ABRAHAM CALOV

S. S. Theol. D. & P. P.
Elements of Gnostology
or
GNOSTOLOGIA
Succinctly
Comprehended
Exhibiting
the Nature, Principles, Affections, and Species of the
Cognoscible, insofar as it is such, First proposed in
public disputations at the Academy of Königsberg
Eighteen Years Ago, Then again at the Rostock
Academy, Now printed for the third time, and placed
before divine Metaphysics.
YEAR 1650.
At the expense of JOACHIM VVilden, Bookseller of
Rostock. LÜBECK By the letters of ALBERT
HAKELMANN.
R Scaliger. Excerc. 307. S. 20.

A Man Studious of TRUTH must act with Reasons, not

Ciceronian or Platonic embellishments. For
declamations are the works of the ambitious, the food
of the idle: he who is occupied with the affairs of
nature and divinity must study that brevity, which
makes words equal to things, which has sure
demonstrations for the bare truth.
 D. ABRAHAM CALOV’S Elements of Gnostology

Exhibiting the Nature, Principles, Affections, and Species of the Cognoscible, insofar as it is
such, i.e. The Mode of apprehending any Object, on which all human cognition relies.

The Nature of the present habit is to be examined, both in itself, by attaching a definition,
and in its parts, by sending forth their delineation, which the proemial consideration
furnishes: as well as the object, distinctly represented under a general and specific aspect,
concerning which is the Essential treatment. Therefore let it be

The Nature of Gnostology [Gnōstologia] in general.

1.Definition.

Gnostology is a principal habit of the mind, contemplating the cognoscible, insofar as it is

such.

It is a habit of the mind, because it perfects the mind, in the cognition of its object, by the
mode of a principle added on top of the natural potency, and strongly rooted. Principal:
because it is not consecrated to the use of others per se, and it is contemplative: for it
subsists in the mere truth of the cognoscible taken universally, and since it is neither
Intelligence, which claims for itself precisely not the knowable, but the principles of
knowing: nor Wisdom, which has command over the other disciplines, not without cognition
of their objects, which you will expect in vain here; nor Science; inasmuch as it contemplates
only a determinate being, namely, only the necessary, and has only truth as its object: But
the Knowable is extended more widely, to which discursive cognition is adequate, and here
not actual, but habitual, insofar as it perfects the mind intensively: and therefore it remains,
that it is rightly established and defined as a peculiar habit of the mind.

The cognoscible is to be explained, both generally, what is it? And specially, of what kind is
it? The former is explained both a priori, by definition, and declaration of principles: and a
posteriori, by determination of affections.

The latter is examined by consideration of the species of the cognoscible.

2.[Hypothetikē] [Hypothetical]

I. Gnostology (a) is given, (b) distinct from the remaining disciplines, and (c) is to be
proposed distinctly. For the cognition of the knowable in itself is given: which (b)
 is examined precisely nowhere else, since all are occupied with this or that
knowable in particular: and therefore (c) so that distinct things may be proposed
distinctly, abstract things abstractly, it requires a peculiar discipline, which is
called Gnostology from its object, as the rest are.

II. Gnostology is (a) first of all disciplines (b) by nature (c) last by culture, (d) and
perhaps by doctrine. It has the most general object, and on account of this (b) by
nature or insofar as community, not dignity it is supreme, although (c) it was
invented last after the others, or rather cultivated, and not (d) to be learned at
last after the common ones.

III. Gnostology is to be sent forth before the Philosophical precognita. Because at the
threshold of Philosophy only the Philosophical knowable is precognized, not
every one, still less universally, which is cognized in Gnostology.

IV. (a) The Knowable or (b) rather the cognoscible is (c) the object of Gnostology. I
want you to take the Knowable broadly, as the [gnōston] [knowable] of the
Greeks, but not strictly, as [alētheia] [truth] although [alēthēs] [true] is for the
most part taken more strictly, as it respects science properly so called, in which
way (b) cognoscible is more suitable, also including [to gnōston] [the knowable]:
whence thus (c) it will be the adequate object of our discipline, which is
expounded in no other way in any other discipline, but fully constitutes this one
in itself, and sufficiently distinguishes it from all others, with the mode of
considering having been observed, insofar as it is cognoscible, by which is not
denied descent to the contraction of the knowable, but only the special
consideration of particular knowables is removed, which belongs to other habits,
e.g. of Metaphysics, Being; of Pneumatics, Spirit, etc.

V. With the (a) constitution of the knowable having been cognized, its (b)
contraction is to be attached. The constitution of the knowable in the first
moment is clear from the definition and principles, which open up, what it is, and
how the knowable comes to be: but in the second moment it becomes known
from the principles (analogously all things) following the nature of the knowable,
which are to be sent forth, because general. But afterwards (b) the contraction of
the knowable is not to be neglected, to the proximate species, or rather more
limited modes, evidently the primary knowable and the secondary, etc. By which
 a complete notion of the object may be had, which presents itself to the intellect
in just as many modes.

II

Consideration of the Object

PART I.

On the General quiddity of the cognoscible.

CHAPTER I. DEFINITION OF THE COGNOSCIBLE.

The cognoscible is, what is objected to our intellect for cognizing.

The cognoscible does not recognize a genus, and thus, neither a definition, but is only
described, and denotes that, which is cognized directly by our intellect. This is easily clear.
For nothing can be thought more widely. For if it is thought, it will be cognized. Therefore it
will be cognoscible: wherefore it transcends the predicaments, and on account of
commonality refuses definition, because it says everything, which is cognoscible, [kata
delōsin] [by exposition], either as simple, or complex: Although the simple is attended to
primarily; the complex not unless secondarily, insofar as by reason of the ingredient terms it
recognizes the same principles of cognition. Thus a proposition presupposes abstraction,
idea, is cognized in the discipline of bare truths, or [phōs] [light] by cause etc. The simple
knowable is all that, which either is a real Being and outside the fiction of the intellect, or a
negation and defect of Entity, or a respect of reason, not subsisting without the fiction of the
mind, and thus which is either directly or indirectly cognoscible, so that it may be perceived
either [ōs] [as], or [analōgōs] [analogously], in such a way nevertheless, that it is cognized by
the intellect, (sensual notice does not suffice, although it may precede) and this not simply
by any whatsoever, divine or Angelic but human, and thus by cognition not intuitive, but
abstractive and discursive.

CANONS

I. Natural cognoscible is distinct from Theological. Every thing, which begets

cognition in us, becomes known either from the book of Nature or Scripture.
Thence the knowable of Reason and of Revelation; This latter is dismissed to the
 Theologians, because its production is often far different from the excitation of
natural cognition. For such notice is not always acquired, but also immediately
infused, and does not recognize an idea, except revelation. Therefore only the
former is attended to here.

II. Intelligible is everything which is. Consider all Beings, by that very fact you will
teach that they are cognoscible: But Non-Being is minimally intelligible, so that its
species are wrongly established Something and nothing. For the intellect by
understanding becomes all things. But can Non-Being be made? Thence by what
anything is more in act, by that it is more intelligible. For it can move more
strongly both the senses and the intellect. Wherefore true Beings are cognized
more easily, than modes of Beings, because these have a diminished essence as it
were.

CHAPTER II. INTERNAL PRINCIPLES OF THE COGNOSCIBLE.

The principles of the cognoscible are either intrinsic, or extrinsic.

Analogy in these principles is to be urged. For properly so called internal principles have no
place here: except by likeness.

The Intrinsic Principles are the material of the object, namely, Entity, and the formal, namely,
knowability.

That is the foundation of this. According to that the knowable is fundamentally in Nature:
According to this it is formally in the intellect. There [dynamei] [potentially] it is knowable;
here in act it is cognized.

CANONS

I. Whatever is knowable (a) by the light of reason, (b) recognizes Nature as its
foundation, (c) i.e. the collection of all things, which are in the world. The
knowable, which becomes known by the grace of revelation, has Scripture as its
foundation: What is revealed through Creation, Nature: each the highest and
ultimate principle, GOD speaking in the word of grace or power. Here is the
measure of the knowable insofar as constitution, so that it may be said true,
whatever is conformed to the divine intellect; Thus if a thing is from God. (b) But
Nature and Scripture are the measure insofar as apprehension: in which way the
true is called the adequation of the intellect with the thing posited by God: and
therefore knowables are thus cognized according to GOD, concerning which
alone it holds, because [haplōs] [simply]. GOD is the constitutive foundation, the
two books opened by GOD, the radical. Each has infallible truth, nor is GOD
manifested through creation to be opposed to GOD revealing himself through the
Word. But our intellect in apprehension is often deceived: whence here
minimally, but those most truly are the foundation of all cognition. (c) Moreover,
Nature here says the whole universe or the visible theater of the world, which
God has proposed to us for contemplating: hence all cognition is drawn from
things created either in comparison to the Maker, or among themselves, and
sensibles having been cognized by abstraction from sensibles, intelligibles from
intelligibles. From which collation and abstraction flow the first principles of
cognizing, on which all truth relies. Thence we arrive at the notion of all Beings:
from consideration of the university of Being, the divine power shines forth from
the infinite: from comparison of this with all most common predicates and
attributes result: Being, unity, etc. From intuition of the Macrocosm things
Physical lie open to the eyes, the causes of things are sought out by reason:
Likewise it becomes known from the excellent conformation and harmony, by
which all things are founded by weight, measure, number, the [theōrēma]
[theorem]: Hence Mathematics, By contemplating the Microcosm, we apprehend
the immortal soul by Spirit, where if we sometimes admire the uneducated, and
those ignorant of all things to speak in various languages, to discourse subtly, nay
to blaspheme, we are led into the nature of a spirit beyond our Mind, We learn to
refer That and this to the Mind effecting all things, which we point out as the
infinite Spirit: of which we also labor to acquire habitual cognition. Further the
love of virtue implanted in us, the private and public societies instituted by GOD
admonish us concerning the habit to be sought of honest actions: by which we
conform our mind most similar to GOD. Finally reason searching out the
Architecture of the universe is intent for a like one, whereby according to the idea
of natural things it may devise artifice, so that art may be the imitator of nature.
Thence the habits of [oikodomia] [economy] have flowed: all these the intellect
directs by certain notions, to more certain perception, and better propagation,
reason and speech perfecting: which are minimally applied to the thing by the
intellect contrary to the nature of the thing, still less are they formed by the
intellect without a real foundation: so that it may truly remain: That Nature is the
representative foundation of every knowable.
 II. (a) To be wise in naturals outside nature, is to indulge in rash speculations (b) to
refer immediately to GOD things made manifest in Nature, is to close the book
opened by GOD on account of ignorance. Therefore let it be right there to
assume [to arkhein] [the beginning], and to doubt learnedly about some things:
(b) but here let us scrutinize the thing, as it is brought forth: nor thus let us
collect: Aristotle is capable of discipline: why? Because GOD so willed: But in such
a way: because he is rational: rational because man. But why is man rational?
Because for man to be and not to be rational implies opposition in the appositive.
But it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time: Why
does it imply a contradiction? Here at last truth orders to subsist: because GOD
willed man to be rational.

CHAPTER III, ON THE END AND PRINCIPAL EFFICIENT, AND THE MEANS OF THE KNOWABLE
IN GENERAL

The extrinsic principles of the cognoscible either excite cognition in the first place, or
promote excited cognition.

Those are called principles of constitution, these of conservation.

It is not to be thought, that these principles are exactly opposed to each other, since
conservation presupposes constitution, in such a way nevertheless, that by the principles of
constitution we are moved in the first place into the cognition of things: but as to
propagation besides those another principle is also required.

The principles of Constitution are, the End on account of which, and the Efficient, from
which the cognoscible is. The End is either intermediate or ultimate.

That is the cognition of the thing or [gnōsis] [knowledge], which is that act, by which our
intellect from itself indeterminate is rendered objectively determinate.

This is the Glorification of God arisen from cognition.

The Efficient is either moving to producing, or acting, or producing the cognoscible.

The Mover on the part of things is their multivaried beauty, and beautiful variety: on our
part the connate privation of knowledge, which includes both ignorance of things, and the
desire of knowing.

The Acting is principal, or medium.

The Principal is the intellect, which makes what is intelligible in potency, intelligible in act,
and thus apprehends.
The Medium is either remote or proximate, The Remote are the senses bringing knowable
objects.

The Proximate medium is one of production, abstraction; another of apprehension, concept,

Evidently objects move the senses: which apprehend the singular thing, and bring it to the
intellect, where it is purified by means of abstraction, and is represented by the work of the
concept, so that it may come forth knowable.

Concerning which things in the following chapter.

CANONS.

I. What are the principles of cognition, these are also of the cognoscible as such.
For the Cognoscible involves a respect to cognition. Therefore from which
principles cognition arises, from the same things are elevated into the state of
cognoscibility.

II. Any cognition whatsoever is ample material of divine praise. For the sake of this a
thing is objected to the intellect, so that by contemplating it or directing it to
operation the potency of the intellect may be perfected, and it may learn to refer
all things to him, from whom are all things

III. (a) A thing invites to cognition, (b) our ignorance instigates, (c) desire compels.
The remarkable variety of things, and harmonic proportion cannot but arouse
their love in our intellect, by which (b) devoid of all things, it burns with love of
cognizing all things, since (c) the desire of knowing is also innate to all. 1. Met. T.
1.

IV. The appetite of knowing is never satiated. The intellect is accustomed to be

compared to the Aristotelian prime matter, which indeterminate to all forms
desires all with an insatiable appetite. For it also possessing no cognition, seeks
to exhaust every knowable: because the appetite is not in the whole frustrated,
since it cognizes many things: nor is it ever fulfilled in the whole: since those
things which we know, are almost none to those, which we still desire to cognize.
Hence those tears of the Philosophers, especially of the Ancients, modestly
dissimulating knowledge, not impetuously removing.
 V. (a) Things outside the mind are singular, (b) and are apprehended by the senses.
Platonic Ideas outside the intellect are none. (b) For sense is of singulars, but
intellect is also of universals.

VI. Two are the senses [logikōtatoi] [most rational]. (a) Sight and (b) Hearing. That by
reason of invention and apprehension, (b) this by reason of institution and
communication of the sciences, and thus that is necessary simply, this only
according to quid. For things taken up by the eyes, when they enter the mind, are
held most certain. But things transmitted through the ears are impressed more
strongly: since the living voice teaches more.

VII. Two are the little eyes of cognition, (a) [peira] [experience] and (b) [logos]
[reason]. With these we penetrate all things, and (b) we behold the causes of
things. To things especially conduces experience, which receives strength from
the collection of singulars. Reason most of all makes manifest the causes of
things. For the most part the being of a thing is accustomed to be better known
than the cause, so that we apprehend that by sense, but we need to hunt this by
consequence.

VIII. Sense is perfected by (a) observation, (b) experience and induction. That
apprehends singulars (b) this collects things apprehended, that elicits the
universal from these things perpetually observed.

CHAPTER IV. ON ABSTRACTION

Abstraction is a function of the intellect, by which our mind frees a thing precisely
represented from individuating conditions, or accidental imperfections, and deduces from
the state of singularity into the universal or eminent, so that it may be distinctly cognized.

Abstraction here is understood not as a real separation, either of one thing from another, or
from matter, which it does not implicate, nor a pure negation of something concerning
something, but a precision of the mind, by which from certain things joined in act I
apprehend one, the rest having been left behind: in which sense it obtains a twofold respect:
1. Absolute, insofar as it is an operation of the mind. 2. Relative, as it is a principle of the
knowable, in which way it is properly of this place. Which is defined 1. from the principle, a
function of the intellect, by which is removed the precision made by the senses from the
common sense, which apprehends distinctly the objects of any senses whatsoever: 2. From
the effect, and that partly immediate, which is both the precision of one thing from another,
and the liberation of a thing from individuating conditions, by which it is bound in the
singular to the here and now; and also from those, which involve an accidental imperfection;
partly ultimate, which is the deduction of a thing from the singular state into the universal,
by the work of liberation from individuals: which is done by consideration of those things,
which either agree with others partly, partly do not agree, or are common to all; and also
the elevation of a thing from its proper state into the eminent, to consider the singular thing
with the eminent containment of all perfections, which is the infinite being, which cannot be
known otherwise. 3. From the end, which is the distinct consideration of distinct things.
Hence abstract cognition is better than concrete.

CANONS

I. He who takes away Abstraction, takes away all knowledge. So great is its
necessity, that he alone is held a Philosopher, who knows to abstract. For since
our mind cannot apprehend singular things, e.g. all individuals of horses or men,
there is need of an inquiry of the formal reason, in which all agree and which is
rooted in all of the same order, which abstraction furnishes: Therefore without
this no things are to be apprehended, since you cannot form a concept, without
which our intellect does not cognize, still less acquires or possesses knowledge.

II. Abstraction is not the formal reason of a thing, but the inquiry of the same. The
knowable does not have Entity, but knowability through abstraction. For
precision does not constitute a concept internally, but is an external medium, by
which the concept is placed before the mind; much less is it the natural reason of
the cognoscible being, insofar as it is fundamentally outside the intellect; but it
plainly does not respect this, except under that notion, insofar as it is knowable,
and that only as a productive principle, by whose work we cognize a thing in its
formality, while it presents the thing to us in idea. Hence abstraction is not
formally the denudation of a thing from matter, nor also simply from singulars,
but is the inquiry of the formal reason in the widest, broad and adequate concept
for producing an idea and universal concept. In which way it separates general
things from special, substantial from accidental, essential from circumstantial, the
reason of the whole from the reason of the parts, nature from modes, essence
from adventitious defects and distinguishes accidents among themselves.
 III. The intelligible species is to be abstracted from the phantasm. It is necessary for
the one understanding to speculate the phantasms. Arist. 1.3. on the soul t. 39.
not because it is occupied in understanding in the phantasm, but because
without the work of phantasms intelligible species are not produced t. 30. 30.
And thus everything, which is understood, was first a phantasm. For the
beginning of understanding is taken from the senses. But the species is formed by
the phantasm, so that through it the object may be represented in act to the
intellect.

IV. Abstraction is not a bare production of the intelligible species. For it is the
universal principle of the knowable, so that nothing can be cognized without this.
But God must be cognized by the rational creature, for it would be unjust for the
creature to be ignorant of the Creator. But we cannot form an intelligible species
of God, on account of the defect of singular conditions from the highest
simplicity, on account of the negation of the formal sign, representing sufficiently
the formality of the infinite Being, from the perfection incomprehensible by the
finite intellect; finally on account of the repugnance of commonness to many and
of the universal concept, from the most simple unity. Thus we cognize GOD only
obliquely, and we make an idea through mere analogy. And therefore abstraction
has been defined more rightly disjunctively, that it is the deduction of a singular
thing into the universal or eminent state.

V. By negation we are often advanced into the notice of things. For we cognize a
thing in a twofold way. 1. [thalōs] [positively] insofar as it is. 2. [arnētikōs]
[negatively], by removing, what it is not. The former is served by precisive
abstraction; concerning which now: The latter by negative, when we cognize a
thing by the removal of those things, which are not in it. Which way of
investigating the formal concept obtains especially in the most perfect Being, and
also in Beings of the lowest condition; as also in other most abstract things, when
it is easier to say, what a thing is not, than to state, what it is.

CHAPTER V. ON CONCEPT.

Concept is a species formed by the intellect, representative of the knowable in the mind, as
it is to be cognized in itself.
The formal concept is here described, which is the apprehensive principle of the objective
concept. Otherwise the word of the mind, intelligible species, intention, notion, formality,
Idea, [noēma] [concept] etc. are greeted. For since the cognoscible cannot be cognized by
the immediate reception of itself into the intellect; there is need of a medium, through
which, as through a formal sign, knowable things may be offered, assimilated, and
represented to the intellect, so that intellection may come about. For how could a thing
outside the mind, be really received into the mind? Therefore the image formed concerning
the apprehended thing, is the formal concept, but the thing itself objected to the intellect,
concerning which such a form is conceived in the intellect, is called the objective concept.
That is necessarily a real Being, namely a quality inhering in the mind, and therefore also is
always singular, because it inheres in this or that intellect; but this is equally so, whether it is
a real Being, or of reason, whether singular, or universal, since all these can be conceived.
And this is a Synonym of the cognoscible, That is its principle, in which way it is from the
intellect, namely the agent as an image impressed on the mind by the thing, and expressing
the thing: it is in the possible intellect, in which it is received: it is on account of the intellect,
since for the intellection of the mind and the intelligible a union is required, which cannot be
immediate, but comes about by means of the concept, which places the thing before the
mind, as it is in itself, even outside the mind.

CANONS

I. The formal concept is a sign of the objective concept. For that consists in the
genuine representation of this before the mind, to which is required 1. Likeness
with the thing exhibited, so that there may be agreement of the thing and the
cognizing intellect of the thing. 2. Order of dependence on the thing: since not
everything, which is similar to the thing, is its concept. 3. Adequation of
proportion, which requires, that the species be adequate to the thing, neither
wider nor narrower than it, but exactly congruent. But the species is not on that
account of the same notion with the thing, but that is in the mind interiorly, and
intentional, this remains outside, is exterior and real. For if it were the same,
then, when you understood combustion, you would be burned. Scal. exerc.
307.s.2.

II. To possess the truth without a concept is impossible. By Abstraction we attain the
truth: by concept we possess the same. For our mind does not penetrate the
things themselves by intuiting but by abstracting it fashions the simulacra of
things, which if they are conformed to the thing, the mind possesses the
cognition of things. Take away the ideas of things, and you will understand
 nothing. How therefore will the intellect be able to be conformed to things, so
that it may truly understand?

III. Concept is the formal reason of a thing. He who cognizes the formal reason of a
thing, truly holds the thing itself. But that is cognized by a certain notion, by
which the intellect is deduced from potency into act. Which if it has been formed
exactly, it exhibits the quiddity and essence of the thing in idea, and by this name
it is greeted the formal reason. Not really but intentionally, just as it is said
concerning the intellect, that it is converted into the intelligible. Wherefore a
thing is then said to be considered in idea, when it is cognized definitively in the
universal. Although to speak accurately the states of things are distinct, formal,
ideal, universal, which presuppose the objective fundamental. For a thing is in
the objective fundamental state, insofar as it exists, and is rooted in individuals.
Which since we cannot cognize all, nor can we receive them in the intellect,
therefore their species or [noēma] [concept] is represented to the mind, so that
the thing may be in the formal state: but if [noēma] [concept] is considered not
only, as it is founded in individuals, but also in the aspect of precision from
singulars, it is said to be in the ideal state, according to which things are defined:
finally if to the aforesaid is added the aptitude of being in many, so that it can be
contracted through species, or modes, it exists in the universal state: in which
way concept is defined, a reason formed by the intellect from things, by the work
of abstraction, placing something common to many before the mind.

CHAPTER VI. ON DISCIPLINE.

The conservative principle of the knowable is, both discipline, and intellectual habit.

Our knowledge is drawn from others by the aid of disciplines. It is conserved in us by habit,
which is moved with difficulty, after it has driven firm roots in the mind. Therefore these are
principles of the knowable only in a qualified sense. Discipline on account of the propagation
of the cognoscible to others: habit for the firm radication of cognition in us. For a thing can
be understood apart from discipline. It nevertheless helps understanding, on account of the
condition of our mind, by which it comes about, that since it cannot penetrate all things, it is
greatly promoted in cognition by the systems of disciplines accurately constituted in a long
tract of time: and by this medium knowledge is as it were transmitted to posterity. Such a
system is outside the mind, and is comprehended by the living voice or writing, and
communicates the explication of things with others, as a medium of propagation of the
sciences: to this corresponds the interior discipline in the mind, which is defined the
adequate representation of its object before the mind: to which if by accurate
comprehension of precepts and manifold exercise there supervenes a habit, which is a
[hexis] [state] of the intellective potency, by this as it were medium the knowable is firmly
conserved in the mind, so that it can be greeted the conservative principle of the knowable.
We therefore join habit with discipline, especially since the aspect of each depends on the
object: whence also a declaration of this is to be subjoined.

Discipline is the orderly treatment of homogeneous things recalled to the same highest
object, serving for the propagation of the cognoscible.

Homogeneous things are, which participate of the same common concept, or can be
recalled to the same genus, or as genus, which if they are reduced to something else, and
are disposed in a fit order of precepts, they exhibit a discipline. But precepts are as it were
terms circumscribing each single thing by definite limits, so that the definitions, divisions,
and affections of things may be declared, and may be reduced methodically under one body
or system.

Of Disciplines the foundation and terminus is to be attended to. The object takes the place
of both.

The Object is a real concept, affected by its essential constitutives and contracting modes,
which in no discipline has itself by the manner of constituting, consequent, or contracting
essentially.

[Noēma] [Notion] is wider than object, since indeed every object is [noēma] [notion], but
not every [noēma] [notion] is an object. For everything which can be understood by the
intellect is [noēma] [notion], but for the object still another relation is required, which it
involves to the discipline

Moreover the object is, either general, or special. General is, in the explication of which the
discipline is occupied either directly, or through a habitude to something direct. Special is
either adequate and total of some whole discipline, or inadequate and partial. This is a
mode, or species of the total subject, and if it is principal, it is called the object of perfection.
That is attended to by us here, of which the requisites are 1. That it be one, not equivocal,
lest it distract the mind, although it can be an aggregate, such as is in subalternate
disciplines. 2. That it be, adequate to the habit, whose object it is, evidently that it be
neither wider nor narrower. 3. That it be the basis of all things, which are treated in the
discipline. For those things are to be recalled to the object, or ought to be contained under
the object; and therefore let it be affected by those things, which either essentially
constitute, denominate or restrict the same. For since the object is to be cognized, surely it
will be cognized through those things, which constitute it, either as to being, or as to being
cognized, and which essentially and accidentally follow it, and also which participate of the
essential constituents and consequents. 4. That in no discipline is it considered in the
manner of a constituting principle, denominating affection, or contracting mode another
concept, to which it is recalled, or under which it is contained.

The Object contains two things 1. The thing considered or the material. 2. The Mode of
considering or the formal. According to that it is apt to be cognized by many disciplines, and
it has itself, as wider; According to this it is claimed only by one discipline, which it
adequately constitutes.

The formal reason of the object is twofold, one of the object, as it is a thing, the other as it is
an object. Which are not diverse, but this is a sign of that, the prior can be called the
formality of entity, the posterior of knowability.

CANONS.

I. To cognize Discipline, object, and habit in idea is of this place. For they do not
recognize another seat. Discipline is most common and hides the cognoscible.
The Object constitutes and denominates the discipline, and is contained under
the cognoscible, and here is precisely defined with the determination of the same
to certain disciplines having been remitted to the first Philosopher. Habit perfects
the potency of understanding, conserves the cognoscible, and is to be restricted
according to the variety of the cognoscible to certain species in the second part,
so that the genera of Philosophical disciplines may be explicated, and from that
theory first principles may afterwards be drawn out. Whence I gather - 1. None of
these in idea does the habit of intelligence explicate. For they will not be able to
be recalled to its object; nay it also presupposes their explication, and from the
same only elicits first principles, 2. The formality of the object is not to be sought
from the Metaphysician, 3. Hexilogy is in vain invented as a peculiar discipline.
For no necessity compels us to accept the same, since all things pertaining to
habit ought to be expounded here. 4. To none besides Gnostology can the
constitution and division of habits be assigned. Indeed the determination of the
inferior disciplines is to be attributed to the first Philosophy, but not the
specification of habits. For these extend themselves more widely, than that they
are concluded only by the boundaries of inferior disciplines.

II. The office of discipline is to explicate things, and to transfer the explication to
use. Precepts are to be declared by examples, the cognition of a thing is to be
transferred to use. That they call widely [theōria] [theory], this [praxis] [practice]:
 That is said to expend the thing in act signified, as to the formal reason, this in act
exercised, as to application.

III. The negation of principles, real affections, and species does not take away the
reason of object. An object is required for every discipline, but it is not
necessarily affected by principles. Those suffice, which constitute it (analogously
also), whether synonymic predicates, by which the nature of the object may be
declared: or real affections, if it admits only denominative or paronymic
attributes, which are deduced from the nature of the object: or species properly
so called, provided it has contracting respects, or more limited essential modes,
which restrict the object. For thus it will be able to be considered both commonly
and restrictedly in the discipline. For not all objects recognize those rigorously,
but only composite ones..

IV. The formal reason of the object is not abstraction. For although it renders the
object knowable, as a medium, nevertheless it does not intrinsically constitute
the object, still less discernit from others. For it is a pure function of the mind,
nor does it distinguish the object from its attributes and species, because those
could similarly enjoy the same abstraction with their object.

CHAPTER VII. ON HABIT.

Intellectual habit is a quality firmly rooted in the mind for its perfection, concerning the
cognition of objects.

The consideration of habit is twofold, one absolute, insofar as it is a relative species of

quality, the other, insofar as it has itself to the knowable, in which way it is attended to here,
not under inchoation, which is called a disposition to habit, nor under imperfection, such as
the habits are, opinion, human faith, doubting or suspicion. For although these also make for
cognition, since we often need to seek probable means, authorities, conjectures, and [haplē]
[simply] is the [hodos] [way] [pros] [to] [epistēmēn] [knowledge] 3. Metaph. C. 1., primarily
nevertheless we here respect perfect habits, which determine the mind more exactly, but
minimally error, by which the intellect is not perfected, but deceived. The end of habit is
both to conserve cognition, by which it is immovably rooted, and to determine the intellect,
insofar as objects are to be cognized habitually.
 CANONS

I. For the perception of invented things three things are required, [Physis] [Nature],
[mathēsis] [instruction], [askēsis] [exercise]. These necessarily concur in habitual
cognition, as it is now to be acquired. Nature is presupposed and requires by
reason of the sentient soul, the natural conformity of the organs, and goodness
of memory, by reason of the intellect, [akribian] [exactness] in judging and an
expeditious felicity. This doctrine directs involving a respect to the teacher and
the learner. Mute Doctors are books: if these are accurate, methodical, brief,
sufficient, perspicuous, they are judged best. Let living Doctors have this in
common with learners, that they implore the deity by the example of Hermes
Trismegistus, who made the beginning of study with song, the end with sacrifice:
let them have a good purpose: and also let them study with a temperate life,
since a dry soul, is a prudent soul: and finally let them expedite all things eagerly.
For Love conquers all things, the labor of study conquers all things. Separately let
the Preceptor have an accurate notice of the thing to be taught and let him foster
a benevolent affection towards the learners, and let him be instructed especially
with the gifts of teaching, so that with an expeditious tongue he both can and
wishes to propose each thing dexterously and perspicuously to the learner. In the
learner is required modesty of mind, so that omnes may be absent, attentive
diligence, so that the wandering of thoughts may be banished, and also a
restricted liberty, by which he neither swears by the words of the Master, nor in
the first years especially of learning spurns the authority of the teacher in the
manner of Pythagorean silence. Doctrine is perfected and consummated by
[askēsis] [exercise], consisting in frequent discourse and continued exercise of
virtue and art.

II. Habits are not intelligible species. For the office of these is to unite the intelligible
object with the intellect, which union is the apprehension itself of the thing,
which the judgment concerning falsity or truth follows, in which since some
difficulty consists, it is to be taken away by Habits.

III. Dread is conjoined with opinion, and human faith. And that perpetually: namely
virtual dread, by which someone can fear, lest the contrary be true or false,
because the foundation does not appear firm enough, the probable reason or the
human authority of the one speaking: Actual dread nevertheless is often absent,
 especially from those opinions, which are received by almost common
calculation, even though they accompany pectorals for the most part.

IV. Doubting is concerning the truth of a proposition, suspicion concerning a fact, or

the quality of a person. Each inclines to an indeterminate assent. That on account
of the equilibrium i.e. [isostheneia tōn enantiōn logismōn] [equipollence of
contrary reasonings] 1. Top. C.6. whence the mind is suspended and as it were
[meteōros] [in suspense], while it restrains, it is prone, while it inclines to assent.
This on account of a merely probable judgment or conjecture. Thence suspicion
proximately accedes to opinion, from which it does not differ except by reason
both of the medium, insofar as that is more or less efficacious; and of the object
which it properly respects those things which come about, or whether something
has been said or done; but opinion those things, which are asserted, whether
they are true or false.

V. Error is born from the imbecility of the one cognizing. Therefore it must not be
imputed to things. For the object of assent is either a first principle, or a
conclusion. That is evident: but the deduction of this from principles is not always
evidently perceived by the intellect. Wherefore here error especially happens,
which is to be ascribed to the simple imbecility of the mind: but if the error is
circa the principles themselves, it flows from affected ignorance, or Sophistic
malice, nor is it to be retunded with words, but with blows.

CHAPTER VIII. ON EMINENCE AND PREDICAMENTALITY.

The affections of the knowable are, which extraessentially denominate the knowable, and
are reciprocated with it under disjunction.

The knowable is simple: it is properly constituted from nothing intrinsically. And therefore
neither can its attributes be demonstrated through such principles, yet there is given a
certain likeness; so that the predicates of the knowable are found denominating the very
same thing, which neither constitute, nor contract it, but follow, when through abstraction
they are coproduced, through concept they are simultaneously represented, through
discipline they are cognized together, and are attended to in every habit, and which are
competent to every cognoscible, and therefore by a certain analogy they respond to
attributes, and to those disjoined, since they are not simply converted with the knowable,
but with disjunction, which follow.
The affections are first or second.

The first are eminence and predicamentality.

By which everything which is cognized, is denominated to be eminent or predicamental.

Eminence is, by which the knowable on account of simplicity is said to transcend the genera
of things,

Thence the Eminent is either transcendental by commonness, which is said absolutely

transcendent, as being and its attributes: or by nobility, as Spirit, precisely the infinite Spirit,
and things pertaining hither. For simplicity is either of permission and indifference: or of
perfection and essence. The former obtains in eminents by commonness, which implicate
nothing of imperfection or composition, since they are common to the finite and infinite: to
the most simple and composite. The latter has place in eminents by nobility, from which all
composition is exiled. Each transcends the genera of things, nor are they to be judged from
the class of composites, from which they recede most greatly.

Predicamentality is, by which the knowable on account of composition is comprehended by

a certain genus of things.

Such are all created things. For all are composite and of a determinate quiddity, and on
account of that are to be referred to a certain class of being either directly or indirectly.

CANONS.

I. Whatever is cognized is eminent, or predicamental. For it will be, either

composite or devoid of composition, or common to the composite and simple..
But the mode of cognizing follows the mode of being.

II. The eminent is cognized by the containment of all perfections found in the
predicamental. This containment is virtual or eminent. For the perfection, which
shines forth in composite things determined to a certain class in the cognition of
the eminent is to be claimed for the same, and ought to be referred both to the
transcendent, in which there is potency, as species to genus, and to the infinite
being, in which there is eminence, as effect to cause, so that it is not only
enunciated most nobly concerning it, but also has itself by the mode of an idea,
on which in created things a similar perfection depends.

CHAPTER IX. ON UNIVOCATION AND ANALOGY.

The secondary affections are univocation and Analogy.

By which every knowable is denominated univocal or analogous. For equivocation is

attributed to concepts per accidens, partly on account of the defect of the intellect, by which
men neither sufficiently apprehend things, nor adequately distinguish them, partly on
account of the poverty of words. Therefore it cannot per se denominate the knowable. For
the equivocal places nothing certain before the mind, but distracts it hither and thither.
Moreover these affections are called arising; because they presuppose the former for a
foundation; and also having been perceived those are more easily cognized; or second:
because the knowable is simply denominated eminent, or predicamental. But Analogy and
univocation at the same time designate application: in which respect they are considered
here: but not insofar as they are notions defining the aptitude of predicating which
intentional respect is the peculium of Logic.

Univocation is that by which the knowable can be attributed to many equally.

Analogy, by which it is attributed to inferiors unequally, to one by priority, to the rest by

posteriority.

There there is an indifferent attribution to inferiors, with equal participation, which is called
a concept of equiparance. Here there is an unequal attribution in concepts of disquiparance.
In univocals the common nature is the same in inferiors; and is the same uniformly; by which
is not denied inequality of attribution, by which nobility, in which way man and beast
univocally agree in the aspect of animal, although the former is nobler than the latter: but
partly as to the habitude, which one involves to the other: as accident to substance when
the entity of substance belongs by priority, to accident through dependence on substance:
partly as to the eminence, which one obtains before another infinitely more perfect.

But Analogy is one of proportion, according to which a concept is attributed to one

analogate properly, to the other improperly and according to a certain likeness, as thirst to
plants and animals, laughter to meadows and man: which is equivocation itself, where it
often happens, that the abuse of some term is prior to its legitimate use nevertheless that
ought not to be judged the proper, this the improper acception: but rather the imbecilities
arisen from abuse are to be removed, and the formal reason of terms is to be adjudicated to
that thing to which it is owed: as the word GOD was first applied to [THEOI] [Gods]
[homōnymōs] [equivocally], but properly it denotes the author of all good, and is claimed for
our Jehovah. Another Analogy is of attribution, which we attend to here, and we make
twofold. 1. Of extrinsic attribution, in which way the analogous concept is common to one
intrinsically: to others extrinsically: as health is internal to an animal, external to urine or a
medicament, it is ascribed to the former significatively, to the latter productively. 2. Of
intrinsic attribution, when the denominating form is intrinsic to all the analogates, but by an
unequal aspect, to one primarily to another secondarily. And this is twofold: either with the
dependence of one analogate on the other: or apart from that dependence. That is called
[pros hen] [to one]; but this is singular, and has place only there, where inferiors recognize a
common concept unequally, so that one in comparison to another participates the same in
an infinitely more perfect mode without any habitude between themselves. Thus human
generation involves no habitude to divine generation, nor does the latter properly depend
on the former, but nevertheless they analogically agree in the formal of generation, since
neither a univocal aspect, nor equivocation obtains here. But the former which is from one
to one, is found either in eminents, in which way being is analogous to GOD and creatures,
and also to substance and accident, or in predicamentals, in which way friendship is
analogous to honest useful and pleasant. Moreover in mystical analogues, where between
the analogates there is given an infinite distance, application obtains a twofold special
respect. For it happens either through the attribution of eminent perfection, which is to be
adjudicated to the principal, if it is found in the less principal analogate; or through the
removal of all imperfection; for this is to be purged from the principal analogate, to which
nevertheless the formal aspect is to be attributed with the imbecillity having been left
behind; nor is it to be inferred into the common concept, which is absolved by the formal
aspect alone, with the special conditions having been cast away, lest either things be
confused, which are infinitely distant between themselves, or that which adheres to the
specific concept, as such, be attributed to the generic.

CANONS.

I. Analogy has place in the eminent participation of concepts. For when the dignity,
and condition adhering having been cast away divides the concept from the
equal participation of formality, one participates of that formality
predicamentally, but the other eminently. Therefore here that analogy obtains,
which happens through the removal of imperfection, and the attribution of
perfection.

II. In transcendentals analogy of attribution is especially dominant. For since they

ought to be common to the finite and infinite, it is clear, that the inferior
[noēmata] [notions] do not equally participate of their formal aspect. I say
especially. For unequal attribution also occurs in predicamentals.

PART II. ON THE SPECIAL VARIETY OF THE KNOWABLE.

 CHAPTER I. The Philosophical Cognoscible.

The Cognoscible is twofold: one Philosophical and liberal, the other Poetic and illiberal.

For in so many ways our intellect is perfected in the cognition of Objects. It cognizes certain
things for the sake of the mind, by which it may be instructed to natural [eudaimonian]
[happiness]: certain things for the sake of the body, this may be exercised, to the advantage
and ornament of our life. Some things can be cognized, so that they may be effected by
bodily organs: but some things ought to be cognized, so that they may be apprehended by
the eyes of the mind, for the sake of contemplation alone, or of operation. By which name
one cognition is liberal, which is worthy of the name of Philosophy; the other illiberal, which
on account of the effection, which it intends, is called [tekhnē] [art]. Thence is born that
division of the cognoscible.

The Philosophical Cognoscible is, what is objected to the intellect for the sake of more liberal
cognition to natural felicity of the mind.

More liberal cognition is that, which perfects the intellect and appetite, by removing
[agnoian] [ignorance] of the mind, and [ataxian] [disorder] of the will, which he who
possesses, is truly called wise. And it is either contemplable, or [theōrētikon] [theoretical]
and operable, or [praktikon] [practical]. Since it either ultimately terminates the intellect to
the inside, or arouses the mind so that it may exert itself to operation both to be issued and
to be elicited, hence cognition perfecting the mind intensively and extensively. The former is
when it is ended in the union of the knowable object with the intellect: The latter when the
intellect to the previous cognition of the object, either takes up the work of the same, or
commits it to an inferior faculty. Each is founded in [gnōsis] [knowledge], which per se is
either knowable, or doable.

CANONS.

I. The liberal cognoscible encompasses primarily those things, which are to be

cognized in Philosophy, afterwards the objects of the inferior faculties, and finally
of the instrumental. For all these can be cognized by the light of nature, nor do
they intend effection per se. Therefore they are to be referred to liberal [gnōston]
[knowledge] But unequally: per se the real knowables, which are cognized by
their own merit, per accidens the notional which are sought not unless on
account of other things, and can be known only indirectly. From those again the
 Philosophical knowables (strictly so called) are cognized first, but secondarily and
insofar as the objects of the inferior Faculties are referred to them: of
Jurisprudence I think and Medicine: inasmuch evidently as the former nourishes
kinship with moral habit: the latter with natural science. Just as also the greatest
familiarity intercedes with the instrumental with the Poetic habits. For the acts of
justice to be administered prudently, and the works concerning the care of the
body are truly doables. Nor are notional things any less cognized for the sake of
operation, otherwise they would be of no use or dignity. Therefore since the
Philosophical is the chief, the denomination is taken from the more powerful. To
that accordingly it is permitted to recall all things, which perfect the intellect
either for the sake of true cognition, or of salutary operation, and which tend to
natural felicity. Wherefore when afterwards we will be about to consider only the
principal knowable, about to dismiss the rest, this division is most approved by
us; although we cannot deny, that by another scope most rightly the knowable is
divided immediately into [theōrētikon] [theoretical] and [poiētikon] [productive],
and this into [praktikon] [practical] specially so called and [tekhnikon] [technical].

II. The Cognoscible is a genus [kat’ analogian] [by analogy]. For first the
Philosophical is such: and when this varies, it belongs [haplos] [simply] by
priority, to [pros ti] [relatives] by posteriority,

III. Natural felicity is the end of all liberal cognition. Not insofar as it includes all
felicity, even of the body, nor insofar as it is opposed to moral beatitude: For that
is too ample, this too narrow: but insofar as it says the perfection of the mind,
which consists in contemplation and action, recalling to this any honest actions
whatsoever of Practicals, and salutary actions of Physicians; but excluding
artificial actions, which do not properly, pertain to the felicity of the mind. For we
cognize, so that we may be blessed both by accurately cognizing things and by
virtuously passing through life; by which pristine knowledge and [apatheia]
[impassivity] may be restored to the intellect, conformable ordination of the
affections, and [ataraxia] [imperturbability] to the will. Let these be the goal of all
cognition.

IV. Distinct cognoscible demands distinct principles. It is clear 1. Concerning each

one, thus anything whatsoever has its own abstraction and concept from which it
is produced; discipline and habit, by which it is conserved. 2. Concerning the
specific modes of being: Concerning the directly cognoscible it is so certain, that
thence some claim for each object besides a certain discipline, in which they are
 cognized, a habit, which perfects the intelligent potency in their cognition, also a
peculiar abstraction. Not indeed falsely, unless they also explain abstraction less
rightly through precision from matter, and ascribe too many things to abstraction,
and those which are proper to the formal object. But concerning these things in
species afterwards.

V. Any object whatsoever has its proper abstraction and concept. For it obtains a
formal aspect, which represented to the intellect is its proper concept. But its
investigation comes about by the aid of abstraction. For that reason it also
postulates its own proper abstraction. Beware however lest you infer thence:
that discipline is specified by abstraction, but I want you to establish thus, that
abstraction has place in every discipline, which is clear from general things.
Therefore abstraction if it is to be determined, one is of things prescinding from
matter, which is according to indifference: the other of things plainly refusing
matter, which is said to be according to essence; they rightly call this, that not
without contradiction abstraction from matter according to thing and reason.
Another is of things implicating matter, either as they are constituted from
matter, which is called abstraction according to thing from designated matter: or
as, they presuppose matter, which is to be prescinded by reason only; whether
things of this kind flow from matter, and follow it, which it is permitted to
prescind also from universal matter; or they exist in it; of which abstraction can
be called precision from singular matter (the universal subject of inhesion having
been retained).

VI. Habits and disciplines vary according to the diversity of objects..It flows from
what has been said. Understand both the ultimate division of habits by which one
is Metaphysical, another Physical etc. Which holds itself in the same pact, as the
distribution of disciplines, and the mediate: by which it is divided into proximate
species. Concerning that as to the Philosophical ones at the threshold of
Philosophy. From which by analogy the aspect of the rest is taken. According to
this, habit is either Theoretical, or Practical. The denomination is taken from the
end, with any complication whatsoever of the object, but not from the end alone,
or from the object alone, but formally from the end, radically from the object.
But the end here is not estimated from the intention of the learner, or from
anywhere else extrinsically, but from the nature of the object, whose aspect if it
is such, that it can be rightly subjected to operation, denominates the discipline
and habit practical, if not, theoretical.
VII. Between theoretical and practical habit none mediates. Intellectual habit denotes
either a habit concerning any cognoscible whatsoever, or a habit concerning an
object; which I point out as disciplinary. Concerning the former it is beyond
doubt. For everything which is cognized, is either known, so that the intellect can
acquiesce in cognition, or so that of itself it may be ordained to operation.
Therefore the medium between these is exiled: as which stand under
contradiction. But concerning discipline those raise a doubt, who undertake the
defense of a mixed habit. But if the appellation is to be taken from the ultimate
end of any discipline whatsoever, there is no cause of doubting. For it is
impossible for the same discipline ultimately to subsist in cognition; and at the
same time to tend to operation. This meanwhile is certain, that in a practical
habit also sometimes [ti eikē] [something speculative] is proposed, such as GOD
in Theology etc. But, so that all cognition may be ultimately ordained to
operation.

VIII. Second notions are cognized indirectly. These are to be dismissed. Therefore only
briefly is their cognition to be explicated here., They are called second intentions,
second concepts, as real objects first concepts. And they are (speaking
concerning second notions as objects) nothing else, than objects cognized
according to the denomination of the intellect under some mode of reason.
Abstraction is given here in the apprehension of second notions, not from matter,
but from all things, or certain things, by a reflex act of the intellect not into
things, but into itself, which having been done it finds a certain reason, perduring
only to the operation of the mind arising from things. Thence the formal second
notion, representing the objective, which differs from the first notion, both
because it is formed not to the thing itself, but from the mode of understanding,
and because it says the thing only mediately, and because it only facilitates the
cognition of the thing, minimally cognoscible on account of itself. Wherefore the
word of second intention is defined, which signifies a concept of the mind
accepted not immediately from the understood thing, but from the mode of
understanding the thing itself, and is immediately founded in the first concept of
the thing itself. Their seats are the discipline and instrumental habits, which
participate in the nature of practicals [analogōs] [analogously]. But second
notions are formed either on account of any disciplines whatsoever, both so that
in the apprehension of all things the intellect may be versed more easily and
more felicitously, by weighing the same, comparing them among themselves, and
deducing one thing from another, and proposing after another, which are of the
jurisdiction of Logic: and so that it can bring forth things precepts with certain
symbols of words, to which Grammar brings supplies. Which having been done
from the ashes of truth and virtue stored up in the high mind the culture of
 languages is strong to perceive things, the use of reason to cognize the true and
the good so much the more exactly, by as much as the instruments, which it has
used, have been formed more accurately, which may be adequate and conformed
to things, and also veiling facility. (2.) Or on account of certain disciplines, by
which all difficulty may expire, in the introduction of good, and also secondarily
for truth (for it does not need color per se, content with a simple habit) to be
persuaded to others, a medium may be procured, which notions introduced
especially on account of the exercise of virtue to be instilled directing ornate
speech whether prose or bound, are owed to Rhetoric and Poetics. But more fully
concerning these things at the threshold of instrumental habits. They are suited
and conformed to things, and also sailing to ease. (2.) Or on account of certain
disciplines, so that all difficulty may expire, in the introduction of good, and also
secondarily to truth (for color does not need [anything] by itself, content with a
simple disposition), a medium may be prepared for persuading other things,
which notions introduced chiefly for the sake of instilling the exercise of virtue,
directing ornate speech, whether prose or bound, are owed to Rhetoric and
Poetics.

But [let us speak] more extensively about these things on the threshold of instrumental
dispositions [habituum instrumentalia].

CHAPTER II. The knowable [Scibile]

The knowable [Scibile] is contemplable [contemplabile], which by its own nature is set
before the intellect for the sake of science alone. It is called τῶν θεωρητικόν [theoretical]
from θεῶν [viewing], which is like proceeding to θεὸν [god]. For we approach God most
closely by speculation. Its material is necessary being; its formal [aspect] is to be set before
the intellect for the sake of cognition alone, and that not from the intention of the
apprehender, but from its own nature when it is such that it is not placed in our power. The
principles are the theoretical intellect, and its function, contemplation, by which our mind
perfects itself inwardly from its innate potency by speculating necessary things and their
attributes. Moreover, it abstracts the thing most of all from specific attributes and modes, or
[abstracts] the species from genus, when it recognizes that the affections are in the thing
through the principles constituting the thing, and thus separates the posterior from the
prior. It forms a concept abstracted from things, which, being known, may remain in the
intellect, and may not extend itself to an ἐνέργεια [activity] to be produced by the intellect
itself, or by a lower faculty, which are all things rejecting action and effection, which the
Metaphysician will determine.

Theoretical disciplines and dispositions [habitus Theoretici] perfect the theoretical

intellective potency. These consist of those things, and their general determination is [a
matter] of the philosophical proemium, [while their] special [determination], by reason of
the inferior disciplines, is first Philosophy, which alone holds all things, and is the Queen of
the rest.

A disposition [habitus] superadded to the potency facilitates the same by contemplation

either about any ὂν [being], or about a disciplinary object. The former speculates the nature
of the thing, either by contemplating τὸ ὂν [being] or τὸ συμβεβηκὸς [accident]: the latter
weighs the attributes and species of the object, or those things which are analogous to
these, whose variety will be set forth in the following chapter.

CANONS

I. Whatever is necessary is contemplable. [It is] necessary not by absolute

necessity, which belongs to the first being alone, but also by natural [necessity]:
that is, whatever does not depend on our intellect or will, but exists without the
mind's fiction or our operation, whether it exists immutably perpetually, or exists
mutably [but] not perpetually, provided it has necessary causes, by which, when
posited in act, it cannot fail to exist, all this is contemplable. For he would be
inept, who, for example, would know God, Heaven, etc., in order to effect [them];
since it is not placed in his power.

II. The cognition of the knowable [scibile] is terminated in the intellect by itself
without ἐνέργεια [activity]. For it perfects the intellect intensively, so that it may
acquiesce in the cognition of the object, and does not tend to operation. [This is
true of] the knowable qua tale: for although it ought also to excite man
perpetually to the study of piety and honesty, and is sometimes wont to be
directed from the intention of men to operation, yet nothing departs from its
nature: since primarily and per se it is not operable. Hence it is that we are called
virtuous on account of the cognition of virtue (which is itself virtuous operation),
[we are called] cobblers on account of the cognition of cobbling a shoe, but on
account of the cognition of a stone, tree, ass, etc., we are by no means called
stony, arboreal, asinine, etc. I add "without ἐνέργεια [activity]". For praxis is also
terminated in the intellect itself, but [as] producing ἐνέργεια [activity].

III. Just as the knowable [scibile] is not to be opposed to the useful, so neither is
science to be opposed to use. Γνῶσις [knowing] and θεωρία [contemplation],
χρῆσις [use] and πρᾶξις [action], πρᾶξις [action] and ποίητις [making] are
distinct. Γνῶσις [knowing] designates any cognition whatsoever, θεωρία
 [contemplation] the contemplation of necessary things alone, χρῆσις [use] posits
use, which any cognition ought to have, unless it itself is to be considered null.
But praxis implies operation, and that either commonly all [operation], or strictly
only such as subsists in action, in which way it is opposed to ποίησις [making],
i.e., effection, concerning which [let us speak] in what follows.

IV. The knowable [scibile] is the foundation of theoretical dispositions [habituum

theoreticorum], and of speculative Philosophy. For objects specify theoretical
dispositions [habitus theoreticos]. Therefore they are their bases. And thus a
general disposition [habitus] diffuses itself to whatever [objects]; a special
[habitus] is enclosed by the boundaries of a certain object, concerning which only
those things are verified which pertain to it. But because objects are knowable
[scibilia] most of all, all παράγωγα [derivatives] are to be referred to these, so
that they may receive their measure from these. Therefore, in as many ways as
objects vary, so many theoretical dispositions [habitus theoretici] are to be
constituted, the complex of which is called Theoretical Philosophy.

CHAPTER III.

The knowable [scibile] in species and Theoretical dispositions [habitus Theoretici].

The contemplable [contemplabile] is restricted to two genera: of which the first is the
affinity of things; the latter the quiddity [i.e., essence] of things: hence one disposition
[habitus] is σχετικὸς [relative]; the other διανοητικὸς [intellectual]: the latter is called
Intelligence [Intelligentia]; the former Wisdom [Sapientia].

Intelligence is the disposition [habitus] of first principles. Wisdom [is the disposition] of
principles and conclusions simultaneously.

I speak of the restricted contemplable [contemplabile]: by which the indeterminate

cognoscible [cognoscibile] is excluded, which is contemplated precisely by the disposition
[habitus] of Gnostology, which we are now treating. But restricted knowables [scibilia] are
both things to be known in themselves, and things collated among themselves: [their] τὸ
esse rei [the being of the thing] and proportion, which each thing has, according as it is, in
collation to others. Which are altogether distinct. For the σύγκρισις [comparison] of things
begets the most common principles, [while the] ἀκριβὲς [exact] contemplation forms
conclusions concerning any existing things whatsoever, deduced from those [principles], and
both are θεωρήματα [theorems]. Hence the contemplative disposition [habitus] is restricted
to Intelligence, which [contemplates] the affinity of things, and the first principles emanating
from this; and Wisdom, which contemplates the quiddity [i.e., essence] of things, and the
conclusions formed concerning these.

Intelligence is a species specialissima [most special species], because it cannot be contracted

through opposed differences short of contradiction. But Wisdom, because it weighs diverse
conclusions concerning diverse things, varies by reason of those [things]. For the analogy of
things is the same, the principles are one; but things are diverse and conclusions vary in
infinite ways, [and] are therefore to be revoked to certain objects, which generate diverse
dispositions [habitus]. Therefore Wisdom is first or second,

First [Wisdom] is that which elicits conclusions from first principles. Second [Wisdom is that]
which deduces its conclusions from originated principles.

The former [concludes] concerning being qua tale; the latter concerning Being of a
determinate quiddity. Hence the former according to excellence [is called] Wisdom, or
Science, or Science with a head; the latter is truly called only second wisdom or science.

Aristotle defines first Wisdom, that it is νοῦς καὶ ἐπιστήμη [intellect and science],
understand not formally, but virtually: For it is intelligence with the power of applying first
principles: It is science but with a head, and first principles, which it considers [as] requisites,
materially, eliciting from the same the most universal conclusions in the abstraction of Being.
But there are three ἐξαίρετα [excellences] of it: One respective to the sciences, which it
rules: whence it is the direction of the inferior disciplines: I say Inferior. For it does not direct
intelligence but applies [it] to establishing its assertions: The rest are absolute, which flow
from that [respective excellence]. For because it directs all things, it is necessary that it have
the objects of all things known: wherefore secondly there is required here the universal
cognition of all things; but because regimen is conjoined with application, it is bound to
prescribe common laws, which it extracts from nature itself and the most accepted notions.
Hence 3. The revocation of Proofs to first causes. But [let us speak] more extensively about
these things [in] the wisdom itself. Cf. the preface of the divine Metaphysics.

Therefore this [First Wisdom], by speculating Being most commonly, dismisses determinate
Beings to the rest of the sciences, which are called second wisdom by us, both in the order
of nature, and of dignity. And these, besides that they contemplate determinate necessary
Being, also have only particular conclusions, which do not transgress the limits of the object.
But they adduce not conclusions alone, but also principles, which nevertheless, since they
are only second with respect to first [principles] are called conclusions, so that science may
be truly said to be of conclusions alone. But we by no means here respect science, insofar as
it is the effect of demonstration alone, in which way any demonstrative conclusion
whatsoever can generate science: But insofar as it is equivalent to a Theoretical disposition
[habitus Theoreticus] of conclusions formed concerning a determinate object. In which
sense it embraces several demonstrative conclusions; yet nevertheless not necessarily are all
proofs in the same apodictic, nor is the adequate object a genus, which would require
affections and principles really diverse from itself. It suffices for the ratio [i.e., nature] of
science: to prove attributes through reasons a priori concerning necessary, restricted Being,
which since they have no place in wisdom (for nothing is prior to Being) but are found in all
sciences, the distinction of wisdom from the sciences remains valid.

CANONS.

I. Intelligence is a simple first disposition [habitus], Wisdom [is] originated and

composite. The former is called simple: because by simple assent it subscribes to
principles; First, because it knows first principles: The latter [is called] originated
because it inclines to assenting to conclusions through principles; Composite,
because it involves both principles and conclusions.

II. Intelligence does not differ in species from Synderesis. Some explicate
intelligence of the disposition [habitus] of Theoretical principles: Synderesis of
the disposition of practical principles. In vain! They agree in object, which is the
affinity of things, which of itself founds both [kinds of] principles. To each
immediate truth is owed. What necessity then [is there] of multiplying Beings?

III. Wisdom is (a) ἀρχικωτάτη [most ruling] (b) ἀκριβεστάτη [most exact] (c)
διδασκαλικωτάτη [most apt to teach] (d) σοφία [wisdom]. 1. Metaph. c. 2. (a) It is
bound to know all things not one by one, but under the most common notion.
But those things which are more remote from sense, those are more difficult:
Hence (b) Wisdom is versed about the most difficult things. And since it revokes
singulars to first principles, it is most accurate, and therefore at the same time (c)
most apt to teach, not insofar as [it provides] method, but insofar as [it provides]
the connection of things, which is extracted from the first seeds of cognition.
Therefore it cannot fail to be supremely desirable, for if we desire to know certain
things, why not all things? why not the most certain things? why not the most
evident things? Finally furnished with these endowments it is to us the τέλος:
and the Eagle of all cognition, so that it may obtain dominion over the sciences,
which need regimen even for that reason, that they do not ascend all the way to
first causes, but subsist in proximate [causes], and that they have their objects
dependent on Wisdom. Therefore it both supplies strength to assertions, or
suggests [it], and prefixes and prescribes terms to the sciences. Cf. the preface of
the divine Metaphysics.
 IV. Science renders the mind of man ἀκριβοδιάθετον [accurately disposed], because
it demonstrates the thing from proximate reasons. For two things are required
for science: that it be certain in itself; and that it be certain to the apprehending
intellect. It is certain: because it proceeds from proximate reasons. ens. Indeed it
proves attributes through reasons a priori concerning the object: Therefore it
requires I. An Object, and let that be necessary, so that it may be distinguished
against practical dispositions [habitus], Let it be determinate. For transcendentals
proceed from first principles. Let it be precognized, what it is and what its name
signifies: which precognition does not have a place in Being most commonly, but
in all the rest certainly, when they are revoked to the tribunal of the Wise Man,
But whether it is further required, that the scientific object properly have species
under itself, I doubt? Surely that is per accidens to the ratio [i.e., nature] of
science. And in most [sciences] that condition expires, so that it is deservedly
suspect. II. an attribute, which i.e., Let it have an Essential connection with the
subject, whether it be posterior to it in concept, or in re [i.e., in reality]: which
presupposes a reason prior to itself: through which it may be proved to be in the
subject, whether that [reason] be causal, or not, by which requisite again it is
distinguished from Wisdom, where you cannot even feign something prior to
Being. III. A Reason, which is most of all proximate to the flowing subject, and
evincing the attribute of the subject, which again ought to be precognized,
whether in a superior science; or in the same [science]. Since therefore the
reason necessarily so coheres with the attribute, and flows immediately from the
subject: the attribute will not be able not to cohere necessarily with the subject.
Therefore with this necessity having been detected our mind is rendered
ἀμετάπειστον [not to be persuaded otherwise]. Let opinion conjoined with dread
therefore be banished from here: Let ignorance be banished. Whether ἄγονια
[anxiety] or pure negation, or διάθεσις [disposition] of deprivation. Let all things
be certain, all things evident.

CHAPTER IV.

The operable [agibile], and the Practical disposition [habitus Practicus].

The operable [agibile] is the cognoscible [cognoscibile], which is set before the intellect for
the sake of action, in which [action] one must acquiesce. Prudence knows this, which is a
disposition [habitus] active with right reason; about those things which are good or bad for
man morally. τὸ πρακτὸν [the practical] is said specifically, insofar as this operable is, but [is]
not factible. Its material is contingent Being; Its formal [aspect] is to be set before the
intellect for the sake of action or ἐνέργεια [activity], which is distinguished from the
knowable [scibile], which is such for the sake of mere cognition, and from the factible, which
is thus to be effected, so that ἔργον [work] or opus [work] may appear. The principles are the
Practical intellect, and its operation i.e., direction [directio], which is a function of the
intellect, by which it is extended to operating. But that extension is nothing other than a
regulated action of the intellect, by which the practical intellect either elicits the operation
itself according to a foreknown ideal notion, when the praxis is immanent, or commands [it]
to a lower faculty, and directs it in transient actions: the former is properly indeed praxis
([for] action is distinguished from effection in this alone, that the former is the ultimate end
to itself, the latter is directed to a work, which since it is not repugnant to ἐνέργεια [activity],
even [to] an immanent [activity], of which sort are the acts of the rectified intellect, praxis
truly obtains there.) But since such a direction of the operations of the mind is not
terminated by its use, but is instituted for the sake of the action of good [and] for the
contemplation of truth alone, and moreover needs second notions, which are known only
indirectly, and therefore are operable only through an intentional form, therefore it is
dismissed to instrumental dispositions [habitus] and nominally to Logic, and only that
[praxis] is attended to here, which is not terminated in the intellect, but is directed to
honesty, which a faculty of the mind subordinate [to the intellect] executes, its obedience
being pledged to [the intellect]. Of which sort only are the acts of the will and of the
sensitive appetite rectified morally, which are operable through a real form; In a word: moral
actions, Virtues, which are not known of themselves so that they may be either known
(although per accidens they are sometimes known by some for the sake of notice alone,
which cognition nevertheless is not practical, inasmuch as it is not directive of some praxis,
from which the denomination is made, and therefore from the notice e.g. of the definition
of justice no one will be called just; but from practical cognition of justice) or effected. For
just as solitary cognition of virtue [is] useless, so he would be foolish, who would presume to
fabricate virtue with bodily instruments. It is nevertheless certain, that praxis also requires
γνῶσιν [knowledge] and the operable [agibile] needs abstraction, by which honest actions,
moral virtues, the duties of parents, children, Magistrates, subjects, etc., which cannot be
weighed in the singular, are represented precisely abstracted from the singular subject and
matter in which [they are], the universal subject nevertheless being retained. Thus not the
justice of Aristides, the heroic fortitude of Gustavus Magnus, the Venetian Republic, but in
idea the virtue, which can fall upon man [as] best, and the most praiseworthy state of the
Republic are weighed. For how will singulars be able to be known? Therefore these ideas are
the objects of a practical disposition [habitus practici], which is only one (dismissing the
instrumental [dispositions] less principal, and standing within the septa of Philosophy) and is
called prudence. For this is uniquely given, since there are no other liberal actions than
[those] to be directed morally. I say liberal, to exclude others, of which sort is Cytharization
for Aristotle 1. Magn. Moral. T. 35. This likewise is said primarily only of practical Philosophy,
but only secondarily of the prudence of Law. But its nature consists least of all in the assent
of practical conclusions, but in the operation itself of things placed in our will. For although it
knows practical conclusions, yet its ratio [i.e., nature] is not absolved by this notice; but is
more rightly defined from the object and end, that it is about τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν
[things admitting of being otherwise], and indeed those, which are good or bad for man (by
which artificial things are separated) morally, so that it may be versed in the same according
to right reason and operate well. I say morally, to exclude actions good or bad for man
naturally; concerning which [let us speak in] Medicine. But whether praxis per se and
formally is restricted to honesty, or not, concerning this see the tract. De Methodo in
disciplinis Practicis specialibus [Concerning Method in the special Practical disciplines]. L.

CANONS.

I. Whatever is operable, is contingent. For if it ought to be done by us, it will surely

be free, so that it may be done, or not done. But although operables are
contingent by reason of [their] existence and operation, yet by reason of [their]
norm they have an immutable truth, which is sanctioned in the law of nature.
What I say, is evident both in practical conclusions, and in the operable things
themselves, which are constant and perpetual by reason of [their] essence and
ideally. The same also must be said in its way concerning efectibles. For these are
not παρέργα [incidental works], contingent and operable: since factibilia also are
contingent in such a way.

II. The notice of the operable perfects the intellect extensively to praxis. But the
intellect is extended to πρᾶξιν [action], which is an operation following a practical
judgment which is itself the ultimate end, and is not referred to some work.
Therefore this extension is from the practical intellect to the outside into
subordinate faculties, which extension plainly expires, when the theoretical
intellect is content with contemplation alone, and is perfected intensively to the
inside.

III. The operable [agibile] is the proper object of prudence & the object of practical
Philosophy. Therefore to this [philosophy] alone are to be referred all things,
which fall under the census of the former: Not so that they may fall under
contemplation, and be demonstrated; There is no demonstration concerning any
contingent thing: but so that they may be revoked under the anvil of virtuous
operation, and be carried out ὀρθῶς [correctly]. Whether they are properly the
objects of operation, or bear the ratio [i.e., nature] of a practical end, or are
means conducing to the end to be obtained, and those primary or secondary, so
that whatever is operable in some way to practical felicity, is to be revoked hither.
 But these are to be taken of the objects of a natural and principal practical
disposition [habitus practici]. By which the instrumental Philosophical disciplines
are removed. For how the Poetic dispositions [habitus Poetici] can be distributed
into principal, and instrumental has been said. Tract. De Methodo docendi, de
processu Analytico Regulæ Speciales [tract Concerning the Method of teaching,
concerning the Analytic process Special Rules].

CHAPTER V. AND LAST.

The Effective cognoscibile [Cognoscibile Effectivum].

The illiberal or Poetic cognoscibile [cognoscibile] is the cognoscibile [cognoscibile], which is

set before the intellect for the sake of effection. Art is occupied about this, which is a
disposition [habitus] effective with right reason.

It is called ποιητὸν [poetic ] from ποιεῖν [to make] not for fiction, which belongs to Poets,
but for effection, which [belongs to] artifice; and it is defined [as] an operation of the
intellect directly perfect for executing something else by a subordinate faculty with bodily
instruments: It differs v[erily] from praxis 1, because the ultimate end of the latter is
ἐνέργεια [activity], [but the end] of the former [is] ἔργον [work], whether it falls under the
senses or not? Let others discuss, for us it suffices [that it is] the introduction of an artificial
form into a given object 2, because to πρᾶξιν [action] the action is indifferent to immanent
and transient: but in ποίησιν [making] according to most [it is] a transient action; so that the
factibile is a work distinct from the one operating and 3. Most of all in this, that it indicates
the formal ratio [i.e., nature], which is τὸ operari [operating] in a subject [and] introducing a
form into matter with bodily organs. Therefore the principle directing principally is the
poetic intellect: proximately it is an idea impressed on the mind of the artificer by the
benefice of abstraction from a singular object. For abstraction is required here also, because
it is cognoscibile [cognoscibile]. But the cognition of the artificer is not implicated in the
singular matter, although the operation brings in singular circumstances. But the universal
matter can in no way be prescinded, since any artificer whatever demands a determinate
sensible matter. Therefore that abstraction is not real, but only according to reason, by
which figures exist in the mind of the artificer [as] ideas of the operation. The principally
executing [principle] is the locomotive faculty subject to the command of the intellect of the
will for effecting according to their prescript; The Organic [principles] are manual
instruments accommodated to any effection. The Facilitating [principles] are the dispositions
[habitus] called mechanical arts. But Art is defined [as] an effective disposition [habitus], by
which it is distinguished from the rest of the dispositions [habitus], so that the instrumental
[arts] are ineptly called, arts, since in these [there is] no ποίησις [making]. I speak of the
Philosophical instrumental disciplines: For how the Poetic dispositions [habitus Poetici] can
be distributed into principal, and instrumental has been said. Tract. De Methodo docendi, de
processu Analytico [tract Concerning the Method of teaching, concerning the Analytic
process]. Special Rules. But because the notice of the arts belongs to workmen, presently
they will be dismissed, if we note the following.

CANONS

I. The effective [effectivum] is any artificial thing. I call an artificial thing, [that]
which is [a matter] of care for the artificer. But a scientific [man] also can be
versed about an artificial thing, but only by knowing it or even by directing the
effection, but by no reason by moving [his] hand to the work. Thus the Architect;
who is distinguished from the number [of workmen] in this, that he does not use
[his] hand in the work, but only presides over those using [their hands], as Plato
teaches. And to these and similar [men] there intercedes the greatest cognation
with artificers, [but] nevertheless such, as by no means introduces a conclusion.

II. The factibile is the basis of the arts. Insofar, of course, as the arts respect it. From
this the variety of the arts flows, which are distinguished either by a material
[difference] only, or by a formal [difference] only, or by reason of both.

III. The factibile is [a matter] outside the pomeria [i.e., bounds] of Philosophy.
Because the cognition of them does not make for the felicity of the mind.
Therefore they are proposed to the literate only either for the sake of
delectation, or of some information, so that the technical [terms] occurring in
Authors may be understood, natural forms may be declared through artificial
[forms], instruments and arts may be discerned, from public, private use, in
victuals, clothing, habitations, riches, etc.

So much concerning Gnostology.

TO GOD ALONE BE GLORY.