-factor
authentication, antivirus software, and firewalls. Cybersecurity controls include anything
specifically designed to prevent attacks on data, including DDoS ("Distributed Denial-of-
Service (DDoS) Attack") mitigation (Mitigation means reducing risk of loss from the occurrence
of any undesirable event), and intrusion prevention systems.
The Application Stratum provided to the end-user. It includes end-to-end protocols and
functions which make use of services
The transports stratum in the ITU-T Next Generation Networks (NGN) is expected to provide
end-to-end connectivity according to the service
The Serving stratum/Home stratum is Serving Gateway (S-GW) routes user data packets from
the P-GW (packet data network gateway) to an evolved Node B (eNB) that transmits them over
the LTE radio interface to an end user.
19. Write the best secure of a user domain.
Monitor Local Administrators.
Don't Use GPOs (Group Policy Objects) to Set Passwords.
Ensure LSASS (Local Security Authority Server Service) Protection.
Have a Stringent Password Policy (Strong security policy using upper- and lower-case
letters numbers and strings).
5G QoS: The concept of QoS(Quality of service ) in 5G is flow based. Packets are classified and
marked using QFI (QoS Flow Identifier). The 5G QoS flows are mapped in the AN (Access
Network) to DRBs (Data Radio Bearers) unlike 4G LTE where mapping is one to one between
EPC(Evolved Packet Core) and radio bearers.
QFI (QoS Flow Identifier): In 5G networks, QFI is used to identify different QoS Flows within
a PDU Session (Packet Data Unit Session). It is used to distinguish between different data
streams or flows within the same PDU Session.
Encryption
Multi-factor Authentication
Network Segmentation
Threat Intelligence
Security Testing
PART - B
Security requirements:
When designing the 5G system, 3GPP (Third Generation Partnership Project) agreed on overall
security requirements for the 5G standard. These include overall requirements on the system to
support e.g., authentication and authorization of subscribers, usage of ciphering and
integrity protection between the UE and the network etc.
There are also security requirements on each entity such as the UE, base station (NB,gNB, eNB)
etc., and these include requirements for secure storage and processing of subscription credentials
and keys, support for specific ciphering and integrity protection algorithms etc.
Node B(NB) is the radio base station in 3G UMTS networks; eNodeB(eNB) is the radio base
station in 4G LTE networks; gNodeB (gNB) is the radio base station in 5G NR networks. These
radio base stations (nodes) are the cell towers mobile operators use to connect our mobile phones
to 3G, 4G and 5G networks.
Security services:
Ciphering and integrity protection serve different purposes and the need for ciphering and/or
integrity protection differs depending on what traffic it is.
Ciphering protection, we ensure that the information transmitted is only readable to the
intended recipients.
Integrity protection, on the other hand, is a means of detecting whether traffic that reaches the
intended recipient has or has not been modified, for example by an attacker between the sender
and the receiver.
In order to encrypt/decrypt as well as to perform integrity protection, the sending and receiving
entities need cryptographic keys. It may seem tempting to use the same key for all purposes,
including authentication, ciphering, integrity protection, etc.
However, using the same key for several purposes should generally be avoided. One reason is
that if the same key is used for authentication and traffic protection, an attacker that manages to
recover the ciphering key by breaking. For this reason, the keys used in one access should not
be the same as the keys used in another access.
Privacy protection is another important security feature. By privacy protection we mean the
features that are available to ensure that information about a subscriber does not become
available to others. For example, it may include mechanisms to ensure that the permanent user
ID is not sent in clear text over the air link.
Overview:
In order to describe the different security features of 5GS it is useful to divide the complete
security architecture into different security domains. Each domain may have its own set of
security threats and security solutions. 3GPP TS 33.501 divides the security architecture into
different groups or domains:
The first group is specific to each access technology (NG-RAN, Non-3GPP access), whereas the
others are common for all accesses.
The NDS/IP (Network Domain Security / IP Security) key management and distribution
architecture is based on the IPsec IKE protocol.
Internet Key Exchange (IKE) is a standard protocol used to set up a secure and authenticated
communication channel between two parties.
The basic idea to the NDS/IP architecture is to provide hop-by-hop security. The use of hop-by-
hop security also makes it easy to operate separate security policies internally and towards other
external security domains.
A Security Gateway (SEGs), also called a Data Guard or Information Exchange Gateway, is a
device that controls, validates, and filters the information exchange that takes place between
different security domains.
5.2. Two Security domains deploying NDS/IP
The NEs (Network Entity) may be able to establish and maintain ESP Security Associations as
needed towards a SEG or other NEs within the same security domain. And it will be afforded
hop-by-hop security protection towards the final destination.
The Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol provides data confidentiality, and also
optionally provides data origin authentication, data integrity checking, and replay protection.
Operators may decide to establish only one ESP Security Association between two
communicating security domains. The benefits to this are that it gives a certain amount of
protection against traffic flow analysis.
2.2. Security aspects of Service Based interfaces:
The following interfaces are defined for protection of native IP based protocols: -
SEG-SEG interface covers all NDS/IP traffic between security domains. The SEGs use IKE to
negotiate, establish and maintain a secure ESP tunnel between them.
NE-SEG / NE-NE interface is located between SEGs and NEs and between NEs within the
same security domain. These is optional for implementation. If implemented, it shall implement
ESP+IKE.
The internetwork interconnect allows secure communication between service consuming and
service-producing NFs in different PLMNs. Security is enabled by the Security Edge Protection
Proxies (SEPP) of both networks.
The below Fig. shows an example of a serving PLMN where an NF wants to access a service
produced by an NF in a home PLMN. The serving PLMN has a consumer’s SEPP (cSEPP) and
the home PLMN has a producer’s SEPP (pSEPP).
Each PLMN has a business relation with an IPX or IP exchange operator. The cSEPP’s operator
has a business relationship with an interconnect provider (consumer’s IPX, or cIPX), while the
pSEPP’s operator has a business relationship with an interconnect provider (producer’s IPX, or
pIPX). There could be further interconnect providers in between cIPX and pIPX.
Interconnect operators (pIPX and cIPX in the figure) may modify the messages exchanged
between the PLMNs to provide the mediation services.
5.3. Overview of security between PLMNs (N32)
Network access security refers to the security features that provide a user with secure access to
the network. This includes mutual authentication as well as privacy features. In addition,
protection of signaling traffic and User Plane traffic in the access is also included. This
protection may provide confidentiality and/or integrity protection of the traffic.
Network access security generally has access specific components – that is, the detailed
solutions, algorithms, etc. differ between access technologies. With 5GS, a large degree of
harmonization has been done across access technologies, e.g., to use common access
authentication. The system now allows authentication over NAS to be used over both 3GPP and
non-3GPP access technologies.
3. User domain security:
User domain security refers to the set of security features that secure the physical access to
terminals. For example, the user may need to enter a PIN code before being able to access the
terminal or before being able to use the SIM card in the terminal.
User Domain
The User Domain represents a great weakness within the IT infrastructure. This domain includes
any end-user accessing information at the organization. With “almost 90% of cyber-attacks
caused by human error or behavior”, this domain needs strong scrutiny. The following risks have
been identified within this domain:
Employees that fail to lock their computers when getting up from their desks.
Digital security controls include such things as usernames and passwords, two-factor
authentication, antivirus software, and firewalls. Cybersecurity controls include anything
specifically designed to prevent attacks on data, including DDoS ("Distributed Denial-of-
Service (DDoS) Attack") mitigation (Mitigation means reducing risk of loss from the occurrence
of any undesirable event), and intrusion prevention systems.
The term 'DDoS mitigation' refers to the process of successfully protecting a target from a
distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack.
User domain security (III) is the set of security features that secures the user access to mobile
equipment (ME).
The 5G user equipment, such as a smartphone, set-top box, PC, or IoT device. User equipment
management standards will be part of the base specifications for 5G.
3GPP defines the overall 5G security architecture, illustrated in Figure above. This includes
many networks architectural elements and concepts such as:
Network access security (I)
Network domain security (II)
User domain security (III),
Application domain security (IV)
SBA (Service-Based Architecture) domain security (V)
Universal subscriber identity module (USIM): The USIM is the functional equivalent of the
SIM in a GSM device. It is the entity that stores subscriber-related information and implements
the security functions pertaining to authentication and ciphering on the user side in UMTS and
LTE (3G and 4G) devices.
Serving network (SN): An SN provides services (e.g., call or SMS) once both the UE (User
equipment) and the SN have mutually authenticated each other (this supports billing) and have
established a secure channel with the help of the subscriber's HN (home network).
Home Environment (HN): In Network access security (I), that enables user equipment (UE) of
home environment devices used directly by an end user to communicate, such as a cellphone,
laptop computer or tablet -- to authenticate and access services, including 3GPP access and non-
3GPP access, and particularly to protect against attacks on radio interfaces. It also includes
security context delivery from the SN to UE for access security.
5.6. This Fig. is common diagram for network domain and user domain security which provides a
schematic illustration of different security domains.
The ME (Mobile Equipment) and the USIM together form the UE (User Equipment).
QFI (QoS Flow Identifier): In 5G networks, QFI is used to identify different QoS Flows within
a PDU Session (Packet Data Unit Session). It is used to distinguish between different data
streams or flows within the same PDU Session.
DRBs are used for data transmission only. DRB is used to carry the data associated with EPS
bearer. The EPS bearer or Evolved Packet System bearer provides user plane IP connectivity
between UE and PGW (Packet Network Data Gateway).
The Service Data Adaptation Protocol (SDAP), specified in 3GPP is used to enable multiplexing
if more than one QoS Flow is sent on a DRB (Data radio bearer).
The UPF (user Plane Function) resolves the data packets into IP flows, and the UPF also
performs any bit rate policing and other logic as directed by the various N4 rules provided by the
SMF (Session Management Function).
Mitigation Strategies:
Encryption:
Data is transformed into a secure code through the process of encryption to keep it safe from
unauthorized access. Data saved in the cloud and sent via the 5G network may both be protected
using encryption. Encryption may be used to defend sensitive data against assaults ( illegal act of
causing physical harm) like data breaches.
Multi-factor Authentication:
Users must submit two or more kinds of authentication to access a system while using the multi-
factor authentication (MFA) security method. MFA may be used to guard against network
intrusions such as password assaults. MFA implementation can aid in preventing network access
by cybercriminals.
Network Segmentation:
The process of segmenting a network into smaller portions to minimize the attack surface.
Critical systems and sensitive information can be separated from the rest of the network via
network segmentation. Implementing network segmentation can aid in preventing lateral
network movement by hackers.
Threat Intelligence:
The process of acquiring and examining data concerning possible threats and vulnerabilities is
known as threat intelligence. The 5G network’s weaknesses and prospective threats may be
found via threat intelligence, and preventive actions can be taken to stop cyberattacks.
Security Testing:
Security testing is the procedure used to assess a system’s security by mimicking (to imitate or
copy in action) actual threats. The 5G network’s vulnerabilities may be found through security
testing, which can also be used to evaluate how well mitigation measures perform. Regular
security testing can help find vulnerabilities and repair them before hackers can use them against
you.
The fact that 5G can handle a huge number of linked devices, including Internet of Things (IoT)
devices, is one of the technology’s key advantages. However, as the number of linked devices
grows, so does the chance of cyberattacks on those devices.
IOT devices are frequently not adequately secured, leaving them open to hackers. IoT device
vulnerabilities may be used by cybercriminals to get into networks and conduct attacks.
Cybercriminals can steal sensitive data, including financial information, personal information,
and intellectual property, by taking advantage of network flaws.
Cybercriminals can acquire access to the network and conduct attacks like Distributed Denial of
Service (DDoS) assaults by taking advantage of network weaknesses.