ΠΛΑΤΩΝ | Plato: Four Dialogues
Handout 7
Socratic Method II: Midwifery (Maieutics)
Introduction. Socrates compares his philosophical work as midwifery (ἡ μαιευτικὴ
τέχνη, he maieutikê technê), in a famous passage in Theatetus; of which here is an
extract (148e–151d; sentences numbered for ease of reference):1
[150b] SOCRATES: “[1] Well, my midwifery has all the standard features, except
that I practice it on men instead of women, and supervise the labour of their
minds, not their bodies. [2] And the most important aspect of my skill is [150c] the
ability to apply every conceivable test to see whether the young man’s mental off-
spring is illusory and false or viable and true. [3] But I have this feature in common
with midwifes—I myself am barren of wisdom [ἄγονός εἰμι σοφίας, agonos eimi
sophias]. [4] The criticism that is often made of me—that it is a lack of wisdom
that makes me ask others questions, but say nothing positive myself—is perfectly
true. [5] Why do I behave like this? [6] Because the god compels me to attend to
the labours of others [μαιεύεσθαί με ὁ θεὸς ἀναγκάζει, maieuesthai me ho deos
anagkazei], but prohibits me from having any offspring myself. [7] I myself, there-
fore, am quite devoid of wisdom; [150d] my mind has never produced an idea that
could be called clever. [8] But as for those who associate with me—well, although
at first some of them give the impression of being pretty stupid, yet later, as the
association continues, all of those to whom the god vouchsafes it improve mar-
vellously, as is evident to themselves as well as to others. [9] And they make this
progress, clearly, not because they ever learn anything from me; the many fine
ideas and offspring that they produce come from within themselves. [10] But the
god and I are responsible for the delivery. [150e]
[11] There is clear evidence of this. Often in the past people have not been
aware of the part I play; they have discounted me, and thought that they them-
selves were responsible for the delivery. [12] Either of their own accord, or under
the influence of others, they left me sooner that they ought to. [13] Then, because
they kept bad company, they proceeded to have only miscarriages, and they
spoiled all the offspring I had delivered with wrong upbringing. [14] They placed
more weight on counterfeits and illusions than on the truth. [15] Eventually, they
gained a reputation for stupidity, and thought themselves stupid too. [151a] […]
[16] There is another experience which those who associate with me have in
common with pregnant women: they suffer labour-pains. [17] In fact, they are
racked night and day with a far greater distress than women undergo; and the
arousal and relief of this pain is the province of my expertise. [151b]
[18] So it is with them, Theatetus. [19] As for people who strike me as not yet
pregnant and therefore as having no need of me, this is where my skills as a kindly
matchmaker come into play. [20] Though I say to myself, I am pretty good at
guessing whose company would be beneficial for them. […]
[21] Now, why have I gone on at such length about all this to you? [22] Because
I suspect, as you do yourself, that you are in pain, and that this is due to pregnancy.
1 Translation R. Waterfield (1987). Plato: Theatetus. London: Penguin (pp. 25–9).
OUDCE Michaelmas Term 2014 Peter Wyss
[23] So let me take on your case: remember, I am a midwife’s son and [151c]
practise the art myself. [24] When I ask a question, set about answering it to the
best of your ability. [25] And if, on examination, I find that some thought of yours
is illusory and untrue, and if I then draw it out of you and discard it, do not rant
and rave at me, as a first-time mother might if her baby was involved. [26] In the
past, my friend, when I have removed some piece of nonsense of theirs, people
have often worked themselves up into such a state that they have been ready
literally to bite me! [27] They do not believe that I am acting out of goodwill;
[151d] it does not even cross their minds that no god bears ill-will against men, and
that I am not motivated by ill-will either. [28] I do what I do because it is my
moral duty not to connive at falsehood and cover up truth.”
Study & Discussion Questions.
1. What are the key features of the analogy between real and Socratic midwifery?
2. And what are the key differences?
3. How does Socrates’s avowal not to be wise himself fit the analogy?
4. What is the contrast between learning and maieutics?
5. What happens once ideas are ‘delivered’ (cf. esp. [24]ff.)? Is this compatible
with Socratic ignorance?
Further Background. (1) Maieutics suggests that Socrates first enables and then
criticises other people’s ideas; aporia or perplexity is hence analogous to the labour
of childbirth.2 (2) People cannot be forced to be virtuous or happy; the maieutic
process starts where they are, so to speak, and goes where they lead (cf. Euthyphro
14c)—perhaps to aporia. Socratic midwidery takes people seriously. (3) In an
intriguing passage in the Sophist (231b), the Eleatic Visitor suggests that the ‘noble’
sophist cleanses the soul insofar as he examines pseudo-wisdom and the mere
appreance of knowing. If so, Socrates is a ‘noble’ sophist. (4) In the Symposion,
Alcibiades compares Socrates with a silenos: a bald, opulent, and snub-nosed demon
with the tail and ears of a horse (215b ff.; 221d). But this appearance is deceptive:
Socrates’s words only seem comical (or ironical); yet, if penetrated, they reveal
their significance. (5) According to the midwife analogy people ‘deliver’ what they
find, or produce, in themselves. This relates to Plato’s theory of recollection or
anamnêsis (ἀνάμνησις): learning amounts to uncovering in oneself, or recovering,
what is already there. This is developed in the famous slave boy passage in Meno
(81d ff.)3, and also in Phaedo (72e–77a). The core idea is that the soul is already
informed by general truths when it gets embodied, but this information needs to
be recovered. Hence, the theory of recollection is connected to the immortality of
the soul and the theory of Forms. More of this in Phaedo. (6) A related puzzle: if
the philosopher has knowledge of these Forms, Socrates is not a philosopher.
2 Matthews, G. B. (1999). Socratic Perplexity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
3 Meno 85d: “Without anyone having taught him, and only through questions put to him, he will
understand, recovering the knowledge out of himself?”: οὐκοῦν οὐδενὸς διδάξαντος ἀλλ᾽
ἐρωτήσαντος ἐπιστήσεται, ἀναλαβὼν αὐτὸς ἐξ αὑτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην; (oukoun oudenos dida-
xantos all’ erôtêsantos epistêsetai, analabôn autos ex hautou tên epistêmên?).
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