Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī’s al-Risālah al-Shamsiyyah

An Edition and Translation with Commentary

 Library of Arabic Literature

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 Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī’s
al-Risālah al-Shamsiyyah

An Edition and Translation

with Commentary

Tony Street

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY PRESS

New York
 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY PRESS
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Copyright © 2024 by New York University

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 Table of Contents

Letter from the General Editor iii

About This Scholarly Edition iv
Abbreviations ix
Acknowledgments x
Introduction xiii
Note on the Text and the Commentary xxii
Notes to the Introduction xxviii

Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī’s al -R isālah al -Shamsiyyah 1

The Introduction 6
The First Discussion: On the Quiddity of Logic, and Proof of the
Need for It 6
The Second Discussion: On the Subject of Logic 8
The First Treatise: On Simple Terms 10
The First Section: On Expressions 10
The Second Section: On Simple Meanings 14
The Third Section: On Universals and Particulars 18
The Fourth Section: On Definitions 24
The Second Treatise: On Propositions and Their Valuations 28
The Introduction: On Defining the Proposition and Its Primary
Divisions 28
The First Section: On the Categorical Proposition 28
The Second Section: On the Divisions of the Hypothetical
Proposition 38
The Third Section: On the Valuations of Propositions 42
The Third Treatise: On Syllogism 58
The First Section: On Definition and Division of Syllogism 58
The Second Section: On Mixes of Modalized Premises 66
The Third Section: On Connective Syllogisms with Hypothetical
Premises 70
The Fourth Section: On the Repetitive Syllogism 74
The Fifth Section: On Matters Appended to the Syllogism 74

vii
 Table of Contents

The Conclusion 78
The First Discussion: On Syllogistic Matters 78
The Second Discussion: On the Parts of the Sciences 84

Commentary 87

Notes 287
Tables 303
Figures 309
Appendix 1: Names of Propositions 329
Appendix 2: Propositional Forms 330
Appendix 3: Examples of Quantified Hypothetical Propositions 346
Appendix 4: Contradictories for Modalized Propositions 347
Appendix 5: List of Translated Texts in Commentary 349
Bibliography 354
Further Reading 362
List of Technical Terms 365
Index 375
About the NYUAD Research Institute 416
About the Typefaces 417
Titles Published by the Library of Arabic Literature 418
About the Editor–Translator 424

viii
 Abbreviations

AI Avicenna. Kitāb al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt.

AʿI Avicenna. Al-Shifāʾ: al-Manṭiq: al-ʿIbārah.
AM Avicenna. Al-Shifāʾ: al-Manṭiq: al-Madkhal.
AN Avicenna. Al-Najāt min al-gharq fī baḥr al-ḍalālāt.
AQ Avicenna. Al-Shifāʾ: al-Manṭiq: al-Qiyās.
ḤA al-Ḥillī. Al-Asrār al-khafiyyah fī l-ʿulūm al-ʿaqliyyah.
ḤQ al-Ḥillī. Al-Qawāʿid al-jaliyyah fī sharḥ al-Risālah al-Shamsiyyah.
ḪK al-Khūnajī. Kashf al-asrār ʿan ghawāmiḍ al-afkār.
RM al-Rāzī. Manṭiq al-mulakhkhaṣ.
SQ al-Samarqandī. Qisṭās al-afkār fī l-manṭiq.
ṬḤ al-Ṭūsī. Ḥall mushkilāt al-ishārāt.
TŠ al-Taftāzānī. Sharḥ al-Risālah al-Shamsiyyah.
TT al-Taḥtānī. Taḥrīr al-qawāʿid al-manṭiqiyyah fī sharḥ al-Risālah al-
Shamsiyyah (Qom, 2011).

ix
 Acknowledgments

Warm thanks to James Montgomery for entrusting al-Risālah al-Shamsiyyah to

me in the first place, and for keeping faith over the years as I allowed myself to
be distracted by other things. Joe Lowry has been an ideal editor; he has saved
me from countless mistakes, alerted me to glaring omissions, and rallied my
spirits when they flagged. LAL’s editorial director Dr Chip Rossetti has been
supportive throughout, and LAL’s digital production manager Stuart Brown
went beyond the call of duty and made substantive improvements to the con-
tent. I am grateful to the editors of the Library of Arabic Literature for finding
a place for this book as one of their scholarly editions. What follows is not a
scholarly edition in any sense of the phrase, but it is long, and fits better along-
side other long books.
Many other people have helped, often without knowing, and most in more
ways than I can record. Thanks to Nicholas Rescher for having paved everyone’s
path to the study of Arabic logic, to Tony Johns for introducing me to Fakhr
al-Dīn al-Rāzī, to Father Georges Anawati for confirming me as a follower of
al-Rāzī, and to Richard Frank for insisting I look beyond al-Rāzī. A timely phone
call from Dimitri Gutas was the only thing that kept me in Islamic studies. Paul
Thom has generously helped over the years as I struggled with the material. Asad
Ahmed, Ahmed Alwishah, Feriel Bouhafa, Reza Dadkhah, Silvia Di Vincenzo,
Asad Fallahi, Pree Jareonsettasin, Jari Kaukua, Dustin Klinger, Harun Kuşlu,
Joep Lameer, Stephen Menn, Yoav Meyrav, Reza Pourjavady, Boaz Schuman,
Ayman Shihadeh, Rob Wisnovsky, Walter Young, and Behnam Zolghadr have
helped me obtain manuscripts or solve interpretive problems. Colleagues close
by—John Marenbon, Catherine Pickstock, and Yasser Qureshy—have made
medieval philosophy at Cambridge deeply congenial. Colleagues farther afield
have had the kindness to involve me in projects from which I have learned
things crucial to understanding al-Risālah al-Shamsiyyah: Peter Adamson,
Leone Gazziero, Nadja Germann, Yehuda Halper, Charles Manekin, and Shahid
Rahman. I have learned more from my (mostly former) students than they have
from me: Suf Amichay, Amal Awad, Necmeddin Besikci, Zhenyu Cai, Daniel
Davies, Tareq Moqbel, Mohammed Saleh Zarepour, and Tianyi Zhang.

x
 Acknowledgments

I owe special thanks to three former colleagues at Cambridge. Khaled El-

Rouayheb came more than twenty years ago; his extraordinary work since then
has transformed the study of Arabic logic. He has always been generous to a
fault in sharing manuscripts and insights. At roughly the same time, Cornelia
Schöck also arrived; she made me aware of the huge importance of the connec-
tions between logic and the broader Islamic sciences. After leaving for Bochum,
Cornelia was awarded a grant from the DFG (German Research Foundation)
that employed Riccardo Strobino, and in an act of monumental kindness
allowed him to base himself in Cambridge. Riccardo’s time here was certainly
the happiest period of my academic career. If my translation has any fidelity to
the original, or clarity in expression, it is entirely due to watching Riccardo go
about his work.
This book is the fulfillment of a promise made—first implicitly, later explic-
itly—in applications to the Arts and Humanities Research Council for two grants
on which I was principal investigator (19484/1 and AH/I50060X/1). I am grate-
ful to the AHRC for its support.
Above all, much love and many thanks to Ruth for putting up with it all.

xi
 Introduction

Logic was revered in the thirteenth century, perhaps more highly than it has
been revered before or since. This is as true of the Muslim East as it is of the
Christian West. It has recently been said of Peter of Spain’s Summaries of Logic,
probably written in the 1230s, that no other book on logic prior to the twenti-
eth century had such wide readership or, in consequence, did so much to shape
Western ways of constructing well-formed sentences and putting them together
in valid arguments.1 But perhaps one other logic text has had just as many read-
ers, and as profound an impact on ways of formal discourse and argument. In the
Muslim East, al-Risālah al-Shamsiyyah (literally The Epistle [on Logical Rules]
for Shams al-Dīn) was written some forty years after the Summaries, by some-
one who was Peter’s exact contemporary: Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī (d. 675/1276).
Al-Risālah al-Shamsiyyah also came to figure in the education of nearly every
aspiring young scholar, and is still read in traditional schools.

Logic in the Muslim East

How did logic come to be so important in the syllabus of Muslim schools? From
the moment the armies first came out of the Arabian Peninsula, Muslims found
themselves in control of communities that had studied logic for centuries, and
that—in the case of the Syriac Christians—had made it a central feature of reli-
gious education. But it is not until late in the Umayyad period (ca. 44–132/661–
750) that we have clear evidence of Muslim interest in logic, specifically among
courtiers of the regime, one of whom translated an introductory text based on
Porphyry’s Introduction, and Aristotle’s Categories, De Interpretatione, and the
first seven chapters of the Prior Analytics.2 This interest intensified dramatically
with the Abbasids (ca. 132–656/750–1258), when the needs of propaganda—the
need to be seen to adopt Sasanian cultural projects—led the dynasty to support
networks of translators of scientific literature drawn from the various religious
communities. From the early ninth century, Baghdad was home to a number of
translation projects, increasingly devoted to producing full translations of the
texts that make up the Aristotelian Organon. The culmination of the work of

xiii
 Introduction

these translators was the emergence of a textual Aristotelianism in the first quar-
ter of the tenth century, led by the Muslim Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī (d. 339/950) and
the Christian Abū Bishr Mattā ibn Yūnus (d. 328/940). Much of their output can
be seen as a continuation of the late antique commentators, producing careful
and often critical analyses of the Aristotelian texts on logic.
The commentary work continued through the first half of the eleventh cen-
tury in Baghdad’s school of loosely affiliated scholars, only to be rudely inter-
rupted by a letter from a rising young star, Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā; d. 428/1037),
who was working at the time in Hamadhān, asking the Baghdadi scholars details
about their doctrine on universals.3 Here was a philosopher who, seemingly out-
side of any scholarly network, had come to his own quite radical take on Aristo-
telian logic, who could defend his views with crushingly cogent arguments, and
who—at the time of the letter to the Baghdadis—was in the process of present-
ing his views in various genres designed to appeal to different audiences, and to
students at different stages in their education. Early on there was resistance to
Avicenna’s logic,4 but fairly rapidly it became the standard system against which
an Arabic logician would define his own position. The Aristotelian Organon was
effectively replaced by the Avicennian logical corpus; indeed, reference to the
First Teacher (Aristotle) dwindled, only to be replaced by constant reference to
Avicenna, the Leading Master (al-shaykh al-raʾīs).
Throughout this period, from the early third/ninth to the late fifth/eleventh
century, logic was still confined to networks of scholars associated more with
courts, or institutions like hospitals and observatories, than with any given reli-
gion. At the same time, there was some anxiety among pious believers—whether
Muslims, Jews, or Christians—that by studying the methods by which Aristotle
arrived at his heretical beliefs, the student could end up holding the same beliefs.
Lawyers and theologians learned no logic in their studies, or at any rate, no logic
derived from the Aristotelian Organon. Against this trend, al-Fārābī wrote a
work in the early fourth/tenth century designed to show that Aristotelian logic
could contribute to legal studies a deeper understanding of forensic argument
techniques. It is difficult to assign a single reason behind the ultimate acceptance
of logic in Muslim institutions of learning, but there can be no doubt that the
utility of logic for analyzing and justifying legal reasoning was a major consider-
ation. Among others, the renowned scholar Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111)
took up this line of defense, and even prefaced his summa of jurisprudence, the
Distillation of the Principles of Jurisprudence (al-Mustaṣfā min ʿilm al-uṣūl), with
an introduction on logic.5

xiv
 Introduction

Al-Kātibī’s Life, Logic, Works, and Significance

Due to Avicenna’s victory over conservative Aristotelianism, al-Kātibī’s

al-Risālah al-Shamsiyyah presents a logic strongly marked by Avicenna, and
divergent in many ways from the logic in Peter’s Summaries. Due to widespread
acceptance of the claim that logic was helpful for legal studies, the Risālah’s
major reception was not among scholars working in courts and scientific institu-
tions, but in the religious schools, among Muslim students of law and theology.
It is ironic that a work commended so highly by the fatāwā, the legal opinions,
was written by someone working in an observatory funded by monies usurped
from religious trusts, but so it was: al-Kātibī was one of the founding members of
the Īl-Khānid observatory at Marāghah, on which work began in 657/1259.6 The
Shams al-Dīn to whom al-Kātibī dedicated his Risālah was the regime’s vizier,
who had come to power in 661/1263. This means that the Risālah’s dedication,
and probably its composition, postdate 1263.
Najm al-Dīn Abū l-Ḥasan ʿAlī ibn ʿUmar al-Kātibī was born in 600/1204 in
Qazvīn, about a hundred miles west of modern Tehran. A member of the Shāfiʿī
school of law, the “al-Kātibī” in his name may mean he had connections of some
kind with the scribal class. He went off to study the rational sciences with Athīr
al-Dīn al-Abharī (d. ca. 660/1261), and manuscripts from that period of study
survive to this day in al-Kātibī’s hand.7 The most important political event that
unfolded through al-Kātibī’s lifetime was the Mongol invasion and the sack of
Baghdad (656/1258), among other cities. Catastrophic as the event was for many,
for al-Kātibī it seems mainly to have presented him with a golden opportunity. In
the late 1250s, he was approached by the famous Shi ʿi scholar Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī
(d. 672/1274), and enlisted to help found the Īl-Khānid observatory at Marāghah,
far to the west of Qazvīn. Al-Kātibī taught a number of students, among them the
famous Shi ʿi theologian al-ʿAllāmah al-Ḥillī (d. 726/1325); there were others, but
al-Ḥillī was the one who mattered most for the reception of the Risālah. Al-Kātibī
seems by and large to have remained teaching in Marāghah until shortly before
his death, and probably died there in 675/1276; he was buried in Qazvīn.8
The fact that al-Kātibī studied with al-Abharī is extremely significant, because
al-Abharī is said to have been a student of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210;
more likely he was a student of one of al-Rāzī’s students),9 and al-Rāzī is one
of the three most important intellectual coordinates for al-Kātibī’s work, along
with Avicenna and Afḍal al-Dīn al-Khūnajī (d. 646/1248). Indeed, al-Kātibī is

xv
 Introduction

described as one of the followers of Fakhr al-Dīn (min atbāʿ Fakhr al-Dīn) by
al-Ḥillī, so al-Abharī must have managed to convey to al-Kātibī a vivid sense
of al-Rāzī’s intellectual project. Exactly what that project was in terms of logic
will emerge through the course of the commentary that follows the translation,
but—in broad terms—al-Rāzī’s project was to recruit the philosophy of Avicenna
for the service of Islamic theology. This involved commentary on one of Avicen-
na’s major works, Pointers and Reminders (Kitāb al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt), and
criticism of many of the principles it invokes; it also involved the composition of
independent works in which traditional theological topics were developed with
heavy use of philosophical concepts.
Just as al-Rāzī mediated al-Kātibī’s reception of Avicenna, al-Khūnajī medi-
ated his reception of al-Rāzī, mainly of the logic. Al-Khūnajī had ceaselessly and
critically evaluated al-Rāzī’s logical work, and pushed it in an ever more formal
direction. So, while al-Rāzī had set Pointers and Reminders as the focus for much
later work on Avicenna’s logic, and established a number of crucial research
questions and distinctions with which to deal with these questions, al-Khūnajī
critically evaluated both al-Rāzī’s distinctions and his arguments. Al-Kātibī
often took up al-Khūnajī’s refinements and alternative arguments, but often also
defended al-Rāzī or introduced further refinements. However well al-Kātibī
got on with his colleague al-Ṭūsī at the observatory, over logic they must have
argued endlessly: al-Ṭūsī would never have been prepared to treat al-Rāzī and
al-Khūnajī as though their arguments were on par with Avicenna’s.
Al-Kātibī is almost as famous for a work that covered metaphysics and phys-
ics, Philosophy of the Source (Ḥikmat al-ʿayn), as concise and beautifully struc-
tured as the Risālah, and consequently equally popular in the schoolroom. He
wrote a companion text on logic for the Philosophy of the Source, the Source of
the Precepts (ʿAyn al-qawāʿid), and he wrote the long Compendium of Subtleties
in the Disclosure of Truths (Jāmiʿ al-daqāʾiq fī kashf al-ḥaqāʾiq). He wrote other
short treatises and epistles, and a commentary on al-Rāzī’s text on philosophical
theology, the Treatise on the Thoughts of Ancient and Recent Scholars (Muḥaṣṣal
afkār al-mutaqaddimīn wa-l-mutaʾakhkhirīn). He also wrote two massive com-
mentaries, on al-Rāzī’s Epitome of Logic and Philosophy (al-Mulakhkhaṣ fī
l-manṭiq wa-l-ḥikmah; I only consult the logic volume, published under the title
Manṭiq al-Mulakhkhaṣ) and al-Khūnajī’s Disclosure of Secrets from the Obscurities
of Thought (Kashf al-asrār ʿan ghawāmiḍ al-afkār). Al-Kātibī was, in short, first
and foremost a philosopher with a special interest in logic.

xvi
 Introduction

Al-Risālah al-Shamsiyyah is a text that was read by nearly every aspiring

scholar in the central territories of the Islamic world, through what has been
called the Late Middle Period, and—in traditional schools—it is still read today.10
One measure of its extraordinary standing as a high-level introductory text for
the study of logic is the number of manuscripts of it we find in libraries that hold
Arabic collections. Likewise, when lithography and printing became common
in the Muslim world, numerous versions of the Risālah were made available.
Most of these manuscripts and printed versions give the text of the Risālah,
along with one of the many commentaries written on it, especially the commen-
tary of Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī al-Taḥtānī (d. 766/1365). Even the British East India
Company joined in, producing what is probably the first movable-type version
of the text, along with al-Taḥtānī’s commentary. Indeed, another way to gauge
the scale of the Risālah’s impact is in terms of these commentaries; it is certainly
among the texts most commented upon in Muslim scholarly circles. The focus
of the commentators changed over time, and this was a factor in the Risālah’s
continued recognition as a central teaching text. Commentaries would dwell on
subjects touched on in the text, contingent on the central focus in approaching
the discipline as that focus changed through the centuries and across regions.
And, of course, the commentaries continued to be written because the Risālah
had found a secure place in the syllabus of many religious colleges. For what-
ever reason, even those scholars who regarded the broader logical tradition with
suspicion were prepared to include the Risālah among texts unobjectionable to
pious concerns.11

Reception of the Risālah

A text lives in readers’ reception of it; the way readers through the ages have
received the Risālah is set out for us in the many commentaries written on it.
Before I say a few words about the commentators I have used to understand the
Risālah and assess its reception, let me say something about the place Aristotle
and Avicenna have among the authorities invoked by the Risālah.
Most notable by his absence is Aristotle. Al-Kātibī makes no reference to
Aristotle, though admittedly he makes no direct reference to anyone at all. But
if we fill out the authorities al-Kātibī is tacitly invoking by looking at what his
commentators say (and in particular al-Ḥillī, who studied the text under his
guidance), the point remains: neither Aristotle nor his work occupies al-Kātibī’s

xvii
 Introduction

attention. Before I turn to Avicenna, who does have that honor, I should note
that this does not mean that Arabic logicians did not recognize Aristotle’s ulti-
mate primacy in the discipline. Al-Rāzī could think of no higher compliment to
pay al-Shāfiʿī than that he was to jurisprudence what Aristotle was to logic.12 The
respected bibliographer Ibn al-Akfānī (d. 749/1348) says much the same (along
with some questionable chronology):

It is widely known that the person who originated and instituted logic is
Aristotle, that he found no other book [on logic] by his predecessors other
than a book on the categories, and that he was alerted to writing logic
down and putting it in that order by the organization of Euclid’s book on
geometry.13

But respect did not mean a student should devote time to reading the transla-
tions of Aristotle’s logic that were available. Ibn al-Akfānī went on to set out a
syllabus for the student of logic, and it is noteworthy that even someone who
is prepared to read “the vast ocean of the logic part” of Avicenna’s Cure (Kitāb
al-Shifāʾ ) is not advised to read Aristotle’s logical works. Even so, there was
a continuing sense that it was valid to evaluate at least some aspects of what
the Arabic logicians were doing in terms of what Aristotle had done. This is
what the great intellectual historian Ibn Khaldūn (d. 784/1382) did (following
al-Taftāzānī, see Text 0.1 in the commentary) in a much-quoted passage in which
he criticizes post-Avicennian logic for failing to cover the valuable uses of logic
set out in the books, the Posterior Analytics, the Topics, the Rhetoric, the Poetics,
and the Sophistical Refutations.14 But—to return to the primary point—we do not
find the textual engagement with Aristotle that shapes so much Latin philoso-
phy, nor any appeal to his authority on substantive matters.
It is Avicenna who towers over al-Kātibī’s Risālah, who replaces Aristotle
in every sense, whose presence is underlined at every turn by the commenta-
tors. But Avicenna is for al-Kātibī as old as Kant is for us, and the logicians men-
tioned earlier—al-Rāzī and al-Khūnajī—played a huge role in how al-Kātibī read
Avicenna. Indeed, Ibn al-Akfānī recommends that the aspiring logician read
al-Kātibī’s commentaries on the logic texts of both of his great post-Avicennian
mentors.15 But rather than go back to the books that make up al-Kātibī’s canon
of authorities to try to work out how he is responding to his predecessors, I have
turned to three of the earliest commentators on the Risālah: al-ʿAllāmah al-Ḥillī,
Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī al-Taḥtānī, and Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī (d. 792/1390). In
fact, I have relied on them so much that, if the commentary that follows the

xviii
 Introduction

translation clarifies what al-Kātibī is doing in the Risālah, these three scholars
must take the credit.
A few words on these early commentators are in order. Al-Ḥillī is a young
man writing one of his earliest books when composing Clear Precepts in Com-
mentary on the Epistle for Shams al-Dīn (al-Qawāʿid al-jaliyyah fī sharḥ al-Risālah
al-Shamsiyyah); he intends to provide (so we are told) guidance for his young
colleagues trying to read a difficult text. (I would note that, at first glance, the
Risālah does not look so difficult, so al-Ḥillī’s colleagues are at least advanced
enough to resist being lulled into a false sense of security by the Risālah’s brisk
and straightforward tone.) Al-Ḥillī’s major point of difference from al-Taḥtānī
and al-Taftāzānī is that he writes a second, deeper book in tandem with the Clear
Precepts, Hidden Secrets (al-Asrār al-khafiyyah fī l-ʿulūm al-ʿaqliyyah), and thus
feels able for the most part to leave disputed points up in the air. These are espe-
cially the points at which al-Kātibī departs from Avicenna and follows al-Rāzī.
Al-Taḥtānī is a more senior scholar than al-Ḥillī was when he writes his com-
mentary, Redaction of the Rules of Logic in Commentary on the Epistle for Shams
al-Dīn (Taḥrīr al-qawāʿid al-manṭiqiyyah fī sharḥ al-Risālah al-Shamsiyyah), and
he settles to each point (especially early in the commentary) with thorough and
slightly self-satisfied precision. The sense I have is that he is more aligned with
al-Kātibī’s views on the subject, and even though he corrects a number of claims
in the Risālah, he rarely displays hostility toward al-Kātibī’s broader program, or
the authorities on which he draws for inspiration.
Al-Taftāzānī is engaged in a second-order commentary, Commentary on the
Epistle for Shams al-Dīn (Sharḥ al-Risālah al-Shamsiyyah), correcting al-Taḥtānī.
He has a reputation—probably undeserved—for plodding scholarship,16 and
writes his commentary to clarify and at points deepen al-Taḥtānī’s Taḥrīr. I
follow him with fervor through the modal syllogistic; he and I agree on a cen-
tral issue that culminates in Text 98.2. Al-Taftāzānī was drawn into a debilitating
enmity with a younger scholar, al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī (d. 816/1413), who
wrote marginal notes (a ḥāshiyah) on the Taḥrīr; the work by al-Jurjānī is much
shorter than al-Taftāzānī’s, and is printed in the margins or footnotes of many
versions of the Taḥrīr (including the edition I use, by Bīdārfar). It has been help-
ful for a couple of matters, though I have not used it systematically.
My sense is that al-Ḥillī’s commentary is the clearest of the three, but it is
also the most hostile, and its charity grows thinner the more al-Kātibī diverges
from Avicenna.17 Further, although each commentary has its virtues, none
covers every point that seems important to me. So al-Taḥtānī alone presents

xix
 Introduction

tables of the modal mixes (sadly garbled in the Bīdārfar printing), and these are
too helpful to leave out of a commentary. At the same time, he often fails to give
details for the scholars on whom al-Kātibī draws, or from whom he distances
himself. For example, although al-Taḥtānī gives the different truth-conditions
for the coincidental conditional al-Ḥillī sets out in Text 60.1 in the commen-
tary below (in TT 301.6–u),18 he fails to note which Avicenna prefers. Similarly,
al-Ḥillī draws attention to—and deplores—the fact that al-Kātibī is following
al-Rāzī in his taxonomy of definitions (Text 36.2 in the commentary below),
whereas al-Taḥtānī simply delivers al-Kātibī’s account without complaint (TT
314.1–12). Al-Taftāzānī’s commentary stands as an independent work much
more than we would expect given its declared intention—dealing with what
al-Taḥtānī had neglected, resolving problems arising from his zeal for explana-
tion, pinning down his loose phrasing (TŠ 88.1–2)—but nonetheless he assumes
more advanced knowledge of the subject on the part of his readers than either
of his predecessors.
In writing my own commentary under the spell of the great early commen-
taries on the Risālah, I encountered a number of surprises. On many occasions,
I have read a lemma of the Risālah and thought it straightforward, only to dis-
cover from the commentators a tangle of difficulties I simply had not seen. Take,
for the earliest example of this, the first lemma. The resolutions and refinements
of the phrasing (how does al-Kātibī intend us to take the disjunctive?) and of the
material being treated (if a conception is actually a component of an assertion,
rather than merely a precondition for it, how can the two be opposed?) become
so ramified that a pragmatic decision has to limit how far to follow the discus-
sion. Nearly always, I go no further than al-Ḥillī; if he feels we have reached a
provisional preliminary interpretation of the lemma, I let it go. I have also been
surprised by the questions, both those addressed and those that are not raised,
not just in the reception of the Risālah, but in its initial composition. Why dwell
so long, for example, on the aspects of signification theory set out in §§7–14
(and especially those set out in the first three lemmata), and not—given that the
Risālah is meant for students early in their logical studies—say something about
how to define signification, and to distinguish in particular conventional signifi-
cation? Again, I import material from the commentators (in this case, al-Ḥillī) to
fill in these gaps. Looking back over the translations I have made of what strike
me as especially illuminating insights from the commentators, al-Ḥillī is over-
whelmingly the resource to which I have turned. And he has certainly provided

xx
 Introduction

me with my guiding principle, which is at most to introduce issues raised in the

Risālah, rather than to explore and assess them.
At the end of reading the Risālah, one may wonder what students of the text
would have gained from their efforts. Theories of signification and predication,
obviously, along with analyses of quantified, modalized, and hypothetical prop-
ositions; procedures for checking inferences; and the outlines of a philosophy
of science. But, in the most general terms, they would have come to realize with
what indeterminate materials natural language operates—the shifting signi-
fications of expressions, the overtones of meanings, and the deep ambiguities
hidden in seemingly clear sentences—and the lengths to which one must go to
make these aspects of language determinate. I suspect that few of the Risālah’s
readers went on to formulate knowledge-claims in the propositional forms listed
in the Risālah, and still fewer went on to deduce new knowledge-claims using
the inference-schemata al-Kātibī had proved to be valid. But all would have
come away from their study with an appreciation of the many pitfalls of building
an argument or setting out an unambiguous claim in a natural language.
They were also made aware of a culturally revered canon of philosophical
authority, one that freed their own culture from adherence to strictly Aristote-
lian forms. Reading the commentaries showed that no reference needed to be
made beyond Arabic texts, and “the ancients” (al-qudamāʾ ) only rarely recall a
logician more ancient than al-Fārābī. Learning how all important problems were
generated and resolved within the Risālah’s canon drove home more memora-
bly than anything else could the resources of Arabic philosophical culture. We
need not wonder how logic fitted so snugly into a legal and theological educa-
tion: it reasserted rather than unsettled the independence of Arabic scholarship.

xxi
 Note on the Text and
the Commentary

The Arabic Text

By and large, I follow the text of the Risālah given as lemmata in Tabrīziyān’s
‫ ت‬in the footnotes; it omits the dedica-
edition of al-Ḥillī’s Clear Rules (T, or �
tion, my §0, which I take from Ṣāliḥ’s edition of al-Taftāzānī’s Commentary).
There are many manuscripts of the Risālah, and—generally with one or other
of its early commentaries—many printings and editions, some more criti-
cal than others. I have consulted three manuscripts. The earliest, al-Astānah
al-Raḍawiyyah 1114 (R, ‫ )ر‬dates to 679/1280–81, three years after al-Kātibī’s
death, and includes the commentary by al-Ḥillī.19 The second oldest (S, ‫ )��س‬is
given in the Ark of Tabrīz (Safīna-yi Tabrīz), a codex with a number of texts
precious to Abū l-Majd Muḥammad ibn Masʿūd al-Tabrīzī, a scribe famous in
his day, and copied between 721/1321 and 723/1323 (now available in facsimile).20
This is a beautiful manuscript in a minute hand, but notably has no corrections.
The third manuscript, Trinity R.13.54 (K, ‫)ك‬, is noted in Palmer’s catalogue of
Arabic manuscripts at Trinity College in Cambridge, where it is claimed that it
is a holograph.21
The oldest witness, R, is extremely valuable; it is, however, primarily a wit-
ness to al-Ḥillī’s commentary, and omits the opening material of the Risālah. The
rare occasions I would question it is when S offers a different reading in a stretch
of text that suffers no other obvious problem. I apply such a convoluted test
because of the extraordinary nature of the Ark. Late though it is (at least, relative
to R), the text in the Ark is presented free of commentary, by a renowned scribe
who had access to the finest manuscripts available in his day. What matters,
however, is that the scribe of the Ark, at least when he was copying the Risālah,
was determined to produce a minutely rendered text that looked flawless. There
is no marginal correction, no overwriting, no interlinear activity; when an error
was made, on he wrote, without a backward glance. The scribe of the Risālah in
the Ark aspires to a page without blemish of emendation. When it makes sense,
I have given great weight to the text in the Ark, but when it has obvious gaps, I

xxii
 Note on the Text and the Commentary

have attributed this to scribal vanity. Would that K were, as its colophon claims,
a holograph. Even though Adam Gacek has dashed that hope,22 it remains a rela-
tively early manuscript of the text alone, with marginal and interlinear correc-
tions; it is in agreement more often than not with the other two manuscripts.
I use it mainly as a preponderating consideration, and only a few times as a lone
voice of correction.
The outcome of examining these three witnesses of the Risālah in this way has
led me to adopt Tabrīziyān’s edition for nearly all the Arabic text that follows. To
consider alternative readings left to one side by his edition, I have consulted three
among the many printed versions of the Risālah: the edition by Aloys Sprenger
‫ف‬
and his team, that by M. Faḍlallāh (F, ��), and the recent version of al-Taḥtānī’s
Taḥrīr by M. Bīdārfar, which gives the Risālah in its lemmata.23 The last two
embrace roughly the same approach to establishing the text. Faḍlallāh seeks to
use a number of earlier printings to establish an integrated version aiming at
grammatical correctness and orthographic consistency; on two occasions in the
text that follows, I adopt his reading.24 Bīdārfar’s text is derived from two Cairo
printings.25 There is no account of how Sprenger’s text was established, but it
observes grammatical agreement and provides all vowels. Somewhat arbitrarily,
I have taken Faḍlallāh’s variants as representative of the range of material left out
of Tabrīziyān’s text; I record some of them in the notes. The variants involve deci-
sions that are, from my point of view, fairly harmless. Most often, they involve
phrases designed to fill out al-Kātibī’s lean exposition (clear examples are found
in §§30, 42, 48, 64, 85.2, and 106). Of even less consequence, some variants give
different examples to make the same point (as in §39), or different but synony-
mous expressions (as in §9). Points of crucial difference are, I think, rare; §45
(see Text 45.6 in the commentary, and the footnote to it) is one example, and
the variant rejected in §7 would have produced a text that I for one would have
had trouble translating. I expose myself as someone who should leave the editing
of texts to others when I say this: if the primary goal is to set before the reader
the text students have read through the centuries, we need to recognize that the
Risālah has been so long embedded in commentary that trying to cut it back to
what al-Kātibī actually wrote can look like quixotic nostalgia.
The text is given with minimal punctuation and minimal voweling. I have left
the numbers as they are in Tabrīziyān’s edition, even when one of the manu-
scripts gives them closer to classical rules of agreement. I have departed from
Middle Arabic orthographic conventions for the hamzah.

xxiii
 Note on the Text and the Commentary

The text is divided into short lemmata numbered so that they by and large
correspond to the division into passages for comment that is given in most print-
ings of the Risālah with al-Taḥtānī’s commentary.26 Sadly, this differs from the
division given by al-Ḥillī (my favorite among the commentators), but al-Taḥtānī
has an unassailable status in the tradition of reading the Risālah. I hope that
many who read the Risālah will want to go on to read a more profound commen-
tary than the one I have provided, and the lemmata numbered as in printings
of al-Taḥtānī’s commentary should facilitate that second reading. Within the
passages al-Taḥtānī identifies, I sometimes introduce even finer subdivisions, to
help key the commentary I have written to separate topics (§52 is a case in point,
especially when compared with §53 and following).
Whereas the various divisions into passages for comment are posthumous,
the tight structure of the text itself, reflected in the sectioning of my translation,
is all al-Kātibī’s work; I have merely given as headings and subheadings parts of
the text of the Risālah. The minute script of manuscript S means that the Risālah
can be fitted onto five sides of folio, and the structure is available to a sweep of
the eye: a discipline unfolding under rubrications as al-Kātibī divided it. It is,
in a real sense, a universal table of contents, one that does service for countless
post-Mongol logic texts in Arabic.

The English Translation

Al-Risālah al-Shamsiyyah was edited and translated into English by Aloys

Sprenger and William Kay in the 1850s. Their translation is an extremely helpful
point of reference, which guided me in my early encounter with the Risālah, and
against which I have checked my work at the end. Sprenger left the section on
the modal syllogistic out of the translation (§§98–104 in the following text), and
provided few notes on the Risālah to help the reader. It was more than a hundred
years later that Nicholas Rescher came back to translate the omitted section.27
Even before I read Sprenger-Kay, I had read Rescher’s introductions and analy-
ses of al-Kātibī’s logic, and the translation is guided by an interpretation of the
syllogistic that owes its main lines to Rescher.28 I have also followed Rescher
in adopting Sprenger’s translations of the names of the various modal proposi-
tions for my version of the Risālah; this decision has a few curious consequences
(for example, the English “conditional” applies both to one kind of categorical

xxiv
 Note on the Text and the Commentary

proposition and to one kind of hypothetical), but will hopefully make it slightly
easier to refer back to earlier work on the Risālah.
Given its debts to earlier work, it is fair to ask whether the translation offered
here represents the original text more clearly or more faithfully than its prede-
cessor. I hope it does; and if it does, it will be for two reasons. One lies in the
field’s increasing grip on Avicennian and post-Avicennian philosophy, and the
increasing availability of texts from the community in which al-Kātibī worked.
In particular, recent editions of the works of al-Rāzī and al-Khūnajī allow us
to see al-Kātibī’s work as the outcome of a century-long project of assimilat-
ing Avicennian logic. Well over half the works on which I call regularly in the
commentary (those under Abbreviations) have been translated or edited for the
first time in the last twenty years. The other reason is that, as noted above, I
have decided to follow in the footsteps of al-Kātibī’s main early commentators,
al-Ḥillī, al-Taḥtānī, and al-Taftāzānī. I concede that they may be wrong on points
in interpreting the Risālah, but they (especially al-Ḥillī) are closely acquainted
with al-Kātibī’s central concerns, and strive to order the text according to these
concerns. For the future, the most important single resource for guiding a fresh
translation of al-Kātibī will be al-Kātibī’s other logical works, nearly all of which
remain in manuscript as of the time of writing this introduction.29
There is a grand tradition of translating medieval Latin logic into English—one
need only think of Brian P. Copenhaver and his team, of Paul Thom, and above
all of Gyula Klima—and the resulting translations are readable in ways that reflect
a consensus on how to approach the task.30 There are certainly accurate transla-
tions of Arabic logic texts—F. W. Zimmermann’s translation of al-Fārābī’s com-
mentary on De Interpretatione still deserves honorable mention, even though
his work has now been joined by a number of other worthy efforts (see Further
Reading)—but the results have yet to converge on an agreed way to translate
the terms of art. More than any other work to which I refer, Riccardo Strobino’s
entry on Avicenna’s logic in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy serves as
a glossary for the vast majority of the terms translated in the text that follows;31
I hope this makes the task of putting al-Kātibī’s logic in the context of the most
important authority from which it derives somewhat easier. I also believe Strobi-
no’s entry reflects an emerging consensus on how to translate the terms.
This is a translation of a text written within a group of scholars whose activi-
ties grew out of translations made long ago, but who, as a group, avoided work-
ing with translated texts, which they believed must be misleading. They were
right. I have hesitated when choosing among possible translations for technical

xxv
 Note on the Text and the Commentary

terms, and I refer here to a few of those hesitations, chosen to illustrate some
of the considerations at play. The first is perhaps the most difficult to resolve.
Like other premodern logicians, al-Kātibī presented his logic in a natural lan-
guage or, more precisely, did not present his logic by translating arguments into
a formal language. At the same time, the sentence forms into which he regiments
his propositions for logical treatment are hardly idiomatic Arabic; aside from
anything else, they can involve opaque hangovers from the translation move-
ment. Take as an example the absolute proposition (al-qaḍiyyah al-muṭlaqah) as
set out in §78; the Arabic for the a-proposition would read bi-l-iṭlāq al-ʿāmm kull
jīm bāʾ. One way to render this is in parallel with the structurally similar neces-
sity proposition (al-qaḍiyyah al-ḍarūriyyah), for which bi-l-ḍarūrah kull jīm bāʾ
is clearly “by necessity, every C is B.” With Strobino, I render bi-l-iṭlāq al-ʿāmm
with the clumsy phrase “general absoluteness,” but the origin of the Arabic is
cloudy, and its earliest usage is at variance with al-Kātibī’s.32 We are told that the
contradictory of “by general absoluteness, every C is B” (bi-l-iṭlāq al-ʿāmm kull
jīm bāʾ ) is “always, some C is not B” (dāʾiman baʿḍ jīm laysa bāʾ; §69.2), so, how-
ever it is expressed, the general absolute should be understood as “every C is at
least once B.” Given that no native speaker innocent of Avicenna’s logic would
take this understanding from bi-l-iṭlāq al-ʿāmm kull jīm bāʾ, the translator has to
decide whether the English should make the reader face the same difficulty as a
pre-philosophical reader of the Arabic, or over-translate. I have chosen the first
path for the translation itself, and the path of over-translation for my commen-
tary. I hope the awkward phrasing in the translation reflects what I take to be
al-Kātibī’s intention: to make the language of regimentation awkward enough to
signal that those passages should be read in a different register.
The second problem is often noted by translators in the Library of Arabic Lit-
erature series: there are words that are productive in Arabic for which no equally
productive English term can be found. Take the example of ʿāmm, “general.” The
general absolute (al-muṭlaqah al-ʿāmmah) such as “every C is at least once B” is
combined to make a second, two-sided absolute (§56 below, the non-perpetual
existential): “every C is at least once B and at least once not B,” referred to by
al-Kātibī’s commentators (but not by al-Kātibī himself, at least in the Risālah) as
the special absolute (al-muṭlaqah al-khāṣṣah). The general proposition (ʿāmmah)
is implicationally weaker (“more general,” aʿamm) than the special (khāṣṣah), in
the sense that a two-sided absolute implies a one-sided one, but not the other
way round. ʿUmūm, “generality,” may also refer to the relative extension of terms;
if between the two there is ʿumūm muṭlaq (§26 and following), the individuals

xxvi
 Note on the Text and the Commentary

under the more particular term are included in or form a subset of the individu-
als under the more general. Inconsistently, I translate “proper inclusion,” not
“absolute generality.” In short, technical English obscures deeper links among
the terms of art that are clear to the Arabic logicians.
Let me conclude with a couple of more minor worries. Ideally, the transla-
tion of a term should reflect its Greek provenance. Strictly, qaḍiyyah ḥamliyyah
should be “predicative proposition,” not “categorical proposition,” but then it
would no longer correspond to the common English rendition of the original
phrase in Aristotle’s logic; this consideration is generally decisive. On the other
hand, once a term is translated into Arabic, its further development may depend
on whether the productivity of the Arabic term is exploited. Take lāzim (liter-
ally “inseparable”) as we find it in the translation of Porphyry’s Introduction (the
classical text introducing the material given in the first treatise of the Risālah);
Barnes’s translation gives its corresponding Greek as “concomitant,” now the
most common translation of lāzim. But once in Arabic, lāzim the active parti-
ciple invokes its passive participle malzūm (“what is followed”); together, they
are used in technical phrases like lāzim al-lāzim lāzim al-malzūm (“the impli-
cate of the implicate is the implicate of the implicant”; not in the Risālah, but
often called on by commentators when explaining later sections of the text). The
English terms “implicate” and “implicant” may sound ugly and jar with modern
logical usage, but unlike “concomitant” and its cognates, both at least appear in
modern dictionaries (for example, the Oxford English Dictionary) with mean-
ings that make sense of such technical phrases.
I close with one last consideration. Avicenna is the culmination of the late
antique tradition of commentary on Aristotle, and it makes the most sense to
translate him with words evocative of the Greek tradition in which he inter-
venes. But writers of the second wave of Avicennian philosophy, from the twelfth
century on, are at best mediated in their reading of Aristotle, and indifferent to
textual problems in the ancient tradition. Their concern is rather to contest the
reading of Avicenna, and increasingly they contest that reading in theological
venues. In this respect, the activities of later readers of Avicenna’s logic among
adherents of the Shāfiʿī school of legal thought and the Ash ʿarī school of theol-
ogy, like al-Kātibī, strongly resemble the activities of their contemporaries in the
Latin West; ideally, a translation should be designed to recall these contempo-
raries more than al-Kātibī’s discarded Greek predecessors.

xxvii
 Notes to the Introduction

1 Copenhaver et al., Peter of Spain: Summaries of Logic: Text, Translation, Introduction,

and Notes, ix. Most references I make to Peter’s Summaries are through Buridan’s com-
mentary on them; see Klima, John Buridan, Summulae de Dialectica: An Annotated
Translation, with a Philosophical Introduction. Peter was a contemporary of al-Kātibī,
and Buridan, Peter’s greatest commentator, was a contemporary of al-Kātibī’s commen-
tator al-Taḥtānī.
2 Some of the convolutions of the early transmission are recently traced in Hermans,
“A Persian Origin of the Arabic Aristotle? The Debate on the Circumstantial Evidence
of the Manteq Revisited.”
3 See an account in broad terms in Michot, Ibn Sīnā: Lettre au Vizir Abū Saʿd, 10*–14*;
reference to the edition used is given by Michot on p. 134.
4 The reaction of Avicenna’s contemporaries in Shiraz to his logic is examined in Street,
“Avicenna’s Twenty Questions on Logic: Preliminary Notes for Further Work.”
5 On al-Fārābī’s project, see for example Sabra’s notes in his review of Rescher’s Al-Fārābī’s
Short Commentary on Aristotle’s Prior Analytics, 242. For al-Ghazālī’s contribution, see
the short account of his detractor, Averroes, Le Philosophe et la Loi, 122–23.
6 The classic account of the founding of the observatory is Sayılı, The Observatory in Islam
and Its Place in the General History of the Observatory, 205; the finances are noted in pass-
ing in al-Rahim, The Creation of Philosophical Tradition: Biography and the Reception of
Avicenna’s Philosophy from the Eleventh to the Fourteenth Centuries A.D., 106.
7 For a reproduction, see Eichner, “The Post-Avicennian Philosophical Tradition and
Islamic Orthodoxy: Philosophical and Theological Summae in Context,” 536.
8 Al-Rahim, The Creation of Philosophical Tradition, 107; al-Rahim’s account of al-Kātibī
(106–117) is a full and critical treatment of his life and work. For an account focused
on his work on logic, see El-Rouayheb, The Development of Arabic Logic (1200–1800),
56–59; for a resolution of doubts about date and likely place of death, see El-Rouayheb,
“Al-Kātibī al-Qazwīnī.”
9 Barhebraeus, Specimen Historiae Arabum, Sive, Gregorii Abul Farajii Malatiensis de Orig-
ine & Moribus Arabum Succincta Narratio, 485.
10 I adopt the periodization of Islamic history in Hodgson; see his The Venture of Islam:
Conscience and History in a World Civilization, 2:3.

xxviii
 Notes to the Introduction

11 The later fortunes of the Risālah and the studies devoted to their various aspects are
noted in Street, “Kātibī (d. 1277), Taḥtānī (d. 1365), and the Shamsiyya,” 365.
12 In Lowry’s introduction, quoting Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s Irshād al-ṭālibīn ilā l-minhaj
al-qawīm fī bayān manāqib al-imām al-Shāfiʿī (Guiding Students on the Right Way to Set
Out the Virtues of Imām al-Shāfiʿī); al-Shāfiʿī, The Epistle on Legal Theory, xv.
13 Quoted in Gutas, “Aspects of Literary Form and Genre in Arabic Logical Works,” 60.
14 Ibn Khaldūn, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History, 3:142–43.
15 Gutas, “Aspects of Literary Form,” 61.
16 Smyth, “Controversy in a Tradition of Commentary: The Academic Legacy of
al-Sakkākī’s Miftāḥ al-ʿUlūm,” 594. I take all my information about al-Taftāzānī’s rela-
tionship with al-Jurjānī from this interesting account.
17 Especially in the modal propositions and the way they contribute to syllogistic infer-
ences; see Street, “Al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī (d. 1325) and the Early Reception of Kātibī’s
Shamsīya: Notes towards a Study of the Dynamics of Post-Avicennan Logical
Commentary.”
18 That is, al-Taḥtānī, Taḥrīr al-qawāʿid al-manṭiqiyyah fī sharḥ al-Risālah al-Shamsiyyah;
for these and other abbreviations, see Abbreviations.
19 Described in Tabrīziyān, Introduction to ḤQ, 160.
20 Tabrīzī, Ark of Tabrīz.
21 Palmer, A Descriptive Catalogue of the Arabic, Persian, and Turkish Manuscripts in the
Library of Trinity College, Cambridge, 141–43. “Small quarto, 44 pages. Part I. Arabic
Nasḣí handwriting, on thick glazed paper, discoloured by age.” Part 1, which runs from
pages 1b to 28b, contains the Risālah. After a lengthy description of the contents of the
work, the entry continues: “This copy is said to be an autograph, the following words
being written on the first leaf . . . (This is the Risálaħ Šamsíyaħ, in the handwriting of its
author, the late Mauláná Kátibí); and the appearance of the paper and writing would
confirm the statement. An additional proof of its authenticity is that the readings are
more correct and intelligible than those of any other MS that I have seen, or those from
which the text of Dr. Sprenger and his colleagues was formed . . . A great many marginal
notes have been made, in the same handwriting as the following manuscript.”
22 Trinity R.13.54. From notes sent by Adam Gacek (to whom I am indebted): Al-Risālah
al-shamsīyah bi-khaṭṭ muṣannifihā mawlānā al-Kātibī ʿalayhi al-raḥmah (Cambridge
Trinity College Arabian Tracts 13) Fol. 1a–28b. Title in calligraphic thuluth. No colophon
and no date. Script: partly pointed, clear naskh with the nūn in reverse as in shikastah.
Assimilated alif in the definite article; it looks like ٢. Omissions in the same hand as the
body of the text.

xxix
 Notes to the Introduction

23 See, respectively, Tahānawī, A Dictionary of the Technical Terms Used in the Sciences of
the Musalmans, al-Kātibī, al-Risālah, and the 2011 version of al-Taḥtānī, Taḥrīr.
24 Faḍlallāh’s introduction to the edition of the Risālah discusses previous printings, 21–22;
he names the texts most important for his work and states his editorial goals, 24–25.
25 Bīdārfar names the texts in the introduction to his edition of al-Taḥtānī’s Taḥrīr, 14.
26 I differ somewhat from the numbering in the Bīdārfar edition; I number the opening
dedication as 0 (he has it as 1), and he jumps from 17 (my 16) on page 129 to 19 (my 17)
on page 136, so I’m out by one at first, then by two. I suspect the lemmata crystallized
as clear-cut and fairly lengthy only in the later nineteenth-century printings of the text.
I give a concordance for the lemmata in the Sprenger edition and those in a typical later
printing (specifically, a version of the Taḥrīr reprinted in Cairo in 1948) in Street, “Kātibī
(d. 1277),” 367–72.
27 Rescher, Temporal Modalities in Arabic Logic.
28 Rescher and vander Nat, “The Theory of Modal Syllogistic in Medieval Arabic
Philosophy.”
29 Khaled El-Rouayheb was in the process of preparing an edition of al-Kātibī’s Jāmiʿ
al-daqāʾiq; he has kindly sent me some transcribed text. Qarāmalikī makes use
of al-Munaṣṣaṣ fī sharḥ al-Mulakhkhaṣ (The Precise Commentary on the Epitome),
al-Kātibī’s commentary on al-Rāzī’s Mulakhkhaṣ (still in manuscript), and Moham-
mad Saleh Zarepour transcribed a considerable portion of al-Kātibī’s commentary on
al-Khūnajī’s Kashf al-asrār from MS Süleymaniya: Carullah 1417 for a 2018 Cambridge
Humanities Research Grant. Since then, a preliminary edition has been given of the
whole commentary by Enver Şahin, “Kâtibî’nin Şerhu Keşfi’l-Esrâr Adlı Eserinin Tah-
kîki ve Değerlendirmesi (Critical Edition and Analysis of Kātibī’s Sharh Kashf al-asrâr),”
see al-Kātibī, Sharḥ Kashf al-asrār.
30 Copenhaver et al., Peter of Spain: Summaries; Kilwardby, Notule libri priorum; Klima,
John Buridan, Summulae.
31 Strobino, “Ibn Sina’s Logic.”
32 See Lameer, Al-Fārābī and Aristotelian Syllogistics: Greek Theory and Islamic Practice,
55–62; the story is even more complicated, involving as it does Avicenna’s reception
of post-Aristotelian commentary, but Lameer’s comments are more than enough for
present purposes.

xxx
‫ل���� م����سّ����ة ف� ا �ل��ق�� ا ���ع�د ا �ل� م ن��ط��ق����ّ�ي��ة‬
‫ا �ل ���س�ا �ل��ة ا � ش‬
� �� � ‫ي ي� و‬ � ‫ر‬

Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī’s

al-Risālah al-Shamsiyyah
 ‫�ود‬ ‫ا�����ي���اء ب�م��ق��ت���ض��� ا �جل‬ ‫� ال ش‬ ‫��ح��م�د �ل�ّ�لٰ�ه ا �ل��ذ � �أ ��د ن��ظ���ا ا �ل � د ا خ�ت�� �م�ا �هّ���ا ت‬ ‫ا �ل‬
‫أ ى‬ ‫�ي ب ع م و ج و و رع ي‬
‫أ‬ ‫�أ �ن ش���� ���ق���د ت�ه � ن‬
‫أ‬ ‫أ‬
‫‪٠‬‬

‫� ال� ج�را ا �ل��ف����ل ي�‬

‫�كّ���ة‬ ‫كا ت‬ ‫�ل�ع��ق����لّ ة ف‬
‫حّر �‬ ‫�‬‫� ب�رح�مت���ه م‬ ‫ا‬
‫�‬
‫ي و �ض‬‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫��‬‫�‬ ‫ا‬ ‫�ه‬ ‫ا‬ ‫�‬
‫و ب ر� وع ج و ر‬‫ل‬‫�‬ ‫ا‬ ‫ا‬ ‫�‬
‫م‬
‫ن‬
‫� ا ت ال �����سّ����ة‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫ل‬ ‫ا‬ ‫�ن‬ ‫�‬
‫ع‬ ‫�‬ ‫ا � ص� ا �ة ع�� �ذ ا ت ال أن���ف�� ا �ل��ق���د ����سّ����ة ا ل��ن�ز ���ه��ة‬
‫ّ‬
‫�إ ي‬ ‫�‬ ‫ور‬ ‫�د‬ ‫ك‬ ‫ي م‬ ‫و ل��� ل لى و � � ��س‬
‫آ أ‬ ‫آ‬ ‫ّ‬
‫ح�ا ب��ه‬ ‫� وع��ل � �ل�ه و� �ص‬
‫�‬ ‫� ا ل��م�ع���ج�ز ا ت‬
‫و‬
‫ح�� ال� �ا ت‬
‫ي‬ ‫ب‬ ‫خ����صو�ًص�ا ع��ل ����سيّ���د ن�ا محمد �ص�ا �‬
‫ى‬ ‫ى‬
‫ت‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ّ‬
‫ح�� ج ��ج وا ب���ي��ا �‪.‬‬ ‫�‬
‫�ل‬ ‫�‬ ‫ا ��لت��ا ب��ع��ي�ن �ل��ل���‬
‫أ نّ‬ ‫فّ ن ّ ق أ‬ ‫�‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ق �ذ‬
‫� �ل � � ا �ل�ع�لوم ��سي�ما‬ ‫كا � ب�ا ت���ف���ا � � �ه�ل ا �ل�ع��ق���ل و�إ ط ب���ا � و��ي ا �ل��ف�����ض‬ ‫و�ب�ع�د ��ل�م�ا �‬
‫��ا � ا �� ش��� ّ��ة‬ ‫أ‬
‫ح���ه�ا �أ �ش�� �ف ال� ش���خ‬ ‫ق أ نّ‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ق �ن ّ ة أ‬
‫ص ل�ب ر�ي‬ ‫ا ��لي���ي��� ي��� � ع��لى ا لم��ط�ا �ل� ب� و� ب���هى ا لم ن���ا �� ب� و� � �ص�ا � ب� ر�‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ّ ً‬ ‫أ‬
‫�كن��ه‬ ‫كا ن� الاط�لا ع��لى د ق��ا ئ���ق����ه�ا وال�إح�ا ط��ة ب� �‬ ‫�‬ ‫و‬ ‫ي‬‫ون���ف����س�ه � ��سر ا �ت���ص�ا لا ب�ا �ل�ع��ق��ول ا لم��ل �‬
‫�كّ���ة‬
‫ن ق �إ�ذع ت ف � ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ع‬
‫ق‬ ‫�‬ ‫�ن‬ ‫�‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ص‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫�� �إ ا ب�ا ل�ع��ل ا مو �سو ب�ا م����ط� ب��ه ��عر� ح����ه�ا م� �س������م�ه�ا‬ ‫ل‬ ‫�‬ ‫ل‬ ‫�‬ ‫ل‬ ‫�ن‬ ‫ح��ق���ا ئ���ق����ه�ا لا يم ك‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫ّ‬ ‫أ‬ ‫م‬ ‫م‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ّ‬
‫ح قّ ا �مت���ا �ز �ت�� ���د ه �م��ن ��ي�ن ف���ة‬ ‫� �م��ن ��س�ع�د ب��ل��ط��ف� ا �ل‬ ‫و�غ� ث����ه�ا �م��ن ��سم��ي ن����ه�ا ف�� �ش���ا ر �إل‬
‫كا‬
‫ب� �‬ ‫ب يي‬ ‫�� و‬ ‫ي‬
‫� ن���ا ��ه ا �ل�د ا �ن ا �ل��ق���ا � �أ ف���ل�� �مت���ا ��عت‬ ‫�خ ق‬
‫�ه‬
‫يع و ص�ي و و‬ ‫�‬ ‫ا‬
‫�‬‫ع‬‫�‬‫�‬
‫ل‬ ‫ا‬ ‫��‬‫ط‬‫م��‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ا‬ ‫�ه‬ ‫��‬ ‫ي� و ص�ي و ح ب ب‬ ‫ا ل��ل� و�م�ا ل �إلى ج ب‬
‫�ظّ‬
‫ح��س��ي� ب�‬ ‫ح����س�ن ا �ل‬
‫�‬ ‫� �ل ا لم��ق����بول ا لم ن���ع ا لم���‬ ‫ع��� ا �ل�ع�ا ل ا �ل��ف���ا �ض‬ ‫ح� ب� ا ل��م�‬ ‫ا لمو لى ا �ل���ص�د ر ا �ل���ص�ا �‬
‫م‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫م م‬
‫ا ل ف خ� �ش�� ا ل ة ا � �ي�ن اء ال �� ا ا ل ل ي�ن �ق �ة‬ ‫�ذ ن ق‬ ‫�ن‬
‫ا �ل�أ��س��ي� ب� و ا لم���ا �� ب� و م�����ا ر م��س م�ل�� و ل�د ب���ه� �إ س�ل م و م��س��م�� �د و‬
‫� � �ق��ط�� ال�أع�ا ل ف��ل�ك ا ل��م�ع�ا ل محّد �ب�ن‬ ‫ال أ ف‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫كا � ال�أ�م�ا ث‬
‫ي� م‬ ‫�‬
‫أ �ظ ل تب آ ف يق آ‬
‫�ض‬ ‫ا‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫ور و‬ ‫�د‬ ‫ص‬ ‫�‬ ‫ل��‬ ‫ا‬ ‫�ك‬ ‫ل‬‫�‬‫م‬‫�‬ ‫ال� � ب ر و ل‬
‫�‬
‫ن‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ّ‬
‫ا لم ا �ل�� ص�د ا ل��م� �ظ‬
‫ح� ب� ال��ع��� د ����س��ور ال���ا � � �ص� ا �ل�ز �م�ا � �م�ل�ك‬ ‫ع��� وا �ل���ص�ا �‬ ‫و لى � ر‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫م‬ ‫م‬
‫ح ق� وا �ل�د�ي�ن و�م�ؤ �ي�د ع�ل�م�اء‬ ‫ح� ب� د �يوا ن� ا لمم�ا �ل�ك ب���ه�اء ا �ل‬
‫�‬ ‫ل���ر ق� وا � �غل�ر ب� �ص�ا �‬ ‫�ز اء ا � ش‬
‫ور‬
‫ف‬ ‫�ظ‬ ‫ّٰ‬ ‫ّ أ‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ي�ن‬
‫� �ا �ع��� ج��لا ��ل�ه���م�ا‬ ‫ال�إ ��س�لا وا لم��س�ل�م�� ���ط� ب� ا لم�لوك محمد � د ا ا �ل��ل�ه �لا ��ل�ه���م�ا و �ض‬
‫ّة خ ت ّ‬
‫�‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ت أم ّ‬ ‫ق‬ ‫�‬‫ف‬ ‫ّ‬‫ن‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ث‬
‫�ذ م‬
‫�را �م�ا � ا �ل��سر�م�د ي��� وا �����ص‬ ‫ا �ل� ��ي �م ح�د ا ��� ����س���ه �ا � ب�ا �ل��س�ع�ا د ا � ال�ب��د ي��� وا �ل ك�‬
‫ع‬
‫ف‬ ‫ة �ت� ت‬ ‫�ا �ل��ف�����ض �ا ئ� ا �ل����م���ل��ة ا �لخ‬
‫كا ب� �ي� ا لم ن����ط ق� ج��ا �م �ل��ق��وا ع�د ه‬ ‫حر�ير ��‬ ‫ي ب‬ ‫�‬ ‫�د‬ ‫��‬ ‫م‬‫��‬ ‫�‬‫ل‬
‫�‬
‫ح‬‫�‬ ‫ا‬ ‫ل‬ ‫�‬ ‫����ص�ا ئ‬
‫ب � ل ج ي و‬
‫ع‬

‫‪2‬‬ ‫‪2‬‬
Praise be to God, who created the system of existence, drew forth the quid- 0
dities of things in accordance with His generosity, established through His
power the species of intellectual substances, and bestows through His mercy
the movements of the celestial bodies. Let us offer prayers for those holy
souls free of human stains, especially for Muḥammad, the bringer of signs
and miracles, and for his family and companions who follow his arguments
and proofs.
The intelligent and the virtuous agree that the sciences—especially the
exact sciences—are the highest goal and brightest virtue, and that those pro-
ficient in them are the noblest humans, with souls most apt to contact the
angelic intelligences. Knowing the subtleties of these sciences and compre-
hending the essence of the realities they deal with is only possible through
the science designated as logic, for by way of it one knows what is correct
from what is wrong, what is worthless from what is valuable; knowing this,
someone assigned me to compose a book on logic, gathering its rules and
containing its principles and guidelines. He who assigned me this task is one
who flourishes by the grace of truth, distinguished from all others by its sup-
port. Both those close and those distant are drawn to his side, and both the
compliant and the wayward thrive through following him, for he is the exalted
Lord Master, preeminent, pleasing, beneficent, noble, patrician, possessed of
virtue and glorious traits, Sun of the Community, Shams al-Dīn, splendor of
Islam and Muslims, model for the great and the exemplary, king of the power-
ful and the virtuous, pillar of the high, orb of the excellent. He is the son of the
exalted and most great Lord Master who governs distant lands, the Asaph of
his age,1 king of ministers from the east and the west, convenor of the impe-
rial court, Splendor of Truth, Bahāʾ al-Dīn, support of the scholars of Islam
and of Muslims, pillar of kings. May God lengthen the reach of the power and
redouble the glory of both. Though young in years, Shams al-Dīn is crowned
with eternal happiness and honor, and characterized by beautiful virtues and

3 3
 ‫ل������م����سّ����ة ف� ا �ل��ق�� ا ع�د ا �ل� م ن��ط��ق��ّ����ة‬
‫ا �ل ��س�ا �ل��ة ا � ش‬
‫�� �� ي‬ ‫ي ي� و‬ ‫ر‬

‫ت‬ ‫ف‬ ‫� ا ���ط�ه ف����ا د ت‬ ‫أ‬

‫كا ب�ت��ه‬ ‫� �إلى �م��ق��ت���ض���ى �إ �ش���ا رت��ه و�ش��ر�ع� ت� �ي� ث��ب� ت��ه و��‬ ‫ب ر‬ ‫ح�ا و ل� و و و ب‬
‫�ض‬ ‫�ه‬
‫ل‬‫�‬ ‫ص‬‫�‬
‫�م����ست���ل�ز �ًم�ا �أ ن ل �أ خ��ّ � ش�� ء ��عت���د �ه �م��ن ا �ل��ق�� ا ع�د ا � �ض ا ���ط �م �ز ا د ا ت �ش�� ���ف����ة‬
‫ّ‬
‫� ا ل ب ��ي ي ب� أ و و ل��� و ب ع ي� � ري‬
‫� قّ � � �ذ‬ ‫�خ ا ئ ق‬
‫�ن �ل‬ ‫�غ ت‬ ‫ن� ك ت � ف ة �ن � ن‬
‫��َ� أْل��طي����ٱ��ْ �م� ُ ع���د ��ي ي��ر َ �ا ب�ع لَ�ح�د �م� خَ اْ �ل �� ب�ل �ل��ل��ح� ا ل���صريح ا �ل� ��ي‬ ‫و‬
‫ل������م����سّ����ة‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫�‬ ‫ْ‬ ‫َ‬ ‫ْ‬ ‫يَ‬ ‫ْ‬ ‫بَ‬ ‫ٰ‬
‫{ لا �� ت���ه � �ل��َ�ب�ط� �م��نۢ ����ن ��د ��ي�ه لا �م��ن ���ل���ف�ه} ��سم� ت���ه �ا �ل ��س�ا �ل�� ا � ش‬ ‫يَ‬
‫ي‬ ‫ِ ِ و �ي ب ر‬ ‫ِي ِ � ِ ل ِ ي ِ � ِ و ِ‬
‫ّ‬
‫ف�� ا �ل��ق��وا ع�د ا لم ن����ط��ق��يّ����ة ورتّ��ب� ت��ه ع��ل �م��ق���د �م��ة و �لا � �م�����ا لا� و��ا �م�� �م�ع�����صما ب�‬
‫�‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ت‬ ‫خ‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ث‬ ‫ث‬
‫ح ب���ل‬ ‫تىّ‬ ‫ي‬
‫كلاً ع�� � د ه ا لم��ف������� �ل��ل�� خ��� ا �ل�ع�د ل نّ��ه ���خ‬ ‫�‬ ‫ق‬ ‫�‬ ‫�ن‬ ‫�‬ ‫ق‬ ‫��لت ف‬
‫�إ ير‬ ‫ير و‬ ‫ي �ض‬ ‫ا و ي� و ب� ل و و � لى ج و‬
‫��‬‫م‬ ‫�‬‫��‬‫�‬
‫�‬‫ع‬‫�‬‫ل‬ ‫ا‬ ‫�‬
‫ه‬ ‫�‬ ‫ا‬ ‫�‬
‫م‬ ‫��‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫فّ‬
‫�مو� ق� و�م�عي�� ن�‪.‬‬

‫‪4‬‬ ‫‪4‬‬
 Al-Risālah al-shamsiyyah

praiseworthy traits. He assigned me this task, and I set out to draft the book
and write it up, bound by a commitment not to omit any rule or guideline of
consequence (along with a few worthy additions and pleasing insights of my
own), a commitment not to follow any other logician, but rather plain truth:
«falsehood cannot come at it from before it or behind it».2 I gave this book
the title The Epistle on Logical Rules for Shams al-Dīn, and I structured it as an
Introduction, three Treatises, and a Conclusion; clinging all the while to the
lifeline given by the Giver of Intellect,3 and relying on His generosity, which
bestows goodness and justice. Indeed, He is the best of those who sustain
and grant aid.

5 5
 ‫�أ �ّم�ا ا ل������ ّ�د ��� ��ة‬
‫مق م‬
‫� ن‬ ‫ف‬
‫حث���ا �‬ ‫���ف�����‬
‫ي�ه�ا ب�‬

‫أ‬
‫ح�ا ���ج��ة �إ �ل����ي�ه‬ ‫ال� ّول ف�� �م�ا ����هيّ����ة ا لم ����ن�ط ق� و�����ي�ا ن� ا �ل‬
‫�‬ ‫ب‬ ‫ي‬
‫أ‬
‫ت‬
‫ل��� ء �ي� ا �ل�ع��ق���ل � و‪���� ١‬ص ّور �م�ع�ه ح ك‬
‫�‬
‫ة �ش ف‬
‫ح���صول �صور� ا‬ ‫ا �ل���ع��ل �إ �ّم�ا �ت���ص ّور ف����ق��ط و�هو �‬
‫م‬ ‫�ي‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ً أ‬ ‫آ‬ ‫أ‬ ‫م‬
‫‪١‬‬
‫ت‬
‫��ا ب�ا � و ��س��لب��ا و�ي��ق���ا ل ل�ل�م�� ج ���مو ����ص�د �ي�‪.‬‬
‫ق‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫و�هو ����سن���ا د � �مر �إلى � خ�ر ي ج�‬
‫�إ‬ ‫�إ‬
‫ن ظ ًّ ّ‬ ‫ًّ ّ � ن شعئً‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ّ �ن ّ‬
‫ي�هي���ا و�إلا لم�ا ج���ه��ل��ا �����ي��ا ولا ����ر�يا و�إلا �ل�د ا ر‬ ‫كل �م����ه���م�ا ب��د ��‬ ‫��ل �م� �‬ ‫و�ل��ي��س ا �ل ك�‬
‫أ ت‬
‫‪٢‬‬

‫� و ���س��ل��س�ل‪.‬‬
‫ح���ص�ل ب�ا �ل��ف�� ك�‬ ‫ي�ه ّ وا ��لب��ع����ض ‪ ٢‬ن� ظ���ر� ّ ي�‬
‫�‬ ‫ك ّ �م ن‬ ‫� ا ��ل��ع�� �ن‬
‫�ر و�هو‬ ‫�ي‬ ‫�‬ ‫ي‬
‫��‬ ‫�د‬ ‫�‬ ‫ب‬ ‫ا‬
‫�‬ ‫م‬ ‫��‬‫�‬‫ه‬‫���‬
‫�‬
‫ّ‬ ‫أ‬ ‫� �م� �ل‬ ‫ب ل أ ب �ض‬
‫ت‬
‫‪٣‬‬
‫ت‬ ‫�ذ‬ ‫ة‬
‫ت�رت���ي� ب� � �مور �م�ع�لو�م�� �ل��ل�� د � ب���ه�ا �إلى ا لم�� ج�‬
‫ت‬
‫���هول و �ل�ك ا �ل��ر���ي� ب� �ل��ي��س ب����صوا ب�‬ ‫�ي‬
‫ن‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ً ف قت ض أ‬ ‫ئً ق‬
‫��ا ر ب�ل ال�إ ���س�ا � ا �لوا ح�د‬ ‫ه‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫� �ا � �م����������ى � ك�‬
‫ي‬
‫�‬ ‫� ا �ل�ع��ق���لاء ب��ع���ض‬ ‫ع��‬
‫�ض‬ ‫� ��ة ب��‬ ‫د ا �م�ا لم ن���ا ����ض‬
‫م‬
‫ق ن ن ف � فة ق‬
‫ط‬ ‫��‬‫�‬ ‫ع‬‫�‬ ‫م‬ ‫�د‬‫ح�ا ج��� �إلى ��ا �و� ي ي‬
‫��‬‫��‬ ‫�‬
‫�‬‫�‬ ‫� ة‬ ‫�ت���� فل����ي�ن ف��م��ّ��س� ت� ا �ل‬ ‫�ن��ا ق���� ن���ف����س�ه ف� ق���ت��ي�ن مخ‬
‫ر ر�‬ ‫ي� و‬ ‫ي �ض‬
‫ف‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ض‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ظ‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ت‬
‫�ر‬‫ح��ي�� وا �ل�����ا ��س�د �م��ن ا �ل���� ك�‬ ‫�����س�ا ب� ا ��ل����ر �ا � �م��ن ا �ل����ر وري�ا � وال�إح�ا ط�� ب�ا �ل���ص���‬
‫ي‬ ‫اك‬
‫خ أ‬ ‫ح‬ ‫ُ‬ ‫آ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫أ‬
‫���ط�‬ ‫ي�ه�ا و�هو ا لم ن����ط ق ور��سموه ب�� ن��ه � �ل��ة �ق�ا ن�ون�يّ���ة �ت�ع���ص �مرا ع�ا ت���ه�ا ا �ل��ذ �ه��ن �ع��ن ا �ل‬ ‫ق ف‬
‫ا �لوا �� ����‬
‫م‬ ‫�‬ ‫ف ع‬
‫�ر‪.‬‬ ‫�ي� ا �ل��ف�� ك�‬
‫أ ت‬ ‫ن ظ ًّ ّ‬ ‫ت ّ‬ ‫���� ك�ّ�ه �د ��هّ��ً�ا ّلا لا����ستُ���غ� ن�يَ‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫س‬ ‫�ل��‬‫�‬
‫س‬ ‫��‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫ا‬ ‫�د‬ ‫ل‬‫�‬ ‫ا‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ا‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬‫��‬ ‫�‬ ‫ا‬‫ل‬ ‫�ه‬‫م‬‫ل‬ ‫�‬‫ع‬‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�ن‬‫�‬
‫ع‬ ‫�‬
‫ل بل‬ ‫رو‬ ‫و ري و�إ‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫ِ‬ ‫ول�ي س ل ب� ي� ي و�إ‬
‫ّ‬
‫‪٤‬‬
‫ن‬ ‫ّ‬
‫� �ه � ظ���ر��ي ي�����ست�� ف���ا د �م ن���ه‪.‬‬ ‫ي�ه� و�ب�ع���ض‬ ‫�� �ض �ه �د ��‬
‫ب ع��� ب� ي‬

‫آ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ف‬

‫� ال� خ�ر‪.‬‬
‫‪ :�� ١‬و�إ�م�ا‪ :�� ٢ .‬وا � ب�ل��ع���ض‬

‫‪6‬‬ ‫‪6‬‬
 The Introduction

Containing two discussions

The First Discussion: On the Quiddity of Logic, and Proof of the Need for It

Knowledge is either merely conception, which is the occurrence of the form of 1

something in the intellect, or conception together with a judgment, which is
the subordination of one thing to another affirmatively or negatively; such an
aggregate of conception and judgment is called assertion.
It is not the case that the whole of each of the two divisions of knowledge 2
is entirely primitive (otherwise there would be nothing we do not know) or
entirely inferred (otherwise knowledge claims would form a vicious circle
or regress).
Rather, part of each division of knowledge is primitive, and part inferred, 3
obtained by thinking, which is the ordering of known things such that they
lead to knowledge of the unknown. But this ordering is not always correct,
given that some thinkers contradict others according to what they think and,
indeed, the same person may contradict himself at different times. Thus, there
is need for a canon that provides knowledge of the ways of acquiring inferred
knowledge from necessary propositions, and that also provides the compre-
hension of sound and unsound thinking which arises in the course of such
acquisition—this is logic. It is delineated as a canonical instrument, which,
if implemented, preserves our mind from error in thinking.
Logic is neither entirely primitive (otherwise we could dispense with learn- 4
ing it), nor is it entirely inferred (otherwise its claims would form a vicious
circle or regress); but part of it is primitive, and part inferred from what
is primitive.

7 7
 ‫�ث ث ن‬ ‫ّ‬
‫ح�� ا �ل��ا �ي�‬‫ا لم��ق���د �م��ة ‪ -‬ا �ل ب����‬

‫ن ق‬ ‫ن ف‬
‫� وع ا لم����ط�‬ ‫ح� ث� ا ��لث��ا �ي� �ي� �مو �ض‬ ‫ا �ل ب�����‬
‫أ‬ ‫ّ‬
‫ح��ق���ه لم�ا �هو �هو � �ي�‬ ‫� �ه ا �ل��ذ ا ت�يّ���ة ا ��لت� ت��ل���‬ ‫� �� ف‬
‫ح� ث� �ي���ه �ع��ن �عوا ر �ض‬ ‫ي‬
‫�ب‬ ‫كل ع��ل م�ا‬ ‫� وع �‬ ‫�مو �ض‬
‫ّ‬ ‫�ي‬ ‫أ‬ ‫م‬ ‫أ‬
‫‪٥‬‬
‫��ذ ات�ه � لم�ا ���س�ا �ه � �ل�ج�ز ئ�ه �م �ض ا ل ن��ط ق ا ل�م�ع�ل �م�ا ت ا ��لت� ص ّ ��ة ا ��لت� ص�د ���ق��ّ����ة‬
‫ل� أ � و ي و�ي و � و و� وع م ��� � و � ��� ور�ي و ��� ي ي‬
‫أ ت‬ ‫ت‬ ‫أ ّن‬ ‫ل نّ ا ل ن �ق ّ‬
‫ح��ي� ث� � ���ه�ا ت�و�� �ص�ل �إلى ����ص ّور � و ����� �ص�د �ي�ق ‪١‬‬ ‫ح� ث� �ع ن����ه�ا �م��ن �‬ ‫� ي��ب�‬ ‫�� م�������ط�‬
‫ي‬
‫� ن��ه�ا ك�ّ�لّ���ة �ج�ز ئ�ّ���ة �ذ ا ت�ّ���ة‬ ‫ح��ي� ث� ي�ت�و���� ع��لي���ه�ا ا لمو�ص�ل �إلى ا ��لت����ص ّور ك‬
‫ف‬ ‫ّ‬
‫ق‬ ‫و�م��ن �‬
‫� كو � ي و ي و ي‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ّق ف‬ ‫ً‬
‫��س�ا و ف����ص�لا ‪ ٢‬و�م��ن �‬ ‫� ّ ة �ن ً‬
‫ح��ي� ث� ي�ت�و���� ع��لي���ه�ا ا لمو�ص�ل �إلى ا ��لت����ص�د �يق� �إ �م�ا‬ ‫�� ي���� و ج��‬ ‫وعر �ض‬
‫ًا � ن‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ّ‬
‫ق‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ق‬ ‫� ن��ه�ا ق����ض� ّ����ة �ع�ك�� ق����ض ّ ة ن ق‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ت ّق فً ق‬
‫�و���ه�ا‬ ‫�� يّ����ة و�إ�م�ا ت�و���ف���ا ب��عي���د ك ك‬
‫� ����ض‬ ‫�� ي���� و�����ي�����ض‬ ‫س‬ ‫و‬ ‫ي‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫و‬‫ك‬ ‫�‬
‫ك‬ ‫ا‬‫�‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫ر‬‫�و������ا �‬
‫يب‬
‫ح���م ل ت‬ ‫� وم‬ ‫� ع�ا ت‬
‫ا�‪.‬‬ ‫� و‬ ‫�مو �ض و‬
‫ت ّ �ق ش ً‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ة ن ّ‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ت‬ ‫�ق‬
‫و �د ج�ر� ا �ل�ع�ا د � ب�� � ي���س���مى ا لمأو�ص�ل �إلى ا ��ل����صور ولا ����ا رح�ا وا لمو�ص�ل‬
‫��� ت���ق���د� ال� ّ ل ع��ل ا ��لث��ا �ن �ض ً � ت ق ّ � ت ّ‬ ‫�حّ ة �‬
‫‪٦‬‬
‫ق‬ ‫ت‬
‫� �ع�ا �ل����د م ا �ل����صور ع�أ�لى‬ ‫يم و ى ي� و‬ ‫�أ�� ويج ب‬ ‫�إلى ا ��ل����ص�د �ي� ج‬
‫�ذ ت‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ً نّ ّ‬
‫�وم ع��لي��ه ‪ ٣‬ب� ا ��ه � و‬ ‫حك‬ ‫كل �ت���ص�د �يق� لا ب��د �ل�ه �م��ن �ت���ص ّور ا لم���‬ ‫ا ��لت����ص�د �يق� ط ب���ع�ا ل�� �‬
‫أ‬ ‫أ‬
‫���ه�ل � ح�د‬ ‫� مم�ّ�ن ج�‬ ‫حك‬ ‫� لا�مت�� ن���ا ا �ل‬
‫�‬ ‫حك‬ ‫���ذ �ل�ك وا �ل‬
‫�‬ ‫ك‬ ‫�و ب��ه‬ ‫حك‬ ‫ب�� �مر �ص�ا د ق� ع��لي��ه وا لم���‬
‫م‬ ‫ع‬ ‫م‬ ‫م‬ ‫أ‬
‫�ه��ذه ال� ش�����ي���ا ء‪٤.‬‬

‫ّ‬ ‫أ‬
‫�و ع� ي�ل��ه‬ ‫� �ا و خ��ا �ص��ة‪� ٣ .‬ف�‪ :‬ا لم���‬
‫حك‬
‫ف‬ ‫�ن‬ ‫ف‬
‫���هول‪ :�� ٢ .‬ج����س�ا و����ص�لا و�عر �ض‬
‫�‬ ‫ي‬
‫ت ّ م‬
‫���ه ل � و �ت���ص�د � ق� جم‬ ‫ف‬
‫‪� :�� ١‬إلى ����صور ج� و‬
‫م‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ّ‬
‫�إ �م�ا‪ :�� ٤ .‬ال��مور‪.‬‬

‫‪8‬‬ ‫‪8‬‬
 Introduction—Second Discussion

The Second Discussion: On the Subject of Logic

The subject of a science is that whose essential accidents are investigated in the 5
science, accidents that attach to the subject due to what it is (that is, due to its
essence), or due to what is coextensive with it, or a part of it. So the subject of
logic is known conceptions and assertions, because the logician investigates
them insofar as they conduce to a conception or an assertion. He also investi-
gates them insofar as what conduces to conception depends on them, like their
being universal, particular, essential, accidental, genus, or differentia; and
insofar as what conduces to assertion depends on them, whether proximately
(like their being a proposition, the converse of a proposition, the contradic-
tory of a proposition) or remotely (like their being subject and predicate).
It is customary to call what conduces to conception an explanatory phrase, 6
and to call what conduces to assertion an argument. The first must be put
before the second in an exposition due to the priority by nature of conception
over assertion. This is because every assertion must involve the conception of
what is subject to judgment (whether in itself, or under a matter that happens
to be true of it); then, likewise, of what is judged to belong to it; and, finally, of
the judgment itself, because it is impossible for anyone who is ignorant of any
of these things to make a judgment.

9 9
 ‫�أ �ّم�ا ا لم��ق���ا ل ت‬
‫ا� ف�ث���لا ث‬
‫�‬ ‫و‬
‫ا لم������ف� د ا ت‬ ‫� ة أ ف‬
‫�‬
‫�‬ ‫ر‬ ‫ا لم�����ق�ا �ل�� ال�ولى ي�‬
‫ف أ ةف‬
‫ي�ه�ا � ر ب��ع�� ����صول‬
‫و����‬

‫ا �ل��ف���� ص� ال�أ ّ ف� ال�أ �ل��ف���ا �ظ‬

‫� ل ول ي�‬
‫� ن‬
‫ح��يوا �‬ ‫��د لا �ل��ة ال �ن��س�ا ن� ع��ل ا �ل‬ ‫ك‬
‫د ل ���ة ا ��� فل���ظ ع�� ا ل�م�ع ن �ت� �ّ�سط ا �ل �ض ��ه � ط�ا ���ق����ة‬
‫ا ل ل �� لى � �ى ب و �� و�ع ل م�� ب‬
‫ى‬ ‫�إ‬
‫أ‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬
‫‪٧‬‬
‫� ن‬ ‫خ ف� ت ّ‬
‫ح��يوا � � و ا ��لن��ا ط ق� وب�ت�و��س��ط�ه‬ ‫��د لا ��لت��ه ع��ل ا �ل‬
‫تى‬ ‫ا ��لن��ا ط ق� وب�ت�و��س��ط�ه لم�ا د ��ل ي���ه ‪���� ١‬ض‬
‫�� ���م��ن ك‬
‫ق‬ ‫ت‬
‫ل�ا ب���ة‪.‬‬ ‫��د لا ��لت��ه ع��لى ��ا ب�ل ��ص ن���ع��ة ا � ك��‬ ‫لم�ا خ�ر ج� �ع ن���ه ا �ل���ز ا ك‬
‫م‬
‫ّ‬
‫�‬‫س‬‫م��‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ا‬ ‫ح�ا �ل��ة ��ل�ز �م��ن �ت���ص ّ‬ ‫�‬
‫�‬ ‫ا‬
‫�‬‫�‬‫� ن ا �لخ‬ ‫ك‬ ‫�ُش���ت�� ط ف� ا ��د ل ���ة ال ���ت�ز ا �مّ����ة‬
‫م‬ ‫��‬ ‫ور‬ ‫ر ج� ب‬ ‫ي و�‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ا‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ا‬ ‫وي ر ي� ل‬
‫ى‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ي م‬ ‫ُ‬ ‫ّ‬
‫‪٨‬‬

‫ح�ا �ل��ة ي��ل�ز �م��ن �‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ت‬

‫�قق‬
‫ح�����‬
‫�ون��ه ب�‬
‫�‬ ‫ي�ه�ا ك‬ ‫����ص ّوره و�إلا لا�مت�� ن�� ����ه���م�ه �م��ن ا �ل�� فل���ظ�� ولا ي� ش���ت��رط ����‬
‫م‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ع‬
‫ح��قّ����ق���ه � ل ���ة �ل��ف���ظ�� ا �ل�ع� ع�� ا ��ل� ص �م ع�د ا لم� ا �ز �م��ة‬ ‫�خ�ا ر ج �‬
‫�‬ ‫ا لم��س���ّم ف�� ا �ل‬
‫��مى لى ب ��� ر ع م ل‬ ‫ك�د ا ل‬ ‫�‬ ‫ى ي‬
‫خ‬ ‫ف‬
‫ب���ي ن���ه���م�ا �ي� ا ��ا ر ج ‪.‬‬
‫ل‬ ‫�‬
‫�‬
‫��‬ ‫ا لم��ط�ا ���ق����ة لا �ت����ست���ل�ز ا ��لت����ض� � ّ��م��ن ك ف� ا �ل���س�ا ئ���ط �أ �ّم�ا ا ����ست���ل�ز ا ��مه�ا الا �لت���ز ا ف���غ‬
‫�‬
‫م ير‬ ‫�‬ ‫و‬ ‫م ي� �ب‬ ‫ا‬ ‫�‬ ‫م‬ ‫و ب‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ّ أ‬
‫‪٩‬‬
‫�غ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ت‬ ‫�ز‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫�ز‬ ‫ن‬
‫�مت��ي��ق����ن ل�� و ج�ود لا ‪� ٢‬ل ك�‬
‫��ل �م�ا �هي���� ي��ل �م��ن ����صور�ه�ا ����صوره ي��ر �م�ع�لو و�م�ا‬
‫�ن م �ذ‬ ‫ن‬ ‫�غ‬ ‫ت‬ ‫نّ ت ّ ّ م ّ ة ت �ز ت ّم أ ّ‬
‫ن‬ ‫ق‬
‫�‬
‫ع‬
‫م‬
‫كل �م�ا �هي���� ي�����س���ل ����صور � ���ه�ا ل��ي����س�� ي��ر�ه�ا م��و و م� �ه� ا‬
‫�‬ ‫�ي���ل �إ � ����صور �‬
‫م‬
‫ت��ّ���ن ع�د ا ����ست���ل�ز ا ا ��لت� �ض� � ّ��م��ن ال ���ت�ز ا �أ �ّم�ا �ه�م�ا ف�� ا � ��د ا ن �د ن ‪ ٣‬ا ل ط�ا ���ق����ة‬
‫ل يو ج � ب� و� م�� ب‬ ‫ال م و‬ ‫م ���‬ ‫م‬ ‫بي‬
‫ت‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ّ‬
‫ن‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ث‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ت‬
‫ح��ي�� � ��ه �ا ب� ب��د و� ا لم����بو ‪.‬‬ ‫�ن‬
‫ح�ا �ل�� و ج�ود ا ��ل��ا ب� �م� �‬ ‫لا����س�����‬
‫ع‬ ‫ع‬ ‫ع‬

‫ف ّ‬ ‫�ذ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫‪� ١‬ف�‪ :‬لم�ا د خ�� ف����ه �ذ �ل�ك ا ل��م� ن‬

‫ع�ى‪ :�� ٢ .‬لا�ز �ه� ‪� :�� ٣ .‬إ لا �م ‪.‬‬ ‫ل ي‬
‫ع‬ ‫م ن�ي‬

‫‪10‬‬ ‫‪10‬‬
 There are three treatises:

The First Treatise: On Simple Terms

Containing four sections

The First Section: On Expressions

The expression’s signification of a meaning by way of its having been imposed 7

on that meaning is correspondence; this is like “man” signifying rational
animal. The expression’s signifying by way of that imposition what is contained
in its meaning by correspondence is containment; this is like “man” signifying
animal or rational. The expression’s signifying by way of that imposition what
is extrinsic to its meaning by correspondence is implication; this is like “man”
signifying receptive of skill in writing.
It is stipulated for implicational signification that the extrinsic implicate 8
be such that its conception follow from the conception of the named; other-
wise, its being understood from the expression would be impossible. It is not,
however, stipulated that the implicate be such that its actual realization follow
from the actual realization of the named. This is like the expression “blind,”
which signifies sight even though there is no implicational relation between
the two in actual existence.
Correspondence does not entail containment, as emerges when consider- 9
ing the case of simple entities. Whether correspondence entails implication
is not known for sure, because it is unknowable whether there is a mental
implicate belonging to every quiddity whose conception follows from the
conception of that quiddity. We have ruled out what has been said, that the
conception of every quiddity entails the conception that it is not other than
itself. From this it would also be clear that containment does not entail impli-
cation. Containment and implication only come about with correspondence,
due to the impossibility of a consequent—insofar as it is a consequent—
without an antecedent.

11 11
 ‫أّ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ق ة أ‬
‫ا لم�����ا �ل�� ال�ولى ‪ -‬ا �ل�������ص�ل ال�ول‬

‫ّ‬ ‫ن ف‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ق ة ن ُق‬ ‫ّ‬

‫ج�ز‬ ‫ج�ز ئ‬
‫وا �ل�د ا ل ب�ا لم��ط�ا ب������� �إ � ����ص�د ب� ��ه ‪ ١‬ا �ل�د لا �ل�� ع��لى � ء �م�ع���ا ه ����هو ا ل�مر�ك ب ر ي�‬
‫م‬ ‫ا‬ ‫�‬‫ك‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫�‬
‫� ة ّ ف‬
‫‪١٠‬‬

‫ح�� ج��ا ر� و�إلا ����هو ا لم��ف��رد‪.‬‬ ‫ا �ل‬

‫ف ن ّ‬ ‫�ذ‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ة ف‬ ‫أ‬ ‫أ‬
‫����ي� ولا و�إ� �ص��ل��ح �ل� �ل�ك ���إ � د ل‬
‫ف‬
‫�خ��بر ب��ه ����هو ال�د ا � ك‬ ‫و�هو ن� ل �ي���ص��ل�� ل� ن� ي�‬
‫ّ‬ ‫أ‬ ‫�إ م ح‬
‫‪١١‬‬

‫�س‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬‫ف‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ف‬

‫�‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ث‬ ‫ث‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ن‬ ‫�ز‬ ‫�ن‬ ‫�ن‬‫ّ‬
‫ب���هي����ئت��ه ع��ل �ز �م�ا ن� �م�عي�� �م� ال� �م���� ا ��ل��لا ��� ���هو ا �ل ك�‬
‫��ل�م�� و�إ� ل ي��د ل ���هو الا ‪.‬‬
‫ت ّم‬
‫خ‬
‫م‬
‫�ث ًا ف ن ن ال أ ّ ف ن‬ ‫ً أ‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ى ّ أ‬ ‫� �ن �ذ‬
‫ش‬
‫كا � �ول ���إ � ����������ص‬ ‫�و� �م�ع���ا ه وا ح�د ا � و �ك�ي��ر ���إ � �‬ ‫ن‬ ‫حي��� ئ�� �إ �م�ا � � ي� ك‬ ‫و‬
‫�ذ � ل ن ��س ّ َ َلً ّل ف� ت ئً ن ت ت أ ف ه ��ذ �ن ّ ة �لخ ّ ة ف‬
‫‪١،١٢‬‬

‫ل�ك ا ��م�ع�ى م� ع��م�ا و�إ ا �م��وا ط���ا �إ � ا ����س��و� � �را د ا ل� �ه� ي���� وا ��ا ر ج�ي���� �ي���ه‬
‫ي‬
‫أ‬ ‫أ‬
‫ح���ص �ل�ه ف�� ا ��ل��ع��� � و لى و� �ق�د �م��ن‬ ‫�‬ ‫� ش ّ ً� ن ن‬ ‫ش‬ ‫ن ن‬
‫و ي ب �ض‬ ‫كا �‬ ‫��ا �إ � �‬ ‫�ك‬ ‫كا ل�إ ���س�ا � وا �ل������م��س و م��� ك‬ ‫�‬
‫م‬ ‫آ‬
‫ة‬ ‫�ن‬
‫���ن ‪.‬‬ ‫كا �لو ج�ود ب�ا �ل�����سب���� �إلى ا �لوا ج�� ب� وا لمم ك‬ ‫ال� خ�ر �‬
‫م���ت��رك‬ ‫� �ع�ه ��لت��ل�ك ا ل��م�ع�ا �ن ع��ل ا �ل��س ّ���ة ف���ه ا ل ش‬ ‫كا � و �ض‬
‫ن ن ا ��لث �ن ف ن ن‬
‫كا � ��ا ي� ���إ � �‬ ‫و�إ� �‬
‫ي� ى وي � و‬ ‫أ‬
‫� �ن ئ�ذ‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ُ‬
‫‪٢،١٢‬‬

‫� ل�ح�د �ه�م�ا ث�ّ ن�������ق�ل �إلى ا ��لث��ا �ي� وحي�����‬ ‫ُ �ض‬ ‫���ن ��ذ �‬ ‫ل �ك‬
‫� ي�ن ن‬
‫� ل�ع��‬
‫كا ُ و�إ� م ي أ ك� ل�ك ب�ل و عً ً م‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ّ � ن ق ل � ف� ّ ن ن‬
‫كا � ا ��لن��ا �� �ه ا �ل�ع � ا �ل�ع�ا‬ ‫� وع�ه ال� ّول ي���س���مى م����وا عر ي���ا �إ � �‬ ‫�إ ن� ت�رك �مو �ض‬
‫ل و ر� ً م‬
‫ا�ّ ن‬ ‫ة‬ ‫كا ن� �ه ا � ش‬ ‫ّ ة ش ًّ ن‬
‫حي���ا �إ �‬ ‫كا �ل���ص�لا � وا �ل���صوم وا �ص��ط�ل‬ ‫ل����ا رع ‪� ٢‬‬ ‫كا �ل�د ا ب��� و���ر�عي���ا �إ � � و‬ ‫�‬
‫ت ن ة ن �ظّ‬ ‫ف �خ ّ‬
‫ح�ا � وا ��ل����ا ر‪.‬‬ ‫كا �ص��ط�لاح�ا � ا �ل�����‬ ‫كا �ن ‪� ٣‬هو ا �ل�عر�� ا ل��ا �ص �‬ ‫�‬
‫�ن ة‬ ‫ن ل ت�� �م �ض ع�ه ال ّ ���س� ّ ا ���ن����س����ة ��ل��ه ‪ � ٤‬ق ق ة‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ُ‬
‫ح����ي������ وب�ا �ل�����سب���� �إلى‬ ‫و�إ� م ي� رك و� و �ول ي ��مى ب� ل ب �إ ي‬
‫�زً أ‬
‫‪٣،١٢‬‬

‫ل����� ج��ا ‪.‬‬ ‫ح�� ا ن� ا لم��ف��ت�� �� ا �ل �� ا � ش‬ ‫ل‬

‫�‬‫كا ل���س�د �ا �ل��ن����س����ة �إلى ا �‬ ‫��ا ا �‬ ‫ا لم ن��ق��ول ��لي��ه جم‬
‫ع‬ ‫ر ل‬ ‫ج‬ ‫و‬ ‫س‬ ‫ر‬ ‫يو‬ ‫ب‬ ‫ب‬ ‫�إ‬
‫ك ّ �ل��ف���ظ�� ف���ه �ا �ل��ن����س����ة �ل��ف���ظ�� �آ خ� �م ا د �ف� �ل�ه ن ت� ا ف���ق���ا ف� ا ل��م�ع ن� �م���ا�ي�ن‬
‫‪١٣‬‬ ‫�إ � و ي� ى و ب‬ ‫ر ر‬ ‫ب �إلى‬ ‫�و ب‬ ‫و �ل‬
‫� ن خت ف ف‬
‫ل�ه �إ � ا �����ل���ا �ي���ه‪.‬‬
‫ت ّ �غ ت ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫�ذ‬ ‫ّ تّ‬ ‫� ف‬ ‫أّ ّ‬
‫�ه‬
‫و� و�إ ير م و و‬ ‫ا‬‫�‬ ‫��‬ ‫ا‬
‫�‬‫م‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫ك‬ ‫ل��س‬ ‫�‬ ‫ا‬ ‫�ه‬
‫�‬ ‫و� �م�ا ا ل�مر�ك ب� � و �إ م و و �ي ي�ح ي‬
‫�ل‬‫�‬ ‫ع‬ ‫�‬
‫�‬ ‫ص‬ ‫��‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬‫ل‬‫�‬ ‫ا‬ ‫�ه‬ ‫ا‬‫�‬ ‫ا‬
‫�‬‫م‬‫�‬ ‫ه‬ ‫��‬‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫�ذ‬
‫‪١،١٤‬‬

‫ا �ل� ��ي �ي��ق���ا ب��ل�ه‪٥.‬‬

‫ف ن ّ‬
‫حت�م�ل ‪��� ٦‬إ � د ل ع��ىل‬ ‫���بر و ن� ل ي�‬
‫�‬ ‫���ذ � ف���ه ا �لخ‬
‫و‬ ‫�‬ ‫ب‬
‫ق‬
‫حت�م�ل ا �ل���ص�د � وا �ل �ك‬ ‫وا ��لت��ا ّ �إ ن� ا �‬
‫‪٢،١٤‬‬
‫أم ق‬ ‫�إ‬ ‫أ أ‬ ‫م‬
‫ف‬
‫�����و��لن��ا ا ض��ر ب� و�م‬ ‫� �عيّ����ة ����هو �م الا����ست���ع�لاء � �مر ك‬ ‫ط�ل� ب� ا �ل��ف���ع�ل د لا �ل��ة � ّو��ليّ���ة � ��ي و �ض‬
‫ع‬ ‫ع‬

‫ف‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ن ن ق‬ ‫ف‬ ‫كا ن� ا � ن�ل��ا �ق� �ه ا � ش‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ف‬

‫كا � ا � ن�ل��ا ��ل‪� :�� ٤ .‬إلى ا لم ن��ق��ول �ع ن���ه‪:�� ٥ .‬‬
‫ل���رع‪� :�� ٣ .‬إ � �‬ ‫ل و‬ ‫‪ :�� ١‬ب�ج�ز ء �م ن���ه‪� :�� ٢ .‬إ � �‬
‫ن‬ ‫�ت ف‬ ‫�خ�لا ف��ه‪� ٦ .‬ف� ‪:‬و ن� ل ي�‬
‫ح�م�ل ����هو ال�إ � ش����ا ء‪.‬‬ ‫و�هو ب�‬
‫�إ م‬

‫‪12‬‬ ‫‪12‬‬
 First Treatise—First Section

If one intends to signify by part of what signifies through correspondence a 10

part of its meaning, then it is a compound expression (like “stone-thrower”);
otherwise, it is a simple expression.
If the expression is not fit to be a predicate, it is a particle, like “in” and 11
“not.” If it is fit to be a predicate, then if by its form it signifies one of the three
tenses specifically, it is a verb. If it does not so signify, it is a name.
Thereupon, its meaning is either one or many. If it is the first, then if that 12.1
meaning is for an individual, it is a proper name. Otherwise, if its members—
both mental and actual—are equal under it, as with “man” and “sun,” it is
univocal. But if its occurrence in one is more eminent than, and prior to, the
other—like existence in relation to the necessary and the contingent—then it
is systematically ambiguous.
If it is the second, with many meanings, then if it is imposed equally on each 12.2
of those meanings, it is equivocal, like ʿayn.4 If that is not the case, but rather it
has been imposed in the first place on one of the two meanings, and then trans-
ferred to the second such that its first imposition has been abandoned, then it
is called a conventionally transferred expression if it is transferred by general
convention, as in the case of the word dābbah, “animal,” which has come to
mean “mount”; it is called a legislatively transferred expression if it is trans-
ferred by revealed legislation, as in the case of the word ṣalāt, “prayer,” which
has come to mean “ritual prayer,” and the word ṣawm, “fasting,” which has
come to mean “ritual fasting”; and it is called a technically transferred expres-
sion if it is transferred by special convention, as in the case of the technical
usage of the grammarians and theorists.
If the primary imposition has not been abandoned, the expression is said 12.3
to be literal in relation to what it was initially imposed upon, and figurative
in relation to what it has been transferred to, like “lion” in relation to the wild
animal and the courageous man.
Every expression, when taken in relation to another expression, is synony- 13
mous with it if the two agree in meaning, and distinct from it if they differ.
A compound expression is either complete (after which silence is appropri- 14.1
ate) or incomplete (which is the opposite).
If a complete expression bears the valuations true and false, it is informa- 14.2
tion. But if it does not, then, if as its primary (that is, its imposed) signification
it signifies seeking that an action be undertaken, it is a command (like “Beat!”)

13 13
 ‫ث ن‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ق ة أ‬
‫ا لم�����ا �ل�� ال�ولى ‪ -‬ا �ل�������ص�ل ا �ل��ا �ي�‬

‫ن‬ ‫ّ ف ت �ن‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ت‬ ‫�ؤ‬ ‫ا �لخ‬

‫� وع ��س ا ل ود ع�اء و�مع ا �ل����س�ا و��ي ا ��ل�ما ��س و�إ� لم ي��د ل ����هو ا ��ل����بي���ه وي���د ر�ج‬ ‫����ض‬
‫ف �لت نّ ت ّ‬
‫م� وا �ل��ر ج��ي� وا �ل��ق����س وا ��لن��د ا ء‪.‬‬ ‫�ي���ه ا �‬
‫ّ‬ ‫م‬ ‫�ي‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ّ �غ‬ ‫� ن‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ّ ف‬ ‫أ ّ �غ‬
‫� ب�‬ ‫ح��يوا � ا ��لن��ا ط ق� و�إ�م�ا ي��ر ت���ق����يي���د ��ي �‬
‫كا ل�مر�ك�‬ ‫و� �م�ا ي��ر ا ��لت��ا ����هو �إ �م�ا ت���ق����يي���د ��ي �‬
‫كا �ل‬
‫م‬
‫� �ن ا ��س �أ ا �ة �أ ل ة �أ ا �ة‬
‫‪٣،١٤‬‬

‫و د وك��م�� و د ‪.‬‬ ‫م�‬

‫م‬

‫ا ل �ن ا ل � �ة‬ ‫� ن ف‬ ‫ف‬
‫��م���ع�ا ي� م�����ف�رد‬ ‫ا �ل�������� �ص�ل ا �ل���ث�ا �ي� �ي�‬
‫ف‬
‫���ة �ي���ه‬ ‫ل���رك‬ ‫ح��ق������ق ّ ن� �م ن�� ن���ف���� �ت���ص ّ �م�ع ن���ا ه �م��ن ق� ا � ش‬ ‫�‬ ‫ف� �ج�ز ئ ّ‬
‫�‬ ‫ه‬
‫��‬ ‫ه‬‫���‬‫ك ّ �م��ف‬
‫ع‬‫و‬ ‫و‬ ‫ر‬ ‫و‬ ‫س‬ ‫�إ‬ ‫�‬
‫يّ‬
‫ي‬ ‫�‬ ‫ي‬ ‫و‬ ‫�‬ ‫و‬ ‫�‬ ‫� ّل‬
‫ع ّ ج�ز ئ ًّ ّ ًّ‬ ‫م‬
‫‪١٥‬‬
‫�ظ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ّ‬
‫� ‪.‬‬ ‫وك�لي� �إ � لم ي�م��ع وا �ل��ل���� ا �ل�د ا ل ع��لي���ه���م�ا ي���س���مى � �ي��ا وك��لي��ا ب�ا �ل�عر �ض‬
‫خ ً ف أ‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫ا‬ ‫ا‬
‫ج�ز ئ ّ ت أ‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫ل‬
‫�‬‫�‬ ‫ا‬ ‫�ن‬ ‫�‬ ‫حت‬‫�‬
‫�‬
‫ت‬
‫�‬ ‫� ن ت��ا �م�ا �هّ����ة‬ ‫ا � �ّ ّ �ّ � ن‬
‫أ‬
‫ي� و‬ ‫ا‬
‫�‬‫ه‬ ‫���‬ ‫ل‬ ‫�‬
‫�‬ ‫د‬ ‫و‬ ‫�‬ ‫ا‬
‫�‬‫�‬‫ي‬ ‫�‬
‫م‬ ‫�ه‬
‫��‬ ‫ا‬
‫�‬‫م‬ ‫��لي� �إ م�ا ي و م ي‬‫م‬ ‫�‬ ‫ك‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫ول ك‬
‫ً‬
‫‪١،١٦‬‬

‫خ��ا ر ج��ا �ع ن����ه�ا‪.‬‬

‫ق ف‬
‫��ا �ص و�هو ا لم����ول �ي� ج�وا ب�‬ ‫كا ن �مت���ع ّ�د د ال�أ ش���خ‬ ‫� ق �ق ّ‬ ‫وال� ّول �هو ا ��لن�و ا �ل‬
‫أ‬
‫ح����ي���ي� ��سواء � �‬ ‫ع‬
‫أ‬ ‫أ‬
‫كا ل �ن��س�ا ن� � و �غ��ر �مت���ع ّ�د د ال� ش��‬ ‫ّة ً‬
‫‪٢،١٦‬‬

‫�‬ ‫��اخ‬
‫�‬ ‫خ‬
‫ل‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫ة‬ ‫�‬ ‫ش‬ ‫�م�ا �هو ب�‬
‫�‬
‫ص‬ ‫ي‬ ‫ح����س� ب� ا �ل���رك�� وا ���صو��صي���� �م�ع�ا � �إ‬
‫ف �إ�ذ ن‬
‫ل������م��س ����هو �‬ ‫كا � ش‬ ‫� ص �صّ����ة ا ل �� �ض ة‬
‫� �� �‬ ‫ح����س� ب� ا �لخ��� و� ي م�ح��‬ ‫و�هو ا لم��ق��ول ف�� ج�وا � �م�ا �هو ب�‬
‫�‬
‫� ق ئ ق �ف‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ث‬ ‫ب أ‬ ‫ي‬
‫ك�ّ ّ‬
‫�‬
‫��ي��ر � �م���������� ب�ا لح�����ا �� ي� ج�وا ب� �م�ا �هو‪.‬‬ ‫ي�ن‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ي�ن‬ ‫� �م��ق��ول ع��لى وا ح�د � و ع��لى �ك‬ ‫ل‬
‫ق ف‬ ‫آ‬ ‫ن ن �ث ف ن ن ت‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ي‬
‫خ ف‬ ‫ن ي�ن ن‬ ‫�ج�ز ش ت‬
‫كا � �م�ا م ا ل� ء ا لم�����رك ب���ي���ه�ا وب��� �وع � �ر ����هو ا لم����ول �ي�‬ ‫كا � ا �ل��ا �ي� ���إ � �‬ ‫و�إ� �‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ّ �ن ً‬
‫‪١٧‬‬
‫��س�ا ��سم ه �� ن��ه ا �ل ك� ّ ق‬
‫��ل� ا لم����ول‬ ‫ب‬ ‫و‬ ‫ور‬ ‫� ��ة ‪ ١‬و�ي��س���مى ج��‬ ‫ح���ض‬ ‫���ة ا لم���‬ ‫ل���رك‬ ‫ح����س�� ا � ش‬ ‫�‬
‫ج�وا ب� �م�ا �هو ب� ب‬
‫ي‬
‫ح��ق���ا ئ� ق� �ي� ج�وا ب� �م�ا �هو‪.‬‬
‫ف‬ ‫�ت���� فل����ي�ن ب�ا �ل‬
‫�‬ ‫��ث�� �ي�ن مخ‬
‫ع��لى �ك ير‬
‫� ش � ف‬ ‫ّ ة �ن‬ ‫�ن‬ ‫�ل‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ق‬
‫� م�ا ي�����ا ر �ك�ه�ا �ي���ه �هو‬ ‫كا � ا ج�وا ب� �ع� ا لم�ا �هي���� و�ع� ب��ع���ض‬ ‫و�هو �ري� ب� �إ � �‬
‫ن‬ ‫ّ‬
‫‪١،١٨‬‬
‫ن‬ ‫� ن �ن‬ ‫ف‬
‫ح��يوا � ب�ا �ل�����سب����ة �إلى ال�إ ���س�ا � و�ب�عي���د‬ ‫كا �ل‬‫كل �م�ا ي� ش����ا ر��ك�ه�ا �ي���ه �‬ ‫ا �جل�وا ب� �ع ن����ه�ا و�ع��ن �‬
‫� ا � �ع ن����ه�ا و�ع��ن‬ ‫ف �غ �‬ ‫ش‬ ‫�ن‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ن� � ن �ل‬
‫� �م�ا ي�����ا ر��ك�ه�ا �ي���ه ي��ر ا جلو ب‬ ‫كا � ا آج�وا ب� �ع����ه�ا و�ع� ب��ع���ض‬ ‫�إ‬
‫خ‬
‫� ال��ر‪.‬‬ ‫ا ��لب��ع���ض‬

‫ن ن‬ ‫� ن �ن‬ ‫ف‬
‫ح��يوا � ب�ا �ل�����سب����ة �إلى ال�إ ���س�ا � وا �ل��ف��ر��س‪.‬‬
‫كا �ل‬
‫‪� :�� ١‬‬

‫‪14‬‬ ‫‪14‬‬
 First Treatise—Second Section

when said with haughtiness; with submissiveness, a petition and supplication;

with equality, a request. If it does not signify any of these, it is a notification,
under which are subsumed wishing, hoping, oath swearing, and calling.
An incomplete expression is either restrictive, like “rational animal,” or 14.3
nonrestrictive, like the compound of a name and a particle, or a verb with
a particle.

The Second Section: On Simple Meanings

Every concept is a real particular if the very conception of its meaning pre- 15
cludes sharing in the meaning, and universal if the conception of its meaning
does not preclude such sharing. The expression signifying one or the other
kind of meaning is said to be particular or universal per accidens.
The universal is either the whole quiddity of the particulars under it, or 16.1
intrinsic to the quiddity, or extrinsic from it.
The first division—that is, the whole quiddity—is the real species, whether 16.2
it has numerous individuals under it (and this universal is what is said in
answer to the question “what is it?” in respect of both sharing and specificity,
like man) or does not have numerous individuals under it (and this universal is
what is said in answer to the question “what is it?” in respect of pure specific-
ity, like sun). Thus, the real species is a universal said of one or of many things,
which agree in realities in answer to the question “what is it?”
If it is the second division—that is, something intrinsic to the quiddity—if it 17
is the whole of the part shared between the quiddity and another species, then
this is what is said in answer to the question “what is it?” in respect of pure
sharing, and is called genus. They delineate this universal as a universal said of
many, which differ in realities in answer to the question “what is it?”
The genus is proximate if the answer about the quiddity and about some- 18.1
thing that shares with the quiddity in the putatively proximate genus is the
same as the answer about the quiddity and about whatever else shares with it
in that genus, like animal in relation to man. The genus is remote if the answer
about the quiddity and about something that shares with it in the putatively
remote genus is not the same as the answer about the quiddity and something
else under the genus.

15 15
 ‫ث ن‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ق ة أ‬
‫ا لم�����ا �ل�� ال�ولى ‪ -‬ا �ل�������ص�ل ا �ل��ا �ي�‬

‫�ن ة‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ن ن �ا ن ن ن‬

‫كا �جل���سم ا ��ل��ا مي� ب�ا �ل�����سب���� �إلى‬ ‫كا � ب��عي���د ا �ب�مرت�ب��� وا ح�د � �‬ ‫�و� �ه���ا ك ج و ب�ا � �إ � �‬ ‫و�ي ك‬
‫أ‬ ‫أ‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ن‬
‫‪٢،١٨‬‬
‫� ة �� ة ن ن‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ث اث ة � � ة ن ن‬
‫كا �‬ ‫كا �جل���س و ر ب��ع�� ج وب��� �إ � �‬ ‫كا � ب��عي���د ا �ب�مرت��ب� ت���ي�ن �‬ ‫ال�إ ���س�ا �ن ‪ ١‬و �ل ��� ج وب��� �إ � �‬
‫م‬ ‫�ذ‬
‫� �مرا ت��ب ‪ ٢‬وع��لى �ه� ا ا �ل��ق��ي���ا ��س‪.‬‬ ‫��ع���دًا �ث��لا ت‬
‫بي ب‬
‫ن شت ً‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ن ي�ن ن آ خ ف ّ أ‬ ‫ت‬ ‫���ن �م�ا ا ل ش‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ن‬
‫كا ‪٤‬‬ ‫�و� �م�����ر �‬ ‫م�����رك ب���ي���ه�ا وب��� �و � �ر ��لا ب��د ‪ ٣‬و� � لا ي� ك‬ ‫و�إ� ل ي� ك‬
‫ع‬‫ّ‬ ‫م‬ ‫م‬ ‫أ‬
‫م���ت�� ً ��ي�ن ا ل�ا �هّ����ة ��ي�ن ن‬ ‫ً‬ ‫�ً�ا �م��ن ت�م�ا ا ل ش‬
‫‪١٩‬‬

‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫م‬ ‫�‬ ‫ا‬

‫ك‬
‫�‬ ‫��ا ن� � ش‬ ‫�‬
‫ك‬ ‫�‬
‫ل‬ ‫ا‬ ‫ل‬ ‫�‬‫�‬
‫ل‬ ‫ا‬
‫�‬ ‫ا‬
‫�‬‫س‬ ‫م��‬ ‫�‬ ‫ك‬ ‫م���ت‬
‫��‬ ‫�ض‬
‫ع��‬ ‫�‬‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫ع‬ ‫و‬ ‫ب‬‫و‬ ‫ي‬ ‫ب‬ ‫ر‬ ‫�إ‬‫و‬ ‫ه ‪٦‬‬ ‫ي‬ ‫و‬ ‫ر‬ ‫م‬ ‫ب‬ ‫‪٥‬‬ ‫و‬
‫ف‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ن‬ ‫أ‬ ‫�ذ‬ ‫�ن‬ ‫� ن� ت�م�ا ‪ ٧‬ا ل ش‬ ‫ن‬ ‫أ‬ ‫آ‬
‫م���ت��رك ب�ا �ل�����سب����ة �إلى �ل�ك ا ��لن�و ل�� ا لم��ق���د ر خ��لا ��ه‬ ‫� خ� لا � �ز � � ك‬
‫ع‬ ‫ر و يجو � ي و م‬
‫ن‬ ‫�ك ف‬ ‫�ن‬ ‫ف� ن ف‬ ‫�ن‬
‫كا �‬ ‫�ي�� �‬ ‫�و� ����ص�ل ج����س و‬ ‫� �ه ولا ي��ت��س��ل��س�ل ب�ل ي�� ت���ه� �إلى �م�ا ي���س�ا و�ي�ه ي�� ك‬ ‫ب�ل ب��ع���ض‬
‫ف ن ف ً‬ ‫ف �ن أ‬ ‫ي‬
‫��ا � ����ص�لا‪.‬‬ ‫م����ا ر��ك�ه�ا �� ج����س � و و ج�ود � ك�‬ ‫�مّ���ز ا لم�ا �ه���� �ع��ن � ش‬
‫ة‬ ‫ّ‬
‫ي‬ ‫ي‬ ‫يي‬
‫أ � ّ �ش�� �ه ف� � �ه ه ف‬ ‫� ش �ف‬ ‫أ نّ ّ ّ ُ‬
‫�‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫ور سموّه ب�� ��هك�لي� يح���م�ل أع��لى ا ل����ي ء ي� ج�أوا أب� � �ي �ي ء و ي� ج و ر ���ع��لى‬
‫ت ة ن ّ ن ف ً‬ ‫�ذ ت‬
‫‪٢٠‬‬
‫ت‬ ‫�� ت � ة‬
‫كل �م����ه�ا ����ص�لا‬ ‫كا � �‬ ‫ح��ق��ي��ق���� �م��ن � �مر�ي�ن �م����س�ا و�ي��ي�ن � و � �مور �م����س�ا و�ي�� �‬ ‫�ه� ا �لو �ر�ك��ب �‬
‫ف‬
‫م����ا ر��ك�ه�ا �ي� ا �لو ج�ود‪.‬‬ ‫��له�ا ل�أ نّ��ه �مّ���ز �ه�ا �ع��ن � ش‬
‫يي‬ ‫�‬
‫ن � ّ�زه � ن ف� �ن‬ ‫لم ّ�ز ���لن � �ن � ش � ف� �ل �ن �ق‬ ‫ف‬
‫وا �ل�������ص�ل ا مي�� ل �وع ع� م����ا رك�ه ي� ا ج����س ري� ب� �إ � مي�� ع���ه ي� ج����س‬
‫ن ن‬ ‫�ل ّ‬ ‫ن ن‬
‫‪٢١‬‬
‫ف �ن‬ ‫ن ّ‬ ‫ق‬
‫ح��س�ا ��س �ل�ل�إ ���س�ا �‪.‬‬ ‫كا �‬ ‫كا ��لن��ا ط ق� �ل�ل�إ ���س�ا � و�ب�عي���د �إ � �مي���زه �ع ن���ه �ي� ج����س ب��عي���د �‬ ‫�ري� ب� �‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫أّ‬
‫� �ه ‪ ٨‬ف����هو ا �ل�لا �ز و لا ف����هو ا �ل�عر��‬ ‫�ض‬ ‫و‬ ‫ر‬ ‫ع‬
‫�‬ ‫م‬‫�‬ ‫��ه �ع��ن‬ ‫ك‬ ‫ا‬‫�‬
‫�‬‫و� �م�ا ا ��لث��ا �ل� ث� ف���إ ن� ا �مت�� ن�� ا ن���ف�� ك�‬
‫‪١،٢٢‬‬
‫ض�ي‬ ‫م �إ‬ ‫ع‬
‫ق‬
‫ا لم��ف���ا ر�‪٩.‬‬
‫ن ً‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ن ً‬ ‫ق‬
‫�و� لا�ز �م�ا �ل�ل�م�ا �هيّ����ة ‪١٠‬‬ ‫ح��ب ش��� ّ و��د ي� ك‬ ‫كا �ل��سوا د �ل��ل���‬ ‫�و� لا�ز �م�ا �ل�لو ج�ود �‬ ‫وا �ل�لا �ز ��د ي� ك‬
‫�ي‬ ‫ّ ّم‬
‫كا ف���ً�ا ف�� �ج�ز ا �ل��ذ �ه��ن‬ ‫�ذ‬
‫‪٢،٢٢‬‬

‫�‬ ‫� ن �ت���ص ّ ه �م �ت���ص ّ �م�ل�ز‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�ن‬

‫ي ي�ذ م‬
‫�‬ ‫�ه‬
‫م‬ ‫و�هو �إ �م�ا ب�ي�� و و �ي ي و� ور ع ور و‬ ‫ك‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬‫ل‬ ‫ا‬ ‫�ه‬
‫ا���ق����س�ا �م��ت��س�ا ���ي�ن �ل�ل�أ ��ع��ة �ّم�ا �غ�� �ّ���ن �ه ا �ل� � ���ف��ت����ق �ج�ز‬ ‫كا ل ن‬ ‫ب�ا �ل�ل�ز و ب���ي ن���ه���م�ا �‬
‫م ب وي ت ر ب و�إ ير بيّ و و ئ �ي ي ر م‬ ‫�ذ م‬
‫�����س�ا � �ز ا �ا ا لمث����ل� ت �ل��قل���ا �مت����ي�ن �ق�د ������اق‬ ‫ن‬ ‫�ز‬‫ل‬ ‫�ن‬
‫و ي ل‬
‫أ‬
‫�‬ ‫ا �ل� �ه� ب�ا ل� وم ب��ي���ه���م�ا �إلى و �س��ط ك و�ي و ي‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫أ‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ت‬ ‫�ذ‬ ‫ّ‬
‫ا ��لب�ي���ن ع��لى ا �ل�لا �ز ا �ل� ��ي ي��ل�ز �م��ن ����ص ّور �م�ل�ز و�م�ه ����ص ّوره وال� ّول � �عّ‪.‬‬
‫م‬ ‫م‬ ‫م‬

‫�م���ت�� ��ي�ن ا لم�ا �هّ����ة‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ف ف ّ ّ‬ ‫�‪� ٢ .‬ف ‪� :‬ث��لا ث‬ ‫‪� ١‬ف ‪ :‬ال �ن��س�ا ن ا �ل��ن���ات�ا ت‬
‫ي‬ ‫�و�هر‪�� :�� ٣ .‬لا ب��د �إ �م�ا‪ :�� ٤ .‬ش ر �‬
‫كا ب�‬ ‫� �مرا ت� ب� �‬
‫كا �جل‬ ‫� ب‬ ‫� �إ � و ب‬
‫ت� ف‬ ‫�ل ّ‬ ‫�ف‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ف أ‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ة‬ ‫�ن‬ ‫ن آ‬
‫�‬
‫كا ح��س�ا س‪ ( ٧ .‬م�ا ) ي� ر‪،‬‬ ‫��‬ ‫�‬ ‫�و�‪� :� ٦ .‬م��س�ا وي�ا �ل�ه �‬ ‫�‬ ‫ق‬
‫كا � ن�ل��ا ط� ب�ا �ل�����سب���� �إلى ال�إ ���س�ا �‪ � :� ٥ .‬و ي� ك‬ ‫وب���ي�ن �وع � خ�ر �‬
‫م‬
‫ق‬ ‫ف‬ ‫�� ّ ف ق ف‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ق ة �ن ت‬ ‫ف‬
‫� ا لم��ف���ا ر�‪.‬‬ ‫ت‬
‫ض�ي ا لم�����ا ر�) �ي� ��س‪ ،‬ك؛ �‪ ،‬ر‪ :�� ،‬ا �ل�عر �ض‬ ‫�ن‬
‫��س‪ ،�� ،‬ك؛ ��س�ا ���ط�� �م� �‪� :�� ٨ .‬ع� ا لم�ا �هي����‪( ٩ .‬ا �ل�عر‬
‫أ‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ف‬
‫كا �ل�ز و ج�ي����ة �ل�ل�ر ب��ع��ة‪.‬‬ ‫‪� :�� ١٠‬ل�ل�م�ا �هي���� �‬

‫‪16‬‬ ‫‪16‬‬
 First Treatise—Second Section

There are two answers to “what is it?” if it is remote by one degree (like 18.2
growing body in relation to man), three answers if it is remote by two degrees
(like body), four answers if it is remote by three degrees, and so on like this.
If it is not the whole part that is shared between the quiddity and another 19
species, then inevitably either it is not shared, or it is a part of the whole that
is shared and coextensive with it. Otherwise, it would be shared between the
quiddity and another species. Yet it cannot be the whole that is shared in rela-
tion to that species, because the hypothesis is to the contrary. Rather, it is part
of what is shared. This does not regress ad infinitum, but rather terminates in
what is coextensive with what is shared, so it is the differentia of a genus. No
matter how it distinguishes the quiddity from what shares with it—whether in
a genus or in existence—it is a differentia.
They delineate the differentia as a universal predicated of something in 20
answer to the question “which thing is it?” with respect to its substance. On
this account, were a reality compounded from two or more coextensive mat-
ters, then each one would be a differentia for the reality, because each would
distinguish it from what shares with it in existence.
The differentia distinguishing the species from what shares with it in genus 21
is proximate if it distinguishes the species from what shares with it in a proxi-
mate genus (like “rational” for man), and remote if it distinguishes the species
from what shares with it in a remote genus (like “sensate” for man).
As for the third division (in which the universal is extrinsic from the quid- 22.1
dity of the particulars under it),5 if it is impossible to separate it from its sub-
strate then it is an implicate; otherwise, it is a separable accidental.
The implicate may be an implicate of the existence of something, like black 22.2
for the Ethiopian, and it may be an implicate of the quiddity. It is either evi-
dent, such that its conception along with the conception of its implicant is
sufficient for the mind to declare an implication between the two (like divis-
ibility into two equal parts for four); or it is not evident, such that it needs a
middle for the mind to declare that there is an implication between the two
(like the three angles of triangle summing to two right angles). “Evident” may
also be said of an implicate whose conception follows from the conception of
its implicant; the first definition is the more general.

17 17
 ‫ا لم��ق���ا �ل��ة ال�أ ل ‪ -‬ا �ل��ف�����ص� ا �ثل��ا �ل ث‬
‫��‬ ‫ل‬ ‫وى‬

‫ّ‬ ‫وا �ل�عر�� ّ ‪ّ� ١‬م�ا ��سر� ا �ل�ز وا ل ك‬

‫��� ج��ل و� فص��ر�ة ا �لو ج��ل و �م�ا ب���ط��ي�ؤه‬ ‫ح���م �ة ا �لخ‬
‫ر‬
‫�‬
‫ض�ي �إ‬
‫�إ‬ ‫يع‬
‫‪٣،٢٢‬‬
‫ل������ ا � ش‬ ‫� ش‬
‫ل�����ب���ا ب�‪.‬‬ ‫كا � �ي ب و‬
‫� �ن ا � ا �ز ا ل ف ق ن ا خ�ت ّ أ ف� ا � ق ق ة ا �ة ف‬
‫�‬
‫ّ‬
‫كل وا ح�د م� ل�ل م و م�����ا ر� �إ � �����ص ب�� ر د ح����ي������ و ح�د ّ و‬
‫ه‬‫�‬‫��‬ ‫و�‬
‫��ا ّص��ة �أ ّن��ه�ا ك��لّ���ة‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬
‫‪٢٣‬‬
‫�خ‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ش‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ا �لخ‬
‫كا لم�ا ����ي و�ر��سم ا ل � ب� � ي‬ ‫� ا �ل�ع�ا �‬
‫م‬ ‫� �ا ح�ك و�إلا ����هو ا �ل�عر �ض‬ ‫كا �ل���ض‬
‫��ا �ص�� �‬
‫ّ أ نّ ّّ‬ ‫ًّ‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ة ف‬ ‫ت‬
‫ح��ق��ي��ق����ة وا ح�د � ����ق��ط �ولا �عر �ض‬ ‫ح� ت� �‬‫�م��ق��و�ل��ة ع��ل �م�ا �‬
‫�‬
‫� ا �ل�ع�ا م ب�� ��ه ك�لي�‬ ‫�� ي���ا وا �ل�عر �ض‬
‫ىأ‬
‫��ّ�لّ��ا ت �إ�ذ ن �خ�م��س��ة �ن‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ًّ‬ ‫ق ً‬ ‫�غ‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ف‬
‫�م��ق��ول ع��ل � �را د �‬
‫وع‬ ‫�� ي���ا ��ا �ل ك� ي � �‬ ‫ح����ي������ وا ح�د � و ي��ر�ه�ا �ولا �عر �ض‬ ‫ى‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ة‬ ‫خ ّ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫�ن‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫و ج����س و ���ص�ل و��ا �ص�� وعر �ض ع�ا ‪.‬‬ ‫�‬
‫م‬

‫�ل �ز ئ ّ‬ ‫��ّ ّ‬‫�ث �‬ ‫� ث ف�‬ ‫ف‬

‫وا ���ج� �ي�‬ ‫ا �ل�������� �ص�ل ا �ل���ث�ا �ل�� ي� ����مب���ا ح�� ا �ل ك لي�‬
‫�ه �خ�م��س��ة‬
‫و ي�‬
‫��ا ر ج� لا ��لن� ف����س �م��ف����هو ا �ل�� فل���ظ��‬ ‫� ن ممت�� ن�� ا �ل � د ف� ا �لخ‬ ‫ك‬ ‫�‬ ‫�د‬
‫� �ّ ّ ق‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬‫�‬‫ك‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ا‬ ‫ال�أ ّ‬
‫م‬ ‫�‬‫ي‬ ‫و‬ ‫ج‬ ‫و‬ ‫ع‬ ‫�‬ ‫و‬ ‫ي‬ ‫�‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ل‬ ‫و‬
‫��ل ي ��ئ �ع�زّ ��س �ق‬
‫‪٢٤‬‬
‫� ن ق �ق‬ ‫ل‬ ‫�ن‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�ن‬ ‫م‬ ‫ن‬ ‫�ش‬
‫كا ل�ع�����اء و �د‬ ‫�� ا �يو ج��د �‬ ‫�� ا لو ج ود ل ك‬ ‫�و� م ك‬ ‫ا م�ه و �د ي� ك‬ ‫�ك���ر�ي�ك ا ب��ا ر‬
‫أ‬ ‫ً ف‬
‫كا ��لب��ا ر ��ئ �ت�ع�ا لى � و �م �إ �م ك�‬
‫��ا ن��ه‬
‫�غ‬
‫�و� ا لمو ج�ود �م ن���ه وا ح�د ا ����ق��ط �م ا �مت�� ن���اع ي��ره �‬
‫ن‬
‫ي� ك‬
‫ع‬ ‫ع‬
‫�ث ًا �ّ � ت ن � ً � ا� ا � ة ا � ّ �ة‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ق‬
‫�و �ك� ب� ل����سب���ع�� ل����سي���ا ر‬ ‫�و� ا لمو ج�ود �م ن���ه �ك�ي��ر �إ م�ا م�����ا هي���ا �‬
‫كا ل ك‬ ‫ل������م��س و��د ي� ك‬ ‫كا � ش‬ ‫�‬
‫أ �غ‬
‫كا ��لن� ف��و��س ا ��لن��ا ط��ق����ة‪.‬‬
‫� و ي��ر �مت�� ن���ا ه �‬

‫أ‬ ‫ّ‬
‫ح��ي� ث�‬ ‫ح��يوا ن� �م��ن �‬ ‫ح��يوا ن� �مث���لاً نّ��ه ك�ل ّ ف����ه ن���ا ك � �مور ث�لا ث���ة ا �ل‬
‫�‬ ‫ي �إ�ذ ا �ق��لن��ا �ل��ل���‬‫�‬
‫�ث ن‬
‫ا �ل��ا �‬
‫�‬ ‫أي‬ ‫�إ‬ ‫ّ‬
‫ًّ ث ن ّ ًّ ن ق ًّ‬ ‫ّ ّ ًّ‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ّ‬
‫‪٢٥‬‬

‫� ب� �م ن����ه���م�ا وال� ّول ي���س���مىك��لي��ا ط��بي���عي���ا وا ��ل��ا �ي�ك��لي��ا �م����ط����ي���ا‬‫�ون��هك��ليّ��ا وا ل�مر�ك�‬ ‫�هو �هو وك‬
‫�ذ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫أ‬ ‫�� ّ ا �ل��ط� ���ع ّ �م � د ف� ا �لخ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ً‬
‫ث ث ّ ق ّ‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ّ‬
‫��ا ر ج ل� ن��ه �ج�ز ء �م��ن �ه� ا‬ ‫وا ��ل��ا �ل�� ك��لي��ا �ع������لي��ا وا �ل ك�لي� �ب ي ي� و ج و ي�‬
‫�‬ ‫� أّ‬
‫�‬ ‫��ّ�لّ��ا ن ال�آ خ� ا ن ف��ف‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫ك‬ ‫ل‬‫�‬ ‫ا‬ ‫ا‬‫�‬‫م‬‫�خ�ا ر ج و�ج�ز ء ا لمو ج�ود �مو ج ود و� �‬ ‫ح��يوا ن� ا لمو ج�ود ف�� ا �ل‬ ‫ا �ل‬
‫�‬
‫ي�‬ ‫�‬ ‫ر‬ ‫�‬ ‫ي‬ ‫�‬ ‫ي‬
‫ي�ه���م�ا خ��ا ر ج �ع��ن ا لم ن����ط ق�‪.‬‬ ‫���‬‫��ا ر ج خ��لا�ف� وا ��لن� ظ���ر ف�‬ ‫� د �ه�م�ا ف� ا �لخ‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫ي�‬ ‫و جو‬

‫ق‬ ‫ف‬
‫� ا لم��ف���ا ر�‪.‬‬
‫‪ :�� ١‬ا �ل�عر �ض‬

‫‪18‬‬ ‫‪18‬‬
 First Treatise—Third Section

The separable accidental may disappear quickly, like the redness of a blush 22.3
or the pallor of fear; or it may do so slowly, like the graying of hair or the pass-
ing of youth.
If either the implicate or the separable is possessed solely by the members 23
of one reality, it is a proprium (like “laughing”); otherwise, it is a general
accident (like “walking”). We delineate the proprium as a universal said in
an accidental way of what is under a single reality only, and general accident
as a universal said in an accidental way of members of more than one reality.
The universals are therefore five: species, genus, differentia, proprium, and
general accident.

The Third Section: On Universals and Particulars

Containing five discussions

The First Discussion It may be that the universal cannot possibly exist outside 24
the mind, though not due to the meaning of the expression alone, like partner
of the Creator; and it may possibly exist yet not actually exist, like phoenix;
and it may be that the existent under it is only one, and no other is possible,
like the Creator; or that the existent under it is only one, but it is possible for
there to be another, like sun; and it may be that there are many existents under
it, whether finite (like the seven planets) or infinite (like rational souls).

The Second Discussion If we say of animal, for example, that it is a universal, 25

there are three aspects to this: animal insofar as it is what it is, its being a uni-
versal, and the compound of the two. The first is called a natural universal,
the second a logical universal, and the third a mental universal. The natural
universal exists outside the mind because it is a part of this actually existent
animal, and a part of an existent is existent. There is dispute about whether the
other two universals exist outside the mind, but investigation into them falls
outside logic.

19 19
 ‫ا لم��ق���ا �ل��ة ال�أ ل ‪ -‬ا �ل��ف�����ص� ا �ثل��ا �ل ث‬
‫��‬ ‫ل‬ ‫وى‬

‫ق‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ق ّ‬ ‫ن ن‬ ‫ا ��لث��ا �ل� ث ا �ل ك�ّ ّ ن ت‬

‫كل �م�ا �ص�د � ع��لي��ه‬ ‫كل �م ن����ه���م�ا ع��لى �‬ ‫���لي��ا � �م����س�ا وي�ا � �إ � �ص�د � �‬ ‫�‬
‫ق أ‬ ‫ن‬ ‫آ‬
‫‪٢٦‬‬
‫ق ن‬ ‫ن‬
‫كا ل�إ ����س�ا � وا ��لن��ا ط� و�ب��ي ن���ه���م�ا �ع�موم ‪� ١‬م��ط�ل� �إ � �ص�د � � ح�د �ه�م�ا ع��ىل‬
‫ق‬ ‫ال� خ�ر �‬
‫ن ن‬ ‫� ن‬ ‫�غ‬ ‫آ‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ّ‬
‫ح��يوا � وال�إ ���س�ا � و�ب��ي ن���ه���م�ا �ع�مو ‪٢‬‬ ‫كا �ل‬ ‫كل �م�ا �ص�د � ع��لي��ه ال� خ�ر �م��ن ي��ر �ع�ك��س �‬ ‫�‬
‫م‬ ‫آ‬ ‫ّ‬
‫� ان‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ن‬
‫كا �لح��يو �‬ ‫� �م�ا �� �ص�د � ع��لي��ه ال� خ�ر �‬ ‫كل �م����ه���م�ا ع��لى ب��ع���ض‬
‫�م��ن ��ه � �� �ص�د � ن‬
‫�‬ ‫و ج �إ‬
‫ال�أ����� �مت�����ا �ن��ا ن ن ل ��� ص�د ق �ش�� ء �م ن���ه���م�ا ع�� �ش�� ء مم�ا ص�د ق ع��ل��ه ال��خ‬
‫آ‬
‫ر‬ ‫� � ي‬ ‫� لى �ي‬ ‫و بي �ض و ب ي � �إ � م ي� � �ي‬
‫ن ن‬
‫كا ل�إ ���س�ا � وا �ل��ف��ر��س‪.‬‬ ‫�‬
‫خ‬ ‫آ‬ ‫� �ذ‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ن���ق�������ض ت‬
‫�� ب� ع��لي��ه ال��ر‬ ‫� �ا ا لم����س�ا و�ي��ي�ن �م����س�ا وي�ا � و�إلا �ل���ص�د � � ح�د �ه�م�ا ع��لى م�ا ك‬ ‫و ي‬
‫آ‬ ‫أ‬
‫‪١،٢٧‬‬

‫�� � ع��لي��ه ال� خ�ر و�هو م‬ ‫�ذ‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ف ق‬

‫ح�ا ل‪.‬‬ ‫�‬ ‫ب‬ ‫����ص�د � � ح�د ا لم����س�ا و�ي��ي�ن ع��لى �م�ا ك‬
‫ال أ خ ّ � قً � ق‬ ‫ن���ق������� ال�أ�عّ �م��ن �ش�� ء �م��ط��قل��ً�ا �أ خ���� ّ �م��ن ن���ق‬
‫�‬ ‫�د‬ ‫ص‬ ‫�‬‫ل��‬ ‫ا‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫ل��‬‫�‬‫ط‬‫م��‬ ‫ص‬ ‫�‬
‫��‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫��‬
‫ي �ض‬ ‫��‬
‫��‬ ‫ص‬ ‫�ي‬ ‫و ي �ض‬
‫م‬
‫ك ّ �م�ا ص�د ق ع��ل��ه ن���ق������� ال�أ�عّ �م��ن �غ�� �ع�ك�� �أ �ّم�ا ال�أ ّ‬ ‫ال أ خ ّ‬
‫‪٢،٢٧‬‬

‫ول‬ ‫س‬ ‫ير‬ ‫م‬ ‫�ض‬ ‫� �����ص ع��لى �ل � � ي ي‬ ‫ن���ق��ي����‬

‫�ض‬
‫ف�� �أ ن�ّ�ه �ل لا �ذ �ل �ل�� ص�د ق ع��ي�ن ال�أ خ���� ّ ع�� ��ع��� �م�ا ص�د ق ع��ل��ه ن���ق������� ال�أ�عّ‬
‫� �أ ّ ي ن ي �ض أ م‬ ‫ص لى أب �ض‬ ‫ل و �ك � �‬
‫� ث ف� � نّ‬ ‫ق أ‬
‫ح�ا ل و� �م�ا ا �لأ��ا �ي� �ل ��ه �لو‬ ‫�‬‫و�ذ �ل�ك �م����ست���ل�ز �ل���ص�د � ال����� ب��د و� ال��ع و�هو م‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫خ‬
‫م‬ ‫أ ص‬ ‫م‬
‫�ذ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫خ‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫لا �ذ �ل �ل�� ص�د ق ن���ق������� ال��عّ‬
‫� ال�����ص و �ل�ك‬ ‫��‬ ‫��‬
‫��‬ ‫�‬
‫�‬‫�‬ ‫�ه‬
‫�‬
‫م ى ل ي � ي أ ي �ض‬ ‫�ل‬‫�‬‫ع‬ ‫�د‬ ‫ص‬‫�‬ ‫��‬ ‫�‬ ‫ا‬
‫�‬‫م‬ ‫�‬ ‫ك‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫ل‬ ‫�‬
‫ع‬ ‫�ك � � أي �ض‬
‫ك �م�ا �ي���ص�د ق� ع��لي��ه ال��عّ و�هو م‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ق‬
‫ح�ا ل‪.‬‬ ‫�‬
‫م‬ ‫ل‬ ‫�م����ست���ل�ز �ل���ص�د � ال� خ����ص ع��لى �‬
‫�ع أ اً ت � قّ ق ث �ذ‬ ‫أم‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫ي�ه���م�ا �مو � �ص�ل ل����ح����� م���ل �ه� ا‬ ‫�� ���‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ي�ن‬
‫وال� م� �ي ء م� و ج��ه ل��ي��س ب��� �����ي�����ض‬
‫�‬ ‫�ن‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫ش‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�ن‬ ‫�‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ع‬ ‫�‬
‫ّ‬ ‫م‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ً‬ ‫مي�ن ي�ن أ‬
‫‪٣،٢٧‬‬
‫ق‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ي�ن‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ي�ن‬ ‫ت‬
‫� ال�����ص �م ا �ل�� ب���ا � ا �ل ك�‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫خ‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ي�ن‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ع‬‫�‬
‫��لي� ب��� �����ي�����ض‬
‫�‬
‫ع‬ ‫ا �ل�عأ���موم ب��� ع�� ال� مأ �م��ط��ل���ا وب��� �����ي�����ض‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ً‬
‫ال��عّ �م��ط��قل���ا وع��ي�ن ال� خ����ص‪.‬‬
‫ًّ أ نّ‬ ‫م‬
‫ق‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ن‬
‫كا �ل�لاو ج�ود‬ ‫� �ا ا لمت�� ب���ا ي�ن���ي�ن �مت�� ب���ا ي�ن��ا � ت�ب��ا ي�ن��ا �ج�ز ئ�ي��ا ل� ���ه���م�ا �إ � ل �ي���ص�د ��ا ‪� ٣‬‬ ‫ون���ق��ي�����ض‬
‫م‬
‫�ا ن ن �اف‬ ‫ت� �ي�ن ّ ّ ن‬
‫‪٤،٢٧‬‬
‫ن‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ن‬
‫كا �‬ ‫��‬ ‫�‬
‫كا ل�ل �إ ���س�ا � وا ل�ل ر س �‬ ‫� و�إ� �� �ص�د ��ا ‪� ٤‬‬ ‫كا � ب���ي ن���ه���م�ا ب��ا ك�ل‬ ‫وا �ل�لا ع�د �‬
‫�ق‬ ‫ال خ� ف‬ ‫آ‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ي�ن‬ ‫ن‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ي‬
‫ة‬ ‫ض‬ ‫تم �ي�ن �ج�ز ئ ّ‬
‫�‬
‫� � ر �� ��ط‬ ‫ت‬
‫�ي� ��ر ور� �ص�د � � ح�د ا لم�� ب���ا ي���� �مع �����ي�����ض‬ ‫ب���ي ن���ه���م�ا �ب��ا‬
‫ً‬ ‫ئّ‬ ‫ف‬
‫��ا �لت�� ب���ا�ي�ن ا �ل�ج�ز �ي� لا�ز �ج�ز �م�ا‪.‬‬
‫م‬

‫ن‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ش‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ف‬ ‫خ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫خ‬ ‫ف‬
‫‪� :�� ١‬ع�موم و����صو�ص‪� :�� ٢ .‬ع�موم و����صو�ص‪� :�� ٣ .‬إ � لم �ي���ص�د ��ا �م�ع�ا � �ص�لا ع��لى ����ي ء‪� :�� ٤ .‬إ �‬
‫ق‬
‫�ص�د ��ا �م�ع�ا‪.‬‬

‫‪20‬‬ ‫‪20‬‬
 First Treatise—Third Section

The Third Discussion Two universals are coextensive if each one is true of 26
whatever the other is true of, like man and rational. One is included within the
other if one is true of whatever the other is true of, without the converse being
the case, like animal and man. The two overlap if each one is only true of part
of what the other is true of, like animal and white. And they are disjunct if nei-
ther is true of anything of which the other is true, like man and horse.
The contradictories of two coextensive universals are coextensive. Were 27.1
that not the case, then one of the two contradictories would be true of what
the other is false of, so one of the original coextensive universals would be true
of what the other is false of, and that is inconceivable.
In the case of inclusion, the contradictory of the more general simpliciter 27.2
is more specific than the contradictory of the more specific simpliciter, due
to the fact that the contradictory of the more specific is true of everything of
which the contradictory of the more general is true, though not the reverse.
As for the first part of the claim, it is because, were that not the case, then the
more specific itself would be true of some of what the contradictory of the
more general is true of, and that entails the truth of the more specific without
the more general, and that is inconceivable. As for the second part of the claim,
it is because, were that not the case, the contradictory of the more general
would be true of everything of which the contradictory of the more specific is
true, and that entails that the more specific be true of all of the more general,
and that is inconceivable.
As for universals that overlap, there is no fundamental reason their two 27.3
contradictories should overlap, due to the verification of the like of this lim-
ited overlap between the more general simpliciter and the contradictory of the
more specific, along with complete disjunction between the contradictory of
the more general simpliciter and the more specific itself.
The two contradictories of two disjuncts are disjoined at least partly. This is 27.4
because if the two taken together are not true of anything—like nonexistence
and non-privation—there is a complete disjunction between the two. And if
they can be true together—like not-man and not-horse—there is a partial dis-
junction between the two as a necessary consequence of the fact that one of
the two disjuncts is true only with the contradictory of the other. So partial
disjunction is certainly an implicate in this case.

21 21
 ‫ا لم��ق���ا �ل��ة ال�أ ل ‪ -‬ا �ل��ف�����ص� ا �ثل��ا �ل ث‬
‫��‬ ‫ل‬ ‫وى‬

‫ق‬ ‫� ق �ق ّ ف ��ذ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫�ذ‬ ‫ج�ز ئ ّ‬

‫�� �لأ�ك ي������اأ ّل ع��لى‬ ‫كا ي���ق���ا ل ع��لى ا ل��م�ع ن�ى ا لم� ك‬
‫�ور ا لم��س���مى ب�ا �لح����ي���ي� � ك‬ ‫ا �لرا ب�ع ا �ل� �ي� م‬
‫ن ّ‬ ‫ح� ت ال�أ�عّ ���س���ّ ا �ل�ج�ز �ئ ّ ال �ض �ا ف� ّ �ه �أ �عّ �م��ن ال� ّ‬ ‫ت‬
‫ك ّ � خ���� ّ �‬
‫أ‬
‫‪٢٨‬‬

‫ل‬ ‫ك‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬‫ل‬ ‫ل‬ ‫و‬ ‫و‬ ‫و‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�إ‬ ‫�‬ ‫م‬
‫م ي ى‬ ‫و‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫ص‬ ‫�ل‬
‫ش‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫أي ّ أ م‬ ‫ي‬
‫ئ‬ ‫ئ‬
‫خ‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ّ‬
‫� �ا �� ب��د و� ا �ل�ع�ك�� � �م�ا ال�ول ��لا ��د را ج � ���‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ج�ز‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫�ق‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ّ‬
‫�ج�ز �� �‬
‫كل ����ص‬ ‫أ س‬ ‫ي‬ ‫ح����ي���� ����هو � �ي� �إ �ض‬ ‫ت ي‬
‫�‬ ‫ي‬
‫ف� ّ‬ ‫ّ � �ن ش خّ ت ّ � ث ن ف� �ز� ن �لج�ز ئ ّ‬ ‫ّ‬
‫ح� ت� �م�ا �ه��ي���ه ا ل��م�عرا �ة ‪ ١‬ع� ا لم���������ص�ا � و� �م�ا ا �ل��ا �ي� ��ل�� ج�وا كو� ا � �ي� ال�إ �ض‬
‫� �ا ي�‬
‫ت‬ ‫�‬
‫�‬
‫� ق �ق ّ �ذ‬ ‫ئّ‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ّ‬
‫�� �ل�ك‪.‬‬ ‫�و� ا �ل�ج�ز �ي� ا �لح����ي���ي� ك‬ ‫ك��ليّ��ا وا �مت�� ن���ا ك‬
‫ع‬

‫ق‬ ‫ف ��ذ‬ ‫� ق �ق ّ‬ ‫�رن�ا ه و���ق���ا ل �ل�ه ا ��لن�و ا �ل‬ ‫�ذ‬

‫�� �ل�ك ي������ا ل‬‫�ك‬ ‫ح����ي���ي�‬ ‫ي‬ ‫كا ي���ق���ا ل ع��لى �م�ا ك‬ ‫ن‬
‫ا �ل��ا �م��س ا ��ل�وع م‬
‫خ‬
‫�ق ً أ ّ ًّ‬ ‫ع‬ ‫ّ‬
‫‪٢٩‬‬
‫�ل �ن ف‬ ‫�غ‬ ‫ّة ق‬
‫�هو ولا � و��لي��ا‬ ‫� ���س �ي� ج�وا ب� �م�ا‬ ‫كل �م�ا �هي���� ي������ا ل ع��لي���ه�ا وع��لى ي��ر�ه�ا ا ج‬ ‫ع��لى �‬
‫ف� ّ‬ ‫ّ‬
‫� �ا ي�‪.‬‬ ‫و�ي��س���مى ا ��لن�و ال�إ �ض‬
‫ع‬
‫�ه‬ ‫ا‬
‫�‬‫ه‬‫�ص‬
‫�ل أ أ خ ّ‬
‫��‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫��س‬ ‫�‬ ‫ا‬
‫ك‬
‫�‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ا‬‫�‬
‫ع‬ ‫�‬‫�‬
‫ل‬ ‫ا‬ ‫�‬‫�م ا ت���ه �أ � ل�أ ن�ّ�ه �ّم�ا �أ �عّ ال�أ ن� ا �ه ا ��لن‬
‫� وو‬ ‫�‬ ‫و‬ ‫�إ م وع و و وع ي� ج‬ ‫و ر ب ربع‬
‫ّ‬ ‫مف أ‬ ‫أ أ‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ن‬
‫‪٣٠‬‬
‫خ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ف‬
‫ص‬ ‫ل‬ ‫م‬
‫�‬
‫كا ل ���س�ا � و���س���م � ال� � ا ‪ � ٢‬و � ع �م��ن ا �ل��س�ا �� و� ���� �م��ن‬
‫ع‬ ‫ي ى وع و‬ ‫�إ‬ ‫ا ��لن�وع ا �ل��س�ا ��ل �‬
‫�� ّ �ه ا ��لن‬ ‫���س ا ��لن��ا م �أ �م���ا�ي�ن‬ ‫� ن �‬ ‫كا �ل‬ ‫ّ‬
‫ا �ل�ع�ا لي� و�هو ا ��لن�وع ا لمت��و��س��ط �‬
‫وع‬
‫�‬ ‫و‬ ‫و‬ ‫ل‬ ‫�‬‫ك‬ ‫�ل‬‫�‬‫�‬
‫ل‬ ‫ح��يوا � وا جل م ي� و ب‬
‫�ن‬ ‫ن ق نّ‬
‫كا �ل�ع��ق���ل �إ � ���لن��ا �إ � ا �جل�و�هر ج����س‪.‬‬ ‫ا لم��ف��رد �‬
‫ف‬ ‫�ن‬ ‫أ‬ ‫أ ن �� أ ً‬
‫كا �جل�و�هر �ي� �مرا ت� ب�‬ ‫���نّ ا �جل����س ا �ل�ع�ا لي� �‬ ‫� �ا �ه��ذه ال�ر ب� �ل ك‬ ‫و�مرا ت� ب� ال� ج����ا س � �ي���ض‬
‫ع‬ ‫أ‬ ‫أ‬
‫ّ ف‬ ‫ّ �ن‬
‫‪٣١‬‬
‫� ن‬ ‫ف‬
‫ح��يوا � و�مث���ا ل ا لمت��و��س��ط ����‬
‫ي�ه�ا‬ ‫كا �ل‬‫ال� ج� ن���ا ��س ي���س���مى ج����س ال� ج� ن���ا ��س لا ا �ل��س�ا ��ل �‬
‫� �ه �� � �ن‬ ‫ق ن ق ن نّ‬ ‫ف‬
‫� ���س‪.‬‬ ‫���سم و�م���ا ل ا لم����رد ‪ ٣‬ا �ل�ع�����ل �إ � ���ل��ا �إ � ا �جلو ر ل�ي��س ب ج‬
‫ث‬ ‫���س ا ��لن��ا م� وا �جل‬ ‫�ل‬
‫أ‬ ‫ا ج م ي‬
‫� ّ‬
‫ح��ق��ي����ق� �مو ج�ود‬ ‫كا ل� ن�وا ا لمت��و�ّ�س��ط��ة وا �ل‬ ‫�‬
‫� ق �ق ّ‬ ‫ن‬
‫� �ا �ي� �مو ج�ود ب��د و� ا �لح����ي���‬
‫فّ‬
‫وا ��لن�و ال�إ �ض‬
‫ي‬ ‫ع‬ ‫�‬ ‫ي‬ ‫ع‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ف� ّ‬
‫‪٣٢‬‬
‫خ��� ص � �م��ط�ل ق‬ ‫ع‬‫ح��ق���ا ئ� ق ا �ل�����س����ط��ة ف��ل��� �� ن��ه���م�ا �‬ ‫�‬
‫ل‬
‫�‬ ‫ن‬
‫ك‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫وم و و ص � ب ل ل‬ ‫�‬ ‫�م‬ ‫�ي س ب �ي �‬ ‫� �ب ي‬ ‫ا‬‫ك‬
‫�‬ ‫ب��د و� ال�إ ي�‬
‫ا‬
‫�‬ ‫�ض‬
‫�‬
‫ف‬ ‫ق‬ ‫آ‬ ‫أ‬
‫�م ن����ه���م�ا ‪� � ٤‬عّ �م��ن ال� خ�ر �م��ن و ج��ه‪� ٥‬ل���ص�د ����ه���م�ا ع��لى ا ��لن�و ا �ل��س�ا ��ل‪.‬‬
‫ع‬ ‫م‬
‫�ق ً‬ ‫قة ّ‬ ‫ن ن �ذ� ً‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ق‬
‫‪٣٣‬‬ ‫ل‬
‫كا � م� كورا ب�ا م��ط�ا ب������� ي���س���مى وا ��ع�ا‬ ‫�‬ ‫و�ج�ز ء ا م����ول ي� ج وا ب� م�ا �هو �إ � �‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫ل‬
‫ف‬ ‫� ن ن ق ق‬ ‫ح��يوا ن� وا ��لن��ا ط ق� ب�ا �ل��ن����سب����ة �إلى ا �ل‬ ‫ف‬
‫ح��يوا � ا ��ل��ا ط� ا لم����ول �ي�‬ ‫كا �ل‬
‫�‬ ‫�ي� طر�يق� �م�ا �هو �‬

‫ا‪ �...‬ال�أ�ن ا ) ف� ‪� ، �� ،‬ف ‪ ،‬ك؛ ��س�ا �ق��ط��ة �م��ن ت‬

‫ن‬ ‫أ أ ّ‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫‪� ١‬ف ‪ :‬ا لم�ا �هّ���ا ت‬
‫�‪( ٣ .‬و�مث���ا ل‬ ‫وع وع ي� ر س �‬ ‫���ليّ���ة ا ل��م�ع ّرا �‪ �( ٢ .‬و � خ�����ص�ه�‬
‫� ا �ل ك�‬ ‫ي‬ ‫�‬
‫�� �ف‬ ‫ف‬ ‫�� �ف‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ف‬
‫ا لم��ف��رد)‪ :‬ي� ك؛ �‪ ،‬ر‪ :‬ا ج ��س ا لم����رد‪�( ٤ .‬م����ه���م�ا) ي� ر‪ ،‬س‪ ،� ،‬ك؛ � ‪�:‬م����ه�ا‪�( ٥ .‬م� و ج��ه) ي� ر‪ ،‬س‪ ،� ،‬ك؛‬
‫�‬ ‫�ن‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ت‬ ‫�‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ف‬ ‫�‬
‫ل‬
‫�‬ ‫ت‬ ‫�‬
‫�‪.‬‬ ‫��س�ا �ق��ط��ة �م��ن ت‬

‫‪22‬‬ ‫‪22‬‬
 First Treatise—Third Section

The Fourth Discussion Just as “particular” is said of the meaning mentioned 28

above (what is termed the real particular),6 it is likewise said of everything
more specific under the more general. This is called the relative particular, and
it is more general than the first, because every real particular is a relative par-
ticular, without the converse being the case. As for the first part of the claim,
it is because every individual is subsumed by its quiddity stripped of whatever
individuates it; as for the second, it is because the relative particular can be a
universal, whereas the real particular cannot.

The Fifth Discussion Just as “species” is said of what we mentioned above 29

(what is termed the real species),7 it may likewise be said of every quiddity
that, along with other quiddities, has a genus said of it as a primary response to
the question “what is it?” This is called relative species.
The ranks of relative species come to four: it is either the most general of 30
the species, which is the supreme species, like body; or the most specific of
them, which is the inferior species, like man (and it is called the species of spe-
cies); or more general than the inferior and more specific than the supreme,
which is the intermediate species, like animal and growing body; or distinct
from everything else, which is the isolated species, like intelligence (if it is said
that substance is a genus for it).
The ranks of genera also come to these four, but the supreme rank of the 31
ranks of genera (like substance)—and not the inferior (like animal)—is called
the genus of genera; an example of an intermediate genus is growing body and
body; and an example of the isolated is intelligence (if we say substance is not
a genus for it).
We may find the relative species without the real species (as in the case of 32
the intermediate species), and the real without the relative (as in the case of
the simple realities). One is therefore not included in the other; rather, the two
overlap because both are true of the inferior species.
Part of what is said in answer to “what is it?,” if it is said by correspondence, 33
is called what arises on the way to “what is it?”; this is like animal and rational

23 23
 ‫أ‬
‫ا لم��ق���ا �ل��ة ال�ولى ‪ -‬ا �ل��ف���� ص� ا �ل ا �‬
‫� ل ر بع‬
‫خ ً‬ ‫� �ن ن ن ن ن �ذ ً‬
‫�� � ّ��م��ن ي���س���ّمى د ا ��لا‬ ‫�ورا ب�ا ��لت����ض‬‫كا � �م� ك‬ ‫ج�وا ب� ا �ل��س�ؤ ا ل ب�م�ا �هو ع� ال�إ ���س�ا � و�إ� �‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ة‬ ‫�ل ّ‬ ‫ف‬
‫� ّرك ب�ا ل�إ را د � ا �ل�د ا ل ع��لي���ه�ا‬ ‫ح��س�ا ��س وا لمت����ح‬ ‫كا �جل���س ا ��لن��ا م� وا �‬ ‫�ي� ج�وا ب� �م�ا �هو �‬
‫ي‬ ‫م‬ ‫� ن �ت ّ‬
‫�� ���م��ن ‪.‬‬
‫ا �لح��يوا � ب�ا �ل����ض‬
‫أ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫أ‬
‫ا �ل �ن ا � ل �ز � ن ن ف‬
‫���ه �م��ن � �مر�ي�ن �م��ت��س�ا و�ي��ي�ن ‪١‬‬ ‫ق ّ � �ز ت‬
‫�و� �ل�ه ����ص�ل ي�����و�م�ه جل�وا �ر�كب‬ ‫و ج����س ل�ع�ا ي� ج��ا � ي� ك‬
‫قّ‬ ‫أ‬ ‫أ‬ ‫أ‬
‫‪٣٤‬‬
‫��لن � ف‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ن‬ ‫� و �م��ن � �مور �م��ت��س�ا و���ة ويج�‬
‫�و� �ل�ه ����ص�ل ي�������س���م�ه وا �وع ا ل��س�ا ��ل ي ج�� ب�‬ ‫�� ب� � � ي� ك‬ ‫ي‬
‫� ن �ل�ه ف����ص� ���ق�� ّ��س���م�ه ا لمت�� �ّ�س��ط�ا ت‬ ‫أن‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ن ف‬ ‫أن‬
‫� ي ج�� ب�‬ ‫و و‬ ‫لي‬ ‫�و� �ل�ه ����ص�ل ي����� ّو�م�ه وي�مت�� ن��ع � � ي� كو�‬ ‫� � ي� ك‬
‫ك ّ ف����ص� ���ق�� ّ ا �ل�ع�ا ل ف���ه ���ق�� ّ‬ ‫تق ّ‬ ‫تق ّ� ف‬
‫�‬ ‫ن � ف‬
‫�‬ ‫�أ ن‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫و‬ ‫ا‬
‫�‬‫ه‬‫���م‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫��س‬ ‫�‬
‫��‬‫�‬‫�‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ص‬‫�‬ ‫��‬ ‫و‬ ‫ا‬
‫�‬‫ه‬‫�م‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫��‬‫�‬
‫�‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ص‬‫�‬ ‫��‬ ‫ا‬
‫�‬‫ه‬‫�ل‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫ك‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫ّ ل ل ي وم ّ ي و ي وم‬ ‫و‬
‫ّ‬
‫و و‬ ‫يو‬
‫ك ّ ف����ص� ���ق����س ا �ل���س�ا ف�� ف����ه ���ق����س ا �ل�ع�ا ل� �م��ن‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫�غ‬ ‫�ن‬
‫ا �ل���س�ا ��ل �م� ي��ر �ع�ك��س ك�ل� و �‬
‫ف‬
‫ل وي م ي‬ ‫م‬ ‫ي‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ي‬
‫�‪.‬‬ ‫�غ�� �ع�ك�� ك�ّ ّ‬
‫ل‬
‫ير س ي‬

‫�‬ ‫ا �ل��ف������ �ص� ا �ل ا � ف� ا ��لت����ع� ���ف���ا ت‬

‫ري‬ ‫ل ر بع ي�‬
‫�ن ّ‬ ‫ل��� ء �أ ا �مت‬ ‫ش‬ ‫ت �ز ت ّ ت ّ �ذ‬ ‫�ذ‬ ‫ش‬ ‫َّ ف‬
‫ل‬ ‫ك‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫ع‬ ‫�‬ ‫�زه‬ ‫ا‬‫�‬‫ا ل��م�عر�� �ل��ل����ي ء �هو ا �ل� ��ي ي�����س���ل م ����صوره ����صو أر �ل�ك ا � �ي و ي‬
‫��‬ ‫��‬
‫ّ ة نّ ّ ف‬ ‫� �ز �أ ن � ك ن ن ف‬
‫‪٣٥‬‬
‫َف‬ ‫ق‬
‫�و� �������س ا لم�ا �هي���� ل�� ا ل��م�عَر�� �م�ع�لوم � ب���ل ا ل��م�ع ّر��‬ ‫�م�ا ع�د ا ه و�هو لا ي ج�و � ي‬
‫أخ ّ‬ ‫�ن ف ة ت ف‬ ‫أ � ّ �ق‬ ‫ُ ق نف‬ ‫ش‬
‫وا �ل����ي أء لا �ي�ع��لم � ب���ل �������س�ه ولا � عم �ل�� ���صوره �ع� �إ ��ا د � ا ��ل��عر�ي��� ولا � ����ص‬
‫����صو�ص‪.‬‬ ‫� ن��ه � خ��ف�� ف���ه �م��س�ا ��له�ا ف� ا �ل�ع���م ا �لخ‬
‫وم و‬ ‫ى � و و � ي�‬ ‫�ل كو‬
‫نق ً ن‬ ‫ًّ‬ ‫�ق‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ا ت �ّ ن ن �ل �ن‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ًّ‬ ‫ّ‬
‫� ���س وا �ل�������ص�ل ا �ل�� ري�ب���ي�ن وح�د ا �ا ����ص�ا �إ �‬ ‫كا � ب�ا ج‬ ‫و�ي��س���مى ح�د �ا م�ا �إ � �‬
‫ً ت �ًّ ن ن‬ ‫أ‬
‫‪٣٦‬‬
‫�ن‬ ‫ن‬
‫كا �‬ ‫كا � ب�ا �ل��ف�����ص�ل ا �ل���ق ري� ب� وح�د ه � و ب��ه وب�ا �جل����س ا ��لب��عي���د ور��س���م�ا �ا م�ا �إ � �‬ ‫�‬
‫أ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫� �ن‬
‫��ا �ص��ة وح�د �ه�ا � و ب���ه�ا‬ ‫كا �ا �لخ‬ ‫ن‬ ‫�خ ة‬
‫ب�ا جل����س ا �ل�� ري� ب� وا ل��ا �ص�� ور��س���م�ا �ا ����ص�ا �إ � � � ب‬
‫�ق‬
‫�ن‬
‫وب�ا �جل����س ا ��لب��عي���د‪.‬‬
‫� � ة �كت ف‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ف‬ ‫��� الاحت�� ا �ز �ع��ن �ت�ع ���ف� ا � ش‬
‫���عر�ي���‬ ‫ل��� ء ب�م�ا ي���س�ا و�ي�ه �ي� ا ل��م�عر���ة وا �جل���ه�ا ل��‬ ‫ري‬ ‫ر‬ ‫ويج ب‬
‫�‬
‫�ي‬
‫ُ ف‬
‫‪١،٣٧‬‬

‫ل����ي ء ب�م�ا لا �ي�عر��‬ ‫��ن ا �ل�ز ج �م�ا �ل��� ���ف�� د �ع��ن �ت�ع ���ف� ا � ش‬ ‫ح ة‬
‫ا �ل�رك‬
‫ري‬ ‫��� ب�م�ا �ل��ي��س ب���س�ا ك� و و� ب �ي س ب ر و‬
‫�ك� ف��ّ����ة �م�ا ��ه�ا ت���ق�� ا ل ش ة ث ّ ق‬ ‫كا ن �ب�م ت����ة ا ح�د �ة ك ���ق‬ ‫ّ‬
‫م����ا ب���ه�� �م ي������ا ل‬ ‫ع‬ ‫ب�‬ ‫ي ي‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫ل‬ ‫ا‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ا‬‫�‬
‫��‬ ‫مي‬ ‫ا‬ ‫�إ ب و � ر ب و‬ ‫�‬ ‫اء‬ ‫�س‬ ‫�‬ ‫�ه‬ ‫�‬ ‫ا‬‫ل‬
‫ث ن ن �ز أ‬ ‫ف ّة أ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ّ‬
‫�ز‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ث‬ ‫ّ‬
‫كا ي������ا ل الا ���ا � و ج� � ول �م ي������ا ل ا �ل و�ج‬
‫ق‬ ‫ت‬ ‫م����ا ب���ه��ة ا ت���ف���ا ق� �ي� ا �ل �‬
‫�كي���ي���� � و �ب�مرا � ب� م‬
‫ال ش‬
‫‪� ، �� ،‬ف ‪ ،‬ك؛ ��س�ا �ق��ط��ة �م��ن ت‬ ‫ت ي�ن ف‬
‫�‪.‬‬ ‫ر س �‬ ‫‪�( ١‬م����س�ا و�ي�� ) �ي�‬

‫‪24‬‬ ‫‪24‬‬
 First Treatise—Fourth Section

in relation to “rational animal” said in response to the question “what is it?”

asked about man. If it is mentioned by containment, it is called intrinsic to the
answer to “what is it?”; this is like body and growing and sensate and moving
voluntarily, which “animal” signifies by containment.
The superior genus may have a differentia that constitutes it (because 34
the genus may be compounded from two or more coextensive matters),
and it must have a differentia that divides it. The inferior species must have
a differentia that constitutes it, and cannot have a differentia that divides
it. The intermediates must have differentiae that constitute them and dif-
ferentiae that divide them. Every differentia that constitutes the superior
constitutes the inferior, though this does not convert universally. Every dif-
ferentia that divides the inferior divides the superior, though this does not
convert universally.

The Fourth Section: On Definitions

What defines a given thing is something that, when it is conceived, entails 35

the conception of that thing, or that thing’s distinction from everything else.
The definition may not be the quiddity itself, because the definition is known
prior to what is made known, and a thing is not known prior to itself; nor
may it be more general than what is defined (otherwise it would fall short of
conveying a definition); nor may it be more specific (otherwise it would be
more obscure than what is to be defined). The definition must be coextensive
with what is being defined.
It is called a complete definition if it is by way of the proximate genus and dif- 36
ferentia, and an incomplete definition if it comes about through the proximate
differentia alone, or through the proximate differentia and the remote genus.
It is called complete delineation if it comes about through the proximate genus
and the proprium, and incomplete delineation if it comes about through the
proprium alone, or through the proprium and the remote genus.
One must be careful not to define something by what is equally known or 37.1
unknown, as in defining “motion” by “what is not at rest,” or “even” by “what is
not odd.” Nor may one thing be defined by another that is known only through
the first, whether at one remove (as in “Quality is that in which similarity

25 25
 ‫أ‬
‫ا لم��ق���ا �ل��ة ال�ولى ‪ -‬ا �ل��ف���� ص� ا �ل ا �‬
‫� ل ر بع‬
‫أ‬ ‫ن �ه� ا � ش ن �ذ ن‬
‫ل�����ي ئ��ا � ا �ل�ل� ا � لا ي���ف�����ض‬
‫� �ل � ح�د �ه�م�ا‬ ‫�هو ا لم ن��ق����س ب�م��ت��س�ا و�ي��ي�ن ث�ّ ي���ق���ا ل ا لم��ت��س�ا وي�ا � م�ا‬
‫م‬
‫ن‬ ‫الآ خ� مث�ّ ق ا � ش ن‬
‫ل�����ي ئ��ا � �ه�م�ا الاث�ن��ا �‪.‬‬ ‫ع��لى � ر م ي������ا ل‬
‫ف �ظ غ ة‬ ‫أ‬ ‫أ ُ‬
‫ح�����ّ����ة �غ�� �ظ �ا �ه �ة ا ��د ل ���ة‬
‫ر ل ال‬ ‫ش‬ ‫ت‬
‫ح��ر �ع��ن ا ����س���عما ل � �ل�����ا � ري�ب��� و� ي ير‬
‫�ت �ز‬ ‫�� ب� � ن� ي�‬ ‫ويج�‬
‫ًّ‬
‫‪٢،٣٧‬‬
‫ض‬
‫�ون��ه �م��ف��وت�ا �ل�� �غل�ر��‪.‬‬ ‫ب�ا �ل��ق��ي���ا ��س �إلى ا �ل��س�ا ئ�ل �ل ك‬

‫‪26‬‬ ‫‪26‬‬
 First Treatise—Fourth Section

occurs,” then “Similarity is coincidence in quality”), or at several removes

(as in, “2 is the first even,” then “the even is divisible into two equal parts,”
then “two equal parts are two things neither of which exceeds the other,” then
“two things are 2”).
One must be careful not to use strange and barbarous expressions, which 37.2
will be—in relation to the questioner—unclear as to what they signify. This
would be to miss the whole purpose of the exercise.

27 27
 ‫أ‬ ‫� ة � نةف‬
‫ا �ل���ق�������ض�ا ي�ا و� ح ك�‬
‫��ا ���م�ه�ا‬ ‫ا لم�����ق�ا �ل�� ا �ل���ث�ا �ي��� �ي�‬
‫ةف‬ ‫قّ ة‬ ‫ف‬
‫ي�ه�ا �م�����د �م�� وث�لا ث��� ����صول‬
‫و����‬

‫�أ �ّم�ا ا ل������ ّ�د �م��ة ف��ف� �ت���ع� ���ف ا �ل���ق � ����ضّ����ة �أ ق����س�ا ��مه�ا ال أ ّ �ل��ّ ��ة‬
‫� �و ��ي‬ ‫�ي� ري� ��� ي و‬ ‫مق‬
‫ّة ن ن ّ‬ ‫ق أ �ذ‬ ‫ّ أ ن ق ق ئ نّ‬ ‫�ق � ّ ة ق‬
‫ح��ل� ت�‬‫ب ‪ ١‬و�ه� ح�م��لي��� � ا �‬
‫�‬ ‫�إ‬ ‫ي‬ ‫�‬ ‫ا‬
‫ك‬
‫�‬ ‫و‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫د‬ ‫ا‬‫�‬
‫ص‬ ‫�‬ ‫�ه‬‫�‬ ‫ا �ل�� �������ضي���� �ول �ي���ص��ح � � ي������ا ل �ل�����ا ��ل�ه �إ‬
‫ش ّ ة ن ت��ن ّ‬ ‫ف ي�ن ق‬
‫‪٣٨‬‬

‫�����و��لن��ا �ز �ي�د ع�ا ل �ز �ي�د �ل��ي��س ب��ع�ا ل و���رطي���� �إ � ل �‬ ‫ف‬

‫ح�ل‪.‬‬ ‫ي�ه�ا �إلى �م����رد � ك‬ ‫ب���طر����‬
‫أ م‬ ‫م‬ ‫ُ‬ ‫م‬
‫ق‬
‫�� ي���� � و لا �ص�د ����ه�ا ع��ىل‬
‫� ف� ه�ا � ص�د ق �ق �ض ّ ة‬
‫ي� ب��� � ��‬ ‫ح ك ���‬ ‫ل���رطيّ����ة �ّم�ا �متّ�����ص�ل��ة و�ه� ا ��لت� ي�‬
‫�‬ ‫ا�ش‬
‫و‬
‫م‬ ‫�ي‬ ‫ي‬ ‫�إ‬ ‫تق أ‬
‫ن ن �ذ ن نً‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ق ن ن ن �ذ ن‬
‫‪٣٩‬‬
‫ن‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ن‬
‫كا � �ه� ا �إ ���س�ا �ا ����هو �‬ ‫خ‬
‫كا � �ه� ا �إ ���س�ا �ا‬ ‫ح��يوا � و�ل��ي��س �إ � �‬ ‫�����و��ل��ا �إ � �‬
‫������دي�ر � �ر�ى‪ ٢‬ك‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ُ‬
‫ق‬ ‫ت ن ف� ي�ن ق تي�ن ف‬
‫� ��ي��� �ي� ا �ل���ص�د �‬ ‫ي�ه�ا ب�ا �ل�����ا ي� ب��� ����ض‬ ‫� ف‬
‫� ����‬ ‫حك‬‫ف����هو �ج �م�ا د و �ّم�ا �م ن�� ف�����ص�ل��ة و�ه� ا ��لت� ي�‬
‫ي‬ ‫�إ‬
‫�ز ً‬ ‫ً أ ف� أ �ه ف� �ق �ي أ نمف �ق � ن ّ أ ن ن �ذ‬ ‫� ��ذ‬
‫�‬
‫�و� �ه� ا ا ل�ع�د د و ج��ا‬ ‫�� ب� �م�ع�ا � و ي� � ح�د �م�ا �� ��ط � و ب����ي���ه ك����و�ل��ا �إ �م�ا � � ي� ك‬ ‫وا ل ك‬
‫نً أ أ‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ن ن‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ّ أ‬ ‫ً‬ ‫أ ف‬
‫ح��يوا �ا ‪ � ٣‬و � ��سود‪.‬‬ ‫�و� ال�إ ���س�ا � �‬ ‫� و �رد ا و�ل��ي��س �إ �م�ا � � ي� ك‬

‫أ‬
‫ح���م��لّ���ة‬
‫ل‬
‫�‬‫ا �ل��ف�����ص� ال� ّ ل ف� ا �‬
‫ي‬ ‫�‬ ‫و‬
‫ث‬
‫ي‬
‫ة‬ ‫فل أ‬
‫ح��‬ ‫و�ي���ه � ر ب��ع�� �م ب���ا �‬
‫أ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫أ‬ ‫أ‬ ‫أ‬
‫�و ع��لي��ه‬ ‫حك‬ ‫ح��قّ�� ق ب�� �ج�ز اء ث�لا ث���ة م‬
‫�‬ ‫ح���م��ليّ���ة ن�م�ا ت�ت�‬
‫�‬ ‫ال� ّول ف�� � ���ج��ز ا ئ���ه�ا و� �ق���س�ا ��م�ه�ا ا �ل‬
‫�‬
‫م‬ ‫�‬ ‫�إ‬ ‫ي‬
‫ّ م ً ن‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ّ‬
‫‪٤٠‬‬
‫ت‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ة‬
‫ح���مولا و�����سب���� ب���ي���ه���م�ا ب���ه�ا ي�ر �ب���ط ا لم���‬ ‫�و ب��ه و���س���مى �‬ ‫� وع�ا و م‬
‫�‬ ‫و�ي��س���مى �مو �ض‬
‫ح���مول‬ ‫ي‬ ‫ّم‬
‫حك‬
‫ت ّ‬ ‫�ز‬ ‫ن‬ ‫�‬ ‫ة� ف� ق‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ف �ظ‬
‫�‬
‫س‬ ‫��‬‫�‬ ‫ل‬
‫� وع وا �ل��ل���� ا �ل�د ا ل يُ� ي ��مى ر ب � و ي� و ي و م و ��مى‬
‫ا‬
‫�‬‫ع‬ ‫�ه‬ ‫�د‬ ‫�‬ ‫ا‬‫�‬‫�‬ ‫�ل‬ ‫�‬ ‫ه‬‫�ك‬ ‫��‬‫ط‬‫��‬ ‫�‬ ‫ا‬ ‫�‬‫س‬‫��‬ ‫�‬ ‫ا‬‫�‬
‫ه‬ ‫��‬ ‫�ل‬‫�‬‫ع‬ ‫ب�ا لمو �ض‬
‫� �ذ ف‬ ‫ت‬
‫ل����ع ر ا �ل��ذ �ه��ن‬
‫�غ ت ش‬ ‫ة ف�‬ ‫حي����ن ئ���ذ ث�لا ث�يّ���ة و�ق�د �‬‫�� يّ����ة �‬
‫ا �ل���ق���ض‬
‫� ا �ل��ل��ا � � و‬ ‫ح� �� ا �لرا ب���ط�� ي� ب��ع���ض‬
‫�ق ّ ة � �ن �ذ ت ّ‬
‫حي��� ئ�� ���س���مى ث�ن��ا ئ�يّ���ة‪.‬‬ ‫�ب��م�ع ن���ا �ه�ا وا �ل�� ���ض‬
‫�� ي����‬

‫ن ن‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ق أ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫تق أ خ‬ ‫�ذ ف‬ ‫ف‬

‫� ‪:‬ع��لى ت���ق���د�ير �ص�د � � خ�ر�ى‪ :�� ٣ .‬ال�إ ���س�ا � �‬
‫كا ت�ب��ا‪.‬‬ ‫‪ ، �� ،‬ك؛ ت‬
‫ر س‬ ‫كا ب� �ي���ه‪( ٢ .‬ع��لى ������د�ير � �ر�ى) �ي�‬
‫‪� :�� ١‬‬

‫‪28‬‬ ‫‪28‬‬
The Second Treatise: On Propositions and Their Valuations

Containing an introduction and three sections

The Introduction: On Defining the Proposition and Its Primary Divisions

A proposition is a discourse such that it is correct to say of him who produces it 38

that he is truthful or false in what he says. It is a categorical proposition if its two
extremes may be analyzed into two simple terms, as in “Zayd is knowing,” or
“Zayd is not knowing”; it is hypothetical if it cannot be analyzed in such a way.
The hypothetical proposition is either conditional or disjunctive. A con- 39
ditional is that in which one proposition is judged to be true or not on the
assumption of another proposition. This is like “if this is a man, it is an animal,”
and “not, if this is a man, it is inanimate.” A disjunctive is that in which two
propositions are judged to be incompatible with each other, either when both
are true or false, or one is true and the other false (as in “this number is either
even or odd”), or when their incompatibility is denied (as in “not, either this
man is an animal or black”).

The First Section: On the Categorical Proposition

Containing four discussions

The First Discussion: On Its Parts and Divisions The categorical proposition 40
is only realized through three parts: that on which judgment is passed (which
is called the subject), that which is judged of it (which is called the predicate),
and the relation between the two by which the predicate is connected to the
subject; the expression signifying this relation is called a copula, like “is” in
“Zayd is knowing.” In this case, the proposition is called three-part. The copula
may be omitted in some languages because the mind is aware of its meaning; in
this case, the proposition is called two-part.

29 29
 ‫أّ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ق ة‬
‫ا لم�����ا �ل�� ا � ث�ل��ا ن�ي��� ‪ -‬ا �ل�������ص�ل ال�ول‬

‫ّ‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ن‬

‫ح���مول‬ ‫�و م‬
‫�‬ ‫كا ن� ت� �����سب����ة �ي���ص�� ب���ه�ا � ن� ي���ق���ا ل �إ ن� ا لمو �ض‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫�ذه ا � �ن ة ن‬
‫ل�����سب���� �إ‬ ‫و�ه�‬
‫نّ‬ ‫ّ أع‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ح‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ق‬
‫‪٤١‬‬
‫ن ق‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ف � �ق ّ ة �م ة� ��لن ال ن � ن ن‬
‫كا ن� ت� �����سب���� ب���ه�ا �ي���ص��ح � � ي������ا ل �إ �‬ ‫ح��يوا � و�إ� �‬ ‫�� ي���� و ج� ب���� ك����و��ا �إ ���س�ا �‬ ‫��ا ل�� ���ض‬
‫�����و��لن��ا ال �ن��س�ا ن� �ل��ي�� ب�‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ف‬
‫ح�� ج�ر‪.‬‬ ‫�‬ ‫س‬ ‫�إ‬ ‫�� يّ����ة ��س�ا ��لب���ة ك‬ ‫ح���مول ��ا �ل���ق���ض‬ ‫� و �ل��ي��س ب�م���‬ ‫ا لمو �ض‬
‫ع‬
‫� �صّ����ة‬ ‫ة ش�� خ‬ ‫��� ًص�ا �م�ع�ّ ن��ً�ا ��سم�ّ� ت� ا �ل���ق���ض ّ ة مخ‬ ‫ح���م��لّ���ة ن � ن ش�� خ‬ ‫� و ا �ل‬
‫�� ي���� ����صو�ص�� و ���� ي‬ ‫�ي‬ ‫كا � � � �ي‬ ‫� ي �إ �‬ ‫وو ع‬
‫ّ‬
‫�م �ض‬
‫ّ‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ُ‬ ‫ً‬
‫‪٤٢‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫��م����ي��ة � �را د �م�ا ع��لي��ه ا �ل‬‫ف‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ن ن‬
‫ف �ظ‬
‫� و�ي��س���مى ا �ل��ل���� ا �ل�د ا ل‬ ‫حك‬ ‫�‬ ‫ي�ه�ا ك‬ ‫كا � ك��ليّ��ا ���إ � ب�ي���ن ����‬ ‫و�إ� �‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ُ‬ ‫م‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫أ‬ ‫أ‬
‫� ع��لى �‬ ‫حك‬ ‫ح���صور�ة و�م��س ّور�ة و�ه� � ر ب� ل� ن��ه ن� ب�ي���ن � ن� ا �ل‬
‫�‬ ‫ع��لي���ه�ا ��سورًا ��سم��يّ� ت� م‬
‫�‬
‫كل‬ ‫�إ‬ ‫ع‬ ‫ي‬
‫���ق�� ��لن��ا ّ نا ح�ا ّ �ة م�ّم�ا ��س�ا ��ل���ة‬ ‫ك‬
‫ّ‬
‫ا‬‫�‬‫ه‬‫�‬ ‫�س‬ ‫�‬ ‫��ّ�لّ���ة �ّم�ا �م �����ة‬ ‫�‬
‫ك‬ ‫�‬
‫ل‬ ‫ا‬ ‫ال أ ف� ا ف‬
‫�‬
‫ب‬ ‫�إ‬‫و‬ ‫ر‬ ‫ر‬ ‫�‬ ‫ك‬
‫�‬
‫ل و ل‬ ‫ك‬
‫�‬ ‫ر‬ ‫و‬ ‫و‬ ‫ب‬ ‫ج‬ ‫و‬ ‫ي �إ‬ ‫� ر د ي�‬
‫ه‬ ‫�‬‫��‬
‫ن‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ن‬
‫�����و��لن��ا لا ��� ء ولا وا ح�د �م��ن ال ���س�ا � ب ج�‬ ‫ش‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ش‬
‫����م�ا د و�إ�‬ ‫�إ‬ ‫�ي‬ ‫و��سور�ه�ا لا ����ي ء ولا وا ح�د ك‬
‫�لج�ز ئ ّ ة ّ‬ ‫ف ف‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ُ ّ�ن ف أ ّ‬
‫ة‬ ‫ي�ه�ا � ن� ا �ل‬
‫�‬‫� ال� �را د ����هي� ا � �ي��� �إ �م�ا �مو ج� ب���� و��سور�ه�ا ب��ع���ض‬ ‫� ع��لى ب��ع���ض‬ ‫حك‬
‫م‬
‫�‬ ‫ب�ي�� ����‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ن‬ ‫�����و��لن��ا ب��ع��� ا �ل‬ ‫ق‬
‫كل و�ل��ي��س‬ ‫ح��يوا �ن ‪� ١‬إ ���س�ا � و�إ�م�ا ��س�ا ��لب��� و��سور�ه�ا �ل��ي��س �‬ ‫�‬ ‫�ض‬ ‫ووا ح�د ك‬
‫ّ � ن ن ً‬ ‫ق‬
‫ح��يوا � �إ ���س�ا ن�ا‪٢.‬‬ ‫ل‬ ‫�����و��لن��ا �ل��ي��س �‬
‫ك‬ ‫� �ل��ي��س ك‬ ‫� و�ب�ع���ض‬ ‫ب��ع���ض‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ن‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ف‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ُ‬ ‫ن‬
‫��م����ي�� ال� �را د ���إ � لم ����ص��ل��ح ل�� ����ص�د �ك��لي��� و�ج�ز ئ�ي��� ��سم��ي� ت�‬ ‫ي�ه�ا ك‬ ‫و�إ� ل ي�ب�ي���ن ����‬
‫م‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ن � �ذ‬ ‫ن ن ن‬ ‫���ق��و��لن��ا ا �ل‬
‫‪٤٣‬‬
‫� ن �ن‬
‫ح� ت� �ل� �ل�ك ��سم��ي� ت�‬ ‫ح��يوا � ج����س وال�إ ���س�ا � �وع و�إ� �ص��ل��‬ ‫�� يّ����ة ط��بي���عيّ����ة ك‬‫ا �ل���ق���ض‬
‫ف‬ ‫ن ن‬ ‫ن ن ف‬ ‫ة ق‬
‫�����و��لن��ا ال�إ ���س�ا � �ي� خ���سر ال�إ ���س�ا � �ل��ي��س �ي� خ���سر‪.‬‬ ‫��م�ه���م�ل�� ك‬
‫ن ن‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ق ن ن ف� خ‬ ‫أ‬
‫ف� �ق ّ ة �لج�ز ئ ّ ة نّ ت‬
‫‪٤٤‬‬ ‫� ال�إ ���س�ا �‬ ‫و�هي� ي� و� ا � �ي��� ل� ��ه �م�ى �ص�د � ال�إ ���س�ا � ي� ���سر �ص�د � ب��ع���ض‬
‫ف‬
‫�ي� خ���سر وب�ا �ل�ع�ك��س‪.‬‬

‫ُ ت ت �ة‬ ‫ق ن ّ‬ ‫ت أ‬ ‫ت‬
‫ح� ث� ا �ل����ث�ا �ن� ف�� �‬
‫ح�������ق�� ق‬ ‫ا �ل ب�����‬
‫كل ج� ب� ي�����س���عم�ل �ا ر‬ ‫� ال�ر���ب �و��ل��ا �‬ ‫ح���صورا‬ ‫ي� ا لم���‬ ‫�‬
‫ي ي‬
‫أ‬ ‫ع‬ ‫ن ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫أ‬
‫‪٤٥‬‬
‫� �ن ال ف� ا ا لمم � ن ة ف‬
‫�ك��� ����هو‬ ‫كا �ن ‪ ٣‬ج م� � ر د‬ ‫ح��ق��ي��ق����ة و�م�ع ن���ا ه � � � �م�ا �ل ُ ��د‬ ‫�‬‫ح����س� ب� ا �ل‬ ‫ب�‬
‫�‬
‫ك ّل و و ج � �‬ ‫أ‬ ‫� �إ�ذ‬
‫ك �م�ا �هو �م�ل�ز و ج ف����هو �م�ل�ز و � وت�ا ر�ة ب�‬
‫�‬
‫ح����س� ب�‬ ‫ب‬ ‫ل‬ ‫�‬ ‫كا ن� ب� � �‬
‫�ي‬ ‫�‬ ‫ح��ي� ث� ا ُو ج��د‬ ‫ب�‬
‫أ‬ ‫أم‬ ‫م�‬ ‫ن ّ‬
‫ف‬ ‫ق‬ ‫كا ن� ح�ا ل ا �ل‬ ‫ف� ا �لخ‬
‫��ا ر ج� ��سوا ءً �‬ ‫ا �لخ‬
‫� � و � ب���ل�ه � و ب��ع�د ه ����هو‬
‫حك‬
‫م‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬‫ك � ي‬ ‫ج‬ ‫ل‬ ‫��ا ر ج� و�م�ع���ا ه �‬
‫��ا ر ج ‪.‬‬ ‫� ف� ا �لخ‬
‫�‬ ‫ب ي�‬

‫� ن ن ن‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫أ‬
‫ح��يوا ن� �ن��س�ا ن�ا و�ل��ي�� ب��ع��� ا �ل‬
‫كل �‬ ‫ف‬ ‫� ن‬ ‫‪� ١‬ف�‪ :‬ب��ع��� ا �ل‬
‫ح��يوا ن� � و وا ح�د �م��ن ا �ل‬
‫ح��يوا �‪� :�� ٢ .‬ل��ي��س �‬ ‫�‬
‫ح��يوا � ب��إ ���س�ا � و�ب�ع���ض‬
‫�‬ ‫س �ض‬ ‫�إ‬ ‫�ض‬
‫ن‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ف‬
‫�‬ ‫ن ف‬
‫�‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ن‬ ‫� ن‬ ‫ا �ل‬
‫كا �‪.‬‬ ‫كا �) ي� س‪ ،� ،‬ك؛ �‪ ،‬ر‪� :‬لو و ج��د و �‬ ‫��‬ ‫ح��يوا � �ل��ي��س ب��إ ���س�ا �‪�( ٣ .‬لو و ج��د �‬

‫‪30‬‬ ‫‪30‬‬
 Second Treatise—First Section

If the relation is such that it is correct to say that the subject has a given 41
predicate, the proposition is affirmative, like “man is an animal.” If the relation
is such that it is correct to say that the subject does not have a given predicate,
it is negative, like “man is not a stone.”
If the subject of a categorical proposition is a specified individual, the prop- 42
osition is called singular. If the subject is universal, and if the quantity of the
individuals of which the judgment is true is made clear in the proposition (the
expression signifying the quantity being called “quantifier”), then the proposi-
tion is called quantified. There are four kinds of quantified proposition. If it
is made clear that the judgment is on all the individuals, the proposition is
universal. The universal is either affirmative, its quantifier being “every” (as
in “every fire is hot”), or negative, its quantifier being “no” or “not one” (as in
“no man is inanimate”). If it is made clear in the proposition that the judgment
is on some of the individuals, it is particular. The particular is either affirma-
tive, its quantifier being “some” or “one” (as in “some animal is a man”), or it
is negative, its quantifier being “not every” or “some are not” (as in “not every
animal is a man”).
If the quantity of the individuals is not made clear in it, then—if it is not fit 43
to be true as a universal or a particular—the proposition is called natural, like
“animal is a genus” and “man is a species.” On the other hand, if it is fit to be
true as a universal or a particular it is called indefinite, as in “man is in loss” and
“man is not in loss.”8
Such a proposition has the force of a particular, for if “man is in loss” is true, 44
“some man is in loss” is true, and vice versa.

The Second Discussion: On Verifying the Four Quantified Propositions “Every 45

C is B” is used occasionally according to the essence, and its meaning is that
every possible individual that, were it to exist, would be a C, would be a B
under the same assumption (that is, that it were to exist); in other words,
everything that is an implicant of C is an implicant of B. And occasionally it is
used according to external existence, and its meaning is that every C in exter-
nal existence, whether at the time of the judgment or before it or after it, is B
in external existence.

31 31
 ‫أّ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ق ة‬
‫ا لم�����ا �ل�� ا � ث�ل��ا ن�ي��� ‪ -‬ا �ل�������ص�ل ال�ول‬

‫ّ ت ف خ‬ ‫ش‬ ‫ف نّ‬ ‫ي�ن �ظ‬ ‫ف ق ي�ن‬

‫وا �ل����ر� ب��� الا�عت�� ب���ا ر � �ا �هر ���إ ��ه �لو لم �يو ج��د ����ي ء �م��ن ا ل�مر ب��ع�ا � �ي� ا �ل��ا ر�ج‬
‫ن ث ن‬ ‫أّ‬ ‫ّ ّ‬ ‫ّ أن‬
‫‪٤٦‬‬
‫ف‬ ‫ت‬
‫��ل ب�ا لا�ع�� ب���ا ر ال�ول د و� ا ��ل��ا �ي� و�لو لم �يو ج��د �ي�‬ ‫كل �مر ب� �ش�� ك�‬‫�ل���ص�� � � ي���ق���ا ل �‬
‫� ت �ث ن‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ّأ‬ ‫ّع ّ‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ح‬
‫�‬ ‫ل‬ ‫�‬ ‫ش‬
‫كل ��� ك‬
‫��ل �مر ب�ع ب�ا اع�� ب���ا ر ا �ل��ا ي�‬ ‫�‬ ‫ل‬
‫��ا ل �إ ا ا �مر ب� ل���ص�� � � ي������ا ل �‬‫ل‬ ‫�خ�ا ر ج� �م� ���� ك‬
‫�‬ ‫ش‬ ‫ال‬ ‫�ن‬ ‫ا �ل‬
‫ع ح‬ ‫ن ّأ‬
‫د و� ال�ول‪.‬‬
‫ق‬
‫� ا ��لب��ا �ي����ة‪.‬‬ ‫ح���ص ا ت‬ ‫�ذ ق‬
‫ف‬
‫‪٤٧‬‬ ‫وع��لى �ه� ا �������س ا لم��� ور‬

‫كا ن� �ج�ز ءًا �م��ن‬ ‫ن‬

‫�ر�� ا �ل��س�ل� ب� �إ � �‬
‫ف‬
‫ح���� ��صي���ل ح‬ ‫ح� ث� ا �ل����ث�ا �ل� ث� ف�� ا �ل���ع�د ول وا �لت�����‬ ‫ا �ل ب�����‬
‫أ‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ي‬
‫ق‬ ‫�ق � ن ا� ّ‬
‫‪٤٨‬‬

‫�����و��لن��ا ا �جل����م�ا د لاع�ا ل � و �م ن����ه���م�ا‬ ‫ح���مول ك‬ ‫� �ج �م�ا د � و �م��ن ا لم���‬ ‫�‬

‫� وع ك����و�ل��ا ا ل�ل حي‬ ‫ا لمو �ض‬
‫م‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ّ‬
‫ً‬
‫���ن �ج�ز ء ا � ش‬ ‫ن‬
‫كا ن� ت� � و ��س�ا ��لب���ة و�إ� ل ي� ك‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ة‬ ‫�م���عً�ا ‪�� ١‬س � � ت ا �ل���ق �ض ّ ة‬
‫ل��� ء‬ ‫�� ي���� �م�ع�د و�ل�� �مو ج� ب���� �‬ ‫م �ي � ��‬ ‫�ج ي‬
‫�ي‬ ‫م‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬
‫ة ن‬ ‫ة‬ ‫� ة ن‬
‫كا ن� ت� ��س�ا ��لب���ة‪.‬‬ ‫كا ن� ت� �مو ج� ب���� وب�����سي����ط�� �إ � �‬ ‫ح���ص�ل�� �إ � �‬ ‫�م ن����ه���م�ا ��سم��ي� ت� م‬
‫ف‬ ‫ّة‬ ‫�ن ة �ث ت ّ ة‬ ‫ا �ل���ق �ض ّ ة‬ ‫والا�عت�� ب���ا ر ب� ي ج�‬
‫�� ي���� و��س��لب���ه�ا ب�ا �ل�����سب���� ا �ل� ��بو�ي��� وا �ل��س�ل��بي���� لا ب���طر �ي�‬ ‫��ا ب� ��‬ ‫�إ‬
‫أ‬
‫� ّ ف� ل ل � ة � نّ ف‬ ‫�ق ّ ة ف� نّ �ق ن ّ‬
‫‪٤٩‬‬
‫�ّ ن‬ ‫�‬
‫ي�ه�ا ع�د مي���ا �‬ ‫كل �م�ا �ل��ي��س بح� ���هو ا ع�ا مو ج� ب���� م � � طر ���‬ ‫�� ي���� ��إ � و��ل��ا �‬ ‫ا �ل�� ���ض‬
‫ع‬ ‫م‬ ‫ي‬
‫� ّ ن‬ ‫��ن ��ل ة � أ نّ ف‬ ‫و�و��لن��ا لا �ش���ي ء �م��ن ا لمت����ح‬
‫ق‬
‫ي�ه�ا و ج ود ي�ا �‪.‬‬ ‫� ّرك ب���س�ا ك� ��س�ا ب��� م � � طر����‬
‫ع‬ ‫أ‬
‫ق‬ ‫وا �ل��س�ا ��لب���ة ا �ل��ب����سي����ط��ة � �عّ �م��ن ا لمو ج� ب����ة ا ل��م�ع�د و�ل��ة ا لم���‬
‫ح���مول �ل���ص�د � ا �ل��س�ل� ب� �ع ن���د‬
‫م قّ‬ ‫ّ ّ‬ ‫ف نّ‬ ‫م‬
‫‪١،٥٠‬‬
‫ق‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫�‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ع�د ا لمو �ض‬
‫� وع د و� ال�إ ي ج �ا ب� ��إ � �إ ي ج �ا ب� ا �ي���ص��ح �إ ا ع��لى مو ج ود ‪ ٢‬ح����� م‬
‫كا‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ال‬
‫ف م‬
‫ن‬ ‫�إ�ذ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ف‬ ‫قّ‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫خ‬
‫� و و� �م�ا ا � ا ل �ض‬ ‫ح������������ ا ل �ض‬ ‫ل‬‫�‬
‫كا � ا �‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫ل‬ ‫�‬
‫�ي� ا ��ا ر ج ي���� ا لمو �ض‬
‫كا � مو� وع‬ ‫ي ي مو ع‬ ‫� وع � و �م�����د ر م ي‬
‫ن‬ ‫ً ف ّن‬
‫�مو ج�ود ا ���إ ���ه���م�ا �مت���لا �ز �م�ا �‪.‬‬
‫ة ن ��ُ ّ‬ ‫ا �ل��ف�� ق �� ن��ه� م�ا ف� ا ��� فل���ظ �أ �ّم�ا ف� ا ��لث�� ا ث�ّ���ة ف��ا �ل���ق �ض ّ ة‬
‫�� ي���� �مو ج� ب���� �إ � ��ق�د �م� ت�‬ ‫��‬ ‫ي� ُل ي‬ ‫و ر� ب �ي � �� ي� ل ��‬
‫أ‬
‫� ت �ع ن���ه�ا � �ّم�ا ف� ا �ل��ث ن���ا ئ�ّ���ة ف����ا �ل��ن ّ����ة‬ ‫أ‬
‫ة ن خّ‬
‫‪٢،٥٠‬‬
‫ف‬
‫ي ب ي‬ ‫�ر�� ا �ل��س�ل� ب� و���س�ا ��لب��� �إ � � ر� � و ي�‬ ‫ا �لرا ب���ط��ة ع��لى ح‬
‫�ل��ف���ظ‬ ‫ف �ظ �غ أ‬ ‫�أ �ا لا ص��ط�لا ع�� ت�خ‬
‫��‬ ‫�‬‫ل‬‫�‬ ‫��‬ ‫ل‬ ‫�د‬‫ع‬‫�‬‫م‬
‫�‬‫�‬‫ل‬ ‫ا‬ ‫�‬ ‫ا‬‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫�‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ا‬
‫�‬ ‫ا‬ ‫ل‬ ‫�‬ ‫��‬ ‫��‬ ‫��‬ ‫�‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫ل‬ ‫�‬‫��‬ ‫��‬‫ص‬ ‫�‬
‫�‬‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫�ي س‬ ‫و و‬ ‫ي‬
‫ير و ب �إ ج ب‬ ‫ي ص‬ ‫و ب � ح لأى‬
‫ب�ا �ل��س�ل� ب� ا �ل��ب����سي����ط � و ب�ا �ل�ع�ك��س‪.‬‬

‫ف‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ف‬

‫�����و� ن�ل��ا ا �ل�لا�حي� لا ع�ا ل ‪� : � ٢ .‬م �ض‬
‫� و �مو ج�ود‪.‬‬ ‫‪� :�� ١‬م ن����ه���م�ا �ج �مي���ع�ا ك‬
‫� و ع‬ ‫م‬

‫‪32‬‬ ‫‪32‬‬
 Second Treatise—First Section

The distinction between the two considerations is obvious. Were there no 46

squares in external existence, it would be true to say “every square is a figure”
under the first consideration but not the second; and were there no figures in
external existence other than squares, it would be correct to say “every figure
is a square” under the second consideration but not the first.
On this basis, work out the remaining quantified propositions. 47

The Third Discussion: On the Indefinite and the Determinate If the negative 48
particle is part of the subject (as in “the not-living is inanimate”) or of the
predicate (as in “the inanimate is not-knowing”),9 or of both, the proposition,
whether affirmative or negative, is called metathetic. But if the negative par-
ticle is not part of either term, the proposition is called determinate if it is
affirmative, and simple if it is negative.
The consideration with respect to whether a proposition is affirmative 49
or negative goes to the affirming or negating relation, and not to its two
extremes. “Every not-living is not-knowing” is an affirmative even though
both extremes are privatives; “no moving is at rest” is a negative even though
both extremes are positive.
The simple negative proposition is weaker than the affirmative with an 50.1
indefinite predicate, because the negative is true given the nonexistence of the
subject, but the affirmative is not. This is because affirmation is only correct for
a subject verified to exist (as in propositions whose subject is under an exter-
nalist reading) or assumed to exist (as in propositions whose subject is under
an essentialist reading). If the subject does exist, the simple negative and affir-
mative with indefinite predicate imply each other.
The distinction between the two is in expression. In the three-part propo- 50.2
sition, the proposition is affirmative if the copula comes before the negative
particle, and negative if it comes after it. In the two-part proposition, the
distinction comes down to intention, or technical usage specifying “non” for
metathetic affirmation, and “not” for simple negation, or the reverse.

33 33
 ‫أّ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ق ة‬
‫ا لم�����ا �ل�� ا � ث�ل��ا ن�ي��� ‪ -‬ا �ل�������ص�ل ال�ول‬

‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ف �ق �‬
‫ح���مولا� �إلى‬
‫ت‬ ‫�����ه��ة ‪ ١‬لا ��ب�د �ل �����ن����سب����ة ا لم���‬ ‫�‬‫ح�� ا �لرا ���بع �ي� ا �ل�� ������ض�ا ي�ا ا لمو ج‬
‫ا �ل����� ث‬
‫ب‬
‫ّ ة ن ت �ن ة أ‬
‫‪٥١‬‬
‫ة‬ ‫ض‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ت‬
‫� وع�ا � �م��ن �ك‬
‫كا �ل��� � ا �ل�د ا‬ ‫كا �� ا �ل�����سب���� � و ��س�ل��بي���� �‬ ‫�ي���ي���� �إ ي ج��ا ب�ي��� �‬ ‫ا لمو �ض‬
‫� ر ور و و ّم‬ ‫ّ‬
‫ف �ظ‬ ‫�ك� ف��ّ����ة �م�ا د �ة ا �ل���ق �ض ّ ة‬ ‫ت ّ ت‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ض‬
‫�� ي���� وا �ل��ل���� ا �ل�د ا ل‬ ‫��‬ ‫وا �ل�لا ��ر ور� وا �ل�لا د وا م و���س���مى ��ل�ك ا �ل �ي ي‬
‫���ه��ة ا �ل���ق���ض‬
‫�� يّ����ة‪.‬‬ ‫ع��لي���ه�ا ي���س���ّمى ج�‬
‫أ‬ ‫�ّ‬
‫� ��مه�ا ث ا ث��ة‬
‫ح� ث� �ع ن����ه�ا و�ع��ن � ح ك��ا � �ل �‬ ‫� ا �ل�ع�ا د �ة ب�ا �ل ب�����‬ ‫��ه��ة ا ��لت� � ت‬
‫ر‬ ‫ج‬ ‫�‬ ‫� �ا ي�ا ا لمو ج‬ ‫وا �ل���ق���ض‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ف �ق أ‬ ‫�ي‬
‫‪١،٥٢‬‬
‫����ة‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ف �ق‬ ‫ع��� �م ن���ه�ا �����س����ط��ة �ه ا ��لت� � ق ق ت‬ ‫�ش‬
‫ح����ي��������ه�ا �إ ي ج��ا ب� ��� ��ط � و ��س�ل� ب� ��� ��ط و�م����ه�ا �مر�كب‬ ‫�ي‬ ‫�‬‫ر � ب ي و ّي‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ئ‬ ‫�ه ا ��لت � ق ق ت تت‬
‫��ا ب� و��س�ل��ب ‪ ٢‬وا �ل��ب��س�ا ���ط ����س� ت�‪.‬‬ ‫�� �م��ن ي ج�‬
‫ح����ي��������ه�ا ���ر�ك� ب‬ ‫�‬
‫ُ‬
‫�إ‬
‫ّ‬ ‫و ي� أ �ي‬
‫� ا لم���‬ ‫ة‬
‫� ����ه�ا ����� � ث�� ت‬ ‫ض‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ق‬
‫ال�و لى ا �ل����رور��� ا لم��ط��ل���� و�ه� ا ��لت� ي�‬
‫�‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ض‬
‫ح���مول‬ ‫ح مك ي� ب رور بو‬ ‫ي �ي‬ ‫ي‬
‫ة ّ‬ ‫ً ق‬ ‫أ‬
‫‪٢،٥٢‬‬
‫ض‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ت‬ ‫�ذ‬ ‫ن‬
‫كل‬ ‫�����و��ل��ا ب�ا �ل����رور� �‬ ‫� و �مو ج�ود ا ك‬
‫نع‬
‫� و � و ��س��لب��ه �ع���ه �م�ا د ا ا � ا لمو �ض‬ ‫��لم �ض‬
‫ل ن� و ع‬
‫م‬
‫ح�� ج�ر‪.‬‬ ‫ح��يوا ن� و �ا �ل�ض���رور�ة لا �ش�� ء �م��ن ال ���س�ا ن� ب�‬
‫�‬ ‫�إ ���س�ا ن� �‬
‫�إ‬ ‫�ي‬ ‫ب‬
‫� ف����ه�ا ��د ا ث�� ت‬ ‫ت ُ‬ ‫قة‬ ‫ئة‬ ‫ثنة‬
‫و‬ ‫�‬‫ح���مول �ل�ل�مو �ض‬ ‫� ا لم���‬ ‫ب م بو‬ ‫و‬ ‫ي�‬ ‫ك‬ ‫ح‬‫�‬
‫�‬ ‫ا ��ل��ا �ي��� ا �ل�د ا �م�� ا لم��ط��ل���� و�هي� ا ��ل��ي ي‬
‫ع‬ ‫م‬
‫ً‬ ‫�ً‬ ‫�أ ��س��ل��ه �ع ن���ه �م�ا د ا �ذ ا ت‬
‫‪٣،٥٢‬‬

‫��ا ب�ا و��س��لب��ا �م�ا �م ّر‪.‬‬ ‫ً ث‬

‫� وع �مو ج�ود ا و�م���ا ��ل�ه�ا �إ جي‬ ‫� ا لمو �ض‬
‫م‬ ‫و ب‬
‫ت‬ ‫ث‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ض‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ت ُ‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ة‬
‫ح���مول‬ ‫ي�ه�ا ب�����رور� ��بو� ا لم���‬ ‫� ����‬ ‫حك‬ ‫ا ��لث��ا ��ل��� ا لم���رو��ط�� ا �ل�ع�ا ���م�� و�ه� ا ��ل� ي�‬
‫�‬ ‫ش‬ ‫ث‬
‫م‬ ‫ي �ي‬ ‫أ‬
‫ة ّ‬ ‫���ق�� ��لن��ا �ا �ل�ض‬
‫‪٤،٥٢‬‬
‫ف‬
‫� وع � و ��س��لب��ه �ع ن���ه ب� ش���رط و�ص� و� وع و ب � رور ل ب�‬
‫ت‬
‫�‬ ‫ا‬
‫ك‬‫�‬ ‫ك‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫ك‬ ‫�ض‬ ‫م‬‫ل‬ ‫ا‬ ‫�ل�ل�مو �ض‬
‫أ‬ ‫أ‬
‫��ن ال� ص�ا �‬ ‫��ا ت� ب� ب���س�ا ك�‬ ‫كا ت�بً��ا وب�ا �ل�ض���رور�ة لا �ش�� ء �م��ن ا �ل ك�‬ ‫� ّرك ال��ص�ا ب� �م�ا د ا �‬ ‫�مت����ح‬
‫� بع‬ ‫�ي‬ ‫م‬ ‫ً ع‬
‫كا ت�ب��ا‪.‬‬
‫�م�ا د ا �‬
‫ُ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫م‬
‫ل‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫ل‬ ‫� ����ه�ا ��د ا ث�� ت‬ ‫ف‬ ‫�‬
‫�‬ ‫ف‬
‫ا �ل ا ��ع��ة ا �ل�ع �ّ����ة ا �ل�ع�ا �م��ة �ه ا ��لت‬
‫�‬‫�ض‬ ‫م‬‫�‬ ‫�‬‫ل‬ ‫ل‬ ‫��م‬
‫�‬‫ح‬ ‫�‬
‫�‬ ‫م‬ ‫ا‬ ‫�‬ ‫و ي� �ي ي م ي� ب و بو‬ ‫ك‬ ‫ح‬ ‫�‬
‫و و وع‬ ‫ري‬ ‫رب‬
‫ًم ً‬ ‫أ‬
‫‪٥،٥٢‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ث‬ ‫ف‬
‫� و ��س��لب��ه �ع���ه ب����رط و�ص� ا لمو �ض‬ ‫ش‬ ‫ن‬
‫� و و�م���ا ��ل�ه�ا �إ ي ج��ا ب�ا و��س��لب��ا �م�ا �مر‪.‬‬
‫أ‬ ‫�ث‬ ‫� ف‬ ‫تع ُ‬ ‫ّ‬
‫� وع � و‬ ‫ل‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫ي�ه�ا ب� �بو� ا م��ح���مول ل��مو �ض‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ت‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫� ���‬ ‫�خ�ا �م��س��ة ا لم��ط��قل����ة ا �ل�ع�ا �م��ة و�هي� ا ��ل� يح ك‬
‫�‬ ‫ا �ل‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ّ ّ ن ن ّ‬ ‫م‬ ‫�ي‬ ‫ق‬
‫‪٦،٥٢‬‬
‫ق‬ ‫ق‬
‫كل �إ ���س�ا � �مت�� ن�� ف����س وب�ا ل�إ ط�لا � ا �ل�ع�ا‬ ‫�����و��لن��ا ب�ا ل�إ ط�لا � ا �ل�ع�ا �‬ ‫��س��لب��ه �ع ن���ه ب�ا �ل��ف���ع�ل ك‬
‫م‬ ‫م‬ ‫ن ن ّ‬
‫لا �ش���ي ء �م��ن ال�إ ���س�ا � ب�مت�� ن�� ف����س‪.‬‬

‫�‪�� ،‬س‪ :‬ا لمو ج� ب����ة‪� ٢ .‬ف�‪ :‬ي ج�‬

‫‪� ،‬ف ‪ ،‬ك؛ ت‬ ‫�ّ ة ف‬
‫��ا ب� و��س�ل� ب� �م�ع�ا‪.‬‬ ‫�إ‬ ‫ر �‬ ‫���ه��) �ي�‬
‫‪( ١‬ا لمو ج‬

‫‪34‬‬ ‫‪34‬‬
 Second Treatise—First Section

The Fourth Discussion: On Modal Propositions Inevitably, the relation of a 51

predicate to its subject, whether affirmative or negative, has a certain qual-
ity like necessity, perpetuity, nonnecessity, or non-perpetuity. This quality is
called the matter of the proposition, and the expression signifying it is called
the mode of the proposition.
The modal propositions that are customarily investigated (along with their 52.1
valuations) come to thirteen. Some are simple (those the essence of which
is only affirmation or negation), and some are compound (those the essence
of which is made up of both an affirmation and a negation). There are six
simple propositions.
The first, the absolute necessary proposition, is that in which affirming or 52.2
negating the predicate of the subject is judged to be necessary as long as the
essence of the subject exists, as in “necessarily, every man is an animal” and
“necessarily, no man is a stone.”
The second, the absolute perpetual proposition, is that in which affirming 52.3
or negating the predicate of the subject is judged to be perpetual as long as the
essence of the subject exists. The affirmative and negative examples for the
absolute necessary proposition apply here too.
The third, the general conditional proposition,10 is that in which affirming 52.4
or negating the predicate of the subject is judged to be necessary on condition
the subject is under a description, as in “necessarily, everyone writing moves
his fingers as long as he is writing,” and “necessarily, no one writing keeps his
fingers still as long as he is writing.”
The fourth, the general conventional proposition, is that in which affirming 52.5
or negating the predicate of the subject is judged to be perpetual on condition
the subject is under a description. The affirmative and negative examples for
the general conditional proposition apply here too.
The fifth, the general absolute proposition, is that in which affirming or 52.6
negating the predicate of the subject is judged to be actual, as in “by gen-
eral absoluteness, every man breathes” and “by general absoluteness, no
man breathes.”

35 35
 ‫أّ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ق ة‬
‫ا لم�����ا �ل�� ا � ث�ل��ا ن�ي��� ‪ -‬ا �ل�������ص�ل ال�ول‬

‫ُ‬
‫ي�ه�ا �ا رت���ف���ا ا �ل�ض��� ور�ة ا لم��ط��قل����ة �ع��ن‬
‫� ���� ب ع ر‬
‫� ف‬
‫حك‬ ‫�كن���ة ا �ل�ع�ا �ّم��ة و�ه� ا ��لت� ي�‬ ‫ا �ل��س�ا د ��س��ة ا لمم �‬
‫م‬ ‫�ي‬ ‫ي‬
‫ّ �ة ل � � ن‬ ‫ّ ّ‬ ‫ا �ل ن ا ل خ � ف �ق ��لن ل � � ن‬
‫‪٧،٥٢‬‬
‫ّ‬
‫��ا � ا �ل�ع�ا لا‬ ‫كل ن�ا ر ح�ا ر وب�ا �إ م ك‬ ‫��ا � ا �ل�ع�ا �‬ ‫ج��ا � ب� م����ا ل��� ‪ ١‬ك����و��ا ب�ا �إ م ك‬
‫م‬ ‫م‬ ‫� ّ‬
‫ح�ا ر ب�ب��ا ر د‪.‬‬ ‫�ش�� ء �م��ن ا �ل‬
‫ة‬ ‫ة ّ‬ ‫ش‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ة �لخ ّ‬ ‫ش‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫�ي أ‬
‫كا � ����سب�� ال�و لى ا لم���روط�� ا ��ا �ص�� و�هي� ا لم���روط�� ا �ل�ع�ا �م�� �م‬ ‫�‬ ‫� �م�ا ا ل�مر ب��‬
‫ع‬ ‫ة ّ‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ع‬
‫‪٥٣‬‬
‫ن‬ ‫�ذ‬ ‫ق‬
‫كل‬ ‫�����و��لن��ا ب�ا �ل�ض���رور� �‬ ‫كا ن� ت� �مو ج� ب����ة ك‬ ‫� و�هي� �إ � �‬ ‫ح����س�� ا �ل� ا ت‬ ‫�‬
‫�ي���د ا �ل�لا د وا م ب� أ ب‬
‫م��� ط��ة ع�ا �ّم��ة‬ ‫ة ش‬ ‫ئً ف ت‬ ‫ً‬
‫��ي���ب�ه�ا �م��ن �مو ج� ب���� � رو‬ ‫كا ت�ب��ا لا د ا �م�ا ���ر�ك�‬ ‫� ّرك ال��ص�ا ب� �م�ا د ا �‬ ‫كا ت� ب� �مت����ح‬ ‫�‬
‫ق‬ ‫م‬ ‫ع‬
‫�����و��لن��ا ب�ا �ل�ض���رور�ة لا �ش�� ء �م��ن ا �ل ك�‬ ‫ة ّة ن‬
‫��ا ت� ب�‬ ‫�ي‬ ‫كا ن� ت� ��س�ا ��لب���ة ك‬ ‫و��س�ا ��لب��� �م��ط��قل���� ع�ا �م�� و�إ� �‬
‫ة‬
‫م��� ط��ة ع�ا �ّم��ة �م �����ة‬ ‫����ه�ا �م��ن ��س�ا ��ل���ة � ش‬ ‫� ا ت�ً ل ا ئ�ً ف� ت‬ ‫أ‬
‫ووج ب‬ ‫رو‬ ‫ب‬ ‫ر �ي ب�‬‫�‬
‫�ك‬ ‫��‬ ‫ا‬‫�‬
‫م‬ ‫د‬ ‫ا‬ ‫ا‬
‫�‬‫�‬‫م ب‬‫ا‬
‫ك‬
‫�‬ ‫د‬ ‫ا‬
‫�‬‫م‬ ‫�‬ ‫ا‬‫�‬
‫ص‬ ‫�‬ ‫��ن ال�‬ ‫ب���س�ا ك�‬
‫ّ بع‬
‫�م��ط��قل����ة ع�ا �م��ة‪.‬‬
‫ح����س�� ا �ل��ذ ا ت‬ ‫�‬ ‫فّة ّ ة ق‬ ‫ث ن ة ف ّ ة �خ ّ ة‬
‫�‬ ‫ا ��ل��ا �ي��� ا �ل�عر�ي���� ا ل��ا �ص�� و�هي� ا �ل�عر�ي���� ا �ل�ع�ا �م�� �مع �ي���د ا �ل�لا د وا م ب� ب‬
‫����ه�ا �م��ن �م �����ة �ع ف� ّ����ة ع�ا �ّم��ة ��س�ا ��ل���ة � ط��قل����ة ع�ا �ّم��ة‬
‫‪٥٤‬‬
‫ة فت‬ ‫�ه ن� � ن ت‬
‫و ب م��‬ ‫و ج ب ري‬ ‫كا �� �مو ج� ب���� ���ر�ك��ي ب�‬ ‫و ي� �إ‬
‫�ً‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ن‬
‫كا ن� ت� ��س�ا ��لب��� ��م��ن ‪�� ٢‬س�ا ��لب��� �عر�ي���� ع�ا �م�� و�مو ج� ب���� �م��ط��ل���� ع�ا �م�� و�مث���ا ��ل�ه�ا �إ ي ج��ا ب�ا‬ ‫و�إ� �‬
‫ً‬
‫و��س��لب��ا �م�ا �م ّر‪.‬‬
‫ا ��لث ��لث ة ا � � ّ ة ا � ا ض � ّ ة �ه ا ل ق ة ا � �ّ ة � ق ا � ا ض � �ة‬
‫��ا ��� لو ج ود ي��� ل�ل � ر ور�ي�� و ي� م��ط��ل���� ل�ع�ا م�� مع �ي���د ل�ل � ر ور‬
‫ا ��ذ ا ت �ه ن ن ت �م � ة�ق ��لن ّ ن ن‬
‫‪٥٥‬‬

‫� �ا ح�ك ب�ا �ل��ف���ع�ل لا‬ ‫كل �إ ���س�ا � �ض‬ ‫كا �� و ج ب���� ك����و��ا �‬ ‫ح����س� ب� ل� � و ي� �إ � �‬ ‫ب�‬
‫�‬
‫�كن���ة ع�ا �ّم��ة ن ن� ت ��س�ا ��ل���ة‬ ‫ّ‬
‫��ي���ب�ه�ا �م��ن �مو ج� ب����ة �م��ط��قل����ة ع�ا �م��ة و��س�ا ��لب���ة مم �‬ ‫ة فت‬
‫ب�ا �ل�ض���رور� ���ر�ك�‬
‫كا � ب‬ ‫و�إ� �‬
‫����ه�ا �م��ن ��س�ا ��ل���ة‬ ‫ة فت‬ ‫ن ن‬ ‫ق‬
‫ب‬
‫ض‬ ‫ف‬
‫� �ا ح�ك ب�ا �ل�����ع�ل لا ب�ا �ل����رور� ���ر�ك��ي ب�‬ ‫�����و��لن��ا لا �ش���ي ء �م��ن ال�إ ���س�ا � ب����ض‬ ‫ك‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬
‫�كن���ة ع�ا �م��ة‪.‬‬ ‫�م��ط��قل����ة ع�ا �م��ة و�مو ج� ب����ة مم �‬
‫ح����س� ب�‬ ‫ا �لرا ب��ع��ة ا �لو ج�ود يّ���ة ا �ل�لا د ا ئ�م��ة و�ه� ا لم��ط��قل����ة ا �ل�ع�ا �ّم��ة �م �قي���د ا �ل�لا د وا ب�‬
‫�‬
‫م‬
‫����ه�ا �م��ن �م��ط��قل��ت����ي�ن ع�ا �ّمت����ي�ن‬
‫ع‬ ‫ية أ‬ ‫�ذ ت‬
‫‪٥٦‬‬
‫��ل ة ف� ت‬ ‫� �ه ��س ا ءً � ن ت‬
‫كا �� �مو ج� ب���� � و ��س�ا ب��� ��ر�ك��ي ب�‬ ‫ا �ل� ا و ي� و‬
‫ً‬ ‫ً‬ ‫أ‬
‫�إح�د ا �ه�م�ا �مو ج� ب����ة وال� خ�ر�ى ��س�ا ��لب���ة و�مث���ا ��ل�ه�ا �إ ي ج��ا ب�ا و��س��لب��ا �م�ا �م ّر‪.‬‬
‫أ‬ ‫ُ‬
‫� وع � و‬ ‫ح���مول �ل�ل�مو �ض‬ ‫� ا لم���‬ ‫� ف����ه�ا ��ض��� �ة ث�� ت‬
‫ح مك ي� ب ر ور بو‬ ‫��ا �م��س��ة ا �لوق�ت��يّ����ة و�ه� ا ��لت� ي�‬
‫�‬ ‫ا �لخ‬
‫�ي‬ ‫ي‬
‫��س��ل��ه �ع ن���ه ف� �ق� ت� �م�ع ّ���ن �م��ن �أ �ق�ا ت‬
‫‪٥٧‬‬

‫ح����س� ب�‬ ‫� و �م��ق��يّ���دًا ب�ا �ل�لا د وا ‪ ٣‬ب�‬

‫�‬ ‫� و ج�ود ا لمو �ض‬ ‫و‬ ‫ي‬ ‫ي� و‬ ‫ب‬
‫م‬ ‫ع‬
‫ق‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ف فت‬ ‫‪� ١‬ف�‪ :‬ا لم�� خ��ا �ل��ف� �ل��ل���‬
‫��ي���ب�ه�ا �م��ن ‪� :�� ٣ .‬م �ي���د ا �ل�لا د وا ‪.‬‬
‫�‪��� :�� ٢ .‬ر�ك�‬
‫حك‬
‫م‬ ‫ع‬ ‫م‬

‫‪36‬‬ ‫‪36‬‬
 Second Treatise—First Section

The sixth, the general possible proposition, is that in which the opposing 52.7
absolute necessity is judged to be removed, as in “by general possibility, every
fire is hot” and “by general possibility, no fire is cold.”
There are seven compound propositions: The first, the special conditional 53
proposition, is the general conditional proposition with the restriction of non-
perpetuity with respect to the essence. If it is affirmative (as in “necessarily,
everyone writing moves his fingers as long as he is writing, not always”), it is
made up of an affirmative general conditional and a negative general absolute.
If it is negative (as in “necessarily, no one writing keeps his fingers still as long
as he is writing, not always”), it is made up of a negative general conditional
and an affirmative general absolute.
The second, the special conventional proposition, is the general conven- 54
tional proposition with the restriction of non-perpetuity with respect to the
essence. If it is affirmative, it is made up of an affirmative general conventional
and a negative general absolute; if it is negative, it is made up of a negative
general conventional and an affirmative general absolute. The affirmative and
negative examples for the special conditional proposition apply here too.
The third, the nonnecessary existential proposition, is the general absolute 55
with the restriction of nonnecessity with respect to the essence. If it is affir-
mative (as in “every man actually laughs, not necessarily”), it is made up of an
affirmative general absolute and a negative general possible. If it is negative
(as in “no man actually laughs, not necessarily”), it is made up of a negative
general absolute and an affirmative general possible.
The fourth, the non-perpetual existential proposition, is the general 56
absolute with the restriction of non-perpetuity with respect to the essence.
Whether affirmative or negative, it is made up of two general absolute prop-
ositions, one of which is affirmative and the other negative. The affirmative
and negative examples for the nonnecessary existential proposition apply
here too.
The fifth, the temporal, is that in which affirming or negating the predicate 57
of the subject is judged to be necessary at one specified moment during the
existence of the subject, with the restriction of non-perpetuity with respect
to the essence. If it is affirmative (as in “necessarily, every moon is eclipsed

37 37
 ‫ث ن‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ق ة ثنة‬
‫ا لم�����ا �ل�� ا �ل��ا �ي��� ‪ -‬ا �ل�������ص�ل ا �ل��ا �ي�‬

‫ح���ل ���ة‬ ‫ف ق‬ ‫ة ّ ق‬ ‫ة ق‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ا �ل��ذ ا ت‬

‫كل ��مر �م ن���� خ���س� و�� ت� �ي ول‬ ‫�����و��لن��ا ب�ا �ل�ض���رور� �‬ ‫كا ن� ت� �مو ج� ب���� ك‬ ‫� و�هي� �إ � �‬
‫����ه�ا �م��ن �م �����ة ق�ت��ّ����ة � ط��قل����ة ��س�ا ��ل���ة‬ ‫ئً ف ت‬ ‫أ‬
‫ن ي�ن ش‬
‫و ج ب و ي م�� و ب‬ ‫� ب���ي��ه وب��� ا �ل������م��س لا د ا �م�ا ���ر�ك��ي ب�‬ ‫ال�ر �ض‬
‫خ ف‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ة ش‬ ‫ض‬ ‫ة ق‬ ‫ة ّة ن‬
‫�����و��لن��ا ب�ا �ل����رور� لا ����ي ء �م��ن ا �ل�������مر ب�م ن�������س�‬ ‫كا ن� ت� ��س�ا ��لب��� ك‬ ‫�م��ط��قل���� ع�ا �م�� و�إ� �‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ئً ف ت‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ق‬
‫��ي���ب�ه�ا �م��ن ��س�ا ��لب���ة و�ت��يّ����ة �م��ط��قل����ة و�مو ج� ب����ة �م��ط��قل����ة ع�ا �م��ة‪.‬‬ ‫و�� ت� ا �ل��رب�ي� لا د ا �م�ا ���ر�ك�‬
‫ت ُ‬ ‫ع‬
‫�‬‫�ض‬ ‫م‬‫ل‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬‫�‬
‫ل‬ ‫ل‬ ‫��م‬ ‫�‬‫�‬
‫ح‬ ‫�‬‫�‬‫م‬‫ل‬ ‫ا‬ ‫�‬ ‫� ف����ه�ا ��ض��� �ة ث�� ت‬ ‫ك‬ ‫ح‬‫�‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫�ل‬ ‫ا‬ ‫ه‬ ‫�‬ ‫ا � �� ة ا ل ن ت ش �ة‬
‫���‬‫�‬‫�‬‫��‬ ‫م‬ ‫ل��س�ا د س��‬
‫و و وع‬ ‫ر و ي� �ي ي م ي� ب رور بو‬
‫�أ ��س��ل��ه �ع ن���ه ف� ق�� ت� �غ�� �م�ع ّ���ن �م��ن � ق��ا ت‬
‫أ‬
‫‪٥٨‬‬
‫ً‬
‫� و �م��ق��يّ���د ا ب�ا �ل�لا د وا‬ ‫� و ج�ود ا لمو �ض‬ ‫و‬ ‫ير ي‬ ‫ي� و‬ ‫و ب‬
‫ّ فم‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ّع‬ ‫ق‬
‫ف‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ض‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ت‬ ‫�ذ‬
‫تن‬
‫كل �إ ���س�ا � �م��������س �ي�‬ ‫�����و��ل��ا ب�ا �ل����رور� �‬ ‫كا ن� ت� �مو ج� ب���� ك‬ ‫ح����س� ب� ا �ل� ا � و�هي� �إ � �‬ ‫ب�‬
‫�‬
‫ة قة ّة ن‬ ‫قة‬ ‫ة ت ة‬ ‫ئ فت‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ق‬
‫��ي���ب�ه�ا �م��ن �مو ج� ب���� �م ن���� ش���ر� �م��ط��ل���� و��س�ا ��لب��� �م��ط��ل���� ع�ا �م�� و�إ�‬ ‫و�� ت� �م�ا لا د ا �م�ا ���ر�ك�‬
‫ئً‬ ‫قً‬ ‫ن ن ّ‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ة ق‬
‫�����و��لن��ا ب�ا �ل�ض���رور� لا �ش���ي ء �م��ن ال�إ ���س�ا � ب�مت�� ن�� ف����س و�����ت�ا �م�ا ‪ ١‬لا د ا �م�ا‬ ‫كا ن� ت� ��س�ا ��لب��� ك‬ ‫�‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ة‬ ‫فت‬
‫��ي���ب�ه�ا �م��ن ��س�ا ��لب���ة �م ن����ت ش���ر� �م��ط��قل����ة و�مو ج� ب����ة �م��ط��قل����ة ع�ا �م��ة‪.‬‬ ‫���ر�ك�‬
‫� ف‬ ‫ت ُ‬ ‫�كن���ة ا �لخ ّ ة‬
‫ي�ه�ا �ا رت���ف���ا ا �ل�ض��� ور�ة ا لم��ط��قل����ة �ع��ن‬ ‫���‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫ك‬ ‫�‬
‫ح‬ ‫��ا �ص�� و�هي� ا ��ل��ي ي‬ ‫ا �ل��س�ا ب��ع��ة ا لمم �‬
‫ب ع ر‬
‫ن �خ ّ‬ ‫���ق�� ��لن‬ ‫��ا ن� ا �ل � د ا �ل�ع�د �م���عً�ا �ه ��س ا ءً م ن� ت �م �����ة‬
‫‪١،٥٩‬‬

‫�‬ ‫ا‬
‫�‬‫�‬‫ل‬ ‫ا‬ ‫�‬
‫�‬
‫ا‬ ‫م‬‫�‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ا‬ ‫ا‬‫�‬‫�‬ ‫ك‬
‫ص‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬‫ك‬ ‫كا � و ج ب و ب �إ‬
‫�‬ ‫�ج ي و ي� و �‬
‫ج ّب�ي نو ج و و أم‬
‫�‬
‫��ل ة �ق ��لن ل � � ن ا �لخ � ّ ل �ش�� � �ن ال ن ن‬ ‫ن‬
‫��ا � ��ا ص ا �ي ء م� �إ ���س�ا �‬ ‫كا ت� ب� � و ��س�ا ب��� ك����و��ا ب�ا �إ م ك‬ ‫كل �إ ���س�ا � �‬ ‫�‬
‫أ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫� ت ف ت� � �ن م �ن‬
‫�� ت����ي�ن ع�ا �مت����ي�ن �إح�د ا �ه�م�ا �مو ج� ب����ة وال� خ�ر�ى ��س�ا ��لب���ة‪.‬‬ ‫��ا � ب� ���ر�ك��ي���ب�ه�ا م� م ك‬ ‫ب� ك‬
‫�كن���ة ع�ا �ّم��ة‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫أ‬
‫� �ا ب���ط � ن� ا �ل�لا د وا �إ �ش���ا ر�ة �إلى �م��ط��قل����ة ع�ا �م��ة وا �ل�لا ض��رور�ة �إلى مم �‬ ‫وا �ل���ض‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫م‬
‫‪٢،٥٩‬‬
‫ة‬
‫�� يّ����ة ا لم��ق��يّ���د � ب���ه���م�ا‪.‬‬ ‫�كي� ف��يّ����ة �مت��وا ف���ق��ت� ا �ل ك‬
‫��مي����ة �ل��ل��ق���ض‬ ‫�مت���� خ��ا �ل��ف��ت� ا �ل �‬
‫�ي‬ ‫�ي‬

‫ل��� ط��ّ ��ة‬ ‫ن ف أق‬

‫ا �ل��ف������ �ص�ل ا �ل����ث�ا �ي� �ي� � ����س�ا ا � ش ر ��ي‬
‫م‬
‫أ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ن ً‬ ‫ًّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫أ‬
‫ا �ل�ج�ز ء ال� ّول �م ن����ه�ا ي���س���مى �م��ق���د �م�ا وا ��لث��ا �ي� ت�ا ��لي��ا و�هي� �إ �م�ا �مت�����ص�ل��ة � و �م ن�� ف�����ص�ل��ة‪٢.‬‬
‫أّ ّ ة ف ّ‬
‫‪١،٦٠‬‬
‫ق‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ة‬
‫تق‬
‫ي�ه�ا ع��لى ������دي�ر �ص�د �‬ ‫� �م�ا ا لمت������ �ص�ل�� ���إ �م�ا �ل�ز و�ميّ���� و�هي� ا ��لت� �� �ص�د � ا ��لت��ا لي� ����‬
‫�ذ �ي ّ‬ ‫ّ‬
‫� �ا ���ف� �ّم�ا ا تّ���ف���ا �قّ����ة �ه ا ��ل�ت‬
‫‪٢،٦٠‬‬
‫ة‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ت‬ ‫قة‬
‫�‬
‫ي‬ ‫و‬ ‫ي‬ ‫�إ‬‫و‬ ‫ي‬
‫ت‬ ‫ا لم��ق���د �ل�ع�لا ��� ب���ي ن���ه���م�ا �و ج�� ب� �ل�ك �‬
‫كا �ل�ع��لي��� وا ��ل����ض‬
‫ق �ق � ن ن ن ن ن �يً‬ ‫ّ ت ف‬ ‫ف‬
‫م‬
‫ن �ذ‬
‫كا � ال�إ ���س�ا � ن�ا ط��ق���ا‬ ‫ي�ه�ا لم�� ج�رد �وا � ق� ا �ل�ج�ز ئ���ي�ن ع��لى ا �ل���ص�د � ك����و�ل��ا �إ � �‬ ‫�و� �ل�ك ����‬ ‫ي� ك‬
‫ف��ا �ل‬
‫ح���م�ا ر ن�ا �ه ق�‪.‬‬
‫�‬
‫�ف ؛ ��س�ا �ق��ط��ة �م��ن ت‬ ‫ّ تّ ة أ ن ف ة ف‬ ‫قت‬ ‫ف ف‬
‫�‪ ،‬ر‪�� ،‬س‪ ،‬ك‪.‬‬ ‫�‬ ‫و��� �م�ا‪( ٢ .‬و�هي� �إ �م�ا �م�����ص�ل�� � و �م�������ص�ل��) �ي�‬ ‫‪� :�� ١‬ي�‬

‫‪38‬‬ ‫‪38‬‬
 Second Treatise—Second Section

on the earth’s coming between it and the sun, not always”), it is made up
of an affirmative absolute temporal and a negative general absolute. If it is
negative (as in “necessarily, no moon is eclipsed at the moment of quadrature,
not always”), it is made up of a negative absolute temporal and an affirmative
general absolute.
The sixth, the spread proposition, is that in which affirming or negating the 58
predicate of the subject is judged to be necessary at an unspecified moment
during the existence of the subject, restricted by non-perpetuity with respect
to the essence. If it is affirmative (as in “necessarily, every man breathes at a
given time, not always”), it is made up of an affirmative absolute spread and a
negative general absolute. If it is negative (as in “necessarily, no man is breath-
ing at a given time, not always”), it is made up of a negative absolute spread
and an affirmative general absolute.
The seventh, the special possible proposition, is that in which absolute 59.1
necessity is judged to be removed, both as to the predicate’s existence and its
privation. Whether affirmative (as in “by special possibility, every man is a
writer”) or negative (as in “by special possibility, no man is a writer”), the spe-
cial possible is made up of two general possible propositions, one affirmative
and the other negative.
The guideline regarding these restrictions is that non-perpetuity points to a 59.2
general absolute proposition, and nonnecessity to a general possible proposi-
tion, each disagreeing in quality but agreeing in quantity with the proposition
it restricts.

The Second Section: On the Divisions of the Hypothetical Proposition

The first part of a hypothetical proposition is called antecedent and the second 60.1
consequent. It is either conditional or disjunctive.
The conditional is either implicative or coincidental. In the implicative, the 60.2
consequent is true on the supposition that the antecedent is true due to a con-
nection between the two which necessitates that (as in causality or correla-
tion). In the coincidental, the consequent is true by virtue of the two parts
simply coinciding in being true (as in, “if man is rational, the donkey brays”).

39 39
 ‫ث ن‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ق ة ثنة‬
‫ا لم�����ا �ل�� ا �ل��ا �ي��� ‪ -‬ا �ل�������ص�ل ا �ل��ا �ي�‬

‫ُ‬ ‫أ‬
‫ت ن ف ي�ن ج�ز ئ ف‬
‫ي�ه�ا ب�ا �ل�����ا �ي� ب��� � �ي���ه�ا �ي�‬
‫� ف‬
‫� ����‬ ‫حك‬ ‫ح��ق��ي��ق��يّ����ة و�ه� ا ��لت� ي�‬ ‫و� �ّم�ا ا لم ن�� ����ف��ص�ل��ة ف���إ �ّم�ا �‬
‫��ا �أ ف� دًا �ّم�ا �م�ا ن��ع��ة‬ ‫�ز ً‬ ‫ّ أ ني ن�ي �ذ م‬ ‫ً ق‬
‫‪٣،٦٠‬‬

‫�‬ ‫�����و��لن��ا �إ �‬ ‫� ق � ��ذ‬

‫�إ‬‫و‬ ‫ر‬ ‫و‬ ‫ج‬ ‫و‬ ‫د‬ ‫�د‬‫ع‬‫�‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ا‬ ‫ا‬ ‫�‬‫ه‬‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫و‬ ‫�‬
‫ك‬ ‫�‬
‫ي‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫ا‬
‫�‬‫م‬ ‫�� ب� �م�ع�ا ك‬ ‫ا ل���ص�د � وا ل ك‬
‫ن ّ ن‬‫أ‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ق ف‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ف‬ ‫� ف‬ ‫ُ‬
‫�����و��ل��ا �إ �م�ا � �‬ ‫ي�ه�ا ب�ا �لت�� ن���ا �ي� ب���ي�ن ا �ل�ج�ز ئ���ي�ن �ي� ا �ل���ص�د � ����ق��ط ك‬ ‫� ����‬ ‫حك‬ ‫����م و�ه� ا ��لت� ي�‬
‫ا جع ي‬
‫�ل‬
‫ُ‬ ‫أ‬ ‫م‬ ‫�ي‬
‫� ف����ه�ا �ا �لت�� ن���ا ف� ���ي�ن‬ ‫��ل ّو و�ه� ا ��لت� ي�‬
‫�‬ ‫� ًا � ش��� ًا �ّم�ا �م�ا ن��ع��ة ا �لخ‬ ‫ل��� ء ج�ح‬ ‫� ن� �ه��ذ ا ا � ش‬
‫ح مك ي� ب ي� ب‬ ‫ف �ي‬ ‫ي‬ ‫�إ‬‫و‬ ‫ر‬ ‫ج‬ ‫و‬ ‫ر‬ ‫ي و ف �ي‬
‫�ك‬
‫� أ ل �غ ق‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ن‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ف‬ ‫�ذ‬
‫�و� �ز �ي�د �ي� ا �ل ب����حر � و ‪ ١‬ا �ي�ر�‪.‬‬ ‫�����و��لن��ا �إ �م�ا � � ي� ك‬ ‫�� ب� ����ق��ط ك‬ ‫ا �ل�ج�ز ئ���ي�ن �ي� ا �ل �ك‬
‫ن ت ن ف� ف �ذ ت‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫�ث ا ث ّ‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ّ‬
‫ي�ه�ا �ل� ا �ي�‬ ‫�و� ا �ل�����ا ي� ����‬ ‫� �إ �م�ا �ع ن���ا د ي���ة و�هي� ا ��لت� ي� ك‬ ‫ل‬ ‫كل وا ح�د � �م��ن �ه��ذه ا �ل��‬ ‫و�‬
‫�ي‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ث ة �ذ ة ّ‬ ‫أ‬
‫‪٦١‬‬
‫ف ف‬ ‫ن‬ ‫قّ‬ ‫�ل�ج�ز ئي�ن ف‬
‫ي�ه�ا لم�� ج�ّرد‬ ‫�و� ا �لت�� ن���ا �ي� ����‬ ‫�ور� و�إ�م�ا ا ت���ف���ا �ي����ة و�هي� ا ��لت� ي� ك‬ ‫كا �ي� ال��م���ل�� ا لم� ك‬ ‫ا ��� م‬
‫أ تً ق ق ّ ة أ أ‬ ‫�ي‬ ‫ن أ‬ ‫ت ّ أ‬ ‫تّ ف ق ق ن أ‬
‫كا �ب��ا �‬ ‫ن‬
‫ح����ي����ي���� � ولا � ��سود‬ ‫�و� � ��سود � و �‬ ‫كا � ب� �إ �م�ا � � ي� ك‬ ‫�����و��ل��ا �ل�ل� ��سود ا �ل�لا �‬ ‫الا ������ا � ك‬
‫ن‬ ‫ً‬ ‫أ‬ ‫أ‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ن‬ ‫أ تً‬
‫��ل ّو‪.‬‬‫كا ت���ا �م�ا ��ع��ة ا �لخ‬ ‫ة �‬
‫كا �ب��ا �م�ا ��ع�� ا جل����مع � و � ��سود � و لا � ب‬ ‫�و �‬
‫ف‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ة‬
‫� ب�ه ‪٢‬‬ ‫� �ا ي�ا ا �ل��ث���م�ا � �هي� ا ��لت� ت�ر�� �م�ا ح ك‬ ‫كل وا ح�د � �م��ن �ه��ذه ا �ل���ق���ض‬ ‫و���س�ا ��لب��� �‬
‫ع‬ ‫�ي‬
‫ف� �م �� ت���ه�ا ف���س�ا ��ل���ة ا ��ل�ز �ت��س� ّ ��س�ا ��ل���ة �ل�ز �مّ����ة ��س�ا ��ل���ة ا �ل�ع ن���ا د �ت��س� ّ م��س�ا ��ل���ة‬
‫‪٦٢‬‬

‫��مى ب‬ ‫ب ل وم ��مى ب و ي و ب‬ ‫ي� و ج �ب �‬

‫� ة تّ ف �قّ‬ ‫� ة تّ ف ق ت ّ‬ ‫ّ‬
‫�ع ن���ا د ي���ة و��س�ا �لب��� الا ������ا � ���س���مى ��س�ا �لب��� ا ������ا ي����‪.‬‬
‫ة‬
‫ق‬ ‫كا �ذ ب���ي�ن و�ع��ن جم‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ة ت ق‬ ‫ّ ة‬
‫���هو لي� ا �ل���ص�د �‬ ‫�‬ ‫وا لمت�����ص�ل�� ا لمو ج� ب���� ����ص�د � �ع��ن �ص�ا د ���ي�ن ‪ ٣‬و �‬
‫ّ‬
‫‪٦٣‬‬
‫ق‬ ‫�ذ‬ ‫� ��ذ‬
‫كا ب� وت�ا ل �ص�ا د � د و ن� �ع�ك��س�ه لا�مت�� ن���ا ا ����ست���ل�ز ا‬ ‫�‬ ‫�� ب� و�ع��ن �م��ق���د‬ ‫وا ل ك‬
‫م‬ ‫ّ ع‬ ‫م‬
‫�ذ‬ ‫� �ن �ج�ز ئي�ن �ذ‬ ‫ت ��ذ‬ ‫ق � � �ذ‬
‫كا ب� وت�ا ل‬ ‫كا ب���ي�ن و�ع��ن �م��ق���د �‬ ‫��� �‬ ‫�� ب� ع�‬ ‫��ا ب� و� ك‬ ‫ا �ل���ص�ا د � ا ل ك‬
‫م‬ ‫أ‬
‫�ع��ن ص�ا د �ق��ي�ن �إ�ذ ا ن� ت �ل�ز �مّ����ة � �ّم�ا �إ�ذ ا ن� ت ا تّ���ف���ا �قّ����ة‬ ‫ق‬
‫ي‬ ‫كا �‬ ‫�‬ ‫كا � و ي و‬ ‫�‬ ‫�ص�ا د � وب�ا �ل�ع�ك��س و �‬
‫ح�ا ل‪.‬‬ ‫���ذ ب���ه�ا �ع��ن �ص�ا د ق���ي�ن م‬
‫�‬ ‫� �ك‬
‫ف‬
‫���ذ � �ع��ن‬ ‫�ذ‬ ‫ق‬ ‫� ّة ت ق‬ ‫ا لم ن�� ف�����ص�ل��ة ا لمو ج� ب����ة ا �ل‬
‫‪٦٤‬‬ ‫ت‬
‫كا ب� و� �ك ب‬ ‫ح��ق��ي��ق��ي���� ����ص�د � �ع��ن �ص�ا د � و �‬
‫�ذ‬ ‫ق‬ ‫� ت ق � �ن �ذ‬ ‫ن‬ ‫�قي�ن �ذ‬
‫كا ب�‬ ‫كا ب���ي�ن و�ع��ن �ص�ا د � و �‬ ‫كا ب���ي�ن وا لم�ا ��ع��ة ‪ ٤‬ا �جل���م ����ص�د � ع� �‬ ‫�ص�ا د �� و �‬
‫ع‬
‫ق‬ ‫ي�ن‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ت‬ ‫خ ّ‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ي�ن‬‫ق‬ ‫ت ��ذ‬
‫�� ب� �ع��ن �ص�ا د ��� وا لم�ا ��ع��ة ‪ ٥‬ا �ل��لو ����ص�د � �ع��ن �ص�ا د ��� و�ع��ن �ص�ا د �‬ ‫و� ك‬
‫ل ة ت ��ذ‬ ‫� �ن �ذ ي�ن � ��ل ة ت ق �عّ ت ��ذ‬ ‫ت ��ذ‬ ‫�ذ‬
‫�� ب�‬ ‫�� ب� ا مو ج� ب���� و� ك‬ ‫كا ب��� وا ل��س�ا ب��� ����ص�د � �م�ا � ك‬ ‫�� ب� ع� �‬ ‫كا ب� و� ك‬ ‫و�‬
‫ّ ت ق‬
‫�ع�م�ا ����ص�د �‪٦.‬‬

‫ن‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ف‬ ‫� ��ه) ف� �ف ‪ ،‬ك؛ ت‬ ‫ّ أن‬ ‫ف‬

‫‪� :�� ٣‬ع��ن �ج�ز ئ���ي�ن �ص�ا د ���ي�ن ‪� :�� ٤ .‬م�ا ��ع��ة‪.‬‬ ‫�‪.‬‬ ‫�‪�� ،‬س‪ ،‬ر‪� :‬م�ا ح ك‬ ‫‪ :�� ١‬و�إ�م�ا � �‪�( ٢ .‬م�ا ح ك ب ي� �‬
‫م‬ ‫م‬
‫ّ ت ق‬ ‫ت ��ذ‬ ‫� � ة ت ق �عّ ت ��ذ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ن ة‬ ‫ف‬
‫�� ب� �ع�م�ا ����ص�د � �ع ن���ه ا لمو ج� ب����ة‪.‬‬‫و� ك‬
‫�ع ن���ه ا ل �����ة‬
‫مو ج ب‬ ‫�� ب�‬‫‪� :�� ٥‬م�ا ��ع��‪ :�� ٦ .‬وا ل��س�ا ب�ل��� ����ص�د � �م�ا � ك‬

‫‪40‬‬ ‫‪40‬‬
 Second Treatise—Second Section

The disjunctive is either exclusive, in which it is judged that the two parts 60.3
are mutually incompatible with each other if true together or false together,
as in “this number is either even or odd”; or alternative denial, in which it is
judged that the two parts are incompatible with each other only when both
are true, as in “this thing is either a stone or a tree”; or inclusive, in which it is
judged that the two parts are incompatible with each other only when both are
false, as in “either Zayd is in the water or else he will not be drowned.”
Each of the three kinds of disjunction is either oppositional, in which 61
the mutual exclusion is due to the two parts themselves, as in the examples
above, or coincidental, in which the mutual exclusion just happens to be the
case, as for example by positing someone who is black and not a writer, we
have “this person is either black or a writer” as an exclusive disjunction, or
“not-black or a writer” as an alternative denial, or “black or a not-writer” as
an inclusive.
The negative of each of these eight propositions is that which removes 62
what is judged to be in their affirmatives. So that which negates implication
is called a negative implicative, that which negates opposition is called a neg-
ative oppositional, and that which negates what happens to be the case is
called a negative coincidental.
The affirmative conditional may be true with two true and two false con- 63
stituent propositions; and with two unknown as to truth and falsity; and with
a false antecedent and true consequent (but not the reverse, because it is
impossible that a true proposition entail a false one). The affirmative con-
ditional may be false with two false parts; and with a false antecedent and
true consequent, and the reverse; and with two true propositions (that is, if
it is implicative; if it is coincidental, it is impossible for it to be false with two
true propositions).
The affirmative exclusive disjunctive is true with one true and one false 64
proposition; it is false with two true and two false propositions. Alternative
denial is true with two false propositions, and with a true and a false; it is false
with two true ones. The inclusive is true with two true propositions, and with
a true one and a false one; it is false with two false ones. The negative is true
of that of which the affirmative is false, and false of that of which the affirma-
tive is true.

41 41
 ‫ا لم��ق���ا �ل��ة ا �ثل��ا �ن����ة ‪ -‬ا �ل��ف�����ص� ا �ثل��ا �ل ث‬
‫��‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ي‬
‫أ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ً أ‬ ‫ن‬ ‫أن‬ ‫ّ‬
‫�و� ا ��لت��ا لي� لا�ز �م�ا � و �م�ع�ا ن��د ا �ل�ل�م��ق���د ع��لى �ج �مي�� ال�و �ض‬
‫� �ا‬ ‫ل���رطيّ����ة ‪ � � ١‬ي� ك‬ ‫ك��لّ���ة ا � ش‬
‫أ ع‬ ‫ع‬ ‫م‬ ‫و ي‬
‫ت ت‬ ‫أ‬
‫‪١،٦٥‬‬
‫ن‬ ‫ت‬ ‫��‬
‫ح���ص�ل ب���س�ب�� ب� ا �ق��را � ال��مور‬ ‫� �ا ا ��ل� �‬
‫�‬ ‫ح���صو�ل�ه ع��لي���ه�ا و�هي� ال�و �ض‬ ‫���ن �‬ ‫ا ��لت� ي�م ك‬
‫أ‬ ‫�ي‬ ‫ع‬ ‫ج�ز ئ ّ ة أ‬ ‫�ي‬
‫�ذ‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ت‬
‫�ض �ا‬ ‫ال‬ ‫� �ه��ذه‬ ‫�‬
‫�و� ك� ل�ك ع��لى ب��ع���ض‬ ‫�‬ ‫ت‬ ‫�‬‫ل‬‫�‬
‫�� ا ج �ما ع�ه �م��ع�ه�ا ‪ ٢‬وا �ي��� � � � ك‬ ‫�‬ ‫�ن‬‫ا ��لت� يم ك‬
‫�‬
‫�و� ع‬ ‫أ‬ ‫�ي‬
‫�ن‬‫ّ‬ ‫�ذ‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ة‬ ‫خ‬
‫� �م�عي�� ‪.‬‬ ‫�� �ل ع�� �ض‬ ‫� ك‬ ‫ا لم����� ص ص�� � � ك‬
‫ت ف ن ف ة ئً‬ ‫و � و� � و ّ� ف �ك ّ لى و ّع‬
‫ت ة‬ ‫��س ا ل �����ة ا �ل ك� ّ ة‬
‫‪٢،٦٥‬‬ ‫���لي��� �ي� ا لم�����ص�ل��ك�ل�م�ا و��م�ه���م�ا و�م�ى و �ي� ا لم�������ص�ل�� د ا �م�ا و��سور‬ ‫و ور مّو ج ب‬
‫ق‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫� ��ل ة �ل � ة ف‬
‫�و� وا �ل��س�ا ��لب���ة ا �ل�ج�ز ئ�يّ���ة ��د‬ ‫ي�ه���م�ا �ل��ي��س ا �ل��بت����ة وا لمو ج� ب����ة ا �ل�ج�ز ئ�يّ���ة ��د ي� ك‬
‫���ليّ��� ����‬
‫ا ل��س�ا ب��� ا ك‬
‫ق‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ف‬
‫ة‬
‫��لي� وا ل�م�ه���م�ل�� ب��إ ط�لا �‬
‫��ا � ا �ل ك� ّ‬ ‫�‬
‫�ر�� ا �ل��س�ل� ب� ع��لى ��سور ال�إ ي ج ب‬ ‫�و ن� وب� د خ��ا ل ح‬ ‫لا ي� ك‬
‫ن �إ�ذ ف ّ‬ ‫�إ‬
‫ّ ف‬
‫�ل��ف���ظ�� �لو و�إ� و ا �ي� ا لمت�����ص�ل��ة و�إ�م�ا ‪� ٣‬ي� ا لم ن�� ف�����ص�ل��ة‪.‬‬
‫ّة ق ت ّ‬
‫�� �ع��ن ح�م�ل�ّت����ي�ن و�ع��ن �متّ�����ص��لت���ي�ن و�ع��ن �م ن�� ف�����ص��لت���ي�ن و�ع��ن‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ش‬
‫�ي‬ ‫وا �ل���رطي���� ��د ���ر�ك ب‬
‫�‬
‫ك ّ وا ح�د �ة �م��ن‬ ‫ح�م��لّ���ة �متّ�� ص���ة �ع��ن ح�م��لّ���ة �م ن�� ف�� ص���ة �ع��ن �متّ�� ص���ة �م ن�� ف�� ص���ة‬
‫‪٦٦‬‬

‫��� ل و ��� ل ل‬
‫�‬ ‫و‬ ‫ي و ��� ل و‬ ‫ي و ��� ل و‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ق‬ ‫أ ة ف ّ‬
‫ا ��لث��لا ث���ة ال� خ�ي��ر� �ي� ا لمت�����ص�ل��ة ت�ن�ق����س �إلى ���س���م��ي�ن لا�مت��ي���ا �ز �م��ق���د ��م�ه�ا �ع��ن ت�ا ��لي���ه�ا‬
‫��‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫نّ‬ ‫ف نّ م ّ‬ ‫� ف‬
‫� ��ف��ق��ط‬ ‫�خ�لا�� ا لم ن�� ����ف��ص�ل��ة ���إ � �م��ق���د ��م�ه�ا �إ �م�ا ي�ت�����مي���ز �ع��ن ت�ا ��لي���ه�ا ب�ا �لو �ض‬ ‫ب�ا �ل��ط ب��ع ب‬
‫ع‬ ‫أ‬ ‫أ‬
‫���ه�ا‬
‫ف‬ ‫ّ‬
‫� ����ست����ة و� �م�ا ال��مث���ل��ة ���ع��لي��ك ب�ا ����ست���� خ�را ج�‬‫ّ‬ ‫� ���س�ع��ة ا لم ن�� ف�����ص�لا ت‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ف��أ ق���س�ا ا لمت�����ص�لا ت‬
‫ّ‬
‫و‬ ‫م‬
‫�م��ن ن���ف����س�ك‪.‬‬

‫أ‬
‫ح���ك�ا ا �ل���ق�������ض�ا ي�ا‬ ‫ا �ل��ف������ �ص�ل ا �ل����ث�ا �ل� ث� ف�� � �‬
‫م‬ ‫أي‬
‫ث‬ ‫ف‬
‫و�ي���ه � ر ب�ع م ب���ا ح��‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬

‫� ��يّت���ي�ن ب�ا ل ي ج�‬ ‫ّ أ نّ خ�ت ا�ف �ق‬ ‫ا � � ال أ ّ ف� ا �ت ن �ق‬

‫��ا ب� وا �ل��س�ل� ب�‬ ‫�إ‬ ‫�ض‬
‫��‬ ‫�‬ ‫ل‬ ‫�‬
‫��‬ ‫ا‬ ‫�ه‬‫�‬ ‫�‬‫�‬‫ب‬ ‫ه‬ ‫و‬ ‫�د‬‫�ض ح‬ ‫�‬ ‫��‬ ‫ث ‪� ٤‬ول ي� ل�����ا‬ ‫ل ب����ح��‬
‫�ق ة ال أ خ� � �ذ‬ ‫�ذ ت أ‬
‫‪٦٧‬‬
‫ة‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ق‬
‫كا ب���‪.‬‬ ‫�و� �إح�د ا �ه�م�ا �ص�ا د �� و � رى �‬ ‫ح��ي� ث� ي�����ت������ �ل� ا ��ه � � ت� ك‬
‫ب�‬
‫�‬
‫ّ‬‫ت‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ض�ي‬
‫�ة‬ ‫ف‬
‫� و وت�ن��د ر ج �ي���ه وح�د‬ ‫ح�ا د ا لمو �ض‬ ‫ح��قّ�� ق ‪ ٥‬ف�� ا لم�� خ����صو�� ��صت����ي�ن لا �ع ن���د ا �‬
‫�‬ ‫ولا ي�ت�‬
‫�‬
‫�‬ ‫ع‬ ‫�إ‬ ‫تّ‬ ‫ي‬ ‫�‬
‫ّ‬
‫‪٦٨‬‬
‫�ة ا ��ز � ن ا ل � ن‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ح���م ل ت�ن‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ج�ز‬ ‫ش‬
‫ا‬
‫�و �‬‫�‬
‫�‬
‫ك‬ ‫م‬ ‫ا‬
‫�‬‫م‬ ‫ل‬ ‫�د‬ ‫ح‬ ‫�ه‬ ‫��‬‫�‬
‫و و ر ج� ي و‬ ‫�د‬‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬‫�‬‫م‬‫ل‬ ‫ا‬ ‫د‬ ‫ا‬
‫�‬‫ح‬‫�‬
‫�‬ ‫ا‬ ‫�د‬‫��‬ ‫ع‬‫�‬ ‫ا �ل���رط وا �ل� ء و ل و‬
‫�‬
‫�‬
‫�‬
‫ك‬ ‫�‬
‫ل‬ ‫ا‬

‫�ث ف‬ ‫ف ّ أ‬
‫��س‪� ،‬ف�‪ ،‬ك؛ ��س�ا �ق��ط��ة �م��ن‬ ‫ح��) �ي�‬
‫ف‬
‫ل���رطيّ����ة ا لمو ج� ب����ة‪ :�� ٢ .‬ا ج� ت�ما ��ع�ه�ا �م�ع�ه‪� :�� ٣ .‬إ �م�ا و� و‪( ٤ .‬ا �ل ب����‬‫‪� ١‬ف�‪ :‬ا � ش‬
‫� قّ قَ ت ن ق‬ ‫�‪ ،‬ر‪� ٥ .‬ف�‪ :‬لا ي�ت�‬ ‫ت‬
‫� ‪.‬‬‫ح����� ا �ل�����ا ����ض‬

‫‪42‬‬ ‫‪42‬‬
 Second Treatise—Third Section

Universality for the hypothetical proposition is that the consequent be 65.1

implied by or opposed to the antecedent under all situations in which the ante-
cedent can occur—that is to say, the situations that may arise for the anteced-
ent by reason of being connected with matters that are compatible with it. It
is the same for the particular hypothetical proposition under some of these
situations; likewise for the singular under a specified situation.
The quantifiers for the universal affirmative in the conditional are “when- 65.2
ever,” “whatever,” and “when”; in the disjunctive, “always.” The quantifier for
the universal negative is “never” in both conditional and disjunctive. The quan-
tifier for the particular affirmative is “sometimes” in both, and for the particu-
lar negative “sometimes not” in both (and also for the particular negative by
inserting the negative particle in the quantifier for the universal affirmative).
The quantifier for the indefinite in the conditional is by attaching “were it” and
“if,” and in the disjunctive, “either.”
The hypothetical may be made up of two categorical propositions, or two 66
conditionals, or two disjunctives, or a categorical and a conditional, or a cat-
egorical and a disjunctive, or a conditional and a disjunctive. Each of the last
three divides, if conditional, into two subdivisions, due to the distinction by
nature between their antecedent and consequent. This is in contrast to the dis-
junctive, for its antecedent is distinguished from the consequent only by its
placement. So there are nine divisions of conditionals, and six of disjunctives.
You should extract their forms for yourself.

The Third Section: On the Valuations of Propositions

Containing four discussions

The First Discussion: On Contradiction Contradiction has been defined as a 67

difference between two propositions in affirmation and negation such that it
requires of itself that one is true and the other false.
The contradiction of two singular propositions is only realized when the 68
subjects of both propositions are the same (under which must be considered
unity of condition, and of part and whole), and if the predicates in both propo-
sitions are the same (under which must be considered unity of time, place,
relation, potentiality, and actuality). With respect to two quantified proposi-
tions, there must be, in addition to the above, a difference in quantity (because

43 43
 ‫ا لم��ق���ا �ل��ة ا �ثل��ا �ن����ة ‪ -‬ا �ل��ف�����ص� ا �ثل��ا �ل ث‬
‫��‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ي‬

‫ّ‬
‫خ ف‬
‫ح���صورت���ي�ن لا ب��د �مع �ل�ك �م��ن الا�ت���لا��‬
‫�ذ‬ ‫� �ا ف���ة وا �ل��ق�� ّو�ة وا �ل��ف���ع�ل و ف�� ا لم���‬ ‫وال�إ �ض‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ي‬
‫�و ن� ا لمو �ض‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫���ل���ّ��يت����ي�ن ف�‬ ‫���ذ ب� ا �ل ك�‬ ‫���ّ��مّ����ة �ل���ص�د ق ا �ل�ج�ز ئ���ّ��يت����ي�ن‬
‫ع‬ ‫و‬ ‫�‬ ‫كل �م�ا د � ي� ك‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫ي‬ ‫ك‬ ‫و‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫ب�ا �ل ك ي‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ف أ‬
‫�� ب�‬
‫� ة � ق لم �نتي�ن �ذ‬
‫�� ���� وك‬ ‫��ل ب�ا �جل���ه�� ل���ص�د � ا م ك‬ ‫ي�ه�ا � �عّ  ‪ ١‬ولا ب��د ‪� ٢‬م��ن الا خ�ت���لا�ف� ف�� ا �ل ك�‬ ‫����‬
‫ي‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫م‬
‫�تي�ن ف� � ّ �ة ال � � ن‬
‫��ا �‪.‬‬ ‫ا �ل�ض���ر وري��� ي� م�ا د �إ م ك‬
‫�ة‬ ‫�كن���ة ا �ل�ع�ا �ّم��ة ل�أ نّ ��س�ل� ا �ل�ض�� �ة �م ا �ل�ض‬ ‫ّ‬
‫� ا �ل�ض���رور�ي��ة ا لم��ط��قل����ة ا لمم �‬ ‫فنق‬
‫�‬‫�‬
‫ب� � رور ع رور‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�����ي�����ض‬
‫مّ ت ن ق ن ً‬
‫‪١،٦٩‬‬

‫� �ا � �ج�ز �م�ا‪.‬‬ ‫م�ا ي����ا ����ض‬

‫ق‬ ‫أ‬
‫ك ّ ال� ���ق�ا ت‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫أ‬
‫ّة ن‬ ‫� ة‬ ‫ئ ة‬ ‫نق‬
‫‪٢،٦٩‬‬ ‫� �ه‬ ‫� ي�ن��ا ����ض‬ ‫� ا �ل�د ا ����م�� ا لم��ط��ل���ق�� ا �ل�ع�ا �م�� ل�� ا �ل��س�ل� ب� �ي� �ل و‬ ‫و�����ي�����ض‬
‫ث ت ف‬
‫� ‪� ٣‬ي� ا ��لب��ع����ض ‪ ٤‬وب�ا �ل�ع�ك��س‪.‬‬ ‫ال�إ �ب��ا‬
‫�ة‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ف‬ ‫أ‬ ‫�ن‬ ‫ّ‬
‫ض‬
‫ي�ه�ا ب�ر��ع ا �ل����رور‬ ‫� ����‬ ‫�كن���ة � �ع� ا ��لت� ُح ك‬ ‫حي��� يّ���ة ا لمم �‬
‫م��� وط��ة ا �ل�ع�ا �م��ة ا �ل‬
‫�‬ ‫ش‬
‫� ال ر‬ ‫ون���ق��ي����‬
‫�ض‬
‫م‬ ‫�ي‬ ‫ن�ي‬
‫ا � ف � �ن ا �ل ن ا ل خ � ف �ق ��لن ّ � �ن �ذ ا ت ا �ل �ن � أ ن‬
‫‪٣،٦٩‬‬

‫���ن � �‬ ‫كل م� ب��ه � ج�� � ب� يم ك‬ ‫ح����س� ب� لو�ص� ع� ج��ا � ب� م����ا ل��� ك����و��ا �‬ ‫ب�‬
‫�‬
‫�ق ت � ن م ً‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ف‬
‫� ن��وب�ا‪.‬‬ ‫� � و �ا � كو��ه ج‬ ‫ي���س�ع�ل �ي� ب��ع��‬
‫�ض‬
‫� ف����ه�ا ���ث� ت‬ ‫ح����ن ّ���ة ا لم��ط��قل����ة �أ �ع ا ��لت ُ‬ ‫ون���ق��ي����� ا �ل�ع ف� ّ����ة ا �ل�ع�ا �ّم��ة ا �ل‬
‫ح���مول‬ ‫� ا لم���‬ ‫�ن�ي ��ي م ي� ب بو‬ ‫ك‬ ‫ح‬ ‫�ي ي‬ ‫ري‬
‫أ‬ ‫�ض أ‬
‫‪٤،٦٩‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ث‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ن‬
‫� و و�م���ا ��ل�ه�ا �م�ا �مر‪.‬‬ ‫ص ا ل �ض‬ ‫� ��‬
‫ح���ا‬ ‫� و � و ��س��لب��ه �ع���ه �ي� ب��‬ ‫��لم �ض‬
‫ي � و أ� � مو ع‬ ‫ع���ض‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ل �و أ ّع‬
‫� ب��ع�د‬ ‫كا ن� ت�ك��لّ���ة ف� ن��ق���� ض�� ��ه�ا � ح�د ن���ق�������� �ج�ز ئ���ه�ا �ذ �ل�ك ��� ّ‬ ‫� ���إ � �‬
‫�� ال ك ت ف ن‬
‫و م�ا �مر ب��ا‬
‫جل‬ ‫ي� و‬ ‫ض�ي‬ ‫ي‬ ‫ي� �‬ ‫ي‬
‫ي‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ّ‬
‫ح��ق����ق��� ت � ن ا �ل � د ّ��ة‬ ‫� ون���ق���ا ئ���� ا �ل��ب���س�ا ئ���ط ف�� نّ��ك �إ�ذ ا �‬
‫‪٧٠‬‬

‫� � � و ج و ي�‬ ‫�إ‬ ‫�ض‬

‫كا ت‬ ‫ح��ق���ا ئ� ق� ا ل�مر ب��‬ ‫ال�إح�ا ط��ة ب�‬
‫�‬
‫����ه�ا �م��ن � ط��قل������ت��ي�ن ع�ا �ّمت����ي�ن �إح�د ا �ه�م�ا �م �����ة ال أ خ� � ���س�ا ��ل���ة‬ ‫ئة ت‬
‫ب‬ ‫و ج ب و � رى‬ ‫م��‬ ‫ا �ل�لا د ا �م�� �ر�ك��ي ب�‬
‫ئ خ ف أ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ح��قّ����ق��� ت �أ نّ ن���ق���� ض‬ ‫ئة ت‬ ‫�أ نّ ن���ق����� ا ل ط��قل����ة‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫ل‬ ‫ا‬‫�‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫�‬ ‫ل‬
‫م‬ ‫ا‬ ‫�‬ ‫ا‬ ‫�د‬ ‫ل‬‫�‬ ‫ا‬ ‫ا‬‫�‬‫م‬‫�‬ ‫ا‬‫�‬‫ه‬‫��‬ ‫�‬ ‫��‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫�‬ ‫��‬‫م‬‫�‬ ‫ا‬ ‫�د‬‫ل‬‫�‬ ‫ا‬ ‫�ه‬ ‫و � ي���ض م��‬
‫و‬ ‫م‬ ‫� ي � �إ‬ ‫و‬
‫ف‬
‫ا �ل�د ا ئ� ا لموا � ق�‪٥.‬‬
‫م‬
‫ل‬
‫�‬‫�‬ ‫ن ن ت �ج�ز ئ�ّ ة ف� ا ف ف� ن ق ض � �ذ� ن ه ل أنّ ��ذ‬
‫�� � ��ع��� ا ��س‬ ‫����ي� ي� �����ي��������ه�ا م�ا كر �ا � ��ه � ك‬ ‫كا �� ي��� �ل ي� ك‬ ‫و�إ� �‬
‫ي ّب ف ب �ض ج أ نم‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ً‬
‫‪٧١‬‬
‫ض‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ق‬
‫ك وا ح�د �م��ن �����ي������ �ج�ز ئ�ي���ه�ا ب� ا �ل‬ ‫ن‬ ‫�ذ‬ ‫ئ‬ ‫� ن‬
‫ح ق� �ي� �����ي��������ه�ا � �‬ ‫�‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ل‬ ‫�� ب� �‬ ‫ح��يوا � لا د ا �م�ا �م ك‬
‫ك ّ ا ح�د ا ح�د لا خ‬ ‫ض�يأ‬ ‫َّ ي�ن ن ق ع �لج�ز ئي�ن ّ‬
‫��ل �ع��ن‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�د‬ ‫ح‬ ‫ا‬ ‫�د‬
‫��ل و و‬‫ح‬ ‫ا‬ ‫ي�رد د ب��� �����ي������ ا � ��� �ل ك�‬
‫ي و‬ ‫�ي ل و و‬
‫ن ئً‬ ‫ن ئً أ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ف قض�ي ّ‬
‫ح��يوا � د ا �م�ا‪.‬‬ ‫ح��يوا � د ا �م�ا � و �ل��ي�� ب�‬
‫�‬ ‫س‬ ‫�‬ ‫ا‬
‫�‬‫م‬‫�‬ ‫��س‬
‫كل ج م �إ‬
‫‪٧‬‬ ‫�‬ ‫ي�ه���م�ا ‪� ٦‬ي�����ا ل �‬ ‫�� ���‬ ‫ن���ق��ي�����ض‬
‫ف ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫أ‬ ‫أ‬
‫ف‬
‫� ) �ي� ��س‪،‬‬‫ا � ب�ل��ع���ض‬
‫ف‬
‫ال�إ ي ج��ا ب�‪� ( ٤ .‬ي�‬
‫ف‬ ‫ف‬
‫���هت����ي�ن ��لا ب��د‪ :�� ٣ .‬ي�ن��ا �ي���ه‬ ‫‪� ٢‬ف�‪�ّ � :‬م�ا ف�� ا لمو ج�‬ ‫ح���مول‪.‬‬ ‫‪� ١‬ف�‪� � :‬عّ �م��ن ا لم���‬
‫ي‬ ‫م‬
‫�ف ؛ ت‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ئ‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ئ‬ ‫ف ّ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫�ف ‪ ،‬ك؛ ت‬
‫�‪ ،‬ر‪�� ،‬س‪،‬‬ ‫�‬ ‫ي�ه���م�ا) �ي�‬ ‫‪ ٦‬ن(���ق��ي�����ض‬
‫�� ���‬ ‫‪� :�� ٥‬إ �م�ا ا �ل�د ا �م��ة ا لم�� خ��ا �ل��ف����ة � و ا �ل�د ا �م��ة ا لموا ���ق����ة‪.‬‬ ‫�‪ ،‬ر‪� :‬ي� ب��ع���ض‬
‫� �ه‪.‬‬ ‫�‬
‫أف‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫�ف‬ ‫ك‪ :‬ن���ق���� ض‬
‫وا ح�د وا ح�د �م��ن � �را د ا �جل���س ‪.‬‬ ‫ك‬
‫�‬
‫� ل‬ ‫‪:‬‬ ‫‪٧‬‬ ‫ا‪.‬‬ ‫�‬
‫ه‬ ‫��‬
‫ي� �‬‫��‬
‫م‬

‫‪44‬‬ ‫‪44‬‬
 Second Treatise—Third Section

the two particulars are true and the two universals are false in every proposi-
tional matter in which the subject is more general than the predicate). In all
propositions, there must also be a difference in modality (because the two
possible propositions are true and the two necessary propositions are false in
contingent matter).
The contradictory of the absolute necessary proposition is the general pos- 69.1
sible proposition, because the negation of necessity and necessity are certainly
mutually contradictory.
The contradictory of the absolute perpetual proposition is the general 69.2
absolute, because negation at every moment contradicts affirmation at some
moment, and vice versa.
The contradictory of the general conditional is the possible continuing: 69.3
I mean, that in which it is judged to remove the opposing necessity with
respect to the description, as in “everyone afflicted with pleurisy may cough
at times while afflicted.”
The contradictory of the general conventional is the absolute continuing: 69.4
I mean, that in which it is judged to affirm or negate the predicate of the sub-
ject at some of the moments the description of the subject holds; the preced-
ing example serves here too.
Let us turn to compound propositions. If the compound is universal, 70
its contradictory is one of the contradictories of its two parts. This is clear
once you have understood the realities of compound propositions and the
contradictories of simple propositions. So, if you have verified that the non-
perpetual existential is made up of two general absolute propositions, one of
which is affirmative and the other negative, and that the contradictory of the
absolute is the perpetual proposition, then you have also verified that the con-
tradictory of the compound is either the perpetual proposition that opposes
the original in quantity and quality, or the perpetual proposition that agrees
with the original.
If the compound proposition is particular, however, what we have men- 71
tioned will not be sufficient to find a contradictory for it, for “some bodies are
animals, not always” is false, and so are both of the contradictories of its two
parts. The truth in forming the contradictory is to flank a disjunctive with the
contradictories of the two parts for every one of the subjects—that is, each
taken one by one must have both contradictories, so “every body is either
always an animal or always not an animal.”

45 45
 ‫ا لم��ق���ا �ل��ة ا �ثل��ا �ن����ة ‪ -‬ا �ل��ف�����ص� ا �ثل��ا �ل ث‬
‫��‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ي‬

‫ا ��لن� ا ل�� خ��ا �ل��ف����ة‬ ‫�ن‬ ‫ّة ف ة ف‬ ‫ل��� طّ����ة ف� ن��ق����� ا �ل ك� ّ ّ ة‬

‫أّ ش‬
‫‪٧٢‬‬ ‫���لي��� �م ن����ه�ا ا �ل�ج�ز ئ�ي��� ا لموا ���ق���� �ي� ا �جل����س و وع م‬ ‫و� �م�ا ا � ر ي ي���ض‬
‫ف� �ل � ف‬
‫� وب�ا �ل�ع�ك��س‪١.‬‬ ‫�كي�� وا �ل ك‬ ‫ي� ا‬
‫م‬
‫أ‬
‫ح� ث� ا �ل����ث�ا �ن� ف�� ا �ل�ع�ك�� ا �ل���م����ست�� ��ي و�ه �ع���ا ر�ة �ع��ن ج���ع� ا �ل�ج�ز ء ال� ّول �م��ن‬ ‫ا �ل ب�����‬
‫ل‬ ‫و ب‬ ‫و‬ ‫ي ي أ ًس‬
‫ن‬ ‫ً‬
‫‪٧٣‬‬
‫ق‬
‫�� يّ����ة ث�ا ن�ي��ا وا ��لث��ا �ي� � ّولا �م ب���ق���اء ا �ل���ص�د � وا �ل �‬
‫�كي� ف��يّ����ة‪٢.‬‬ ‫ا �ل���ق���ض‬
‫ع‬
‫ّ ن‬ ‫قت ّ ن‬ ‫ّّ ة ف‬ ‫ف ن‬ ‫أّ‬
‫كا ن� ت� ك��لي��� �����سب��ع �م ن����ه�ا و�هي� ا �لو�����ي ت��ا � وا �لو ج�ود ي�ت��ا �‬ ‫� �م�ا ا �ل��سوا �ل� ب� ���إ � �‬
‫���نت���ا ن ا ل ط��قل����ة ا �ل�ع�ا �ّم��ة ل ت�ن��ع� ل �مت�� ن���ا ا �ل�ع� ف� �أ خ� ّ ه�ا �ه ا �ل �قت��ّ����ة‬
‫‪٧٤‬‬

‫ا ك��س ا ع ك��س ي� ����ص� و ي� و ي‬ ‫وا لمم ك � و م��‬

‫ئً‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ق ق‬
‫�ل���ص�د � �و��لن��ا ب�ا �ل�ض���رور� لا �ش���ي ء �م��ن ا �ل��ق�����مر ب�م ن���� خ���س� و�� ت� ا �لت��رب�ي� لا د ا �م�ا‬
‫أ � ّ �ع ت أ نّ‬
‫���ه�ا � ل��‬ ‫��ا ن� ا �ل�ع�ا ّ ا �ل��ذ � �هو � ع ا جل‬
‫�‬ ‫� ا لم ن���� خ���س ف� �ل��ي��س ب���ق�����مر ب�ا ل�إ �م ك�‬ ‫ع��‬ ‫�‬‫�‬‫ب‬ ‫�‬
‫��ذ‬
‫وك�‬
‫أ‬ ‫م‬ ‫أم �ي‬ ‫�ض‬ ‫ب‬
‫� ّ �إ�ذ‬ ‫خ ّ ن‬ ‫ة �إ�ذ ن‬ ‫ض‬ ‫ق‬‫ك �م ن���� خ� ف ف �‬ ‫ّ‬
‫��س� ����هو �مر ب�ا �ل��أ��رور� أو ا لم ي���ع�أك��س ال����� أص لم ي���ع�ك��س ال�عم �لو‬ ‫أ‬ ‫�ل‬
‫ة‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬‫ّ ن‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ن‬
‫ا ��ع�ك��س ال��عّ لا��ع�ك��س ال� خ����ص ل�� لا�ز ال��عّ لا�ز ال� خ����ص ض��رور�‪.‬‬
‫م‬ ‫م‬ ‫م‬ ‫م‬
‫ق‬ ‫ن ئ� ة ّ ّ ة ل أنّ �إ�ذ‬ ‫�أ �ّم�ا ا �ل�ض��� ّ���ة ا �ل�د ا ئ�م��ة ا لم��ط��قل��ت���ا ن� ف�ت�� ن‬
‫�‬ ‫�د‬ ‫ص‬ ‫�‬ ‫ا‬ ‫�ه‬‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫��‬ ‫�‬
‫ي‬‫�ل‬ ‫�‬‫ك‬ ‫��‬‫م‬ ‫ا‬ ‫د‬ ‫�‬ ‫ا‬‫�‬
‫س‬ ‫ك��‬‫�‬ ‫ع‬
‫�‬ ‫��‬ ‫روري و‬ ‫و‬
‫ّل ف‬ ‫ف ئً‬ ‫ة أ ئً‬
‫‪٧٥‬‬
‫�ن‬ ‫ش‬ ‫�ن‬ ‫ش‬ ‫ض‬
‫�‬‫ب�ا �ل����رور� � و د ا �م�ا لا ����ي ء �م� ج� أ ب� ��د ا �م�ا لا ����ي ء �م� ب� ج� و�إ ا � ب���ع���ض‬
‫ةف‬ ‫ض‬ ‫�نت‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ق‬
‫� ب� �ل��ي��س ب� ب�ا �ل����رور� �ي�‬ ‫ب� ج� ب�ا ل�إ ط�لا � ا �ل�ع�ا م و�هو �مع ال��ص�ل ي������ج� ب��ع���ض‬
‫ً‬
‫ح�ا ل‪.‬‬ ‫ا �ل�ض���رورّ���ة ود ا ئ�م�ا ف�� ا �ل�د ا ئ�م��ة و�هو م‬
‫�‬
‫ي‬ ‫أ ي‬
‫ق‬ ‫ن � ف� ّ ة ّ ة ّ ّ ة ل أنّ �إ�ذ‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ف‬
‫�‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ف� ّ ة ّ‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ش‬ ‫ّ‬
‫و� �م�ا ا لم���روط�� وا �ل�عر ي���� ا �ل�ع�ا �م���ا � �����ع�ك��س�ا � عر ي���� ع�ا �م��ك��لي��� � ��ه ا �ص�د �‬
‫ف ئً‬ ‫ة أ ئً‬
‫‪١،٧٦‬‬

‫ب�ا �ل�ض���رور� � و د ا �م�ا لا �ش���ي ء �م��ن ج ب� �م�ا د ا ج ��د ا �م�ا لا �ش���ي ء �م��ن ب� ج �م�ا‬
‫�‬ ‫م� أ‬ ‫�‬
‫��‬ ‫�‬‫ل‬‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫ع��‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬‫�‬‫ت‬
‫��‬
‫��ن‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫ص‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬‫ال‬ ‫م‬ ‫�‬ ‫�ه‬ ‫�‬ ‫�ه‬ ‫د ا � ّلا ف����ع��� � ح��ي�ن‬
‫س‬ ‫�ي‬ ‫ب‬ ‫�ض‬ ‫ب‬ ‫ج‬
‫ل �‬ ‫ي‬ ‫ع‬ ‫و‬ ‫و‬ ‫ب‬ ‫و‬ ‫م ب و�إ ب �ض ب ج�‬
‫ح�ا ل‪.‬‬ ‫� ح��ي�ن �هو � و�هو م‬
‫�‬ ‫ب‬ ‫ب أ‬
‫ف‬
‫�‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ئ‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ف‬
‫�‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ف‬
‫�‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ف� ّ ة �لخ ّ‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ش‬ ‫ّ‬
‫� ‪٣‬‬ ‫�‬
‫أ و� �م�ا ا لم���روط�� وا �ل�عر ي���� ا ��ا ��ص���ا � �����ع�ك��س�ا �أ عر ي���� ع�ا �م�� لا د ا �م�� ي� ا ��لب��ع���ض‬
‫ف �أ نّ � �ذ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫� �ّ ا � ف ّ ة ا � �ّ ة ف ن‬
‫‪٢،٧٦‬‬
‫ة‬
‫�� �‬ ‫�و���ه�ا لا�ز �م�� �ل��ل�ع�ا �مت����ي�ن و� �م�ا ا �ل�لا د وا ‪�� ٤‬ل ��ه لو ك‬ ‫م�ا ل�عر�ي���� ل�ع�ا م�� ���ل ك‬
‫م‬
‫ب ‪٥‬‬

‫خ فة ف‬ ‫ا ل ا ف� ق ة ف� ا �ل �ن‬ ‫ف‬ ‫� ن ل خ � ف ة ف� �ل � ف‬ ‫‪( ١‬ا لموا ف���ق����ة ف�� ا �جل‬

‫� ���س ا لم����ا �ل������ �ي�‬
‫ت‬
‫� وب�ا �ل�ع�ك��س) �ي� ك؛ �‪ ،‬ر‪ :‬مو ������ ي� ج‬ ‫�يك�� وا �ل ك‬ ‫� ��ن��س وا �ل�و ا م����ا ل������ ي� ا‬ ‫ي‬
‫م‬ ‫ع‬
‫ت‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ح�ا ��ل�ه���م�ا‪ ( ٣ .‬ف�� ا � ب�ل��ع�� ف�‬
‫�يك� ف� ب�‬ ‫�يك� ف��ي����ة وب�ا �ل�ع�ك��س‪� ٢ .‬ف�‪� :‬م ب���ق���ا ء ا �ل���ص�د ق� وا �‬
‫� ‪.‬‬ ‫� ) ي� ��س‪ ،�� ،‬ك؛ �‪ ،‬ر‪� :‬ل� ب�ل��ع���ض‬ ‫�ض‬ ‫ي‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫ل‬
‫ع‬
‫ا �ل �‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ل � ن‬ ‫�ذ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ف‬
‫�‬ ‫ف‬
‫��ا � ا �ل�ع�ا ‪.‬‬ ‫� ب� ج� ب�ا �إ �م ك‬ ‫�� ب� ب��ع���ض‬ ‫� ‪� :�� ٥ .‬لو ك‬ ‫‪ :�� ٤‬ا �ل�لا د وا م ي� ا � ب�ل��ع���ض‬
‫م‬

‫‪46‬‬ ‫‪46‬‬
 Second Treatise—Third Section

The contradictory of the universal hypothetical is the particular that 72

agrees with it in genus and species, but that opposes it in quality and quan-
tity, and vice versa.

The Second Discussion: On Straight Conversion Straight conversion con- 73

sists of placing the first part of a proposition second and the second part
first, with the truth and quality remaining in the converse as they were in
the convertend. 74
Consider the negatives: If the negative is universal, there are seven modali-
ties that cannot be converted—namely, the two temporals, the two existen-
tials, the two possibles, and the general absolute. This is because of the impos-
sibility of converting the strongest of them, the temporal, due to the truth of
“necessarily, no moon is eclipsed at the time of quadrature, not always,” and
the falsity of “some of what is eclipsed is not a moon” by general possibility
(which is the weakest of the modalities), because everything that is eclipsed is
necessarily a moon. If the strongest does not convert, neither does the weaker;
for were the weaker to convert, so would the stronger (because the implicate
of the weaker is necessarily the implicate of the stronger).
The absolute necessary and absolute perpetual propositions convert as a 75
universal perpetual, because if it is of necessity, or always, true that “no C is B,”
then always “no B is C”; were it not the case, then “some B is C” as a general
absolute proposition, and this, together with the original proposition, would
produce “some B is not B by necessity” for the necessary proposition, and
“some B is not B always” for the perpetual proposition; this is absurd.
The general conditional and the general conventional convert as a univer- 76.1
sal general conventional, because if it is of necessity, or always, true that “no
C is B as long as it is C,” then “always, no B is C as long as it is B”; were it not
the case, then “some B is C while B,” and this with the original proposition
produces “some B is not B while B”; this is absurd.
The special conditional and special conventional convert as a general 76.2
conventional, which is non-perpetual-for-some. The general conventional
component of the converse follows because it is the implicate of both the
general conditional and conventional propositions; the component that is

47 47
 ‫ا لم��ق���ا �ل��ة ا �ثل��ا �ن����ة ‪ -‬ا �ل��ف�����ص� ا �ثل��ا �ل ث‬
‫��‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ي‬

‫ا ئ�ً ق ن‬ ‫ش‬ ‫ئً ف‬ ‫ش‬ ‫ق‬

‫كا �‬ ‫�ل���ص�د � لا ����ي ء �م��ن ب� ج� د ا �م�ا �ت�� ن���ع�ك��س ‪ ١‬لا ����ي ء �م��ن ج� ب� د م�ا و��د �‬
‫ف‬ ‫�ذ‬ ‫ّ‬
‫كل ج ب� ب�ا �ل��ف���ع�ل �ه� ا خ���ل�‪.‬‬
‫� �‬
‫ن � ف� ّ ة خ ّ ة أنّ‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫خ‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ئ‬ ‫ج�ز‬
‫كا ن� ت� � ���� ��ا ل ش‬ ‫ن‬
‫��ا ��صت���ا � ���ع�ك��س�ا � عر ي���� ��ا �ص�� ل� ��ه‬ ‫م���روط�� وا �ل�عر�ي���� ا �ل‬ ‫ي‬ ‫و�إ� �‬
‫أن‬ ‫ئً‬ ‫ة أ ئً‬
‫‪١،٧٧‬‬
‫ق ض‬ ‫�إ�ذ‬
‫� ج� �ل��ي��س ب� �م�ا د ا م ج� لا د ا �م�ا و ج�� ب� � �‬ ‫ع��‬
‫�ض‬ ‫�‬ ‫ا �ص�د � ب�ا �ل����رور� � و د ا �م ب‬
‫�‬ ‫ا‬‫�‬
‫ل‬ ‫�م�ا د ا � لا د ا ئ�مً�ا ل�أ نّ�ا ن���ف�� � �ذ ا ت‬ ‫ق‬
‫�ه‬
‫و وع و و‬ ‫�ض‬
‫�‬ ‫م‬ ‫ا‬ ‫�‬ ‫ر �ض‬ ‫� ب� �ل��ي��س ج� أ م ب‬ ‫�ي���ص�د � ب��ع���ض‬
‫ً‬ ‫ف‬
‫� �ا �ل�لا د وا ��س�ل� ب� ا ��لب��اء �ع ن���ه ‪ ٢‬و�ل��ي��س ‪ ٣‬ج �م�ا د ا‬ ‫ج د ��د ج ب�ا �ل��ف���ع�ل ود ب� � �ي���ض‬
‫م‬ ‫�‬ ‫م‬ ‫� ّ �‬
‫ق‬ ‫ف‬
‫كا ن� �ل��ي��س ب� �م�ا د ا‬ ‫��ا �ن ‪ ٤‬ج� ح��ي�ن �هو ب� �� ب� ح��ي�ن �هو ج� و��د �‬ ‫ب� و لا �ل ك�‬
‫م ج�‬ ‫�إ‬
‫ق‬ ‫ف‬
‫�‬ ‫ف‬
‫�‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ل‬‫�‬ ‫ق‬ ‫�إ�ذ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫خ‬ ‫�ذ‬
‫� ب� �ل��ي��س‬ ‫�ه� ا ���ل� و ا �ص�د � ا ��لب��اء وا �ج�يم ع��لي��ه ‪ ٥‬و���ا ي���ا ي���ه �ص�د � ب��ع���ض‬
‫ئً‬
‫ج �م�ا د ا ب� لا د ا �م�ا و�هو ا لم��ط�لو ب�‪.‬‬
‫م‬ ‫�‬
‫��‬ ‫�‬‫ل‬‫�‬ ‫� ان‬
‫��‬
‫ح‬ ‫�‬
‫ل‬ ‫ا‬ ‫�‬‫ع��‬ ‫�‬‫�‬
‫�ة‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�أ �ّم�ا ا ��ل� ا �ق ف�� ا ت������ن�ع�ك�� ل�أ ن�ّ�ه ���� �ص�د ق �ا �ل�ض‬
‫يو � �ي س‬ ‫ي� � ب � رور ب �ض‬ ‫س‬ ‫بو ي� ل‬ ‫و‬
‫ئً‬ ‫�ق ت ت‬ ‫ن‬
‫‪٢،٧٧‬‬
‫ف‬ ‫خ‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ض‬ ‫ن‬
‫� ا �ل�������مر �ل��ي��س ب�م�������س� و �� ا �ل��رب�ي� لا د ا �م�ا �م‬ ‫ب��إ ���س�ا � وب�ا �ل����رور� ب��ع��‬
‫�ض‬
‫ع‬ ‫ع‬
‫���نّ ا � ض � ّ��ة �أ خ�� ّ ا ����س�ا ئ���ط ا �ل �قت��ّ����ة‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ل� � ن‬ ‫�ذ‬
‫وو ي‬ ‫��ا � ا �ل�ع�ا م ‪� ٦‬ل ك ل��� رور�ي �� ص ل�ب‬ ‫�� ب� �ع�ك���س�ه���م�ا ب�ا �إ م ك‬ ‫ك‬
‫ف ت أ نّ‬ ‫كا ت ا ��ل��ا �����ة �مت ل ت�ن��ع�ك��س�ا ل �ن��ع�ك�� �ش‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫�أ خ‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬‫�‬ ‫ع‬‫�‬ ‫ا‬‫�‬
‫م‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ا‬‫�‬
‫ه‬ ‫ن‬
‫���‬ ‫م‬‫�‬ ‫ء‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫�‬ ‫ل‬
‫م‬
‫�‬ ‫ا‬ ‫�‬‫��‬ ‫�‬
‫ر‬ ‫�‬ ‫م ي س �ي‬ ‫ب ي وى‬ ‫ص رب‬
‫ّ ت �ز ن م �لخ ّ‬
‫��ا ��س ا ��ا �ص‪.‬‬ ‫��ا ��س ا �ل�ع�ا �م����س���ل لا��ع ك�‬ ‫ا ن��ع ك�‬
‫ّ‬ ‫م‬ ‫م‬
‫�و ن� ا لم���‬ ‫حت�ما ل ك‬ ‫كا ن� ت� � و �ج�ز ئ�يّ���ة ف��لا ت�ن��ع�ك��سك��ليّ���ة لا�‬
‫أ‬ ‫�أ �ّم�ا ا ل �����ة ف� ك� ّ ّ ة‬
‫ح���مول‬ ‫���لي��� �‬ ‫و مو ج ب‬
‫� �ن ّ ة ق ة أنّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫أ‬
‫� �عّ  ‪ ٧‬و� �ّم�ا ف�� ا �جل‬
‫أ‬
‫‪١،٧٨‬‬
‫ن‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ئ‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ض‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ة‬
‫���ه�� ��ا �ل����رور�ي�� وا �ل�د ا �م�� وا �ل�ع�ا �مت���ا � ت�ن��ع�ك��س حي��� ي��� �م��ط��ل���� ل� ��ه‬ ‫�‬
‫ي‬ ‫م‬
‫ي�ن‬ ‫� ت ال أ ل �ذ� �ة ف‬ ‫ل‬‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ق‬ ‫�إ�ذ‬
‫و‬ ‫�ه‬ ‫��‬‫ح‬ ‫�‬
‫ربع ور ب �ض ب �ج‬ ‫�‬‫ع��‬ ‫�‬ ‫��‬
‫�‬ ‫ك‬ ‫�‬
‫م‬ ‫ا‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫ا‬
‫�‬‫ه‬ ‫��‬ ‫ا‬
‫� ل ج� ب ب ى ج �‬ ‫�د‬‫�إح‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫ك‬
‫�‬ ‫�د‬ ‫ص‬‫�‬ ‫ا‬
‫ش‬ ‫�نت‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ّ ف ش‬
‫ب� و�إلا ��لا ����ي ء �م��ن ب� ج� �م�ا د ا م ب� و�هو �مع ال��ص�ل ي������ج� لا ����ي ء �م��ن �ج‬
‫ً‬
‫ح�ا ل‪.‬‬ ‫�‬‫ج د ا ئ�م�ا ف�� ا �ل�ض���رورّ���ة وا �ل�د ا ئ�م��ة و�م�ا د ا ج ف�� ا �ل�ع�ا �ّمت����ي�ن و�هو م‬
‫م� ي‬ ‫ي‬ ‫ي‬
‫ح����ن ّ���ة ا ل ط��قل����ة‬ ‫�‬‫ل‬‫�‬ ‫أّ‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫�ن‬ ‫�‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ف‬
‫�‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ت‬ ‫� أ ّ �لخ ّ‬
‫ا‬
‫و� �م�ا ا ��ا ��ص���ا � �����ع�ك��س�ا � حي��� ي��� �م��ط��ل���� �م����ي���د � ب�ا �ل�ل د وا � �م�ا ا ي ي م��‬
‫م‬ ‫ف أ‬
‫� �ّ ّ ف �أ نّ � �ذ‬ ‫أّ ق‬ ‫ّ‬
‫‪٢،٧٨‬‬
‫ف ن‬
‫�� �‬ ‫��ل� ��ل ��ه لو ك‬ ‫ي�ه���م�ا و� �م�ا �ي���د ا �ل�لا د وا �ي� ال��ص�ل ا ل ك‬ ‫�و���ه�ا لا�ز �م��ة �ل�ع�ا �مت�����‬ ‫���ل ك‬
‫ي‬ ‫م‬
‫ب ‪٨‬‬
‫�ة‬ ‫ق ن ض‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ج�ز‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ئ ف‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ق‬
‫�� ���م�ه �إلى ا �ل� ء ال�ول �م��ن ال��ص�ل و�هو �و��ل��ا ب�ا �ل����رور‬ ‫كل ب� ج د ا �م�ا � ن�����ض‬ ‫�ل���ص�د � �‬
‫�‬
‫ف‬ ‫ف‬ ‫�ف � � ن‬ ‫ف‬ ‫‪� ١‬ف�‪ :‬ف�ت�� ن���ع�ك�� �إلى‪� ٢ .‬ف�‪ :‬ب�‬
‫��ا � د‪ :�� ٥ .‬ع��لى د‪:�� ٦ .‬‬ ‫� ا �ل�لا د وا ‪� :�� ٣ .‬ل��ي��س د‪ :� ٤ .‬ل ك‬
‫حك‬‫�‬ ‫س‬
‫م‬
‫ف أ‬ ‫م‬ ‫أ‬
‫�ذ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫�ذ‬ ‫ّ‬
‫ف‬
‫� ب� �ل��ي��س ج ب�ا �ل�����ع�ل‪.‬‬‫�� ب� ب��ع���ض‬ ‫�‬ ‫��ا ن� ا �ل�ع�ا ا �ل� ��ي �هو � ا ج���ه�ا �‪� � :� ٧ .‬م� ا لمو �ض‬
‫� وع‪� :� ٨ .‬لو ك‬ ‫�ن‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫�‬
‫ع‬ ‫�‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ل‬
‫�‬‫�‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫�‬
‫ع‬ ‫ب�ا ل�إ �م ك�‬
‫�‬ ‫م‬ ‫م‬ ‫م‬

‫‪48‬‬ ‫‪48‬‬
 Second Treatise—Third Section

non-perpetual-for-some follows because, were it false, “always, no B is C”

would be true, which converts as “always, no C is B”; but it was the case that
every C is B actually. This is absurd.
Turning to the particulars: Both the special conditional and conventional 77.1
convert as a special conventional, because if it is of necessity, or always, true
that “some C is not B as long as it is C, not always,” then “some B is not C as
long as it is B, not always” must be true, because we may expose what under-
lies the subject, C, as D; then D is C actually, and D is also B due to the non-
perpetual rider relative to negating B of C; further, D is not C as long as it is
B (otherwise, D would be C while B, and so B while C; yet it was the case C
is not B as long as it is C; this is absurd). And if B and C are true of D and are
incompatible with each other, it is true that “some B is not C as long as it is B,
not always,” which is what is sought.
The remaining particular propositions do not convert. This is because “nec- 77.2
essarily, some animals are not human” and “necessarily, some moon is not
eclipsed at the time of quadrature, not always” are true, while their converses
as general possible propositions are false. But the necessary proposition is the
strongest of the simple propositions, and the temporal the strongest of the
remaining compound propositions. When they do not convert, neither does
any other proposition, due to what you have learned: the conversion of the
weak entails the conversion of the strong.
The affirmative, whether universal or particular, does not convert as a uni- 78.1
versal due to the possibility that the predicate is more general than the subject.
Turning to modality, the necessary, the perpetual, the general conditional, and
the general conventional convert as an absolute continuing. This is because if
“every C is B” is true under any of the four modalities mentioned, “some B is
C while B.” Were this not the case, then “always, no B is C as long as it is B,”
which, with the original proposition, produces “always, no C is C” in the case
of the necessary and the perpetual, and “always, no C is C as long as it is C” in
the case of the two generals; these conclusions are absurd.
The two specials convert as absolute continuing restricted by non-perpetu- 78.2
ity. The absolute continuing component is due to its being an implicate of the
two generals. The non-perpetuity rider from the original universal proposition
is there because, were it false that some B is not C actually, it would be true

49 49
 ‫ا لم��ق���ا �ل��ة ا �ثل��ا �ن����ة ‪ -‬ا �ل��ف�����ص� ا �ثل��ا �ل ث‬
‫��‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ي‬

‫�ج�ز ث ن‬ ‫ئ�ً ن ّ‬ ‫�نت ّ‬ ‫أ ئً ّ‬

‫�� ���م�ه �إلى ا ل� ء ا ��ل��ا �ي�‬ ‫كل ب� ب� د ا م�ا و����ض‬ ‫كل ج� ب� �م�ا د ا ج� ي������ج �‬
‫�‬ ‫م‬
‫� و د ا �م�ا �‬
‫ش‬ ‫ّ ف �ن‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ش‬ ‫ق‬ ‫أ ً‬
‫� �ا و�هو �و��لن��ا لا ����ي ء �م��ن ج� ب� ب�ا ل�إ ط�لا � ا �ل�ع�ا �ي��� ت����ج لا ����ي ء �م��ن ب� ب�‬ ‫� �ي���ض‬
‫م �‬
‫ّ ف‬ ‫ق‬
‫ح�ا ل‪.‬‬ ‫� ��ي�ن و�هو م‬
‫�‬ ‫ب�ا ل�إ ط�لا � ا �ل�ع�ا �ي���ل�ز ا ج� ت�ما ا ��لن�ق��ي�����ض‬
‫ع‬ ‫م‬ ‫م‬
‫ئً ف‬ ‫ّل � � ن‬ ‫ف‬ ‫�أ �ّم�ا ف� ا �ل�ج�ز �ئ ف�ت�� ف‬
‫��ا � ج� د ا �م�ا �� ب�‬ ‫� وع د ����هولا ج� ب�ا �ل��ف���ع�ل و�إ ا ل ك‬ ‫� ا لمو �ض‬ ‫��‬
‫ي� ر �ض‬ ‫و ي�‬
‫أ‬ ‫ئً‬
‫‪٣،٧٨‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ق‬
‫�� ا �ل�لا ب�ا ط�ل ��ل���ي���د‪ ١‬ال��ص�ل ب�ا �ل�لا د وا ‪.‬‬ ‫ت‬ ‫�ز‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫�ن‬ ‫�‬
‫د ا �م�ا �ل�د وا ا ��لب��اء ب��د وا ا ل�ج�ي �ل ك‬
‫م‬ ‫م‬ ‫م ّم‬ ‫أ ّ مقتّ‬
‫ّ أّ �إ�ذ‬ ‫ّ ف‬
‫و� �م�ا ا �لو�����ي ت��ا ن� وا �لو ج�ود ي�ت��ا ن� وا لم��ط��قل����ة ا �ل�ع�ا �م��ة �ت�� ن���ع�ك��س �م��ط��قل����ة ع�ا �م��ة ل� ن��ه ا‬
‫ك ّ ج � ب��إح�د �ى ا �جل‬
‫‪٤،٧٨‬‬
‫ق‬ ‫ل �ذ ة ف‬ ‫ق‬
‫� ب� ج� ب�ا ل�إ ط�لا �‬ ‫�أور� � ب���ع���ض‬ ‫�خ���م��س ا م� ك‬ ‫� ا �ل‬ ‫��ه�ا ت‬
‫��‬ ‫�ص�د � ّ�ل � ب‬
‫ش‬ ‫�نت‬ ‫ئً‬ ‫ف ش‬ ‫ّ‬
‫ا �ل�ع�ا م و�إلا ��لا ����ي ء �م��ن ب� ج� د ا �م�ا و�هو �مع ال��ص�ل ي������ج� لا ����ي ء �م��ن ج� �ج‬
‫ً‬
‫ح�ا ل‪.‬‬ ‫د ا ئ�م�ا و�هو م‬
‫�‬
‫أ‬ ‫ق نق‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ف�‬ ‫ت نق‬ ‫ن ش �ئ ت‬
‫‪٧٩‬‬
‫� ال� ل‬
‫�‬‫ص‬‫�‬ ‫� ا �ل�ع�ك��س ي� ا لمو ج� ب���ا � ��لي����ص�د � �����ي�����ض‬ ‫أ و�إأ� ������ �ع�ك����س�� �����ي�����ض‬
‫ّ‬
‫� و ال� خ����ص �م ن���ه‪.‬‬
‫ن‬ ‫ّق ف‬ ‫�غ‬ ‫ف� ال ن‬ ‫أ ّ ل �نت ن ف‬
‫��ا ��س وع�د �م�ه ي��ر �م�ع�لوم ��لت�و���� ا �ل��بر�ه�ا �‬ ‫ا��ع ك�‬ ‫� ي�‬ ‫ا‬
‫�‬‫م‬‫��‬‫�‬‫ه‬‫�ل‬‫�‬ ‫ا‬
‫�‬‫ح‬ ‫�‬
‫�‬ ‫و� �م�ا ا مم ك‬
‫�� ���ا �‬
‫ن‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫�ذ‬
‫‪٨٠‬‬
‫نت‬ ‫��ا �� ا �ل��س�ا ��ل���ة ا �ل�ض�� ���ة �ك ف‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ف‬ ‫�ور �ل�لا �ن�ع ك�‬
‫�������س�ه�ا وع��لى �إ ���ا�ج‬ ‫ب � ر أوري‬ ‫ي�ه���م�ا ع��لى ا ��ع ك� س‬ ‫��ا ��س ����‬ ‫ا لم� ك‬
‫�ذ ي�ن ّ‬ ‫��� � ا �ل�ض��� ّ���ة ف� ا � ش‬ ‫ا � �غص� � ا لمم � ن ة‬
‫كل �م ن����ه���م�ا ‪٢‬‬ ‫��ل ال� ّول ا �ل�ل� � �‬ ‫ل��� ك�‬ ‫روري ي�‬ ‫�ك��� �مع ا �ل �ك بر ى‬ ‫ل��� رى‬
‫��ل � � ال ن‬ ‫�ظ ف‬ ‫�غ م قّ‬
‫��ا ��س وع�د �م�ه‪.‬‬ ‫ا��ع ك�‬ ‫ح���� ق� و�ل�ع�د م ا �ل������ر ب��د ي��ل يو ج � ب�‬ ‫ي��ر �‬
‫ّ‬
‫���لّ���ة‬
‫�‬
‫ك‬ ‫ل‬‫�‬ ‫ا‬ ‫ل��� طّ����ة ف��ا ل تّ�� ص���ة ا ل �����ة ‪ ٣‬ت�ن��ع� �م �����ة �ج�ز ئ�ّ���ة ا �ل��س�ا ��ل���ة‬
‫ك��‬ ‫م‬ ‫ل‬ ‫�‬‫��‬ ‫م‬ ‫�أ �ّم�ا ا � ش‬
‫ي‬ ‫ي و ب‬ ‫س وج‬ ‫وج ب‬ ‫و ّ ر ي‬
‫ق ً �ن ت ً‬ ‫بأ‬
‫‪٨١‬‬
‫�ظ‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ة ّ ة �إ�ذ‬
‫ح�ا ل‬ ‫� ا �ل�ع�ك��س لا ����� �م ال��ص�ل �ي���ا ��س�ا �م� ���� ج��ا �ل�ل�م���‬ ‫��س�ا ��لب���ك��لي��� �لو �ص�د � �����ي����‬
‫�ض‬
‫ن �ذ � ً‬ ‫ق مع‬ ‫أّ‬
‫ن �إ�ذ‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ف‬
‫ح��يوا ن�ا‬ ‫كا � �ه� ا‬ ‫�و� ا �‬ ‫و� �م�ا ا �ل��س�ا ��لب���ة ا �ل�ج�ز ئ�يّ���ة ��لا ت�ن��ع�ك��س �ل���ص�د � �و��لن��ا ��د لا ي� ك‬
‫ف‬ ‫ة ف ُ‬ ‫أّ‬ ‫ن ن � �ذ‬ ‫ف‬
‫ي�ه�ا ا �ل�ع�ك��س �ل�ع�د‬ ‫�� ب� ا �ل�ع�ك��س و� �م�ا ا لم ن�� ف�����ص�ل�� ��لا ي�ت����ص ّور ����‬ ‫����هو �إ ���س�ا � م ك‬
‫م‬ ‫ع‬
‫الا�مت��ي���ا �ز ب���ي�ن �ج�ز ئ�ي���ه�ا ب�ا �ل��ط ب�� ‪.‬‬
‫ع‬

‫� ال أ ّ ا � ث�ل��ا �ل� ث ا �ل��ذ �ي�ن ّ ا ح�د �م ن���ه� م�ا‪� ٣ .‬ف ‪ :‬ف��ا ل تّ�� ص���ة‬ ‫� ‪�:‬ل��ق�����د‪� ٢ .‬ف�‪ :‬ف� ا � ش‬‫‪ �( ١‬ت�ل�ق��ّ���د) ف� ‪ ، �� ،‬ك؛ ت‬
‫� م ��� ل‬ ‫� ��‬ ‫كل و‬
‫�‬ ‫ل��� ك��ل �ول و � ل�‬ ‫ي�‬ ‫ي‬ ‫ي ي� ر س‬
‫ة‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ئ‬ ‫ج�ز‬ ‫ن ت ّّ ة أ‬ ‫ة‬
‫�‬
‫كا ��ك��لي��� � و �ي���‪.‬‬ ‫ا لمو ج� ب���� ��سواء �‬

‫‪50‬‬ ‫‪50‬‬
 Second Treatise—Third Section

“always, every B is C”; we add this to the first part of the original proposi-
tion (“necessarily or always, every C is B as long as it is C”), which produces
“always, every B is B.” Now add it also to the second part (“no C is B” by a gen-
eral absoluteness), which produces “no B is B” by a general absoluteness; so it
follows that two contradictories are conjoined, and this is absurd.
To convert the particular of the special conditional and special conven- 78.3
tional, expose from the subject C D such that it is actually not C, otherwise it
would always be C, and thus always B due to B’s perpetuity as a function of the
perpetuity of C. But the implicate is false due to the restriction of the original
proposition by non-perpetuity.
The two temporals, the two existentials, and the general absolute convert 78.4
as a general absolute. This is because if “every C is B” is true under one of the
five modalities mentioned, then “some B is C” by general absoluteness. Were
this not the case, then “always, no B is C” would be true and, with the original
proposition, produces “always, no C is C”; this is absurd.
If you wish, you may when dealing with affirmative propositions convert 79
the contradictory of the converse so that the contradictory of the original
proposition (or what is stronger than it) would be true.
The status of the two possible propositions with respect to conversion or 80
its failure is unknown due to the fact that the demonstration mentioned to
prove their conversion depends on the conversion of the negative necessary
proposition as itself, and on the productivity of a possible minor with a neces-
sary major in the first figure, and neither of these can be verified. This in turn
is due to lack of success in finding a proof that requires either that the possible
converts or that it does not.
Affirmative conditional hypothetical propositions convert as particular 81
affirmative, and the universal negative as universal negative; since were the
contradictory of the converse true, it could be ordered with the original as
a syllogism producing the absurd. The particular negative does not convert
because “sometimes not, if this is an animal then this is a man” is true while the
converse is false. Conversion in the disjunctive is inconceivable due to the lack
of distinction between the two parts by nature.

51 51
 ‫ا لم��ق���ا �ل��ة ا �ثل��ا �ن����ة ‪ -‬ا �ل��ف�����ص� ا �ثل��ا �ل ث‬
‫��‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ي‬

‫أّ‬ ‫ة‬ ‫�‬ ‫ف‬

‫ح� ث� ا �ل����ث�ا �ل� ث� �ي� �ع�ك��س ا ��لن�����قي������ض و�هو �ع ب���ا ر� �ع��ن ����ج�ع�ل ا �ل�ج�ز ء ال�ول‬ ‫ا �ل ب�����‬
‫أ‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ن‬
‫‪٨٢‬‬
‫ف� �ل � ف‬ ‫�� ّ����ة ن���ق������� ا ��لث��ا � ا ��لث��ا � ع��ي�ن ال� ّ �م مخ‬
‫�كي��‬ ‫��ا �ل��ف��ت���ه ال��ص�ل ي� ا‬ ‫�م� ا �ل�� ���ض ي ي �ض‬
‫�ن �ق‬
‫ول ع‬ ‫ي� و ي�‬
‫ف ف‬
‫ق‬
‫و�موا ���ق��ت���ه �ي� ا �ل���ص�د �‪.‬‬
‫ّ ف‬ ‫ت ف ن‬ ‫أّ‬
‫كا ن� ت� ك��ليّ���ة �����سب�� �م ن����ه�ا و�هي� ا ��لت� لا ت�ن��ع�ك��س ��سوا ��لب���ه�ا‬ ‫� ���إ � �‬ ‫و� �م�ا ا لمو ج� ب���ا‬
‫�ي‬ ‫ع‬ ‫أّ‬
‫�ة ّ ق ف‬
‫‪١،٨٣‬‬
‫خ ف‬ ‫ق‬
‫كل ��مر ����هو �ل��ي��س ب�م ن�������س�‬ ‫ب�ا �ل�ع�ك��س ا لم����ست��و��ي لا ت�ن��ع�ك��س ل� ن��ه �ي���ص�د � ب�ا �ل�ض���رور �‬
‫ف‬ ‫ئً ن‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ق‬
‫و�� ت� ا �ل��رب�ي� لا د ا �م�ا د و� �ع�ك��س�ه لم�ا �عر�� ت�‪.‬‬
‫ع‬
‫ة أ ئً‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ئ ّ أّ �إ�ذ‬ ‫ئ‬ ‫ّ‬
‫وت�ن��ع�ك��س ا �ل�ض���رور�ي��ة وا �ل�د ا �م��ة د ا �م��ةك��ليّ���ة ل� ن��ه ا �ص�د � ب�ا �ل�ض���رور� � و د ا �م�ا‬
‫ّل ف‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ف��د ا ئ�مً�ا لا �ش‬ ‫ّ‬
‫‪٢،٨٣‬‬

‫�‬‫ع‬‫�‬‫��‬‫ف���ه �ا �ل��ف‬ ‫��‬ ‫�‬‫ل‬‫�‬ ‫ا‬‫�‬

‫م‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫ع��‬ ‫�‬ ‫��‬‫�‬ ‫ا‬ ‫��‬ ‫�‬‫ل‬‫�‬ ‫ا‬
‫�‬‫م‬‫م‬ ‫ء‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫�ي س ب � و� ب ل‬ ‫ج‬ ‫�‬ ‫�ي س ب � و�إ ب �ض‬ ‫ج‬ ‫�‬ ‫�ي‬ ‫كل ج� ب�‬ ‫�‬
‫ّ ة ئً‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ف‬ ‫�نت‬ ‫أ‬
‫� �م�ا �ل��ي��س ب� ����هو ب� ب�ا �ل�ض���رور� �ي� ا �ل�ض���رور�ي�� ود ا �م�ا‬ ‫و�هو �مع ال��ص�ل ي������ج� ب��ع���ض‬
‫ح�ا ل‪.‬‬ ‫ف�� ا �ل�د ا ئ�م��ة و�هو م‬
‫�‬
‫ي‬
‫ق‬ ‫ن � ف� ّ ة ّ ة ّ ّ ة ل أنّ �إ�ذ‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ف‬
‫�‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ف� ّ ة ّ‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ش‬ ‫ل‬
‫أّ‬
‫�‬
‫و� م�ا ا م���روط�� وا ل�عر ي���� ا ل�ع�ا م���ا � �����ع�ك��س�ا � عر ي���� ع�ا م��ك��لي��� � ��ه ا �ص�د �‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ف ئً‬ ‫ة أ ئً ّ‬
‫‪٣،٨٣‬‬

‫كل ج ب� �م�ا د ا ج ��د ا �م�ا لا �ش���ي ء مم�ا �ل��ي��س ب� ج �م�ا د ا‬ ‫�‬ ‫ب�ا �ل�ض���رور� � و د ا �م�ا‬
‫� أ م‬ ‫م�‬ ‫�‬
‫ال‬ ‫�‬ ‫ح��ي�ن‬ ‫�‬‫ف‬ ‫�‬ ‫ّل ف‬
‫ل‬ ‫�‬
‫ص‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫م‬‫�‬ ‫�ه‬
‫و �ي س ب و و ع‬
‫�‬ ‫��‬ ‫�‬ ‫ل‬ ‫�ه‬ ‫ه‬‫��‬
‫�ي س ب � و ج�‬ ‫�‬ ‫��‬ ‫�‬‫ل‬ ‫ا‬‫�‬‫م‬‫�‬ ‫�‬‫�ل��ي��س ب� و�إ ا ب �ض‬
‫ع��‬ ‫�‬ ‫��‬‫�‬
‫ح�ا ل‪.‬‬ ‫ي���نت����ج ب��ع��� �م�ا �ل��ي�� � ف����هو � ح��ي�ن �هو �ل��ي�� � و�هو م‬
‫�‬ ‫س ب‬ ‫ب‬ ‫س ب‬ ‫�أ �ض‬
‫�خ�ا ّ�صت���ا ن ف�ت�� ن���ع�ك��س�ا ن �ع ف� ّ����ة ع�ا �ّم��ة ل د ا ئ�م��ة ف� ا ��ل�� � �أ �ّم�ا ا �ل�ع ف� ّ����ة ا �ل�ع�ا �ّم��ة‬ ‫ّ‬
‫ري‬ ‫ي� ب ع���ض‬ ‫ا‬ ‫� ري‬ ‫و� �م�ا ا �ل � �‬
‫ف� �أ نّ‬ ‫ف� ا ت ل�ز � �ّ تي�ن ّ أ �ّ �ق‬
‫‪٤،٨٣‬‬
‫ق‬ ‫�‬ ‫ف‬
‫�‬ ‫ا‬ ‫�‬
‫� �م�ا‬ ‫ع��‬ ‫�‬‫�‬
‫ي � ب �ض‬ ‫�د‬‫ص‬‫�‬‫��‬ ‫�‬ ‫�ه‬
‫�‬ ‫ل‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫ع��‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�ل‬
‫�ل ����س��� ا م ا ل�ع�ا م���� �إ ي�ا �ه�ا و� م�ا ي ّ و م ي� ب �ض‬
‫ا‬ ‫ا‬ ‫د‬ ‫ل‬ ‫�‬‫ل‬ ‫ا‬ ‫�د‬ ‫��‬
‫ف‬ ‫ً‬‫ئ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ف‬
‫�ل��ي��س ب� ����هو ج� ب�ا ل�إ ط�لا � ا �ل�ع�ا و�إلا ��لا �ش���ي ء مم�ا �ل��ي��س ب� ج� د ا �م�ا �ت�� ن���ع�ك��س لا‬
‫ئً م‬
‫كا ن� لا �ش�� ء �م��ن ج � ب�ا �ل��ف���ع� ب�‬ ‫ق‬
‫� ا �ل�لا د وا‬ ‫حك‬ ‫�‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ب‬ ‫�ي‬ ‫�‬ ‫�ش���ي ء �م��ن ج �ل��ي��س ب� د ا �م�ا و��د‬
‫م‬ ‫م‬ ‫�‬ ‫ّ�‬
‫�ذ خ ف‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ف‬
‫� و �ه� ا ���ل�‪.‬‬
‫ع‬
‫ل‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫كل ج ���هو ل��ي��س ب� ب�ا ل�����ع�ل لو ج ود ا مو �ض‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫�‬ ‫و�ي�ل�ز �م�ه �‬
‫ق‬ ‫ن � ف� ّ ة خ ّ ة ل أنّ �إ�ذ‬ ‫ن ن ت �ج�ز ئ�ّ ة ف� �لخ ّ ن‬
‫�‬ ‫�د‬ ‫ص‬ ‫�‬ ‫ا‬ ‫��ا ��صت���ا � ت�ن��ع�ك��س�ا � عر ي���� ��ا �ص�� � ��ه‬ ‫ي��� �ا‬ ‫كا ��‬ ‫و�إ� �‬
‫ً‬ ‫ً‬ ‫أ‬
‫‪١،٨٤‬‬
‫نف‬ ‫ئ‬ ‫ئ‬ ‫ة‬
‫� وع ‪ ١‬و�هو �ج‬ ‫� ا لمو �ض‬ ‫� ج� ب� �م�ا د ا م ج� لا د ا �م�ا �����ر �ض‬ ‫ب�ا �ل�ض���رور� � و د ا �م�ا ب��ع��‬
‫�ض‬
‫ّ‬ ‫د ف��د �ل��� � �ا �ل��ف���ع� �ل�لا د ا ث�� ت‬
‫� ا ��لب��اء �ل�ه و�ل��ي��س ج� �م�ا د ا �ل��ي��س ب� و�إلا‬ ‫و م بو‬ ‫�ي س ب ب ل‬
‫�ذ‬ ‫م‬
‫ن‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ف‬ ‫�� ن‬
‫كا � ب� �م�ا د ا ج �ه� ا‬
‫م�‬ ‫��ا � ج� ح��ي�ن �هو �ل��ي��س ب� ��ل��ي��س ب� ح�� �هو ج� و��د �‬
‫ي�ن‬ ‫لك‬

‫ف �ذ‬
‫‪ : � ١‬ا ت ا ل �ض‬
‫�و ‪.‬‬
‫� � مو ع‬

‫‪52‬‬ ‫‪52‬‬
 Second Treatise—Third Section

The Third Discussion: On Contraposition Contraposition consists of making 82

the contradictory of the second part of the original proposition the first part
of the derived proposition, and leaving the first part of the original unchanged
as the second part of the derived proposition; the derived proposition differs
from the original in quality but agrees with it in truth.
Consider universal affirmative propositions. Seven of them do not con- 83.1
trapose—namely, those whose negatives do not convert by straight conver-
sion. This is because “necessarily, every moon is not-eclipsed at the time of
quadrature, not always” is true while its contrapositive is not, due to what
you have learned.
The necessary proposition and the perpetual contrapose as perpetual uni- 83.2
versals because, if “necessarily, or always, every C is B” is true, then “always,
nothing that is not-B is C.” Were that not the case, then “some of what is not-B
is C actually,” and this with the original proposition produces “necessarily,
some of what is not-B is B” (in the necessary proposition), or “always . . .”
(in the perpetual proposition); this is absurd.
General conditional and conventional propositions contrapose as general 83.3
conventional universals because, if “necessarily, or always, every C is B as
long as it is C” is true, then “always, nothing that is not-B is C as long as it
is not-B.” Were that not so, then “some of what is not-B is C while not-B”;
this with the original proposition produces “some of what is not-B is B while
not-B,” and this is absurd.
The special conditional and conventional propositions contrapose as gen- 83.4
eral conventional non-perpetual-for-some. The general conventional part of
the contrapositive follows because both general propositions entail it. The
non-perpetual-for-some part follows because “some of what is not-B is C” is
true as a general absolute, otherwise “always, no not-B is C,” which converts
as “always, no C is not-B”; yet it is the case that “no C is B actually” (as a result
of the judgment of non-perpetuity), from which it follows that “every C is
not-B actually” (due to the existence of the subject in the original proposi-
tion); this is absurd.
If the original proposition is particular, then both the special conditional 84.1
and the special conventional contrapose as a special conventional. This is
because if “necessarily, or always, some C is B as long as it is C, not always”
is true, then let us expose part of the subject C as D; D is not-B actually due

53 53
 ‫ا لم��ق���ا �ل��ة ا �ثل��ا �ن����ة ‪ -‬ا �ل��ف�����ص� ا �ثل��ا �ل ث‬
‫��‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ي‬

‫ف‬ ‫�ظ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫خ ف‬

‫� �م�ا �ل��ي��س ب� �ل��ي��س �هو ج� �م�ا د ا م �ل��ي��س‬ ‫���ل� ود ج� ب�ا �ل�����ع�ل و�هو �ا �هر � ب���ع���ض‬
‫ئً‬
‫ب� لا د ا �م�ا و�هو ا لم��ط�لو ب�‪.‬‬
‫ن ن‬ ‫أ‬
‫ح��يوا � �هو �ل��ي��س ب��إ ���س�ا �‬
‫� ن‬ ‫و� �ّم�ا ا ��ل�بوا �ق� ف��لا ت�ن��ع�ك�� �ل���ص�د ق� �قو��لن��ا ب��ع��� ا �ل‬
‫‪٢،٨٤‬‬ ‫�ض‬ ‫س‬ ‫ي‬
‫ن‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ت‬ ‫�ة � �ق‬ ‫ض‬ ‫ف‬ ‫خ‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ض‬
‫� ا �ل�������مر �هو �ل��ي��س ب�م�������س� ب�ا �ل����رور ا لو ��ي���� د و�‬ ‫ب�ا �ل����رور� ا لم��ط��ل���� و�ب�ع���ض‬
‫ف ف‬
‫�ع�ك���س�ه���م�ا ‪ ١‬و�مت�ى ل ت�ن��ع�ك��س�ا ل ي�ن��ع�ك��س �ش���ي ء �م ن����ه�ا لم�ا �عر�� ت� �ي� ا �ل�ع�ك��س ا لم����ست��و��ي ‪.‬‬
‫م‬ ‫م‬
‫ن‬ ‫�ّ�لّ ة ل � ت �أ ن‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ا‬ ‫�ّ�لّ ة ن ت أ �ج�ز ئ�ّ ة ف‬ ‫أّ‬
‫�‬‫ك‬ ‫�‬
‫�ما ل � ي و�‬ ‫ح‬ ‫ا‬ ‫��‬
‫�‬ ‫س ي‬‫ك‬ ‫�‬
‫ك��‬ ‫ع‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬‫�‬
‫� و ي ل‬ ‫��‬‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫ا‬
‫ك‬
‫�‬ ‫��‬‫�‬‫و� �م�ا ا �ل��سوا �ل� ب� ي‬
‫ك‬
‫أّ‬ ‫�خ ّ ت ن � �ن‬ ‫أ‬
‫‪١،٨٥‬‬

‫حي��� يّ���ة �م��ط��قل����ة ل� ن��ه‬ ‫� وع و���ع�ك��س ا �ل�ا ��ص���ا �‬

‫تن‬ ‫ح���مول � �عّ �م��ن ا لمو �ض‬ ‫� ا لم���‬ ‫ن���ق��ي����‬
‫�ض‬
‫م‬
‫�‬ ‫��‬‫لا د ا ئ�مً�ا ن���ف‬ ‫ا‬ ‫د‬ ‫ا‬
‫�‬‫م‬‫�‬ ‫�ن‬‫�‬
‫م‬ ‫�‬ ‫ء‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬‫�إ�ذ ا ص�د ق ا �ل�ض�� �ة �أ د ا ئ�مً�ا لا �ش‬
‫ر �ض‬ ‫ج‬
‫� ب أ م�‬ ‫�‬ ‫ج‬ ‫�ي‬ ‫� � ب� � رور و‬
‫أنّ‬ ‫��‬
‫� ��ع��� � �ق�ا ت‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ف‬
‫� ‪� ٢‬ل��ي��س ب� ل� ��ه‬ ‫� وع د ����هو �ل��ي��س ب� ب�ا �ل�������ع�ل ود ج� ي� ب �ض و‬ ‫ا لمو �ض‬
‫أ‬ ‫أ‬
‫�� ن‬ ‫ف�‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ق ت‬ ‫ف�‬
‫حي���ا �‬ ‫�‬‫� �م�ا �ل��ي��س ب� ����هو ج� ي� ب��ع���ض‬ ‫�ل��ي��س ب� ي� �ج �مي��ع � و��ا � ‪ ٣‬ج� � ب���ع���ض‬
‫ّ‬
‫�ل��ي��س ب� و�هو ا لم�د�عى‪.‬‬
‫ق‬ ‫ة ّ ة أّ �إ�ذ‬ ‫ّ ن ف‬ ‫أ ّ �� ّ ن‬
‫‪٢،٨٥‬‬ ‫و� �م�ا ا �لو��قت����ي ت��ا � وا �لو ج�ود ي�ت��ا � �ت�� ن���ع�ك��س ‪� ٤‬م��ط��قل���� ع�ا �م�� ل� ن��ه ا �ص�د � لا‬
‫ف‬ ‫� ت نف‬ ‫�ش�� ء �م��ن ج � ب��إح�د �ى �ه��ذه ا �جل‬
‫� وع د ����هو �ل��ي��س ب�‬ ‫� ا لمو �ض‬ ‫���ه�ا � ‪����� ٥‬ر �ض‬ ‫� ب‬ ‫�ي‬
‫���ذ ا ت��ّ���ن‬ ‫ك‬‫�‬ ‫�ه‬ ‫ل‬‫�‬‫ط‬‫م��‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ا‬ ‫�ه‬ ‫�‬‫ع‬‫�‬ ‫ف‬
‫��‬‫�‬‫�‬‫ل‬‫�‬ ‫ا‬
‫�‬ ‫ه‬ ‫��‬
‫ف‬
‫�‬ ‫��‬ ‫�‬‫ل‬‫�‬ ‫ا‬
‫�‬‫م‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬‫ع��‬ ‫�‬ ‫��‬‫�‬
‫ف‬
‫د‬ ‫�‬
‫ع‬ ‫�‬ ‫��‬‫�ا �ل��ف‬
‫بي‬ ‫�ي س ب� � و ج� ب ل و و و ب� و‬ ‫ب ل و � ب �ض‬ ‫ج ‪٦‬‬
‫ت‬
‫�و��س �ج�ز ئ�يّ��ا ���ه�ا‪.‬‬ ‫�ع ك‬
‫أ‬
‫ل��� طّ���ا ت �م �����ة ن� ت � ��س�ا ��ل���ة ف���غ��� �م�ع�ل �م��ة‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫أ‬
‫‪٨٦‬‬ ‫ير و‬ ‫كا � و ب‬ ‫و� �م�ا ب�وا �ي� ا �ل��سوا �ل� ب� وا � ش ر ي � و ج ب �‬
‫ن‬ ‫ال ن‬
‫��ا ��س �ل�ع�د ا � �ظل����ف��ر ب�ا �ل��بر�ه�ا �‪.‬‬ ‫ا��ع ك�‬
‫م‬

‫��ّ�لّ���ة ف���ت����ست���ل�ز‬ ‫�ز ش ّ ت أ‬

‫�  � �ّم�ا ا لمتّ�����ص�ل��ة ا لمو ج� ب����ة ا �ل ك�‬ ‫ف‬
‫ح� ث� ا �لرا ���ب �ي� �لوا ا �ل���ر���طي���ا‬ ‫ا �ل ب�����‬
‫م‬ ‫ي‬ ‫م‬ ‫ع‬
‫ّ‬
‫‪١،٨٧‬‬
‫ن ة �لخ ّ �ن ن ق‬ ‫����م �م��ن ع��ي�ن ا لم��ق���د ن���ق������ ت‬ ‫�م ن�� ف�����ص�ل��ة �م�ا ن��ع��ة ا �ل‬
‫�‬‫� ا ��ل��ا لي� و�م�ا ��ع�� ا ��لو �م� �����ي�����ض‬ ‫م ّو ي �ض‬ ‫جع‬ ‫قّ‬
‫ا���ف�����ص�ا ل‪.‬‬ ‫ال ن‬ ‫�ز‬ ‫ت ي�ن‬ ‫ي�ن ت‬
‫ا لم�����د م وع�� ا ��ل��ا لي� �م���ع�ا��ك��س�� ع��لي���ه�ا و�إلا ��لب���ط�ل ا �ل�ل وم و‬

‫ف‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ف‬

‫�ون��ه‪�( ٤ .‬ت�� ن���ع�ك��س) �ي� ر‪�� ،‬س‪ ،�� ،‬ك؛‬ ‫� ن��ه‪� ٣ .‬ف ‪� :‬أ �ق�ا ت‬ ‫ف أ ق ت‬ ‫� ت‬ ‫أ‬
‫‪� ١‬ف�‪� :‬ع�ك���س�ه���م�ا ب�� �عّ ا �جل‬
‫�ك‬ ‫� و‬ ‫���ه�ا �‪ � :�� ٢ .‬و��ا � كو‬ ‫م‬
‫ف‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ق‬ ‫� ت ل �ذ ة ف‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ن‬
‫� �م�ا �ل��ي��س ب� ج ب�ا ل�إ ط�لا � ا �ل�ع�ا ‪ :�� ٦ .‬ج ب�ا �ل��ف���ع�ل �لو ج�ود‬ ‫� ‪:‬ت�ن��ع�ك��س�ا �‪ :�� ٥ .‬ا �جل���ه�ا � ا م� ك‬
‫�ور� � ب���ع���ض‬
‫ت‬
‫�‬ ‫م‬ ‫�‬
‫�و ‪.‬‬ ‫ا ل �ض‬
‫مو ع‬

‫‪54‬‬ ‫‪54‬‬
 Second Treatise—Third Section

to the non-perpetuity of the affirmation of B of it, and is not C as long as it is

not-B (otherwise it would be C while not-B, whereupon D would be not-B
while it is C, yet it is B as long as it is C; this is absurd), and D is C actually; this
is obvious. So “some of what is not-B is not C as long as it is not-B, not always,”
which is what is sought.
As for the rest, they do not contrapose. This is because “some animal is 84.2
not-man” is true by absolute necessity, and “some moon is not-eclipsed” is
true by temporal necessity, yet their contrapositives are not true; since these
two do not contrapose, nor do any of the weaker modals, due to what you
learned in the treatment of straight conversion.
Negatives, whether universal or particular, do not contrapose as universal 85.1
due to the possibility that the contradictory of the predicate is more gen-
eral than the subject. The two specials contrapose as absolute continuing
because, if “necessarily, or always, no C is B as long as it is C, not always” is
true, then let us expose part of the subject as D; D is not-B actually, and C at
some times of its being not-B (because it is not-B at all times of its being C);
so “some of what is not-B is C at some moments it is not-B.” And that is what
is claimed.
The two temporals and the two existentials all contrapose as a general 85.2
absolute. This is because if “no C is B” is true by one of these modalities,
we expose part of the subject as D. So D is not-B actually, and C actually; so
“some of what is not-B is C actually,” which is what is sought. So too we may
prove the contrapositives of the particulars.
As for the rest of the negatives, and the affirmative and negative hypotheti- 86
cal propositions: their status with respect to contraposition is unknown, due
to lack of success in finding a proof.

The Fourth Discussion: On the Implicates of Hypothetical Propositions The 87.1

affirmative universal conditional entails an alternative denial consisting of the
original antecedent and the contradictory of the consequent, and an inclusive
disjunctive consisting of the contradictory of the antecedent and the original
consequent. And they both convert back to the original conditional, other-
wise implication and disjunction mean nothing.

55 55
 ‫ا لم��ق���ا �ل��ة ا �ثل��ا �ن����ة ‪ -‬ا �ل��ف�����ص� ا �ثل��ا �ل ث‬
‫��‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ي‬
‫أ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ح��ق����ق��ّ����ة ف���ت����ست���ل�ز �أ � �متّ�����ص�لا ت‬ ‫أ‬
‫� �م��ق���د ا ث�ن���ي�ن ع��ي�ن � ح�د‬ ‫ب‬ ‫ر‬ ‫ي‬ ‫ي‬ ‫و� �ّم�ا ا لم ن�� ف�����ص�ل��ة ا �ل‬
‫�‬
‫أ م‬ ‫م ع‬
‫ا �ل�ج�ز ئ���ي�ن ت�ا ��ل��ه���م�ا ن���ق������� ال�آ خ� �م��ق�� ّ�د ال�آ خ� �ي�ن ‪ ١‬ن���ق‬
‫‪٢،٨٧‬‬

‫� � ح�د ا �ل�ج�ز ئ���ي�ن وت�ا ��لي���ه���م�ا‬ ‫��‬‫��‬‫��‬

‫ي �ض‬ ‫ر‬ ‫رو م‬ ‫ي �ض‬ ‫و ي�‬
‫آ‬
‫ع��ي�ن ال� خ�ر‪.‬‬
‫ّ ا ح�د �ة �م��ن �غ�� ا �ل���حق����ق��ّ����ة �م����ست���ل�ز �م��ة � �أ خ� � �م �كّ ة‬
‫�����ب�� �م��ن ن���ق������ي���‬ ‫ل�ل رى ر‬ ‫يي‬ ‫ير‬ ‫كل و‬ ‫و�‬
‫ض�ي‬
‫‪٣،٨٧‬‬

‫ا �ل�ج�ز ئ�ي�� ن�‪.‬‬

‫ت آ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ق ّ آ خ ي�ن ف‬
‫�‪ ،‬ر‪ � :‬خ�ر�ي�ن ‪.‬‬ ‫��‪ ،‬ك؛‬ ‫‪�( ١‬م�����د م ال��ر� ) �ي�‬

‫‪56‬‬ ‫‪56‬‬
 Second Treatise—Third Section

The exclusive disjunctive entails four conditional propositions. The ante- 87.2
cedent of two of them is one of the two parts of the original proposition
unchanged, each with a consequent that is the contradictory of the other part.
The antecedent of the other two conditionals is the contradictory of one of the
two parts, each with a consequent that is the other part unchanged.
Each of the other two nonexclusive disjunctives entails the other com- 87.3
pounded of the contradictories of the two parts of the original proposition.

57 57
 ‫ق‬ ‫ق ة � ثة ف‬
‫ا �ل����ي���ا ��س‬ ‫ا ل���م���ا �ل�� ا �ل���ث�ا ��ل��� �ي�‬
‫ف �خ ة ف‬
‫ي�ه�ا �م��س�� ����صول‬
‫و����‬

‫أق‬ ‫أ ف ت ف‬
‫ا �ل��ف������ �ص�ل ال� ّول �ي� ��عر���ي� ا �ل�������قي���ا ��س و� ����س�ا ���م�ه‬
‫�ذ ت ق آ‬ ‫�إ�ذ ُ ّ‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ّف‬ ‫ق‬
‫� �ا ي�ا ا ‪�� ١‬س�ل�م� ت� �ل�ز �ع ن����ه�ا �ل� ا ���ه�ا �ول � خ�ر‪.‬‬ ‫ا �ل�������قي���ا ��س �ول �م�ؤ �ل��� �م��ن ����ض‬
‫م‬
‫ق ن ن‬ ‫ت �ث ن �ئ ّ ن ن ي�ن ��لن ت � ة أ ن ق ض � �ذ ً ف‬
‫‪٨٨‬‬

‫�����و��ل��ا �إ �‬ ‫�ورا �ي���ه ب�ا �ل��ف���ع�ل ك‬ ‫كا � ع�� ا �����ي�� ج �� � و �����ي��������ه�ا م� ك‬ ‫و�هو ا ��س��� ���ا ي� �إ � �‬
‫ّ‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ن‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ّ‬
‫‪١،٨٩‬‬
‫ن � �ذ� �ف‬ ‫ً‬ ‫�ذ‬
‫�ّرك و�هو ب��ع��ي���ه م� كور ي���ه‬ ‫�كن��ه ج���س � ��ج� � ن��ه �مت����ح‬ ‫�ّرك �ل �‬ ‫كا ن� �ه� ا ج���سما ف����هو �مت����ح‬ ‫�‬
‫� �ذ� ف‬ ‫م‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ن‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ق‬
‫� �ه م� كور �ي���ه‪.‬‬ ‫���س ون���ق��ي�����ض‬ ‫�ّرك � ��ج� � ن��ه �ل��ي�� ب ج�‬
‫س‬ ‫�كن��ه �ل��ي��س ب�مت����ح‬ ‫و�لو ���لن��ا �ل �‬
‫ث �نت‬ ‫ّ �ؤ ّ ف‬ ‫ّف‬ ‫م‬ ‫ق ن ّ‬ ‫قت �ن ّ ن ل �ن �ذ‬
‫كل �م �ل��� ح�ا د � ي�������ج‬ ‫كل ج���س �م�ؤ �ل��� و �‬ ‫�����و��ل��ا �‬ ‫�� �ل�ك ك‬ ‫�� ك‬ ‫وا ���را ي� �إ � ي� ك‬
‫م‬ ‫م‬ ‫ّ‬
‫‪٢،٨٩‬‬

‫�‬‫� �ذ� ً ف‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ث‬

‫� �ه م� كورا ي���ه‪٢.‬‬ ‫كل ج���س ح�ا د � ول��ي��س �هو وا �����ي�����ض‬
‫ل‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫ُ‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫أ‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫م‬
‫�ق‬ ‫� و ا لم��ط�لو� �ي���ه ���س���م � � �غص�ر و م‬
‫�� ي���� ا ��لت��ي ج���ع�ل� ت�‬ ‫���بر وا �ل�� ���ض‬ ‫ح���مو�ل�ه � ك‬ ‫�‬ ‫ي ى‬ ‫ب‬ ‫وو ع‬
‫�م �ض‬
‫أ‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ت‬
‫‪٩٠‬‬
‫ف‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ق‬
‫���بر‬ ‫ي�ه�ا ال�� �غص�ر ا �ل��� �غص�ر�ى وا ��لت� ����‬
‫ي�ه�ا ال� ك‬ ‫�ج�ز ء �ي���ا ��س ���س���مى �م��ق���د �م�� وا لم��ق���د �م�� ا ��لت� ����‬
‫�ي‬ ‫�ي‬ ‫ًّ أ‬
‫��� � ���س� ّ �ق �ن���ة‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫ا‬ ‫�‬ ‫�غ‬ ‫�‬ ‫ا‬ ‫ا قت ا ن‬ ‫�‬ ‫�رر ب���ي ن���ه���م�ا ح�د ا �‬
‫� � � لت �ّ‬
‫ر‬
‫ّ ىآ ي‬ ‫م‬‫��‬ ‫ي‬ ‫ى‬ ‫بر‬ ‫ك‬ ‫ل‬ ‫و‬ ‫ى‬ ‫ر‬ ‫ص�‬ ‫�‬ ‫ل��‬ ‫�‬ ‫ر‬ ‫��‬‫�‬ ‫و‬ ‫ط‬ ‫�س��‬ ‫و‬ ‫���بر ى وا م�� ك‬ ‫ال ك‬
‫أ‬ ‫ّ‬
‫ح�د�ي�ن ال� خ� �ي�ن‬
‫ر‬ ‫ح�د ال�و��س��ط �ع ن���د ا �ل‬
‫�‬ ‫� ا �ل‬
‫�‬ ‫�ي� ف��يّ����ة و �ض‬‫ح�ا �ص�ل��ة �م��ن �ك‬ ‫و ض��رً�ا وا ��ل�ه��ي ئ����ة ا �ل‬
‫�‬
‫ً‬ ‫ع‬ ‫أ ة أ نّ أ‬ ‫ب‬
‫ً‬ ‫�غ‬ ‫ف‬
‫�‬ ‫م‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ت ّ ش ً‬
‫� وع�ا‬ ‫ح���مولا ي� ا �ل���ص�ر�ى �مو �ض‬ ‫كا � �‬ ‫��لا و�هو � ر ب��ع�� ل�� ال�و��س��ط ‪� ٣‬إ � �‬ ‫���س���مى ��� ك�‬
‫ن‬ ‫�ث ن‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ن‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ف‬
‫��ل ا �ل��ا �ي� و�إ�‬ ‫ل��� ك�‬‫ح���م لا ����ه���م�ا ���ه ا � ش‬
‫� و ي� � و‬ ‫كا � م‬ ‫��ل ال� ّول و�إ� �‬ ‫ل��� ك�‬ ‫��� � ���ه ا � ش‬
‫�ي� ا �ل �ك بر ى � و‬
‫ً‬
‫ح���مولا‬ ‫�‬‫� و ًع�ا ف�� ا �ل��� �غص�ر�ى م‬ ‫�ض‬ ‫و‬ ‫م‬‫كا ن� �‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫ف� ا � ش � ا ��لث � ث ن‬
‫و‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫ل‬ ‫ا‬
‫�‬‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫�‬‫ك‬ ‫ل���‬ ‫و‬ ‫ه‬ ‫��‬
‫�‬ ‫ا‬‫�‬
‫م‬ ‫��‬‫�‬‫ه‬‫ي�‬‫�‬
‫���‬
‫ً ف‬
‫� وع�ا‬ ‫كا ن� �مو �ض‬ ‫�‬
‫ي‬ ‫�إ‬ ‫ل‬
‫��� � ف���ه ا � ش‬ ‫ف‬
‫��ل ا �لرا ب� ‪.‬‬
‫ع‬
‫ل��� ك�‬ ‫�ي� ا �ل �ك بر ى � و‬

‫ك؛ ت‬ ‫ف‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫�ف � �ذ ً ف‬ ‫ف‬

‫�‪ ،‬ر‪ :‬ا �لو��س��ط‪.‬‬ ‫‪ � :�� ١‬تم�ى‪ : � ٢ .‬م� ك‬
‫�ورا �ي���ه ب�ا �ل�����ع�ل‪( ٣ .‬ال�و��س��ط) �ي�‬

‫‪58‬‬ ‫‪58‬‬
 The Third Treatise: On Syllogism

Containing five sections

The First Section: On Definition and Division of Syllogism

Syllogism is a discourse composed of propositions from which alone, if admit- 88

ted, another discourse follows necessarily.
A syllogism is repetitive if the conclusion itself or its contradictory is actu- 89.1
ally mentioned in the syllogism, as in “if this is a body, it is mobile; but it is a
body,” which produces “it is mobile”; so the conclusion itself is mentioned in
the syllogism. Were we to say “but it is not mobile,” it would produce “it is not
a body,” the contradictory of which is actually mentioned in the syllogism.
If that is not the case, then the syllogism is connective, as in “every body 89.2
is composite” and “every composite is produced in time,” which produces
“every body is produced in time”; neither the conclusion nor its contradic-
tory is mentioned in the syllogism.
The subject of what is sought is called the minor term, and its predicate 90
is called the major term. A proposition that is made part of a syllogism is
called a premise. The premise that contains the minor term is called the
minor premise, and the one that contains the major term is called the major
premise. The term repeated in both is called the middle term. The connec-
tion between the minor and major premises is called the connection-form,
or mood. The form resulting from how the middle term is positioned relative
to the other two terms is called a figure. There are four figures, because if the
middle term is predicate in the minor premise and subject in the major, it is
first figure; if it is predicate in both, it is second figure; if it is subject in both,
it is third figure; and if it is subject in the minor premise and predicate in the
major, it is fourth figure.

59 59
 ‫أّ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ا لم��ق���ا �ل��ة ا � ث�ل��ا �ل ث‬
‫�� ‪ -‬ا �ل�������ص�ل ال�ول‬

‫أ �غ ف‬
‫�‬ ‫�� ال�أ ّ ل ف� ش��� ط�ه ‪�� ١‬ا � ا �ل��� �غص� � ّلا ل �ن‬ ‫أّ ش‬
‫ص�‬ ‫�‬
‫رى و�إ م ي ر ج� أ ر ي�‬‫�‬ ‫ال‬ ‫�د‬ ‫�‬ ‫�إ ي ج أ ب‬ ‫ر‬ ‫� �م�ا ا �ل��� ك�ل و‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫أ‬
‫‪١،٩١‬‬
‫ا ل � ع��ل ل �غ‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ال�و��س��ط وك��ليّ���ة ا �ل �‬
‫���بر ي��ر‬ ‫�و ي��ه ب�ا � ك‬ ‫� م��ح ك‬ ‫�و� ا ��لب��ع��‬
‫�ض‬ ‫حت�م�ل � � ي� ك‬ ‫���بر �ى و لا ا �‬ ‫ك‬
‫م‬
‫ة‬ ‫ن ت ةأ‬ ‫ض‬ ‫�غ‬ ‫�إ أ‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫�‬
‫�و ب��ه ع��لى ال��ص�ر و��روب��ه ا �ل��ا ج �� � ر ب��ع��‪.‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫م‬
‫� ا لم���‬
‫حك‬ ‫ا ��لب��ع���ض‬
‫أ‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ة ّة ق ن ّ‬ ‫�ن‬ ‫ّ �ن � تي�ن ّ‬
‫كل ب� ا‬ ‫كل ج� ب� و �‬ ‫�����و��ل��ا �‬ ‫ك�ل�����يت����ي�ن ي�� ت����ج �مو ج� ب���� ك��لي��� ك‬ ‫ال�ول �م� مو ج���ب���� �‬
‫�‬ ‫ف ّ‬
‫‪٢،٩١‬‬

‫��ل ج ا‪.‬‬ ‫� ك�‬

‫ق‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫�‬‫ن‬
‫�ن‬ ‫�ن ّ‬
‫�����و��لن��ا‬‫���بر�ى ��س�ا ��لب���ة ي�� ت����ج ��س�ا ��لب���ةك��ليّ���ة ك‬ ‫ة‬
‫ك�ل�����يت����ي�ن وا �ل��� �غص�ر�ى �مو ج� ب���� وا �ل �ك‬ ‫ا ��لث��ا �ي� �م� �‬
‫�‬ ‫ّ‬
‫‪٣،٩١‬‬
‫�ن‬
‫كل ج ب� ولا �ش���ي ء �م��ن ب� ا ي�� ت����ج لا �ش���ي ء �م��ن ج ا‪.‬‬ ‫�‬
‫ق‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫ة‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ة‬ ‫�ن‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ّ‬
‫ا ��لث��ا �ل� ث� �م��ن �م �� ت����ي�ن ا �ل��� �غص� � �ج�ز ئ���� �� ت���� �م ����� �ج�ز ئ���� ك ن‬
‫�‬ ‫�����و��ل��ا ب��ع���ض‬ ‫ي‬ ‫و ج �ب و رى ي ي ج� و ج ب‬
‫ّ‬
‫‪٤،٩١‬‬
‫ف‬
‫� ج ا‪.‬‬ ‫�ض‬‫ع��‬ ‫كل ب� ا � ب���‬ ‫ج� ب� و �‬
‫ق‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫�‬
‫�ن‬
‫�����و��لن��ا‬‫���بر�ى ي�� ت����ج ��س�ا ��لب���ة �ج�ز ئ�يّ���ة ك‬ ‫ة ّة‬ ‫ة ّة‬
‫ا �لرا ب� �م��ن �مو ج� ب���� �ج�ز ئ�ي��� � �غص�ر�ى و��س�ا ��لب��� ك��لي��� ك‬
‫�‬ ‫ع‬
‫‪٥،٩١‬‬

‫�‬ ‫ف‬
‫�‬ ‫�ن‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬‫ش‬ ‫�‬ ‫ل‬
‫� ج ل��ي��س ا‪.‬‬ ‫ا ���‬ ‫ء م�‬ ‫�� �‬
‫ب ع���ض ج� ب� وا �ي ّ ب� ب ع���ض �‬
‫ن�ت � � �ذ ا ا � ش � � ن ة �ذ ا ت‬
‫��ل ب��ي��� ب� ���ه�ا‪.‬‬ ‫و��ا ئ�ج ه� ل��� ك‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ن‬ ‫�أ �ّم�ا ا � ش‬
‫‪٦،٩١‬‬
‫ّة‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ف‬
‫‪٩٢‬‬ ‫���بر�ى و�إلا‬ ‫�كي�� وك��لي��� ا �ل �ك‬ ‫��ل ا ��لث��ا �ي� � ش���رط�ه ا خ�ت���لا�� �م��ق���د �مت��ي���ه ب�ا �ل �‬ ‫ل��� ك�‬
‫ق ق‬ ‫ف‬
‫ح���ص�ل الا خ�ت���لا�� ا لمو ج�� ب� �ل�ع�د ال�إ ن�ت��ا ج� و�هو �ص�د � ا �ل����ي���ا ��س �م �إ ي ج��ا ب�‬ ‫�‬‫�ل‬
‫ع‬ ‫م‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ة‬
‫ا ��لن���ت��ي�� ج���ة ت�ا ر� و�م ��س��لب���ه�ا � خ�ر�ى‪.‬‬
‫ن ت ةأ ً أ‬ ‫ع‬
‫� �ا � ر ب��ع��ة‪.‬‬ ‫��� � �ي���ض‬ ‫و ض��رو��ه ا ��ل��ا ج�‬
‫ة ّّ ة ق ن ّ‬ ‫أّ ب ّ‬
‫‪١،٩٣‬‬
‫ت‬‫�ن‬ ‫�غ‬ ‫ي�ن‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ّ‬
‫كل ج� ب� ولا‬ ‫�����و��ل��ا �‬ ‫ك�ل�����ي���� وا �ل���ص�ر�ى �مو ج� ب����ة ‪ ٢‬ي������ج ��س�ا ��لب���ك��لي��� ك‬ ‫ال�ول �م��ن �‬
‫�‬
‫‪٢،٩٣‬‬
‫ة‬ ‫�لخ ف‬ ‫ف ش‬ ‫ش‬
‫���بر�ى‬ ‫� ا ��لن���ت��ي�� ج��� �إلى ا �ل �ك‬ ‫ّ نق‬ ‫�ن‬
‫����ي ء �م� ا ب� ��لا ����ي ء �م� ج� ا ب�ا ���ل� و�هو �ض� م �����ي����أ�ض‬
‫�ن‬
‫ّ‬
‫���بر�ى �لي��رت��د �إلى ال� ّول‪٣.‬‬ ‫��ا ��س ا �ل �ك‬ ‫� ا �ل��� �غص�ر�ى وب�ا ن��ع ك�‬ ‫�ض‬
‫�ن‬
‫��لي�� ت����ج ن���ق��ي����‬
‫�‬
‫���ق�� ��لن��ا لا �ش�� ء �م��ن‬ ‫��� � �م �����ة ‪�� ٤‬نت���� ��س�ا ��ل���ة ك�ّ�لّ���ة‬ ‫ك�لّ��ّ��يت����ي�ن‬ ‫ث ن �ن‬
‫�ي‬ ‫ك‬
‫و برى و ج ب ي ج� ب ي و‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫ك‬ ‫�‬
‫ل‬ ‫ا‬ ‫ا ��ل��ا �ي� �م� � �‬
‫ّ‬
‫‪٣،٩٣‬‬
‫�لخ ف‬ ‫ف‬
‫���بر�ى‬ ‫���ل� و�ب�ع�ك��س ا �ل��� �غص�ر�ى و ج���ع���ل�ه�ا ك‬ ‫كل ا ب� ��لا �ش���ي ء �م��ن ج ا ب�ا‬ ‫ج� ب� و �‬
‫�‬
‫ث�ّ �ع�ك��س ا ��لن���ت��ي�� ج���ة‪.‬‬
‫م‬

‫� ال أ ّ ‪� ٤ .‬ف ‪� :‬م �����ة‬ ‫��� � ��س�ا ��ل���ة‪� ٣ .‬ف�‪ :‬ا � ش‬ ‫ة‬ ‫�غ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫نت‬ ‫ف فش‬
‫� وج ب‬ ‫ل��� ك��ل �ول‬ ‫‪���� :�� ١‬رط �إ ���ا ج��ه‪ : �� ٢ .‬وا �ل���ص�ر�ى �مو ج� ب���� وا �ل �ك برى ب‬
‫ّ‬
‫ك��ليّ���ة‪.‬‬

‫‪60‬‬ ‫‪60‬‬
 Third Treatise—First Section

The conditions of productivity in the first figure are that the minor prem- 91.1
ise be affirmative (otherwise the minor term does not come under the
middle term), and that the major premise be universal (otherwise it may
be that the part of the middle of which the major term is predicated is not
the part of the middle predicated of the minor term). This figure has four
productive moods.
The first, with two universal affirmatives, produces a universal affirmative, 91.2
as in “every C is B, every B is A, therefore every C is A.”
The second, with two universals, the minor premise affirmative and the 91.3
major negative, produces a universal negative, as in “every C is B, no B is A,
therefore no C is A.”
The third, with two affirmatives, the minor premise being a particular, pro- 91.4
duces a particular affirmative conclusion, as in “some C is B, every B is A,
therefore some C is A.”
The fourth, with a particular affirmative minor and a universal negative 91.5
major, produces a particular negative, as in “some C is B, no B is A, therefore
some C is not A.”
The conclusions of this figure are self-evident. 91.6
The conditions of productivity in the second figure are that the two prem- 92
ises differ in quality, and that the major premise be universal; otherwise, we
get discrepant conclusions revealing lack of productivity (which is a syllogism
with true premises leading in some cases to an affirmative conclusion, and in
others to a negative conclusion).
Its productive moods are also four. 93.1
The first, with two universals, the minor affirmative, produces a universal 93.2
negative, as in “every C is B, no A is B; therefore, no C is A.” This is proved
by reductio, which involves joining the contradictory of the conclusion to the
major to produce the contradictory of the minor. It can also be proved by con-
version of the major premise to reduce it to the first figure.
The second, with two universals, the major affirmative, produces a univer- 93.3
sal negative, as in “no C is B, and every A is B; therefore, no C is A.” This is
proved by reductio, or by converting the minor, placing it as major, and con-
verting the conclusion.

61 61
 ‫أّ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ا لم��ق���ا �ل��ة ا � ث�ل��ا �ل ث‬
‫�� ‪ -‬ا �ل�������ص�ل ال�ول‬

‫ا ��لث��ا �ل� ث �م��ن �م �����ة �ج�ز ئ�ّ���ة �غص� � ��س�ا ��ل���ة ك�ّ�لّ���ة ��� � ��نت���� ��س�ا ��ل���ة �ج�ز ئ�ّ���ة‬
‫ي‬ ‫ي � رى و ب ي ك برى ي� ج� ب‬ ‫وج ب‬ ‫�‬
‫���ق�� ��لن��ا ��ع��� ج � ولا �ش�� ء �م��ن‬
‫‪٤،٩٣‬‬
‫�لخ ف‬ ‫ف‬
‫س‬ ‫ك��‬ ‫�‬ ‫ع‬‫�‬‫�‬
‫ب‬ ‫و‬ ‫�‬ ‫ل‬
‫�‬‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫ا‬
‫�‬ ‫ب‬ ‫ا‬ ‫ج‬ ‫�‬ ‫ع��‬
‫�ض‬ ‫�‬‫�‬
‫ب‬ ‫س‬ ‫��‬ ‫�‬
‫�ي‬ ‫ل‬‫�‬‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫ب‬ ‫ا‬ ‫ك و ب �ض � ب أ �ي‬
‫�‬
‫‪١‬‬
‫�لج�ز ئ ّ ة ف� ّ‬
‫��ل د ب� ولا �ش���ي ء‬ ‫� و ا � �ي��� د ك�‬ ‫ال ّ ت���ف � �م �ض‬ ‫��� � ��� � �‬ ‫ا �ل �‬
‫ك برى لير جع �إلى �ول و ��ر �ض و ع‬
‫ف‬ ‫�ن‬ ‫ش‬ ‫ث ّ تق‬ ‫�ن‬ ‫ف ش‬ ‫�ن‬
‫� ج� د ولا ����ي ء �م� د ا � ب���ع���ض‬
‫�‬ ‫�م� ا ب� ��لا ����ي ء �م� د ا �م �����ول ب��ع���ض‬
‫ج �ل��ي��س ا‪.‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫�‬
‫ا �ل ا � �م��ن ��س�ا ��ل���ة �ج�ز ئ�ّ���ة �غص� � �م �����ة ك��لّ���ة ��� � ��نت���� ��س�ا ��ل���ة �ج�ز ئ�ّ���ة‬
‫ي‬ ‫ي � رى و و ج ب ي برى ي� ج� ب‬ ‫ك‬ ‫ب‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ق ر بع‬
‫‪٥،٩٣‬‬
‫�خ ف‬ ‫ف‬
‫� ج �ل��ي��س ا ب�ا �ل ��ل�‪.‬‬
‫�‬ ‫كل ا ب� � ب���ع��‬
‫�ض‬ ‫� ج� �ل��ي��س ب� و �‬ ‫�ض‬‫�����و��لن��ا ب��ع��‬‫ك‬
‫خ�ت ا�ف‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫أ‬
‫�‬‫�� ا ��لث��ا �ل� ث� � ش���رط�ه �مو ج���بي���� ا �ل��� �غص�ر�ى ‪ ٢‬و لا �ل‬ ‫ش‬
‫ح���ص�ل الا ���ل �‬
‫أ‬ ‫�إ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ّو� �م�ا ا �ل��� ك�ل‬
‫� ا ل ق ّ � تي�ن ل � � ن‬
‫‪١،٩٤‬‬
‫�غ �غ‬ ‫ّة‬
‫�وم ع��لي��ه ب�ا ل��ص�ر ي��ر ا ��لب��ع���ض‬
‫�‬ ‫حك‬ ‫� ا لم���‬ ‫��ا � ا ��لب��ع���ض‬ ‫وك��لي��� �إح�د ى م�����د م���� و�إ ا ل ك‬
‫أ‬
‫ف ت‬
‫���بر ���ل ج�� ب� ا ��لت��ع�د ي���ة‪.‬‬ ‫� ع��ل��ه �ا ل� ك‬ ‫حك‬ ‫ا لم���‬
‫ضوم ي ب ت ة ّ ةم‬
‫��� ����ست����‪.‬‬ ‫و��رو��ه ا ��لن��ا ج�‬
‫تي�ن ّ‬ ‫أ ب‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ة ج�ز ئ ّ ة ق ن ّ‬
‫‪٢،٩٤‬‬
‫�ن‬ ‫ّ‬
‫كل ب� ا‬ ‫كل ب� ج� و �‬ ‫�����و��ل��ا �‬ ‫�‬
‫ك�ل�����ي���� ي������ج �مو ج ب���� � �ي��� ك‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ي�ن‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ال� ّول �م� �مو ج ��ب���� �‬
‫�‬ ‫�ن‬
‫�‬
‫‪٣،٩٤‬‬

‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫���ل ف �ه �ض� ّ ن���ق������� ا ��لن���ت�������ة ا �ل�� �غص� � ��ل���نت���� ن���ق‬ ‫�لخ‬ ‫ف‬
‫برى‬ ‫��‬ ‫�‬
‫ك‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ا‬ ‫�‬ ‫��‬ ‫��‬ ‫��‬
‫رى ي ج� ي �ض‬ ‫�‬ ‫ي ج �إلى‬ ‫�ّ ج� ا ب�ا أ � و و م ي �ض‬ ‫� ب���ع���ض‬
‫وب�ا �لرد �إلى ال� ّول ب��ع�ك��س ا �ل��� �غص�ر�ى‪.‬‬
‫ة ج�ز ئ ّ ة ق ن ّ‬ ‫�ن‬ ‫� ث ن �ن ّّ‬
‫كل ب� ج� ولا‬ ‫�����و��ل��ا �‬ ‫���بر�ى ��س�ا ��لب���ة ي�� ت����ج ��س�ا ��لب��� � �ي��� ك‬ ‫ك�ل�����يت����ي�ن وا �ل �ك‬ ‫ا �ل��ا �ي� �م� �‬
‫�‬
‫‪٤،٩٤‬‬
‫�لخ ف‬ ‫ف‬
‫���ل� و�ب�ع�ك��س ا �ل��� �غص�ر�ى‪.‬‬ ‫� ج �ل��ي��س ا ب�ا‬ ‫ع��‬
‫�ض‬ ‫�ش���ي ء �م��ن ب� ا � ب���‬
‫�‬
‫���ق�� ��لن‬ ‫��� � ك�ّ�لّ���ة ��نت���� �م �����ة �ج�ز ئ�ّ���ة‬ ‫تي�ن‬ ‫ث ث �ن‬
‫� ب�‬ ‫ع��‬‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫ي و ب �ض‬ ‫ا‬‫�‬
‫�‬ ‫ك‬ ‫ا ��ل��ا �ل�� �م� �مو ج���ب���� و برى ي ي ج� و ج ب‬
‫�‬ ‫ك‬‫�‬ ‫ل‬‫�‬ ‫ا‬
‫ّ‬
‫‪٥،٩٤‬‬
‫���ل ف ��ع� ا � �غص� � ت���ف�� � �م �ض ا �ل�ج�ز ئ�ّ���ة‬ ‫ا �ا �لخ‬ ‫ف‬
‫ي‬ ‫و‬ ‫�‬ ‫و‬ ‫�ض‬ ‫ر‬ ‫و‬ ‫ى‬ ‫ر‬ ‫�‬‫ل��‬ ‫س‬ ‫ك��‬ ‫ب‬ ‫و‬ ‫�‬ ‫ب‬ ‫ج‬ ‫�‬ ‫ع��‬
‫�ض‬ ‫�‬ ‫��‬
‫ب‬ ‫�‬ ‫ا‬ ‫�‬ ‫ب‬ ‫كل‬ ‫ج� و �‬
‫ع‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ف� ّ‬ ‫�‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ف� ّ‬
‫ف‬ ‫ث‬
‫� ج ا‬
‫ب ع���ض �‬
‫كل د ا ����‬ ‫كل د ج� و �‬ ‫��ل د ا �مّ ت���ق��ول �‬ ‫كل ب� ا ك�‬ ‫��ل د ب� و �‬ ‫د ك�‬
‫و�هو ا لم��ط�لو ب�‪.‬‬
‫ّ‬
‫ا �ل ا � �م��ن �م �����ة �ج�ز ئ�ّ���ة �غص� � ��س�ا ��ل���ة ك��لّ���ة ��� � ��نت���� ��س�ا ��ل���ة �ج�ز ئ�ّ���ة‬
‫‪٦،٩٤‬‬ ‫ي‬ ‫ي � رى و ب ي ك برى ي� ج� ب‬ ‫وج ب‬ ‫ق ر بع‬
‫�لخ ف‬ ‫ف‬ ‫�ن‬ ‫ش‬ ‫ك ن‬
‫� ج� �ل��ي��س ا ب�ا ���ل� و�ب�ع�ك��س‬ ‫� ب� ج� ولا ����ي ء �م� ب� ا � ب���ع���ض‬ ‫�����و��ل��ا ب��ع���ض‬
‫�� ت‬ ‫�غ‬
‫� ‪.‬‬ ‫ا �ل���ص�ر�ى والا�ف��را �ض‬

‫‪� ١‬ف�‪ :‬ف� ب���ع��� ج �ل��ي�� ا‪� ٢ .‬ف�‪ :‬ي ج�‬

‫��ا ب� ا �ل��� �غص�ر�ى‪.‬‬ ‫�إ‬ ‫�ض � س‬

‫‪62‬‬ ‫‪62‬‬
 Third Treatise—First Section

The third, with a particular affirmative minor and a universal negative 93.4
major, produces a particular negative, as in “some C is B, no A is B, therefore
some C is not A.” This is proved by reductio, or by conversion of the major to
reduce it to the first figure. It can also be proved by ecthesis: expose the subject
of the particular as D, then “every D is B, no A is B, therefore no D is A.” But
“some C is D, no D is A, therefore some C is not A.”
The fourth, with a particular negative minor and a universal affirmative 93.5
major, produces a particular negative, as in “some C is not B, and every A is B,
therefore some C is not A.” It is proved by reductio.
The conditions of productivity in the third figure are that the minor be 94.1
affirmative (otherwise there will be discrepant conclusions), and that one
of the premises be universal (otherwise the part of the middle of which the
minor term is predicated may be different from the part of the middle of
which the major is predicated, such that the judgment does not necessarily
pass to the minor).
Its productive moods are six. 94.2
The first, with two universal affirmatives, produces a particular affirmative, 94.3
as in “every B is C, and every B is A, therefore some C is A.” It is proved by
reductio (which involves conjoining the contradictory of the conclusion to the
minor to produce the contradictory of the major), or by reduction to the first
figure by converting the minor.
The second, with two universals, the major negative, produces a particular 94.4
negative, as in “every B is C, and no B is A, therefore some C is not A.” It is
proved by reductio, or by converting the minor.
The third, with two affirmatives, the major universal, produces a particular 94.5
affirmative, as in “some B is C, every B is A, therefore some C is A.” It is proved
by reductio, or by converting the minor, or by ecthesis: expose the subject of
the particular premise as D. Then “every D is B, every B is A, therefore every
D is A.” Then we have “every D is C, every D is A, therefore some C is A”; and
this is what is sought.
The fourth, with a particular affirmative minor and a universal negative 94.6
major, produces a particular negative, as in “some B is C, no B is A, therefore
some C is not A.” It is proved by reductio, or by converting the minor, or
by ecthesis.

63 63
 ‫أّ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ا لم��ق���ا �ل��ة ا � ث�ل��ا �ل ث‬
‫�� ‪ -‬ا �ل�������ص�ل ال�ول‬

‫ة ج�ز ئ ّ ة ق ن ّ‬ ‫ّ‬
‫�‬ ‫ك‬
‫�‬ ‫ا‬
‫�‬‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫�ل‬ ‫�‬
‫��‬‫�‬
‫�‬‫ك‬ ‫��‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫��‬
‫��‬‫�‬ ‫م‬‫�‬ ‫�‬‫�‬‫ا �ل��� �غص� � ك��لّ���ة ���نت‬
‫��‬ ‫��ا �م�� �م��ن �م �� ت����ي�ن‬ ‫ا �لخ‬
‫ي و ل ب ج�‬ ‫و رى ي ي ج� و ج ب‬ ‫و ج �ب‬ ‫س‬
‫‪٧،٩٤‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ث‬ ‫�غ‬ ‫�لخ ف‬ ‫ف‬
‫���بر�ى و ج���ع���ل�ه�ا �ص�ر�ى �م �ع�ك��س‬ ‫���ل� و�ب�ع�ك��س ا �ل �ك‬ ‫ب�ا‬ ‫� ج ا‬
‫و ب ع���ض ب� ب ع���ض �‬
‫ا ����‬ ‫�� �‬
‫ن ت ة �� ت‬
‫� ‪.‬‬ ‫ا ��ل�����ي�� ج��� والا�ف��را �ض‬
‫ا �ل��س�ا د �� �م��ن �م �����ةك�ّ�لّ���ة �غص� � ��س�ا ��ل���ة �ج�ز ئ�ّ���ة��� � ��نت���� ��س�ا ��ل���ة �ج�ز ئ�ّ���ة‬
‫ي‬ ‫ي ك برى ي� ج� ب‬ ‫و ج ب ي � رى و ب‬ ‫س‬
‫ق ن ّ‬
‫‪٨،٩٤‬‬
‫� ا �لخ ف ال �� ت ا � ن‬ ‫ف‬
‫� ج� ل��ي��س ب�ا ���ل� و ا �ف��ر �ض �إ �‬ ‫� ب� �ل��ي��س ا � ب���ع���ض‬ ‫كل ب� ج� ّو�ب�ع���ض‬ ‫�����و��ل��ا �‬ ‫ك‬
‫����ة‪.‬‬ ‫ة‬
‫كا �� ا �ل��س�ا ��لب��� �مر�كب‬
‫�ن ت‬
‫��ا � ا لم��ق�� ّ�د �مت����ي�ن‬ ‫�كي� ف��يّ����ة ي ج�‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫ل‬ ‫ا‬ ‫���ّ��مّ����ة‬
‫ك‬ ‫�‬
‫ل‬ ‫ا‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫س‬‫�‬‫�‬‫ح��‬‫�‬
‫�‬ ‫ب‬ ‫�ه‬‫ط‬ ‫���‬‫�� ا �ل ا � ف� ش‬ ‫�‬
‫ك‬ ‫�أ �ّم�ا ا � ش‬
‫ل���‬
‫و‬ ‫ل ر بع ر‬ ‫و‬
‫�إ ب ّ‬ ‫ي ّ‬ ‫ب‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ّ‬
‫‪١،٩٥‬‬

‫�كي�� ‪� ١‬م ك��لي��� �إح�د ا �ه�م�ا و لا �ل‬

‫�‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ف‬
‫�م ك��لي��� ا �ل��� �غص�ر�ى � و ا خ�ت���لا ����ه���م�ا ب�ا �ل �‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ّ‬
‫ح���ص�ل‬ ‫�إ‬ ‫ع‬ ‫ع‬
‫ف‬
‫الا خ�ت���لا�� ا لمو ج�� ب� �ل�ع�د ال�إ ن�ت��ا ج ‪.‬‬
‫�‬ ‫ت ث م‬
‫و ض��روب��ه ا ��لن��ا ج���ة �م�ا ن�ي���ة‪.‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ة ج�ز ئ ّ ة ق ن ّ‬ ‫أ ّ �ن � � تي�ن ّّ‬
‫‪٢،٩٥‬‬
‫�ن‬
‫كل ا ب�‬ ‫كل ب� ج� و �‬ ‫�����و��ل��ا �‬ ‫ك�ل�����يت����ي�ن ي�� ت����ج �مو ج� ب���� � �ي��� ك‬ ‫ال�ول �م� مو ج ��ب���� �‬
‫�‬ ‫ت‬
‫‪٣،٩٥‬‬
‫ف‬
‫� ج ا ب��ع�ك��س ا �ل��رت���ي� ب� ث�ّ �ع�ك��س ا ��لن���ت��ي�� ج���ة‪.‬‬ ‫ع��‬
‫�ض‬ ‫� ب���‬
‫ة ج�ز ئ ّ ة ق ن ّ‬ ‫م‬ ‫�‬
‫�‬ ‫ك‬
‫�‬ ‫ا‬
‫�‬‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫�ل‬ ‫��‬‫�‬
‫�‬‫�‬‫ك‬ ‫��‬‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫��‬‫��‬‫�‬ ‫م‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫�‬ ‫��� � �ج�ز ئ�ّ���ة ���نت‬
‫��‬ ‫�‬
‫ك‬ ‫�‬
‫ل‬ ‫ا‬ ‫ا ��لث��ا �ن �م��ن �م �� ت����ي�ن‬
‫ي و ل ب ج�‬ ‫و ج �ب و برى ي ي ج� و ج ب‬ ‫ي�‬
‫‪٤،٩٥‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ف‬
‫� ج ا لم�ا �مر‪.‬‬ ‫� ا ����‬ ‫و�ب�ع���ض‬
‫ق‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ب� ب ّع���ض �‬
‫�ن‬ ‫� ث � ث �ن ّ‬
‫ش‬
‫�����و��لن��ا لا ����ي ء �م��ن ب�‬ ‫ك�ل�����يت����ي�ن وا �ل��� �غص�ر�ى ��س�ا ��لب���ة ي�� ت����ج ��س�ا ��لب���ةك��ليّ���ة ك‬ ‫ا �ل��ا ل�� �م� �‬
‫�‬ ‫ّ‬
‫‪٥،٩٥‬‬
‫ف‬
‫كل ا ب� ��لا �ش���ي ء �م��ن ج ا لم�ا �م ّر‪.‬‬ ‫ج� و �‬
‫ة ج�ز ئ ّ ة ق ن ّ‬ ‫�‬ ‫ّ‬
‫�ن‬ ‫ّ‬
‫كل ب� ج� ولا‬ ‫�����و��ل��ا �‬‫ك�ل�����يت����ي�ن وا �ل��� �غص�ر�ى �مو ج� ب����ة ي�� ت����ج ��س�ا ��لب��� � �ي��� ك‬ ‫ا �لرا ب� �م��ن �‬
‫ّ‬ ‫�‬ ‫ع‬
‫‪٦،٩٥‬‬
‫ف‬ ‫ش‬
‫� ج �ل��ي��س ا ب��ع�ك��س ا لم��ق���د �مت����ي�ن ‪.‬‬ ‫�ض‬‫ع��‬ ‫�‬ ‫��‬
‫ب‬ ‫�‬ ‫����ي ء �م��ن ب�‬
‫ا‬
‫�‬
‫�خ�ا � �م��ن �م �����ة �ج�ز ئ�ّ���ة �غص� � ��س�ا ��ل���ة ك�ّ�لّ���ة ��� � ��نت���� ��س�ا ��ل���ة �ج�ز ئ�ّ���ة‬ ‫�ل‬
‫ي‬ ‫ي � رى و ب ي ك برى ي� ج� ب‬
‫آ‬
‫وج ب‬ ‫ا م��س‬
‫ً‬ ‫ق‬
‫‪٧،٩٥‬‬
‫ف‬
‫� ج �ل��ي��س ا لم�ا �م ّر � ن���ف���ا‪.‬‬ ‫ع��‬
‫�ض‬ ‫� ب� ج ولا �ش���ي ء �م��ن ا ب� � ب���‬ ‫ع��‬
‫�ض‬ ‫�����و��لن��ا ب��‬ ‫ك‬
‫�‬
‫ّ‬ ‫�‬
‫ا �ل��س�ا د �� �م��ن ��س�ا ��ل���ة �ج�ز ئ�ّ���ة �غص� � �م �����ةك��لّ���ة ��� � ��نت���� ��س�ا ��ل���ة �ج�ز ئ�ّ���ة‬
‫ي‬ ‫ي � رى و و ج ب ي ك برى ي� ج� ب‬ ‫ب‬ ‫س‬
‫ت تّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫���ق�� ��لن‬
‫‪٨،٩٥‬‬
‫�غ‬ ‫ف‬
‫� ج �ل��ي��س ا ب��ع�ك��س ا �ل���ص�ر�ى �ل��ر��د‬ ‫ع��‬
‫�ض‬ ‫كل ا ب� � ب���‬ ‫�‬ ‫و‬ ‫ج‬ ‫��‬ ‫�ي‬ ‫�‬‫ل‬‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫ب‬ ‫�‬ ‫ع��‬
‫�ض‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫ب‬ ‫ا‬
‫�‬‫�‬ ‫كو‬
‫�‬ ‫س�‬ ‫ن‬
‫�إلى ا ��لث��ا �ي�‪.‬‬

‫�ل � ف‬ ‫ف ف‬
‫�يك��‪.‬‬ ‫ا‬ ‫‪� :�� ١‬ي�‬

‫‪64‬‬ ‫‪64‬‬
 Third Treatise—First Section

The fifth, with two affirmatives, the minor universal, produces a particular 94.7
affirmative, as in “every B is C, and some B is A, therefore some C is A.” It is
proved by reductio, or by using the converted major as minor and then con-
verting the conclusion, or by ecthesis.
The sixth, with a universal affirmative minor and a particular negative 94.8
major, produces a particular negative conclusion, as in “every B is C, and some
B is not A, therefore some C is not A.” It is proved by reductio, or by ecthesis
if the negative is compound.
The conditions for the fourth figure with respect to quantity and quality are 95.1
that the two premises be affirmative and the minor a universal, or that the two
premises differ from each other in quality and one of them be universal; oth-
erwise, there will be discrepant conclusions, which reveal lack of productivity.
The productive moods in this figure come to eight. 95.2
The first, with two universal affirmatives, produces a particular affirmative, 95.3
as in “every B is C, and every A is B, therefore some C is A.” It is proved by
reversing the order of the premises and converting the conclusion.
The second, with two affirmatives, the major being a particular, produces 95.4
a particular affirmative, as in “every B is C, and some A is B, therefore some C
is A.” The proof is what preceded.
The third, with two universals, the minor being negative, produces a uni- 95.5
versal negative, as in “no B is C, and every A is B, therefore no C is A.” The
proof is what preceded.
The fourth, with two universals, the minor being affirmative, pro- 95.6
duces a particular negative, as in “every B is C, and no A is B; therefore,
some C is not A.” It is proved by converting both premises.
The fifth, with a particular affirmative minor and a universal negative major, 95.7
produces a particular negative, as in “some B is C, and no A is B, therefore
some C is not A.” The proof is what preceded.
The sixth, with a particular negative minor and a universal affirmative 95.8
major, produces a particular negative, as in “some B is not C, and every A is B,
therefore some C is not A.” This is proved by converting the minor to reduce
it to the second figure.

65 65
 ‫ث ن‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ق ة ث ث‬
‫ا لم�����ا �ل�� ا �ل��ا �ل�� ‪ -‬ا �ل�������ص�ل ا �ل��ا �ي�‬

‫��س�ا ��ل���ة �ج�ز ئ�ّ���ة‬ ‫�ن‬ ‫ّة‬ ‫ا �ل��س�ا � �م��ن �م �����ة ك�ّ�لّ���ة �غص� � ��س�ا ��ل���ة‬
‫�ج�ز ئ���� ك‬
‫��� � �� ت����‬ ‫و ج ب ي � رى و ب‬
‫ت تّ‬
‫ي‬ ‫ب‬ ‫ي برى ي ج�‬ ‫ب‬
‫ق ن عّ‬
‫‪٩،٩٥‬‬
‫ف‬
‫���بر�ى �ل��ر��د‬ ‫ا �ل �ك‬ ‫ج� �ل��ي��س ا ب��ع�ك��س‬ ‫�‬‫� ا �ل��ي��س ب� � ب���ع���ض‬ ‫كل ب� ج� و�ب�ع���ض‬ ‫�����و��ل��ا �‬‫ك‬
‫�إلى ا ��لث��ا �ل� ث�‪.‬‬
‫ا ��لث��ا �م��ن �م��ن ��س�ا ��ل���ة ك�ّ�لّ���ة �غص� � �م �����ة �ج�ز ئ�ّ���ة ��� � ��نت���� ��س�ا ��ل���ة �ج�ز ئ�ّ���ة‬
‫ي‬ ‫ي ك برى ي� ج� ب‬ ‫ب ي � رى و و ج ب‬
‫ت‬ ‫كق ن‬
‫‪١٠،٩٥‬‬
‫ف‬ ‫ش‬
‫� ج� �ل��ي��س ا ب��ع�ك��س ا �ل��رت���ي� ب�‬ ‫� ا ب� � ب���ع���ض‬
‫�ن‬
‫�����و��ل��ا لا ����ي ء �م� ب� ج� و�ب�ع���ض‬
‫ث�ّ �ع�ك��س ا ��لن���ت��ي�� ج���ة‪.‬‬
‫ن خ ة أ‬ ‫م‬
‫�‬ ‫ة‬ ‫�‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ن‬ ‫�‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫�‬‫�ض‬ ‫ف‬ ‫خ‬
‫�‬‫ل‬‫�‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ال‬ ‫�‬
‫ل‬
‫�‬ ‫�ن‬ ‫�‬
‫� ا �ل�����ي�� ج �� �إلى �إح�د ى‬ ‫�� ب�ي��ا � ا ���م��س�� �ول ب�ا ��ل� وأ�هو م �����ي�����ض‬ ‫ويم ك‬
‫ن‬ ‫ق ّ تي�ن‬
‫‪٩٦‬‬
‫ت‬ ‫��‬ ‫خ‬ ‫ث‬ ‫خ‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ت‬ ‫�ن‬
‫� ال��ر�ى وا ��ل��ا �ي� وا �ل��ا �م��س ب�ا لا�ف��را �ض‬
‫�‬ ‫ا لم�����د �م���� ��لي������ج� �م�ا ي���ع�ك��س �إلى �����ي�����ض‬
‫�ذ‬ ‫��ا �م�� و��ل� ك�ن‬ ‫�خ‬ ‫ف ث ن ق‬ ‫�ن ّ�ن �ذ‬
‫� ا �ل� ��ي �هو ا د ‪١‬‬ ‫�� ا ��لب��ع���ض‬ ‫و�ل� ب��ي�� �ل�ك �ي� ا ��ل��ا �ي� ��لي����ا ��س ع��لي��ه ا ل س ي‬
‫ف‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ف ّ‬
‫كل د ا � ب���ع���ض‬
‫�‬ ‫� ج� د و �‬ ‫كل د ب� � ب���ع���ض‬ ‫كل ب� ج� و �‬ ‫كل د ب� � ن��ق��ول �‬ ‫��ل د ا و �‬ ‫� ك�‬
‫ج ا و�هو ا لم��ط�لو ب�‪.‬‬
‫�ذ‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ة‬ ‫خ‬ ‫�‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ض‬ ‫ن‬ ‫� تق ّ‬
‫�روا �ل�ع�د‬ ‫ل‬ ‫�‬
‫ح���صر وا ا �ل����ر و ب� ا ��ل��ا ج��� ي� ا ����م��س�� ال�و لى و ك‬ ‫�‬ ‫وا لم�����د �مو� �‬
‫م‬
‫� �ن ن ش ت � ن‬ ‫تي�ن ن‬ ‫ن�ت��ا ا ��لث�� ا ث���ة ال�أ خ��� � الا خ�ت��� ا� � ا �ل��ق‬
‫‪٩٧‬‬

‫�‬ ‫�ن‬ ‫��‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ة‬

‫ر و�‬ ‫ك‬ ‫ط‬ ‫��‬
‫���‬‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫ح‬ ‫و‬ ‫��‬
‫��‬‫ط‬‫��‬ ‫��‬‫س‬
‫�‬
‫ب ي‬‫�‬‫��‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫م‬ ‫�‬ ‫ل � ي� ي س‬ ‫ا‬
‫�‬‫��‬‫��‬ ‫ير‬ ‫�إ ج� ل‬
‫ف‬ ‫�ذ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ا �ل��س�ا ��ل���ة ف����ه�ا �م��ن �إح�د � ا �لخ‬
‫�روه �م��ن الا خ�ت���لا ��‪.‬‬ ‫��ا ��صت����ي�ن ���س��ق��ط �م�ا ك‬ ‫ى‬ ‫ب ي�‬

‫�‬ ‫ا �ل��ف������ �ص� ا �ل����ث�ا �ن ف� ا لم�� ����خت����ل��ط�ا ت‬

‫ي� ي�‬ ‫ل‬
‫أ‬
‫� ف‬
‫���ه��ة ���ع��ليّ���ة ا �ل��� �غص�ر�ى‪.‬‬‫ح����س�� ا �جل‬‫�� ال� ّول ف� ش���رط�ه ب�‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫ك‬ ‫�أ �ّم�ا ا � ش‬
‫ل���‬
‫‪٩٨‬‬
‫ف ّ تي�ن ّ‬ ‫ب‬ ‫ل‬
‫ي�ن‬ ‫ش‬ ‫�غ‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ة‬
‫�‬
‫كا �� ي��ر ا لم���روط���ت�� وا �ل�عر������ي���� و�إلا‬ ‫كا �ل��ك��بر�ى �إ � �‬ ‫وا �ل �����نت����ي�� ج��� �ي���ه �‬
‫ح��ذ ف�ً�ا �ع ن���ه�ا ق����د ا � ا ض � �ة ا � ا د ا ا � ض � �ة ا ل � خ� ص ص��ة‬
‫‪٩٩‬‬

‫� ي ل�ل � ر ور و ل�ل و م و ل��� رور م� ��� و�‬ ‫� و‬ ‫��ا �ل��� �غص�ر�ى م‬ ‫ف� ك�‬
‫ن‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ن‬
‫كا ن� ت� �إح�د �ى ا �ل�ع�ا �مت����ي�ن و�ب�ع�د �ض� مّ ‪ ٢‬ا �ل�لا د وا ا ��لي���ه�ا �إ � �‬
‫كا ن� ت�‬ ‫ب�ا �ل��� �غص�ر�ى �إ � �‬
‫م‬ ‫�لخ ّ‬
‫��ا ��صت����ي�ن ‪.‬‬ ‫�إح�د �ى ا‬

‫ف‬ ‫�ذ‬ ‫ف‬

‫‪ :�� ١‬ا �ل� ��ي �هو ا ب� د‪ :�� ٢ .‬ب���ض�� ّ‪.‬‬
‫م‬

‫‪66‬‬ ‫‪66‬‬
 Third Treatise—Second Section

The seventh, with a universal affirmative minor and a particular negative 95.9
major, produces a particular negative, as in “every B is C, and some A is not B,
therefore some C is not A.” This is proved by converting the major to reduce
it to the third figure.
The eighth, with a universal negative minor and a particular affirmative 95.10
major, produces a particular negative, as in “no B is C, and some A is B, there-
fore some C is not A.” It is proved by reversing the order of the premises and
converting the conclusion.
It is possible to prove the first five moods by reductio—that is to say, by 96
joining the contradictory of the conclusion to one of the two premises to pro-
duce what converts to the contradictory of the other premise. The second and
fifth moods can be proved by ecthesis. Let us prove this in the second; the fifth
can be proved in the same way. Let the some that is A be D such that “every D
is A” and “every D is B.” Thus, “every B is C, every D is B, therefore some C is
D” and “every D is A,” so “some C is A”; this is what is sought.
The scholars who went before us limited the productive moods to the first 97
five of this figure, and spoke of discrepant conclusions from a syllogism with
two simple premises to show the lack of productivity of the last three. We, on
the other hand, stipulate that the negative be one of the two specials, and then
the problem they mention to do with discrepant conclusions falls away.

The Second Section: On Mixes of Modalized Premises

The condition for the first figure with regard to modality is that the minor 98
premise be an actuality proposition.
If the major premise is not one of the two conditional propositions or the 99
two conventionals, the conclusion has the modality of the major. If, on the
other hand, the major is one of these four propositions, then (1) if the major
is one of the two generals, the modality of the conclusion is like the minor,
though dropping any restriction of non-perpetuity and nonnecessity, and
whatever necessity belongs only to the minor; and (2) if the major is one of the
two specials, the modality of the conclusion is like the minor, though joining
the restriction of non-perpetuity to it.

67 67
 ‫ث ن‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ق ة ث ث‬
‫ا لم�����ا �ل�� ا �ل��ا �ل�� ‪ -‬ا �ل�������ص�ل ا �ل��ا �ي�‬

‫ق‬ ‫ةأ ن أ‬ ‫ل��� ك� � ث ن ف ش‬ ‫�أ �ّم�ا ا � ش‬

‫�ه‬ ‫�ل‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫�‬
‫��ل ا �ل��ا �ي� ����رط�ه بح����س� ب� ا ج���ه�� � �مرا � � ح�د �م�ا �ص�د أ� ا �ل�د وُا م ع��لى‬ ‫�غ أ‬
‫و‬
‫ث ن ن ت‬
‫‪١٠٠‬‬
‫ت‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ن‬ ‫�ق‬ ‫ن‬
‫� �ا ي�ا ا لم���ع�ك��س�� ا �ل��سوا �ل� ب� وا ��ل��ا �ي� � � لا �����س���عم�ل‬ ‫���بر�ى �م��ن ا �ل�� ���ض‬ ‫�و� ا �ل �ك‬ ‫ا �ل���ص�ر�ى � و ك‬
‫أ‬ ‫�كن���ة ّل �م ا � ض � ّ��ة ا ل ط��قل����ة‬
‫م���روطت����ي�ن ‪.‬‬ ‫��� ���ي�ن ا ل ش‬
‫ي‬‫بر‬ ‫�‬
‫ك‬ ‫ل‬‫�‬ ‫ا‬ ‫م‬‫�‬ ‫و‬ ‫�‬ ‫ل��� رور�ي م��‬ ‫ا لمم � �إ ا‬
‫ع‬ ‫ع‬
‫� � ق ّ � ت ّل ف‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ة ئة ن‬
‫رى‬ ‫�‬ ‫��ا �ل�� �غ‬
‫ص�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫ك‬ ‫�‬ ‫وا ��لن���ت��ي�� ج��� د ا �م�� �إ � �ص�د � ا �ل�د وا ع��لى �إح�د ى م�����د م��ي���ه و�إ ا‬
‫م‬
‫ة أ ّة ض‬ ‫م �ذ فً‬
‫‪١٠١‬‬
‫ة‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ض‬ ‫ق‬
‫كا ن� ت�‪.‬‬ ‫ح� و��ا �ع ن����ه�ا �ي���د ا �ل�لا د وا وا �ل�لا ��ر ور� وا �ل�ض���رور� � ي��� ��ر ور� �‬ ‫�‬
‫م‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫أ‬
‫ن‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ف ّة‬ ‫ف‬
‫كا ن� ت� ‪٢‬‬ ‫���بر�ى �إ � �‬ ‫��ل ا ��لث��ا �ل� ث� � ش���رط�ه ‪��� ١‬ع��لي��� ا �ل��� �غص�ر�ى وا ��لن���ت��ي�� ج��� �‬
‫كا �ل �ك‬ ‫ل��� ك�‬‫� �م�ا ا � ش‬
‫و‬
‫ً‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫أ‬
‫‪١٠٢‬‬
‫ن‬ ‫ف‬ ‫�ذ‬ ‫�غ ي��ر ال�ر ب� و لا ���ع�ك�� ا �ل���ص�ر�ى م‬
‫�غ‬ ‫ف‬
‫���بر�ى‬ ‫كا ن� ت� ا �ل �ك‬ ‫ح� و��ا �ع ن����ه�ا ا �ل�لا د وا ‪� ٣‬إ � �‬ ‫�‬ ‫س‬ ‫ع �إ‬
‫ّم‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ّ‬
‫ي�ن‬ ‫ت‬ ‫خ‬‫ل‬‫�‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ي�ن‬ ‫ت‬
‫كا �� �إح�د �ى ا ��ا ��ص���� ‪.‬‬ ‫�� ���مو�م�ا �إ ��لي���ه�ا �إ � �‬ ‫�إح�د �ى ا �ل�ع�ا �م���� و�م���ض‬
‫� ة �أ �م �خ ة ال أ ّ � ن‬ ‫�� ا �لرا ب� ف� ش���رط ن�ت��ا ج��ه ب�‬ ‫�أ �ّم�ا ا � ش‬
‫ح����س� ب� ا �جل���ه�� ور �م��س�� �ول كو�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�إ‬ ‫ع‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ل��� ك�‬ ‫و‬
‫ن‬
‫‪١٠٣‬‬
‫ث‬ ‫ث‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ث‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ف‬
‫ا �ل��ق��ي���ا ��س �ي���ه �م��ن ا �ل�����ع��لي��ا � وا ��ل��ا �� ا ��ع ك�‬
‫ت‬ ‫ف‬
‫��ا ��س ا �ل��س�ا ��لب��� ا لم����س���عم�ل�� �ي���ه وا ��ل��ا �ل��‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ف� ّ‬ ‫ض ي ث ث أ‬ ‫ق‬
‫�‬
‫��� ا ل ا �‬ ‫�‬ ‫�ص�د � ا �ل�د وا ع��لى � �غص�ر�ى ا �ل����ر ب� ا ��ل��ا �ل� � ا ل�ع ا ل�ع�ا ع�� ا ل ك‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫� و ر ي� م لى برى ر بفع‬ ‫م‬
‫�غ‬ ‫ن‬ ‫��� � ف� ا �ل��س�ا د �� �م��ن ا لم ن���ع�ك��س��ة ا �ل��س ا �ل�� ا �لخ‬ ‫ن‬
‫�و� ا �ل���ص�ر�ى �ي�‬ ‫��ا �م��س ك‬ ‫و ب‬ ‫س‬ ‫�و� ا �ل �ك برى ي�‬ ‫ك‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ف� ّ‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ا ��لث��ا �م��ن �إح�د � ا �لخ‬
‫���بر�ى مم�ا �ي���ص�د � ع��لي���ه�ا ا �ل�عر ي� ا �ل�ع�ا ‪.‬‬ ‫��ا ��صت����ي�ن وا �ل �ك‬ ‫ى‬
‫م‬ ‫ن ت ة ف ض ي�ن أ‬
‫ق‬ ‫ن‬ ‫�غ‬ ‫ي�ن‬ ‫ّ‬
‫وا ��ل�����ي�� ج��� �ي� ا �ل����ر ب��� ال�و�ل�� �ع�ك��س ‪ ٤‬ا �ل���ص�ر�ى �إ � �ص�د � ا �ل�د وا ع��لي���ه�ا‬
‫ّ ف م‬
‫ّ ف ة ة‬ ‫�أ � ن ق‬
‫‪١٠٤‬‬
‫ض‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ّ‬
‫كا � ا �ل����ي���ا ��س �م��ن ا �ل����س� ت� ا لم ن���ع�ك��س�� ا �ل��سوا �ل� ب� و�إلا ��م��ط��قل���� ع�ا �م�� و �ي� ا �ل����ر ب�‬ ‫و‬
‫�غ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ئ‬ ‫ث ث‬
‫ا ��ل��ا �ل�� د ا �م�� �إ � �ص�د � ا �ل�د وا م ع��لى �إح�د �ى �م�����د �م��ي���ه و�إلا ���ع�ك��س ‪ ٥‬ا �ل���ص�ر�ى‬
‫�غ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ئة ن‬ ‫ف� ا �ل ا � ا �لخ‬
‫���بر�ى و�إلا ���ع�ك��س ا �ل���ص�ر�ى‬ ‫��ا �م��س د ا �م�� �إ � �ص�د � ا �ل�د وا ع��لى ا �ل �ك‬ ‫و ي� ر بع و‬
‫فم‬
‫�ف‬ ‫�غ‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ث‬ ‫ف‬ ‫� �ذ فً ن‬ ‫م‬
‫ي ‪ ٧‬ب��ع�د �ع�ك��س ا �ل���ص�ر�ى و ي�‬ ‫كا �ي� ا ��ل��ا ��‬ ‫ح� و��ا �ع���ه ا �ل�لا د وا م ‪ ٦‬و �ي� ا �ل��س�ا د ��س م‬
‫ف‬ ‫ف‬
‫��ع�ك��س ا ��لن���ت��ي�� ج���ة ب��ع�د‬ ‫���بر�ى و �ي� ا ��لث��ا �م��ن ك‬ ‫ث ‪ ٨‬ب��ع�د �ع�ك��س ا �ل �ك‬ ‫كا �ي� ا ��لث��ا �ل��‬ ‫ا �ل��س�ا ب�ع م‬
‫ت‬
‫�ع�ك��س ا �ل��رت���ي� ب�‪.‬‬

‫ف‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ف ق‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ف‬ ‫� ة‬ ‫ف ش‬

‫���بر�ى‪� :�� ٣ .‬ي���د ا �ل�لا د وا ‪ :�� ٤ .‬ب��ع�ك��س‪:�� ٥ .‬‬ ‫كا ن� ت� ا �ل �ك‬ ‫ح����س�� ا �جل‬
‫���ه��‪� :�� ٢ .‬إ � �‬ ‫�‬
‫‪��� :�� ١‬رط�ه ب� ب‬
‫م‬
‫��ل ا � ث�ل��ا �ل� ث�‪.‬‬ ‫�� ا � ث�ل��ا �ن ‪� ٨ .‬ف�‪ :‬ا � ش‬ ‫ش‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ف ق‬ ‫ف‬
‫ل��� ك�‬ ‫� ب���ع�ك��س‪� : �� ٦ .‬ي���د ا �ل�لا د وا م‪ :�� ٧ .‬ا �ل��� ك�ل ي�‬

‫‪68‬‬ ‫‪68‬‬
 Third Treatise—Second Section

The condition for the second figure with regard to modality comes down to 100
two matters. One of them is that the minor be true as a perpetual proposition,
or that the major be one of the propositions with convertible negatives. The
second is that the possible proposition is only used with an absolute necessary,
or with either of the two conditional propositions as majors.
If one of the premises is true as a perpetual proposition, the conclusion is a 101
perpetual proposition; otherwise, it is like the minor, but dropping its restric-
tion of non-perpetuity or nonnecessity, and dropping whichever necessity the
minor may have.
The condition for the third figure is that it have an actuality minor. The 102
modality of the conclusion is like the major if the major is not one of the four
descriptional propositions. Otherwise it is like the converse of the minor
from which the restriction of non-perpetuity is dropped if the major is one of
the two generals, and to which that restriction is added if the major is one of
the two specials.
The condition for productivity with respect to modality in the fourth figure 103
comes down to five matters. The first is that the syllogism in this figure have
actuality premises. The second is that the negative proposition used in it be
convertible. The third is that, for the third mood, the minor be true as a per-
petual proposition, or the major be true as a general conventional. The fourth
is that the major in the sixth mood be a convertible negative. The fifth is that
the minor of the eighth mood be one of the two specials, and the major be one
of the propositions true as a general conventional.
The modality of the conclusion in the first two moods is that of the converse 104
of the minor if (1) it is true as a perpetual proposition or (2) the syllogism is
from the six propositions with convertible negatives; otherwise, it is a general
absolute. In the third mood, the conclusion is a perpetual proposition if one of
the premises is true as a perpetual proposition; otherwise, the modality is that
of the converse of the minor. In the fourth and fifth moods, the conclusion is
a perpetual proposition if the major is true as a perpetual proposition; other-
wise, it is that of the converse of the minor, though dropping its restriction of
non-perpetuity. In the sixth mood, it is like the second figure after converting
the minor. In the seventh mood, it is like the third figure after converting the
major. In the eighth mood, it is like the converse of the conclusion after revers-
ing the order of the premises.

69 69
 ‫ا لم��ق���ا �ل��ة ا �ثل��ا �ل ث‬
‫�� ‪ -‬ا �ل��ف�����ص� ا �ثل��ا �ل ث‬
‫��‬ ‫ل‬

‫� ا �ل ك� ئ � ة �ن ش‬
‫ل��� ���طّ���ا ت‬ ‫ا �ل��ف������ �ص� ا �ل����ث�ا �ل� ث� ف� الا ���قت�� ا ن���ّ�ي�ا ت‬
‫�‬ ‫��ا ����ن�� �م� ا � ر ي‬ ‫ر�‬ ‫ي�‬ ‫ل‬
‫�ه �خ ة أ ق‬
‫و ي� �م��س�� � ���س�ا‬
‫م‬
‫نت ش ة ف‬ ‫�� �م��ن ا لمتّ�����ص�لا ت‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫أ‬
‫��� �ي�‬ ‫كا �� ا �ل���رك‬ ‫� وا لم��ط��بوع �م ن���ه �م�ا �‬ ‫ب‬ ‫ا �ل��ق�����س� ال� ّول �م�ا ي�ت��ر�ك�‬
‫ن ن ت �ً ف‬ ‫أ ة ف� أنّ‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ج�ز تم ّ �ن ق ّ‬
‫‪١٠٥‬‬

‫�‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ال‬ ‫�‬ ‫ش‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ي�ن‬

‫� ء �ا �م� ا لم�����د �م���� و���ع�����د ���� ك‬
‫ال‬ ‫ت‬
‫كا � �ا �لي��ا ي�‬ ‫��ا ل �ر ب��ع�� ي���ه � ��ه ‪� ١‬إ � �‬
‫ش‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫أ‬
‫ش‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ً‬ ‫�غ م ق ّ‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫كا � �ا ��لي��ا ���‬
‫ي�ه���م�ا ���هو ا �ل��� ك�‬ ‫��ل ال�ول و�إ� �‬ ‫���بر�ى ���هو ا �ل��� ك�‬‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫ا �ل���ص�ر�ى �م�����د �م�ا ي� ا �ل �ك‬
‫��ل‬
‫�غ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫� ق‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ن‬ ‫كا ن� �م��ق�� ّ�د �ًم�ا ����ه���م�ا ���ه ا � ش‬
‫ف‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ن ن‬
‫كا � �م�����د �م�ا �ي� ا �ل���ص�ر�ى‬ ‫��ل ا ��لث��ا �ل� ث� و�إ�‬ ‫ل��� ك�‬ ‫ي� � و‬ ‫ا ��لث��ا �ي� و�إ� �‬
‫ا ��لن���ت�������ة‬ ‫ض‬ ‫نت‬ ‫ش ئ‬ ‫��� � ف���ه ا � ش‬ ‫ت ً ف‬
‫��ل ا �لرا ب�ع و���را ���ط ال�إ ���ا ج� وع�د د ا �ل����ر و ب� و ي ج‬ ‫ل��� ك�‬ ‫�ا ��لي��ا �ي� ا �ل �ك برى � و‬
‫ض‬ ‫�غ ف ق‬ ‫ح���م��لّ��ا ت‬‫كا ف� ا �‬ ‫ك ّ �ش‬ ‫ف� � كّ ّ ة � ف ّ ة ف‬
‫� �م��ن ي��ر �ر� �مث���ا ل ا �ل����ر ب�‬ ‫ي‬ ‫ل‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫ي‬ ‫م‬ ‫�‬
‫�كي���ي���� ي أ ل ّ ل‬
‫�‬
‫�‬
‫ك‬ ‫��‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫ي� ا ل�����مي���� وا ل �‬
‫ف �ز �نت ّ‬
‫كا � ج د ��ه ي������ج ك�ل�م�ا‬
‫ن‬
‫�‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ف‬
‫كا � ا ب� �ج � د وك�ل�م�ا‬
‫ن‬
‫�‬ ‫��ل ال� ّول ك�ل�م�ا‬ ‫ال�أ ّ ل �م��ن ا � ش‬
‫ل��� ك�‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫و‬
‫�ز‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ن‬
‫كا � ا ب� ��ه ‪.‬‬ ‫�‬

‫ف‬ ‫�� �م��ن ا لم ن�� ف�����ص�لا ت‬ ‫ت ّ‬ ‫� ن‬ ‫ق‬

‫كا ن� ت� ا � ش‬ ‫� وا لم��ط��بوع �م ن���ه �م�ا �‬
‫���ة ‪� ٢‬ي�‬
‫ل���رك‬ ‫ب‬ ‫ي �م�ا ي���ر�ك‬
‫�‬ ‫ا �ل�������س�م ا �ل���ث�ا ��‬
‫أ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫أ ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ج�ز �غ ت ّ �ن ق ّ تي�ن ق‬
‫‪١٠٦‬‬

‫و‬ ‫�‬ ‫ه‬ ‫د‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ك‬

‫�‬ ‫ا‬
‫�‬‫م‬‫�‬ ‫د‬
‫كل � و�إ‬ ‫ج‬ ‫كل ا ب� � و �‬ ‫�����و��لن��ا �إ �م�ا ‪� ٣‬‬
‫� ء ي��ر �ا �م� ا لم�����د �م���� ك‬
‫ّ �ز �نمت ّ‬
‫‪٤‬‬
‫ق‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ّ‬
‫ك و �ز لا�مت�� ن���ا خ��ل ّ ا �ل ا �� �ع��ن‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫ه‬ ‫ك‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫ا‬ ‫ك‬
‫�‬ ‫ا‬‫�‬
‫م‬ ‫كل و ي������ج �إ �‬ ‫�‬
‫عأ و و ع‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ل ب آ و ل ج� و ل‬ ‫أ‬
‫‪٥‬‬
‫أ�‬
‫� ق � ت ا ��لت ��ل ف � �ن � ال خ� � ت�ن ق ف ال �ش � ال ة ا � ش ئ‬ ‫ّ‬
‫ل���را ���ط‬ ‫��ا ل �ر ب��ع�� و‬ ‫م�����د م� �� ي�� وع� ح�د � ري�ن ‪ ٦‬و��ع�����د �ي���ه � �� ك‬
‫ي�ن‬ ‫ش‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ي�ن‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ي�ن‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ت ة�ي ي�ن �ل ّ‬
‫�‬ ‫ل‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫ح���م�ل��ي���� م�ع����بر ��ه�ه���ا ب��� ا م������ا رك�� ‪.‬‬ ‫ا ل��م�ع����بر� ب��� ا �‬

‫� ّة ّ ة‬ ‫ت ّ‬ ‫ق‬
‫كا ن� ت�‬ ‫ح���م��لي��� وا لمت�����ص�ل�� وا لم��ط��بوع �م ن���ه �م�ا �‬ ‫�� �م��ن ا �ل‬
‫ث �م�ا ي���ر�ك ب‬
‫�‬ ‫ا �ل�������س� ا �ل����ث�ا �ل��‬
‫م‬
‫ل������ة �م تا ل ا ل تّ�� ص���ة ن �ت�����ت���ه �متّ�� ص���ة �م��ق�� ّ�د ��مه�ا �م��ق�� ّ�د ا ل تّ�� ص���ة‬
‫‪١٠٧‬‬
‫ش‬ ‫� ّة‬ ‫ا �ل‬
‫م ��� ل‬
‫م‬ ‫�‬ ‫��� ل‬ ‫���بر�ى وا � رك ع � ي� م ��� ل و � ي ج‬ ‫ح���م��لي��� ك‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ف� ّ‬ ‫ح� م��لّ ة�ق ��لن ّل ن‬ ‫أ‬
‫ك‬
‫�‬ ‫د‬ ‫ج‬ ‫�‬
‫�‬
‫�‬‫ك‬ ‫�‬ ‫ا‬ ‫�‬ ‫ا‬
‫ك‬
‫�‬ ‫ا‬‫�‬‫م‬‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫ك‬ ‫ا‬
‫�‬‫�‬ ‫��‬‫�‬
‫�‬ ‫ك‬ ‫��‬‫�‬ ‫��‬ ‫�‬‫ت�ا ��ل��ه�ا ن��ت�������ة ا ��لت�� ��ل� ف� ���ي�ن ا ��لت��ا ل ا �‬
‫ل‬
‫ل‬ ‫و‬ ‫ل�‬ ‫ب‬ ‫ي و‬ ‫و‬ ‫�‬‫ي‬ ‫ي ب‬ ‫و ي� ي ج‬
‫ف� � ّ ه ت�ن ق ف� ال أ�ش � ال أ ة ا � ش ا ئ‬ ‫ن‬ ‫�نت ّ‬
‫��ا ل �ر ب��ع�� و ل���ر ���ط‬ ‫��ل ج� و��ع�����د ي���ه � �� ك‬ ‫كا � ا ب� ك‬ ‫د ه ي������ج ك�ل�م�ا �‬
‫ّ‬ ‫�‬
‫ة‬ ‫ا ل��م�عت����بر�ة ���ي�ن ا �‬
‫ح���م��ليّ���ة‪.‬‬‫ح���م�ل��يت����ي�ن �م�عت����بر� ��ه�ه ن���ا ���ي�ن ا ��لت��ا ل� وا �ل‬
‫�‬
‫ي‬ ‫ب‬ ‫ل‬
‫�‬ ‫ب‬
‫ف‬ ‫ئ ّ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ئ ّ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ئ ّ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ف‬
‫���ة �ي���ه‪ :�� ٣ .‬د ا �م�ا �إ �م�ا‪ :�� ٤ .‬د ا �م�ا �إ �م�ا‪ :�� ٥ .‬د ا �م�ا �إ �م�ا‪:�� ٦ .‬‬ ‫‪� ١‬ف�‪ :‬ل�أ نّ� ال�أ ��س��ط‪� ٢ .‬ف�‪ :‬ا � ش‬
‫ل���رك‬ ‫و‬
‫�ز‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫أ خ ي�ن �ه ّ‬
‫كل و ‪.‬‬ ‫كل ا ب� و �‬ ‫�إح�د �ى ال��ر�ي�� و �م�ا �‬

‫‪70‬‬ ‫‪70‬‬
 Third Treatise—Third Section

The Third Section: On Connective Syllogisms with Hypothetical Premises

Containing five divisions

The First Kind This kind is compounded of conditional premises. The norm 105
in this class is that in which what is shared is a complete part of both premises.
The four figures are formed in it because, if the consequent in the minor is
antecedent in the major, the syllogism is first figure; if the middle is conse-
quent in both, the syllogism is second figure; if it is antecedent in both, the
syllogism is third figure; and if it is antecedent in the minor and consequent
in the major, the syllogism is fourth figure. The conditions of productivity,
the number of moods, and the quantity and quality of the conclusion in every
figure are exactly the same as in the categoricals, with no distinction. The form
of the first mood is “whenever A is B, C is D, and whenever C is D, H is Z,”
which produces “whenever A is B, H is Z.”

The Second Kind This kind is compounded of disjunctives. The norm in this 106
class is that in which the two premises share an incomplete part, as in: “either
every A is B or every C is D,” and “either every D is H, or every W is Z,” which
produces “either every A is B or every C is H or every W is Z” (because of the
inclusive disjunction arising from the two premises of the composition and
one of the other two). The four figures are formed in this class, and the condi-
tions taken into account between two categoricals are taken into account here
between the two sharing a part.

The Third Kind This kind is compounded of a categorical and a conditional. 107
The norm in this class is that in which the categorical is the major and the
consequent of the conditional is shared. The conclusion is a conditional, the
antecedent of which is the antecedent of the conditional premise, and the con-
sequent is the conclusion of the composition between the consequent in the
minor and the categorical, as in “whenever A is B, C is D,” and “every D is H,”
which produces “whenever A is B, every C is H.” So the four figures are formed
in this class, and the conditions taken into account between two categoricals
are taken into account here between the consequent and the categorical.

71 71
 ‫ا لم��ق���ا �ل��ة ا �ثل��ا �ل ث‬
‫�� ‪ -‬ا �ل��ف�����ص� ا �ثل��ا �ل ث‬
‫��‬ ‫ل‬

‫ق ي�ن ال أ ّ �أ ن‬ ‫ح���م��لّ���ة ا ل ن�� ف�� ص���ة‬ ‫ت ّ‬ ‫ق‬

‫�‬
‫ل‬
‫�‬ ‫�ن‬ ‫�‬
‫و �‬ ‫ل‬ ‫�‬ ‫��‬‫م‬ ‫�‬
‫��‬‫س‬‫��‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫ل‬
‫وو ى‬ ‫�‬
‫ع‬ ‫�ه‬ ‫ل‬ ‫�‬‫��‬ ‫م‬ ‫ي و‬ ‫ا‬ ‫�‬
‫م‬ ‫�‬ ‫ا �ل�������س�م ا �لرا ���بع �م�ا ي���ر�ك أب‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫ك ّ وا ح�د �م ن����ه�ا وا ح�دًا �م��ن‬
‫‪١،١٠٨‬‬
‫ش‬ ‫نف‬ ‫ج�ز‬ ‫� ّ ت‬ ‫ت� ك ن �ل‬
‫�و� ا ح���م��لي��ا � ‪ ١‬ب��ع�د د �ّ� اء أالا��������ص�ا ل ي�����ا ر ك �ل‬
‫ّ‬
‫كل ج �إ �م�ا ب� و�إ�م�ا‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ت� ت ف ت ف� ن ت ة ق ن ّ‬
‫�‬ ‫�����و��ل��ا‬‫ح�ا د ا ��ل�� ��لي����ا � ‪ ٢‬ي� ا ��ل�����ي�� ج��� ك‬
‫ّ‬
‫ا���ف�����ص�ا ل �إ �م�ا �م ا �‬ ‫�أ �ج�ز اء ال ن‬
‫ج�ز‬ ‫� أ أ‬ ‫ق‬ ‫�نت ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫عّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬
‫كل ج ط �ل���ص�د � � ح�د � � اء‬ ‫�‬ ‫ج‬‫�‬‫�‬‫��‬ ‫كل ه ط ي��‬ ‫�‬ ‫و‬ ‫كل د ط‬ ‫�‬ ‫و‬ ‫كل ب� ط‬ ‫�‬ ‫و‬ ‫د و �م�ا ه‬
‫�إ‬
‫� �‬
‫ح���م��لّ���ة �ّم�ا �م ا خ�ت��� ا�ف ا ��لت��أ ��ل� ف���ا ت ‪ ٣‬ف� ا ��لن���ت�������ة‬
‫��ه �م� ا � ي و�إ ع ل � ي � ي� ي ج‬ ‫ل‬‫�‬ ‫�ن‬ ‫ا���ف�����ص�ا ل �م �م�ا ي�����ا رك‬
‫ش‬ ‫ال ن‬
‫ّ �ز �نت ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ع‬ ‫ق ن ّ‬
‫� ل‬ ‫ك‬
‫�‬ ‫ج‬‫�‬‫�‬ ‫��‬ ‫�‬‫�‬
‫ي‬ ‫ه‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ك‬
‫�‬ ‫و‬ ‫ط‬ ‫د‬ ‫ك‬
‫�‬
‫ل � ل‬ ‫و‬ ‫ج‬ ‫�‬ ‫ب‬ ‫ك‬
‫�‬ ‫و‬ ‫ه‬ ‫ا‬‫�‬
‫م‬ ‫�‬
‫�إ‬‫و‬ ‫د‬ ‫ا‬
‫�‬‫م‬‫�‬
‫�إ‬‫و‬ ‫�‬‫ب‬ ‫ا‬‫�‬
‫م‬ ‫�‬ ‫�إ‬ ‫�‬ ‫ج‬ ‫كل‬‫�����و��ل��ا �‬ ‫ك‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬
‫ج �إ �م�ا ج و�إ�م�ا ط و�إ�م�ا �ز لم�ا �م ّر‪.‬‬
‫ح���م��لّ ة ا �ة‬ ‫ل‬‫�‬ ‫�ن‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ج�ز‬ ‫أ‬
‫�ن‬ ‫� ث ن أ ن ت ن �ل ّ ت أ ق ّ‬ ‫�‬
‫�� ا ي��� و ح�د‬ ‫�‬ ‫ح���م��لي��ا � � ��ل �م� � � اء الا��������ص�ا ل و��ل� ك‬ ‫�و� ا �‬ ‫وا ��ل��ا �ي� � � � ك‬
‫أ ّ‬ ‫ش ة أ �ه ق ن ّ ّ‬
‫‪٢،١٠٨‬‬

‫كل ج� ب�‬ ‫كل ا ط � و �‬ ‫�����و��ل��ا �إ �م�ا �‬ ‫��� �م � ح�د �م�ا ك‬ ‫� �ج�ز ئ���ي�ن وا لم����ا رك‬ ‫ا لم ن�� ف�����ص�ل��ة �ذ ا ت‬
‫أ ع‬ ‫و‬
‫ك ّ د لا�مت�� ن���ا خ��ل ّ ا �ل ا ق�� �ع��ن �م��ق�� ّ�د �م�ت‬ ‫كل ا ط �‬
‫�نت ّ ّ‬
‫كل ب� د ي������ج �إ �م�ا �‬
‫ّ‬
‫�ي‬ ‫ع و وع‬ ‫و �ل ج�‬ ‫�‬ ‫أ‬
‫و�‬
‫م����ا ر ك‪.‬‬ ‫ا ��لت�� ��ل� ف� �ع��ن ا �ل�ج�ز ء �غ�� ا ل ش‬
‫ير‬ ‫ي و‬

‫ّ ف‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬
‫� ب� �م��ن ا لمت�����ص�ل��ة وا لم ن�� ف�����ص�ل��ة والا�ش��ت��را ك �إ �م�ا �ي� �ج�ز ء‬ ‫��خ�ا �م��س �م�ا ي�ت��ر�ك�‬ ‫ا �ل��ق�����س� ا �ل�‬
‫م‬
‫� ن ا ل تّ�� ص���ة‬ ‫ت�ا ّ �م��ن ا لم��ق�� ّ�د �مت����ي�ن �أ �غ�� ت�ا ّ �م ن‬
‫‪١،١٠٩‬‬
‫ن ف‬ ‫�ك ف‬
‫كا � ��ا لم��ط��بوع �م ن���ه �م�ا ت� كو� م ��� ل‬ ‫�ي�� �‬ ‫ا‬
‫�‬‫م‬‫��‬‫�‬
‫و ير م � و‬‫ه‬‫���‬
‫ئً‬ ‫ف‬ ‫أّ ق ن ّ‬ ‫م‬
‫ن‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ة‬
‫�‬
‫كا � ا ب� �ج د ود ا �م�ا‬ ‫���بر�ى �مث���ا ل ال�ول �و��ل��ا ك�ل�م�ا �‬ ‫� �غص�ر�ى وا لم ن�� ف�����ص�ل�� �مو ج� ب���� ك‬
‫�و ن� ا ب� ا و ه �ز �م�ا ن��ع��ة ا �جل‬ ‫ئً ّ أ ن‬ ‫�ن‬ ‫أ‬
‫�ّم�ا ج د � و ه �ز �م�ا ن��ع��ة ا �جل‬
‫����م‬ ‫����م ي�� ت����ج د ا �م�ا �إ �م�ا � � ي� ك‬
‫ع‬ ‫ع �‬ ‫�إ �‬
‫لا����ست���ل�ز ا ا �مت�� ن���ا الا� ت�ا �م ا �ل�لا �ز د ا ئ�مً�ا �أ ف� ا �ل����م�ل��ة ا �مت�� ن���ا ع�ه �م ا لم�ل�ز‬
‫وم‬ ‫ع‬ ‫و ي� ج‬ ‫م‬ ‫ئً أ مف ع ج مع ع‬
‫�ز‬ ‫ت‬ ‫�ز‬ ‫ف‬ ‫�ن‬ ‫�إ�ذ‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ت‬‫�ن‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫د ا �م�ا � � ا �ل����م�ل��ة �م�ا ن��ع��ة ا �لخ‬
‫�� ا ب� ��ه لا����س���ل ا‬ ‫�و� ا ل ي� ك‬ ‫��لو ������ج ��د ي� ك‬ ‫و‬ ‫و ي� ج‬
‫م‬ ‫م‬ ‫في�ن ت �ز ً �ّ ًّ‬ ‫أ‬
‫�ذ‬
‫ث‬ ‫ث‬ ‫�ز‬ ‫ت‬
‫� ال�و��س��ط �ل��ل��طر��� ا ����س���ل ا �م�ا ك��لي��ا وا ����س���ل ا م �ل�ك ا لم��ط�لو ب� �م��ن ا ��ل��ا �ل��‬ ‫ن���ق��ي����‬
‫�ض‬
‫�ز �م�ا ن��ع��ة ا �لخ ّ‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ئً ّ ّ‬ ‫ف� ّ‬ ‫ن ّ‬
‫��لو‬ ‫كل د ه � و و‬ ‫��ل ج� د ود ا �م�ا �إ �م�ا �‬ ‫كا ن� ا ب� ك�‬ ‫�مث���ا ل ا ��لث��ا �ي� ك�ل�م�ا �‬
‫أ‬ ‫ف� ّ ّ‬ ‫�نت ّل ن‬
‫كل ج ه � و و �ز ‪.‬‬ ‫�‬ ‫كا � ا ب� ��إ �م�ا‬ ‫ي������ج ك��م�ا �‬
‫أ�‬ ‫�‬
‫ف‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ف‬
‫والا����ست����ق���ص�اء �ي� �ه��ذه ال����س�ا �إلى ا �لر��س�ا ئ�ل ا ��لت� �ع�م��لن��ا �ه�ا �ي� ���نّ ا لم ن����ط ق�‪.‬‬
‫�ي‬ ‫م‬
‫‪٢،١٠٩‬‬

‫أ ف‬ ‫أ ف‬ ‫ّ‬
‫ف‬ ‫ف‬ ‫�‪� ٢ .‬ف�‪ :‬ا ت�‬
‫ح�ا د ا � ت�ل�� �ي�ل��‪ :�� ٣ .‬ا خ�ت���لا�� ا � ت�ل�� �ي�ل��‪.‬‬
‫�‬ ‫��م� ّ�ل��ا ت‬
‫�لح‬ ‫ف‬
‫‪ :�� ١‬ع�د د ا ي‬

‫‪72‬‬ ‫‪72‬‬
 Third Treatise—Third Section

The Fourth Kind This kind is compounded of a categorical and a disjunctive, 108.1
and forms two subcategories. In the first, the categorical propositions are the
same in number as the parts of the disjunction, and each categorical proposi-
tion shares a term with one of the parts of the disjunction. Further, the com-
positions are either united in the conclusion, as in “every C is either B or D
or H,” and “every B is T and every D is T and every H is T,” which produces
“every C is T,” because one of the parts of the disjunction is true along with
a categorical with which it shares a term; or the compositions differ in the
conclusion, as in “every C is either B or D or H; but every B is C and every D
is T and every H is Z,” which produces “every C is either C or T or Z,” for the
reason just mentioned.
In the second, the categoricals are fewer than the parts of the disjunction. 108.2
Let the categorical be one, and the disjunctive have two parts, and the sharing
takes place with one of those two parts, as in “either every A is T or every C
is B,” but “every B is D,” which produces “either every A is T or every C is D,”
because an inclusive disjunction arises from the two premises of the composi-
tion and the unshared part.

The Fifth Kind This kind is compounded of a conditional and a disjunctive, 109.1
and what is shared is either a complete or an incomplete part of the premises.
In either case, the norm is what has a conditional as minor and a disjunctive
as affirmative major. An example of the first is “whenever A is B, C is D,” but
“always, either C is D or H is Z” (the disjunctive is an alternative denial), which
produces “always, either A is B or H is Z” as an alternative denial, because
the impossibility of conjunction with the implicate always or in general entails
the impossibility of conjunction with the implicant always or in general. The
disjunctive with an inclusive disjunction produces “sometimes, if A is not B
then H is Z,” due to the contradictory of the middle entailing the two extremes
universally (and the inference of what is sought is by a third-figure syllogism).
An example of the second kind—when the two premises have an incomplete
part in common—is “whenever A is B, every C is D,” and “always, either every
D is H or W is Z” as an inclusive disjunction, which produces “whenever A is
B, either every C is H or W is Z.”
A full treatment of these divisions is given in the epistles we have written 109.2
on the art of logic.

73 73
 ‫�لخ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ق ة ث ث‬
‫ا لم�����ا �ل�� ا ��ل��ا �ل�� ‪ -‬ا �ل�������ص�ل ا ��ا �م��س‬

‫ت �ث � ئ ّ‬ ‫ف� �‬ ‫ف‬
‫ا �ل�������� �ص�ل ا �لرا ���بع ي� ا �ل������قي���ا ��س الا����س������ن�ا �ي�‬
‫ج�ز ئ أ‬ ‫أ‬ ‫�� �م��ن �م��ق�� ّ�د �مت����ي�ن �إح�د ا �ه�م�ا �ش�� طّ����ة ال�أ خ‬ ‫ّ‬
‫ي� و‬ ‫�‬ ‫ا‬
‫�‬‫ه‬‫��‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�د‬‫ح‬ ‫�‬ ‫ل‬ ‫�ض‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫و�هو �مر�ك ب‬
‫�‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ر ي و رى و ع‬ ‫أ‬ ‫آ‬
‫‪١١٠‬‬
‫ل��� طّ����ة �ل�ز �مّ����ة ا ل ت�� ص���ة‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ف‬
‫� ال� خ�ر � و ر���ع�ه ويج�� ب� �إ ي ج��ا ب� ا � ش ر ي و و ي م ��� ل‬ ‫ر���ع�ه ��لي��ل�ز و �ض‬
‫ع‬ ‫ّّ أ ّ‬‫م‬
‫���ن �ق� ت الا�تّ�� ص�ا ال ن‬
‫ا���ف�����ص�ا ل �هو ب��ع��ي ن���ه‬
‫ف ن‬
‫ك�ل��يت����ه�ا ‪ � ١‬وك��ليّ���ة ا �لو �ض‬
‫�ع وا �لر��ع �إ � لم ي� ك و � � ل و‬ ‫و�‬
‫� �ف‬ ‫ق‬
‫� وا لر � ‪.‬‬ ‫و�� ت� ا �لو �ض‬
‫ع ع‬
‫كا ن� ت� �متّ�����ص�ل��ة ف��ا ��س��ت��ثن���اء ع��ي�ن ا لم��ق�� ّ�د ���نت���� ع��ي�ن‬ ‫�‬
‫ا � ش ّ ة ا ل �ض ة ف ن‬
‫و ل���رطي���� مو� و ي �إ �‬
‫�ه‬‫��‬‫�‬ ‫��‬‫ع‬
‫م ي ج�‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬
‫‪١١١‬‬
‫ن‬ ‫�ن‬ ‫�ث‬
‫�ز‬
‫� ا لم�����د م و�إلا ��لب���ط�ل ا �ل�ل وم د و�‬
‫ق‬ ‫� ا ��لت��ا لي� ي�� ت����ج ن���ق��ي����‬
‫�ض‬ ‫ا ��لت��ا لي� وا ��س��ت� ن���اء ن���ق��ي����‬
‫�ض‬
‫ّ‬ ‫أ‬ ‫�‬
‫ن ن� ت �م ن�� ف�� ص���ة‬
‫كا � ��� ل‬ ‫�و� ا ��لت��ا لي� � �عمّ �م��ن ا لم��ق���د و�إ� �‬
‫ن‬
‫حت�ما ل ك‬ ‫ا �ل�ع�ك��س ف�� �ش�� ء �م ن����ه���م�ا لا�‬
‫ح�ا ���ة‬ ‫ت‬ ‫خ‬ ‫آ‬ ‫م‬
‫ق‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ت‬ ‫�ن‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ج�ز‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ف ن ن تي �يق ق ّ ة ف ت �ثن ي�ن أ‬
‫� ال��ر لا����س����� ل‬ ‫كا � ي������ج�آ �����ي�����ض‬ ‫ح����ي����ي���� ��ا ��س��� ���اء ع�� � ��ي � ء �‬ ‫كا �� �‬ ‫���إ � �‬
‫ن �نت ي�ن ال خ� ل ت � ة خ ّ ن‬ ‫أ ّ‬ ‫�ث‬
‫ح�ا �ل�� ا �ل��لو و�إ�‬ ‫كا � ي������ج ع�� � ر ا����س����‬ ‫� � ��ي �ج�ز ء �‬ ‫ا �جل����م وا ��س��ت� ن���اء ن���ق��ي����‬
‫�ض‬
‫�‬ ‫ع‬
‫ن ا �لخ ل ّ ن‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ال‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ت‬ ‫�‬ ‫ل‬ ‫�ق‬ ‫ن ت � ن ة �ل ت �نت � ق ال أ ّ ف‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫ع ج �ماع و� و و�إ�‬ ‫د‬ ‫�‬ ‫ا‬ ‫ا‬
‫�‬‫��‬ ‫��‬‫م‬ ‫ا‬ ‫ط‬‫��‬ ‫�‬‫�‬‫�‬ ‫ول‬ ‫�‬ ‫��س‬ ‫��‬‫�‬
‫�‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ا‬ ‫�‬
‫�‬ ‫��‬
‫جع ج‬ ‫�‬‫�‬ ‫��م‬ ‫�‬
‫�‬ ‫ا‬ ‫��‬‫ع‬‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫ا‬
‫�‬‫م‬ ‫كا ��‬ ‫�‬
‫م‬ ‫�‬
‫‪٢‬‬
‫�خ�ل ّ د ن ا �ل‬
‫����م ‪.‬‬ ‫�خ�ل ّو ت���نت����ج ا �ل��ق����س ا ��لث��ا �ن� ف����ق��ط لا�مت�� ن���ا ا �ل‬ ‫كا ن� ت� �م�ا ن��ع��ة ا �ل‬ ‫�‬
‫ع و و� ج ع‬ ‫م ي‬ ‫�‬

‫��خ�ا �م�� ف� �ل ا � ق �‬ ‫��‬ ‫ف‬

‫ح� ا �ل������قي���ا ��س‬ ‫ا �ل�������� �ص�ل ا ل س ي� و‬
‫�ه �أ ��ع��ة‬
‫و ي� ر ب‬
‫� ���نت���� �� ض‬ ‫��� �م��ق�� ّ�د �م�ا ت‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ال�أ ّ ا �ل��ق‬
‫ع������ه�ا ن��ت��ي�� ج���ة ي��ل�ز �م ن����ه�ا‬ ‫ي� ب‬‫ج‬ ‫ب‬ ‫�‬
‫�ي‬‫�ك‬ ‫ر‬
‫�ه ت‬
‫�‬ ‫و‬ ‫و‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬‫�‬
‫�ك‬ ‫ل‬
‫م‬
‫�‬ ‫ا‬
‫ول ي أ ر ب‬ ‫س‬ ‫��‬ ‫ا‬
‫�‬‫��‬‫��‬
‫م ّ‬ ‫أ‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ّ‬
‫‪١١٢‬‬

‫�‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ً‬

‫و�م��ن �م��ق���د �م��ة � خ�ر�ى ن����ي�� ج��� � خ�ر�ى و�ه��لّ ج� ّرا �إلى � � ي�‬
‫ة‬ ‫ت‬
‫ح���ص�ل ا لم��ط�لو ب� و�هو �إ �م�ا‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ثّ ّ‬ ‫ف ّ‬ ‫ّم‬ ‫�ن ت � ق ن ّ‬
‫كل د ا‬ ‫كل ج� د و �‬ ‫��ل ج� د �م �‬ ‫كل ب� د � ك�‬ ‫كل ج� ب� و �‬ ‫�����و��ل��ا �‬‫�مو�صول ا �ل� ���ا ئ�ج ك‬
‫�ن ت � ق ن ّ‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ثّ ّ‬ ‫ف ّ‬
‫كل ج� ب�‬ ‫�����و��ل��ا �‬ ‫��ل ج ه � و �م��ف�����صول ا �ل� ���ا ئ�ج ك‬ ‫كل ا ه ف� ك�‬ ‫�‬ ‫و‬ ‫كل ج ا‬ ‫�‬ ‫��ل ج ا �‬ ‫� ك�‬
‫ّ �‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫�‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫م‬ ‫�‬ ‫ّ‬
‫��ل ج ه‪.‬‬ ‫كل ا ه ف� �‬ ‫كل د ا و �‬ ‫كل ب� د و �‬
‫ك �‬ ‫و�‬
‫ن ّة ن ف ة ّ‬ ‫��ز ّ ة ل تّ ة ّّ‬
‫ك�ل���ّ��يت����ه�ا‪� ٢ .‬ف ‪ :‬ا �ل‬
‫����م ‪.‬‬ ‫ك�ل�����يت����ه�ا و�ع���ا د ي��� ا لم�������ص�ل�� و �‬
‫ف‬
‫‪ :�� ١‬ول و�مي���� ا م�����ص�ل�� و �‬
‫� جع‬

‫‪74‬‬ ‫‪74‬‬
 Third Treatise—Fifth Section

The Fourth Section: On the Repetitive Syllogism

This is a compound of two premises, one a hypothetical, the other a propo- 110
sition that either affirms or denies one of the two parts of the hypothetical
premise, such that affirming or denying the other part follows from it. It is nec-
essary that the hypothetical premise is affirmative, and that the conditional is
implicative and universal; or that the affirmation of the antecedent or denial of
the consequent are universal (unless the time of the condition or disjunction is
exactly the time of the affirmation or denial).
If the hypothetical proposition that forms part of the repetitive syllogism 111
is conditional, then the repetition of the antecedent produces exactly the con-
sequent, and the repetition of the contradictory of the consequent produces
the contradictory of the antecedent; otherwise, the implication would be void
(though not in the reverse of either of the two cases above, due to the possibility
that the consequent is more general than the antecedent). If the hypothetical is
a disjunctive, then, if it is an exclusive disjunction, the repetition of either part
produces the contradictory of the other due to the impossibility of conjunc-
tion; the repetition of the contradictory of either part produces the other, due
to the impossibility of excluding both. If the disjunctive is alternative denial, it
produces only in the first case (due to the impossibility of conjunction though
not exclusion); and if the disjunctive is inclusive, it produces only in the second
case (due to the impossibility of exclusion though not conjunction).

The Fifth Section: On Matters Appended to the Syllogism

Containing four topics

The first is the compound syllogism, which is compounded of several prem- 112
ises, some of which produce a conclusion, from which, along with another
premise, follows another conclusion, and so on until what is sought is deter-
mined. The compound syllogism has either explicit intermediate conclusions,
as in “every C is B, and every B is D, therefore every C is D,” then “every C is
D and every D is A, therefore every C is A,” then “every C is A and every A is
H, therefore every C is H”; or elided intermediate conclusions, as in “every
C is B and every B is D and every D is A and every A is H, therefore every
C is H.”

75 75
 ‫�لخ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ق ة ث ث‬
‫ا لم�����ا �ل�� ا ��ل��ا �ل�� ‪ -‬ا �ل�������ص�ل ا ��ا �م��س‬

‫ن ق �ق ��لن � �ذ‬ ‫���ل ف� �ه ث���ا ت‬ ‫ا ��لث��ا �ن ق����ا �� ا �لخ‬

‫�� ب�‬ ‫� �ه ك����و��ا لو ك‬ ‫� ا لم��ط�لو ب� ب��إ ب���ط�ا ل �����ي�����ض‬ ‫و و �إ ب‬ ‫و ي� ي س‬
‫أ ّن ق ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ن ّ‬ ‫ّ‬
‫‪١١٣‬‬
‫ت‬‫�ن‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ة‬ ‫كل ج ب� �ل ك�‬
‫كل ب� ا ع��لى � ���ه�ا �م�����د �م�� �ص�ا د ��� ������ج� �لو‬ ‫كل ج� ب� و �‬ ‫��ا � �‬ ‫�‬ ‫�ل��ي��س �‬
‫أ‬ ‫أ‬
‫� ف �نت‬
‫ح�ا ��������‬ ‫ك ّ ج ا ع��ل � نّ�ه ‪� � ١‬م م‬ ‫ك ّ ج ا �ل ك�ن‬ ‫�� ن‬ ‫ّ‬
‫�� ب� �ل��ي��س �‬
‫�ذ‬
‫ر ل ي ج�‬ ‫�� �ل��ي��س �ل � ى‬ ‫كل ج� ب� ك�ا � �ل �‬
‫ل�‬ ‫ك‬
‫ّ‬
‫كل ج ب� و�هو ا لم��ط�لو ب�‪.‬‬ ‫��‬
‫ف� أ ث ج�ز ئ ّ ت ق ن ّ‬ ‫ّّ‬ ‫ل�ي��س � �‬
‫�����و��ل��ا �‬ ‫���ر � �ي��ا ��ه ك‬ ‫� ع��لى ك�ل� �لو ج�ود ه ي� � ك‬ ‫حك‬ ‫�‬‫ا ��لث��ا �ل� ث� الا����ست����ق راء و�هو ا �ل‬
‫كل‬ ‫ي‬ ‫م‬
‫أ نّ ن ن‬ ‫��ه ال�أ� ف‬ ‫ن ّ فّ‬
‫‪١١٤‬‬
‫�ذ‬ ‫ئ‬
‫�� �ل�ك‬ ‫�س���ل �ع ن���د ا لم����ض�غ ل�� ال�إ ���س�ا � وا ��لب���ه�ا �م وا �ل����سب���اع ك‬ ‫حرك � �ك‬ ‫ح��يوا � ي�‬‫�‬
‫� �ة ت‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫أ‬
‫كا �ل�م��س�ا ‪.‬‬ ‫��ل ب���ه��ذه ا �لح�ا ��‬ ‫�و ن� ا �ل ك�‬ ‫ن‬
‫حت�ما ل � � لا ي� ك‬ ‫و�هولا ي���ف��ي���د ا ��لي�ق����ي�ن لا�‬
‫ل ئ �آ ح‬
‫م���ت��رك‬ ‫� ف� �ج�ز �ئ ّ ُ ��د ف� �ج�ز � ّ � خ� ل��م�ع ن� � ش‬ ‫ث ت‬ ‫�لت �ث‬
‫ا �لرا ب�ع ا �م� ي���ل و�هو �إ ّ�ب��ا � ح مك ي� ي� و ج يأ� ي�ّ ر ى‬
‫�� ن��ه���م�ا ك ق ن‬
‫‪١١٥‬‬
‫كا ��ل��� ت� �ث�� ت� ا ع��لّ���ة ا ل��م�ع ن� ا ل ش‬ ‫�ؤ ف ف‬
‫م���ت��رك‬ ‫ث‬
‫�����و��ل��ا ا �ل�ع�ا لم �م �ل��� ّ����هو ح�ا د � � ب �ي و �ب و ي ّ ى‬ ‫ب �ي �‬
‫ة �ل ث ّ‬ ‫ث ت ق‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ي�ن‬ ‫�غ‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ن‬
‫ح�د و� �إ �م�ا‬ ‫�����و��ل�ه� ع�ل�� ا �‬ ‫ب�ا �ل�د ورا � وب�ا ��ل�����س�ي ي��ر ا ل�مرد د ب��� ا ��ل���� وال�إ �ب��ا � ك‬
‫ّ م‬ ‫ي‬
‫ف‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ا ن �ت خ� ّف ف‬ ‫أ ن‬ ‫��لت أ ��ل ف أ ��ذ أ م�ذ‬
‫� �عي���‬ ‫�� ا وال� خ�ي��را � ب�ا ط�ل � ب�ا ل���� ��ل� ���عي�� �ول و�هو �ض‬
‫ال‬ ‫�ن‬ ‫ت‬ ‫�‬ ‫ا �� ي�� � و ك� ا � و ك‬
‫ل��� ا ئ���ط ‪� ٢‬م�د ا �م �أ ّن��ه�ا ������س� ت ��ع�ّ��ة‬ ‫أ‬
‫� ل�ي � ب ل‬ ‫�أ �ّم�ا ا �ل�د ا ن� ف��ل�أ نّ� ا �ل�ج�ز ء ال� خ��� ��س�ا � ا � ش‬
‫ئ‬
‫ع‬ ‫ر‬ ‫ير وّ ر ر‬ ‫ور‬
‫ّ‬ ‫تق ت‬ ‫أ‬
‫ت‬ ‫ش‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ّ‬
‫�ور وب�����دي�ر ���س��ل�ي ع��لي��� ا لم�����رك‬
‫�ذ‬ ‫�غ‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫�ز‬ ‫�‬
‫ح���صر مم��و ‪ ٣‬جل�وا ع��لي��� ي��ر ا لم� ك‬ ‫ن‬ ‫و� �ّم�ا ا ��لت�ق���� ��ا ل‬
‫�‬‫�‬ ‫ف‬
‫ة‬ ‫ّم‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ن‬ ‫�ز أ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ت �ز ع ّ‬ ‫س�يم‬ ‫ف‬
‫ق‬
‫�و� ����صو��صي���� ا لم������ي��س ع��لي��ه‬ ‫خ‬ ‫�ي� ا لم��ق����ي��س ع��لي��ه لا ��ل ع��لي��� �ي� ا لم������ي��س �جل�وا � � � ك‬
‫ت‬ ‫ق‬
‫م‬ ‫ً ّ أ‬
‫ن‬
‫�ش��رط�ا �ل��ل�ع��ليّ���ة � و خ����صو��صيّ����ة ا لم��ق����ي��س �م�ا ��ع��ة �م ����ن���ه�ا‪.‬‬

‫�ل ف‬ ‫�� ‪� ،‬ف ‪ ،‬ك؛ ت‬ ‫ن ف‬ ‫ك ّ ج ا‪� ٢ .‬ف�‪ :‬ا � ش‬‫أ نّ‬ ‫ف‬
‫ح���صر ��م���م ن��و ‪.‬‬
‫�‪ ،‬ر‪ :‬وا �‬ ‫ل���روط ا لم��س�ا و���ة‪ ( ٣ .‬ف��ا �ل‬
‫ح���صر مم��وع) �ي�‬
‫�‬ ‫‪ : � ١‬ع�� �‬
‫ع‬ ‫س �‬ ‫ي‬ ‫� لى � �ل �‬

‫‪76‬‬ ‫‪76‬‬
 Third Treatise—Fifth Section

The second is the reductio syllogism. What is to be proved is affirmed by

113
disproving its contradictory, as in: Were “not every C is B” false, then “every C
is B” and “every B is A” (on the basis that it is a true premise). This produces:
Were “not every C is B” false, then “every C is A”; but it is not the case that
“every C is A” (on the basis that it is something impossible); so this produces
“not every C is B,” which is what is sought.
The third is induction, which is a judgment on a universal made on the basis 114
that it belongs to most of the particulars, as in “all animals move the lower jaw
in eating because men, oxen, lions . . . do so.” Induction does not convey cer-
tainty, because of the possibility that not all are like the ones considered (as, in
this case, with the crocodile).
The fourth is example, which is taking a judgment belonging to one par- 115
ticular and affirming it of another particular because of a meaning common
to both, as in “the world is composed of parts, so it is produced in time, like a
house.” Proponents of this argument technique affirm the real causality of the
common meaning by concomitance along with division (though this division
is not the one that proceeds by opposing negation to affirmation), as in “the
real cause of temporal production is either composition or this or that; yet the
last two are false due to counterexample, so the first is specified.” But this kind
of argument is weak. The concomitance step in the argument is weak because
the last part and the other conditions may be a presumed concomitant cause
even though it is not a real cause. The division step in the argument is weak
because its exhaustiveness may be rejected due to the possibility that the real
causality belongs to something that has not been mentioned. Even supposing
we grant the real causality of the common meaning in the principal analogue,
its having real causality in the derivative analogue does not follow, due to the
possibility that the specificities of the principal analogue are a condition for
the causality, or the specificities of the derivative analogue are an impediment
to such causality.

77 77
 ‫�� �ا ت��� ��ة‬ ‫أّ‬
‫ا �ل�خ م‬ ‫و� �م�ا‬
‫� ن‬ ‫ف‬
‫حث���ا �‬ ‫���ف�����‬
‫ي�ه�ا ب�‬

‫ال أ ّ ف� �م ا دّ ال أ�ق���� ��ة‬

‫�ول ي� و � �ي س‬
‫� ق �ن ّ ت �غ ق �ن ّ ت أ ّ ��ل ق �ن ّ ت ف ّ‬
‫� �����س� ت�‪.‬‬ ‫و هي� ي�����ي��� ي��ا � و ي��ر ي�����ي��� ي��ا � � �م�ا ا ي���ي��� ي��ا‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ق‬ ‫�أ ّ ��لّ��ا ت‬
‫‪١،١١٦‬‬

‫�����و��لن��ا ا �ل ك�‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ق‬

‫��ل‬ ‫كا �� �ي� ا �ل�ج�ز ‪ ١‬ب���ي ن���ه���م�ا ك‬ ‫ي�ه�ا �‬ ‫� �ا ي�ا ����ص ّور طر����‬ ‫� و�هي� ����ض‬ ‫وي‬
‫م‬
‫�أ � �ظ‬
‫‪٢،١١٦‬‬
‫ج�ز‬
‫ع��� �م��ن ا �ل� ء‪.‬‬
‫ن ة � أ نّ‬ ‫ق �ظ ة أ‬ ‫ُ‬ ‫م‬
‫ش‬ ‫�‬ ‫ل‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫�‬ ‫ق‬‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ش‬
‫� ب�� � ا ل������م��س‬ ‫كا ح ك‬ ‫� ب���ه�ا ل����و�ى �ا �هر� � و ب�ا ط���� �‬ ‫� �ا ي�ا يح ك‬ ‫�م����ا �ه�د ا � ه ���ض‬
‫م‬ ‫و ة أ نّ خو فيً� غ ً م‬
‫‪٣،١١٦‬‬

‫� ��ي ئ��� و� � ��لن��ا �و��ا و����ض‬

‫�� ب���ا‪.‬‬ ‫�م���ض‬
‫ت ت ّ ة ف ة ق ي�ن � أ نّ‬ ‫� ��ه�ا ل ش‬ ‫ُ‬ ‫ق‬ ‫� ّ �ا ت‬ ‫م‬
‫� ب�� �‬ ‫حك‬ ‫كا ل‬
‫�‬ ‫�رر� �م����ي���د � �ل��لي����� �‬ ‫م����ا �ه�د ا � �م�� ك�‬ ‫ح مك ب �‬ ‫� �ا ي�ا ي�‬
‫�‬ ‫� و�هي� ����ض‬
‫‪٤،١١٦‬‬
‫م‬ ‫و ج رب‬
‫ا� ق‬
‫ل��س�����مون�ي��ا �مو ج�� ب� �ل�ل�إ ���س�ه�ا ل‪.‬‬ ‫�ش��ر ب�‬
‫ق‬ ‫ُ‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ح�د ����سّ���ا ت‬
‫�‬
‫حك‬ ‫كا �ل‬
‫�‬ ‫ح�د ��س �و��ي �م��ن ا ��لن� ف����س �م��ف��ي���د �ل��ل�ع��ل �‬ ‫� ب���ه�ا �ل‬
‫�‬ ‫حك‬ ‫� �ا ي�ا ي�‬
‫�‬ ‫� و�هي� ����ض‬ ‫ي‬ ‫و‬
‫م‬ ‫م‬ ‫م‬
‫��أ نّ� � ا �ل�������م �م����ست�����ا د �م��ن ا � ش‬
‫‪٥،١١٦‬‬
‫ق‬ ‫ة‬
‫ح�د �� �ه ��س ع�� الان�ت����ا ل �م��ن ا لم���ا د ��ئ‬ ‫�‬‫ل‬‫�‬ ‫ا‬ ‫�‬‫ل���‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ن‬
‫ب‬ ‫س و ر‬ ‫سو‬ ‫��م��‬ ‫ب ور ر‬
‫�إلى ا لم��ط�ا �ل� ب�‪.‬‬
‫ث‬
‫� ��ه�ا �ل �ك ة ش‬
‫ل����ه�ا د ا ت‬ ‫ُ‬ ‫ق‬ ‫�مت�� ا ت� ا ت‬
‫� ب��ع�د ا �ل�ع��ل ب��ع�د ا �مت�� ن���ا ��ع�ه�ا‬ ‫���ر� ا � �‬ ‫ح مك ب �‬ ‫�‬‫� �ا ي�ا ي�‬ ‫� و�هي� ����ض‬ ‫و ور‬
‫م م‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫أ‬
‫‪٦،١١٦‬‬
‫ح���ص �م����ل�غ‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫��� ���د ا د لا �ن‬
‫��‬ ‫�غ‬ ‫ة‬ ‫�‬ ‫م‬‫�‬ ‫د‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫ك‬ ‫ل‬
‫�‬
‫ح‬‫كا �‬ ‫ا‬
‫�‬‫ه‬ ‫�ل‬ ‫�‬‫ع‬ ‫�ؤ‬‫ط‬ ‫ا‬ ‫ت‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫�ل‬ ‫ا‬ ‫وال��م��ن �م��ن‬
‫ر ب‬ ‫�‬ ‫ي‬ ‫و‬ ‫ب‬ ‫و‬ ‫ك‬ ‫و‬ ‫ج‬ ‫و‬ ‫ب‬ ‫�‬ ‫��‬
‫�‬ ‫ي‬ ‫و‬
‫م‬
‫كا ل ا �ل�ع�د د‪.‬‬ ‫� ف�� ع�د د ب�ل ا ��لي����� �هو ا �ل�����ا ��‬
‫ض�ي ب� م‬
‫ق‬ ‫ي�ن‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ل����ه�ا د ا ت‬
‫ا� �‬
‫ش‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ي‬
‫ح�� ج���ة ع��لى ا � �غل� ي��ر‪.‬‬‫ح�د ��س وا ��لت�وا ت�ر �ل��ي�� ب�‬ ‫ح�ا �ص� �م��ن ا �لت���� ج�ر���ة وا �ل‬
‫�‬ ‫�ل‬
‫‪٧،١١٦‬‬ ‫�‬ ‫س‬ ‫ب‬ ‫وا �ل�ع��لم ا � ل‬

‫�ن‬ ‫ف‬
‫‪ :�� ١‬ا �ل�ج�ز ب�ا �ل�����سب����ة‪.‬‬
‫م‬

‫‪78‬‬ ‫‪78‬‬
 The Conclusion

Containing two discussions

The First Discussion: On Syllogistic Matters

These matters comprise what is certain and what is not. There are six proposi- 116.1
tions of certainty.
Primary propositions, which are propositions such that conceiving their 116.2
two extremes is sufficient to be certain of the relation between the two, as in
“the whole is greater than the part.”
Observational propositions, which are propositions in which judgments 116.3
are made by the external and internal faculties, like the judgment “the sun
shines” and that we are subject to anger and fear.
Propositions based on experience, which are propositions in which judg- 116.4
ments are made due to repeated observations conveying certainty, like “drink-
ing scammony leads to diarrhea.”
Intuited propositions, which are propositions in which judgments are made 116.5
due to a strong intuition of the soul that conveys knowledge, like the judgment
that the light of the moon is acquired from the sun. (Intuition is rapidity of
transfer from principles to what is sought.)
Propositions based on sequential testimony, which are propositions in 116.6
which judgments are made due to copious testimony, after it is known that
the occurrence of what is claimed is not impossible, and they are trusted due
to widespread agreement about them; this is like the existence of Mecca and
Baghdad. There is no number set for the right level of testimony; rather, reach-
ing certainty is what decides that the number is complete.
Knowledge available from the last three propositions (that is, those based 116.7
on experience, intuition, or sequential testimony) does not constitute a proof
that is compelling for someone else.

79 79
 ‫ح ث أّ‬ ‫��ا ت�م��ة ‪ -‬ا �ل ب�����‬
‫ا �لخ‬
‫�� ال�ول‬

‫�ذ‬ ‫ُ‬
‫ت‬
‫ي�ه�ا ب�وا ��س��ط��ة لا ��غ���ي� ب� �ع��ن ا �ل� �ه��ن �ع ن���د‬
‫� ف‬
‫� ����‬ ‫حك‬ ‫� �ا ي�ا ق�ي���ا ��س�ا ت���ه�ا �م��ع�ه�ا و�ه� ا ��لت� ي�‬ ‫�ض‬
‫��‬ ‫�‬
‫ق‬
‫و‬
‫أ نّ ي أ �ي ة �ز م‬
‫‪٨،١١٦‬‬
‫ت‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ت‬
‫ي�ن‬
‫� ب�� � ال�ر ب��ع�� و ج لا�������س�ا ��م�ه�ا ب�م����س�ا و�ي�� ‪.‬‬
‫�‬
‫حك‬ ‫كا �ل‬
‫�‬ ‫����ص ّور ح�د ود �ه�ا �‬
‫�ّ‬ ‫م‬ ‫ّ‬
‫ح�د‬ ‫�‬‫وا �ل��ق��ي���ا ��س ا لم�ؤ �ل��ف� �م��ن �ه��ذه ا �ل����ستّ����ة ي���س���ّم ب�ر�ه�ا نً�ا و�ه� �ّم�ا لمّ ّ و�هو ا �ل��ذ � ا ل‬
‫ي �إ ي� أ �ي‬ ‫ى‬ ‫أ‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ي�ن ق ن �ذ ت فّ‬ ‫ف� ّ ة �ن ة ف� �ذ‬
‫‪١١٧‬‬

‫ا‬ ‫خ‬ ‫ال‬ ‫�ن‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�ن‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫ول‬ ‫ك‬
‫�‬ ‫ط‬ ‫ل‬ ‫�‬‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫��‬ ‫�‬
‫�‬‫ع‬ ‫�‬ ‫��‬ ‫م‬‫�‬ ‫ا‬ ‫�‬‫ه‬‫�‬ ‫ا‬‫�‬‫�‬‫�ل‬‫ّو‬ ‫��‬ ‫�‬
‫�‬ ‫ك‬ ‫��‬‫ع‬‫�‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ا‬‫و‬ ‫�‬
‫ه‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬‫ل‬ ‫ا‬ ‫ب ي�‬ ‫��‬ ‫��‬‫س‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬‫��‬ ‫�‬‫ل‬‫�‬‫ل‬ ‫��‬‫ل‬‫�‬‫ع‬ ‫�ه‬ ‫��‬
‫أي‬ ‫ط‪١‬‬ ‫�س��‬ ‫�‬‫ال�و‬
‫ف‬ ‫ّ أ‬ ‫�ذ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ّ أ‬ ‫�ذ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ّ‬
‫ح�د ال�و��س��ط‪� ٢‬ي���ه‬ ‫ح���مو و �م�ا � �� و�هو ا �ل� � ا �ل‬
‫�‬ ‫ح���مو ����ه� ا م‬
‫�‬ ‫�مت���ع��ف����ن ال� خ��لا ط م‬
‫�‬
‫أ‬ ‫�ي‬ ‫ي‬ ‫�إ‬ ‫م‬ ‫م‬
‫ّ‬
‫ح���مو �مت���ع��ف����ن ال� خ��لا ط‬ ‫كّ م‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫��م‬‫�‬ ‫���ق��و��لن��ا �ه��ذ ا م‬
‫�‬
‫ح‬ ‫ك‬ ‫ط‬ ‫��‬ ‫ع�لّ��ة �ل�ل��ن����س����ة ف� ا �ل��ذ �ه��ن ف����ق‬
‫و‬ ‫و‬ ‫�‬
‫م‬ ‫م ل‬
‫خ‬ ‫ف �ذ ت بفّ ي أ‬
‫����ه� ا �م���ع������ن ال���لا ط‪.‬‬
‫أ ّ �غ ��ل ق �ن ّ ت ف ّ‬
‫� �����س� ت�‪.‬‬ ‫و� �م�ا ي��ر ا ي���ي��� ي��ا‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ُ‬
‫‪١،١١٨‬‬
‫ح��ة ع�ا �م��ة‬ ‫� ب���ه�ا لاعت��را �� �ج �مي�� ا ��لن��ا ��س ب���ه�ا لم���ص��ل���‬ ‫ف‬ ‫� �ا ي�ا ي�‬ ‫ق‬ ‫م����ه ا ت‬ ‫ش‬
‫حك‬ ‫�‬ ‫� و�هي� ����ض‬ ‫� � ور‬
‫ع‬ ‫م‬
‫� �ش�� ا ئ� �آ د ا � ا �ل��ف�� ق �� ن��ه�ا ���ي�ن‬ ‫�أ ّق���ة �أ ح�مّ����ة ‪� ٣‬أ ا ن���ف���ع�ا ل ت‬
‫‪٢،١١٨‬‬
‫ا� �م��ن ع�ا د ا ت‬
‫و‬ ‫�‬ ‫�ي‬ ‫ب‬ ‫�‬ ‫ر‬ ‫و‬ ‫و‬ ‫ر‬ ‫و‬ ‫و‬ ‫ور و‬
‫ب‬
‫ق‬
‫ب‬ ‫ع �ّ‬ ‫ظ‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ق‬ ‫سَ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ن‬ ‫أّ ّ ت أ نّ ي ن ن خُ ّ‬
‫� ب���ه�ا‬ ‫حك‬ ‫ال�و��لي��ا � � � ال ���س�ا � �لو ���ل و������� �ه �م �����ط ا ��ل����رع�م�ا وراء �ع�����ل�ه ل ي�‬
‫�‬
‫م ة �ذم‬ ‫ع ع‬ ‫ي�‬ ‫�إ‬
‫ف‬ ‫ق‬ ‫�ظ‬ ‫أّ ّ ت ق‬ ‫� ف‬
‫و‬ ‫ح���� و��ك���� ا �ل�عور� �م� �م‬ ‫ش‬ ‫س�ن‬ ‫�‬
‫�����و��ل��ا ا �ل����ل ��ب��ي�� وا �ل�ع�د ل �‬ ‫ن‬ ‫�خ�لا�� ال�و��لي��ا � ك‬ ‫ب‬
‫ّ قم‬ ‫ً‬ ‫قً‬ ‫م ح‬
‫�ذ‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ة‬ ‫� �ع��ف���اء م‬ ‫ة‬
‫�� �‬ ‫كا �ا �ل ك�‬ ‫� �‬ ‫�و� �ص�ا د ��ا �م�ا � ك‬ ‫ح���مود � و�م��ن �ه��ذه �م�ا ي� ك‬ ‫�‬ ‫و�مرا ع�ا � ا �ل���ض‬
‫و ي و� ب و ل وم‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫أ‬
‫ح����س���ب�ه�ا‪.‬‬ ‫ك ��ص ن���ا ع��ة ب�‬
‫�‬ ‫� ول��ه�ل �‬ ‫م����ه ا ت‬
‫� � ور‬
‫ش‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ل‬
‫ف ت‬
‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫ا‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫ا‬ ‫�ل‬‫�‬‫ع‬ ‫�خ���ص ف���� ن‬ ‫� �ا �ا ت��ت��س��ل �م��ن ا �‬
‫ل‬ ‫� ّل ت �ه �ق‬
‫�ل‬ ‫�‬‫س‬ ‫��‬‫�‬‫�‬‫ك‬ ‫�ه‬
‫ع‬ ‫�‬‫�‬ ‫�د‬‫ل‬ ‫ل‬ ‫�‬
‫�‬‫ك‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ا‬
‫�‬‫ه‬‫�‬‫��‬
‫م يى ي‬ ‫�‬ ‫�ب‬ ‫�ض‬
‫��‬ ‫و م��س��م�ا � و ي�‬
‫�يم‬ ‫م‬ ‫يف ق م‬ ‫أ‬
‫‪٣،١١٨‬‬

‫ا �ل��ف����ق����ه�اء �م��س�ا ئ�ل � �صول ا �ل���������ه‪.‬‬

‫� �إ � ن���ا ا �ل��ق���ا �صر �ع��ن د ر ك ‪٤‬‬
‫ق‬ ‫ا �ل��ق�����ا �� ا لم�ؤ �لّ��ف �م��ن �ه��ذ �ي�ن ���س���ّ ��د لاً ا � �غ‬
‫ل�‬
‫‪٤،١١٨‬‬
‫ع‬ ‫ي مى ج و ر �ض‬ ‫و ي س �‬
‫����ص ‪.‬‬ ‫ا �ل�� �ه�ا ن �ل�ز ا ا �لخ‬
‫م‬ ‫بر � و�إ م‬
‫ا� �ه �ق���ض �ا �ا ت��ؤ خ���ذ مم�ّ�ن �ُ�عت��ق���د ف����ه �ّم�ا ل�أ�م ��س � ّ �أ �م�ز ��د �ع�����ق‬ ‫ق ت‬
‫ل‬ ‫ر ما و�ي و ي‬ ‫ي �إ‬ ‫ي‬ ‫و�م������بول و ي� � ي‬
‫أ‬ ‫كا لم�أ خ� �ذ ا ت‬
‫‪٥،١١٨‬‬

‫� �م��ن � �ه�ل ا �ل�ع��ل وا �ل�ز �ه�د‪.‬‬ ‫ي�ن‬

‫م‬ ‫ود � � و‬
‫�ف‬ ‫ف ن‬ ‫تّ ً �ظ �نّ ق‬ ‫ُ‬ ‫ق‬ ‫� �ظم�� ن�� ن�ا ت‬
‫� �ا ي�ا ي�‬ ‫� و�هي� ����ض‬
‫‪٦،١١٨‬‬ ‫�����و�ل�ك ��لا � �ي��طو� ب�ا �ل��لي��ل‬ ‫� ب���ه�ا ا �ب��ا ع�ا �ل��ل�� � ك‬ ‫حك‬
‫م‬
‫�‬ ‫و و‬
‫ق‬ ‫ف‬
‫����هو ��س�ا ر�‪.‬‬

‫ت ّ أ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ّ أ‬ ‫ت ّ أ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ّ أ‬

‫� ‪:‬ح�د ال�و��س��ط‪.‬‬ ‫��‪ ،‬ك؛‬ ‫� ‪:‬ح�د ال�و��س��ط‪( ٢ .‬ا �ل‬
‫ح�د ال�و��س��ط) �ي�‬
‫�‬ ‫ح�د ال�و��س��ط) �ي� ر‪�� ،‬س‪ ،�� ،‬ك؛‬ ‫‪( ١‬ا �ل‬
‫�‬
‫�ف‬ ‫ف‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ف‬
‫‪ :�� ٣‬ر� ���ة وح�ميّ����ة‪� :� ٤ .‬إ د را ك‪.‬‬

‫‪80‬‬ ‫‪80‬‬
 Conclusion—First Discussion

Implicitly syllogistic propositions, which are those in which judgment 116.8

is made by an intermediary always present to the mind upon conceiving
the terms, like the judgment that four is even due to its divisibility into two
equal parts.
A syllogism composed of these six propositions of certainty is called a 117
demonstration. It is either a demonstration of the reasoned fact, in which the
middle term is a real cause for the relation between the terms of the conclu-
sion in the mind and in concrete reality, as in “This person has putrid humors,
everything with putrid humors is feverish, therefore this person is feverish”;
or it is a demonstration of the fact, in which the middle term is a real cause for
the relation in the mind alone, as in “This person is feverish, everything fever-
ish has putrid humors, therefore this person has putrid humors.”
Those that are not propositions of certainty are six. 118.1
Endoxic propositions, which are propositions in which the judgment is 118.2
made because it is acknowledged by all people, whether on grounds of general
utility, compassion, or fervor, or under the influence of customs or laws and
manners. The distinction between these and primary propositions is that were
a man taken out of a social context, ignoring everything that is not in the mind
itself, he would not judge the endoxic to be true (in contrast to the primary);
as in “injustice is evil,” “justice is good,” “uncovering the pudenda is blame-
worthy,” “looking after the weak is praiseworthy.” Some endoxic propositions
are true, others not. Every nation has its own endoxic propositions, as do the
exponents of every craft with respect to that craft.
Conceded propositions, which are propositions conceded by the opponent 118.3
and upon which discourse is built to refute him, as in the way jurists concede
questions in jurisprudence.
A syllogism composed of these last two kinds of premises is called dialectic. 118.4
Its goal is to persuade someone who fails to grasp a demonstration, and to
refute an opponent.
Received propositions, which are propositions taken up on the authority 118.5
of someone credible, whether due to a heavenly matter or superior intellect or
religiosity, as in what is taken from scholars and the pious.
Suppositional propositions, which are propositions in which judgments are 118.6
made in accordance with a supposition, as in “so-and-so roams about at night,
so he is a thief.”

81 81
 ‫ح ث أّ‬ ‫��ا ت�م��ة ‪ -‬ا �ل ب�����‬
‫ا �لخ‬
‫�� ال�ول‬

‫� � ف‬ ‫ّ خ ة � �غ � � ن ت� �غ‬
‫�‬ ‫ي�ن‬
‫�‬ ‫ق �� �ؤ ّ ف �ن �ذ‬
‫‪٧،١١٨‬‬ ‫�‬
‫ع يما‬‫�‬ ‫م‬ ‫ا‬
‫�‬‫س‬‫ل��‬ ‫ا‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫ر �ي ب‬ ‫�ه‬ ‫��‬‫م‬ ‫ب ر �ض‬ ‫ل�‬ ‫ا‬ ‫��‬‫�‬ ‫ا‬‫ط‬
‫�‬‫��‬ ‫�‬ ‫وا �ل����ي���ا س ا لم �ل��� أ�م� �ه� أ ي ى‬
‫م‬ ‫��‬‫�‬‫س‬ ‫��‬‫�‬
‫ق‬ ‫ت �ذ‬
‫ي�ن� ف���ع�ه �م��ن ���ه� ي� ب� ال� خ��لا � و� �مر ا �ل�د�ي�ن ‪.‬‬
‫�� ��ً�ا �م��ن‬ ‫� ف���� ت أث ً �‬ ‫� ع��ل ا ��لن� ف���� �أث�ّ ت‬ ‫� �ا �ا �إ�ذ ا د ت‬ ‫ق‬ ‫مخ ّ ت‬
‫ي�ه�ا �� �ي��را جع ب�ي‬ ‫س ر‬ ‫ى‬ ‫ور‬ ‫� ي���لا � و�هي� ����ض ي‬ ‫و‬
‫ق‬
‫‪٨،١١٨‬‬
‫ة‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ق‬ ‫����� ��له� ا �لخ‬ ‫ق‬
‫����مر ي�ا �وت��� ����سي���ا �ل�� وا �ل�ع��س�ل �مّر� �مت����ه ّوع��‪.‬‬ ‫�‬ ‫و‬ ‫� وب���س��ط ك‬ ‫� ب����‬
‫�ض‬
‫م‬
‫ت �غ‬ ‫ف‬
‫� �م ن���ه ا ������ع�ا ل ا ��لن�����س ب�ا �ل��ر� ��ي� ب�‬
‫نف‬ ‫ا �ل��ق�����ا �� ا لم�ؤ �لّ��ف �م ن���ه�ا ���س���ّ �ش���ع ًا ا � �غ‬
‫ل�‬
‫و ي س � � ي ى ر و ر �ض‬ ‫م‬
‫ّ‬
‫‪٩،١١٨‬‬

‫� ا �ل��ط��ي� ب�‪.‬‬ ‫ا �لت�� ن�� ف���� � ح�ه ا �ل �ز ن ا �ل���ص ت‬

‫و ير ويرو و � و و‬
‫ة ق ن ّ‬ ‫ف أ‬
‫�����و��ل��ا �‬ ‫ح��سو��س�� ك‬ ‫�‬ ‫�غ‬
‫� ب���ه�ا ا �لو�ه �� � �مور ي��ر م‬ ‫حك‬ ‫�‬‫كا �ذ ب��� ي�‬
‫ة‬
‫� �ا ي�ا �‬
‫ق‬
‫� و�هي� ����ض‬ ‫�ه�مّ���ا ت‬
‫كل‬ ‫مي‬ ‫وو ي‬
‫اء ا � لَ ف� ماء ل ��ت ن �ه � ل ف� ا � ق ا � ش ا ئ‬
‫‪١٠،١١٨‬‬

‫� � ا ��ا ‪ ١‬ل ا د � ل�ع����� ل��� �‬ ‫م����ا ر ا ��لي��ه وور ل�ع�ا ���ض‬ ‫�م � د � ش‬
‫ي ى وو ف ع ّ ل و ر ع‬ ‫م‬ ‫و جو‬
‫ق‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ف‬ ‫�ذ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ن ت �ن ّ ّ ت ُ‬ ‫أ‬
‫�� ب� ا �لوهم ب�موا ��������ه ا �ل�ع�����ل �ي� �م�����د �م�ا � ا �ل����ي���ا ��س‬ ‫�‬ ‫��ا �� �م� ال�و��لي��ا � و�عر�� ك‬ ‫�ل ك�‬
‫ت‬
‫��ا ره ن���ف����س�ه �ع ن���د ا �لو�صول �إلى ا ��لن���ت��ي�� ج���ة‪.‬‬ ‫�م�ه و ن� ك�‬
‫�إ‬
‫� ح �ك‬ ‫ا ��لن��ا�ج� ��لن�ق��ي����‬
‫�ض‬
‫ت‬
‫�خ���ص و��غ� ��لي���ط�ه‪.‬‬ ‫ح�ا ا �ل‬ ‫�‬
‫ف‬
‫� �م ن����ه�ا �‬ ‫�س����س��ط��ة ا � �غ‬
‫ل�‬ ‫ا �ل��ق�����ا �� ا لم�ؤ �لّ��ف �م ن���ه�ا ���س���ّ � ف‬
‫‪١١،١١٨‬‬
‫م‬ ‫�إ م‬ ‫�ض‬ ‫ر‬ ‫و‬
‫أ‬ ‫و ي س � � ي مى‬
‫ة‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ق‬
‫خ‬
‫�و� ع��لى �ه��ي ئ���� �م��ن ت���� ج��� لا�ت���لا ل‬ ‫وا ل���غم��ا �ل��ط��ة �ي���ا ��س ت���ف����س�د �صورت��ه ب�� � لا ي� ك‬
‫ّ‬ ‫� ة �أ � ّ ت أ ن ت ن‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ّ أ‬
‫‪١١٩‬‬

‫�و� ا لم��ق���د �م��ة ‪٢‬‬ ‫�كي� ف��يّ����ة � و ا �جل���ه�� و م�ا د ��ه ب�� � � ك‬ ‫�����ميّ����ة � و ا �ل �‬‫ح����س� ب� ا �ل ك‬ ‫�ش��رط �م�عت����بر ب�‬
‫�‬
‫ك ّ �ن��س�ا ن� � ش��� � ّ ش‬ ‫� ن ال�أ �ل��ف���ا �ظ �مت�� ا د ف���ة ك ق ن‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ش ً‬
‫كل ب����ر‬ ‫ب رو‬ ‫�����و��ل��ا �ل �إ‬ ‫ر‬ ‫وا لم��ط�لو ب� �����ي ئ��ا وا ح�د ا �ل كو�‬
‫ة ف �ظ ق‬ ‫ّ ف ّ ن ن ّ أ‬
‫�����و��لن��ا‬‫���ه�� ا �ل��ل���� ك‬ ‫كا �ذ ب���ة �ش���ب� ي���ه��ة ب�ا �ل���ص�ا د �ق��ة �م��ن ج�‬ ‫ح�ا ك � و �‬ ‫��ل �إ ���س�ا � ��ض�‬ ‫ح�ا ك � ك�‬ ‫��ض�‬
‫نّ‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ّ ف‬ ‫� ئ �ذ ف‬
‫�ن‬
‫كل �ر��س ��ص�ه�ا ل ��لي�� ت����ج� � � ت��ل�ك‬ ‫ح�ا ���ط �ه� ا �ر��س و �‬ ‫�ل���صور�ة ا �ل��ف��ر��س ا لم ن��ق��وش��� ع��ل ا �ل‬
‫ى‬ ‫ة ّ ةأ‬
‫��ه��ة ا ل�م�ع ن �ل�ع�د ‪� ٣‬م ا ع�ا �ة � د ا ل �ض ف� ا ل �����ة‬ ‫�‬ ‫�ن‬
‫م‬
‫و ج و و وع ي� و ج ب‬ ‫�‬ ‫م‬ ‫ى م ر‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬ ‫ج�‬ ‫�‬
‫م‬ ‫�‬ ‫ا �ل���صور� ��ص�ه�ا �ل�� � و‬
‫�نت‬ ‫ن ف ف ف‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ن‬ ‫�ق ��لن ّ ن ن ف ف‬
‫�‬ ‫كل ّ �إ ���س�ا � و�ر��س ����هو �ر��س ��لي������ج� ب��ع���ض‬ ‫كل �إ ���س�ا � و�ر��س ����هو �إ ���س�ا � و �‬ ‫ك����و��ا �‬
‫� ن‬ ‫ح��يوا ن� وا �ل‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ن ن ف‬
‫ح��يوا �‬ ‫�����و��لن��ا ال�إ ���س�ا ن� �‬ ‫���ليّ���ة ك‬ ‫��ا ن� ا �ل ك�‬ ‫� ا �ل��ط��بي���عيّ����ة �م ك�‬ ‫ال�إ ���س�ا � �ر��س وو �ض‬
‫ع‬
‫�‬ ‫ا‬ ‫� ن ا �ل�ع����ن ّ���ة‬ ‫�‬ ‫م‬‫�‬ ‫�أ خ���ذ ال أ�م ا ��ذ �ه��ن ّ����ة‬ ‫�ن ��ل �نت �أ نّ ال ن ن �ن‬
‫س‬ ‫ك��‬ ‫�‬ ‫ع‬‫�‬ ‫ل‬ ‫�‬‫ي ي وب‬ ‫�‬ ‫ا‬
‫�‬‫ك‬ ‫ي‬ ‫�‬
‫ل‬ ‫ور‬ ‫�‬ ‫ج����س ي������ج� � �إ ���س�ا � ج�� س و‬
‫��‬
‫ئّ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫�غ ة‬ ‫ت‬ ‫�غ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ئ ّ تق‬ ‫�ة ّ �ذ‬ ‫ف‬
‫كل �ل�ك ��ل��لا �����ع �ي� ا �ل���ل��ط وا لم����س���عم�ل �ل�ل�م��ا �ل��ط�� ��سو���س��ط�ا �ي�‬ ‫���ع��لي��ك �مرا ع�ا �‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ن ق‬ ‫� ش �غ‬ ‫ن� ق��ا ب� ب���ه�ا ا �ل‬
‫م����ا � � ّ �إ � ��ا ب�ل ب���ه�ا ا �جل��د لي�‪.‬‬ ‫ح�ك�يم و‬ ‫�‬ ‫ل‬ ‫�إ‬
‫ب�ي‬

‫ف‬ ‫‪� ١‬ف ‪ :‬لا ن��ه�ا ���ة �ل�ه‪� ٢ .‬ف ‪�� :‬ع��� ا لم��ق�� ّ�د �م�ا ت‬
‫�‪ :�� ٣ .‬ك‬
‫��ع�د ‪.‬‬
‫م‬ ‫� ب �ض‬ ‫�ي‬ ‫�‬

‫‪82‬‬ ‫‪82‬‬
 Conclusion—First Discussion

A syllogism composed of these last two kinds of premises is called rhetoric. 118.7
Its goal is to exhort the hearer to things useful for him, such as the cultivation
of morals and religion.
Image-eliciting propositions, which are propositions that come upon the 118.8
soul and have on it a marvelous influence such as melancholy and joy, as in
“wine is a fluid ruby,” and “honey is bitter and nauseous.”
A syllogism composed of such propositions is called poetry, and its goal 118.9
is to impress upon the soul a desire or dislike; it is animated by meter and a
sweet voice.
Estimative propositions, which are false propositions, judgments made by 118.10
the estimative faculty with respect to imperceptible matters, as in “every exis-
tent may be pointed to,” and “beyond the world is a limitless void.” Were they
not refuted by reason or revelation they would pass for primary propositions.
Their falsity can, however, be recognized, in that the estimative premise may
agree with the intellect in premises of a syllogism, which then leads to the con-
tradictory of the estimative judgment; the estimative faculty repudiates itself
on arriving at the conclusion.
A syllogism formed of these is called sophistry, and its goal is to silence or 118.11
deceive the opponent.
A fallacy is a syllogism whose form is corrupt such that it is not productive 119
on account of a violation of some important condition in quantity, quality, or
mode; or whose matter is corrupt such that the premise and the question may
be identical due to synonymous expressions (as in “every man is a person, and
every person is risible, therefore every man is risible”). Or one of the prem-
ises may be false but seem true with respect to expression, as when it is said
of a painted horse: “every horse neighs, this is a horse, therefore the painting
neighs.” Or again, the falsity of the premises may be with respect to meaning,
by failing for example to take care that the subject exists in the affirmative, as
in “everything that is man-and-horse is man, and everything that is man-and-
horse is horse,” which produces “some men are horses”; or by using a natural
proposition instead of a universal, as in “man is an animal, animal is a genus,”
which produces “man is a genus”; or by taking what is merely mental to be real
(or vice versa). You should watch out for all these things to avoid falling into
error. One who makes use of fallacies is called sophistical if he confronts a phi-
losopher with them, and eristic if he confronts a dialectician with them.

83 83
 ‫�ث ث ن‬ ‫�لخ ت‬
‫ح�� ا �ل��ا �ي�‬‫��ا �م��ة ‪ -‬ا �ل ب����‬ ‫ا‬

‫ن ف أ‬
‫و‬ ‫ح� ث� ا �ل����ث�ا �ي� �ي� � ���ج��ز ا ء ا �ل���ع�ل‬ ‫وا �ل ب�����‬
‫م‬
‫ت أ‬ ‫فَ‬ ‫ت ق‬
‫� و� �ج�ز ا �ؤ �ه�ا‬ ‫� وع�ا‬‫� و��د �عر�ت����ه�ا و�م ب���ا د ��ئ ‪ ١‬و�هي� ح�د ود ا لمو �ض‬ ‫� وع�ا‬ ‫و�هي� �مو �ض‬
‫أ‬ ‫�أ �ع ا ض ��ه�ا ا �ل��ذ ا ت�ّ���ة ا لم��ق���د �م�ا ت �غ�� ا ��ل�� ن���ة ف� ن���ف‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬
‫‪١،١٢٠‬‬

‫�‬ ‫س‬‫��‬ ‫ا ل خ� �ذ �ة‬

‫ل‬ ‫�‬‫�‬‫ي‬ ‫�ب‬ ‫ى‬ ‫�‬
‫ل‬ ‫�‬
‫ع‬ ‫و‬ ‫�‬ ‫م‬ ‫ا‬
‫�‬‫ه‬‫���س‬
‫�‬ ‫��‬ ‫� ير ب �ي ي�‬ ‫ي و‬ ‫و ر ��‬
‫أ ّ‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ن‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫خ‬ ‫�ق‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ن‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ق‬
‫���ط �م����ست����ق�ي و� � ��عم�ل ب�� ��ي ب��ع�د‬ ‫ك ��� ��طت����ي�ن ب�‬ ‫ي�ن‬
‫�����و��ل��ا ��ل��ا � � ����ص�ل ب��� �ل‬ ‫� ك‬ ‫ا �لو �ض‬
‫م‬ ‫ع‬
‫���ق�� ��لن��ا ا ل��ق���ا د ا لم��س�ا ��ة‬ ‫ع�� � ّ ن �ق ة ش �ئ ن ئ ة ق ّ ت ّ ن ة ن ف‬
‫و�ي‬ ‫كل ��� ��ط�� ������ا د ا �ر� وا لم�����د �م�ا � ا ��لب���ي��� ب�������س�ه�ا ك و م ر‬ ‫و لى‬
‫� ت‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ت‬
‫� �ا ي�ا ا ��لت� ���ط�ل��ب ‪����� ٢‬سب����ة م‬
‫ح���مولا���ه�ا �إلى‬ ‫لم��ق���د ا ر وا ح�د �م��ت��س�ا و�ي��ة و�م��س�ا ئ�ل و�هي� ا �ل���ق���ض‬
‫�ي‬
‫ت ف �ذ‬
‫� وع�ا ���ه�ا �ي� �ل�ك ا �ل�ع��ل ‪.‬‬ ‫�مو �ض‬
‫آخ أ‬ ‫����� ��لن��ا � ّ ق‬ ‫ق‬ ‫م‬
‫ّ ش‬ ‫�و ن� �مو �ض‬
‫ت ق‬
‫� وع�ا ���ه�ا ��د ت� ك‬
‫كل �م�����د ا ر �إ �م�ا �م����ا ر ك ل��ر � و‬ ‫� وع ا �ل�ع��لم ك و‬ ‫و�مو �ض‬
‫���ق�� ��لن��ا � ّ ق‬ ‫�ذ ت ّ‬
‫‪٢،١٢٠‬‬
‫ف �ن ة ف‬ ‫� �ي�ن �ق ت ن‬
‫كل �م�����د ا ر و��س��ط �ي� ا �ل�����سب���� ����هو‬ ‫� ا �ي� ك و‬ ‫�و� �هو �مع �عر �ض‬ ‫م ب���ا و �د � ك‬
‫ن ن �ق ��لن ّ خ ّ � �ن ت ن ف ق‬ ‫� ف ن ق‬ ‫� ��ل �م�ا ي�‬
‫�‬
‫�� ������صي�����ه و��د‬ ‫كل ���ط يم ك‬ ‫�و� �وع�ه ك����و��ا �‬ ‫حي����ط ب��ه ا ل��طر��ا � و��د ي� ك‬ ‫�ض‬
‫خ ّ ف نّ �ز ت ن ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ع‬
‫ق‬ ‫�ذ‬ ‫�ك ن ن‬
‫كل خ���ط ��ا ع��لى ���ط ���إ � ا و�ي� ج��� �ب� ي��ه �إ �م�ا‬ ‫�����و��لن��ا �‬
‫� ا �ي� ك‬ ‫�و� �وع�ه �مع �عر �ض‬ ‫ي‬
‫�ي‬
‫ً �ذ ت ًّ ق ن ّ ث ّ ث ف نّ‬ ‫م‬ ‫ق ئت ن أ‬
‫�ز‬
‫كل �م����ل�� ���إ � وا ي�ا ه‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ت‬
‫�����و��ل��ا �‬ ‫� �ا ا �ي��ا ك‬ ‫�و� �عر �ض‬ ‫��ا �م���ا � � و �م��س�ا وي���ا � ��ل�ه���م�ا و��د ي� ك‬
‫ئ‬
‫�م��س�ا و�ي��ة �ل��ق���ا �مت����ي�ن ‪.‬‬
‫ً‬ ‫� ن� �ج�ز ء ا � ش‬ ‫� ل ت ف�خ ة � �ن �م �ض ت ل � ت ن �أ ن‬ ‫م‬ ‫أّ‬
‫ل��� ء �م��ط�لوب�ا‬ ‫ك‬ ‫�‬
‫ع �ي و‬ ‫ا‬‫�‬
‫��‬‫��‬‫م‬ ‫ا‬ ‫ا‬‫�‬‫ه‬‫��‬ ‫ا‬
‫و و �‬‫�‬‫ع‬ ‫�‬ ‫�‬
‫ع‬ ‫��‬ ‫�‬ ‫و � رج‬ ‫ا‬
‫�‬‫�‬ ‫ا‬‫�‬
‫ه‬ ‫ا��‬ ‫��م‬‫�‬‫ح‬ ‫ا‬‫�‬
‫م‬ ‫و� �‬
‫�ي‬
‫‪٣،١٢٠‬‬
‫ن‬
‫ث��بوت��ه �ل�ه ب�ا �ل��بر�ه�ا �‪.‬‬
‫� �ن �ذ آ خ� � ف‬
‫��لا �ي� �ه��ذه ا �لر���س�ا �ل��ة‪.‬‬
‫�� �ه� ا � ر ا �ل ك‬
‫و�لي� ك‬
‫م‬
‫ّٰ ّ‬
‫� ا �ل���ع�ا ل��م�� ن‬ ‫�ل‬
‫ي�‪.‬‬ ‫وا ��ح��م�د �ل��ل�ه ر ب‬

‫ف‬ ‫�ف ؛ ت‬ ‫�ئ ف‬

‫�‪ ،‬ر‪�� ،‬س‪ ،‬ك‪� :‬م ب���ا د‪� :�� ٢ .‬ي��ط�ل� ب� ب���ه�ا‪.‬‬ ‫�‬ ‫‪�( ١‬م ب���ا د � ) �ي�‬

‫‪84‬‬ ‫‪84‬‬
 Conclusion—Second Discussion

The Second Discussion: On the Parts of the Sciences

The parts include the subjects (of which you have learned already); the princi- 120.1
ples, which include the definitions of the subjects and their parts and essential
accidents, the premises that are not self-evident but accepted by way of being
posited (as in “to connect any two points by a straight line” and “to produce a
circle at any distance round any point”),11 and the self-evident premises (as in
“quantities equal to another quantity are equal to each other”);12 and the ques-
tions, which are propositions in which the relation of the predicates to their
subjects in the respective science is sought.
The subjects of the questions are either identical with the subject of the 120.2
science, as in “every magnitude is either commensurable or incommensura-
ble with another magnitude”; or the subject with an essential accident, as in
“every mean proportional is a side contained by the other two extremes”; or a
species under the generic subject, as in “every line may be bisected”; or a spe-
cies under the generic subject with an essential accident, as in “if one line is set
upon another, the angles on either side are either two right angles or sum to
two right angles”; or an essential accident, as in “every triangle has angles that
sum to two right angles.”
The predicates of the questions must be extrinsic to their subjects because 120.3
it is impossible in a demonstration to seek to prove that a part of a given thing
belongs to that thing.

Let this be the end of what we have to say in this epistle.

Praise be to God, Lord of the Worlds.

85 85
 Commentary

§013 The exordium of al-Risālah al-Shamsiyyah exhibits al-Kātibī’s broader

theological positions. He affirms a commitment to creation ex nihilo (“creation
is bringing something forth without it being preceded by matter or time” [TŠ
89.1]), though in emanationist terms (“the system of existence is the series of
contingent entities, the first of which is the creative intellectual substance, the
first intelligence;14 there we find existence in utmost honor and perfection”
[TŠ 89.3–4]). He presents himself as a Muslim believer faithful to the prophet’s
example, and a practitioner of logic for its necessary role in allowing humans to
flourish (except for those holy souls free of human stains—the prophets—who
can do without logic). Al-Kātibī is intellectualist in the way he envisages how
humans flourish, taking it to be brought about through contact with the angelic
intelligences. The exordium records deep gratitude to his patrons, and displays
quiet confidence in the originality of aspects of the Risālah.
The Risālah gives us great insight into the religious culture of the time. It is
noteworthy that a Muslim whose theological positions are so deeply inflected
by Avicennian philosophy should have such a secure position in the syllabus of
legal schools otherwise opposed to al-Kātibī’s broader vision of what the subject
could do for its practitioners.15
The exordium ends with a few words on the structure of the Risālah. After
defining logic and defending our need to learn it, the presentation begins with
the simplest elements of logic (terms or, more strictly, expressions and the
simple meanings they signify), moves on to propositions constructed from
terms, then to arguments constructed from propositions, and finally to sciences
that develop sets of arguments dealing with specific subject matter. The order of
treatment is defended by the commentators in terms of the final goal of logic as a
science (see Introduction generally, but especially §§5 and 6). There are aspects
of nostalgia about al-Taftāzānī’s consideration of the Risālah’s coverage, which
is limited in comparison with the range of subjects covered by al-Kātibī’s distant
predecessors (universals, definitions, propositions, syllogism, demonstration,
dialectic, rhetoric, sophistical refutations, and poetry).

87 87
 Commentary, §1

Text 0.1 But the later scholars omit the five arts, [that is, demonstra-
tion, dialectic, rhetoric, sophistical refutations, and poetry,] in spite of
their great value; instead they go on at length about conversions, co-impli-
cation, and connective syllogisms, in spite of their low value. (TŠ 93.1–2)

The Risālah is, as al-Taftāzānī says, mainly devoted to the formal aspects of
logic.

The Introduction

The Introduction deals with matters preliminary to coming to grips with any
science. The need we have for a science involves identifying its final cause and
benefit; the quiddity of the science allows us to identify the questions it asks
that distinguish it from other sciences, and its subject matter confers a unity on
it (TŠ 95.5–13). The lemmata that make up the Introduction broach issues that
show what it means for logic to be a science, and foreshadow issues touched
on in the Conclusion. (That said, as al-Taftāzānī notes, students embark suc-
cessfully on the study of an instrumental science such as grammar without any
notion of its delineation16 or final cause [TŠ 97.7–8]). The questions of a science
(the theorems to be proved) are most important for understanding the unity of
a given science:

Text 1.a Here there is a lofty insight, which is that the true nature
(ḥaqīqah) of each science is its questions, because these questions have
first arisen, then a name is imposed on the science relative to [the ques-
tions]; [the science] has no quiddity or true nature beyond these questions.
So knowledge [of the science] with respect to its definition and true nature
only comes about through knowledge of all its questions. (TT 62.pu–63.2)

The first discussion, on the quiddity of

logic and proof of the need for it

The first four lemmata set out two divisions of knowledge: the first, knowledge
divided into its broadest kinds; the second, knowledge divided with respect to
its acquisition. The first two lemmata culminate in the argument of §3 that it is
necessary for humans to learn logic; §4 goes on to argue that logic involves both
primitive and inferred knowledge claims.

88 88
 Commentary, §1

§117 The first division of knowledge al-Kātibī considers is into conception

(taṣawwur) and assertion (taṣdīq).18 Everything we know is either a concep-
tion or an assertion, though not every conception or assertion is knowledge.
This is Avicenna’s doctrine (for example, Pointers 1.4 [AI 3.15–4.11]), which is in
turn a development from a division first put forward by al-Fārābī (SQ 97–100).
The precise definition of these two divisions of knowledge varied according to
the philosopher using the terms. Although the first of the definitions offered
by al-Kātibī (“conception . . . is the occurrence of a form in the intellect”) fol-
lows Avicenna, the second (assertion is “an aggregate of conception and judg-
ment” or, more properly, an aggregate of conceptions and a judgment) does not;
according to al-Ḥillī, the first sentence of the Risālah marks al-Kātibī out as one
of the followers of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (see RM 7).

Text 1.1 If you judge [a conception such as “man”] to be a certain

matter (as in “man is an animal”), then the aggregate of the conception
“man” and the conception “animal” and the judgment of the relation one
has to the other is said to be an assertion. This is according to the custom
of Fakhr al-Dīn and his followers, and it differs from what the ancients laid
down in their terms of art; for the ancients considered the assertion to be
the judgment itself alone, and the conception a condition for the assertion.
(ḤQ 183.1–5)

Both al-Rāzī’s and Avicenna’s accounts face a common problem.

Text 1.2 Philosophers agree that assertion depends on conception,

whether by the dependence of the whole on the part, or the dependence of
what is subject to a condition on the condition (according to the difference
between the two opinions here [which is to say, al-Rāzī’s and Avicenna’s]);
so, were the conception to consist of the occurrence [of the form in the
mind] devoid of the judgment, then a judgment would depend on its own
absence; but this is absurd. The answer to this objection is that “concep-
tion” is an expression equivocal between two meanings, one of which is
the mental occurrence without qualification (without the restriction of the
presence or absence of a judgment), and the other the mental occurrence
devoid of judgment. The first is the condition for assertion, and the second
is the counterpart of assertion. (ḤQ 183.12–184.4)

So the solution to the problem turns on the fact that “conception” is imposed
on two meanings. Al-Kātibī’s statement of the aggregate account raises a further

89 89
 Commentary, §2

problem in taking conception as a component of, yet opposed to, assertion. The
fact that “conception” is equivocal once again solves the problem:

Text 1.3 The upshot is that al-Kātibī’s position—made clear else-

where—is that mere conception (al-taṣawwur faqaṭ) is apprehension inso-
far as it is apprehension without considering judgment or anything else
along with it (and it is synonymous with conception and knowledge).19 It is
not impossible to divide knowledge into apprehension insofar as it is what
it is, and apprehension along with judgment, by inclusive disjunction (ʿalā
sabīl manʿ al-khulūw),20 whereupon “which” in “which is the occurrence
of the form of something” would refer to mere conception; and it is cor-
rect to take into consideration with it the conception that is the opposite
of assertion. (TŠ 100.7–12)

Many object to the division of a thing into itself and something else, and
investigate more deeply the equivocation of taṣawwur, and the referent of the
pronoun I have translated as “which” (TŠ 100.13–u); but Text 1.3 presents a
respectable preliminary reading of §1.

§221 Al-Kātibī goes on to consider the ways we come to have knowledge. For
this, he presents the second division of knowledge, this time into badīhī and
naẓarī. I translate these terms as “primitive” and “inferred.”22

Text 2.1 Know that the primitive conception consists of that whose
occurrence does not depend on search and acquisition, like the concep-
tion of hot and cold. The primitive assertion consists of an assertion for
which conceiving the two extremes is sufficient for asserting the relation
of one extreme to the other, as in “the whole is greater than the part”;
for whoever conceives “whole” and “part” and “being greater” asserts
this judgment. The acquired conception (al-taṣawwur al-muktasab) is the
opposite of the primitive, such that its occurrence in the mind depends
on search and acquisition (like conceiving “angel” and “jinni”). And the
acquired assertion is such that conceiving its two extremes is not sufficient
for the judgment (like “the world came to exist in time”). (ḤQ 184.u–185.8)

In this context, al-Taftāzānī takes “primitive” as synonymous with “necessary”

(ḍarūrī) in §3, and both as antonyms of “inferred” and its synonym, “acquired”
(kasbī, muktasab) (TŠ 104.5–6, 104.u). Note that the necessity of a proposition
that is necessary in respect of how we come to know it has to do with the fact

90 90
 Commentary, §2

that we cannot fail to see the proposition’s truth once we understand its terms;
it is not the necessity of a necessary proposition that has to do with the rela-
tion between the predicate and the subject (explored from §52 on), the truth of
which we often fail to see.23
On al-Ḥillī’s definition of assertion, a primitive assertion may depend on
acquired conceptions. Further, the primitive assertion may include the relat-
ing of conceptions by an assertion not brought about by thinking (fikr) but by
intuition (ḥads) or repeated observation (tajribah) (TŠ 104.11–apu) (see §116.4
and §116.5). The examples Avicenna gives of acquired conceptions in Pointers 1.4
include “binomial” (AI 3.u–4.2), the definition of which is given as Proposition
36 in Book 10 of Euclid’s Elements: “If two rational straight lines commensurable
in square only are added together, then the whole is irrational; let it be called
binomial.” The example illustrates how theory-laden a conception can be; no
one learns the meaning of binomial without preceding geometrical instruction
deploying both assertions and conceptions, whether primitive or acquired. But
al-Taḥtānī claims that the acquisition of an unknown conception is through mat-
ters of which we do have conceptions (al-umūr al-taṣawwuriyyah), whereas the
acquisition of an unknown assertion is through assertions we have already (TT
55.pu–u); as al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī says, “it has not been verified that there
is a way to acquire conception from assertions, or the reverse (even though no
demonstration has been given that it is impossible)” (TT 55n2). Whatever way
we come to a conception of “binomial,” insofar as it is acquired, it is acquired
through—which is to say, expressible as—two prior conceptions.
Al-Kātibī then considers first whether every conception and every asser-
tion is primitive; were that the case, he claims, we would know everything (and
al-Kātibī assumes without argument that we do not). He then considers whether
every conception and every assertion is inferred; were that the case, he claims,
we could never know anything (and yet we do know some things). Al-Kātibī
seems to assume that we know all primitive knowledge, which is too strong
an assumption if al-Ḥillī’s hot and cold are good examples of the primitive; he
also assumes that inferred knowledge falls into regress or circularity if it is not
ultimately based on primitive knowledge. Al-Kātibī does not need to consider
further possibilities that arise on his approach to the problem (among them,
that every conception is primitive but every assertion is inferred, and that every
conception is inferred but every assertion is primitive); conceptions are inferred
from conceptions, assertions from assertions. Here is al-Ḥillī’s expansion of the
elided argument in the lemma to do with regress or circularity:

91 91
 Commentary, §3

Text 2.2 It is impossible for knowledge claims—both conceptions and

assertions—to be as a whole primitive, otherwise we would not be igno-
rant of anything; and the consequent is necessarily false, so the anteced-
ent must be too. And it is impossible for them to be as a whole inferred,
otherwise one of two matters would follow—namely, either a circle or an
infinite regress; and the consequent consisting of these two parts is false,
so the antecedent must be too.
The explanation of the implication [in the second argument] is this:
Everything acquired inevitably has something that allows its acquisition;
were what allows this acquisition (al-kāsib) itself acquired, it would need
something else that acquires it. If that which acquires it is the first knowl-
edge claim, we have a circle; if it is yet another thing that allows its acquisi-
tion, we have either an infinite regress, or we come to a primitive thing that
allows its acquisition, and that is what we seek to prove. (ḤQ 184.8–pu)

One possible motivation for this lemma is that al-Kātibī’s predecessor

al-Rāzī argued in one of his works that no conception is acquired (anna shayʾan
minhā ghayr muktasab, glossed by al-Kātibī as ay lā shayʾ wa-lā wāḥid minhā
ka-dhālik [al-Kātibī, al-Mufaṣṣal fī sharḥ al-Muḥaṣṣal, 54.3, 54.8–10]); rather,
they are either primitive or innate (ḥāṣil fī l-nafs). The first argument al-Rāzī
offers for the claim is that we cannot seek what we are unaware of (because
we are not aware of it), and we cannot seek what we are aware of (because we
have it already); al-Jurjānī in his gloss on the lemma explicitly mentions this
position of al-Rāzī (TT 53n2). I note the position simply to provide context for
al-Kātibī’s decision to address these questions; he is faced with a distant echo
of Aristotle’s motivation for writing the Posterior Analytics.24 However, in the
early parts of the book al-Rāzī wrote that is most directly connected with the
tradition of logic al-Kātibī is developing in the Risālah, he seems to fall in with
the Avicennian majority and affirms that some conceptions and assertions must
be acquired (RM 8.10–9.5).25

§326 At this point, al-Kātibī takes himself to have shown that some concep-
tions and assertions are primitive, and some inferred. To infer conceptions and
assertions of the unknown, we have to order known things; the delineation of
thinking al-Kātibī gives need not delay us, though note that thinking may order
things that are in fact false (ḤQ 185.pu–u). The fact that thinkers contradict each
other, and even—over time—themselves, proves that we stand in need of a set of

92 92
 Commentary, §4

rules for thinking to make sure that the ways we order primitive knowledge are
sound (this argument is taken, often word for word, from Avicenna’s al-Madkhal
[AM 34.apu–38.u]); this is the business of logic.
Al-Kātibī gives in §3 a delineation of logic as a canonical instrument (often
rendered “normative instrument”; “normative organon” is another possible
translation, and would highlight the fact that the same word is used for instru-
ment as is used to refer to the system of methods developed in Aristotle’s corpus
on logic), the implementation of which preserves us from error in thinking.27
(What is offered is only a delineation because al-Kātibī uses accidental matters
in his formulation, like being an instrument, which belongs to logic only in rela-
tion to other sciences [TT 61.apu–u]; see the conditions for delineation in §36.)
In §§5 and 6, he goes on to argue that logic is also a science with a determinate
subject matter. In taking logic to be both an instrument and a science with its
own subject matter, he is adopting Avicenna’s position, which agrees with the
Peripatetics that logic is an instrument for the other sciences, while at the same
time agreeing with the Platonists that logic is a science in itself.28 Al-Kātibī in
§5, however, will differ from Avicenna as to what the subject matter of the sci-
ence of logic is.

§429 Al-Kātibī goes on to make two claims specifically about how we come to
know logic. As in the argument in §2, its knowledge claims cannot be entirely
primitive or we would know logic without learning it (which clearly we do not);
nor are they entirely inferred, otherwise they would form either a regress or a
vicious circle. The lemma is taken to be an answer to an elided problem (ḤQ
188.1, TT 64.apu–u), treated by (among others) his colleague at Marāghah, Naṣīr
al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī: if in logic we need to infer some of the knowledge logic contains,
what are we using to protect ourselves from incorrect thinking in making those
inferences? The logic that is not yet fully achieved? Or another logic?

Text 4.1 The greater part of logic consists of technical terms to which
one needs to be alerted, of primary propositions that one needs to have
brought to mind and that prepare for others, and of inferred knowledge
claims that are such that one does not fall into error concerning them (the
like of which geometry uses in its demonstrations). None of these stands
in need of logic. Should any of these need logical canons (and that will
be rarely), that need will only be for the first kind [that is, the technical
terms]; there is therefore no circularity of need at all. (ṬḤ 118.18–apu)

93 93
 Commentary, §5

The second discussion, on the subject of logic

§530 The lemma preempts the discussion of the structure of a science in §120
(the last lemma of the treatise) by assuming we know why it matters that we
identify the subject of an Aristotelian science,31 and what studying a science
involves. A subject has to be assumed to exist, or be proved to exist outside
the science itself; and the scientist tries to prove a number of essential acci-
dents of the subject or its parts. So geometry has as its subject matter extended
magnitude, which has subjects under it like line and plane figure. In this con-
text, “essential accident” is used in a technical sense,32 different from “essential”
(dhātī) when used by Avicenna to mean “constituent” (muqawwim) in discuss-
ing the material covered by al-Kātibī in Section 2 of the first treatise (from §15
on, though note that al-Kātibī does not himself use the term “essential” in the
Risālah until §120, where it quite clearly has the second sense, of essential acci-
dent). For present purposes, an essential accident is one that belongs to its sub-
ject in virtue of what the subject is (like capacity for astonishment belongs to
man, ḤQ 189.15–16), or what constitutes the subject (“a part of it,” like walking
belongs to man because he is an animal, ḤQ 189.pu), or what is implied by the
subject alone (“coextensive with it,” like laughing belongs to man because he
has a capacity for astonishment, ḤQ 189.u). Having internal angles that sum to
two right angles belongs to triangle alone, and belongs to triangle necessarily.
A science is developed by proving that (and why) essential accidents belong to
the science’s subjects; the questions as to whether or not they do are the ques-
tions spoken of in Text 1.a.
It is therefore crucial for the purposes of the Aristotelian theory of science to
identify the subject matter of a science.

Text 5.1 The sciences are only distinguished among themselves by

the distinction of their subjects; by reason of not knowing the subject of
the science, one fumbles with its questions. For example, the parts of the
cosmos with respect to form (al-shakl) are the subject of astronomy, and
with respect to nature the subject of On the Heavens. Were we not to take
notice of these two lines of approach, the investigation would sometimes
be about astronomy, sometimes about physics; we need therefore to state
the subject of a science. (ḤQ 189.7–11)

Avicenna had identified secondary intelligibles as the subject matter of logic

(Avicenna, Metaphysics, 7), and al-Rāzī agreed with him on this point.

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Text 5.2 The subject matter of logic is the secondary intelligibles insofar
as it is possible to pass by means of them from the known (al-maʿlūmāt) to
the unknown (al-majhūlāt).33 The explanation of “secondary intelligibles”
is that man conceives the realities of things (ḥaqāʾiq al-ashyāʾ ) in the first
place, then judges some with others either restrictively or predicatively
(ḥukman taqyīdiyyan aw khabariyyan). The quiddity’s being judged in this
way is something that only attaches to the quiddity after it has become
known in the first place, so it is a second-order [consideration] (fī l-dara-
jah al-thāniyah). If these considerations are investigated—not absolutely,
but rather with respect to how it is possible to pass correctly by means of
them from the known to the unknown—that is logic. So its subject matter
is certainly the secondary intelligibles under the consideration mentioned
above. (RM 10.1–8)

Against these two authorities whom he respects so highly, al-Kātibī follows

Afḍal al-Dīn al-Khūnajī and takes the subject matter of logic to be more general
than secondary intelligibles—namely, conceptions and assertions, investigated
insofar as they lead to further conceptions or assertions. Being a differentia of
human, for example, is somehow an essential accident of the primary intelligible
rational, and since notions like differentia are part of the logician’s brief, the logi-
cian is investigating essential accidents of primary intelligibles.34 Al-Taftāzānī
among others notes the dispute (TŠ 114.15–u), but defers its fuller treatment to a
more advanced text (TŠ 117.9).35

§636 It is customary for logicians in the Avicennian tradition to structure their

treatises to deal with definition (which leads to a conception) and proof (which
leads to an assertion). So it is that §6 evokes the two terms introduced in the
opening lemma of the treatise in promising to deal first with explanatory phrases
and then with proofs. The exposition is linked directly to the logical priority
of the components, the simple before the complex. This principle of ordering
becomes ever more rigorously applied by post-Avicennian logicians (mukhālafat
al-waḍ ʿ al-ṭabī ʿ fī quwwat al-khaṭaʾ ʿinda l-muḥaṣṣilīn, TT 98.7), and is clearly a
great concern for al-Kātibī. Al-Taḥtānī offers a detailed account of the reasoning
behind the structure of the Risālah.

Text 6.1 Al-Kātibī only ordered [al-Risālah al-Shamsiyyah] in this

way because, of that which must be known in logic, it is either crucial
for making a start in the discipline, or it is not. If it is crucial for making a

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start, it forms the Introduction. If it is not, then investigation of it either

has to do with simple terms (the First Treatise), or with combinations.
Investigation into combinations must either be concerned with those that
are not the ultimate goal of the investigation (the Second Treatise), or
with those that are. Reflection about the latter must either be relative to
form alone (the Third Treatise), or relative to matter (the Conclusion).
(TT 23.pu–25.1)

The First Treatise, on Simple Terms

The first treatise of the Risālah is on the simple elements (al-mufradāt) that
make up logical constructions; al-Kātibī does not limit his treatment to either
simple expressions or simple meanings. The treatise is made up of four sections.
In the first, al-Kātibī deals with simple expressions, which are defined negatively
as not being compound expressions (murakkabāt; see §10 and commentary
below). The section also offers definitions for complete and incomplete com-
pound expressions (§14). Two compound constructions are of logical inter-
est: the definition and the proposition. The treatment of definition is deferred
to the fourth and final section of the first treatise (so the first treatise stretches
to include compound expressions that convey simple meanings), and the other
logically interesting compound expression—the proposition, or truth-apt sen-
tence—and its role in inference occupy al-Kātibī for the remaining two Treatises
and the Conclusion.
The first section presents material considered by Avicenna in his response,
on the one hand, to Aristotle’s De Interpretatione, the ʿIbārah, and on the other,
to Porphyry’s Introduction, the Madkhal. In between the first section on expres-
sions and the last section on definition, al-Kātibī deals with simple meanings
(which are what simple expressions are imposed on, and what definitions are
both made up of, and define), and the five kinds of predicates used in logic,
referred to as the five predicables, or the five universals. In the third section of
the first treatise, al-Kātibī deals with five more profound discussions that affect
how any universal should be used in logical investigations.

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The first section, on expressions

These eight lemmata deal with the relation between expressions and meanings;
given that the logician is not primarily interested in expressions (ḤQ 194.apu),
subsequent lemmata nearly all concern the relation of one meaning to another
meaning. There are a number of discrete discussions underway in this part of the
Risālah. Lemmata 7–9 deal with a development on the theory of signification
first set out by Avicenna in the Madkhal (AM 92.1–3); al-Kātibī is clearly follow-
ing the version Avicenna put forward in Pointers 1.6 (AI 4.apu–5.7), emending it
in light of criticisms advanced by al-Rāzī. Lemma 10 distinguishes simple from
compound expressions, §§11–13 develop a division of simple terms in competi-
tion with grammar and—among other things—identify the name (or noun; see
comments on §11 below for why I prefer the less technical term) as the expression
imposed on the simple universal meaning. Lemma 14 offers distinctions relative
to compound expressions. The distinctions developed in the first discussion iso-
late the expressions to be investigated through the rest of the treatise.
The Risālah was intended for teaching, and the teacher was meant to supply
background for its treatment of signification. In broad terms, the problem of sig-
nification deals with the way meanings are conveyed. As treated by Avicenna and
his followers, the discussion focuses above all on the way meanings are conveyed
by someone uttering an expression to someone else familiar with the conven-
tions of the language; it does not deal with the institution or acquisition of lan-
guage. One way to introduce the topic—taken from al-Ḥillī (ḤQ 195.1–9)—was to
say that the signification (dalālah) of a meaning may be by a gesture or by a verbal
expression. Some expressions signify meanings without being imposed to signify
those meanings, whether naturally (bi-l-ṭabʿ ) like “ouch!” for pain, or intellectu-
ally (bi-l-ʿaql); that is, by mediation of inference: an articulated sound signifies a
voice, in that even from a word we do not understand, we grasp a meaning—that
someone has pronounced the word. As noted, most philosophical discussion is
directed to the case in which an expression (lafẓ) has been imposed (mawḍūʿ )
on a given meaning (maʿnan); in this case, the sense of “an expression’s signify-
ing a meaning” is “the meaning understood by one who is conversant with the
imposition from the expression when it is uttered or brought to mind” (fahm
al-maʿnā min al-lafẓ ʿinda iṭlāqihi aw takhayyulihi bi-l-nisbah ilā man huwa ʿālim
bi-l-waḍ ʿ ). A problem arises at this point due to the structure of meanings them-
selves: the containment (taḍammun) of one meaning in another, or the implica-
tion (iltizām) of one meaning by another (without the implicate meaning being

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contained in the implicant meaning).37 An expression imposed to signify one

meaning also signifies necessarily on being uttered (ʿinda iṭlāqihi) meanings con-
tained in or inseparable from that meaning. The definition of signification was
therefore refined by Avicenna, and this is where al-Kātibī takes up his discussion
from §7. Such refinement is necessary if an account—at any rate, an Avicennian
account—is to be given of what signifies the quiddity, or, in other words, what
signifies what the thing is. Other problems come about because expressions can
be imposed on more than a single meaning, either by the original imposition
(waḍʿ ) of the first Positor (wāḍiʿ ), or by the later technical convention (iṣṭilāḥ) of
a group of language users; this is the problem addressed in §12.

§738 To repeat: The theory of signification set out here starts with the assump-
tion that an act of imposition has related an expression with a meaning. It is
this relation that determines that the expression signifies the meaning by signi-
fication of correspondence; the meaning necessarily comes to mind for those
familiar with the imposition on the utterance of the expression. But because
of the necessary interconnections among meanings—and “necessary” here
excludes purely cultural and personal associations, like the laurel with heroic
deeds, and the rose with love—in most cases, other meanings beyond the one
signified by correspondence are also signified on the utterance of the expression.
These meanings beyond the one on which the expression is imposed are signi-
fied through a relation combining the first element, the imposition, and a second
element, the relation the first meaning has to the other meaning. The relevant
relations between meanings are containment (in which the second meaning is
contained in the first, as animal and rational are contained in man), and
implication (in which a meaning extrinsic to the first meaning follows it neces-
sarily, as laughing follows man, and 2R follows triangle).39 The two fur-
ther kinds of signification are named after these second elements that constitute
them. (See Figure 1, where the broken line from “Expression” to “Meaning” rep-
resents imposition, the double line the containment of one meaning in another,
the single line the implication of one meaning by another, the heavy dotted line
the expression’s signification of meaning by containment, and the light dotted
line the expression’s signification of meaning by implication.)
The definitions of the three kinds of signification al-Kātibī offers are highly
compressed, and the translation is guided by al-Taftāzānī’s expansion of §7,
here given with subscripted numbers to make it clear which of the meanings is
spoken of.

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 Commentary, §7

Text 7.1 The expression’s signification of meaning 1 by way of that

expression being imposed on that meaning 1 (like the signification by
“man” of rational animal) is called correspondence (dalālat al-lafẓ
ʿalā l-maʿnā bi-tawassuṭ waḍ ʿ dhālika l-lafẓ li-dhālika l-maʿnā . . . tusammā
muṭābaqah), due to the expression matching the meaning1 because it is
imposed as its counterpart. The expression’s signification of meaning 2 by
way of the expression being imposed on something 1 in which that mean-
ing 2 is included (like signification by “man” of animal by way of its
being imposed on that in which animal is intrinsic; namely, rational
animal) is called signification by containment (dalālat al-lafẓ ʿalā l-maʿnā
bi-tawassuṭ waḍ ʿ al-lafẓ li-shayʾ dakhala fīhi dhālika l-maʿnā . . . tusammā
dalālat al-taḍammun), due to the signified meaning 2 being within the
meaning 1 on which it is imposed. The expression’s signification of mean-
ing 3 by way of the expression being imposed on something 1 to which the
meaning 3 signified is extrinsic (like signification by “man” of receptive
of knowledge, which is extrinsic to rational animal) is called sig-
nification by implication (dalālat al-lafẓ ʿalā l-maʿnā bi-tawassuṭ waḍ ʿihi
li-shayʾ kharaja ʿanhu dhālika l-maʿnā al-madlūl . . . tusammā dalālat
al-iltizām), due to the signified meaning 3 being an implicate of the mean-
ing 1 on which it is imposed. (TŠ 121.4–12)

Al-Kātibī is stipulating, roughly, that if expression E signifies meaning X by

containment, then there is a second meaning, Y, on which E is imposed, X is a
part of Y, and is taken to be signified by E only in virtue of E’s being imposed on
Y. And if expression E signifies meaning X by implication, then there is a second
meaning, Y, on which E is imposed, X follows Y as an implicate, and is signified
by E only in virtue of E’s being imposed on Y. These ponderous definitions are
the outcome of a dialectical process (which I here pass over) from Avicenna’s
definitions in Pointers 1.6 (AI 4.apu–5.7), through their critical reception by
al-Rāzī, and their final refinement at the hands of al-Khūnajī.40 Among the com-
mentators, al-Taftāzānī in particular dwells on the motivation for modifying
Avicenna’s definitions in Pointers; I do not intend to go into the details, but the
modification eliminates problems for the definitions when dealing with particu-
lar kinds of equivocation (ḤQ 196.2–3) (among others, the kind of equivocation
that arises in cases of conventionally and legislatively transferred expressions in
§12.2 if the primary imposition is not abandoned).

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 Commentary, §8

§841 “Understood” in al-Kātibī’s phrase “otherwise its being understood from

the expression would be impossible” is glossed by al-Ḥillī as “always understood”
(ḤQ 197.9); even the possibility of failure in following voids the implication. Sig-
nification by implication raises further questions as to how strong the relation
should be between the implied meaning and the implicant meaning. To use the
example given in §7, how should the meaning receptive of knowledge
follow from man? First, the relation between the meaning on which the expres-
sion is imposed and its implicate is specified as a relation at the conceptual level
rather than one in existence; al-Kātibī’s example of blind and having vision
makes the distinction clear. Second, the implicate meaning (al-lāzim) must also
be extrinsic to the implicant meaning (al-malzūm), which is to say, it cannot be
part of the implicant meaning (in the way that animal is part of both the defi-
nition rational animal and the quiddity it defines, man); this is why it is
referred to as extrinsic (al-khārij) in §8. (Recall that Avicenna reserves lāzim for
meanings extrinsic to the implicant meaning [AI 8.pu–9.1].) Third, the implicate
meaning involved in signification theory need not be predicable of the implicant
meaning (as in the case of al-Kātibī’s example of blind and sight), whereas
the implicate meanings dealt with in the next section (on the predicables; see
§22) must be predicable of the implicant meaning. Finally, as al-Kātibī puts it,
the implicate must “be such that its conception follows from the conception
of the named”; this is formulated in a way that—set against al-Khūnajī’s treat-
ment of the matter—highlights an important distinction. (Al-Taftāzānī follows
al-Kātibī’s formulation most closely [TŠ 123.3–4].)

Text 8.1 Two notions are intended by mental implication, the first of
which is that whenever there is an awareness of the implicant there is an
awareness of the implicate (kullamā ḥaṣala l-shuʿūr bi-l-malzūm ḥaṣala
l-shuʿūr bi-l-lāzim); the second, that whenever there is an awareness of
both there is an awareness of the implication between the two (kullamā
ḥaṣala l-shuʿūr bi-himā ḥaṣala l-shuʿūr bi-l-luzūm). The first is stronger than
the second, and it is what is taken into account according to [the argu-
ment] just rehearsed. Nothing can have infinite implicates according to
this sense, whether with a middle or without. (ḪK 13.1–5)

It is the stronger sense that is involved in signification by implication. In

§22.2 below, when dealing with inseparable implicates,42 al-Kātibī makes the
same distinction (though in reverse order, weaker first). The two strengths of
implication are used at different philosophical moments; the stronger is used

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 Commentary, §9

in signification theory, the weaker for the immediate and evident implicates of
a quiddity that give a demonstrative science its proper principles (on which see
commentary on §22 and §120).
Looking into why it is the strong implication that is considered in significa-
tion reveals what is at stake; I consider two criticisms of the theory.43 First, a
meaning on which an expression is imposed might have infinitely many impli-
cates; for example, from two follows half of four, third of six, and so
forth. This is true, but according to al-Khūnajī these implicates follow only on
the weak account of evident implication, and are only acknowledged when two
is considered along with the putative implicate. Another objection is that impli-
cation is different for different people, and therefore signification by implica-
tion is not a determinate or necessary signification. Al-Khūnajī again disagrees:
The implicate meaning is strongly implied, as in the case of one correlative with
another. One simply does not understand the meaning of “father” unless one
also understands the meaning of “child,” nor does one understand the meaning
of the privation “blind” unless one understands that of which it is a privation.

§944 Al-Kātibī goes on to consider whether, given the presence of one of the
three significations, we may infer that one or both of the other two must also
be present. Avicenna had made the claim that correspondence is necessarily
entailed by containment and implication (Avicenna, Manṭiq al-mashriqiyyīn,
15.5–6). What he meant is: If expression E signifies X by containment, there
must be a meaning Y of which X is a proper part and which is signified by E
by correspondence. Similarly, if expression E signifies X by implication, there
must be a meaning Y of which X is an implicate and which is signified by E by
correspondence. The post-Avicennian logicians comprehensively explored the
relations among significations, and investigated the remaining four possible
entailments (correspondence-containment, correspondence-implication, con-
tainment-implication, implication-containment).
To take the claims in the order that we find them in the Risālah: Al-Kātibī
considers but rules out the entailment of containment by correspondence (so he
is ruling out what would amount to the claim: if expression E signifies meaning
X by correspondence, there must be a meaning Y that is part of X and that E will
signify by containment). He rejects this claim because there may be simple quid-
dities that are not constituted by a genus and differentia, or other parts; he gives
what may be a relevant example in §31: “an example of the simple is intelligence
(if we say substance is not a genus for it).” He also rejected al-Rāzī’s argument for

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 Commentary, §9

the entailment of implication by correspondence (“we have ruled out what has
been said, that the conception of every quiddity entails the conception that it is
not other than itself ”). This is how al-Rāzī sets out his claim:

Text 9.1 Signification by imposition is correspondence, and the

remaining two [kinds of signification] are consequences, not absolutely
but rather on the condition that the quiddity is a compound for the first
and an implicant for the second. Since the part does not necessarily belong
to every quiddity, but an implicate has to belong to every quiddity—at the
least, that it is not other than itself (wa-aqalluhu annahu laysa ghayrahu)—
containment does not have to follow correspondence, but implication
does. Neither is found without correspondence because it is inconceivable
that the consequent occur insofar as it is a consequent without an anteced-
ent. (RM 19.pu–20.3)

It is difficult to know precisely what al-Rāzī means by the claim that any sig-
nification by correspondence implies that “it is not other than itself ”; perhaps
that dog implies not-cat, not-horse, and so forth, or perhaps that dog is
self-identical. Whatever al-Rāzī’s precise claim, al-Khūnajī rejected it using the
distinction in Text 8.1:

Text 9.2 In response to the claim that everything has an evident impli-
cate, we say that on the stronger understanding [of implication] this is
rejected, and the consideration [al-Rāzī] mentions as inevitable and that
follows everything is on the weaker sense not the stronger, due to the pos-
sibility of conceiving something while not paying attention to its being not
other than itself (li-imkān taṣawwur al-shayʾ maʿa l-dhuhūl ʿan kawnihi
laysa ghayrahu). (ḪK 13.8–10)

As noted above, only the stronger sense of implication plays a role in significa-
tion theory. If I understand the root of al-Khūnajī’s objection to al-Rāzī’s claim,
it lies in the distinction between an implicate of father like not-rock and
the implicate child, a distinction that matters because the meaning of “father”
cannot be understood without simultaneously understanding what a child is,
whereas it can be understood without even adverting to a rock.
Al-Kātibī in the Risālah extends the last conclusion (that correspondence
does not entail containment) to rule out the entailment of implication by con-
tainment. I cannot see how this stronger conclusion would follow from the
weaker one, though I think he is right to rule it out. By contrast, al-Kātibī had

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 Commentary, §9

accepted in Jāmiʿ al-daqāʾiq that containment entails implication. In any event,

here in the Risālah he is rejecting the claim that if expression E signifies meaning
X by containment, there must be a meaning Z signified by E by correspondence
of which X is a proper part, and further, there must be a meaning Y that is an
implicate of meaning Z, and E signifies Y by implication. Al-Taftāzānī thinks
al-Kātibī is right in the Risālah to reject containment-entails-implication:

Text 9.3 From what we have mentioned, that correspondence does not
decisively and certainly entail implication, it is apparent that containment
does not decisively and certainly entail implication, because there may
be a compound quiddity that has no evident implicate, and the expres-
sion would signify its part by containment but without implication. What
al-Kātibī said in the Jāmiʿ (mā dhakarahu l-muṣannif fī l-Jāmiʿ )—contain-
ment entails implication because the conception of a compound quiddity
definitely entails the conception that it is compound, thus verifying impli-
cation necessarily—is to be rejected (fa-mamnūʿ ). Rather, the concep-
tion of the quiddity does not even entail that it is a quiddity, let alone its
being simple or compound; otherwise, correspondence would also entail
implication. If you were to argue: Containment is the understanding of
the proper part insofar as it is a proper part, and the qualification being a
part (al-juzʾiyyah) is an extrinsic implicate meaning that entails the con-
ception being a whole (al-kulliyyah) as a necessary consequence of the
correlation between being a part and being a whole, so containment with-
out implication is impossible, we would respond: The meaning of their
claim “containment is understanding the part insofar as it is a part” is not
that containment consists of understanding the part along with the qualifi-
cation of being a part, but rather that it is understanding the part by way of
its being a part and by reason of that; that is, the reason for understanding
it from the expression is its being a part of what is understood from the
expression (mafhūm al-lafẓ), whether or not the qualification of being a
part is noticed in that state.
Implication does not entail containment due to the possibility that
there may be a simple quiddity that entails an evident implicate; this is
something they ignore in spite of it being obvious. (TŠ 124.11–125.8)

On this last point al-Taftāzānī makes, note that al-Kātibī in the Risālah in
fact fails to consider whether implication might entail containment. Al-Kātibī
concludes §9 by accepting only Avicenna’s initial claim, that signification by

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 Commentary, §10

containment and signification by implication both entail signification by cor-

respondence “due to the impossibility of a consequent—insofar as it is a con-
sequent—without an antecedent.” Another way to consider these cases is that
both signification by containment and signification by implication are relative
products, and are defined as having signification by correspondence as part of
that product.

§1045 Al-Kātibī needs to isolate simple expressions that signify simple mean-
ings for the purposes of the discussion in the following two sections of the first
treatise, and to distinguish them from compound expressions (see §14 below,
where he gets his distinctions in order for the fourth section, and for the remain-
der of the treatise). Al-Kātibī adopts Avicenna’s criterion for distinguishing
simple from compound (in Pointers 1.8 [AI 5.13–6.1]), and al-Ḥillī, in his com-
mentary, even brings in one of Avicenna’s examples of a proper name composed
of two significant expressions, ʿAbdallāh. The test consists of considering the
expression’s signification by correspondence. Is it intended that any part of
the expression signify part of the meaning? If so, the expression is compound
(murakkab). It may be that insān (“man”) breaks down into elements which
include in (“if ”); but if is no part of the meaning of “man.” We must also ignore
compounds used as a proper name, like ʿAbdallāh; as a name, neither part is
intended to follow the intention of the first Positor (by which it would be the
compound “slave of God”), because that intention has been overridden by a sec-
ondary intention, to use the two words as a single proper name for a given man.

Text 10.1 Some people divide the expression into three. First, the
simple, no part of which signifies anything at all, like “man” (insān);
second, the compound (al-murakkab), part of which signifies something
that is not part of the meaning, like ʿAbdallāh (when it is used as a proper
name); and third, the composite (al-muʾallaf), part of which signifies part
of the meaning, like “stone-thrower.”46 (ḤQ 200.3–8)

The second division (here called murakkab) is of no logical interest, concern-

ing as it does expression only insofar as it does not contribute to the signification
of the relevant meaning. Note that the interpretation of Aristotle by al-Fārābī
and the Baghdad school is the target of Text 10.1.47
It does not come up in the Risālah, but al-Khūnajī mentions a worry some
have about compound expressions; I record it because it gives a deeper insight
into the full range of the role imposition plays in language.

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 Commentary, §11

Text 10.2 It is not to be said that the compound expression’s signifi-

cation of its meaning (dalālah . . . ʿalā mafhūmihi) lies beyond the three
[kinds of signification], since the Positor did not impose it for that mean-
ing, nor [did the Positor impose it] for what is intrinsic to or follows from
that meaning. Because we answer: The meaning of “the expression’s signi-
fication of what it is imposed on” is that this exact expression is imposed
on this exact meaning, or [the expression’s] parts for [the meaning’s] parts
(such that the aggregate of the expression corresponds with the aggregate
of the meaning). There is no harm in the variation that attaches to the com-
plex (al-jumlah) through the form of the compound—among other exam-
ples, like the genitive term going second in Arabic and first in other lan-
guages—because the form of compounding simple expressions is imposed
in each language as a function of the form of compounding those simple
meanings; so the whole is by imposition. (ḪK 11.9–pu)

§1148 The simple expression divides into the parts of speech: name, verb
(kalimah), and particle. I adopt the convention of translating ism as “name”
because it is not merely noun, but also adjective; on Avicenna’s division in the
ʿIbārah, it even applies to particles. Note too that most logicians use a calque
from the Greek (kalimah, “word”) for verb, departing from the usage of the
Arabic grammarians, who use fiʿl.49
Avicenna had defined the name as “an expression signifying by convention
a meaning abstracted from time, not one of whose parts is significant taken
in isolation” (lafẓ dāll bi-l-tawāṭuʾ ʿalā maʿnan mujarrad min al-zamān wa-lā
yakūnu wāḥid min ajzāʾihi dalīlan bi-nfirādihi), and a verb as “what signifies
time along with other things, not one of whose parts is significant taken in
isolation, and always signifies what is said of something else” (yadullu maʿa
mā yadullu ʿalayhi ʿalā l-zamān wa-lā yakūnu wāḥid min ajzāʾihi dalīlan
bi-nfirādihi wa-yakūnu abadan dalīlan ʿalā mā yuqālu ʿalā ghayrihi).50 On this
definition, the particle falls under name. Al-Kātibī has, however, chosen a dif-
ferent principle of division (used by al-Rāzī in RM 23.9–11; see Figure 2). An
expression is either fit to be predicated, or is not (if not, it is a particle);51 and a
predicable expression either signifies by its form (bi-hayʾatihi) one of the three
tenses (a verb), or does not (a name). (Names like “morning” that signify time
are not verbs because they do not signify it by their form [ḤQ 201.3–4].) For
the next two lemmata, al-Kātibī focuses on names and how they signify mean-
ings by correspondence.

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§1252 The manuscripts I have looked at all divide §13 from §12, and that is how
I present the two lemmata; that said, the commentators offer an analysis that
runs them together, based on a division that in turn has been seen to lie at the
heart of Aristotle’s presentation of synonyms and homonyms at the beginning
of the Categories. Philoponus, for example, fills it out by saying that some things
“share with one another a name but differ in definition and these are called
homonyms, while those things that have in common a definition but differ in
name are called polynyms. Those things that have in common both a name and
a definition are called synonyms, while those that differ both in name and in
definition are called heteronyms.”53 I translate mushtarak as “equivocal” instead
of “homonymous,” mutawāṭiʾ as “univocal” instead of “synonymous,” mutarādif
as “synonymous” instead of “polynymous,” mutabāyin as “distinct” instead of
“heteronymous,” and mushtaqq as “denominative” instead of “paronymous”
(not given in the text quoted).
It should be noted that, even though al-Kātibī never uses the term mushtaqq,
denominative, throughout the Risālah, his commentators do, and many of the
example sentences in the Risālah have denominative predicates (among others,
“rational” and “black”). Avicenna places the denominative and the abstract noun
from which it is denominated under distinct (or heteronymous) terms—“neither
their name nor meaning is one”—they are, however, linked “by a certain confor-
mity (mushākalah) between the two names and the two meanings, not enough
to make them a single name and a single meaning,” and this is what makes the
concrete term denominative. Avicenna’s own examples include “eloquent” from
“eloquence,” “monied” from “money,” and “ironsmith” from “iron” (Avicenna,
Al-Shifāʾ: al-Manṭiq: al-Maqūlāt, 16.12–17.4).54
Here is al-Ḥillī’s partial division, one which could be extended to include the
material in Text 13.1; see Figure 3 for a diagram.

Text 12.1 This is a division of the simple name according to its relation
to its meaning. Its meaning is either one or many. The first [1, simple name
with one meaning] subdivides so that [1.a] the meaning is individual, the
very conception of the meaning of which makes impossible sharing in the
meaning; the expression signifying it is called a proper name, like “Zayd.”
Or [1.b.i] [the expression’s] meaning is universal and its relation to its mean-
ings is identical; the expression signifying [this meaning] is called univocal,
like “animal,” for its meaning is a universal true of many. Its relation to the
many that are under it is one; none of them is more eminent than or prior

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 Commentary, §13

to the others. No actually existing many is stipulated, for the sun is one
actually, but what is understood from [“sun”] is a universal matter, which
is true of many in the mind. Or [1.b.ii] the meaning is universal, but its rela-
tion to the items [under it] differs, so some of them are more eminent than
others in that universal meaning, like existence; for its meaning is universal
and its relation to the items under it differs, for the cause is more eminent
in existence than the effect; or some are prior, again as existence is for the
cause; or some are more intense, like white, for it is more intense in snow
than it is in ivory. The expression signifying like this is called systematically
ambiguous (mushakkik), and it is so called because the items under it differ
in one respect and are united in another, so that the investigator doubts
(yushakkiku) whether they are equivocal or univocal.55
The second [2] is that the meaning is many, and it also subdivides. The
first [2.a, simple expression with more than one meaning] is equivocal (al-
mushtarak), when the expression has been imposed on two different reali-
ties in a primary way, like ʿayn, for it is imposed on the kneecap (ʿayn al-
rukbah) and the eye. The second [2.b] is what is transferred, which [in the
first case, 2.b.i] is when the expression is first imposed on one of a number
of meanings, and then is transferred from that meaning to another, leaving
behind the first meaning. (ḤQ 202.6–203.12)
Third [2.c] is that the expression is first imposed on one of a number of
meanings, then is transferred to a second without leaving behind its first
imposition. Then the expression is called literal in view of its use for the
first meaning, and metaphorical in relation to its use for the second mean-
ing; this is like “lion.” (ḤQ 204.7–10)

§1356 The second of the divisions given in §12 defines the terms I translate as
“synonymous” (murādif) (2.a.ii) and “distinct” (mubāyin) (2.a.I). Here is al-Ḥillī,
with examples (the last of which is of a denominative):

Text 13.1 Any two expressions either have a meaning that is one, and
the expressions are called synonymous, like “man” (insān) and “man”
(bashar); or they have meanings that are multiple as a function of the
number of expressions, and the expressions are called distinct, like “man”
and “horse,” whether they are distinct in essence as in the example,
or whether one of them signifies the essence and the other signifies the
description (al-waṣf), like “man” and “laughing.” (ḤQ 205.1–6)

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 Commentary, §14

Al-Rāzī offers a slightly different division, which shows more clearly how the
material presented in §12 can fit with material presented in §13 (as 2.a in what fol-
lows [RM 22.3–23.5]; see Figure 4). Either (1) expression and meaning are each
one; if (1.a) it is not possible for the meaning to have more than one instance—
that is, it is a proper name—but if (1.b) it is possible, then the items under it
(1.b.i) all equally instantiate the meaning, and it is univocal, or (1.b.ii) instanti-
ate the meaning in differing degrees, and it is systematically ambiguous; or (2)
expression or meaning are more than one; if (2.a) the expressions are more than
one, then (2.a.i) the meanings may also not be one, whereupon they are distinct
expressions for distinct meanings, but if (2.a.ii) the meaning is one, then the two
expressions are synonymous (mutarādifān). If (2.b) the expression is one but the
meaning is more than one, the expression is equivocal (or transferred; I have
elided part of al-Rāzī’s division both here and in Figure 4).

§1457 This is the first lemma in the Risālah to deal with compound expressions,
defined in §10. There is again a dichotomous division presented: compound
expressions may be (1) complete (tāmm) or (2) incomplete (ghayr tāmm). The
criterion for completeness is whether silence is appropriate after the expression
is uttered. The complete subdivides into (1.a) the truth-apt (muḥtamil al-ṣidq
wa-l-kidhb) and (1.b) what is not truth-apt (inshāʾ ), which further subdivides
but holds no interest for the logician. The incomplete subdivides into (2.a) the
restrictive (taqyīdī), for which al-Kātibī gives as an example two names (a noun
and an adjective), “rational animal,” and (2.b) the nonrestrictive, for which
al-Kātibī gives fragments formed of a verb and a particle and a name and a parti-
cle; neither of these fragments could be either (1) complete or (2.a) incomplete
restrictive.
In §38, at the beginning of the Second Treatise, on propositions, al-Kātibī
comes back to (1.a), the truth-apt complete compound expression; it is the
proposition (qaḍiyyah). There, however, he uses a different distinction to come
to a definition of proposition.

The second section, on simple meanings

The following nine lemmata (§§15–23) introduce the doctrine of the predicables.
As noted above, they correspond to material first gathered as a treatise by Por-
phyry in the Introduction, and then vastly changed in presentation and content in
Avicenna’s Madkhal. Al-Kātibī does not follow Avicenna slavishly here, but does

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 Commentary, §15

adopt all the modifications Avicenna insisted were necessary to correct Porphy-
ry’s errors. Unlike Avicenna, al-Kātibī does not use the term “essential” (dhātī) in
developing his account, though all his commentators use the term when expand-
ing on the lemmata (see comments on §16). Al-Kātibī presents the material
according to a division of the predicables set out in Figure 5, and defers a number
of general questions about universals to the following section of the treatise.
A passage from Porphyry may help orient the reader in the material covered.
I follow it with a warning sounded by al-Taftāzānī in comment on §16. Por-
phyry says toward the end of his treatment of genus that “animal, for example,
is a genus; man a species; rational a difference; laughing a property; and white,
black, sitting are accidents” (Barnes, Porphyry: Introduction, 4). It is tempting
to think that any given meaning comes under one and only one kind of predi-
cable; for example, that animal is always a genus, and man is always a species.
Al-Taftāzānī corrects this misconception, saying that the predicables

Text 15.a are relational matters that differ according to the consider-
ation [at issue]. For color is a genus for black, a differentia for quality, a
species for what is qualified, a proprium of body, and a general accident of
animal. (TŠ 142.u–143.1)

Al-Ṭūsī notes that there are some problems with this example, but nonethe-
less agrees with the general point being made (ṬḤ 244.20–245.6).

§1558 The particular is defined first by al-Kātibī. Al-Taftāzānī’s definition dif-

fers slightly from al-Kātibī’s, as that “whose very conception precludes the
occurrence of sharing by a multiplicity,” and that of universal as obtaining when
the conditions for the particular are not met.59 (Al-Taftāzānī clarifies the defini-
tion in Text 24.1.) The sciences are directed only to the study of the universal.
Al-Taḥtānī says:

Text 15.1 You have come to know that the goal in composing this trea-
tise is knowledge of the method of acquiring things unknown conceptually
(iqtināṣ al-majhūlāt al-taṣawwuriyyah) from things which are known con-
ceptually. These are not acquired through particulars (for these, rather, are
not investigated in the sciences because they are transient and defy precise
analysis (li-taghayyurihā wa-ʿadam inḍibāṭihā)). For this reason, the logi-
cian’s investigations are limited to explaining universals and making precise
their divisions (bayān al-kulliyyāt wa-ḍabṭ aqsāmihā). (TT 129.pu–130.2)

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 Commentary, §16

This is where al-Kātibī begins his investigation of semantic matters (ḤQ

207.u). A meaning (maʿnan) is “the form obtaining in the intellect insofar as
it is intended by the expression; insofar as it is obtained in the intellect from
the expression it is called an understanding (mafhūm)” (TŠ 139.3–4). Univer-
sality turns on what is meant by “the occurrence of sharing in it” (wuqūʿ al-
sharikah fīhi). What is meant is that it is possible for the intellect to posit the
putative universal as true of many and corresponding to them, whether or not
it corresponds to them in fact (fī nafs al-amr). Thus merely posited universals
(al-kulliyāt al-farḍiyyah) come under the definition, like the inconceivable
(al-lā-mumkin al-taṣawwur). Al-Kātibī comes back to underline the fact that
a universal need have no instantiations in his five discussions directed to the
universal in the third section of the first treatise (specifically in §24), though
he seems to expect—inconsistently—that the universal be instantiated in the
delineation he offers of species in §16.
The term “quiddity” (māhiyyah) has been used often up to this point. Through
the treatment of the predicables, however, al-Kātibī relies on the notion much
more intensively, and a few words here and in the next section may help pin
down how he uses it.60 The expression for the quiddity of something—its mā
hiya—is what is said in answer to “what is it?” (mā huwa?). A quiddity is, in most
cases, a meaning made up of two component meanings, one of which is also a
quiddity, the other of which, while not a quiddity, is denominated from a quid-
dity (for example, “rational” from “rationality”); a term derived (mushtaqq) in
this way must have a quiddity as its substrate (see comments below on §19). So
the quiddity man is made up of (has as proper parts) the quiddity animal and
the differentia rational. Al-Kātibī seems to assume that even before philo-
sophical study, we are aware that the answer to the question “what is it?” should
be a quiddity.61

§1662 Al-Kātibī divides the universal into that which is said of the whole of
the quiddity of the particulars under it or at most a part of the quiddity, and
that which is said either of what is intrinsic to the quiddity (a proper part of the
quiddity) or of what is extrinsic to the quiddity (see Figure 5).63 The first two
(the quiddity, and what is intrinsic to, or a part of, the quiddity) are essential
(dhātī) in the sense of constituent (muqawwim); the third (extrinsic to the quid-
dity) is accidental (ʿaraḍī). As mentioned before, al-Kātibī himself does not use
“essential” in this sense anywhere in the Risālah (he uses it in a second sense in
§120), though all his commentators do. “Extrinsic” (khārijī or khārij) is used to

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 Commentary, §16

characterize the implicate (lāzim) introduced in §22; I come back to this specific
usage in commentary on that lemma. Al-Taftāzānī comments on previous use of
the criteria for the division.

Text 16.1 The ancients mentioned that the universal is related to

something else, being either the whole of its reality (tamām ḥaqīqatihi),
or intrinsic to it, or extrinsic to it. The first—what is said in answer to
“what is it?”—is either said purely in respect of being specific [to the thing]
(bi-ḥasab al-khuṣūṣiyyah al-maḥḍah), as the definition in relation to what is
defined; or purely in respect of being shared [with other things] (bi-ḥasab
al-sharikah al-maḥḍah), as the genus in relation to its species; or in respect
of being both specific and shared, like the species in relation to its mem-
bers. Since there are problems (ishkālāt) with this division, al-Kātibī used
another consideration to divide [the universal]; he thereby dropped the
definition in relation to what is defined because it is compound and the
discussion concerns the simple.64 (TŠ 141.10–16)

I believe that al-Kātibī assumes that an understanding of real species is

common to speakers of a natural language. If I ask the question “what is it?”
of a real particular, I can expect an answer that tells me what it is (its quiddity,
its mā hiya), something that can be said of other particulars differentiated from
the first particular only by accidental features such as color, position, age, and
so forth; the phrase used by al-Ḥillī for these features is “accidental individu-
ating factors” (umūr mushakhkhiṣah ʿāriḍah; [ḤQ 209.2]). I have a right to be
answered with the most complete quiddity common to what I am asking about
(the consequences of this expectation are further explored in Texts 17.1 and 17.3).
So al-Kātibī assumes that “man” is the right answer to “what is it?” asked of a
man. It would also be true to say “animal” in response, but it would not be as
informative as “man” because there are quiddities such as horses that are also
animals. And—to give examples of the considerations at play in the division
of the predicables—a quiddity like man is a meaning that is made up of other,
intrinsic meanings (“part of the quiddity,” like animal), and that implies other,
extrinsic meanings (“external to the quiddity,” like laughter).
Al-Kātibī comes under fire from all of his commentators in his delineation
of species in §16. He takes the whole quiddity insofar as it has many under it,
or only one; as he puts it, whether the quiddity is said in respect both of being
shared and being specific (“man” said of Zayd and ʿAmr in answer to “what are
they?”; “man” said of Zayd in answer to “what is it?”), or whether it is said only

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 Commentary, §17

in respect of being specific (“sun” said in respect of the contingently unique sun).
So the delineation of species al-Kātibī offers is “universal said of one or many
things in answer to the question ‘what is it?’” Al-Ḥillī (for example) says that
“thus we interpret ‘many’ as the externally existent many; were we to take it in
the delineation as ‘many’ without restriction, we would say that it is the univer-
sal that may be said of many agreeing in reality in answer to ‘what is it?’” (ḤQ
209.16–apu). Al-Ḥillī’s modified delineation would then conform to the defini-
tion of universal given in §15.65
All the predicables are given by delineation, and the commentators offer
fairly predictable comments on each delineation. Here is al-Ḥillī—whom I quote
on each predicable as it comes up—on this one:

Text 16.2 So “universal” is like a genus for the five universals. By saying
“said of many which agree in realities,” genus, general accident, and dif-
ferentia of the genus are excluded; by saying “in answer to ‘what is it?,’”
differentia and proprium are excluded. (ḤQ 209.pu–210.2)

Later on (in §29), al-Kātibī brings up the relative species (al-nawʿ al-iḍāfī),
the species whose delineation includes coming under a genus. Al-Kātibī’s divi-
sion of the predicables only works with real species (al-nawʿ al-ḥaqīqī), which is
what is presented in this section; many relative species can be a part of the whole
of the meaning shared among quiddities.

§1766 Al-Kātibī now turns to intrinsic components of the meaning (more spe-
cifically, of the quiddity). These are constituents (muqawwimāt, sing. muqaw-
wim) of the quiddity, essential (dhātī) to the quiddity in the sense that its defini-
tion includes them.67
Genus is presented by al-Kātibī as a part of the meaning of the species. He
does not speak of a genus including a species, but of two quiddities (or a quiddity
and another species) sharing a genus. He is taking the meaning (the quiddity) of
the genus to be a part of the meaning (the quiddity) of the species. Here is how
al-Ḥillī introduces his commentary on the section, at the end of which he sets
out the protocol of answering “what is it?”:

Text 17.1 This is the second division of the essentials [in §16.1], and it
is that which is a part of those items under it. It further divides into two
subdivisions, the first of which is the whole of what is shared between the

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 Commentary, §17

quiddity and another species, the second of which is not [the whole of
what is shared].
The first is called genus, like animal; for it is the whole of what is
shared between the quiddity of the particulars of a species under it like
man, and another species like horse. It is also like body, for [body]
is the whole of what is shared between the quiddity man and the
quiddity stone.
It is said in answer to “what is it?” in respect of just being shared
(al-sharikah al-maḥḍah); if you ask about man and horse, the answer is
“animal,” but were you to ask about man alone, “animal” alone would not
be fitting as a response, because someone asking “what is it?” is simply
seeking the whole of the reality of the thing, and the whole of the reality
of the thing is not [given] by genus alone, but rather by [genus] and dif-
ferentia. So genus is only said in response to “what is it?” if it is asked of
the quiddity of a species and of something else under [the genus] that is
different. (ḤQ 210.7–211.3)

This is Avicenna’s delineation of genus, and al-Ḥillī analyzes the contribu-

tions of its components as follows:

Text 17.2 So what is “said . . . of many” is a genus, and by the restric-

tion “which differ in realities,” species and differentia and proprium are
excluded; and by saying “in answer to the question ‘what is it?,’” the
remaining [universal, accident] is excluded. (ḤQ 211.4–8)

The commentators after al-Ḥillī worry about just what it is to be “the whole
of the part shared,” and about whether a part can be predicated of the whole,
which seems to be implicit in al-Kātibī’s account. Al-Taftāzānī deals with the first
question by examples:

Text 17.3 What is meant by “the whole of the part shared” is the part
shared for which there is nothing more than it (warāʾahu) that is intrin-
sic to the quiddity and the [other] species. This is like animal for man
and horse, and living body for man and tree; and unlike living
body in relation to man and horse—for living body is not the whole
of what is shared between man and horse, because the whole of what
is shared between them is living body and sensate and moving by
volition.68 (TŠ 143.15–u)

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 Commentary, §18

Take the quiddity man; the whole of the part shared is relative to man and
another quiddity, and changes as we have to go higher in the Porphyrian tree
(see Figure 8, and commentary on the following lemma) to find that shared part.
So man and horse share animal, whereas man and tree share living
body; all of them share living body, but in the case of man and horse,
living body is no longer the whole of the part shared, and only becomes that
whole when taken along with the differentiae (there are arguably two in this
case), sensate and moving by volition. This is the first condition on the
whole of the part shared: it must be as proximate as possible to at least one of
the two quiddities. The second condition is that it cannot be a denominative
(mushtaqq, like sensate and moving by volition); that is, it cannot be a
meaning that implies but does not contain its substrate (see Text 40.1).
Second, how can a part be predicated of a whole? It is easy to think of parts
that cannot be predicated of the whole to which they contribute (think of a
wheel and the car of which it is a part). The question is taken up by al-Taftāzānī,
presenting a distinction from Avicenna’s Cure (Metaphysics 5, 3:164.5–15).

Text 17.4 If someone objects: It is unintelligible that the genus should

be part of the quiddity and yet be said of it, because the part precedes the
whole in the two [modes of ] existence (fī l-wujūdayn), whereas the predi-
cate is united in existence with the subject actually.
We answer: It is not intended by the part being predicated that it is
predicated insofar as it is a part; rather, what is meant is that the sub-
strate of being a part is the substrate of being predicated. So, for example,
animal taken on condition that rational enter it is a species, but taken
on condition that rational does not enter it is a part. What is taken inso-
far as it is possible for it to be a substrate for being a part and for being a
species is a genus and a predicate. (TŠ 145.9–u)

§1869 Nearly everyone who writes on the predicables, whether inside or

outside the Arabic tradition, follows Porphyry in giving an example of a quid-
dity—a species—with what may be taken to be all the genera above it, divided
by what may be taken to be the differentiae that constitute the lower species
down to what al-Kātibī has referred to as the real species (see Figure 8). man,
at the bottom of the Porphyrian tree, is an animal differentiated by being ratio-
nal. “What is man?” is answered with the genus “animal”; “which (ayyu shayʾ )
[animal] is man?” is answered with the differentia “rational.” Because it is the

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 Commentary, §19

answer to the first “what is it?” question, animal is the proximate genus. The
answer to a further “what is animal?” is with its proximate genus, “living body”
(al-jism al-nāmī). So asking “what is it?” twice has given us the genus remote
from man by one degree; asking it three times will give us the answer “body,”
remote from man by two degrees; asking it four times will give us the answer
“substance,” remote from man by three degrees.
We are obliged by philosophical convention to give the largest whole part
shared between two quiddities if we are asked “what are they?” (mā humā), as
noted in Texts 17.1 and 17.3. Of course man and horse share the ultimate genus
substance, and the intermediate genera body and living body, but none
of these is the largest whole part that they share; “animal” is the proper response
to “what is it?”; the proper answer is the most proximate genus shared by both
quiddities. This means that for “what are they?” asked of a man and a tree, the
proper answer will be “living body,” one degree remote from man; asked of a
man and a stone, the proper answer will be “body,” two degrees remote from
man. As will emerge in §30, there is no agreement as to where intelligence
falls in the tree, but many take it to be incorporeal substance. In that case, were
“what are they?” asked of a man and a celestial intelligence, the proper answer
would be “substance,” three degrees remote from man.
In §21, al-Kātibī broaches degrees of remoteness when talking about the dif-
ferentia; I return to the tree briefly in comment on that lemma.

§1970 First, some context for this difficult lemma. The genus is taken to be a
whole part (a quiddity) shared between two more complex quiddities. By con-
trast, the differentia is an essential part coextensive with the whole that is shared.
A differentia is signified by a denominative (mushtaqqah); that is, denominated
from a quiddity. The form of the denominative leaves a space for its substrate,
such that, for example, we take nāṭiq (rational) actually to be dhū nuṭq (pos-
sessor of rationality); the form implies that there is a substrate—a quiddity—that
is qualified by the denominative (the dhū to be filled in, so to speak), though it
does not specify what that substrate is (see Text 40.1).71
This part that is possessed by its substrate—which is to say, has a gap for a
quiddity—can either be shared by more than one species (the generic differ-
entia, faṣl al-jins), or only by individuals under a single species (the specific dif-
ferentia, faṣl al-nawʿ ). An example of the first is sensate (ḥassās), which along
with the quiddity, living body, constitutes animal; this generic differentia
is shared by all quiddities that share the quiddity it is a part of (so, since the

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 Commentary, §19

quiddity animal is shared by all species of animal, so too is sensate). An

example of the second is rational (nāṭiq), which is shared only by the individ-
uals under the species, man, which rational along with animal constitutes.
Al-Kātibī claims in this lemma that a differentia as defined is either not shared
(intifāʾ al-ishtirāk) with another species, or—if it is—it is not the whole of the
part that is shared (intifāʾ al-tamāmiyyah), although the differentia is none-
theless coextensive with that whole shared part. Al-Kātibī is claiming that a
meaning like sensate must be (1) only a part of the whole that is shared, and
(2) coextensive with that whole. As stated above, there must be something—
animal—that is sensate; it must always be possible to rephrase a denominative
such that it have a dhū that possesses the quality. So the differentia qualifies the
quiddity it constitutes, the whole of what is shared. The constitutive differentiae
in a given quiddity must be finite, and part of such a whole, “otherwise a regress
follows, that is, the composition of the quiddity from infinite parts (and that
is what is meant by ‘regress’ here); that is absurd because it would entail enu-
merating the innumerable, so it would be impossible to understand [the quid-
dity] (yamtaniʿ taʿaqquluhā) even though we are concerned with an intelligible
quiddity” (TŠ 148.8–10).
Part of the key to filling out the argument alluded to here is in §26, where
al-Kātibī defines “coextensive,” along with three other ways one universal mean-
ing can relate to another; namely, as a subset of, having an overlap with, and being
disjoined from. If al-Kātibī can show that the last three relations are excluded,
then the differentia must be coextensive with the whole of the part that is shared.
The commentators take it as obvious (ẓāhir) that al-Kātibī is entitled to exclude
the possibility that the differentia is disjoined from the whole of the part that
is shared. Al-Taftāzānī tells us that the differentia cannot be a proper subset or
merely overlap the whole of the part shared (lā akhaṣṣa minhu muṭlaqan aw min
wajh) “due to the impossibility of the whole being realized without the part”
(TŠ 148.2–3); roughly, I think, that the whole of the part shared cannot be con-
stituted unless the differentia is present for all of it. This means that the only real
alternatives are that the differentia is coextensive with the whole of the part that
is shared, or is more general than it.
This, roughly, is how the commentators take him to proceed: Let us refer to
the whole of the part that is shared as Q1, the differentia as D. Suppose that D
is more general than Q1; then (by the definition of more general given in §26)
it must be true of what Q1 is true of, and of a species (S1) disjoined from Q1. So
D is either the whole of what is shared (call it Q2) between Q1 and S1 (but this

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 Commentary, §19

is against the hypothesis), or part of what is shared. If D is coextensive with Q2,

this is what is sought; if it is not, then D is more general than Q2, and it must be
true of what Q2 is true of, and of a species (S2) disjoined from Q2. And so forth.
So D is coextensive with some Q, or we face an infinite regress.
In reading the compressed argument in §19 in this way, I follow al-Ḥillī,
though the other commentators explain what al-Kātibī is doing in broadly simi-
lar terms. Considering the differentia, al-Ḥillī fills in al-Kātibī’s lemma thus:

Text 19.1 Were it not coextensive with [that whole that is shared], it
would be more general, so it would be shared between the quiddity and
another species that does not come under the whole of what is shared. So
it must either be the whole of what is shared between the quiddity and
the posited species, or not. But the first is false because it is contrary to
the [initial] hypothesis. And the second—[namely,] when it is coextensive
with the whole of what is shared between the quiddity and this species—is
what is sought. If it is more general than [that whole], then either it con-
cludes in what is coextensive with the whole of what is shared between
the quiddity and a given species, or not; the first is what is sought, and the
second leads to regress, and is absurd. (ḤQ 214.11–pu)

With this argument, al-Kātibī reassures his students that any constitutive dif-
ferentia of a quiddity is coextensive with either the whole quiddity, or with a
whole part of the quiddity. A definition (say, for man as represented in Figure
8) given such that every part of it signifies by correspondence (as opposed to
“rational animal,” in which “animal” signifies a number of meanings by contain-
ment; see Text 33.1 below) will set out the highest genus and every constitutive
differentia (“rational sensate animate corporeal substance”); each differentia is
coextensive with the quiddities that are the genera of man. If the highest genus
(substance) cannot be analyzed into more primitive components, he has also
shown that every quiddity must either contain a quiddity or be a simple quid-
dity. Finally, he has set out his conviction that every composite quiddity must
contain at least one differentia (but only a finite number). I take it that these
are the questions al-Kātibī is addressing.72 In the next lemma, he will allude to,
rather than deliver, an argument aimed at undermining the claim that every
quiddity must either contain a quiddity or be a simple quiddity.
Al-Kātibī concludes the lemma by saying that what distinguishes the quiddity
from what shares with it, “whether in a genus or in existence,” is a differentia.
The discussion to this point seems to me to have presupposed that differentiae

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 Commentary, §20

are essential to what they qualify, but the claim is not made explicit until §20,
with the phrase “with respect to its substance.” But the force of “in a genus or in
existence” as against “in a genus” is made clear in a passage by al-Ṭūsī comment-
ing on the discussion of differentia in Pointers 2.3.1 (AI 15.3–6).

Text 19.2 Thus, every essential that is not fit to be an answer to “what
is it?” is fit to make an essential distinction, and is a differentia. The differ-
entia may be proper to the genus and not present in another, for example
like sensate for living body; or it may not be proper [to a genus], like
rational for animal, according to one who takes it to be said of the
non-animal, like some angels, for example . . . In the first case, [sensate
distinguishes animal] from everything else in existence, whereas in the
second case, [rational distinguishes man] only from everything else
that shares with it in the genus animal.73 (ṬḤ 193.1–8)

§2074 Al-Kātibī only now gives a delineation of differentia, a delineation

from which he may intend to distance himself with the phrase “they delineate”
(though see §34). Here is al-Ḥillī’s analysis of the delineation and the way each
of its elements contributes to its meaning.

Text 20.1 This is the delineation of the differentia. So universal is the

genus, and by saying “predicated of something in answer to the ques-
tion ‘which thing is it?,’” those universals other than the proprium are
excluded; because the differentia occurs in the question about the distin-
guishing factor, so it occurs in the answer to “which thing is it?,” so the
one who poses a question [in these terms] asks about the distinguishing
portion (al-qadr al-mumayyiz). And by saying “with respect to its sub-
stance (jawhar)” the proprium is excluded, because although it occurs in
answer to “which thing is it?,” it does not convey the substantial distinction
(al-tamyīz al-jawharī)—that is, essential [distinction] (al-dhātī)—rather, it
conveys an accidental distinction. (ḤQ 215.7–apu)

Al-Taftāzānī notes that this is the only delineation al-Kātibī gives of a predi-
cable in which it is delineated as being something that is predicated of (yuḥmalu)
something rather than said of (maqūl) something.

Text 20.2 Al-Kātibī says “predicated” rather than “said” as, for the rest
of the universals, just because people have noted that the differentia is a
cause for the species’ share of the genus (ḥiṣṣat al-nawʿ min al-jins),75 so it

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 Commentary, §20

was thought this might give the impression that the differentia is not predi-
cated of it due to the impossibility of predicating the cause of the effect.
(TŠ 150.apu–u)

Al-Kātibī goes on straight after giving the delineation of differentia to set out
one of the points on which it has been attacked. In doing so, he retraces—in
highly compressed form—Avicenna’s two attempts to delineate the differentia.
Here is al-Khūnajī on Avicenna’s change of heart:

Text 20.3 Moreover, Avicenna delineated [differentia in the Cure] as

“the universal said of species in answer to ‘which thing is it?’ under its
genus essentially.”76 And he delineated it in Pointers as “the universal that
is predicated of the thing in answer to ‘which thing is it?’ in its substance.”77
This [second delineation] is broader (aʿamm) than the first, and with it one
has to add some clarification (wa-bi-hi yajibu an yufassara); otherwise, the
proof that the essentials are limited (inḥiṣār) to genus and differentia does
not go through. (ḪK 45.14–u)

So al-Kātibī has presented the definition from Avicenna’s Pointers in this

lemma. What is at issue between the two definitions? And how does the prob-
lem with two coextensive matters (for which the supreme genus is given as an
example) highlight the issue? Al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī gives the clearest short account
of what is involved in the example of something composed of two coextensive
matters (though see also ḤQ 216.1–9 and, especially, SQ 183–84).

Text 20.4 They gave as examples these two [that is, the supreme genus
and the ultimate differentia], due to the impossibility that they be com-
pounded from both a genus and a differentia (otherwise the supreme
genus would not be supreme, nor would the ultimate differentia be ulti-
mate); if it is supposed that they might be compounded from parts, those
parts would have to be coextensive. (TT 150n1)

Unless there is a proof that the supreme genus must be simple, or a similar
proof in respect of the ultimate differentia, there are logically possible coun-
terexamples to the notion that compound quiddities must be compounds of a
genus and a differentia. Consider the case of the supreme genus. If the supreme
genus is a compound, it cannot be—as al-Jurjānī says, and for the reason he
gives—a compound of a genus with something else. Further, both meanings
must be coextensive; were the second meaning broader in extension, it would

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 Commentary, §21

be the genus, which has been ruled out. So both meanings serve equally to dis-
tinguish the supreme genus from other things in existence, and both meanings
are essential to it; but neither is under a genus. On the Cure definition (taʿrīf),
by which differentia involves the differentia coming under a genus, neither com-
ponent is a differentia; on the Pointers definition (entertained but not endorsed
by al-Kātibī in §20), both are. Any attempt to limit essentials (in the sense of
constituents) of compound quiddities to differentiae and a quiddity is subject to
modification (wa-bi-hi yajibu an yufassara) in light of this counterexample: all
parts of a compound quiddity would ultimately be differentiae, and there would
be no simple quiddity. Al-Ṭūsī notes that al-Rāzī and his intellectual forebears
were, by reason of their account of differentia, associated with a claim like the
one al-Kātibī describes; they were, according to al-Ṭūsī, “compelled by this to
declare it permissible to compose the most general of the essentials (which is
the supreme genus) from two matters coextensive with it, neither of which is a
genus, but rather both of which are differentiae” (ṬḤ 193.20–apu).78

§2179 The discussion of the degrees of differentiae harks back to §18 (see
Figure 8), and a differentia’s degree of remoteness will be a function of the quid-
dity it constitutes. If a differentia constitutes quiddity A itself, it is the proximate
differentia of quiddity A, whereas if it constitutes quiddity A’s proximate genus,
it is remote from quiddity A by one degree, and so forth. Al-Taftāzānī notes (TŠ
151.12–u) that the Pointers definition of differentia—which has the component
“in its genus or in existence,” and which al-Kātibī tested in §20—is not appropri-
ate for the discussion in §21. This is because §21 is assuming the old Cure-style
definition in which every differentia distinguishes a quiddity under a genus.

§2280 Al-Ḥillī says of this lemma that it begins investigation of “the third of
the divisions of the universal” set out in §16.1, “that which is neither the quiddity
itself nor intrinsic to it” (ḤQ 217.7), the accidental (ʿaraḍī). That is true, but it
seems to me that al-Kātibī is pausing in his exposition of the predicables to exam-
ine aspects of a distinction between, on the one hand, a meaning that is extrinsic
to a quiddity but inseparable from it and, on the other hand, separable extrinsic
meanings. In doing this, he is laying the groundwork for his theory of science,
which is more or less Avicenna’s theory of science.81 The distinction alluded to
here is the one that matters most in identifying a science’s principles and the
predicates for the theorems it must demonstrate. The distinction is developed
so that it also applies to meanings that cannot be predicated of a subject; these

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 Commentary, §22

meanings are not taken into account in al-Kātibī’s theory of science, though they
figure in his theory of signification.
In his definition of inseparability, al-Kātibī—at least as he is interpreted by
his commentators—is following Avicenna’s response to a problem about the test
to decide if something is essential (in the second of the senses set out in com-
mentary on §16 above). Like his predecessors, al-Kātibī distinguishes between
meanings whose inseparability from another meaning is immediately apparent
when one is subject and the other predicate in a proposition, and those whose
inseparability is only made apparent by finding a middle term that relates the
subject to the predicate. Further—following al-Khūnajī (see Text 8.1)—he
distinguishes different strengths of immediacy within those meanings whose
inseparability is immediately apparent. Finally, in §22.3, he sketches some dis-
tinctions to do with separability, effectively to show that they are immaterial to
logical discussions.
None of this lemma is continuous with the discussion of predicables up to
now; the distinctions it develops are not used to distinguish among the five
kinds of predicable. Since only proprium and general accident can be extrin-
sic to the quiddity, they are the only candidates to be inseparable in the sense
developed here. But different features are used in §23 to delineate proprium and
general accident—namely, extrinsic meaning possessed solely by members of
one reality, or extrinsic meaning possessed by more than one reality.
Al-Kātibī opens the lemma by distinguishing between that which is inseparable
from its substrate (that which “it is impossible to separate . . . from its substrate”:
imtanaʿa nfikākuhu ʿan maʿrūḍihi)—an implicate (lāzim)—from that which is
separable (mufāriq). Note that by this definition, what is perpetually associated
with a substrate but possibly separated from it is nonetheless separable.
The first section of the lemma sidesteps difficult aspects of the distinction.
Al-Kātibī elides an Avicennian distinction between inseparability in concep-
tion (fī l-taṣawwur) and in estimation (fī l-tawahhum), and between both and
inseparability in existence (fī l-wujūd).82 The first is true of the relation between
a constituent and the quiddity it constitutes (the relation the genus and the dif-
ferentia have to the species they constitute); the second is true of the relation
between a property that necessarily belongs to a quiddity but does not actually
constitute it. 2R said of triangle is a common example of the second (al-Taftāzānī
uses this as his prime example in commentary on the lemma). Although one can
conceive a triangle and not advert to whether 2R belongs to it, one cannot imag-
ine a triangle without 2R; as Avicenna puts it in Pointers 1.12.5, “it is impossible

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 Commentary, §22

to remove [the property] in the estimation even though it is not a constituent”

(kānat mumtaniʿat al-raf ʿ fī l-wahm maʿa kawnihā ghayr muqawwimah) (AI 9.6–
7). The claim is that what is posterior to the constitution of a quiddity but insepa-
rable from it can be separated when conceiving the quiddity, whereas what is
prior to that constitution (that is, the constituents) cannot be so separated. Those
properties that are separable in conception but not in estimation are the impli-
cates (what al-Kātibī calls the “implicate of the quiddity”: lāzim li-l-māhiyyah);
the further claim is that—if they do not evidently belong to the quiddity—they
are exactly the predicates (the essential accidents) to be proved to belong to the
subjects in the theorems of a given science. Those properties that are inseparable
from a quiddity in existence (the dark skin color of someone from Ethiopia) but
separable in both conception and estimation are of no scientific interest.
The second section of §22 passes over the problems involved in distinguish-
ing the implicates of the quiddity from logically prior components of the quid-
dity (the constituents), and from scientifically uninteresting entailments of
an actually existing quiddity (the implicates of existence), but then goes on to
deliver two further crucial distinctions. The implicate of the quiddity may be
evident (bayyin, often bayyin bi-dhātihi, “evident in itself ”) in that it is affirmed
to belong to the quiddity without recourse to another term—a middle (wasaṭ)—
that would make its belonging evident; it is, in short, immediate. At least some
of the principles of a science must be such that the subjects of those principles
have as their predicates implicates that are evident and not constituents of the
subject. The reason for the second condition is that scientific theorems must
have predicates extrinsic to the subject (see §120.3), so there must be such a
predicate in the original premise-set. When the implicate is not evident, like 2R
for triangle, proof is needed; the remaining two sections and the conclusion of
the Risālah present what is needed to construct such proofs.
The third of the substantive points made in §22.2 (and this is, I believe, the
only distinction that Avicenna does not himself make) is that “evident” is said
of implicates in two different ways. The first and weaker (aʿamm) way is that,
given a conception of the implicant and a conception of the implicate, we affirm
that one is an implicate of the other. This is the definition of evident relevant for
demonstration theory. The second and stronger (akhaṣṣ) way is that, given only
a conception of the implicant, we both acquire a conception of the implicate
and affirm that it is an implicate of the implicant. This is the definition of evident
relevant for signification theory (see Text 8.1). These distinctions are laid out
schematically in Figure 9.

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 Commentary, §23

§2383 Al-Kātibī returns to an exposition directly related to the predicables. A

second criterion over and above being extrinsic is added: single-reality instan-
tiation. Given this extra criterion, both implicate and separable may be counted
as propria. Attributes essential in the second sense (essential accidents, ʿawāriḍ
dhātiyyah) are implicates, inseparable and extrinsic. If an accidental feature is
shared across two or more realities, relative to those realities, it is a general acci-
dent. But every general accident will be a proprium of a genus higher than the
reality under consideration (TŠ 161.1–4). Al-Ḥillī’s meditation on the definition
of proprium calls on the notion of intermediate species and genera set out in
§§30 and 31 below.

Text 23.1 The proprium is delineated as “a universal said in an acciden-

tal way of what is under a single reality.” By the first, [“what is under a single
reality,”] genus and general accident are excluded, and by the second, [“in
an accidental way,”] species and differentia are excluded.
This reality may be the reality of the supreme genus, and it may be an
intermediate genus, and it may be the reality of the lowest species; the
delineation of proprium covers them all. But if we delineate proprium as
“universal said of members of the reality of a single species in an accidental
way,” as Avicenna delineated it in the Cure [AM 182.8], the proprium of the
highest genus is excluded from this definition.84 (ḤQ 220.5–11)

The division of the predicables is claimed to be exhaustive; see also Figures

6 and 7.

Text 23.2 The universals are therefore limited to these five, because the
universal is either just what the individuals under it are, and it is the spe-
cies; or is intrinsic to them, so if it is the whole that is shared between them
and another given species, it is the genus, or if not [the whole], it is the
differentia; or it is extrinsic to them, so if it is proper to a single reality it is a
proprium; otherwise, it is a general accident. (ḤQ 220.14–apu)

The third section, on discussions about universals and particulars

The next eleven lemmata go more deeply into five topics to do with universals.
The topics dealt with are: the relation between a universal and the existence of
the particulars under it (§24); the existence of the natural, logical, and mental
universal (§25); the relative generality of universals and their contradictories

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 Commentary, §24

(§§26 and 27); the relative particular as opposed to the particular strictly so
called introduced in §15 (§28); and a series of discussions coordinated around
the notions of relative species and genera (§§29–34).

§2485 A universal is a meaning such that it is not impossible to predicate it of

more than one thing. As was noted in comment on §16, al-Kātibī uses a form of
words that appears to take a universal as a meaning actually predicated of some-
thing. By the definition in §15, however, a universal need have no instantiations
under it, and in this lemma, al-Kātibī gives examples of universals with no par-
ticulars under them, with unique instantiations, and with many instantiations. In
this, he changes the criteria for the division and extends the examples given by
Avicenna in Pointers 1.9 (AI 6.10–7.4). Al-Kātibī’s examples, given by dichoto-
mous division, are summarized in Figure 10.
Al-Taftāzānī provides a reformulation of the phrase “conception of its mean-
ing does not preclude sharing” in addressing the lemma:

Text 24.1 This is an allusion to the fact that what is considered in uni-
versality is the possibility of supposing [the universal] true of many (imkān
farḍ ṣidqihi ʿalā kathīrīn), and not its truth of them in respect of [actual]
existence. (TŠ 163.3–4)

What kind of possibility is involved in this reformulation (“possibly supposed

true of many”)?

Text 24.2 What is meant by it is what is possible of existence as a one-

sided possibility restricted to the side of existence (al-imkān al-ʿāmm al-
muqayyad bi-jānib al-wujūd), which is to say, it negates the necessity of
nonexistence. (TŠ 163.u–164.2)

§2586 Al-Kātibī tackles the question of whether or not universals exist outside
the mind, at least in part. He begins his treatment of the issue by first distinguish-
ing among the kinds of universal. Here is a fuller statement of the distinctions
al-Kātibī borrows from Avicenna:87

Text 25.1 For example, if we say “animal is a universal,” we have three

matters: animal insofar as it is animal, the meaning of “universal” without
alluding to any given matter, and the universal animal (being the com-
pound aggregate of the two; namely, of animal and universal).

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 Commentary, §25

The difference between these meanings is clear, for were the meaning
of [“animal” or “universal”] the meaning of the other, then bringing one to
mind would follow necessarily from bringing the other to mind, but that
is not the case. For the meaning of “universal” is “that the conception of
which does not preclude the occurrence of sharing in it,” and the meaning
of “animal” is “sensate and moving-by-volition living body,” and it is evi-
dent that it is possible to bring each one of these to mind without attending
to the other.
The first is called “natural universal” because it is one of the natures,
or because it exists naturally; that is, in extramental existence (fī l-khārij).
The second is called “logical universal” because the logician investigates it.
When al-Kātibī says “logical universal” it is only loosely speaking univer-
sal; universality is simply the basis for it. The third is called “mental univer-
sal” because it is only realized in the intellect. (TT 168.1–169.u)

Al-Khūnajī presents an argument for the actual existence of natural universals:

Text 25.2 That which points to the existence of the universal inside
actually existent particulars is that there is no doubting the existence of
animal (for example) because it is a part of this actually existent animal
(hādhā l-ḥayawān al-khārijī), so animal that is part of this animal is
animal itself insofar as it is what it is, either without further restriction or
with further restriction. If it is the second [with further restriction], it con-
tains animal (ishtamala ʿalā l-ḥayawān) and the division occurs again; it
only ends with the first division [that is, without further restriction]. Thus,
animal is unconditionally and actually an existent thing, and is so insofar
as its very conception does not preclude being shared; so that whose very
conception does not preclude its being shared actually exists. So the uni-
versal actually exists. (ḪK 35.15–36.2)

The existence of the logical and mental universals is disputed.88 They are in
any event posterior to the natural universal.

Text 25.3 Universality and particularity are among the secondary intel-
ligibles that occur to the primary intelligibles; for were universality the
quiddity itself, or part of it, the quiddity would not be true of the particu-
lar falling under it. Further, universality is a relational matter that is only
determined after the determination of the two relata. (ḤQ 221.u–222.3)

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 Commentary, §26

Al-Ḥillī records the basis for a dispute about the existence of the second and
third kinds of universal, one that centers on the logical universal, which infects
the mental universal of which it is a part.

Text 25.4 There is dispute among philosophers about the existence of

logical and mental universals. This is because the logical is a kind of rela-
tion, and the arguments about the existence or otherwise of the relative is
in metaphysics and not logic; and because part of the mental [universal] is
relative, its existence is also disputed. (ḤQ 222.12–15)

§2689 I do not offer shorthand versions of the proofs given by al-Kātibī in the
next lemma, proofs that work with the definitions given in this lemma; however,
diagrams of the cases he has in mind, with letters assigned to the terms he gives
as examples, may be helpful (see Figures 11–19). There are a number of ways to
set these relations out as diagrams, and I have chosen those that struck me as
the clearest, Euler diagrams as set out by Keynes.90 It will be clear on consulting
Keynes that the diagrams needed to illustrate the points al-Kātibī is making do
not exhaust all possible relations among two terms and their contradictories; I
put this down to al-Kātibī’s focus on natural language. Four of the diagrams are
given twice, the first time in commentary on §26 with only positive terms (A,
B) and—in all save one case (Figure 18)—a large empty circle that contains all
the other things that are neither A nor B (what Keynes, but not al-Kātibī, calls
the universe of discourse). On their second appearance, in commentary on §27,
the empty circle in the diagrams has been allocated to indefinite terms (not-A,
not-B, covered further in §48 and following) in the hope that this makes clear
the relation between these terms, and between both these terms and the origi-
nal terms. One last preliminary note: Keynes refers to not-A in relation to A as
its complement, the common English term. Al-Kātibī, however, uses the Arabic
naqīḍ, “contradictory,” when used of a proposition. Since Joseph acknowledges
the use of “contradictory term” in the sense that Keynes uses complement,91
and it directly translates al-Kātibī’s preference, that is the translation I adopt.
The diagrams for §26 are straightforward. There are four cases, each with
examples that correspond with A and B in the respective diagrams. The first
case (Figure 11) is when each term is true of whatever the other is true of; these
terms are called coextensive (mutasāwiyān), and al-Kātibī’s examples are “man”
(A) and “rational” (B). Everything beyond the circle that bounds A and B are
the things that are neither man nor rational. The second case (Figure 12) is

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 Commentary, §27

when one term is true of whatever the other is true of, but the reverse does not
hold; the relation between the two terms is called absolute generality (ʿumūm
muṭlaq)—which I refer to as inclusion—and al-Kātibī’s examples are “animal”
(A) and “man” (B). Again, the circle bounding A marks the point beyond which
are things neither animal nor man. The third case (one example of which is
given in Figure 13) is when one term is true of part of what the other is true
of; the relation between the two terms is generality in one respect (ʿumūm min
wajh)—which I refer to as overlap—and al-Kātibī’s examples are “animal” (A)
and “white” (B). The last case (Figure 14) is when neither term is true of any-
thing of which the other is true; the two terms are disjoined (mutabāyinān),
and the examples are “man” (A) and “horse” (B). It will become obvious in §27
that al-Kātibī recognizes a second case of disjunction, in which the two terms
together exhaust the whole universe of discourse (see Figure 18); the examples
in this case are existence and privation.

§2792 This lemma and the one before are linked by Asad Fallahi to Avicenna’s
response in the ʿIbārah to the tenth chapter of Aristotle’s De Interpretatione,
and—if I understand correctly—to the discussions taken up in §§48–50 and
from §82. In the ʿIbārah, Avicenna argues for the claim that “whatever is nar-
rower in truth than another thing has a contradictory that is broader in truth
than the contradictory of that other thing” (AʿI 85.5). The complex of related
problems, both historical and philosophical, has been investigated by Fallahi to a
depth far beyond the aspirations of my commentary;93 I hope only to make clear
the outline of al-Kātibī’s discussion here.
The first claim is that the contradictories of coextensive terms are coexten-
sive. Figure 15 exhibits the claim. The proof is, roughly, if not-A and not-B were
not coextensive, then one of them (say, not-A) must be true of something that
not-B is not true of—namely, B; but then A would not have been true of every-
thing of which B is true; this is contrary to the initial hypothesis.
The second claim is that in the case in which one term, B (the more specific),
is contained within the other, A (the more general), then their contradictories
are related such that not-A is contained within not-B (see Figure 16). For this
claim to be true (drawing on the relevant definition set down in §26), not-B
must be true of everything that not-A is true of, but not the reverse (that is,
there must be something not-B is true of that not-A is not true of ). Al-Kātibī
takes the proof in two steps. First, were not-B not true of everything that not-A

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is true of, then B would be true of some of what not-A is true of. In that case,
however, the more specific (B) would be true of something that the more gen-
eral (A) is not true of; but the hypothesis was that B is contained in A. Second,
were it not the case that there is something that not-B is true of that not-A is
not true of, then not-A would be true of everything that not-B is true of; but
this, along with the claim that not-B is true of everything that not-A is true
of, would mean that they are coextensive, which—as shown in the preceding
proof—means that their contradictories are coextensive. But the hypothesis
was that one was contained in the other.
The third and fourth cases considered are not proofs for a given conclusion
in the sense that the first two cases are, but rather counterexamples ruling out
broad claims. So the third case exhibits the claim that contradictories of over-
lapping terms do not necessarily overlap. Figure 17 gives one example of over-
lapping terms (in al-Kātibī’s example, “animal” and “white”), which have con-
tradictories (“not-animal,” “not-white”) that overlap. But there are other ways
for terms to overlap, and al-Kātibī refers back to the claim he has investigated
immediately before, in §27.2. In Figure 16, note that not-B overlaps with A, but B
is disjoined from not-A. It is therefore not necessarily the case that overlapping
terms will have contradictories that overlap. There is another case of overlap
that al-Kātibī does not consider, and I leave it to one side.
In the case of disjoined terms, al-Kātibī considers two subcases. First, it may
be impossible for the two contradictories to be jointly true of anything (Figure
18); al-Kātibī’s example of the two original terms is “existence” (A) and “pri-
vation” (B); in this case, the contradictories are completely disjoined. But in
the second case (Figure 19), the contradictories overlap (in al-Kātibī’s example,
“not-man” and “not-horse”) but must be partly disjoined. Given these exam-
ples, the most general conclusion is that contradictories of disjoined terms are
at least partly disjoined.

§2894 The fourth discussion is on the relative particular and its logical relation
to the real particular, corresponding to Avicenna’s Pointers 1.9 (AI 6.10–7.4).
The real particular (which was used to define the universal in §15, the particular
such that it can be pointed to as a “this”) is now distinguished from the relative
particular (of which it is a subset), which is either a real particular or a universal
term that comes under a more general universal. On this understanding, horse
would be a particular relative to animal. Al-Khūnajī uses the notion of the rela-
tive particular to identify natural subjects for logical propositions:

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 Commentary, §29

Text 28.1 Every universal is by nature a predicate, because it is, insofar

as it is a universal, predicable of what is below it. Similarly, every relative
particular is by nature a subject. (ḪK 36.3–4)

§2995 This lemma is the first of a long discussion—the fifth—which runs for six
lemmata to §34, a discussion of species, both real or relative; genus; matters to
do with the ordering of species and genera; the scientific question that invites
them as answers; and the role they play in those answers, and in constituting and
dividing quiddities. To some extent, the material gathers reflections on a number
of mistakes Avicenna had found in the work of his predecessors, and innovations
in terms of art that post-Avicennian logicians like al-Rāzī had introduced.
This lemma compares the real species delineated in §16 with the relative spe-
cies, delineated here as “every quiddity that, along with other quiddities, has a
genus said of it as a primary response to the question ‘what is it?’ . . . is called
relative species.” This is the way Porphyry tended to take species—namely, as
a correlative of genus; Avicenna tended to take species as real species, thereby
avoiding the circularity in defining technical terms that dogs Porphyry’s
account. Relative species as delineated by al-Kātibī corresponds to the second
of the delineations Avicenna speaks of in Pointers 2.1 (AI 13.u–14.10). The last
phrase in the delineation (“primary response”) distinguishes the relative spe-
cies from a nonessential type (ṣinf) such as we have with “Turk”; a species may
be relative but it is nonetheless an essential division.96 There is—so al-Ḥillī tells
us—an alternative delineation of relative species: “the more special of two uni-
versals said in answer to ‘what is it?’” (ḤQ 229.3 et seq.). Some divisions of the
predicables take species as relative (for example, Figure 7).

§3097 In this lemma, al-Kātibī considers the ranking of relative species; in the
next lemma, he will consider the ranking of relative genera. Lemmata 30 and 31
correspond roughly to Pointers 2.2 (AI 14.10–15.2). It will be more efficient to deal
with the issues common to both lemmata together. Al-Kātibī is effectively ana-
lyzing the structured hierarchy implicit in the Porphyrian tree first introduced in
§§18 and 21 (see Figure 8). To consider this hierarchy as it moves up to the high-
est quiddity is to consider the ranking of genera, and to consider its downward
movement to instantiated quiddities is to consider the ranking of relative spe-
cies. In each of these two rankings, there are extremes: a highest species (under a
genus that is not itself a species) and a lowest species (under a genus and directly
above instantiations that only differ from each other numerically); or a highest

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 Commentary, §31

genus (with nothing above it) and a lowest genus (under which are a number of
lowest species). In the hierarchy of quiddities, the remaining quiddities will be
intermediate genera if one is having regard to what is beneath them, and interme-
diate species if one is having regard to what is above them.
In this context, someone generated a question as to whether there can be an
isolated species or an isolated genus (al-nawʿ al-mufrad, al-jins al-mufrad).98 In
both lemmata, the question arises by applying the criteria of dividing species
and genera given in the last paragraph, and asking, first, whether there can be
a species with no species above it or below it, and second, whether there can
be a genus with no genus above it or below it. For both questions, the disputed
candidate answer is intelligence (in the sense that includes the first emana-
tions from God, the celestial intelligences).99 Intelligence may be a species of
the ultimate genus, substance, and have only particular instantiations of intel-
ligence below it, whereupon it would serve as an instance of an isolated species.
Alternatively, intelligence may itself be an ultimate genus, and have species of
intelligence below it, whereupon it would serve as an instance of an isolated
genus. What we have, then, is candidate models to show the possibility of each
isolated quiddity.
Al-Ḥillī sets out the dispute behind whether intelligence can be an example
of an isolated species thus:

Text 30.1 What is disjoined from species is the isolated [species] like
intelligence, if we say that substance (jawhar) is a genus [for intelligence].
That is because there is dispute among philosophers about substance
being a genus (jinsiyyat al-jawhar). Some say that [substance] is a supreme
genus, others that it is a general accident (ʿaraḍ ʿāmm); this is not the place
to verify [the answer to the question]. On the hypothesis that substance
is a genus, intelligence—which is substance both essentially and in action
separated from bodies—is a species for it, yet there is no species above it,
because substance—a supreme genus—is above it; and there is no species
below it. So it is an isolated species. On the hypothesis that substance is
not a genus, however, intelligence does not have a genus, and so is not a
relative species. (ḤQ 230.7–14)

§31100 I have covered the four kinds of genus in commentary on the last
lemma. In this comment, I simply reiterate one consequence of using intelli-
gence as an example of both an isolated genus and an isolated species. Genus is

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 Commentary, §32

defined as what is said of many differing in species in response to “what is it?,”

or as a whole part of a quiddity that is shared with another quiddity. In using
intelligence as the candidate model for an isolated species, al-Kātibī is assuming
that what comes under it differs only numerically; but as a model for isolated
genus, it must have species under it that differ from each other in their quiddi-
ties. So it is not simply the first assumption that changes (that intelligence is a
species), but also the second (that under intelligence there are things which
differ only numerically). Al-Taftāzānī makes both assumptions clear for the
isolated species:

Text 31.1 The second [case] is the distinct species (al-nawʿ al-mubāyin)
like intelligence, on the assumption that substance is a genus for it such
that it is said of [intelligence] and of other things in answer to “what is it?,”
and that the ten intelligences are instantiations of it and not species (afrād
lahu lā anwāʿ ), so that no other species is realized under it. (TŠ 183.10–12)

And for the isolated genus, which is

Text 31.2 distinct from everything, being the isolated [genus] like
intelligence, on the assumption that substance is not a genus for it but a
general accident (so there will not be a genus more general than it), where-
upon the ten intelligences will be different species and not genera (so there
is no genus more particular than it) or individuals (so that its being a genus
can be realized). So intelligence is an example for the isolated genus on one
assumption, and for isolated species on another assumption; this is enough
about the example given. (TŠ 183.apu–184.2)

§32101 Tempted by the terminology, some ancients have concluded that real
species are a proper subset of relative species, in the same way that real particu-
lars are a subset of relative particulars (see §28).102 But in fact relative and real
species only overlap (see the distinctions made in §26 above); neither wholly
contains the other, nor are they coextensive. Relative species that are not real
species are obviously distinct, and real species that are simple realities are not
relative species.

Text 32.1 Know that a group of the ancients supposed that the relative
species is more general absolutely than [that is, contains] the real species.
The author refutes the view of such people by citing the presence of each
without its counterpart. (ḤQ 232.11–13)

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 Commentary, §33

The presence of the real species without the relative is as in simple reali-
ties; for the simple that has no part cannot be a relative species, due to the
necessity that the relative species comes under a genus that constitutes it,
so it will be a compound of genus and differentia; but we have already sup-
posed it to be simple, so this is absurd. (ḤQ 232.pu–233.2)

§33103 This lemma deals with how essentials are deployed in answer to “what
is it?”; it is continuous with the discussion since §30 because it concerns how
we signify the higher genera in the series we have been considering. This is a
theme to which Avicenna returns from time to time in Pointers, starting at 1.16
and going through 2.3 (AI 11.16–15.14). He deals with two confusions to which
his interlocutors are prone. The first is taking the essential to be what should
be said in answer to “what is it?”; the second—on having it pointed out that the
differentia is an essential but cannot be said in answer to “what is it?”—is that
the answer to “what is it?” is the more general essential. The terms and phrases
Avicenna deploys as he formulates his position on the matter are not as clearly
defined as perhaps they could be; al-Rāzī gave the terms quite precise clarifica-
tion, and al-Kātibī adopts these modified terms as his own. So for him, if “what
is it?” is asked of a man, “animal” and “rational” are given by correspondence and
therefore occur on the way to what is it (fī ṭarīq mā huwa), but the components
of animal (such as living body and sensate and moving by volition,
which are signified by “animal” by containment) are given implicitly in the
answer to “what is it?” (dākhilan fī jawāb mā huwa). Al-Rāzī and his followers
are, however, not primarily concerned to provide a way to interpret Avicenna’s
texts, and al-Ṭūsī and his followers (among them al-Ḥillī) both object to their
clarification of the terms, and offer an alternative clarification, which also pro-
vides a way to understand Avicenna’s texts.
Since it is both important for understanding Rāzian logicians, and helpful in
providing one way to understand Avicenna’s texts, here is the full story, told by
al-Taftāzānī.

Text 33.1 The goal in this discussion is that the notion had cropped
up in the usage of literalist logicians that what is said in answer to “what
is it?” is the essential (al-dhātī), and when they were reminded that the
differentia is an essential, yet not said in answer to “what is it?,” some of
them shifted to the position that what is said in answer to “what is it?” is the
more general essential (al-dhātī al-aʿamm). Avicenna responded to them

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 Commentary, §33

that the generic differentia like, for example, sensate is a more general
essential, yet not said in answer to “what is it?” For he claimed that “what
is it?” is a question about the quiddity, so the answer must be a quiddity.
Further, he distinguished between what is said in answer to “what is it?,”
what is intrinsic to the answer to “what is it?,” and what occurs on the way
to “what is it?”; [he made these distinctions by saying] that the answer
itself is the quiddity, and what is intrinsic to it and occurs on its way is the
essential—that is, part of the quiddity.
Al-Rāzī interpreted what is intrinsic in the answer to “what is it?” as the
part signified by containment, and what occurs on its way the part signi-
fied by correspondence; the later scholars followed him in this [interpreta-
tion], and al-Kātibī alludes to it here. The verification of [this interpreta-
tion] is that the answer to “what is it?” is only given by correspondence,
and part of it is either given by correspondence or by containment. This
is because signification by implication is entirely avoided in answering
“what is it?,” such that it is inappropriate to signify a quiddity or even its
parts by implication; and containment (aside from [signifying] a part) is
avoided in answer [to the same question]. So if the part is given by corre-
spondence, like “animal” or “rational” in “rational animal” said in response
to “what is man?,” we refer to it as having occurred on the way to “what is
it?,” and having been said in [the answer], because it occurs in [the process
of ] answering “what is it?” (which is the way to “what is it?”); if it is given
by containment, like body and sensate in the example just offered, it is
referred to as intrinsic in the answer to “what is it?”
Since there was nothing in their discussion [from Avicenna’s works]
that points to this interpretation, al-Ṭūsī interpreted what is intrinsic to
the answer to “what is it?” as the essential which is part of the quiddity,
whether more general or coextensive, and that which occurs on the way to
“what is it?” as the more general essential. This means that he who inter-
prets what is said in answer to “what is it?” as the essential [in Pointers 1.16,
AI 10.apu–11.14] does not distinguish between what is said in answer to
“what is it?” and what is intrinsic to it; and he who interprets it as the more
general essential does not distinguish between what is said in answer to
“what is it?” and that which occurs on its way. (TŠ 186.7–188.1)

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 Commentary, §34

§34104 A final note, dealing with divisive and constitutive differentiae as they
relate to the three levels of genera and species: Al-Kātibī begins with the hypoth-
esis advanced in §20 and expanded in Text 20.4 that the highest genus might
be compounded from two coextensive matters, which means—on the Pointers
definition for differentia presented in §20—that both will be differentiae for the
genus, and therefore constitutive (muqawwim) of it. Every genus must have
more than one species below it. So every superior genus may have a differentia
that constitutes it, and must have more than one divisive (muqassim) differen-
tia. At the other end, the lowest species must have a differentia that constitutes
it, but cannot have a differentia that divides it. In between, the intermediate
genera and species must have both divisive and constitutive differentiae.
Traditionally, further relations are inferred from these claims. The first part of
the first claim that al-Kātibī makes, that what constitutes the higher constitutes
the lower, is proved as follows:

Text 34.1 The differentia that constitutes the higher is a part of it, and
the higher is a part of the lower, and the part of the part is a part [of the
whole] (juzʾ al-juzʾ juzʾ ), so [the differentia] is also constitutive of the
lower. (ḤQ 235.apu–pu)

This does not convert universally (that is, it is not true that what constitutes
the lower necessarily constitutes the higher), and this is shown by counterex-
ample. So rational constitutes man, but is only adventitiously a property
of animal. At the same time, the constitutive of the lower may be constitutive
of the higher, as is shown by the example of sensate, which constitutes man
and animal.
The second claim mirrors the first: what divides the lower divides the higher,
but again, it is not necessarily the case that what divides the higher divides the
lower. The first part of the second claim (as when rational divides animal
and body) is true

Text 34.2 because the meaning of the division of the lower is its pres-
ence in two natures (wujūduhu fī ṭabī ʿatayn), and the presence of the
lower entails the presence of the higher in the two [natures]. (ḤQ 236.7–8)

Examples are given to show that the reverse (that what divides the higher
divides the lower) is not necessarily the case, but may be the case. So sensate
divides body but not animal, but rational divides body and animal.

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 Commentary, §35

The fourth section, on definitions

This section deals with definitions in the broad sense (taʿrīfāt), both real or
essential definitions in the Aristotelian sense, and delineations that simply dif-
ferentiate the thing being defined (the definiendum, muʿarraf, or—in the case
of real definition—maḥdūd) from other things. This is one of the parts of logic
that al-Taftāzānī noted, with some regret, was treated superficially by post-Avi-
cennian logicians. The Risālah has three lemmata on definition (corresponding
to Pointers 2.7–2.11 [AI 17.3–21.u]), though of course the material leading up to
this section goes to issues central to the topic. Lemma 35 first states the two goals
that can motivate the search for a definition, and then stipulates two conditions
that apply to all definitions, whether real or less-than-real (whether nominal or
deficient definition, or delineation). Lemma 36 sketches a taxonomy of defini-
tions based on the elements from which definitions are constructed; al-Ḥillī
criticizes this taxonomy, relying on the Avicennian alternative that works from
the effectiveness of a definition. Lemma 37 examines some defects that afflict
definitions, dividing them into defects arising from the component meanings
chosen for the construction of the definition, and into defects—in some cases
relative to one of the parties to a debate—arising from poorly chosen expres-
sions. Here again, al-Ḥillī finds fault with al-Kātibī for leaving material out of
the section that should have been included. By contrast, Avicenna goes on to
consider the acquisition of definitions even in an introductory exposition like
the Najāt (AN §§139–144).105
Let me pause here to look back to the theory of signification, which mat-
ters a great deal in this section. Avicenna and his followers—and in this respect,
al-Kātibī is one of those followers—stipulate that to define a quiddity (say, man),
the highest quiddity that is part of its meaning (in this case, substance) must
be given along with all differentiae that constitute the quiddity being defined. So
man will be defined as “substance that is corporeal, living, sensate, and rational”
(see the tree given in Figure 8).106 Everyone is, however, prepared to proceed by
abbreviation, giving the proximate genus of the quiddity followed by its specific
differentia (as in §36, foreshadowed in §33). Although the expression signifying
the specific differentia signifies it by correspondence, in this case the expression
for the proximate genus is taken insofar as it signifies by containment the mean-
ing of “substance that is corporeal, living, and sensate.” These strict definitions
do not call on signification by implication at all. In delineations—useful to dis-
tinguish the quiddity from other quiddities, but not to bring all components of

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 Commentary, §35

its meaning to mind—signification by implication can be used (§36; al-Kātibī is

prepared to call definition through the specific differentia alone deficient defini-
tion, though it is a kind of delineation).

§35107 A definition is formulated with one of two goals in mind. The first is
to find a compound meaning “the conception of which entails the conception
of that thing” (yastalzimu taṣawwuruhu taṣawwur dhālika l-shayʾ ); this is the
essential definition (ḥadd). The second is to find a meaning that serves merely to
distinguish (imtiyāz) the reality from other realities (whether—as al-Ḥillī notes
on §36—absolutely or within a given subset of realities). Al-Kātibī returns to
the formulations that fulfill these different functions in §36; these formulations
deploy the predicables examined in §§15–23 in various ways.
Al-Kātibī gives two conditions for a successful definition, whether real or for
the purposes of distinguishing something within a broader class. The first is that
the definiens (al-muʿarrif) must be distinct from the definiendum; the second is
that it must be equal (musāwin) to the definiendum, in the sense that it must be
fit to serve as a substitute for the definiendum with no loss of truth or—specifi-
cally in the case of essential definition—meaning.108 The argument that the first
condition must be adopted is given with al-Kātibī’s trademark concision—that
is, that the definiens is known prior to the definiendum. A slightly less com-
pressed version of the argument goes like this:

Text 35.1 The definiens (al-muʿarrif) is a cause in the definition of

the definiendum, so it must be distinct (mughāyir). [This is] because the
cause is prior and what is prior is distinct [from what is posterior], due to
the impossibility that something is prior to itself in any respect (bi-ʿtibār
wāḥid). (ḤQ 237.8–10)

The second condition, that the definiens is equal to the definiendum in the
sense set out above, works by excluding the other ways that the first could relate
to the second. It cannot be overly broad (aʿamm) in the sense of being true of
a wider group of realities, or overly narrow (akhaṣṣ) in the sense being true of
a subset of the reality being defined; nor—and this is so obvious that al-Kātibī
does not even advert to it—can it be entirely distinct (mubāyin) from the reality
being defined. So the definiens must be equal to the definiendum,

Text 35.2 because, were it overly broad, it would fall short of con-
veying the definition, for what is conveyed by a definition is either the

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 Commentary, §36

conception of the reality (taṣawwur al-ḥaqīqah), and the general does

not entail the specific, or differentiation, and the general does not differ-
entiate. And were it overly narrow, it would be more obscure, because it
would be less available (aqall wujūdan), yet the definiens is more known
[than the definiendum]. So it must be equal with [what is being defined].
(ḤQ 237.12–u)

§36109 In this lemma, al-Kātibī orders definitions according to their compo-

nent meanings, using the distinctions given in treatment of the predicables in
§§15–23. Although al-Kātibī only uses the term “constitutes” (yuqawwimu) in
dealing with differentia, and has not used the term “essential” (dhātī) at all, the
use of genus and differentia—introduced in §16 as being intrinsic to the quid-
dity—in characterizing the components of definitions amounts to the same
thing. His ordering of real and working definitions (respectively, ḥudūd and
taʿrīfāt) is vulnerable to an objection arising from consideration of the goal of
definitions stated in §35 (see Texts 36.2 and 36.3 below).
Al-Kātibī works with what is effectively another dichotomous division (see
Figure 20). If an expository phrase (qawl shāriḥ) has (1) as one of its compo-
nents the reality’s proximate differentia, then it is a definition; otherwise, it
is at best a delineation. Given that it has a proximate differentia, if it also has
(1a) the proximate genus it is a complete definition (ḥadd tāmm), and if (1b) it
has a remote genus, or no genus, or a genus in the wrong order relative to the
differentia (cf. ḤQ 238.10), then it is a deficient definition (ḥadd nāqiṣ). If, on
the other hand, the component of the definition is not the quiddity’s differen-
tia but (2) its proximate proprium, the expository phrase will be a delineation;
if joined to (2a) the proximate genus, it will be a complete delineation (rasm
tāmm), but if it is joined to (2b) a remote genus or no genus, it will be a deficient
delineation (rasm nāqiṣ).

Text 36.1 If the definition (ḥadd) includes the sum of constituents

(majmūʿ al-muqawwimāt), then it is called a complete definition, like the
definition of man as rational animal (al-ḥayawān al-nāṭiq); for the proxi-
mate genus is animal, and the proximate differentia is rational. If it does
not include all [constituents] it would be deficient, whether with the dif-
ferentia alone or with it and a remote genus, like “man is rational” or “man
is rational body.” If the specified order is abandoned in the definition, such
that the differentia comes before the genus, it too will be deficient.

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 Commentary, §36

The complete delineation is that in which the proximate genus and a

coextensive proprium are given, as in “man is a risible animal.” The defi-
cient [delineation] is that in which the proprium alone is given, as in defin-
ing [man] as “the risible”; or that in which the remote genus and the pro-
prium are given, as in defining [man] as “the risible body.” (ḤQ 238.5–u)

The attack al-Ḥillī launches against this division is historically informative

and helpful in what it tells us about the definition theory of his time.110 First, the
accounts of incomplete definition and delineation fail to satisfy the conditions
laid down in §35.

Text 36.2 Know that in this discussion [of definitions], the author has
followed Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, but it differs from what scholars who verify
their work (al-muḥaqqiqūn) hold. First, in [claiming that] the differentia
alone, or the proprium alone, conveys the differentiation of the quiddity
from everything else (ʿammā ʿadāhā), this is a mistake, for “the risible”
and “the rational” only signify a thing that possesses risibility or rational-
ity without [further] restriction, so here there is scope (tajwīz) for the
thing to be more general or more specific than man, or coextensive or dis-
tinct. Thus, without [further] restriction that signifies their being proper
(takhṣīṣ) to man, these two [terms] convey neither differentiation nor the
conception of the reality. (ḤQ 239.1–9)

So al-Kātibī’s accounts of deficient definition and deficient delineation are

wrong as they stand. So too, according to al-Ḥillī, his account of complete
delineation:

Text 36.3 Second, with respect to the complete delineation being a

compound of genus and proprium, and the deficient being what dispenses
with the genus: the common doctrine (al-mashhūr) among logicians is
that the delineation only conveys differentiation, so if it conveys differ-
entiation from everything else then it is a complete delineation, and if it
conveys differentiation from some things apart from it, then it is deficient,
and would be a delineation in relation to [those things]. (ḤQ 239.12–16)

For one of his commentators at least, al-Kātibī’s presentation of the kinds of

definition can stand only insofar as it treats complete definition.

138 138
 Commentary, §37

§37111 Al-Kātibī presents the defects that afflict definitions in two divisions,
the first of which arises from matters relating to meaning, the second from mat-
ters relating to expression. Again, al-Ḥillī upbraids al-Kātibī for giving the wrong
example to illustrate the definition of something by what is equally known or
unknown, and for omitting altogether from the list of defects the definition
of something by what is more obscure. By contrast, he seems to be content
with al-Kātibī’s account of defects arising from expression. On the first defect,
al-Ḥillī noted:

Text 37.1 Semantic mistakes include defining something with what is

just as known or unknown [as the definiendum], like someone who defines
movement as lack of stillness, and even as not odd; for lack of stillness
is equally known as movement, and not odd as even. This [account of
the defect] is according to widely accepted opinion (al-mashhūr), which
holds that both movement and stillness, and even and odd, are opposed
as contraries (al-aḍdād). But if we verify this matter, the opposition in
these pairs is the opposition of privation and capacity; for stillness is lack
of movement from what is prone to move, and odd is not even. So the defi-
nition with these terms is [in fact] defining something with that on which
it depends to be known. The correct example [for the defect] is like the
definition of one of two correlatives with the other, like defining “father”
as “he who has a son.” (ḤQ 240.9–u)

Then, on a defect al-Kātibī omits:

Text 37.2 Beyond this degree of outraging [good definition technique]

(al-radāʾah) is defining something with what is more obscure (al-akhfā);
this is more of an outrage than definition with the equally [unknown]. It is
like defining fire as an element like soul, for soul is more obscure than fire.
The author failed to mention this degree [of error]. (ḤQ 241.1–3)

Circular definitions are an even worse outrage, especially when the circular-
ity works in a way that conceals itself.

Text 37.3 Beyond this degree [of error] is defining something with
what is only known through [that thing] at one remove (bi-martabah
wāḥidah), for this is clearly circular. It is like defining quality as a form
through which similarity and dissimilarity occur, then defining similarity
as agreement in quality.

139 139
 Commentary, §38

And beyond this degree [of error] is defining something with what is
only known through [that thing] at a number of removes (bi-marātib), like
defining 2 as the first even, then defining even as the number divisible into
two equal parts, then defining two equals as two things neither of which
exceeds the other, then—in defining two things—that they are 2. This is a
hidden circle, and it is more reprehensible (aqbaḥ) than the first because
it involves making the knowledge of a thing prior to itself by a number of
degrees. (ḤQ 241.4–12)

The problems that arise from expression are relative to the person who is
being instructed by the definition; if expressions are strange for the auditor, the
goal of definition is lost.

Text 37.4 For one who seeks a meaning [of an otherwise unknown
expression] thereupon abandons what he seeks, and seeks rather to under-
stand the expression, and thus he misses his goal. (ḤQ 241.pu–u)

The Second Treatise, on Propositions and Their Valuations

The Second Treatise runs from §38 to §87.

Text 38.a Al-Kātibī ordered [this Treatise] as an Introduction (to

define “proposition” and its primary divisions) and three sections. This is
because the discussion either concerns the categorical specifically, or the
hypothetical specifically, or both. What is meant by “its primary divisions”
is the divisions that arise in considering the first division of the proposi-
tion, as in “the proposition is either categorical or hypothetical,” in contrast
with “. . . is necessary” and so forth, for the proposition only divides into
these after being divided into categorical and hypothetical. (TŠ 201.3–7)

So the two lemmata of the Introduction (§§38 and 39) deal with the defini-
tion and primary divisions of the proposition. The first of the three sections,
On the Categorical (§§40–59), covers four topics: the parts and divisions of
the categorical proposition (§§40–44), the truth-conditions for the four quan-
tified propositions (§§45–47), the relation between propositions with deter-
minate and indefinite terms (§§48–50), and modal propositions (§§51–59).
The second section, On the Divisions of the Hypothetical (§§60–66), sketches
consequence and disjunction, their modal and non-modal variants, and their

140 140
 Commentary, §38

negation, truth-conditions, and quantification. The third section, Valuations of

Propositions (§§67–87), deals with four topics, three of which relate to both
categorical and hypothetical propositions: contradiction (§§67–72), conver-
sion (§§73–81), contraposition (§§82–86), and—dealing with immediate infer-
ences with no parallels in the categoricals—the implicates of hypothetical
propositions (§87).

The Introduction, on defining the proposition

and its primary divisions

§38112 Having finished with the First Treatise and its treatment of simple
terms, al-Kātibī moves on to compound expressions that are complete—that
is to say, after which silence is appropriate—and informative (both defined in
§14): an informative expression (khabar) is a complete compound expression
that is either true or false. In this lemma, al-Kātibī takes a slightly different tack
in defining truth-apt discourse. Details of what he says are more easily appreci-
ated by comparing §38 with the sentence with which Avicenna begins the third
Path of the Logic of Pointers and Reminders (3.1.1):

Text 38.1 This kind of composition, which we all agree should be men-
tioned, is informative composition (al-tarkīb al-khabarī); he who pro-
duces it is said to be truthful or false in what he says (huwa lladhī yuqālu
li-qāʾilihi innahu ṣādiq fīmā qālahu aw kādhib). (AI 22.2–4)

Al-Kātibī does not refer back to what he has said about informative expres-
sion in §14. Instead, he defines a proposition as “discourse such that it is correct
to say of him who produces it that he is truthful or false in what he says.” (The
translation hides an ambiguity in the Arabic, the nominal clause of which could
also be understood as “that it—what is said—is true or false”; whatever al-Kātibī
really intended, he was understood by his commentators to be saying something
similar to Avicenna in Text 38.1.)

Text 38.2 So discourse—which is the compound expression in the

proposition as uttered (al-qaḍiyyah al-malfūẓah), or the compound intel-
lectual meaning (al-mafhūm al-ʿaqlī l-murakkab) in the proposition as
understood (al-qaḍiyyah al-maʿqūlah)—is a genus that includes complete
and defective discourse, and “such that it is correct to say of him who
produces it that he is truthful or false in what he says” is a differentia that

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 Commentary, §38

excludes incomplete discourse and [complete discourse, which is] non-

propositional (al-inshāʾāt). (TT 221.6–u)

Some raise the concern that the definitions (in fact, delineations) of “prop-
osition” and “truth” might be circular. “Someone might object that it is only
possible to define truth through ‘information corresponding [to the actual],’ so
defining information through truth is circular” (RM 124.1–2), to which al-Rāzī
responds that knowledge of the reality of information, and its distinction from
other kinds of discourse, is necessary and primitive (badīhī) (RM 124.5).113
Al-Taftāzānī takes truth to belong to a spoken discourse by virtue of the fact
that the intelligible content signified by that discourse corresponds to what
is actual.

Text 38.3 “Discourse” (al-qawl) is synonymous with “compound

[expression]” (al-murakkab). It is said of what is intelligible (al-maʿqūl)
and of what is audible (al-masmūʿ ); the first is what is considered in the
intelligible proposition, and the second in the expressed proposition (fī
l-malfūẓah). Just as “true” (al-ṣādiq) is used of discourse whose judgment
corresponds with the actual (al-qawl al-muṭābiq ḥukmuhu li-l-wāqiʿ ), it is
also used of someone who makes the statement; this is what is meant here.
(TŠ 202.1–3)

The proposition divides into the categorical and the hypothetical. This first
division, and the one below it of the hypothetical into conditional and disjunc-
tive (see Figure 21), are taken to be deeper and more natural than subsequent
divisions into propositions under different readings, or different modalizations.
(The commentators make use of these different kinds of division, for example,
in discussion of §72.)

Text 38.4 For the proposition at times divides into species (aqsām
nawʿiyyah), and at others into types (aqsām ṣinfiyyah). The first is a pri-
mary division (like the division of the proposition into categorical and
hypothetical, for these are two different species), whereas the division [of
the proposition] into, for example, necessary, referential, and other modal-
izations is a division into types because the differences involved are only
through adventitious considerations (lā khtilāf fīhā illā bi-l-ʿawāriḍ).114
(ḤQ 242.8–apu)

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 Commentary, §38

The test for making the primary division of propositions into categorical
and hypothetical turns on whether “its two extremes may be analyzed into two
simple terms.” As for the meaning of analysis:

Text 38.5 The meaning of analysis (al-inḥilāl) is dropping the syncat-

egorematic terms (al-adawāt) signifying the judgment through which
that proposition is a proposition. So, if we have “Zayd is knowing” (Zayd
huwa ʿālim) or “Zayd is not knowing” (Zayd laysa huwa bi-ʿālim), and we
drop “is” (huwa) signifying affirmation, and “is not” (huwa laysa) sig-
nifying negation, then “Zayd” and “knowing” remain, and they are two
simple terms (mufradān). And if we have “if the sun is up then it is day”
and “number is either even or odd,” and we drop the expressions “if ” and
“then” signifying conditional connection (al-ittiṣāl), and the expressions
“either” and “or” signifying disjunction, “the sun is up” and “it is day”
remain (and they are propositions not simple terms), and similarly for “the
number is even” and “the number is odd.” (TŠ 202.6–11)

Note that the phrase is “may be analyzed into two simple terms”; the phrase
allows for compound expressions that amount to simple terms, which are
“potentially simple” (mufrad bi-l-quwwah).

Text 38.6 We mean by “potentially simple” what is possibly expressed

by a simple expression while being a part of that proposition and on con-
veying its judgment; so a proposition like “Zayd’s father is standing” (Zayd
abūhu qāʾim) is included under the categorical . . . [This is] because [such
propositions] resolve to two things that can be expressed as two simple
expressions taken respectively as that on which judgment is passed and
that which is judged of it (maḥkūman ʿalayhi wa-maḥkūman bi-hi). This is
contrary to the hypothetical, for in [the hypothetical] it is not correct to
say “this is that.” (TŠ 202.12–apu, 203.1–3)

Lemma 38 is the first mention of the hypothetical in the Risālah. All the
examples al-Kātibī gives in the next lemma are of simple hypothetical proposi-
tions, though in §66 he encourages his readers to compose examples of the vari-
ous kinds of more complex hypotheticals, and I have given there the examples
al-Taftāzānī offers in comment on the lemma.

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 Commentary, §39

§39115 Al-Kātibī carries on with the hypothetical propositions (al-sharṭiyyāt)

in §39 (see again Figure 21). Although the treatment of hypotheticals in the
Risālah is sparse relative to the treatment of categorical propositions, it none-
theless provides a solid introduction to the material. The treatment makes up
19 of the Risālah’s 120 lemmata on the division of the text I use (§38: definition
against the categorical; §39: informal division into kinds with examples; §§60–
67: more rigorous division into kinds of hypotheticals with their truth-condi-
tions, their meaning when quantified and the terms expressing quantification,
and their various compositions; §72: squares of opposition; §81: conversion;
§86: contraposition; §87: co-implication of hypotheticals; §§105–109: some of
the kinds of syllogistic inferences with hypothetical propositions). I cross-ref-
erence my comments on these passages to form a treatment of the subject that
may be read as a single unit.
Al-Kātibī departs from Avicenna’s foundational treatment of hypothetical
propositions on a number of points, mostly minor. In the 250 years between
Avicenna and al-Kātibī, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī had reordered the treatment (and
indeed questioned the utility of covering the finer points in the exposition), and
Afḍal al-Dīn al-Khūnajī had—with a number of remarks critical of the rigor of
Avicenna’s treatment—reworked the entire exposition and reaffirmed its cen-
trality as a topic for logicians.116 Al-Kātibī adopts the broad ordering of the mate-
rial introduced by al-Rāzī, though he divides the various compositions of more
complex hypothetical propositions in §67 as Avicenna does.117 He differs slightly
in dividing the various kinds of arguments built up using hypothetical proposi-
tions (§105 and following), however, and allows their limited utility in argument
to shape his exposition (if we are to believe al-Taftāzānī, Text 105.a). He also dif-
fers in the truth-conditions he stipulates for a number of operators; his versions
are stronger than Avicenna’s (see §60 below, and especially comments I trans-
late from al-Ḥillī’s commentary). Other points—such as a square of opposition
omitting some oppositions (see §72)—may indicate that al-Kātibī is seeking to
provide a simplified account rather than a revision of the system.
Back to §39, in which al-Kātibī introduces the two kinds (later, in §72 on the
squares of opposition, they will be referred to by the expression “species”) of
hypothetical propositions: the division is secondary relative to the division pre-
sented in §38. Obviously, the tradition is conscious of the fact that it is using
terms—above all, “hypothetical” (sharṭiyyah)—which are among the terms of
art of Arabic grammar. Al-Ḥillī explains:

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 Commentary, §40

Text 39.1 Know that calling the conditional (muttaṣilah) a hypotheti-

cal (sharṭiyyah) corresponds with linguistic custom, whereas calling the
disjunctive (munfaṣilah) a hypothetical is metaphorical; similarly, calling
the affirmatives conditionals or disjunctives is literal, whereas calling the
negatives [by the same terms] is metaphorical. (ḤQ 245.15–apu)

That in which “one proposition is judged to be true or not on the assumption

of another proposition” is called a muttaṣilah, which I have translated as “con-
ditional”; the term is from the same root as Avicenna’s ittiṣāl, contact with the
Active Intellect, and the core idea may be of a productive contact between one
proposition and another. Avicenna associates this with the form of words for the
conditional of natural language (using “if-then”). The other hypothetical is that
in which “two propositions are judged to be incompatible with each other”; this
is a munfaṣilah, which uses the form of words for the disjunctive of natural lan-
guage (using “either-or”). Al-Kātibī indicates how each kind of proposition will
be negated: “not, if this is a man, it is inanimate,” and “not, either this man is an
animal or black” (more on negation in comment on §§62 and 72).

The First Section, on the Categorical

The first discussion, on its parts and divisions

The categorical proposition is in one view the simple element (mufrad) that
makes up the hypothetical proposition, so it comes first in al-Kātibī’s exposi-
tion of propositions. Of five lemmata, the first two go to aspects of the relation
between the subject and the predicate (Is there a copula? Does the copula sig-
nify everything in the proposition other than the subject and the predicate?
How do affirmation and negation relate to the copula?), and the next three go to
aspects of quantification, which are taken to belong to the subject.

§40118 The main points made explicitly in §40 are, first, that the proposi-
tion has three parts (the subject, the predicate, and the copula); second, that
the copula (rābiṭah) can be omitted in Arabic; and finally, that as a function of
including or omitting the copula in the expressed proposition, the proposition is
called either two-part or three-part.
First, on the subject and the predicate taken together, al-Ḥillī notes that
the subject and the predicate are the same in at least one respect (both true of
certain things; I assume he has an affirmative proposition in mind), but must

145 145
 Commentary, §40

differ in some other respect. He is explicit that synonyms (in the sense speci-
fied in §13) cannot fulfill the roles of subject and predicate (lam yakun al-waḍ ʿ
wa-l-ḥaml fī l-alfāẓ al-mutarādifah) (ḤQ 246.13–14). His discussion then moves
beyond al-Kātibī’s lemma to touch on univocal and denominative predication.
I mention again the denominative,119 though here as it has to do with predica-
tion. (I take it that because denominative predication has no impact on the valid
inferences al-Kātibī presents in the Risālah, he has not defined it.) Speaking
of univocal predication (ḥaml huwa huwa l-musammā bi-ḥaml al-muwāṭaʾah),
al-Ṭūsī says it “invokes the unification of the subject and the predicate in one
respect, and their differentiation in another.” For example, in “triangle is figure,”
“the predicate alone is that through which there is unification, abstracted from
that through which there is differentiation” (whatever specific properties make
a figure a triangle).

Text 40.1 There is another species of predication called denominative

predication (ḥaml al-ishtiqāq), and it is the predication this-is-possessor-
of-that (ḥaml huwa dhū huwa). It is like “whiteness” said of “body”; the
predicate in this predication is not predicated by itself of the subject uni-
vocally, but rather is predicated with the expression “possessor of,” as in
“the body is possessor of whiteness” (al-jism dhū bayāḍ). Alternatively, an
adjective like “white” is derived from it (yushtaqqu minhu), so it may be
predicated univocally of [the subject], as in “the body is white” (al-jism
abyaḍ); strictly speaking, the predicate is the first. (ṬḤ 142.7–u)

I come back to one aspect to do with the denominative predicate (in Texts
40.3 and 40.4) after briefly considering the second item on al-Kātibī’s list of
propositional components, the copula. Nothing is needed in Arabic to make
Zaydun kātibun (“Zayd is a writer”) a grammatical sentence (other than, strictly
speaking, the case endings to show the syntactic function of the component
words, and the awareness that “Zayd” is definite), but then there is no separate
expression that signifies the connection the subject has to the predicate. There
are expressions in Arabic for the tensed copula, but—as al-Taftāzānī tells us he
learned from al-Fārābī’s account of the reception of logic—an expression must
be transferred to fill the need for an atemporal copula.

Text 40.2 So they used huwa in Arabic in place of hast in Persian,

and they made its gerund huwiyyah, like insāniyyah from insān. Some of
them chose instead of huwa the expression al-mawjūd, and they set wujūd

146 146
 Commentary, §40

in place of huwiyyah; and in place of kāna and yakūnu and sa-yakūnu [,

respectively,] wujida and yūjad and sa-yūjad. This is what al-Fārābī said.120
(TŠ 209.9–12)

The Risālah has no example propositions with a tensed copula (except in the
analysis of the essentialist proposition in §45, with the phrase law wujida, where
the perfective is required by the conditional particle), and uses huwa through-
out as atemporal copula. It follows from the differing preferences expressed in
Text 40.2 that the copula seems to be in the form of a verb (kalimah) in the case
of kāna, or of a name (ism) in the case of huwa (ḤQ 247.5–6). In fact, according
to al-Ḥillī, the copula is a particle, a syncategorematic term (adāt) (see §11), as
emerges in the following discussion involving denominative predicates.

Text 40.3 Know that denominative predicates and verbs may need no
mention of the copula in [the proposition] because they connect of them-
selves (li-dhawātihā) with a given subject. Fakhr al-Dīn claimed that [verbs
and denominatives] do [indeed] connect of themselves (li-dhātihā) with
the subject in the proposition, but this is an error. (ḤQ 247.12–u)

The reason al-Rāzī’s claim is an error—as we find in al-Ḥillī’s Asrār—is that the
relation an agent has to its verb is not the relation that is signified by the copula:

Text 40.4 Whether the predicate is a name or a verb or denominative,

it requires that the copula be stated; for the verb in itself (bi-dhātihā) only
connects to its agent, as in the form of “Zayd stood” (qāma Zayd). Know
that the copula is not the pronoun implicit in the verb and the denomina-
tive name, for that pronoun is a name, and [the copula] is a particle (adāt).
(ḤA 56.20–apu)

In any event, it may be that the verb or denominative as predicate needs a

copula no less than univocal predicates,121 but al-Kātibī is taken to make the
claim that in all cases in Arabic it is open to the speaker to omit the expression
for the copula.

Text 40.5 This is the case in Arabic, and therefore al-Kātibī restricted
the omission to “some languages,” because in Persian it is not omitted. (ḤQ
247.10–11)

Al-Taftāzānī goes on to show how a verbal predicate (as in the example in

Text 40.4) is to be regimented for logical treatment:

147 147
 Commentary, §40

Text 40.6 Know that the rules of logic taken literally do not include
the proposition whose predicate is a verb—and it is that which is called by
grammarians a verbal sentence—like “Zayd stood” (qāma Zayd); at best
it is construed as “Zayd is an individual to whom standing belongs” (Zayd
shakhṣ la-hu l-qiyām). (TŠ 210.8–10)

Let me now return to the first of the points raised by al-Kātibī in the lemma.
He identifies the three parts of the categorical as the maḥkūm ʿalayhi—that on
which judgment is made—for the subject; maḥkūm bi-hi—the judgment made—
for the predicate; and the nisbah—relation—for the copula. The expressed prop-
osition (al-qaḍiyyah al-malfūẓah) may omit the copula, but its meaning is still
present in the intelligible proposition (al-qaḍiyyah al-maʿqūlah).

Text 40.7 In respect of the copula, the categorical proposition is either

two-part or three-part, because if the copula is stated in [the proposition]
it is three-part due to its including three expressions for three meanings; if
it is omitted—because the mind is aware of the meaning of [the copula]—
it is two-part because it only includes two parts as counterparts for two
meanings. (TT 234.3–6)

The meaning of the copula is in respect of the judgment-relation (al-nis-

bah al-ḥukmiyyah); what is signified by the copula is affirmation or negation
(TT 235.9–10).

Text 40.8 The correct thing is to say, the judgment in the proposition
is either that the subject is the predicate or that the subject is not the predi-
cate; or to say, the judgment in [the proposition] is either to put the rela-
tion forward (bi-īqāʿ al-nisbah) or to retract it (bi-ntizāʿihā). (TT 236.6–8)

Finally, al-Taftāzānī in commentary on this lemma notes a dispute about

al-Kātibī’s doctrine that the proposition has only three parts; it has been argued
that in fact it has four parts. Speaking of the proposition “Zayd is the writer,”
he says:

Text 40.9 So if we understand “Zayd,” and “the writer” and the rela-
tion (which is to say, the understanding that [the second] is affirmed or not
affirmed of [the first]), the proposition will not obtain, as is the situation
for those who doubt or merely entertain [a proposition] (al-shākkīn wa-l-
mutawahhimīn). For these understand the two extremes and the relation
between them without any judgment; until doubt ceases and the mind

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 Commentary, §41

comes to believe that the relation is or is not actual (I mean that the predi-
cate is affirmed or not affirmed of the subject), [only] then the proposition
obtains.122 (TŠ 204.15–pu)

§41123 The negation toward which al-Kātibī gestures in this lemma—which is

on affirmation and negation—is a propositional negation. Propositional nega-
tion (what Buridan calls negating negation), dealt with in this lemma, will be
distinguished from nominal negation (what Buridan, for example, calls infinitiz-
ing negation; see §§26 and 27) in §§48–50.124 As noted in Text 40.8, this nega-
tion relates above all to the connection (al-nisbah al-ḥukmiyyah) signified by the
copula: “the judgment in [the proposition] is either to put the relation forward
(bi-īqāʿ al-nisbah) or to retract it (bi-ntizāʿihā)” (TT 236.6–8). The effect of what
al-Kātibī says in §50.2 is that the negative particle is distinct from the copula, and
should be placed in the expressed proposition before the copula to signify that it
is the proposition which is negated.
The test for the affirmative is whether it is correct to say that the subject has
a given predicate; the test for the negative is whether it is correct to say that the
subject does not have a given predicate. When a subject is under the predication
of a determinate name, the result is an affirmative. Al-Taftāzānī reaches out to
Persian to help the reader. When we can say that the subject has a given predi-
cate, “it is the projective relation that is understood from (al-nisbah al-īqāʿiyyah
al-mafhūmah min) a word like hast”; if we can say that the subject does not have
a given predicate, “it is the retractive relation that is understood from (al-nisbah
al-intizāʿiyyah al-mafhūmah min) the word nīst” (TŠ 210.apu–u). He goes on to
stress that both affirmation and negation relate to formal aspects of the proposi-
tion; it may be that it is false to say that “man is a stone,” but the question of the
proposition’s falsity is entirely different from the question of its being an affirma-
tion or a negation (TŠ 211.1–4).

§42125 In this lemma, al-Kātibī turns to the division of the categorical into
propositions with singular terms as subjects, and quantified propositions, which
have universal terms as subjects. He settles his focus immediately on quanti-
fied propositions, “because scientific discussions are only conducted using
one of these” (ḤQ 249.6–7). As in the case of negation, al-Kātibī refrains from
defining quantification, and is content merely to give examples. I have trans-
lated maḥṣūrah wa-musawwarah with the single English word “quantified,”
but al-Kātibī’s commentators make it clear that maḥṣūrah signifies that the

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 Commentary, §42

propositional meaning specifies the quantity of the subject, whereas musaw-

warah signifies that the expression for the proposition includes the particle
(the sūr, the “wall”), which signifies the quantity of the subject (“every,” “no,”
and so forth).
In this commentary, I adopt the Western convention of referring to the four
quantified propositions using the letters A, E, I, and O in the following way:

A: Every C is B (universal affirmative, kulliyyah mūjibah);

E: No C is B (universal negative, kulliyyah sālibah);
I: Some C is B (particular affirmative, juzʾiyyah mūjibah);
O: Some C is not B (particular negative, juzʾiyyah sālibah).

The letters are used in the Western names for the syllogistic moods, so it is
worth learning them. In the comments that follow, I often use, for example,
“a-proposition” to translate al-kulliyyah al-mūjibah.
Most of what is given in §42 is simply a list of quantifiers with examples, and
variant expressions that are synonymous with each other. This is true at least
for the first three quantified propositions, but not for the last quantified propo-
sition, the o-proposition. Al-Kātibī gives three variants (I have only translated
two): laysa kull, laysa baʿḍ, and baʿḍ laysa.

Text 42.1 The difference between the first and the other two is that the
first signifies by correspondence the negation of the judgment from all, and
by implication its negation from some, while the other two are the reverse;
they signify negation of the judgment from some by correspondence, and
from all by implication. The difference between the second and the third is
that the second may be used in universal negation as in “not, some stone is
a man” (laysa baʿḍ al-ḥajar bi-insān), and by it one means to negate human-
ity of every stone taken one at a time; the third cannot be used like this.
Further, the third may be used in the metathetic affirmation, such as “some
animal is not-man” (baʿḍ al-ḥayawān huwa laysa bi-insān), in contrast to
the second, which simply cannot be used in affirmation. (ḤQ 250.6–13)

Al-Kātibī often uses the third form in the Risālah, though in §93.4 (for exam-
ple) he uses the second and third forms one after the other, and in §113 (on the
reductio) he uses the first form.

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§43126 The singular and the quantified propositions set out explicitly the quan-
tity of the items under the subject, whereas the natural proposition (qaḍiyyah
ṭabī ʿiyyah) and the indefinite proposition (qaḍiyyah muhmalah) do not. In
this lemma, al-Kātibī sets out the criterion to distinguish between these two—
whether or not the proposition is apt to be true with a universal or particular
quantifier added to it—and considers first the natural proposition (which is not
apt to be true as a universal or particular proposition). It “is a judgment on the
quiddity with respect to the universality attaching to it (bi-ʿtibār ʿurūḍ al-kulli-
yyah la-hā)” (ḤQ 251.9–10). Al-Ḥillī goes on to criticize al-Kātibī for neglecting
a third kind of proposition, which also has no quantifier:

Text 43.1 The author has neglected another division of propositions:

that in which judgment is made on the quiddity insofar as it is what it is;
we call this proposition the natural proposition, and that which the author
calls the natural we call the general proposition. (ḤQ 251.u–252.2)

Al-Taḥtānī pauses briefly to consider the division of propositions to this

point, which is effectively quadripartite.

Text 43.2 Avicenna in the Cure gave a three-fold division, saying that
if the subject is particular [the proposition] is singular; if it is universal,
then if the quantity of items is made clear it is a quantified proposition;
otherwise, it is indefinite.127 The later logicians denounced this as incom-
plete, excluding [as it does] the natural proposition. The answer [to them]
is that the discussion is focused on propositions taken into account in the
sciences, and no account is taken [in the sciences] of the natural proposi-
tion. (TT 243.7–u)

Once again, the range of components of logic necessary for its use in the sci-
ences determines how far al-Kātibī is prepared to diverge from his narrow path
through the Risālah. The natural proposition does not, however, contribute to
syllogistic inferences; neglecting that limitation can lead to fallacious reasoning
(see Text 119.4).128

§44129 Indefinite propositions have the logical status of i-propositions accord-

ing to philosophers, in the sense that both an indefinite affirmative (say) and
a particular affirmative are mutually implicative (mutalāzimān) (TT 244.79).
Those who are not philosophers may worry that “man is a writer” is true whether
taken as a universal or a particular, and “some man is a writer” can be heard as

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implicitly denying that all men are writers. The philosophers insist that when
used in the context of logic, the i-proposition does not have this further implicit
meaning (see also Avicenna Pointers 3.4 [AI 25.apu–26.9]).

The second discussion, on verifying the four quantified propositions

From §45 on, al-Kātibī begins to focus on a set of issues that affect how he under-
stands modalized propositions and their contribution to inferences. In §§45–47,
he examines different ways to interpret the subject term of a proposition; some
of his post-Avicennian colleagues held that these differing interpretations played
a decisive role in determining which inferences were valid. In §51, he introduces
the notion of matter (māddah) as the underlying relation between two terms
that is expressed by the mode of a true modal proposition. In §52, he sets out
the simple modalized propositions, along with the distinction between referen-
tial (dhātī) and descriptional (waṣfī) readings, and in §§53–59, the compound
modalized propositions. He expands on his understanding of these proposi-
tions by specifying their contradictories in §§67–71. Using these contradicto-
ries, he proves the converses (§§73–80) and contrapositives (§§82–86) that may
be inferred from each modalized proposition. Finally, in §§98–104, he exam-
ines which modalized propositions can be used in a productive syllogism, and
what modal strength the conclusion will have. In short, al-Kātibī devotes nearly
a third of the Risālah to modal logic. One goal of this short introductory pas-
sage is to identify the relevant lemmata. The other is to give the reader notice of
themes the lemmata develop, and methods they deploy. Further, al-Kātibī and
his Rāzian colleagues differ at certain points from Avicenna’s account of modal
logic, and I hope that by drawing attention to a number of texts translated from
the commentators, I help clarify what post-Avicennian logicians thought Avi-
cenna was doing, why some of them (let us call them the revisionist Avicen-
nian logicians) wanted to do something different, and, finally, how the purists
defended Avicenna’s choices.
Since the substance in these reflections derives from texts I take from com-
mentators for my own commentary, I should note again that the earliest of the
commentators on the Risālah, al-Ḥillī, presents himself at the time of writing his
commentary as a committed Avicennian purist, along with al-Ṭūsī; they both
strain against the tendency among the Rāzians to reform Avicenna’s modal logic.
Whether al-Ḥillī’s understanding of Avicenna is right or wrong, it represents the
most hospitable reception of that logic in the late thirteenth century.

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Al-Ḥillī criticizes al-Kātibī’s account of inferences involving modal prop-

ositions, claiming that his own more faithfully reflects Avicenna’s original
account. His opponents (whether dead, like al-Khūnajī, or as yet unborn, like
al-Taftāzānī) offer counterexamples to Avicenna’s inferences (see for example
Text 76.4, which spawned a family of counterexamples). Some acknowledge
that the counterexamples do not touch Avicenna because of the truth-condi-
tions he stipulates for his propositions (see al-Taftāzānī in Text 98.2); according
to al-Taftāzānī, these truth-conditions include understanding the subject term
(“every C”) to include the possible as well as the actual, in the way al-Fārābī
understood the subject term (see Text 45.3). Some, including al-Khūnajī, even
accuse Avicenna of sliding between different readings of the subject term so
that some of his inferences from modalized propositions cannot be treated sys-
tematically (see Text 45.10). Avicenna’s doctrine on the subject term is given as
al-Ḥillī understands it in Text 45.12; the Rāzian logicians put forward an alter-
native doctrine, which among other things determines what the relata are in a
proposition (see Text 45.1). Their alternative doctrine rules out the relata that
interest Avicenna (for example, Text 101.2, rejected in Text 101.3). The discussion
in §§45–47 goes primarily to these matters.
The inferences al-Kātibī defends, both immediate (§§73–80, §§82–86) and
syllogistic (§§98–104), differ from those defended by the Avicennian purists in
respect of syllogisms with a possibility proposition as minor premise; such syl-
logisms are, according to the Rāzians, unproductive. One way these syllogisms
could be made productive is by taking the subject term as understood by al-Fārābī
(and, according to al-Taftāzānī, by Avicenna). Another way is presented by al-Ḥillī
(see for example Text 98.1, first used though not named in Text 76.1), and works
by supposing a possible actual (ʿalā taqdīr wuqūʿ al-mumkin; his teacher al-Ṭūsī
used to refer to the method with phrases like “supposing the possible actual,”
farḍ al-mumkin mawjūdan; for example, ṬḤ 391.22). For example, the Avicennian
purists want to defend Barbara LML (“every C is possibly B, every B is neces-
sarily A, therefore every C is necessarily A”); as al-Ḥillī puts it in the first of the
inferences in Text 98.1, assume the minor (“every C is possibly B”) to be actual
(“every C is B”), and the mix self-evidently concludes in a necessity proposition.
But since the conclusion must be necessary given the way things really are (fī nafs
al-amr), and since assuming what is possibly the case to be the case cannot lead
to the impossible, the necessity proposition is the true conclusion.
Al-Khūnajī’s student Ibn Wāṣil al-Ḥamawī (d. 697/1298) relays al-Khūnajī’s
complaint against this move: “We do not concede that on the supposition of

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the truth of the minor actually [and not merely possibly] the universal major
remains true. Rather, it is true that on this supposition the middle term will
include what the major term is not true of necessarily.”130 So take a typical coun-
terexample against Barbara LML, framed on the assumption that Zayd only
ever rides horses: “every donkey is possibly a mount for Zayd, every mount for
Zayd is necessarily a horse, therefore every donkey is necessarily a horse.” By
supposing the minor actual, as “every donkey is a mount for Zayd,” the middle
term (“mount for Zayd”) includes things of which the major is no longer true. As
al-Khūnajī himself puts it, we cannot make the supposition “because the indi-
viduals under [the major’s] subject term might at that point increase (li-jawāz
izdiyād afrād mawḍūʿihā ḥīnaʾidhin)” (ḪK 136.13). Al-Ḥillī does what he can
to fight against this criticism at the end of Text 98.1. In fact, al-Khūnajī has a
second, more substantial criticism of the method.

Text 45.a Know that some people interpret “the necessary” as that
in which the separation of the predicate from the subject is impossible
in itself, and as that in which the subject requires the predicate. Our own
technical convention is that the necessary is weaker than this; it is that
for which the separation of the predicate from the subject is impossible
whether in itself or due to a matter independent [of the meanings of the
extremes] (aw li-amr munfaṣil). We do not want to dispute with anyone
who interprets it in the stricter sense, since there is no point arguing
about expressions. Their further claims about the valuations of proposi-
tions, however, cannot stand, because they have interpreted the possible
as the contradictory of the necessary, and use it in reductio proofs such
that the possible is that from the supposition of which no impossibility
follows (anna l-mumkin lā yalzam min farḍihi muḥāl). But it is not impos-
sible that from the supposition of the possible—on the interpretation they
propose—a number of impossibilities may follow, due to the possibility
that the essence of the subject may not require the predicate, nor separa-
tion from it be impossible in itself, yet its separation from it may be impos-
sible due to an external factor. (ḪK 109.5–apu)

The Avicennian purists are using too strong a definition of necessity; in con-
sequence, its dual, possibility, is too weak, at least to be consistent with the
method of supposing a possible actual.

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Two reflections in concluding this short overview. The first is that the Rāzians
accuse Avicenna, or at any rate his thirteenth-century devotees, of using defini-
tions of modal notions that will not work with some of the methods and conclu-
sions they seek to prove. The second—and I think this is the more significant—is
that the Rāzians put forward misdirected counterexamples that do not touch
Avicenna (as al-Taftāzānī acknowledges in Text 98.2). This is not a sign that they
do not understand what Avicenna is doing; rather, it is a sign that they want to
replace the program he follows in regimenting natural language for logical treat-
ment with their own program. That program begins to crystallize in Text 45.1.

§45131 This is the lemma in which al-Kātibī sets out the truth-conditions for
the quantified propositions, and he does so under two “considerations,” or
readings of the subject, the essentialist (bi-ḥasab al-ḥaqīqah) and the external-
ist (bi-ḥasab al-khārij). Before considering the distinction between these two
readings, al-Taḥtānī offers a number of preliminary reflections on the quantified
propositions for which al-Kātibī is presenting truth-conditions; I summarize
here some fundamental aspects of these reflections. One aspect is that presenta-
tions of this material customarily use dummy terms (“C,” “B”) rather than con-
crete terms like “man” or “animal”; this is because, first, it shortens the presen-
tation and, second, if concrete terms were used, “one might imagine that these
valuations occur only in this matter (fī hādhihi l-māddah),132 and not in other
a-propositions (dūna l-mūjibāt al-kulliyyāt al-ukhar)” (TT 245.apu–246.2).
Another aspect is that the subject and predicate cannot be synonyms (see §13,
and commentary on §40); the relation between the subject and the predicate is
more complex:

Text 45.1 If we have “every C is B,” there are two aspects to consider
(amrān), one of which is the meaning of C and its reality (mafhūm jīm
wa-ḥaqīqatihi), the other the individual items (al-afrād) of which C is true.
[The proposition’s] meaning is not that the meaning of C is the meaning
of B, otherwise C and B would be two synonymous expressions, so there
would be no predication in meaning, but rather [a connection of some
kind] in respect of expression. The meaning of [the proposition] is rather
that every individual item of which C is true is B. (TT 246.pu–247.pu)

Identifying the individual items (afrād) of which the meaning C is true

involves a number of considerations.

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 Commentary, §45

Text 45.2 It is possible that aspects (al-umūr) that differ according to

meaning may be true of a single essence; so what C is true of is called the
essence of the subject (dhāt al-mawḍūʿ ), and the meaning of C is called the
description of the subject and its title (ʿunwānuhu) (because the essence
of C—that which is judged—is made known as a reality through it just as a
book is made known through its title). The title may be the essence itself,
as in “every man is an animal” (for the reality of man is exactly the quiddity
of Zayd and ʿAmr and Bakr and other individuals); it may be a part of it,
as in “every animal is sensate” (for the judgment on [“animal”] is also on
Zayd and ʿAmr and other individuals, and the reality of animal is only a part
of [the essence of these things]); and it may be extrinsic to it, as in “every
walker is an animal” (for the judgment on it is also on Zayd and ʿAmr and
other individuals, and the meaning of “walker” is extrinsic to their quiddi-
ties). (TT 250.7–251.4)

It is with these considerations in mind that Strobino has coined the term “ref-
erential” for the dhātī proposition: the subject term is taken insofar as it refers
to an essence, whether it is necessarily or only momentarily true of it.133 Is the
subject term taken to refer to that of which it is merely possibly true? According
to al-Fārābī, it is, whereas Avicenna insists that the subject term must have been
actually true of the things it refers to at least once, “so that what is never C does
not enter under [the subject term].”

Text 45.3 If we say “every black is such and such,” the judgment covers
everything that is possibly black (even Greeks, for example), according
to the view of al-Fārābī, due to the possibility of their being described by
blackness; whereas in the view of Avicenna, the judgment does not cover
them due to their never having been described by blackness at any time.
The view of Avicenna is closer to customary usage (aqrab ilā l-ʿurf).134 (TT
253.3–253.7)

The predicate may relate in a number of ways to the essence of which the
subject is the title:

Text 45.4 The description of the predicate may be true of the essence
of the subject by necessity, or possibly, or actually, or always, according
to what will follow in the investigation of the modal propositions. (TT
253.8–9)

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With these points in hand, al-Taḥtānī begins his exposition of the essential-
ist and externalist readings. Before setting out his exposition, let me take a his-
torical detour and say a few words about how the distinction seems to have first
come about. The distinction first appears in the work of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī
(RM 141.6–10, 142.13–143.1);135 he used it to distinguish the propositions he
wanted to investigate—and which, for the most part, are suitable for interpret-
ing Avicenna’s syllogistic (the essentialist reading)—from those he seems to have
viewed as logically uninteresting or useless for interpreting Avicenna (the exter-
nalist reading). Al-Khūnajī adopted al-Rāzī’s distinction, and used almost the
same words to describe the essentialist reading (ḪK 84.14–84.15). But—and this
is the important point—al-Khūnajī took the essentialist reading to refer not only
to nonexistent things (as al-Rāzī, the first legislator of the reading, intended),
but also to the impossible. So “every C—were it to exist—would be insofar as it
were to exist a B” includes C of which, for example, a constituent part is denied
(“not-animal man”). I am not going to rehearse the arguments for or against this
specific interpretation of al-Khūnajī, but it is the reason that al-Kātibī stresses
in §45—against al-Khūnajī—that the subject only has to do with “every possible
individual” (jīm min al-afrād al-mumkinah) (TT 254.3–u, 255.12–16). Finally, and
here I speculate, it is with al-Khūnajī that the main focus of texts came to settle
on propositions under the externalist reading. I take it that the Risālah from §48
on is best read using the externalist reading.
What is the utility of these readings, and why are they referred to by the
names they have?

Text 45.5 “Every C is B” is considered at times according to the

essence (bi-ḥasab al-ḥaqīqah) (whereupon it is called “essentialist,” as
though the subject is an essence in a proposition used in the sciences), and
at other times according to external reality (whereupon it is called “exter-
nalist,” and what is meant by “external” is what is external to the senses).
(TT 253.10–13)

Note the common shorthand for the readings used in §50: al-khārijiyyat
al-mawḍūʿ, al-ḥaqīqiyyat al-mawḍūʿ. And here is al-Taḥtānī’s exposition of
the reading:

Text 45.6 We mean by the first everything that, were it to exist, would
be C (law wujida kāna jīm)136 among possible individuals (al-afrād al-
mumkinah), and so would be B, insofar as it were to exist. So the judgment

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on it137 is not limited only to what has existence extramentally, but rather
to everything whose existence is hypothesized (quddira), whether it does
or does not exist extramentally. So, if C does not exist, the judgment on it
is on its individuals assumed to exist, as in “every phoenix flies.” If it does
exist, the judgment is not only on its existent individuals, but rather is on
them and on its individual items assumed to exist as well, as in “every man
is an animal.” (TT 253.14–254.2)

Al-Kātibī may have decided to reject al-Khūnajī’s stipulation that the essen-
tialist reading cover the impossible, but he nonetheless adopted important
aspects of al-Khūnajī’s further interpretation of the essentialist reading, which is
to cast the reading into a form using implicative conditionals (see §60). Al-Kātibī
adopts this interpretation in setting out the alternative “the implicant of C is the
implicant of B.” Here is al-Taḥtānī’s account of al-Khūnajī’s interpretation, fol-
lowed by what seems to me a decisive criticism.

Text 45.7 Since connection [in the sense of a conditional] (al-ittiṣāl)

is taken into account in the stipulation [relating to] the subject (fī ʿaqd
al-waḍ ʿ )—that is, [with the expression] “were it to exist it would be C”
(law wujida kāna jīm)—and so too in the stipulation [relating to] the predi-
cate (fī ʿaqd al-ḥaml)—that is, “were it to exist it would be B” (law wujida
kāna bāʾ )—and since connection may be by way of implication (al-luzūm),
as in “if the sun is up, then it is day,” and it may be by way of coincidence, as
in “if man is rational, then donkeys bray,” al-Khūnajī and those who follow
him interpret [the subjunctive phrases] as implication. And so they say
that “everything such that were it to exist it would be C, is such that were
it to exist it would be B” amounts to “everything that is an implicant of C
is an implicant of B.”
I wish I could understand why they are not content with simple con-
nection (muṭlaq al-ittiṣāl), since it follows from their position that most
propositions are excluded from their interpretation; because [the impli-
cation interpretation] only applies (lā yanṭabiqu illā) to a proposition
whose subject-description and predicate-description are implicates of the
essence under the subject (lāzimayn li-dhāt al-mawḍūʿ ). A proposition
with one or both descriptions not implied [by the essence in this way],
however, falls outside [their interpretation]. Further, they are forced to
limit propositions to the necessary—since there is no sense to the neces-
sary proposition other than the implication of the predicate description

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 Commentary, §45

by the essence—indeed, to [propositions] stronger than the necessary,

due to the consideration on this understanding of the proposition that
the subject description must also be implied by the essence, and its not
being taken into account in understanding the necessary proposition.
(TT 256.1–257.9)

With that, we come to the second of the readings, the externalist (al-iʿtibār
al-khārijī). For various reasons, it is easier to come to an unproblematically con-
sistent account of syllogistic inferences using propositions under the externalist
reading, and—although al-Kātibī never states this explicitly—it is the reading
used for the rest of the Risālah.

Text 45.8 What is meant by the second [interpretation of the prop-

osition, the externalist reading,] is every C in extramental reality is B
in extramental reality; and the judgment in it is on what exists in extra-
mental reality, whether it is described as C at the time of the judgment
or before it or after it (because what never exists extramentally cannot
be B extramentally).
He only says “whether at the time of the judgment or before it or after
it” to prevent one imagining (daf ʿan li-tawahhum) that the meaning of “C
is B” is describing C with B-ness at the time of its being described with
C-ness. For the judgment on it is not upon the description of C such that
it is necessary that it be realized extramentally at the same time the judg-
ment is realized. Rather [it should be realized] for the essence of C, so the
judgment only claims that it belongs [to that essence]. It is not necessary
that describing [the essence of C] (ittiṣāfuhu) with C-ness be realized at
the time of the realization of the judgment (fa-lā yajibu taḥaqququhu ḥāl
taḥaqquq al-ḥukm). So if we say “every writer laughs,” it is not among the
conditions on the essence under “writer” as subject that it be writing at
the time of its being described as laughing; rather, it is sufficient for [the
truth of the proposition] that it be described with being-a-writer (bi-l-
kātibiyyah) at a certain time. Thus, our statement “every sleeper wakes” is
true; if the sleeper is described with the two descriptions, it is only at two
[different] times. (TT 257.16–258.pu)

Let me underline the last stipulation. It is true to say “every sleeper is awake”
because the things described at some moment by “sleeper” are at another
moment awake.

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One objection raised against these two accounts of the subject term is that they
fail to deal with every proposition used in philosophical discourse. Consider the
proposition—true as far as the participants in this debate are concerned—that
“the cocreator is impossible.”138 This proposition cannot be expressed under the
essentialist reading as al-Kātibī stipulates it, because “cocreator” is not among
items that are possible (min al-afrād al-mumkinah); nor can it be expressed
under the externalist reading because it has at no time existed extramentally.

Text 45.9 It is not to be said here [that these are] propositions which
cannot be taken in either of the two ways, and they are those whose sub-
jects are impossible, like “the partner of the Creator is impossible” and
“every impossible is nonexistent”; and the art [of logic] (al-fann) should
have general rules (qawāʿid ʿāmmah). Because we say: People do not claim
all propositions are limited to either the externalist or the essentialist, but
rather claim that the propositions used in the sciences are taken for the
most part under one of the two considerations. Therefore, people set them
down and extract their rules (aḥkāmahumā) that these propositions may
thereby be of benefit in the sciences. The rules (aḥkām) for the proposi-
tions that cannot be taken under one these two considerations are not yet
known; generalization of rules (taʿmīm al-qawāʿid) is only according to
human capacity. (TT 258.u–260.1)

Some of the arguments about one- and two-premise modal inferences come
down to how the subject term is understood, others to whether there is a real
distinction between a perpetuity proposition and a necessity. By and large, from
the time of al-Rāzī, a critique had developed against inconsistencies in Avi-
cenna’s account of the subject term, perhaps best summarized by al-Khūnajī,
basing his criticism on inferences Avicenna is—or should be—committed to in
his modal syllogistic, which are, however, inconsistent:

Text 45.10 Perhaps Avicenna hesitated over the conversion of actual-

ity propositions (al-fiʿliyyāt) as either possible or absolute propositions
just because of his hesitation over technical usage. And so, when he says
that they convert as possible propositions, he does not consider affirma-
tion in actuality with respect to the subject; and when he says that they
convert as absolute propositions, he does.139 (ḪK 145.11–pu)

Much of al-Ḥillī’s commentary on syllogistic inferences is directed to show-

ing that there is no such inconsistency, and moreover that the later scholars fail

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to understand the argument, which works on the hypothesis that the possible
occurs (ʿalā taqdīr wuqūʿ al-mumkin). For the moment, let me draw attention to
the arguments al-Ḥillī advances for an alternative account of the subject term.
Al-Ḥillī attacks shortcomings in al-Kātibī’s account of the essentialist reading in
dealing with the mental proposition (see Text 45.9 above); he also agrees with
al-Taḥtānī that the alternative interpretation (“every implicant of C is an impli-
cant of B”) is vulnerable. He notes, further, that Avicenna has already rejected
the externalist reading, presumably expecting his reader to find Avicenna’s
argument cogent:

Text 45.11 The externalist proposition is the doctrine of a certain

ancient scholar, and Avicenna in the Cure rejected it as folly (nasabahu ilā
l-sakhāfah); he explained its falsity (buṭlānahu) by arguing that if we mean
by “every C” what is C among the individuals that occur at a given time, it
is only some of C, not all of it. (ḤQ 254.16–pu)

Al-Ḥillī concludes by restating Avicenna’s position as he understands it:

Text 45.12 Know that the meaning common among most people for
“every C is B” is that every single thing of which C is said—whether veri-
fied or posited (immā taḥqīqan wa-immā farḍan), whether the C-ness is its
essence (dhātahu) or its attribute (ṣifatahu), whether perpetually or not,
whether existent externally or in the intellect or in mental supposition,
and given that it is not impossible of existence in itself (li-dhātihi)—is a
B. On this understanding, impossibilities do not enter under the subject,
nor does what is only potentially C (unless it is assumed to be C). If the
subject is impossible of existence, as for example the void and the atom
(al-jawhar), it may be understood according to the opinion of someone
who holds that it is not impossible; on being described as actually existing
externally, as a vacuum and an atom, judgment is made of it insofar as what
would be judged of it if it were like that.
This is a verification of this subject (taḥqīq hādhā l-mawḍūʿ ), and we
have gone on at length here due to the error of the author and a group of
later scholars with respect to it. (ḤQ 254.u–255.9)

§46140 This lemma and the next are devoted entirely to the implicational rela-
tions among the different quantified propositions under the two readings. This
lemma deals with a-propositions under the two different readings. There are

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 Commentary, §47

situations in which both propositions—the essentialist and the externalist—are

true, but there are also situations in which one is true and the other is not. It is
not possible to assume that one is true (or false) on the basis that the other is
true (or false). Note that al-Ḥillī makes these implicational relations specific to
al-Kātibī’s usage.

Text 46.1 On al-Kātibī’s technical usage, what distinguishes the abso-

lute essentialist from the absolute externalist is that each one may be true
while the other is not.
The essentialist may be true without the externalist because, were we to
suppose there were never any squares in external existence, “every square
is a figure” would be true [as an essentialist]. This is because were a square
to exist it would be a figure (and you know that no existence is stipulated
for this [to be true]); but the externalist would be false, due to the stipula-
tion that its subject exist externally. The externalist may be true without
the essentialist because, were we to suppose that the figures in external
existence were limited to squares, “every figure is a square” would be true
as an externalist proposition, because every figure externally would be a
square externally. But the essentialist proposition would be false, because
the triangle, were it to exist, would be, insofar as it were to exist, a figure,
yet insofar as it were to exist, it would not be a square.
Neither of the two a-propositions is implicationally weaker (aʿamm)
than the other; rather, they overlap in truth-conditions. This is so due to
the difference between the cases in which they are true (li-ftirāqihimā fī
l-ṣidq) given above, and their [common] truth in every matter for whose
individuals it is impossible that there exist anything other than what exists
externally. (ḤQ 255.14–256.8)

§47141 Whereas neither a-proposition under one of the two readings implies
the other—which is to say, neither is stronger (akhaṣṣ) than the other—in both
e- and i-propositions, one proposition is stronger than the other. So, if the
externalist i-proposition is true, the essentialist i-proposition with the same
terms must be true, but not the other way round (see Figure 22); and if the
essentialist e-proposition is true, the externalist e-proposition with the same
terms must be true, but not the other way round (see Figure 23). Finally,
al-Ḥillī claims that if the o-proposition is true in either reading, it will be true
in the other.

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 Commentary, §47

Text 47.1 The essentialist i-proposition is weaker than its a-proposi-

tion, and than the externalist a- and i-propositions. The essentialist e-prop-
osition is stronger than142 the externalist e-proposition (because whenever
the essentialist e-proposition is true, so is the externalist e-proposition, the
members (afrād) of its subject being some of the members of the essen-
tialist). The converse is not the case, due to the truth of the externalist
e-proposition in the example we have given (limiting figures to squares);
for it may be true that “no figure is a triangle” as an externalist, but not
as an essentialist e-proposition, because some of that which, were it to
exist, would be a figure, would be, insofar as it were to exist, a triangle.
The o-propositions [in the two readings] imply each other (wa-l-sālibatān
al-juzʾiyyatān mutalāzimatān). (ḤQ 256.9–15)

I worry there is an error in the text recording the last claim, and I have left it
out of Figure 23. Consider “some figures are not triangles” in a world in which
the only figures are triangles; the proposition is true as an essentialist, but false
as an externalist. I agree with al-Taftāzānī on this (and his treatment incidentally
shows how insights from §§26 and 27 can be put to use).

Text 47.2 The essentialist i-proposition is weaker than the externalist

i-proposition (aʿamm min al-khārijiyyah muṭlaqan), because the judgment
on some externally existent individuals is a judgment on the individuals
hypothesized to exist [for the essentialist reading], but not the reverse
(because it is possible that there is no externally existent individual, so the
predicate will not be affirmed of it [as an externalist proposition]). The
externalist e-proposition is weaker [than the essentialist e-proposition]
because the contradictory of the stronger is weaker. There is partial dis-
junction between the two o-propositions143 (as is the status of the con-
tradictories of overlapping terms) (ḥukm naqīḍ al-ʿumūm min wajh).144
(TŠ 224.9–pu)

The third discussion, on the indefinite and the determinate

The next three lemmata discuss the distinction between propositions with at
least one term negated by a nominal negation (as against propositional nega-
tion introduced in §41), and propositions with both terms positive and deter-
minate (wujūdī muḥaṣṣal). It parallels Avicenna’s discussion in Pointers 3.7 (AI
27.9–29.2), though al-Kātibī does not even mention the question of the relation

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 Commentary, §48

between expressions like “not-seeing” and “blind” and the range of subjects of
which they are legitimately predicated.145 The discussion in §50 underlines one
aspect of the truth-conditions of affirmative and negative propositions (that the
subject of a true affirmative proposition exists, already touched on in the discus-
sion of externalist propositions), an aspect that plays a role in the discussion of
conversion, contraposition, and the fourth figure.

§48146 The criterion that distinguishes a proposition as metathetic (maʿdūlah)

is whether one or both of its extremes is indefinite. Al-Kātibī gives two exam-
ples, the first of a proposition with an indefinite subject (“the not-living is inani-
mate”),147 the second of a proposition with a retracted predicate (“the inanimate
is not-knowing”). Al-Taḥtānī defends al-Kātibī’s decision not to give a third
example with both terms indefinite because the examples given show how each
term is made indefinite (TT 264.3–5). Al-Taḥtānī explains the use of the term
maʿdūlah.

Text 48.1 It is only called “modified” (maʿdūlah) because the parti-

cles of negation, such as laysa and ghayr and lā, were imposed originally
on negation and removal (li-l-salb wa-l-raf ʿ ); if they are set down with
another [expression] as a single thing of which it is affirmed that something
belongs to it, or that it belongs to something else, or of which something is
negated, or that it does not belong to something else, then [the expression]
has been modified by [the negative particle] (ʿudila bi-hi) from its original
imposition to something else. (TT 263.pu–264.2)

Propositions that have both terms positive and determinate (wujūdī muḥaṣṣal)
are determinate (muḥaṣṣalah) if affirmative, and—for al-Kātibī at least—simple
(basīṭah) if negative; his name for the negative may derive from the simplicity
of its terms (TT 264.9–12). Al-Kātibī gives no examples for it because all the
examples of negative propositions up to now (which is to say, the examples in
§§41 and 42) are simple.

§49148 Al-Kātibī recurs to the test for a negative proposition (given in §41) to
ensure that the presence of nominal negation—that is, the negation in an indefi-
nite term—does not mislead his readers.

Text 49.1 You have already come to know that affirmation is projecting
a relation [between subject and predicate] (īqāʿ al-nisbah) and negation is

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 Commentary, §50

removing it (raf ʿuhā), so the important consideration in whether a propo-

sition is affirmative or negative is in the projection or removal of the rela-
tion, and not in [the proposition’s] two extremes. (TT 265.5–6)

§50149 It is with this lemma that the discussion moves beyond definitional
matters. Al-Kātibī only deals with metathetic propositions that have an indefi-
nite predicate and a positive and determinate subject; in fact, he only deals with
the implicational relations between the metathetic affirmative proposition and
the simple negative. The commentators begin by explaining why he limits him-
self in this way.

Text 50.1 The reason for focusing on the second [that is, the difference
between the metathetic affirmative and the simple negative] is that taking
indefiniteness and determination into account in the predicate leads to
a four-fold division . . . determinate affirmative, like “Zayd is a writer”;
determinate negative, like “Zayd is not a writer”; metathetic affirmative,
like “Zayd is a not-writer”; and metathetic negative, like “Zayd is not a
not-writer.” (TT 267.5–12)

Al-Taḥtānī argues that, of the six possible ways these propositions can be
paired, confusion can only arise between the determinate (or simple) negative
and the metathetic affirmative; this is the only pair in which both propositions
have exactly the same number of particles of negation.
The two propositions can be confused not just because of matters to do with
expression (lafẓī), but also because of those that are semantic (maʿnawī).

Text 50.2 The semantic [difference between the two] is that the simple
negative is implicationally weaker (aʿamm) than the affirmative with an
indefinite predicate, which is to say, when the affirmative with an indefi-
nite predicate is true, so is the simple negative, but not [necessarily] the
reverse. (TT 268.8–10)

This is because—and this may be the first time this aspect of the semantics
of affirmative propositions has come up in the Risālah itself—neither the a- nor
i-proposition is true unless the subject exists, whereas the e- and o-propositions
are true if the subject does not exist, or if the subject exists and all (or some,
in the case of the o-proposition) of the items that come under it are such that
the predicate is not true of them. So “every Martian is not-green” is true only if

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 Commentary, §51

there are Martians and they are not green, whereas “no Martian is green” is true
if there are no Martians, or if they are not green.
Al-Kātibī immediately goes on to clarify that this implicational relation holds
for both readings of the proposition that have just been set out in §§45–47; that
is, the externalist and the essentialist.

Text 50.3 [Al-Kātibī’s text here] is as though it is an answer to a ques-

tion that has been posed—namely, if you mean by the phrase “affirmation
invokes the existence of the subject” that affirmation invokes the existence
of the subject in external reality (fī l-khārij), then the essentialist affirma-
tive is fundamentally never true, because the judgment in it is not limited
to subjects that exist in external reality. (TT 270.11–14)

I conclude with the summary al-Ḥillī offers on implication and indefinite

terms.

Text 50.4 The result of this (al-ḥāṣil) is that if the two propositions
differ in quality and agree in indefiniteness and determination, they con-
tradict; and if [the situation] is the reverse, they cannot be true together
as affirmatives or false together as negatives; and if they differ in these two
considerations, then the affirmative is stronger than the negative. (ḤQ
258.14–16)

Which is to make the following claims: (1) “A is not-B” is the contradictory

of “A is not not-B”; (2a) “A is B” and “A is not-B” cannot be true together but
they can be false together; (2b) “A is not B” and “A is not not-B” cannot be false
together but they can be true together; and (3) “A is B” implies “A is not not-B,”
but not the reverse.
The distinction in expression between these propositions is sensitive to
whether the proposition used is three-part or two-part (see the distinction
in §40). If three-part, what matters is where the negative particle comes with
respect to the copula; if two-part, what matters is whether the negative particle
is one specifically set aside for nominal or propositional negation.

The fourth discussion, on modal propositions

§51150 In the fourth discussion, al-Kātibī develops further the fundamental
aspects of modal logic. With this lemma, al-Kātibī deals with issues that Avi-
cenna deals with in Pointers 4.1 (AI 32.1–10). Al-Kātibī does not use the term, but

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 Commentary, §51

he analyzes the proposition here as four-part (rubāʿiyyah), completing the anal-

ysis into two-part (thunāʾiyyah) and three-part (thulāthiyyah) he began in §40.
A four-part proposition will make the copula explicit in the way it is expressed,
and also the modality by which the predicate belongs to the subject.

Text 51.1 We have already explained that the proposition comprises

three parts: that on which judgment is passed, the judgment made on it,
and the relation between the two. Know now that the relation, whether
affirmative or negative, inevitably has a quality (kayfiyyah) in the fact of
the matter (fī nafs al-amr), which is necessity or perpetuity, nonnecessity
or non-perpetuity, or others that arise; in the fact of the matter, a proposi-
tion cannot be without this quality. This quality is called the matter of the
proposition. What is understood (al-maʿqūl) or expressed (al-malfūẓ) of
this quality is called the mode of the proposition. For example, the rela-
tion of animal to man in the fact of the matter is necessary (al-wujūb).
Suppose we were not aware of this quality, the relation in what we under-
stand would be the relation of general possibility; then the mode of the
proposition would differ from the matter on one kind of consideration.
(ḤQ 259.apu–260.7)

Al-Kātibī is not limiting matter and its corresponding modes to the four he
lists in the lemma (TŠ 232.2); they are given by way of example. Every proposi-
tion, even if expressed as a two-part proposition, has in itself both a copula and a
mode. Although contingent matter is expressed as māddat al-imkān, and remote
or impossible matter is expressed as māddat al-imtināʿ, note that natural or nec-
essary matter is expressed as māddat al-wujūb, which is to say, it is signified by a
term different from the term signifying the mode.
Al-Ḥillī in Text 51.1 may not be setting out al-Kātibī’s position on the topic
in exact terms; he claims that “what is understood or expressed . . . is called the
mode,” whereas al-Kātibī stipulates that “the expression signifying” the matter
of the proposition is the mode. On the face of it, al-Kātibī takes a mode to be an
expression signifying the matter of the proposition, not an expression signifying
what the speaker takes to be the matter.

Text 51.2 According to the technical usage of the ancients, matter is

the quality of the affirmative relation in terms of necessity, possibility, and
impossibility, and mode is the expression signifying what someone con-
siders to be the quality of that relation, whether it is the matter itself, or

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 Commentary, §52

more general or more particular than it, or distinct from it. So the mode
on this understanding can also differ from the matter in the true proposi-
tion, as “man is an animal by one-sided possibility” so the matter is neces-
sary (al-wujūb) and the mode is something more general than [necessity].
Since the technical usage of the ancients is not adequate to providing a
detailed account of propositions, the later scholars modified it (ʿadala
ʿanhu). (TŠ 233.12–234.1)

Finally, let me draw attention to two other uses of māddah in the Risālah. The
first came earlier, in commentary on §45, where al-Taḥtānī says that al-Kātibī
uses dummy letters rather than concrete terms to avoid the misconception
that the logical point is specific to a certain matter; al-Taḥtānī is using “matter”
simply to refer to the concrete terms of a proposition. Here in §51, in dealing
with propositional matter, the relation between the meanings of the subject
term and the predicate term is assessed as a function of the necessity, possibil-
ity, and impossibility of the semantic relation between the two (irrespective of
the person asserting the relation). Later, from §116 on, the notion of syllogis-
tic matter (mawādd al-aqyisah) is introduced. There, the relation between the
meanings of the subject and the predicate is assessed in terms of epistemic con-
siderations, dealing with how we came to bring the meanings into relation with
each other, and how certain we can be that we were right to do so.

§52151 After al-Rāzī, it became common to speak of “the thirteen propositions

into which it is usual to inquire”; that is, the thirteen modal propositions that are
central to al-Kātibī’s investigation. A few more over and above the thirteen come
up in the discussion as their contradictories, or as conclusions to inferences, but
do not make it onto the “official” list.152 In Appendix 1, I offer a unified list of
the propositions in the order al-Kātibī presents them, the way they are referred
to by Rescher in his groundbreaking work (which I adopt for the translation of
the Risālah, and of the commentators),153 and the way Strobino refers to cor-
responding propositions in Avicenna’s work.154 In Appendix 2, I offer a fuller
list, with these thirteen propositions set out in AEIO forms, along with other
propositions assumed or referred to by al-Kātibī but not among the thirteen.
A few points should be made before the propositions are presented. The first
has to do with how the modal propositions are generated. Taking four modali-
ties and four temporality conditions as primitives allows the generation of four-
teen simple propositions; these may then be made into compound propositions.

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 Commentary, §52

The modalities are (1) necessity (L), (2) perpetuity (A), (3) actuality (X), and
(4) possibility (M). (3) “C is at least once B” deserves special mention. The
muṭlaqah proposition—muṭlaqah is used to translate the term for the assertoric
proposition in Aristotle’s Prior Analytics—has the elided temporal operator,
“at least once.”
Al-Kātibī never devotes a section of the Risālah to set out the temporality
conditions, though they come up throughout the presentation of the modal
propositions that begins at §52. Here is how al-Kātibī’s colleague al-Ṭūsī intro-
duces them in his commentary on Avicenna’s Pointers, where they are gathered
and formalized. A proposition may be under a condition (mashrūṭah):

Text 52.1 Either [1] by the duration of the existence of the essence
(dhāt) of the subject, or [2] by the duration of the existence of the descrip-
tion of the subject set down with the subject, or [3] by the duration of the
predicate as predicate. These three are conditioned by what is included in
the proposition. Or it can be [4] according to a definite time, or [5] accord-
ing to an indefinite time; these two are conditioned by what is extrinsic to
the proposition. It is as though [Avicenna] says that a condition is either
intrinsic or extrinsic to the proposition. The intrinsic [condition] is either
connected to the subject or connected to the predicate. What is connected
to the subject is either [the subject] itself, or a description set down with
it. [The condition] connected to the predicate is one thing, because [the
predicate] is also a description and it has no essence distinct from that of
the subject. The extrinsic is relative either to a definite time, or to an indefi-
nite time. (ṬḤ 265.5–266.3)

The temporality conditions that matter for al-Kātibī are (1) as long as the
substance underlying the subject term exists (no symbol, the referential read-
ing), (2) as long as the substance underlying the subject term is described by the
subject term (subscripted D), (4) at a specified time (subscripted T), and (5) at
some unspecified time (subscripted X). Simple propositions can be conjoined
with other simple propositions to form compound propositions, such as two-
sided possibility, “every C is possibly B and possibly not B”; being two-sided
is noted with a subscripted 2 (except for the nonnecessary existential, X~L; M2
might be better as M~L).
Obviously, with the four modalities, the four temporality conditions, and the
possibility of forming compound propositions, many more than just thirteen
propositions can be constructed. How did the thirteen propositions presented

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 Commentary, §52

in the Risālah come to be the ones traditionally investigated? There is a story

here (about interpretive preferences), but this is how al-Khūnajī puts it after set-
ting out the conditions and modalities:

Text 52.2 If you know this much about the differentiation of proposi-
tions according to their modalities, you can take account of the modality
however you like and construct propositions from them as much as you
want. Those about which we shall speak, the propositions mentioned with
respect to their conversions and contradictories and syllogistic reasoning
(whether in simple or mixed [modal premise sets]) are thirteen; you will
know from them the valuations of the remainder of those mentioned, and
of others that can be constructed from them. (ḪK 104.7–11)

Al-Rāzī also mentions thirteen propositions; I think he may be the first to

have come to this set. In any event, he speaks of these thirteen when he comes to
deal with syllogisms with mixed modality premises in the Mulakhkhaṣ:

Text 52.3 You have come to know that the propositions make up fifteen
species, but we will not devote attention to the strongest possible proposi-
tion or the future possible proposition, because anyone who knows the
valuations of the one-sided and two-sided possible propositions in the four
figures will find it easy to account for the valuations of the other two [pos-
sible propositions], except in some rare cases for which such consideration
must be defined. We take account of the valuation of the remaining propo-
sitions. (RM 272.4–apu)

For my comments, but not for the translation, I have adopted a number of
conventions from Paul Thom’s Medieval Modal Systems and extended them to
deal with the propositions customarily investigated in the Arabic logical tradi-
tion. In consequence, a proposition in which a property is said to belong neces-
sarily to a subject is not referred to as a “necessary proposition” but a “necessity
proposition,” and one in which a property is said to belong possibly to a sub-
ject is not referred to as a “possible proposition” but a “possibility proposition.”
I extend this terminology to the temporal modalities of the Arabic logicians, and
refer to a proposition asserting that a property always belongs to a subject as a
“perpetuity proposition.” Were “actuality proposition” not the obvious way to
translate fiʿliyyah, that would be how I would refer to the muṭlaqah; in the event,
I have continued with Rescher’s “absolute.”

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 Commentary, §52

For my comments (but, again, not for the translations), I tend to a conven-
tion Thom institutes that respects natural English usage, whereby he gives the
modality in negative propositions as the dual of the modality in the affirmative
propositions. So the necessity (L) a-proposition is “every C is necessarily B,” but
its e-proposition is “no C is possibly B”; similarly, its i-proposition is “some C
is necessarily B,” while its o-proposition is “some C is not possibly B.” The pos-
sibility (M1) a-proposition is “every C is possibly B,” its e-proposition is “no C is
necessarily B,” its i-proposition is “some C is possibly B,” and its o-proposition is
“some C is not necessarily B.” This convention may be extended from the alethic
(“necessarily,” “possibly”) to the temporal modalities (“always,” “at least once”).
Thus, the perpetuity (A) a-proposition is “every C is always B,” its e-proposition
is “no C is ever B,” its i-proposition is “some C is always B,” and its o-proposition
is “some C is not ever B.” So too, the absolute (X1) a-proposition is “every C is at
least once B,” its e-proposition is “no C is always B,” its i-proposition is “some C
is at least once B,” and its o-proposition is “some C is not always B.”
The compound propositions (or two-sided, or “special”: al-khāṣṣah) are
simple propositions conjoined with a rider agreeing in quantity and disagree-
ing in quality. If it is a two-sided possibility proposition (M2) or a nonnecessary
absolute proposition (X~L), the rider is a possibility proposition; in every other
case (for al-Kātibī) it is an absolute proposition. If the compound proposition is
an i- or o-proposition, the second conjunct must be understood to refer to the
individuals under the subject of the first conjunct; for example: “some Cs are at
least once B while C, and those same Cs are not always B” (see §71). The com-
pound is expressed in the shorthand: “some Cs are at least once B while C, not
always.” I often expand this shorthand in my comments.
I follow al-Kātibī’s order of exposition from §52 on, going on at the end of §52
and §59 to mention simple and compound propositions beyond the thirteen that
come up later. For the relative strength of the propositions, see Figures 24 and
25.155 In introducing each proposition, I give Strobino’s symbolic name for the
proposition (or a lightly modified alternative), followed by Rescher’s translation
of the Arabic term, the Arabic term, and Strobino’s alternative term. I then give
the examples of the a- and e-propositions from my translation of the Risālah,
followed by a second English version I take to be more idiomatic, and then the
original Arabic. In the second appendix, I set out a summary of all four quanti-
fied propositions in each modality.

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 Commentary, §52

1. L: absolute necessary proposition (ḍarūriyyah muṭlaqah); referential

necessity.

Necessarily, every man is an animal (every man is necessarily an animal; bi-l-

ḍarūrah kull insān ḥayawān); necessarily, no man is a stone (no man is possibly
a stone; bi-l-ḍarūrah lā shayʾ min al-insān bi-ḥajar).

2. A: absolute perpetual proposition (dāʾimah muṭlaqah); referential

perpetuity.

Always, every man is an animal (every man is always an animal; dāʾiman kull
insān ḥayawān); always, no man is a stone (no man is ever a stone; dāʾiman lā
shayʾ min al-insān bi-ḥajar).

3. LD1: general conditional (mashrūṭah ʿāmmah); descriptional unre-

stricted necessity.

Necessarily, every writer moves his fingers as long as he is writing (every-

one writing necessarily moves his fingers as long as he is writing; bi-l-ḍarūrah
kull kātib mutaḥarrik al-aṣābiʿ mā dāma kātiban); necessarily, no writer has his
fingers still as long as he is writing (no one writing possibly has his fingers still
as long as he is writing; bi-l-ḍarūrah lā shayʾ min al-kātib bi-sākin al-aṣābiʿ mā
dāma kātiban).

4. AD1: general conventional (ʿurfiyyah ʿāmmah); descriptional unrestricted

perpetuity.

Always, every writer moves his fingers as long as he is writing (everyone

writing always moves his fingers as long as he is writing; dāʾiman kull kātibin
mutaḥarrik al-aṣābiʿ mā dāma kātiban); always, no writer has his fingers still as
long as he is writing (no one writing ever has his fingers still as long as he is writ-
ing; dāʾiman lā shayʾ min al-kātib bi-sākin al-aṣābiʿ mā dāma kātiban). Note that
dāʾiman is normally left out (for example, ḤQ 296.4), being understood from
the mā dāma.
Al-Kātibī’s examples of descriptional necessity and perpetuity propositions
have denominative subjects and predicates. The descriptional is able to display
predicates that necessarily or always belong to a subject under a given descrip-
tion, but perhaps do not belong necessarily or always to the underlying sub-
stance of which the subject term is the title (ʿunwān; see Text 45.2 above). But
the descriptional is still true with univocal subject and predicate (it is implied by,

172 172
 Commentary, §52

but does not imply, the referential, so it is weaker (aʿamm) than the referential):
“every man is necessarily an animal as long as he is described as a man.” It does
not come up in the Risālah, but the default proposition in Avicennian demon-
stration theory is AD1, the descriptional perpetuity proposition (for example,
Avicenna, Najāt [AN §§123, 133]).156

5. X1: general absolute (muṭlaqah ʿāmmah); referential one-sided

absoluteness.

By general absoluteness, every man is breathing (every man is at least once

breathing; bi-l-iṭlāq al-ʿāmm kull insān mutanaffis); by general absoluteness,
no man is breathing (no man is always breathing; bi-l-iṭlāq al-ʿāmm lā shayʾ
min al-insān bi-mutanaffis). Variants: §55: kull insān ḍāḥik bi-l-fiʿl (every man
actually laughs).

6. M1: general possible (mumkinah ʿāmmah); referential one-sided

possibility.

By general possibility, every fire is hot (every fire is possibly hot; bi-l-imkān
al-ʿāmm kull nār ḥārrah); by general possibility, no fire is cold (no fire is neces-
sarily cold; bi-l-imkān al-ʿāmm lā shayʾ min al-nār bi-bārid).
Al-Kātibī explicitly or implicitly calls on eight further simple propositions
(numbered as given in the second appendix).

14. LT1: absolute temporal (al-waqtiyyah al-muṭlaqah); assumed in working

out the contradictories for LT2 as one of its component propositions, and
also the conclusion to some first-figure syllogistic mixes.

Necessarily, every C is B at time T (every C is necessarily B at time T; kull jīm

bāʾ bi-l-ḍarūrah fī waqt muʿayyan); necessarily, no C is B at time T (no C is pos-
sibly B at time T; lā shayʾ min jīm bāʾ bi-l-ḍarūrah fī waqt muʿayyan).

15. LX1: absolute spread (al-muntashirah al-muṭlaqah); assumed in working

out the contradictories for LX2 as one of its component propositions, and
also the conclusion to some first-figure syllogistic mixes.

Necessarily, every C is B at some time (every C is necessarily B at some time;

kull jīm bāʾ bi-l-ḍarūrah fī waqt mā); necessarily, no C is B at time T (no C is pos-
sibly B at time T; lā shayʾ min jīm bāʾ bi-l-ḍarūrah fī waqt mā).

173 173
 Commentary, §52

16. XT1: temporal absolute (al-muṭlaqah al-waqtiyyah); conclusion in some

first- and second-figure mixes.

By general absoluteness, every C is B at time T (every C is actually B at time

T; kull jīm bāʾ bi-l-fiʿl fī waqt muʿayyan); by general absoluteness, no C is B at
time T (no C is actually B at time T; lā shayʾ min jīm bāʾ bi-l-fiʿl fī waqt muʿayyan).

17. XX1: spread absolute (al-muṭlaqah al-muntashirah); a conclusion in some

first- and second-figure mixes.

By general absoluteness, every C is B at some time (every C is actually B

at some time; kull jīm bāʾ bi-l-fiʿl fī waqt mā); by general absoluteness, no C is
B at some time (no C is actually B at some time; lā shayʾ min jīm bāʾ bi-l-fiʿl fī
waqt mā).

18. MT1: temporal possible (al-mumkinah al-waqtiyyah); given as contradic-

tory of LT1, a component of LT2. The Arabic is given for the o-proposi-
tion in ḤQ 296.12–14, though with fī dhālika l-waqt for fī waqt muʿayyan.

Possibly, every C is B at time T (every C is possibly B at time T; kull jīm bāʾ

bi-l-imkān fī waqt muʿayyan); possibly, no C is B at time T (no C is necessarily B
at time T; lā shayʾ min jīm bāʾ bi-l-imkān fī waqt muʿayyan).

19. MA: perpetual possible (al-mumkinah al-dāʾimah); given as contradic-

tory of LX1, a component of LX2. The Arabic is given for the o-propo-
sition in ḤQ 296.15–16, where, however, it is given as the possible per-
petual (al-dāʾimah al-mumkinah); I have followed the name for it given
in ḪK 126.11, and Rescher and vander Nat, “Theory of Modal Syllogistic,”
25.

Always, every C is possibly B (kull jīm bāʾ bi-l-imkān dāʾiman); always, no C

is necessarily B (lā shayʾ min jīm bāʾ bi-l-imkān dāʾiman).

20. XD1: absolute continuing (al-ḥīniyyah al-muṭlaqah); given as the contra-

dictory of AD1, and as the conclusion to a number of third- and fourth-
figure syllogistic mixes. The ḥīna-clause is given in some examples as fī
baʿḍ awqāt kawnihi jīm, as for example in §69.3: “Everyone afflicted with
pleurisy may cough at times while afflicted” (kull man bi-hi dhāt al-janb
yumkinu an yasʿala fī baʿḍ awqāt kawnihi majnūban). Bi-l-iṭlāq al-ʿāmm
could be put at the beginning or end of the proposition.

174 174
 Commentary, §53

Every C is [at least once] B while it is C (every C is at least once B while C;

kull jīm bāʾ ḥīna huwa jīm); no C is [always] B while it is C (no C is always B
while C; lā shayʾ min jīm bāʾ ḥīna huwa jīm).

21. MD1: possible continuing (al-ḥīniyyah al-mumkinah); given as the con-

tradictory of LD1. As with XD1, the ḥīna-clause can be replaced with fī
baʿḍ awqāt kawnihi jīm; bi-l-imkān al-ʿāmm can be replaced as in the
example given for 19; alternatively, below it would be replaced by the
modalized copula, yumkinu an yakūna.

Every C is possibly B while C (bi-l-imkān al-ʿāmm kull jīm bāʾ ḥīna huwa
jīm); no C is necessarily B while C (bi-l-imkān al-ʿāmm lā shayʾ min jīm bāʾ ḥīna
huwa jīm).
Both XD1 and MD1 are stronger than their corresponding referential propo-
sitions (that is, X1 and M2), because they stipulate not only that the predicate
holds of what underlies the subject in a given way, but also that it holds of what
underlies the subject in a given way at some time that the subject is true of it.

§53157 The compound propositions are made up of one of the simple modals
conjoined with a second proposition that is, first, taken to be anaphorically
linked to the same items under the subject of the first proposition (see §71).
Second, it is a one-sided possibility proposition (M1) when the compound prop-
osition as a whole is said to be nonnecessary—that is, for the general possibility
(M2) and the nonnecessary existential (X~L)—and otherwise a one-sided abso-
lute (X1). Finally, it is the same quantity but the opposite quality of the proposi-
tion it restricts (§59.2).

7. LD2: special conditional (mashrūṭah khāṣṣah); descriptional restricted

necessity.

Necessarily, every writer moves his fingers as long as he is writing, not always
(everyone writing necessarily moves his fingers as long as he is writing, and no
writer is always moving his fingers; bi-l-ḍarūrah kull kātib mutaḥarrik al-aṣābiʿ
mā dāma kātiban lā dāʾiman); necessarily, no writer has his fingers still as long as
he is writing, not always (no one writing possibly has his fingers still as long as he
is writing, and every writer at least once has his fingers still; bi-l-ḍarūrah lā shayʾ
min al-kātib bi-sākin al-aṣābiʿ mā dāma kātiban lā dāʾiman).

175 175
 Commentary, §54

§54158

8. AD2: special conventional (ʿurfiyyah khāṣṣah); descriptional restricted

perpetuity.

Always, every writer moves his fingers as long as he is writing, not always
(everyone writing always moves his fingers as long as he is writing, and no writer
is always moving his fingers; dāʾiman kull kātib mutaḥarrik al-aṣābiʿ mā dāma
kātiban lā dāʾiman); always, no writer has his fingers still as long as he is writ-
ing, not always (no one writing ever has his fingers still as long as he is writing,
and every writer at least once has his fingers still; dāʾiman lā shayʾ min al-kātib
bi-sākin al-aṣābiʿ mā dāma kātiban lā dāʾiman).

§55159

9. X~L: nonnecessary existential (wujūdiyyah lā-ḍarūriyyah); referential

nonnecessary absoluteness.

Every man is actually laughing, not necessarily (every man is at least once
laughing, and no man is necessarily laughing; kull insān ḍāḥik bi-l-fiʿl lā bi-l-
ḍarūrah); no man is actually laughing, not necessarily (no man is always laugh-
ing, and every man is possibly laughing; lā shayʾ min al-insān ḍāḥik bi-l-fiʿl lā
bi-l-ḍarūrah).

§56160

10. X2: non-perpetual existential (wujūdiyyah lā-dāʾimah); referential two-

sided absoluteness.

Every man is actually laughing, not always (every man is at least once laugh-
ing, and no man is always laughing; kullu insān ḍāḥik bi-l-fiʿl lā dāʾiman); no man
is actually laughing, not necessarily (no man is always laughing, and every man
is at least once laughing; lā shayʾ min al-insān ḍāḥik bi-l-fiʿl lā dāʾiman). As with
the two-sided possibility proposition, a- and e-propositions are made up of the
same components but in reverse order. (Al-Kātibī gives no examples here; those
I offer are modified from the preceding proposition.)

176 176
 Commentary, §57

§57161

11. LT2: temporal (waqtiyyah); referential temporal determinate.

Necessarily, every moon is eclipsed at the time of the earth’s coming between
it and the sun, not always (every moon is necessarily eclipsed at the time of the
earth’s coming between it and the sun, and no moon is always eclipsed; bi-l-
ḍarūrah kull qamar munkhasif waqt ḥaylūlat al-arḍ baynahu wa-bayna l-shams
lā dāʾiman); necessarily, no moon is eclipsed at the time of quadrature, not
always (no moon is possibly eclipsed at the time of quadrature, and every moon
is at least once eclipsed; bi-l-ḍarūrah lā shayʾ min al-qamar bi-munkhasif waqt
al-tarbī ʿ lā dāʾiman).
Al-Kātibī names the first component of each of these compounds the abso-
lute temporal (waqtiyyah muṭlaqah), noted above at the end of commentary on
the simple propositions.

§58162

12. LX2: spread (muntashirah); referential temporal indeterminate.

Necessarily, every man breathes at a given time, not always (every man nec-
essarily inhales at some time, and no man is always inhaling; bi-l-ḍarūrah kull
insān mutanaffis fī waqt mā lā dāʾiman); necessarily, no man breathes at some
time, not always (no man possibly inhales at some time, and every man is at
least once inhaling; bi-l-ḍarūrah lā shayʾ min al-insān bi-mutanaffis fī waqt mā
lā dāʾiman).
As before, al-Kātibī names the first component of each of these compounds
the absolute spread (muntashirah muṭlaqah), noted above at the end of the com-
ments on the simple propositions.

§59163

13. M2: special possible (mumkinah khāṣṣah); referential two-sided

possibility.164

This is the last of the thirteen propositions, the special possible (al-mum-
kinah al-khāṣṣah), the two-sided possible. By special possibility, every man
is writing (every man is possibly writing, and no man is necessarily writing;
bi-l-imkān al-khāṣṣ kull insān kātib); by special possibility, no man is writing

177 177
 Commentary, §59

(no man is necessarily writing, and every man is possibly writing; bi-l-imkān
al-khāṣṣ lā shayʾ min al-insān bi-kātib). As in the case of the non-perpetual exis-
tential, the a- and e-propositions are made up of the same components set out
in a different order.
In the treatment of conversion, the propositions appear with the adver-
bial phrase—“by necessity,” or “by general absoluteness,” or whatever—at the
end of the proposition, thus: baʿḍ bāʾ jīm bi-l-iṭlāq al-ʿāmm, baʿḍ bāʾ laysa bāʾ
bi-l-ḍarūrah, baʿḍ bāʾ laysa bāʾ dāʾiman (§75). The modality is unstated in the
absolute continuing (§76.1), and, as mentioned, the use of ḥīna rather than mā
dāma indicates that the modality is either general absoluteness or possibility
(and, obviously, the use of mā dāma signals either necessity or perpetuity; §78).
As mentioned in presenting the general absolute, it can be formulated as kull
jīm bāʾ bi-l-fiʿl (in §76.2). A number of differently modalized propositions are
occasionally referred to with phrases like kull jīm bāʾ bi-iḥdā l-jihāt al-arbaʿ
al-madhkūrah (§78.1, §78.4).
Al-Kātibī mentions six more compound propositions as conclusions to infer-
ences; again, I number them as they appear in the second appendix.

22. L2: non-perpetual necessary (impossible proposition) (al-ḍarūriyyah

al-lā-dāʾimah), given as conclusion to a first-figure mix.

Every C is necessarily B, not always (every C is necessarily B, and no C is

always B; bi-l-ḍarūrah kull jīm bāʾ lā dāʾiman); necessarily, no C is B, not always
(no C is possibly B, and every C is at least once B; bi-l-ḍarūrah lā shayʾ min jīm
bāʾ lā dāʾiman).

23. A2: non-perpetual perpetual (impossible proposition) (al-dāʾimah al-lā-

dāʾimah), given as conclusion to some first-figure mixes.

Always, every C is B, not always (every C is always B, and no C is always B;

dāʾiman kull jīm bāʾ lā dāʾiman); always, no C is B, not always (no C is ever B,
and every C is at least once B; dāʾiman lā shayʾ min jīm bāʾ lā dāʾiman).

24. AD(2): non-perpetual-for-some conventional (al-ʿurfiyyah lā dāʾimah fi

l-baʿḍ), given as converse of certain propositions, and as conclusion for
some fourth-figure mixes.

Always, every C is B as long as it is C, not always for some (every C is always

B as long as it is C, and some C is not always B; dāʾiman kull jīm bāʾ mā dāma jīm
lā dāʾiman fi l-baʿḍ); always, no C is B as long as it is C, not always for some (no

178 178
 Commentary, §59

C is ever B as long as it is C, and some C is at least once B; dāʾiman lā shayʾ min

jīm bāʾ mā dāma jīm lā dāʾiman fi l-baʿḍ).

25. XT2: non-perpetual temporal absolute (al-muṭlaqah al-waqtiyyah al-lā-

dāʾimah); given as conclusion for a first-figure mix.

Every C is B at time T, not always (every C is B at time T, and no C is always

B; kull jīm bāʾ fī waqt muʿayyan lā dāʾiman); no C is B at time T, not always (no C
is B at time T, and every C is at least once B; lā shayʾ min jīm bāʾ fī waqt muʿayyan
lā dāʾiman).

26. XX2: non-perpetual spread absolute (al-muṭlaqah al-muntashirah al-lā-

dāʾimah); given as a conclusion for a first-figure mix.

Every C is B at some time, not always (every C is B at some time, and no C is

always B; kull jīm bāʾ fī waqt mā lā dāʾiman); no C is B at some time, not always
(no C is B at some time, and every C is at least once B; lā shayʾ min jīm bāʾ fī waqt
mā lā dāʾiman).

27. XD2: non-perpetual absolute continuing (al-ḥīniyyah al-muṭlaqah

al-lā-dāʾimah).

Every C is [at least once] B while it is C, not always (every C is at least once
B while C, and no C is always B; kull jīm bāʾ ḥīna huwa jīm lā dāʾiman); no C is
[always] B while it is C, not always (no C is always B while C, and every C is at
least once B; lā shayʾ min jīm bāʾ ḥīna huwa jīm lā dāʾiman).

The second section, on the divisions of the hypothetical proposition

As noted in commentary on §39 above, the material presented in §§60–66

goes much more deeply into matters first touched on in §39. These seven lem-
mata begin with §60, which introduces the technical terms for the parts of the
propositions. It goes on to divide the following (luzūm) in conditionals into
what is now commonly translated as implicative (luzūmiyyah) and coinciden-
tal (ittifāqiyyah), and concludes by setting out the three kinds of disjunction
(exclusive, inclusive, and what I call alternative denial).165 Lemma 61 sets out the
incompatibility in disjunctives as either oppositional (ʿinādiyyah) or coinciden-
tal, with examples of coincidental incompatibility in the three kinds of disjunc-
tion. Lemma 62 deals with how to negate hypothetical propositions. Lemma 63
sets out the possible combination of true and false component propositions,

179 179
 Commentary, §60

which, over and above the strong following stipulated in §60, determine the
truth-conditions for the implicative conditional; §64 sets out the parallel com-
binations for disjunctives. One of Avicenna’s notable innovations in dealing with
the hypothetical propositions was to quantify conditionals and disjunctives, and
§65 stipulates what it is for a hypothetical proposition to be universal or par-
ticular, and then lists the expressions used to indicate quantification. Lemma
66 closes this section of al-Kātibī’s treatment of the hypotheticals by gesturing
toward the more complex hypothetical propositions that can be built up out of
the simple ones already introduced.

§60166 Lemma 60.1 presents the terms of art for the parts of hypothetical
propositions, whether conditional or disjunctive; the first component is the
antecedent, the second the consequent. For the disjunctive, as al-Kātibī notes
later, the distinction between the components is merely a question of place-
ment of the disjuncts. Lemma 60.2 turns to issues of real substance, and I quote
al-Ḥillī. Note the examples offered for the implicative (which exhibit a strong
relation between antecedent and consequent like causality and correlation) and
coincidental conditionals (for which truth of the components is enough). Note
also that al-Kātibī and Avicenna have different definitions for the coincidental.

Text 60.1 The conditional divides into the implicative and the coinci-
dental, and that which covers both is the associative (al-istiṣḥāb).167 Impli-
cation is the relation of necessity, coincidence the relation of [two-sided]
possibility, while association is the relation of general possibility.
The implicative is that in which the truth of the consequent is [depen-
dent] on the assumption (taqdīr) of the truth of the antecedent due to a
connection (ʿalāqah) between the two that requires the association of one
with the other in truth, like causality and correlation (al-ʿilliyyah wa-l-
taḍāyuf). So, when a cause exists, so does its effect, as in “if the sun is up,
then it is day”; for the sun’s being up is cause for it being day. Similarly, if
one of two correlatives is true the other is true, as in “if father exists, then
child exists.”
The coincidental has two interpretations. The first—the one the
author uses—is that in which the consequent is true with the antecedent
(mujāmiʿan li-l-muqaddam fī l-ṣidq) without any connection between the
two, as in “if man is rational, then donkey brays.” The second interpretation
is that the consequent in [the conditional] is true in fact (fī nafs al-amr),

180 180
 Commentary, §60

whether the antecedent is true or false. This is the interpretation Avicenna

used in the Cure, and it is weaker than the first.168 (ḤQ 276.6–277.2)

Lemma 60.3 turns to the three kinds of disjunctive proposition, implicitly

dealing with the strength of disjunction by giving examples that—so we are told
in §61—exhibit the stronger oppositional relation between the disjuncts (exam-
ples for the weaker coincidental relation are given in §61). I translate māniʿat
al-jamʿ as alternative denial (“this thing is either a stone or a tree”): it could be
one or the other, or neither, but it cannot be both. The exclusive has contradic-
tories or opposites as disjuncts (“this number is either even or odd”): it can only
be one or the other. And the inclusive disjunction (“either Zayd is in the water or
else he will not drown”): it can be one or the other, or both; it cannot be neither.
The fact that these relations are modalized comes out strongly in al-Ḥillī’s com-
mentary on the lemma. First, alternative denial (māniʿat al-jamʿ ):

Text 60.2 It has two interpretations. The first—used by the author—

is that in which it is judged that the two parts are incompatible in truth
though not in falsity, as in “either this is a stone or a tree”; for the judgment
here is only of the impossibility of conjunction in truth (imtināʿ al-ijtimāʿ
ʿalā l-ṣidq) not in falsity, due to the possibility of their being false together
(li-jawāz kidhbihimā maʿan). And it comes about (taḥdath) from the prop-
osition and what is more particular (akhaṣṣ) than its contradictory (for
tree is more particular than not-stone).
The second interpretation is that in which it is judged that it is impos-
sible to conjoin its two parts in truth. This sense is weaker than the first,
and covers both the first and the real disjunction. (ḤQ 277.apu–278.6)

Al-Kātibī’s preferred usage is that the alternative denial “either P or Q” means

“not-possible (P and Q), and possible (not-P and not-Q)”; the weaker usage is
“not-possible (P and Q).” As for inclusive disjunction (māniʿat al-khulūw):

Text 60.3 It also has two interpretations. The first is that it is that in
which it is judged only to be impossible to conjoin its two parts in falsity, as
in “either Zayd is in the water or he is not drowned”; for the judgment here
is that it is impossible to conjoin them in falsity, for it is impossible that
he not be in the water and drowned. It comes about from the proposition
and what is more general (aʿamm) than its contradictory, for “he does not
drown” is more general than his not being in the water.

181 181
 Commentary, §61

The second interpretation holds that in [this disjunction] it is judged

that it is impossible to conjoin the two parts in falsity. This sense is weaker
than the first, and covers both the first and the exclusive (al-ḥaqīqiyyah).
(ḤQ 278.10–u)

In Texts 60.2 and 60.3, the first interpretations (the stronger) are stronger by
virtue of the “only,” which is effectively a conjunct, “yet it is possible.” So, for
the stronger inclusive disjunction we have “not-possible (not-P and not-Q), and
possible (P and Q),” and for the weaker, “not-possible (not-P and not-Q).” As
al-Ḥillī notes, the weaker senses of both alternative denial and inclusive disjunc-
tion are true of the exclusive disjunction.
A note in closing this section of the commentary. One aspect of the treatment
of conditionals that finds its way into al-Ḥillī’s commentary is the insistence that
the distinction between necessity and possibility in categorical propositions
parallels the distinction between implicative (luzūmiyyah) and coincidental
(ittifāqiyyah) conditionals, and that, moreover, the coincidental corresponds to
two-sided possibility. This prompts al-Ḥillī to note the istiṣḥābiyyah conditional
(implied by either an implicative or a coincidental conditional) is like one-sided
possibility (mentioned at the beginning of Text 60.1, but I think the statement
in the Asrār is clearer):

Text 60.4 Implication resembles necessity, coincidence resembles

two-sided possibility, and association (al-istiṣḥāb) resembles one-sided
possibility. (ḤA 79.12)

I believe that the opposition between the oppositional (ʿinādiyyah) and the
coincidental disjunctives also parallels the opposition between the implicative
and the coincidental conditional.

§61169 It is in §61 that we are told that the examples of disjunctive propositions
given so far in the Risālah are all oppositional (ʿinādiyyah); the lemma goes on to
give us examples of coincidental disjunctive propositions on al-Kātibī’s assump-
tion of a state of affairs such that there is a black person who does not write. The
truth-conditions that make each of these disjunctives true are congenial with
those given in modern propositional logic for, respectively, exclusive disjunc-
tion, alternative denial, and inclusive disjunction (see §64).

182 182
 Commentary, §62

§62170 As for Avicenna, what matters in negating a hypothetical is the relation

between its parts, and not the quality (or quantity) of those parts themselves.171
This is what al-Kātibī is referring to when he talks about removing “what is
judged to be in their affirmatives.” As for the eight propositions:

Text 62.1 He means by “these eight propositions” the implicative con-

ditional, the coincidental, and the three disjunctives taken as oppositional
and coincidental. (ḤQ 280.5–6)

Which is to say, the propositions to be negated are (1) the implicative condi-
tional, (2) the coincidental conditional, (3) the oppositional exclusive disjunc-
tion, (4) the coincidental exclusive disjunction, (5) the oppositional inclusive
disjunction, (6) the coincidental inclusive disjunction, (7) the oppositional
alternative denial, and (8) the coincidental alternative denial. Text 64.2 presents
some of the relevant truth-conditions; see also §72.

§63172 The truth-conditions of the affirmative conditional differ according

to whether the conditional is implicative or coincidental,173 and—for the coin-
cidental—according to which interpretation of the coincidental is being used
(al-Ḥillī has told us in commentary on §60—the interpretations are set out
in Text 60.1—that Avicenna in the Cure uses the weaker of the two). For the
implicative, there are two considerations. The first has to do with the relation
between the antecedent and the consequent (are they inseparable?), the second
with the truth or falsity of the component propositions. Section 60.2 has set
out the first consideration—basically, that the two components are related to
each other causally or as correlatives—and §63 sets out the second consideration
(which is the only consideration for the truth of the coincidental).
This is what al-Ḥillī has to say about the truth of the affirmative implicative
conditional:

Text 63.1 The truth and falsity of conditionals is not a function [simply]
of the truth and falsity of the parts (laysa li-ṣidq ajzāʾihā wa-kidhbihā); for
the affirmative conditional is true with two true propositions, as in “if man
is an animal, it is a body”; with two false propositions, as in “if man is a
donkey, then he brays”; with two unknown as to truth and falsity, as in “if
Zayd has money, then he is rich”; and with a false antecedent and a true
consequent, as in “if man is a donkey, then he is a body.”

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The reverse is not the case—that is, that the antecedent be true and the
consequent false—due to the impossibility of the true entailing the false.
This is because the meaning of luzūm is the necessity of the truth of the
consequent if the antecedent is true or the necessity of the falsity of the
antecedent on the falsity of the consequent. Were the true to entail the
false, the falsity of the true implicant would follow from the falsity of its
implicate, and the truth of the false implicate would follow from the truth
of its implicant; so two contradictories would be conjoined, and that is
absurd. (ḤQ 281.1–10)

So the affirmative implicative conditional will be false with a true antecedent

and a false consequent irrespective of the relation between the two parts; but it
will also be false when the relation between the two parts falls short of the rela-
tion set out in §60.2, irrespective of the truth or falsity of the parts:

Text 63.2 The false affirmative is composed of two false propositions,

as in “if man is a horse, then he is a donkey”; and from a false antecedent
and a true consequent, as in “if man is a donkey, then he is rational,” and
the reverse—that is, from a true antecedent and a false consequent—as in
“if man is rational, then he is a donkey”; and from two true propositions, as
in “if man is an animal, then he is rational.” (ḤQ 282.2–6)

The coincidental conditional is true on al-Kātibī’s account only when both

the antecedent and the consequent are true. On Avicenna’s weaker account, it is
true when the consequent is true. Specifically on al-Kātibī’s account:

Text 63.3 If, however, [the conditional] is coincidental then its falsity
from two true propositions is impossible, because the meaning of the coin-
cidental is association (muṣāḥabah) in truth (this in the coincidental in the
stronger sense). (ḤQ 282.7–8)

§64174 Lemma 64 begins with a consideration of the truth-conditions for affir-

mative disjunctive propositions. It follows on with a brief indication of the truth-
conditions for the various negative hypothetical propositions (set out in broad
terms in §62).
Like the conditional, the disjunctives have different truth-conditions accord-
ing to whether they are oppositional or coincidental. As for the implicative con-
ditional, there are two considerations for the oppositional: the first the relation

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between the terms themselves (are they incompatible?); the second the truth
of the component disjuncts. For the first consideration there are two views, set
out in Texts 60.2 and 60.3 above; al-Kātibī prefers the strong sense. For the coin-
cidental—set out in §61—the only consideration is the truth of the component
disjuncts. So the truth-conditions in the first part of §64 apply to both opposi-
tional and coincidental, but the oppositional have further requirements set out
at the beginning of §61 (mutual exclusion due to the two parts themselves). Here
is what al-Ḥillī has to say about the real, or exclusive, disjunction:

Text 64.1 The affirmative real disjunction is true from a true and a false
proposition, because it judges of them the impossibility of their joint truth
and their joint falsity (as in “number is either even or odd”); so it is not true
from two true propositions due to the impossibility of their joint truth, or
from two false propositions due to the impossibility of their joint falsity.
(ḤQ 282.9–10)

Al-Kātibī offers a single sentence for the truth-conditions of the negatives

(“true of that of which the affirmative is false, and false of that of which the affir-
mative is true”); al-Ḥillī goes through aspects of the resulting truth-conditions.

Text 64.2 The negative conditional may be true with two true propo-
sitions, as in “not, whenever man is animal, he is rational”; and with two
false propositions, as in “not, whenever man is a donkey, he is a horse”;
and from a true antecedent and a false consequent, as in: “not, whenever
man is rational, he is a horse”; or the reverse, as in “not, whenever man is
a horse, he is rational.” It may be false from two true propositions, as in
“never, if man is a body, then he is an animal”; and from two false propo-
sitions, as in “never, if man is a donkey, then he brays”; and from a false
antecedent and a true consequent, as in “never, if man is a donkey, then
he is a body”; [the false conditional] is not composed of a true antecedent
and a false consequent, otherwise the affirmative will be true [against the
stipulation in Text 63.1].
The negative real disjunctive may be true from two false propositions,
as in “not, either the man is a donkey or a horse”; from two true proposi-
tions, as in “not, either the man is an animal or rational”; and from a true
and a false proposition if they are not contradictories (or with the force of
contradictories), as in “not, either the man is an animal or a horse.” And it
may be false from a true and a false proposition that are contradictories (or

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that have the force of contradictories), as in “not, the number is either odd
or even.” (ḤQ 283.2–15)

§65175 One of Avicenna’s innovations is to quantify hypothetical proposi-

tions.176 Lemma 65.1 deals with what is meant by, respectively, a universal con-
ditional, a particular, and a singular. Lemma 65.2 sets out the quantifiers used
for the propositions in their various quantifications; although this part of the
lemma is clear without commentary, it seems the obvious moment to introduce
the forms of the quantified conditionals and disjunctives.
Hypothetical propositions are quantified over circumstances or situations.
An a-proposition is true if it is true that the consequent follows/is opposed
to the antecedent in all cases in which the antecedent can possibly occur; an
i-proposition is true if it is true that the consequent follows/is opposed to the
antecedent in some cases in which the antecedent can possibly occur; a singular
proposition is true if it is true that the consequent follows/is opposed to the
antecedent in one case in which the antecedent can possibly occur.

Text 65.1 If we have “whenever A is B then C is D” or “always, either A

is B or C is D,” we do not mean that “C is D” is an implicate of or opposed
to “A is B” in all contexts in which “A is B” occurs (fī jamī ʿ al-madār allatī
yaqaʿu ʿalayhā alif bāʾ ), for the antecedent may be something unchanging
(amran thābitan), as in “whenever God is knowing he is living.” Rather,
we mean by it that “C is D” is an implicate of or opposed to “A is B” in
all situations (fī jamī ʿ al-awḍāʿ ) we may suppose with which “A is B” is
compatible; and the situations are those that occur by reason of connect-
ing (al-iqtirān) [it] to matters with which the antecedent is compatible . . .
In the particular, it is judged that the antecedent entails the consequent
(or is opposed to it) under some situations that are supposed, as in “some-
times, if this is a body then it is an animal,” for body entails animal only in
the situation of its being connected to sense and not otherwise. Similarly
for “sometimes, number is either abundant or deficient.”
The singular (al-makhṣūṣah) is that entailment or opposition is judged
in it in a specified situation or time, as in “if you bring me Zayd I will honor
you,” or “if you come today I will honor you,” or “at this moment, either
Zayd is in the water, or he is not.”177 (ḤQ 284.6–285.6)

Al-Kātibī’s account of the hypotheticals has few examples. A shorthand for

the hypotheticals has been devised by Strobino, and the form of three of the

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propositions is illustrated by examples offered by al-Ḥillī (ḤQ 285.apu–286.14).

I present shorthand first, then examples of the form in what follows (and
again in summary in Appendix 3). Here are the conditionals (given in short-
hand with a-propositions as the component propositions; this is arbitrary and
does not reflect the examples—all with unquantified components—that al-Ḥillī
actually offers):

A-conditional: (a-ℂ)aa. Whenever the sun is up then it is day (kullamā kānat

al-shams ṭāliʿah fa-l-nahār mawjūd; alternatives to kullamā: mahmā,
matā);
E-conditional: (e-ℂ)aa. Never, if the sun is up then it is night (laysa l-battata
idhā kānat al-shams ṭāliʿah fa-l-layl mawjūd);
I-conditional: (i-ℂ)aa. Sometimes, if the sun is up then it is day (qad yakūnu
idhā kānat al-shams ṭāliʿah fa-l-nahār mawjūd);
O-proposition: (o-ℂ)aa. Two forms (no examples given): (1) Sometimes not,
if P then Q (qad lā yakūnu); (2) Not always, if P then Q (laysa kullamā,
or laysa mahmā, or laysa matā).

And here are the disjunctives:

A-proposition: (a-𝔻)aa. Always, either the sun is up, or it is not (dāʾiman

immā an takūna l-shams ṭāliʿah aw lā takūna);
E-proposition: (e-𝔻)aa. Never, either the sun is up, or it is day (laysa l-battata
immā an takūna l-shams ṭāliʿah wa-immā an yakūna l-nahār mawjūdan);
I-proposition: (i-𝔻)aa. Sometimes, either the sun is up, or it is night (qad
yakūnu immā an takūna l-shams ṭāliʿah wa-immā an yakūna l-layl
mawjūdan);
O-proposition: (o-𝔻)aa. Two forms (no examples given): (1) Sometimes not,
either P or Q (qad lā yakūnu); (2) Not always, either P or Q (laysa dāʾiman).

No equivalences between conditionals, or between disjunctives, are called

on in the Risālah, but they are included in the square of opposition that I
take from Strobino. Figure 30 assumes that Avicenna’s account of equiva-
lences is accepted by al-Kātibī (specifically, that (a-ℂ)aa is equivalent to (e-ℂ)
ao, (o-ℂ)ao to (i-ℂ)aa, (o-ℂ)aa to (i-ℂ)ao, and (a-ℂ)ao to (e-ℂ)aa); it may
not be the account al-Kātibī would offer outside an introductory text like
the Risālah. See further discussion in commentary on §72 (on the square of
opposition), on §86 (on contraposition), and on §87 (on the co-implication of
hypothetical propositions).

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 Commentary, §66

§66178 We are told at the end of §66 that we should work out the various ways
in which hypothetical propositions can be composed (murakkab). The order fol-
lowed by the commentators (categorical-categorical, conditional-conditional,
disjunctive-disjunctive, categorical-conditional, categorical-disjunctive, condi-
tional-disjunctive) is conventional, and is followed in the presentation of hypo-
thetical arguments in §§105–9 (though they are like disjunctive propositions
with respect to their component disjuncts, the arguments do not take account
of the ordering of the premises, and so only have six rather than nine classifica-
tions). Al-Taftāzānī gives us the examples al-Kātibī has asked us to find as an
exercise (TŠ 272–73). Here are the divisions of the conditionals; I note in square
brackets after each what kind it represents on al-Kātibī’s division.179

1. Whenever (something is man) then (it is an animal). [Categorical-

categorical]
2. Whenever (whenever something is a man it is an animal) then (when-
ever it is not an animal it is not a man). [Conditional-conditional]
3. Whenever (always, a number is either even or odd) then (always, it is
either divisible into two equal parts or not so divisible). [Disjunctive-
disjunctive]
4. If (animal is more general than man) then (whenever something is man
it is animal). [Categorical-conditional]
5. Whenever (whenever something is a man it is an animal) then (it is an
implicant of animal). [Conditional-categorical]
6. If (this is a number) then (it is either even or odd). [Categorical-disjunctive]
7. If (this is either even or odd) then (it is a number). [Disjunctive-categorical]
8. If (whenever something is a man it is an animal) then (either it is a man
or it is not an animal). [Conditional-disjunctive]
9. If (always, either the sun is up or it is night) then (whenever the sun is up,
then it is not night). [Disjunctive-conditional]

And here is the division of the disjunctives:

1. A number is either even or odd. [Categorical-categorical]

2. Either (if the sun is up then it is day) or (if the sun is up then it is night).
[Conditional-conditional]
3. Either (a number is either even or odd) or (it is even or indivisible into
two equal parts). [Disjunctive-disjunctive]

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 Commentary, §67

4. Either (the sun is not an implicant for day) or (whenever the sun is up it
is day). [Categorical-conditional]
5. Either (something is one) or (it is either even or odd).
[Categorical-disjunctive]
6. Either (if number is odd it is even) or (number is either even or odd).
[Conditional-disjunctive]

The study of hypothetical propositions carries on with the square of opposi-

tion in §72 (see Figure 30).

The third section, on the valuations of propositions

Let me begin by explaining my choice of “valuation” as a translation here of

ḥukm, a term rendered elsewhere in the translation as “judgment.” This section
treats four topics (contradiction, straight conversion, contraposition, and the
implicates of hypotheticals), the last three of which evaluate what proposition of
a certain form the first proposition can imply. Contradiction is an important pre-
liminary for these evaluations. Many of the proofs for these implications—which
is to say, of these one-premise arguments (to introduce a phrase that al-Kātibī
did not use)—depend on putting forward the contradictory of the putative con-
clusion and deriving an impossible conclusion from it and the first proposition.

Text 67.a He begins with contradiction because some of the proofs for
conversion and co-implication depend upon it. (TŠ 274.9)

Furthermore, the contradictories are themselves a function of the truth-con-

ditions stipulated for the various propositions; specifying a proposition’s contra-
dictory specifies precisely what the assertion of the proposition denies.

The first discussion, on contradiction

Lemmata 67–72 lay out the contradictories of the six simple and seven com-
pound categorical propositions, and of the hypothetical propositions, that
have so far been introduced (see Appendix 4 and Figures 26–30). Other simple
categorical propositions—introduced in commentary on §§52–59—play a role
in the further discussion of those propositions “customarily investigated” by
Arabic logicians. For example, the perpetuity proposition (A) has the gen-
eral absolute (X1) as its contradictory, and both of these are presented among
the thirteen, whereas the conventional (AD1: “every C is always B as long as

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 Commentary, §67

it is C”) has as its contradictory the absolute continuing (ḥīniyyah muṭlaqah,

XD1: “some C is not always B while C”). These further propositions are listed in
the second appendix.

§67180 The definition of contradiction given in §67 (“a difference between two
propositions in affirmation and negation such that it requires of itself that one is
true and the other false”) incites the commentators to identify the genus and the
differentiae deployed to narrow it.

Text 67.1 “Difference” (al-ikhtilāf) is like a genus, for what occurs

between propositions also occurs between terms, and restricting “differ-
ence” with “between two propositions” excludes the difference between
terms. Next, the difference between two propositions may occur through
affirmation and negation, as in “Zayd is knowing,” “Zayd is not know-
ing,” and it may occur through difference between subject and predicate,
as in “Zayd is knowing” and “ʿAmr is ignorant.” Moreover, the difference
through affirmation and negation may require [that the two propositions
divide] in truth and falsity, though it may not, as in “Zayd is knowing,”
“Zayd is not not-knowing.”181 This division [in truth and falsity] may be
due to the difference [in affirmation and negation] itself, as in the case of
two mutually contradictory propositions, and it may not, as in “this is a
man” and “this is not rational.” For the first is true and the second is false,
but not due to the difference itself, but because being a man entails ratio-
nality. (ḤQ 289.9–290.2)

§68182 The lemma proceeds by investigating ever more complex propositions

and the factors that need to be taken into account to find a proposition’s con-
tradictory. The first stipulations apply even to the simplest propositions, the
singular (al-makhṣūṣah):

Text 68.1 If [the proposition] is singular, the widely held doctrine is

that contradiction is only realized with eight conditions: unity of the sub-
ject, of the predicate, of relation (al-iḍāfah), of potentiality and actuality,
of part and whole, of condition (al-sharṭ), of place, and of time (al-zamān).
(RM 177.10–apu)

In short, these factors must all be the same so that two propositions can be
each other’s formal contradictory. The first two mean that the subject and the

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predicate are the same in the two propositions. Unity of relation is breached in
“Zayd is ʿAmr’s father” and “Zayd is not Khālid’s father”; unity of potentiality
and actuality is breached in “the sword is cutting” (in that it is sharp and has the
potential to cut) and “the sword is not cutting” (in that it is not actually being
used to cut); unity of part and whole is breached in “the black person is black”
(in respect of his complexion) and “the black person is not black” (in respect
of his teeth); unity of condition is breached in “the black thing compresses the
vision” (when it is black) and “the black thing does not compress the vision”
(when it is not black); unity of place is breached in “Zayd is sitting” (in the
house) and “Zayd is not sitting” (in the marketplace); unity of time is breached
in “Zayd is here” (now) and “Zayd is not here” (at some other time) (all examples
from ṬḤ 301.apu–304.3 on Pointers 5.1.3, AI 44.8–14). Al-Rāzī had tried to allo-
cate different unities to either the subject or the predicate and thereby reduce
their number (RM 177–179), but his attempt at reduction was resisted by al-Ṭūsī
and al-Ḥillī:

Text 68.2 This is what the author mentions following Fakhr al-Dīn.
The truth is that these things belong to [both] the subject and the predi-
cate; specifying some as “of the predicate” and some as “of the subject” is
simply arbitrary. (ḤQ 291.14–pu)

Al-Rāzī’s reduction was, however, accepted by al-Kātibī, and §68 stipulates

the conditions to be observed to ensure that the propositions differentiated by
contradiction are unified with respect to their predicates and subjects.
Al-Kātibī sets out the further condition for finding the formal contradictory
of a quantified proposition, which is that the two contradictories must also differ
in quantity:

Text 68.3 The first is specific to quantified propositions, which is dif-

ference in quantity. For the two particulars may be true together, and the
two universals false together; that is, in every matter in which the subject
is more general than the predicate. So “some animal is human” and “some
animal is not human” are both true, and “every animal is human” and “no
animal is human” are false. But if we say “some animal is human” and “no
animal is human,” it is impossible to conjoin them so that both are true or
both false. (ḤQ 292.6–12)

Al-Kātibī sets out a final condition, specific to modalized propositions.

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 Commentary, §69

Text 68.4 The second condition is difference in mode (and this

extends to the quantified and the singular propositions). For the two pos-
sible propositions may be true in contingent matter with the falsity of the
two necessary propositions: “possibly, every man is a writer” and “pos-
sibly, not every man is a writer”; they are both true, while “necessarily,
every man is a writer” and “necessarily, not every man is a writer” are false.
(ḤQ 292.13–pu)

§69183 There are six simple propositions that are named in §52 (the possibil-
ity, the absolute, the necessity, the perpetuity, the conventional, and the condi-
tional; respectively, M1, X1, L, A, AD1, and LD1), and four unnamed in the first
list by al-Kātibī, which however crop up elsewhere in the treatise: the possible
continuing (ḥīniyyah mumkinah), the absolute continuing (ḥīniyyah muṭlaqah),
the absolute temporal, and the absolute spread; respectively, MD1, XD1, LT1,
and LX1. Leaving the absolute temporal and absolute spread to one side for the
moment, the remaining eight propositions can be set out as four opposed pairs
(see for examples Figure 26 for the square generated by the propositions dealt
with in 1 below, and Figure 27 for the square generated by the propositions dealt
with in 4 below):

1. The absolute necessity proposition (L) has as its contradictory the gen-
eral possibility proposition (M1): “every A is necessarily B” contradicts
“some A is not necessarily B” (or “some A is possibly not B”).
2. The absolute perpetuity (A) has the general absolute (X1): “every A is
always B” contradicts “some A is not always B” (or “some A is sometimes
not B”).
3. The general conditional (LD1) has the possible continuing (MD1, ḥīniyyah
mumkinah): “every A is necessarily B as long as it is A” contradicts “some
A is possibly not B while A” (or “some A is not necessarily B while A”).
4. The general conventional (AD1) has the absolute continuing (XD1,
ḥīniyyah muṭlaqah): “every A is always B as long as it is A” contra-
dicts “some A is sometimes not B while A” (or “some A is not always B
while A”).

To repeat: I use “as long as it is” to translate ma dāma, which means “at
every moment it is,” and “while” to translate ḥīna, which means “for at least one
moment it is”; this is simply to reflect Arabic usage, which renders the same tem-
porality condition differently according to whether the modality it is associated

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 Commentary, §70

with is necessity or perpetuity (mā dāma), or possibility or actuality-at-a-time

(ḥīna). The temporal modality can be left out; we assume perpetuity with mā
dāma, at-least-once with ḥīna. Further, note that in holding the possible con-
tinuing (MD1) to be the contradictory of the general conditional (LD1), al-Kātibī
talks about a proposition “in which it is judged to remove the opposing necessity
with respect to the description”; so “someone cannot ever cough as long as he is
afflicted” is opposed in quantity, quality, and modality to “everyone may cough
at times while afflicted.”
As noted, “absolute” (muṭlaqah) was used by the tenth-century translators
of Aristotle to translate “assertoric,”184 yet in 2 above its contradictory is not
a general absolute (X1) but a perpetuity proposition (A). This looks odd to an
Aristotelian (and in Text 69.1 al-Ḥillī is using al-qudamāʾ to refer to Aristotle and
his followers rather than to Avicenna), for whom an assertoric is contradicted by
another assertoric of opposing quantity and quality:

Text 69.1 Most of the ancients (jamāhīr al-qudamāʾ ) were negligent

(sahaw) about the contradictory of the absolute; they reckoned that it was
an absolute too, and were not struck by the truth of two contraries in non-
perpetual matter. (ḤQ 294.6–7)

A common example for two such contraries is “every man is sleeping,” which
is true on the truth-conditions for the general absolute with “no man is sleeping”
(put differently, “every man is at least once sleeping” can be true with “no man
is always sleeping”).

§70185 The compound propositions are conjunctions of simpler propositions,

so their contradictories are alternations of the contradictories of those simpler
propositions. Al-Taḥtānī tells us (TT 337.2) that the disjunction in the disjunc-
tive contradictories are inclusive (māniʿat al-khulūw). Here is the example in
less compressed language: For the proposition, “every A is at least once B and
at least once not B,” we take the opposing propositional form (here, an o-form)
and the dual of the modality (here, always) and produce “some A is never B”; the
proposition “which agrees with the original” agrees in quality, is also a perpetu-
ity proposition, and is limited to the items made subject in the first proposition
(see §71), so the disjunct is “or those same As are always B.”
Al-Ḥillī gives a complete list of the a-propositions and their o-proposition
contradictories (ḤQ 295.7–296.u); I summarize it here and in Appendix 4, along
with al-Ḥillī’s Arabic for the propositions:

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 Commentary, §70

1. LD2 a-proposition contradicts either MD1 o-proposition or A i-propo-

sition: the contradictory of “every C is necessarily B as long as it is C,
not always”—the “not always” is shorthand for “and no C is always B”—
is “either some C is not necessarily B while C, or some C is always B”
(naqīḍ kull jīm bāʾ bi-l-ḍarūrah mā dāma jīm lā dāʾiman immā baʿḍ jīm
laysa bāʾ bi-l-imkān ḥīna huwa jīm aw baʿḍ jīm bāʾ dāʾiman).
2. AD2 a-proposition contradicts either XD1 o-proposition or A i-propo-
sition: the contradictory of “every C is always B as long as it is C, not
always” is “either some C is not always B while C, or some C is always B”
(naqīḍ kull jīm bāʾ mā dāma jīm lā dāʾiman immā baʿḍ jīm laysa bāʾ ḥīna
huwa jīm aw baʿḍ jīm bāʾ dāʾiman).
3. X2 a-proposition contradicts either A o-proposition or A i-proposition:
the contradictory of “every C is B, not always” is “either some C is never
B, or some C is always B” (naqīḍ kull jīm bāʾ lā dāʾiman immā baʿḍ jīm
laysa bāʾ dāʾiman aw baʿḍ jīm bāʾ dāʾiman).186
4. X~L a-proposition contradicts either A o-proposition or L i-proposition:
the contradictory of “every C is B, not necessarily” is “either some C is
never B, or some C is necessarily B” (naqīḍ kull jīm bāʾ lā bi-l-ḍarūrah
immā baʿḍ jīm laysa bāʾ dāʾiman aw baʿḍ jīm bāʾ bi-l-ḍarūrah).
5. LT2 contradicts MT or A:187 the temporal is a compound of an absolute
temporal (waqtiyyah muṭlaqah) and a general absolute, so its contradic-
tory is either a possibility temporal or a perpetuity; so the contradictory
of “every C is B necessarily at a specified time, not always” is “either pos-
sibly at that time some C is not B, or some C is always B” (naqīḍ kull jīm
bāʾ bi-l-ḍarūrah fī waqt muʿayyan lā dāʾiman immā baʿḍ jīm laysa bāʾ bi-l-
imkān fī dhālika l-waqt aw baʿḍ jīm bāʾ dāʾiman).
6. LX2 contradicts MA or A: the spread is a compound of an absolute spread
(muntashirah muṭlaqah) and a general absolute, so its contradictory
is either a possible perpetual or a perpetuity; so the contradictory of
“every C is B necessarily at some time, not always” is “either some C is
not necessarily B always, or some C is always B” (naqīḍ kull jīm bāʾ lā
bi-l-ḍarūrah fī waqt mā lā dāʾiman immā baʿḍ jīm laysa bāʾ bi-l-imkān
dāʾiman aw baʿḍ jīm bāʾ dāʾiman).
7. M2 contradicts either L o-proposition or L i-proposition: the contradic-
tory of “some C is B by a special possibility” is “either some C is not pos-
sibly B or some C is necessarily B” (naqīḍ kull jīm bāʾ bi-l-imkān al-khāṣṣ
immā baʿḍ jīm laysa bāʾ bi-l-ḍarūrah aw baʿḍ jīm bāʾ bi-l-ḍarūrah).

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§71188 This is the moment in the treatment of contradiction when al-Kātibī

deals explicitly with particular (that is, i- and o-) compound propositions, and so
it is here that he sets out precisely how the conjunction operates in a compound
proposition and, by extension, how the disjunction operates in the contradic-
tory of the original compound; all examples up to now should be read in this
more precise manner. Take a compound i-proposition. The shorthand (1) “some
body is an animal, not always” could either unpack to (1.1) “some body is at least
once an animal, and some body is at least once not an animal,” or—and this is
the reading al-Kātibī insists on—to the stronger (1.2) “some body is at least once
an animal and [that same body is] at least once not an animal.” For (1.1), the con-
tradictory would be (2.1) “no body is ever an animal or every body is always an
animal,” whereas for the preferred version (1.2) the contradictory would be (2.2)
“every body is either never an animal or always an animal.” In (2.1), the disjunc-
tion has two sentences as its disjuncts, each with its own subject, but in (2.2), the
disjunction is restricted to having the terms in the predicate as disjuncts. Al-Ḥillī
agrees with al-Kātibī, and expands on the meaning of the contradictory (2.2):

Text 71.1 “Every body is either always an animal or always not an

animal”: this covers three meanings, first, that every body is always an
animal; second, that no body is ever an animal; and third, that some bodies
are animals always and some others are never animals. (ḤQ 297.10–15)

I take it that (1.1) is plainly true (I am at least once an animal, and my desk
is at least once not an animal), and so (2.1) is plainly false. Since al-Kātibī states
without argument that (1) is false, he must expect his readership to hear it as
(1.2). In short, he seems to assume that we know that the conjunction in a com-
pound proposition has predicates and not propositions as its conjuncts. I worry
that I cannot hear the specific example as he expects his readers to hear it. “Some
bodies are at least once animals, and those bodies are at least once not animals”
does not seem to me to be obviously false without further stipulations about the
continuity of animal bodies: my body is for the moment an animal, but surely on
my death it will continue to be a body but cease to be an animal?

§72189 This lemma resumes the treatment of hypothetical propositions from

§66. It takes up from the introduction of the truth-conditions and formal aspects
of the propositions—in particular their quantification—and sets out elements to
sketch squares of opposition for them. Al-Kātibī’s rule for finding the contradic-
tories of hypothetical propositions states that the contradictory must be of the

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same “genus” (a conditional for a conditional, a disjunctive for a disjunctive)

and the same “species” (an implicative for an implicative, a coincidental for a
coincidental, see §60.2; and in the case of a disjunctive, an oppositional for an
oppositional, a coincidental for a coincidental, see §61) (TŠ 289.pu–u). If species
and genus are preserved, the contradictory is produced by changing the quan-
tity and quality of the proposition (in other words, from A to O, from E to I, as
in the categoricals). Al-Ḥillī writes:

Text 72.1 So the contradictory of the affirmative implicative condi-

tional is the negative implicative conditional: I mean, the judgment in it
is of the negation of implication, not the implication of negation; so it is a
species of the implicative. So the contradictory of “whenever A is B, C is
D” is “not always, if A is B, C is D,” and vice versa. (ḤQ 298.3–5)

There are no grounds in §72 of the Risālah to attribute to al-Kātibī the whole
of the square of opposition set out in Figure 30, at any rate, not (as already noted
in comment on §65) the equivalences between (a-ℂ)aa and (e-ℂ)ao, (o-ℂ)ao
and (i-ℂ)aa, (o-ℂ)aa and (i-ℂ)ao, and (a-ℂ)ao and (e-ℂ)aa (the central opposi-
tions are certainly to be found in §72). Khaled El-Rouayheb has examined Avi-
cenna’s argument for the equivalence between (a-ℂ)aa and (e-ℂ)ao, and shown
that it is effectively a formulation of a thesis attributed to Boethius, associated
with connexive logic.190 It is clear from what the commentators say about later
lemmata of the Risālah (and specifically §86 and §87) that al-Kātibī himself
rejected the thesis; al-Taḥtānī’s attribution to al-Kātibī of the position set out in
Text 86.4, and al-Ḥillī’s similar attribution in Text 87.5, both entail rejection of
the thesis. That said, al-Kātibī goes on in both §86 and §87 to set out positions
he probably does not accept; a teacher has to make his or her students aware of
the most commonly held views in the field. With the contradictories in hand,
al-Kātibī is ready to go on to prove conversions for the conditional propositions
when he returns to the topic of hypothetical propositions in §81.

The second discussion, on straight conversion

The following fifteen lemmata (which is to say, §§73–87) deal with immediate
inferences (also called in modern treatments one-premise inferences).191 In the
Risālah, these include conversion, contraposition, and inferences among hypo-
thetical propositions. I defer making observations on the inferences among
hypothetical propositions to §81, where al-Kātibī picks up his intermittent

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treatment, which I have been tying together through cross-reference. The reader
should bear in mind, however, that the definition of conversion is broadened by
the post-Avicennian logicians specifically so it applies to hypothetical proposi-
tions as well as categorical (see comments to §73).
A couple of notes on the terms of art and how I translate them, given the
juxtaposition of these two inferences in the exposition. The conversion of cat-
egorical propositions is called “straight conversion” (al-ʿaks al-mustawī; “regular
conversion” would also reflect the technical phrase, and Sprenger quite reason-
ably rendered it “even conversion”), referring to conversion in which the terms
in the original proposition (al-aṣl, here, the convertend) appear unchanged in
the resulting converse (also al-ʿaks). Contrast this with contraposition (ʿaks
al-naqīḍ), in which at least one of the extremes in the original proposition is
transformed into its contradictory term in the contrapositive. Because al-Kātibī
treats these two kinds of inference together, and yet mainly uses the same term
(ʿaks) for both the inference and its result, some confusion may arise. In conse-
quence, I have translated ʿaks as “conversion” or “converse” and its related verb
as “convert” in the passage §§73–80, and as “contraposition” or “contrapositive”
and the related verb as “contrapose” in §§82–85. Note, finally, that al-Kātibī does
not use distinct terms for simple and per accidens conversion, unlike Western
treatments (between, that is to say, a conversion that results in a converse of the
same quantity as its convertend, and one that results in a particular converse for
a universal convertend).
The proofs that are given for these valuations are of three kinds: reductio,
ecthetic, and by way of the converse. An example of the reductio proof is first
given by Alexander of Aphrodisias:192 if “no C is B” does not convert to “no B
is C,” then “some B is C,”193 but this with the first proposition gives us by Ferio
(see §91.5) “some B is not B,” which is impossible; therefore the first converse
proposed is correct. Al-Kātibī’s first use of this form of proof—his favorite—is
in §75. (It is worth reiterating that as a general absolute (X1), “some B is not
B” is not self-contradictory on its Avicennian truth-conditions; it simply means
that something that is at some stage B is at least once not B; see Text 69.1.) An
example of the ecthetic proof is first given in Aristotle: if “some C is B” is true,
then there must be some C—call it D—which is both C and B, which means
there is a B which is C, which allows us to infer “some B is C.” Al-Kātibī’s first
use of ecthesis is in §77.1.194 The third method, by way of the converse, converts
the contradictory of the converse to obtain something incompatible with the
original proposition. So “no C is B” must convert to “no B is C”; otherwise,

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“some B is C,” from which i-conversion allows us to infer “some C is B”; but “no
C is B”; therefore, the original conversion proposed must be correct. Obviously,
the third method is cumulative, drawing on conversions that have been proved
in the account before the proof in question. Al-Kātibī first uses this method
in §76.2 (for the affirmative component of a compound e-proposition), and
makes special mention of it in §79, reserving its use for affirmative propositions
because—so it seems to me—it calls on conversions of negative propositions
that come first in this exposition.
Proofs to reject invalid conversions are by counterexample. One counter-
example serves to reject the conversion of a given proposition and, by exten-
sion, to reject the convertibility of all weaker propositions. We find examples of
rejections in §74 and §77. The proofs depend for their economy on the relative
implicational strength of the propositions, developed (in a somewhat desultory
fashion) in the course of laying out the propositions (see Figure 24 for simple
propositions, Figure 25 for a frequently referred to set of five compound and two
simple propositions, and Figures 28 and 29 for squares of opposition with impli-
cational relations). I refer to one of two propositions as stronger (akhaṣṣ) if it
implies the second proposition but is not implied by it, and the second proposi-
tion as weaker (aʿamm). Anything that follows from the weaker follows from the
stronger, which is stated by the Arabic logicians as “the implicate of the weaker
is the implicate of the stronger” (lāzim al-aʿamm lāzim al-akhaṣṣ); the contra-
positive of this maxim is “what does not follow from the stronger does not follow
from the weaker” (mā lā yalzamu min al-akhaṣṣ lā yalzamu min al-aʿamm). So if
there really is a counterexample to show that the stronger cannot convert (which
is to say, that it cannot have its converse as one of its implicates), then none of
the propositions weaker than that proposition can convert; if they could, then—
since they themselves are implicates of the stronger—that converse would be the
stronger’s converse (lāzim al-lāzim lāzim al-malzūm).
The exposition begins (§§74–76) with e-propositions (of the form, “no C
is B”), moves on to o-propositions (§77), and finishes with affirmatives, all of
which result in i-propositions (§78); see Conversions in Table 1. Al-Ḥillī offers
the slightly misleading note:

Text 73.a The custom of the ancients (ʿādat al-awāʾil) was first to men-
tion the status of the negative propositions in conversion, and so—in imi-
tation of his forebears—the author begins with these propositions. (ḤQ
299.17–apu)

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 Commentary, §73

The earliest essay on conversion in this tradition that I have read is in Avi-
cenna’s Najāt. There, Avicenna deals with the conversion of absolute proposi-
tions, then necessity propositions, then possibility propositions (AN §§55–57,
45–51). He goes through negative then affirmative propositions in each modality.
He does the same in Path Five of Pointers (AI 51–55). Al-Rāzī followed roughly
the same layout in first discussing conversion in the Mulakhkhaṣ (RM 184–97),
but when he came to summarize his own position on the conversions and the
disputes surrounding them (RM 197–99), he offered the summary doctrine first
as it relates to negative propositions irrespective of their modality, then as it
relates to affirmative. He did not touch on o-propositions because no one had
yet worked out that LD2 and AD2 o-propositions convert (see §77.1 below). It is
the structure of al-Rāzī’s concluding statement that determines the structure for
the treatment of conversion offered by al-Kātibī: he not only begins with nega-
tive propositions in a given modality, he begins by covering the negatives of all
the modalized propositions.

§73195 Al-Kātibī’s definition of straight conversion (al-ʿaks al-mustawī) refers

to parts of a proposition rather than terms. The relative breadth of al-Kātibī’s
definition is clear when contrasted with Avicenna’s from Pointers 5.3.1:

Text 73.1 Conversion is putting the predicate of the proposition as sub-

ject, and the subject as predicate, while preserving the quality and keeping
truth and falsity as it was [in the original]. (AI 51.1–3)

Note that Avicenna only has categorical propositions in mind, whereas the
definition we find in the Risālah stretches to include—arguably—all hypothetical
propositions (for more on which, see Texts 73.3 and 81.1). Note also the phrase
“keeping truth and falsity as it was” in Avicenna’s definition, which—after chal-
lenge from the Rāzians—is modified by al-Kātibī so that only truth is preserved
in the converse. Here is al-Ḥillī on these points:

Text 73.2 The expression “the first part” is general for the subject and
the antecedent, so the conversion of both categoricals and conditionals
enter under [the definition]. Preservation of truth is necessary for the
converse, otherwise it would not be an implicate of the first proposition.
We do not mean that it must be true, just that it follows the first proposi-
tion in truth, so if the first proposition is actually true, so too is the con-
verse; if it is [true] by supposition, so too the converse. We do not stipulate

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 Commentary, §73

preservation of falsehood due to the possibility that the implicate is true

while the implicant is false; so “every animal is a man” is false while its
converse is true, “some man is an animal.” Preservation of quality is part of
what conversion is stipulated to be (amr iṣṭilāḥī). (ḤQ 299.1–9)

The question that troubles two of the commentators I have read is whether
the definition is too broad; as it stands, the definition includes disjunctive prop-
ositions, which certainly have parts, one stated before the other. I do not think
the outcome of the debate is important, but the discussion illustrates the kind of
considerations taken into account, and one aspect of the truth-conditions of the
disjunctive. For al-Ḥillī, the question does not arise, simply because he under-
stands “the first part” to cover the subject of a categorical and the antecedent of
a conditional and—seemingly—nothing more (ḤQ 299.1–2). Al-Taḥtānī argues
the disjunctive has a converse, but that it is of no value:

Text 73.3 It is not to be said: It follows on this [account] that the dis-
junctive has a converse, because its two parts are distinct in how they
are stated and placed, even if they are not distinct in respect of nature
(bi-ḥasab al-ṭabʿ ). So if one of them is exchanged with the other, [the dis-
junctive] will have a converse because the definition holds of this [opera-
tion], but they have been explicit (ṣarraḥū) that [disjunctives] have no
converse. Because we answer: We do not concede that the disjunctive has
no converse, because the meaning (al-mafhūm) of “either the number is
even or odd” is a judgment on the evenness of number being incompatible
with oddness (bi-muʿānadat al-fardiyyah), and the meaning of “either the
number is odd or even” is a judgment on the oddness of number being
incompatible with evenness (bi-muʿānadat al-zawjiyyah). There is no
doubt that “this is incompatible with that” is different in meaning from
“that is incompatible with this.” So the disjunctive also has a converse dif-
ferent from it in meaning. It is simply that since there is no benefit in [this
conversion], no one considered it; it is as though this is all that is meant by
the claim that disjunctives have no converse. (TT 344.11–u)

Al-Taftāzānī is unimpressed by this line of argument:

Text 73.4 “Either the number is odd or even” is not a converse for
“either the number is even or odd,” since there is no difference (taghāyur)
in meaning [between them]. This is because the judgment in it is only of
conflict between “this is even” and “this is odd,” as is borne out by the

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 Commentary, §74

interpretation of the disjunctive (tafsīr al-munfaṣilah) and understanding

its meaning (taʿaqqul mafhūmihā). (TŠ 290.9–12)

§74196 The four lemmata from §74 to §77 consider all negative propositions (e-
and o-propositions) in all thirteen modalities “customarily investigated.” Seven
of the thirteen are proved not to convert by counterexample. As mentioned in
the introduction to the commentary on the section, this is done neatly. Al-Kātibī
assumes his readers will have in mind the relative implicational strength of the
seven propositions—LT2, LX2, X2, X~L, X1, M2, and M1 (see Figure 25). He takes
the strongest, LT2, and sets out a proposition which is true in that modality
(assume that the eclipse in question is a lunar eclipse): “no moon is possibly
eclipsed at the time of quadrature, and every moon is at least once eclipsed.”
This proposition is true, mutatis mutandis, in all the weaker modalities. But its
converse (first part second, second part first, truth and quality as in the origi-
nal proposition) in the weakest negative proposition—the M1 o-proposition—is
false: “some of what is eclipsed is not necessarily a moon” (or “some of what is
eclipsed is possibly not a moon”); so none of the seven propositions converts.
Al-Ḥillī writes:

Text 74.1 Seven of the e-propositions do not convert—the ones the

author mentions. This is because the temporal is the strongest of these
seven, and—as we said earlier—it does not convert; and if the strongest
does not convert, nor does the weaker. The proof (bayān) that [the tempo-
ral] does not convert is that “necessarily, no moon is eclipsed at the time
of quadrature, not always” may be true, but its converse (namely, “some of
what is eclipsed is not a moon,” by the weakest of the modalities, general
possibility [M1]) is false, because every eclipsed is necessarily a moon. The
proof that the remaining e-propositions fail to convert is because they are
weaker than the temporal; were they to convert, so would the temporal,
because the implicate of the weaker is the implicate of the stronger (li-
anna lāzim al-ʿāmm lāzim al-khāṣṣ). (ḤQ 299.pu–300.8)

Al-Ḥillī goes on straight after this to deal with al-Khūnajī’s argument that
these seven propositions—if taken with his interpretation of the essentialist sub-
ject (see §45 for al-Kātibī’s conflicting interpretation, and Text 45.7)—all con-
vert as A o-propositions (so the example would convert as “some eclipsed is
never a moon”). As al-Ḥillī says: “This proof only goes through if it is granted
that the subject of the essentialist proposition be taken in such a way that the

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 Commentary, §75

impossible enters into it” (ḤQ 300.apu–pu); here, that impossible would be
eclipsed-which-is-not-a-moon. I merely note this in passing.197 I think al-Kātibī
in the Risālah is exploring propositional implication when taken under the
externalist reading of the subject. In any event, he has blocked al-Khūnajī’s inter-
pretation of the essentialist subject by his phrase in §45, by limiting the subject
to “every possible . . . C” (kull . . . jīm min al-afrād al-mumkinah).

§75198 Having proved seven propositions do not convert, al-Kātibī has six
propositions still to consider (see e-conversion in Table 1). He takes them in two
passes, dealing first with propositions read as referential necessity and perpe-
tuity (L and A), and then those read as descriptional necessity and perpetuity
(LD1, AD1, LD2, and AD2). This is the first of the reductio proofs I mentioned in
the introduction to this section. Al-Kātibī’s exposition is clear, but I set out one
proof—for the conversion of the necessity e-proposition—in numbered steps,
both for the purposes of illustration and because it is the first point where a dif-
ference becomes apparent between al-Kātibī and Avicenna in their respective
accounts of the modal syllogistic. Al-Kātibī’s proof runs like this:

1. no C is possibly B (L e-proposition, premise)

2. no B is ever C (A e-proposition, to prove)
3. some B is at least once C (X1 contradictory of 2; assumed)
4. some B is not possibly B (3, 1 by Ferio LXL; absurd)

By contrast, Avicenna’s followers prove a stronger converse; not just an A

converse as al-Kātibī has proved, but an L converse:

1. no C is possibly B (L e-proposition, premise)

2. no B is possibly C (L e-proposition, to prove)
3. some B is possibly C (M1 contradictory of 2, assumed)
4. some B is not possibly B (3, 1 by Ferio LML; absurd)

Al-Kātibī rejects L e-conversion, because he does not accept Ferio LML—that

is, stating minor first—“some C is possibly B, no B is possibly A, therefore some
C is not possibly A.” This is not a valid argument according to al-Kātibī. I say
more about this claim in my commentary on the next lemma, and on §98, but for
the meantime, note that it ramifies through the account of conversion, and that
al-Ḥillī disagrees with al-Kātibī and defends the validity of Ferio LML.

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 Commentary, §76

§76199 Al-Kātibī comes to the remaining four e-propositions, the description-

als (LD1, AD1, LD2, and AD2). Here is a step-by-step version of the proof both
al-Kātibī and his purist Avicennian detractors agree on, for AD1 e-conversion.

1. no C is ever B as long as it is C (AD1 e-proposition, premise)

2. no B is ever C as long as it is B (AD1 e-proposition, to prove)
3. some B is at least once C while B (XD1 contradictory of 2; assumed)
4. some B is not always B while B (3, 1 by Ferio ADXDXD, absurd)

The validity—indeed, the self-evidence—of the syllogism is accepted in

§99(1). But again, if the minor premise—here an absolute continuing (XD1,
ḥīniyyah muṭlaqah) in step 3—is instead a possible continuing (MD1, ḥīniyyah
mumkinah), al-Kātibī holds that there can be no productive syllogism. But, as
with the proof in the preceding lemma for referential L e-conversion, follow-
ers of Avicenna such as al-Ḥillī claim that there is a proof for descriptional LD1
e-conversion:

1. no C is possibly B as long as it is C (LD1 e-proposition, premise)

2. no B is possibly C as long as it is B (LD1 e-proposition, to prove)
3. some B is possibly C while B (MD1 contradictory of 2, assumed)
4. some B is not necessarily B while B (3, 1 by Ferio LDMDMD; absurd)

But the possible continuing (MD1, ḥīniyyah mumkinah) is for al-Kātibī simply
another possibility proposition, not an actuality proposition (fiʿliyyah; see §98),
and therefore not able to serve as minor premise in a productive syllogism.
Al-Ḥillī takes himself to address the rejection of both L e-conversion and
LD1 e-conversion in the following passage, though he only makes one comment
directly on the descriptional. I consider first his recapitulation of the argument
in favor of the conversion, then aspects of his opponents’ view, and finally how
al-Ḥillī parses the descriptional.

Text 76.1 Know that the writer differs from the earlier scholars with
respect to the conversions of the necessary and conditional [categorical]
propositions; they held that both convert as themselves. With respect to
the necessary proposition, this is because if “necessarily, no C is B” is true,
then “necessarily, no B is C” is true, otherwise “some B is possibly C,”
which is impossible for a number of reasons. The first of these is that, were
it true in actuality (law ṣadaqa bi-l-fiʿl), it would form with the original
proposition [“necessarily, no C is B”] a syllogism producing “necessarily,

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 Commentary, §76

some B is not B,” which is impossible, so the truth [of the putative conclu-
sion] in actuality is impossible. (ḤQ 303.1–7)

A few points on this passage: Both al-Kātibī and al-Ḥillī accept Ferio LXL
(here stated minor first: “some C is at least once B, no B is possibly A, therefore
some C is not possibly A”) as perfect. It is the strength of the minor premise
required for productivity that matters for how strong a converse can be proved.
Because Ferio LXL (“some B is at least once C, no C is possibly B, therefore
some B is not possibly B”) and Ferio AXA (“some B is at least once C, no C is
ever B, therefore some B is never B”) both lead to an impossibility when used in
the reductio proofs above, they can be used to prove that the contradictory of
“some B is at least once C” is true, which is to say, the A e-proposition “no B is
ever C.” To prove the stronger L e-proposition (“no B is possibly C”), it would
be necessary to have the reductio syllogism go through with a possibility propo-
sition as its minor (“some B is possibly C, no C is possibly B, therefore some B
is not possibly B”). But this is ruled out by al-Kātibī in §98. Al-Ḥillī, by contrast,
accepts the syllogism as valid, arguing in the last sentence of Text 76.1 that if one
supposes the possibility proposition that is the minor to be true in actuality, it
leads to an impossibility whose truth in actuality is impossible. Here is al-Ḥillī’s
response to al-Kātibī’s claim in §98:

Text 76.2 The ancients (al-qudamāʾ ) claimed to produce a necessary

conclusion from a possible minor with a necessary major. On the hypoth-
esis that the possible occurs (ʿalā taqdīr wuqūʿ al-mumkin), the conclusion
would be necessary, and thus it is necessary in the way things in fact are (fī
nafs al-amr); otherwise, the possible entails the impossible (namely, what
is not necessary being necessary on the assumption of the possible). (ḤQ
356.5–8)

The dispute involves both how we interpret a modal proposition, and how we
interpret the modalities themselves. I simply note two comments by al-Kātibī’s
admired predecessor, the first quoted by al-Ḥillī himself (these expand the notes
given before comments on §45).

Text 76.3 A certain later scholar [al-Khūnajī] said: “We do not concede
that the original [proposition] remains true on the hypothesis that the pos-
sible occurs (ʿalā taqdīr wuqūʿ al-mumkin), such that an impossibility fol-
lows.” To which we answer: One of two matters follows—namely, either
the original proposition is false on the hypothesis that the possible occurs,

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or it entails the impossible. Yet each one of these alternatives is impossible,

so the occurrence of the possible is impossible—so it is not possible, which
is what is sought. (ḤQ 303.8–12)

In his Kashf al-asrār, al-Khūnajī enlarged on his concerns, and argued by

counterexample against “no C is possibly B” converting as “no B is possibly C”
(L e-conversion) because

Text 76.4 there is no impossibility in an attribute possibly belonging

to two distinct species, but belonging actually only to one and not the
other. So “necessarily, none of those things of which this attribute is actu-
ally affirmed in external reality is this second species” may be true, as a
necessary consequence of the fact that all the things described actually by
this attribute in external reality are without exception individual members
of the first species; and [as a necessary consequence of the fact] that the
second species is necessarily negated of the individual members of the first
species. Yet the converse of the original proposition, “necessarily, none of
those things under the second species in external reality has this attribute”
may not be true, as a necessary consequence of the fact that it is possible
to describe the second species with this attribute. In exactly the same way,
“necessarily, nothing inside a certain house at a certain moment is a man”
may be true if we assume that whatever is inside the house at that time is
limited to not-men, while “necessarily, no man is inside that house at that
time” may not be true as a converse. There are many analogous cases here.
(ḪK 135.4–apu)

In this line of argument against al-Kātibī, al-Ḥillī offers an insight into how he
reads the descriptional propositions (LD1), with “no C is possibly B as long as it
is C” in mind; in this, I think he differs from al-Kātibī, but I do not propose to
pursue exactly how.

Text 76.5 The meaning of the general conditional proposition [LD1]

is that it is impossible to conjoin the descriptions C and B in a single
essence—this entails the truth of the converse mentioned. [This can also
be proved] by the proof given for the necessary proposition. (ḤQ 303.
apu–u)

The second part of §76 deals with the two-sided descriptional propositions,
the special conditional (LD2) and the special conventional (AD2). Bear in mind

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how these propositions unpack from—to take the special conditional as the
example—“no C is possibly B as long as it is C, not always,” which is short for “no
C is possibly B as long as it is C, and every C is at least once B.” The conversion
will be by two steps. The general conditional component (LD1) converts as “no
B is ever C as long as it is B,” whereas the general absolute component (X1) con-
verts as “some Bs are at least once C” (proved by way of the converse referred
to in §79). The resulting “no B is ever C as long as it is B and some Bs are at least
once C” is called the non-perpetual-for-some (lā dāʾimah fi l-baʿḍ).200

§77201 There are only two o-propositions that convert—that is, the special
conditional (LD2) and the special conventional (AD2; see Table 1, o-conversion).
The proof in §77 is the first ecthetic proof in the Risālah. This kind of ecthetic
proof takes an i-proposition—in both cases, the X1 i-proposition “some C is at
least once B”—and, taking one of the Cs that is B and calling it D, produces two
propositions: “D is at least once C” and “D is at least once B.” The proof is clear,
so long as it is remembered that the rider “not always” hides a second proposi-
tion (in this case, “some C is at least once B”), from which we infer both that
some C exists and that some B exists.202 Here is a slightly reordered line-by-line
version, with the proposition to be converted given already simplified into its
two components:

1. some C is not possibly B as long as it is C

(first conjunct of LD2 o-proposition, premise)
2. those same Cs are at least once B
(second conjunct of LD2 o-proposition, premise)
3. D is at least once C (2, ecthesis)
4. D is at least once B (2, ecthesis)
5. D is not possibly C as long as it is B (1 and 3)
6. some B is not possibly C as long as it is B (4 and 5)
7. some B is at least once C (3 and 4)
8. some B is not possibly C as long as it is B, not always (6 and 7)

Al-Kātibī pauses to prove step 5:

5. D is not possibly C as long as it is B (to prove)

5a. D is possibly C while B (contradictory of 5; assumed)
5b. D is possibly B while C (5a)
5c. some C is possibly B while C (1, 3, 5b; absurd)

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 Commentary, §78

Al-Ḥillī seems to imply that the proof for o-conversion is al-Kātibī’s discov-
ery, though the best evidence suggests that it was in fact al-Khūnajī who first
gave the proof.203

Text 77.1 The ancients were convinced that there is absolutely no con-
version for the o-proposition. But the author has proved the conversion of
the o-proposition (if it is one of the two specials) by ecthesis. (ḤQ 306.2–4)

The conversion of other o-propositions is rejected by counterexamples for the

strongest simple proposition (the necessity, L) and the strongest remaining com-
pound (the temporal, LT2); each of the rejected converses is a one-sided possibil-
ity (M1), which is the weakest of the modalities (see Figures 24 and 25). Here are
the counterexamples with the rejected converses made explicit: the L o-propo-
sition, “some animals are not possibly human,” is true, while the M1 o-proposi-
tion, “some humans are not necessarily animals,” is false; the LT2 o-proposition,
“some moon is not possibly eclipsed at quadrature, not always,” is true, while the
M1 o-proposition, “some eclipsed is not necessarily a moon,” is false.

§78204 This lemma considers and proves the conversions of all affirmative con-
vertible (munʿakisah) propositions. All converses are i-propositions; al-Kātibī
invites us to consider “every animal is a man” as a counterexample against a
stronger converse. He moves on to prove that L, LD1, A, and AD1 all convert as
XD1. Consider L:

1. every C is necessarily B (L a-proposition, premise)

2. some B is at least once C while B (XD1 i-proposition, to prove)
3. no B is ever C as long as it is B (AD contradictory of 2, assumed)
4. no C is ever C (1, 3 by Celarent ADLA; absurd)

The proofs take Celarent ADLA, ADAA, ADLDAD, and ADADAD to be self-evi-
dent (see §99).
In §78.2, al-Kātibī directs the proof for the conversion of special conditional
(LD2) and special conventional (AD2) a-propositions to proving that the converse
has a non-perpetuity rider; in short—and here I take the special conventional
(AD2) as an example—that “every C is always B as long as it is C, not always”
converts to XD2, “some B is at least once C while B, not always.” The first part
(“some B is at least once C while B”) has just been proved in §78.1; the second
part, the rider, is proved by assuming it (that is, “some B is at least once not C”)
to be false, whereupon “every B is always C” would be true. This is then added

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 Commentary, §78

to the first and second parts of the original proposition. Consider it joined to the
first part:

1. every C is always B as long as it is C

(first conjunct of AD2 a-proposition)
2. every B is always C (contradictory of X o-proposition)
3. every B is always B (1, 2 by Barbara AD1AA)

Now consider it in tandem with the second part:

4. no C is always B (second conjunct of AD2 a-proposition)

2. every B is always C (contradictory of X o-proposition)
5. no B is always B (4, 2 by Celarent XXX)

But 3 and 5 are contraries, so to conjoin them would be absurd; so 2 is false

and “some B is at least once not C” is true.
In §78.3, it is clear that the proofs in §78.2 do not work for the i-propositions
of the special conditional and special conventional, because we do not have
a universal proposition as a major premise for the syllogisms that lead to an
impossibility (consider the role of 1 in the first part of the proof just offered).

Text 78.1 He only turned to ecthesis for the two particulars because the
proof mentioned for the universals does not work here, because a particu-
lar cannot be the major in the first [figure of the syllogism]. (ḤQ 311.6–7)

This means that the proofs presented for the special conditional (LD2) and
special conventional (AD2) i-propositions involve an ecthetic component to
show that the rider of the convertend passes on to the converse. Consider the
AD2 i-proposition: “Some C is always B as long as it is C, and those Cs are not
always B”; al-Ḥillī expands al-Kātibī’s telegraphic version of the proof:

Text 78.2 If the two specials are particular, like “some C is B as long as
it is C, not always,” they convert as a non-perpetual [absolute] continuing.
The proof is by ecthesis, which is that we suppose the C which is B to be D,
so D is not C actually [at least once]; otherwise, it would be C always and
so be B always, since the perpetuity of B is a function of the perpetuity of
the description of C [which is to say, because of the first component of the
proposition to be converted]; but we have already stated “not always,” so
[its being C always] would be absurd. And D is B actually; this is clear. So
“some B is not C” is true, along with “some B is C while B,” due to what was

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 Commentary, §79

said about the general [conditional and conventional] propositions before.

So it follows that “some B is C while B, not always,” and that is what is
sought. (ḤQ 310.apu–311.5)

In §78.4, the five remaining affirmative propositions that convert (LT2, LX2,
X2, X~L, X1) are shown to convert to X1 by reductio. Take for example LT2:
“every moon is eclipsed at the earth’s alignment, not always,” which will convert
to “some eclipsed is at least once a moon.” Were this not the case, “no eclipsed is
ever a moon” would be true, which would produce with the original proposition
“no moon is ever a moon” by Celarent (in this case, ALT2A; see §99).

§79205 To provide an example for al-Kātibī’s alternative method set out in

this lemma, al-Ḥillī gives the proof that the L a-proposition converts as an MD1
i-proposition (that is, that “every C is necessarily B” converts as “some B is pos-
sibly C while B”).

Text 79.1 This is an allusion to a general proof for the conversions of

affirmatives, like when you say: The affirmative necessary proposition con-
verts as a possible continuing (al-ḥīniyyah); otherwise, its contradictory
is true, which is “no B is [possibly] C as long as it is B,” which converts as
itself—that is, “no C is [possibly] B as long as it is C”; but this is implica-
tionally stronger (akhaṣṣ) than [and therefore implies] the contradictory
of the necessary proposition and is therefore false, because were it true,
then the contradictory of the necessary proposition assumed to be true
[as the premise] would be true, so two contradictories would be true.
(ḤQ 312.1–6)

This method also works to prove the convertibility of negative convertible

propositions. Take “no C is ever B,” the converse of which is “no B is ever C”;
were this not the case, “some B is at least once C” would be true, which converts
as “some C is at least once B.” But this is the contradictory of “no C is ever B.”
But al-Kātibī limits the method to affirmative propositions, presumably because
their proofs call on the negative conversions already proved.

§80206 The issues touched on in this lemma are those first raised in §§75 and
76. As mentioned in my commentary on those lemmata, the issues involve how
a proposition regimented for use in logic should be read, and the modal notions
it displays. This is the issue in modal logic that most divides the post-Avicennian

209 209
 Commentary, §81

revisionist logicians like al-Khūnajī and al-Kātibī from Avicenna. I have no inten-
tion of grappling with the second issue, important though it is. I do, however,
offer al-Ḥillī’s sketch of the interrelation among the readings of the necessity and
possibility propositions for the modal conversions.

Text 80.1 Our predecessors held that the two possible propositions
[M1 and M2] convert as a general possible proposition [M1], and they
sought to prove this conversion with two arguments.
First, were the converse false, its contradictory (the necessary e-prop-
osition) would be true, which converts as itself, whereupon it follows that
two contradictories are true, which is absurd. For example, if every, or
some, C is B by one of the two possibilities, then “some B is possibly C” is
true; otherwise, “necessarily, no B is C,” which converts to “necessarily,
no C is B,” which contradicts the original i-proposition and is contrary to
(yuḍādd) the a-proposition.
Second, were the contradictory of the converse true (that is, “nec-
essarily, no B is C”), we make it the major and the original proposition
(“every” or “some C is B” by either one-sided or two-sided possibility) the
minor, which produces in the first figure “necessarily, some C is not C” or
“necessarily, no C is C”—this is absurd.
Since the author has proved the necessary proposition does not con-
vert as itself, he has—in his opinion—refuted the first argument. And
since—in his opinion—the possible minor is not to be used in the first
figure (as will be explained presently),207 he has refuted the second argu-
ment. And since no proof for the conversion of the possible proposition
other than these two has become apparent to him, he has undoubtedly
to suspend judgment (tawaqqafa) as to its convertibility or otherwise.
(ḤQ 312.pu–313.15)

§81208 This lemma returns to the treatment of hypothetical propositions

begun in §38, and uses the contradictories covered in §72 above (the last lemma
in which the hypotheticals were treated) to prove the converses of convertible
conditional propositions. (Al-Kātibī, following the tradition, takes it to be mean-
ingless to say that a disjunctive proposition converts, given that the order of the
two disjuncts is arbitrary; see the discussion in Texts 73.3 and 73.4.) Al-Kātibī
offers guidelines to prove that conditional a- and i-propositions both convert to
a conditional i-proposition, and that the conditional e-proposition converts to a

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 Commentary, §82

conditional e-proposition; he also offers a counterexample against the convert-

ibility of the conditional o-proposition.
The proof for the conversion of the a-proposition in the conditional is of the
common type, and should work for both implicative and coincidental condition-
als:209 “always, if A is B then C is D” converts as “sometimes, if C is D then A is
B”; if not, then “never, if C is D then A is B,” which with the original produces by
Celarent the absurd conclusion, “never, if A is B then A is B.” The proof for the
conversion of the e-proposition is that if it is true “never, if A is B then C is D,”
then it is true “never, if C is D then A is B”; if not, then the contradictory is true,
“sometimes, if C is D then A is B”; as minor with the first proposition it produces
by Ferio “sometimes not, if C is D then C is D,” which is absurd. (Both proofs
depend on syllogisms mentioned by al-Kātibī in broad terms in §105.)
The counterexample for o-conversion (with the putative converse, “some-
times not, if this is a man then this is an animal”) is self-explanatory. For
al-Kātibī, there is no meaningful way to talk about conversion of disjunctives;
here is al-Ḥillī prefiguring al-Taftāzānī’s argument in Text 73.4.

Text 81.1 We have explained already that there is no differentiation in

nature between its parts, but only in placement. If one of the two parts is
opposed to its counterpart, then the second is opposed to the first; which-
ever is supposed as antecedent or consequent, the disjunctive does not
alter. (ḤQ 315.1–3)

The third discussion, on contraposition

§82210 This is the second of the three discussions devoted to immediate infer-
ences (see Table 1). Again, as in the case of conversion, the Avicennian definition
is abandoned. This time, however, the definition is not abandoned in search of
generality (which for conversion extended the definition to include hypotheti-
cal propositions), but validity. The replacement definition offered in §82 defines
an inference that is not typically called contraposition in English, but conver-
sion by negation.211 Here, however, I continue to call it contraposition because
it was offered by the post-Avicennian logicians as a replacement for Avicennian
contraposition.
Avicenna claimed to be able to prove that from a categorical a-proposition a
contrapositive follows that is, arguably, stronger than what can in fact be proved
to follow on his doctrine.212 Later scholars came to accept a modified, weaker

211 211
 Commentary, §82

contrapositive. The original Avicennian definition that is implicitly rejected in

the Risālah runs:

Text 82.1 [Contraposition] involves taking what contradicts the predi-

cate and making it subject, and what contradicts the subject and making it
predicate.213 (ḪK 147.2–3)

For “every C is B,” this would give us the contrapositive “every not-B is not-
C.” Al-Khūnajī says that Avicenna’s account fails even on Avicenna’s own doc-
trine, the important elements of which are set out faithfully in the Risālah in
§§48–50.

Text 82.2 Because [Avicenna] said of the contrapositive of the a-prop-

osition, if we have “every C is B,” then “every not-B is not-C” follows. But
if the predicate in this [second] proposition is the negative of C (salb jīm),
[the proposition] is an affirmative with two indefinite terms (mūjibatan
maʿdūlat al-ṭarafayn), and so its contradictory is a negative that also has
two indefinite terms [which is to say, “some not-B is not not-C”]. The affir-
mative with a determinate predicate (namely, “some not-B is C”) does not,
however, follow [this contradictory], because such an affirmative is stron-
ger than the negative with an indefinite predicate; the affirmative with
determinate predicate cannot follow the contradictory of the affirmative
with indefinite predicate, otherwise it would be possible that both [puta-
tive] contradictories [namely, “every not-B is not-C” and “some not-B is
C”] be false together, due to the possibility that both are false when the
subject does not exist. (ḪK 147.6–12)

Take “every C is B.” Let us say that its contrapositive is “every not-B is not-C,”
otherwise “some not-B is not not-C”; we cannot claim that this with the original
proposition gives us “some not-B is B” (which would be absurd and prove the
assumed contrapositive to be a valid inference), because we cannot take “some
not-B is not not-C” to imply “some not-B is C” to derive the absurdity. Here
and in al-Khūnajī’s argument, we are not entitled to assert the existence of the
subject term of the o-proposition that is joined to the original proposition (see
§50.1), but we must assert it to exist in the conclusion, which is an i-proposition.
Al-Kātibī’s definition (differing from al-Khūnajī’s [ḪK 148.3–4] by including
hypotheticals, and by making it explicit that the truth of the contrapositive must
agree with that in the original proposition) gives a weaker contrapositive than
Avicenna’s, so that for “every C is B” the contrapositive is “no not-B is C”; it also

212 212
 Commentary, §83

gives—as has become obvious in the discussion to this point—the i-proposition

“some C is B” the contrapositive “some not-B is not C.” Here is al-Ḥillī’s sum-
mary of al-Kātibī’s position:

Text 82.3 If we have “every C is B,” its contrapositive is “no not-B is

C.” So not-B is the contradictory of the predicate, which we have made
the subject, and C is the subject, which we have made the predicate; the
quality [of the contrapositive] differs from [the quality of the original]: this
is according to the opinion of the writer. But he has differed in this from
the opinion of the ancients, because they made it consist of making the
first part the contradictory of the second, and the second part the con-
tradictory of the first, keeping quality the same. So they took the contra-
positive of “every C is B” to be “every not-B is not-C,” whereas the author
took an implicate of this contrapositive and made [the implicate] the
contrapositive. (ḤQ 315.9–apu)

Let me note before descending to the details of the specific propositions

for which al-Kātibī proves al-Khūnajī’s modified contraposition that al-Sharīf
al-Jurjānī claims that Avicenna’s original account works for the sciences.

Text 82.4 The contraposition used in the sciences is the contraposition

in this sense [Avicenna put forward]; the sense set out by the later scholars
is not used in [the sciences]. (TT 364n1)

I imagine that this is because every term in a science refers to something, and
no term exhausts the subject matter of the science.
Contradictory terms as considered in §§26 and 27 in the Risālah model some
of these relations; the contrapositive of an a-proposition is represented by Fig-
ures 15 and 16. Note that in both these figures, however, Avicenna’s claims for the
contrapositive of “every B is A” as “every not-A is not-B” are justified;214 so too,
the inference of “some not-B is A” from “some not-B is not not-A” seems to be
justified by Figures 16, 17, 18, and 19 (see Text 83.3).

§83215 The claims given in this lemma may be taken in four distinct sections,
all to do with affirmative universal propositions (a-propositions). Let me preface
these sections with a general comment offered by al-Ḥillī.

Text 83.1 Affirmatives in contraposition are interchangeable

(yatabādalāni) with negatives in straight conversion, according to the

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 Commentary, §83

ancients; that is, the negatives there are like the affirmatives here, and so
too [the affirmatives are like the negatives]. The author disputes the second
[of these claims]. (ḤQ 316.2–5)

So al-Kātibī by and large agrees with the claims Avicenna makes about the
contrapositives of negative propositions (in other words, if a negative proposi-
tion of a given modality converts by way of straight conversion, an affirmative
proposition of the same modality has one of al-Kātibī’s weaker contrapositives),
but not of affirmative propositions (see Table 1); reasons for differing from Avi-
cenna have been rehearsed in commentary on §82.
I say “by and large”; one of the reasons al-Kātibī comes to different conclu-
sions from those who follow Avicenna is that he rejects syllogisms with possibil-
ity minors for the reductio proofs. These have been mentioned in the course of
commenting on straight conversions (§§73–80); al-Kātibī uses Darii LXL and
Darii AXA but rejects Darii LML and Darii AMA. That this matters becomes
apparent in (for example) Text 83.3.
For §83.1, the first of the two guidelines offered in Text 83.1 means that if a
negative proposition does not convert by straight conversion, the affirmative
proposition of the same modality has no contrapositive. The counterexamples
given to show which e-propositions do not convert may be modified to identify
the a-propositions with no contrapositive; this means that the discussion in §74
applies mutatis mutandis to the affirmatives. “Every moon is necessarily not-
eclipsed at the time of quadrature, not always” is true as a temporal (LT2), the
strongest of the seven propositions set out in Figure 25. The weakest of its putative
contrapositives, a general possibility (M1) o-proposition, “some eclipsed is not
necessarily a moon” (the weakest of the propositions set out in Figure 25), which
is however false, because every eclipsed is necessarily a moon. The counterex-
ample shows that there is no valid contrapositive for the universal affirmative of
the seven propositions set out in Figure 25, nor for the particular affirmative of
those propositions, because the o-proposition that has just been mentioned is
the only candidate contrapositive, and it is false. Al-Ḥillī confirms that first of the
two guidelines offered in Text 83.1 works for the doctrine of the ancients:

Text 83.2 Nor does this contrapose according to the ancients, because
“necessarily, every moon is not-eclipsed at the time of quadrature, not
always” is true, along with the falsity of “every eclipsed is a not-moon” by
a general possibility. (ḤQ 316.14–apu)

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 Commentary, §83

Lemma 83.2 turns to the contrapositives of necessity (L) and perpetuity

(A) a-propositions. As in the treatment of the conversion of the corresponding
e-propositions (in §75), the ancients contraposed the necessity e-proposition
as a necessity e-proposition (“as itself,” ka-nafsihi), whereas al-Kātibī has them
both as a perpetuity e-proposition.

Text 83.3 The ancients contraposed the necessary [a-proposition] as

itself, because if it is true “every C is B necessarily,” then it is true “every
not-B is not-C necessarily,” otherwise “some not-B is not not-C”216 as a
general possibility, from which “some not-B is possibly C” follows, which
added to the original proposition produces “some not-B is B necessarily.”
The same is the case for the perpetual proposition.
The later scholars said that the negative with two indefinite extremes
does not entail the affirmative with an indefinite subject, because [the
affirmative] is stronger than [the negative], and the weaker does not entail
the stronger. The truth is that this [criticism by the later scholars] of the
ancients is misdirected (ghayr wārid), because [the ancients] suppose all
of what is not-B to exist and on that basis judge it to be not-C; on this
hypothesis the negative and the affirmative imply each other. Further, the
author has already judged this contraposition to be clear when he said that
the contradictory of the more general is more particular than the contra-
dictory of the more particular [as set out in §27]. (ḤQ 317.14–318.9)

Al-Ḥillī’s last comment is a reference back to §27, where al-Kātibī has proved
what amounts to the claims of the ancients to do with contraposition (see for this
specific point Figure 16). The proofs that are given by al-Kātibī in §83.2 assume
Darii LXL and AXA; the contrapositive of the necessity proposition cannot be
the stronger “no not-B is possibly C” (let alone the ancients’ “every not-B is nec-
essarily not-C”) because of al-Kātibī’s rejection of Darii LML (see §98 below).
Similarly, §83.3 proves that general conditional and conventional a-propo-
sitions convert as conventional e-propositions with indefinite subjects. Again,
the proofs are clear, and they assume that Darii with descriptional a-major and
descriptional i-minor produces a descriptional i-conclusion. Once again, the
ancients differ in two respects: first, that the contrapositive is an a-proposition
with two indefinite terms, and second, that from the conditional categorical
proposition (LD1) we infer a conditional proposition (LD1), and not merely the
weaker conventional (AD1).

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 Commentary, §83

Text 83.4 According to the doctrine of the ancients, the conditional

[categorical, that is, LD1] contraposes as a conditional, because if “every C
is necessarily B as long as it is C,” then “necessarily every not-B is not-C as
long as it is not-B,” otherwise “some not-B is possibly C while not-B.” This
is absurd, because were it true actually with the original proposition, it
would produce “some not-B is B while not-B,” which is absurd. The [con-
trapositive] conversion of the conventional as a conventional is the same
style of proof. (ḤQ 319.3–9)

The fourth section of the lemma, which I have marked off in the translation
as §83.4, deals with the remaining a-propositions in the privileged set—namely,
the special conditional and conventional propositions (that is, LD2 and AD2).
Their general form is: “every C is always B as long as it is C, and every C is at
least once not B” (consider “writer” and “pen-holding”). Because they are com-
pound propositions, and as in the case of straight conversion, the contraposition
of these propositions is given by adopting the proof for the first part from (in this
case) the preceding discussion in §83.3, and joining that contrapositive to the
contrapositive of the second component proposition. I think al-Kātibī’s state-
ment of the second part of the proof is clear, but here it is line by line:

1. every C is at least once not B

(X e-proposition, second conjunct of premise)
2. some not-B is at least once C (X i-proposition, to prove)
3. no not-B is ever C (A contradictory of 2, assumed)
4. no C is ever not-B (3 by A e-conversion; absurd)

The “non-perpetual-for-some” rider goes through “due to the existence

of the subject”: al-Kātibī means that we know the not-Bs exist because of the
second component of the original proposition. Al-Ḥillī offers an alternative
contrapositive:

Text 83.5 According to the canon of the ancients, “every C is B as long

as it is C, not always” converts to “every not-B is not-C as long as it is not-B,
not always for-some.” The first part is due to its being an implicate of the
two generals; the second is due to what went before. (ḤQ 320.12–15)

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 Commentary, §84

§84217 Al-Kātibī completes his treatment of the contraposition of affirmative

propositions by dealing with i-propositions. This lemma is made up of two parts.
The first part gives a proof for the contraposition of the two special descriptional
i-propositions (LD2 and AD2), a proof that—in parallel with the case of straight
o-conversion of the specials (§77.1)—depends on the fact that the second part of
the compound proposition guarantees the existence of not-B. The second part
of the lemma presents counterexamples showing that there are no contraposi-
tives for the remaining eleven propositions. Again, al-Kātibī broadly follows the
first of the general guidelines in Text 83.1.
We need to keep the unpacked proposition in mind to follow al-Kātibī’s
proof: “some C is always B as long as it is C, and those same Cs are at least once
not B.” As noted, the proof has strong affinities with the proof for the o-conver-
sion of the specials given in §77, and also uses ecthesis.

1. some C is always B as long as it is C

(first conjunct of AD2 i-proposition)
2. those same Cs are at least once not B
(second conjunct of AD2 i-proposition)
3. D is one of the Cs (ecthesis)
4. D is at least once not-B (3, 2)
5. D is never C as long as it is not-B (3, 1)
6. some not-B is never C as long as it is not-B, not always (4, 5, 3)

The justification for 5 (D is never C as long as it is not-B) is this:

5. D is never C as long as it is not-B (to prove)

5a. D is at least once C while not-B (contradictory of 5, assumed)
5b. D is at least once not-B while C (5a)
5c. one of the Cs in 1 is at least once not-B while C (5b, 1; absurd)

For the other eleven modalities of i-propositions, al-Kātibī takes the stron-
gest simple and compound propositions (respectively, L and LT2), and their
putative contrapositives as the weakest simple proposition (M1). (See Figures
24 and 25 for the relative strengths of the propositions.) So “some animal is
necessarily not-man” is a true L i-proposition, while “some man is not neces-
sarily animal” is a false M1 o-proposition. And “some moon is necessarily not-
eclipsed at the time of quadrature, not always” is a true LT2 i-proposition, while
“some eclipsed is not necessarily a moon” is a false M1 o-proposition. As al-Ḥillī
notes (ḤQ 322.8), the counterexamples were used to show that o-propositions

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 Commentary, §85

fail in straight conversion (see §77.2, where al-Kātibī offers somewhat more
explanation as to why it is enough only to show that conversion fails for these
two propositions).

§85218 The last two lemmata of the third discussion deal with contraposition of
negative propositions, which mirror some but not all aspects of the straight con-
version of affirmative propositions (see Text 83.1). Al-Kātibī begins by gesturing
toward a general argument that the contrapositive of an e-proposition cannot be
an a-proposition; al-Ḥillī expands, referring back to §78.1:

Text 85.1 Whether universal or particular, none of the negatives con-

trapose (tanʿakisu) as a universal (as with the affirmatives in straight con-
version), because the contradictory of the predicate might be more gen-
eral than the original subject (ʿayn al-mawḍūʿ ), whereupon it would not be
true to affirm the subject of all the individuals under the contradictory of
the predicate. This is like “no man is a stone”; “every not-stone is a man” is
not true, because not-stone is more general than man, and it is not correct
to affirm [man] of all the individuals [under not-stone] (ʿalā jamī ʿ afrādihi).
(ḤQ 322.u–323.4)

Only two-sided propositions contrapose. Al-Kātibī claims that LD2, AD2, LT2,
LX2, X2, and X~L contrapose. His proof for AD2 runs:

1. no C is ever B as long as it is C (first conjunct of AD2 e-proposition)

2. every C is at least once B (second conjunct of AD2 e-proposition)
3. D is one of the Cs (ecthesis)
4. D is at least once not-B (3, 1)
5. D is at least once C while not-B (1; see Text 85.2)
6. some of what is not-B is at least once C while not-B (4, 5)

The justification for 5 is that because of 1, D is not-B at all times that it is C;

here is al-Ḥillī on the matter:

Text 85.2 Because we expose (nafriḍu) the subject as a specific

thing—let it be D—two premises are true. First, and clearly, D is not-B by
absoluteness (bi-l-iṭlāq);219 second, D is C at some times that it is not-B,
because it is not-B at all times that it is C. [This is] due to the truth of the
first proposition (al-aṣl): if it is true that it is not-B at all times it is C, then
it is true that it is C at some times it is not-B. (ḤQ 323.13–pu)

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 Commentary, §86

Al-Kātibī’s proof for X2, the weakest but one of the remaining four (LT2, LX2,
X2, and X~L) runs:

1. no C is always B (first conjunct of X2 e-proposition)

2. every C is at least once B (second conjunct of X2 e-proposition)
3. D is one of the Cs (ecthesis)
4. D is at least once not-B (3, 1)
5. some not-B is at least once C (4, 3)

§86220 This lemma deals with two final aspects of the discussion of contraposi-
tion. Dealing with the first aspect—to do with the contrapositives of the seven
remaining negative propositions (that is, L, A, LD1, AD1, X1, M1, and M2)—
al-Kātibī regrets that there has been no success in finding the requisite proofs. It is
here that he differs from the second guideline in Text 83.1. The second part of the
lemma has to do with hypothetical propositions, and so forms part of the piece-
meal treatment begun in §38, and carried on with some interruptions through
truth-conditions, quantification, contradiction, and conversion. Particularly
on the first aspect, to do with al-Kātibī on modalized categorical propositions,
al-Ḥillī is a hostile commentator; he believes that Avicenna has a perfectly good
proof for the conversion of a possibility proposition. He is strangely less hostile to
the second part, in which al-Kātibī is also rejecting Avicenna’s position.
Al-Ḥillī begins his consideration of al-Kātibī’s claims about the remaining
propositions with the necessity proposition: does “no C is possibly B” (L) con-
trapose to “some not-B is possibly C” (M1, its weakest possible contrapositive)?

Text 86.1 The e-necessary proposition is the strongest of the simple

negatives, and—according to [al-Kātibī’s] doctrine—it does not contra-
pose, due to the lack of success in finding a proof. This is because the dem-
onstration is either by reductio [or ecthesis], and it is not possible to come
forward with such a proof here, because—given “necessarily, no C is B,” if
“some not-B is C” by a one-sided possibility is not true, then its contradic-
tory is, “necessarily, no not-B is C,” which converts to “necessarily, no C is
not-B,” which is absurd—[the putative proof ] does not go through because
it is possible to have [these] two negatives when the subject is empty (kidhb
al-mawḍūʿ ). Nor will ecthetic proofs work here, because—in [al-Kātibī’s]
view—ecthesis is only for affirmative [components of compound nega-
tives], and not for simple negatives. And if the necessary proposition does

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 Commentary, §86

not contrapose, nor do any of the other simple propositions, because [the
L e-proposition] is the strongest. (ḤQ 325.4–13)

This would eliminate L, A, LD1, AD1, X1, and M1. The two-sided possibility
(M2) cannot provide an adequately strong subject term for contraposition.

Text 86.2 The two-sided possibility among the compound proposi-

tions is also unknown as to contraposition, because a reductio proof will
not go through. [This is] because, if we make the claim: if “no C is B” is true
by a two-sided possibility, “some not-B is C” is true by a one-sided pos-
sibility, otherwise its contradictory is true, which is “necessarily, no not-B
is C,” which converts to “necessarily, no C is not-B,” which is absurd, [the
claim] does not go through, due to the possibility of the truth of the two
negatives when the subject is empty. (In this there is occasion for reflec-
tion, because the subject of the possible proposition must be existent actu-
ally, as we explained in the verification of the quantified propositions.) An
ecthetic proof does not work here either, because were we to say: suppose
from C a D, so it is true of [D] that it is possibly not-B and it is C, and hence
it is true that “some not-B is possibly C”; this does not go through, because
the subject being taken must be insofar as it is in actuality, not in possibil-
ity, according to what we have explained. (ḤQ 325.14–326.8)

The second part of §86 moves on to the hypothetical propositions, and

concerns the contraposition of conditionals (to be clear, the hypothetical
muttaṣilah, not the categorical mashrūṭah). As one would expect, someone—the
ancients—defended the contraposition of conditional hypothetical propositions
(ḤQ 326.9). Al-Taḥtānī gives the clearest account of why al-Kātibī thinks the
proofs fail. Here are the proofs he rejects:

Text 86.3 [The proof for] the contraposition of the affirmative con-
ditional is because if (1) “whenever A is B then C is D” is true, then (2)
“never, if C is not D then A is B,” otherwise (3) “sometimes, if C is not
D then A is B,” which with the original proposition produces (4) “some-
times, if C is not D then C is D,” which is absurd. Or (3) converts by straight
conversion to (5) “sometimes, if A is B then C is not D.” But then “A is B”
implies two contradictories [that is, in (1) and (5)].
[The proof for] the contraposition of the negative conditional is because
if (6) “never, if A is B then C is D,” then (7) “sometimes, if C is not D then

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 Commentary, §87

A is B,” otherwise (8) “never, if C is not D then A is B,” so (9) “sometimes

not, if A is B then C is not D,” from which it follows (10) “sometimes, if A
is B then C is D,” which contradicts the original proposition [that is, (6)].
Since these proofs did not go through according to the author, and he
was not successful by way of another proof, he suspended judgment on
whether or not they contrapose (tawaqqafa fī l-inʿikās wa-ʿadamihi). (TT
375.7–u)

Why reject these proofs? Al-Taḥtānī rejects the assumption that there is a
problem with “A is B,” implying two contradictories:

Text 86.4 Nor do we concede that having “A is B” entail two contradic-

tories is impossible; because “A is B” may be impossible, and the impos-
sible may entail the impossible. (TT 377.5–6)

We will see in Texts 87.2 and 87.5 that al-Ḥillī claims—and al-Taftāzānī backs
him up in Text 86.5—that al-Kātibī in his Jāmiʿ al-daqāʾiq agrees with Text 86.4.221
Al-Taftāzānī goes on to say that negative coincidental conditionals contra-
pose, though affirmative coincidentals do not, and nor do disjunctives (TŠ 310.3,
310.7, 310.10); I note but do not propose to explore these claims. I conclude by
drawing attention to the fact that the claims defended in the Risālah may not
wholly reflect al-Kātibī’s considered position. At the end of the argument against
the contraposition of disjunctives, al-Taftāzānī says:

Text 86.5 This is what the author said in the Jāmiʿ [al-daqāʾiq], and by
this he made it clear that what he intended by “hypotheticals” here was
not the coincidentals, and that his own doctrine was not suspension [of
judgment] (al-tawaqquf) with respect to contraposition and its failure;
rather, what he meant was that [the status of ] contraposition was unknow-
able, although in some [of the propositions] failure of contraposition was
known. (TŠ 310.14–16)

The fourth discussion, on the co-implication of hypothetical propositions

§87222 This lemma follows directly on the treatment of the contraposition
of conditional hypothetical propositions, and makes up part of the nineteen
lemmata al-Kātibī devotes to the hypothetical propositions and their role
in inference. Like the treatment of conversion in §81 and of contraposition
in the preceding lemma, this is a treatment of immediate or single-premise

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 Commentary, §87

inference; unlike conversion and contraposition, the proposition inferred is

not the same species (see §72) as the premise from which it is inferred. The
discussion is confined to three broad issues: what disjunctive propositions are
entailed by, and entail, conditional propositions; what conditional proposi-
tions are entailed by, and entail, exclusive disjunctive propositions; and what
conditional propositions are entailed by, and entail, inclusive disjunction and
alternative denial (see Figures 31–33). According to al-Taftāzānī, it is so lim-
ited a treatment because this part of the syllogistic is of little value (li-qillat
jadwāhu) (TŠ 310.pu).
Al-Kātibī claims to base all his proofs in this lemma on the fundamental
meaning of implication and disjunction:

Text 87.1 Al-Kātibī alludes to the demonstration of all [these claims]

with the words: “otherwise implication and disjunction mean nothing,”
which is to say, if there is a universal implication between two matters,
then were it not impossible to conjoin (manʿ jamʿ ) the implicant and the
contradictory of the implicate, it would be possible to conjoin them so
that the implicant would be affirmed without the implicate (maʿa ʿadam
al-lāzim) such that the implicate would not be an implicate. And were it
not impossible to exclude (manʿ khulūw) the contradictory of the impli-
cant and the implicate, it would be possible to remove them both, so the
implicant would be affirmed without the implicate, so the implicate would
not be an implicate. If it is impossible to conjoin universally, were each
[disjunct] not to entail the contradictory of the other, it would be possible
to assert (thubūt) one with the other, and there would not be a disjunc-
tion—alternative denial—between them. If there is inclusive disjunction
between them, then were the contradictory of each of them not to entail
the other disjunct, it would be possible to affirm the contradictory of one
while supposing the contradictory of the other; so then there would be no
inclusive disjunction between them. (TŠ 311.8–16)

Al-Kātibī lists a number of implicates of the hypothetical propositions,

without proofs. Al-Ḥillī assesses the claims in three passes, considering the
proofs for the co-implication among a conditional, an inclusive disjunctive
with the conditional’s antecedent negated, and an alternative denial with the
conditional’s consequent negated (see Figure 31). He denies that al-Kātibī
is entitled to rely on them, which is to say that al-Kātibī has an incoherent
account of the conditionals:223

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 Commentary, §87

Text 87.2 If “whenever A is B then C is D” is true, then so is “always,

either A is B or C is not D” (as an alternative denial), otherwise it would be
possible to conjoin “A is B” and “C is not D” such that “A is B” is established
but with “C is not D,” whereupon the universal conditional (“whenever A
is B then C is D”) would not be true.
But on the rule [al-Kātibī] mentioned in his other books—such that it
is problematic by reason of [the rule] to have contraposition for condition-
als, I mean [the rule] that something entails its contradictory—this will
not go through.
“Always, either A is not B or C is D” (as an inclusive disjunction) would
also be true, because were both disjuncts false (law khalā l-amr ʿanhumā),
“A is B” would be established but “C is D” would be false, and that is absurd,
due to what we established at the outset; this is the sense of [al-Kātibī’s]
claim “otherwise the implication would be void.”
But this also would not go through on his rule. (ḤQ 327.9–14)

Proofs are given for the claims in §87.2 by al-Taftāzānī (see Figure 32):

Text 87.3 Since both alternative denial and inclusive disjunction entail
two conditional connections (li-ttiṣālayn), and the real disjunctive covers
both blocking conjunction of both disjuncts and blocking exclusion of
both disjuncts, it in consequence entails four conditionals, two with one of
the two disjuncts as antecedent and the contradictory of the other disjunct
as consequent, and two with reversed components; since were one of the
disjuncts not to entail the contradictory of the other there would be no
relation between them blocking conjunction of both disjuncts (lam yakun
baynahumā manʿ jamʿ ), and were the contradictory of one of the disjuncts
not to entail the other disjunct, there would be no relation between them
blocking exclusion of both disjuncts. For example, “this number is either
even or odd” entails “always, if it is even then it is not odd” and “always, if it
is odd then it is not even,” and “always, if it is not even then it is odd,” and
“always, if it is not odd, then it is even.” (TŠ 311.17–312.2)

And for the co-implication between alternative denial and inclusive disjunc-
tion (see Figure 33):

Text 87.4 Further, alternative denial and inclusive disjunction each

entail the other with the contradictories of both parts [of the original prop-
osition], which is to say, blocking conjunction of both disjuncts entails

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 Commentary, §88

blocking exclusion of their contradictories, since were the exclusion of

both contradictories possible, the original parts (al-ʿaynayn) could con-
join, which vitiates blocking conjunction. So too, blocking exclusion of the
two matters requires blocking conjunction of their contradictories, since
were it possible to conjoin the two contradictories it would be possible to
remove the two original parts (irtifāʿ al-ʿaynayn), which vitiates blocking
exclusion. For example, if “either the thing is a man or horse” is true as an
alternative denial, “either it is not-man or not-horse” is true as an inclusive
disjunctive, and vice versa. (TŠ 312.2–u)

Al-Ḥillī, assessing the proofs for al-Kātibī’s claims, comes at the end to say:

Text 87.5 According to his rule which has been mentioned (and that is
[the possibility of ] something entailing two contradictories, and the pos-
sibility of something entailing something as a universal and its absence as a
particular), none of these implications goes through. (ḤQ 329.11–13)

In making this claim, al-Ḥillī is reinforcing the ascription of a position to

al-Kātibī already ascribed to him by al-Taḥtānī in Text 86.4.

The Third Treatise, on Syllogisms

The first section, on the definition and division of syllogism

The lemmata on syllogism are presented by all commentators on the Risālah as

treating the most important element of the logic, because it is the most impor-
tant means for establishing new assertions. The first ten lemmata (§§88–97)
define the syllogism and the technical terms for its components, then sketch the
moods of what in Latin logic is referred to as the categorical syllogistic (what
Avicenna and the later Arabic tradition affiliated with his work called connec-
tive syllogisms with categorical premises). The lemmata touch on but do not
develop some of the most important notions of logic—in particular, that of the
relation the conclusion has to the premises of the syllogism. The commentators
develop some of these notions—and I offer here a few of their comments—but
their primary concern, given that the Risālah is a book for beginners, is to make
sure that readers are able to follow the proofs al-Kātibī sets out for the produc-
tive moods, and to be aware of the rules—and the reasons for them—to which he
alludes in rejecting sterile moods.

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 Commentary, §88

Before I descend to the details covered in §§88–97, I should say something

about how the proofs for the moods relate, on the one hand, to the passage that
introduces the propositions deployed in the syllogisms (§§51–59), and, on the
other, to the passage that examines how those propositions used as premises
determine the modality of the proposition produced as conclusion to a syllogism
(§§98–104). As I see it, the only claim al-Kātibī is making for the moods set out
in this passage is that there is at least one kind of proposition covered in §§51–59,
which, when used for the premises, makes the mood productive. He is present-
ing the syllogism taken without restriction (al-qiyās al-muṭlaq) as to what kind of
alethically or temporally modalized propositions serve as premises. He is not, in
other words, offering an assertoric syllogistic. He is simply claiming that if there
are propositions that make the mood productive, this is the way a proof can be
constructed to prove that productivity. The clearest indication that this is what
he is doing is in the three moods presented in the lemmata I have numbered as
§§95.7–97 (the last three of the eight moods he presents for the fourth figure).
There, al-Kātibī says that these moods are valid when the negative proposition is
one of the two “specials” (that is, LD2 and AD2, described in §§53 and 54, whose
o-propositions are proved to convert in §77); it is enough that he has at least one
proposition that works for the mood to include it in the presentation.
In terms of procedure, what al-Kātibī tries to show in the following treatment
is that some combinations of premises must be rejected because they never pro-
duce a conclusion, and that those that are left should be accepted in the account
because proofs can be constructed for their productivity.
In rejecting a number of moods as sterile, al-Kātibī refers to conditions of
productivity for the figures. These conditions are given for the first figure (§91.1:
that the minor premise be affirmative, and the major premise universal) with
reasons for why they are necessary, for the second figure (§92: that the two
premises differ in quality, and that the major be universal), for the third (§94:
that the minor be affirmative, and that one of the premises be universal), and for
the fourth (§95: either that both premises be affirmative and the minor univer-
sal, or that they differ in quality with one a universal). Reasons are offered why
some of these conditions should be observed, and at three points (while consid-
ering the second, third, and fourth figures) al-Kātibī alludes to countermodels
that produce (as I translate the phrase, first used in §92) “discrepant conclusions
revealing lack of productivity” (al-ikhtilāf al-mūjib li-ʿadam al-intāj), “which is a
syllogism with true premises leading in some cases to an affirmative conclusion,

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and in others to a negative conclusion.” The commentators provide us with some

appropriate countermodels in dealing with §§92, 94, and 95,224 and I follow in
their footsteps (though less and less doggedly as the account goes on).
The presentation of the proofs that the remaining moods are indeed produc-
tive calls on conversion (discussed above in §§67–80, though all that matters
for the current discussion is that e-, a-, and i-conversion go through for some
propositions, and o-conversion goes through for LD2 and AD2), reductio (qiyās
al-khalf), or ecthesis (al-iftirāḍ). These last two techniques have been deployed
in the treatment of conversion (reductio is used often from its first appearance
in §75, and ecthesis somewhat less frequently from its first appearance in §77).
Al-Kātibī reflects on the structure of a reductio proof in §113. He does not discuss
ecthesis, so I offer comments distinguishing its use in §93 from the ecthesis in §75.

§88225 The delineation of the syllogism al-Kātibī offers (“syllogism is a dis-

course composed of propositions from which alone, if admitted, another dis-
course follows necessarily”) is very much like the last one Avicenna formulated,
in ʿUyūn al-ḥikmah;226 this is the most common definition (using “definition” for
now in the loose sense of taʿrīf) given by post-Avicennian logicians, and differs
from Avicenna’s earlier definitions, and from Aristotle’s and al-Fārābī’s.
The commentators on the Risālah clarify the definition’s coverage, and the
force of the various elements that make it up. To begin: “Discourse composed of
propositions” must include the syllogism held in the mind (al-qiyās al-maʿqūl)
and, secondarily, the syllogism actually uttered (al-qiyās al-malfūẓ). Both the
following (luzūm) of the conclusion and the syllogicity of the syllogism belong
primarily to the syllogism held in the mind: “expressing the propositions entails
the intellection of their meanings by one familiar with imposition, and intellect-
ing their meanings on the hypothesis they are conceded (ʿalā taqdīr al-taslīm)
entails the conclusion” (TŠ 312.9–11); it is the conclusion as understood in the
mind that is primarily referred to in the definition as the “other discourse” (TŠ
312.11–12). The point is made by al-Rāzī with reference to the definition from
ʿUyūn al-ḥikmah:

Text 88.1 What is intended by “that which follows necessarily from

admitting the premises is admitting the conclusion” is not oral discourse
(al-qawl al-lisānī); for uttering the conclusion does not follow necessarily
from uttering the premises, but rather the psychological thoughts [follow
one from another].227 (RM 244.u–245.2)

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 Commentary, §88

Al-Khūnajī directs his comments in the Kashf al-asrār to the delineation in

the Cure (AQ 54.6–7),228 which runs (ḪK 231.2–3): “a discourse in which, if more
than one thing is posited, from the things posited alone, and not accidentally,
another discourse different from them follows necessarily” (qawl idhā wuḍiʿat
fīhi ashyāʾ akthar min wāḥid lazima ʿan tilka l-ashyāʾ al-mawḍūʿah li-dhātihā
lā bi-l-ʿaraḍ qawl mā ākhar ghayruhā bi-l-iḍṭirār).229 Like al-Rāzī, al-Khūnajī
offers some comments on the relation between syllogism as concepts under-
stood and as propositions uttered (more or less relaying Avicenna’s comments
[AQ 54.9–u]):

Text 88.2 Know that there are intelligible syllogisms, and they are
thoughts that are composed in the soul in such a way as to lead to the
assertion in the soul of something else; and there are audible syllogisms,
and they are uttered discourse that are composed of propositions with the
restrictions which have been mentioned. [The latter] are not syllogisms
insofar as they are audible—since uttering the syllogism does not require
uttering what is sought, nor does [what is sought] follow from it—but
rather insofar as they signify meanings that are understood, which are syl-
logisms in the first sense. (ḪK 239.11–pu)

The genus in the definition of syllogism is “discourse” (qawl). “Propositions”

(qaḍāyā) is used in the plural to exclude single-premise inferences that, when
involving a compound proposition (like for example the conversion or the con-
traposition of LD2), trouble the limits of the definition (the problem is solved by
claiming that the elements of a compound proposition are not taken themselves
as propositions). “Propositions” is used rather than “premises” because a prem-
ise is a proposition that is part of a syllogism, so using “premises” would make
the definition circular (ḤQ 331.u–332.1). “If admitted” points to the fact that the
premises need not be actually conceded or accepted; all that matters is what
follows from the premises were they to be conceded. This means the definition
includes syllogisms with false premises as well as those with true premises. “Fol-
lows” (lazima) defines a strong enough relation between premises and conclu-
sion to exclude induction and example. (Note that lazima is a compression of
the Arabic Aristotle’s original lazima . . . min al-iḍṭirār; this has led me often
to translate the word in the Risālah as “follows necessarily.”) In first-figure syl-
logisms, the following is self-evident (see §22). “From which” (ʿanhā, in some
formulations minhā) excludes a conclusion that follows from the matter of the

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premises (bi-ḥasab khuṣūṣ al-māddah) rather than from the premises by virtue
of their form; for example, “no man is a stone, every stone is inanimate, no man
is inanimate” is excluded. Al-Taḥtānī emphasizes the necessity implicit in “fol-
lows from them” (lazima ʿanhā); he agrees that the effect of the whole phrase is
to exclude induction and example, “due to the possibility of a counterexample
to what they prove” (TT 384.8–9). “Alone” (bi- or li-dhātihā) is to exclude infer-
ences that entail a conclusion by means of a proposition not in the premise-
set, whether that proposition is foreign (not entailed by the premise-set) or not
(entailed by the premise-set; the example given involves a contrapositive of one
of the premises). “Another discourse” points to the fact that the conclusion must
differ from each one of the premises; without this restriction, any two premises
would be a syllogism from which either of the two premises could be concluded
(though this might also breach the “from them” condition).230

§89231 The distinction between connective (iqtirānī) and repetitive (istithnāʾī)

syllogisms is one Avicenna explicitly claimed as his own (Pointers 7.2.1 [AI 65.u–
66.10]); it is a distinction made by all who belong to the broader logical tradition
he initiated. The distinction turns on whether the conclusion is in the premises
actually (bi-l-fiʿl) or only potentially (bi-l-quwwah). Whereas the connective syl-
logism is so-called because it establishes a connection between extremes, the
repetitive is so-called “because it includes a repetitive particle; namely, ‘but’
(li-shtimālihi ʿalā ḥarf al-istithnāʾ aʿnī lākin)” (TT 386.9).
It was recognized by the post-Avicennian tradition that the new distinction
was an important point of divergence from the Aristotelian tradition, because it
made space for an extraordinary extension to the syllogistic system, an exten-
sion that was to become even larger in the works of some post-Avicennian logi-
cians (see §§105–9 for an overview of the simpler syllogisms in this extension;
these are effectively being placed alongside the categorical syllogism set out in
§§91–97). This is one of the occasions on which al-Ḥillī uses the term “ancients”
(in this case, actually “ancient logicians”) to refer to the logicians who came
before Avicenna rather than to Avicenna himself.

Text 89.1 The ancient logicians divided the syllogism into that com-
posed of categoricals and that composed of hypotheticals, and they con-
sidered the first to be the connective and the second to be the repetitive.
The cause of their error here was their failure to apprehend the connec-
tive hypotheticals. When Avicenna had extracted these [syllogisms] from

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 Commentary, §89

potentiality to actuality, he introduced a primary division of the syllo-

gism into connective and repetitive, exactly as the author has done here.
(ḤQ 334.6–10)

Al-Ḥillī mildly rebukes al-Kātibī’s formulation of the delineation. Al-Ḥillī

says that the components of a hypothetical are not taken as propositions insofar
as they are parts of a hypothetical proposition (see commentary on §§60 to 66
above), which is to say, they are neither true nor false insofar as they are compo-
nents of the hypothetical.

Text 89.2 We say “of the genus of the conclusion,” not, as the author
does, “the conclusion itself ”; because the conclusion is a discourse that
bears truth and falsehood, yet when it is a part of the hypothetical it does
not; so the part mentioned in the syllogism is not itself the conclusion.
(ḤQ 334.pu–335.1)

But the most crucial element of the delineation is the distinction between a
conclusion that is actually in the premises, and one that is only potentially in the
premises. On this, al-Taḥtānī says:

Text 89.3 Al-Kātibī restricted the mention of the conclusion and its
contradictory in the definition with “actually” simply because, were it
not restricted like this, the connective syllogisms would come under the
definition of the repetitive syllogism; since the conclusion is a compound
of matter (its two extremes) and of form (its compositional structure),
and a thing’s matter is that through which potentiality comes about, so
the conclusion is mentioned in [the connective syllogisms] potentially.
(TT 386.13–apu)

Further doubts are raised about the delineation, among them whether—
given that the definition of syllogism in §88 insists that the conclusion be other
than either of the premises—the fact that the repetitive syllogism is defined as
actually mentioning the conclusion or its contradictory breaches that part of the
definition of syllogism. It does not:

Text 89.4 We do not concede that if the conclusion is actually men-

tioned in the syllogism it will not be distinct (mughāyirah) from each
of the premises. It would only be like that were the conclusion not part
of the premise, which is rejected, because the premise in the repetitive

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 Commentary, §90

syllogism is not “the sun is up” but rather its entailing the presence of day
(bal istilzāmuhu li-wujūd al-nahār). (TT 387.6–9)

So too the fact that the part of a hypothetical does not have a truth-value
insofar as it is a part of a hypothetical—and therefore is not a proposition, unlike
the conclusion—does not prevent it being an actual mention of the conclusion;
all that is required for actual mention is both extremes in the order given in
the conclusion.

§90232 Al-Kātibī’s exposition of the terms of art specific to the syllogism

requires no commentary. He includes fourth-figure syllogisms, though the
fourth figure is only distinguishable when the syllogism (which in the Arabic
tradition is the major and minor premises, excluding the conclusion) is consid-
ered relative to the conclusion. Considered in itself, the syllogism can only have
three figures.233 Note that al-Kātibī, in line with the later Arabic tradition, puts
minor premise before major, and subject before predicate (so Prior Analytics
25b38 anna alif in kānat maqūlah ʿalā kull bāʾ wa-kānat bāʾ tuqālu ʿalā kull jīm
is for al-Kātibī kull jīm bāʾ wa-kull bāʾ alif); I follow al-Kātibī in my translations,
but when I use the Latin mnemonics, Barbara Celarent, or a, e, i, o for premises
(as in “the premise-pair a-e”), reference is to the major first.
Al-Kātibī begins with the categorical syllogisms:

Text 90.1 The connective syllogism is either categorical (if it is

made up of two categorical propositions) or hypothetical (if it is not so
constructed). Since the categorical is simpler, let us begin with it. (TT
388.13–14)

Al-Taḥtānī lays out the two sets of conditions that need to be covered:

Text 90.2 Know that for the productivity of the four figures there
are conditions that have to do with the quantity and quality of the prem-
ises, and conditions that have to do with the modality of the premises.
(TT 391.apu–pu)

Al-Kātibī deals with the first set of conditions from §§91 to 97, and moves on
to the second set in Section 2 (§§98–104).

230 230
 Commentary, §91

§91234 The two conditions for productivity in the first figure are that the minor
premise be affirmative (because if it is not affirmative, the minor term will not
come under the middle [TT 392.4–9]), and that the major premise be universal
(because if it is not universal, the minor term may not come under the major
term predicated of the middle [TT 392.10–14]). The first condition rules out
eight premise-pairs (stating major premise first), a-e, a-o, e-e, e-o, i-e, i-o, o-e,
and o-o, and the second condition rules out (I repeat those already eliminated
by the first condition; that is, the last four I have just listed) i-a, i-e, i-i, i-o, o-a,
o-e, o-i, and o-o; together the two conditions rule out twelve premise-pairs of
the possible sixteen. Unlike Aristotle, neither al-Kātibī nor his commentators go
any further into the rejection of these twelve or the moods they can make up.235
The remaining four are taken to make up moods that are said to be self-evident
(bayyinah bi-nafsihā); they are (given major first):236

§91.2 Barbara: BaA, CaB ⊦ CaA

§91.3 Celarent: BeA, CaB ⊦ CeA
§91.4 Darii: BaA, CiB ⊦ CiA
§91.5 Ferio: BeA, CiB ⊦ CoA

§92237 Al-Kātibī sets out the two conditions for productivity in the second
figure: that the premises differ in quality, and that the major premise be uni-
versal; “otherwise we get discrepant conclusions revealing lack of productivity
(wa-illā la-ḥaṣala l-ikhtilāf al-mūjib li-ʿadam al-intāj).” Al-Taḥtānī provides rel-
evant examples leading to such conclusions; these show us that breaching either
of the two conditions leaves us with a premise combination for which we can
find true premises and a true affirmative putative conclusion, and for which we
can also find true premises and a true negative putative conclusion.

Text 92.1 And the fact is that such discrepancy requires the sterility of
the syllogism, because, when it is true with the affirmative it does not pro-
duce the negative, and when it is true with the negative it does not produce
the affirmative. This is because what is meant by “production” is that the
syllogism entails one of the two specifically (istilzām al-qiyās li-aḥadihimā
ʿalā al-taʿyīn). (TT 396.10–12)

Here are two compressed passages in which al-Taḥtānī presents triplets of

terms. The first is designed to show that the first condition—that the premises

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 Commentary, §92

differ in quality—must be observed. If the condition is breached, the premises

will agree in quality:

Text 92.2 Consider the case that the two premises are affirmative. [It
leads to discrepant conclusions] because it is true “every man is an animal”
and “every rational is an animal,” and the true [conclusion, “every man is
rational,”] would be affirmative; but were we to change the major premise
[from “every rational is an animal”] to “every horse is an animal,” the true
[conclusion, “no man is a horse,”] would be negative.
Now consider the case that the two [premises] are negative. [It leads
to discrepant conclusions] due to the truth of “no man is a stone” and “no
horse is a stone,” and the true [conclusion, “no man is a horse,”] would be
negative; but were we to have “no rational is a stone” [in place of the major
premise “no horse is a stone,”] the true [conclusion, “every man is ratio-
nal,”] would be affirmative. (TT 395.14–u)

The second passage assumes that the second condition—that the major be uni-
versal—is breached, so the major is either an i-proposition or an o-proposition.

Text 92.3 Consider the case that it is an i-proposition. [It leads to dis-
crepant conclusions] because “no man is a horse” and “some animal is a
horse” are true, and the true [conclusion, “some man is an animal,”] is
affirmative; but were we to change the major [“some animal is a horse”] to
“some thing-that-neighs is a horse,” the true [conclusion, “some man is not
a thing-that-neighs,”] is negative.
Then consider the case that it is an o-proposition. [It leads to discrepant
conclusions] because “every man is an animal” and “some body is not an
animal” are true, and the true [conclusion, “some man is a body,”] is affir-
mative; but with “some stone is not an animal” the true [conclusion, “some
man is not a stone,”] is negative. (TT 396.4–9)

With these four pairs of triplets, al-Taḥtānī takes himself to have established
the two conditions of productivity for the second figure. He does not consider
and reject every invalid mood. He would be entitled to assume that premises
weaker than those he considers must also be rejected;238 this would be another
application of the rule (see §74) that what follows from the weaker follows from
the stronger (lāzim al-aʿamm lāzim al-akhaṣṣ) and—more specifically—its con-
trapositive, what does not follow from the stronger does not follow from the

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 Commentary, §93

weaker. Stronger conclusions must also be rejected.239 But this is not the path
al-Taḥtānī follows.

§93240 The conditions defended in §92 leave four productive moods, named
by Peter of Spain as Cesare, Camestres, Festino, and Baroco, and treated by both
Peter and al-Kātibī in that order. In Strobino’s shorthand:

§93.2 Cesare: AeB, CaB ⊦ CeA

§93.3 Camestres: AaB, CeB ⊦ CeA
§93.4 Festino: AeB, CiB ⊦ CoA
§93.5 Baroco: AaB, CoB ⊦ CoA

As noted above, al-Kātibī proves that these syllogisms are productive by call-
ing on the four self-evident first-figure moods, the conversions proved in §§73–
80, reductio, and syllogistic ecthesis. Al-Kātibī begins with Cesare (§93.2). I
expand al-Kātibī’s shorthand proofs for Camestres (§93.3), Festino (§93.4), and
Baroco (§93.5) to show the methods he has in mind; I give the proof for Cam-
estres by conversion, for Festino by ecthesis, and for Baroco by reductio.
Camestres by conversion; note that the minor will have to be a convertible
proposition (munʿakisah):

1. every A is B (major)
2. no C is B (minor)
3. no B is C (2, e-conversion)
4. no A is C (1, 3 by Celarent)
5. no C is A (4, e-conversion)

Festino by ecthesis; in 3, al-Kātibī exposes that part of C which is B and calls

it D; note that the ecthesis here and in commentary on the fourth figure is syl-
logistic ecthesis, to be distinguished from the perceptual ecthesis (al-iftirāḍ
bi-l-ḥiss) used in proving i-conversion (see comments before the treatment of
§73 above):

1. no A is B (major)
2. some C is B (minor)
3. every D is B, some C is D (2, i-ecthesis)
4. no D is A (1, first proposition in 3 by Cesare)
5. some C is not A (4, second proposition in 3 by Ferio)

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 Commentary, §94

Baroco is by reductio (see §113), where in 3 the contradictory of the conclu-

sion is assumed:

1. every A is B (major)
2. some C is not B (minor)
3. every C is A (contradictory of conclusion, assumed)
4. every C is B (3, 1 by Barbara; absurd)
5. not (every C is A) (contradictory of 3)

Some had sought to prove Baroco by ecthesis:

Text 93.1 The ancients proved it also by ecthesis, by supposing that

some [of “some C is not B”] as D, so it is not B; so it is true “no D is B,” and
“every A is B,” so “no D is A.” Then we say “some C is D,” and “no D is A,”
which produces “some C is not A,” which is what is sought. The author
does not mention this [method] because according to him ecthesis invokes
the existence of the subject, and the subject of the negative can be nonex-
istent;241 but there is no doubt their argument is flawed.242 (ḤQ 343.5–11)

§94243 The exposition of the third figure follows the model established in the
treatment of the second; I sketch rapidly the rejections and proofs to which
al-Kātibī alludes. There are again two conditions for productivity in the third:
first, that the minor is affirmative, and second, that one of the premises is uni-
versal. Take the first condition: If the minor were to be negative, it would form a
premise-set with either an affirmative or a negative proposition. Consider it with
an affirmative major (so “no C is B” and “every A is B”) with “horse” as minor,
“man” as middle, and “animal” and “rational” as major terms. So we have:

1.1 no man is a horse, every man is an animal; every horse is an animal

1.2 no man is a horse, every man is rational; no horse is rational

With a negative major, consider examples with “that-which-neighs” and

“horse” as major terms.

2.1 no man is a horse, no man is that-which-neighs; every horse is

that-which-neighs
2.2 no man is a horse, no man is a donkey; no horse is a donkey

Al-Taḥtānī goes on to explain why we cannot breach the second condition.

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 Commentary, §95

Text 94.1 One of the premises must be universal because, were they
both particular, it would be possible that the part of the middle that is
judged to come under the major is not the part of the middle that is judged
to come under the minor, and so the judgment may not pass from the
middle to the minor. This is like “some animals are human” with “some
animals are horses.” The judgment on some animals as being horses does
not pass to the part judged to be humans. (TT 401.12–16)

Observing both conditions leaves six productive moods, referred to by

the Latin tradition as Darapti, Felapton, Disamis, Datisi, Bocardo, and Feri-
son; al-Kātibī presents them in the following order: Darapti (§94.3), Felapton
(§94.4), Datisi (§94.5), Ferison (§94.6), Disamis (§94.7), and Bocardo (§94.8).
Aside from when he gives the ecthetic proof for Datisi, al-Kātibī merely names
the methods by which the moods may be proved productive. Here are the syl-
logisms in Strobino’s shorthand:

§94.3 Darapti: BaA, BaC ⊦ CiA

§94.4 Felapton: BeA, BaC ⊦ CoA
§94.5 Datisi: BaA, BiC ⊦ CiA
§94.6 Ferison: BeA, BiC ⊦ CoA
§94.7 Disamis: BiA, BaC ⊦ CiA
§94.8 Bocardo: BoA, BaC ⊦ CoA

§95244 The conditions for productive fourth-figure moods are the most com-
plex of those offered, being set out as disjuncts: either that both premises be
affirmative and the minor be a universal, or that the two premises differ in qual-
ity and one of them be universal. As al-Taḥtānī says:

Text 95.1 That is because, were one of the two [conditions] not met,
one of three outcomes would follow: both premises would be negative, or
both would be affirmative and the minor particular, or they would differ in
quality and both would be particular. In these cases, we have discrepant
conclusions, which reveal nonproductivity. (TT 405.15–17)

Al-Taḥtānī once again offers pairs of triplets to reject sterile moods. For the
first case where the conditions are not met (e-e-4):

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 Commentary, §96

1.1 no man is a horse, no donkey is a man; no horse is a donkey

1.2 no man is a horse, no thing-that-neighs is a man; every horse is a
thing-that-neighs

For the second case (a-i-4):

2.1 some animal is a man, every rational is an animal; some man is rational
2.2 some animal is a man, every horse is an animal; some man is not a horse

For the first possibility under the third case (o-i-4):

3.1 some rational is man, some animal is not rational; some man is an animal
3.2 some rational is man, some horse is not rational; some man is not a horse

And for the second possibility under the third case (i-o-4):

4.1 some man is not a horse, some animal is man; some horse is an animal
4.2 some man is not a horse, some rational is man; some horse is not rational

If al-Taḥtānī has shown that the conditions must be observed, al-Kātibī is

left with eight productive fourth-figure moods, rather than the five normally
given, which are the first five in the Risālah: Bramantip, Dimaris, Camenes,
Fesapo, Fresison.245 The proofs for their productivity are easily recovered from
al-Kātibī’s directions (which are all for reduction through conversion and inver-
sion of premise order). Al-Kātibī goes on to give another three moods (§§95.8–
95.10), and comes back to meditate on their relatively recent acceptance as valid
in §97. Here are the moods in Strobino’s shorthand:

§95.3 Bramantip: AaB, BaC ⊦ CiA

§95.4 Dimaris: AaB, BiC ⊦ CiA
§95.5 Camenes: AaB, BeC ⊦ CeA
§95.6 Fesapo: AeB, BaC ⊦ CoA
§95.7 Fresison: AeB, BiC ⊦ CoA
§95.8 A-O-O: AaB, BoC ⊦ CoA
§95.9 O-A-O: AoB, BaC ⊦ CoA
§95.10 I-E-O: AiB, BeC ⊦ CoA

§96246 Al-Kātibī notes that all moods in the fourth can be proved by reductio
(first used in the Risālah in §75), but goes on to point out that Dimaris and Fre-
sison can also be proved by ecthesis. His further comments relate to Dimaris,
but what follows is at least one way they can be made to apply to Fresison

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 Commentary, §97

(though i-conversion on 1 and e-conversion on 2, followed by Ferio would

surely be easier):

1. some B is C (minor)
2. no A is B (major)
3. every D is B, some D is C (1, i-ecthesis)
4. no B is A (2, e-conversion)
5. no D is A (first proposition in 3, 4 by Celarent)
6. some C is D (second proposition in 3, i-conversion)
7. some C is not A (5, 6 by Ferio).

§97247 I give al-Taḥtānī’s comments here in full, because they record not
only the countermodels the ancients gave against the productivity of the last
three moods noted in §95, but also the reason these moods were subsequently
accepted. As is so often the case with innovations in the later logic, the emi-
nent scholar who showed how to prove productivity for these moods with the
appropriate proposition (which is to say, LD2 or AD2) may be—once again—
Afḍal al-Dīn al-Khūnajī (although al-Ṭūsī credits al-Abharī with discovering the
proof ).248 That said, al-Khūnajī and al-Rāzī are named by al-Ḥillī as opposing the
validity of syllogisms beyond the first five (ḤQ 354.6) (wrongly, as al-Ḥillī says,
because the arguments rehearsed and then rejected in Text 97.1 do not take LD2
or AD2 o-conversion into account [ḤQ 355.11–13]).

Text 97.1 The ancients used to limit the productive moods of this
figure to the first five; according to them, the last three moods were sterile
due to discrepant conclusions arising in them.
Consider the sixth mood [A-O-O], it is true that “some animal is not
human,” and “every horse is an animal,” and the truth is the negative [con-
clusion; “some human is not a horse”]; or [with a different major] “every
rational is animal,” and the truth is the affirmative [conclusion: “some
human is rational”].
Consider the seventh [O-A-O], it is [sterile] because it is true that
“every man is rational,” and “some horse is not man,” and the truth is the
negative [conclusion; “some horse is not rational”]; or [with a different
major] “some animal is not man,” and the truth is the affirmative [conclu-
sion; “some rational is animal”].
Consider the eighth [I-E-O], it is like “no man is a horse,” and “some ratio-
nal is a man” [which terms are true as a negative conclusion, “some horse

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 Commentary, §97

is not rational”], or [with a different major] “some animal is man” [which

terms are true as an affirmative conclusion, “some rational is animal”].
The writer alludes to his answer by the fact that the proof for discrepant
conclusions in these moods only goes through if the syllogism is made up
of simple premises; but if we stipulate for its productivity that the negative
that is used must be one of the two specials [LD2 or AD2], these objections
have no traction. Know that their productivity is based on the conversion
of the special o-proposition as itself; because the sixth and the seventh
simply reduce through its conversion to the second [figure] and the third
[figure], and the eighth only produces were it such that if its premises were
reversed, there would result in the first figure a negative special that would
convert to the conclusion sought. The conversion of the [special] was not
apparent to the ancients, but a certain eminent later scholar (baʿḍ al-afāḍil
min al-mutaʾakhkhirīn) hit upon it and proved it. (TT 412.1–413.u)

The second section, on mixes of modalized propositions

In setting out al-Kātibī’s take on the modal mixes (that is, syllogisms with mixes
of modalized premises, taken with reference to the strongest modal conclu-
sion they produce), I have been guided above all by the pioneering work of
Nicholas Rescher. His exposition was aided enormously by a series of tables
of the mixes (each of the modals given as minor along the vertical axis, and
each given as major along the horizontal axis), and I have presented these tables
too. As far as I can tell, the first commentator to present al-Kātibī’s claims in
this way was al-Taḥtānī (though I present versions from Ibn Mubarakshāh; see
opening comments to the Tables). Here, I mainly present a paraphrase of what
al-Taftāzānī has to say in support of al-Kātibī’s account in reaction to al-Ḥillī’s
hostile comments.
I have noted already in treating the propositions, their contradictories, and
their conversions, that although there are thirteen propositions “that are cus-
tomarily investigated,” there are in fact more propositions called on to serve as
contradictories. Even more propositions come into play in treating the modal
mixes, above all because of the way the rules of production operate on the tem-
poral (LT2) and spread (LX2) propositions.
Since this is an important part of al-Kātibī’s logic, and is often at odds with
Avicenna’s, I make reference to Avicenna’s alternative account in Pointers.
There, Avicenna had—for the first time in his treatments of the modals, so far as

238 238
 Commentary, §98

I am aware—decided to treat modal mixes one figure at a time, rather than by

taking one mix of modal propositions and following that premise-pair through
all figures (as he does in the Najāt). The way Avicenna presents his account is
as a modified version of the broadly Aristotelian rule of the major, which has it
that the modality of the conclusion follows the modality of the major premise
(al-natījah tābiʿah li-l-kubrā); since al-Kātibī adopts most of Avicenna’s modifi-
cations to the rule, I deal with them below.

§98249 The Rāzian logicians differ from Avicenna in that they take all first-figure
syllogisms with a possibility proposition (whether M1, M2, MD1, or MD2) as minor
premise to be sterile (see Text 45.a and preceding notes). Avicenna accepted first-
figure syllogisms with a possibility proposition as minor premise: Barbara MMM
(“every C is possibly B, every B is possibly A, therefore every C is possibly A”;
M-BaA, M-CaB ⊦ M-CaA), Barbara XMM: (“every C is possibly B, every B is A,
therefore every C is possibly A”; X-BaA, M-CaB ⊦ M-CaA), and Barbara LML
(“every C is possibly B, every B is necessarily A, therefore every C is necessar-
ily A”; L-BaA, M-CaB ⊦ L-CaA).250 The thrust of §98 is to exclude these mixes.
Al-Ḥillī fought against al-Kātibī here more than on any other point of logic; the
second paragraph of Text 98.1 gives his defense of “assuming the occurrence of
the possible,” his name for a proof by upgrading, a move al-Ṭūsī refers to as sup-
posing the possible actual (farḍ dhālika l-mumkin mawjūdan):251

Text 98.1 The ancients claimed to produce a necessary conclusion

from a possible minor with a necessary major. Assuming the possible to
be the case (ʿalā taqdīr wuqūʿ al-mumkin), the conclusion would be neces-
sary, and thus it is necessary in the way things are in themselves (fī nafs
al-amr); otherwise the possible entails the impossible (namely, what is not
necessary being necessary on the assumption of the possible).
[And the ancients also claimed] that from a possible minor and a pos-
sible major a one-sided possible [is produced]. [This is because,] assuming
the possible to be the case, the possible [conclusion] is true; so it is that
the possible [conclusion] is true in the way things are in themselves. Oth-
erwise, what is not possible in the way things are in themselves could be
possible on assuming the possible to be the case, and this is absurd.
So too if the major is existential and the minor a possible. If it is a two-
sided possible, then, with one of its two parts, the minor forms a syllogism
that produces a one-sided possible, and with its other part, a syllogism

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 Commentary, §98

produces a one-sided possible conclusion differing [in quality] from the

first—so the conclusion will be two-sided.
The later scholars rejected the truth of the major on the assumption of
the occurrence of the minor. This is an error [which they should reject],
otherwise they are mired in what they seek to flee. For were the necessary
or possible majors false on the occurrence of the possible [predicate in the
possible minor], then the possible would entail the impossible, because
the falsity (kidhb) of the necessary or the possible is impossible in itself.
[This falsity] may, however, be the case for the existential, due to the possi-
bility (iḥtimāl) that the judgment follow not the essence of the middle but
its description, which is unknown as to whether it applies to the essence
of the minor term; so here one may rebut the truth as to actuality. But the
possible [must follow], for the possible follows in any case.
According to the doctrine of the ancients, the productive connections
in this figure are 169 moods, coming about from 13 squared. According to
the doctrine of the author, 26 of these are dropped, the result of 13 times 2
possible propositions. (ḤQ 356.5–357.4)

As mentioned, all of the syllogisms with possibility minors (the three listed at
the beginning of this section of the commentary) are rejected by the Rāzian logi-
cians, at least, unless a special reading of the subject term (bi-ḥasab al-ḥaqīqah)
is adopted. The problem as they see it is that the middle term (“B” in all the
examples above) may not actually come to belong to the minor term (“C”),
whereupon the judgment made of B will not pass to C (fa-yajūzu an lā yakhruja
ilā l-fiʿl fa-lā yataʿaddā l-ḥukm ilayhi). Al-Taftāzānī reflects specifically on the last
syllogism (Barbara LML), offers a countermodel, and distinguishes Avicenna’s
view from his own. To consider Barbara LML, he imagines a situation in which
Zayd only rides horses.

Text 98.2 For this reason it is true on the supposition that has been
mentioned, “every donkey is possibly a mount for Zayd,” and “every mount
for Zayd is necessarily a horse,” along with the falsity of the conclusion
[that is, “every donkey is necessarily a horse”]. This is clear if what is taken
into account with respect to the subject term is describing the essence
with a qualification that is actually the case (bi-l-fiʿl fī nafs al-amr); but
if what is taken into account is describing it with what is actual in mental
existence (bi-l-fiʿl bi-l-dhihn), which is Avicenna’s position, then the pos-
sible proposition as minor premise (al-ṣughrā l-mumkinah) produces just

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 Commentary, §99

as if simple possibility were taken into account (as is the case on al-Fārābī’s
view, since there is no difference between the two views in real but only
in notional terms). [On Avicenna’s position,] the counterexample would
have no traction because the major would be false. As you learned in the
section on propositions, there is matter here for reflection. (TŠ 335.8–14)

Which is to say, the major premise in the counterexample on al-Taftāzānī’s

reading (“Every actual mount for Zayd is necessarily a horse”) is unproblemati-
cally true; whereas when it is read on Avicenna’s understanding (“Every pos-
sible mount for Zayd is necessarily a horse”), it is false, and Avicenna need not
worry about the counterexample. But for the purposes of the Risālah, the sub-
ject term is read throughout all the inferences presented in the way al-Taftāzānī
reads it here.
This is one part of a long discussion reviewing some of the considerations at
play in deciding that the possibility proposition could not serve as minor prem-
ise in a modal syllogism. Note that al-Taftāzānī has not brought up issues of how
modalities are defined—other writers did that—but only how the subject term
of a proposition was to be understood.

§99252 The Risālah has set down the minimum requirements for the modalities
of the premises for a first-figure mood to produce a conclusion (that the minor
premise not be a possibility proposition). In §99, al-Kātibī considers the strength
of the conclusion; this is where he directly accosts the second set of problems
dealt with by Avicenna’s interpretation of the Rule of the Major. It is worthwhile
stating Avicenna’s rule before considering the variations al-Kātibī introduces
(and has already introduced by virtue of §98). Here is how al-Ṭūsī states it:

Text 99.1 So from this discussion it emerges that the necessary major,
with all actual and non-actual minors (al-ṣughrayāt al-fiʿliyyah wa-ghayr
al-fiʿliyyah), produces a necessary conclusion. If a nonnecessary major and
the minor are two actuals, an actual is produced. If one of [the premises],
or both, are possible, a possible is produced. A major that may be either
produces something that may be actual or non-actual. So some conclu-
sions happen to follow the major, like what results from an actual minor
with whatever major, so long as it is not descriptional. Some of them
happen to follow the minor, like what results from a possible and an abso-
lute, whether both are one-sided or two-sided (ʿāmmatayn aw khāṣṣatayn).
And some happen to differ from both [major and minor], like what results

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 Commentary, §99

from a possible and an absolute, one of which is one-sided, the other two-
sided. Then the conclusion is like the minor in possibility, and the major in
whether it is one-sided or two-sided. (ṬḤ 394.10–395.5)

The first rule pressed upon us by al-Kātibī (§98) is that the minor premise
must be one of the actuals (al-fiʿliyyāt), which is to say, one of the eleven left
from the customary thirteen after the one- and two-sided possibility proposi-
tions (M1 and M2) are taken out. As al-Ḥillī has told us in Text 98.1, the modal
mixes we have left to consider are not thirteen squared, but thirteen times eleven.
Once we have set the mixes with possibility propositions as minor premises
to one side, does al-Kātibī now—like Avicenna—by and large follow the major?
Yes, unless (and in this he also imitates Avicenna) the major is a descriptional.
This step in the process of working out modal mixes calls on the deeply Avi-
cennian distinction between referential (dhātī) and descriptional (waṣfī) read-
ings (see commentary on §52 above), a distinction that is crucially important
for Avicenna’s own account of the modal mixes in Text 99.1 (see Text 52.1). We
must treat the nine non-descriptionals as one group (group 1), and the four
descriptionals (al-waṣfiyyāt, which is to say LD1, AD1, LD2, and AD2) as another
(group 2). When a proposition from group 1 is major premise, the conclusion
has the modality of the major, which is to say that for these propositions, the Avi-
cennian rule stands without modification. When, however, a proposition from
group 2 is major premise, the conclusion by and large follows the modality of the
minor, with a few exceptions.
Al-Taftāzānī sets out five matters to explain why the rules apply (TŠ 337.1–
338.5). (1) Group 1 conclusions follow the major due to the clear subsumption
of the minor under the middle (li-l-indirāj al-bayyin); the major premise makes
clear that everything of which the middle is established is judged by the major
term, and by the same modality. (2) Group 2, by contrast, has a conclusion that
follows the minor premise, because the major premise signifies that the major
term belongs (to the middle, and by the middle to the minor) exactly as long
as the middle exists; so the major term will belong to the minor term as long as
the middle belongs to the minor. In short, if the minor premise signifies that the
middle belongs to the minor perpetually as a referential predication (that is, as
the predicate in a dhātī proposition), the major term in the major premise will
also belong as a referential predication, even if the major premise is descrip-
tional. (3) We drop the second element of compound propositions when they
serve as minors (this applies to both referential and descriptional propositions);

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 Commentary, §99

there is no reason that the conclusion will be limited by the second element
given that the minor has come under the middle. Anyway, it will be the affirma-
tive element of the compound that meets the condition for first-figure produc-
tivity, not the negative element. (4) The only non-Avicennian rule in this part of
the Risālah, however, is that the specific necessity (al-ḍarūrah al-makhṣūṣah) is
dropped; this is to say, if one of the premises is nonnecessary and necessity is
specific only to the other premise, the necessity is stripped out, appearing in the
conclusion as perpetuity or even something weaker. Finally, (5) the rider on the
major will remain as an element of the conclusion.
There is, however, a combination (taʾlīf) from which no syllogism with true
premises can be constructed. In his presentation of the first figure in Point-
ers 7.3.13, Avicenna closes with the words (and “pure” here has the sense of
two-sided):

Text 99.2 Know that if the minor is necessary and the major pure exis-
tential (wujūdiyyah ṣirfah) among those in the sense of “while the subject
is described in a certain way,” there is no syllogism with true premises that
can be constructed (lam tantaẓim minhu qiyās ṣādiq al-muqaddamāt). (AI
70.5–7)

Al-Ṭūsī illustrates the point with the following example (ṬḤ 399.12–13):

minor: every sphere is necessarily moving (L a-proposition)

major: every moving thing necessarily changes, not always
(LD2 a-proposition)

Remember that the “not always” rider is short for (using the concrete terms
of this example) “and no moving thing is always changing”; this amounts to the
claim that no moving thing is always moving. But the minor is making the claim
that celestial spheres are necessarily—and therefore always—moving; to assert
both at once would be absurd. Al-Taftāzānī sets out the problem in his treatment
of the next lemma from another angle:

Text 99.3 It will be obvious to you that no syllogism with true prem-
ises is constructed from the necessary proposition with either the special
conditional or special conventional; this because the conclusion that is
implied—I mean the non-perpetual necessary, or the non-perpetual per-
petual—is absurd, and the absurd cannot be implied by the true (wa-l-
muḥāl lā yakūnu lāziman li-l-ṣādiq). (TŠ 338.6–8)

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 Commentary, §100

Rescher was able to set out a clear statement of the rules for the first figure,
which I modify slightly to fit with the conventions I have been following:253

1. The minor premise must be one of the actuality propositions (that is, the
eleven propositions left over after taking out M1 and M2).
2. If the major is not one of Group 2 (that is, if it is not one of LD1, AD1, LD2,
or AD2), then the mode of the conclusion is the mode of the major.
3. If the major is from Group 2, then the mode of the conclusion is that
of the minor except that (a) the conclusion is under whatever rider the
major was under, and (b) the conclusion is L if and only if both the minor
and the major are (see Table 2, first-figure mixes).

§100254 Once again, the first consideration for mixes in the second figure is the
minimum conditions for productivity; strength of conclusion is deferred to the
next lemma. Here is a paraphrase of the first condition according to al-Taftāzānī
(TŠ 338.14–15):

First condition: (1a) minor one of the two perpetuals (L or A), or (1b) major
one of six convertible e-propositions (L, A, LD1, LD2, AD1, AD2).

If both conditions are breached, then the minor would be one of the eleven
that are not L or A (the strongest of which are AD2 and LT2), and the major would
be one of the seven e-propositions that do not convert, the strongest of which
is LT2. Al-Taftāzānī finds pairs of triplets with discrepant conclusions for Cesare
and Camestres (which are the strongest of the moods). He begins with Cam-
estres (TŠ 339.3–6). Read each minor with major 1 and the first actual state of
affairs, then with the major 2 and the second actual state of affairs; these actual
states of affairs are putative conclusions that are discrepant in form.

minor: no eclipsed shines as long as it is eclipsed, not always (AD2)

minor: no eclipsed shines at the time of quadrature, not always (LT2)255
major 1: every moon shines necessarily at a certain time, not always
(LT2)
major 2: every sun shines at a certain time, not always (LT2)
in fact 1: every eclipsed is always or necessarily a moon (A or L)
in fact 2: no eclipsed is ever or possibly a sun (A or L)

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 Commentary, §100

Al-Taftāzānī goes on to Cesare (TŠ 339.7–11):

minor: every eclipsed is not-luminous necessarily as long as it is

eclipsed, not always (AD2)
minor: every eclipsed is not-luminous at a given time, not always
(LT2)
major 1: no moon is not-luminous at a given time, not always (LT2)
major 2: no sun is not-luminous at a given time, not always (LT2)
in fact 1: every eclipsed is necessarily a moon (L)
in fact 2: no eclipsed is possibly a sun (L)

We can generalize from these two sets of triplets to cover Festino (by Cesare)
and Baroco (by Camestres):

Text 100.1 When these two mixes do not produce in these two moods,
the rest of the mixes do not produce in the rest of the moods, because
the sterility in production of the stronger requires the absence of produc-
tivity in the weaker (wa-matā lam yuntij hādhāni l-ikhtilāṭān fī hādhayni
l-ḍarbayn lam yuntij sāʾir al-ikhtilāṭāt fī sāʾir al-ḍurūb li-anna ʿadam intāj
al-akhaṣṣ yūjibu ʿadam intāj al-aʿamm). (TŠ 339.9–11)

This brings us to the second condition for productivity in the second figure:

Second condition: The possible (M1 and M2) can only be used with L, LD1,
and LD2.

The reasoning is that (a) it is known from the first condition that—because
neither M entails L or A—it could only produce with L, A, LD1, AD1, LD2, or AD2;
but, (b) we can provide triplets of terms with discrepant conclusions against A,
AD1, and AD2. Here is a pair of triplets with M as minor:

minor: every Greek is possibly black (M)

major 1: no Greek is ever black (A)
major 2: no Turk is ever black (A)
in fact 1: every Greek is necessarily Greek (L)
in fact 2: no Turk is possibly Greek (L)

So we know that possibility minors only produce with necessity majors.

Al-Taftāzānī goes on to show that, similarly, possibility majors only produce
with necessity minors:

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 Commentary, §101

Text 100.2 This is the case if it is the minor; but if it is the major, it
could only be used with the absolute necessary proposition (because it is
known from the first condition that the possible major only produces with
the two perpetuals [L and A] due to otherwise breaching the two con-
ditions—namely, the perpetuity of the minor and the major being one of
the six convertibles). Its producing with the perpetual is, however, impos-
sible due to the following counterexample: “every Greek is always white,
and possibly, no Greek is white” (with the truth of the affirmative [“every
Greek is necessarily Greek”]) and [the formally identical syllogism pro-
ducing a different quality conclusion:] “possibly, no Indian is white” (with
the truth of the negative [when considered with “every Greek is always
white”; namely, “no Greek is possibly Indian”]). (TŠ 340.6–11)

§101256 A few notes are in order to set al-Kātibī and al-Taftāzānī’s discussion
of the second figure in context. They are both Avicennian logicians, however
much they protest against some of Avicenna’s claims about the modal syllogistic;
they both accept Avicenna’s reading of the absolute proposition as having an
elided “at least once.” On this understanding of the absolute—which is unlike
Aristotle’s assertoric proposition (even though they share the same name in
the translation of, for example, Prior Analytics 25a1: kull muqaddamah immā an
takūna muṭlaqah wa-immā ḍṭirāriyyah wa-immā mumkinah)—the second-figure
syllogisms with two absolute premises are unproductive (they fail against the
first condition for second-figure productivity given in commentary on §100).
The exclusion was controversial in Avicenna’s day, and he begins by saying that
there can be no second-figure mixes from two absolute propositions (nor—as
Aristotle also had it—from two possibles or from a mix of an absolute and a pos-
sible). This is a moment where Avicenna follows truth rather than Aristotle; as
he says in the Najāt, if the absolute e-proposition does not convert “according to
true doctrine, there is no conclusion from two absolutes in the second” (AN §63,
58.apu–pu). A century before al-Kātibī, Abū l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī still fumed
about how perverse Avicenna’s reading was (al-Baghdādī, al-Kitāb al-muʿtabar fī
l-ḥikmah, 120.18–21), but everyone in the eastern realms of Islam had accepted it
by the time al-Kātibī took up his pen. Avicenna spends the first four lemmata of
Pointers 7.6 on the conditions of productivity for the second figure (AI 70.15–71.
apu), and they are much like al-Kātibī’s account. Avicenna’s claims about first-fig-
ure mixes that are rejected by al-Kātibī will, however, ramify through the imper-
fect figures. Al-Kātibī’s changes are explained by al-Taftāzānī and questioned

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 Commentary, §101

by al-Ḥillī. I return to them after I have set out the conditions governing the
strength of the conclusion in a second-figure syllogism; the remarks of the com-
mentators are important for the light they throw on how the various participants
in the debate stipulated different truth-conditions for the propositions.
Seventy-seven moods are dropped from the possible 169 by the first condi-
tion (leaving 92), and 8 by the second, (leaving 84) (TŠ 340.14–u). After the first
condition, al-Taftāzānī pauses in his exposition of the conditions for the second-
figure mixes by disputing a central feature of Avicenna’s account of the modal
syllogistic; I omit it from the following text, and return to it as Text 101.3. I also
omit the reasons al-Taftāzānī gives for each of the rules.257

Text 101.1 The rule for the mode of the conclusion [of these remaining
84 moods] is that if one of the two premises is necessary or perpetual, the
conclusion is perpetual; otherwise the conclusion is like the minor (though
on condition that the existence rider (qayd al-wujūd) is dropped—I mean
the “not necessarily” or “not always”—and that the temporal or descrip-
tional reading of necessity is dropped). (TŠ 341.1–3)

Al-Taftāzānī then dwells on a number of mixes, and especially LD1 with LT2,
and LD1 with LD1. He disagrees with al-Khūnajī and defends the account recorded
in Rescher (see Table 3, second-figure mixes)258 by stating that these premises
do not produce necessity propositions of some kind (TŠ 342.5). Al-Taftāzānī
works from what is sought in a proposition; namely, the relation between an
underlying essence and a description. The reason al-Khūnajī claims a stronger
conclusion from each premise pair is that he understands the proposition in a
different way (TŠ 342.4–343.3). I note this merely to indicate that there are dif-
ferences among post-Avicennian logicians.
In concluding these comments, however, I want to draw attention to how the
post-Avicennian logicians differ from Avicenna himself. The following discus-
sion is revealing. Consider Camestres LML: no C is necessarily B (M minor),
every A is necessarily B (L major), therefore no C is possibly A (L conclusion).
This is a mix that follows from claims Avicenna made about the first-figure mixes,
and in Pointers 7.6.11 he invites us to the following reflection:

Text 101.2 You know that if C is such that B is true of it in its totality
affirmatively without necessity (so B is nonnecessary for everything which
is C, or nonnecessary for what is the exposited part of C), while A differs
from this (since of everything that is A, B is necessary for it), then the

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 Commentary, §102

nature of C (fa-inna ṭabī ʿat jīm) or the exposited part of it is disjoined from
the nature of A (mubāyanah li-ṭabī ʿat alif), neither of them entering under
the other, not even possibly . . . You likewise know that the conclusion is
always necessary negative. (AI 74.4–11)

Al-Taftāzānī again rejects the argument on the grounds of the two relata at
issue; as noted in commentary on §45 (especially Texts 45.3 and 45.5), al-Taḥtānī
takes the subject insofar as it is a title for the essence of the subject, and the
predicate as a description.

Text 101.3 It should not be said: If the middle is necessarily affirmed

of one of the two extremes, and necessarily negated of the other, there
is a necessary separation (mubāyanah ḍarūriyyah) between the two, so
the conclusion from two necessaries is a necessary. Because we answer:
The only thing that follows from this is the incompatibility between the
essences of the two extremes, and what is sought is the incompatibility
between the essence of the minor term and the description of the major
term, so what is sought does not follow necessarily, and what follows is
not what is sought. For this reason it is true on the celebrated assumption,
“no donkey is possibly a horse” [L minor], and “every mount for Zayd is
necessarily a horse” [L major], along with the falsity of “some donkey is
not possibly a mount for Zayd” [which would be the L conclusion to Avi-
cenna’s Camestres LLL]. (TŠ 341.6–11)

§102259 Al-Taftāzānī sets out the first condition for the third figure, which is
that the minor premise be one of the actuality propositions (al-fiʿliyyāt), and
defends it by presenting counterexamples.

Text 102.1 [The minor must be actual] because the strongest of the
mixes with possible minor premise (I mean the mix of the special possible
minor premise with the necessary or conditional major) in the strongest
moods (I mean the first two) are sterile due to discrepant conclusions (li-l-
ikhtilāf).260 Suppose that Zayd rides a horse and not a donkey, and ʿAmr
rides a donkey and not a horse, then “every mount for Zayd is possibly
a mount for ʿAmr” and “every mount for Zayd is necessarily a horse” are
true, along with the impossibility of an affirmative [conclusion, because
the truth is no mount for ʿAmr is a horse]. But change the major to “nec-
essarily, no mount for Zayd is a donkey,” then we have Felapton (al-ḍarb

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 Commentary, §102

al-thānī), yet with the impossibility of a negative [conclusion, because the

truth is that every mount for ʿAmr is a donkey]. (TŠ 343.5–11)

Al-Taftāzānī calculates the mixes excluded by this condition as 26 (2 possi-

bility propositions times 13 customarily investigated propositions), leaving 134
productive mixes. Avicenna need not feel bound by this condition, as al-Ḥillī
explains:

Text 102.2 The later scholars stipulated for the third figure the actu-
ality of its minor just as for the first; because if the minor is possible for
the middle and the major is affirmed (thābitan) for it, the affirmation of
the major of the minor does not follow, due to what went before in the
first figure to do with the fact that the judgment of the major is only on
that which is the middle actually, not what is possibly [the middle]. But
Avicenna produced a possible from two possible propositions, and from
[a possible] and an absolute a possible also; and from a possible and a
necessary a possible if the major is a possible, otherwise a necessary.
(ḤQ 363.pu–364.4)

Al-Taftāzānī states the condition for the modality of the conclusion (see
Table 4):261

Text 102.3 The rule for the modality of the conclusion is that, if the
major262 is not one of the four descriptionals, the conclusion is like the
major; and if it is one of the four descriptionals, then the conclusion is—by
the proofs mentioned for the unmodalized propositions—like the converse
of the minor, but on condition that (1) if there is a non-perpetuity rider, it
is dropped from the converse (because it will be negative, and the negative
has no role as the minor of this mood), and (2) that we add to the converse
the non-perpetuity of the major if there is such a rider, as in the case of the
two specials. [This second condition is] because, with the minor, it pro-
duces non-perpetuity of the conclusion, as in “every B is always C,” and
“every B is A as long as it is B, not always,” which produces “some C is
A while C, not always.” The main component of the proposition [“some
C is A while C”] is due to what went before in the [exposition to do with
the] absolute propositions; the non-perpetuity rider is because we add the
minor to the non-perpetuity rider of the major thus: “every B is always
C,” and “no B is always A (lā shayʾ min bāʾ alif bi-l-iṭlāq),” which produces

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 Commentary, §103

“some C is not always A (laysa baʿḍ jīm alif bi-l-iṭlāq).” And this is what is
meant by “the non-perpetuity of the conclusion.” (TŠ 344.4–u)

§103263 There are five conditions to take into account for productivity in
the fourth figure. Only the first two conditions (that both premises be actual,
and that negative premises must be convertible) apply without exception to
all moods (though the second does not really apply to Bramantip or Dimaris,
because neither has a negative premise); the other three conditions are each
specific to one mood alone. For this reason, it is important to bear in mind
throughout the commentary on this lemma and the next the moods and the
order in which al-Kātibī gives them. Further, for those seeking to shed light on
my account by comparison with Rescher and vander Nat’s “Theory of Modal
Syllogistic,” note that he follows someone he refers to as al-Shirwānī,264 who
departs from al-Kātibī’s ordering of the moods. So—for reference—al-Kātibī has
(1) Bramantip, (2) Dimaris, (3) Camenes, (4) Fesapo, (5) Fresison, (6) AOO,
(7) OAO, and (8) IEO. As noted, al-Kātibī says that the last three moods are only
productive by virtue of the convertibility of the special conditional and conven-
tional o-propositions.
Here, as before, the commentators take each condition one by one, work out
what propositions are excluded by it, take the strongest of the excluded proposi-
tions, and find a pair of term-triplets that lead to discrepant conclusions, or a
counterexample against the conclusion proposed for the syllogism; syllogisms
with these and all weaker premises are thus rejected. In this case, I provide
al-Ḥillī’s argument on behalf of al-Kātibī for the first two conditions, and then
simply summarize the remaining three conditions. So, for the condition that the
syllogism must have actuality propositions as its premise:

Text 103.1 We cannot use the possible in this figure, whether as minor
or major, because it will be either affirmative or negative, and in both
cases it will fail.
The negative case is due to what we will explain, that the negative used
in this figure must be convertible. The affirmative case is because—if it
is the minor—it does not determine decisive production due to the pos-
sibility that a property may belong to one species [actually] and yet be
possible for another, just as when we suppose that man is picked out spe-
cifically by being in a house at a certain time, yet [being in the house] is
possible for a horse; it is true “every horse is possibly in the house” and

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“every neighing thing is a horse necessarily,” along with the impossibil-

ity of “some in the house is a neighing thing.” Were we to have as major
“necessarily, no man is a horse,” the negative (namely, “some in the house
is not a man”) is false.
If [a possible premise] is the major, it is similarly [unproductive], due
to the truth of “everyone in the house is necessarily a man” and “every
horse is possibly in the house,” along with the falsity of the affirmation
[that every man is possibly a horse]. Were we to have as the minor “neces-
sarily, nothing in the house is a neighing thing,” the negative [that is, that
no horse is possibly a neighing thing] is false. (ḤQ 365.7–u)

The second condition is that the negative premise must be convertible; this
affects Camenes, Fesapo, Fresison, AOO, OAO, and IEO. Al-Ḥillī takes the
temporal (LT2, the strongest of the inconvertible negatives, §74), and provides
a counterexample against it producing as minor premise with the strongest
of the simple propositions (L) as major. So, if the minor is LT2 (as in the true
premises “no man is possibly a writer, not always, but at the time of his being
still,” and “every rational is necessarily a man”) along with the falsity of a nega-
tive conclusion (“no writer is rational,” no matter how weak the modality), all
seven inconvertibles as minor fail to produce. Since L does not produce with the
inconvertibles, nor will the weaker simple propositions. And since the produc-
tive component of the strongest of the compounds (LD2) is LD1, and L implies
LD1, nor will any compound produce.

Text 103.2 The second [—that it fails as major—] is due to the sterility
of the necessary with the temporal major, due to the truth of “necessarily,
every writer is a man” and “no man is a writer” as necessary temporal, with
the impossibility of negating man of himself.
[And it fails as a major due to] the sterility of the special conditional
with [the temporal] also, because it is true “everyone laughing is aston-
ished necessarily as long as he is laughing, not always” and “no man is
laughing” as a necessary temporal, along with the impossibility of negat-
ing man of being astonished.
So, since it has been proved that the temporal is not productive with
the strongest of the simple propositions and of the compound proposi-
tions, it has also been proved that it does not produce with the rest. And
it is proved that the other propositions aside from the temporal that have
inconvertible negatives do not produce. (ḤQ 366.pu–367.7)

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Here are the remaining conditions, presented without supporting argument.

The third condition is that for Camenes, either “perpetuity must be true of the
minor” (it must be either a necessity or a perpetuity proposition) or “the general
conventional must be true of the major” (it must be one of the six with convert-
ible negatives; that is, L, A, LD1, AD1, LD2, or AD2). The fourth condition relates
only to the sixth mood (AOO): the major must be of a modality the negative
propositions of which convert (the six mentioned in the third condition). On
the face of it, this is strange (the major is an a-proposition), but the o-minor
converts in the first stage of the proof to reduce the mood to Baroco, so it must
be one of the two specials (conditional or conventional) to convert; “where-
upon the major must be one of the six, as you learned in [rules for] the second
figure: if perpetuity is not true of the minor then the major must be one of the
six with convertible negatives” (TŠ 349.apu–u). The fifth condition relates only
to the eighth mood (IEO), that—once again—the minor must be one of the two
specials, so the major must be one of the six just mentioned. This is the same
condition, but the reasons are different: the proof is made cogent by metathesis
(which in this context means swapping the two premises, ʿaks al-tartīb), which
in the first stage of the proof reduces the fourth figure to the first figure, and
then, in the final stage of the proof, converts the conclusion.

Text 103.3 So it is unavoidable for the two premises of the eighth

mood that they be such that if they are presented in reverse order (in
buddilatā), they produce a special negative in the first figure. But the
first figure only produces the special negative if the major is one of the
two specials, and the minor is one of the six [with convertible negatives].
Inevitably, then, here the minor must be one of the two specials because
it is the major in the first-figure reduct, and the major must be one of the
six [with convertible negatives] because it is the minor in the first-figure
reduct. (TŠ 350.5–9)

§104265 The conclusions to the fourth-figure moods are taken in four passes,
corresponding to the four tables presented in Rescher (though numbered dif-
ferently because al-Kātibī orders his treatment differently). So Bramantip and
Dimaris have 121 productive mixes each (eleven times eleven, the number of the
customarily investigated propositions left once the two possibility propositions
are taken out) (TŠ 351.2–4). The mood of the conclusion is that of the converse
of the minor if it is either L or A, or the syllogism is from the six with convertible

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 Commentary, §104

negatives; otherwise the conclusion is an absolute; see Table 5 for these two
moods (TŠ 351.apu–u).266 In Camenes, there are 46 productive mixes (from two
perpetual minors times the eleven actuals, plus the four descriptional minors
times the six propositions with convertible negatives) (TŠ 351.5–7). The mood
of the conclusion is a perpetuity proposition if perpetuity is true of one of the
premises, otherwise the mood of the converse of the minor; see Table 6 (TŠ
351.u–352.1).267 In Fesapo and Fresison, there are 66 productive mixes (from the
eleven actuality minors times the six propositions with convertible negatives)
(TŠ 351.8–10). The conclusion is a perpetuity proposition if the major is L or A,
otherwise it is the mood of the converse of the minor dropping the non-perpet-
ual rider; see Table 7 (TŠ 352.1–2).268 For all the moods to now:

Text 104.1 The proof for everything is by the proofs mentioned for
the unmodalized propositions, and the proof that the conclusions are no
stronger is by counterexample (bayān ʿadam luzūm al-zāʾid bi-l-naqḍ).
(TŠ 352.3)

Finally, we come to the three moods made valid by the convertibility of the
special conditional or conventional o-proposition. In the sixth mood (AOO)
and the eighth (IEO) there are 12 productive mixes (from two specials as minor
times six propositions with convertible negatives), while in the seventh (OAO)
there are 22 productive mixes (from the two specials as major times the eleven
actuality propositions) (TŠ 352.9–12). Their conclusions are governed by the fol-
lowing considerations:

Text 104.2 The conclusion in the sixth is like that in its second-fig-
ure [reduct, Baroco,] after reducing [the sixth to it] through converting
the minor;269 in the seventh, as it is in the third figure after converting
the major (to reduce it by that means to [the third]); and in the eighth,
like the converse of the conclusion resulting from the first figure, which
comes about through metathesis of the premises (min ʿaks al-tartīb).270
(TŠ 352.4–7)

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 Commentary, §105

The third section, on connective syllogisms

with hypothetical premises

The hypothetical syllogistic is made up of those connective syllogisms (see §89)

in which there is at least one hypothetical premise (TŠ 352.11–12). Avicenna
developed the hypothetical syllogistic for a number of applications. It under-
pins his analysis of the reductio proof (see §113), it provides a method to prove
conclusions of a certain form that are integral to sciences like geometry, and it
remedies a textual gap that, on one reading, Aristotle had left in his exposition
of logic. Avicenna was proud of his extraction (istikhrāj) of the hypothetical syl-
logistic, though al-Kātibī’s immediate predecessor al-Khūnajī presented himself
as consciously correcting and expanding work in which Avicenna had expressed
too much pride. Most of these points are rehearsed by al-Taftāzānī at the begin-
ning of his treatment of the section.

Text 105.a This chapter is one that must be included in logic, because
there are assertions sought (al-maṭālib al-taṣdīqiyyah) that are hypo-
thetical propositions, especially in geometry, set out in Euclid’s Elements.
Because Aristotle did not deal with the matter in the Organon, some have
claimed that there is no need for it, because the knowledge of categorical
syllogisms can do without mentioning [the hypothetical syllogistic]. But
this claim fails due to the manifest difference between the valuations [of
the hypothetical and the categorical syllogistic]. Avicenna said: “Perhaps
Aristotle worked on it but it was not translated into Arabic”; he claimed
to have singlehandedly invented [this part of logic] and put it in a book;
he said: “We wrote a book on this subject nearly eighteen years ago, and
after extracting it, I came across a book attributed to al-Fārābī; but it must
be wrongly ascribed, because it was so unclear and full of errors and weak
proofs.” In spite of this, Avicenna got much of [the hypothetical syllogistic]
wrong; he claimed much that is productive to be sterile, and made certain
matters conditions that have no effect on productivity. Indeed, al-Khūnajī
and those who follow him treated [this kind of syllogism] extensively;271 of
this, al-Kātibī has limited himself in the Risālah to a small portion appro-
priate to a summary, and left most of it to one side due to its lesser value or
its distance from nature. (TŠ 352.13–353.9)

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 Commentary, §105

The hypothetical syllogisms may be divided according to the composition of

their premises: two conditional premises, two disjunctive premises, a categori-
cal and a conditional, a categorical and a disjunctive, or a conditional and a dis-
junctive. This is not Avicenna’s ordering of treatment of the divisions, and may
have been first used by al-Rāzī.272

§105273 Hypothetical syllogisms made up of two conditional premises further

divide into three subdivisions. This is where commentators first mention the
“incomplete part” (juzʾ ghayr tāmm), which became culturally synonymous with
whatever is abstruse and impenetrable. The examples al-Taftāzānī gives clarify
his understanding of “incomplete part” as he delivers the division of syllogisms
with two conditional premises; note that the part may be a term or a proposi-
tion, because its parthood is defined relative to the premise’s dominant operator.
The syllogisms may be divided:

Text 105.1 [Either] the sharing between the two conditionals is in a

complete part of both—I mean, the whole antecedent (tamām al-muqa-
ddam) or the whole consequent—as in “whenever A is B then C is D”
and “whenever C is D then H is Z”; or in an incomplete part of both—I
mean one of the two extremes of the antecedent or the consequent—as
in “whenever A is B then C is D” and “whenever D is H then W is Z”; or
in a complete part of one of [the two premises] and an incomplete part of
the other, as in “whenever C is D then whenever A is B then H is Ṭ” and
“whenever H is Ṭ then W is Z.” (TŠ 353.12–354.2)

The normal form (al-maṭbūʿ )—that is, the naturally available form of this
kind of hypothetical syllogism—is the first, with two conditional premises that
share in a complete part (ḤQ 372.10–16). It generates a syllogistic that almost
perfectly parallels the categorical syllogistic, one of the reasons that critics of the
hypothetical syllogistic like Abū l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī complained that there
was nothing new or valuable in Avicenna’s extension.274 Al-Taftāzānī notes that
al-Kātibī’s account relates only to syllogisms in which both premises are either
implicative (luzūmī) or coincidental (ittifāqī)—assuming that a syllogism with
coincidental premises is productive—but does not touch on the much more
complicated question of production from an implicative premise with a coinci-
dental (TŠ 354.3–6).

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 Commentary, §106

It is at this point that an important distinction relating to implicative con-

ditionals is introduced by al-Taftāzānī to deal with an objection to using two
implicative conditionals to construct a syllogism.

Text 105.2 It is raised against two implicative premises

(al-luzūmiyyatayn) that “whenever two is odd it is a number” and “when-
ever [two] is a number it is even” are both true, while the conclusion is
false, I mean “whenever two is odd it is even.” I answer that if the implica-
tive is taken as true in the fact of the matter (in uʿtubira fī l-luzūmiyyah
al-ṣidq bi-ḥasab nafs al-amr), we do not concede that the minor [“when-
ever two is odd it is a number”] is true; and if it is taken counterfactually
(bi-ḥasab al-ilzām), we do not concede the falsity of the conclusion, for
whoever takes two as odd inevitably takes it to be even. (TŠ 354.7–11)

§106275 As before, hypothetical syllogisms made up of two disjunctive prem-

ises further divide into three subdivisions.

Text 106.1 The syllogism composed of disjunctives also forms a set of

three divisions. The first is when what is shared between the two premises
is a complete part of both; the second is when what is shared between
them is a complete part of one and an incomplete part of the other, and
the third is when what is shared between them is an incomplete part in
both. Since the first two are remote from nature and the last is proximate,
the author mentioned it and left the first two to one side. (ḤQ 374.9–375.1)

Al-Taftāzānī’s examples for these (reordered to fit with al-Ḥillī) run as fol-
lows. First, a syllogism in which the premises share in a complete part is like
“always, either A is B or C is D” and “always, either C is D or H is Z”; second,
a syllogism in which premises share a part that is a complete part in one and
incomplete in the other is like “always, either whenever A is B then C is D, or
whenever A is B then H is Z” and “always, either every H is Z or every Ḥ is Ṭ”;
and third, a syllogism in which premises share an incomplete part is—and this is
the normal form (al-maṭbūʿ ) al-Kātibī decides to exemplify in the Risālah—like
“always, either every A is B or every A is C” and “always, either every C is D or
every H is Z” (TŠ 354.pu–355.4).
The conditions for production in what is the third form on my presenta-
tion are, first, that both premises are affirmative; second, that one of them is

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 Commentary, §107

universal; and third, that the disjunctives are inclusive (ṣidq manʿ al-khulūw
ʿalayhā). Here is an example of the first figure in this form:

minor: always, either every A is B or every C is D

major: either every D is H or every W is Z
conclusion: always, either every A is B or every C is H or every W is Z

Al-Taftāzānī claims that this is a valid argument

Text 106.2 because inevitably in each of the two disjunctives one of the
disjuncts must occur (as a necessary consequence of their being inclusive
disjunctions); so what occurs in the first disjunctive is that the first part (I
mean “every A is B”) is the first of the parts of the conclusion; and if it is the
second part (I mean “every C is D”), what occurs from it is with the second
disjunctive; and the first part [of the second disjunctive] (I mean “every
D is H”) forms a syllogism thus: “every C is D, and every D is H,” which
produces “every C is H”; this becomes the second of the parts of the con-
clusion. The second part [of the second disjunctive] (I mean “every W is
Z”) is [also] one of the parts of the conclusion. On every hypothesis, one of
the three parts of the stated disjunctive is inevitably true. (TŠ 355.8–apu)

The categorical syllogism at the heart of the second disjunct of the conclusion
(“every C is D, and every D is H, therefore every C is H”) is in the first figure; the
whole syllogism is categorized according to this syllogism, and obviously can
come about in any of the four figures (examples of second-, third-, and fourth-
figure syllogisms are given in al-Taftāzānī [TŠ 356.1–7]).

§107276 This form of syllogism is composed of a categorical and a conditional,

and it too divides into a number of subdivisions.

Text 107.1 This division divides into four subdivisions, because the cat-
egorical occurs either as major or as minor. On both assumptions, it shares
with the conditional in either [the conditional’s] consequent or anteced-
ent. The last three are remote from nature, so the author turns from them
and mentions the first division, which is the categorical as major and the
sharing with the consequent of the conditional. (ḤQ 376.11–14)

Al-Taftāzānī gives examples, reordered here to match al-Ḥillī’s division (that

is, categorical major sharing consequent, categorical major sharing antecedent,

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 Commentary, §108

conditional major sharing consequent, conditional major sharing antecedent).

So an example of the natural (al-maṭbūʿ ) syllogism with the categorical as major,
sharing with the conditional’s consequent, is:

minor: whenever A is B then C is D

major: every D is H
conclusion: whenever A is B then C is H

This is valid “because whenever the antecedent is true the consequent is

necessarily true” (TŠ 356.15–16). This is the form al-Kātibī expects his students
to learn. The categorical must be true in the fact of the matter (fī nafs al-amr).
The composition of the antecedent and the categorical determine the figure the
syllogism is counted under; here, the form of the consequent “C is D” and the
major “every D is H” make the whole syllogism count as first figure. What fol-
lows are the less natural forms inappropriate to a summary of logic. The first
example is of a categorical major sharing with the antecedent:

minor: whenever A is B then C is D

major: every B is H
conclusion: whenever A is H then C is D (not given in al-Taftāzānī)

A categorical minor sharing with the consequent (in the second figure; note
the presence of the quantifier in the consequent):

minor: every A is B
major: whenever C is D then every H is B
conclusion: whenever C is D then some A is H (not given in al-Taftāzānī)

A categorical minor sharing with the antecedent:

minor: every A is B
major: whenever B is C then D is H
conclusion: whenever A is C then D is H (not given in al-Taftāzānī)

§108277 Al-Kātibī gives three natural forms under two broad types for the
fourth kind of hypothetical syllogism, composed from a number of categorical
propositions and a disjunctive. These are divided into those in which the cat-
egoricals are the same number as the disjuncts of the disjunctive, and the second
kind al-Kātibī illustrates, in which the categoricals are fewer in number than the
disjuncts of the disjunctive. The first kind further subdivides into those in which

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 Commentary, §109

the categoricals all have the same predicate and thus lead to a categorical con-
clusion with a single predicate (this is the first example in §108.1, and is called
divided syllogism; it is taken to serve as an analysis of complete induction), and
those in which the categoricals have different predicates and thus lead to a cat-
egorical conclusion with a disjunctive predicate. Al-Taftāzānī takes al-Kātibī’s
exposition to be clear in itself, though he makes four points over and above what
we find in the Risālah. The first three points he makes are to confirm that all
three of these natural forms of syllogism with categorical and disjunctive prem-
ises have moods in all four figures (TŠ 357.13, 358.2, 358.11). Finally, al-Taftāzānī
does not here follow his normal practice of setting out the forms al-Kātibī is
excluding, but concludes his commentary on this lemma thus:

Text 108.1 Al-Kātibī ignores [two cases], when the categoricals are
more numerous than the disjuncts of the disjunction, or when they are the
same number, but are such that not every one of the categoricals shares in
one of the disjuncts of the disjunction; he does so because they are remote
from nature. (TŠ 358.apu–u)

§109278 The fifth form of syllogism with at least one hypothetical premise is
composed of a conditional and a disjunctive. Again, al-Kātibī is highly selective
about the forms he includes in the Risālah.

Text 109.1 This division subdivides into a number of divisions. The

first is that the sharing is in a complete part of the two premises, and the
conditional is the minor. The second is that the sharing is in a complete
part of them both and the conditional is the major. The third is that the
sharing is in an incomplete part of the two premises and the conditional is
the minor. The fourth is that the sharing is in an incomplete part of them
both and the conditional is the major. The fifth is that the sharing is in a
complete part of one of them and not the other; here there are two divi-
sions, and if you add to this the conditional being minor or major it comes
to be four more. The author mentions the natural inferences (al-maṭbūʿ )
among these; namely, the first and the third. (ḤQ 380.3–13)

Aside from ignoring subdivisions with the conditional as major, an example

of the form al-Kātibī completely ignores in the Risālah (number five in al-Ḥillī’s
list in Text 109.1) is: “always, either whenever A is B then C is D, or whenever H
is W then Z is Ḥ” and “whenever Z is Ḥ then Ṭ is Y” (TŠ 359.5–8).

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 Commentary, §109

Al-Taftāzānī examines the inferences al-Kātibī does include; his analysis

goes no deeper than to restate the rule al-Kātibī gives in the Risālah (roughly,
if p is incompatible with q, then p is incompatible with the implicant of q). His
remarks in Text 109.2 have the following syllogism in mind:

minor: whenever A is B then C is D

major: always (or sometimes), either C is D or H is Z
(alternative denial)
conclusion: always (or sometimes), either A is B or H is Z

Text 109.2 This is because “C is D” is an implicate of “A is B,” and “H is

Z” is incompatible (yamtaniʿ ijtimāʿuhu) with “C is D” both as a universal
and as a particular; so “H is Z” is also incompatible with “A is B,” because
incompatibility with the implicate—whether always or generally—entails
a similar incompatibility with the implicant. This is the case if the disjunc-
tive is alternative denial. (TŠ 359.11–14)

Al-Taftāzānī turns to consider the same example with an inclusive disjunc-

tion in the major, and here his analysis adds a great deal to what we find in
the Risālah.

minor: whenever A is B then C is D

major: always (or sometimes), either C is D or H is Z
(inclusive disjunction)
conclusion: sometimes, if A is not B then H is Z

Text 109.3 This is because the contradictory of the middle (I mean

the contradictory of “C is D”) entails the two extremes of the conclusion
(I mean the contradictory of “A is B” and the proposition “H is Z”). It
entails the first because the contradictory of the implicate entails the con-
tradictory of the implicant; it entails the second because of the inclusive
disjunction between “C is D” and “H is Z”—for every two cases related in
this way, the contradictory of either entails the other. So if the contradic-
tory of the middle entails the two extremes, [the syllogism] produces that
the first extreme (I mean the contradictory of “A is B”) may entail “H is Z”
by a third-figure syllogism in the following way: “whenever the contradic-
tory of the middle is realized, the first extreme is realized” (I mean “A is not
B”), and “whenever the contradictory of the middle is realized, the other

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 Commentary, §110

extreme is realized” (I mean “H is Z”), which produces “sometimes, if A is

not B then H is Z,” which is what is sought. (TŠ 359.15–360.2)

Going beyond al-Kātibī, al-Taftāzānī concludes from the analysis of the two
preceding texts that if the disjunction in the major is exclusive (ḥaqīqiyyah) then
the syllogism produces both conclusions at once.
Al-Taftāzānī takes the example of the second kind of inference al-Kātibī con-
siders here and offers a proof for it. The syllogism is:

minor: whenever A is B then C is D

major: always, either every D is H or W is Z (inclusive disjunction)
conclusion: whenever A is B then either every C is H or W is Z

Text 109.4 This is because “every C is D” is affirmed on the supposi-

tion (taqdīr) of “A is B,” whereupon what comes about in the disjunctive
given the first part (I mean “every D is H”) is “every C is D” and “every D
is H,” which produce “every C is H”; so “every C is H” is affirmed on the
supposition of “A is B.” Whereas, given the second part [of the disjunc-
tive] (I mean “W is Z”), what comes about on the supposition of “A is B”
is “W is Z.” So, on the supposition of “A is B,” one of two cases follow:
either “every D is H,” or “W is Z.” This is what the conclusion amounts to.
(TŠ 360.7–11)

The fourth section, on the repetitive syllogism

§110279 The repetitive syllogism is one of the two kinds of syllogism distin-
guished by Avicenna’s novel analysis.280 It first comes up in the Risālah in §89,
where the commentators deal with how the repetitive fits in under the broad
definition of syllogism (given in §88), particularly in relation to the condition
that the premises lead to another discourse (that is, it leads to a new proposi-
tion not given in the premise-set in the sense set out by al-Ḥillī in Text 89.2). A
further question arises in relation to the definition specifically of the repetitive
syllogism in §89, and what it means for the conclusion to be mentioned in actu-
ality (bi-l-fiʿl) as opposed to in potentiality (bi-l-quwwah); briefly, it means that
the conclusion must be given though not asserted, in the same structure and
with the same terms, though not necessarily in the same quality, as one of the
components of the major premise.

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 Commentary, §110

Al-Kātibī comes back in this lemma to lay out the conditions for a valid repet-
itive syllogism. He presents five conditions (the last two being alternative condi-
tions): one premise must be a hypothetical (sharṭiyyah); the other premise must
affirm or deny one of the two parts of the first premise; the hypothetical must be
affirmative and—if conditional—implicative and universal; or—if the hypotheti-
cal premise is not universal—the other premise must be universal or must hold
at precisely the same time the first premise holds.
A few remarks from the commentators throw more light on these conditions.
Clearly, it must be one of the components of the hypothetical premise that is
produced as conclusion; otherwise a premise would be repeated as conclusion,
breaching the condition in the general definition of syllogism that it lead to
another discourse. Since, however, hypothetical propositions can be composed
from categorical or from hypothetical propositions, it is not a condition that the
other premise be a categorical—because it may be a component hypothetical
proposition of the first proposition—nor that the conclusion be categorical, for
exactly the same reason (TŠ 360.u).
Some points should be made about hypothetical propositions that bear on
issues not explored in the Risālah itself. The conditional must be affirmative
because a negated conditional denies the implication between the antecedent
and the consequent (see above §62); so too a negated disjunctive denies the
opposition between the disjuncts. Yet “if there is no implication or opposi-
tion between two matters, the presence or absence of one will not imply the
presence or absence of the other” (TŠ 361.6–7). Further, the reason that the
hypothetical must be either implicative (luzūmī) or oppositional (ʿinādī) (see
§§60 and 61) is that if the hypothetical were merely coincidental (ittifāqī), then
“because knowing the truth or falsity of the coincidental depends on knowing
the truth or falsity of one of its parts, then were we to acquire knowledge of the
truth or falsity of one of the parts from the coincidental, that would be circular”
(TŠ 361.8–10).
Either the hypothetical premise must be necessary and universal (whether
conditional or disjunctive, which must be, respectively, an implicative a-propo-
sition or an oppositional a-proposition), or the other premise must be universal
or true at the time the major premise holds. The second part of the disjunctive
condition for a valid repetitive means that even if the hypothetical is not univer-
sal, there will be a valid argument if there is perpetual positing of the antecedent
of a particular conditional, or of a disjunct of an appropriate particular disjunc-
tive; or the perpetual denying of the consequent of a particular conditional, or

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of a disjunct of an appropriate particular disjunctive. As it happens, al-Taḥtānī

disagrees on this point, and thereby tells us more about how to interpret the
universal hypothetical.

Text 110.1 It is said in some books that the perpetuity of positing [the
antecedent of the conditional, or of one of the disjuncts] or of removing
[the consequent of the conditional, or of one of the disjuncts] is productive;
but this is only correct if we interpret the universal hypothetical as that in
which the implication or opposition is realized (mutaḥaqqiqan) with actu-
ally realized situations (al-awḍāʿ al-mutaḥaqqiqah fī nafs al-amr), so that
from the perpetuity of positing or removing, the realization [of the impli-
cation or opposition] follows with all the situations taken into account.
But this is not [how we interpret the universal hypothetical]; rather, it
is interpreted as the realization of implication or opposition in situations
that are not incompatible with the antecedent, so it is possible that the
implication in the particular has a condition that never exists in spite of
the perpetual presence of the implicant; whereupon the existence of the
implicate does not follow due to the fact that a situation of the implicant
is not realized with the implicate and its condition (due to their always
being negated together). This is like the truth of the proposition, “it may
be if the Necessary exists then atom exists”—in the third figure281—and
[of the proposition] “the Necessary always exists.” It does not follow from
this that atom exists tout court, because the implication here is just for the
situation the Necessary and the atom exist together, even though [this situ-
ation] does not come about at all. (TT 448.9–u)

§111282 Al-Kātibī lists the productive moods of repetitive syllogisms that

meet the conditions set out in §110. With a conditional major, there are two
moods, what in the Latin West would be called modus ponens and modus tol-
lens. Al-Kātibī sketches a proof that these moods must be valid if the major is
indeed an implication, and sketches why other moods must be rejected. He
goes on to list valid moods with a disjunctive major. With an exclusive disjunc-
tion, we have modus ponendo tollens and modus tollendo ponens; with alterna-
tive denial, only modus ponendo tollens; and with inclusive disjunction, only
modus tollendo ponens.
Al-Taḥtānī adds little to what we find in the Risālah itself here, though what
he and al-Kātibī say expands on the notions of implication and opposition as

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 Commentary, §112

they relate to inferences (first set out in §§60 and 61). So “the repetition of
the conditional’s antecedent produces the consequent, otherwise it would
follow that the implicate is separable from the implicant, so the implication
would be void (illā lazima nfikāk al-lāzim ʿan al-malzūm fa-yabṭulu l-luzūm)”
(TT 449.14–15). So too, the denial of the consequent entails the denial of the
antecedent, “otherwise [we would have] the presence of the implicant without
the implicate, so the implication would be void (illā lazima wujūd al-malzūm
bi-dūn al-lāzim fa-yabṭulu l-luzūm)” (TT 449.16). The further comments on
oppositional disjunctives define them relative to the impossibility of affirming
both disjuncts (imtināʿ al-jamʿ ) and the impossibility of denying both disjuncts
(imtināʿ al-khulūw).

The fifth section, on matters appended to the syllogism

The following four lemmata deal with four topics that are only loosely related to
each other. So the first lemma deals with aspects of how related syllogisms can
be regarded as forming a unity of some kind, the second lemma deals with the
reductio (which lies at the heart of the formal syllogistic), and the last two lem-
mata deal with inferences that are not deductions but that figure in the broader
applications of logic in science and law. That said, the first topic deals with the
pragmatic matter of referring to the collection of premises and inferences that
relate a theorem in a science back to first principles, the second with reflections
on how to analyze indirect reasoning, the third with the main inductive method
used in some sciences, and the fourth with a style of forensic reasoning devel-
oped outside the philosophical sciences.

§112283 The compound syllogism is not defined by al-Kātibī to have special

relevance to science, but al-Taḥtānī’s comments seem to envisage a role for it in
organizing principles and interim conclusions relative to a scientific question.

Text 112.1 The compound syllogism is a syllogism made up of a

number of premises, two of which produce a conclusion that, taken with
another premise [from the initial set], produces another conclusion, and
so on until reaching what is sought (al-maṭlūb). And that is just if the
premises (or one of them) of the syllogism that produces what is sought
need likewise to be acquired through another syllogism; [this goes on]
until the acquisition ends in principles that are primitive (al-mabādiʾ

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 Commentary, §113

al-badīhiyyah). So there will be [a number of ] syllogisms ordered and

determined to what is sought, and for this reason it is called a compound
syllogism. (TT 451.13–u)

The collection of premises can either be presented so that the interim conclu-
sions that serve as premises in later syllogisms on the way to what is sought are
made explicit (mawṣūl al-natāʾij), or so that these interim conclusions are elided
(mafṣūl al-natāʾij). Presumably, the approach of eliding interim conclusions is
the more common way to set out a science, and the lemma effectively prescribes
a study method for students of such sciences.

§113284 The analysis of the reductio is as a compound syllogism, though not in

the narrow and precise sense of §112. Al-Taftāzānī notes that it is called qiyās al-
khalf—syllogism through the impossible—because it leads to the impossible by
supposing that what is sought is not true (I ignore the dispute about the vowel in
kh-l-f, and alternative etymologies).

Text 113.1 Since the syllogism is limited to the connective and the
repetitive (along with their divisions, which have been mentioned), the
syllogism must be reduced and analyzed to that. Yet great difference of
opinion has occurred here; Avicenna’s settled view is that the reductio is a
compound of two syllogisms, one connective and the other repetitive.285
(TŠ 364.3–7)

I doubt I can do much better than to fill out al-Kātibī’s analysis. He takes it
that we want to prove Baroco (see §93.5):

minor: some C is not A

major: every B is A
conclusion: some C is not B

Take the conclusion posited above, and suppose it to be untrue (if “some C is
not B” is not true, then “every C is B”). Can we show that this leads to an impos-
sibility? Take the other premise (“every B is A”), which as a premise is assumed
to be true (musallamah; see §88, and Text 118.1 below); by Barbara we know that
“every C is B” and “every B is A” produce “every C is A.” Up to here, we have
assembled the components of the first connective syllogism of the reductio (of
the form set out in §107):

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 Commentary, §114

1. if some C is not B is false, then every C is B

(statement of contradictory)
2. but every B is A (major premise of Baroco restated)
3. if some C is not B is false, then every C is A (by schema cited in §107)

But we have assumed (as the minor premise of the original syllogism) “some
C is not A.” So we can take the conclusion of the connective and, with the minor
premise, assemble a repetitive syllogism (modus tollens):

3. if some C is not B is false, then every C is A

4. but some C is not A (minor premise of Baroco restated)
5. therefore some C is not B is not false
(by second repetitive syllogism in §111)

Al-Taftāzānī’s analysis is as follows (“question” is the conclusion sought):

Text 113.2 The connective is a compound of two conditionals, one

of which is the implication (al-mulāzamah) between the posited ques-
tion (al-maṭlūb al-mawḍūʿ ) on the assumption that it is not true, and the
contradictory of the question; this implication is self-evident. The other is
between the contradictory of the question, on the assumption it is true,
and an impossible matter; this implication may need explanation. So this
connective produces a conditional that is a compound of the conditional
(on the assumption that [the question] is not true) and the impossible
matter. The repetitive is a compound of an implicative conditional that is
the conclusion of the connective and of the repetition of the contradictory
of the consequent to produce the contradictory of the antecedent; so the
verification (taḥaqquq) of the question follows. (TŠ 364.8–apu)

His overall account of what is going on is this:

Text 113.3 In summary, were the question not to be verified, its contra-
dictory would be; but if its contradictory were to be verified, an impossi-
bility would come about; an impossibility cannot come about, so the con-
tradictory of the question cannot come about, so the question is verified.
(TŠ 364.pu–u)

§114286 Induction is a defeasible inference, and therefore differs from the

inferences considered in the Risālah up to now. It is described by al-Kātibī as
arriving at a universal judgment on the basis of most of its particulars. One line

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 Commentary, §115

of thinking among al-Kātibī’s contemporaries was that it ceases to be induc-

tion when all particulars have been taken into account, whereupon it becomes
a divided syllogism (qiyās muqassam) (TŠ 365.6), under the kind sketched in
§108.287 As al-Taftāzānī rightly says, however, once every particular has been
taken into account, so too have most of them. In light of this, some say that
induction divides into complete (tāmm)—and this is the divided syllogism, a
kind of syllogism set out in the first example in §108.1—and incomplete (nāqiṣ),
which is the kind of induction commonly understood from the term, a kind
of induction that leads only to supposition but not knowledge. (If this is true,
then one would think induction should be used in rhetoric, but not in dialectic;
whereas al-Ḥillī claims that complete induction is used in sciences, but incom-
plete in dialectic [ḤQ 388.12–16].)
But in fact, it is not the process of induction itself that matters, but the univer-
sal assertion to which it leads; it seems as if some intend the affirmation of what
is sought by induction to be the affirmation of a universal judgment because it
exists in most particulars. But—as the imam made clear (I assume this is al-Ṭūsī,
because the mention is followed by ḥujjat al-Islām raḍiya llāh ʿanhu)—it consists
of examining one by one (taṣaffuḥ) particular matters under a judgment to judge
them against a single matter that takes in all those particulars (TŠ 365.12–13).
If I understand al-Taftāzānī rightly, the goal is not to abstract a judgment from
particulars, but to test a judgment’s fit against particulars. Whatever al-Taftāzānī
has in mind, he claims that it agrees with what al-Fārābī had to say:

Text 114.1 Induction is the examination of particulars under a given

universal matter, one after the other, to show the correctness (taṣḥīḥ) of
a given judgment judged affirmatively or negatively of that matter; so our
examining the particulars under that universal to seek the judgment in
each one is induction. Affirming or negating the judgment of that universal
matter is the conclusion of the induction. Induction is so called because
the inductive reasoner (al-mustaqriʾ ) investigates successively one partic-
ular after another to determine the conclusion. (TŠ 365.apu–366.2)

§115288 Following earlier logicians (for example, Avicenna in Pointers 7.1.3

[AI 64.apu–65.4]), al-Kātibī is concerned to set out and criticize the method of
those who defend the use of example in his own milieu, and his commentators
refer to those culturally specific argument techniques by name.289 Al-Taftāzānī
notes that the description al-Kātibī gives (“taking a judgment belonging to one

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particular and affirming it of another particular because of a meaning common

to both”) is loose, as was the description of induction. More correctly:

Text 115.1 It involves drawing attention to a similarity one particular

has to another by virtue of a meaning common to both, in order to affirm
of the first, [the derivative case,] the judgment affirmed of the second,
[the principal case,] a judgment caused by that [common] meaning
. . . The theologians call example inference from the seen to the unseen
(al-istidlāl bi-l-shāhid ʿalā l-ghāʾib) . . . the lawyers call it analogy (qiyās).
(TŠ 366.7–apu)

Induction and example are commonly reduced to syllogisms. Al-Taftāzānī

takes the argument by example given by al-Kātibī (the heavens are created in
time because they are like a house in terms of its being a composite, which is
the real cause (ʿillah) a house is known to be created in time) and turns it into a
syllogism (TŠ 367.8–9):

minor: the heavens are composite

major: everything composite is created in time
conclusion: the heavens are created in time

Whereas the flaw (khalal) in induction lies in the minor premise of its syllo-
gistic form (has every subject claimed to have the property predicated of its kind
in the conclusion really been examined?), the weakness in example lies in the
major premise (in the example just presented, in “everything composite is cre-
ated in time”). Clearly, everything turns on the defense of the major, for which
the proponents of example as a valid argument have two methods, concomi-
tance (dawarān) and division (taqsīm), which are attacked by al-Kātibī one after
the other after his dismissive “But this kind of argument is weak.”
The first attack is on concomitance—specifically, special concomitance
(al-dawarān al-khāṣṣ), which is the causal subordination (tarattub) of the judg-
ment to something that has an appropriately causal link to that judgment both
in being present and in being absent (al-shayʾ alladhī la-hu ṣulūḥ ʿilliyyat dhālika
l-ḥukm wujūdan wa-ʿadaman).290 The judgment (al-ḥukm) is the presumed con-
comitant effect (al-dāʾir) of the thing that has such an appropriate causal link;
that is, the presumed concomitant cause (al-madār). But how can we come to
know about this link? If we know about it by complete induction, we have some
grounds to assert it, but we are no longer using example as our method (TŠ

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 Commentary, §116

367.2–12). In short, as al-Kātibī asks, how could we know that two permanently
linked concomitants are actually causally related?
The second attack is on the division that supports the connection of the prin-
cipal analogue with the judgment; in this form of argument, the division is not
produced by dichotomous division. Both al-Taftāzānī and al-Kātibī worry about
the lack of system in generating disjuncts, the seemingly arbitrary collection
of disjuncts that might result, and the risk of producing a division that is not
exhaustive (TŠ 367.13–u).

Text 115.2 Be aware that no one contests the fact that induction and
example only produce supposition and not certainty. (TŠ 368.7)

The Conclusion

Up to this point, virtually the entire focus of the Risālah has been on issues to
do with form (ṣūrah). In the concluding section, al-Kātibī enlarges on issues to
do with matter (māddah). According to al-Taftāzānī, it is this order of treatment
that allows al-Kātibī to move smoothly from the formal division of the syllogism
(into connective and repetitive, and under the connective into categorical and
hypothetical, and under the categorical into the four figures) to a division under
the criterion of matter (bi-ʿtibār al-māddah) into the five arts of logic, “I mean,
demonstration, dialectic, rhetoric, fallacy theory, and poetry, because each con-
veys either an assertion or something else with [affective] impact, like what pro-
vokes the imagination” (TŠ 368.10–12). How are these five arts distinguished
from each other?

Text 116.a Assertion is either declarative (jāzim) or not, and the

declarative is either considered with respect to its truth (ḥaqīqatuhu) or
not. What is considered [in this way] is either actually true or not; what
conveys declarative true assertion is demonstration, and what conveys
declarative untrue assertion is sophistry (al-safsaṭah). The assertion that
is not considered with respect to its being true or untrue, but rather with
respect to its being generally acknowledged, is dialectic (if [the assertion]
really is generally acknowledged, otherwise it is eristic, which, along with
sophistry, comes under fallacy theory). That which conveys non-declar-
ative assertion is rhetoric, and that which conveys what elicits images
(al-mufīd li-l-takhyīl) rather than assertion is poetry. (TŠ 368.13–u)

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 Commentary, §116

What al-Kātibī is referring to as the matter of syllogisms (māddat al-aqyisah)

is a function of the truth of an assertion, its epistemic justification and its pre-
sentation in terms of that truth and justification. This use of matter is a further
development of the notion of propositional matter (māddat al-qaḍiyyah) set out
in §51, and of terms as a proposition’s matter first set out at the beginning of the
comment on §45.
In short, the different propositional matters are used to distinguish among
different disciplinary uses of syllogistic. From the time of Avicenna, particularly
in his exposition of logic in Pointers and Reminders, it had become common
merely to mention the five arts, and concentrate on demonstration (which
leads to truth) and sophistry (which looks like demonstration, and deceives the
student on the path to learning demonstrative truth). It was a topos to lament
this change in coverage (see al-Taftāzānī in Text 0.1; his comments are echoed
by Ibn Khaldūn), though rare—as far as I am aware—not to accept it. The fact
remains that we are looking at the remnants of a grand theory of discourse, an
attempt to offer a unified theory of the persuasive power of language as used
across the disciplines.291
In what follows, al-Kātibī deals in turn with the six propositions of certainty
used for demonstration (§116) and the demonstrations that can be constructed
using them (§117), then goes on to consider various epistemically weaker prem-
ises and the kinds of arguments that are constructed from each of them (§118).
He pauses to deal with propositions used in the pathological discourse of soph-
istry (§119) before concluding with an account of how a science is constructed,
touching on aspects of its internal structure, its structure in the broader system
of sciences, and the nature of the theorems it is directed to demonstrating
(§120). A prominent part of what follows involves the classification of proposi-
tions in terms of their respective epistemic force, and it is worth bearing in mind
that they are distinguished as types (aṣnāf) and not species (anwāʿ ); this is not
an essential division, and no claim is implied that they or the further distinctions
that depend on them are natural or unchanging.

The first discussion, on syllogistic matters

Propositions taken in terms of their syllogistic matter are taken in terms of

their epistemic justification. The first six syllogistic matters are propositions
taken to be certain (al-yaqīniyyāt; sometimes the necessary propositions,
al-ḍarūriyyāt); these are the propositions that provide data for demonstrative

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 Commentary, §116

science. Al-Ḥillī sets out three necessary conditions for a proposition to be

certain (yaqīnī): it must be declarative (jāzim), correspondent with reality
(muṭābiq), and stable through justification by some rational consideration
(thābit). The antonyms for each of these are, respectively, that it be merely sup-
position (ẓann), that it be compound ignorance (jahl murakkab),292 and that it
be a belief accepted on authority (iʿtiqād al-muqallid) [ḤQ 394.9–apu]. So an
assertion that is certain must be presented as justified, it must be the case, and
it must be justified by a consideration which guarantees that it is the case. The
separate ways each of the sources of data for demonstrative science are justified
by some consideration distinguish them as different syllogistic matters. As just
mentioned, these distinctions are not ultimately dictated by the way things are
in themselves; they are, to use once again the terms al-Ṭūsī uses, types (aṣnāf)
and not species (anwāʿ ).
There is a further restriction on the way “certain” is being used to qualify
assertion. The conclusion of a demonstration inherits certainty if all conditions
of a demonstration are met, and there are more than six grounds for this kind
of demonstratively secured certainty. The use of “certain” in this section of the
Risālah, however, is limited: “What is meant is that the primary certain matters
(al-mawādd al-uwal al-yaqīniyyah) are limited to six, whereas acquired [certain
assertions] are not primary but rather secondary or even more remote [from
primary certain propositions]” (TŠ 369.6–8); see Text 117.1 below.

§116293 Primary premises (awwaliyyāt) are defined as those for which the
intellect needs nothing more than conceiving the two extremes (taṣawwur
al-ṭarafayn) to assert that the premises are certain. This was the criterion for
primitive assertion (taṣdīq badīhī) set out in Text 2.1 (indeed, al-Ḥillī refers to
awwaliyyāt as primitive premises, badīhiyyāt [ḤA 197.9]), so in this lemma we
see the way the foundational elements of propositional knowledge introduced at
the beginning of the treatise ground the development of demonstrative science.

Text 116.1 The primaries are propositions on which the intellect judges
simply by virtue of conceiving its extremes, like “the whole is greater than
the part,” “every assertion must be denied or affirmed,” and “the same
body is not in two places at a single moment.” If the extremes are clearly
conceived and related (jaliyyat al-taṣawwur wa-l-irtibāṭ), then the judg-
ment is absolutely clear; otherwise it is clear to one for whom the concep-
tion and relation is clear, and unclear for others. Sometimes the intellect

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 Commentary, §116

hesitates in a primary judgment after conceiving the extremes, either due

to deficiency of natural disposition (al-gharīzah) as in the young or the
dull-witted, or due to the natural operation of the intelligence (al-fiṭrah)
being tarnished by beliefs that are at odds with the primaries, as in the case
of some vulgar or ignorant people. (TŠ 370.1–7)

The remaining five propositions of certainty require something over and

above the conception of the extremes to aid the intellect in coming to assert
them (TŠ 369.10–11). Observational propositions (al-mushāhadāt)—based on
sense-perception—issue in a judgment (ḥukm), whether to do with the observed
world (ẓāhirah) such as “the sun is hot,” or with internal (bāṭinah) states such
as “I am afraid”; the second kind makes a judgment to do with our affective
(wijdāniyyah) states (ḤQ 395.5).

Text 116.2 All the judgments based on sense-perception are, however,

particular, for the senses only convey that this fire is hot; the judgment
that every fire is hot is an intellectual judgment that the intellect acquires
from perceiving particulars of that judgment and coming to understand its
causes. From this, it appears that what makes a judgment on observed data
is a compound of the senses and the intellect, and not the senses alone.
(TŠ 370.10–13)

Premises based on experience (al-mujarrabāt) involve, over and above

observation, repeated experience, such that one matter occurs on the occur-
rence of another, or is absent on the absence of another (al-Kātibī’s example
is the occurrence of purgation after taking scammony). Al-Ḥillī explains the
underlying structure. It is a syllogism that allows the soul to move from repeated
experience to the universal proposition (here, “scammony is purgative”). The
syllogism is repetitive (see §110 and following): were the occurrence of purga-
tion coincidental (ittifāqī), it would not always be the case after taking scam-
mony; but it is always the case; therefore it is not coincidental. It is this syllogism
that distinguishes premises based on experience from data acquired by induc-
tion discussed in §114 (ḤQ 395.11).
We find out more about premises based on experience by considering the
next kind of certain proposition. Premises provided by intuiting the middle
term of a syllogism (al-ḥadsiyyāt, ḤQ 396.5) are like those based on experience,
except that in a judgment provided by intuiting the middle term, the judgment
is given as to both the fact that a given thing is the case, and as to what that

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 Commentary, §116

thing is; that is, judgment is given as to the causality and quiddity (sababiyyah,
māhiyyah) of the thing. By contrast, in premises based on experience, the judg-
ment is given only as to the causality (sababiyyah), the fact that something is the
case. For example, from “moonlight is light reflected from the sun,” we know
not simply that the sun causes moonlight, we know what moonlight is (reflected
sunlight); whereas from “scammony is purgative” we know only that scammony
causes purgation, but not what it is.

Text 116.3 Intuited premises are propositions on which judgment is

made by a strong intuition from the soul conveying knowledge, like the
judgment that the light of the moon is acquired from the sun due to the
formations of its light in accordance with its different states relative to the
sun. So it is like premises based on experience in terms of repeated obser-
vations and the addition of a hidden syllogism; it differs in that the cause in
premises based on experience is known only in terms of its being a cause,
not in terms of what it is, whereas in intuited propositions it is known in
both respects. [This type of premise] depends only on intuition and not
on thinking, otherwise it would be an acquired knowledge claim (min
al-ʿulūm al-kasbiyyah). (TŠ 370.pu–371.4)

For premises based on sequential testimony (al-mutawātirāt, ḤQ 397.1),

al-Kātibī sets down two conditions. First, the claim cannot be impossible,
and second, trust must be generated by widespread agreement on the matter
(there is no arbitrary number of witnesses that can guarantee that agreement
on a matter; the requisite number is a function of producing the requisite
trust). Al-Ḥillī sets down a third condition, which is that the data must ulti-
mately be such that it can be derived from the sense-perception (al-istinād ilā
l-ḥiss). By this condition, sequential testimony as to—for example—the exis-
tence of God is excluded.

Text 116.4 Premises based on sequential testimony are propositions

on which judgment is made due to manifold witness after the possibility
of what is judged and trust in there being no agreement to lie among the
witness-bearers. This is like the judgment that Mecca exists, and Baghdad,
and the stipulation [that the data] are traced back to the senses—since
this kind of report is only considered for what is traced back to observa-
tion (al-mushāhadah). The criterion (al-ḍābiṭ) for the minimum number
[of witnesses] for sequential testimony is that certainty in the judgment

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 Commentary, §116

result, and the possibility [that it is false] cease. There is no proof for what
those hold who stipulate five or twelve or twenty or forty or seventy, for
we decide (qāṭiʿūn) that we have knowledge through data from sequential
testimony without knowledge of a specified number; [that number] would
differ according to differences among events and informants and auditors.
(TŠ 372.4–10)

Al-Kātibī excludes from a debate data from experience, intuition, and sequen-
tial testimony; at least, such premises cannot be used to compel an opponent to
accept an argument. Al-Ḥillī explains that this is because the data are derived
from sense-perception (li-stinādihi ilā l-ḥiss), and are therefore particular; and
because—I take this to be a separate argument—people have differing levels of
ability to intuit middle terms. I have to say I find confusing the claim that these
data are particular. Surely the whole point of the syllogistic condition in (4) and
(5) is that it makes the claim universal. Further, data given by (5) are from an
expert; the whole notion of a functioning scientific community is based on rec-
ognizing expertise in specific sciences and agreeing to defer to the appropriate
experts. In any event, al-Kātibī and al-Ḥillī caution that these premises cannot
guarantee success in a debate. At the same time, they both accept that such data
can be used in demonstrations. At the least, this means that some demonstra-
tions cannot be used in debate. It may mean further that some demonstrations
are for the demonstrator alone.
Lastly, (6) implicitly syllogistic premises (al-qaḍāyā llatī qiyāsātuhā maʿahā,
ḤQ 398.2) depend on a middle always present to the mind (“its divisibility into
two equal parts,” which is always present to the mind and determines the cer-
tainty of “four is even”). What is always present to the mind is not obtained by
reflection but, according to al-Ḥillī, by the natural operation of the intellect
(fiṭrah) and what is inherent to it as it operates.

Text 116.5 Implicitly syllogistic premises, also called propositions with

inherently available syllogisms (al-qaḍāyā al-fiṭriyyat al-qiyās), are propo-
sitions on which judgment is made by mediation of a syllogistic middle
always available to the mind on the occurrence of the two extremes of the
proposition, as in “four is even because it is divisible into two equal parts.”
(TŠ 372.13–15)

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 Commentary, §117

§117294 A necessary condition for a syllogism to be a demonstration is that its

premises be taken from among the premises of certainty (al-yaqīniyyāt) set out
above. It is not, however, a sufficient condition for a syllogism to be a demonstra-
tion, as might seem to be implied by the way al-Kātibī opens this lemma. Further
necessary conditions involve the causal relations discussed in this lemma, as well
as appropriate subject term and predicate, discussed in §120. In this lemma, in
fact, two issues are dealt with. The first is how the conditions considered in §116
relate to, and are to be distinguished from, considerations that were introduced
in dealing with the modal propositions. The second is the kind of causal relations
between middle and major terms that determine whether a demonstration can
be produced, and what kind can be produced.
Yaqīniyyāt—what I have translated as “premises of certainty”—was inter-
preted by early scholars to entail that the premises are necessary in the sense
discussed in §§51 to 59.295 Due to demonstrations given in physics, however, it
became clear that weaker modal grades such as for-the-most-part premises had
to be accepted as adequate for demonstration. Avicenna insisted that even lower
modal grades such as merely contingent propositions could be used, so long as
it was recognized that the conclusion would be of correspondingly lower modal
grade (for example, in Pointers 9.2, AI 81.10–82.10). Presumably, he meant to
dissociate yaqīniyyāt from any particular modal grade; to say that such a propo-
sition is necessary should be taken to refer to its epistemic status (specifically, to
the nature of the justification for holding the proposition to be true).

Text 117.1 The premises of demonstration need not be taken from

the six necessary propositions (al-ḍarūriyyāt), but rather may include
the derived propositions that culminate in [those six] (al-kasbiyyāt
al-muntahiyāt ilayhā); so what is intended by al-Kātibī is that the syllo-
gism whose ultimate material (mawādduhu l-uwal) is from the six neces-
sary propositions—whether its premises are two necessary propositions,
or two acquired propositions, or a mix—is called a demonstration.
When it is said that demonstration is only composed of necessary
propositions, we mean that it can only be composed of propositions it is
necessary to assert (qaḍāyā yakūnu l-taṣdīq bi-hā ḍarūriyyan), whether in
themselves they are necessary, possible, or existential propositions, and
whether they are primitive or acquired. (TŠ 372.pu–373.5)

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 Commentary, §117

Al-Kātibī distinguishes between a demonstration of the fact and a demon-

stration of the reasoned fact. He states the classic condition for a demonstra-
tion of the reasoned fact (rephrased slightly by al-Ḥillī [ḤQ 399.5])—namely,
that the middle term must be the cause for the occurrence of the major term to
the minor term both in the mind and in existence—and of the demonstration
of the fact (again, in al-Ḥillī’s terms) that the middle term is the cause for the
occurrence of the major term to the minor term in the mind but not in exis-
tence. Burhān annī is the preferable reading of the Arabic for demonstration of
the fact, burhān limmī for demonstration of the reasoned fact; but note that for
al-Ḥillī—and for everyone else in this tradition—the proofs are, respectively,
burhān in and burhān lim.296

Text 117.2 So it is a syllogism made up of propositions of certainty to

convey another proposition of certainty. The middle term must inevitably
be a real cause (ʿillah) for the occurrence of the assertion of the judgment
sought, otherwise the demonstration would not be a demonstration of
[the judgment sought]. At this point, it must be that either it is moreover
a cause for the existence of that judgment extramentally as well, and is
called a demonstration of the reasoned fact (burhānan limmiyyan) because
it conveys the reason why [the predicate exists] (al-limmiyyah), I mean,
the causality of the judgment (ʿilliyyat al-ḥukm) absolutely; or it is not [a
cause for the extramental existence of the judgment], and is called a dem-
onstration of the fact (burhānan anniyyan) because it conveys the fact that
[the predicate obtains], I mean, the affirmation in the intellect without the
causality for its existence (dūn al-ʿilliyyah fī l-wujūd). (TŠ 373.6–11)

Al-Kātibī does not go on in the Risālah to identify a further, more specific

way that the causality of the terms may be related, but most of his commenta-
tors do.

Text 117.3 If the middle in a demonstration of the fact is an effect of

the existence of the judgment extramentally, it is called a proof (dalīl), as
in “Zayd is fevered, and every fevered suffers putrid humors”; otherwise
[the argument-form] is not given a special name, as in “this fever is tertian,
every tertian fever has acute periods,” because being tertian is not an effect
of acute periods of fever; rather, both [having tertian fever and having
acute bouts] are effects of putrid bile exuding from the veins. (TŠ 374.1–4)

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 Commentary, §118

§118297 The syllogistic matters given to this point can serve for premises in a
demonstration. The epistemically less secure premises that follow are acknowl-
edged as justified in ways weaker than those above, and they are used in levels of
discourse less scientifically beneficial than demonstration, though perhaps more
broadly beneficial to society. The different contexts in which these premises
occur are, in descending order of epistemic robustness, dialectic, rhetoric, and
poetry. The theory that systematically distributes differing syllogistic matters
to differing discursive contexts is, as mentioned above, called by some modern
scholars the context theory. Al-Kātibī adopts the version of the theory that Avi-
cenna had settled on in his final writings.
The criterion for a premise being (1) endoxic is that it is widely recognized as
true (ʿumūm al-iʿtirāf). Of course, primary premises may be as widely recognized
as those that are endoxic, and when used along with other dialectical premises,
it is their widespread acceptance that matters. The causes of widespread accep-
tance of an opinion (shuhrah) are various, and al-Ḥillī enumerates four: truth;
general social utility; passions resulting from humoral disposition; and the
effects of rules, laws, and manners on dispositions. The test to distinguish the
endoxic from the primary is a thought experiment: were a man “to suppose his
soul empty of all matters other than his intellect (law faraḍa nafsahu khāliyatan
min jamī ʿ al-umūr al-mughāyirah li-ʿaqlihi),” he would judge a primary premise
to be true, but not the endoxic. The test for making the distinction, according
to al-Taftāzānī, comes down to “the pure mind, which only looks at the content
of the extremes (al-ʿaql al-ṣarīḥ alladhī lā yanẓuru ilā ghayr buṭūn al-ṭarafayn).”
Every nation accepts its own endoxic data; so too the practitioners of every art
accept endoxic premises relative to their art (bi-ḥasab ṣināʿatihim). Endoxic
premises are used in dialectical arguments, along with conceded premises.
On one usage, premises that are conceded (musallamāt) may include those
that are certain and those that are not, but al-Kātibī uses the term in §118 as
a counterpart (qasīmah) of the certain. The test for (2) whether a premise is
conceded is obvious, but the way such premises are used calls for explanation.
A premise is conceded by an opponent in a dialectic exchange; once conceded,
the questioner tries to build on the conceded premises an argument that refutes
the larger claim of the opponent (fa-idhā tasallamahā minhu banā ʿalayhā mā
yubṭilu bi-hi kalāmahu). A classic example of such an exchange is that which
takes place in legal methodology as to whether consensus is probative. The util-
ity of dialectic is in convincing someone unable to grasp the demonstration of a

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 Commentary, §118

truth by means of a less difficult kind of argument, and in compelling someone

to accept what he does not believe.

Text 118.1 What is intended is that its propositions are taken insofar
as they are endoxic or conceded, even if actually they are certain or even
primary. The truth is that it is more general than demonstration in respect
of form too, because what is considered in it is production insofar as [the
premises are] conceded, being so whether as syllogism or induction or
example, unlike demonstration; so it is just syllogism.
The goal of dialectic is to persuade someone who falls short of appre-
hending demonstration, and compelling an opponent. The dialectician
may be the respondent protecting a view—his goal being to avoid being
compelled [to relinquish it]—or he may be the questioner objecting to,
and trying to destroy, a given posit—his goal being to compel his opponent
[to relinquish the view]. (TŠ 375.4–10)

Rhetorical discourse is socially useful. It uses premises that are approved

on authority, or that are merely suppositional. (3) A received proposition
(maqbūlah) is taken from someone whose credibility derives from some reli-
gious matter (at least in all of al-Kātibī’s examples, though al-Ḥillī extends the
source of credibility to include proverbial wisdom [ḤQ 402.13]). (4) A premise
that is merely supposed (maẓnūn) as true may include what is not declarative
(jāzim) in the sense introduced above (Text 116.a), or what is not certain (yaqīn),
whereupon it covers compound ignorance, pure supposition, and the belief of
those bound by authority (ḤQ 403.1).

Text 118.2 What is intended by supposition is the judgment on the

proposition preponderantly one way while acknowledging the possibility
that it be the other way (even if those who use [these propositions] in rhe-
torical discourse declare them certain without entertaining the possibility
that things are otherwise). These propositions include for-the-most-part
premises based on experience (al-tajrībiyyāt), sequential testimony, and
intuited propositions that are not certain. (TŠ 375.apu–u)

There is nothing much to add to al-Kātibī’s treatment of what elicits images in

poetical discourse. Its impact is a physical affection; whether conceded or not,
whether true or not, it imparts strength to its auditor through its expression or
its meaning. Poetic syllogism exercises an effect on the soul, which is passive in
receiving this effect; we are more inclined toward, and pliable (aṭwaʿ ) before,

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 Commentary, §118

this discourse. Other things like meter and a pleasing voice lend it even more
force. It is worth noting that earlier logicians did not consider meter in their
analysis of poetry, whereas later logicians (and in this case, al-Ḥillī presumably
means Avicenna) do consider it, and even rhyme (ḤQ 403.apu).

Text 118.3 What is meant by meter is a form that follows the system of
organization of the vowels and silences and their interrelation in number
and extent such that the soul finds a special delight—which is called taste—
in apprehending [this form]. (TŠ 376.14–15)

The last premise al-Kātibī considers in this lemma, (5) the estimative (wah-
miyyah), leads him to consider sophistical refutations in the following lemma.

Text 118.4 Estimative propositions are false propositions in which

judgment is made by the human estimative faculty with respect to imper-
ceptible matters. It is qualified by the phrase [“with respect to impercep-
tible matters”] just because the intellect [rightly] believes the judgments of
the estimative faculty about matters perceived by the senses (al-maḥsūsāt).
And due to the concord through extreme clarity between the intellect and
the estimative faculty in whatever is like geometry, dispute rarely occurs
about [these judgments]. In pure intelligibles, however, [the judgments of
the estimative faculty] are false; this is proved by the fact that the estima-
tive faculty helps the intellect in [acquiring] premises of certainty that pro-
duce a conclusion which is certain, yet disputes [with the intellect] about
the conclusion, as in “the dead are inanimate, and every inanimate is such
that it is not to be feared.”
The judgments of the estimative faculty are endoxic for the most part
(fī l-akthar), because it is closer to sensible things, and has more impact on
people (awqaʿ fī l-ḍamāʾir).
The syllogism composed of [these propositions] is sophistry, the goal
of which is to silence and overcome the opponent. The strongest benefit in
knowing [sophistry] is to [be able to] avoid it. (TŠ 377.1–10)

So powerful is the hold that estimative propositions have over certain people
that such propositions are only overcome by intellectual arguments and provi-
sions in religious law.

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 Commentary, §119

§119298 Al-Kātibī’s treatment of fallacy theory comes before rather than after
his treatment of demonstration theory; he follows the same order in Jāmiʿ
al-daqāʾiq. In this, he departs from Avicenna’s ordering of material in Pointers,
where we find fallacy theory as the final chapter of the logic volume. It is hard
to say what led al-Kātibī to this decision. He had predecessors in ordering the
subjects like this (not least al-Fārābī), but I suspect it is mainly because he treats
all material considerations in logic together, rather than—as Avicenna did—first
as they have to do with propositions (Pointers Path 6) and then as they have to do
with arguments (Pointers Paths 9 and 10). By contrast, §118 deals with premises
for arguments that fail to meet the criteria for demonstration, and §119 develops
the topic by moving straight on to the fallacious arguments in which some of
those premises find a place. Unlike Avicenna, however, al-Kātibī makes no men-
tion of specious premises (al-mushabbihāt), which is where in Path 6 of Pointers
Avicenna deals with fallacious propositions. Indeed, al-Kātibī presents estimative
premises (al-wahmiyyāt) in terms closely modeled on Avicenna, but goes straight
on to say that it is these which are the premises used in fallacious syllogisms.299
The treatment in the Risālah is short and highly selective. I do not think
that this is due to influence from al-Rāzī, who omitted fallacy theory from the
Mulakhkhaṣ, saying that “the discussion of the details of fallacies is also rather
like an extra we can do without . . . So it is better to set them out in the extended
treatments [of logic]” (RM 354.9–u). Al-Kātibī sets out a substantial treatment
of fallacies in his Jāmiʿ al-daqāʾiq, and adds such a treatment to his commentary
on the Mulakhkhaṣ. And there is clear evidence—presented at the end of this
section—that he thinks proper analysis of fallacies is essential even in short trea-
tises like the Risālah, especially for theology students.
We can say, however, that the treatment of fallacies was in flux through
the period in which the Risālah was written. Al-Kātibī’s commentator al-Ḥillī
epitomizes a different approach to dealing with fallacy theory, which reflects
deeper differences to do with the continuing direct relevance of Aristotle for
logic. Al-Kātibī sets out five fallacies in the Risālah, and names them only in
broad terms (a fallacy may be one “whose matter is corrupt,” or it “may be false
but seem true with respect to expression,” or its falsity “may be with respect
to meaning”), whereas al-Ḥillī in his commentary gives each fallacy its name
under the Aristotelian division. Furthermore, in the Asrār, al-Ḥillī gives the list
of fallacies first treated by Aristotle, set out in substantially the same way as they
were in Sophistical Refutations (ḤA 218.1–222.3). Nonetheless, I will stick to the
fallacies treated by al-Kātibī.

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 Commentary, §119

Al-Ḥillī disagrees with al-Kātibī’s analysis of begging the question (the first
syllogism in the lemma, the example that concludes “every man is risible”);
al-Kātibī, following al-Rāzī, claims that the problem derives from corrupt matter.
Against al-Rāzī, al-Ṭūsī claims rather that the fallacy derives from a formal prob-
lem (ṬḤ 498.7–10). But according to al-Ḥillī:

Text 119.1 The truth is that the defect in this is due neither to matter
nor to form, because the matter is correct and true, so too the form of the
syllogism. The defect here is only with respect to the fact that it begs the
question because the discourse implied does not differ from the discourse
in the premises.300 (ḤQ 408.9–12)

Al-Ḥillī agrees with al-Kātibī’s analysis of the painted-horse problem as

equivocation:

Text 119.2 The error in this only arises due to confusion (ishtibāh)
of the expression “horse” between the engraved image and the specific
animal; it is one of the kinds of error to do with expression. (ḤQ 409.1–2)

He also agrees with the analysis of the fallacy arising from “man-and-horse”
as a fallacy of meaning, though he names precisely what kind of fallacy it is:

Text 119.3 This is an error to do with meaning, which is due to a con-

fusion of the true with the false; it involves a judgment being made in the
affirmative on a subject not specified to exist. The truth is that the error
in this comes under the category of secundum quid (min bāb sūʾ iʿtibār
al-ḥaml). (ḤQ 409.6–8)

The fourth example (taking the natural proposition—see §43—as a universal)

is worth special mention, because according to al-Taftāzānī, al-Kātibī analyzed
it differently before changing his mind.

Text 119.4 If it is said: Putting the natural proposition in place of the

universal, as in “man is an animal, animal is a genus,” is not a corruption
of matter (fasād al-māddah), but a corruption of form due to leaving out
the universal quantifier of the major (kulliyyat al-kubrā). I answer: The
principle of the major here is true as a natural proposition (whereupon
the form [of the syllogism] is corrupt), and it is false as a universal (where-
upon the matter is corrupt); so al-Kātibī took the corruption of the syllo-
gism here to arise from the matter, having regard to [the proposition] not

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 Commentary, §119

being true when expressed as a universal. In the Jāmiʿ, al-Kātibī took [the
fallacy] as arising from the form, having regard to the universal quanti-
fier of the major being left out when expressed as a natural proposition.301
(TŠ 379.1–6)

Finally, al-Ḥillī agrees that the fifth example in §119 (taking mental matters as
real) is a fallacy of meaning (more precisely, another example of secundum quid,
though—pace al-Ḥillī—in Text 119.6 it looks to me like it’s a part of a false cause)
(ḤQ 410.5). Al-Taftāzānī offers an example of what is under discussion:

Text 119.5 An example of al-Kātibī’s “taking what is merely mental to

be real” is: Were the partner of the Creator impossible in external real-
ity, then [the cocreator’s] impossibility would obtain in external reality,
so that which is described by impossibility (al-mawṣūf bi-l-imtināʿ ) would
be realized in external reality (because the realization of the description
(taḥaqquq al-ṣifah) in external reality necessarily requires the realization
of what is described by it). The error here is that the impossibility is in
mental matters that fundamentally have no realization. (TŠ 379.14–u)

And it is here that we can see how much fallacy theory matters for al-Kātibī,
because we find out in the Jāmiʿ just who it is whose work is riddled with this
fallacy.302

Text 119.6 Also under [the second broad division of fallacies] is what
occurs because of taking mental considerations as external, as when it
is said, were the partner of God impossible in extramental existence, its
impossibility would occur in extramental reality. And what is described
with impossibility occurring in extramental reality in fact occurs in extra-
mental reality; so that which is impossible in extramental reality would
occur in extramental reality, which is absurd. The error here is that the
impossibility is a mental consideration that is not realized in extramental
reality . . . This fallacious reasoning occurs frequently in scientific books,
especially the books connected to the imam [Fakhr al-Dīn]; so you have
to pay attention to it. By this, many obscurities will be solved for you.
(Jāmiʿ al-daqāʾiq, 78a.1–14, Chester Beatty 3577)

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 Commentary, §120

The second discussion, on the parts of the sciences

§120303 This is the last lemma of the Risālah, appropriately given to what
al-Kātibī and his contemporaries took to be the culmination and highest goal
of logic, demonstration theory. It carries on with discussions opened up in the
Conclusion, specifically in §116 on the kinds of propositions that can be used
in a demonstration, and in §117, on further conditions (to do with the middle
term, modality and causality) for a successful demonstration. But in fact,
nearly every point al-Kātibī has developed in the Risālah so far can be brought
to bear on demonstration, and it is natural that he refers back to §5 in open-
ing this lemma, and specifically to the definition of a scientific subject given
there: “that whose essential accidents are investigated in the science, accidents
that attach to the subject due to what it is (that is, due to its essence), or due
to what is coextensive with it, or a part of it.” The range of scientific subjects
is explored by al-Kātibī and by al-Taftāzānī in Text 120.2. Essential accidents
(aʿrāḍ dhātiyyah), mentioned before and crucial for this lemma, are defined
before Text 120.2 below. “Subject” is used in the plural (“subjects,” mawḍūʿāt)
to include all subjects of propositions used in the science. As noted in Text 5.1,
a given science is distinct from another by virtue of the distinction between the
subjects each studies.

Text 120.1 Know that a single science may have a single subject, either
absolutely like number for arithmetic or insofar as a property occurs to
it (whether an essential property, like natural body insofar as it is subject
to change for physics, or a foreign property,304 like moving sphere for its
science [astronomy]). And the science may have a number of subjects on
condition that they are interrelated (mutanāsibah). The sense of interrela-
tion [of subjects] is their sharing in an essential property like line and plane
and body if they are made subjects for geometry (they share extended
magnitude), or in an accidental property (ʿaraḍī) like the body of man and
its parts and states and medicine and nutrition and whatever shares with
these things when they are all taken as subjects of the science of medicine
(for they share in being related to health, which is the goal of that science).
(TŠ 381.1–8)

What al-Kātibī does not consider in the Risālah is the way subjects of differ-
ent sciences relate to each other.305 The goal of scientific research is to produce

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 Commentary, §120

a system of interrelated knowledge claims where higher sciences establish

claims more abstract and fundamental than those established in the lower sci-
ences; the theorems proved in the higher science are taken up as principles in
the lower science. (The reverse can also happen if the principles of the lower
science used in establishing the claim to be borrowed do not depend on the
higher science that borrows the claim.) Al-Taftāzānī in particular among the
commentators writes on the matter, but the clearest contribution is from
al-Ḥillī in his Asrār (ḤA 208.9–209.2); I mention it but follow al-Kātibī in leav-
ing it to one side.
The subject (and the subjects under it) are defined according to the rules
set out in §§35–37;306 the resulting definitions are considered to be among the
principles of the science. As such—and al-Kātibī stresses this again as he closes
his treatise—they cannot be proved in the science, because they constitute the
subjects that must be assumed for the propositions of the science (they are, to
put it another way, preconditions for the investigation). What must be proved to
belong to the subjects are the essential accidents (al-aʿrāḍ al-dhātiyyah)—never
defined in the Risālah—a technical term, which in this context refers to an attri-
bute in whose definition the subject is taken (yuʾkhadh al-mawḍūʿ fī ḥaddihi),
like “snub” in “snub nose,” which is defined as “a nose possessing a bend” (anf
dhū taqʿīr) (ḤA 203.6–7); these are—again, most commonly—accidents that
belong only to the subjects of the science. A much-cited example of a theorem
(masʾalah) to be proved in geometry is “triangle has internal angles that sum to
two right angles” (Elements 1.32). The essential accident (“internal angles that
sum to two right angles”) belongs only to the subject “triangle,” and it is proved
by using postulates (in this case, derivatively on 1.31, which uses postulate 1 “to
draw a straight line from any point to any point”), by using common notions (in
this case, first, common notion 2, “if equals are added to equals, then the wholes
are equals”), and by using other conclusions already proved.307 These essential
accidents belong to their subjects as extrinsic to the meaning (they are not con-
stitutive of the subject), but they hold as implicates of the subject. Since every
conclusion in a science relates a subject to an essential accident, and essential
accidents cannot be constituents of a quiddity, there must ultimately be essential
accidents of quiddity that are immediate (see §22).308
In §120.2, al-Kātibī focuses more closely on how the subjects of the theo-
rems may relate to the subject of the science (he takes these examples from Avi-
cenna [AN §§126, 135–36]); these examples serve to show how the theory of

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demonstration is applied to a science (in this case, geometry).309 Al-Taftāzānī

expands on al-Kātibī’s examples and adds one more:

Text 120.2 The questions are the propositions for which the science
seeks to demonstrate a relation between their predicates and their sub-
jects. These propositions can only be acquired, and this is something no
one disputes (to claim they could be available without acquisition would
be bizarre). The subjects of the questions can be the subject of the sci-
ence if [that subject] is taken without qualification (mujarradan), as in
geometry. So “every magnitude is either commensurable or incommen-
surable”; here, magnitude is the subject of geometry, and the meaning of
two magnitudes being commensurable is that both have a common mea-
sure, and being incommensurable is the opposite.310 Or [the subject of the
theorem could be the subject of the science] with a per se attribute, like
“every [magnitude which is a] mean proportional is a side contained by the
two other extremes”; here “magnitude” is the subject, though it has been
taken with one of its per se accidents (namely, its being a mean propor-
tional—that is, its being between two magnitudes, its relation to one being
the same as the other to it, like four cubits between two and eight, which is
half eight, and two is half of it). The meaning of it being a side contained by
the two other extremes is that the result of squaring it is the result of multi-
plying one extreme by the other; so the result of multiplying four by four is
sixteen, which is the result of multiplying two by eight. And [the subject of
the theorem] may be a species of the subject of the science, either unquali-
fied (mujarrad), as “every line may be bisected,” line being a species of
magnitude; or [it may be a species of a subject of the science] with a per
se attribute, as in “every line set upon another line produces angles that
are either right angles or that sum to right angles”; here line is taken with
its being set upon another line (which is one of its per se accidents). And
[the subject of the theorem] may be a per se accident of the subject, as in
“every triangle has angles that sum to two right angles”; triangle is a per se
attribute of magnitude. And [the subject of the theorem] may be a species
of per se attribute, as in “every isosceles triangle has base angles that are
equal to each other”; the triangle that is described is a species of triangle.
(TŠ 386.8–387.10)

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 Commentary, §120

In §120.3, al-Kātibī stresses once again in closing that a demonstration must

be of an extrinsic property belonging to a subject. Were it of something intrinsic
to the subject, the demonstration would amount to demonstrating that a consti-
tutive belongs to the subject. But we had to conceive the subject before begin-
ning the demonstration, and we can only conceive the subject with all its con-
stituents. So we cannot demonstrate a constituent (or, as it is more commonly
expressed, it is impossible to demonstrate a definition).311

286 286
 Notes

1 Asaph: The son of Berechiah the Gershonite (2 Chronicles 20:14); psalmist charged by
King David to worship God in song and praise (1 Chronicles 15:16–17).
2 Q Fuṣṣilat 41:42.
3 “The rope of God,” an allusion to Q Āl ʿImrān 3:103.
4 Among other meanings, the Arabic ʿayn is equivocal between “eye” and “spring.”
5 Al-Kātibī is referring back to the division set out in §16 above.
6 A reference to §15 above.
7 A reference to §16 above.
8 An allusion to a phrase in Q ʿAṣr 103:2.
9 The Arabic for “inanimate” is a positive term (see §49).
10 Because I adopt Rescher’s translations of the names of propositions, “conditional” is
used both for the categorical necessity proposition under a descriptional reading and
for the hypothetical proposition first set out in §39 above.
11 This is what Euclid would call a postulate (his first and third postulates are given as
examples).
12 This is one of Euclid’s common notions (his first is the example).
13 TT 21 (no comment); TŠ 88. ḤQ omits the exordium.
14 I adopt the convention of using “intellect” for sublunary intellect and “intelligence” for
superlunary; see Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect: Their Cosmolo-
gies, Theories of the Active Intellect, and Theories of Human Intellect, 4.
15 Perhaps because it presents logic detached from metaphysics and physics; scholars were
more negative to the logic section in al-Bayḍāwī’s Ṭawāliʿ al-anwār min maṭāliʿ al-anẓār
(translated in al-Bayḍāwī et al., Nature, Man and God in Medieval Islam), on the face of
it no more logically objectionable than al-Risālah al-Shamsiyyah; El-Rouayheb, “Sunni
Muslim Scholars on the Status of Logic, 1500–1800,” 227.
16 See §36; a delineation (or description) makes something known using nonessential
elements.
17 TT 30; TŠ 97; ḤQ 182.
18 For reflections on the difficulties in reaching a definitive translation for taṣdīq, see Sabra,
“Avicenna on the Subject Matter of Logic,” 758; for an argument that taṣdīq should be
translated as “belief,” see Lameer, Conception and Belief in Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī: Intro-
duction, Translation and Commentary. I follow Strobino’s preference for “assertion”;

287 287
 Notes

see “Ibn Sina’s Logic.” A common alternative for taṣawwur is “conceptualization” (e.g.,
Ahmed in AN) to reflect the process of coming to a conception; I believe that through-
out the Risālah al-Kātibī uses the term to refer to the conception attained.
19 One common definition of knowledge is—as for conception—“the occurrence of the
form of something in the intellect” (TŠ 98.2).
20 A disjunction—māniʿat al-khulūw—presented in §60.3, second section of the second
treatise.
21 ḤQ 184; TT 44; TŠ 104.
22 I take al-Ḥillī’s use of badīhiyyāt for awwaliyyāt in ḤA 197.9 to be a relevant consider-
ation. I avoid “innate” due to the examples “hot” and “cold” in Text 2.1.
23 Al-Khūnajī sets out the distinction, with implicational relations between the two; ḪK
115.4–apu.
24 See Strobino, Avicenna’s Theory of Science: Logic, Metaphysics, Epistemology, Chapter
1, especially page 28, Text 1.7 (Avicenna, Al-Shifāʾ: al-Manṭiq: Burhān 77.1–5); from
page 24, Strobino examines how Avicenna’s discussion relates to the learner’s paradox
from Plato’s Meno, the impact of the paradox on the Posterior Analytics, and Avicenna’s
foundationalism.
25 Al-Rāzī is, however, strongly associated with the position set out in the Muḥaṣṣal; see,
e.g., ṬḤ 124.20, and al-Rāzī’s late Mafātīḥ al-ghayb al-mushtahar bi-l-Tafsīr al-kabīr,
2.143.15 and following (I am grateful to Tareq Moqbel for the reference). See also Ben-
evich, “Scepticism and Semantics in Twelfth-Century Arabic Philosophy,” Section 1.
26 ḤQ 185 (not from start of lemma); TT 52; TŠ 106.
27 For Avicenna’s delineations of logic, see Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition:
Introduction to Reading Avicenna’s Philosophical Works, 316–18.
28 See especially Sabra, “Avicenna on the Subject Matter of Logic,” 752.
29 ḤQ 187; TT 64; TŠ 112.
30 ḤQ 188; TT 68; TŠ 114.
31 “Subject” can mean the subject matter of a science; in the plural, it means the subjects of
the propositions used or proved in the science; see commentary to §120 below.
32 Meaning what is called a per se 2 attribute; see Strobino “Per Se, Inseparability, Con-
tainment and Implication: Bridging the Gap between Avicenna’s Theory of Demonstra-
tion and Logic of the Predicables,” 187–208, at 190. I mention the definition in commen-
tary on §120. See further AN §§7, 11, and §§121, 131.
33 The opening sentence draws on Avicenna’s wording in al-Taʿlīqāt 167 (quoted in SQ
109n7).

288 288
 Notes

34 As I understand it, this is the reading put forward by El-Rouayheb, “Post-Avicennan

Logicians on the Subject Matter of Logic: Some Thirteenth- and Fourteenth-Century
Discussions,” 74. For the origin of the revision, see ḪK 8.13–9.2.
35 As does al-Ḥillī. He agrees, however, with Avicenna, ḤA 10.14, as does al-Samarqandī,
SQ 108–112.6.
36 ḤQ 190; TT 74; TŠ 116.
37 Avicenna, Pointers 1.12.1 (AI 8.pu–9.1), records the convention that “implication”
(luzūm) is reserved for the relation of one meaning to another that is extrinsic to the
first, even though in ordinary usage it also refers to the relation between one mean-
ing and another contained in the first. The passage is translated in Strobino, “Per Se,”
245–46, see comments in Kalbarczyk Sprachphilosophie in der Islamischen Rechtstheorie,
85–86nn54, 55.
38 ḤQ 194; TT 82; TŠ 119.
39 Since the distinction between expression and meaning is important throughout this first
section of the first treatise, in Text 7.1 and the following discussion I use small capitals
for meaning and quotation marks for “expression.”
40 Recounted in Section 2 of Street, “The Reception of Pointers 1.6 in Thirteenth-Century
Logic: On the Expression’s Signification of Meaning.”
41 ḤQ 196; TT 89; TŠ 123.
42 That is, implicates that cannot be removed in the imagination (fī l-wahm); see Strobino,
“Per Se,” 237–43, the second kind. Al-Khūnajī and al-Kātibī are using a distinction finer
than those in Avicenna.
43 I summarize here aspects of ḪK 11.u–13.u and RM 20.u–21.pu; see Section 5 of Street,
“Reception of Pointers.”
44 ḤQ 197; TT 91; TŠ 123.
45 ḤQ 199; TT 96; TŠ 128.
46 The same alternative is given and rejected in ḪK 14.11–14, though he reverses the usage
for the second two terms in the proposed new terminology: “the composite comes
under the simple on Avicenna’s definition.”
47 See Zimmermann, Al-Fārābī’s Commentary and Short Treatise on Aristotle’s “De Inter-
pretatione”, 17 and 17n3, and AM 50–53 with Di Vincenzo’s comments 285–87. I think
Aristotle is dealing with issues that may cloud the distinction between simple and com-
pound, and (as Di Vincenzo says) Avicenna is making the same point. Perhaps the doc-
trine reported in Text 10.1 is an attempt to provide a term for borderline cases.
48 ḤQ 200; TT 102; TŠ 132.

289 289
 Notes

49 The full story is more complex: The grammarians’ fiʿl is not the logicians’ kalimah,
which does not conjugate fully; Avicenna, ʿIbārah (AʿI 18.12). Notably, al-Rāzī adopts
the grammarians’ term of art, fiʿl.
50 AʿI 7.4–5, 17.4–5; cf. ḪK 14.15–15.11, whence I take some of my observations.
51 That is, it is syncategorematic; see Copenhaver et al., Peter of Spain: Summaries, 105.
52 ḤQ 201; TT 108; TŠ 134.
53 Philoponus, On Aristotle Categories 1–5, 52.
54 See Schöck, “Name (ism), Derived Name (mushtaqq), and Description (waṣf) in Arabic
Grammar, Muslim Dialectical Theology and Arabic Logic.”
55 For further distinction into three kinds of tashkīk, see TT 112.5–15.
56 ḤQ 204; TT 115; TŠ 136.
57 ḤQ 205; TT 117; TŠ 137.
58 ḤQ 207; TT 124; TŠ 139.
59 Note that al-Taftāzānī reads what I give as “conception of its meaning” (taṣawwur
maʿnāhu) as “its conception” (taṣawwuruhu), on the grounds that “meaning” is redun-
dant, since only a meaning can be conceived (TŠ 139.apu). I think the evidence of the
manuscripts is against al-Taftāzānī on this point.
60 I draw what I have to say here from the opening section of Thom, “Avicenna’s Mereology.”
61 There is no systematic presentation in the Risālah of scientific questions, the interroga-
tives (maṭlab, pl. maṭālib) deployed in the process of a scientific investigation, and the
protocols involved in answering them. This lemma, §19, and Text 33.1 present some rel-
evant points, but see Strobino, “What If That (Is) Why? Avicenna’s Taxonomy of Scien-
tific Inquiries” for a full account; see also AN §§115–18, 128–30.
62 ḤQ 208; TT 129; TŠ 134.
63 See Figures 6 and 7 for alternative divisions presented by al-Ṭūsī in commentary on
Pointers 2.5 (ṬḤ 201.7–24); mentioned again in commentary on §23.
64 I assume al-Kātibī is basing his division on notions gathered by Avicenna in Pointers
1.17.2 (AI 11.16–12.9).
65 Al-Taḥtānī condemns al-Kātibī’s decision as stepping beyond the bounds of logic, first,
by limiting his interest to species with actual instantiations (al-nawʿ al-khārijī), and,
second, by confusing species (when it is taken with respect to pure specificity) with
definition (TT 135.pu–136.2). I translate maqūl as “that may be said” to reflect the point
al-Ḥillī is making.
66 ḤQ 210; TT 136; TŠ 143.
67 To repeat: al-Kātibī only uses the first of these terms in this section of his treatise (but
not until §34), and the second, in the sense of essential accident, at the close of his whole

290 290
 Notes

treatise (in §120). Avicenna distinguishes the two senses of dhātī (e.g., AI 10.1–4); see
generally Strobino, “Per Se,” and Text 7 on page 201.
68 Al-Taḥtānī offered this definition for “the whole of the part shared,” and defended it
against an alternative definition, the sum of parts shared between the quiddity and
the other species (TT 137.7); consider the simple (ultimate) genera, like substance,
which have no parts.
69 ḤQ 211; TT 139; TŠ 145.
70 ḤQ 213; TT 142; TŠ 147.
71 See remarks in comment on §12. I follow Thom, “Avicenna’s Mereology,” but note that
mushtaqq is more general than Buridan’s denominative.
72 I am guided by the rubrication of SQ 154.4, wujūh fī nḥiṣār juzʾ al-māhiyyah fī l-jins
wa-l-faṣl.
73 See Porphyry in Barnes, Porphyry, 10.
74 ḤQ 215; TT 148; TŠ 150.
75 That is, what causes the species to be the portion of the generic meaning that it is.
76 AM 166.pu–u.
77 Pointers 2.6 [AI 16.15–16].
78 I think al-Kātibī is holding back from endorsing al-Rāzī’s position, at least for the
Risālah; see al-Rāzī, Sharḥ al-ishārāt, 98.3–11.
79 ḤQ 216; TT 150; TŠ 152.
80 ḤQ 217; TT 153; TŠ 154.
81 My account derives from Strobino, “Per Se,” insofar as it relates to Avicenna’s theories;
the article gives a full account of how the Eisagoge material relates to the Posterior Ana-
lytics material.
82 Strobino, “Per Se,” Section 2.1, 237–43. Al-Kātibī uses the phrase “impossible to sepa-
rate” without further explanation; drawing directly on Strobino, I simply note the basic
notions Avicenna uses in delivering the original distinctions on which al-Kātibī draws.
Al-Kātibī implicitly assumes that the implicate is posterior to what is called its substrate,
or—in some versions of the lemma—its underlying quiddity. Cf. SQ 148–50.
83 ḤQ 219; TT 160; TŠ 160.
84 As when defining differentia, Avicenna has two definitions for proprium, and al-Kātibī
is closer to the one in Pointers (AI 15.apu).
85 ḤQ 221; TT 165; TŠ 163.
86 ḤQ 221; TT 167; TŠ 164.
87 See Marmura, “Avicenna’s Chapter on Universals in the Isagoge of his Shifāʾ ”; the three
universals developed here (especially the first) are alluded to in Pointers 1.11 (AI 7.pu–8.
apu, especially 8.15–16), and laid out in more detail by al-Ṭūsī.

291 291
 Notes

88 As is, in fact, the existence of the natural universal; for a counterargument, see SQ
140.8–141.5.
89 ḤQ 223; TT 171; TŠ 171.
90 From Keynes, Studies and Exercises, 172.
91 Joseph, An Introduction to Logic, 41.
92 ḤQ 226; TT 175; TŠ 173.
93 See at the outset Fallahi, “Fārābī and Avicenna on Contraposition”; SQ 133 and, espe-
cially, from 134 (where, at 134.10–11, al-Kātibī provides a counterexample against the
first and second claims set out in this lemma).
94 ḤQ 227; TT 186; TŠ 179.
95 ḤQ 228; TT 191; TŠ 182.
96 Take for example al-Ṭūsī’s comment in Pointers on 6.4: “Know that these divisions are
not essential . . . for this reason, Avicenna called them ‘types’ not ‘species’” (ṬḤ 392.18–
19). The distinction between ṣinf and nawʿ is said by al-Kātibī’s commentators to matter
in reading the Risālah; see, e.g., Text 38.4.
97 ḤQ 229; TT 194; TŠ 183.
98 Not, I think, Avicenna, though the discussion is perhaps a development of his consider-
ation of “universal at the top under which no other universal is subsumed,” like “point”
(in the geometrical sense) according to some philosophers; AM 118.17–18. I am grateful
to Silvia di Vincenzo for important references on this and the following lemmata.
99 As noted in comment on §0 above, I adopt Davidson’s convention of referring to the
superlunary intelligences as such, and their sublunary congeners as intellects.
100 ḤQ 230; TT 197; TŠ 183.
101 ḤQ 232; TT 200; TŠ 185.
102 “Ancients” as a group term generally includes Avicenna, but not this time; see Pointers
2.1.3 (AI 14.8–10).
103 ḤQ 233; TT 202; TŠ 186.
104 ḤQ 234; TT 205; TŠ 188.
105 His major contribution is in the Burhān; see Strobino, Avicenna’s Theory of Science,
Part 5.
106 I draw from Strobino, “Per Se,” 188, where a more formal account is presented.
107 ḤQ 236; TT 208; TŠ 191.
108 I have earlier translated musāwin as coextensive; perhaps “equal” is better in this con-
text, because the definition must not only be true of what the definiendum is true of, but
also mean the same.
109 ḤQ 238; TT 212; TŠ 195.
110 Cf. Avicenna, Burhān 52.3–20; Strobino, Avicenna’s Theory of Science, Text 12.1.

292 292
 Notes

111 ḤQ 239; TT 216; TŠ 197.

112 ḤQ 242; TT 220; TŠ 201.
113 A different argument for the same conclusion is given by al-Ḥillī, ḤQ 243.4–7.
114 Cf. al-Ṭūsī (ṬḤ 392.18–19) quoted in comment on §29 making much the same point.
115 ḤQ 244; TT 226; TŠ 203.
116 RM 313–319; ḪK Section 7, 195–229, Section 10, 317–423, remarks critical of Avicenna,
317.11–u.
117 Strobino, “Ibn Sina’s Logic,” 3.2.1. Cf. AN §§24–26, 19–20; §§78–84, 79–93.
118 ḤQ 246; TT 231; TŠ 204.
119 See AM 57.pu–58.2 for Avicenna’s presentation of the distinction, and SQ 131–133.1; fur-
ther comments given at §§12 and 13 above.
120 Al-Fārābī, Kitāb al-Ḥurūf §§85 and 86 (not a direct quotation).
121 I cut my remarks short; for more, see Klinger, “Language and Logic in the Graeco-Ara-
bic Tradition: A History of Propositional Analysis from the Hellenic Commentators on
Aristotle to Theories of the Proposition in Arabic Philosophy, 900–1350,” Section 3. Cf.
SQ 227.9–228.7.
122 Translated in El-Rouayheb, “Does a Proposition Have Three Parts or Four? A Debate in
Later Arabic Logic,” 306–7; the paper traces the origins, long history, and demise of the
four-part doctrine.
123 ḤQ 248; TT 235; TŠ 210.
124 See Klima, John Buridan, Summulae, 269.
125 ḤQ 248; TT 236; TŠ 211.
126 ḤQ 251; TT 241; TŠ 214.
127 AʿI 45.8–pu (not a direct quote).
128 There is no unified theory of reference presented in the Risālah, but in a proposition of
the type “man is a species,” “man” refers not to some or all individual men (as it does
in quantified propositions), but to the meaning of the quiddity; see also the opening
sentence of Text 45.1.
129 ḤQ 252; TT 244; TŠ 215.
130 Translated from a manuscript of Ibn Wāṣil’s Sharḥ al-Jumal in El-Rouayheb’s “Introduc-
tion” to his edition of Khūnajī (2010) (ḪK), xliii.
131 ḤQ 252; TT 245; TŠ 216.
132 For present purposes, “matter” refers to the two terms that fill the subject and predicate
positions. Māddah is opposed to ṣūrah, form; see Text 51.2.
133 Strobino, “Ibn Sina’s Logic,” 3.1.1.
134 See al-Taftāzānī in Text 98.2 below on the difference between the positions of al-Fārābī
and Avicenna.

293 293
 Notes

135 So Qarāmalikī in commentary on al-Rāzī’s Mulakhkhaṣ (RM), in notes to text at 400.

136 I am leaving to one side the complications of an alternative reading (preferred by the
editor at ḤQ 252.u), law wujida wa-kāna jīm. I agree with the dominant interpretation:
I restrict the protasis to law wujida, and read law wujida kāna jīm; see TT 257.10–15.
Al-Ḥillī himself rejects the alternative (ḤQ 254.13–15).
137 The essence under C for which C is the title.
138 The proposition with an impossible subject is called the mental proposition (qaḍiyyah
dhihniyyah) by al-Ḥillī; ḤQ 254.9.
139 Actuality propositions (al-fiʿliyyāt) are all propositions aside from M1 and M2. See
Appendix 1.
140 ḤQ 255; TT 260; TŠ 224.
141 ḤQ 255; TT 261; TŠ 225.
142 Reading akhaṣṣ min for akhaṣṣ.
143 Including al-sālibatayn from the apparatus.
144 So, if a-propositions are represented by Figure 13, o-propositions are represented by
Figure 17.
145 See SQ 259–68, and comments on §27 above, and Thom, “Al-Fārābī on Indefinite and
Privative Names,” on al-Fārābī’s corresponding treatment in commentary on De Interpre-
tatione. I translate maʿdūlah of the term as “indefinite,” of the proposition, “metathetic.”
146 ḤQ 256; TT 263; TŠ 226.
147 Note that what I translate here as “inanimate” (jāmid) is not an indefinite predicate in
Arabic.
148 ḤQ 257; TT 264; TŠ 226.
149 ḤQ 257; TT 265; TŠ 227.
150 ḤQ 259; TT 273; TŠ 231.
151 ḤQ 260; TT 275; TŠ 234.
152 Al-Khūnajī lists thirty-two modal propositions (the central thirteen, and nineteen
others), ḪK 107.8–109.4.
153 Rescher and vander Nat, “Theory of Modal Syllogistic.”
154 Strobino, “Ibn Sina’s Logic.”
155 See Rescher and vander Nat, “Theory of Modal Syllogistic,” 34–35, for a fuller sketch;
this should be checked against, e.g., ḪK 104.12–107.2.
156 See Strobino, “Time and Necessity in Avicenna’s Theory of Demonstration,” 341–54.
157 ḤQ 266; TT 285; TŠ 240.
158 ḤQ 267; TT 288; TŠ 241.
159 ḤQ 268; TT 289; TŠ 241.
160 ḤQ 269; TT 290; TŠ 242.

294 294
 Notes

161 ḤQ 271; TT 291; TŠ 243.

162 ḤQ 272; TT 294; TŠ 244.
163 ḤQ 273; TT 296; TŠ 245.
164 M~L would be more consistent with my convention for X~L, but M2 is widely used.
165 I rarely depart from Strobino’s terminology, but here I think his “exclusive non-exhaus-
tive” for māniʿat al-jamʿ, though now common, is inelegant, and forces us into the
equally inelegant “exclusive and exhaustive” for what modern logicians call the exclusive
(in al-Kātibī’s Arabic, munfaṣilah ḥaqīqiyyah). Were we to follow the Arabic, it would be
real (ḥaqīqiyyah), inclusive (māniʿat al-khulūw), and exclusive (māniʿat al-jamʿ ).
166 ḤQ 275–76; TT 299; TŠ 250–52.
167 Al-Kātibī never mentions the associative in the Risālah, whereas al-Ṭūsī in comment on
Pointers does (ṬḤ 433.7 on Pointers 8.1 [AI 79.13]). I would have expected al-Ḥillī to use,
like al-Ṭūsī, al-istiṣḥābī. See Text 60.4.
168 Avicenna’s position is reported in Strobino, “Ibn Sina’s Logic,” 3.2.4; see AQ 279.2–
283.9. For more on the differing truth-conditions, see Text 63.2 and following. Avicenna
may have shifted in his view; see ḪK 323.3–u, and editor’s reference there to AQ 299–300
(thanks to Behnam Zolghadr for bringing this to my attention).
169 ḤQ 279; TT 305; TŠ 254.
170 ḤQ 280; TT 306; TŠ 260.
171 Strobino, “Ibn Sina’s Logic,” 4.2.
172 ḤQ 280; TT 308; TŠ 260.
173 Strobino, “Ibn Sina’s Logic,” 3.2.2.
174 ḤQ 281; TT 311; TŠ 264.
175 ḤQ 284; TT 313; TŠ 265.
176 Rescher, “Avicenna on the Logic of ‘Conditional Propositions’”; Strobino, “Ibn Sina’s
Logic,” 3.2, 4.2; Avicenna, Pointers 3.5 (AI 26.10–u).
177 Further light is shed on the truth-conditions of the conditional in al-Taḥtānī on §110 in
Text 110.1, specifically, on the situations quantified over.
178 ḤQ 286; TT 319; TŠ 270.
179 See Pointers 3.8 (AI 29.3–30.8) for Avicenna’s account of complex hypotheticals; see
al-Ṭūsī’s notes (ṬḤ 246–254), and Strobino “Ibn Sina’s Logic,” 3.2.1.
180 ḤQ 289; TT 323; TŠ 274.
181 I read laysa lā ʿālim with R, against Tabrīziyān’s choice of lā ʿālim. Al-Kātibī has yet to
introduce the unities between a proposition and its contradictory (he does so in the
next lemma)—which this example obviously breaches—and I think the point here is
that the two propositions are both true or both false, even though one is affirmative and
the other negative.

295 295
 Notes

182 ḤQ 290; TT 325; TŠ 276.

183 ḤQ 292; TT 332; TŠ 281.
184 See, e.g., the opening of Prior Analytics A.2: wa-kull muqaddamah immā muṭlaqah
wa-immā iḍṭirāriyyah wa-immā mumkinah.
185 ḤQ 295; TT 336; TŠ 283.
186 The text actually has immā baʿḍ jīm bāʾ dāʾiman aw baʿḍ jīm laysa bāʾ dāʾiman; I emend
this since it breaches the rule as stated in §70, and departs from the format of the other
contradictories. The passage is fiddly, and there are other equally trivial errors corrected
without note.
187 The propositions that make up LT2 and LX2 are set out as component propositions, at
§§57 and 58. I omitted mention there of the simple temporal components of their con-
tradictories. MT: every C is possibly B at time T; MA: every C is possibly B always. See
ḪK 108.10.
188 ḤQ 297; TT 338; TŠ 286.
189 ḤQ 297; TT 341; TŠ 289.
190 El-Rouayheb, “Impossible Antecedents and Their Consequences: Some Thirteenth-
Century Arabic Discussions,” 209–10; the relation between rejection of the thesis and
analysis of the reductio is given further down page 210. See further comments on §113.
I am grateful to Behnam Zolghadr for guidance on this matter.
191 Thom, Syllogism, 45–47.
192 See Łukasiewicz, Aristotle’s Syllogistic from the Standpoint of Modern Formal Logic, 10.
193 Let us assume for the sake of argument that we are proving conversion for an A
e-proposition (see §69.2); its square will be that in Figure 26 with “always” in place of
“necessarily,” and “at least once” in place of “possibly.” The resulting syllogism leading
to an impossibility assumes Ferio AXA, a self-evident syllogism (for which, see §91.5
and §99).
194 Al-Kātibī in the Risālah does not distinguish iftirāḍ bi-l-ḥiss (perceptual ecthesis) from
iftirāḍ qiyāsī, but his colleague al-Ṭūsī does (ṬḤ 324.7–9). See Smith, Aristotle: Prior
Analytics, xxiii–xxv, and Thom, Syllogism, 164–76. Syllogistic ecthesis, and al-Kātibī’s
preferred move, i-ecthesis, is used, for example, in §93. See Text 93.1 for al-Kātibī’s dim
view of Avicenna’s favorite ecthetic move, o-ecthesis.
195 ḤQ 298; TT 342; TŠ 290.
196 ḤQ 299; TT 345; TŠ 291.
197 For relevant translated material, see Street, “Afḍal al-Dīn al-Khūnajī (d. 1248) on the
Conversion of Modal Propositions” and “al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī.”
198 ḤQ 301; TT 347; TŠ 292.
199 ḤQ 302; TT 349; TŠ 294.

296 296
 Notes

200 Rescher and vander Nat, “Theory of Modal Syllogistic,” 30; on the occasions it comes
up, I symbolize it as LD(2) or AD(2).
201 ḤQ 305; TT 351; TŠ 296.
202 Recall the discussion in §§48–50 on the existence of the subject term of an affirmative
proposition.
203 I do not think the ascription is certain. Al-Ṭūsī in comment on Pointers 5.4.9 (AI 53.2–5)
seems to assume it is Athīr al-Dīn al-Abharī’s proof (ṬḤ 333.10–u); cf. El-Rouayheb,
“Introduction” to ḪK, xxiv–xxv.
204 ḤQ 307; TT 353; TŠ 297.
205 ḤQ 311; TT 356; TŠ 299.
206 ḤQ 312; TT 359; TŠ 301.
207 In §98. There is a variant in the received text here, seemingly preferred by al-Taḥtānī
(and by the Sprenger and Cairo printings), such that the possibility minor is not used
in the first or the third figures. This is certainly al-Kātibī’s position, but it is irrelevant to
the point at issue here.
208 ḤQ 313; TT 361; TŠ 302.
209 This and the following material comes from ḤQ 313.apu–314.u.
210 ḤQ 315; TT 364; TŠ 304.
211 Joseph, Introduction, 238–39.
212 The arguments against Avicenna here do not take account of counterarguments in SQ
321–38; see Fallahi, “Fārābī,” and the references therein to a series of studies.
213 Quoting AQ 93.11–13.
214 So too in the more systematic exposition in Keynes, Studies and Exercises, 170–74;
Keynes does, however, explicitly stipulate that the terms and their contradictories rep-
resent existing classes. Note that in Text 83.3 al-Ḥillī seems to agree with Keynes.
215 ḤQ 315; TT 368; TŠ 305.
216 Reading laysa laysa jīm for laysa jīm at ḤQ 317.pu.
217 ḤQ 320; TT 370; TŠ 305.
218 ḤQ 322; TT 372; TŠ 307.
219 Which is to say, D is at least once not B.
220 ḤQ 325; TT 374; TŠ 308.
221 To al-Kātibī is also attributed the rule that something can entail its own contradictory
(Text 87.2), so (4) in the proof of Text 86.3 is unproblematic. See El-Rouayheb, “Impos-
sible Antecedents,” 210.
222 ḤQ 327; TT 378; TŠ 310.

297 297
 Notes

223 One that al-Ḥillī himself came to share in his al-Jawhar al-naḍīd fī sharḥ Kitāb al-Tajrīd
(The Faceted Jewel in Commentary on the Book of Abstraction); see Street, “al-ʿAllāma
al-Ḥillī,” 272.
224 Using triplets of terms, some taken from Aristotle, Prior Analytics 26a36–38 and 27a18–
21; see Thom, The Syllogism, §§15 and 16, for an account of what Aristotle is doing, though
note that al-Kātibī—as interpreted by his commentators—is only worried about what
happens if his conditions are breached, and not in providing a full account of rejections.
225 ḤQ 331; TT 382; TŠ 313.
226 For a careful consideration of the evolving definition of syllogism, from Aristotle’s (ren-
dered into Arabic as qawl matā wuḍiʿat fīhi ashyāʾ akthar min wāḥid lazima shayʾ ākhar
min al-iḍṭirār li-wujūd tilka l-ashyāʾ al-mawḍūʿah bi-dhātihā, El-Rouayheb, Relational
Syllogisms and the History of Arabic Logic, 900–1900, 17) through Avicenna’s ever briefer
formulations, see ibid., Chapter 1.2. It should be noted that the Arabic from ʿUyūn
al-ḥikmah in El-Rouayheb’s transcription (on page 21) differs only in having li-dhātihi
instead of al-Kātibī’s li-dhātihā. Further, the definition given in ʿUyūn actually runs:
al-qiyās muʾallaf min aqwāl idhā sullimat lazima ʿanhā li-dhātihā qawl ākhar (see Avi-
cenna, Fontes Sapientiae, 5.17).
227 The entire discussion (with doubts and replies) takes up RM 241–48.
228 ḪK 231–43.
229 Thus al-Khūnajī. The Qiyās edition has: qawl idhā wuḍiʿat fīhi ashyāʾ akthar min wāḥid
lazima min tilka l-ashyāʾ al-mawḍūʿah bi-dhātihā lā bi-l-ʿaraḍ qawl ākhar ghayruhā min
al-iḍṭirār.
230 Notes mostly from TŠ 313–15.
231 ḤQ 333; TT 385; TŠ 316.
232 ḤQ 335; TT 388; TŠ 317.
233 Thom, Syllogism, §3.
234 ḤQ 337; TT 391; TŠ 319.
235 For an account of Aristotle’s “highly elegant” procedure (called by Ross “proof by con-
trasted instances”), see Thom, Syllogism §15; none of al-Kātibī’s commentators is so
thorough or rigorous.
236 For an overview of the mnemonics, see Smith, Aristotle: Prior Analytics, 229–30; Thom,
Syllogism, 54.
237 ḤQ 339; TT 395; TŠ 322.
238 Cf. Smith, Aristotle: Prior Analytics, 116 (in comment on 27b20–23): Aristotle “invokes
the principle that if a set of premises yields no conclusion, then the set that results from
it when one of the premises is replaced by a weaker premise also yields no conclusion.”
239 Thom, Syllogism, 60.

298 298
 Notes

240 ḤQ 340; TT 396; TŠ 322.

241 See §50.
242 Avicenna represents the ancients here; cf. Pointers 7.6.6 (AI 72.14–17). See Street, “An
Outline of Avicenna’s Syllogistic,” 1.3.2. Al-Ḥillī agrees with Avicenna, ḤA 123.8–10.
243 ḤQ 343; TT 400; TŠ 325.
244 ḤQ 347; TT 404; TŠ 328.
245 I am taking the Latin names for these moods from Thom, Syllogism, 54.
246 ḤQ 352; TT 408; TŠ 330.
247 ḤQ 354; TT 411; TŠ 334.
248 See note in comment on §77 above.
249 ḤQ 355; TT 414; TŠ 335.
250 See Strobino, “Ibn Sina’s Logic,” Appendix C.
251 See Thom, “Logic and Metaphysics in Avicenna’s Modal Syllogistic”; cf. El-Rouayheb,
“Introduction” to ḪK, xl–xlv.
252 ḤQ 357; TT 415; TŠ 335.
253 Rescher and vander Nat, “Theory of Modal Syllogistic,” 36.
254 ḤQ 360; TT 419; TŠ 337.
255 So the text; I would emend to “no eclipsed shines at the time of conjunction, not always.”
256 ḤQ 362; TT 422; TŠ 340.
257 Rescher and vander Nat, “Theory of Modal Syllogistic,” 39–41.
258 Rescher and vander Nat, “Theory of Modal Syllogistic,” 40.
259 ḤQ 363; TT 425; TŠ 343.
260 That is, Darapti L-M2, LD1-M2 and Felapton L-M2, LD1-M2.
261 Rescher and vander Nat, “Theory of Modal Syllogistic,” 41.
262 Reading al-kubrā for al-ṣughrā at TŠ 344.4.
263 ḤQ 365; TT 427; TŠ 345.
264 See El-Rouayheb, “Takmīl al-Manṭiq: A Sixteenth-Century Arabic Manual on Logic,”
210, where the author is identified as Ḥasan ibn Muḥammad ibn Ḥusayn al-Amlashī
l-ʿAjamī, active in the Ottoman Empire in the 1530s and 1540s (ca. 935–45).
265 ḤQ 369; TT 431; TŠ 351.
266 Results given in Rescher and vander Nat, “Theory of Modal Syllogistic,” 43, as Table
XI. Note that Rescher, following the so-called al-Shirwānī, has extended the number
of propositions to include all assumed in the investigation, and not just those explicitly
listed for investigation. This ramifies through his whole account for the fourth.
267 Rescher and vander Nat, “Theory of Modal Syllogistic,” 44, Table XIC at 47.
268 Rescher “Theory,” 44, Table XIA at 45.

299 299
 Notes

269 This is how I would translate baʿda ʿaks al-ṣughrā li-rujūʿihi ilayhi bi-ʿaks al-ṣughrā. Per-
haps the text needs emendation.
270 Rescher and vander Nat, “Theory of Modal Syllogistic,” 44, deals with the sixth and the
seventh, see also Table XID on 48; Rescher and vander Nat deal with the eighth on 49;
see also Table XIE on 48.
271 Al-Taftāzānī is referring to Avicenna’s comments in AQ 356.7–11, and al-Khūnajī’s in ḪK
317.11–u.
272 Strobino, “Ibn Sina’s Logic,” 5.1.2; cf. RM 313–18.
273 ḤQ 371; TT 437; TŠ 352.
274 See Qaramālikī’s comments on Abū l-Barakāt’s possible influence, RM 441–42.
275 ḤQ 374; TT 439; TŠ 354.
276 ḤQ 376; TT 440; TŠ 356.
277 ḤQ 377; TT 441; TŠ 357.
278 ḤQ 379; TT 443; TŠ 359.
279 ḤQ 382; TT 446; TŠ 360.
280 See Pointers 7.2 (AI 65.u–66.u); the point raised here corresponds with Pointers 8.3 (AI
78.10–79.12). See Strobino, “Ibn Sina’s Logic,” 5.2.
281 I assume that al-Taḥtānī has this proposition in mind as conclusion to a third-figure
syllogism like “possibly (sometimes), if substance is contingent then atom exists,” and
“necessarily (always), if substance is contingent then the necessary existent exists”; this
would give al-Taḥtānī the hypothetical syllogism Disamis MLM, and the conclusion
“possibly (sometimes), if the necessary existent exists then atom exists.”
282 ḤQ 384; TT 449; TŠ 362.
283 ḤQ 386; TT 451; TŠ 363.
284 ḤQ 387; TT 452; TŠ 364.
285 E.g., Pointers 8.4 (AI 79.13–80.6). See El-Rouayheb, “Impossible Antecedents,” 210, for
a contemporary account of reductio; for a view opposed to Avicenna, see ṬḤ 455.19–
456.1 referring to al-Kāshī, al-Minhāj al-mubīn (relevant part of text in Cambridge UL
ms Browne D.19(10) ff. 71v–72v).
286 ḤQ 388; TT 454; TŠ 365.
287 See Strobino, “Ibn Sina’s Logic,” 5.1.2 type 5. See also Avicenna, Pointers 7.1.2 (AI
64.10–apu).
288 ḤQ 389; TT 454; TŠ 366.
289 For terminology, see Walter Young, “Concomitance to Causation: Arguing Dawarān
in the Proto-Ādāb al-Baḥth,” a study of inference taken from a treatise nearly contem-
porary with al-Kātibī, on juristic dialectic (jadal), the Fuṣūl of Burhān al-Dīn al-Nasafī

300 300
 Notes

(d. 687/1288) (the Fuṣūl was a curricular text taught to students more or less alongside
the Risālah).
290 TŠ 367.2–3; I adopt an emendation of the text proposed by Young in “Concomitance to
Causation,” 265n192, and his translation of the passage.
291 See especially Black, Logic and Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics in Medieval Arabic Phi-
losophy, 247–58. This theory is often called the context theory (a theory of the way dis-
course is used according to its disciplinary context); see Lameer, “Aristotelian Rhetoric
and Poetics as Logical Arts in Medieval Islamic Philosophy” for what may be a histori-
cally more precise account.
292 Simple ignorance is not knowing that P is Q; compound ignorance is, for example,
believing wrongly that P is not Q.
293 ḤQ 394; TT 457; TŠ 368. See Black, Aristotle’s Rhetoric, Gutas, “The Empiricism of Avi-
cenna,” and especially Strobino, Avicenna’s Theory of Science, Chapter 2.
294 ḤQ 398; TT 460; TŠ 372.
295 AD1 is named by Avicenna as the default proposition for demonstration; AN §123 (iii),
101.
296 The double mīm clouds the etymology of limmī, which becomes clear in light of the
earlier preference, burhān al-limā (or burhān limā); note also burhān al-anna (or burhān
anna). In fact, al-Kātibī’s choices are already options for Avicenna. See Strobino, Avi-
cenna’s Theory of Science, 217.
297 ḤQ 400; TT 461; TŠ 374.
298 ḤQ 405; TT 465; TŠ 377.
299 In this, I would speculate that al-Kātibī is influenced by an approach developed by
al-Rāzī (RM 347–54).
300 In fact, al-Ḥillī disagrees with the taxonomy of Avicenna (and al-Ṭūsī) in Pointers Path
10, as well as with al-Kātibī’s taxonomy (which seems to me to assign fallacies to more
than one division; I present Figure 34 as a highly provisional reading).
301 I should note that Buridan (for example) relies on supposition theory in one of his analy-
ses of this fallacy; see Klima, John Buridan, Summulae, 522. I am not aware of a unified
treatment of a theory of reference in the Arabic texts, but the two analyses considered
by al-Taftāzānī turn on what to take as the reference of “animal.”
302 To sum up al-Kātibī’s analysis of the fallacies: begging the question is named as such
in Figure 34, equivocation (“the painted horse”) comes under premises specious by
expression; secundum quid (the man-and-horse fallacy, and taking the mental as real)
comes under premises specious by meaning; and the fallacy generated by the natural
proposition is either a material fallacy under premises specious by meaning, or a formal
fallacy under argument in a sterile figure (see Text 119.4).

301 301
 Notes

303 ḤQ 410; TT 468; TŠ 380.

304 “Foreign” (gharīb) in the sense that moving need not apply to sphere in the way that
change must apply to physical body.
305 See Strobino, Avicenna’s Theory of Science, Chapter 5. Al-Taftāzānī does consider the
matter (TŠ 381–82), but there are clearly problems in the edition at this point.
306 Though nothing is said about how they are acquired; see Avicenna, Najāt (AN §§140–
43, 149–59).
307 I am using the more common geometrical terms here. Al-Kātibī gives Euclid’s first and
third postulates as examples, but speaks of them in the Aristotelian manner as “prem-
ises that are not self-evident but accepted by way of being posited” (al-muqaddamāt
ghayr al-bayyinah fī nafsihā al-maʾkhūdhah ʿalā sabīl al-waḍ ʿ ), and he gives Euclid’s
first common notion as an example, but speaks of it as among “self-evident premises”
(al-muqaddamāt al-bayyinah fī nafsihā).
308 Established in Pointers 1.12 (AI 8.pu–9.17).
309 See Strobino “Per Se,” 215; the references al-Kātibī makes to Euclid and Avicenna’s
Geometry are given in footnote 64.
310 Reading the original an yakūna la-humā miqdār wāḥid bi-qadrihimā jamī ʿan wa-l-
mubāyanah bi-khilāfihimā (following Euclid) for the editor’s preferred variant an
yaʿuddahā ʿadad ghayr al-wāḥid ka-l-arbaʿah wa-l-sittah wa-l-mubāyanah bi-khilāfihimā
ka-l-arbaʿah wa-l-khamsah.
311 Strobino, “Avicenna on the Indemonstrability of Definition.”

302 302
 Tables

Key to Symbols for Propositions

Both versions of al-Taḥtānī’s Taḥrīr I use have some problems in the tables they
present for the conclusions to syllogisms with mixed modal premises, and I have
instead adopted the tables in Ibn Mubārakshāh’s commentary on the Risālah.
I am grateful to Khaled El-Rouayheb for alerting me to the value of this work
and offering me a manuscript of it; and to Dustin Klinger for overcoming my
reluctance to consult yet another commentator: Ibn Mubārakshāh, Sharḥ al-
Shamsiyyah (El-Rouayheb, “Two Fourteenth-Century Islamic Philosophers:
Ibn Mubārakshāh al-Bukhārī and Mullāzāde al-Kharziyānī,” 4n10). The tables
appear, in the order I give them below, on folios 96a, 98b, 99b, 102a, 102b, and
103a. I list again most of the propositional types given in Appendix 2; unlike the
list in Appendix 2, however, I here follow the order Ibn Mubārakshāh adopts in
setting out the major and minor premises in the tables.

L necessary (al-ḍarūriyyah)
A perpetual (al-dāʾimah)
LD1 general conditional (al-mashrūṭah al-ʿāmmah)
AD1 general conventional (al-ʿurfiyyah al-ʿāmmah)
LD2 special conditional (al-mashrūṭah al-khāṣṣah)
AD2 special conventional (al-ʿurfiyyah al-khāṣṣah)
X1 general absolute (al-muṭlaqah al-ʿāmmah)
LT2 temporal (al-waqtiyyah)
LX2 spread (al-muntashirah)
X2 non-perpetual existential (al-wujūdiyyah al-lā-dāʾimah)
X~L nonnecessary existential (al-wujūdiyyah al-lā-ḍarūriyyah)
M1 general possible (al-mumkinah al-ʿāmmah)

Simple propositions not customarily investigated that come up:

LT1 absolute temporal (al-waqtiyyah al-muṭlaqah)

LX1 absolute spread (al-muntashirah al-muṭlaqah)
XT1 temporal absolute (al-muṭlaqah al-waqtiyyah)

303 303
 Tables

XX1 spread absolute (al-muṭlaqah al-muntashirah)

XD1 absolute continuing (al-ḥīniyyah al-muṭlaqah)

Compound propositions not customarily investigated that come up:

L2 non-perpetual necessary (impossible proposition) (al-ḍarūriyyah

al-lā-dāʾimah)
A2 non-perpetual perpetual (impossible proposition) (al-dāʾimah al-
lā-dāʾimah)
AD(2) non-perpetual-for-some conventional (al-ʿurfiyyah al-lā-dāʾimah fī
l-baʿḍ)
XT2 non-perpetual temporal absolute (al-muṭlaqah al-waqtiyyah al-lā-
dāʾimah)
XX2 non-perpetual spread absolute (al-muṭlaqah al-muntashirah al-lā-
dāʾimah)
XD2 non-perpetual absolute continuing (al-ḥīniyyah al-muṭlaqah al-lā-
dāʾimah)

In Tables 2 to 7 the headings to the columns represent the major premises and
those to the rows the minor.

304 304
 Tables

Table 1: Conversion and Contraposition

E conversion A contraposition (a → e)

L → A (§75) L → A (§83.2)
A → A (§75) A → A (§83.2)
LD1 → AD1 (§76.1) LD1 → AD1 (§83.3)
AD1 → AD1 (§76.1) AD1 → AD1 (§83.3)
LD2 → AD(2) (§76.2) LD2 → AD(2) (§83.4)
AD2 → AD(2) (§76.2) AD2 → AD(2) (§83.4)

O conversion I contraposition (i → o)

LD2 → AD2 (§77) LD2 → AD2 (§84.1)

AD2 → AD2 (§77) AD2 → AD2 (§84.1)

A/I conversion E/O contraposition (e → i)

L → XD1 (§78.1) L fails (§86)

A → XD1 (§78.1) A fails (§86)
LD1 → XD1 (§78.1) LD1 fails (§86)
AD1 → XD1 (§78.1) AD1 fails (§86)
LD2 → XD2 (§78.2 for a, §78.3 for i) LD2 → XD1 (§85.1)
AD2 → XD2 (§78.2 for a, §78.3 for i) AD2 → XD1 (§85.1)
X1 → X1 (§78.4) X1 fails (§86)
LT2 → X1 (§78.4) LT2 → X1 (§85.2)
LX2 → X1 (§78.4) LX2 → X1 (§85.2)
X2 → X1 (§78.4) X2 → X1 (§85.2)
X~L → X1 (§78.4) X~L → X1 (§85.2)
M1 fails (§80) M1 fails (§86)
M2 fails (§80) M2 fails (§86)

305 305
 Tables

Table 2: Figure 1 Mixes

Major ⟶
LD1 AD1 LD2 AD2
L L A L2 * A2 *

⟵ Minor
A A A A2 * A2 *
LD1 LD1 AD1 LD2 AD2
AD1 AD1 AD1 AD2 AD2
LD2 LD1 AD1 LD2 AD2
AD2 AD1 AD1 AD2 AD2
X1 X1 X1 X2 X2
LT2 LT1 XT1 LT2 XT2
LX2 LX1 XX1 LX2 XX2
X2 X1 X1 X2 X2
X~L X1 X1 X2 X2

* = impossible.

Table 3: Figure 2 Mixes

Major ⟶
L LD1 LD2 A AD1 AD2 X1 LT2 LX2 X2 X~L M1 M2
L A A A A A A A A A A A A A
⟵ Minor

A A A A A A A A A A A A    
LD1 A AD1 AD1 A AD1 AD1              
AD1 A AD1 AD1 A AD1 AD1              
LD2 A AD1 AD1 A AD1 AD1              
AD2 A AD1 AD1 A AD1 AD1              
X1 A X1 X1 A X1 X1              
LT2 A XT1 XT1 A XT1 XT1              
LX2 A XX1 XX1 A XX1 XX1              
X2 A X1 X1 A X1 X1              
X~L A X1 X1 A X1 X1              
M1 A M1 M1                    

306 306
 Tables

Table 4: Figure 3 Mixes

Major ⟶
LD1 AD1 LD2 AD2
L XD1 XD1 XD2 XD2
⟵ Minor
A XD1 XD1 XD2 XD2
LD1 XD1 XD1 XD2 XD2
AD1 XD1 XD1 XD2 XD2
LD2 XD1 XD1 XD2 XD2
AD2 XD1 XD1 XD2 XD2
X1 X1 X1 X2 X2
LT2 X1 X1 X2 X2
LX2 X1 X1 X2 X2
X2 X1 X1 X2 X2
X~L X1 X1 X2 X2

Table 5: Figure 4, Bramantip and Dimaris

Major ⟶
L A LD1 AD1 LD2 AD2 X1 LT2 LX2 X2 X~L
⟵ Minor

L XD1 XD1 XD1 XD1 XD1 XD1 XD1 XD1 XD1 XD1 XD1
A XD1 XD1 XD1 XD1 XD1 XD1 XD1 XD1 XD1 XD1 XD1
LD1 XD1 XD1 XD1 XD1 XD1 XD1 X1 X1 X1 X1 X1
AD1 XD1 XD1 XD1 XD1 XD1 XD1 X1 X1 X1 X1 X1
LD2 XD2 XD2 XD2 XD2 XD2 XD2 X1 X1 X1 X1 X1
AD2 XD2 XD2 XD2 XD2 XD2 XD2 X1 X1 X1 X1 X1
X1 X1 X1 X1 X1 X1 X1 X1 X1 X1 X1 X1
LT2 X1 X1 X1 X1 X1 X1 X1 X1 X1 X1 X1
LX2 X1 X1 X1 X1 X1 X1 X1 X1 X1 X1 X1
X2 X1 X1 X1 X1 X1 X1 X1 X1 X1 X1 X1
X~L X1 X1 X1 X1 X1 X1 X1 X1 X1 X1 X1

307 307
 Tables

Table 6: Figure 4, Camenes

Major ⟶
L A LD1 AD1 LD2 AD2 X1 LT2 LX2 X2 X~L
⟵ Minor

L A A A A A A A A A A A
A A A A A A A A A A A A
LD1 A A AD1 AD1 AD1 AD1          
AD1 A A AD1 AD1 AD1 AD1          
LD2 A A AD(2) AD(2) AD(2) AD(2)          
AD2 A A AD(2) AD(2) AD(2) AD(2)          

Table 7: Figure 4, Fesapo and Fresison

Major ⟶
L A LD1 AD1 LD2 AD2
L A A XD1 XD1 XD1 XD1
⟵ Minor

A A A XD1 XD1 XD1 XD1

LD1 A A XD1 XD1 XD1 XD1
AD1 A A XD1 XD1 XD1 XD1
LD2 A A XD1 XD1 XD1 XD1
AD2 A A XD1 XD1 XD1 XD1
X1 A A X1 X1 X1 X1
LT2 A A X1 X1 X1 X1
LX2 A A X1 X1 X1 X1
X2 A A X1 X1 X1 X1
X~L A A X1 X1 X1 X1

308 308
 Figures

Figure 1: The tripartite signification (for §7)

Contained meaning
ent
tainm
by con

Expression Meaning

by imp
licatio
n
Implicate meaning

Figure 2: The parts of speech (for §11)

Expression

Fit for Unfit for

predication predication

Particle
Signifies time Does not
by its form signify time
by its form

Verb Name

309 309
 Figures

Figure 3: Al-Ḥillī on the relation of expression to meaning (for §12)

Expression’s
meaning . . .

One Many

For single For many By first By new

instance instances imposition convention

Proper name Universal Equivocal First First

imposition imposition
abandoned retained
Univocal Systematically
ambiguous
Transferred Metaphorical

310 310
 Figures

Figure 4: Al-Rāzī on the relation of expression to meaning (for §§12 and 13)

Expression
in relation to
meaning . . .

Both one Expression

or meaning
more than
one

Meaning Meaning can Both more Only Only

cannot have have more than one expression meaning
more than than single more than more than
single instance instance one one

Proper name Expression Expression Distinct Synonymous Equivocal

said of each said of each
equally in differing
degrees

Univocal Systematically
ambiguous

311 311
 Figures

Figure 5: Division of the predicables (for §16)

Universal

Whole of Not whole

quiddity of quiddity

Species Intrinsic to Extrinsic to

quiddity quiddity

Whole of Coextensive Shared by Shared by

part shared with part one reality more than
shared only one reality

Genus Shared by Shared in Proprium General

more than one quiddity Accident
one quiddity only

Differentia Differentia
of the of the
Genus Species

312 312
 Figures

Figure 6: Ḥall mushkilāt al-ishārāt, first

division of the predicables (for §16)

Universal

Essential Not essential

In answer to Not in answer Proper to Not proper to

“what is it?” to “what is it?” one species one species

Of things Of things Differentia Proprium General

differing in differing only Accident
realities by number

Genus Species

313 313
 Figures

Figure 7: Ḥall mushkilāt al-ishārāt, second

division of the predicables (for §16)

Universal

In answer to Not in answer

“what is it?” to “what is it?”

Answer with Answer Essential Accidental

the more with the less
general general

Genus Species Differentia Proper to Not proper to

one species one species

Proprium General
Accident

314 314
 Figures

Figure 8: Porphyrian tree (for §18)

Substance

Corporeal Incorporeal

Body E.g. angel

Animate Inanimate

Living body E.g. stone

Sensate Insensate

Animal E.g. tree

Rational Irrational

Man E.g. horse

315 315
 Figures

Figure 9: Separable and inseparable (for §22)

Extrinsic to
quiddity

Inseparable Separable

Implicate Passing away Passing away

swiftly slowly

Of existence Of quiddity

Evident Not evident

Strongly Weakly
evident evident

316 316
 Figures

Figure 10: Universals and existence (for §24)

Universal

Does not Exists outside

exist outside the mind
the mind

Cannot Could exist

Unique Multiple
exist outside outside
instantiations instantiations
the mind the mind

Partner of Phoenix Necessarily Contingently Finite Infinite

the Creator unique unique

God Sun Seven planets Rational souls

317 317
 Figures

Figure 11: Coextensive terms (for §26)

A
B

Figure 12: One term included in the other (for §26)

A
B

318 318
 Figures

Figure 13: Overlapping terms (for §26)

A
A B
B

Figure 14: Disjoined terms (for §26)

A B

319 319
 Figures

Figure 15: Contradictories of coextensive terms (for §27)

¬A
¬B

A
B

Figure 16: Contradictories of terms, one included in the other (for §27)

¬A
¬B
A
¬B

A
B

320 320
 Figures

Figure 17: Contradictories of overlapping terms (for §27)

¬A
¬B

A A B
¬B B ¬A

Figure 18: Contradictories of two disjoined terms, case 1 (for §27)

A B
¬B ¬A

321 321
 Figures

Figure 19: Contradictories of two disjoined terms, case 2 (for §27)

¬A
¬B

A B
¬B ¬A

Figure 20: Al-Kātibī on definitions and delineations (for §36)

Expository
phase

With Without
proximate proximate
differentia differentia

Definition Delineation

With ordered Without With Without

proximate ordered proximate proximate
genus proximate genus genus
genus

Complete Incomplete Complete Incomplete

definition definition delineation delineation

322 322
 Figures

Figure 21: Species of propositions

Proposition

Categorical Hypothetical

Modal Absolute Disjunctive Conditional

Oppositional Coincidental Implicative Coincidental

Figure 22: Relations among externalist and

essentialist affirmatives (for §47)

Essentialist A Externalist A

Essentialist I Externalist I

Figure 23: Relations among externalist and

essentialist negatives (for §47)

Essentialist E Externalist E

Essentialist O Externalist O

323 323
 Figures

Figure 24: Implicational relations among simple propositions

Absolute necessary General conditional

Absolute perpetual General conventional

General absolute Absolute continuing

General possible Possible continuing

Figure 25: Implicational relations among subset

of propositions first mentioned in §74

Temporal

Spread

Non-perpetual existential

Nonnecessary existential Special possible

General absolute

General possible

324 324
 Figures

Figure 26: Square of opposition: referential

necessity and possibility (for §69.1)

subcontrary
Mo Mi

La Le
subaltern

subaltern

subaltern

subaltern
Li Lo

Me Ma
contrary

Figure 27: Square of opposition: descriptional

necessity and possibility (for §69.4)

subcontrary
XD1o XD1i

AD1a AD1e
subaltern

subaltern

subaltern

subaltern

AD1i AD1o

XD1e XD1a
contrary

325 325
 Figures

Figure 28: Referential L, A, X, and M: entailment and contradiction

La Le

Aa Ae

Xa Xe

Ma Me

Mi Mo

Xi Xo

Ai Ao

Li Lo

Figure 29: Descriptional L, A, X, and M: entailment and contradiction

LD1a LD1e

AD1a AD1e

XD1a XD1e

MD1a MD1e

MD1i MD1o

XD1i XD1o

AD1i AD1o

LD1i LD1o

326 326
 Figures

Figure 30: Square of opposition: conditionals (for §72)

(a-ℂ)aa (e-ℂ)aa

(e-ℂ)ao (a-ℂ)ao

(o-ℂ)ao (i-ℂ)ao

(i-ℂ)aa (o-ℂ)aa

Figure 31: Implicational relations among hypothetical

propositions claimed or implicit in §87.1

(a-ℂ)pq (e-𝔻2)p ¬ q

(a-𝔻3)¬ pq

Figure 32: Conditionals entailed by exclusive

disjunction as claimed in §87.2

(a-ℂ)¬ pq (a-𝔻1)pq (a-ℂ)p ¬ q

(a-ℂ)¬ qp (a-ℂ) q ¬ p

Figure 33: Mutual entailment between alternative denial

(𝔻2) and inclusive disjunction (𝔻3) as claimed in §87.3

(a-𝔻2)pq (e-𝔻3)¬p¬q

327 327
 Figure 34: Al-Kātibī’s primary division of the fallacies, Jāmiʿ al-daqāʾiq
(leaving aside fallacies from both form and matter together)

Fallacies from

Form Matter

328
Whole Part of Premises Premises
argument argument true specious
Figures

defective defective

328
not in a figure not in a premise non-matching Begging the Non-cause by expression by meaning
(no middle productive wrong extremes question which is
term) mood quality

metaphorical literal
 Appendix 1: Names of Propositions

I list here the translations of the names of the propositions as proposed by

Rescher and Strobino, along with the symbols they use. I list the Rescher symbol
and translation of the proposition’s name, then Strobino’s translation and
symbol. I give my modification of the Strobino symbol in brackets at the end.

□E absolute necessary (ḍarūriyyah muṭlaqah); referential necessity: L.

∀E absolute perpetual (dāʾimah muṭlaqah); referential perpetuity: A.
□C general conditional (mashrūṭah ʿāmmah); descriptional unrestricted
necessity: LD1.
∀C general conventional (ʿurfiyyah ʿāmmah); descriptional unrestricted
perpetuity: AD1.
∃E general absolute (muṭlaqah ʿāmmah); referential one-sided abso-
luteness: X1.
◇E general possibility (mumkinah ʿāmmah); referential one-sided pos-
sibility: M1.
□ C&~∀E special conditional (mashrūṭah khāṣṣah); descriptional restricted
necessity: LD2.
∀C&~∀E special conventional (ʿurfiyyah khāṣṣah); descriptional restricted
perpetuity: AD2.
∃E&~□ E nonnecessary existential (wujūdiyyah lā-ḍarūriyyah); referential
nonnecessary absoluteness: X3 (X~L).
∃E&~∀E non-perpetual existential (wujūdiyyah lā-dāʾimah); referential two-
sided absoluteness: X2.
□ T&~∀E temporal (waqtiyyah); referential temporal determinate: T (LT2).
□ S&~∀E spread (muntashirah); referential temporal indeterminate: U (LX2).
◇E&~□ E special possibility (mumkinah khāṣṣah); referential two-sided pos-
sibility: M2.

329 329
 Appendix 2: Propositional Forms

A: Every C is B (universal affirmative, mūjibah kulliyyah);

E: No C is B (universal negative, sālibah kulliyyah);
I: Some C is B (particular affirmative, mūjibah juzʾiyyah);
O: Some C is not B (particular negative, sālibah juzʾiyyah).

Modal propositions are given below in all four forms, first in Arabic with dummy
variables (often there is no example in the Rules, and—caveat lector—I have set
down what I believe would be al-Kātibī’s phrasing), then in a close English trans-
lation, then in a translation in English that strikes me as natural, and that hope-
fully conveys the meaning of the proposition. I set out first the simple and then
the compound propositions that are customarily investigated; I then go on to
give only those further propositions that al-Kātibī refers to for the squares of
opposition or in inferences.

The simple propositions customarily investigated

1. L: absolute necessity proposition (ḍarūriyyah muṭlaqah); referential

necessity.

L a-proposition: bi-l-ḍarūrah kull jīm bāʾ

Necessarily, every C is B.
Every C is necessarily B.

L e-proposition: bi-l-ḍarūrah lā shayʾ min jīm bāʾ

Necessarily, no C is B.
No C is possibly B.

L i-proposition: bi-l-ḍarūrah baʿḍ jīm bāʾ

Necessarily, some C is B.
Some C is necessarily B.

330 330
 Appendix 2: Propositional Forms

L o-proposition: bi-l-ḍarūrah baʿḍ jīm laysa bāʾ

Necessarily, some C is not B.
Some C is not possibly B.

2. A: absolute perpetuity proposition (dāʾimah muṭlaqah); referential

perpetuity.

A a-proposition: dāʾiman kull jīm bāʾ

Always, every C is B.
Every C is always B.

A e-proposition: dāʾiman lā shayʾ min jīm bāʾ

Always, no C is B.
No C is ever B.

A i-proposition: dāʾiman baʿḍ jīm bāʾ

Always, some C is B.
Some C is always B.

A o-proposition: dāʾiman baʿḍ jīm laysa bāʾ

Always, some C is not B.
Some C is never B.

3. LD1: general conditional (mashrūṭah ʿāmmah); descriptional unrestricted

necessity.

LD1 a-proposition: bi-l-ḍarūrah kull jīm bāʾ mā dāma jīm

Necessarily, every C is B as long as it is C.
Every C is necessarily B as long as it is C.

LD1 e-proposition: bi-l-ḍarūrah lā shayʾ min jīm bāʾ mā dāma jīm

Necessarily, no C is B as long as it is C.
No C is possibly B as long as it is C.

LD1 i-proposition: bi-l-ḍarūrah baʿḍ jīm bāʾ mā dāma jīm

Necessarily, some C is B as long as it is C.
Some C is necessarily B as long as it is C.

331 331
 Appendix 2: Propositional Forms

LD1 o-proposition: bi-l-ḍarūrah baʿḍ jīm laysa bāʾ mā dāma jīm

Necessarily, some C is not B as long as it is C.
Some C is not possibly B as long as it is C.

4. AD1: general conventional (ʿurfiyyah ʿāmmah); descriptional unrestricted

perpetuity.

AD1 a-proposition: dāʾiman kull jīm bāʾ mā dāma jīm

Always, every C is B as long as it is C.
Every C is always B as long as it is C.

AD1 e-proposition: dāʾiman lā shayʾ min jīm bāʾ mā dāma jīm

Always, no C is B as long as it is C.
No C is ever B as long as it is C.

AD1 i-proposition: dāʾiman baʿḍ jīm bāʾ mā dāma jīm

Always, some C is B as long as it is C.
Some C is always B as long as it is C.

AD1 o-proposition: dāʾiman baʿḍ jīm laysa bāʾ mā dāma jīm

Always, some C is not B as long as it is C.
Some C is not ever B as long as it is C.

5. X1: general absolute proposition (muṭlaqah ʿāmmah); referential one-sided

absolute.

X1 a-proposition: bi-l-iṭlāq al-ʿāmm kull jīm bāʾ

By general absoluteness, every C is B.
Every C is at least once B.

X1 e-proposition: bi-l-iṭlāq al-ʿāmm lā shayʾ min jīm bāʾ

By general absoluteness, no C is B.
No C is always B.

X1 i-proposition: bi-l-iṭlāq al-ʿāmm baʿḍ jīm bāʾ

By general absoluteness, some C is B.
Some C is at least once B.

332 332
 Appendix 2: Propositional Forms

X1 o-proposition: bi-l-iṭlāq al-ʿāmm baʿḍ jīm laysa bāʾ

By general absoluteness, some C is not B.
Some C is not always B.

6. M1: general possible proposition (mumkinah ʿāmmah); referential one-

sided possibility.

M1 a-proposition: bi-l-imkān al-ʿāmm kull jīm bāʾ

By general possibility, every C is B.
Every C is possibly B.

M1 e-proposition: bi-l-imkān al-ʿāmm lā shayʾ min jīm bāʾ

By general possibility, no C is B.
No C is necessarily B.

M1 i-proposition: bi-l-imkān al-ʿāmm baʿḍ jīm bāʾ

By general possibility, some C is B.
Some C is possibly B.

M1 o-proposition: bi-l-imkān al-ʿāmm baʿḍ jīm laysa bāʾ

By general possibility, some C is not B.
Some C is not necessarily B.

The compound propositions customarily investigated

7. LD2: special conditional (mashrūṭah khāṣṣah); descriptional restricted

necessity.

LD2 a-proposition: bi-l-ḍarūrah kull jīm bāʾ mā dāma jīm lā dāʾiman

Necessarily, every C is B as long as it is C, not always.
Every C is necessarily B as long as it is C, and no C is always B.

LD2 e-proposition: bi-l-ḍarūrah lā shayʾ min jīm bāʾ mā dāma jīm lā

dāʾiman
Necessarily, no C is B as long as it is C, not always.
No C is possibly B as long as it is C, and every C is at least once B.

333 333
 Appendix 2: Propositional Forms

LD2 i-proposition: bi-l-ḍarūrah baʿḍ jīm bāʾ mā dāma jīm lā dāʾiman

Necessarily, some C is B as long as it is C, not always.
Some C is necessarily B as long as it is C, and those Cs are at least once
not B.

LD2 o-proposition: bi-l-ḍarūrah baʿḍ jīm laysa bāʾ mā dāma jīm lā

dāʾiman
Necessarily, some C is not B as long as it is C, not always.
Some C is not possibly B as long as it is C, and those Cs are at least
once B.

8. AD2: special conventional (ʿurfiyyah khāṣṣah); descriptional restricted

perpetuity.

AD2 a-proposition: dāʾiman kull jīm bāʾ mā dāma jīm lā dāʾiman

Always, every C is B as long as it is C, not always.
Every C is always B as long as it is C, and no C is always B.

AD2 e-proposition: dāʾiman lā shayʾ min jīm bāʾ mā dāma jīm lā dāʾiman
Always, no C is B as long as it is C, not always.
No C is ever B as long as it is C, and every C is at least once B.

AD2 i-proposition: dāʾiman baʿḍ jīm bāʾ mā dāma jīm lā dāʾiman

Always, some C is B as long as it is C, not always.
Some C is always B as long as it is C, and those Cs are at least once
not B.

AD2 o-proposition: dāʾiman baʿḍ jīm laysa bāʾ mā dāma jīm lā dāʾiman
Always, some C is not B as long as it is C, not always.
Some C is not ever B as long as it is C, and those Cs are at least once B.

334 334
 Appendix 2: Propositional Forms

9. X~L: nonnecessary existential (wujūdiyyah lā-ḍarūriyyah); referential non-

necessary absoluteness.

X~L a-proposition: kull jīm bāʾ bi-l-fiʿl lā bi-l-ḍarūrah

Actually, every C is B, not necessarily.
Every C is at least once B, and no C is necessarily B.

X~L e-proposition: lā shayʾ min jīm bāʾ bi-l-fiʿl lā bi-l-ḍarūrah

Actually, no C is B, not necessarily.
No C is always B, and every C is possibly B.

X~L i-proposition: baʿḍ jīm bāʾ bi-l-fiʿl lā bi-l-ḍarūrah

Actually, some C is B, not necessarily.
Some C is at least once B, and those Cs are possibly not B.

X~L o-proposition: baʿḍ jīm laysa bāʾ bi-l-fiʿl lā bi-l-ḍarūrah

Actually, some C is not B, not necessarily.
Some C is not always B, and those Cs are possibly B.

10. X2: non-perpetual existential (wujūdiyyah lā-dāʾimah); referential two-

sided absoluteness.

X2 a-proposition: kull jīm bāʾ bi-l-fiʿl lā dāʾiman

Actually, every C is B, not always.
Every C is at least once B, and no C is always B.

X2 e-proposition: lā shayʾ min jīm bāʾ bi-l-fiʿl lā dāʾiman

Actually, no C is B, not always.
No C is always B, and every C is at least once B.

X2 i-proposition: baʿḍ jīm bāʾ bi-l-fiʿl lā dāʾiman

Actually, some C is B, not always.
Some C is at least once B, and those Cs are not always B.

X2 o-proposition: baʿḍ jīm laysa bāʾ bi-l-fiʿl lā dāʾiman

Actually, some C is not B, not always.
Some C is not always B, and those Cs are at least once B.

335 335
 Appendix 2: Propositional Forms

11. LT2: temporal (waqtiyyah); referential temporal determinate.

See Appendix 4.

LT2 a-proposition: bi-l-ḍarūrah kull qamar munkhasif waqt ḥaylūlat

al-arḍ baynahu wa-bayna l-shams lā dāʾiman
Necessarily, every moon is eclipsed on the earth’s coming between it
and the sun, not always.
Necessarily, every C is B at time T, not always.
Every C is necessarily B at time T, and no C is always B.

LT2 e-proposition: bi-l-ḍarūrah lā shayʾ min al-qamar bi-munkhasif

waqt al-tarbī ʿ lā dāʾiman
Necessarily, no moon is eclipsed at the moment of quadrature, not
always.
Necessarily, no C is B at time T, not always.
No C is possibly B at time T, and every C is at least once B.

LT2 i-proposition: bi-l-ḍarūrah baʿḍ qamar munkhasif waqt ḥaylūlat

al-arḍ baynahu wa-bayna l-shams lā dāʾiman
Necessarily, some moon is eclipsed on the earth’s coming between it
and the sun, not always.
Necessarily, some C is B at time T, not always.
Some C is necessarily B at time T, and those Cs are not always B.

LT2 o-proposition: bi-l-ḍarūrah baʿḍ qamar laysa bi-munkhasif waqt

al-tarbī ʿ lā dāʾiman
Necessarily, some moon is not eclipsed at the moment of quadrature,
not always.
Necessarily, some C is not B at time T, not always.
Some C is not possibly B at time T, and those Cs are at least once B.

12. LX2: spread (muntashirah); referential temporal indeterminate.

See Appendix 4.

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 Appendix 2: Propositional Forms

LX2 a-proposition: bi-l-ḍarūrah kull insān mutanaffis fī waqt mā lā

dāʾiman
Necessarily, every man breathes at a given time, not always.
Necessarily, every C is B at some time, not always.
Every C is necessarily B at some time, and no C is always B.

LX2 e-proposition: bi-l-ḍarūrah lā shayʾ min al-insān bi-mutanaffis fī

waqt mā lā dāʾiman
Necessarily, no man breathes at a given time, not always.
Necessarily, no C is B at some time, not always.
No C is possibly B at some time, and every C is at least once B.

LX2 i-proposition: bi-l-ḍarūrah baʿḍ jīm bāʾ fī waqt mā lā dāʾiman

Necessarily, some C is B at some time, not always.
Some C is necessarily B at some time, and those Cs are not always B.

LX2 o-proposition: bi-l-ḍarūrah baʿḍ jīm laysa bāʾ fī waqt mā lā dāʾiman

Necessarily, some C is not B at some time, not always.
Some C is not possibly B at some time, and those Cs are at least once B.

13. M2: special possible (mumkinah khāṣṣah); referential two-sided possibility.

M2 a-proposition: kull jīm bāʾ bi-l-imkān lā bi-l-ḍarūrah

Possibly, every C is B, not necessarily.
Every C is possibly B, and no C is necessarily B.

M2 e-proposition: lā shayʾ min jīm bāʾ bi-l-imkān lā bi-l-ḍarūrah

Possibly, no C is B, not necessarily.
No C is necessarily B, and every C is possibly B.

M2 i-proposition: baʿḍ jīm bāʾ bi-l-imkān lā bi-l-ḍarūrah

Possibly, some C is B, not necessarily.
Some C is possibly B, and those Cs are not necessarily B.

M2 o-proposition: baʿḍ jīm laysa bāʾ bi-l-imkān lā bi-l-ḍarūrah

Possibly, some C is not B, not necessarily.
Some C is not necessarily B, and those Cs are possibly B.

337 337
 Appendix 2: Propositional Forms

Unlisted simple propositions called on by al-Kātibī

14. LT1: absolute temporal (al-waqtiyyah al-muṭlaqah); assumed in work-

ing out the contradictories for LT2 as one of its component propositions;
conclusion to some first-figure syllogistic mixes; see Appendix 4.

LT1 a-proposition: kull jīm bāʾ bi-l-ḍarūrah fī waqt muʿayyan

Necessarily, every C is B at time T.
Every C is necessarily B at time T.

LT1 e-proposition: lā shayʾ min jīm bāʾ bi-l-ḍarūrah fī waqt muʿayyan

Necessarily, no C is B at time T.
No C is possibly B at time T.

LT1 i-proposition: baʿḍ jīm bāʾ bi-l-ḍarūrah fī waqt muʿayyan

Necessarily, some C is B at time T.
Some C is necessarily B at time T.

LT1 o-proposition: baʿḍ jīm laysa bāʾ bi-l-ḍarūrah fī waqt muʿayyan

Necessarily, some C is not B at time T.
Some C is not possibly B at time T.

15. LX1: absolute spread (al-muntashirah al-muṭlaqah); assumed in working

out the contradictories for LX2 as one of its component propositions; con-
clusion to some first-figure syllogistic mixes.

LX1 a-proposition: kull jīm bāʾ bi-l-ḍarūrah fī waqt mā

Necessarily, every C is B at some time.
Every C is necessarily B at some time.

LX1 e-proposition: lā shayʾ min jīm bāʾ bi-l-ḍarūrah fī waqt mā

Necessarily, no C is B at time T.
No C is possibly B at time T.

LX1 i-proposition: baʿḍ jīm bāʾ bi-l-ḍarūrah fī waqt mā

Necessarily, some C is B at some time.
Some C is necessarily B at some time.

338 338
 Appendix 2: Propositional Forms

LX1 o-proposition: baʿḍ jīm laysa bāʾ bi-l-ḍarūrah fī waqt mā

Necessarily, some C is not B at some time.
Some C is not possibly B at some time.

16. XT1: temporal absolute (al-muṭlaqah al-waqtiyyah); conclusion in some

first- and second-figure mixes.

I don’t think I’ve ever seen XT1 written out as a proposition in full, whether
with dummy letters or concrete terms; see MT1 in Appendix 4.

XT1 a-proposition: kull jīm bāʾ bi-l-fiʿl fī waqt muʿayyan

By general absoluteness, every C is B at time T.
Every C is actually B at time T.

XT1 e-proposition: lā shayʾ min jīm bāʾ bi-l-fiʿl fī waqt muʿayyan

By general absoluteness, no C is B at time T.
No C is actually B at time T.

XT1 i-proposition: baʿḍ jīm bāʾ bi-l-fiʿl fī waqt muʿayyan

By general absoluteness, some C is B at time T.
Some C is actually B at time T.

XT1 o-proposition: baʿḍ jīm laysa bāʾ bi-l-fiʿl fī waqt muʿayyan

By general absoluteness, some C is not B at time T.
Some C is not actually B at time T.

17. XX1: spread absolute (al-muṭlaqah al-muntashirah); again, a conclusion in

some first- and second-figure mixes.

I don’t think I’ve ever seen XX1 written out as a proposition in full, whether
with dummy letters or concrete terms; this is my best guess.

XX1 a-proposition: kull jīm bāʾ bi-l-fiʿl fī waqt mā

By general absoluteness, every C is B at some time.
Every C is actually B at some time.

XX1 e-proposition: lā shayʾ min jīm bāʾ bi-l-fiʿl fī waqt mā

By general absoluteness, no C is B at some time.
No C is actually B at some time.

339 339
 Appendix 2: Propositional Forms

XX1 i-proposition: baʿḍ jīm bāʾ bi-l-fiʿl fī waqt mā

By general absoluteness, some C is B at some time.
Some C is actually B at some time.

XX1 o-proposition: baʿḍ jīm laysa bāʾ bi-l-fiʿl fī waqt mā

By general absoluteness, some C is not B at some time.
Some C is not actually B at some time.

18. MT1: temporal possible (al-mumkinah al-waqtiyyah); given as contradic-

tory of LT1, a component of LT2.

See Appendix 4, though note al-Ḥillī gives fī dhālika l-waqt for fī waqt
muʿayyan (ḤQ 296.12–14).

MT1 a-proposition: kull jīm bāʾ bi-l-imkān fī waqt muʿayyan

Possibly, every C is B at time T.
Every C is possibly B at time T.

MT1 e-proposition: lā shayʾ min jīm bāʾ bi-l-imkān fī waqt muʿayyan

Possibly, no C is B at time T.
No C is necessarily B at time T.

MT1 i-proposition: baʿḍ jīm bāʾ bi-l-imkān fī waqt muʿayyan

Possibly, some C is B at time T.
Some C is possibly B at time T.

MT1 o-proposition: baʿḍ jīm laysa bāʾ bi-l-imkān fī waqt muʿayyan

Possibly, some C is not B at time T.
Some C is not necessarily B at time T.

19. MA: perpetual possible (al-mumkinah al-dāʾimah); given as contradictory

of LX1, a component of LX2.

See Appendix 4; I adopt the name for this proposition given in ḪK 126.11,
and Rescher and vander Nat, “Theory of Modal Syllogistic,” 25.

MA a-proposition: kull jīm bāʾ bi-l-imkān dāʾiman

Always, every C is possibly B.

MA e-proposition: lā shayʾ min jīm bāʾ bi-l-imkān dāʾiman

Always, no C is necessarily B.

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 Appendix 2: Propositional Forms

MA i-proposition: baʿḍ jīm bāʾ bi-l-imkān dāʾiman

Always, some C is possibly B.

MA o-proposition: baʿḍ jīm laysa bāʾ bi-l-imkān dāʾiman

Always, some C is not necessarily B.

20. XD1: absolute continuing (al-ḥīniyyah al-muṭlaqah); given as contradictory

of AD1, and as conclusion to a number of third- and fourth-figure syllogistic
mixes.

The ḥīna-clause is given in some examples as fī baʿḍ awqāt kawnihi jīm, for
example in §69.3: “Everyone afflicted with pleurisy may cough at times
while afflicted” (kull man bi-hi dhāt al-janb yumkinu an yasʿala fī baʿḍ awqāt
kawnihi majnūban). Bi-l-iṭlāq al-ʿāmm could be put at the beginning or end
of the proposition.

XD1 a-proposition: kull jīm bāʾ ḥīna huwa jīm

Every C is [at least once] B while it is C.
Every C is at least once B while C.

XD1 e-proposition: lā shayʾ min jīm bāʾ ḥīna huwa jīm

No C is [always] B while it is C.
No C is always B while C.

XD1 i-proposition: baʿḍ jīm bāʾ ḥīna huwa jīm

Some C is [at least once] B while it is C.
Some C is at least once B while C.

XD1 o-proposition: baʿḍ jīm laysa bāʾ ḥīna huwa jīm

Some C is not B [at least once] while it is C.
Some C is not always B while C.

21. MD1: possible continuing (al-ḥīniyyah al-mumkinah); given as contradic-

tory of LD1.

As with XD1. The ḥīna-clause can be replaced with fī baʿḍ awqāt kawnihi jīm;
bi-l-imkān al-ʿāmm can be replaced as in the example given for 20, which is
to say, by the modalized copula, yumkinu an yakūna.

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 Appendix 2: Propositional Forms

MD1 a-proposition: bi-l-imkān al-ʿāmm kull jīm bāʾ ḥīna huwa jīm
Possibly, every C is B while C.
Every C is possibly B while C.

MD1 e-proposition: bi-l-imkān al-ʿāmm lā shayʾ min jīm bāʾ ḥīna huwa
jīm
Possibly, no C is B while C.
No C is necessarily B while C.

MD1 i-proposition: bi-l-imkān al-ʿāmm baʿḍ jīm bāʾ ḥīna huwa jīm
Possibly, some C is B while C.
Some C is possibly B while C.

MD1 o-proposition: bi-l-imkān al-ʿāmm baʿḍ jīm laysa bāʾ ḥīna huwa jīm
Possibly, some C is not B while C.
Some C is not necessarily B while C.

Unlisted compound propositions called on by al-Kātibī

Al-Kātibī mentions six more compound propositions as conclusions to

inferences.

22. L2: non-perpetual necessary (impossible proposition) (al-ḍarūriyyah al-lā-

dāʾimah), given as conclusion to a first-figure mix.

L2 a-proposition: bi-l-ḍarūrah kull jīm bāʾ lā dāʾiman

Every C is necessarily B, not always.
Every C is necessarily B, and no C is always B.

L2 e-proposition: bi-l-ḍarūrah lā shayʾ min jīm bāʾ lā dāʾiman

Necessarily, no C is B, not always.
No C is possibly B, and every C is at least once B.

L2 i-proposition: bi-l-ḍarūrah baʿḍ jīm bāʾ lā dāʾiman

Necessarily, some C is B, not always.
Some Cs are necessarily B, and those Cs are at least once not B.

L2 o-proposition: bi-l-ḍarūrah baʿḍ jīm laysa bāʾ lā dāʾiman

Necessarily, some C is not B, not always.
Some Cs are not possibly B, and those Cs are at least once B.

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 Appendix 2: Propositional Forms

23. A2: non-perpetual perpetual (impossible proposition) (al-dāʾimah al-lā-

dāʾimah), given as conclusion to some first-figure mixes.

A2 a-proposition: dāʾiman kull jīm bāʾ lā dāʾiman

Always, every C is B, not always.
Every C is always B, and no C is always B.

A2 e-proposition: dāʾiman lā shayʾ min jīm bāʾ lā dāʾiman

Always, no C is B, not always.
No C is ever B, and every C is at least once B.

A2 i-proposition: dāʾiman baʿḍ jīm bāʾ lā dāʾiman

Always, some C is B, not always.
Some Cs are always B, and those Cs are at least once not B.

A2 o-proposition: dāʾiman baʿḍ jīm laysa bāʾ lā dāʾiman

Always, some C is not B, not always.
Some Cs are not ever B, and those Cs are at least once B.

24. AD(2): non-perpetual-for-some conventional (al-ʿurfiyyah lā dāʾimah li-l-

baʿḍ), given as converse of certain propositions, and as conclusion for some
fourth-figure mixes.

AD(2) a-proposition: dāʾiman kull jīm bāʾ mā dāma jīm lā dāʾiman

li-l-baʿḍ
Always, every C is B as long as it is C, not always for some.
Every C is always B as long as it is C, and some C is not always B.

AD2 e-proposition: dāʾiman lā shayʾ min jīm bāʾ mā dāma jīm lā dāʾiman
li-l-baʿḍ
Always, no C is B as long as it is C, not always for some.
No C is ever B as long as it is C, and some C is at least once B.

AD2 i-proposition: dāʾiman baʿḍ jīm bāʾ mā dāma jīm lā dāʾiman li-l-baʿḍ
Always, some C is B as long as it is C, not always for some.
Some C is always B as long as it is C, and some of those Cs are not
always B.

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 Appendix 2: Propositional Forms

AD2 o-proposition: dāʾiman baʿḍ jīm laysa bāʾ mā dāma jīm lā dāʾiman
li-l-baʿḍ
Always, some C is not B as long as it is C, not always for some.
Some C is not ever B as long as it is C, and some of those Cs are at least
once B.

25. XT2: non-perpetual temporal absolute (al-muṭlaqah al-waqtiyyah al-lā-

dāʾimah); conclusion for a first-figure mix.

XT2 a-proposition: kull jīm bāʾ fī waqt muʿayyan lā dāʾiman

Every C is B at time T, not always.
Every C is B at time T, and no C is always B.

XT2 e-proposition: lā shayʾ min jīm bāʾ fī waqt muʿayyan lā dāʾiman

No C is B at time T, not always.
No C is B at time T, and every C is at least once B.

XT2 i-proposition: baʿḍ jīm bāʾ fī waqt muʿayyan lā dāʾiman

Some C is B at time T, not always.
Some C is B at time T, and those Cs are not always B.

XT2 o-proposition: baʿḍ jīm laysa bāʾ fī waqt muʿayyan lā dāʾiman

Some C is not B at time T, not always.
Some C is not B at time T, and those Cs are at least once B.

26. XX2: non-perpetual spread absolute (al-muṭlaqah al-muntashirah al-lā-

dāʾimah); conclusion for a first-figure mix.

XX2 a-proposition: kull jīm bāʾ fī waqt mā lā dāʾiman

Every C is B at some time, not always.
Every C is B at some time, and no C is always B.

XX2 e-proposition: lā shayʾ min jīm bāʾ fī waqt mā lā dāʾiman

No C is B at some time, not always.
No C is B at some time, and every C is at least once B.

XX2 i-proposition: baʿḍ jīm bāʾ fī waqt mā lā dāʾiman

Some C is B at some time, not always.
Some C is B at some time, and those Cs are not always B.

344 344
 Appendix 2: Propositional Forms

XX2 o-proposition: baʿḍ jīm laysa bāʾ fī waqt mā lā dāʾiman

Some C is not B at some time, not always.
Some C is not B at some time, and those Cs are at least once B.

27. XD2: non-perpetual absolute continuing (al-ḥīniyyah al-muṭlaqah

al-lā-dāʾimah)

XD2 a-proposition: kull jīm bāʾ ḥīna huwa jīm lā dāʾiman

Every C is [at least once] B while it is C, not always.
Every C is at least once B while C, and no C is always B.

XD2 e-proposition: lā shayʾ min jīm bāʾ ḥīna huwa jīm lā dāʾiman
No C is [always] B while it is C, not always.
No C is always B while C, and every C is at least once B.

XD2 i-proposition: baʿḍ jīm bāʾ ḥīna huwa jīm lā dāʾiman

Some C is [at least once] B while it is C, not always.
Some C is at least once B while C, and those Cs are not always B.

XD2 o-proposition: baʿḍ jīm laysa bāʾ ḥīna huwa jīm lā dāʾiman
Some C is not B [at least once] while it is C, not always.
Some C is not always B while C, and those Cs are at least once B.

345 345
 Appendix 3: Examples of Quantified
Hypothetical Propositions

The following examples are taken from ḤQ 285–86.

Conditionals:

A-conditional: (a-ℂ)aa. Whenever the sun is up, then it is day (kullamā

kānat al-shams ṭāliʿah fa-l-nahār mawjūd; alternatives to kullamā:
mahmā, matā);
E-conditional: (e-ℂ)aa. Never, if the sun is up, then it is night (laysa al-bat-
tata idhā kānat al-shams ṭāliʿah fa-l-layl mawjūd);
I-conditional: (i-ℂ)aa. Sometimes, if the sun is up, then it is day (qad yakūnu
idhā kānat al-shams ṭāliʿah fa-l-nahār mawjūd);
O-proposition: (o-ℂ)aa. Two forms (no examples given): (1) Sometimes
not, if P then Q (qad lā yakūnu); (2) Not always, if P then Q (laysa
kullamā, or laysa mahmā, or laysa matā).

Disjunctives:

A-proposition: (a-𝔻)aa. Always, either the sun is up, or it is not (dāʾiman

immā an takūna l-shams ṭāliʿah aw lā takūna);
E-proposition: (e-𝔻)aa. Never, either the sun is up, or it is day (laysa al-
battata immā an takūna l-shams ṭāliʿah wa-immā an yakūna l-nahār
mawjūdan);
I-proposition: (i-𝔻)aa. Sometimes, either the sun is up, or it is night (qad
yakūnu immā an takūna l-shams ṭāliʿah wa-immā an yakūna l-layl
mawjūdan);
O-proposition: (o-𝔻)aa. Two forms (no examples given): (1) Sometimes
not, either P or Q (qad lā yakūnu); (2) Not always, either P or Q (laysa
dāʾiman).

346 346
 Appendix 4: Contradictories
for Modalized Propositions

Here is a summary of the a- and o-proposition contradictories:

L/M The absolute necessity proposition has as its contradictory the

general possibility proposition: “every A is necessarily B” contradicts
“some A is not necessarily B” (or “some A is possibly not B”).
A/X The absolute perpetual has the general absolute: “every A is always B”
contradicts “some A is not always B” (or “some A is sometimes not B”).
LD1/MD1 The general conditional has the continuing possibility (ḥīniyyah
mumkinah): “every A is necessarily B as long as it is A” contradicts “some
A is possibly not B while A” (or “some A is not necessarily B while A”).
AD1/XD1 The general conventional has the continuing absolute (ḥīniyyah
muṭlaqah): “every A is always B as long as it is A” contradicts “some A is
sometimes not B while A” (or “some A is not always B while A”).

Compounds (read subject to §71; taken from ḤQ 295–96):

LD2 a-proposition contradicts MD1 o-proposition or A i-proposition: the

contradictory of “every C is necessarily B as long as it is C, not always”
is “either some C is not necessarily B while C, or some C is always B”
(naqīḍ kull jīm bi-l-ḍarūrah bāʾ mā dāma jīm lā dāʾiman immā baʿḍ jīm
laysa bāʾ bi-l-imkān ḥīna huwa jīm aw baʿḍ jīm bāʾ dāʾiman);
AD2 a-proposition contradicts XD1 o-proposition or A i-proposition: the
contradictory of “every C is always B as long as it is C, not always” is
“either some C is not always B while C, or some C is always B” (naqīḍ
kull jīm bāʾ mā dāma jīm lā dāʾiman immā baʿḍ jīm laysa bāʾ ḥīna huwa
jīm aw baʿḍ jīm bāʾ dāʾiman);
X2 a-proposition contradicts A i-proposition or A o-proposition: the con-
tradictory of “every C is B, not always” is “either some C is always B,
or some C is never B” (naqīḍ kull jīm bāʾ lā dāʾiman immā baʿḍ jīm bāʾ
dāʾiman aw baʿḍ jīm laysa bāʾ dāʾiman);

347 347
 Appendix 4: Contradictories for Modalized Propositions

X~L a-proposition contradicts A o-proposition or L i-proposition: the con-

tradictory of “every C is B, not necessarily” is “either some C is never
B, or some C is necessarily B” (naqīḍ kullu jīm bāʾ lā bi-l-ḍarūrah immā
baʿḍ jīm laysa bāʾ dāʾiman aw baʿḍ jīm bāʾ bi-l-ḍarūrah);
LT2 a-proposition contradicts MT o-proposition or A i-proposition: the tem-
poral is a compound of an absolute temporal (waqtiyyah muṭlaqah) and
a general absolute, so its contradictory is either a possibility temporal or
a perpetuity; so the contradictory of “every C is B necessarily at a speci-
fied time, not always” is “either possibly at that time some C is not B, or
some C is always B” (naqīḍ kull jīm bāʾ lā bi-l-ḍarūrah fī waqt muʿayyan
lā dāʾiman immā baʿḍ jīm laysa bāʾ bi-l-imkān fī dhālika l-waqt aw baʿḍ
jīm bāʾ dāʾiman);
LX2 a-proposition contradicts MA o-proposition or A i-proposition: the
spread is a compound of an absolute spread (muntashirah muṭlaqah)
and a general absolute, so its contradictory is either a perpetual possible
or a perpetual; so the contradictory of “every C is B necessarily at some
time, not always” is “either always some C is not necessarily B, or some
C is always B” (naqīḍ kull jīm bāʾ lā bi-l-ḍarūrah fī waqt mā lā dāʾiman
immā baʿḍ jīm laysa bāʾ bi-l-imkān dāʾiman aw baʿḍ jīm bāʾ dāʾiman);
M2 a-proposition contradicts L o-proposition or L i-proposition: the con-
tradictory of “every C is B by a special possibility” is “either some C
is not possibly B or some C is necessarily B” (naqīḍ kull jīm bāʾ bi-l-
imkān al-khāṣṣ immā baʿḍ jīm laysa bāʾ bi-l-ḍarūrah aw baʿḍ jīm bāʾ
bi-l-ḍarūrah).

348 348
 Appendix 5: List of Translated
Texts in Commentary

§0 Text 0.1 TŠ 93.1–2 §13 Text 13.1 ḤQ 205.1–6

§1 Text 1.a TT 62.pu–63.2 §15 Text 15.a TŠ 142.u–143.1

Text 1.1 ḤQ 183.1–5 Text 15.1 TT 129.pu–130.2
Text 1.2 ḤQ 183.12–184.4
Text 1.3 TŠ 100.7–12 §16 Text 16.1 TŠ 141.10–16
Text 16.2 ḤQ 209.pu–210.2
§2 Text 2.1 ḤQ 184.u–185.8
Text 2.2 ḤQ 184.8–pu §17 Text 17.1 ḤQ 210.7–211.3
Text 17.2 ḤQ 211.4–8
§4 Text 4.1 ṬḤ 118.18–apu Text 17.3 TŠ 143.15–u
Text 17.4 TŠ 145.9–u
§5 Text 5.1 ḤQ 189.7–11
Text 5.2 RM 10.1–10.8 §19 Text 19.1 ḤQ 214.11–pu
Text 19.2 ṬḤ 193.1–8
§6 Text 6.1 TT 23.pu–25.1
§20 Text 20.1 ḤQ 215.7–apu
§7 Text 7.1 TŠ 121.4–12 Text 20.2 TŠ 150.apu–u
Text 20.3 ḪK 45.14–u
§8 Text 8.1 ḪK 13.1–5 Text 20.4 TT 150n1

§9 Text 9.1 RM 19.pu–20.3 §23 Text 23.1 ḤQ 220.5–11

Text 9.2 ḪK 13.8–10 Text 23.2 ḤQ 220.14–apu
Text 9.3 TŠ 124.11–125.8
§24 Text 24.1 TŠ 163.3–4
§10 Text 10.1 ḤQ 200.3–8 Text 24.2 TŠ 163.u–164.2
Text 10.2 ḪK 11.9–pu
§25 Text 25.1 TT 168.1–169.u
§12 Text 12.1 ḤQ 202.6–203.12, Text 25.2 ḪK 35.15–36.2
204.7–10 Text 25.3 ḤQ 221.u–222.3

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 Appendix 5: List of Translated Texts in Commentary

§25 Text 25.4 ḤQ 222.12–15 §39 Text 39.1 ḤQ 245.15–apu

§28 Text 28.1 ḪK 36.3–4 §40 Text 40.1 ṬḤ 142.7–u

Text 40.2 TŠ 209.9–12
§30 Text 30.1 ḤQ 230.7–14 Text 40.3 ḤQ 247.12–u
Text 40.4 ḤA 56.20–apu
§31 Text 31.1 TŠ 183.10–12 Text 40.5 ḤQ 247.10–11
Text 31.2 TŠ 183.apu–184.2 Text 40.6 TŠ 210.8–10
Text 40.7 TT 234.3–6
§32 Text 32.1 ḤQ 232.11–13, 232. Text 40.8 TT 236.6–8
pu–233.2 Text 40.9 TŠ 204.15–pu

§33 Text 33.1 TŠ 186.7–188.1 §42 Text 42.1 ḤQ 250.6–13

§34 Text 34.1 ḤQ 235.apu–pu §43 Text 43.1 ḤQ 251.u–252.2

Text 34.2 ḤQ 236.7–8 Text 43.2 TT 243.7–u

§35 Text 35.1 ḤQ 237.8–10 §45 Text 45.a ḪK 109.5–apu

Text 35.2 ḤQ 237.12–u Text 45.1 TT 246.pu–247.pu
Text 45.2 TT 250.7–251.4
§36 Text 36.1 ḤQ 238.5–u Text 45.3 TT 253.3–7
Text 36.2 ḤQ 239.1–9 Text 45.4 TT 253.8–9
Text 36.3 ḤQ 239.12–16 Text 45.5 TT 253.10–13
Text 45.6 TT 253.14–254.2
§37 Text 37.1 ḤQ 240.9–u Text 45.7 TT 256.1–257.9
Text 37.2 ḤQ 241.1–3 Text 45.8 TT 257.16–258.pu
Text 37.3 ḤQ 241.4–12 Text 45.9 TT 258.u–260.1
Text 37.4 ḤQ 241.pu–u Text 45.10 ḪK 145.11–pu
Text 45.11 ḤQ 254.16–pu
§38 Text 38.a TŠ 201.3–7 Text 45.12 ḤQ 254.u–255.9
Text 38.1 AI 22.2–4
Text 38.2 TT 221.6–u §46 Text 46.1 ḤQ 255.14–256.8
Text 38.3 TŠ 202.1–3
Text 38.4 ḤQ 242.8–apu §47 Text 47.1 ḤQ 256.9–15
Text 38.5 TŠ 202.6–11 Text 47.2 TŠ 224.9–pu
Text 38.6 TŠ 202.12–apu,
203.1–3 §48 Text 48.1 TT 263.pu–264.2

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 Appendix 5: List of Translated Texts in Commentary

§49 Text 49.1 TT 265.5–6 §69 Text 69.1 ḤQ 294.6–7

§50 Text 50.1 TT 267.5–12 §70 ḤQ 295.7–296.u

Text 50.2 TT 268.8–10 (paraphrase)
Text 50.3 TT 270.11–14
Text 50.4 ḤQ 258.14–16 §71 Text 71.1 ḤQ 297.10–15

§51 Text 51.1 ḤQ 259.apu–260.7 §72 Text 72.1 ḤQ 298.3–5

Text 51.2 TŠ 233.12–234.1
§73 Text 73.a ḤQ 299.17–apu
§52 Text 52.1 ṬḤ 265.5–266.3 Text 73.1 AI 51.1–3
Text 52.2 ḪK 104.7–11 Text 73.2 ḤQ 299.1–9
Text 52.3 RM 272.4–apu Text 73.3 TT 344.11–u
Text 73.4 TŠ 290.9–12
§60 Text 60.1 ḤQ 276.6–277.2
Text 60.2 ḤQ 277.apu–278.6 §74 Text 74.1 ḤQ 299.pu–300.8
Text 60.3 ḤQ 278.10–u
Text 60.4 ḤA 79.12 §76 Text 76.1 ḤQ 303.1–7
Text 76.2 ḤQ 356.5–8
§62 Text 62.1 ḤQ 280.5–6 Text 76.3 ḤQ 303.8–12
Text 76.4 ḪK 135.4–apu
§63 Text 63.1 ḤQ 281.1–10 Text 76.5 ḤQ 303.apu–u
Text 63.2 ḤQ 282.2–6
Text 63.3 ḤQ 282.7–8 §77 Text 77.1 ḤQ 306.2–4

§64 Text 64.1 ḤQ 282.9–10 §78 Text 78.1 ḤQ 311.6–7

Text 64.2 ḤQ 283.2–15 Text 78.2 ḤQ 310.apu–311.5

§65 Text 65.1 ḤQ 284.6–285.6 §79 Text 79.1 ḤQ 312.1–6

§67 Text 67.a TŠ 274.9 §80 Text 80.1 ḤQ 312.pu–313.15

Text 67.1 ḤQ 289.9–290.2
§81 Text 81.1 ḤQ 315.1–3
§68 Text 68.1 RM 177.10–apu
Text 68.2 ḤQ 291.14–pu §82 Text 82.1 ḪK 147.2–3;
Text 68.3 ḤQ 292.6–12 quoting AQ 93.11–13
Text 68.4 ḤQ 292.13–pu Text 82.2 ḪK 147.6–12

351 351
 Appendix 5: List of Translated Texts in Commentary

§82 Text 82.3 ḤQ 315.9–apu §92 Text 92.3 TT 396.4–9

Text 82.4 TT 364n1
§93 Text 93.1 ḤQ 343.5–11
§83 Text 83.1 ḤQ 316.2–5
Text 83.2 ḤQ 316.14–apu §94 Text 94.1 TT 401.12–16
Text 83.3 ḤQ 317.14–318.9
Text 83.4 ḤQ 319.3–9 §95 Text 95.1 TT 405.15–17
Text 83.5 ḤQ 320.12–15
§97 Text 97.1 TT 412.1–413.u
§85 Text 85.1 ḤQ 322.u–323.4
Text 85.2 ḤQ 323.13–pu §98 Text 98.1 ḤQ 356.5–357.4
Text 98.2 TŠ 335.8–14
§86 Text 86.1 ḤQ 325.4–13
Text 86.2 ḤQ 325.14–326.8 §99 Text 99.1 ṬḤ 394.10–395.5
Text 86.3 TT 375.7–u Text 99.2 AI 70.5–7
Text 86.4 TT 377.5–6 Text 99.3 TŠ 338.6–8
Text 86.5 TŠ 310.14–16
§100 Text 100.1 TŠ 339.9–11
§87 Text 87.1 TŠ 311.8–16 Text 100.2 TŠ 340.6–11
Text 87.2 ḤQ 327.9–14
Text 87.3 TŠ 311.17–312.2 §101 Text 101.1 TŠ 341.1–3
Text 87.4 TŠ 312.2–u Text 101.2 AI 74.4–11
Text 87.5 ḤQ 329.11–13 Text 101.3 TŠ 341.6–11

§88 Text 88.1 RM 244.u–245.2 §102 Text 102.1 TŠ 343.5–11

Text 88.2 ḪK 239.11–pu Text 102.2 ḤQ 363.pu–364.4
Text 102.3 TŠ 344.4–u
§89 Text 89.1 ḤQ 334.6–10
Text 89.2 ḤQ 334.pu–335.1 §103 Text 103.1 ḤQ 365.7–u
Text 89.3 TT 386.13–apu Text 103.2 ḤQ 366.pu–367.7
Text 89.4 TT 387.6–9 Text 103.3 TŠ 350.5–9

§90 Text 90.1 TT 388.13–14 §104 Text 104.1 TŠ 352.3

Text 90.2 TT 391.apu–pu Text 104.2 TŠ 352.4–7

§92 Text 92.1 TT 396.10–12 §105 Text 105.a TŠ 352.13–353.9

Text 92.2 TT 395.14–u Text 105.1 TŠ 353.12–354.2

352 352
 Appendix 5: List of Translated Texts in Commentary

§105 Text 105.2 TŠ 354.7–11 §116 Text 116.a TŠ 368.13–u

Text 116.1 TŠ 370.1–7
§106 Text 106.1 ḤQ 374.9–375.1 Text 116.2 TŠ 370.10–13
Text 106.2 TŠ 355.8–apu Text 116.3 TŠ 370.pu–371.4
Text 116.4 TŠ 372.4–10
§107 Text 107.1 ḤQ 376.11–14 Text 116.5 TŠ 372.13–15

§108 Text 108.1 TŠ 358.apu–u §117 Text 117.1 TŠ 372.pu–373.5

Text 117.2 TŠ 373.6–11
§109 Text 109.1 ḤQ 380.3–13 Text 117.3 TŠ 374.1–4
Text 109.2 TŠ 359.11–14
Text 109.3 TŠ 359.15–360.2 §118 Text 118.1 TŠ 375.4–10
Text 109.4 TŠ 360.7–11 Text 118.2 TŠ 375.apu–u
Text 118.3 TŠ 376.14–15
§110 Text 110.1 TT 448.9–u Text 118.4 TŠ 377.1–10

§112 Text 112.1 TT 451.13–u §119 Text 119.1 ḤQ 408.9–12

Text 119.2 ḤQ 409.1–2
§113 Text 113.1 TŠ 364.3–7 Text 119.3 ḤQ 409.6–8
Text 113.2 TŠ 364.8–apu Text 119.4 TŠ 379.1–6
Text 113.3 TŠ 364.pu–u Text 119.5 TŠ 379.14–u
Text 119.6 Chester Beatty
§114 Text 114.1 TŠ 365.apu–366.2 3577, 78a.1–78a.14

§115 Text 115.1 TŠ 366.7–apu §120 Text 120.1 TŠ 381.1–8

Text 115.2 TŠ 368.7 Text 120.2 TŠ 386.8–387.10

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Ṣāliḥ. Qom, Iran: Dār Zayn al-ʿĀbidīn, 2012.
Al-Tahānawī, Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī et al. A Dictionary of the Technical Terms Used in the
Sciences of the Musalmans. Calcutta: W. N. Lees, 1862.
Al-Taḥtānī, Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī. Taḥrīr al-qawāʿid
al-manṭiqiyyah fī sharḥ al-Risālah al-Shamsiyyah. Edited by M. Bīdārfar. Qom, Iran:
Intishārāt Bīdār, 2011.
   . Taḥrīr al-qawāʿid al-manṭiqīyyah fī sharḥ al-Risālah al-Shamsīyyah. Cairo: Ḥalabī
and Sons, 1948.
Thom, Paul. “Al-Fārābī on Indefinite and Privative Names.” Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 18
(2008): 193–209.

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 Bibliography

   . “Avicenna’s Mereology of the Predicables.” In Mereology in Medieval Logic

and Metaphysics: Proceedings of the 21st European Symposium of Medieval Logic and
Semantics, edited by Farbizio Amerini, 55–74. Pisa, Italy: Scuola Normale Superiore,
2019.
   . “Logic and Metaphysics in Avicenna’s Modal Syllogistic.” In The Unity of Science
in the Arabic Tradition, edited by Shahid Rahman, T. Street, and H. Tahiri, 361–76.
Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer, 2008.
   . Medieval Modal Systems: Problems and Concepts. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2003.
   . The Syllogism. Munich: Philosophia, 1981.
Al-Ṭūsī, Naṣīr al-Dīn. Ḥall mushkilāt al-ishārāt [=ṬḤ]. Edited by S. Dunyā. 2nd ed. Cairo:
Dār al-Maʿārif, 1971.
   . Taʿdīl al-miʿyār fī naqd Tanzīl al-afkār. In Collected Texts and Papers on Logic and
Language, edited by M. Mohaghegh and T. Izutsu. Tehran: Tehran University Press,
1971.
   . Akhlāq-Nāṣirī. See Lameer, The Arabic Version of Ṭūsī’s Nasirean Ethics.
Young, Walter Edward. “Concomitance to Causation: Arguing Dawarān in the Proto-Ādāb
al-Baḥth.” In Philosophy and Jurisprudence in the Islamic World, edited by Peter Adamson,
205–82. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019.
Zimmermann, F. W., trans. Al-Fārābī’s Commentary and Short Treatise on Aristotle’s De
Interpretatione. London: Oxford University Press for the British Academy, 1981.

361 361
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The Tradition of Greek Philosophy in Arabic

Gutas, Dimitri. Greek Thought, Arabic Culture. London: Routledge, 1998.

   . Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition: Introduction to Reading Avicenna’s
Philosophical Works. 2nd edition. Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science. Texts and
Studies, vol. 89. Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2014.
Peters, Francis E. Aristotle and the Arabs: The Aristotelian Tradition in Islam. New York: New
York University Press, 1968.
Al-Rahim, Ahmed H. The Creation of Philosophical Tradition: Biography and the Reception
of Avicenna’s Philosophy from the Eleventh to the Fourteenth Centuries A.D. Diskurse der
Arabistik, vol. 21. Wiesbaden, Germany: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2018.

Traditions of Learning

Berkey, Jonathan P. The Transmission of Knowledge in Medieval Cairo: A Social History

of Islamic Education. Princeton Studies on the Near East. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1992.
Brentjes, Sonia. “On the Location of the Ancient or ‘Rational’ Sciences in Muslim
Educational Landscapes (AH 500–1100).” Bulletin of the Royal Institute for Inter-Faith
Studies 4.1 (2002): 47–72.
Eichner, Heidrun. “The Post-Avicennian Philosophical Tradition and Islamic Orthodoxy:
Philosophical and Theological Summae in Context.” PhD diss., MLU Halle-Wittenberg,
Germany, 2009.
Ibn Khaldun, Abū Zayd. The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History. Translated by Franz
Rosenthal. Vol. 3. London: Routledge, 1958.
Makdisi, George. The Rise of Colleges: Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West.
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981.
Pfeiffer, Judith. “Confessional Ambiguity vs. Confessional Polarization: Politics and the
Negotiation of Religious Boundaries in the Ilkhanate.” In Politics, Patronage and the
Transmission of Knowledge in 13th–15th Century Tabriz, edited by Judith Pfeiffer, 129–68.
Iran Studies, vol. 8. Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2013.

362 362
 Further Reading

Texts from Post-Mongol Marāghah

Madelung, Wilferd. “Nasir al-Din Tusi’s Ethics: Between Philosophy, Shi’ism and Sufism.”
In Ethics in Islam, edited by Richard Hovannisian, 85–101. Malibu, CA: Undena, 1983.
Morrison, Robert. “What Was the Purpose of Astronomy in Ījī’s Kitāb al-Mawāqif fī ʿIlm
al-Kalām?” In Politics, Patronage and the Transmission of Knowledge in 13th–15th Century
Tabriz, edited by Judith Pfeiffer, 201–29. Iran Studies, vol. 8. Leiden, Netherlands: Brill,
2013.
Ragep, F. Jamil. Naṣīr Al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī’s Memoir on Astronomy (al-Tadhkira fī ʿilm al-hayʾa).
Vols. 1 and 2. Sources in the History of Mathematics and Physical Sciences, vol. 12.
Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1993.
Al-Ṭūsī, Naṣīr al-Dīn. The Nasirean Ethics. Translated by G. M. Wickens. Persian Heritage
Series. London: Allen and Unwin, 1964.

Studies on Arabic Logic

Chatti, Saloua. Arabic Logic from Al-Fārābī to Averroes: A Study of the Early Arabic
Categorical, Modal, and Hypothetical Syllogistics. Cham, Switzerland: Springer Basel AG,
2020.
El-Rouayheb, Khaled. The Development of Arabic Logic (1200–1800). Basel: Schwabe, 2019.
Kalbarczyk, Alexander. Predication and Ontology: Studies and Texts on Avicennian and Post-
Avicennian Readings of Aristotle’s Categories. Scientia Graeco-Arabica, vol. 22. Berlin: De
Gruyter, 2018.
Rescher, Nicholas. Temporal Modalities in Arabic Logic. Dordrecht, Netherlands: D. Reidel,
1967.
   . “The Theory of Modal Syllogistic in Medieval Arabic Philosophy.” In Studies
in Modality, edited by Nicholas Rescher and Ruth Manor Rescher, 17–56. Oxford:
Blackwells, 1974.
Strobino, Riccardo. Avicenna’s Theory of Science: Logic, Metaphysics, Epistemology. Berkeley
Series in Postclassical Islamic Scholarship. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2021.
Thom, Paul. Medieval Modal Systems: Problems and Concepts. Ashgate Studies in Medieval
Philosophy. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2003.

363 363
 Further Reading

Translations

Ahmed, Asad Q. Avicenna’s Deliverance: Logic. Studies in Islamic Philosophy. Karachi:

Oxford University Press, 2011.
Chatti, Saloua, and Wilfrid Hodges. Al-Fārābī, Syllogism: An Abridgement of Aristotle’s “Prior
Analytics.” Ancient Commentators on Aristotle. New York: Bloomsbury Academic,
2020.
Di Vincenzo, Silvia. Avicenna, “The Healing, Logic: Isagoge”: A New Edition, English
Translation and Commentary of the “Kitāb al-Madḫal” of Avicenna’s “Kitāb al-Šifāʾ.”
Scientia Graeco-Arabica, vol. 31. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2021.
Zimmermann, F. W. Al-Farabi’s Commentary and Short Treatise on Aristotle’s “De
Interpretatione.” Oxford: Oxford University Press for the British Academy, 1981.

364 364
 List of Technical Terms

Arabic Term English Term First Occurrence in Text

adāh particle §11

ʿadamī privative (of term) §49
akbar major (term) §90
ʿaks converse, conversion §§5, 73
ʿaks al-naqīḍ contraposition §82
ʿaks al-tartīb reversing the order of the premises
(i.e. metathesis) §95
ālah instrument §3
ʿalam proper name §12
amr command §14
ʿaqliyyah mental §25
ʿaraḍ accident §5
ʿaraḍ ʿāmm general accident §23
ʿaraḍ dhātī essential accident §5
ʿaraḍī accidental §5
ʿaraḍī mufāriq separable accidental §22
aṣghar minor (term) §90
awḍāʿ situations (for quantifying over
in conditional) §65
awsaṭ middle (term) §90
awwaliyyah primary, primitive (of propositions) §116
badīhī primitive (of knowledge) §2
baʿīd remote (of genus or differentia) §18
basīṭah simple (of meaning or proposition) §48
bayyin evident (of implicate) §22
bayyinah bi-dhātihā self-evident §91
bi-l-ʿaraḍ per accidens/ accidentally §15
bi-l-fiʿl in actuality, actually §52
bi-ḥasab al-dhāt with respect to the essence §53
bi-l-imkān by possibility, possibly §52

365 365
 List of Technical Terms

Arabic Term English Term First Occurrence in Text

bi-l-iṭlāq in actuality, by absoluteness, at least once §52

burhān demonstration §80
burhān annī demonstration of the fact §117
burhān limmī demonstration of the reasoned fact §117
ḍābiṭ guideline , rule §59
dākhil fī jawāb mā huwa intrinsic to the answer to “what is it?” §33
dalālah signification §7
ḍarb mood (of syllogism) §90
dawām perpetuity §51
dawr circle (in reasoning), vicious circle §2
dawrān concomitance §115
dhāt essence §5
dhihniyyah mental §12
duʿāʾ petition §14
fard individual, member, item §12
faṣl differentia §5
fī jawharihi in its substance , essentially §20
fī l-khārij actual existence (in extramental reality) §8
ḥadd (1) [real] definition §36
(2) term §90
ḥadd nāqiṣ incomplete or deficient definition §36
ḥadd tāmm complete definition §36
ḥaqīqah (1) literal §12
(2) reality §20
ḥaqīqah basīṭah simple reality §32
ḥaqīqiyyah exclusive (of disjunctive) §60
ḥaṣr exhaustiveness §115
hayʾah form §11
ḥujjah argument §6
ḥukm judgment §1
iḍāfah relation (as category) §68
iftirāḍ ecthesis §77
ījāb affirmation §1
ikhtilāf mūjib li-ʿadam al-intāj discrepant conclusions, contrasted
instances §92

366 366
 List of Technical Terms

Arabic Term English Term First Occurrence in Text

iktisāb acquiring , acquisition §3

ʿilliyyah causality §60
ʿilm knowledge, science §1
iltimās request §14
iltizām implication (kind of signification) §7
imtināʿ impossibility §6
ʿinādiyyah oppositional (of disjunctive ) §61
infikāk separation §22
inḥilāl analysis §38
intāj production (of syllogistic conclusion) §75
intiẓām organize (as a syllogism) §81
iqtirān connection (between categorical
premises) §90
irtidād reduction (of second- or higher
figure syllogism to first) §93
irtifāʿ removing §52
ism name §11
isnād subordination §1
istiḥālah impossibility §9
istilzām entailment §9
istiqrāʾ induction §114
istithnāʾ repeating (as in affirming antecedent
or denying consequent) §111
ithbāt affirmation §1
iʿtirāf acknowledgement §118
ittiḥād unity, identity §68
jadal dialectic §118
jawhar substance §20
jihah mode §51
jins genus §5
jins al-ajnās supreme genus §31
jins ʿālin superior genus §31
jins iḍāfī relative genus §31
jins mufrad isolated genus §31
jins mutawassiṭ intermediate genus §31

367 367
 List of Technical Terms

Arabic Term English Term First Occurrence in Text

jins sāfil inferior genus §31

juzʾ ghayr tāmm incomplete part (of hypothetical
proposition) §106
juzʾ tāmm complete part (of hypothetical) §105
juzʾ wa-kull part and whole §5
juzʾī particular §5
juzʾī ḥaqīqī real particular §15
juzʾī iḍāfī relative particular §28
kādhib false §38
kāfin sufficient (of condition) §22
kalimah verb §11
kammiyyah quantity §42
kayfiyyah quality §42
khabar information §14
khāṣṣah proprium §23
khiṭābah rhetoric §118
khulf absurd, impossibility, inconceivable §76
khuṣūṣiyyah specificity §16
kidhb falsity §14
kubrā major (premise) §90
kull whole (in part and whole) §5
kullī universal §15
kullī ʿaqlī mental universal §25
kullī manṭiqī logical universal §25
kullī ṭabī ʿī natural universal §25
lafẓ expression §7
lāzim implicate §22
luzūm implication (of meaning) §22
mabdaʾ principle (of science) §120
māddah matter (of proposition, syllogism) §51, §116
maʿdūlah metathetic (of categorical with
indefinite terms) §48
mafhūm concept §15
māhiyyah quiddity §9
maḥmūl predicate §5

368 368
 List of Technical Terms

Arabic Term English Term First Occurrence in Text

maḥṣūrah quantified (with respect to meaning) §42

majāz figurative §12
majhūl unknown §3
majmūʿ aggregate §1
makhṣūṣah singular §42
malzūm implicant §22
maʿnan meaning §7
māniʿat al-jamʿ alternative denial (kind of disjunction) §60
māniʿat al-khuluww inclusive disjunction §60
manqūl transferred (of expression’s
signification) §12
manqūl iṣṭilāḥī technically transferred §12
manqūl sharʿī legislatively transferred §12
manqūl ʿurfī conventionally transferred §12
maqbūlah received proposition §118
maqīs derivative analogue §115
maqīs ʿalayhi principal analogue §115
al-maqūl fī jawāb mā huwa what is said in answer to “what is it?” §16
maʿrūḍ substrate §22
masāʾil questions (or theorems of science) §120
mashhūrah endoxic proposition §118
matbūʿ antecedent (of conditional) §9
maṭbūʿ norm (as natural inference of a
given schema) §105
maṭlūb what is sought, the question §77
mawḍūʿ (1) imposed (said of expression imposed
on meaning) §12
(2) subject (of a categorical proposition) §40
(3) subject (of a science) §120
min jihat al-lafẓ with respect to expression §119
min jihat al-maʿnā with respect to meaning §119
muʿānid opposed §65
muʿarrāh stripped, abstract §28
muʿarrif that which defines a thing (i.e., definiens) §35
mutabāyin disjunct §27

369 369
 List of Technical Terms

Arabic Term English Term First Occurrence in Text

mubāyin distinct (of terms, also heteronymous) §13

mufrad term (specifically, simple term) §10
mughālaṭah fallacy §119
muḥāl absurd, impossibility, inconceivable §27
muḥaṣṣalah determinate (of categorical
proposition with positive terms) §48
muhmalah indefinite proposition §43
mujarrabah proposition based on experience §116
mūjibah affirmative proposition §41
mukhayyilah image-eliciting proposition §118
mukhtaliṭah mix (of modalized premises) §98
mulāzamah implication (of meaning) §8
mumkin contingent, two-sided possible §12
munfaṣilah disjunctive §39
munfaṣilah ittifāqiyyah coincidental disjunctive §61
muntij productive (of syllogism) §81
muqaddamah premise §90
muqaddam antecedent (of conditional) §60
murādif synonymous (of expressions) §13
murakkab compound (of term or proposition) §10
musallamah conceded proposition §118
musāwin coextensive §5
musawwarah quantified (with respect to expression) §42
mushāghibī eristic §119
mushāhadah observational proposition §116
mushakhkhiṣ individuating §28
mushakkik systematically ambiguous §12
mushtarak equivocal §12
mustawin straight (in conversion) §73
muṭābaqah correspondence (kind of signification) §7
mutawāṭiʾ univocal §12
mutawātirah proposition based on sequential
testimony §116
muttaṣilah ittifāqiyyah coincidental conditional §60
muttaṣilah luzūmiyyah implicative conditional §60

370 370
 List of Technical Terms

Arabic Term English Term First Occurrence in Text

naqīḍ contradictory (of terms or propositions) §5

natījah conclusion §89
nātijah productive (of syllogism) §91
nawʿ species §16
nawʿ al-anwāʿ lowest species (i.e. infima species) §30
nawʿ ḥaqīqī real species §29
nawʿ iḍāfī relative species §29
nawʿ mufrad isolated species §30
nawʿ mutawassiṭ intermediate species §30
nawʿ sāfil lowest species (i.e. infima species) §30
naẓarī inferred §2
nisbah relation (between terms in proposition) §40
qaḍiyyah proposition §5
qaḍiyyah dāʾimah perpetual proposition §52
qaḍiyyah ḍarūriyyah necessary proposition §3
qaḍiyyag fiʿliyyah actuality proposition §98
qaḍiyyah ḥadsiyyah intuited proposition §116
qaḍiyyah ḥamliyyah categorical proposition §38
qaḍiyyah ḥīniyyah mumkinah possible continuing proposition §69
qaḍiyyah ḥīniyyah muṭlaqah absolute continuing proposition §69
qaḍiyyah juzʾiyyah sālibah particular negative, o-proposition §42
qaḍiyyah mashrūṭah conditional (categorical) proposition §52
qaḍiyyah mashrūṭah khāṣṣah special conditional (categorical)
proposition §53
qaḍiyyah maẓnūnah suppositional proposition §118
qaḍiyyah mūjibah juzʾiyyah particular affirmative, i-proposition §42
qaḍiyyah mūjibah kulliyyah universal affirmative, a-proposition §42
qaḍiyyah mumkinah possible proposition §52
qaḍiyyah mumkinah khāṣṣah special possible proposition §59
qaḍiyyah munʿakisah convertible proposition §100
qaḍiyyah muntashirah spread proposition §58
qaḍiyyah muntashirah muṭlaqah absolute spread proposition §58
qaḍiyyah muwajjahah modal proposition §51
qaḍiyyah muṭlaqah absolute proposition §52
qaḍiyyah muttaṣilah conditional (hypothetical) proposition §39

371 371
 List of Technical Terms

Arabic Term English Term First Occurrence in Text

qaḍiyyah qiyāsuhā maʿahā implicitly syllogistic propositions §116

qaḍiyyah sālibah kulliyyah universal negative, e-proposition §42
qaḍiyyah ṭabī ʿiyyah natural proposition §43
qaḍiyyah ʿurfiyyah conventional proposition §52
qaḍiyyah ʿurfiyyah khāṣṣah special conventional proposition §54
qaḍiyyah waqtiyyah temporal proposition §57
qaḍiyyah waqtiyyah muṭlaqah absolute temporal proposition §57
qaḍiyyah wujūdiyyah lā-dāʾimah non-perpetual existential proposition §56
qaḍiyyah wujūdiyyah lā-
ḍarūriyyah nonnecessary existential proposition §55
qāʿidah rule §59
qānūn canon §3
qarīb proximate (of genus or differentia) §5
qarīnah mood (of syllogism) §90
qawl shāriḥ explanatory phrase §6
qayd al-lā-darūrah restriction of nonnecessity §55
qayd al-lā-dawām restriction of non-perpetuity §53
qism division §38
qiyās syllogism §81
qiyās iqtirānī connective syllogism §89
qiyās istithnāʾī repetitive syllogism §89
qiyās al-khalf reductio §93
qiyās murakkab compound syllogism §112
rābiṭah copula §40
radd reduction (of second- or higher
figure syllogism to first) §94
raf ʿ denying (the consequent) §110
rasm delineation §36
rasm nāqiṣ incomplete delineation §36
rasm tāmm complete delineation §36
rujūʿ reduction (of second- or higher
figure syllogism to first) §93
ṣādiq true §6
safsaṭah sophistry §118
salb negation §50

372 372
 List of Technical Terms

Arabic Term English Term First Occurrence in Text

sālibah negative §41

shahādah testimony §116
shakhṣ individual §16
shakhṣiyyah singular §42
shakl figure (of syllogism) §80
sharṭ condition §68
sharṭiyyah hypothetical §38
shiʿr poetry §118
ṣidq truth §14
ṣughrā minor (premise) §90
sūr quantifier §42
ṣurah form §1
tabāyun juzʾī partial disjunction §27
tabāyun kullī complete disjunction §27
tābiʿ consequent (of conditional) §9
taḍammun containment (kind of signification) §7
taḍāyuf correlation §60
taḥqīq verification §27
takhalluf counterexample §115
talāzum coimplication §50
tālin consequent (of conditional) §60
tāmm complete (of expression) §14
tamthīl example §115
al-tanāfī incompatibility §39
tanāquḍ contradiction (of propositions) §67
tanbīh notification §14
taqdīr supposition §60
taqyīdī restrictive (of expression) §14
ṭaraf extreme (of proposition) §38
tardīd setting out as disjuncts §71
targhīb exhortation §118
taʿrīf definition (weak sense) §35
tartīb ordering §3
tasalsul regress §2
taṣawwur conception §1

373 373
 List of Technical Terms

Arabic Term English Term First Occurrence in Text

taṣdīq assertion §1
taslīm concession §88
taʾthīr influencing §118
thubūt affirmation §1
thulāthiyyah three-part (of proposition) §40
thunāʾiyyah two-part (of proposition) §40
ʿumūm muṭlaq inclusion §26
ʿumūm min wajh overlap §26
waḍ ʿ (1) imposition §7
(2) affirming the antecedent §110
wahmiyyah estimative proposition §118
wāqiʿ fī ṭarīq mā huwa what arises on the way to “what is it?” §33
waqt muʿayyan specified moment §57
waṣf description §52
wujūdī positive (of term) §49
yaqīn certainty §116
yaqīniyyah proposition of certainty §116
zaman time, tense §68

374 374
 Index

Abbasid caliphate, xiii 220, 223, 234, 239, 243, 282. See also
ʿAbdallah al-Bayḍāwī, 287n15 inconceivable (muḥāl)
absolute continuing proposition (qaḍiyyah Abū ʿAbdallah ibn Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī, xviii
ḥīniyyah muṭlaqah), xxv–xxvi, §§78.1–2, Abū Bishr Mattā ibn Yūnus, xiv
174–175, 178, 190, 192, 203, 341, 347 Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, xiv–xv
absolute generality (ʿumūm muṭlaq): See Abū l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī, 246, 255
general absolute proposition (qaḍiyyah Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī: and ancients
muṭlaqah ʿāmmah); inclusion (ʿumūm (al-qudamāʾ ), xxi; Aristotelianism, xiv,
muṭlaq) xxv; on conception (taṣawwur), 89; on
absolute necessary proposition (qaḍiyyah connective syllogisms with hypothetical
ḍarūriyyah muṭlaqah), §§52.2–3, §69.1, premises, 254; on copula (rābiṭah),
§75, §100, 172, 246, 329, 330, 347 146–147; on fallacy (mughālaṭah), 280;
absolute nonnecessary proposition, 171 on indefinite vs. determinate, 294n145;
absolute perpetual proposition (dāʾimah on induction (istiqrāʾ ), 267; on mixes
muṭlaqah), §52.3, §69.2, §70, §75, §78.1, of modalized premises (mukhtaliṭāt),
§83.2, §§100–101, §§103–104, 172, 329, 241; on referential (dhātī), 293n134; on
331, 347 simple vs. compound expressions, 104;
absolute perpetuity proposition, 192 on subject term, 153, 156; on syllogism
absolute proposition, 160, 171, 175, 192, 193, (qiyās), 226
199, 241–242, 246, 249 accident (ʿaraḍ): essential accident (ʿaraḍ
absolute spread proposition (qaḍiyyah dhātī), §5, §§120.1–2, 94–95, 122, 123,
muntashirah muṭlaqah), §58, 173, 174, 283, 284, 290n67; general accident
177, 192, 194, 338, 339 (ʿaraḍ ʿāmm), §23, 109, 112, 121, 123,
absolute temporal proposition (qaḍiyyah 130, 131. See also essential accident
waqtiyyah muṭlaqah), §57, §78.4, 173, (ʿaraḍ dhātī); inseparable; separable
174, 177, 192, 194, 338 (mufāriq); substrate (maʿrūḍ)
absoluteness (iṭlāq), xxvi, §52.6, §78.2, accidental (ʿaraḍī), §5, §22.1, §22.3, §23, 110,
§78.4, 173, 174, 176, 178, 218 113, 118, 120, 283. See also constitutive
abstract, abstracted, 105, 106, 146, 267, 284 (muqawwim)
absurd (muḥāl), §§75–77.1, §78.4, §§78.1–2, according to essence (bi-ḥasab al-ḥaqīqah),
§81, §§83.2–84.1, 89, 116, 117, 132, 184, §45, 147, 155, 156–157
202, 203, 210, 211, 212, 216, 217, 219,

375 375
 Index

according to external existence (bi-ḥasab propositions, 170

al-kharij), §45, 155, 156–157 —WORKS OF, Kashf al-asrār, 205, 227
acknowledgement (iʿ tirāf), §118.2 affirmation (ījāb, ithbāt, thubūt): and
acquired (muktasab), §116.5, 91, 92, 271, categorical proposition (ḥamliyyah),
273, 275, 285, 302n306. See also inferred 145, 148; and conception (taṣawwur),
(naẓarī) §1; and connective syllogisms with
actuality (fiʿl), §68, §102, §103, 169, 190–191, hypothetical premises, 261; and
193, 203–204, 220, 228–229, 240, 249, contradiction (tanāquḍ), §67, §69.2,
253, 261, 290n49. See also potentiality 190; and contraposition (ʿaks al-naqīḍ),
(quwwah) §84.1; and demonstration of the fact
actuality proposition (fiʿliyyah), §98, 153– (burhān innī), 276; and example
154, 160, 203, 242, 244, 248, 250–251, (tamthīl), §115; of implicant (malzūm),
253, 294n139 222; of implicate (lāzim), 122; indefinite
admission (taslīm), §88 vs. determinate, §§50.1–2; and
Afḍal al-Dīn al-Khūnajī: on Avicenna, induction (istiqrāʾ ), 267; and metathetic
xviii, xxv, 119, 153, 160; on compound (maʿdūlah), 164, 166; and mixes of
expressions, 104–105; on connective modalized premises (mukhtaliṭāt),
syllogisms with hypothetical premises, 249; and modal proposition (qaḍiyyah
254, 300n271; on contraposition (ʿaks muwajjahah), §52.1; and negation
al-naqīḍ), 212, 213; on conversion (ʿaks), (salb), 164–165; and syllogism (qiyās),
202, 204–205, 207; on essentialist and §93.2, §93.3, §95.6, §109.1; and
externalist readings, 157, 158; and Fakhr syllogism, repetitive (qiyās istithnāʾ ī),
al-Dīn al-Rāzī, xvi; on hypothetical §110, 264
proposition (sharṭiyyah), 144; on affirmative proposition (mūjibah): and
implication (luzum, mulazamah), actuality proposition (fiʿliyyah),
100, 101, 102, 289n42; on implicative 160; and categorical proposition
conditional (luzūmiyyah), 158–159; (ḥamliyyah), §§41–42, 149; and
on logic, 95; on mixes of modalized connective syllogisms with hypothetical
premises (mukhtaliṭāt), 99, 247; on premises (qiyās iqtirānī), §109.1, 256;
modal logic, 209–210; on modal and contradiction (tanāquḍ), §69.4,
proposition (qaḍiyyah muwajjahah), §70, 295n181; and contraposition
294n152; on natural universal (kullī (ʿaks al-naqīḍ), 212, 215, 217–218,
ṭabī ʿī), 125; on necessary proposition 219, 220, 221; and conversion (ʿaks),
(qaḍiyyah ḍarūriyyah), 153–154, 288n23; §78.1, §79, 198, 199, 207–209; and
on relative particular (juzʾ ī iḍāfī), 128– fallacy (mughālaṭah), §119, 281; and
129; on separability, 121; on syllogism hypothetical proposition (sharṭiyyah),
(qiyās), production of, 237; on thirteen §§62–65.2, §86, 183, 184;

376 376
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affirmative proposition (mūjibah) (cont.): also specific ancients, e.g. Avicenna

Ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī on, 145, (Abū ʿAlī ibn Sīnā)
183–184; indefinite vs. determinate, angels, 87
§§48–50.2, 151, 164, 165; and metathetic antecedent (matbūʿ, muqaddam), §§60.1–
(maʿdūlah), 164; and mixes of 62, §63, §65.1, §66, §§87.1–2, §105, §107,
modalized premises (mukhtaliṭāt), 250, §§110–111, 92, 102, 104, 180–181, 183–184,
251; and modal proposition (qaḍiyyah 185, 186, 199, 200, 211, 222, 223, 255,
muwajjahah), §§51–59.1; and reductio 257–258, 262–263, 264, 266. See also
(qiyās al-khulf), §113; and syllogism consequent (tābiʿ, tālin)
(qiyās), §§91.1–5, §§92–94.1, §94.3, apprehension (idrāk), 90, 228, 278, 279
§§94.5–95.1, §§95.3–4, §§95.6–10, a-proposition (qaḍiyyah mūjibah
225, 231–232, 234, 235; and syllogism, kulliyyah), xxv–xxvi, 155, 161–163, 165,
repetitive (qiyās istithnāʾ ī), §110, 262; 171, 176, 178, 186, 193–194, 207, 209,
translating, 171. See also particular 210–211, 212, 213–214, 215, 216, 218,
affirmative proposition (qaḍiyyah 243, 252, 262, 294n139, 330–345, 346,
mūjibah juzʾiyyah); universal affirmative 347–348. See also universal affirmative
proposition (qaḍiyyah mūjibah proposition (qaḍiyyah mūjibah
kulliyyah) kulliyyah)
affirming one part of a hypothetical (waḍ ʿ ), argument (burhān, ḥujjah, dalīl): in
§110, 262. See also denying one part of a general, xiii, xxi, xxvi, 87; Afḍal al-Dīn
hypothetical (raf ʿ ); imposition (waḍ ʿ ); al-Khūnajī on, xvi; and assertion
singular situation (waḍ ʿ ) (taṣdīq), §6; Avicenna on, xiv; and
aggregate (majmūʿ ), §1, 89–90 conceded propositions (musallamāt),
Ahmed, Asad, x 277–278; and demonstration of the
Alexander of Aphrodisias, 197 fact (burhān innī), 276; and example
alternative denial (kind of disjunction, (tamthīl), §115, 268; and fallacy
māniʿah min al-jamʿ ), §60.3, §61, (mughālaṭah), 280, 301n302; and
§64, §87.1, §109.1, §111, 181, 182, 183, hypothetical proposition (sharṭiyyah),
222–223, 223–224, 260, 263. See also 144; in opening prayer, §0; and
denial (nafy); exclusive disjunction propositions based on sequential
(munfaṣilah ḥaqīqiyyah); inclusive testimony (mutawātirah), 274; silence
disjunction (māniʿah min al-khuluww) an opponent in argument (ifḥām),
analysis (inḥilal), §38, 109, 143 §14.1, §118.11, 279; and syllogism
ancients (al-qudamāʾ ), xxi, 89, 111, 131, (qiyās), 234; and syllogism, repetitive
161, 167–168, 198, 204, 207, 213–214, (qiyās istithnāʾ ī), 262. See also proof
214–215, 216, 220, 228–229, 234, 237, (ḥujjah)
238, 239, 240, 292n102, 299n242. See

377 377
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Aristotle: about, xiii–xiv, xxvii; absence 183, 184; on conception (taṣawwur),

of, in al-Risālah al-Shamsiyyah, xvii– 89, 91; on connective syllogisms
xviii; on assertoric, 193; on connective with hypothetical premises, 254, 255,
syllogisms with hypothetical premises, 300n271; on contact with the Active
254; on ecthetic proof, 197; on fallacy Intellect (ittiṣāl), 145; on
(mughālaṭah), 280; methods, 93; contraposition (ʿaks al-naqīḍ), 211,
on mixes of modalized premises 212, 213, 214, 219; on conversion (ʿaks),
(mukhtaliṭāt), 239; on simple vs. 199; on correspondence (muṭābaqah),
compound expressions, 104, 289n47; 101, 103–104; on definition, broad
and subjects of sciences (mawḍūʿāt), sense (taʿ rīf), 135; on denominative
94; on syllogism (qiyās), 227, 231, (mushtaqq), 106, 293n119; on
298n226, 298n235; on weaker (aʿamm), descriptional perpetuity proposition,
298n238 173; on differentia (faṣl), 119, 291n84;
—WORKS OF, Categories, xiii, 106; De on disjunctive (munfaṣilah), 180; on
Interpretatione, xiii, 96, 127; Organon, division of propositions, 151; on
xiii, xiv, 254; Posterior Analytics, 92, ecthesis (iftirāḍ), 296n194; on
288n24, 291n81; Prior Analytics, xiii, equivalences, 187, 196; on essential
169, 246, 296n184, 298n224; Sophistical (dhātī), 94, 121, 132; on essentialist
Refutations, 280 and externalist readings, 157, 161;
Asaph, §0, 287n1 on example (tamthīl), 267; and
assertion (taṣdīq), xx, §1, §§5–6, 89–92, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, xvi; on fallacy
95, 189, 227, 254, 267, 269–270, 271, (mughālaṭah), 280, 301n300; on general
276, 287–288n18. See also conception conventional proposition (ʿurfiyyah
(taṣawwur) ʿāmmah), 301n295; on genus (jins),
assertoric, 169, 193, 225, 246. See also 113; on hypothetical proposition
absoluteness (iṭlāq) (sharṭiyyah), 144, 180, 183, 186; Ibn
association (al-istiṣḥāb), 180, 182, 295n167 al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī on, xix–xx, 152–153,
assumption, supposition (taqdīr), §39, §45, 160–161, 219; on implicate (lāzim),
131, 153, 180, 199, 204, 239–240, 248, 122, 289n42; on implication (luzum,
257, 261, 266, 267, 269 mulazamah), 289n37; on informative
Athīr al-Dīn al-Abharī, xv–xvi, 237, 297n203 (khabar) expression, 141; on
Avicenna (Abū ʿAlī ibn Sīnā): about, xiv, inseparability, 291n82; on intelligibles,
xv, xviii, xxv, xxviiin4; on absolute 289n35; on logic, 270; mistakes found
proposition, 246; and ancients by, 129; on mixes of modalized premises
(al-qudamāʾ ), 193, 228–229, 292n102, (mukhtaliṭāt), 238–239, 240, 241, 242,
299n242; on coincidental conditional 243, 247–248, 249; on modal logic,
(muttaṣilah ittifāqiyyah), 180–181, 152–153, 154–155, 160, 166, 209–210, 275;

378 378
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Avicenna (Abū ʿAlī ibn Sīnā) (cont.): on Barbara, 153, 154, 208, 230, 231, 234, 239,
modalized propositions (qaḍiyyah 240, 265
muwajjahah), 168; on poetry (shiʿr), Barnes, Jonathan, xxvii
279; on proprium (khāṣṣah), 123; Baroco, §93.5, 233, 234, 245, 252, 253,
purism, Avicennian, 152–153, 154, 265–266
160–161, 219; on reductio (qiyās begging the question, 281, 301n302
al-khulf), 265, 300n285; on referential Benevich, Fedor, 288n25
(dhātī), 291n67, 293n134; on science Bīdārfar, Muḥsin, xix–xx, xxiii
(ʿilm), 284; science, theory of, 120; Black, Deborah, 301n291, 301n293
signification theory, xx, 97–101, 102, Bocardo, §94.8, 235
103–105, 122, 135–136; on simple vs. Boethius, 196
compound expressions, 104, 289n46; Bramantip, 236, 250, 252
on species (nawʿ ), 129; Strobino on, British East India Company, xvii
288n24, 291n81; on subject term, 153, Burhān al-Dīn al-Nasafī, 300–301n289
156, 160; on syllogism (qiyās), 202, 224, Buridan, John, xxviiin1, 149, 301n301
226–227, 228–229, 246, 247, 254, 261,
277, 298n226; on truth-conditions, 153, Camenes, 236, 250, 251, 252, 253
295n168; on types, 292n96; on universal Camestres, §93.3, 233, 244, 245, 247, 248
(kullī), 124–125, 291n87, 292n98; on canon (qānūn), xviii, xxi, §3, 93, 216
what is said in answer to “what is it?” categorical proposition (ḥamliyyah), xxiv,
(al-maqūl fī jawāb mā huwa), 132–133 xxvi, §38, §§40–44, §66, §90, §105,
—WORKS OF, Cure, 114, 119, 120, 161, 183, §108.1, 142–143, 145, 146–147, 148–149,
227; Geometry, 302n309; ʿIbārah, 96, 188–189, 197, 199, 200, 219, 230, 254,
105, 127; Madkhal, 93, 97, 108–109; 255, 257–259, 262. See also hypothetical
Najāt, 135, 199, 239, 246; Pointers, 89, proposition (sharṭiyyah)
97, 99, 118, 119, 120, 121–122, 124, 128, causality (ʿilliyyah), §60.2, §115, 180, 183,
129, 132, 135, 141, 163–164, 166, 169, 273, 276
199, 238–239, 243, 246, 267, 270, 275, Celarent, 207, 208, 209, 211, 230, 231, 233,
290n64, 291n84, 291n87, 300n280, 237
301n300, 302n308; al-Taʿlīqāt, 288n33; certainty (yaqīn), §114, 269, 270, 271–272,
ʿUyūn al-ḥikmah, 226, 298n226 273–274, 277, 278. See also proposition
awareness (shuʿūr), 92, 100 of certainty (yaqīniyyah)
ʿayn, §12.2, 107, 287n4 Cesare, §93.2, 233, 244, 245
circle, circular reasoning (dawr), §2, §4,
Baghdad, xiii–xiv, xv, §116.6, 273 91–92, 93, 129, 139–140, 142, 227, 262.
Baghdad school, 104 See also regress (tasalsul)

379 379
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coextensive, equivalent (musāwin), §5, complete expression (lafẓ tāmm), §14.1–2,

§§19–20, §§26–27.1, §34, §35, 115, 96, 108, 141. See also incomplete
116–117, 119, 126, 127–128, 133, 138, 283, expression (lafẓ nāqiṣ)
292n108 complete part of hypothetical proposition
co-implication (talāzum), 144, 187, 189, (juzʾ tāmm), §105, §109.1, 255, 256, 259.
221–224 See also incomplete part of hypothetical
coincidental conditional (muttaṣilah proposition (juzʾ ghayr tāmm)
ittifāqiyyah), xx, §60.2, §63, 158, 179, compound, said of term, proposition, or
180–181, 182, 183, 184, 211, 221, 255, 262– syllogism (murakkab): in appendix,
263. See also implicative, of conditional 330, 333–337, 342–345; expression,
(luzūmiyyah) compound, §10, §14.1, §14.3, 96, 97, 141,
coincidental disjunctive (munfaṣilah 142, 143; propositions, compound, §52.1,
ittifāqiyyah), §61, 182, 184–185, 196. §§53–59.2, §§70–71, §77.2, §87.3, 152,
See also oppositional disjunctive 168, 169, 171, 175, 178, 189, 193–194, 195,
(ʿinādiyyah) 198, 207, 216, 217, 220, 227, 242–243,
college (madrasah), xvii 251; vs. simple expression, 104, 289n47;
command (amr), §14.2 syllogism, compound (qiyās murakkab),
common notion, §120.1, 284, 287n12, §§105–109.1, §112, 264–265, 266; and
302n307. See also postulates temporality conditions, 169. See also
(muqaddamāt ghayr bayyinah fī simple, said of meaning, proposition, or
nafsihā); self-evident (bayyinah reality (basīṭah)
bi-dhātihā) conceded propositions (musallamāt),
complement: See contradictory, of terms or §118.3, 277–278
propositions (naqīḍ) concept (mafhūm), §15
complete definition (ḥadd tāmm), §36, 137. conception (taṣawwur), xx, §1, §§5–6,
See also incomplete definition (ḥadd §§8–9, §15, §22.2, §35, §116.8, 89–92, 95,
nāqiṣ) 100, 103, 106, 121, 122, 125, 136–137, 138,
complete delineation (rasm tāmm), §36, 271, 288n18, 290n59. See also assertion
137–138. See also incomplete delineation (taṣdīq)
(rasm nāqiṣ) conclusion (natījah): Avicennian purists
complete disjunction (tabāyun kullī), vs. Rāzians on, 155; and compound
§27.3–4, 128. See also coextensive, propositions, 342–345; and
equivalent (musāwin); disjunction connective syllogisms with
(mubāyanah, tabāyun, infiṣāl); partial hypothetical premises, §105, §107,
disjunction (tabāyun juzʾ ī) §108.1, 254, 256, 257, 259, 260–261; and
contraposition (ʿaks al-naqīḍ), 215;

380 380
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conclusion (natījah) (cont.): and (burhān), 271; and example (tamthīl),

conversion (ʿaks), §78.1, 204; and §115; and fallacy (mughālaṭah), §119;
demonstration (burhān), §117, 271; and general conditional proposition
discrepant conclusions (ikhtilāf mūjib (mashrūṭah ʿāmmah), §52.4; and general
li-ʿadam al-intāj), §92, §94.1, §95.1, conventional proposition (ʿurfiyyah
§97; elided intermediate conclusions ʿāmmah), §52.5; and mixes of modalized
(mafṣūl al-natāʾij), §112; and estimative premises (mukhtaliṭāt), §98, §100,
propositions (wahmiyyāt), §118.10, §102, §103, 244, 246–247, 248, 249,
279; explicit intermediate conclusions 250, 251–252; and premise of certainty
(mawṣūl al-natāʾij), §112; and induction (al-yaqīniyyāt), 275; and syllogism
(istiqrāʾ ), 267, 268; and mixes of (qiyās), §§91.1–5, §§92–94.8, §§95.2–10,
modalized premises (mukhtaliṭāt), §99, §96, 230–234; and syllogism (qiyās),
§§101–102, §104, 239–240, 241–242, connective, with hypothetical premises,
243, 244, 246–247, 248–250, 252–253; §§105–107; and syllogism, repetitive
to modalized propositions (qaḍiyyah (qiyās istithnāʾ ī), §110, 261–262, 263;
muwajjahah), 168; and necessary temporality conditions, 169–170,
proposition (qaḍiyyah ḍarūriyyah), 192–193
153; and reductio (qiyās al-khulf), 266; conditional, kind of hypothetical
and simple propositions, 338–340; and proposition (muttaṣilah): affirmative
subjects of sciences (mawḍūʿāt), 284; conditional, §63, §65.2; in appendix,
and syllogism (qiyās), §§89.1–2, §91.4, 346; and categorical proposition
§91.6, §92, §§93.2–3, §94.3, §§94.7–8, (ḥamliyyah), 182; and co-implication
§95.3, §95.10, §§96–97, 224, 225–226, (talāzum), 222; and connective
227–228, 229–230, 231–232, 234, syllogisms with hypothetical premises,
236–237, 238; and syllogism, compound §105, §107, §109.1, 255, 257–258, 259;
(qiyās murakkab), §112, 264–265; and and contradiction (tanāquḍ), §69.3, 192;
syllogism, repetitive (qiyās istithnāʾ ī), and contradictory (naqīḍ), §§87.1–2;
261, 262; and universal hypothetical, and contraposition (ʿaks al-naqīḍ),
300n281; and valuation (ḥukm), 189; §§83.3–84, §84.1, 220–221, 223; and
and weaker (aʿamm), 298n238. See conversion (ʿaks), §§76.1–77.1, §81, 200,
also assertion (taṣdīq); syllogism, 210–211; and disjunctive (munfaṣilah),
PRODUCTION OF SYLLOGSTIC 222; division of, §§60.1–62, §66,
CONCLUSION (intāj) 188–189; and hypothetical proposition
concomitance (dawarān), xxvii, §115, 268 (sharṭiyyah), 145; Ibn al-Muṭahhar
condition (sharṭ): and assertion (taṣdīq), al-Ḥillī on, 187; and mixes of modalized
89; and contradiction (tanāquḍ), premises (mukhtaliṭāt), §§99–100; and
§68, 190–191; and demonstration reductio (qiyās al-khulf), 266;

381 381
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conditional, kind of hypothetical correspondence, kind of signification

proposition (muttaṣilah) (cont.): and (muṭābaqah); implication
syllogism, repetitive (qiyās istithnāʾ ī), context theory, 277, 301n291
§110, §111, 262, 263–264; translating, xx, contingent, xvii, 87, 112, 167, 192, 275,
xxiv, 287n10; and truth vs. falsity, §39, 300n281
295n177 contradiction of propositions (tanāquḍ),
conditional, kind of modalized categorical §§67–68, 189–196, 212
proposition (mashrūṭah), xxiv, §§52.4– contradictory, of terms or propositions
55, §78.1, 203, 215–216 (naqīḍ): and absolute continuing
connection: between antecedent and proposition (qaḍiyyah ḥīniyyah
consequent in hypothetical proposition muṭlaqah), 174, 347; and absolute
(ʿalāqah), §60.2, §65.1; and implicative necessity proposition, 192; and
conditional (luzūmiyyah), 158, 180; absolute spread proposition (qaḍiyyah
between predicate and subject, §40; muntashirah muṭlaqah), 173; and
between predicate and verb, 147; absolute temporal proposition
between premises in syllogism (qaḍiyyah waqtiyyah muṭlaqah), 173;
(iqtirān), §90, §§91.1–5, §§93.1–5, and assertion (taṣdīq), what conduces
§§94.2–8, §§95.2–10, §96, §97, §103, to, §5; of coextensive (musāwin)
§104, §105, 240 terms, 127–128; and co-implication
connective syllogism (qiyās iqtirānī), §89.2, (talāzum), 222, 223–224; of compound
§§105–109.2, 224, 228–229, 265–266. propositions, 193–194; and connective
See also repetitive syllogism (qiyās syllogisms with hypothetical premises,
istithnāʾ ī) 260–261; and contradiction (tanāquḍ),
connexive logic, 196 §§68–72, 152, 195; and contraposition
consequences, §0, 102 (ʿaks al-naqīḍ), §82, §85.1, 197, 212, 213,
consequent (tābiʿ, tālin), §9, §§60.1–62, 215, 218, 219, 220–221; and conventional
§63, §65.1, §66, §87.2, §105, §107, proposition (ʿurfiyyah), 189–190; and
§§110–111, 92, 104, 180–181, 183–184, 185, conversion (ʿaks), §78.2, §79, §81, 152,
186, 211, 222, 223, 255, 257–258, 262, 264, 204, 209, 210; of disjoined terms, 128;
266. See also antecedent (matbūʿ ) and disjunction (mubāyanah, tabāyun,
constitutive (muqawwim), §34, §116.7, 94, infiṣāl), 181; entailment (istilzām) of,
110, 112, 117, 121–122, 134, 137, 157, 284, 297n221; and estimative propositions
286. See also divisive (muqassim) (wahmiyyāt), §118.10; and exclusive
containment, kind of signification disjunction (munfaṣilah ḥaqīqiyyah),
(taḍammun), §7, §9, §33, 97, 98–99, 181, 185–186; and externalist reading
101–104, 117, 132, 133, 135. See also (al-khārijiyyah al-mawḍūʿ ), 163;

382 382
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contradictory, of terms or propositions §§83.3–84, §84.1, 220–221, 223; and

(naqīḍ) (cont.): and hypothetical contradictory (naqīḍ), 152, 197; and
proposition (sharṭiyyah), §72, conversion (ʿaks), 198, 216, 219, 220;
§§87.1–3, 144, 195–196; and implicative definition, 211–212; and hypothetical
conditional (luzūmiyyah), 184; Keynes proposition (sharṭiyyah), §86, 219,
on, 126; and metathetic (maʿdūlah), 220–221; and syllogism (qiyās),
166; and mixes of modalized premises 227, 232–233; translating, 197; and
(mukhtaliṭāt), 238; of modalized universal affirmative proposition
propositions (qaḍiyyah muwajjahah), (qaḍiyyah mūjibah kulliyyah), §83.1,
168, 170, 347–348; and necessary 213–214. See also conversion, converse,
proposition (qaḍiyyah ḍarūriyyah), convertend (ʿaks)
154; and perpetual possible proposition contrary to proposition (yuḍādd), 210
(al-mumkinah al-dāʾimah), 174; and conventional proposition (ʿurfiyyah),
possible continuing proposition 189–190, 192, 215. See also general
(ḥīniyyah mumkinah), 175, 341–342; conventional proposition (ʿurfiyyah
and reductio (qiyās al-khulf), 266; ʿāmmah); special conventional
and simple propositions, 338–342; proposition (ʿurfiyyah khāṣṣah)
and singular proposition (shakhṣiyyah conventionally transferred signification
makhṣūṣah), 190; and syllogism (qiyās), (manqūl ʿurfī), §12.2, 99
§§89.1–2, §93.2, §94.3, §96, §109.1, conversion, converse, convertend (ʿaks):
§111, §113, 229, 234; and temporal in general, 196–201; of actuality
possible proposition (al-mumkinah proposition (fiʿliyyah), 160; and
al-waqtiyyah), 174; translating, xxvi, affirmative proposition (mūjibah), §78.1,
296n186; unity (ittiḥād) between §79, 198, 199, 207–209; and assertion
proposition and, 295n181; and universal (taṣdīq), what conduces to, §5; and
(kullī), §§27.1–4; and valuation (ḥukm), contradiction (tanāquḍ), 189; and
189; and the whole of the part shared, contradictory (naqīḍ), §78.2, §79, §81,
117. See also indefinite proposition 152, 204, 209, 210; and contraposition
(muhmalah); metathetic, said of (ʿaks al-naqīḍ), 198, 216, 219, 220;
categorical proposition with indefinite and counterexample (takhalluf), 201;
terms (maʿdūlah); privative, of term definition, 211; and descriptional
(ʿadamī) proposition, 203, 205–206; and
contraposition (ʿaks al-naqīḍ): in general, disjunctive (munfaṣilah), §81, 200–201,
§§82–86; Avicenna on, 211, 212, 213, 210, 211; and essentialist and externalist
214, 219; and conditional, kind of readings, 163; general conventional
hypothetical proposition (muttaṣilah), proposition (ʿurfiyyah ʿāmmah), §76.2;

383 383
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conversion, converse, convertend (ʿaks) (ḥīniyyah mumkinah), 175, 341; and

(cont.): and hypothetical proposition relation (nisbah), 148
(sharṭiyyah), §87.1, 197, 199, 210, 211; correlation (taḍāyuf), §60.2, 103, 180, 183
and mixes of modalized premises correlative, 101, 129, 139, 180, 183
(mukhtaliṭāt), §§102–104, 238, 249, 250, correspondence, kind of signification
251, 252, 253; and modal proposition (muṭābaqah), §7, §§9–10, §33, 98–99,
(qaḍiyyah muwajjahah), 170; and 101–104, 117, 132, 133, 135, 150. See also
negative proposition (sālibah), §74, containment, kind of signification
§§80–81, 198, 199, 209; and non- (taḍammun); implication
perpetual-for-some conventional corrupt form (ṣūrah fāsidah), §119, 281
proposition (ʿurfiyyah lā dāʾimah fī corrupt matter (māddah fāsidah), §119, 281
l-baʿḍ), 178, 343–344; and particular counterexample (takhalluf), §115, 119, 120,
(juzʾ ī), §28, §77.2; and possible 128, 134, 153, 154, 155, 198, 201, 205, 207,
proposition (qaḍiyyah mumkinah), §80; 211, 214, 217–218, 228, 241, 246, 248, 250,
proofs for, 197–198; and reductio (qiyās 251, 253, 292n93
al-khulf), 296n193; simple conversion, counterpart (qasīmah), 89, 277
197; straight conversion (mustawin), creation, 87, 282
§73, §83.1, §84.2, 197, 199, 213–214,
216, 217–218; of the stronger (akhaṣṣ), Darapti, §94.3, 235, 299n260
198; and syllogism (qiyās), §§93.2–4, Darii, 214, 215, 231
§94.7, §§94.3–4, §95.3, §95.6, §95.10, Datisi, §94.5, 235
§§95.8–9, §96, 226, 227, 233, 236, Davidson, Herbert, 292n99
237–238; of thirteen propositions, 178; declarative (jāzim), 269, 271, 278
translating, 197; and universal (kullī), deficient definition (ḥadd nāqiṣ), §36, 137,
§26, §§74–76.1, §§78.1–2, §81. See also 138. See also complete definition (ḥadd
contraposition (ʿaks al-naqīḍ) tāmm)
convertible proposition (munʿakisah), deficient delineation (rasm nāqiṣ), §36, 137,
§100, §103, §104, 233 138. See also complete delineation (rasm
Copenhaver, Brian P., xxv tāmm)
copula (rābiṭah): in general, §40; and definiens (al-muʿarrif), 136–137
affirmative proposition (mūjibah), definition, broad sense (taʿrīf): in general,
§50.2; and categorical proposition §§35–37.2, 135–137; in Avicennian
(ḥamliyyah), 145, 146–147, 148, 149; tradition, 95; complete definition (ḥadd
and four-part proposition (rubāʿiyyah), tāmm), §36, 137; defects afflicting,
167; and metathetic (maʿdūlah), 166; 139–140; and demonstration (burhān),
and possible continuing proposition 286; and differentia (faṣl), 117;

384 384
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definition, broad sense (taʿrīf) (cont.): and general conventional proposition

essential definition (ḥadd), 136; and (ʿurfiyyah ʿāmmah), §52.5, §69.4; and
expression (lafẓ), 139, 140; incomplete implicative conditional (luzūmiyyah),
definition (ḥadd nāqiṣ), §36, 137, 138; 159; and mixes of modalized premises
and meaning (maʿnan), 135, 136, 137, 139, (mukhtaliṭāt), 240, 241, 242, 247, 248,
140; ordering (tartīb), 87; and principle 249, 253; necessity, descriptional, 172–
of science (mabdaʾ ), §120.1; and species 173, 202; propositions, descriptional,
(nawʿ ), 290n65 §76, §102, 203, 205–206, 217, 287n10;
delineation (rasm, tarsīm), §3, §20, §23, reading, descriptional, 152; and
§36, 88, 92–93, 111–112, 118–119, 123, 129, temporality conditions, 169; and what is
135–136, 137–138, 226, 229, 287n16 sought (maṭlūb), 247
demonstration (burhān), §80, §117, §118.4, determinate, kind of categorical
§120.3, 87, 88, 93, 122, 219, 269, 270–271, proposition with positive terms
274, 275, 277–278, 280, 283, 285, 286, (muḥaṣṣalah), xx, §48, 164. See
301n295 also metathetic, said of categorical
demonstration of the fact (burhān innī), proposition with indefinite terms
§117, 276, 301n296 (maʿdūlah)
demonstration of the reasoned fact (burhān Di Vincenzo, Silvia, 289n47, 292n98
limmī), §117, 276, 301n296 dialectic (jadal), §§118.2–4, §119, 87–88,
denial (nafy), §110. See also alternative 267, 269, 277–278, 300n289
denial (kind of disjunction, māniʿah min differentia (faṣl), §5, §§19–21, §23, §34, §36,
al-jamʿ ) 95, 101, 109, 110, 112–120, 123, 132–133,
denominative (mushtaqq), 106, 107, 114, 115, 134–138, 141–142, 190, 291n84
116, 146, 147, 172 Dimaris, 236–237, 250, 252
denying one part of a hypothetical (raf ʿ ), Disamis, §94.7, 235, 300n281
§110, 262. See also affirming one part of discourse (qawl), xiii, §38, §88, §118.3, 127,
a hypothetical (waḍ ʿ ) 141–142, 226–227, 228, 229, 261, 262,
derivative analogue (maqīs), §115 270, 277, 278, 279, 281, 301n291
description (waṣf): and contradiction discrepant conclusions (ikhtilāf mūjib
(tanāquḍ), 193; and contraposition li-ʿadam al-intāj), §92, §94.1, §95.1, §97,
(ʿaks al-naqīḍ), 215; definition, 225–226, 231–232, 235, 237–238, 244,
287n16; and essence (dhāt), 156; and 248, 250
expression (lafẓ), 107; and externalist disjunction (mubāyanah, tabāyun, infiṣāl):
reading (al-khārijiyyah al-mawḍūʿ ), in general, 179; complete disjunction
159; and fallacy (mughālaṭah), 282; (tabāyun kullī), §27.3–4, 128; and
and general conditional proposition connective syllogisms with hypothetical
(mashrūṭah ʿāmmah), §52.4, §69.3; premises, §§108.1–109.1, 259;

385 385
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disjunction (mubāyanah, tabāyun, infiṣāl) 262–263. See also alternative denial

(cont.): and contradiction (tanāquḍ), (kind of disjunction, māniʿah min
193, 195; contradictory (naqīḍ) of, al-jamʿ )
127; exclusive disjunction (munfaṣilah distinct term, heteronymous (mubāyin),
ḥaqīqiyyah), §60.3, §61, §64, §87.1, §13, §30, 106, 107–108
§87.2, §111, 181–182, 183, 185–186, 222, distinguishing (tamyīz, imtiyāz), xx,
261, 263, 295n165; and hypothetical §§20–21, 151
proposition (sharṭiyyah), §§87.1–3; division (taqsīm): compound, 104; of
inclusive disjunction (māniʿah min conditionals, §66; and definitions
al-khuluww), §60.3, §61, §64, §87.1, (taʿrīf), §37.1; of differentiae (faṣl),
§106, §108.2, §109.1, §111, 90, 181–182, 134; exhaustiveness of (ḥaṣr), §115,
193, 222, 223–224, 257, 260, 263, 123, 269; and expression (lafẓ), 105,
295n165; partial disjunction (tabāyun 106–107, 107–108; of hypothetical
juzʾ ī), §27.4, 128, 163; and principal proposition (sharṭiyyah), §39, §§60.1–6,
analogue (maqīs ʿalayhi), 269; strength 144–145, 188; and induction (istiqrāʾ ),
of, 181; and syllogism, repetitive (qiyās 268; of knowledge (ʿilm), §§2–3; and
istithnāʾ ī), §110. See also alternative natural universal (kullī ṭabī ʿī), 125;
denial (kind of disjunction, māniʿah of propositions, 142–143; and simple
min al-jamʿ ); coextensive, equivalent meanings, §§16.2–17, §§22.1–22.2; of
(musāwin); overlap (ʿumūm min wajh) syllogism (qiyās), §90, §§105–109.2; of a
disjunctive (munfaṣilah): in appendix, thing into itself and something else, 90;
346; Avicenna on, 180; coincidental of universal (kullī), 111
disjunctive (munfaṣilah ittifāqiyyah), divisive (muqassim), 134. See also
§61; commentaries on, xx; and constitutive (muqawwim)
connective syllogisms with hypothetical dummy terms, 155, 168
premises, §§108.1–109.1, 255, 256, 257,
258–259; and contradiction (tanāquḍ), ecthesis (iftirāḍ), §77.1, §93.4, §94.5, §94.6,
§71, 193; and contradictory (naqīḍ), 196; §94.7, §94.8, §96, 197, 206–207, 208,
and contraposition (ʿaks al-naqīḍ), 221; 217, 218–219, 226, 233, 234, 235, 296n194.
and conversion (ʿaks), §81, 200–201, See also expose said of item or term
210, 211; division of, 188–189; and subject to ecthesis (farḍ)
hypothetical proposition (sharṭiyyah), elided intermediate conclusions (mafṣūl
§39, §60.1, §60.3, §65.2, §66, §§87.1–3, al-natāʾij), §112, 265. See also
145, 180, 188; Ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī compound, said of term, proposition,
on, 187; oppositional disjunctive or syllogism (murakkab)
(ʿinādiyyah), §61; and syllogism, endoxic propositions (mashhūrāt), §118.2,
repetitive (qiyās istithnāʾ ī), §111, 277–278, 279

386 386
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entailment (istilzām), §9, §27.2, §35, §63, essential accident (ʿaraḍ dhātī), §5,
§77.2, §§87.1–3, §109.1, 101–103, 122, §§120.1–2, 94–95, 122, 123, 283,
186. See also containment, kind of 284, 290n67. See also constitutive
signification (taḍammun); implication (muqawwim)
e-proposition (qaḍiyyah sālibah kulliyyah), essential definition (ḥadd), 136
162, 163, 165, 171, 176, 178, 198, 201, 202– essentialist reading (al-ḥaqīqiyyah
203, 204, 210–211, 214, 215, 216, 218–219, al-mawḍūʿ ), §50.1, 157–158, 160–163, 166
220, 244, 246, 296n193, 330–345, 346. estimative propositions (wahmiyyāt),
See also universal negative proposition §118.10, 279, 280
(qaḍiyyah sālibah kulliyyah) Euclid, xviii, 287n11, 287n12, 302n307,
equivocal (mushtarak), §12.2, 89–90, 99, 302n309, 302n310;
106–107, 281, 301n302 —WORKS OF, Elements, 91, 254
equivocation (ishtirāk), 90, 99, 301n301 Euler diagrams, §83n15, 126
eristic (mushāghibī), §119, 269 evident (bayyin), 122, 125
essence (dhāt): according to (bi-ḥasab example (tamthīl): in general, 267–269,
al-ḥaqīqah), §45, 147, 155, 156–157; 278; of fallacy (mughālaṭah), §119;
and conversion (ʿaks), 205; and of modal propositions (qaḍiyyah
demonstration (burhān), 283; distinct muwajjahah), §52.3, §52.5, §54, §56;
in, 107; and externalist reading and syllogism (qiyās), 227–228. See also
(al-khārijiyyah al-mawḍūʿ ), 159, counterexample (takhalluf)
161; and implicative conditional exclusive disjunction (munfaṣilah
(luzūmiyyah), 158–159; in its essence (fī ḥaqīqiyyah), §60.3, §61, §64, §87.1,
jawharihi), §5; and mixes of modalized §87.2, §111, 181–182, 183, 185–186, 222,
premises (mukhtaliṭāt), 240, 248; 261, 263, 295n165. See also alternative
of modal propositions (qaḍiyyah denial (kind of disjunction); inclusive
muwajjahah), §§52.1–53; and necessary disjunction (māniʿah min al-khuluww)
proposition (qaḍiyyah ḍarūriyyah), exhaustiveness of division (ḥaṣr), §115, 123,
154; with respect to (bi-ḥasab al-dhāt), 269
§53, §54, §55, §56, §57, §58; of subject explanatory phrase (qawl shāriḥ), §6, 95
(dhāt al-mawḍūʿ ), 156; and temporality explicit intermediate conclusions
conditions, 169; and what is sought (mawṣūl al-natāʾij), §112, 265. See also
(maṭlūb), 247. See also quiddity compound, said of term, proposition, or
(māhiyyah); reality (ḥaqīqah) syllogism (murakkab)
essential (dhātī), 109, 110, 112–113, 115, 118, expose said of item or term subject to
119, 120, 121, 129, 132–133, 137 ecthesis (farḍ), §77.1, §78.3, §84.1, §85.1,
§85.2, §93.4, §94.5, 218

387 387
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expository phrase (qawl shāriḥ), 137 external faculties (quwan ẓāhirah), §116.3,
expression (lafẓ): in general, xx, §§7–8, 272. See also internal faculties (quwan
87, 96–100; complete expression (lafẓ bāṭinah)
tāmm), §14.1–2, 96, 108, 141; compound externalist reading (al-khārijiyyah
expression, §10, §14.1, §14.3, 104–105, al-mawḍūʿ ), §50.1, 157–158, 159–163, 166
108, 141; and conception (taṣawwur), extreme of proposition (ṭaraf), §109.1,
89; and containment (taḍammun), 103; §116.2, 271–272, 274
and copula (rābiṭah), §40, 147; and extrinsic (al-khārij), 100, 103, 110–111, 120,
definition, broad sense (taʿrīf), 135, 121, 122, 123, 169, 284, 286, 289n37
139, 140; and fallacy (mughālaṭah), 281,
301n302; figurative (majāz), §12.3; and Faḍlallāh Mahdī, xxiii
implicative conditional (luzūmiyyah), Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī: about, xv–xvi, xviii,
158; incomplete compound expression, xix, xx, xxv; on actuality (fiʿl), 290n49;
§14.1, §14.3; indefinite vs. determinate, on conception (taṣawwur), 89, 92,
§50.2; indicating quantification, 180; 288n25; on connective syllogisms
informative (khabar), 141; literal with hypothetical premises, 255;
(ḥaqīqah), §12.3, 107; and meaning on contradiction (tanāquḍ), 191; on
(maʿnan), 108, 110, 289n39; and conversion (ʿaks), 199; on creation,
metathetic (maʿdūlah), 165, 166; mode 282; on definition, broad sense (taʿrīf),
(jihah) of proposition, §51, 167; name 138; on delineation (rasm, tarsīm), 120,
(ism), §11; and necessary proposition 291n78; on division (taqsīm), 105; on
(qaḍiyyah ḍarūriyyah), 154; non- essentialist and externalist readings,
restrictive of incomplete expression 157; on expression (lafẓ), 97, 99, 108;
(ghayr taqyīdī), §14.3; particle (adāh on fallacy (mughālaṭah), 280, 281,
ḥarf), §11; particular (juzʾ ī), §15; and 301n299; on hypothetical proposition
predication, denominative (mushtaqq), (sharṭiyyah), 144; innovations by,
146; quantifier (sūr), §42; with 129; Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī on, 282; on
respect to (min jihat al-lafẓ), §119; predication, denominative (mushtaqq),
and signification theory, 101; simple 147; and Rāzians, 153, 155, 199, 239,
expression, §10, 96, 97, 104, 105, 107, 240–241; on reality (ḥaqīqah), 142; on
143; strange and barbarous, §37.2; signification, 101–102; on subjects of
synonymous (murādif), xxiii, §13, §119; sciences (mawḍūʿāt), 94; on syllogism
transferred (manqūl), §12.2; universal (qiyās), 226–227, 237; on thirteen
(kullī), §15, §24; verb (kalimah), §11. See propositions, 168, 170; on what is said
also name (ism) in answer to “what is it?” (al-maqūl fī
external existence (fī l-khārij), §45–46, 155, jawāb mā huwa), 132, 133;
156–157

388 388
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Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī: WORKS OF, part shared, 117. See also true, truth
Mulakhkhaṣ, 199, 280, 294n135 (ṣādiq, ṣidq)
fallacy (mughālaṭah), §119, 269, 280–282, false propositions, §§63–64, §118.10, 279
301n300, 301n302 Felapton, §94.4, 235, 248–249, 299n260
Fallahi, Asad, 127 Ferio, 197, 202, 203, 204, 211, 231, 237,
false, falsity (kādhib, kidhb): and 296n193
affirmative vs. negative propositions, Ferison, §94.6, 235
149; and coextensive universal Fesapo, 236, 250, 251, 253
(musāwin), §27.1; and co-implication Festino, §93.4, 233, 245
(talāzum), 223; and connective figurative (majāz), §12.3
syllogisms with hypothetical premises, form (ṣurah): in general, xxi, 269; and
256; and contradiction (tanāquḍ), conceded propositions (musallamāt),
§§67–68, §71, 190, 191–192, 195, 295n181; 278; conception (taṣawwur), §1;
and contraposition (ʿaks al-naqīḍ), 212, connection-form, §90; and connective
214, 217; and conversion (ʿaks), §74, syllogisms with hypothetical premises,
§76.2, §77.2, §§78.2–3, §81, 199–200, §105; corrupt form (ṣūrah fāsidah), §119,
204–205, 207–208, 209; and discourse 281; of expression (lafẓ), §11; and fallacy
(qawl), §§38–39; and essentialist (mughālaṭah), 281–282; of hypothetical
reading (al-ḥaqīqiyyah al-mawḍūʿ ), proposition (sharṭiyyah), §66; and
162–163; and estimative propositions induction (istiqrāʾ ), 268; and matter
(wahmiyyāt), §118.10, 279; and example (māddah), 293n132; on poetry (shiʿr),
(tamthīl), §115; and externalist reading 279; and syllogism (qiyās), 229
(al-khārijiyyah al-mawḍūʿ ), 161, foundationalism, 288n24
162–163; and fallacy (mughālaṭah), four-part proposition (rubāʿiyyah),
§119, 281; and hypothetical proposition 166–167, 293n122
(sharṭiyyah), §60.3, §§63–64, 179–180, Fresison, 236–237, 250, 251, 253
180–181, 183–184; and implicative
conditional (luzūmiyyah), 183–184; Gacek, Adam, xxiii
and information (khabar), §14.2; and general (ʿāmm): absoluteness, general, 178;
metathetic (maʿdūlah), 166; and mixes affirmative general conditional, §53; and
of modalized premises (mukhtaliṭāt), connective syllogisms with hypothetical
240, 241, 248, 251; in opening prayer, premises, §109.1; and conversion (ʿaks),
§0; and propositions based on 199; and definition, broad sense (taʿrīf),
sequential testimony (mutawātirah), 137; more general (aʿamm), xxvi, §22.2,
274; and syllogism (qiyās), §113, 227, §§27.2–3, §28, §30, §35, §68, §78.1,
229; and syllogism, repetitive (qiyās §85.1, §111, 95, 116, 117, 127–128, 131, 132,
istithnāʾ ī), 262; and the whole of the 133, 138, 168, 181, 191, 215, 218, 278;

389 389
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general (ʿāmm) (cont.): propositions, to, §5; and contradiction (tanāquḍ),

general, §78.2, §99, §102; translating, 190; and contradictory (naqīḍ), §72,
xxvi; utility, general, §118.2 196; and definition, broad sense (taʿ rīf),
general absolute proposition (qaḍiyyah §36, 137; definition of, 113, 130–131;
muṭlaqah ʿāmmah), xxvi, §52.6, §§53–58, and delineation, incomplete (rasm
§59.2, §69.2, §70, §§74–75, §78.4, §83.4, nāqiṣ), 138; and differentia (faṣl), §19,
§85.2, §104, 171, 173, 175, 189, 192–193, §21, 115, 118–119, 119–120, 134; and
194, 197, 201, 202, 206, 209, 219–220, discourse (qawl), 141–142; fallacy
329, 332, 347. See also inclusion (ʿumūm (mughālaṭah) example, §119; hierarchy
muṭlaq); special absolute proposition of, 129–130; inferior genus (jins sāfil),
(qaḍiyyah muṭlaqah khāṣṣah) §31, §34; intermediate genus (jins
general accident (ʿaraḍ ʿāmm), §23, 109, 112, mutawassiṭ), §31, §34, 115, 123, 130,
121, 123, 130, 131 134; isolated genus (jins mufrad), §31,
general conditional proposition (mashrūṭah 130, 131; natural proposition (qaḍiyyah
ʿāmmah), §52.4, §52.5, §53, §69.3, ṭabī ʿiyyah) example, §43; Porphyry
§§76.1–2, §78.1, §83.3, §83.4, 172, 175, on, 109, 114–115, 129; and proprium
192–193, 202–203, 205–206, 207, 209, (khāṣṣah), 123; proximate (qarīb) said
215–216, 219–220, 242, 244–245, 247, of, §18.1, §21, §36, 115, 120, 135, 137–138;
251–252, 299n260, 329, 331, 347 and relative species (nawʿ iḍāfī),
general conventional proposition (ʿurfiyyah §§29–30, 132; remote (baʿīd) said of, 115,
ʿāmmah), §52.5, §54, §69.4, §§76.1–2, 137, 138; scientific questions example,
§78.1, §83.3, §83.4, §103, 172–173, 174, §120.2; and signification theory, 101;
189–190, 192, 202, 203, 207, 209, 215, and simple meanings, §§17–18.1, §19,
219–220, 242, 244, 245, 252, 301n295, §21, §23, 117–118; and species (nawʿ ),
329, 332, 347 112–113, 131, 134; supreme genus (ʿālin
general possibility proposition, 175, 192, jins al-ajnās), §31, §34, 119–120, 123, 130,
201, 214, 215 134; and syllogism (qiyās), 227, 229; and
general possible proposition (mumkinah the whole of the part shared, 114, 115,
ʿāmmah), xxvi, §52.7, §55, §59.1, §59.2, 291n68
§68, §69.1, §77.2, §80, §100, 167, 171, geometry, 93, 94, 254, 279, 283, 284, 285,
173, 175, 192, 201, 202, 207, 210, 214, 217, 302n307
219–220, 239, 242, 245, 294n139, 329, grammar, 88, 105
333, 347 guideline (ḍābiṭ), §0, §59.2. See also rule
generality in one respect (ʿumūm min (qāʿidah)
wajh): See overlap (ʿumūm min wajh) Gutas, Dimitri, x, xxixn13, xxixn15, 288n27,
genus (jins): compound, 119; and 301n293
conception (taṣawwur), what conduces

390 390
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Ḥasan ibn Muḥammad ibn Ḥusayn Ibn al-Akfānī, xviii

al-Amlashī l-ʿAjamī, 299n264 Ibn Khaldūn, xviii, 270
heresy, xiv Ibn Mubarakshāh, 238
ḥīna-clause, §69.3, 174, 175, 178, 192–193, Ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī: about, xv–xvi,
341 xviii, xix, xxii, xxiii, xxv; “accidental
hypothetical proposition (sharṭiyyah): individuating factors” (umūr
in general, 179–180; Avicenna on, mushakhkhiṣah ʿāriḍah), 111; on
144, 180, 183, 186; complex, 143, ancients (al-qudamāʾ ), 193, 228–229;
144; and connective syllogisms with on association (al-istiṣḥāb), 295n167;
hypothetical premises, §§105–109.2, on Avicenna, xix–xx; as Avicennian
254–261; contradictory (naqīḍ) of, purist, 152–153, 160–161, 219; on
§72, 144, 195–196; and contraposition co-implication (talāzum), 222–223, 224,
(ʿaks al-naqīḍ), §72, §§87.1–3, 144, 298n223; on conception (taṣawwur),
195–196; and conversion (ʿaks), §87.1, 89, 91–92, 288n22; on conditional
197, 199, 210, 211; defining, §§38–39; and hypothetical proposition (muttaṣilah),
disjunctive (munfaṣilah), §39, §60.1, 187; on connective syllogisms with
§60.3, §65.2, §66, §§87.1–3, 145, 180, 188; hypothetical premises, 256, 257–258,
dividing from categorical proposition 259; on contradiction (tanāquḍ), 191,
(ḥamliyyah), 142–143; divisions of, 193–194; on contradictory (naqīḍ), 195,
§39, §§60.1–6, 144–145, 188; implicate 196; on contraposition (ʿaks al-naqīḍ),
(lāzim) of, §§87.1–3; and negation 213, 214, 215, 216, 217–218, 219, 221,
(salb), §62, 145, 179, 183, 184, 185; part 297n214; on conversion (ʿaks), 198,
(juzʾ ) of, §§60.1–61, §63, §§87.2–3, 145, 199–200, 201–202, 203–204, 205, 207,
183; particular (juzʾ ī), §§65.1–2, 180, 208–209, 211; on copula (rābiṭah), 147;
186; and repetitive syllogism (qiyās on definition, broad sense (taʿrīf), 135,
istithnāʾ ī), §§110–111; simple, 143; 136, 138, 139–140; on delineation (rasm,
squares of opposition, §72, 144, 195–196; tarsīm), 112, 118, 123; on demonstration
and syllogism (qiyās), §90, 228–229, of the (reasoned) fact (burhān
230, 255; and syllogism, repetitive innī/limmī), 276; on disjunction
(qiyās istithnāʾ ī), 262–263; and truth, (mubāyanah, tabāyun, infiṣāl), 181–182;
§§60.2–64, 144, 179–180, 180–181, 182, on division (taqsīm), 106–107, 120; on
183, 184–185; universal (kullī), §§65.1–2, endoxic propositions (mashhūrāt), 277;
180, 186. See also antecedent (matbūʿ, on essentialist reading (al-ḥaqīqiyyah
muqaddam); categorical proposition al-mawḍūʿ ), 160–161, 162–163, 294n136;
(ḥamliyyah); conditional, kind of on exclusive disjunction (munfaṣilah
hypothetical proposition (muttaṣilah); ḥaqīqiyyah), 185–186; on fallacy
consequent (tābiʿ, tālin) (mughālaṭah), 280–282, 301n300;

391 391
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Ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī (cont.): on al-waqtiyyah) proposition, 340; on the

genus (jins), 112–113; on hypothetical whole of the part shared, 117
proposition (sharṭiyyah), 144–145, —WORKS OF, Asrār, 284
145–146, 180, 183–184, 293n113; on Ibn Wāṣil al-Ḥamawī, 153–154
implication (luzum, mulazamah), 100, ignorance (jahl), 271, 278, 301n292
166, 182, 184; on implicitly syllogistic Īl-Khānid Empire, xv
proposition (qaḍiyyah qiyāsātuhā image-eliciting proposition (mukhayyilah),
maʿahā), 274; on induction (istiqrāʾ ), §118.8, 269, 278–279
267; on isolated species (nawʿ mufrad), implicant (malzūm), xxvii, §22.2, §45,
130; on logical universal (kullī manṭiqī), §109.1, 100, 122, 184, 200, 222, 260, 263,
126; on mental proposition (qaḍiyyah 264
dhihniyyah), 294n138; on mixes of implicate (lāzim): and co-implication
modalized premises (mukhtaliṭāt), (talāzum), 222; and connective
239, 247, 249, 250–251; on modal syllogisms with hypothetical premises,
proposition (qaḍiyyah muwajjahah), §109.1, 260; and contraposition (ʿaks
167, 242; on natural proposition al-naqīḍ), 213, 216; and conversion
(qaḍiyyah ṭabī ʿiyyah), 151; on necessary (ʿaks), §74, §76.2, §§78.2–3, 200,
proposition (qaḍiyyah ḍarūriyyah), 201; and evident (bayyin), 122; and
154; on poetry (shiʿr), 279; on possible expression (lafẓ), §§8–9; and extrinsic
actual proposition (ʿalā taqdīr wuqūʿ (al-khārij), 111; inseparable, §22.2,
al-mumkin), 153; on predicables, 112; on 100–101, 121, 122; and partial disjunction
primitive premises, 271; on proposition (tabāyun juzʾ ī), §27.4; and signification
of certainty (yaqīniyyah), 271; on theory, 99, 100, 102, 103, 289n42; and
propositions based on experience simple meaning, §§22.1–2, §23; and
(mujarrabah), 272; on propositions single-reality instantiation, 123; and
based on sequential testimony strength, 198; and subjects of sciences
(mutawātirah), 273–274; on proprium (mawḍūʿāt), 284; and substrate
(khāṣṣah), 123; on received proposition (maʿrūḍ), 291n82; and syllogism,
(maqbūlah), 278; on relative species repetitive (qiyās istithnāʾ ī), 263, 264;
(nawʿ iḍāfī), 129; on science (ʿilm), 284; translating, xxvii; and the whole of
on signification theory, 97; on simple the part shared, 114. See also implicant
vs. compound expressions, 104; on (malzūm); opposed (muʿānid);
species (nawʿ ), 290n65; on subjects separable (mufāriq)
of sciences (mawḍūʿāt), 289n35; on implication (luzum, mulazamah):
syllogism (qiyās), 228–229, 237–238; on Avicenna on, 289n37; and
syllogism, repetitive (qiyās istithnāʾ ī), co-implication (talāzum), 224; and
261; on temporal possible (al-mumkinah conception (taṣawwur), 92;

392 392
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implication (luzum, mulazamah) 119, 136, 153, 154, 157, 161, 167, 184, 185,
(cont.): and conversion (ʿaks), 202; 202, 203–205, 208, 221, 240, 246, 249,
and definition, broad sense (taʿrīf), 251, 264, 265, 266, 273, 282, 294n138,
135–136; and hypothetical proposition 296n193
(sharṭiyyah), §87.1, 180; Ibn al-Muṭahhar in actuality (bi-l-iṭlāq, bi-l-fiʿl), 160,
al-Ḥillī on, 166, 182, 184; and 203–204, 220, 261
implicative conditional (luzūmiyyah), in its essence (fī jawharihi), §5. See also
158–159; and indefinite terms, 166; and accidental (ʿaraḍī); constitutive
negation (salb), §62; of one meaning (muqawwim)
by another, 97–100; and particular inclusion (ʿumūm muṭlaq), xxvi, §27.2,
negative proposition (qaḍiyyah 127. See also coextensive, equivalent
sālibah juzʾiyyah), 150; and reductio (musāwin); disjunction (mubāyanah,
(qiyās al-khulf), 266; and signification tabāyun, infiṣāl); overlap (ʿumūm min
theory, 133; and simple meanings, wajh)
§22.2; and syllogism, repetitive (qiyās inclusive disjunction (māniʿah min
istithnāʾ ī), §111, 262, 263–264. See also al-khuluww), §60.3, §61, §64, §87.1,
co-implication (talāzum) §106, §108.2, §109.1, §111, 90, 181–182,
implication, signification by implication 193, 222, 223–224, 257, 260, 263,
(iltizām), §§7–8, 100–104. See also 295n165. See also alternative denial
containment, kind of signification (kind of disjunction); exclusive
(taḍammun); correspondence, kind of disjunction (munfaṣilah ḥaqīqiyyah)
signification (muṭābaqah) incompatibility (al-tanāfī), §39, §60.3,
implicative, of conditional (luzūmiyyah), §77.1, 179, 197, 200, 248, 260, 263
§60.2, §62, §63, §87.1, §110, 158–159, incomplete definition (ḥadd nāqiṣ), §36,
179, 180, 182, 183, 184–185, 196, 211, 137, 138. See also complete definition
255–256, 262, 266. See also coincidental (ḥadd tāmm)
conditional (muttaṣilah ittifāqiyyah); incomplete delineation (rasm nāqiṣ), §36,
oppositional disjunctive (ʿinādiyyah) 137, 138. See also complete delineation
implicitly syllogistic proposition (qaḍiyyah (rasm tāmm)
qiyāsātuhā maʿahā), §116.8, 274 incomplete expression (lafẓ nāqiṣ), §14.1,
imposed, 88, 89, 96–101, 105, 107, 164 §14.3, 96, 108
imposition (waḍ ʿ ), §7, §§12.2–3, 97, 98–99, incomplete part of hypothetical
102, 104–105, 107, 164, 226. See also proposition (juzʾ ghayr tāmm), §106,
affirming one part of a hypothetical §109.1, 255, 256, 259. See also complete
(waḍ ʿ ); singular situation (waḍ ʿ ) part of hypothetical proposition (juzʾ
impossibility (istiḥālah imtināʿ ), §9, §74, tāmm)
§109.1, §111, §113, §116.6, §120.3, 103, 116,

393 393
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inconceivable (muḥāl), §27.1, §27.2, §81, intermediate species (nawʿ mutawassiṭ),

110. See also absurd (muḥāl) §30, §32, §34, 123, 130, 134
indefinite proposition (muhmalah), §43, internal faculties (quwan bāṭinah), §116.3,
§§48–50.2, §65.2, 151, 164, 165 272. See also external faculties (quwan
indefinite term, 126, 140, 151, 164–166, 169, ẓāhirah)
212, 215, 294n145, 294n147 interrogatives (maṭālib), 290n61
individual (shakhṣ), xxvi, §12.1, §16.2, §28, intrinsic to the answer to “what is it?” §33,
§§42–43, §45, 106, 123, 155–156, 157–158, 133. See also what arises on the way to
161, 162, 171, 218. See also member (fard) “what is it?” (wāqiʿ fī ṭarīq mā huwa)
individual items (afrād), §45.1, 155–156 intuited propositions (ḥadsiyyāt), §116.5,
induction (istiqrāʾ ), §114, 227–228, 259, 264, §116.7, 91, 272–273, 274, 278
266–267, 268, 269, 272, 278 i-proposition (qaḍiyyah mūjibah juzʾiyyah),
inferences, xx, xxi, §§73–80, §§82–86, 151–152, 162–163, 165, 171, 194, 195, 198,
§§98–104, §109.1, 93, 97, 152, 153, 159, 206, 207–209, 210–211, 212–213, 216,
160, 196, 211, 221–222, 227, 259–260, 261, 217–218, 232, 330–345, 346, 347–348. See
264, 266, 268, 330, 342 also particular affirmative proposition
inferior genus (jins sāfil), §31, §34 (qaḍiyyah mūjibah juzʾiyyah)
inferior species (nawʿ al-anwāʿ ), §32, §34, Islam, 87
134 isolated genus (jins mufrad), §31, 130, 131
inferred (naẓarī), §§2–4, 88, 90, 91–92, isolated species (nawʿ mufrad), §30, 130, 131
93. See also necessary, of knowledge
(ḍarūrī); primitive, of knowledge Joseph, Horace W.B., 126
(badīhī) judgment (ḥukm): and analysis (inḥilal),
influencing (taʾthīr), §118.2, §118.8 143; and assertion (taṣdīq), §1, §6,
information (khabar), §14.2 89–90; and categorical proposition
inseparable, xxvii, 120–122, 123, 183 (ḥamliyyah), §40, §42, 148, 149;
instrument (ālah), §3, 93 and contradictory (naqīḍ), 196; and
intellect, 89, 110, 125, 145, 161, 226, 271–272, contraposition (ʿaks al-naqīḍ), §83.4,
274, 276, 277, 279, 287n14, 292n99 221; and conversion (ʿaks), 200–201;
intelligence, 87, 101, 115, 130–131, 271–272, and demonstration of the reasoned
287n14, 292n99 fact (burhān limmī), 276; and discourse
intelligibles, 94–95, 125, 279 (qawl), 142; and disjunction
intermediary (wāsiṭah), §116.8 (mubāyanah, tabāyun, infiṣāl), 181; and
intermediate conclusions, §112 endoxic propositions (mashhūrāt),
intermediate genus (jins mutawassiṭ), §31, §118.2; and estimative propositions
§34, 115, 123, 130, 134 (wahmiyyāt), §118.10, 279; and
example (tamthīl), §115, 267–268;

394 394
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judgment (ḥukm): and externalist reading Lameer, Joep, x, xxxn32, 287n18, 301n291
(al-khārijiyyah al-mawḍūʿ ), 157–158, legal reasoning, xiv, xv, §118.3
159, 161; and fallacy (mughālaṭah), 281; legal schools, 87
and implicitly syllogistic proposition legislatively transferred signification
(qaḍiyyah qiyāsātuhā maʿahā), §116.8, (manqūl sharʿī), §12.2, 99
274; and induction (istiqrāʾ ), §114, literal (ḥaqīqah), §12.3, 107
266, 267; and intuited propositions logic, xiii–xiv, xviii, 87, 88, 93, 94–95, 270,
(ḥadsiyyāt), §116.5, 272–273; and mixes 287n15
of modalized premises (mukhtaliṭāt), logical universal (kullī manṭiqī), §25, 125–126
240; and modal proposition (qaḍiyyah Łukasiewicz, Jan, 296n192
muwajjahah), 167; and natural
proposition (qaḍiyyah ṭabī ʿiyyah), major premise (muqaddamah kubrā): and
151; and observational propositions connective syllogisms with hypothetical
(mushāhadāt), §116.3; and particular premises, §105, §107, 257–258, 259, 260;
negative proposition (qaḍiyyah and conversion (ʿaks), 204, 208; and
sālibah juzʾiyyah), 150; and primary fallacy (mughālaṭah), 281; and induction
propositions (awwaliyyāt), 271; and (istiqrāʾ), 268; and mixes of modalized
propositions based on experience premises (mukhtaliṭāt), §§99–100, §§102–
(mujarrabah), §116.4; and propositions 104, 239–240, 241, 242–243, 244, 246,
based on sequential testimony 249, 250–251, 252; and syllogism (qiyās),
(mutawātirah), §116.6, 273; and §§90–91.1, §91.3, §91.5, §92, §§93.2–94.1,
quantified proposition (maḥṣūrah), §§94.3–8, §95.4, §§95.7–10, 225, 230,
156; and quantified propositions, §45; 231–232, 237; and syllogism, repetitive
sense perception, based on, 272; and (qiyās istithnāʾī), 261, 263. See also minor
suppositional propositions (maẓnūnāt), premise (muqaddamah ṣughrā)
§118.6, 278; and syllogism (qiyās), §94.1, major term (ḥadd akbar), §90, §91.1, §94.1,
235; translating, 189. See also valuation 231, 234–235, 242, 248, 275, 276. See also
(ḥukm) middle term (ḥadd awsaṭ); minor term
(ḥadd aṣghar)
Kay, William, xxiv Marāghah, xv
Keynes, John, 126, 297n214 Marmura, Michael, 291n87
Klima, Gyula, xxv matter of proposition or syllogism
Klinger, Dustin, x, 293n121 (māddah), §19, §20, §34, §51, §65.1,
knowledge, science (ʿilm), xx–xxi, §§1–3, §68, §§116.1–119, 152, 167–168, 229, 262,
88–89, 90, 93, 267, 271, 273, 274, 284, 269–270, 277, 293n132. See also corrupt
288n19. See also primitive, of knowledge form (ṣūrah fāsidah); corrupt matter
(badīhī) (māddah fāsidah)

395 395
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meaning (maʿnan): in appendix, 330; member (fard), xv, §12.1, §23, 121, 163, 205.
coextensive, equivalent (musāwin), See also individual (shakhṣ)
119–120; components of, 112; compound Meno’s paradox, 288n24
expression, §10; conception of mental proposition (qaḍiyyah dhihniyyah),
(taṣawwur maʿnāhu), 290n59; and 161, 294n138
containment (taḍammun), §7, 103; mental universal (kullī ʿaqlī), §25, 125–126
and copula (rābiṭah), §40, 148; and metaphorical, 107, 145
correspondence (muṭābaqah), §7, 103; metaphysics, 126, 287n15
and definition, broad sense (taʿrīf), 135, metathetic, said of categorical proposition
136, 137, 139, 140; definition of, 110; and with indefinite terms (maʿdūlah), §48,
division (taqsīm), 106–107; equivocal §50.2, 150, 164, 165–166, 294n145. See
(mushtarak), §12.2; and example also determinate, kind of categorical
(tamthīl), §115, 268; and expression proposition with positive terms
(lafẓ), 108, 110, 289n39; and externalist (muḥaṣṣalah)
reading (al-khārijiyyah al-mawḍūʿ ), meter (poetry), 279
159; extrinsic (al-khārij), 284; and middle (wasaṭ), §22.2, §94.1, §105, §109.1,
fallacy (mughālaṭah), 281, 282, 301n302; 260–261, 274
and implication (luzum, mulazamah), middle term (ḥadd awsaṭ), §90, §91.1,
97–100, 101; inseparable, xxvii, 120–122, §94.1, §117, 121, 122, 154, 231, 234–235,
123, 183; and necessary proposition 240, 272–273, 274, 275, 276, 283. See also
(qaḍiyyah ḍarūriyyah), 154; particular major term (ḥadd akbar); minor term
(juzʾ ī), §15, §28; proper name (ʿalam), (ḥadd aṣghar)
§12.1; and quantified proposition minor premise (muqaddamah ṣughrā): and
(maḥṣūrah), 155–156; and quantified connective syllogisms with hypothetical
propositions, §45; and quiddity premises, §105, §109.1, 256, 257–258,
(māhiyyah), 110, 293n128; with respect 259, 260; and conversion (ʿaks), 203,
to meaning (min jihat al-maʿnā), §119; 204; and induction (istiqrāʾ ), 268;
separable (mufāriq), §22.1, §§22.3–23, and mixes of modalized premises
120, 121, 123, 264, 291n82; simple, (mukhtaliṭāt), §§98–104, 239–244,
§§15–17, §19, §20, §21, §22.1, §23, 87, 96, 246–253; and necessary proposition
104–105, 108–109, 116; and subjects of (qaḍiyyah ḍarūriyyah), 154; and
sciences (mawḍūʿāt), 285; and syllogism reductio (qiyās al-khulf), 266; and
(qiyās), 227; and syllogistic matter syllogism (qiyās), §§90–91.1, §§91.3–5,
(mawādd al-aqyisah), 168; synonymous §§93.2–5, §94.1, §§94.3–8, §95.1,
(murādif), §13; universal (kullī), §15, §24, §§95.5–10, 225, 230, 231, 234, 235;
124–125. See also signification theory

396 396
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minor premise (muqaddamah ṣughrā) name (ism), xxiv, §11, §12.1, §14.3, 105, 147.
(cont.): syllogisms with possibility See also nouns; proper name (ʿalam)
proposition as, 153. See also major Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī: about, xv, xvi; on
premise (muqaddamah kubrā) association (al-istiṣḥāb), 295n167; as
minor term (ḥadd aṣghar), §90, §91.1, Avicennian purist, 152; on contradiction
§94.1, 234–235, 240, 248, 276. See also (tanāquḍ), 191; on conversion (ʿaks),
major term (ḥadd akbar); middle term 297n203; on differentia (faṣl), 118, 120;
(ḥadd awsaṭ) on division of propositions, 293n114;
mixes of modalized premises (mukhtaliṭāt), on ecthesis (iftirāḍ), 296n194; on
xx, §68, §§98–104, 170, 238–253 essentialist and externalist readings,
modal logic, 152, 154–155, 160, 166, 209–210 290n63; on fallacy (mughālaṭah), 281;
modal proposition (qaḍiyyah muwajjahah), on induction (istiqrāʾ ), 267; on logic,
xx, xxiv, §§51–59.2, §74, §78.1, §78.4, 93; on mixes of modalized premises
§84.2, §85.2, 152, 156, 160, 166–171, 178, (mukhtaliṭāt), 239, 241–242, 243; on
181, 191–193, 199, 204, 219, 225, 230, 275, possible actual (ʿalā taqdīr wuqūʿ
294n152, 347–348 al-mumkin), 153; on predication,
mode (jihah), §51, §119 univocal (mutawāṭiʾ ), 146; on simple
modus ponens, 263 meanings, 109; on species (nawʿ ),
modus tollens, 263 292n96; on syllogism (qiyās),
mood (ḍarb, qarīnah), §90, §§91.1–5, production of, 237; on temporality
§§93.1–5, §§94.2–8, §§95.2–10, §96, conditions, 169; on types (aṣnāf) of
§97, §103, §104, §105, 225, 226, 231, 232, proposition, 271; on universal (kullī),
235, 236, 237–238, 244, 247, 249, 250, 291n87; on what is said in answer to
252, 252–253, 259, 263 “what is it?” (al-maqūl fī jawāb mā
more general (aʿamm), xxvi, §22.2, huwa), 132
§§27.2–3, §28, §30, §35, §68, §78.1, natural language, xxi, xxvi, 111, 126, 145, 155
§85.1, §111, 95, 116, 117, 127–128, 131, 132, natural proposition (qaḍiyyah ṭabī ʿiyyah),
133, 138, 168, 181, 191, 215, 218, 278. See §43, §119, 151, 281–282, 301n302
also weaker (aʿamm) natural universal (kullī ṭabī ʿī), §25, 125,
more specific (akhaṣṣ), §§27.2–3, §28, §30, 292n88
§35, 127–128. See also stronger (akhaṣṣ) necessary, of knowledge (ḍarūrī): and
Muhammad (Prophet), 87 contraposition (ʿaks al-naqīḍ), §83.1,
§83.2; and conversion (ʿaks), §§77.1–2;
Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī, xiv, xv–xvii, xxvii, and general conditional proposition
xxviiin1; Jāmiʿ al-daqāʾiq, 103, 221, 280, (mashrūṭah ʿāmmah), §52.4; and
282; al-Risālah al-Shamsiyyah, xiii, xv, syllogism (qiyās), §88; and syllogism,
xvii–xix, xxii–xxvi, 87–88, 97 repetitive (qiyās istithnāʾ ī), §110.

397 397
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necessary, of knowledge (ḍarūrī) (cont.): negative proposition (sālibah): and

See also inferred (naẓarī); primitive, of categorical proposition (ḥamliyyah),
knowledge (badīhī) §§41–42, 149; and conclusion (natījah),
necessary proposition (qaḍiyyah §92; and contradiction (tanāquḍ),
ḍarūriyyah), §3, §§52.2–53, §68, §69.1, 295n181; and contraposition (ʿaks
§75, §77.2, §§78.1–2, §80, §83.2, §83.3, al-naqīḍ), §85.1, §86, 212, 213–214, 215,
§84.1, §85.1, §100, 90–91, 153–154, 218–220, 220–221; and conversion
158–159, 160, 167, 169, 171, 172, 192, 194, (ʿaks), §74, §§80–81, 198, 199, 201, 209;
201, 202–204, 203, 205, 207, 209, 217, general absolute proposition (qaḍiyyah
219–220, 239, 243–249, 251–253, 262, muṭlaqah ʿāmmah), §53, §§55–57, §70;
270–271, 275, 299n260 general conventional proposition
necessity, 170–172, 175, 178, 180, 182, 184 (ʿurfiyyah ʿāmmah), §54; general
necessity proposition, xxvi, 153, 170, 192, possible proposition (mumkinah
199, 202, 207, 210, 215, 219–220, 247, ʿāmmah), §59.1; and hypothetical
252, 287n10 proposition (sharṭiyyah), §62, §65.2;
negation (salb): and categorical Ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī on, 145;
proposition (ḥamliyyah), 145, 148, 149; indefinite vs. determinate, §§48–50.2,
and co-implication (talāzum), 222; 164, 165; and metathetic (maʿdūlah),
and contradiction (tanāquḍ), §67, 164; and mixes of modalized premises
§69.4, §§69.1–2, 190; and contradictory (mukhtaliṭāt), §§103–104, 250–251, 252,
(naqīḍ), 196; and contraposition 253; and modal proposition (qaḍiyyah
(ʿaks al-naqīḍ), 211; and conversion muwajjahah), §51; and negation
(ʿaks), §77.1; and example (tamthīl), (salb), 164–165; and non-perpetual
§115; and hypothetical proposition existential proposition (wujūdiyyah
(sharṭiyyah), §62, 145, 179, 183, 184, lā-dāʾimah), §56; and special possible
185; and metathetic (maʿdūlah), 164, proposition (mumkinah khāṣṣah),
165; and mixes of modalized premises §59.1; and syllogism (qiyās), §91.3,
(mukhtaliṭāt), 248, 251; of modal §91.5, §92, §§93.2–95, §94.4, §94.6,
propositions, §52.1, §§52.2–56, §58; of §94.8, §§95.5–10, §97, 225, 231–232, 234,
necessity of nonexistence, 124; nominal, 235; and syllogism, repetitive (qiyās
149, 163, 164–165, 166; propositional, istithnāʾ ī), 262; translating, 171. See
149, 163, 166; simple, §50.2; and also particular negative proposition
syllogism, repetitive (qiyās istithnāʾ ī), (qaḍiyyah sālibah juzʾiyyah); universal
263; and temporal proposition negative proposition (qaḍiyyah sālibah
(waqtiyyah), §57. See also remove kulliyyah)
(irtifāʿ )

398 398
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non-necessary existential proposition observational propositions (mushāhadāt),

(wujūdiyyah lā-ḍarūriyyah), §55, §56, §116.3, 272, 273
§59.2, §78.4, 169, 171, 175, 176, 194, 201, opposed (muʿānid), xx, §65.1, §70, §72, 186,
209, 218–219, 295n164, 329, 335 211. See also implicate (lāzim); separable
non-perpetual absolute continuing (mufāriq)
proposition (al-ḥīniyyah al-muṭlaqah oppositional disjunctive (ʿinādiyyah), §61,
al-lā-dāʾimah), 179, 208, 345 179, 181, 182, 183, 184–185, 196, 262, 263,
non-perpetual existential proposition 264. See also coincidental disjunctive
(wujūdiyyah lā-dāʾimah), xxvi, §56, (munfaṣilah ittifāqiyyah)
§59.2, §70, §78.4, 176, 178, 194, 201, 209, o-proposition (qaḍiyyah sālibah juzʾiyyah),
218–219, 329, 335 §§114–128, 150, 162–163, 165, 171, 174,
non-perpetual necessary (impossible 193–194, 198, 199, 201, 206–207, 208,
proposition) (al-ḍarūriyyah al-lā- 211, 212, 214, 217–218, 225, 232, 238,
dāʾimah), 178, 243, 342 250, 253, 294n139, 346, 347–348. See
non-perpetual perpetual (impossible also particular negative proposition
proposition) (al-dāʾimah al-lā-dāʾimah), (qaḍiyyah sālibah juzʾiyyah)
243, 343 ordering (tartīb), xviii, xxv, §3, §81, §95.3,
non-perpetual spread absolute proposition §95.10, §104, 95–96, 188, 236, 250, 255,
(al-muṭlaqah al-muntashirah al-lā- 280
dāʾimah), 179, 344–345 Organon (Aristotle), xiii, xiv, 254
non-perpetual temporal absolute overlap (ʿumūm min wajh), §26, §27.3,
proposition (al-muṭlaqah al-waqtiyyah §32, 127, 128, 131, 162, 163. See also
al-lā-dāʾimah), 179, 344 coextensive, equivalent (musāwin);
non-perpetual-for-some conventional disjunction (mubāyanah, tabāyun,
proposition (ʿurfiyyah lā dāʾimah fī infiṣāl); inclusion (ʿumūm muṭlaq)
l-baʿḍ), §76.2, §83.4, 178–179, 206, 216,
343–344 part (juzʾ ): of categorical proposition
non-restrictive, of incomplete expression (ḥamliyyah), §40; and coextensive
(ghayr taqyīdī), §14.3, 108. See also universal (musāwin), §26; complete
restrictive (taqyīdī) part of hypothetical (juzʾ tāmm),
norm (maṭbūʿ ), §105, §106, §107, §109.1, §105, §109.1; compound expression,
255, 256, 258, 259 §10; and connective syllogisms with
not truth-apt (inshāʾ ), 108 hypothetical premises, §105, §106,
notification (tanbīh), §14.2 §§108.1–109.2; and containment
nouns, 97 (taḍammun), 103; and contradiction
(tanāquḍ), §68, §§70–71, 190–191;

399 399
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part (juzʾ ) (cont.): and contradictory particle (adāh, ḥarf), xxvii, §11, §14.3, §48,
(naqīḍ), §27.2; and contraposition §50.2, §65.2, 105, 150, 164, 166, 228
(ʿaks al-naqīḍ), §82, §§83.4–84.1, particular (juzʾ ī): in general, §5; and
§§85.1–2; and conversion (ʿaks), §73, categorical proposition (ḥamliyyah),
§78.2, §81, 199, 200; dependence §§42–44; and co-implication
on the whole, 89; of disjunction (talāzum), 224; commentaries on, xx;
(mubāyanah, tabāyun, infiṣāl), and contradiction (tanāquḍ), §68,
§§108.1–2; divisibility example, §22.2, §§71–72, 191, 195; and contraposition
§37.1; and example (tamthīl), §115; of (ʿaks al-naqīḍ), §84.1, §85.1, §85.2, 215,
hypothetical proposition (sharṭiyyah), 218; and conversion (ʿaks), §§77.1–2,
§§60.1–61, §63, §§87.2–3, 145, 183; §78.1, §78.3, §81, 197, 208; definition,
and implicitly syllogistic proposition 109; and example (tamthīl), §115, 268;
(qaḍiyyah qiyāsātuhā maʿahā), §116.8; and genus (jins), 113; and hypothetical
incomplete part of hypothetical proposition (sharṭiyyah), §§65.1–2,
proposition (juzʾ ghayr tāmm), §106, 180, 186; and induction (istiqrāʾ ),
§109.1; indefinite vs. determinate, §48; §114, 266–267; and modal proposition
and logic, §§3–5; and natural universal (qaḍiyyah muwajjahah), 168; and
(kullī ṭabī ʿī), §25; primary proposition natural universal (kullī ṭabī ʿī), 125;
(awwaliyyāt) example, §116.2; and and observational propositions
primitive knowledge (badīhī), 90; and (mushāhadāt), 272; and quiddity
relative particular (juzʾ ī iḍāfī), §28; (māhiyyah), 110; real particular (juzʾ ī
of science (ʿilm), §§120.1–123; and ḥaqīqī), §15, §28, 111, 128, 131; relative
syllogism (qiyās), §90, §91.1, §94.1, particular (juzʾ ī iḍāfī), §28, 128–129,
235; and syllogism, repetitive (qiyās 131; and sense perception, 274; and
istithnāʾ ī), §§110–111; of what is said simple meanings, §§15–16.1, §22.1;
in answer to “what is it?” (al-maqūl subject (mawḍūʿ ), 151; and syllogism
fī jawāb mā huwa), §33; of the whole (qiyās), 235; and syllogism, repetitive
(kull) that is shared, §17, §19, 113–114, (qiyās istithnāʾ ī), 262–263; translating,
115, 116–118, 291n68. See also complete xxvi; universal (kullī) without, 124. See
part of hypothetical proposition (juzʾ also universal (kullī)
tāmm); incomplete part of hypothetical particular affirmative proposition
proposition (juzʾ ghayr tāmm); whole (qaḍiyyah mūjibah juzʾiyyah): in
(kull) appendix, 330; and categorical
partial disjunction (tabāyun juzʾ ī), proposition (ḥamliyyah), §42, 150; and
§27.4, 128, 163. See also complete contraposition (ʿaks al-naqīḍ), 214; and
disjunction (tabāyun kullī); disjunction conversion (ʿaks), §81; and indefinite
(mubāyanah, tabāyun, infiṣāl) proposition (muhmalah), 151;

400 400
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particular affirmative proposition poetry (shiʿr), §§118.8–119, 87–88, 269, 277,

(qaḍiyyah mūjibah juzʾiyyah) (cont.): 278–279
and syllogism (qiyās), §§91.4–5, §93.4, Porphyry, xiii, xxvii, §83n10, 96, 108–109,
§94.3, §§94.5–7, §95.10, §§95.3–4, 114, 129
§§95.7–8. See also i-proposition positive, of term (wujūdī), §49, 287n9
(qaḍiyyah mūjibah juzʾiyyah) Positor (wāḍiʿ ), 98, 104, 105
particular negative proposition (qaḍiyyah possibility (imkān), §74, §78.1, §85.1, §111,
sālibah juzʾiyyah): in appendix, 330; and §114, §115, 153–154, 167, 168, 169, 171,
categorical proposition (ḥamliyyah), 177–178, 180, 182, 193, 207, 210, 212, 214,
§42, 150; and syllogism (qiyās), §§93.4– 219, 220, 224, 273, 278, 297n207
5, §94.4, §94.6, §94.8, §§95.6–10. See possibility proposition, 153, 170, 171, 175,
also o-proposition (qaḍiyyah sālibah 176, 192, 194, 199, 203, 204, 210, 219,
juzʾiyyah) 239, 241–242, 249, 252. See also general
per accidens (bi-l-ʿaraḍ), §15, 197 possibility proposition
per se, 285, 288n32 possible continuing proposition (ḥīniyyah
Peripatetics, 93 mumkinah), §69.3, §100, 175, 192–193,
perpetual possible proposition 203, 209, 341, 347
(al-mumkinah al-dāʾimah), 174, 340 possible perpetual proposition (al-dāʾimah
perpetual proposition (al-dāʾimah), 169, al-mumkinah), 194
171, 172, 189, 192, 193, 194, 201–202, possible proposition (qaḍiyyah mumkinah),
204, 207, 215, 216, 219–220, 244–246, xxvi, §52.7, §55, §59.1, §59.2, §68, §69.1,
252–253, 296n193 §77.2, §80, §100, 160, 170, 174, 192, 210,
perpetuity (dawām), §51, §78.3, 160, 167, 220, 240, 241–242, 249, 251, 275
169, 171, 176, 178, 193, 194, 202, 208, 243, postulates (muqaddamāt ghayr bayyinah
246, 252, 253, 263 fī nafsihā), §120.1, 287n11, 302n307. See
perpetuity proposition, 160, 170, 172, 189, also common notion
192, 193, 194, 215, 252, 253 potentiality (quwwah), §68, 190–191,
persuade (iqnāʿ ), §118.4, 270, 278 228–229, 261. See also actuality (fiʿl)
Peter of Spain, xiii, xv, xxviiin1, 233 predicables, 100, 108–109, 111, 112, 114–115,
petition (duʿāʾ ), §14.2 118, 121, 123
Philoponus, John, 106 predicate (maḥmūl): and absolute
philosopher (ḥakīm), xiv, xvii, §119 continuing proposition (qaḍiyyah
philosophy, xvi, xxv ḥīniyyah muṭlaqah), 175; and assertion
philosophy of science, xx (taṣdīq), what conduces to, §5; and
Plato, 288n24 categorical proposition (ḥamliyyah),
Platonists, 93 §§40–41, 145–146, 148, 149;

401 401
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predicate (maḥmūl) (cont.): and predication: denominative (mushtaqq),

connective syllogisms with hypothetical 106, 107, 114, 115, 116, 146, 147, 172;
premises, 259; and contradiction and induction (istiqrāʾ ), 268; vs.
(tanāquḍ), §68, §69.4, 190–191, 195; and said of (maqūl), 118–119; univocal
contraposition (ʿaks al-naqīḍ), §85.1, (mutawāṭiʾ ), §12.1, 106, 108, 146, 147,
212, 213, 218; and conversion (ʿaks), 172–173; and the whole of the part
§78.1, 199; and demonstration of the fact shared, 113–114
(burhān innī), 276; and demonstration premise (muqaddamah): actuality (fiʿl)
of the reasoned fact (burhān limmī), premises, §103; arguments, premise,
276; denominative (mushtaqq), 189; authority, approved on, §118.5,
172; and expression (lafẓ), §11; and 278; of certainty (yaqīniyyah), 275, 279;
externalist reading (al-khārijiyyah complete, of hypothetical proposition
al-mawḍūʿ ), 163; five predicables, (juzʾ tāmm), 255; connection between,
96; and implicative conditional in syllogism, §90, §§91.1–5, §§93.1–5,
(luzūmiyyah), 158–159; indefinite §§94.2–8, §§95.2–10, §96, §97,
vs. determinate, §48, §50.1, 165; and §103, §104, §105; and connective
inseparability, 121, 122; and mixes of syllogisms with hypothetical premises,
modalized premises (mukhtaliṭāt), §§105–107, §§108.2–109.1, 254–255,
240, 242, 248; and modal proposition 255–256; and contraposition (ʿaks
(qaḍiyyah muwajjahah), §51, §§52.2–56, al-naqīḍ), 218; converting of, §95.6;
§§57–59.1, 167, 168; and necessary and dialectic (jadal), §118.4; and
proposition (qaḍiyyah ḍarūriyyah), 154; estimative propositions (wahmiyyāt),
and possible continuing proposition §118.10, 280; and fallacy (mughālaṭah),
(ḥīniyyah mumkinah), 175; predicative §119, 280; and implicitly syllogistic
proposition, xxvi; and quantified proposition (qaḍiyyah qiyāsātuhā
proposition (maḥṣūrah), 155, 156; and maʿahā), 274; intuited, 273; and mixes
questions of science (masāʾil), §120.1, of modalized premises (mukhtaliṭāt),
§120.3; retracted, 164; and subjects of 246, 250, 253; and primary propositions
sciences (mawḍūʿāt), 285; and syllogism (awwaliyyāt), 271; and propositions
(qiyās), §90, 230; and temporality based on experience (mujarrabah), 273;
conditions, 169; for theorems, 120; and propositions based on sequential
and universal (kullī), 129; univocal testimony (mutawātirah), 274; reversing
(mutawāṭiʾ ), 172–173; verbal, 147–148; the ordering of, §95.3, §95.10, §104, 252;
and the whole of the part shared, 114. and rhetoric (khiṭābah), §118.7; self-
See also major term (ḥadd akbar); evident (bayyinah bi-dhātihā), §120.1;
middle term (ḥadd awsaṭ); minor term specious premises (al-mushabbihāt),
(ḥadd aṣghar) 280; suppositional, 278;

402 402
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premise (muqaddamah) (cont.): and proposition of certainty (yaqīniyyah),

syllogism (qiyās), §90, §94.1, §94.5, 270–271
§95.1, §96, §§112–113, 224, 225, 227, propositions: in general, xx–xxi, 87, 96,
228, 229–230, 231–232, 234–235, 238, 141; based on experience (mujarrabah),
264; and syllogism, compound (qiyās §116.4, §116.7, 272, 273, 274, 278; based
murakkab), 264; and syllogism, on sequential testimony (mutawātirah),
repetitive (qiyās istithnāʾ ī), §110, §§116.6–7, 273–274, 278; of certainty
261–262; and syllogistic matter (yaqīniyyah), §§116.1–118.1, 275, 276,
(mawādd al-aqyisah), 277; and weaker 278; compound, §52.1, §§53–59.2,
(aʿamm), 298n238. See also major §§70–71, §77.2, §87.3, 152, 168, 169,
premise (muqaddamah kubrā); minor 171, 175, 178, 189, 193–194, 195, 198,
premise (muqaddamah ṣughrā); mixes 207, 216, 217, 220, 227, 242–243, 251;
of modalized premises (mukhtaliṭāt) convertible proposition (munʿakisah),
primary intelligibles, 95, 125 §100, §103, §104, 233; descriptional
primary propositions (awwaliyyāt), §116.2, propositions, §76, §102, 203, 205–206,
§118.2, §118.10, 93, 271–272, 277, 278 217, 287n10; division of, 142–143,
primitive, of knowledge (badīhī), §§2–4, 151; extreme of proposition (ṭaraf),
88, 90–93, 142, 275. See also inferred §109.1, §116.2, 271–272, 274; and fallacy
(naẓarī); necessary, of knowledge (mughālaṭah), 280; false propositions,
(ḍarūrī) §§63–64, §118.10, 279; image-eliciting
principal analogue (maqīs ʿalayhi), §115, proposition (mukhayyilah), §118.8,
269 269, 278–279; and inseparability, 121;
principle of science (mabdaʾ ), §120.1, 101, intuited propositions (ḥadsiyyāt),
120, 122, 284 §116.5, §116.7, 91, 272–273, 274,
privation, 101, 127, 128, 139 278; natural proposition (qaḍiyyah
privative, of term (ʿadamī), §49, 101 ṭabī ʿiyyah), §43, §119, 151, 281–282,
productivity of minor/major: See syllogism 301n302; observational propositions
(qiyās) (mushāhadāt), §116.3, 272, 273; and
proof (ḥujjah), §80, §86, §95.4, §95.5, subjects of sciences (mawḍūʿāt), 285;
§95.7, §116.7, 95, 119, 122, 126, 127–128, suppositional propositions (maẓnūnāt),
154, 189, 197–198, 201, 203, 205, §118.6, 278; and syllogism (qiyās),
206–208, 210, 211, 216, 217, 219–221, 223, 226–227, 228, 229, 230; thirteen
225, 234, 236, 237–238, 239, 249, 252, propositions, 168, 170, 177–178, 189, 201,
253, 254, 274, 276. See also argument 238, 242; translating, xxiv, xxv–xxvi,
(burhān, ḥujjah, dalīl); ecthesis 170–171. See also conclusion (natījah);
(iftirāḍ); reductio (qiyās al-khulf) copula (rābiṭah); predicate (maḥmūl);
proper name (ʿalam), §12.1, 104, 106, 108 premise (muqaddamah);

403 403
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propositions (cont.): See also subject §51, §59.2, 167–168; and syllogism
(mawḍūʿ ); specific kinds of (qiyās), §92, §95.1, 225, 230, 231–232,
propositions, e.g. hypothetical 235; and syllogism, repetitive (qiyās
proprium (khāṣṣah), §23, §36, 109, 112, 113, istithnāʾ ī), 261
118, 121, 123, 137–138, 291n84 quantified hypothetical propositions, 171,
prove (bayyana): and contraposition (ʿaks 186, 346
al-naqīḍ), §85.2; and conversion (ʿaks), quantified proposition, with respect to
§80; and predicate (maḥmūl), §120.3; expression (musawwarah), xx, 171
and reductio (qiyās al-khulf), §113; quantified proposition, with respect to
and subjects of sciences (mawḍūʿāt), meaning (maḥṣūrah), §42, §45, §47,
284; and syllogism (qiyās), §§93.2–5, §68, 149–150, 151, 155–156, 171, 191–192
§§94.3–8, §95.3, §95.6, §§95.8–96. See quantifier (sūr), §42, §65.2, 150, 186, 258,
also argument (burhān); demonstration 281–282
(burhān) quantity (kammiyyah): and categorical
proximate, said of genus or differentia proposition (ḥamliyyah), §§42–43;
(qarīb), §5, §18.1, §21, §36, 115, 120, 135, and compound propositions, §70,
137–138. See also remote, of genus or 171, 175; and connective syllogisms
differentia (baʿīd) with hypothetical premises, §105; and
contradiction (tanāquḍ), §68, §72,
Qarāmalikī, A.F., xxxn29, 294n135 191, 193; and contradictory (naqīḍ),
Qazvīn, xv 196; and conversion (ʿaks), 197;
qualification, 89, 103, 115, 116, 240, 271, 285 and fallacy (mughālaṭah), §119; and
quality (kayfiyyah): and compound hypothetical proposition (sharṭiyyah),
propositions, §70, 171, 175; and 183; and modal proposition (qaḍiyyah
connective syllogisms with hypothetical muwajjahah), §59.2; and self-evident
premises, §105; and contradiction (bayyinah bi-dhātihā) premises, §120.1;
(tanāquḍ), §70, §72, 193; and and syllogism (qiyās), §95.1, 230
contradictory (naqīḍ), 196; and questions, or theorems, of science
contraposition (ʿaks al-naqīḍ), §82, 213; (masāʾil), xvi, xx, §§16.2–17, §20, §29,
and conversion (ʿaks), §73, 199, 200; §33, §119, §§120.1–3. See also begging
and definitions (taʿrīf), §37.1; and fallacy the question; what is sought (maṭlūb)
(mughālaṭah), §119; and hypothetical quiddity (māhiyyah), §0, §9, §§16.1–18.1,
proposition (sharṭiyyah), 183; and §19, §§22.1–2, §28, §29, §35, 88, 95,
implication (luzum, mulazamah), 98, 101–102, 103, 110–117, 120, 121–122,
166; and mixes of modalized premises 129–131, 133, 135, 137, 138, 151, 273, 284,
(mukhtaliṭāt), 240, 246; and modal 291n68, 291n82, 293n128. See also
proposition (qaḍiyyah muwajjahah), essence (dhāt); reality (ḥaqīqah)

404 404
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Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī al-Taḥtānī: about, real species (nawʿ ḥaqīqī), §16.2, §29, §32,
xvii, xix–xx, xxiii–xxiv, xxv, xxviiin1, 111, 114–115, 129, 131, 132. See also relative
xxvixn18; on conception (taṣawwur), species (nawʿ iḍāfī)
91; on contradiction (tanāquḍ), 193; reality (ḥaqīqah), §0, §§16.2–17, §20, §23,
on contraposition (ʿaks al-naqīḍ), §32, §70, §117, §119, 95, 113, 121, 123,
220–221; on conversion (ʿaks), 200; on 136–137, 138, 142, 155, 156, 159–160, 166,
definition, broad sense (taʿrīf), 290n65; 205, 271, 282. See also essence (dhāt);
on division of propositions, 151; on quiddity (māhiyyah)
essentialist reading (al-ḥaqīqiyyah received proposition (maqbūlah), §118.5,
al-mawḍūʿ ), 157–158, 161; on implicative 278
conditional (luzūmiyyah), 158–159; on reductio (qiyās al-khulf), §§93.2–95, §96,
indefinite proposition (muhmalah), 164; §113, 150, 154, 197, 202, 204, 209, 214,
on matter of proposition (māddah), 219, 220, 226, 233, 234, 236, 254, 264,
168; on metathetic (maʿdūlah), 165; 265, 265–266, 296n190, 300n285
on mixes of modalized premises reduction, of second- or higher figure
(mukhtaliṭāt), 238, 248; on ordering syllogism to first (radd), §93.2, §93.4,
(tartīb), 95–96; on particular (juzʾ ī), §94.3, §§95.8–9
109; on possibility minor, 297n207; on referential (dhātī), 152, 156, 169, 172, 173,
quantified proposition (maḥṣūrah), 175, 202, 242, 291n67
155; on syllogism (qiyās), 228, 229; on refute (ilzām), §118.3, §118.4, §118.10, 87–88,
syllogism (qiyās), production of, 230, 277
231–233, 234–235, 235–236, 237; on regress (tasalsul), §2, §4, §19, 91–92, 93, 116,
syllogism, compound (qiyās murakkab), 117. See also circle, circular reasoning
264–265; on syllogism, repetitive (dawr)
(qiyās istithnāʾ ī), 263–264; on universal rejection, 196, 198, 203, 215, 231, 234,
hypothetical, 300n281; on the whole of 296n190, 298n224. See also discrepant
the parts shared, 291n68 conclusions (ikhtilāf mūjib li-ʿadam
al-intāj)
real disjunction, §60.3, §61, §64, §87.1, relation, in relation to (nisbah): and
§87.2, §111, 181–182, 183, 185–186, 222, affirmative vs. negative propositions,
261, 263, 295n165. See also alternative §49, 164–165; and categorical
denial (kind of disjunction); inclusive proposition (ḥamliyyah), §§40–41,
disjunction (māniʿah min al-khuluww) 145, 147, 148–149; and co-implication
real particular (juzʾ ī ḥaqīqī), §15, §28, 111, (talāzum), 223; and containment
128, 131. See also relative particular (juzʾ ī (taḍammun), §33; and contradiction
iḍāfī) (tanāquḍ), 190–191;

405 405
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relation, in relation to (nisbah) (cont.): relative particular (juzʾ ī iḍāfī), §28,

and copula (rābiṭah), 148; and 128–129, 131. See also real particular
correspondence, kind of signification (juzʾ ī ḥaqīqī)
(muṭābaqah), §33; and delineation relative species (nawʿ iḍāfī), §§29–30, §32,
(rasm, tarsīm), 93; and demonstration 112, 129, 130, 132. See also real species
(burhān), §117; and disjunction (nawʿ ḥaqīqī)
(mubāyanah, tabāyun, infiṣāl), 181; remote, of genus or differentia (baʿīd),
and division (taqsīm), 106–107; and §5, §§18.1–2, §21, §36, 115, 120, 137, 138.
hypothetical proposition (sharṭiyyah), See also proximate, said of genus or
180, 183, 184–185; and implicate differentia (qarīb)
(lāzim), §8; and implication (luzum, remove (irtifāʿ ), §52.7, §59.1, §62, §69.3,
mulazamah), 289n37; and implicative 224. See also negation (salb)
conditional (luzūmiyyah), 183–184; repetitive syllogism (qiyās istithnāʾ ī), §89.1,
literal (ḥaqīqah) vs. figurative (majāz), §§110–111, 228–230, 261–264, 265–266,
§12.3; and matter (māddah), 152; 272. See also connective syllogism (qiyās
and modal proposition (qaḍiyyah iqtirānī)
muwajjahah), §51, 167; as one of request (iltimās), §14.2
conditions for contradiction (iḍāfah), Rescher, Nicholas, xxiv, 168, 171, 174, 238,
§68; and primary propositions 244, 247, 250, 252, 287n10, 299n266,
(awwaliyyāt), 271; and quantified 329, 340
proposition (maḥṣūrah), §45.1, 155, restriction, §59.2, 89, 113, 125, 138, 175, 225,
156; and questions of science (masāʾil), 227, 229
§§120.1–2; and signification theory, 98; restriction of non-necessity (qayd al-lā-
and simple (basīṭah) meanings, §§18.1– darūrah), §55, §99, §101
19; and subjects of sciences (mawḍūʿāt), restriction of non-perpetuity (qayd
285; and syllogism, §116.2, §117; al-lā-dawām), §53, §54, §56, §57, §58,
and syllogism (qiyās), 224, 227; and §§78.2–3, §99, §§101–102, §104
syllogism, repetitive (qiyās istithnāʾ ī), restrictive (taqyīdī), §14.3, 108. See
261; synonymous (murādif), §13; also non-restrictive, of incomplete
systematically ambiguous (mushakkik), expression (ghayr taqyīdī)
§12.1; and universal (kullī), 125–126; rhetoric (khiṭābah), §§118.5–7, 87–88, 269,
and univocal (mutawāṭiʾ ), §12.1; and 277, 278
what is sought (maṭlūb), 247. See rhyme, 279
also correlation (taḍāyuf); relative rope of God, 287n3
particular (juzʾ ī iḍāfī); relative species Ross, W.D., 298n235
(nawʿ iḍāfī) El-Rouayheb, Khaled, xxviiin8, xxxn29,
196, 289n34, 298n226

406 406
 Index

rule (qāʿidah), §0, 223, 224, 232, 241, 242, 248–250; on predicables, 109, 114; on
284. See also guideline (ḍābiṭ) predicate (maḥmūl), verbal, 147–148; on
predication vs. said of (maqūl), 118–119;
Sabra, A.I., xxviiin5, 287n18, 288n28 on primitive knowledge (badīhī), 90;
Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī: about, xviii, xix, on principal analogue (maqīs ʿalayhi),
xx, xxii, xxv, xxixn16; on categorical 269; on reductio (qiyās al-khulf), 265,
proposition (ḥamliyyah), 148–149; on 266; on referential (dhātī), 293n134;
co-implication (talāzum), 223–224; on al-Risālah al-Shamsiyyah, 87–88;
on conception of meaning (taṣawwur on science (ʿilm), 284; on signification
maʿnāhu), 124, 290n59; on connective theory, 98–99; on subjects of sciences
syllogisms with hypothetical premises, (mawḍūʿāt), 285; triangle example, 121;
254, 255–256, 257–258, 259, 260–261, on truth-conditions, 153; on what is said
300n271; on containment (taḍammun), in answer to “what is it?” (al-maqūl fī
103; on contradictory (naqīḍ), 196; jawāb mā huwa), 132–133; on the whole
on contraposition (ʿaks al-naqīḍ), of the part shared, 113
221; on conversion (ʿaks), 200–201, al-Samarqandi, 289n35
211; on copula (rābiṭah), 146–147; on al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī, xix, xxixn16,
counterexample (takhalluf), 155; on 91, 92, 119, 213
definition, broad sense (taʿrīf), 135; on Schöck, Cornelia, xi, 290n54
demonstration (burhān), 270, 283; on science (ʿilm), xvii, xx, §0, §5, §§120.1–3,
differentia (faṣl), 116, 120; on discourse 87, 88, 93, 94, 109, 120–121, 122, 151, 160,
(qawl), 142; on division of universal 213, 267, 270–271, 274, 277, 283, 290n61.
(kullī), 111; on endoxic propositions See also knowledge, science (ʿilm);
(mashhūrāt), 277; on essentialist reading principle of science (mabdaʾ ); subjects,
(al-ḥaqīqiyyah al-mawḍūʿ ), 163; on of sciences (mawḍūʿāt); theorem
example (tamthīl), 267–268; on fallacy (masʾalah)
(mughālaṭah), 281, 282, 301n301; on secondary intelligibles, 94–95, 125
hypothetical proposition (sharṭiyyah), secundum quid, 281, 282, 301n302
143, 188; on implication (luzum, self-evident (bayyinah bi-dhātihā), §91.6,
mulazamah), 100, 222; on incomplete §120.1, 153, 203, 207, 227, 231, 233, 266,
part of hypothetical proposition 296n193, 302n307
(juzʾ ghayr tāmm), 255; on induction semantic matters (maʿnawī), 165
(istiqrāʾ ), 267; on isolated species (nawʿ sense perception, §116.3, 272, 273–274, 279
mufrad), 131; on logic, 95; on matter separable (mufāriq), §22.1, §§22.3–23, 120,
(māddah), 269, 302n305; on mixes 121, 123, 264, 291n82. See also implicate
of modalized premises (mukhtaliṭāt), (lāzim)
238, 240–241, 242–243, 244–246, separation (infikāk), 154

407 407
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Shams al-Dīn al-Juwaynī, xv, §0 See also compound, said of term,

sharing (sharikah), §15, §§16.2–17, §19, proposition, or syllogism (murakkab)
§105, §106, §107, §§108.1–2, §109.1, 111, simple term (mufrad), §38, 96, 97, 143, 145
113, 115–116, 118–119, 123, 124–125, 255, singular, of proposition (shakhṣiyyah
256, 259 makhṣūṣah), §42, §68, 151, 190, 192
al-Shirwānī, 250, 299n266 singular situation (waḍ ʿ ), §65.1, 186. See
signification theory, xx, 97–101, 102, also affirming one part of a hypothetical
103–105, 122, 135–136 (waḍ ʿ ); imposition (waḍ ʿ )
silence an opponent in argument (ifḥām), singular term, 149, 151, 186, 190, 192
§14.1, §118.11, 279 Smith, Robin, 296n194, 298n236, 298n238
simple, said of meaning, proposition, or sophistical (sūfisṭāʾ ī), §119
reality (basīṭah): Avicenna on, 104, sophistry (safsaṭah), §§118.10–11, 87–88,
289n46; and compound propositions, 269, 270, 279
175; and contradiction (tanāquḍ), special absolute proposition (qaḍiyyah
§70, 189, 192; and contraposition (ʿaks muṭlaqah khāṣṣah), xxvi. See also
al-naqīḍ), 217, 220; and conversion general absolute proposition (qaḍiyyah
(ʿaks), §77.2, 198, 207; and division muṭlaqah ʿāmmah)
(taqsīm), §§16.2–17, §§22.1–22.2; special conditional proposition (mashrūṭah
expression (lafẓ), simple, §10, 96, 97, khāṣṣah), §53, §54, §77.1, §§78.2–3,
104, 105, 107, 143; and genus (jins), §§83.4–84.1, 175, 194, 199, 202, 203,
§§17–18.1, §19, §21, §23, 117–118; 205–206, 207, 208–209, 216, 217, 218,
hypothetical proposition (sharṭiyyah), 225, 226, 227, 237–238, 242, 243–245,
143; and implicate (lāzim), §§22.1–2, 250, 251, 252, 253, 329, 333–334. See
§23; indefinite vs. determinate, also conditional, kind of hypothetical
§48, §§50.1–52; meaning (maʿ nan), proposition (muttaṣilah); conditional,
§§15–17, §19, §20, §21, §22.1, §23, 87, 96, kind of modalized categorical
104–105, 108–109, 116; and metathetic proposition (mashrūṭah)
(maʿdūlah), 164, 165; and mixes of special conventional proposition (ʿurfiyyah
modalized premises (mukhtaliṭāt), khāṣṣah), §54, §76.2, §77.1, §§78.2–3,
251; and modal proposition (qaḍiyyah §§83.4–84.1, 176, 194, 199, 202, 203,
muwajjahah), §52.1, 152; and 205–206, 207–209, 216–218, 225, 226,
negation (salb), §50.2; “potentially 237–238, 242, 243, 244–245, 250, 252,
simple” (mufrad bi-l-quwwah), 143; 253, 329, 334
propositions, 173, 330–333, 338–342; special possible proposition (mumkinah
reality (ḥaqīqah), §32; and syllogism khāṣṣah), §59.1, §68, §80, §100, 177–178,
(qiyās), 238, 338–342; and temporality 329, 337
conditions, 169; translating, 171. special propositions, §99, §102, §103, 171

408 408
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species (nawʿ ): and co-implication Sprenger, Aloys, xxiii, xxiv, 197, 297n207
(talāzum), 222; and contradictory straight, of conversion (mustawin), §73,
(naqīḍ), §72, 196; and conversion (ʿaks), §83.1, §84.2, 197, 199, 213–214, 216,
205; and definition, broad sense (taʿrīf), 217–218. See also conversion, converse,
290n65; delineation (rasm, tarsīm) convertend (ʿaks)
of, 111–112; and genus (jins), 131, 134; Strobino, Riccardo, xxv, xxvi, 156, 168,
Ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī on, 112–113; 171, 186, 187, 233, 235, 236, 287–288n18,
inferior species (nawʿ al-anwāʿ ), §32, 288n24, 288n32, 289n37, 291n81, 291n82,
§34, 134; intermediate species (nawʿ 292n106, 295n164, 329
mutawassiṭ), §30, §32, §34, 123, 130, 134; stronger (akhaṣṣ), §74, §77.2, §79, 100–101,
isolated species (nawʿ mufrad), §30, 130, 102, 122, 162–163, 166, 175, 181, 182, 184,
131; lowest species, §30, 123, 129–130; 195, 198, 204, 209, 211, 212, 215, 232–233,
and mixes of modalized premises 245, 253. See also more specific (akhaṣṣ)
(mukhtaliṭāt), 250; natural proposition subject (mawḍūʿ ): and absolute continuing
(qaḍiyyah ṭabī ʿiyyah) example, §43; proposition (qaḍiyyah ḥīniyyah
in opening prayer, §0; Porphyry on, muṭlaqah), 175; and categorical
109, 114–115, 129; and predication proposition (ḥamliyyah), §§40–42,
vs. said of (maqūl), 118–119, 291n75; 145–146, 149; and compound
and propositions, 142; and proprium propositions, 171, 175; and contradiction
(khāṣṣah), 123; and questions of science (tanāquḍ), §68, §69.4, §71, 190–191,
(masāʾil), §120.2; real species (nawʿ 195; and contraposition (ʿaks al-naqīḍ),
ḥaqīqī), §16.2, §29, §32, 111, 114–115, 129, §§83.4–84.1, §§85.1–2, 212, 213, 218, 219,
131, 132; relative species (nawʿ iḍāfī), 220; and conversion (ʿaks), §77.1, §78.1,
§§29–30, §32, 112, 129, 130, 132; and §78.3, 199, 201–202; and demonstration
simple meanings, §§16.2–17, §19, §21, (burhān), 286; denominative
§23; and subjects of sciences (mawḍūʿāt), (mushtaqq), 172; and descriptional
285; supreme species (al-nawʿ al-ʿālī), necessity, 172; essence (dhāt) of, 156;
§30, 129–130; and the whole of the part and essentialist reading (al-ḥaqīqiyyah
shared, 114, 117. See also superior al-mawḍūʿ ), 157, 162–163; and
specificity (khuṣūṣiyyah), §11, §16.2, §115, externalist reading (al-khārijiyyah
111–112 al-mawḍūʿ ), 160–161, 162–163; and
specified moment (waqt muʿayyan), §57 extrinsic (al-khārij) meaning, 120–121;
spread absolute proposition (al-muṭlaqah and fallacy (mughālaṭah), §119, 281; and
al-muntashirah), 174, 296n187 implicative conditional (luzūmiyyah),
spread proposition (muntashirah), §58, 173, 158–159; indefinite vs. determinate,
174, 177, 194, 201, 209, 218–219, 238, 329, §48, §50.1, 165; and inference, 152; and
336–337 metathetic (maʿdūlah), 165–166;

409 409
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subject (mawḍūʿ ) (cont.): and mixes of supreme genus (ʿālin jins al-ajnās), §31, §34,
modalized premises (mukhtaliṭāt), 119–120, 123, 130, 134
240–241, 248; and modal proposition supreme species (al-nawʿ al-ʿālī), §30, 130
(qaḍiyyah muwajjahah), §51, suspension of judgment (tawaqquf), 221
§§52.2–6, §§57–58, 168; and necessary syllogism (qiyās): in general, §§88–97, 87,
proposition (qaḍiyyah ḍarūriyyah), 224; Aristotle on, 227, 231, 298n226,
154; and observational propositions 298n235; Avicenna on, 202, 224, 226–
(mushāhadāt), §116.3; particular (juzʾ ī), 227, 228–229, 246, 247, 254, 261, 277,
151; and possible continuing proposition 298n226; compound syllogism (qiyās
(ḥīniyyah mumkinah), 175; and murakkab), §§105–109.1, §112, 264–265,
quantified proposition (maḥṣūrah), 155, 266; and conceded propositions
156; and questions of science (masāʾil), (musallamāt), 278; connective
§§120.1–3; and relative particular (juzʾ ī syllogism (qiyās iqtirānī), §89.2,
iḍāfī), 129; and science (ʿilm), 88; and §§105–109.2, 224, 228–229, 265–266;
subjects of sciences (mawḍūʿāt), 285; and contraposition (ʿaks al-naqīḍ), 214;
and syllogism (qiyās), §90, §93.4, §94.5, and conversion (ʿaks), §81, 203, 208,
230, 234; and temporality conditions, 211; definition, §88, 226–228, 229–230,
169; translating, 288n31; and truth- 261, 262, 298n226; and demonstration
conditions, 153; universal (kullī), 151; (burhān), §117; dialectic (jadal),
univocal (mutawāṭiʾ ), 172–173. See also §§118.2–4, §119; divided syllogism (qiyās
particular (juzʾ ī); universal (kullī) muqassam), §108.1, 259, 266–267; and
subjects, of sciences (mawḍūʿāt), xvii, §5, estimative propositions (wahmiyyāt),
94–95, 283–284, 288n31 §118.10; and example (tamthīl), 268;
subordination (isnād), §1 and fallacy (mughālaṭah), §119, 280,
substance (jawhar), §0, §20, §30, §31, 87, 281; Ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī on,
101, 115, 118, 119, 130–131, 152, 169, 172. 228–229, 237–238; and induction
See also in its essence (fī jawharihi) (istiqrāʾ ), 268; matters, syllogistic
substrate (maʿrūḍ), §22.1, 110, 114, 115, 121, (mawādd al-aqyisah), §§116.1–119,
291n82 168, 277; matters appended to,
sufficient, said of condition (kāfin), §22.2, §§112–115, 264–269; and mixes of
§71, §116.2 modalized premises (mukhtaliṭāt),
superior, §34, §118.5 §§103–104, 170; and modal proposition
supposition, assumption (taqdīr), §39, §45, (qaḍiyyah muwajjahah), 170, 202;
131, 153, 180, 199, 204, 239–240, 248, and natural proposition (qaḍiyyah
257, 261, 266, 267, 269 ṭabī ʿiyyah), 151; poetry (shiʿr),
suppositional propositions (maẓnūnāt), §§118.8–119, 278–279; and premise
§118.6, 278 of certainty (al-yaqīniyyāt), 275;

410 410
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syllogism (qiyās) (cont.): and reductio §112; conditions of productivity,

(qiyās al-khulf), §113, 296n193; repetitive §§91.1–5, §§92–94.8, §§95.2–10, §96,
syllogism (qiyās istithnāʾ ī), §89.1, 230–234; and connective syllogisms
§§110–111, 228–230, 261–264, 265–266, with hypothetical premises, §105,
272; rhetoric (khiṭābah), §§118.5–7; 256–257; and conversion (ʿaks),
self-evident (bayyinah bi-dhātihā), 203–204; discrepant conclusions
203; sophistry (safsaṭah), §§118.10–11; (ikhtilāf mūjib li-ʿadam al-intāj), §92,
translating, xxiv. See also categorical §94.1, §95.1, §97, 225–226, 231–232, 235,
proposition (ḥamliyyah); conclusion 237–238, 244, 248, 250; earlier scholars
(natījah); major premise (muqaddamah on, §97; and ecthesis (iftirāḍ), 233; and
kubrā); minor premise (muqaddamah example (tamthīl), §115; and fallacy
ṣughrā); syllogism, FIGURE OF (mughālaṭah), §119; and implicative
(shakl); syllogism, PRODUCTION OF and coincidental premises, 255–256;
SYLLOGISTIC CONCLUSION (intāj) innovations in proving, 237; and mixes
—FIGURE OF (shakl): in general, 225, 230; of modalized premises (mukhtaliṭāt),
first, §80, §§90–91.6, §98, §105, 173, §103, 250–251; mood (ḍarb, qarīnah) of,
174, 178, 179, 208, 210, 225, 227, 231, 237–238; Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī al-Taḥtānī
233–234, 238, 239, 243, 244, 246, 247, on, 230, 231–233, 234–235, 235–236, 237;
249, 252, 253, 258, 259, 297n207; second, and reductio (qiyās al-khulf), §113; and
§§92–93.5, §100, §104, §105, 174, 225, syllogism, repetitive (qiyās istithnāʾ ī),
231, 232, 238, 245, 246–247, 252, 253, 263; translating, xxvi, xxvii
259; third, §§94.1–94.8, §102, §104, syncategorematic term (adāt), 143, 147,
§105, §109.1, 174, 225, 234, 238, 248–249, 290n51
253, 259, 260, 263, 297n207, 300n281; synonymous (murādif), xxiii, §13, §119,
fourth, §§95.1–97, §103, §105, 174, 178, 107–108, 146, 155
225, 230, 233, 235–237, 250–252, 259; and systematically ambiguous (mushakkik),
connective syllogisms with hypothetical §12.1, 107, 108
premises, §§105–107, §109.1; and
conversion (ʿaks), §80; and mixes of Tabrīz, xxii
modalized premises (mukhtaliṭāt), §98, Tabrīziyān, Fāris, xxii–xxiii
§100, §§102–104, 239–240; and simple technical usage (iṣṭilāḥ), §12.2, §50.2, 98
propositions, 338–342 technically transferred (manqūl iṣṭilāḥī),
—PRODUCTION OF SYLLOGISTIC §12.2
CONCLUSION (intāj): in general, 152, temporal absolute proposition
224–226; Avicenna on, 254; Avicennian (al-muṭlaqah al-waqtiyyah), 174
purists vs. Rāzians on, 153; and temporal possible proposition
compound syllogism (qiyās murakkab), (al-mumkinah al-waqtiyyah), 174, 340

411 411
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temporal proposition (waqtiyyah), §57, definition, broad sense (taʿrīf); extreme

§74, §77.2, §78.4, 173, 174, 177, 194, 201, of proposition (ṭaraf); middle term
207, 209, 214, 217–219, 238, 245, 247, (ḥadd awsaṭ); simple, said of meaning,
251, 296n187, 329, 336 proposition, or reality (basīṭah)
tense (zamān muʿayyan min al-azminah testimony (shahādah), §§116.6–117
al-thalāthah), §11 theorem (masʾalah), 88, 120, 122, 264, 270,
term (ḥadd): concrete, 339; and connective 284, 285
syllogisms with hypothetical thinking (fikr), §3, 91, 92–93
premises, §108.1; and contradiction Thom, Paul, xxv, 170–171
(tanāquḍ), 126–127, 190, 195; and three-part proposition (thulāthiyyah), §40,
contraposition (ʿaks al-naqīḍ), 212, §50.2, 166
213, 215, 220; and conversion (ʿaks), time (zamān), §68, §74, §77.2, §83.1, §89.2,
199; and demonstration (burhān), §110, §115, 105, 169, 186, 190–191
§117; and descriptional necessity, title (ʿunwānuhu), 156, 172, 248
172; and determinate proposition transferred (manqūl), §12.2, §12.3, 107,
(muḥaṣṣalah), §48; and externalist 108. See also legislatively transferred
reading (al-khārijiyyah al-mawḍūʿ ), signification (manqūl sharʿī); technically
160; and hypothetical proposition transferred (manqūl iṣṭilāḥī)
(sharṭiyyah), 144; and implicitly translations, xiii–xiv, xxiv–xxvi, 170–171
syllogistic proposition (qaḍiyyah true, truth (ṣādiq, ṣidq): and absolute
qiyāsātuhā maʿahā), §116.8; incomplete, continuing proposition (qaḍiyyah
of hypothetical proposition (juzʾ ḥīniyyah muṭlaqah), 175; and assertion
ghayr tāmm), 255; and logic, 87, 93; (taṣdīq), 269–270; Avicenna on, 127,
major term (ḥadd akbar), §90, §91.1, 295n168; and categorical proposition
§94.1, 231, 234–235, 242, 248, 275, (ḥamliyyah), §§42–44, §46; and
276; and matter (māddah), 152; minor coextensive universal (musāwin), §§26–
term (ḥadd aṣghar), §90, §91.1, §94.1, 27.1, 126–127, 127–128; and coincidental
234–235, 240, 248, 276; and mixes of disjunctive (munfaṣilah ittifāqiyyah),
modalized premises (mukhtaliṭāt), 182; and conceded propositions
240–241; positive (wujūdī), §49; (musallamāt), 277–278; and conception
privative (ʿadamī), §49; and quantified (taṣawwur), what conduces to, §6;
proposition (maḥṣūrah), 156; simple and conditional, kind of hypothetical
term (mufrad), §38, 96, 97, 143, proposition (muttaṣilah), §39, 295n177;
145; and syllogism, repetitive (qiyās and connective syllogisms with
istithnāʾ ī), 261; and temporality hypothetical premises, §108.1, 256,
conditions, 169; translating, xxv–xxvii; 257, 258; and contradiction (tanāquḍ),
and truth-conditions, 153. See also §§67–68, §71, 189, 190, 191–192, 295n181;

412 412
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true, truth (ṣādiq, ṣidq) (cont.): and (qiyās al-khulf), 265, 266; and species
contraposition (ʿaks al-naqīḍ), §§82– (nawʿ ), §32; and subject term, 156; and
85.2, 212, 214–215, 216, 217, 218, 220; and suppositional propositions (maẓnūnāt),
conversion (ʿaks), §§73–78.2, §§78.4– 278; and syllogism (qiyās), §92,
79, §81, 197, 199–200, 201, 204, 205, §113, 227, 229, 230, 231–232, 237; and
208, 209, 210, 211; and definition, broad syllogism, repetitive (qiyās istithnāʾ ī),
sense (taʿrīf), 136; and demonstration 262, 263; truth-apt (muḥtamil al-ṣidq
(burhān), 269, 270; and discourse wa-l-kidhb), 108, 141, 151. See also false,
(qawl), §38, 141–142; and disjunctive falsity (kādhib kidhb)
(munfaṣilah), 184–186; and endoxic two-part proposition (thunāʾiyyah), §40,
propositions (mashhūrāt), §118.2, 277; §50.2, 166, 167
and essentialist reading (al-ḥaqīqiyyah types (aṣnāf/aqsām ṣinfiyyah), 129, 142,
al-mawḍūʿ ), 162–163; and externalist 270, 271, 292n96
reading (al-khārijiyyah al-mawḍūʿ ), 159,
162–163; and fallacy (mughālaṭah), §119, Umayyad caliphate, xiii
281–282; and hypothetical proposition under a condition (bi-sharṭ, mashrūṭah),
(sharṭiyyah), §§60.2–64, 144, 179– 169
180, 180–181, 182, 183, 184–185; and unity (ittiḥād), §68, §108.1, 88, 190–191,
implicative conditional (luzūmiyyah), 264, 295n181
183–184; and inclusion (ʿumūm muṭlaq), universal (kullī): in general, xiv, §5,
§27.2; indefinite vs. determinate, §50.1; §§24–27.1, §27.3, 87; Avicenna
and information (khabar), §14.2; and on, 124–125, 291n87, 292n98; and
meaning (maʿnan), 124; and metathetic categorical proposition (ḥamliyyah),
(maʿdūlah), 165–166; and mixes of §§42–43; and co-implication (talāzum),
modalized premises (mukhtaliṭāt), 223, 224; and connective syllogisms
§100, §101, §§103–104, 240, 241, with hypothetical premises, §109.1, 257;
243, 246, 248–249, 251, 252, 253; and and contradiction (tanāquḍ), §§27.1–4,
necessary proposition (qaḍiyyah §68, §70, §72, 191; and contraposition
ḍarūriyyah), 153–154; in opening prayer, (ʿaks al-naqīḍ), §§83.2–3, §85.1, 218;
§0; and partial disjunction (tabāyun and conversion (ʿaks), §26, §§74–76.1,
juzʾ ī), §27.4; and possible continuing §§78.1–2, §81, 197, 208; definition, 109,
proposition (ḥīniyyah mumkinah), 175; 124–125; and delineation (rasm, tarsīm),
and premise of certainty (al-yaqīniyyāt), 112, 118–119; and division (taqsīm),
275; and quantified proposition 106–107, 111; exhaustiveness of division
(maḥṣūrah), §45, 155, 156; Quṭb al-Dīn (ḥaṣr), 123; and fallacy (mughālaṭah),
al-Rāzī al-Taḥtānī on, xx; and reductio §119, 281–282; five universals, 96;

413 413
 Index

universal (kullī) (cont.): and hypothetical also a-proposition (qaḍiyyah mūjibah

proposition (sharṭiyyah), §§65.1–2, 180, kulliyyah)
186; and induction (istiqrāʾ ), §114, 266, universal negative proposition (qaḍiyyah
267; logical universal (kullī manṭiqī), sālibah kulliyyah): in appendix, 330; and
§25, 125–126; meaning (maʿnan), categorical proposition (ḥamliyyah),
§15, §24, 124–125; mental universal §42, 150; and contraposition (ʿaks
(kullī ʿaqlī), §25, 125–126; and natural al-naqīḍ), §83.1; and syllogism (qiyās),
proposition (qaḍiyyah ṭabī ʿiyyah), 151; §91.3, §91.5, §§93.2–4, §94.6, §95.5,
natural universal (kullī ṭabī ʿī), §25, 125, §95.7, §95.10. See also e-proposition
292n88; and necessary proposition (qaḍiyyah sālibah kulliyyah)
(qaḍiyyah ḍarūriyyah), 154; particular univocal (mutawāṭiʾ ), §12.1, 106, 108, 146,
(juzʾ ī), without, 124; and predicate 147, 172–173
(maḥmūl), 129; and propositions based unknown (majhūl), §3, §37.1, §63, §80, §86,
on experience (mujarrabah), 272; 95, 240
and propositions based on sequential
testimony (mutawātirah), 274; and valuation (ḥukm), §14.2, §52.1, 154, 155, 170,
quiddity (māhiyyah), 109–112; and 189, 254. See also judgment (ḥukm)
real particular (juzʾ ī ḥaqīqī), 128; and vander Nat, Aat, xxxn28, 174, 250, 294n153,
relative particular (juzʾ ī iḍāfī), §28; 294n155, 294n200, 299n253, 299n257,
and simple meanings, §§15–17, §20, 299n258, 299n261, 299n266, 299n267,
§22.1, §23, 116; subject (mawḍūʿ ), 151; 300n270
and syllogism (qiyās), §91.5, §§91.1–3, verb (kalimah), §11, §14.3, 105, 147–148
§92, §§93.2–94.1, §§94.3–95.1, §95.3, verification (taḥqīq), §27.3, 161, 266
§§95.5–10, 225, 231, 232, 234–235; and verified (muḥaqqaq), §50.1, §70, §80, 138,
syllogism, repetitive (qiyās istithnāʾ ī), 161
§110, 262–263. See also particular (juzʾ ī)
universal affirmative proposition weaker (aʿamm), xxvi, §50.1, §74, §77.2,
(qaḍiyyah mūjibah kulliyyah): in §84.2, §115, 100–101, 102, 122, 154,
appendix, 330; and categorical 162–163, 165, 173, 181–182, 184, 198, 201,
proposition (ḥamliyyah), §42, 150; and 211–212, 214, 215, 232, 245, 250, 251, 275,
contraposition (ʿaks al-naqīḍ), §83.1, 277, 298n238. See also more general
213–214; and hypothetical proposition (aʿamm)
(sharṭiyyah), §87.1; and syllogism what arises on the way to “what is it?”
(qiyās), §§91.2–3, §93.5, §94.3, §94.8, (wāqiʿ fī ṭarīq mā huwa), §33, 132, 133
§95.3, §§95.8–9; and syllogism, what is intrinsic to “what is it?” (dākhil fī
repetitive (qiyās istithnāʾ ī), 262. See jawāb mā huwa), §33, 133

414 414
 Index

what is said in answer to “what are they?” 116–118, 123, 190–191, 255, 291n68. See
(mā humā), 115 also part (juzʾ )
what is said in answer to “what is it?” whole quiddity, 111, 117
(al-maqūl fī jawāb mā huwa), §§16.2–17, with respect to expression (min jihat
§29, §33, 110, 111, 112–113, 115, 118, 129, al-lafẓ), §119
131, 132–133 with respect to meaning (min jihat
what is sought (maṭlūb), §77.1, §84.1, al-maʿnā), §119
§85.2, §90, §94.5, §96, §109.1, §112, with respect to the description (bi-ḥasab
§113, §116.5, 116–117, 205, 209, 227, 234, al-waṣf), §69.3
247, 248, 261, 264–265, 267. See also with respect to the essence (bi-ḥasab
questions, or theorems, of science al-dhāt), §53, §54, §55, §56, §57, §58
(masāʾil)
while (ḥīna fī baʿḍ al-awqāt), §69.3, §76.1, Young, Walter, 301n290
§77.1, §78.1, §81, §83.1, §83.3, §84.1
whole (kull), §2, §§16.1–17, §19, §68, §116.2, Zimmermann, Fritz, xxv
89, 90, 103, 110, 111–112, 113–114, 115,

415 415
 About the NYUAD Research Institute

The Library of Arabic Literature is a research center affiliated with NYU Abu
Dhabi and is supported by a grant from the NYU Abu Dhabi Research Institute.
The NYU Abu Dhabi Research Institute is a world-class center of cutting-
edge and innovative research, scholarship, and cultural activity. It supports
centers that address questions of global significance and local relevance and al-
lows leading faculty members from across the disciplines to carry out creative
scholarship and high-level research on a range of complex issues with depth,
scale, and longevity that otherwise would not be possible.
From genomics and climate science to the humanities and Arabic litera-
ture, Research Institute centers make significant contributions to scholarship,
scientific understanding, and artistic creativity. Centers strengthen cross-dis-
ciplinary engagement and innovation among the faculty, build critical mass in
infrastructure and research talent at NYU Abu Dhabi, and have helped make
the university a magnet for outstanding faculty, scholars, students, and inter-
national collaborations.

416 416
 About the Typefaces

The Arabic text is set in DecoType Emiri, drawn by Mirjam Somers, based on
the metal typeface in the naskh style that was cut for the 1924 Cairo edition of
the Qurʾan.
This Arabic typeface is controlled by a dedicated font layout engine. ACE,
the Arabic Calligraphic Engine, invented by Peter Somers, Thomas Milo, and
Mirjam Somers of DecoType, first operational in 1985, pioneered the principle
followed by later smart font layout technologies such as OpenType, which is
used for all other typefaces in this series.
The Arabic text was set with WinSoft Tasmeem, a sophisticated user inter-
face for DecoType ACE inside Adobe InDesign. Tasmeem was conceived and
created by Thomas Milo (DecoType) and Pascal Rubini (WinSoft) in 2005.
The English text is set in Adobe Text, a new and versatile text typeface family
designed by Robert Slimbach for Western (Latin, Greek, Cyrillic) typesetting.
Its workhorse qualities make it perfect for a wide variety of applications, espe-
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Adobe Text bridges the gap between calligraphic Renaissance types of the fif-
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laus Kis, and William Caslon. While grounded in classical form, Adobe Text is
also a statement of contemporary utilitarian design, well suited to a wide variety
of print and on-screen applications.

417 417
Titles Published by the Library
of Arabic Literature

For more details on individual titles, visit www.libraryofarabicliterature.org

Classical Arabic Literature: A Library of Arabic Literature Anthology

Selected and translated by Geert Jan van Gelder (2012)

A Treasury of Virtues: Sayings, Sermons, and Teachings of ʿAlī, by al-Qāḍī

al-Quḍāʿī, with the One Hundred Proverbs attributed to al-Jāḥiẓ
Edited and translated by Tahera Qutbuddin (2013)

The Epistle on Legal Theory, by al-Shāfiʿī

Edited and translated by Joseph E. Lowry (2013)

Leg over Leg, by Aḥmad Fāris al-Shidyāq

Edited and translated by Humphrey Davies (4 volumes; 2013–14)

Virtues of the Imām Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, by Ibn al-Jawzī

Edited and translated by Michael Cooperson (2 volumes; 2013–15)

The Epistle of Forgiveness, by Abū l-ʿAlāʾ al-Maʿarrī

Edited and translated by Geert Jan van Gelder and Gregor Schoeler
(2 volumes; 2013–14)

The Principles of Sufism, by ʿĀʾishah al-Bāʿūniyyah

Edited and translated by Th. Emil Homerin (2014)

The Expeditions: An Early Biography of Muḥammad, by Maʿmar ibn Rāshid

Edited and translated by Sean W. Anthony (2014)

Two Arabic Travel Books

Accounts of China and India, by Abū Zayd al-Sīrāfī
   Edited and translated by Tim Mackintosh-Smith (2014)
Mission to the Volga, by Aḥmad ibn Faḍlān
   Edited and translated by James Montgomery (2014)

418 418
 Titles Published by the Library of Arabic Literature

Disagreements of the Jurists: A Manual of Islamic Legal Theory, by al-Qāḍī

al-Nuʿmān
Edited and translated by Devin J. Stewart (2015)

Consorts of the Caliphs: Women and the Court of Baghdad, by Ibn al-Sāʿī
Edited by Shawkat M. Toorawa and translated by the Editors of the Library
of Arabic Literature (2015)

What ʿĪsā ibn Hishām Told Us, by Muḥammad al-Muwayliḥī

Edited and translated by Roger Allen (2 volumes; 2015)

The Life and Times of Abū Tammām, by Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn Yaḥyā
al-Ṣūlī
Edited and translated by Beatrice Gruendler (2015)

The Sword of Ambition: Bureaucratic Rivalry in Medieval Egypt, by ʿUthmān

ibn Ibrāhīm al-Nābulusī
Edited and translated by Luke Yarbrough (2016)

Brains Confounded by the Ode of Abū Shādūf Expounded, by Yūsuf

al-Shirbīnī
Edited and translated by Humphrey Davies (2 volumes; 2016)

Light in the Heavens: Sayings of the Prophet Muḥammad, by al-Qāḍī

al-Quḍāʿī
Edited and translated by Tahera Qutbuddin (2016)

Risible Rhymes, by Muḥammad ibn Maḥfūẓ al-Sanhūrī

Edited and translated by Humphrey Davies (2016)

A Hundred and One Nights

Edited and translated by Bruce Fudge (2016)

The Excellence of the Arabs, by Ibn Qutaybah

Edited by James E. Montgomery and Peter Webb
Translated by Sarah Bowen Savant and Peter Webb (2017)

Scents and Flavors: A Syrian Cookbook

Edited and translated by Charles Perry (2017)

Arabian Satire: Poetry from 18th-Century Najd, by Ḥmēdān al-Shwēʿir

Edited and translated by Marcel Kurpershoek (2017)

419 419
 Titles Published by the Library of Arabic Literature

In Darfur: An Account of the Sultanate and Its People, by Muḥammad ibn

ʿUmar al-Tūnisī
Edited and translated by Humphrey Davies (2 volumes; 2018)

War Songs, by ʿAntarah ibn Shaddād

Edited by James E. Montgomery
Translated by James E. Montgomery with Richard Sieburth (2018)

Arabian Romantic: Poems on Bedouin Life and Love, by ʿAbdallāh ibn Sbayyil
Edited and translated by Marcel Kurpershoek (2018)

Dīwān ʿAntarah ibn Shaddād: A Literary-Historical Study

By James E. Montgomery (2018)

Stories of Piety and Prayer: Deliverance Follows Adversity, by al-Muḥassin

ibn ʿAlī al-Tanūkhī
Edited and translated by Julia Bray (2019)

The Philosopher Responds: An Intellectual Correspondence from the Tenth

Century, by Abū Ḥayyān al-Tawḥīdī and Abū ʿAlī Miskawayh
Edited by Bilal Orfali and Maurice A. Pomerantz
Translated by Sophia Vasalou and James E. Montgomery (2 volumes; 2019)

Tajrīd sayf al-himmah li-stikhrāj mā fī dhimmat al-dhimmah: A Scholarly Edi-

tion of ʿUthmān ibn Ibrāhīm al-Nābulusī’s Text
By Luke Yarbrough (2020)

The Discourses: Reflections on History, Sufism, Theology, and Literature—

Volume One, by al-Ḥasan al-Yūsī
Edited and translated by Justin Stearns (2020)

Impostures, by al-Ḥarīrī
Translated by Michael Cooperson (2020)

Maqāmāt Abī Zayd al-Sarūjī, by al-Ḥarīrī

Edited by Michael Cooperson (2020)

The Yoga Sutras of Patañjali, by Abū Rayḥān al-Bīrūnī

Edited and translated by Mario Kozah (2020)

420 420
 Titles Published by the Library of Arabic Literature

The Book of Charlatans, by Jamāl al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥīm al-Jawbarī

Edited by Manuela Dengler
Translated by Humphrey Davies (2020)

A Physician on the Nile: A Description of Egypt and Journal of the Famine

Years, by ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baghdādī
Edited and translated by Tim Mackintosh-Smith (2021)

The Book of Travels, by Ḥannā Diyāb

Edited by Johannes Stephan
Translated by Elias Muhanna (2 volumes; 2021)

Kalīlah and Dimnah: Fables of Virtue and Vice, by Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ

Edited by Michael Fishbein
Translated by Michael Fishbein and James E. Montgomery (2021)

Love, Death, Fame: Poetry and Lore from the Emirati Oral Tradition, by al-
Māyidī ibn Ẓāhir
Edited and translated by Marcel Kurpershoek (2022)

The Essence of Reality: A Defense of Philosophical Sufism, by ʿAyn al-Quḍāt

Edited and translated by Mohammed Rustom (2022)

The Requirements of the Sufi Path: A Defense of the Mystical Tradition, by

Ibn Khaldūn
Edited and translated by Carolyn Baugh (2022)

The Doctors’ Dinner Party, by Ibn Buṭlān

Edited and translated by Philip F. Kennedy and Jeremy Farrell (2023)

Fate the Hunter: Early Arabic Hunting Poems

Edited and translated by James E. Montgomery (2023)

The Book of Monasteries, by al-Shābushtī

Edited and translated by Hilary Kilpatrick (2023)

In Deadly Embrace: Arabic Hunting Poems, by Ibn al-Muʿtazz

Edited and translated by James E. Montgomery (2023)

The Divine Names: A Mystical Theology of the Names of God in the Qurʾan,
by ʿAfīf al-Dīn al-Tilimsānī
Edited and translated by Yousef Casewit (2023)

421 421
 Titles Published by the Library of Arabic Literature

The Rules of Logic, by Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī

Edited and translated by Tony Street (2024)

Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī’s al-Risālah al-Shamsiyyah: An Edition and Translation

with Commentary
By Tony Street (2024)

Bedouin Poets of the Nafūd Desert, by Khalaf Abū Zwayyid, ʿAdwān al-Hirbīd,
and ʿAjlān ibn Rmāl
Edited and translated by Marcel Kurpershoek (2024)

English-only Paperbacks

Leg over Leg, by Aḥmad Fāris al-Shidyāq (2 volumes; 2015)

The Expeditions: An Early Biography of Muḥammad, by Maʿmar ibn Rāshid
(2015)
The Epistle on Legal Theory: A Translation of al-Shāfiʿī’s Risālah, by
al-Shāfiʿī (2015)
The Epistle of Forgiveness, by Abū l-ʿAlāʾ al-Maʿarrī (2016)
The Principles of Sufism, by ʿĀʾishah al-Bāʿūniyyah (2016)
A Treasury of Virtues: Sayings, Sermons, and Teachings of ʿAlī, by al-Qāḍī
al-Quḍāʿī, with the One Hundred Proverbs attributed to al-Jāḥiẓ (2016)
The Life of Ibn Ḥanbal, by Ibn al-Jawzī (2016)
Mission to the Volga, by Ibn Faḍlān (2017)
Accounts of China and India, by Abū Zayd al-Sīrāfī (2017)
A Hundred and One Nights (2017)
Consorts of the Caliphs: Women and the Court of Baghdad, by Ibn al-Sāʿī
(2017)
Disagreements of the Jurists: A Manual of Islamic Legal Theory, by al-Qāḍī
al-Nuʿmān (2017)
What ʿĪsā ibn Hishām Told Us, by Muḥammad al-Muwayliḥī (2018)
War Songs, by ʿAntarah ibn Shaddād (2018)
The Life and Times of Abū Tammām, by Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn Yaḥyā
al-Ṣūlī (2018)
The Sword of Ambition, by ʿUthmān ibn Ibrāhīm al-Nābulusī (2019)
Brains Confounded by the Ode of Abū Shādūf Expounded: Volume One, by
Yūsuf al-Shirbīnī (2019)

422 422
 Titles Published by the Library of Arabic Literature

Brains Confounded by the Ode of Abū Shādūf Expounded: Volume Two, by

Yūsuf al-Shirbīnī and Risible Rhymes, by Muḥammad ibn Maḥfūẓ al-Sanhūrī
(2019)
The Excellence of the Arabs, by Ibn Qutaybah (2019)
Light in the Heavens: Sayings of the Prophet Muḥammad, by al-Qāḍī al-Quḍāʿī
(2019)
Scents and Flavors: A Syrian Cookbook (2020)
Arabian Satire: Poetry from 18th-Century Najd, by Ḥmēdān al-Shwēʿir (2020)
In Darfur: An Account of the Sultanate and Its People, by Muḥammad al-Tūnisī
(2020)
Arabian Romantic: Poems on Bedouin Life and Love, by ʿAbdallāh ibn Sbayyil
(2020)
The Philosopher Responds, by Abū Ḥayyān al-Tawḥīdī and Abū ʿAlī Miskawayh
(2021)
Impostures, by al-Ḥarīrī (2021)
The Discourses: Reflections on History, Sufism, Theology, and Literature—
Volume One, by al-Ḥasan al-Yūsī (2021)
The Book of Charlatans, by Jamāl al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥīm al-Jawbarī (2022)
The Yoga Sutras of Patañjali, by Abū Rayḥān al-Bīrūnī (2022)
The Book of Travels, by Ḥannā Diyāb (2022)
A Physician on the Nile: A Description of Egypt and Journal of the Famine
Years, by ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baghdādī (2022)
Kalīlah and Dimnah: Fables of Virtue and Vice, by Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ (2023)
Love, Death, Fame: Poetry and Lore from the Emirati Oral Tradition, by al-
Māyidī ibn Ẓāhir (2023)
The Essence of Reality: A Defense of Philosophical Sufism, by ʿAyn al-Quḍāt
(2023)
The Doctors’ Dinner Party, by Ibn Buṭlān (2024)

423 423
 About the Editor–Translator

Tony Street is a Fellow of Clare Hall at the University of Cambridge. He works

on medieval Islamic intellectual history, focusing on Arabic logical texts writ-
ten in the thirteenth century. He has held visiting positions at Paris 7, Berkeley,
Oxford, and the Israel Institute of Advanced Studies. He is currently translating
a commentary on the logic of Avicenna’s Pointers and Reminders by Najm al-Dīn
al-Kātibī’s colleague and rival, Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī.

424 424