Criminal Justice

Recent Scholarship

Edited by
Marilyn McShane and Frank P. Williams III

A Series from LFB Scholarly

Police Use of Intelligence Networks
for Reducing Crime

Charles L. Johnson

LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC

El Paso 2010
Copyright © 2010 by LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC

All rights reserved.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Johnson, Charles L.
Police use of intelligence networks for reducing crime / Charles L.
Johnson.
p. cm. -- (Criminal justice: recent scholarship)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-59332-381-3 (hardcover: alk. paper)
1. Criminal justice, Administration of--United States. 2. Intelligence
service--United States. 3. Social networks--United States. I. Title.
HV9950.J64 2010
363.25--dc22
2009035996

ISBN 978-1-59332-381-3

Printed on acid-free 250-year-life paper.

Manufactured in the United States of America.

Contents

List of Figures.................................................................................vii

Acknowledgements..........................................................................ix

CHAPTER 1: Current State of Policing............................................1

CHAPTER 2: Policing Models Past and Present ..............................9

CHAPTER 3: Washington State Homicide Investigation

Tracking System ......................................................................35

CHAPTER 4: Police Technologies, People, and Professional

Culture .....................................................................................53

CHAPTER 5: Lego® Blocks: The Future of Intelligence

Led Policing...........................................................................147

Appendix 1: Criminal Investigator Survey ...................................161

Appendix 2: Supervising Investigator Survey ..............................173

Appendix 3: Police Chief and Sheriff Survey...............................185

Appendix 4: H.I.T.S. Investigator/Analyst Survey .......................193

v
Contents vi

Appendix 5: H.I.T.S. Bulletin Recipient (On-line) Survey...........201

Appendix 6: Investigator/Analyst Biographies .............................209

Appendix 7: H.I.T.S. Input Form (Murder) ..................................211

Appendix 8: H.I.T.S. Input Form (Sexual Assault) ......................227

References.....................................................................................241

Index .............................................................................................249
List of Figures

Figure 3.1 Washington Statewide Regional Homeland Security

Coordination Districts ..................................................39

vii
Acknowledgments

This work would not have been possible without a tremendous team of
support. I am grateful to the Washington State Attorney General Rob
McKenna, and to the H.I.T.S. team within the Criminal Investigation
Division in his office. Headed now by Darryl Roosendaal, the H.I.T.S.
team works tirelessly behind the scenes to help criminal investigators
across Washington solve cold homicide and serious sexual assault
cases. Scott Blonien, the former commander of the H.I.T.S. unit was
instrumental in ensuring this project saw the light of day.
Nicholas Lovrich, Ph.D., Director of the Division of Governmental
Studies and Services at Washington State University, and Dr. Noelle
Fearn helped tremendously in formulating and directing this project.
Dr. Lovrich stands out in my experience as that single person who has
done more than any other to exemplify what it means to serve others.
Without his wisdom, encouragement, leadership, and guidance, the
evaluation of the H.I.T.S. program may have remained merely an idea
in my mind.
Also noteworthy is the debt owed to the men and women serving
in various law enforcement capacities in Washington whose knowledge
and insight form the cornerstone of this endeavor.
This project is dedicated to my family. I hope that I served as a
worthy role model as I worked through this venture.

ix
CHAPTER 1

Current State of Policing

INTRODUCTION

The police community has labored mightily since the turbulent 1960s
to maintain order while presenting a service-oriented face to the public.
In this regard, we can take note of the large number of agencies that
displayed public commitments of service on their patrol cruisers, such
as “To Protect and Serve” on the part of the Los Angeles Police
Department. Many other agencies emulated this practice in the face of
widespread accusations of police brutality associated with the treatment
of civil rights and anti-war protesters during this period of societal
upheaval in the United States during the process of rebuilding the
policing institutions of the nation. James Q. Wilson (1978) usefully
noted three distinct styles of policing—service, wherein calls for
service are taken seriously, but the emphasis of the mission was that of
pursuing justice by broadly serving the public; watchman, which
connotes the steadfast maintenance of public order and safety; and
legalistic, a model under which police follow strict codes of conduct
and make many arrests to enforce conduct codes on citizens.
In the aftermath of the turbulent 1960s police administrators came
to realize that those they serve expect police agencies to serve them by
conducting police work in an honest, ethical, productive manner
without violating the rights of citizenry. In due course the long
standing professional model of policing reflecting a legalistic style and
quasi-militaristic organizational culture gave way to community
oriented policing (COP) reflecting a service style of operation and an
organizational culture emphasizing the decentralization of authority and
1
2 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

the empowerment of line officers to exercise broad discretion on a wide

range of police action (Crank, 2003; Manning, 1988, 2008). As that
new model of policing continued to evolve among practitioners, some
police agencies turned to the problem-oriented policing (POP) model
(Goldstein, 1979, 1990; Eck and Maguire, 2000). Today, the
professional buzz is on intelligence-led policing (Manning, 2001a,
2008; Ratcliffe, 2001; Maguire and King, 2004).
To date, academics have not produced much research on the
intelligence-led policing model. Lacking such research, serious
questions remain regarding the likelihood of successful implementation
of this new concept in the provision of police services. A major
concern is that of police investigators’ proclivity to refuse the sharing
of information on criminal matters with other agencies charged with
clearing like crimes. Herein rests a paradox for police. How do police
administrators set achievable mission goals of efficient service to their
respective city, county and state citizens while maintaining public order
in their own jurisdiction? Put another way, are police administrators
obligated to work in unison with neighboring law enforcement
administrators, or is their mandate limited to their own socio-political
boundary? This study will examine this paradox in the context of a
specialized criminal investigative unit within an office of a state
attorney general to determine where barriers to communication and
cooperation rest in the pursuit of police mission goals. Suggestions for
reducing those barriers will then be offered based upon a systematic
process of evidence collection associated with an evaluation study
conducted over the course of two years.

Working Silos

Law enforcement department heads, regardless of whether they carry

the title Sheriff, Chief, or Commander, are universally sensitive to their
principal responsibilities to their respective constituents. They
generally believe that their policing agency must give priority to calls
for service from those within the jurisdiction of the agency. It is also
broadly agreed that order keeping duties include the clearance of
crimes by connecting an offender with a reported offense. The point of
negotiation within police agencies is the question of the types of crimes
upon which to allocate resources, and the amount of resources needed
to meet the department’s goals—all the while seeking to achieve the
Current State of Policing 3

contentment and support of the public they serve and the local
government officials who provide for their operational needs.
Police organizational structure will be discussed in more detail
later, but for now suffice it to say that American police agencies are
divided categorically by major components that include at a minimum
sub-agencies responsible for responding to and investigating the crimes
of homicide, robbery, burglary, arson, sexual assault, drug law
violations, vice, as well as a separate unit responsible for vehicular
traffic control. In large departments, within each sub-agency there may
be additional sub-agencies. For example, fraud, theft, and prostitution
would be investigated by teams within a unit or division with a broader
responsibility. One problem associated with the typical organizational
structure in law enforcement agencies is that it allows a division of
work to stand in the way of crime clearance in that detectives working
homicide cases and other violent crimes rarely communicate with
traffic patrol officers. Described in organization literature as “working
silos” (Ratcliffe, 2005; Maguire and John, 2006), agency productivity
and efficiency are hampered by the very nature of agency design. With
corrective systems in place, communication would more easily flow
between functionally-identified employees working within a police
organization, and more efficient use of workforce resources would
result.

Importance of Effective Communication Among Agencies

American law enforcement agencies serve the public and have common
goals that include timely response to criminal incidents deemed
important to the caller and to the agency, and the quick apprehension of
offenders connected to those incidents. As time between the incidents
call and an arrest increases, so too do tensions rise between the agency
and those they serve. The incidence of silo-thinking and the too
common problem of lack of internal communication among police
administrators can contribute to public disaffection from the police. If
barriers to effective communication among officers within a given
agency were reduced, and if barriers to effective communication
between and among agencies were reduced, crime clearance levels
would increase and citizens would be more content with the quality of
their police services.
4 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

There currently exists in the criminal justice community a hearty

discussion of the current police mandate. Some claim the decades-old
professional model of policing is passé, having given way to
community-oriented policing (Crank, 2003; Manning, 1988). Others
think community-oriented policing in many progressive agencies has
largely given way to problem-oriented policing (Goldstein, 1979, 1990;
Eck and Maguire, 2000). Still others are looking at the current state of
policing as being increasingly technologically-based, therefore
assuming a new model referred to as intelligence-led policing
(Manning, 2001a, 2008; Clarke, 2006; Ratcliffe, 2007). Each of these
models will be explored in chapter two, but first the need for this
particular study is addressed directly.

Information Sharing as a Policy, Not Simply an Informal Practice

In the past, the public saw the police as an entity capable of protecting
them while solving crimes with various degrees of competence and
skill. Unknown to most citizens was the fact that police agencies did
not communicate well across jurisdictional borders. Even less known
was that many times officers within the same agencies frequently did
not communicate with one another. The common belief was that
criminals cannot outrun the police radio, thus police had the potential
of omnipresence. In the internal world of policing, a different reality is
widely known. Police agencies only responded to what was known to
them. If communications channels either became clogged or worse yet
did not exist in the first place, accomplishment of the police mandate
was hampered by the lack of timely information. The image of the
police held by the public with respect to their potential for
omnipresence changed dramatically on September 11, 2001 when the
United States was attacked by al Qaeda. What was once only known
within police inner circles was now broad public knowledge; American
police are ill-equipped to know what they need to know to protect their
citizens because of poor lines of communication and the lack of
intelligence. More specifically, both inter and intra-police
communication lines for the timely sharing of intelligence failed in
preventing an act of terrorism involving individuals about whom some
police agencies had telling information not shared with other agencies
which could have taken timely action (Government Accounting Office,
2004).
Current State of Policing 5

The International Association of Chiefs of Police, in a major post

9/11 report, wrote, “Information sharing must become a policy, not an
informal practice” (IACP, 2005: vii). That sharing of information
model includes “cooperative, fluid structures that can collect
information and move intelligence to end users more quickly… [and
they] require increased collaboration in information gathering…”
(IACP, 2005: vii). With respect to the status of the communication
process within the criminal justice institution, the 9/11 Commission
Report concluded that there must be a unity of effort in sharing
information, stating in this regard: “The biggest impediment to all-
source analysis—to a greater likelihood of connecting the dots—is the
human or systemic resistance to sharing information” (9/11
Commission Report: 416). What is clear in our post 9/11 society is that
police need to develop better systems for gathering, maintaining,
analyzing and dispersing information about criminal elements.
Information gathering must extend beyond the ranks of the police if
they are to be better informed. In a highly prescient observation
Maguire (2000) urged much broader police “acceptance of the idea that
organizations other than the police have a major part to play, in
‘partnership’ with the police, in operations against crime; and
concomitantly…information previously regarded as confidential to
individual agencies should be much more freely exchanged between
them” (317).
The ability to gather data is not the principal problem faced by
police. The problem is that collected data largely rests in databases
never to see also the light of day. “The bottom line for police
organizations is that they must display, in their organizational behavior
and design, that they care about constituents’ concerns…” (Crank,
2003:187). In a major study of crime mapping and crime analysis,
Peter Manning discovered that crime mapping has very limited
operational effects because of the following communication-related
problems: “The lack of infrastructure of support and interpretation; the
distribution of the information, isolated and unintegrated (sic)
databases, and lack of on-line access by patrol officers, renders the
extant software and analytic capacity ineffectual” (Manning, 2001: 83;
see also Manning, 2008). Manning elaborated upon communications-
related problems thusly: “The constraints and visibility of railroad
tracks, parks, vacant lots, and high-rise public housing projects are real
and visible, whereas the constraints of gang memberships, co-
6 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

offending, networks of victims and their ‘at risk’ status is not so easily
comprehended. The tacit connections made by officers between the
expressions and the content that constitute the sign are the driving
forces behind any form of problem solving” (Manning, 2001: 98).
The point Manning drives home very effectively is that not only
should police be collecting the proper types of data, but they should
also communicate their insights derived from those data with one
another more fully. In his most recent work, Manning illustrates this
point thusly, “The information problem is that while police store
abundant facts, they have little interest in converting, or capacity to
convert, these facts into useful, actionable information in the future”
(2008: 65). He, of course, builds on his earlier comments on the same
subject with this insightful observation: “Police gather far too much
data for which they have no identified purpose. It is kept in case, or
because it has always been kept…Databases are not coordinated in the
departments I have studied. There are many standard and some new
types of data being gathered in policing, some of which can be
combined, but others that are not and cannot be” (Manning, 2001: 98-
99).
To further illustrate the problem police face regarding their
outmoded intelligence and communication systems, the Global Justice
Information Sharing Initiative organized the Global Intelligence
Working Group (GIWG) following 9/11 to assess responsibilities for
intelligence gathering (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2005). The group,
made up of local, state, federal and tribal law enforcement personnel,
discovered that 75% of law enforcement agencies in the United States
have fewer than 25 sworn officers, “and more often than not, these
agencies do not have staff dedicated to intelligence functions”
(National: iii). Additionally, there is a serious funding issue. The
International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts,
Inc. (IALEIA) reports that, “As local budgets are reduced and the costs
associated with the latest enforcement tools increase, a state
intelligence program will increasingly be called upon to provide and
maintain services and expertise to local law enforcement agencies”
(IALEIA, 1997a: 10). Compstat, which will be discussed in chapter
two, holds promise as it helps law enforcement move into the
information technology derived 21st century. Says the widely read
University of Louisville professor William Walsh, “At the heart of this
[Compstat] process is a new managerial perspective that is based on the
Current State of Policing 7

belief that the police can and should control crime and improve the
livability of neighborhoods [and] not just react to it” (Walsh, 2001:
353).
American citizens are increasingly holding the police agencies
that serve them accountable for their personal security. It is critical that
American law enforcement agencies do a better job of communicating
known information with one another so that the larger police
institutional goals of service and crime response can be more
effectively attained. The purpose of this project is to identify key
barriers to the flow of information through communication in American
police agencies. The chapter that follows will first examine policing
styles that have dominated the American policing landscape for over
the past 100 years, after which a review of the current move toward
intelligence-led policing (ILP) will be conducted. Subsequently, the
reader will be introduced to the Homicide Investigation Tracking
System (H.I.T.S.) and to the various local, state and federal law
enforcement agencies and their personnel that were included in this
evaluation study. The book concludes with recommendations for an
improved policing model.

Likely Reach of this Project

The present study benefits from the evaluation of a unique criminal

investigative unit housed within the office of the Washington State
Attorney General known as H.I.T.S. A thorough description of that
unit is forthcoming, but for the sake of explaining the limitations of this
study the reader should know that to the knowledge of the author only
two such state-level or national-level investigative units exist in the
United States; H.I.T.S. from Washington State and the Violent
Criminal Apprehension Program (ViCAP) which is a national program
maintained by the F.B.I. Therefore, though the observations of the
author cannot be generalized more widely to similar units, there is
substantial inference taken from the research data to lead the author to
conclude that the observations of police practice within surveyed
agencies is characteristic of other similar police agencies.
The basis for this study was a program that helps criminal
investigators throughout the state of Washington clear homicides,
sexual assaults, and other serious felonies. Therefore, much of the
work that makes up everyday police work is not examined.
8 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

Conclusions from the evaluation report are a glaring statement of how

the improvement, both within a policing agency and across agencies,
might help in the clearance of misdemeanors as well. Additionally, the
same conclusions can, if heeded, guide the daily operation of law
enforcement agencies so that they are not surprised by another 9/11-
type attack. That will be a likely result if the flow of criminal
intelligence remains greatly hindered.
This study is further limited by its very design. It is not intended
to test the strength of relationships between specific variables identified
as important in a specific theory; rather, it is designed to offer a
descriptive report of findings of a program evaluation itself designed to
identify the strengths and weaknesses of an information sharing
process. Those findings will add to the currently limited knowledge
base of law enforcement communications barriers that hinder the
making of timely connections between offenders and offenses. A
review of the literature describing various police models follows as a
primary step in the process of understanding the challenges facing
those wishing to build upon an intelligence-led policing conception of
policing in the United States.
CHAPTER 2

Policing Models Past and Present

In a classic treatise on the condition of American political science in

the 1980s, Gabriel Almond, professor emeritus at Stanford University,
argued that the field of political science suffered under a cloud of
“uneasy separateness” (Almond: 828). He contended that political
theorists had become divided along two dimensions of ideology and
methodology. Almond’s concern was that some political scientists had
lost their focus of “commitment to the search of objectivity” (Almond:
840), and instead turned to methodology as a means to support their
ideological, if not political, points. Using Separate Tables (Rattigan,
1955) as a metaphor to describe his view that four different sects of
political science theorists drew from a common intellectual buffet, all
the while protecting their own vulnerable ideas about “proper” political
science, Almond urged the discipline to retain the values that were
important to building the discipline knowledge base while cautioning
that embracing new methodologies (in this case, statistical and
mathematical tools) could continue to divide the discipline in
unproductive ways. Criminal justice, as a discipline, can learn from
the wisdom of Almond, particularly if one considers that the new breed
of quantitatively oriented criminal justice pundits to be as equally
aggressive as were those depicted by Almond in dictating what it is
cops should do according to their own ideological and methodological
preferences.
The divide in policing broadly defines the camps of those in
support of the command and control police structure and those who
prefer decentralization of power and decision-making authority within
police organizations. Command and control, discussed later in chapter
9
10 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

two, connotes a rigid bureaucracy in which orders flow from the top
down. Decentralization of power is a significant component of
community oriented-policing, which will also be discussed later. Those
who support the command and control structure have a difficult time
letting go of that tenet which is engrained in the professional and
standard models of policing. Proponents of community-oriented
policing (COP) and problem-oriented policing (POP) are more willing
to move away from command and control. In fact, they believe such a
move is a prerequisite to ensure the inclusion of key “stakeholders”
who can help to expand the policing mission and enhance public safety.
There is evidence in the as yet scant literature which suggests that as
the policing institution moves toward an intelligence-led base of
operation the structure of policing will appear more like the old
command and control variety, but retaining some boundary spanning
COP components (McGarrell, Freilich and Chermak, 2007; see also
Deukmedjian, 2006). We first examine how policing mandates have
changed over the past 100 years, then a new paradigm in policing,
Intelligence-led Policing, is introduced as a foundation for the case
study of the H.I.T.S. program featured herein.

Professional Policing and the Standard Model of Policing

Formalized local government-based policing in America began in the

late 1820s in the largest American cities, and early police officers were
not considered to be professional with respect to social status. In fact,
the terms professional and police were not likely to appear together.
Policemen in this historical period were typically not much more than
watchmen. It wasn’t until the turn of the 20th century that
professionalism began to characterize American police. Most agree
that the professionalization of the police in the United States began
with the efforts of August Vollmer (Douthit, 1975). Vollmer was the
first Chief of Police of Berkeley, California, elected as the town
Marshall in 1905. By the time of his retirement in 1932, Vollmer had
led the way in reforming policing as a socially recognized profession.
He expanded his police force to include night and daytime patrols, and
he developed law enforcement training courses that would later be
replicated widely throughout the nation. Vollmer developed college
courses as well that were designed to teach both police officers and
civilians alike about the role of police in a democratic society. His
Policing Models Past and Present 11

main focus was on conveying the notion of police officers as “social

workers” who in the course of their public safety promotion work
addressed a broad range of social problems giving rise to criminal
activity. In addition, Vollmer spent ample time training his officers on
technical issues such as criminal law and criminal investigation, and in
the proper use of equipment and law enforcement technology available
at the time (e.g., fingerprinting). Vollmer’s work was championed by
other early reformers, such as O.W. Wilson (Wilson, 1953).
The post-Vollmer era saw formal education as being a critical
component of police work. Some agencies, including Berkeley,
required officers to hold a bachelor’s degree as a work prerequisite.
San Jose, California, later was headed by the first chief in the nation to
hold a Ph.D., Joseph McNamara (Kelling, 1988). Education alone did
not define police professionalism for Vollmer. His tenacious attacks on
public morality crimes such as prostitution, gambling, public
drunkenness, disorderliness, and corruption drew both praise and
criticism from community members. The well-known scholar James Q.
Wilson agreed with Vollmer that the police role was more about
handling people than about the enforcement of laws (Wilson, 1968),
and credits Vollmer with having had a major favorable influence on the
development of policing in the United States.
Manning (2001) characterizes Vollmer as one of the key players
(he also included O.W. Wilson, Bruce Smith, Harry E. Fosdick, and
V.O. Leonard) who was instrumental in the development of the
professional police model. Praising the movement for raising the ideal
of the police to a new level in the eyes of the public, Manning was
nonetheless in agreement with Goldstein (1990) in his criticism that
under the professional police model, too much focus was placed upon
the means of police work to the detriment of adapting the ends to be
served to an ever-changing society. Some characterized these traits as
those of the “traditional bureaucratic professional model with its
emphasis on efficiency and organizational control…” (Walsh, 2001:
348; Goldstein, 1990).
During the 1970s it was assumed that policing could be easily
accomplished by standardizing the police function to include random
patrols, rapid response to calls for service (CFS), and aggressive
response to criminal incidences with attentive follow-up by trained
investigators. However, by mid-decade it had been shown in a Kansas
City field study conducted by Kelling and his associates that the
12 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

standard model might not be as effective as had been assumed (Kelling,

et al., 1974). More recently, Weisburd and Eck found that “…little
evidence supports the standard model of policing” (2004: 42). Based
on their studies Weisburd and Eck agree that community oriented
policing, when combined with hotspots or problem oriented policing,
both helps to reduce the fear of crime and reduces crime levels
(2004:42).
Increases in violent and property crime, coupled with civil unrest
that included war and civil rights protests, led some scholars to
recognize that a new trend was emerging in American policing. The
image of police as professionals was beginning to fade (e.g., Crank,
2003; Skogan, 2006; Klockars, 1988). A new era in policing was
unfolding featuring the emergence of community oriented policing
(COP). Some scholars, including Crank, Weisburd and Eck view the
COP movement as re-legitimating police in America in a period in
which public confidence in law enforcement had become seriously
eroded.

The Community Oriented Policing Mandate

In the true spirit of Thomas Kuhn, for there to be a paradigm shift there
must be a change in the basic assumptions about a process (Kuhn
1962). That is precisely what occurred for policing following the social
unrest in the 1960s and early 1970s. COP was begun in some
communities as neighborhood watches and eventually, following a
flood of federal funding, reshaped as COP storefronts and volunteer-
staffed substations and “COP shops” popped up in local at-risk
neighborhoods. Critics of the conventional command and control
structure that had been the backbone of professionalized police
organizations championed the new “friendlier” face of the beat cop
who once made local residents feel secure. The power shift resulted in
the decentralization of power in police circles so that tactical public
safety decisions were now made at lower levels within police
organizations. In their widely distributed but unpublished manuscript,
Ritti and Mastrofski (2002) contend that COP emerged as a solution to
the problem that the public had rejected the professional police model
that had served as the accepted policing standard. Others, including
Weisburd and Eck (2004), contend that COP reflects the fact that
policing agencies came to understand that they needed outside sources
Policing Models Past and Present 13

of support and cooperation in their effort to carry out the police

mission.
Goldstein (1990), along with Skolnick and Bayley (1986), agree
that effective policing can only be accomplished with the cooperation
of a community larger than the police organization alone. Zhao,
Lovrich and Robinson (2001), citing their research on change in the
organizational priorities pursued within policing agencies in the COP
period, noted that contrary to expectation contingency theory did not
explain organizational change in American policing. Instead, they
concluded that an institutional perspective better accounts for the
acceptance of COP. Their research based on surveys of police agencies
led them to conclude that, “…the core functional priorities of American
policing largely remain closely modeled after the professional
model…” (373). Their findings echo Bittner’s 1972 claim that the core
function of American policing, namely crime control, order
maintenance, and service provision, remain as standards. Of course,
the COP model should be examined on the bases of results as well as
priorities of action specified by police executives.
The question of effectiveness eventually comes up when
discussing any major program; COP is no exception. Looking at FBI
Uniform Crime data on violent property crime rates between 1995 and
1999, Zhao, Scheider and Thurman (2002) reported that, “…COPS
hiring and innovative grant programs have resulted in significant
reductions in local crime rates in cities with populations greater than
10,000 for both violent and nonviolent offenses” (2002: 7). Weisburd
and Eck concluded that the COP model is sound, but with a caveat:
“The research available suggests that when the police partner more
generally with the public, levels of citizen fear will decline” (2004: 52).
Mastrofski, a friendly critic of community policing, challenges the
COP model in observing the following: “To the extent that community
policing is a good thing, it should withstand the careful scrutiny of
thoughtful doubters” (2006: 44). He further concludes that in many
instances police-community partnerships have not added greatly to the
capacity to control crime because the COP model has not done enough
to develop relationships with those from whom intelligence data could
be gleaned, and because the model has not developed strategies for
using the data it has to effectively build strategies for crime control
(57). Mastrofski agrees with Weisburd and Eck in their position that
COP has helped to reduce fear of crime, however (65). The COP
14 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

model withstood challenges from its critics (friendly and unsympathetic

alike) and commanded a strong presence in the police community from
roughly the late 1970s through the present. The staying power of the
COP model can be attributed largely to the availability of federal
funding and the fact that people feel better about themselves when they
think they have a say in the process of deciding how police resources
should be used to address public safety concerns. Under present
circumstances people like helping the police, but citizens are also
coming to have higher expectations about what people are able to do
with modern science and technology—what some have called the “CSI
effect.” Police organizations and prosecutors are under considerable
pressure from citizens (and jurors in particular) to demonstrate that they
can make use of such knowledge-based tools in their public safety
promotion work (Pratt, et al., 2006; Tyler, 2006; Schweitzer and Saks,
2007).
In this regard, Manning (2001, see also 2008) describes one
important police function as that of dramaturgy, noting that police
administrators are key players in controlling public opinion by acting in
ways that respond to the desires of the public and media. Citing the
NYPD administration under Rudy Guiliani’s top cop pick of William
Bratton, Manning successfully demonstrates that Bratton shifted the
policy of the department from COP to a crime control model. Bratton
implemented a zero-tolerance campaign in the 1990s that saw the
frequent citation and apprehension of minor misdemeanants (such as
those who squeegeed car windshields at red lights) in his effort to
restore order and alleviate fear on the streets. The high number of
arrests carried out by officers under the command of Bratton provided
statistical data to support his promise to Guiliani that he would show a
drop in crime. The stats were maintained in a database that Bratton
engineered. Dubbed Compstat (the literature does not agree on the
meaning of the acronym, but it is generally accepted that it refers to
computer statistics, or compare statistics), Bratton created what would
later become the policing standard for the maintenance of statistics on
incidence of criminal activity. Erosion of the COP model was not
limited to the NYPD case study, however.
In a study of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)
mission, Deukmedjian (2006) noted that the RCMP adopted
Intelligence-led policing (ILP) in December 2000 as “…a shift in
executive discourse away from the earlier decade’s emphasis on
Policing Models Past and Present 15

community policing adoption” (523). The reason for the shift from
COP to ILP was given as “Despite their efforts to gain broad
acceptance for community policing by aligning training and
management, executives were unable to integrate the community and
garner organizational support for empowerment” (523-524). The
RCMP shift from COP to ILP was definitively the most significant
break from COP revealed by this research. As will be discussed later,
when many agencies decided to move toward the ILP model they kept
the portions of “community policing” that worked, and built on them.
For the RCMP, however, the decision was to “…discard the
community-policing mission for an intelligence-led mission.” (531).
The language used in this shift was rather direct (531):

In December 2000, the Commissioner’s Office issued the

‘Directional Statement for 2000/2001,’ stating that ‘being an
intelligence-led organization means we will work together
internally, and with our partners at home and abroad, to ensure
that we utilize the best information in making decisions,
taking action and assessing our results’. For RCMP
executives, then, intelligence-led policing maintained the
reflexive notion of policing through partnerships. Among the
key differences was the absence of any notion of
‘community.”

Curtis Clarke (2006) conducted a study of the Edmonton Police Service

from which he concluded that the COP model had established a good
foundation upon which to build the ILP model. Other researchers were
also beginning to sing similar songs, as noted here: “The effectiveness
of the hot-spots policing approach has strong empirical support”
(Weisburd and Eck, 2004: 56).
Maguire and King criticized the COP model as having been
“implemented across the landscape of policing…so weakly…or in such
a scattershot fashion, so as not to constitute a significant transformation
at the industry level” (2004: 17). The chatter in the police management
community and among scholars regarding the effectiveness of COP has
taken its toll, and some began to see also a purpose for policing as an
institution elsewhere than in the established COP liturgy.
16 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

Problem Oriented Policing: the New Solution?

In a now classic article, Herman Goldstein challenged police

administrators to stop focusing on the things that had become their
perennial concerns—things such as “lack of manpower, inadequate
supervision, inadequate training, or strained relations with police
unions” and start focusing on “street robberies, residential burglaries,
battered wives and acts of terrorism” (Goldstein, 1979: 243). Now
termed problem-oriented policing (POP), according to Goldstein the
proper emphasis in policing should be on the end result of law
enforcement action. Disappointed that the term problem-oriented
policing had been “used to describe a wide variety of initiatives, many
of which bear little relationship to the original concept,” Goldstein later
clarified the definition to give problem-oriented policing a more precise
meaning (Goldstein, 2003: 14). Clarifying that POP was originally
defined as, “…a new way of thinking about policing: it introduces a
thought process that could become the centerpiece around which all
elements of police operations are organized” (2003: 14).
Goldstein further elaborates upon his conception by citing reasons
officers’ efforts in addressing problems are typically limited. He notes
the following in this regard: “Chiefs leave office; agencies undergo
changes in their orientation. Key people are promoted or reassigned.
Individual officers are reassigned, or acquire less supportive
supervisors, or are reined-in or discouraged by other changes in their
working environment” (2003: 18). Goldstein further observes in this
regard (2003: 19):

To energize and hasten the development of problem-oriented

policing, the greatest current need, in my opinion, is to invest
heavily in building a capacity into local policing to analyze
discrete pieces of police business in depth and to carefully
evaluate the effectiveness of alternative strategies for
responding to them. Such an investment should continue to
draw on the knowledge and experience of all police
employees, but it will depend heavily, for its success, on the
full engagement of their chief executive and management.
And it will require, in one form or another, the acquisition of
research skills that are not currently available within police
agencies.
Policing Models Past and Present 17

The fundamental premise underlying the concept of

problem-oriented policing is that police practices, in
responding to common problems that arise in the community,
should be informed by the best knowledge that can be
acquired about the nature of those problems and about the
effectiveness of various strategies for dealing with them.

Goldstein ties the current lack of concentrated efforts to the

negative image of the police maintained by many citizens. Says
Goldstein, “With such imperfect working conditions, it should come as
no surprise that, with monotonous regularity, shortcomings in policing
surface…allegations of inefficiency, abuse of authority, corruption,
negligence or incompetence” (2003: 24). Goldstein identifies five
major impediments to the progress of POP: (1) the absence of a long-
term commitment on the part of police leaders to strengthening policing
and the police as an institution; (2) the lack of skills within a police
agency that are required to analyze problems and to evaluate strategies
for dealing with those problems; (3) the lack of a clear academic
connection; (4) the absence of informed outside pressures; and (5) the
lack of financial support (Goldstein, 2003: 26-34). The ways in which
the research data derived from the evaluation of the H.I.T.S. program
can be used to address these issues will be discussed in chapter five.
Weisburd and Eck posit that police administrators should tailor
their provision of services so that the focus is not simply on meeting
the needs of law enforcement, but rather meeting the self-identified
needs of citizens. Acknowledging that COP tends to reduce the fears of
crime in communities, their research points to great results when COP
practices are combined with hotspots policing, or what Hermann
Goldstein called problem-oriented policing (Weisburd and Eck, 2004).
“While we have little evidence indicating the effectiveness of standard
models of policing in reducing crime, disorder, or fear of crime, the
strongest evidence of police effectiveness in our review is found
in…focused policing efforts” (Weisburd and Eck, 2004: 58). This new
way of looking at combining POP with other known data is
accomplished with programs such as H.I.T.S., giving the policing
community new hope for optimism in their ongoing effort to meet the
expectations of citizens.
Innis and Fielding (2002) generally agree with the proposition put
forth by Goldstein that all ‘business’ that is taken to the police should
18 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

be considered ‘police business,’ but they contend that there currently

exists no serious attempt to collect and maintain data related to lesser
incidents. They urge the creation of data management techniques that
capture and record less serious incidents brought to the attention of
police. The H.I.T.S. evaluation report considered this notion and
addressed it with an inquiry of criminal investigators. Specifically, the
question asked was “Do you agree or disagree with the following
statement: ‘Having access to Field Investigation Reports (FIRs)
generated by patrol officers on persons who are under the supervision
of the Department of Corrections would probably assist investigators in
clearing homicides and rapes/sexual assaults” (see also appendix 1,
question 9 this book). The purpose of the question was to ascertain the
level of interest that exists in having access to patrol-generated data.
The results of the survey will be discussed in chapter 5; showing
whether or not the position of Innis, Fielding and Goldstein would be
supported. We now turn to a policing model that is getting a great deal
of attention by academics and practitioners alike, especially since the
turn of the 21st century.

Intelligence-Led Policing

The most commonly used policing organizational model shifted from

command and control through a tight hierarchy to the systematic
decentralization of police decision-making as evidenced by the
placement of storefronts and substations and volunteer-staffed cop
shops in local neighborhoods, as discussed in the section on COP.
There was an unmistaken shift in the basic assumption of how police
work was to be done. The move from COP to POP was not a true
paradigm shift, but rather for those who embraced the POP model it
redefined the COP mission to look at specific ways police could target
specific crimes to accomplish targeted results. In his theory of
organizations, Howard Aldrich defines a transformation as “a major
change occurring along three possible dimensions: changes in goals,
boundaries, and activities” (Aldrich, 1999: 163). Perhaps that is what
ILP is to the police institution. What was needed, in the words of Jerry
Ratcliffe, was the following: “An integrated strategy that combines
some sort of the benefits of problem-oriented policing with the targeted
and objective approach of proactive policing to be the direction in
which proponents of intelligence-led policing are heading” (2008: 63).
Policing Models Past and Present 19

Though intelligence-lead policing (ILP) does not lend itself as a new

model of policing, per se, a more in-depth look at the emergence of ILP
as a strategy is nonetheless quite worthwhile.
The term ILP first took hold in Britain following an Audit
Commission report in 1993 (Hale, Heaton, and Uglow, 2004). The
goal of ILP was to target “…criminals rather than responding to crime
incidents” (Audit Commission, 1993: 2). Manning points to a
significant communication problem that taxes most agencies: “Since
detectives work on a case-based activity, they have no reference to
trends or patterns unless they appear presently, e.g. a series of unsolved
house breakings in a particular neighborhood over the last few days or
weeks” (Manning, 2001: 94). This is a distribution problem as well.
The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) points out
that the U.S. Department of Justice first laid the blueprint for
intelligence work in 1971 when it “…called on every law enforcement
agency and every state to immediately establish and maintain the
capability to gather and evaluate information and to disseminate
intelligence in a manner that protects every individual’s right to privacy
while it curtails organized crime and public disorder” (IACP, 2005: 3).
That decree apparently applied to agencies with a sworn officer count
of 75 or more.
The IACP defines “intelligence” in this context as “…information
plus analysis equals intelligence” (IACP, 2005: 3). Ratcliffe elaborates
on the definition of intelligence to include the component that
intelligence analysis “…involves the development of critical and
substantive products that support law enforcement decision-making
efforts that are centered on organized criminal activity…while crime
analysis…involves the use of various geographical and socio-
demographic information, in combination with spatial techniques, to
analyze, prevent, and solve crime and disorder problems” (Ratcliffe,
2007: v).
Manning (2001a, 2008) characterizes the function of the modern
police as units responding to incidents in the here and now, with
relatively scant regard to preemptive or preventive efforts. His
contention that police should reorient their focus to include the
anticipation of crime, coupled with the analysis of crime through new
technologies is quite on target in the context of strong demand from
citizens that government services—including their police services—
make proper use of modern technology in their provision of services.
20 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

“There is a long and hopeful history, stretching back to the invention of

the telegraph, fire alarm systems, and early police watch stations, that
contains the assumption that rapid and efficient flow of information (by
technological means) would in itself empower policing. This
assumption, a technological fallacy, is a seductive one” (2001a: 84).
New and better ways to gather and store data abound with the turn of
the 21st century. The problem now recognized by virtually every police
agency in America stems from a common thought; how do police,
already short on manpower and technological skills, manage the
mounds of data in ways that allow the timely and efficient analysis and
redistribution of results?
Manning has argued that “substantive direct impact on disorder
and crime can be made via data analysis combining police-gathered and
non-police-gathered data, and this data as information can be used to
direct and systematize enforcement” (2001a: 90). On the topic of the
state of information technology infrastructure, Manning pointed out
that, “Ethnographic research demonstrates further sources of police
resistance and/or acceptance of IT [information technology]—it is
based on time and manner of introduction of the IT, officers’ rank,
specialized function, the level of information to which the officer has
access and must use, and local policing practices and traditions”
(2001a: 94). Says Manning, “The technical support staff in police
departments is typically overworked and inadequate to maintaining
complex electronic infrastructure…elaborate technology-based
systems, such as expert systems for detectives, are not supported and
abandoned when federal funding vanishes” (2001a: 94). Manning
cautions that the current trend to embrace intelligence as a police
mandate may not lead to the desired results anticipated. He notes in
this regard the following:

…the ways of technology are many, and the argument for an

information-based policing, focusing on risk management, and
enhancing security is both premature and flawed. The
potential of crime analysis and crime mapping as means,
combining a technology and a technique, is greater than any
other innovation in policing in recent times, arguably, because
they raise questions about the basic contradictions in the
mandate—that policing can control crime, reduce the fear of
crime, and yet be an almost entirely responsive, demand-
Policing Models Past and Present 21

driven, situational force dispensing just in time and just

enough, order maintenance. (2001a: 101)

Indeed, Manning is quite right in his assessment of the manner in

which it presently appears that police management is attempting to
implement ILP. What Manning to be championing is the notion that
COP and POP are the ex-post facto standards in policing, and that a
new movement in the direction of ILP is potentially ill-fated because of
the lack of training of officers in the proper use of the new technologies
at their disposal. The Washington State H.I.T.S. program might be
viewed as a communication bridge specifically designed to address this
contradiction in mandates. A simple example of how the effective use
of police technologies led to the capture of one of America’s most
notorious terrorists may shed some light on the apparent
communication gap that impedes the effective use of technologies.
After apparently blowing up the Murrow building in Oklahoma
City, Timothy McVeigh drove northbound on a freeway to escape the
scene of his crime. A lone Oklahoma State Highway Patrol officer
stopped McVeigh for speeding, and subsequently discovered that he
had outstanding warrants. An arrest was made, following which the
connection between McVeigh and the bombing of the Murrow building
was made. The information that tied McVeigh to the bombing was
initially developed through a relatively simple searchable database that
stores warrant information. That information, had it not been used
properly, would have remained unexamined, resulting in the release at
the scene of McVeigh. The technology was in place, and it was
properly used by the well trained officer, averting the unthinkable
release of the terrorist McVeigh. Manning is correct in his assessment
that such information technologies too often are not properly used, but
a review of the H.I.T.S. program in Washington and the research
methods used in the development of the evaluation report, followed by
a discussion of properly implemented strategies for the use of
technologies will offer a fresh view of the contradiction in the police
mandate as reported by Manning.
There is a strong tendency in the police culture to gather data only
to under-analyze them, leaving the law enforcement community under-
informed about crime dynamics and the causes of crime (Gill, 1997;
Tramblay and Rochon, 1991). For progress to occur more rapidly in
this area police must become more efficient in the four principal stages
22 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

of the intelligence system—namely, targeting, gathering, analysis and

dissemination (Gill, 1997: 304). Gill cites the dissemination of
intelligence to other agencies as “the critical point at which power
interacts most obviously with the information process” (309) and that
“Dissemination is an important stage in the police’s overall ability to
control of the information process” (309). The ability of the H.I.T.S.
program to recruit local police agencies to work with them on the
systematic sharing of criminal investigation information would be a
good measure of the effectiveness of the program, based on the notions
put forth by Gill.
Willem and Buelens (2007) assert that effective knowledge-
sharing is essential for all formal organizations. Key to that sharing is
the presence of trust among those with whom knowledge is shared
(581). In their research on organizational communications, Willem and
Buelens discovered “It was trust that was important, not as part of
informal or lateral coordination or developed through identification.
Not only would people share more knowledge in an environment of
trust but also knowledge sharing would be more effective” (597). It is
apparent that the subculture of the police is a breeding ground for
mistrust (Cope, 2004; Reuss-Ianni and Ianni, 1983; Walters and
Ussery, 2007; Allen, 2002), and that this problem has to be addressed
effectively before progress toward ILP can be made. This is also a
concern pointed out by Maguire and John (2006) with regard to
information hoarding and silo-thinking; threats to community safety
often remain known to some but are not shared with those who could
take appropriate preventative action. Findings derived from the
H.I.T.S. evaluation report have the potential to address this problem
area.
In a recent important contribution to the topic of ILP, McGarrell,
Freilich and Chermak (2007) point out that ILP is yet the most recent
iteration of the attempt by police to reinvent themselves without having
set out a clear path or goal toward which they aspire. McGarrell and
his colleagues note that external pressures to change have led the police
community to “change for change’s sake,” and they argue for a “broad
conceptualization of ILP that embraces community policing, problem-
solving policing, a continuous improvement managerial philosophy,
and an ‘all crimes’ focus” (McGarrell, et al. 2007: 143). Drawing on
the insights derived from the tribal law enforcement work of Carter
(2004), McGarrell and his colleagues note that both COP and ILP are
Policing Models Past and Present 23

“dependent on two-way communications with the public” (144). They

also point out that both COP and ILP rely on actionable intelligence
that results from the timely analysis of information. McGarrell and his
associates argue that POP should not be abandoned, but rather that it
should be shored up using a “Greater infusion of the ILP philosophy
within policing…strengthening the analytic component of POP” (145).
McGarrell and his colleagues use Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) to
support their contention that the combined efforts of POP and ILP can
work in a productive synergy:

The PSN model calls for multi-agency task forces to employ a

strategic problem-solving model whereby local gun crime
patterns are analyzed, strategies are crafted to respond to these
patterns, and ongoing assessment and refinement occurs. PSN
built on the crime-analysis and resource-deployment approach
embodied in Compstat as well as the problem-solving model
that was part of Boston’s Ceasefire program and later part of
the [U.S.] DOJ’s Strategic Approach to Community Safety
Initiative…Although [this] ILP example…focus(es) only on
traditional street crime and gun crime in particular, we believe
there is great potential in using the ILP model to respond to
terrorism. Recent arrests of suspected terrorists in the United
States (Florida), Canada, and Britain suggest that intelligence
may be able to identify groups and allow for intervention prior
to an attack. This is consistent with reports from countries,
such as Israel, with long experience in combating terrorism.
(145-47)

McGarrell and his colleagues caution that ILP should not simply
become a vague, broad conceptual framework within which the current
models of COP and POP are incorporated haphazardly, resulting in a
watered down version of policing methodology. Instead, the
components of COP, POP and ILP need to be combined in purposeful
ways. Tilley (2003) concurs that ILP does not differ greatly in
fundamental concept from the POP model, and as we are about to see
also Nina Cope also believes that ILP is perhaps most properly viewed
as an important extension and enhancement of POP.
We move now to the view that ILP can establish itself as a
legitimate policing model by means of “volume crime analysis.” Cope
24 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

(2004) examined two police forces in the U.K. and concluded that,
“…while the rhetoric of using analysis to target police activity is
generally accepted, the practice is different” (2004: 188). Police
agencies depend on crime analysis to deliver “the right information…to
the right people at the right time” (Fletcher, 2000: 114). Cope
describes the function of crime analysis as, “..[it] incorporates the
collection and review of information into manageable summaries, for
example crime maps or networks charts, to facilitate its interpretation.
When the nature of crime problems is better understood,
recommendations for action logically follow” (2004: 191). Cope
concludes from her systematic observations of these two law
enforcement agencies that, “Despite the recognition that knowledge
abstraction and production is a collective process, the research
demonstrated that street level police officers continued to exert
considerable control over the intelligence process.” (197). The
implication of this finding is that if ILP is to make a noteworthy impact
on policing it must include the combined efforts of field patrol officers,
criminal investigators, and crime analysts (at a minimum) brought
together as one working group through the leadership of top
management that has “bought into” the notion that ILP can help to
accomplish the police mandate.
Ratcliffe and McCullagh (2001) observed that it is not heretofore a
natural part of police work to develop an overview of crime problems
by drawing on various sources of data. Before we look at the methods
used and data gained from the H.I.T.S. evaluation study, it would be
useful to examine some of the barriers to the communications of
intelligence that were identified in chapter two. Michael Townsley and
colleagues support the integration of ILP with what we know about
POP, stating:

If a defining characteristic of problem-oriented policing is its

being evidence-based, it would be necessary to ensure that
adequate resources are allocated to intelligence units so that
different forms of evidence can be assembled and triangulated,
and that the members of these units acquire ‘problem-oriented
policing heads.’ (Townsley, et al. 2003: 197)

Other researchers echo the view that for policing to move into the new
intelligence-led paradigm, cooperation beyond the walls of the
Policing Models Past and Present 25

traditional policing community will be critical: “The analysis required

in an intelligence-led policing environment goes beyond that which has
traditionally been practiced in most law enforcement agencies. It
requires the exploitation of all pertinent information and the analysts
must be prepared to go beyond traditional sources such as police files
to other government and regulatory agencies, private databases and
open sources” (IALEIA, 1997a: 7). For example, in the case of
national security concerns had flight school records been incorporated
in a scrutinized database, the names of several soon-to-be 9/11
hijackers would have been present on the proverbial radar screen of
criminal investigators.
James Sheptycki identified eleven commonplace pathologies of
organizational information flow that hinder the flow of intelligence and
that deserve attention if we are to solve some of the communication
problems inherent in the current intelligence-sharing scheme. These
common problems are as follows: digital divide; linkage blindness;
noise; intelligence overload; non-reporting; intelligence gaps;
duplication; institutional friction; intelligence-hoarding and information
silos; defensive data concentration and the differences of occupational
subculture (2004: 313). The term digital divide reflects the likelihood
that agencies in different jurisdictions have different information and
communication technology systems that do not allow for the
uninterrupted flow of data from one to the other; the term
“interoperability” is used to characterize the state of seamless data and
communication interchange. Linkage blindness refers to the gap in
information that sometimes occurs that leads to an incomplete picture
of the facts. Sheptycki illustrates this problem by pointing out that
“…a firearm may be ‘rented’ or shared among a group of active
criminals and used in a variety of locations” (315). By Noise,
Sheptycki refers to the fact that all information is subject to
interpretation, thus critical information may not be recognized.
Intelligence overload involves both an abundance of legacy data that
may not be needed, thus it drags the software down, and the lack of
technical capacity to process the important data that is stored. Non-
reporting and non-recording of data is a critical consideration because
analysts can only analyze those data that are present. A significant
reason for non-reporting and non-recording is examined in the H.I.T.S.
evaluation study. Intelligence gaps occur when links between crimes
and the offenders involved in the commission of those crimes are not
26 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

made. Duplication is problematic because it bogs the system down and

indicates the lack of monitoring of data for quality of control.
On institutional friction, Sheptycki comments as follows: “As with
most multi-agency work, intelligence-sharing is based on a
collaborative rather than a command relationship…Insofar as
intelligence-sharing is concerned, ‘institutional friction’ describes the
difficulties of moving information across bureaucratic boundaries”
(320). Intelligence-hoarding and information silos are symptomatic of
the policing occupational subculture (320). Because many in law
enforcement see also good work as being tied to career advancement,
there is a strong tendency to protect information that might lead to that
coveted recognition. Sheptycki calls information such as this “a
valuable commodity that must be kept back until it can realize its best
return for the one who holds it” (321). He warns, however, that “The
intelligence-led policing (ILP) works according to a different logic.
The ILP model depends on the sharing of information in order to
produce accurate pictures of crime and disorder problems” (321). The
systematic hoarding of intelligence, therefore, is highly “corrosive of
the principles of intelligence-led policing” (321).
Defensive data concentration refers to another type of data
duplication that occurs when data are strategically gathered on a given
problem such as sex offenses, illegal gun possession or gang crimes.
According to Sheptycki, this problem leads to “overstretched reporting”
of the incidence of crime. Organizational subcultures cause competing
intelligence systems that lead some to believe the intelligence
communication structure is more like an intricate web than an
interconnected control hub and strategically located and spaced spokes
(322). Rivalries exist between detectives and uniformed officers,
between detectives and crime analysts, and elsewhere in larger police
organizations. Subculture rivalries lead to silo thinking and
information hoarding, as well as data being underused. The
organizational subcultures problem not only leads to a pathology of
criminal intelligence communication flow, but it also describes a well-
established barrier to effective internal organizational communications.
Sheptycki observes in this regard, “It is a long established fact that
multi-agency working is adversely affected by differences in working
practice and that there can be a struggle for power and resources
(including information) between agencies in these circumstances”
(325).
Policing Models Past and Present 27

Heaton (2001) looks to ILP as a way to maintain better control

over repeat offenders through enhanced database records. His research
concurred with the insights derived from most of the researchers
featured in this chapter—namely, that the addition of ‘information
managers’ alone will not lead to the attainment of the desired goal of
enhanced law enforcement through increased information sharing.
Heaton acknowledges that there must be a total organizational buy-in
approach to data gathering, information maintenance, and intelligence
sharing that starts from top management and works its way down
through the ranks. In a multi-national study of policing, Bayley argued
that police can do little to ‘control’ crime, noting the fact that “the
police are not able to prevent crime should not come as a surprise to
thoughtful people. It is generally understood that social conditions
outside the control of the police, as well as outside the control of the
criminal justice system as a whole, determine crime levels in
communities” (1994: 10).
There may exist a compelling alternate reason behind the desire on
the part of contemporary police organizations to move to enhanced
intelligence gathering. Some contend that the desire on the part of the
police to gather and maintain information is part of a larger purposive
scheme. Maguire (2000) cites the growth of a ‘risk society’ as a
possible external pressure forcing policing to shift toward a
‘knowledge’ base. This notion is supported elsewhere in the knowledge
utilization literature, as evidenced by this observation: “Most of the
crime-related knowledge produced by the police is disseminated to
other institutions (for example, those concerned with health, insurance,
public welfare, financial matters, and education) for their risk
management needs, rather than used for criminal prosecution and
punishment” (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997: 5). Thus, the external thirst
for information on the part of other social institutions has lead the
police to become valued ‘gatekeepers of information’ for other social
institutions (Ratcliffe, 2002: 55; see also the powerful story of failures
in information sharing in the area of public health featured in Garrett’s
Betrayal of Trust: The Collapse of Global Public Health, 2000).
Innes, Fielding and Cope (2005) observed that the rush to infuse
crime analysis methods into policing techniques has resulted in the
policing community taking credit for the implementation of ‘scientific
objectification’ of crime analysis through enhanced crime data
techniques, when in reality much of the product of the crime analysis
28 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

function within police agencies goes largely ignored. This has resulted
in the claim by policing administrators that crime analysis is effective
despite the fact that they are seldom using the product of crime analysis
services to target and control crime effectively. Maguire and John
conclude “…evidence of the success of police to engage with partners
for crime reduction is as yet a little elusive, and intelligence-led
policing has also evolved from being an analytical tool to a fully-
fledged business model for policing” (2006: 4). The argument
advanced by Maguire and John is not widely agreed upon, however. It
would be incorrect to assume that the preponderance of veteran police
officials fully embrace new information technologies. “A move
toward intelligence or data-driven strategies often appears to encounter
a recurring problem of resistance to change, either a fear of the impact
of the new technology on the working conditions of officers or as a
feature of the general inflexibility of ‘police culture’” (Ratcliffe, 2005:
437; see also Chan, 1997 and 1999; Weisburd and Eck, 2004;
McGarrell et al., 2007; Manning, 1997). Numerous information
technologies are emerging on the scene such as mobile video/audio
recorders and transmitters, GPS tracking devices, license plate
scanners, and power data mining software, all vying for the attention of
the potentially enormous market that includes all aspects of the
criminal justice arena. One such integrative information technology is
Compstat. Before the potential barriers to moving forward with ILP
are examined, a brief discussion of the concept of Compstat is required
at this point.

A Note on Compstat

This book would be remiss if it failed to include a section on Compstat,

since this process is the most widely used program for putting the
theoretical model of POP into action through an ILP process. Compstat
was a 1996 winner in the Innovations in American Government
Program, administered by Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy
School of Government. Developed for the New York Police
Department by then-Chief William Bratton, Compstat (the origins of
the name are in dispute, but most research ties the name to “compare
statistics”) is used by most police agencies with 100+ sworn officers to
identify criminal hotspots (Weisburd et al., 2003; Walsh, 2001; Willis,
Mastrofski and Weisburd, 2004; IALEIA, 1997b; Eterno and
Policing Models Past and Present 29

Silverman, 2006). The Compstat process for crime analysis reflects the
view that there are four principles of effective crime reduction that
must be interconnected (IALEIA, 1997b: 28): (1) accurate and timely
intelligence; (2) effective tactics; (3) rapid deployment of personnel;
and (4) resources, and relentless follow-up and assessment. The core of
the Compstat program is its ability to analyze weekly crime statistics
and to offer recommended hot spots for the appropriate assignment of
patrols (Silverman, 1999; Walsh, 2001).
Compstat has gained favor among many because it does not
replace COP components, but rather builds on the critical components
of COP in that data derived from personnel in COP programs are used
to inform patrol missions. The command and control model that is the
backbone of the professional model of policing is reinforced under the
Compstat rubric as well. Says Walsh, “The Compstat process when
employed in this fashion establishes accountability at all managerial
levels under the direction of the executive staff and focuses the entire
organization on the department’s mission” (353). In the process of
involving the whole organization, Compstat goes far beyond the
incremental structural changes that occurred during the adaptation of
community policing while retaining an “organizational leadership style
similar to that established by Sir Robert Peel during the police reform
of 1829 and the professional reform movement of 1930-1970” (Walsh,
2004: 353). Walsh warns, however, that:

Compstat is not a quick fix to control crime or lower the crime

rate. Creating more responsive and effective police
organizations will require organizational changes that demand
more than quick and limited structural changes. It will
necessitate major reengineering of police organizations,
changes in managerial culture and re-training of police
personnel especially at the supervisory and managerial
levels—all of which will take significant time and resources to
achieve. (359)

Eterno and Silverman (2006) concur with other researchers working in

this area that Compstat may be ‘the single most important
organizational/administrative innovation in policing during the latter
half of the 20th century’ (e.g., Kelling and Sousa, 2001: 6; Weisburd,
Mastrofski, McNally, Greenspan and Willis, 2003). They are
30 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

proponents of building a future with Compstat on the foundation of

COP. Their chief criticisms of Compstat are that it has “an
overwhelming focus on crime control” (Eterno and Silverman, 2005:
221) and that a strong connection between the use of Compstat and
complaints involving civil rights violations can be pointed to as an
important danger signal which police managers ought to heed (222).
Motives for the use of Compstat have drawn some serious attention
by scholars. Weisburd and his associates note the following in this
regard:

Compstat holds out the promise of allowing police agencies to

adopt innovative technologies and problem-solving techniques
while empowering traditional police organizational structures.
However, our analysis suggests that at this stage, what most
characterizes Compstat departments and distinguishes them
from the others is the development of the control element of
this reform. This leads us to question whether the rapid rise of
Compstat in American police agencies can be interpreted more
as an effort to maintain and reinforce the ‘bureaucratic’ or
‘paramilitary’ model of police organization (that has been
under attack by scholars for most of the last two decades) than
as an attempt to truly reform models of American policing.
(2003: 422)

Weisburd and his colleagues tracked the origins and justification of

Compstat to what had been described by others as failures of traditional
policing (e.g., Goldstein, 1990; Kelling and Moore, 1988; Weisburd
and Braga, 2003) and the “ambiguity of setting priorities under
community policing programs” (425). Their research shows that one-
third of agencies with 100+ sworn officers use Compstat or similar
programs (430); smaller agencies were less likely to use Compstat (but
likely reasons were not given). They concluded that the reason
Compstat has spread so quickly throughout larger agencies is that it
promises to control crime, but they add that many of the components of
Compstat were being used in American police departments before the
term Compstat was coined (445). Weisburd and his colleagues
surmised, “Compstat is appealing precisely because it holds out the
promise of innovation in police organization, strategies, and tactics but
does not demand a revolution in the organizational structure of
Policing Models Past and Present 31

American policing. Rather, it preserves—indeed, claims to

reinvigorate—the traditional hierarchical structure of the military
model of policing, a structure that has been attacked by a powerful
reform wave over the last two decades” (446).
The adaptation of Compstat generally results in a decrease in
crime, but the reasons for the decrease are comingled with other crime
prevention initiatives, making conclusive analysis of the effects of
Compstat difficult (Braga and Weisburd: 343). Willis, Mastrofski and
Weisburd (2004) studied the implementation of Compstat in Lowell,
New York, a city of 105,167 inhabitants that boasts a sworn member
police force of 260 officers. Their survey of officers found that,
“Approximately 92% of those surveyed responded that ‘reducing
violent crime’ and ‘improving the quality of life’ in the city were ‘very’
or ‘somewhat important’ to the department’s COMPSAT strategy”
(2004: 475-76). Overall, their study showed that, “…although fairly
strong on mission clarification and internal accountability,
COMPSTAT agencies were largely indistinguishable from non-
COMPSTAT agencies on measures that gauged the program’s other
elements. The thrust of our argument is that in Lowell, where the
COMPSTAT changes sought to strengthen traditional bureaucratic
structures, they were most successful. Where they tried to loosen or
reverse these structures, they were much less so” (Willis et al., 2004:
490). They further comment, “Most significant, COMPSTAT’s
reinforcement of the bureaucratic hierarchy of policing stifles creative
problem solving approaches” (493) which tends to support the notion
that third-party investigative units would do more to promote a move to
ILP than would Compstat.

Barriers to Moving Forward

The Global Intelligence Working Group (GIWG) identified several

prominent barriers that impede information and intelligence sharing,
some of which relate to the need for increased technical training, and
the importance of the development of minimum standards in planning,
analysis, and dissemination of intelligence. The GIWG stepped outside
the normal rhetoric box, however, by calling for the “need to increase
availability of information, from classified systems to local and state
law enforcement agencies, for the prevention and investigation of crime
in their jurisdictions” (National, 2004: iv). They went further to
32 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

emphasize that there remains a very strong need to “foster trust among
law enforcement agencies, policymakers, and the communities they
serve…” (National, 2004: vi).
In this regard, Jim Basara, CEO of Memex, Inc., a major database
software company, recognizes a significant hurdle in information
sharing that must be overcome. Basara observes the following: “It is
also important to recognize that the composition of U.S. law
enforcement exponentially complicates the use of information
technology to support ILP. While there are many reasons for this, the
most difficulty to overcome are the sheer number of law enforcement
agencies within small geographical regions that must be brought
together in order to have a full intelligence view of that area” (IALEIA,
1997a: 15).
One major reason ILP will have a difficult time moving forward is
abundantly apparent in both the literature and in the H.I.T.S. evaluation
study. Succinctly stated by Weisburd and his colleagues, “Our survey
of police agencies…our observations in Compstat departments suggest
that the rank-and-file remain largely oblivious to Compstat and that it
intrudes little, if at all, into their daily work” (449). While Weisburd
and his associates cite turf battles that prevent teamwork as hindrances
to moving forward (426), Willis and his collaborators (2004) noted in
their Compstat study in Lowell, New York that, “By providing
outsiders with greater access to the department, COMPSTAT can be
used to generate external support among stakeholders, and to solicit and
acquire information and input on the needs and priorities of the
community. Furthermore, it can be used as a mechanism for providing
external constituents with information on the department’s goals and its
progress toward achieving them.
This process of the sharing of information with those outside of the
agency conflicts with Max Weber’s prescient observation, and that of
many police scholars since, that ‘official secrets’ are a common feature
of bureaucratic organizations. Because specialized knowledge and the
acquisition of knowledge that grows ‘out of experience in the service’
bestows power upon officials, they are reluctant to cede this source of
influence to the public (citing Weber 1922/1978: 225, 992)” (Willis et
al., 2004: 488). The IACP cites communication barriers between local,
state, and federal crime analysts as a major hindrance to better
intelligence sharing. The organization also claims that analysis that is
Policing Models Past and Present 33

too specific, (e.g., restricted to burglaries, gangs, or organized crimes)

often fails to see also the bigger picture (IACP, 2005).
Ratcliffe (2007, 2008) argues that the adoption of technology alone
is not enough for moving forward with the ILP model. He notes that,
“While many executives get access to crime analysis, sometimes
through Compstat meetings or similar briefings, too often criminal
intelligence is not integrated into the picture and executives make key
decisions without access to all of the pertinent knowledge available
within their organization” (2007: 1). Referring to the information silos
created when agency sub units within an organization retain
information within the virtual walls of their unit, Ratcliffe urges law
enforcement to do a better job of sharing known information across unit
and agency lines. He also notes that challenges exist in this area,
including the lack of training, data entry problems, lack of continuity in
the structure of intelligence units, opaque chains of command for the
process of intelligence dissemination, a lack of clarity as to the
principles of intelligence-led crime reduction, and a narrowly focused
performance measurement culture rather than a crime reduction culture
(2005: 449). These observations bring us back to the point made by
Goldstein when he argued that the police industry is off track when it
focuses too heavily on means rather than ends.
The existence of disparate databases often constitutes a barrier to
the effective flow of information (Ratcliffe, 2002: 63). The current
study will examine and report on a unique aspect of sharing relevant
information that has been noted in police organizations. The literature
suggests that when civilian colleagues need information from sworn
police officials, such as in the case of crime analysts, there is a
tendency to refrain from the sharing of information on the part of
commissioned officers (Ratcliffe, 2005; 2007). As an obvious barrier
in the timely communication of information, particular attention will be
placed on this phenomenon in the H.I.T.S. evaluation study to
determine if similar situations exist both between investigators within
the H.I.T.S. unit and their crime analyst, and between H.I.T.S.
investigators and field investigators. This focus will help to identify a
possible hurdle that needs to be overcome if H.I.T.S. is to be more
effective in its role as a third-party investigative unit assisting local law
enforcement agencies with the investigation of homicides and sexual
assaults.
34 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

Ratcliffe (2007, 2008) identified numerous hindrances to the

integration of analysis with crime intelligence, citing two notable
instances: civilians working within the law enforcement setting often
feel that they are treated as second-class citizens, and there is a broad
perception of the existence of legal constraints prohibiting the sharing
of some forms of crime information. In the first instance, it is
axiomatic that if some in an agency feel superior to others, they might
tend to treat them as less critical to the mission, thus the sharing of
information might be impeded. On the second issue, if there is a lack
of familiarity with 28 Code of Federal Regulations1, Ratcliffe points
out that this “…leads many intelligence analysts to be overly cautious
in their handling of potentially sensitive information. This results in
both compartmentalization and silo thinking…” (2007: 26). The
phenomena of compartmentalization and silo thinking represent an
important focus for the evaluation done by the W.S.U. research team
assessing the operation of the H.I.T.S. program in Washington. The
present study now turns to the methods used in the gathering of the data
assembled for the H.I.T.S. evaluation study, followed by an analysis of
that data and the development of recommendations derived from that
study for the accomplishment of a unified police intelligence model.

1
28 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 23 governs inter-
jurisdictional and multi-jurisdictional criminal intelligence systems that were
funded by the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 and that
collect, store, or disseminate criminal justice data on behalf of state or local law
enforcement agencies. The regulation applies to very few agencies, but as a
cautionary approach to handling sensitive criminal intelligence data, most state
and local agencies have adopted 28 CFR Part 23 as an operational standard.
CHAPTER 3

Washington State Homicide

Investigation Tracking System

This study relies on the findings in an unpublished evaluation report on

a unique criminal investigation unit housed with the office of the
Washington State Attorney General. A detailed description of the
operations of the Homicide Investigation Tracking System (H.I.T.S)
will follow in chapter four, but a depiction of the methods used for
conducting the evaluation study is essential to the present study as a
preface to that description. A depiction of the methodologies and data
collection processes relied upon will provide a good account of the
study participants and the nature of their ideas regarding the state of the
criminal investigation information sharing process in contemporary
policing. Before moving too deeply into the range of research methods
used, a brief overview of the H.I.T.S. program in Washington will give
the reader a good conceptual framework of how similar programs
might help fill information gaps in their own jurisdictions.
The H.I.T.S. unit is rather unusual in that it is housed within the
criminal investigation division of the Office of the Washington State
Attorney General. Its purpose is to help local law enforcement
agencies statewide investigate homicides and serious sexual assaults,
with an emphasis being placed on helping “small counties with big
cases first, and big counties with small cases last” (Memo to S.
Blonien, October 16, 2006). The H.I.T.S. unit is the only such known
unit operated at the state level in the United States. The services
provided by the H.I.T.S. team of nine investigators and one crime
35
36 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

analyst include most of the criminal investigation support that is

normally found within police agencies. There is no charge to the local
agency for the research and investigative services provided to them,
and the H.I.T.S. investigators are all retired detectives drawn from law
enforcement agencies throughout Washington State. Focusing on
unsolved homicides as a priority, the H.I.T.S. team will assist any local
law enforcement agency on any crime of a serious nature. Their
myriad databases house current as well as legacy archival data that are
not available in any other single source in Washington State. Further
discussion of the capabilities of the H.I.T.S. team will be provided in
chapter 4, following an in-depth description of the methodologies used
for gathering the data assembled for the W.S.U. evaluation study
providing a foundation for this work.
To accomplish this evaluation, several types of data were gathered
to gain insight on the two specific areas of interest (the relevancy of the
technology used by the H.I.T.S. team, and the utility of the services
provided by the people who work in the H.I.T.S. unit). The Dillman
Total Survey Design method was used in developing and carrying out
the several mail and on-line surveys conducted for the evaluation study
(Dillman, 2000). The first area of interest, program impact on service
recipients, was evaluated through the interpretation of pre-tested, self-
administered surveys sent to criminal investigators, their supervisors
(mid-level investigators), and to Police Chiefs and Sheriffs. Tribal
Police Chiefs were also included in that mail survey effort. All surveys
were multi-wave, with a minimum of two follow-ups with non-
respondents. A self-administered survey was also sent to H.I.T.S. unit
investigator/analysts, and follow-up interviews were conducted with
each investigator and the crime analyst. An additional self-
administered survey was used to assess the usefulness of H.I.T.S.
bulletins (police advisories distributed via e-mail) created and
disseminated by the H.I.T.S. unit. That survey was conducted on-line,
and the survey participants were bulletin recipients who carry out
various roles in the criminal justice community.
In conjunction with the mail and on-line self-administered surveys,
several focus group sessions were organized and numerous key actors
were interviewed, either in person or over the telephone. Adding to the
value of this evaluation is an analysis of the very large number of
H.I.T.S. Bulletins created and distributed by the H.I.T.S. team. The
analysis of the 1,179 bulletins assessed includes the first one issued on
Washington State Homicide Investigation Tracking System 37

January 16, 2002, and concludes with those H.I.T.S. Bulletins issued up
through mid-April of 2006.

Profile of Evaluation Survey Participants

Each section below serves to identify evaluation study participants

based on their respective law enforcement roles. This information will
serve to inform the reader as to the question of to whom the H.I.T.S.
program provides its various investigative services. Along with the
description of the roles played by each type of survey respondent is an
account of the rate of response achieved in the multiple-wave surveys
administered over the course of several months during 2006. The costs
associated with the collection of these data were covered by the Office
of the Washington State Attorney General, and the data collection
process was carried out by the staff of the Division of Governmental
Studies and Services at Washington State University. The author
served as a member of the W.S.U. evaluation team and was responsible
for carrying out the surveys, conducting the focus group sessions, and
conducting all of the personal interviews.

Police Chiefs and Sheriffs, and Their Respective Agencies

Police Chiefs from 215 municipalities, tribal police chiefs from 21

tribal law enforcement agencies, and Sheriffs from all 39 counties in
Washington were invited to participate in the H.I.T.S. “user” surveys
(total N=275). Participation varied somewhat across job titles; the
levels of participation which occurred in the 2006 survey of H.I.T.S.
user groups are reported below. It was anticipated that many of the
Police Chiefs and Sheriffs surveyed would delegate the completion of
the H.I.T.S. survey to one of their subordinates due to time constraints
imposed on them by the demands of their status as the chief executive
officer of their respective agencies. Responses graphed out on the
following chart document the rate of response attained in the Chiefs
and Sheriffs survey, and the degree of delegation that occurred at the
CEO level in the completion of this survey (N=177; response rate
[177/275] = 64.4%).
It is noteworthy that two out of three of the Police Chiefs and
County Sheriffs surveyed completed the H.I.T.S. survey questionnaire
themselves rather than delegating that task to a trusted subordinate.
38 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

This fact attests to the importance of the topic for the many Police
Chiefs and Sheriffs taking part in the W.S.U. evaluation study. The
response rate of 64% lies in the normal range for institutional surveys
of this type [see also excellent review of literature on response rates for
institutional surveys in Steven J. Ziegler, “Increasing Response Rates in
Mail Surveys Without Increasing Error: A Research Note.” Criminal
Justice Policy Review, (2006) 17 (1), 22-31]. The suggestions made by
Ziegler were implemented in the design and administration of the
survey components of the H.I.T.S. program evaluation study.

Characteristics of respondents to the Police Chief & Sheriff Survey

Fully 114 (64.4%) of the survey respondents noted that they are the
Chief of Police or Sheriff; another 13 (7.3%) stated they were either a
bureau chief or an undersheriff. Many of the 37 (20.9%) survey
respondents who indicated “other” identified themselves either as
investigative division commanders or acting chiefs. Another 11 (6.2%)
identified themselves as holding the title of Deputy Chief/Assistant
Chief or Assistant Sheriff. Two (1.2%) missing responses were noted
on this survey item. Based on these findings, the W.S.U. evaluation
team had a high degree of confidence that the questions targeting the
state’s local Police Chiefs and Sheriffs were answered by those with the
authority over and/or first-hand knowledge of jurisdictional command-
level issues relating to the investigation of serious crimes. Next, the
evaluation study team sought to determine the size of agencies
managed by the Chiefs and Sheriffs surveyed.
The distribution of agencies represented by participating Police
Chiefs and Sheriffs (N=177) indicated to the W.S.U. evaluation team
that local law enforcement jurisdictions of all sizes were adequately
represented in this evaluation. It was anticipated that the majority of
agencies represented would be composed of 25 or fewer officers. The
data demonstrate that 70.6% of the respondents to the Chief and Sheriff
survey manage small (25 or fewer officers) agencies, while just over
10% run medium sized agencies (51-100 officers), and another 10%
lead large agencies (more than 100 officers). Geographical information
about the respondents was also gathered.
Washington State Homicide Investigation Tracking System 39

The Washington Statewide Regional Homeland Security

Coordination Districts were used in an effort to determine the general
geographical breakdown of 2006 H.I.T.S. Survey respondents. 2
Geographical distribution of CEO survey respondents

Figure 3.1Coordination Districts Map

Fully 31 (17.5%) of responding Police Chiefs and County Sheriffs

manage agencies in the Homeland Security Coordination Districts that
include Snohomish, Whatcom, or Skagit Counties, while another 26
(14.7%) manage agencies located in the City of Spokane, in Spokane
County, and in other eastern Washington cities and counties. Based on
the information displayed in the two foregoing charts, it appears that
agencies of a variety of sizes and a wide array of urban, suburban and
rural geographical locations within Washington state are represented
among the H.I.T.S. survey respondents.

2
Map shown is courtesy of and prepared by the staff of the Washington
Military Department, Emergency Management Division, and is available at
www.emd.wa.gov. The map is used here with permission.
40 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

Since the H.I.T.S. program is based on effective collaboration with

local law enforcement leaders on the part of the people who work in the
H.I.T.S. unit using the information technology available to them, the
following two questions were posed to Police Chiefs and Sheriffs to
help evaluators uncover possible “advanced technology aversion” that
might negatively impact the use of H.I.T.S. services by local law
enforcement agencies.
Asked, “Which of the following most closely represents your
attitude toward new technologies,” a total of 144 (81.4%) Washington
police executive survey respondents claim to be comfortable with new
technologies, while 32 (18.1%) purport to be willing to adopt new
technologies despite their personal lack of technological inclination.
This is an important factor to document in the survey since much of
what the H.I.T.S. program offers involves the use of new
communication technologies and innovative analytical methods
designed to assist local law enforcement officers in identifying patterns
of crime commission and making linkages between and among persons
of interest which are helpful in solving violent crimes. It is additionally
important from the standpoint of a law enforcement leadership role. If
the person at the CEO level of law enforcement in a given law
enforcement agency has a particular proclivity, it is likely that his or
her staff will likewise engage or disengage with specific practices
reflecting those proclivities. Responses to this question by supervising
investigators and criminal investigators are reported next for
comparison and contrast.

Supervising Investigators and Their Respective Agencies

Similar questions to those posed to Washington Police Chiefs and

Sheriffs were asked of 157 supervising investigators in order to develop
a profile of these survey respondents (N=87, or 55.4%) of those
contacted. These survey respondents serve as crucial “middle
management” in local law enforcement agencies, and because of that
role their views are of particular interest. There is considerable
literature dealing with the critical role—often oppositional—of middle
managers in the process of adaptation to organizational change
(Townsley, Johnson and Pease, 2003; Ratcliffe 2008; Chan, 2008). For
this reason it was important to include this group in the H.I.T.S.
program evaluation.
Washington State Homicide Investigation Tracking System 41

When examining the responses it would appear that supervising

investigators from agencies with more than 100 officers were
disproportionately represented in this survey (constituting over a third
of the respondents). The distribution of investigation supervisors is
quite diverse upon a closer look, however. While 28 (32.2%) of the
responding supervising investigators represent large (more than 100
officers) agencies, 22 (25.2%) of these supervisors work in small
agencies of 25 officers or fewer, and another 33 (37.9%) carry out their
duties in mid-sized agencies of more than 25 but fewer than 51 officers.
It was also determined that the number of investigators being
supervised by these middle managers within the agencies represented in
the survey varied considerably, with most managing small units of five
or fewer full-time investigators. This means that these investigator
supervisors are working in settings where the resources of the H.I.T.S.
program could theoretically be of greatest benefit to local investigators
While 58 (66.6%) of the supervising investigators responded that
there are ten or fewer full-time investigators in their particular law
enforcement agency, 26 (29.9%) indicated there are more than ten full-
time investigators present in their department. Survey respondents
were given the opportunity to inform the W.S.U. evaluation team as to
the level of government of their sponsoring agency on a continuum
ranging from municipal, to county, to state, to tribal, and finally to
federal government. Though response options included that of federal,
no survey participant selected that option. The breakdown of survey
respondent agencies by level of government represented follows.
As anticipated by the W.S.U. evaluation team, the majority of
respondents (N=87) reported that they serve in municipal agencies (54,
or 62.1%), followed by county (27, or 31.0%), state (2, or 2.3%), and
tribal (1 or 1.1%) law enforcement agencies. Additionally,
investigative supervisors responded overwhelmingly in the affirmative
that their respective agencies carry out a comprehensive law
enforcement mission which includes crime investigation. This
information contributes to the confidence that the H.I.T.S. surveys
disseminated by the W.S.U. evaluation team reached the desired target
audience; this is the client group that the H.I.T.S. unit was created to
serve. Response options for this question on the survey included the
categories of corrections, law enforcement, prosecution, and “other.”
As was the case with the survey of Police Chiefs and Sheriffs, the
W.S.U. evaluation team sought to document the geographic distribution
42 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

of agencies served by responding supervising investigators. It is

important, of course, that a high degree of diversity of survey
respondents be present among the investigator supervisors responding
to the self-administered survey across the state’s nine homeland
security coordination districts.
A total of 14 (16.1%) of the responding supervising investigators
work in law enforcement agencies in Snohomish, Whatcom, or Skagit
Counties, while 10 (11.5%) work in the City of Spokane, Spokane
County, or other eastern Washington cities and counties. A total of 13
(14.9%) respondents to the 2006 mail survey serve in various law
enforcement agencies located in King County.
Since the H.I.T.S. program focuses on collecting crime “data
related to homicides, sexual assaults, and other crimes” (Memo to S.
Blonien, October 16, 2006) the W.S.U. evaluation team focused its
attention on those activities conducted by survey respondents that
specifically link up to homicides (murders), sexual assaults, and other
violent crimes. Specifically regarding supervising investigators, the
data show that virtually all of the respondents participating in the
supervising investigators survey [85, or 97.7%] confirmed in their
respective questionnaires that they have investigative authority for the
critical tasks set forth by the Criminal Justice Division of the
Washington Office of Attorney General.
Also of importance to evaluators was whether or not investigative
supervisors actively participate in criminal investigations. This
question serves to inform evaluators of the need to filter analyses of
some survey data when they consider responses by supervisors to
questions that pertain to the functional intricacies related to the
investigative role, especially as they pertain to the availability and
delivery of H.I.T.S. program services. A total of 68 survey respondents
(78.2%) responded that they not only supervise investigators of
homicides and/or rapes/sexual assaults, but they also actively
participate in such criminal investigations. A total of 17 (19.5%)
survey respondents responded that they supervise investigators of
homicides and/or rapes/sexual assaults, but they themselves do not
actively participate in such investigations. In subsequent analyses
reported in this publication these particular investigative supervisors
were excluded from the analysis conducted in some instances.
A potential indicator as to the likelihood of a supervising
investigator embracing that which the H.I.T.S. program offers is the
Washington State Homicide Investigation Tracking System 43

acclimation of that supervisor to new technologies. Some of the

literature on the barriers to organizational change posed by middle
management opposition relates to this phenomenon of aversion to new
technology (Ratcliffe, 2008; Weisburd et al, 2003; Eterno and
Silverman, 2005) hence it is important to assess the degree to which
this phenomenon is at play in the case of the H.I.T.S. program.
Responses to the following question indicate that most of the
Washington state investigative supervisors are either currently rather
comfortable with new information technology, or they are willing to
embrace it if that specific technology supports the accomplishment of
their agency mission.
The responses given to the technology acceptance question are in
the range anticipated. A different outcome, such as a large percentage
of investigative supervisors responding that they are often confused by
new technologies, would have signaled to evaluators that many of the
services offered by the H.I.T.S. unit are potentially misdirected. One
would hope to find as well that criminal investigators responded in
similarly high numbers to this question on receptivity to new
information and crime analysis technologies.
The next question asked of supervisors also provides evaluators
with a strong indication that H.I.T.S. unit resources are correctly
founded. Forthcoming discussions related to services offered by the
H.I.T.S. team will be better understood because of the information the
next table confirms. A total of 74 supervisors (85.1%) opine that law
enforcement has access to all of the technological tools it needs to clear
crimes, but felt that agencies have to make greater efforts to learn how
to use them more effectively. This finding would echo one of the
principal findings reported in the 911 Commission Report that, “The
U.S. government has a weak system for processing and using what it
has.” (Government Accounting Office: 416). A similar conclusion was
arrived at regarding the use of GIS technology in one of the major
agencies included in this study (the Spokane Police Department) in a
doctoral dissertation recently completed at Washington State University
(Akgul, 2008).
As a reminder, the present section of this book serves to profile the
evaluation study participants. The connection between responses such
as this one with the services offered by H.I.T.S. will be provided later
in the book.
44 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

Supervisor attitudes regarding their willingness to embrace

mission-driven new and unfamiliar technologies were also assessed
directly in the survey process. Even though the possible responses for
this question ranged all the way from “strongly agree” to “strongly
disagree” along a five-point continuum, 100% of the responding
investigative supervisors either somewhat or strongly agreed that they
embrace any information or investigatory technology that helps their
agency become more efficient or effective in carrying out its law
enforcement duties.
This information bolstered the confidence of the W.S.U. evaluation
team that the need for the criminal investigation services provided by
the H.I.T.S. unit is strongly present in the local law enforcement
community throughout Washington and at all levels of policing—
municipal, county and state.
In summary, most supervising investigators who participated in the
2006 H.I.T.S. evaluation survey were working supervisors at the time
of the survey. That is to say, these survey respondents conduct
criminal investigations as well as supervise others who likewise
investigate homicides and rapes/sexual assaults. Most of these local
law enforcement supervisors work for either a city or county agency
whose main role is the provision of comprehensive law enforcement
services. The investigative supervisors surveyed are about evenly
divided among small, medium and large agencies from all nine of the
state’s Homeland Security coordination districts. About half of them
work in agencies with 10 or fewer full-time investigators, and the other
half work in agencies with more than 10 full time investigators. The
vast majority of these local agency supervisory investigators say that
they openly embrace new technologies that will assist them in the
accomplishment of their law enforcement goals. The next section of
this chapter features a profile of the respondents to the investigator
survey, and documents the character of the agencies in which they
work.

Criminal Investigators and Their Respective Agencies

Fairly comprehensive survey questionnaires were mailed to 566

criminal investigators scattered throughout Washington. The survey
recipients were drawn from lists of known investigators identified by
the Office of the Attorney General from all officially recognized law
Washington State Homicide Investigation Tracking System 45

enforcement agencies present in Washington, including both municipal

and county agencies. The W.S.U. evaluation team received 293
responses, for a return rate of 51.8%. More than one third (114, or
38.9%) of the criminal investigators who responded to the mailed, self-
administered written survey have a workforce of 100 officers or more.
Some 68 (23.2%) work in law enforcement agencies with 51 – 100
commissioned officers, and 47 (16%) work in city or county agencies
with 26 – 50 officers. Some 52 (17.8%) are working in local police
agencies with 25 or fewer officers.
It was anticipated by the W.S.U. evaluation team that Homeland
Security Coordination District Region 6 would be heavily represented
by criminal investigators who responded to the written survey. Region
6 includes Seattle and King County wherein nearly half of the state’s
population resides. Despite the high level of representation of that
region (82, or 28%), other regions across the state received fairly
proportionate representation. As the chart below shows, while regions
1 and 6 each received more than 20% of the total criminal investigation
representation, no region received less than 5% of the representation.
By comparison, Spokane city and county (and the other jurisdictions
that make up region 9) was represented by 25 (8.5%) of the criminal
investigator responses.
Responses confirmed that 98% of criminal investigator survey
participants indicated they have investigative authority for homicides,
sexual assaults, or other violent and non-violent crimes committed
within the state of Washington.
Upon further breakdown of the survey responses reported by
criminal investigators in Washington, it was learned that 188 (64.2%)
investigator survey respondents claim to spend somewhere between
one and 24% of their time carrying out investigations on homicides.
An additional 30 (10.2%) of these investigators indicate they spend
more than a quarter but less than half of their working time
investigating homicides cases. Finally, a total of 36 (12.3%) of the
survey respondents indicated that they tend to spend more than half of
their duty day investigating homicides.
The W.S.U. H.I.T.S. evaluation team was interested to learn about
the nature of rapes/sexual assaults investigations in Washington state.
Providing assistance to local law enforcement agencies is a critical
mission task of the H.I.T.S. program, and this information can help to
establish the degree to which the H.I.T.S. team members are addressing
46 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

this important investigative function. A total of 112 (38.2%) of the

respondents to the criminal investigator survey spend 1 – 24% of their
time investigating rapes/sexual assaults. Another 48 (16.4%) work on
rapes/sexual assaults more than a quarter, but less than half, of their
working time. Finally, 70 (23.8%) of the investigators indicated that
they spend more than half of their time investigating rapes/sexual
assaults.
In determining the potential impact of the H.I.T.S. unit/team on
criminal investigators, it is important to have a good understanding of
the assignment cycle for the role of detectives. Discussed later in the
book are the frustrations H.I.T.S. team members frequently experience
as they attempt to keep in touch with an ever-transitory investigator
client base. The following table serves to inform evaluators of the
likelihood that H.I.T.S. team members have to update periodically their
investigator contact list. A total of 119 (40.6%) of the criminal
investigators who responded to the written survey claim to have been
homicide investigators for more than five years. Another 102 (34.8%)
stated that they have been homicide investigators for between one and
five years. Of those who indicated that they investigate homicides,
only 22 (7.5%) have been doing so for less than a year.
This information confirms that the W.S.U. evaluation team was
successful in getting the H.I.T.S. program evaluation client survey in
the hands of many seasoned investigators. The survey-based
information that is forthcoming from criminal investigators is therefore
reliable inasmuch as it was produced by experienced investigators
working in a wide variety of Washington’s local law enforcement
agencies.
Although nearly a quarter of those responding indicated that they
do not investigate rapes/sexual assaults, 204 (69.6%) of those
responding to the survey affirmed that they do investigate rapes/sexual
assaults and indicated that they have been doing so for a year or longer.
Only 14 (4.8%) claim to have been investigating rapes/sexual assaults
for less than a year. As with homicide investigators, the W.S.U.
evaluation team was confident that the responses that follow which
pertain to rapes/sexual assaults are made by competent, seasoned
investigators.
A total of 109 (37.2%) Washington investigators responded that
they work in an agency that employs ten or more full time
investigators, while 59 (20.1%) indicated that they work in an agency
Washington State Homicide Investigation Tracking System 47

with more than six but fewer than ten investigators. Another group of
110 (37.5%) survey respondents indicated that they work in a law
enforcement agency that has only one to five investigators. In keeping
with H.I.T.S. mission goals of serving smaller agencies with big cases
as a priority, it is indeed significant that more than half of the
respondents to the 2006 H.I.T.S. program evaluation client investigator
survey work in small agencies. An operational doctrine of the H.I.T.S.
unit is to work first with small agencies that have big cases, then to
work with big agencies that have small cases if resources and time
available permit.
The majority of Washington’s criminal investigators who
responded to the W.S.U. H.I.T.S. program evaluation survey (166, or
56.7%) are employed in a municipal law enforcement agency, while the
majority of the balance 113 (38.6%) work in a County Sheriff’s
department. Only four (1.4%) of the investigator survey respondents
work in federal agencies, and only one person (.3%) indicated they
work in either in a tribal or private agency. The most likely scenario
for a survey respondent is that the criminal investigator participating in
the survey in 2006 worked in a local city police department or county
sheriff’s department and carries out the types of major crime
investigations that the H.I.T.S. program is designed to support and
assist.
In summary, a preponderance of criminal investigators who
responded to the survey conducted as part of the H.I.T.S. program
evaluation have been employed as a rape/sexual assault or homicide
investigator for more than a year. They represent all geographical areas
in Washington state, with the highest concentration coming from the
densely populated areas of Whatcom, Skagit, Snohomish and King
counties. While 114 (38.9%) of the survey respondents represent
agencies that have over 100 full time-officers, over half (167, or 57%)
represent agencies with under 100 full-time officers.

H.I.T.S. Investigator/Analysts

The H.I.T.S. unit was headed by Scott Blonien, Criminal Justice

Division Chief, at the time of the study. The H.I.T.S. unit is supervised
by Darryl Roosendaal, Chief Investigator. There are several support
staff members who assist in data entry, data analysis, and staff
document preparation work. At the core of the H.I.T.S. unit are six
48 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

investigator/analysts. Currently, employed in that capacity are

Tammee Matheny, Marv Skeen, Jim Hansen, George Fox, Dick
Gagnon, and Rick Grabenstein. Five of the H.I.T.S. unit team of
investigator/analysts have a combined 173 years of field law
enforcement experience, with most of that experience being in
investigating homicides, rapes/sexual assaults, and other violent crimes.
Only Tammee Matheny serves the unit with no prior field investigative
experience, but the W.S.U. evaluation team determined from a
combination of personal interviews, unsolicited comments from field
investigators, and a review of her work outputs at the H.I.T.S. unit that
she has developed into a highly critical asset for the H.I.T.S. unit. Ms.
Matheny brings to the table valuable expertise in data location and
pattern/linkage analysis that has proven to be mission-critical. Detailed
biographies of all of the members of the H.I.T.S. staff can be found in
appendix 7.

Bulletin Recipients (On-line Survey)

Everyone included on the H.I.T.S. e-mail list who is entitled to receive

the H.I.T.S. Bulletin (on-line police advisory) was e-mailed a survey in
which they were asked to assess the H.I.T.S. program services (see also
appendix 5). The on-line survey resulted in 643 responses (N=643);
however, for the purposes of this project a filter was run on the dataset
to sort out those survey respondents who had no investigative
responsibilities. The result was a sub-set of survey data (N= 219)
representing verified criminal investigators. None of the filtered
responses had a bearing on the outcome of the evaluation study. Most
of the excluded survey respondents were Community Corrections
Officers (CCOs). The state’s CCOs are indeed an important
component of the H.I.T.S. unit target audience for the purpose of
assisting investigators in tracking offenders, but their lack of direct
contribution to the investigation of homicides and/or rapes/sexual
assaults would have translated into a significant skewing of the survey
results had their survey responses been grouped with those of
investigators.
The result of the sorting of respondents in this way is that the
evaluation report and this book are both are informed predominately by
the views and experiences of Washington’s criminal investigators.
That fact is in concert with the mission of the H.I.T.S. unit, to provide
Washington State Homicide Investigation Tracking System 49

timely and helpful assistance to local investigators in their efforts to

anticipate, prevent and solve crime through the effective sharing of
crime investigation information across law enforcement agency
boundaries. The following graph confirms that the filtering of
respondents to the on-line survey of H.I.T.S. Bulletin recipients
resulted in the identification of and connection with the targeted
criminal investigators dealing with the major crimes of homicide and
sexual assault committed in the Evergreen State.
Asked to specify their role in the criminal justice system, some 125
(57.1%) of the on-line survey respondents indicated conducting
criminal investigations. Another 56 (25.6%) of the on-line survey
respondents indicated that they are supervising investigators, and 20
(9.1%) survey participants responded that they are patrol officers.
The vast majority (181, or 82.6%) of the on-line survey
participants responded that they spend less than a quarter of their time
investigating homicides, and nearly everyone who responded (206 or
94%) claimed to spend less than half of their time investigating
homicides. Only 13 (5.9%) of the H.I.T.S. Bulletin recipient
respondents reported that they spend more than half of their duty time
on homicide investigations. However, a large proportion of the
H.I.T.S. Bulletin recipient survey respondents did report that they
spend more than half of their time investigating sexual assaults
(22.4%), while 45 (20.5%) claim to spend up to a quarter of their
available time investigating sexual assaults.
Next, the W.S.U. H.I.T.S. evaluation team wanted to know if the
H.I.T.S. Bulletins were being received by an acceptable number of
homicide investigators who had considerable time on the job. Of those
responding that they investigate homicides, over half (111 or 50.7%)
have been doing so for more than five years. Another 63 (28.8%)
report having been homicide investigators for between one and five
years. Of those responding that they do investigate homicides, only 17
(7.9%) report having been homicide investigators for less than one
year. Based on this information, the W.S.U. evaluation team was quite
confident that survey responses collected from H.I.T.S Bulletin
recipients reflected adequate field-level investigative experience to
inform the evaluation as to the H.I.T.S. unit’s impact on local criminal
investigators.
As with homicide investigators, those who investigate sexual
assaults also represent sufficient experience to inform this evaluation.
50 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

Length of time on the job as investigator of rapes/sexual assaults is

considered to be important because longevity on the job affords
investigators ample time to develop solid working relationships with
other sex crime workers, such as nurses at hospitals. A total of 130
(59.4%) of the investigators responded that they have been sexual
assault investigators for five years or more. Another 53 (24.2%) have
been sexual assault investigators for between one and five years. Of
those who responded that they are sexual assault investigators, only 9
(4.1%) have been doing so for less than one year.
Unlike the case with criminal investigator survey responses, the
H.I.T.S. Bulletin recipients’ survey reveals a pattern of heavy use of
part-time investigators among investigators who work in agencies
featuring ten or fewer criminal investigators. Some 187 (85.4%) of
those responding to the on-line survey report working in agencies that
have fewer than 10 full-time investigators. Only 24 (12.8%) of the on-
line survey respondents indicated that they work in agencies featuring
more than ten investigators. Another 54 (24.7%) survey respondents
responded that their agency has no full-time criminal investigators,
which indicates that their agencies make heavy use of part-time
investigators. That is a common practice in small agencies that are
strapped for manpower resources. Typically part-time investigators in
such agencies also perform other tasks, such as patrol and traffic
enforcement.
On-line survey respondents primarily work in city or county
agencies, as was the case with respondents to the criminal investigators
mail survey. Some 116 (53%) of the on-line survey respondents work
in a city agency, and 82 (37.4%) work in a county agency. Another 14
on-line survey respondents (6.4%) indicated that they work in a state
law enforcement agency and the balance (7, or 3.2%) work in either a
federal agency or are employed by a tribal police department.
The overwhelming majority of 206 (94.1%) of the on-line survey
respondents work in a public agency which carries out a law
enforcement mission; the remainder of five (2.3%) survey respondents
work in the area of community corrections. One person taking part in
the on-line survey responded that he/she works in a prosecutorial
function. One person also indicated he/she is the Sheriff of a county in
which the Sheriff’s department oversees jail operations.
In summary, on-line survey respondents work primarily in
municipal police departments or in county sheriff departments in the
Washington State Homicide Investigation Tracking System 51

role of criminal investigators. Most of them work in law enforcement

agencies with fewer than ten full-time investigators, and they lay claim
to five years or more of criminal investigative experience. Most of the
survey respondents work less than a quarter of their time on homicide
investigations, while nearly 43% work more than a quarter of their time
on rape/sexual assault investigations.

Evaluation Study Focus Group Participants

Focus group interviews were conducted in two distinct ways. First, in-
person interviews were conducted over a two-day period at a basic
homicide class held in Vancouver, Washington (N=30) on March 13
and 14, 2006. The training session was conducted by H.I.T.S. program
investigator/analysts, and it was certified for credit and hosted by the
Washington Criminal Justice Training Commission (CJTC).
Participants in that training class enrolled on their own accord, and
their participation in the evaluation process was not anticipated by them
at the time they enrolled in and began taking instruction in the course.
Attendees were criminal investigators representing city, county and
state law enforcement agencies operating in the state of Washington.
The comments and observations made regarding the H.I.T.S. program
were recorded on audio tapes and those discussions were subsequently
transcribed by the W.S.U. evaluation team staff. The principal themes
derived from this focus group session are incorporated into the analysis
to follow in Chapter 4.
A second set of interviews was conducted among attendees of an
interrogations class held in Cheney, Washington (N=9). That class,
held at the Washington State Digital Archives building on the campus
of Eastern Washington University, was conducted by instructors from
the F.B.I. and it was hosted by the Cheney Police Department.
Attendees, representing a combination of city, county, state and federal
agencies, did not know in advance that their participation in an
evaluation study would be requested. Immediately prior to this focus
group interview the evaluator/interviewer asked for a show of hands of
those in the room who had not heard of the H.I.T.S. program. He then
advised all who had not heard of H.I.T.S. that they could excuse
themselves from the interview. It was reasoned that they would not be
able to provide sufficient comment on the unit and its services to add
substantially to the discussion of the H.I.T.S. program.
52 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

The fact that a number of the original class attendees had not heard
of the H.I.T.S. program was of considerable concern to the W.S.U.
evaluation team. The following is a list of agencies represented by the
original attendees (N=33): Spokane County Sheriff’s Office (13
participants); Washington State Department of Corrections (5
participants); Spokane Police Department (3 participants); Cheney
Police Department (2 participants); F.B.I. (2 participants); Valley Fire
Department (2 participants); Colville Police Department (2
participants); Kalispel Tribe (1 participant); Pullman Police Department
(1 participant); Thurston County Sheriff’s Office (1 participant); and
Liberty Lake Police Department (1 participant).
Those who remained to participate in the focus group interview
were: Spokane County Sheriff’s Office and Spokane Police
Department (7 participants); and Washington State Department of
Corrections (2 participants). Notes were taken of the interview, and
comments were used to support major themes derived from the
evaluation study.
A third set of focus group interviews was conducted via telephone
calls through a recorded conferencing call center. These focus groups
targeted supervising investigators and Police Chiefs and Sheriffs.
Those interviews, conducted over a two-day period, were also
transcribed from audio recordings. Analysis and discussion of the
research findings follow in Chapter 4, and major conclusions to be
drawn and major policy implications of the case study are set forth in
the concluding chapter.
CHAPTER 4

Police Technologies, People, and

Professional Culture

To the ends that this discussion should report how the findings of the
H.I.T.S. evaluation report match up with theories and observations
noted in chapter two, this author has elected to place these observations
into three major categories. These significant topic headings include
technologies, people, and organizational and professional environment.
The technologies category will include discussions on the myriad topics
relating to technology and how it is used in knowledge-based policing.
Databases, software, and information outputs will anchor the
discussion. The people section will center on various actors and their
roles in the intelligence-led policing realm. The environment section is
designed to illuminate the organizational or professional culture of
policing, particularly as it relates to intelligence-led policing. The first
topic, technologies, is quite detailed and follows immediately.

Technologies

This section is designed to inform the reader about the major

information systems and components currently used in American
policing. Details of each follow, then a discussion of some of the major
H.I.T.S. evaluation report findings sheds light on how each of these
information technologies is being used by criminal investigators in
Washington State.

53
54 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

National Crime Information Center

The F.B.I.’s National Crime Information Center (N.C.I.C.) is a

computerized database that maintains records of crimes and criminals.
Included in this repository are vehicle and licensing information, as
well as records on boats and guns; information on wanted, missing, and
unidentified persons is also maintained in N.C.I.C. records. There is an
important component of N.C.I.C. that allows for the exchange of
information across state lines between reporting agencies, and
facilitates communication among those professional law enforcement
personnel specific crime-related information.

ViCAP

The F.B.I. has a specialized unit dedicated to the identification and

apprehension of violent criminals, particularly related to homicide and
sexual assault. The Violent Criminal Apprehension Program (ViCAP)
has 18 analysts who serve all of the U.S. One widely acknowledged
problem associated with ViCAP, and shared with the H.I.T.S. program
as well, is that it is underutilized. The F.B.I. has memoranda of
understanding (MOUs) with only 900 agencies nationwide while
17,456 agencies report crimes to the FBI for tabulation in the Uniform
Crime Reports (UCRs). That equates to less than a 6% rate of
participation in ViCAP by local law enforcement agencies across the
country. The H.I.T.S. program, which was purposefully modeled after
ViCAP, benefits from their team of nine investigators (compared to 18
analysts with ViCAP) who serve a much smaller agency base in
Washington State. That considerably higher investigator-to-agencies
served ratio results in greater program efficiency.

Compstat

Compstat (compare statistics or computer statistics) was discussed

briefly in chapter two, but as a refresher it can be noted that Compstat
is a police management tool being used by two-thirds of U.S. police
agencies featuring 100 or more sworn police officers. First used in
New York City in the late 1990’s, Compstat allows law enforcement
managers to identify crime hot-spots and allows for the reporting of
information on request, eliminating previous lengthy delays in
Police Technologies, People, and Professional Culture 55

reporting. Police agency management teams frequently use Compstat

to make management decisions regarding patrol unit assignments based
on geographically-focused criminal activity and/or anticipated public
safety problems.

COPLINK®

COPLINK® is a commercial database product, developed by the

Artificial Intelligence Laboratory at the University of Arizona under a
grant awarded by the U.S. Department of Justice and the National
Science Foundation working in collaboration. The strengths of
COPLINK® include its ease of access by remote desktop users and its
quite massive collection of data. Weaknesses of the system include the
high cost of implementation and the fact that the database is limited to
data known to system management, a problem shared with all other
information database systems. That is to say, data not known or data
not included because it is not entered for other reasons, such as the lack
of participation by the data host agency, will not be included for search
purposes.
A major hurdle in the way of moving forward with the
intelligence-led policing concept is the high cost to implement the new
information technologies involved. Los Angeles County recently paid
more than $7 million to integrate COPLINK® with 45 local law
enforcement agencies operating in Southern California. At that high
cost, COPLINK® is cost-prohibitive for the vast majority of local
agencies across the country, including most of those located in
Washington; with the exception of the very largest agencies there is
little chance that COPLINK® will become a significant resource for
Washington’s detectives. Without support from a larger network (e.g.,
Los Angeles County in this case) local agencies must turn elsewhere
for help. Most smaller agencies located outside of major metropolitan
areas simply go without.

LInX

The Law Enforcement Information Exchange (LInX) is a collaborative

technology tool for criminal investigators that deserves mention. It is a
partnership between the United States Department of Justice and the
Naval Criminal Investigative Services (N.C.I.S.) that operates in only a
56 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

few regions in the United States. Of particular note is the Pacific

Northwest unit that includes Washington, Alaska, Idaho, Nevada and
Oregon. Unique to LInX is the feature that criminal investigators who
work in agencies that have an executed memorandum of understanding
(MOU) can access data that is stored in the LInX database from the
convenience of the desk of the investigator. The data searched is
housed in a separate data storage system managed by the N.C.I.S. but
gathered from over 250 cooperating law enforcement agencies in the
Pacific Northwest. LInX is light years ahead of the competition in that
it is federal government operated, but not federal government owned.
The participating agencies own the data, and share it within the co-op
established through the N.C.I.S.-brokered MOU. It is inexpensive for
local law enforcement to log on to the database, unlike the civilian
model COPLINK®. Los Angeles County, as mentioned above, paid
over $7 million to connect 45 local agencies to COPLINK® within the
past three years, but has now turned its attention to the less-expensive
LInX.
LInX does not replace programs such as H.I.T.S.; however,
because LInX and similar systems are content-based, they lack the
people component (i.e., investigators with broad detective experience)
that increases the appeal of H.I.T.S. The balance of the discussion
relating to crime-related information technologies will focus on
Washington’s H.I.T.S. program and the various forms of data collected
during the H.I.T.S. program evaluation conducted by the Division of
Governmental Studies and Services at Washington State University.

Homicide Investigation Tracking System

The Homicide Investigation Tracking System (H.I.T.S.) was founded in

Washington State in 1987 and it is maintained in the criminal
investigation unit of the Office of Attorney General Rob McKenna.
Modeled after the F.B.I.’s ViCAP program, H.I.T.S. adds two
important components to the information/knowledge universe. First,
H.I.T.S. maintains nine full-time investigators who retired from various
Washington State police agencies; these investigators specialized in the
investigation of homicides and/or rapes/sexual assaults. Their field
experience helps to open doors to investigators still active in local law
enforcement agencies. The interaction between H.I.T.S. investigators
and the field detectives offers one of the strongest tools available in the
Police Technologies, People, and Professional Culture 57

production of police work—namely, the human interaction of like-

minded people working on the common goal of solving crimes. This
interaction, when it occurs, increases the satisfaction of the public with
the work of the police.
The second component H.I.T.S. adds is that the data maintained by
the unit is never purged. There exists in the Washington State model of
crime information sharing, therefore, legacy data which is lost by the
other contemporaneous intelligence/information investigative systems
mentioned above. It is the position of this author that the discussion of
each of these systems moves forward with the mindset that for the
rhetoric of intelligence-led policing to succeed, it is imperative that a
collaborative platform be soundly established with the foundation being
the integration of the best of each existing system. Just as some
prominent proponents of COP and POP have argued in the research
reviewed above, ILP must integrate the community of
intelligence/knowledge people and systems if ILP is to succeed as a
model of best practices. With a brief description of the most prominent
information systems behind us, we now focus on specific observations
derived from the H.I.T.S. program evaluation report.
The target user of H.I.T.S. resources was determined by program
evaluators as being any law enforcement agency member that has the
authority to investigate, prevent, or otherwise intervene in criminal
activity. Though the physical boundary was not set at the borders of
Washington State, the scope of H.I.T.S. activities would stop largely at
the state’s borders. There is anecdotal evidence that H.I.T.S. has an
impact beyond the physical borders of the state, but forthcoming
discussion and recommendations support the notion that H.I.T.S.
mainly serves city, county, state and federal law enforcement officers
operating primarily within the Evergreen state. The first objective of
this evaluation was to determine how familiar the target user pool is
with the H.I.T.S. unit, and with the various services provided by that
unit. It is theorized that the first logical step in an agency’s decision to
make use of outside services is knowledge that the services in question
exist. Other considerations such as cost for the use of such services
follow. To get at the question of H.I.T.S. program familiarity, several
questions were asked of survey, focus group, and personal interview
participants. What follows is a brief discussion of each set of questions
and their respective answers, categorized by investigative role.
58 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

To determine the extent to which criminal investigators (N=293)

were familiar with the H.I.T.S. program, they were asked to answer a
series of questions concerning program services. The first question
posed addressed the overall level of satisfaction the respondent had
regarding services provided by H.I.T.S. The survey asked, “If you
have used any of the services provided by the H.I.T.S. team, how
would you rate your level of satisfaction with those services?” Only
14.3% of the criminal investigators surveyed indicated that they have
never used the services of the H.I.T.S. team. It is a reasonable
assumption that by the act of answering a question regarding the use of
H.I.T.S. team services, investigators also intended to indicate their use
of the H.I.T.S. database; recall that access to that database is only
achieved through the H.I.T.S. team. A total of 233 (79.5%) of the
survey participants responded that they were satisfied or highly
satisfied with the services of the H.I.T.S. team. Only 5 (1.7%)
indicated dissatisfaction with H.I.T.S. services. Another useful
measure of familiarity with the H.I.T.S. program was derived by
assessing answers to the following survey question: “Specifically
focusing on H.I.T.S., which of the following best represents your level
of information?” Fully 76.8% of criminal investigators responded that
either they use H.I.T.S. even though it is not their primary investigative
database, or that it is their primary investigative database. Only four
out of 293 (1.4%) respondents indicated that they are not at all familiar
with the H.I.T.S program.
Familiarity with H.I.T.S. was also measured by comparative
reference to database use and preference. The following charts show
the response rankings of each of the five most often cited criminal
activity databases. Respondents were asked to rank each of the
databases from 1 to 7, with 1 being the highest level of utility to the
respondent and 7 being the lowest level of crime investigation utility.
The responses recorded were as anticipated by the W.S.U.
evaluation team. The rationale for such anticipation is based on the fact
that every commissioned law enforcement officer is introduced to the
N.C.I.C. in the police academy operated by the Washington Criminal
Justice Training Commission. In addition, virtually every college
student majoring in criminal justice is taught about the significance of
the N.C.I.C. in their college textbooks. The N.C.I.C. is a long-time
standard for criminal and crime scene information. In contrast, it is not
assumed that law enforcement officers have been introduced to the
Police Technologies, People, and Professional Culture 59

H.I.T.S. program. The following table shows that 61.1% of the survey
participants ranked the N.C.I.C. in the top spot in this ranking exercise.
This question asked the respondents to rank each database; it did not
ask them to compare databases with one another. That format allowed
evaluators to make additional observations not available under a
question structure that pits one database against another. One such
observation is that while 61.1% ranked N.C.I.C. as their most utilized
database, 75.1% ranked it as either #1 or #2. When asked to rank
H.I.T.S., 22.9% of respondents ranked it as their most utilized database,
but 61.5% picked H.I.T.S. as either their first or second choice. These
survey-based results indicate quite clearly that both N.C.I.C. and
H.I.T.S. possess high familiarity and receive frequent use among
criminal investigators carrying out their criminal investigations of
homicides and sexual assaults and rapes in Washington State.
Three other databases were compared to N.C.I.C. and H.I.T.S. The
first, Law Enforcement Information Exchange LInX3, was cited as
being the top utility database by 14 respondents (4.8%), compared to
61.1% and 22.9% top rankings for N.C.I.C. and H.I.T.S., respectively.
Unlike N.C.I.C. and H.I.T.S., which were both considered strongly as
either number one or number two databases in terms of utility, LInX
was only ranked either number one or number two a total of 38 times
(13%).
COPLINK® was picked as the top database in terms of utility by 8
(2.7%) of the respondents, compared with RAIN, a King County
regional database, which received 3 (1%) top utility rankings.
Another question devised to assist evaluators in determining
familiarity with the H.I.T.S. program asked survey takers to rank
databases based on their opinion as to the best overall database for
crime scene, criminal, and victim information. The responses not only
indicate that criminal investigators are aware of the H.I.T.S. program,
but they document the fact that they favor it over N.C.I.C. by a slim
margin of 45.5% to 42.8% (N=293). The LInX system ranked third in
this comparison, with 17 (5.8%) of the responses. There is no logical
reason for the difference in responses to these two questions.
Evaluators would have expected the responses to a question regarding

3
The acronym LInX accurately depicts the title of this young program
(Law Enforcement Information Exchange), but the acronym has also appeared
as LYNX.
60 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

opinion of best overall database to closely resemble the responses to a

question referencing utility of the database.
Upon examining the foregoing responses, the attention of program
evaluators was drawn to the striking fact that most of the criminal
investigators who responded to the survey ignore the ViCAP program
as a resource in their work. The following section sheds additional
light on the limited degree of use of the federal government’s ViCAP
system in Washington state criminal investigations. The criminal
investigator survey targeted investigator familiarity of the H.I.T.S.
program through yet another question related to utility. Respondents
were asked to describe the extent to which they rely on each of the
major database resources available to them.
An important regional inference is made when considering the
responses regarding database management systems. Databases that
originated in Canada (ViClas), in New York (HALT), in Pennsylvania
(ATAC), in Iowa, and in Minnesota (MINN/SCAP -Minnesota Sex
Crimes Analysis Program) were so poorly represented in the responses
given by Washington criminal investigators that credence is given to
the value of local or regional databases in lieu of distant ones.
Again, only 4 respondents (1.4%) indicated that they never use
H.I.T.S. A total of 270 (92.2%) of the survey respondents indicated
some level of use of the H.I.T.S. program. These figures take into
consideration some 19 (6.5%) survey takers who did not respond to this
question. By contrast, 122 (41.7%) indicated use of LInX, and 90
(30.7%) indicated use of King County’s RAIN database. N.C.I.C. was
omitted from the list of possible responses, but there was an option for
the inclusion of N.C.I.C. in the “other” selection. N.C.I.C. was only
mentioned 25 times in the “other” category. Even if respondents
simply selected H.I.T.S. as the best option available all the while
neglecting to include N.C.I.C. in the “other” category, the survey
results demonstrate a high level of familiarity with the H.I.T.S.
program on the part of the state’s police investigators.
Survey participants were asked pointedly to indicate their level of
knowledge regarding the H.I.T.S. program. Given a direct opportunity
to indicate that they are not familiar with H.I.T.S., fully 280 (95.6%) of
those surveyed opined that they felt they were familiar with H.I.T.S.
An additional question was posed to criminal investigators, the answer
to which supports the conclusion of wide familiarity and use of, as well
as preference for, the H.I.T.S. program. Nearly half (143 or 48.8%)
Police Technologies, People, and Professional Culture 61

disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement “I have used

H.I.T.S., but I prefer to make use of an alternative resource(s).” Only
48 (16.4%) respondents indicated that, although they have used
H.I.T.S., they prefer to use an alternative database resource. When
prompted to name the alternative source, N.C.I.C. was only mentioned
5 times, and none of the survey respondents selected either Rain or
LInX systems over H.I.T.S.
A proxy for investigator familiarity and use of H.I.T.S. was
indicated by responses to the following statement regarding content of
the H.I.T.S. database: “I am aware that the H.I.T.S. database includes
information on missing children.” While 95.6% of the state’s criminal
investigators previously claimed to know about H.I.T.S., the W.S.U.
evaluation team determined that their familiarity is likely at least
somewhat superficial. Their collective answer to the present question
indicates a lack of detailed knowledge of program elements. While 156
(53.2%) agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, 134 (45.7%)
were either uncertain, or they disagreed with the statement. An
additional 39 (13.3%) indicated that they were not familiar enough with
H.I.T.S. to respond to the statement.
More evidence of somewhat superficial familiarity of the H.I.T.S.
program among the state’s criminal investigators results from responses
to the following survey statement: “I am aware that the H.I.T.S.
database is part of the Amber Alert System.” Only four-in-ten (120)
survey respondents correctly indicate this statement to be true; another
116 (39.6%) survey respondents were either uncertain or incorrectly
disagreed with this factually correct statement concerning the H.I.T.S.
program.
Yet another proxy for documenting the level of familiarity with the
H.I.T.S. program among criminal investigators is found in the
responses to the question, “What is the name of the H.I.T.S.
investigator assigned to your agency?”
One-in-five (58 or 19.8%) of the survey respondents indicated that
they did not know the name of their assigned investigator/analyst, or
they simply did not answer the question. Answers to this question not
only give an indication as to the degree of familiarity criminal
investigators have with H.I.T.S., but they also provide understanding of
the geographical location effects at play since the geographical
assignment of each H.I.T.S. investigator/analyst does not change over
time. A strong majority (235, or 80.2%) readily identified their own
62 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

assigned investigator. It is not likely that respondents guessed at the

name of an investigator without being familiar with the H.I.T.S.
program, though that is perhaps a remote possibility.
In summary, criminal investigator familiarity with the H.I.T.S.
program was measured several ways. In responses to their satisfaction
level of services rendered by H.I.T.S., 85.7% indicated they had made
use of H.I.T.S. program services. That percentage of familiar users
varied, however, depending on the question asked. In a question about
whether or not H.I.T.S. was the primary database of choice, 76.8%
confirmed use of H.I.T.S. When compared to other databases, the use
of H.I.T.S. was confirmed by 61.5% of the respondents. When asked
to confirm the name of the H.I.T.S. investigator/analyst assigned to
their agency, about four-in-five respondents could do so. That measure
indicates about 80% familiarity, but that is not a fully reliable measure
due to the fact that some who use H.I.T.S. might simply not be aware
of their assigned investigator.
The best indicator of H.I.T.S. familiarity is the 95.6% negative
response to the statement, “I do not know what H.I.T.S. is, nor have I
ever used it.” It was apparent to the W.S.U. evaluation team, however,
that Washington investigator knowledge of H.I.T.S. services may be
broad but somewhat shallow because only about half of the respondents
could confirm two true statements about H.I.T.S. database content. The
program evaluation team next examined the level of familiarity with
H.I.T.S. exhibited by supervising investigators. The apparent dismissal
of the ViCAP program of the F.B.I. by criminal investigators indicates
that H.I.T.S. has been successful in securing its place as a legitimate
source for crime scene, criminal, and victim information available to
criminal investigators in Washington.
Supervising investigators were asked to rank a list of criminal
databases with respect to their utility to them or their investigators.
Their responses reflected those of investigators in that N.C.I.C. was
selected most often as the most useful database among the choices
offered. Other databases suggested in the survey were ViCAP (Violent
Criminal Apprehension Program), H.I.T.S. (Homicide Investigation
Tracking System), MATRIX (Multi-state Anti-Terrorism Information
Exchange), COPLINK®, RAIN, and LInX. As indicated in the charts
below, 55 (63.2%) named N.C.I.C. as their first choice of databases
with respect to their utility. Separately, 20 (23%) named H.I.T.S. as
their first choice. Compared to the N.C.I.C., H.I.T.S. ranks high
Police Technologies, People, and Professional Culture 63

considering that 63 (72.4%) of supervisors regard H.I.T.S. as either

their first or second choice of databases with respect to their utility,
while 74 (85.1%) chose N.C.I.C. Only 5 (5.7%) of the supervising
investigators selected LInX first, and 4 (4.6%) selected RAIN first.4
ViCAP received only 8 (9.2%) responses, ranking it as either as the
most or second-most used database.
As with criminal investigators, the supervising investigators were
asked their opinion of the best overall database for crime scene,
criminal, and victim information. H.I.T.S. was selected as the best
overall database by 35 (40.2%) respondents, followed by N.C.I.C. (33
or 37.9%), LInX (9 or 10.3%), and COPLINK® (4 or 4.6%). RAIN
and ViCAP were only selected once each (1.1% each) as the best
overall crime scene, criminal, and victim information database.
As with responses given by criminal investigators, survey
responses indicate that H.I.T.S. has both strong use and support among
supervising investigators. A striking observation is that both
investigators and supervising investigators selected H.I.T.S.
overwhelmingly over the FBI’s ViCAP as their database of choice. It
is reported elsewhere in this book that the national ViCAP system does
not enjoy the level of participation among local law enforcement
agencies as does the Washington state H.I.T.S. program. The reason
for the high level of awareness of the H.I.T.S. program in Washington
state is likely due to the efforts of the H.I.T.S. program
investigator/analysts who make themselves available to local agency
criminal investigators. The following question pertains to H.I.T.S.
awareness: “Specifically focusing on H.I.T.S., which of the following
best represents your level of information?”
None of the 87 supervising investigators selected the option “I am
not at all familiar with H.I.T.S., nor have I heard much about it.” Only
10 (11.5%) indicated that they are familiar with H.I.T.S., but that
neither they nor their investigators make use of it. Their lack of use of
H.I.T.S. might be the result of either their lack of need due to the size
of their agency or the lack of serious crime within their respective
jurisdictions. Investigating supervisors were also given a list of
databases and asked to comment on their level of reliance on each.
Included in the list were H.I.T.S., LInX, ViCAP and COPLINK®
A total of 22 (25.3%) of the supervisors cited H.I.T.S. as their

4
For a complete list of responses, see also appendix 2
64 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

primary database, and another 20 (23%) declared it as their secondary

database. Some 83 (95.4%) of the supervisors indicated their
familiarity with H.I.T.S. by declaring that they use the database at some
level. Only 2 (2.4%) of the supervisors claim to never use H.I.T.S.
The following table shows that investigative supervisors also
acknowledged the use of LInX at some level (52 or 59.8%):
As with the criminal investigator survey, N.C.I.C. was not offered
as an option. Among supervisors, only 4 (4.6%) declared N.C.I.C. as
an investigative tool when they had to write it in as an option. Nobody
selected ViCAP as their primary database, and only 7 (8.%) chose it as
their secondary database. Some 22 (25.3%) indicated that they do not
use ViCAP at all. These responses were unexpected given the clout
and resources of the F.B.I. This situation gives rise to the question as
to whether local law enforcement investigators and their supervisors are
familiar with what it is that ViCAP can do for their criminal
investigations.
COPLINK® is relatively new, and it was anticipated by the
W.S.U. evaluation team that very few investigative supervisors would
affirm that they use this database as their primary investigative tool.
Only 4 (4.6%) use COPLINK® as their primary investigative database,
and only 24 (27.6%) indicated that they use COPLINK® to any degree.
One reason COPLINK® is not more widely used may be owing to its
high cost of implementation. The COPLINK® sales website reports
that a recent contract was negotiated to pull together data from 45
communities in the Los Angeles County region at a cost of $7 million.
A follow-up interview with Tom O’Neil, Vice President of sales for the
corporation, confirmed that the cost to implement the COPLINK®
database in a city the size of Spokane could well exceed $250,000.
The above analysis gives the evaluation team a good idea of
likelihood of use of H.I.T.S. by investigative teams. Fully 100% of the
surveyed supervising investigators indicated they are at least somewhat
familiar with H.I.T.S.
A total of 47 (54%) of the supervisors responded affirmatively to
the following statement regarding the H.I.T.S. database: My
investigators are aware that the H.I.T.S. database includes information
on missing children; another 36 (41.4%) were uncertain or disagreed
with the statement. That result compares with 156 (53.2%) criminal
investigators who agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, and 134
(45.7%) who were either uncertain or disagreed with the statement.
Police Technologies, People, and Professional Culture 65

An additional question sheds somewhat more light on this issue on

H.I.T.S. program content. Asked to comment on the statement, “My
investigators are aware that the H.I.T.S. database part of the Amber
Alert System,” supervising investigators were likewise only partially
(43.9%) able to confirm the statement.
It is difficult to say how much that question reveals about investigator-
supervisor relationships, but one thing is quite clear. Both criminal
investigators and supervisors indicated rather high levels of awareness
of H.I.T.S., but neither group could be definitive about this specific
component of the H.I.T.S. program.
As in the case of criminal investigators, an exceptionally large
proportion of supervising investigators could not identify the H.I.T.S.
team investigator/analyst assigned to their particular agency. While
nearly one-in-five investigators could not make the identification,
nearly one-in-four supervisors (18 or 20.7%) could not make the proper
connection. When the number who simply did not answer this question
is factored in, that number climbs to 28 (32.2%), or close to one-in-
three. The majority (59 or 67.8%) of those who answered the question
did correctly identify an assigned investigator/analyst.
In summary, supervising investigators reported a high level of
awareness of the H.I.T.S. program (95.4% in an indirect response, and
100% on a direct response), but they were not sure that their
subordinate investigators would know specific important things about
the H.I.T.S. program. Most supervising investigators correctly
identified the H.I.T.S. investigator/analyst assigned to their agency, but
one-in-four could not do so. Supervising investigators ranked H.I.T.S.
high in terms of use, placing it a close second to N.C.I.C. They
selected H.I.T.S. as the overall best database for crime scene, criminal,
and victim information. We next turn to an examination of the
familiarity level that Police Chiefs and Sheriffs demonstrate regarding
the H.I.T.S. program.
As with investigators and supervising investigators, Police Chiefs
and Sheriffs were asked a series of questions designed to determine the
level of awareness they possess with respect to the H.I.T.S. program.
The first was, “Specifically focusing on H.I.T.S., which of the
following best represents your level of information?” Their responses
indicate that only 13 (7.3%) indicated that they were not at all familiar
with H.I.T.S. That compares with the responses of 1.4% for criminal
investigators, and 0.0% of supervising investigators to the same
66 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

question. The survey responses registered to this question indicate that

supervising investigators tend to be more familiar with H.I.T.S. than
either their subordinate investigators or their respective Chiefs and
Sheriffs.
Police Chiefs and Sheriffs selected H.I.T.S. as their primary
database 16% of the time. They selected it as their secondary database
in greater numbers (18.4%), and overall 89.7% of Police Chiefs and
Sheriffs indicated some use of H.I.T.S.
Unexpectedly, Police Chiefs and Sheriffs reject ViCAP as their
primary database in almost every instance. Only one (0.6%) Police
Chief or Sheriff selected ViCAP as their primary database. Ten (5.6%)
law enforcement CEOs selected ViCAP as their secondary database,
and 47 (26.6%) say they don’t use ViCAP at all. These findings
coincide with those derived from survey questions posed to both the
criminal investigators and the supervising investigators. As mentioned
earlier in this section the acknowledgement by criminal investigators,
their supervisors, and their CEOs that they do not utilize such a vast
database system that has nationwide roots is a significant commentary
on the state of intelligence in an era that is witness to the development
of intelligence led policing.
While 15 (8.5%) of the Chiefs and Sheriffs noted LInX as their
primary database, 59 (33.3%) claim to not use LInX at all. Only 5
(2.8%) Police Chiefs and Sheriffs reported RAIN as their primary
database, while 84 (47.5%) of their colleagues stated that they do not
use RAIN at all. Only 3 Police Chiefs and Sheriffs (1.7%) claim
COPLINK® to be their primary database, and fully 102 (57.6%) of the
law enforcement CEOs reported that they do not use COPLINK® in
any manner. These findings are not surprising since COPLINK® is a
private, propriety database system that is expensive to implement and
maintain. Additionally, because of its cost it has very limited data that
is geographically narrow in scope.
As with the criminal investigator and supervising investigator
surveys, N.C.I.C. was omitted as an answer option. Some 17 (9.6%) of
the Chiefs and Sheriffs wrote in N.C.I.C. under the “other” category. It
is rather clear that a large proportion of Chiefs, Sheriffs, investigator
supervisors, and criminal investigators are very much familiar with
H.I.T.S., whether familiarity of H.I.T.S. relates to the overall program,
the database, or the team of investigator/analysts. That said, it is also
true that a majority of the same Chiefs, Sheriffs, supervisors, and
Police Technologies, People, and Professional Culture 67

investigators are relatively unfamiliar with the specific services offered

by the H.I.T.S. team. Set forth below is a discussion of evidence that
many who are familiar with the H.I.T.S. program are not particularly
knowledgeable with respect to many of the services offered by the
H.I.T.S. program. Washington Police Chiefs and Sheriffs were also
asked to identify the best overall database for crime scene, criminal,
and victim information.
A total of 79 (44.6%) of the law enforcement CEOs selected
N.C.I.C. as the best overall database for crime scene, criminal, and
victim information. Another 37 (20.9%) cited H.I.T.S. as being the
best overall database. ViCAP, expected by evaluators to receive higher
assessments, was selected by only 8 (4.5%) as being the best overall
database. LInX received 18 (10.2%) high rankings, while RAIN and
COPLINK® each received less than 3% of the preference votes cast in
the statewide police C.E.O. survey.
As with criminal investigators and supervising investigators, Police
Chiefs and Sheriffs were asked to confirm their knowledge of two true
statements regarding the H.I.T.S. database. The following questions
require them to make judgment calls as to both the knowledge level of
their subordinates, and of the components of the H.I.T.S. database. The
first question read as follows: “My investigators and I are aware that
the H.I.T.S. database includes information on missing children.” This
item was answered with rather mixed results. Fully 88 (49.7%) of the
Police Chiefs and Sheriffs confirmed that they and their investigators
are aware the H.I.T.S. database includes information on missing
children. However, initially an identical number (89, 50.3%) could not
make the connection:
The investigator supervisors were likewise unable to confirm the
following statement: “My investigators and I are aware that the H.I.T.S.
database is part of the Amber Alert System.” Only 82 (46.3%) could
make the connection between their knowledge of what they and their
investigators know with the factual statement of this H.I.T.S. database
component. This might not be a good proxy for assessing the level of
familiarity of H.I.T.S. resources because it is not known what Police
Chiefs and Sheriffs know about their investigators. Had familiarity
with H.I.T.S. resources been more widely known, evaluators expected
Chiefs and Sheriffs to have been more confident about their responses
to these questions.
68 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

In summary, Police Chiefs and Sheriffs are less familiar with

H.I.T.S. than supervising investigators and criminal investigators.
Only 16% of Chiefs and Sheriffs indicated that H.I.T.S. is their primary
database, while 25.9% of supervisors and 22.9% of investigators made
that preference designation.
Washington’s Police Chiefs and Sheriffs indicated that H.I.T.S. is
used far more frequently than ViCAP, which may support the
hypothesis that police officials like working with other local police
agencies when it comes to intelligence gathering and information
sharing. There is evidence in the W.S.U. evaluation report to support
the supposition that familiarity with H.I.T.S. by Police Chiefs and
Sheriffs, as is the case with supervisors and investigators, only
scratches the surface of potential benefits to be derived from the
H.I.T.S. program. Many of the database capabilities and H.I.T.S. unit
services are relatively untapped by law enforcement CEOs and their
respective staff members. Familiarity with H.I.T.S. was also
determined among H.I.T.S. Bulletin recipients through the on-line
survey process.
H.I.T.S. Bulletins are created by H.I.T.S. staff support personnel
and are distributed via e-mail. They are generated with the help and
prodding of H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts assigned to each local law
enforcement agency in Washington. Recipients of H.I.T.S. Bulletins
were surveyed via the Internet. There were 643 respondents to the
survey, but it was discovered that many who receive the H.I.T.S.
Bulletins do not have investigative authority over homicide and
rape/sexual assault cases. Such authority was determined to be an
operational standard for the evaluation study. Some of the information
from those lacking investigative authority is nonetheless important.
Consequently, two separate data analysis runs were made on the on-line
survey; one run includes all respondents (N=643), while the other run
included only those survey respondents who have investigative
authority over homicide and/or over rape/sexual assault cases (N=219).
Most of the charts showing responses of H.I.T.S. Bulletin recipients
were taken from the surveys completed by investigators only. In the
relatively rare event that survey responses from all survey participants
were used to make a point, the reader is duly notified of this fact. The
first on-line survey question the W.S.U. evaluation team examined to
aid in determining H.I.T.S. familiarity was, “Which of the following
Police Technologies, People, and Professional Culture 69

obstacles have prevented your criminal investigation from more fully

benefiting from H.I.T.S.?
Two-thirds (145, 66.2%) of the on-line survey respondents
indicated that none of the obstacles posed in the question applied to
them, which suggests that the results of the survey are informed by
participants who are either familiar with H.I.T.S. and use H.I.T.S.
services, or who don’t encounter the obstacles set forth in the question.
Another 32 (14.6%) cited time constraints as hindrances to full benefit
of H.I.T.S., and yet another 38 (17.4%) indicated the lack of familiarity
with H.I.T.S. as the cause. The remaining respondents (4) claimed that
management at their agency hinders their exposure to H.I.T.S.
One important measure of limited familiarity with the H.I.T.S.
program services is demonstrated by the failure of about one-in-five of
those surveyed in each survey subgroup to identify the H.I.T.S. team
investigator/analyst assigned to their own agency.
A survey question was designed to determine if criminal
investigators were comfortable enough with either the person or name
recognition of their assigned investigator/analyst. The results from this
question indicate that the H.I.T.S. Bulletin user investigator/analysts
demonstrate about 80% name recognition. To illustrate an important
point, evaluators investigated the responses from all on-line survey
respondents to this question. The finding of 51.2% checking the “I
don’t know” option among this group of 643 survey respondents is a
clear indicator that those who do not have investigative authority (e.g.,
CCOs) could strongly skew the responses to this survey.
With over half of the on-line survey respondents responding that
they could not identify the H.I.T.S. investigator/analyst assigned to
their agency, it can be concluded that H.I.T.S. Bulletins are being sent
to many people who have no other connection with H.I.T.S. other than
receipt of the periodic criminal investigation advisory bulletins
(N=643).
As with criminal investigators, supervising investigators and Police
Chiefs and Sheriffs, H.I.T.S. Bulletin recipients were asked in the on-
line survey to rank various databases in order of their utility. The
responses to this survey question were open-ended. That is to say, each
participant could write in any number of databases they wished, a
format which differed from the responses allowed in the previous
surveys. In those self-administered mail surveys, participants were
asked to rank databases by use from one to seven. Therefore, the
70 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

following responses include numbers higher than seven. A high

number of survey respondents [145, or 66.2%] of those writing in a
preference selected N.C.I.C. as their primary criminal activity
information database.
With regards to H.I.T.S., 38 (12.4%) of the on-line respondents
with investigative authority who indicated a preference signified
H.I.T.S. as their primary database, and another 109 (49.8%) indicated it
is their second-most used database.
Some investigators who participated in the on-line survey indicated
use of the RAIN database; it was mostly identified as a tool for use
after their respective main databases were consulted. It is important to
note that 122 respondents (55.7%) simply did not select RAIN in any
capacity. Their responses are displayed as “missing data” on the
statistical run.
As with RAIN, a large number of respondents simply did not
comment on LInX (126 or 57.5%). It is not known if that is because of
the lack of use or the lack of familiarity with the database, since there
was not an option to specifically indicate either of those options. The
fact that 7 (3.2%) investigators indicated zero use of the database
suggests that those who gave no response are not familiar with LInX.
A total of 46 (21%) respondents with a choice selected LInX as their
second or third most used database.
As in the case of ViCAP, RAIN and LInX, many (in this case, 127
or 58%) of those surveyed did not comment on COPLINK®. Of those
who commented, only 1 (.5%) ranked COPLINK® as their most-used
database. Only 92 (42% of those surveyed) indicated use of
COPLINK® to any degree.
In summary, investigators of all ranks and levels of responsibility
who participated in the on-line (H.I.T.S. Bulletin recipients) survey
cited N.C.I.C. as their primary database in terms of utility. H.I.T.S.
was ranked second and ViCAP third. RAIN, LInX, and COPLINK®
are used to some degree, but most who took the survey did not
comment on any of the latter-mentioned databases. There were other
options listed, such as HALT and ATAC, but they received such low
rates of mention that their limited mention in the evaluation report leads
to the likely conclusion that the more removed a database is from local
input, the less likely investigators are to participate in the use of that
database.
Police Technologies, People, and Professional Culture 71

Answers to another question can be used to assess the level of

familiarity with the H.I.T.S. unit, and/or its database components.
Participants were asked, “How many times have you contributed data
for inclusion in the H.I.T.S. database.” It was reasoned by the W.S.U.
evaluation team that an investigator must be familiar with H.I.T.S. if
he/she has contributed information to the database. Certainly, not all of
those failing to contribute to the H.I.T.S. database are without
familiarity, so this is only intended as an indirect indicator.
A total of 173 (79%) on-line survey respondents indicated that they
have contributed information to the H.I.T.S. database at least once, with
the majority (101 or 46.1%) of those having contributed information
between one and five times. Another 44 (20.1%) survey respondents
indicated they have contributed data more than ten times, which is a
marker of regular H.I.T.S. use and participation for the evaluation team.
Some of those who claim they have never provided information on
criminal activity for inclusion in the H.I.T.S. database gave specific
reasons for their inactivity. Of those who gave reasons, the most
commonly reason stated was that they have had no cases that needed it
(7 or 3.2%). Other survey respondents indicated that it was not their
job in their agency to do so (6 or 3.0%), while yet others indicated that
they were not sure how to do so (4 or 1.8%). This question addressed
those who were willing to submit data for inclusion in the H.I.T.S.
database. The final component of the determination of familiarity with
the H.I.T.S. program includes an evaluation of H.I.T.S.
investigator/analysts.
Of course, H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts are intimately familiar
with the H.I.T.S. program. In this section, evaluators included answers
to questions posed to the H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts to determine
their familiarity with their constituents. That is, the W.S.U. evaluation
team was to determine how much H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts know
about the use of H.I.T.S. services by those whom they serve. The first
thing evaluators wanted to determine was how investigator/analysts
responded compared to investigators in the field with respect to the
general use of known databases.
H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts were asked, “In a criminal
investigation, which of the following do you see also as being the ‘hub’
for crime scene, criminal, or victim information? (Please mark only
one selection). Options given included: ViCAP; H.I.T.S.; SMART;
72 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

CATCH; MATRIX; N.C.I.C.; and COPLINK®. The H.I.T.S. staff was

offered the opportunity to write-in a response.
Five H.I.T.S. staff (71.4%) indicated H.I.T.S. as the “hub” for
crime scene, criminal, or victim information. One investigator/analyst
cited N.C.I.C. as the hub, while nobody selected ViCAP. The
remaining selection went to the subject of local database systems
maintained by local agencies. Considering that H.I.T.S.
investigator/analysts are (with one exception) seasoned crime scene
veterans, their responses to this question are important in adding value
to the evaluation study. They are either motivated to respond favorably
to a system that they believe in, one that feeds them, or both. When the
strong representation of H.I.T.S. by criminal investigators is factored
in, it must be considered that H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts are drawn
toward H.I.T.S. over N.C.I.C. due to their familiarity with the H.I.T.S.
program and knowing about its capabilities. This observation adds
weight to the conclusion that H.I.T.S.-like programs could serve as
models for effective law enforcement information sharing missions
nationwide.
All seven investigator/analysts agreed that H.I.T.S. Bulletins do
not include all Amber Alerts generated in the state of Washington.
Although H.I.T.S. is part of the National Amber Alert system, the
H.I.T.S. Bulletins do not include all Amber Alerts issued. Such
advisory bulletins are only generated when H.I.T.S. staff members are
notified directly by administrators of the Amber Alert system of such
an alert issuance.
Evaluators posed the question to the H.I.T.S. staff, “What
percentage of the active homicide cases of the agencies within your
support jurisdiction is submitted to H.I.T.S.?” This is a good time to
discuss vernacular as it was used in the survey instruments. The
H.I.T.S. unit is not concerned with all cases of homicide occurring in
the state of Washington. It is only interested in those cases deemed or
considered to be “murders.” The term “homicide” in the context of
H.I.T.S. program operations would include any deaths not attributable
to murder, such as justifiable homicide and accidental deaths. The
H.I.T.S. unit is interested in gathering information on homicides for its
crime scene database because it is not always apparent at first glance if
the investigation is of a murder or not. For the purpose of the
evaluation study the term “homicide” was taken to refer to all cases of
interest to the H.I.T.S. unit wherein the death of a person has occurred.
Police Technologies, People, and Professional Culture 73

Five investigators agreed that 75-100% of all active homicide

investigations (suspected murders) are known to H.I.T.S. One
investigator believes that between 51 and 74% of such cases are known
to H.I.T.S., and one investigator did not answer the question. Six
H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts believe the H.I.T.S. team knows about
most (75-100%) of the active cold case (stalled) homicides in their
respective jurisdictions. Again, one investigator did not respond to the
question.
H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts were asked, “What percentage of the
active sex crime cases of the agencies within your support jurisdiction
is submitted to H.I.T.S.?” The question could have been worded more
carefully to capture the mission of the H.I.T.S. unit, which is to assist in
the investigation of rape/sexual assault, and other serious violent crime.
The answers given by investigator/analysts indicate, however, that they
understood the intended spirit of the question.
Data collected from this question in the survey indicate that four
investigators believe that only 1 – 24% of the active sex crime cases of
the agencies within their support jurisdiction are submitted to H.I.T.S.
One investigator believes that 75-100% of such cases are submitted to
H.I.T.S., one did not know, and one did not respond to the question.
The previous two questions addressed what the W.S.U. evaluation
team determined to be the most critical components of the H.I.T.S. unit
mission. The H.I.T.S. unit was created to focus primarily on unsolved
murders. The focus of the unit widened over time to include active
assistance in the investigation of rapes. In the W.S.U. evaluation study
the term “rapes” is always accompanied by the term “sexual assaults”
because the terms have become interchangeable in both police and
civilian jargon. The primary focus of the H.I.T.S. unit is the incidence
of stranger-to-stranger rape. It is not important to the W.S.U.
evaluators that H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts be able to determine the
exact number of homicides or rapes/sexual assaults reported to the
H.I.T.S. unit. What is of importance is that they made distinctions
between the reporting levels of homicides, cold cases, and rapes/sexual
assaults. Their answers to the following questions indicate even finer
distinctions being drawn. Two of the H.I.T.S. program
investigator/analysts responded that between 54-74% of the missing
persons aged 18 and over are reported to the H.I.T.S. unit. These data
will come in handy later when the same question is responded to by
criminal investigators. The importance of this information in the
74 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

current context is that H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts are clearly split in

terms of their familiarity of both mission goals and response from their
respective jurisdictional agencies.
Regarding missing persons under the age of 18, three H.I.T.S.
investigator/analysts believe that 75-100% of those cases are reported
to H.I.T.S. One believes that number to be 1-24%, while another
believes it to be 25-49%. One did not know, and one did not answer
the question. As in the case before, evaluators are more concerned with
the bigger picture presented by the pattern of responses to this question.
What is apparent is that investigator/analysts are more likely to believe
they know about more cases in which missing persons are under age 18
than they do about similar cases involving adults. This pattern of
responses indicates that missing persons cases are important to
investigator/analysts, and that those involving persons under age 18 are
most important. The tracking of missing persons cases became an
important mission of the H.I.T.S. unit due to the possible link between
missing persons and both homicides and rape/sexual assault victims.
It is shown that most (five out of seven) respondents think that
between 75 and 100% of those in agencies within their jurisdiction
understand what the H.I.T.S. program can do for their agency. One
thinks the percentage is between 50 and 74%, and one person did not
answer the question. This is an important distinction because the
survey data demonstrate that H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts are
confident that they are doing things that are important to the H.I.T.S.
program mission. That is an inferred conclusion because they assume
those with whom they are in contact are highly knowledgeable of
H.I.T.S. services. A discussion of the differences between the
responses given to this question across groups of survey respondents
follows in another area of this book.
Investigator/analysts were asked to estimate the percentage of
investigators working within their assigned jurisdictions who know
them by name. Based on the premise that the strength of the H.I.T.S.
unit is that it marries the personal relationships between knowledgeable
and highly experienced investigator/analysts with field investigators,
and combines those personal relationships with the technologies
available to H.I.T.S., this question informs evaluators as to the strength
of the relationship between H.I.T.S. and those served by the unit. Four
investigators think their criminal investigator constituents are between
75 and 100% likely to be able to identify them by name. One
Police Technologies, People, and Professional Culture 75

investigator/analyst responded that less than 10% would know him/her

by name, and another respondent did not answer the question. A
discussion of the results of cross-analysis of the data gathered from
criminal investigators regarding their knowledge of the investigator
assigned to their agency follows in another segment of this chapter.
In summary, most H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts believe H.I.T.S. to
be the hub for crime scene, criminal, and victim information, while one
person believes that local agency databases (including networks of
local databases) serve that function. They have greater faith in the
H.I.T.S. program than they do in N.C.I.C. and ViCAP. Most believe
that almost all active and cold case murders are known by the H.I.T.S.
program, but most think they do not know about most rapes/sexual
assaults perpetrated by strangers. Most investigator/analysts believe
that their constituent field investigators know what H.I.T.S. can do for
their local agencies. Most are also convinced that between 75 and
100% of their constituents can identify them by name.
Implications of the data gathered by this survey and reported in the
W.S.U. evaluation study are that the major concern of H.I.T.S.
investigator/analysts is both active and cold case murders, followed by
sexual assault. There is a heavy emphasis on tracking adult missing
persons’ cases, but they are most concerned with missing persons’
cases when the person is under the age of 18. Discussion of how the
survey responses given by the H.I.T.S. program investigator/analysts
compare to those of their constituents follow in a separate forthcoming
section of this chapter. Having examined the degree to which various
users of H.I.T.S. services are familiar with the H.I.T.S. program, the
attention now turns to the question of how much the people responsible
for the investigation of serious criminal violations in local police
jurisdictions know about specific H.I.T.S. programs and services.
Evaluators wanted to go beyond mere awareness that the H.I.T.S.
program exists, so questions were asked of all participants to determine
to what degree they were familiar with and have used various H.I.T.S.
services. If there is one overall theme to describe the degree to which
the criminal justice community responded with regard to the H.I.T.S.
program, it can be summed up by the following quote from a criminal
investigator:
76 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

We sporadically consider the use of H.I.T.S.--I don't think they

make themselves known enough or all the services they
provide. We tend to get tunnel vision in our own jurisdictions.

Several of the key services of the H.I.T.S. program are therefore

singled out for inclusion in this section of chapter four. We begin this
segment of our analysis with a look at the H.I.T.S. program training
component. The H.I.T.S. team provides low or no cost certified
training for local law enforcement officers. Training is generally
provided in conjunction with the Washington Criminal Justice Training
Center (CJTC). The ongoing need for high quality, low-cost training in
law enforcement is demonstrated by the following comment recorded
from a criminal investigator during a focus group session held after
such a training session for local police personnel conducted in
Vancouver:

We have to pay the FBI fee for the practical homicide course.
It runs between $375 and $600 for the national instructors
that put it on. This is minimal cost here, about $50 [as
provided by H.I.T.S.]. The private guy out of New York
homicide charges a minimum of $375.

Criminal investigators were asked to confirm their knowledge that the

H.I.T.S. team offers basic investigations training. A common pattern of
limited awareness and utilization was revealed, which will be
documented in a number of areas of H.I.T.S. program activities and
services.
Of those who responded, 126 (43%) indicated they were familiar
with this service, and they have used it. Another 50 (17.1%) responded
that they know this training is available, but indicate that they have not
used it. Another 88 (17.2%) stated that they are not familiar with the
training but that they would use it, and 13 (2.5%) investigators
responded that they would not use this training. These survey results
indicate that 176 (60.1%) criminal investigators know about H.I.T.S.
basic investigation training. It is reasonable to conclude from this
evidence that more criminal investigators would take advantage of this
training if they were aware of its existence. The percentage of
respondents who indicate that they are not familiar with the training but
Police Technologies, People, and Professional Culture 77

would use it can be seen as the untapped market. The untapped market
for this training is 17.2%.
Criminal investigators were also asked about their knowledge of
basic homicide training offered by H.I.T.S. team members. The need
for such classes was pointed out by the following statement from a
criminal investigator:

Basic Homicide class made me more aware of what is

required of a homicide investigator.

A total of 162 (55%) investigators responded that they are familiar

with the basic homicide investigations training offered by H.I.T.S.
Another 46 (15.7%) indicated that they know about this training but
they have not used it. Another 60 (20.5%) responded that they are not
familiar with it, but that they would use it. These numbers indicate that
208 (71%) criminal investigators know about H.I.T.S. basic homicide
investigation training. The untapped market for this training is 20.5%.
Regarding training on advanced homicide investigations, 94
(32.1%) criminal investigators indicated they were familiar with this
service, and that they have used it. Another 82 (28%) responded that
they know that this training is available, but that they have not used it.
Another 96 (32.8%) stated that they are not familiar with the training
but that they would use it, and 6 (2%) responded that they would not
use this training. These numbers indicate that 176 (60.1%) criminal
investigators know about H.I.T.S. basic investigation training. The
untapped market for this training is 32.8%.
Criminal investigators were asked to identify training courses they
think the H.I.T.S. team should offer. As a testament to the fact that
many field investigators are unfamiliar with the training already being
offered by H.I.T.S., many of the responses were for additional training
in the areas of basic and advanced homicide investigations, sexual
assault investigation, training on what H.I.T.S. does, blood spatter
investigation, computer forensic evaluation, DNA analysis training, and
cold case homicide investigation. The only course suggestions offered
by the field that are not already being regularly offered by the H.I.T.S.
team were cell phone and video analysis training. Many of the
suggested courses involved the expansion of current training, such as
first responder training, crime scene processing, and all aspects of
collecting and storing DNA forensic evidence.
78 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

Supervising investigators were also asked about their familiarity

with H.I.T.S. training opportunities. First, they were asked about basic
investigations. Of those who responded, 27 (31%) indicated they were
familiar with this service, and that they have used it. Another 19
(21.8%) responded that they are familiar that this training is available,
but that they have not used it. Another 34 (39.1%) stated that they are
not familiar with the training but that they would use it, and 6 (6.9%)
responded that they would not use this training. These numbers
indicate that 46 (52.9%) of the supervising investigators know about
H.I.T.S. basic investigation training. The untapped market for this
training is 39.1%.
Next, the W.S.U. evaluation team looked at the topic of basic
homicide investigations. As one supervising investigator put it,

Through training classes on homicide

investigations…I can turn to more experienced
homicide detectives with just a call.

Of those who responded, 40 (46%) indicated they were familiar

with this service, and they have used it. Another 20 (23%) responded
that they are familiar that this training is available, but that they have
not used it. Another 23 (26.4%) stated that they are not familiar with
the training but that they would use it, and 3 (3.4%) responded that they
would not use this training. These numbers indicate that 60 (69%)
supervising investigators know about H.I.T.S. basic investigation
training. The untapped market for this training is 26.4%.
As with criminal investigators, supervising investigators were
asked to identify training classes they would like to see also offered by
H.I.T.S. They, too, indicated lack of familiarity with the topics on
which H.I.T.S. team members currently train. Several supervisors
identified new training needs, however. Advanced forensic methods
training was cited a few times. In one instance it was noted that
training in forensic light source and advanced fingerprint processing is
needed. Another suggestion indicated the need for training for those
supervisors who do oversee also rape/sexual assault cases.
Police Chiefs and Sheriffs were not asked the same questions
regarding their familiarity with H.I.T.S. training opportunities. They
were, however, asked to give their opinion of the benefits offered by
H.I.T.S. program training. The following question measures the
Police Technologies, People, and Professional Culture 79

general attitude Police Chiefs and Sheriffs have toward H.I.T.S. in-
service training: “Investigators of homicides and/or rapes/sexual
assaults would benefit from in-service training on basic homicide
investigation, advanced homicide investigation, rape/sexual assault
investigation, and blood spatter analysis.”
Of those responding, 165 (93.2%) agreed or strongly agreed that
such in-service training would be beneficial to their homicide and
rape/sexual assault investigators. Only 6 (3.4%) either were not certain
or disagreed with the statement. This is an important notation to the
topic of training for at least two reasons. First, it indicated that Police
Chiefs and Sheriffs are fully aware of the need for continuing in-service
training. They realize and acknowledge that investigators in their
agencies are not naturally equipped with the wide range of skills and
investigative tools they need to be fully effective as criminal
investigators. Secondly, their collective response affirms that there is a
strong probability that if the H.I.T.S. unit were to continue to enhance
their training offerings to match the needs of the field, and if they were
to make a stronger effort to communicate information about their
training offerings, Chiefs and Sheriffs would support enhanced in-
service training by H.I.T.S. team members.
Evaluators only uncovered one instance in which H.I.T.S. training
deficiencies might exist. The following statement by an on-line survey
respondent makes his/her point:

I've been very satisfied in general with the H.I.T.S. personnel.

The training I've received has been disappointing. It's not the
H.I.T.S. personnel doing the training, they were only the
facilitators.

Other comments regarding the demand for training were directed at the
need for the H.I.T.S. team to train local agency investigators on
H.I.T.S. resources and assistance. For example, note the following
survey statements:

From a criminal investigator; “I am unaware of what H.I.T.S.

does, other than distribute bulletins cross-agency.”

From a Chief or Sheriff; “Would like to receive

training/resources to understand what all is available through
80 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

H.I.T.S. and other resources. At this time we have not

received any specific training or briefings on what H.I.T.S.
can do for us.”

From an on-line survey participant; “Knowledge of all the

services that can be provided by H.I.T.S. could go a long ways
in agencies utilizing their work more.”

Others were more complimentary and supportive of the H.I.T.S.

training mission; an indicator of H.I.T.S. program success:

From a criminal investigator; “Past training and investigator

help - excellent.”

From a criminal investigator; “Training - Consultations -

"War Stories" from investigators.”

From an on-line participant; “The H.I.T.S. Unit provides

services to all law enforcement agencies in Washington (and
even neighboring states) that no other agency can provide.
They provide some excellent training opportunities for
investigators and they provide the pivotal (sic) role in linking
agencies statewide by receiving and distributing critical
information on crimes and wanted persons.”

In summary, the need for in-service training is validated by all

members of law enforcement at all ranks. Survey responses by surveys
of Police Chiefs and Sheriffs indicate their likely support of enhanced
in-service training. There is a significant amount of untapped potential
for future H.I.T.S. training classes. Estimates of potential increases in
demand for training range from 25% to 40%. Training of the nature
demonstrated above shows promise to help overcome what Sheptycki
calls the digital divide (2004: 313).
In another important area of work the H.I.T.S. team offers
assistance to criminal investigators in local law enforcement agencies
across the state who work cases of homicide and rape/sexual assaults
that have “gone cold.” The following are some of the field data the
W.S.U. evaluation team gathered on this topic of cold case
investigations. The need for outside assistance on cold cases can best
Police Technologies, People, and Professional Culture 81

be exemplified by three statements recorded from three different

criminal investigators when asked how the H.I.T.S. team has helped
them in this area of their work:

By providing info on solved and unsolved cases with similar

circumstances. What worked for someone else might work for
me.

I work on cold cases (20+ years old) and H.I.T.S. has a lot of
information on these cases as well as suspects who were
active during that time.

We organized different agencies investigators to review

unsolved cases. This gives input from seasoned investigators
on new ideas to explore to solve them.

Criminal investigators were asked to tell of their knowledge about

assistance available to them from outside their host agency.
Specifically, they were asked to respond to the statement “I have help
from outside of my agency in nearly every instance of homicide or
rape/sexual assault that has turned ‘cold’ (cases that have stalled).”
A total of 151 (51.5%) criminal investigators responded that help
is available to them from outside their agency in cases of homicide and
rape/sexual assault. Nearly as many (134 or 45.7%) indicated that they
were not sure or that such assistance is not available. These findings
somewhat puzzled the W.S.U. evaluation team because cold case
assistance is a major reason for the existence of the H.I.T.S. unit.
Cross-tabulations were run on these data to determine specifics about
those who responded to this statement. Evaluators filtered out all
respondents who did not work homicide or sexual assault investigations
at least 75% of the time to see also if the percentages changed (N=38).
Only 9 (23.7%) criminal investigators who work either homicide or
sexual assault investigations between 75 and 100% of the time could
confirm that assistance on cold cases is available to them from outside
of their agency. Surprisingly, the balance of 29 (76.3%) could not
affirm the statement. As a follow-up step in the analysis, the data from
the same group of highly engaged criminal investigators were drawn
from the responses to the following statement: “H.I.T.S. offers
assistance on homicide and rape/sexual assault cases that have stalled.”
82 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

Of those who responded, 28 (73.7%) demonstrated familiarity with

the H.I.T.S. service. Another 6 (15.8%) indicated that they are not
familiar with the service, but that they would use it. Three individuals
(7.9%) responded that they would not use the service. There is no
ready explanation for the fact that 76.3% of criminal investigators
would indicate their lack of familiarity with outside cold case
assistance in one area of the survey, and then only 16.2% of the same
respondents demonstrated the lack of knowledge of the availability of
H.I.T.S. unit assistance in another area of the survey. It is possible that
“signal bias” played a part in the responses. The mere suggestion of
the H.I.T.S. service could perhaps have reminded the respondents that
it exists.
When leads run dry in a criminal investigation the case often
grows old (it becomes “cold”). Cold cases involving homicide and
rape/sexual assault are of serious concern both to the local law
enforcement agency in whose jurisdiction the crime occurred and to the
Office of the Attorney General of the state. In Washington state the
H.I.T.S. program provides assistance to local law enforcement
investigators in the investigation of cold homicides and rapes/sexual
assaults. Criminal investigators were asked specifically about their
knowledge of H.I.T.S. unit assistance in cold cases (all responses were
included in these findings).
Of those who responded, 66 (23.5%) indicated that they are
familiar with and have used cold case homicide and rape/sexual assault
assistance offered by H.I.T.S. Another 128 (43.7%) reported that they
are familiar with the service, adding that they have not used it. Another
79 (27%) indicated that they are unfamiliar with the service but would
likely use it. Only four (1.4%) survey respondents indicated that they
would not use the service. When evaluators examined the data from
homicide or rape/sexual assault investigators who work at least 75% of
their duty time on such investigations, they discovered that only 16.2%
indicated that they were unfamiliar with H.I.T.S. program cold case
assistance.
The data reported here suggest that 194 (66.2%) criminal
investigators are familiar with the H.I.T.S. unit cold case assistance.
The untapped market for this assistance is estimated at 27%. We now
turn to the data on supervising investigators.
Supervising investigators were asked to respond to two similar
questions statements. The first was “My homicide and rape/sexual
Police Technologies, People, and Professional Culture 83

assault investigators have help available from outside of my agency in

every instance of homicide or rape/sexual assault that has turned ‘cold’
(stalled).”
This first statement/question was specifically designed to inform
the W.S.U. H.I.T.S. evaluation team whether or not supervising
investigators could identify the presence of any outside assistance for
cold cases. Of those who responded, 54 (62.1%) indicated that their
agency’s investigators have access to outside assistance for cold cases.
Another 33 (37.9%) could not confirm the existence of such services.
Supervising investigators were also asked to confirm their familiarity
with H.I.T.S. services that include cold case assistance by the following
statement: “H.I.T.S. offers assistance on homicide and rape/sexual
assault cases that have stalled.”
Of those who responded, 26 (29.9%) indicated that they are
familiar with and have used cold case homicide and rape/sexual assault
assistance offered by H.I.T.S. Another 37 (42.5%) reported that they
are familiar with the service, adding that they have not used it. Twenty
(23%) indicated that they are unfamiliar with the service but would use
it. No supervising investigator responded that they would decline use
of the service.
The findings reported here suggest that 63 (72.4%) supervising
investigators are familiar with the H.I.T.S. unit cold case assistance.
The untapped market for this assistance is estimated to be 23%. Police
Chiefs and Sheriffs were asked a somewhat less pointed question in this
area.
Police Chiefs and Sheriffs are in a unique position to recognize the
need for assistance on cold cases. Consider the following comment
made by a Police Chief who participated in the H.I.T.S. Chief and
Sheriff survey:

They [H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts] have been extremely

helpful in our combined efforts to solve a cold case homicide
investigation. While the case has not been cleared, their
collaboration has definitely been of benefit.

The question that informs evaluators as to the attitude of Police Chiefs

and Sheriffs toward the possibility of teaming up with outside
investigators in order to solve crimes was asked thusly: “Please offer
your opinion as to the tools and resources available to your agency: The
84 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

availability of a third-party team of investigators to assist in guiding,

directing, or counseling my agency’s investigators in some instances of
homicide or rape/sexual assault would be beneficial.”
A total of 133 (75.1%) of the Chiefs and Sheriffs agreed that the
availability of a third-party team of investigators to assist in guiding,
directing, or counseling their agency’s investigators in some instances
of homicide or rape/sexual assault would be beneficial. Another 21
(11.9%) disagreed with the statement, and 19 (10.7%) were uncertain
as to their response.
The Chiefs and Sheriffs were then asked a more pointed follow-up
question regarding the availability of outside assistance. They were
asked to offer their opinion as to the tools and resources available to their
agency. Specifically, the survey question read. “My homicide and rape/sexual
assault investigators have help available from outside of my agency in every
instance of homicide or rape/sexual assault that has turned “cold” (stalled).” A
total of 144 (81.4%) responded that their homicide and rape/sexual
assault investigators have outside help in every homicide or rape/sexual
assault cold case. Twenty-nine (16.4%) of the Chiefs and Sheriffs
could not confirm the existence of such assistance.
In summary, the data regarding the need for and availability of
cold case homicide and rape/sexual assault assistance from outside
entities tell us that there is a significant untapped market for the
H.I.T.S. unit. Criminal investigators were nearly split on their
knowledge of cold case assistance from outside their agency. Nearly
half of the criminal investigators surveyed were familiar with the
H.I.T.S. cold case unit, but only about half of those (23.8%) where
detectives have used the service.
Supervising investigators were more likely than criminal
investigators to confirm the availability of outside assistance for cold
cases (62% to 53%, respectively). Supervisors were more likely than
criminal investigators to have used H.I.T.S. cold case unit services. It
is not known by evaluators if this is because supervisors are more likely
than criminal investigators to have job longevity. Nearly 76% of
supervising investigators indicated familiarity with H.I.T.S. cold case
assistance. That compares with 70% of criminal investigators who
confirmed familiarity with the service. These findings support the
hypothesis posed by some H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts that
investigator turnover makes contact for building awareness of program
services difficult.
Police Technologies, People, and Professional Culture 85

Nearly 77% of Police Chiefs and Sheriffs support the view that
outside help would benefit their agencies’ investigators, but 16% of
Chiefs and Sheriffs could not confirm that such assistance is available.
The potential for H.I.T.S. service growth in the area of cold case
assistance is estimated to be 27% for criminal investigators, 23% for
supervising investigators, and 16% for Police Chiefs and Sheriffs.
While these percentages cannot be relied on for the budgeting of
personnel and resources, they certainly do support the argument that
many of the services currently offered currently by the H.I.T.S.
program are underutilized. This point is tellingly made by a
supervising investigator in registering this comment on the survey:

It wasn't until recently that I truly understood all the different

aspects/resources offered by H.I.T.S. I am confident and
satisfied with the intelligence shared through H.I.T.S. I think
that more agencies/officers need to be made aware of the
benefits/resources available to them.

The discussion now turns to another service offered by the H.I.T.S.

unit.
The H.I.T.S. team is effective at getting together with investigators
and their supervisors across Washington in an effort to have an impact
on what they see also as their core mission—namely, solving cold case
homicides and rapes/sexual assaults. Their efforts have not gone
unnoticed by field investigators, as is evident by the following
statements recorded as comments on the on-line survey of H.I.T.S.
Bulletin recipients:

From an on-line survey respondent;

“Rick Grabenstein is great, always willing to help and share

ideas. Very easy to work with, a real team player, and easy to
get a hold of.”

From another on-line survey participant;

“In my 8 years in the investigative arena (major crimes
supervisor, commander over Green River investigation) I felt
we had a strong relationship with our H.I.T.S. investigator. I
appreciated Marv's insight into our investigations.”
86 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

From yet another on-line survey;

“H.I.T.S. has been very helpful in homicide investigation. On
the last investigation, H.I.T.S. assisted in identifying the main
suspect who was an illegal alien.”

From a final on-line survey;

“I always enjoy being visited by the H.I.T.S. team
investigators. They provide a wealth of knowledge and
experience.”

When H.I.T.S. team members are able to get out visiting field
investigators, their primary mission is to communicate information
regarding the range of services and forms of criminal investigative
assistance they can provide. A measure of their effectiveness in
communicating their services is accomplished through the following
statement/question, asked of criminal investigators: “H.I.T.S. offers
training and support for cold case (stalled) unit development.”
Of those who responded, 52 (17.1%) indicated that they are
familiar with and have used cold case unit development and support
offered by H.I.T.S. Another 113 (38.6%) reported that they are
familiar with the service, adding that they have not used it. Some 102
(34.8%) indicated that they are unfamiliar with the service but would
use it. Only 11 (3.8%) criminal investigators responded that they
would not use the service.
These findings suggest that 165 (56.3%) of the state’s criminal
investigators are familiar with the H.I.T.S. assistance for cold case unit
development. The untapped market for this assistance is 34.8%.
Supervising investigators were asked to respond to the same question.
Supervising investigators are slightly more likely than criminal
investigators to be aware that the H.I.T.S. unit offers training and
support for cold case units. When asked to respond to the statement
“H.I.T.S. offers training and support for cold case (stalled) unit
development,” 20 (23%) supervising investigators indicated that they
are familiar with and have used cold case unit development and support
offered by H.I.T.S. Another 27 (31%) reported that they are familiar
with the service, adding that they have not used it. Thirty (34.5%)
indicated that they are unfamiliar with the service but would use it.
Only 4 (4.6%) supervising investigators responded that they would not
use the service. These findings suggest that 47 (54%) of the
Police Technologies, People, and Professional Culture 87

supervising investigators are familiar with the H.I.T.S. assistance for

cold case unit development. The untapped market for this assistance is
34.5%.
In summary, H.I.T.S. team investigator/analysts are doing a good
job of communicating the services offered by the H.I.T.S. unit, but
there is still a potential to increase the awareness of their ability to
assist in cold case unit development by about 40% among criminal
investigators and supervising investigators. We now turn to another
important service offered by the H.I.T.S. program to assist in
determining how aware field investigators and their supervisors are of
various H.I.T.S. services.
H.I.T.S. team members are qualified to provide expert witness
testimony in criminal matters. What follows are the findings drawn
from the survey data gathered with respect to awareness of this service
by criminal investigators and their supervisors. Criminal investigators
were asked to respond to the statement, “H.I.T.S. offers expert witness
testimony in official court proceedings.” Of those who responded, only
10 (3.4%) indicated that they are familiar with and have used the expert
witness testimony assistance offered by H.I.T.S. Another 101 (34.5%)
reported that they are familiar with the service, adding that they have
not used it. Fully 154 (52.6%) indicated that they are unfamiliar with
the service but would use it. Only 12 (4.1%) criminal investigators
responded that they would not use the service.
These findings suggest that 111 (37.9%) of the criminal
investigators are familiar with the H.I.T.S. unit expert witness
testimony service. The untapped market for this important source of
state-led assistance to local law enforcement is a substantial 52.6%.
Another service offered by H.I.T.S. team members, assistance in
determining how death occurred, is explored next. H.I.T.S. unit
members offer assistance to homicide investigators who need to
determine cause of death in suspicious circumstances. As with other
services offered by the H.I.T.S. team (with the exception of some
training, to which a nominal fee is attached), this assistance is provided
at no cost to the assisted agency. Years of experience in homicide
investigation places H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts in a unique position
to assist field investigators in determining how death occurred (see also
appendix 6 for their biographies).
Of those who responded, 27 (9.2%) local criminal investigators
indicated that they are familiar with and have used H.I.T.S. assistance
88 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

in the matter of determining how death occurred. Another 117 (39.9%)

reported that they are familiar with the service, adding that they have
not used it. Some 114 (38.9%) indicated that they are unfamiliar with
the service but would use it. Only 20 (6.8%) criminal investigators
responded that they would not use the service. These findings suggest
that 144 (49.1%) of the criminal investigators are familiar with the
H.I.T.S. unit service of assistance to determine how death occurred.
The untapped market for this assistance is 39.9%. Supervising
investigators were asked the same question.
Supervising investigators are less likely than criminal investigators
to know that the H.I.T.S. team offers assistance for determining how
death occurred. Of those who responded, 15 (17.2%) supervising
investigators indicated that they are familiar with and have used
H.I.T.S. assistance in the matter of determining how death occurred.
Another 31 (35.6%) reported that they are familiar with the service,
adding that they have not used it. Some 35 (40.2%) indicated that they
are unfamiliar with the service but would use it. Only 5 (5.7%) of the
supervising investigators responded that they would not use the service.
These findings indicate that 46 (52.9%) supervising investigators
are familiar with the H.I.T.S. unit service of assistance to determine
how death occurred. The untapped market for this assistance is 40.2%.
Evaluators now look at investigator awareness of another H.I.T.S.
service. H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts offer assistance to criminal
investigators in interviewing (interrogation) techniques to be used on
known offenders.
As with many of the other services offered by the H.I.T.S.
program, this assistance is significantly overlooked by investigators in
the field. Responses to the following statement give a clear indication
that H.I.T.S. team members could perhaps do a somewhat better job of
communicating the availability of this service to potential clients:
“H.I.T.S. offers assistance to investigators on techniques for interrogating
known offenders.” Of those who responded, 33 (11.3%) criminal
investigators indicated that they are familiar with and have used
H.I.T.S. assistance in developing techniques in interrogating known
offenders. Another 92 (31.4%) reported that they are familiar with the
service, adding that they have not used it. Some 133 (45.4%) indicated
that they are unfamiliar with the service but would use it. Only 19
(6.5%) criminal investigators responded that they would not use the
service.
Police Technologies, People, and Professional Culture 89

These findings suggest that 125 (42.7%) criminal investigators are

familiar with the H.I.T.S. unit service of assistance on techniques for
interrogating known offenders. The untapped market for this assistance
is 45.4%. Responses by supervising investigators to the same question
follow.
The untapped market potential for H.I.T.S. investigators is more
than 50% in this service area, as is demonstrated by responses to the
following statement: “H.I.T.S. offers assistance to investigators on
techniques for interrogating known offenders.” Of those who responded, 10
(11.5%) supervising investigators indicated that they are familiar with
and have used H.I.T.S. program assistance in developing techniques for
interrogating known offenders. Another 24 (27.6%) reported that they
are familiar with the service, adding that they have not used it. Some
46 (52.9%) indicated that they are unfamiliar with the service but
would use it. Only 6 (6.9%) supervising investigators responded that
they would not use the service.
These findings suggest that 34 (39.1%) supervising investigators
are familiar with the H.I.T.S. unit service of assistance on developing
techniques for interrogating known offenders. The untapped market for
this assistance is 52.9%. The evaluation now turns to yet another area
of H.I.T.S. service – namely, assistance in establishing timelines in
criminal cases.
The establishment of documented timelines in criminal cases is
critical for the successful linkage of a potential perpetrator to both the
scene of a crime and the commission of that particular crime.
Timelines are therefore often critical for the successful conviction of a
suspected offender. The H.I.T.S. program team is quite proficient and
experienced in assisting criminal investigators with establishing such
timelines in criminal matters. They combine their experience and
expertise with the use of sophisticated analytical tools to make linkages
that often prove mission-critical in criminal cases. As in previous
instances of H.I.T.S. program services, the W.S.U. evaluation team
examined the level of familiarity criminal investigators and their
supervisors have with this important service provided by the H.I.T.S.
program.
Criminal investigators were first asked to express their opinion
about the importance of access to documented timelines in the
following survey question, “Access to timelines (chronological
sequence of events) in a homicide or rape/sexual assault investigation is
90 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

often important.” A total of 282 (96.2%) of the local police criminal

investigators participating in the survey agreed or strongly agreed with
that statement. There is virtually no question that the H.I.T.S. program
timeline service could be an important aspect of difficult criminal
investigations of violent offenses.
Even though more than 96% of criminal investigators agreed that
access to timelines is often important in crime investigation, only 108
(36.9%) could affirm that timeline assistance is available to them.
Fully 179 (61.1%) criminal investigators could not affirm that such
assistance is available to them at all, much less from outside of their
agency. These findings suggest that the H.I.T.S. unit could see also a
61.1% increase in the use of this untapped resource. Supervising
investigators were asked similar questions.
Supervising investigators were asked to respond to the following
statement: “Access to timelines (chronological sequence events) in a
homicide or rape/sexual assault investigation is often important.” As
with investigators, well over 90% of them agreed on the importance of
timelines. Their responses indicate that there is a high potential for
H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts to capitalize on this under-used service.
Even though more than 96% of supervising investigators (84 of 87)
agreed that access to timelines is often important in crime investigation,
only 38 (43.7%) could affirm that timeline assistance is available to
them and their investigators. Another 47 (54%) of the supervising
investigators could not affirm that such assistance is available to them
at all, much less from outside of their agency. These findings suggest
that the H.I.T.S. unit could see also a 54% increase in the use of this
untapped resource.
The design of this survey did not allow for evaluators to determine
from where assistance is available to those indicating the availability of
such assistance. What can be inferred by these data is that the majority
of criminal investigators and their supervisors agree about the
importance of timelines in criminal investigations, but most are
unaware that timeline assistance is available through H.I.T.S. The
evaluation now examines assistance with DNA analysis, and its place
in the H.I.T.S. team-field investigator world.
The need for assistance with DNA analysis has increased
dramatically since the practice of the collection of DNA from among
evidence present at crime scenes began in the mid 1980s. With the
proliferation of late of various popular television programs in which
Police Technologies, People, and Professional Culture 91

DNA evidence is gathered and used to solve crimes, interest in the

techniques of DNA collection analysis has been piqued among criminal
investigators in the field. The following two comments from criminal
investigators indicate the need for assistance with evidence that might
contain DNA:

If H.I.T.S. had a team to come in and take over or assist small

agencies with DNA type of evidence processing it would be
helpful.

Responding to a question about ways in which H.I.T.S. training can be

improved, another criminal investigator stated:

Methods to obtain DNA in this state without violating

suspect's rights are needed.

Criminal investigators were asked to respond to the statement,

“H.I.T.S. offers assistance in DNA analysis for homicide or rape/sexual
assault cases.” Of those responding, 33 (11.3%) of the criminal
investigators indicated that they are familiar with and have used
H.I.T.S. assistance on DNA analysis for homicide or rape/sexual
assault cases. Another 99 (33.8%) reported that they are familiar with
the service, adding that they have not used it. Some 137 (46.8%)
indicated that they are unfamiliar with the service but would use it.
Only 7 (2.4%) criminal investigators responded that they would not use
the service. These findings show that 132 (45.1%) of the state’s
criminal investigators are familiar with the H.I.T.S. unit service on
DNA analysis. The untapped market for this assistance is 46.8%.
Responses by supervising investigators to the same question follow.
By percentages, more supervising investigators than criminal
investigators have used H.I.T.S. team assistance with DNA analysis,
and more of them indicated that they would be likely to use the service
than did criminal investigators. When asked, “H.I.T.S. offers assistance in
DNA analysis for homicide or rape/sexual assault cases,” 12 (13.8%)
supervising investigators indicated that they are familiar with and have
used H.I.T.S. assistance in DNA analysis in cases of homicide or
rape/sexual assault. Another 26 (29.9%) reported that they are familiar
with the service, adding that they have not used it. Another 45 (51.7%)
indicated that they are unfamiliar with the service but would use it.
92 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

Only 2 (2.3%) supervising investigators responded that they would not

use the service. These findings show that 38 (43.7%) of the
supervising investigators are familiar with the H.I.T.S. unit service of
assistance on DNA analysis. The untapped market for this assistance is
51.7%. Next we look at the service provided by the H.I.T.S. team that
addresses gang affiliation phenomena.
Many crimes in Washington are linked to drugs. Many serious
violent crimes are directly or indirectly the result of drug dealing.
Gangs have been shown to be connected with drugs through the
creation and operation of drug trafficking organizations (DTOs). Drugs
are moved from Mexico and California throughout Washington, and
from Canada throughout Washington by DTOs. Knowledge of gang
affiliation of both offenders and victims, therefore, is clearly an
important tool for criminal investigators.
Two questions were asked of criminal investigators and
supervising investigators with respect to H.I.T.S. services available to
them that will assist them in making the crime scene-victim-offender
connection. Criminal investigators were asked their opinion regarding
gang affiliation: “Knowing the gang affiliation of suspects/victims, if
any, could prove helpful in clearing homicides and rape/sexual
assaults:” Over 90% of the crime investigators either agree or strongly
agree that this constitutes important information.
When asked about their knowledge of the availability of gang
affiliation data, however, only 117 (39.9%) of the respondents
indicated that they somewhat or strongly agree that such data are
available to them. Some 174 (59.4%) of the criminal investigators
were not aware that such data are available through H.I.T.S. The
apparent untapped potential existing in this important area of criminal
investigation among Washington’s criminal investigators for H.I.T.S.
program investigator/analysts is estimated to be 59.2%.
Unexpectedly, supervising investigators responded similarly in this
area. As with some of the responses to other questions, this survey was
not designed to capture their knowledge of the source of gang data, so
it is not known if those who responded affirmatively to the availability
of the data are aware that it is available through H.I.T.S. For the
purposes of this evaluation, however, is can be inferred that the
majority of supervisors and criminal investigators are not aware that
H.I.T.S. maintains gang affiliation data. When asked to confirm that
gang affiliation data are readily available to supervising investigators
Police Technologies, People, and Professional Culture 93

and their teams, only 43 (49.4%) responded that they are aware of the
availability of such data from the H.I.T.S. unit, while 44 (50.5%) of
them could not confirm the availability of such vital data. It is apparent
that this H.I.T.S. service is underutilized by over 50%, thus creating a
50% market potential. Attention now turns to the examination of
criminal profiling assistance provided by H.I.T.S. team members.
The strength of the H.I.T.S. program is the ability of the people
who work in the unit to interact with the tools supplied them,
combining years of criminal investigation expertise with technology to
make deductions that lead investigators to probable suspects in criminal
cases. H.I.T.S. team members have years of experience in assisting the
successful closing of serial murder cases, including that of the Spokane
serial killer Robert Yates and the Green River serial murderer, Gary
Ridgeway. The ability to profile potential killers and rapists is a
principal area of expertise of the H.I.T.S. team. Witness the need for
profiling assistance through the following comment from a criminal
investigator when asked what the H.I.T.S. team has done to improve
the investigative process:

[They] provided profiling, timeline, background, access to

DOL database as well as credit report info.

Criminal investigators were asked to respond to the statement that,

“Criminal profiling is available to me from an entity outside my
agency.” Only 84 (28.7%) criminal investigators could verify that
criminal profiling assistance is available to them from outside their own
agency. Fully 181 (61.8%) could not confirm the existence of help
from outside of their agency for such a critical element of the criminal
investigation mission.
Of those who indicated that criminal profiling assistance is
available through an outside source, the most common response was
H.I.T.S. The F.B.I., W.S.P., Seattle P.D., and N.C.M.E.C. (National
Center for Missing and Exploited Children) were also mentioned, but
the rate of mention for each source was minimal. Criminal
investigators were then asked to verify their familiarity with criminal
profiling assistance provided through H.I.T.S. team members. Of those
who responded, 22 (7.5%) criminal investigators indicated that they are
familiar with and have used H.I.T.S. criminal profiling assistance.
Another 114 (38.9%) reported that they are familiar with the service,
94 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

adding that they have not used it. Another 143 (48.8%) criminal
investigators indicated that they are unfamiliar with the service but
would use it. Only 7 (2.4%) investigators responded that they would
not use the service.
These findings suggest that 136 (46.4%) of the state’s criminal
investigators are familiar with the H.I.T.S. unit criminal profiling
assistance. The untapped market for this assistance is estimated to be
48.8%. Supervising investigators were asked the same questions as
were posed to criminal investigators.
The first question asked of supervising investigators was designed
to determine their awareness of the profiling services available to them
or their investigative team. The majority (74 or 85.1%) of supervising
investigators could not confirm that assistance with criminal profiling is
available within their own agency. Only 12 (13.8%) could make that
confirmation. They were then asked about the same services from
outside of their host agency. Only 42 (48.3%) supervising investigators
affirmed that criminal profiling services are available to them and their
investigators from outside their agency. Most (50.5%) could not
confirm the existence of such services. Of those noting that profiling
services are available to them from outside their agency, one-third cited
the F.B.I. as that source of assistance. A few mentioned H.I.T.S., but
many more cited H.I.T.S. in their responses to the following statement:
“H.I.T.S. offers suspect profiling assistance to homicide investigators.”
Of those who responded, only 8 (9.2%) supervising investigators
indicated that they are familiar with and have used H.I.T.S. criminal
profiling assistance. Another 34 (39.1%) reported that they are familiar
with the service, adding that they have not used it. Some 44 (50.6%)
supervising investigators indicated that they are unfamiliar with the
service but would use it. No supervising investigators responded that
they would decline the use of the service. These findings suggest that
42 (48.3%) supervising investigators are familiar with the H.I.T.S. unit
cold case assistance. The untapped market for criminal profiling
assistance is 50.6%. Next the area of forensic computer analysis
assistance as offered by the H.I.T.S. program team is investigated.
The need for assistance in computer forensic analysis is near the
top of the list of services desired lately. For example, convicted
murderer and child molester Joseph Duncan withheld the encrypted
code to his personal computer from prosecutors until he secured a
better deal under a plea bargain arrangement. It is believed by
Police Technologies, People, and Professional Culture 95

prosecutors that the computer contains leads to many other crimes

committed by Duncan. Many sexual predators are using chat rooms to
connect, first electronically and eventually in person, with their
underage victims. The need for forensic computer analysis is likely to
increase greatly in the years to come.
A majority of both investigators and supervising investigators feel
that they have access to forensic computer analysis within their own
department. As with criminal investigators, more than 59% of the
responding supervising investigators confirmed that forensic computer
crime investigators are available to them within their agency. The data
produced by this line of inquiry confirm to evaluators that many
criminal investigators and their supervisors do not know that the
H.I.T.S. team can assist them in forensic computer crime analysis.
Another service provided by the H.I.T.S. unit is crime mapping, and it
appears that this is another under-utilized service available from
H.I.T.S. team members.
The term “crime mapping” can be somewhat misleading. If
criminal investigators and their supervisors think of crime mapping
simply as identifying where crime has occurred in the past, they would
easily miss the point of the service the H.I.T.S. unit can provide for
them. Crime mapping is an area in which H.I.T.S. team members can
excel, given the opportunity. Getting back to the purpose of the
H.I.T.S. program, to serve investigators by assisting them to solve
murders, rapes/sexual assaults, and other violent crimes, crime mapping
blends the expertise of veteran detectives with technology to help
identify crime and criminal patterns in non static ways. A criminal
investigator stated the benefit thusly:

It [crime mapping] makes us cognizant of possible trends;

patterns and methods used in the crime that may be similar to
what has occurred in other areas/jurisdictions.

And from another:

It [crime mapping] helped by focusing on out of county

suspects. It streamlines the investigations.

Criminal investigators were asked in the survey to tell evaluators some

things about their knowledge of crime mapping assistance available to
96 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

them. The first response statement, “Mapping by crime type/location is

available to me within my agency” was responded to thusly: A total of
172 (58.7%) criminal investigators responded that mapping by crime
type/location is available to them from within their agency. Another
119 (40.6%) could not make that verification. Some 51 (17.4%)
indicated that the same service was available to them from outside of
their agency. Fully 233 (79.5%) could not verify the existence of
outside crime mapping assistance. These data suggest that 79.5% of
criminal investigators are not likely to know that the H.I.T.S. team
offers crime mapping assistance. This demonstrates the possibility of a
79.5% market share for this H.I.T.S. service.
The investigators were given the opportunity to inform the
evaluators of the source of their outside crime mapping assistance.
Most of the responses cited county planning offices, other city police
agencies, and other databases. A few (15 or 5.1%) mentioned H.I.T.S.
as a write-in option. Evaluators conclude, based on these data, the vast
majority of criminal investigators currently working in the field do not
know that they can turn to the H.I.T.S. team for assistance in crime
mapping, and that they may do so at no cost or obligation to their
agency. W.S.U. evaluators next reached out to supervising
investigators for their perspective.
A total of 58 (66.7%) supervising investigators believe crime
mapping to be available to them from within their agency. Their
numbers are slightly higher than those of criminal investigators. This
phenomenon is not perplexing to evaluators of the H.I.T.S. program
because it is commonly believed that supervisors know more about
agency resources than do their subordinates. That knowledge, it is
believed, comes from job longevity. That does not explain, however,
why so few supervising investigators know that the H.I.T.S. team offers
this service.
Only 16 (18.4%) supervising investigators knew that crime
mapping is available to them or their investigators from outside of their
agency. Some 68 (78.2%) did not know of this service. Of those who
named an outside source for crime mapping assistance, only three
mentioned H.I.T.S. The W.S.U. evaluators concluded from these data
that at least 80% of criminal investigators and their supervisors are
likely to be surprised to hear from their assigned investigator/analysts
that crime mapping assistance is available to them through the H.I.T.S.
program. Another service provided by the H.I.T.S. team is research in
Police Technologies, People, and Professional Culture 97

the archival records of the State of Washington regarding motor

vehicles and licensing (Department of Licensing).
Investigators were asked to identify some things that would help to
make H.I.T.S. better. Many answers included services already offered
by the H.I.T.S. team: for example, H.I.T.S. databases contain archived
data from the Department of Licensing. As stated one criminal
investigator regarding needed improvements:

We need to be able to connect capers by M.O. [modus

operandi] statewide. Database searches for vehicle
descriptions/partial license plates.

Unlike the presently accessible current records of state agencies,

the data maintained by the H.I.T.S. unit include archival records that
are never purged. The need for archival motor vehicle records can be
further summed up with a comment from a criminal investigator:

I like to make use of the vehicle registration data that they

[H.I.T.S.] can gather - like partial plate possibilities.

To gauge awareness of this H.I.T.S. service capability, criminal

investigators were asked to respond to the following statement,
“Archival motor vehicle records are available to me even if they have
been purged from publicly available records.” Only one third of those
who responded could verify this statement. Another 93 (31.7%) agreed
that archival motor vehicle records are available to them even if they
have been purged from publicly available records. The majority (197
or 67.2%) of criminal investigators could not confirm that such records
are available to them. Their responses to this statement confirm to
evaluators that the H.I.T.S. unit is maintaining data that is under-
utilized. Supervising investigators were asked to comment on the same
statement.
About the same percentage of supervising investigators (31.7%) as
criminal investigators (32.1%) could confirm that archival motor
vehicle records are available to them even after the records have been
purged from publicly available records. The fact that 67.2% of
supervising investigators could not confirm the availability of archival
motor vehicle records raises the concern that the under-utilization of
these records may be preventing some serious crimes from being
98 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

solved in our state. Next, our attention turns to investigator awareness

of archival driver license records.
As with the case of archival motor vehicle records, the H.I.T.S.
unit also maintains archived driver license records. Those records
provide a host of information, such as past known addresses, that can
greatly assist investigators in solving crimes. Evaluators were
interested to determine if criminal investigators were aware of the
archived database available to them through the H.I.T.S. program.
Survey participants were asked to comment on the following
statement, “Archival driver license information is available to me even
if records have been purged from publicly available records:” Of those
who responded, 99 (33.7%) affirmed that accurate statement. Another
191 (65.2%) criminal investigators could not affirm that archival driver
license information is available to them even if those records had been
purged from publicly available records. This is a strong indicator that
H.I.T.S. unit investigator/analysts have not communicated sufficiently
often to enough law enforcement audiences the fact that they may be of
assistance to investigators in this important regard. Supervising
investigators were offered the opportunity to respond to the same
question.
Of supervising investigators who responded to this statement, only
35 (40.2%) affirmed the availability of archival driver license
information. Some 48 (55.2%) could not connect the availability of
archival driver license information to any source. Though the H.I.T.S.
unit was not specified as a source for such data, supervising
investigators were overwhelmingly unaware of its existence. As in the
case of criminal investigators, the H.I.T.S. team could improve their
communication of this valuable asset. Police Chiefs and Sheriffs were
asked to opine regarding the availability of personal data in public
source databases.
Evaluators were interested in discovering the attitudes Police
Chiefs and Sheriffs hold regarding repositories of personal data. They
were asked to respond to the statement, “The way I see also it, a
repository of personal data that includes records from the Department
of Motor Vehicles, the Department of Licensing, the Department of
Corrections, and other public sources is a valuable tool for criminal
investigators:” As expected, virtually all (92.7%) of Police Chiefs and
Sheriffs agreed with the statement; only 9 (5.1%) law enforcement
CEOs did not agree with this statement.
Police Technologies, People, and Professional Culture 99

In summary, the results obtained from this line of inquiry provided

the W.S.U. evaluation team with considerable information upon which
to draw an informed assessment of the degree to which the H.I.T.S. unit
has effectively communicated many of its services to those most likely
to benefit from the use of those services. When asked to tell evaluators
how H.I.T.S. could improve its services, one supervising investigator
commented as follows:

If one agency was trained in what H.I.T.S. can do. I had no

idea all these services were available.

The importance of the availability of each of the services studied is

demonstrated by the following comment made by a criminal
investigator:

The H.I.T.S. program has assisted many investigators in my

department with crimes/information [such as] vehicles during
the first part of an investigation. Without this resource
agencies within the state would not know about each other’s
crimes. I can ask H.I.T.S. if my investigation is similar to the
other agencies’ case. Armed with that information, I can
contact the investigator who has the case first hand. If not,
then I will not contact the investigator and waste his time.
Partial plates/DOL information/address searches/time lines
on serial criminals/these are all sources which have assisted
me through H.I.T.S. to continue on a path or just an entry that
I checked. Take the resource away and things go back many
years. That is not a good thing when investigating violent
crimes.

Familiarity with or awareness of the existence of assistance is the

key to valuation of that service. Existence of a service or of a database
serves no purpose if those who can benefit from that service or
database cannot access it. Access to the H.I.T.S. database and services
is made only after an investigator in the field is made aware of its
availability. That is why evaluators of the H.I.T.S. program spent so
much energy and time in gathering and reporting on data from the
service side of H.I.T.S.
100 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

Responses to the above statements and questions permitted the

W.S.U. evaluation team to conclude that all of the H.I.T.S. services are
substantially under-utilized by investigators in the field. The degree to
which some services are used while others are not varies somewhat, but
the general pattern is serious under-utilization. What follows is a brief
recap of the services included in this section of the evaluation. First
defined by topic, this chart depicts the percentage of criminal
investigators and supervising investigators that indicated in some way
that they were unaware that assistance for each particular service is
available from an outside source.

Topic Crim. Inves. Super. Inves.

Basic Investigations Training 17.2% 39.2%

Basic Homicide Inv. Training 20.5% 26.4%
Advanced Homicide Inv. Training 32.8% 33.0%
H.I.T.S. Cold Case Assistance 27.0%5 23.0%
Cold Case Assist Outside Agency 47.0%6 37.9%
Cold Case Unit Development Assist 34.8% 40.7%
Expert Witness Testimony Assist 52.6% 51.7%
How Death Occurred Assistance 38.9% 40.2%
Interrogation Technique Assistance 45.4% 52.9%
Crime Timeline Assistance 61.1% 54.0%
DNA Analysis Assistance 46.8% 51.7%
Gang Affiliation Information 59.4% 50.6%
Criminal Profiling 46.4% 50.6%
Crime Mapping 79.5% 78.2%
Archival Motor Vehicle Records 67.2% 67.2%
Archival Driver Licensing Records 65.2% 55.2%

It is important to note that for many of the services listed, the

percentages shown were obtained through a response option that read,

5
This percentage dropped to 16.2% when data were filtered to include
only investigators who work at least 75% of their time on homicide or
rape/sexual assault investigations.
6
This percentage increased to 76.3% when data were filtered to include
only investigators who work at least 75% of their time on homicide or
rape/sexual assault investigations.
Police Technologies, People, and Professional Culture 101

“I am not familiar with it but would use it.” Evaluators are confident
that the above percentages represent potential for use of underutilized
H.I.T.S. services. There is plenty of evidence throughout the W.S.U.
evaluation team’s report that supports the fact that H.I.T.S.
investigator/analysts are effective in their efforts to accomplish H.I.T.S.
mission goals. Communicating more effectively information
concerning the services they can provide to those who would use
them was a principal recommendation made by the W.S.U. program
evaluators. Having sufficiently reviewed the data drawn from many
instances of H.I.T.S. services, we now examine the role H.I.T.S.
Bulletins play in assisting local criminal investigators in their work.

Introduction to H.I.T.S. Bulletins

The H.I.T.S. unit began issuing Bulletins on January 16, 2002 in an

effort to inform the local law enforcement community of unsolved
homicides, rapes/sexual assaults, and other serious crimes that might
affect them. Immediately upon being created, the Bulletins are
distributed via e-mail through a list maintained at the H.I.T.S. unit. A
section of the W.S.U. 2006 H.I.T.S. program evaluation report
addressed many aspects of the H.I.T.S. Bulletins, including their
purpose, the pattern of their distribution, and the opinions users of the
Bulletins hold concerning this informational source. There were 1,179
Bulletins issued and distributed by the H.I.T.S. unit between January
16, 2002 and April 14, 2006.
Recipients of H.I.T.S. Bulletins were surveyed via a self-
administered survey conducted on the Internet. There were 643
respondents to the on-line survey, but it was discovered that many who
receive the periodic bulletins do not have investigative authority over
homicide and rape/sexual assault cases. Such authority was determined
to be an operational standard for the evaluation. Information from
those lacking investigative authority is nonetheless important.
Therefore, it was decided by the evaluation team that two data runs
would be made on the on-line survey. One run includes all respondents
(N=643), while the second run included only those respondents who
have investigative authority over homicide and/or rape/sexual assault
cases (N=219). Consequently, some of the charts that follow will show
more participants than others.
102 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

Distribution of the H.I.T.S. Bulletins

In order to learn how H.I.T.S. Bulletin recipients became aware of, and
began receiving H.I.T.S. Bulletins, the W.S.U. evaluation team asked
them the following question: “Which of the following best describes
how you were introduced to H.I.T.S. Bulletins?” Responses to this
question indicate that bulletin recipients were almost equally divided in
thirds as to the method by which they started receiving H.I.T.S.
Bulletins. Some 220 (34.2%) bulletin recipients responded that they
heard about the bulletins from a co-worker, and they requested to
receive them. A total of 206 (32%) indicated that the bulletins started
appearing in their e-mail without their solicitation. Yet another 205
(31.9%) responded that they heard about the bulletins through a
colleague and they made a request to receive them. The majority of
those who responded that the bulletins started appearing in their e-mail
without solicitation (206, or 32.0%) are likely Community Corrections
Officers (CCOs). When evaluators inquired as to the process by which
names are added to the bulletin recipient list a H.I.T.S. staff member
readily volunteered the evidence that the names of all CCOs in
Washington were added to the H.I.T.S. bulletin e-mail list at one time.
Otherwise, the staffer stated, people are added to the distribution list
only upon direct request.
These survey data results indicate that 425 (66.1%) of the H.I.T.S.
Bulletin recipients requested to receive the bulletins after hearing about
them through either a co-worker or a colleague. The distinction
between the categories “co-worker” and “colleague” was intentionally
left to the respondents. Evaluators intended co-worker to mean
somebody who works in the same agency as the recipient. Colleague
was intended to mean somebody from an allied agency, which could
have included H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts. Nobody commented on
this specific distinction, and the W.S.U. evaluation team cannot be
certain that the intended distinction was realized by the on-line survey
participants. It is believed that those who indicated co-worker implied
that they learned about the H.I.T.S. Bulletins through somebody within
their agency, and those who responded “colleague” meant someone in
law enforcement from outside of their own agency.
Police Technologies, People, and Professional Culture 103

Distribution of Bulletins; Intended Audience

In any program resource allocation the question of whom to include

and whom to exclude arises. In interviews conducted with the H.I.T.S.
team it was learned that the H.I.T.S. staff has grappled with the
question of the proper range of distribution of H.I.T.S. Bulletins. Due
to the confidential nature of some of the bulletins, it is debatable as to
whether they should be distributed to persons who are not certified as
peace officers. Recommendations regarding the distribution of H.I.T.S.
Bulletins follow in a later segment of this book. Of immediate concern
is whether the distribution list produces the impact intended by the
H.I.T.S. unit management. H.I.T.S. Bulletins are designed and issued
as an informational tool intended to increase the potential that serious
crime in Washington be either cleared, meaning that an arrest is made
in the case, or prevented, such as due to the apprehension of a potential
perpetrator prior to the commission of future crimes.
The W.S.U. evaluation team members honed in on one critical
question: Since one measure of success for the H.I.T.S. unit is the
number of bulletins sent out7, and the number of H.I.T.S. Bulletin
recipients, should concern be occasioned that 206, or nearly one-third,
of the H.I.T.S. Bulletin recipients replied that they did not request
receipt of the bulletins? When asked about this issue, a H.I.T.S. staff
member replied to one W.S.U. evaluation team member via e-mail,
“Also, at one point several years ago, we entered every DOC CCO
address we could find. That seriously bloated our numbers.” The term,
“bloated our numbers” was not interpreted by evaluators to mean that
H.I.T.S. team members intentionally padded the numbers of H.I.T.S.
Bulletin recipients to justify their existence. Rather, it was interpreted
literally to mean that the number of recipients increased significantly
following the inclusion of the CCO e-mail addresses. What was left for
the W.S.U. evaluation team to decide was whether the practice of
sending H.I.T.S. Bulletins, some of which contain “law enforcement
confidential information,” to non-sworn personnel serves the intended
mission of the H.I.T.S. unit.

7
H.I.T.S. management refers to the H.I.T.S. Bulletins in two
separate mission statements.
104 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

Information given to H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts is so given

based on the age-old “need to know” doctrine. Based on the review of
over 1,100 H.I.T.S. Bulletins by the W.S.U. evaluation team, it is
submitted that the bulletins do not contain information that would
jeopardize any criminal case. Information that could jeopardize a
criminal case is generally termed as “hold-back” information. Hold-
back information is only released to those with direct ties to the
investigation of that specific case. The sort of information that appears
on the H.I.T.S. Bulletins, though not critical to the prosecution of a
case, is at times rather sensitive. H.I.T.S. program evaluators reviewed
comments from H.I.T.S. Bulletin recipients to gather additional
information on which to make a judgment call as to the appropriateness
of the distribution of H.I.T.S. Bulletins to CCOs. Four notable
comments in this area were as follows:

For Community Corrections Officers and Community

Corrections Supervisors [like me] our use of the bulletins is to
see also if someone whom law enforcement is looking for may
possibly be on our caseloads. We see also so many faces of
offenders throughout the years that many times a CCO
somewhere in the state may be able to provide the tip that law
enforcement needs. That is the benefit for DOC and I would
like to see also that continued.
I am a Washington State D.O.C. Community Corrections
Supervisor and [I] receive the bulletins regularly. I believe it
is very important for officers/supervisors of DOC’s
Community Corrections Division to receive the bulletins, as
we have regular contact and vital information on thousands of
felons in Washington State, and may be able to assist police
investigators in solving their cases.
H.I.T.S. information is rarely used by DOC field staff;
however, it may be used in conjunction with new or ‘crime-
partner’ investigations to locate a wanted person. We usually
leave the investigations to the experts, but we may do a follow-
up violation report to the Court or Hearings Unit in
conjunction with a new conviction.
Police Technologies, People, and Professional Culture 105

…I do not believe that you should have to be a commissioned

officer to belong to H.I.T.S.

Based on the comments presented, the W.S.U. evaluation team

recommended that CCOs continue to receive H.I.T.S. Bulletins, despite
their classification as non-commissioned law enforcement. The job
function of CCOs places them in a unique position to offer timely tips
to local law enforcement regarding the known and verified whereabouts
of potential offenders. That recommendation was also based on the
fact that upon a systematic review of the content of all 1,000+ H.I.T.S.
Bulletins issued up until the most recent ones vis-à-vis the date of the
completion of the W.S.U. program evaluation report, it was determined
that the H.I.T.S. Bulletins did not result in the inappropriate release of
information that could jeopardize the successful clearance of a criminal
case. Furthermore, the distribution of information (including H.I.T.S.
Bulletins) to a greater number of people in the criminal justice
professional network could result in the rendering of timely assistance
to local law enforcement resulting in the clearing of a crime sooner
rather than later. That is, after all, the principal mission of the H.I.T.S.
unit. What follows next is analysis of the H.I.T.S. Bulletins including
the source and purpose of each bulletin.

Source and Purpose of Bulletins:

The list below represents the top 11 agencies to have created H.I.T.S.
Bulletins (from January 16, 2002 through April 14, 2006), not
including bulletins that announced training or featured U.S. Probation
reports:8

8
A similar version of this list appeared in a preliminary evaluation study
report; however that listing showed the top 10 agencies responsible for the
creation of bulletins. The H.I.T.S. team contributions were excluded from that
listing.
106 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

# of Bulletins % of total

1. Seattle P.D. 81 6.9%

2. King Co S.D 80 6.8%
3. Snohomish Co S.D. 74 6.3%
4. H.I.T.S. Team 43 3.6%
5. Spokane P.D. 28 2.4%
6. Tacoma P.D. 28 2.4%
7. Federal Way P.D. 27 2.3%
8. Bellevue P.D. 26 2.2%
9. Bellingham P.D. 23 2.0%
10. Kent P.D. 22 1.9%
11. Auburn P.D. 21 1.8%

A total of 338 (28.7%) H.I.T.S. Bulletins were generated by local

law enforcement agencies located within Washington State Regional
Homeland Security Coordination District Region 6 (King County).
Another 222 (18.8%) H.I.T.S. Bulletins were generated within Region
1 (Snohomish, Skagit, and Whatcom Counties). Nearly half (47.5%) of
the bulletins were generated by agencies located within those four
Westside counties. Following is a categorical breakdown of the
reasons for these bulletins:

Top 18 Reasons Bulletins Were Generated (N=1,179):

# of Bulletins % of total

1. Homicide Suspect 150 12.7%

2. Missing Persons (over age 18) 140 11.9%
3. Training 95 8.1%
4. Robbery Suspect 48 4.1%
5. Bank Robbery Suspect 40 3.4%
6. Rape Suspect 40 3.4%
7. Officer Safety 34 2.9%
8. Armed Robbery Suspects 27 2.3%
9. Assault Suspects 25 2.1%
10. Suspicious Circumstances 21 1.8%
11. Homicide Persons of Interest 20 1.7%
12. Home Invasion Robbery Suspects 19 1.6%
Police Technologies, People, and Professional Culture 107

13. Serial Robbery Suspect 17 1.4%

14. Escapee 16 1.4%
15. Missing Persons (Under age 18) 16 1.4%
16. Child Rape Suspect 16 1.4%
17. Homicide Witness(es) 14 1.2%
18. Rape/Kidnapping Suspect(s) 13 1.1%
All Robbery 151 12.8%
(includes 4,5,8,12, & 13 above)
All Rape 69 5.9%
(includes #6, 16, & 18 above)

In examining the number of bulletins created for each topic, the

W.S.U. evaluation team cautions the reader that more than one bulletin
could have been generated for each incident. For example, if a bulletin
was generated for a homicide suspect, and at a subsequent time another
bulletin is generated to advise that a suspect was arrested in that case,
both bulletins would count in the category “homicide.” Therefore, one
should not assume that the number of homicide-related bulletins (150)
indicates that there were 150 separate homicides that each generated
one H.I.T.S. Bulletin.
It was imperative that the W.S.U. evaluation team look beyond the
crimes that lead to the generation of the bulletins and determine the
jurisdictions that were not the source of bulletins in order to document
if it is the case that some local law enforcement agencies are being left
out of this aspect of H.I.T.S. program services. But first, it is quite
helpful to demonstrate the level of participation in the H.I.T.S. Bulletin
program by Washington cities and counties.
Following is a list of Washington cities and towns (with
population9 indicated, and for towns with a population of 1,000 or
greater) for which H.I.T.S. Bulletins have been created, since the
inception of the bulletin program on January 16, 2002 (N=78).

9
2007 Office of Financial Management Estimate. Source: Scott D.
Dwyor and Mary B. Dwyor (eds.), 2008 Washington State Yearbook.
Sammamish: Electronic Handbook Publishers, Inc.
108 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

Aberdeen (16,450) Mount Vernon (29,390)

Airway Heights (5,030) Mountlake Ter. (20,810)
Algona (2,725) Mukilteo (19,940)
Anacortes (16,400) Oak Harbor (22,690)
Arlington (16,720) Olympia (44,460)
Auburn (50,470) Othello (6,340)
Bellevue (118,100) Pacific (6,055)
Bellingham (75,220) Pasco (50,210)
Bonney Lake (15,740) Port Angeles (19,010)
Bothell (32,400) Port Townsend (8,865)
Bremerton (35,810) Pullman (26,860)
Brewster (2,195) Puyallup (36,790)
Brier (6,480) Quincy (5,455)
Centralia (15,520) Redmond (3,005)
College Place (8,860) Renton (60,290)
Coupeville (1,855) Richland (45,070)
Des Moines (29,090) Seattle (572,600)
Edmonds (40,560) Sedro Wooley (9,945)
Ellensburg (17,220) Sequim (5,330)
Everett (101,800) Shelton (8,895)
Federal Way (87,390) Shoreline (53,190)
Fife (7,180) Snohomish (8,970)
Gig Harbor (6,780) Soap Lake (1,750)
Hoquiam (8,845) South Bend (1,770)
Issaquah (24,710) Spokane (202,900)
Kennewick (62,520) Spokane Valley (88,280)
Kent (86,660) Stanwood (5,200)
Kirkland (47,890) Steilacoom (6,220)
Kittitas (1,135) Sumner (9,035)
Lake Forest Park (12,770) Sunnyside (15,130)
Lakewood (58,950) Tacoma (201,700)
Longview (35,710) Toppenish (9,105)
Lynden (11,150) Tukwila (18,000)
Lynnwood (35,490) Tumwater (13,340)
Marysville (36,210) Vancouver (160,800)
Mercer Island (22,380) Washougal (12,980)
Mill Creek (17,620) Wenatchee (30,270)
Monroe (16,290) West Richland (10,850)
Moses Lake (17,440) Yakima (82,940)
Police Technologies, People, and Professional Culture 109

This is a list of Washington cities and towns for which H.I.T.S.

Bulletins have not been created (N=203)

Albion (625) Cosmopolis (1,645)

Almira (285) Coulee City (600)
Asotin (1,180) Coulee Dam (1,025)
Bainbridge Is. (23,080) Covington (17,190)
Battle Ground (16,240) Creston (255)
Beau Arts Village (310) Cusick (210)
Benton City (2,860) Darrington (1,485)
Bingen (680) Davenport (1,745)
Black Diamond (4,120) Dayton (2,720)
Blaine (4,650) Deer Park (3,235)
Bridgeport (2,090) Dupont (7,045)
Buckley (4,555) Duvall (5,845)
Bucoda (655) East Wenatchee (11,480)
Burien (31,410) Eatonville (2,380)
Burlington (8,400) Edgewood (9,560)
Camas (16,280) Electric City (970)
Carbonado (655) Elma (3,140)
Carnation (1,900) Elmer City (241)
Cashmere (2,980) Endicott (331)
Castle Rock (2,135) Entiat (1,130)
Cathlamet (560) Enumclaw (11,320)
Chehalis (7,045) Ephrata (7,025)
Chelan (3,835) Everson (2,165)
Cheney (10,210) Fairfield (627)
Chewelah (2,350) Farmington (145)
Clarkston (7,280) Ferndale (10,540)
Cle Elum (1,835) Fircrest (6,270)
Clyde Hill (2,810) Forks (3,175)
Colfax (2,905) Friday Harbor (2,220)
Colton (420) Garfield (630)
Colville (5,020) George (530)
Conconully (190) Gold Bar (2,175)
Concrete (845) Goldendale (3,715)
Connell (3,205) Grand Coulee (930)
110 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

Grandview (9,150) Medina (2,950)

Granger (2,955) Mesa (440)
Granite Falls (3,195) Metaline (165)
Hamilton (330) Metaline Falls (286)
Harrah (630) Millwood (1,665)
Harrington (420) Milton (6,520)
Hartline (145) Montesano (3,550)
Hatton (105) Morton (1,140)
Hunts Point (480) Mossyrock (485)
Ilwaco (1,040) Moxee (2,065)
Index (160) Naches (805)
Ione (420) Napavine (1,492)
Kahlotus (220) Nespelem (205)
Kalama (2,105) Newcastle (9,550)
Kelso (11,840) Newport (1,990)
Kenmore (19,940) Nooksack (1,075)
Kettle Falls (1,610) Normandy Park (6,435)
Krupp (60) North Bend (4,705)
La Center (2,440) North Bonneville (882)
La Conner (900) Northport (290)
La Crosse (35,870) Oakesdale (420)
Lake Stevens (13,350) Oakville (715)
Lamont (90) Ocean Shores (4,705)
Langley (1,060) Odessa (955)
Latah (192) Okanogan (2,445)
Leavenworth (2,225) Omak (4,735)
Liberty Lake (6,580) Oroville (1,710)
Lind (560) Orting (5,940)
Long Beach (1,460) Palouse (1,020)
Lyman (450) Port Orchard (8,350)
Lynden (11,150) Pateros (620)
Mabton (2,080) Pe Ell (670)
Malden (215) Pomeroy (1,520)
Mansfield (330) Port Orchard (8,350)
Maple Valley (20,020) Poulsbo (7,560)
Marcus (175) Prescott (315)
Mattawa (3,340) Prosser (5,075)
McCleary (1,555) Rainier (1,705)
Medical Lake (4,695) Raymond (3,005)
Police Technologies, People, and Professional Culture 111

Reardan (630) Toledo (685)

Republic (985) Tonasket (990)
Ridgefield (3,680) Twisp (980)
Ritzville (1,730) Union Gap (5,700)
Riverside (320) Uniontown (345)
Rockford (865) University Place (31,300)
Rock Island (504) Vader (620)
Rosalia (650) Waitsburg (1,230)
Roslyn (1,020) Walla Walla (30,990)
Roy (870) Wapato (4,540)
Royal City (1,885) Warden (2,575)
Ruston (750) Washtucna (260)
Saint John (564) Waterville (1,180)
Sammamish (40,260) Waverly (120)
SeaTac (25,530) Westport (2,335)
Selah (6,935) White Salmon (2,195)
Skykomish (210) Wilbur (900)
Snoqualmie (8,600) Wilkeson (455)
South Cle Elum (580) Wilson Creek (245)
South Prairie (440) Winlock (1,370)
Spangle (275) Winthrop (380)
Sprague (495) Woodinville (10,390)
Starbuck (130) Woodland (4,960)
Stevenson (1,370) Woodway (1,180)
Sultan (4,530) Yacolt (1,370)
Sumas (1,191) Yarrow Point (975)
Tekoa (835) Yelm (4,845)
Tenino (1,520) Zillah (2,660
Tieton (1,200)
112 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

This is a list of Washington counties for which H.I.T.S. Bulletins have

been generated (N=27):
Benton (162,900) Lincoln (10,300)
Chelan (71,200) Mason (54,600)
Clallam (68,500) Pacific (21,600)
Clark (415,000) Pierce (790,500)
Cowlitz (97,800) Skagit (115,300)
Douglas (36,300) Skamania (10,700)
Grant (82,500) Snohomish (686,300)
Grays Harbor (70,800) Spokane (451,200)
Island (78,400) Stevens (43,000)
Jefferson (28,600) Thurston (238,000)
King (1,861,300) Walla Walla (58,300)
Kitsap (244,800) Whatcom (188,300)
Kittitas (38,300) Yakima (234,200)
Lewis (74,100)

Counties not generating H.I.T.S. Bulletins were the following:

Asotin (21,300), Adams (17,600), Columbia (4,100), Ferry (7,550),
Franklin (67,400), Garfield (2,350), Klickitat (19,900), Okanogan
(39,800), Pend Oreille (12,600), San Juan (15,900), Wahkiakum
(4,000), and Whitman (42,700).
There were rare instances in which a city or a county law
enforcement agency worked in conjunction with a neighboring
jurisdiction to develop a H.I.T.S. Bulletin in a criminal investigation
matter of mutual concern. If that was the only instance requiring a
H.I.T.S. Bulletin, it is possible that the neighboring jurisdiction was
annotated as the recipient of the H.I.T.S. unit service, leaving that
agency identified as having not benefited by the distribution of a
H.I.T.S. Bulletin. Only one instance of that occurring was identified
wherein Franklin and Benton counties had a joint case. Because only
one agency could be shown to benefit from the H.I.T.S. service, Benton
County was given the credit and Franklin County shows as having not
received the benefit. Neither county’s Sheriff Department has made
much use of the H.I.T.S. Bulletin service. City police departments such
as Pasco, Richland and Kennewick benefited from H.I.T.S. Bulletin
services while the host county Sheriff’s Departments did not.
Police Technologies, People, and Professional Culture 113

The survey data show a trend in the use of H.I.T.S. bulletins. Fully
81 (72.3%) of the agencies for which no H.I.T.S. Bulletin has ever been
created since the inception of the H.I.T.S. Bulletin program on January
16, 2002 have between one and ten sworn officers. Another 26
(23.1%) have 11 – 25 sworn officers. Four cities--Burien, Kelso,
SeaTac and Walla Walla—are the largest cities in Washington to not
have benefited from H.I.T.S. Bulletin service. They each have between
26 and 50 sworn officers. This is evidence that there is a serious
communication deficiency that must be overcome if law enforcement
agencies want to experience the best possible flow of
information/intelligence.
H.I.T.S. Bulletins are generated and distributed for any reason
deemed by H.I.T.S. personnel to be “mission worthy.” It would be
difficult to argue that the city and county law enforcement agencies
listed above which have not benefited from the distribution of H.I.T.S.
Bulletins have not had incidents that warranted the creation of a
Bulletin since January 16, 2002. It seems clear that H.I.T.S.
investigator/analysts may have the opportunity to penetrate those
jurisdictions if they increase their level of attention to stranger-to-
stranger sexual assaults. Now that a clear pattern of uneven
distribution has emerged, the evaluators turn their attention to the
impact the H.I.T.S. Bulletin program has had on crime.

Bulletin Impact on Crime

The W.S.U. evaluation team sought to ascertain the degree to which

bulletins issued from the H.I.T.S. unit have been useful in assisting
local criminal justice agencies in their crime fighting effort. Several
questions asked of the H.I.T.S. Bulletin recipients were designed to
capture data that informed the evaluation team on this specific
important topic. In this regard they were asked this question: “Which
of the following best describes how useful H.I.T.S. Bulletins are in
assisting you in your job?” The response categories ranged from “not
useful at all” on one end of a continuum to “very useful” on the other.
Responses for all 643 of the Bulletin recipients who responded to
the survey were examined. Fully 472 (73.4%) local criminal justice
professionals responded that the H.I.T.S. Bulletins are “somewhat” or
“very” useful. Another 114 (17.7%) indicated that they were
“undecided,” and only 50 (7.8%) reported that the H.I.T.S. Bulletins
114 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

are not useful in assisting them in their job or on their investigations.

In an effort to determine if the degree of usefulness of H.I.T.S.
Bulletins varied across the groups of those who reported to be criminal
investigators (who investigate homicides and rapes/sexual assault) and
those who do not, the replies to this question recorded by criminal
investigators were plotted separately.
The vast majority of on-line survey respondents who identified
themselves as criminal investigators (184, 84.0%) rated the H.I.T.S.
Bulletins as being useful. This compares to the figure of 73.9% when
all recipients were included. Those who were undecided about the help
provided by H.I.T.S. Bulletins dropped to 12.3% (compared to 17.9%),
and those not finding the H.I.T.S. Bulletins to be useful dropped from
7.9% to 3.7%. These survey data indicate that H.I.T.S. Bulletins are
helpful to more than 92% of all bulletin recipients, and that percentage
of “assistance rendered” increases to over 96% for those whose main
job is the investigation of homicides and rapes/sexual assault.
H.I.T.S. Bulletin recipients were given the opportunity to tell
evaluators how many times they have benefited directly from the
receipt of H.I.T.S. Bulletins. A full 243 (37.8%) responded that they
are not investigators, so they did not believe this question to be
applicable to them. Another 127 (19.8%) indicated that their
investigations have never benefited by H.I.T.S. Bulletins. Some 177
(27.5%) responded that they have benefited one to five times, while 40
(6.2%) claimed to have benefited six to ten times. Forty-seven (7.3%)
individuals indicated that their investigations have been assisted by a
H.I.T.S. Bulletin more than ten times. All told, 41.6% of all H.I.T.S.
Bulletin recipients confirmed that the H.I.T.S. Bulletins have benefited
them in their investigative duties. That percentage dramatically
increases when the responses of those whose job is primarily that of
investigations are more closely examined.
Of those investigators identified as having investigative authority
of homicides and rapes/sexual assaults, 69.6% responded that their
investigations benefited from H.I.T.S. Bulletins. With a firm
understanding of the level of investigation benefits provided by the
H.I.T.S. Bulletins, the W.S.U. evaluation team next explored additional
benefits the H.I.T.S. Bulletins might provide to criminal justice system
professionals working in local police agencies and in community
corrections across the state.
Police Technologies, People, and Professional Culture 115

Bulletins Provide Historical Data

In the process of evaluating a service such as the H.I.T.S. Bulletin it is

inevitable that determinations need to be made as to the need of certain
components of the host program. In the case of the H.I.T.S. Bulletins,
the data gathered confirms that the H.I.T.S. Bulletins provide much
more than an “all points bulletin” type of informational source used on
an immediate criminal offense. Such advisories are usually discarded
within hours or even minutes of their creation. Stated best by one
H.I.T.S. Bulletin recipient who expressed support for the continuation
of the H.I.T.S. Bulletin program, the importance of the bulletins as
historical data needs to be recognized:

Although we do not usually submit items to H.I.T.S., our

agency always reviews the information and compares wanted
suspects with in-house data in case there is a connection. In
November of 2005, while compiling a wanted poster for U.S.
Probation, I recalled an earlier H.I.T.S. Bulletin for a bank
robber. The subject of my wanted poster turned out to be the
H.I.T.S. bank robber of a bank in Kennewick, WA. The FBI
was notified and the suspect was arrested a few weeks later in
Nevada (after robbing a few more banks).

The W.S.U. evaluation team uncovered additional data of this kind that
suggest that H.I.T.S. Bulletins are seen as a valuable asset in the local
law enforcement community.

Support for the Continuation of Distribution of H.I.T.S. Bulletins,

and Comments on Their Use

Information not shared is useless information. – From a

H.I.T.S. Bulletin recipient

The following text is a series of statements made by H.I.T.S. Bulletin

recipients in response to a question that prompted them to comment on
their overall opinion of the H.I.T.S. Bulletins and distribution thereof:
116 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

I work for Immigration and Customs Enforcement (U.S.

Customs) in the intelligence office. As I get the bulletins, I
query subjects for a nexus to the U.S. borders. I have been
able assist investigation with this information.
I started receiving H.I.T.S. Bulletins when I was a detective in
a sexual assault unit. I have continued to receive them after
being promoted and returning to patrol. I will post them on a
LAW ENFORCEMENT ONLY bulletin board if applicable to
our area.
The information contained in these bulletins helps me keep in
tune with the community I serve. This is simply because I am
a Community Corrections Officer and a lot of the H.I.T.S.
bulletins contain information of future members of my case
load. You and your bulletins provide a great service - Thank
you for all you do for me!
H.I.T.S. [bulletin resource] is a great resource of
information. We utilize it to keep officers aware of individuals
and crimes which have occurred in nearby communities.
While we review every bulletin I believe we have only utilized
H.I.T.S. services 1-2 times. - From a Police Chief.
I love to receive the H.I.T.S. bulletins. We are so rural and
small that we are rarely able to provide useful info to other
agencies about their postings. Also, our reported violent
crime/sexual assault crime rate is very low. - From a
supervising investigator.
H.I.T.S. information is rarely used by DOC field staff;
however, it may be used in conjunction with new or ‘crime-
partner’ investigations to locate a wanted person. We usually
leave the investigations to the experts, but we may do a follow-
up violation report to the Court or Hearings Unit in
conjunction with a new conviction.
I am a Washington State D.O.C. Community Corrections
Supervisor, and I receive the bulletins regularly. I believe it is
very important for officers/supervisors of DOC’s Community
Corrections Division to receive the bulletins, as we have
regular contact [with] and vital information on thousands of
Police Technologies, People, and Professional Culture 117

felons in Washington. [We] may be able to assist police

investigators in solving their cases.
I think it is important for DOC to be involved in receiving
these bulletins. Just last month I was able to help another
local agency locate an individual they were looking for
concerning a homicide as I had updated information on him.

It was apparent to the W.S.U. evaluation team that the H.I.T.S. Bulletin
component of the H.I.T.S. unit program provides important and timely
information to local law enforcement agents who serve in varied
capacities to accomplish similar goals. It is important for a program
such as H.I.T.S. to not only have technologies available for the efficient
means by which to attain mission goals, but to achieve a nexus between
people within the program associated with those technologies and those
being served by the program is also critical to mission success. It
appears that this important nexus was achieved in the case of the
H.I.T.S. Bulletins.

Technology-Related Issues

Several key issues related to the H.I.T.S. criminal information

technologies used by local law enforcement were identified by the
W.S.U. evaluation team and were captured in this report. These issues
can be easily categorized under three useful headings: data input
issues; access to the data issues; and training issues. These
observations from the program evaluation study are particularly
important for the development of deeper insight into the barriers to the
successful development of ILP in contemporary American law
enforcement.

Data Input

All database systems rely on the input of accurate and appropriate data.
Queries of the database can only produce outputs based on the
appropriate organization of information entered. It is therefore
essential that policies be established for the inclusion of certain data,
while the exclusion of non-essential data is ensured. Relevant
discussion topics related to data input include: What data are to be
118 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

included and excluded? Who should be charged with the input of data?
How should data be entered into the database? The first task is to
identify the type of data to be included and excluded.
Perhaps the single biggest policy issue related to criminal
intelligence databases concerns the type of data to be included or
excluded. H.I.T.S. administrators pride themselves in their decision to
enter and maintain legacy data for use in solving cold homicides and
rapes. Sheptycki (2004) warns against this practice in his outline of
pathologies that hinder organizational communications. Calling the
collection and maintenance of redundant or outdated information
“intelligence overload,” Sheptycki cautions that only up-to-date data
should be included in police intelligence databases. There is certainly
room for debate on this specific issue inasmuch as H.I.T.S. team
members point to instances in which their database queries have
resulted in retrieving archived license place information long ago
discarded by the department of vehicle licensing. This precisely
illustrates the importance of having policy statements in place to guide
the police intelligence and communications processes. The availability
of legacy data in the H.I.T.S. system is a prime opportunity for the
H.I.T.S. team to use it as a tool to help to open doors of
communications across agency lines, as recommended by Mastrofski
(2006).
An example of data that should be included in all police databases
is field interrogation information. Called FIRs (for field interview or
field interrogation report) in the police community, the information
gathered in the course of routine patrol could be critical to solving
criminal offenses based on the well-known proverb that criminal
offenders seldom commit a single illegal act. Evidence gathered for the
H.I.T.S. program evaluation report prepared by the W.S.U. researchers
indicates that FIRS are vastly underused in criminal investigations.
Support for the inclusion of FIRs in criminal investigative databases
was found in the literature: “Limited evidence supports the
effectiveness of field interrogations in reducing specific types of
crime…” (Weisburd and Eck, 2004: 51).
In a focus group session held on March 14, 2006, one city
patrolman stated “We do FICs (field interview cards, a.k.a. field
interrogation reports) on patrol and that information just sits there. If
H.I.T.S. wants that information, all they have to do is ask for it. Guys
on patrol are too busy with paperwork to fill out H.I.T.S. forms. We
Police Technologies, People, and Professional Culture 119

could send up thousands of cards over the past year.” Important to the
topic of data entry is the process of data entry. Most police agencies
are under-staffed, and their crime analysis unit is typically no
exception. Frankly, there are not enough personnel available to input
thousands of FIRs. As yet, few FIRs are recorded digitally; when that
percentage grows this particular barrier to data entry will be greatly
reduced.
Data input is a serious concern for the H.I.T.S. team as well. Since
they assist in cases that relate specifically to homicides and rapes, the
H.I.T.S. program uses standardized input forms which they make
available to all criminal investigators in Washington State. Key to the
present discussion is the question of who inputs the case-based data.
The H.I.T.S. input forms for homicides and sexual assaults are 236 and
217 data entry items in length, respectively. Data entry for each case
requires between one to two hours. The forms must first be filled out
by the investigating detective, then the data entry process begins at the
H.I.T.S. office. That process adds additional time to the investigation
of each case.
Findings from the W.S.U. H.I.T.S. program evaluation report
highlight the debate over data entry. Regarding the handling of
homicide and rape/sexual assault data, criminal investigators were
asked about the flow of information thusly: “Information would flow
from my agency to H.I.T.S. in a more efficient manner if investigators
from my agency could input homicide or rape/sexual assault data
directly into the H.I.T.S. database and bypass the H.I.T.S. investigative
team.” Only 44 of 293 (15%) responded that they “agree or strongly
agree” with this statement; 79 (27%) were “uncertain;” and 109 (37%)
responded they “somewhat or strongly disagree.” This indicates that
field investigators want help inputting data. Comments associated with
this question cited time constraints as the main reason for requesting
help. This issue was addressed by another survey question which read
as follows: “I would prefer to be able to input data from my
investigations directly into the H.I.T.S. database without having to go
through the H.I.T.S. team.” Only 53 of 293 (18%) Criminal
investigators responded that they “somewhat or strongly agree” with
the statement; 55 of 293 (18.8%) responded they were “uncertain;” and
147 of 293 (50.2%) responded that they “somewhat or strongly
disagree.”
120 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

Supervising investigators were asked to respond to the following

statement: “I would prefer that my investigators input data from their
investigations directly into the H.I.T.S. database without having to go
through the H.I.T.S. team.” Only 9 of 87 (10.3%) responded that they
“somewhat or strongly agree;” 24 (27.6%) responded “uncertain;” 50
(57.5%) responded “somewhat or strongly disagree.” When asked to
respond to the following question, results were somewhat different:
“Information would flow from my agency to H.I.T.S. in a more
efficient manner if investigators from my agency could input homicide
or rape/sexual assault data directly into the H.I.T.S. database and
bypass the H.I.T.S. investigators.” Those supervising investigators
who responded “somewhat or strongly agree” numbered 17 of 87
(19.5%); 27 (31%) were “uncertain;” and 35 (40.2%) responded
“somewhat or strongly disagree.”
Police Chiefs and Sheriffs were also asked to respond to the
statement: “I would prefer that my investigators input data from their
investigations directly into the H.I.T.S. database without having to go
through the H.I.T.S. team.” Only 15.8% (28 of 177) “agree or strongly
agree;” 52 of 177 (29.4%) responded that they were “uncertain;” 56 of
177 (31.6%) responded “somewhat or strongly disagree” and 39 of 177
(22%) indicated they did not have enough experience to answer the
question.
Police Chiefs and Sheriffs were asked to respond to the statement:
“Information would flow from my agency to H.I.T.S. in a more
efficient manner if investigators from my agency could input homicide
or rape/sexual assault data directly into the H.I.T.S. database and
bypass the H.I.T.S. investigative team.” Only slightly more than one-
in-five (41 of 177, or 23.2%) responded “agree or strongly agree;” 52
or 29.4% responded “uncertain;” 34 or 19.2% responded “disagree or
strongly disagree;” and 48 or 27.1% indicated that they did not have
enough experience to answer the question. Data from criminal
investigators, their supervisors, and police chiefs and Sheriffs indicate
that the flow of information would be enhanced if detectives are not
required to input data directly into the H.I.T.S. database.
H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts were asked their views regarding the
need for them to assist local law enforcement criminal investigators to
input crime data into the H.I.T.S. database. To the question, “I would
prefer that detectives input their crime data directly into the H.I.T.S.
system without coordinating that effort through me,” 100% of the
Police Technologies, People, and Professional Culture 121

respondents either selected “somewhat disagree” or “strongly disagree”

as their response.
These comments from the criminal investigator survey were
typical of those wanting direct access to the H.I.T.S. database. Their
responses were to a question that asked them how the H.I.T.S. unit
could be improved:

If we could connect on line and also do our own searches.

Easier access.
Being able to search the database without calling a H.I.T.S.
employee to request information.
Could be accessed from my computer.
Having direct access to the database and being able to input
data would make the database more accessible and
information reading available.
If major crimes investigators could perform queries to the
H.I.T.S. database directly.
The data was more readily available to local investigator
(read only terminal).
The input forms for murder and rape/sexual assault cases contain a
good deal of sensitive information10. The homicide form contains 236
data entry points, and the sexual assault form contains 217 entry points,
as previously mentioned. The trained staff within the H.I.T.S. unit
reports they can complete input of the data in less than an hour. The
evaluation team estimated that it would take each local law
enforcement criminal investigator in the field more than an hour to
complete data input for each incidence of homicide or rape/sexual
assault.
It was apparent to the W.S.U. evaluation team that Police Chiefs,
Sheriffs, supervising investigators and criminal investigators concur
that the time-consuming task of data input is an unwelcome distraction
to clients serviced by the H.I.T.S. unit. It should be noted that this
policy consideration will not come without cost to the H.I.T.S. unit.
10
The complete input form for Murder may be viewed in Appendix 7, for
Sexual assault see also Appendix 8.
122 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

The continuation of the practice of having H.I.T.S. team members

assist local law enforcement agency members to input crime data will
add strain to those within the H.I.T.S. unit, possibly making the
likelihood of the necessity of securing funding for additional H.I.T.S.
investigator/analysts inevitable. Future costs attributable to this data-
tracking process may have to become a shared expense of state and
local governments.
A closer examination of the survey data suggests that there may be
room for negotiation between the H.I.T.S. unit and local law
enforcement agencies with respect to sharing the financial burden of
data entry and analysis. While it is evident elsewhere in survey data
that many investigators want direct access to the data within the
H.I.T.S. database, there exists evidence in the above responses that
suggests that those surveyed might be willing to look more closely at
the issue of data entry. The percentage of criminal investigators (nearly
25%), supervising investigators (nearly 29%), and Police Chiefs and
Sheriffs (nearly 38%) who were uncertain about their preference as to
whether criminal investigators input data with or without assistance
indicates room for further discussion on this topic. A quick look at one
other aspect of access to the H.I.T.S. database will perhaps shed
additional light on this topic. Once data are entered into a policing
database myriad questions arise as to the extent of access permitted to
that data. A few of the major issues surrounding access are now
addressed.

Access to Data

A major hindrance to the sharing of data is nested in the area of

confidentiality. As was indicated in the information gathered for the
H.I.T.S. evaluation report, criminal investigators and their supervisors
want information housed in all other criminal databases to be readily
available to them, but they are reticent to share their information for
fear of jeopardizing cases. Though the question could have been
written for a more direct response regarding the willingness to share
data, the evaluation team believed they captured the essence of the
spirit that local law enforcement officers hold with the following
question: “In your opinion, of the following persons described below,
who should have direct, unfiltered access to the H.I.T.S. database?”
Police Technologies, People, and Professional Culture 123

Slightly more than half (159 or 54.3%) of criminal investigators

responded that any commissioned official employed by an agency
vested with the responsibility to prevent, investigate, or intervene in
criminal activity -- including police patrol officers -- should have
direct, unfiltered access to the H.I.T.S. database. Another 117 (39.9%)
of criminal investigators opined that direct, unfiltered access to the
H.I.T.S. database should be given only to those commissioned officials
assigned to investigative units within a criminal justice agency.
Supervising investigators were asked the same question, and more than
half (48 or 55.2%) of the supervising investigators who responded to
this question agreed that any commissioned official employed by an
agency vested with the responsibility to prevent, investigate, or
intervene in criminal activity, including police patrol officers, should
have direct and unfiltered access to the H.I.T.S. database. Another 34
(39.1%) of the supervising investigators indicated that direct, unfiltered
access to the H.I.T.S. database should be given only to those
commissioned officials assigned to investigative units within a criminal
justice agency. The local Police Chiefs and Sheriffs were asked the
same question.
Nearly two-thirds, 112 (63.3%) of the Police Chiefs and Sheriffs
who responded to the survey agreed that any commissioned official
employed by an agency vested with the responsibility to prevent,
investigate, or intervene in criminal activity, including police patrol
officers, should have direct, unfiltered access to the H.I.T.S. database.
Another 57 (32.2%) of Police Chiefs and Sheriffs stated that direct,
unfiltered access to the H.I.T.S. database should be given only to those
commissioned officials assigned to investigative units within a criminal
justice agency. H.I.T.S. Bulletin recipients were asked a similar
question, and their responses follow: “In your opinion, of the persons
described below, who should have unfiltered access to the H.I.T.S.
database?”
Nearly three-quarters (163 [74.4%]) of the investigators who
responded to this on-line survey question agreed that any
commissioned official employed by an agency vested with the
responsibility to prevent, investigate, or intervene in criminal activity,
including police patrol officers, should have direct and unfiltered
access to the H.I.T.S. database. Another 35 (16%) of the same
respondents replied that direct, unfiltered access to the H.I.T.S.
database should be given only to those commissioned law enforcement
124 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

officials assigned to investigative units within a criminal justice

agency.
These data suggest that the overwhelming majority of criminal
investigators of all ranks and with varying investigative responsibilities
surveyed favor granting access to the H.I.T.S. database by any
commissioned official employed by an agency vested with the
responsibility to prevent, investigate, or intervene in criminal activity,
including police patrol officers. These survey responses indicate
clearly that criminal investigators and their local government-based
colleagues in the criminal justice system believe they should have a
wide scope of authority over crime scene and criminal data maintained
by the State of Washington in the Attorney General’s H.I.T.S. program
database.
Manning (2001a, 2008) persuasively argues that the analytic
capacity of local law enforcement is ineffectual largely due to
impediments to data access. Data from the H.I.T.S. evaluation report
lead the W.S.U. evaluation research team to conclude that the vast
majority of criminal investigators in local law enforcement agencies
want immediate remote access to all of the criminal justice data
available without having to go through complicated processes of search
requests or connecting with other human gatekeepers. This supports
the theory proposed by Manning that police efficiency would be best
accomplished by giving patrol units immediate access to criminal data.
In his study of a police department in a city with 127,000 population,
Manning posits that resistance to new technologies by police officers is
related to whether or not the officer has access to data and is required to
use it. He suggests that if officers have the technology and are trained
to use it, they are more likely to accept it (2001a: 94). While the views
of police officers are important, it is also important to look beyond the
end user, criminal investigators in the field, to their supervisors and
department CEOs in order to gain a broader understanding of the
likelihood of support for new information technologies in policing.
Findings from the W.S.U. H.I.T.S. program evaluation report
supports the notion that the supervisors of criminal investigators and
police chiefs and sheriffs would likely embrace new information
technologies more fully if they were made more available through
easier access processes. Supervising Investigators were asked: “Which
of the following most closely represents your attitude toward new
technologies?” One supervisor responded “I am often confused by new
Police Technologies, People, and Professional Culture 125

technologies, and I defer to others;” 23 of 87 (26.4%) responded “I am

not technologically inclined, but I am willing to learn;” and 62 of 87
(71.3%) responded “I am comfortable with new technologies and I
embrace their use.” Police chiefs and Sheriffs were asked: “Which of
the following statements best represents your perspective on the proper
place of new technologies in criminal justice?” Fully 162 of 177
(91.5%) responded “I believe that law enforcement has access to all of
the technological tools it needs to successfully clear crimes; however
agencies have to make greater efforts to learn to use them properly;”
and 15 (8.5%) responded “I believe that new technologies for crime
solving and crime prevention have been over-sold. There is no
substitute for good old-fashioned detective work.” Police Chiefs and
Sheriffs were also asked to respond to this question: “Which of the
following most closely represents your attitudes toward new
technologies?” A total 34 of 177 (19.2%) responded “I am not
technologically inclined, but I am willing to adopt new technologies if
they show promise for helping my agency meet its mission and/or
goals;” 148 of 177 (83.6%) responded “I am comfortable with new
technologies, and I embrace their use in crime solving and crime
prevention.
The W.S.U. evaluation team wanted to formulate a sense of how
well the H.I.T.S. team shares responsibility with respect to the use of
the H.I.T.S. database for analysis. During interviews with H.I.T.S. staff
members, the W.S.U. evaluation team probed the ability of each
H.I.T.S. team member to run his or her own queries on the program
database. H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts were asked the following
question regarding queries: “I am qualified to run my own queries in
the H.I.T.S. databases.” Six of the seven respondents indicated that
they are somewhat or strongly in agreement that they are qualified to
run their own queries in the H.I.T.S. databases. One respondent
indicated uncertainty. Interview and survey responses from H.I.T.S.
team staff tell a somewhat different story. The W.S.U. H.I.T.S.
evaluation team wanted to learn more about the process of running
database queries on the H.I.T.S. system. Next, H.I.T.S.
investigator/analysts were asked a question about their confidence in
obtaining satisfactory results from their queries. While four
investigator/analysts agree or strongly agree with the statement, one
disagreed with it, and another two investigator/analysts indicated that
they are uncertain that their query results would be satisfactory.
126 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

The H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts work diligently to meet with the

criminal investigators within their respective jurisdictions; however,
despite their best efforts there is much evidence that they need to make
themselves and the services offered by the H.I.T.S. unit better known.
Face-to-face meetings between H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts is the
optimum method by which requisite grooming will occur to ensure that
local law enforcement investigators will think of the H.I.T.S. team in
the course of their investigative work, and as a result call the assigned
H.I.T.S. investigator/analyst when their services are needed. Such
meetings do not always occur, however, and that is not solely the fault
of H.I.T.S. staffers. Many criminal investigators are reticent to give up
valuable time for consultations with H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts when
their time is being consumed by preoccupation with active
investigations.
The H.I.T.S. program’s investigator/analysts have demonstrated
that they are fully aware of their mission to assist local law
enforcement criminal investigators in all aspects of criminal
investigation involving serious crimes against persons. The W.S.U.
evaluation team concluded in its program evaluation report that local
criminal investigators need to be more fully educated on that H.I.T.S.
mission in a manner that will assist the H.I.T.S. team to overcome what
is a natural tendency of local law enforcement officials to resist seeking
outside assistance due to an unfounded fear of having a state agency
“take over” the crime investigation function. To meet this issue head-
on, and to make better use of the new information technologies
currently employed by the H.I.T.S. unit, it is apparent that the H.I.T.S.
program will need additional H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts in the
coming years.
The data from the surveys and impressions gathered in interviews
with the H.I.T.S. staff suggest that while H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts
possess the ability to run queries in the H.I.T.S. databases, some lack
confidence that their search results will end with satisfactory results.
Based on this information, the W.S.U. evaluation team recommended
that H.I.T.S. unit management initiate a staff development training
program featuring cross-training among H.I.T.S. staff. This type of
training initiative will both promote the enhancement of skills among
the staff and will ensure the seamless continuation of service provision
in the event those who are confident of their abilities to run data queries
are for some unforeseen reason unable to perform those mission-critical
Police Technologies, People, and Professional Culture 127

tasks. The importance of training for everyone associated with criminal

justice information is emphasized in the next section of this book.

Training

Nina Cope identified the lack of understanding by police officers of

crime analysis and its potential to support policing as a significant
inhibitor to the use of available analytical products (Cope: 194).
Manning observes that “police gather far too much data for which they
have no identified purpose” (2001a: 98), and he points to inadequate
training in the use of the data gathered as being a major shortcoming of
contemporary policing. As was reported in the H.I.T.S. evaluation
study, many of the criminal investigators, their supervisors, and their
agency chiefs and sheriffs could not positively confirm the existence of
training and support by outside agencies on various topics critical to
their tasks. The H.I.T.S. program offers training and support on myriad
criminal investigation topics, including each of the following: basic
investigation; basic homicide investigations; advanced homicide
investigations; DNA use and collection; expert witness testimony; gang
identification and affiliation; blood spatter analysis; cold case
investigation; crime mapping by time and location, and archival vehicle
and driver license searches—all at no charge to recipient agencies and
these services are significantly underused by local law enforcement.
Findings derived from the H.I.T.S. evaluation report suggest the main
reason for this deficiency in the training cycle is the lack of knowledge
of the existence of the training. Despite the efforts made by the
H.I.T.S. team to inform local law enforcement officials of the
availability of these critical resources, they remain underutilized.

People: Contact with Criminal Investigators

The W.S.U. evaluation team sought to determine if the H.I.T.S.

investigator/analysts were likely to miss opportunities to develop
relationships with more than one criminal investigator within each
client agency (if more than one is available). The purpose of gathering
this information is to help evaluators gauge the extent to which H.I.T.S.
staff members endeavor to develop working relationships with
members of local law enforcement agencies who are likely to use
H.I.T.S. program services.
128 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

Fully 100% of those staff responding to a question on the survey

regarding the contacting of multiple investigators indicated that they
contact more than one investigator within each agency. Responses
indicating that they have a main contact or exclusive contact in each
client agency could have indicated that some potential users of H.I.T.S.
services are excluded from information sharing regarding program
benefits. In response to a follow-up question two respondents agreed
with the statement, “In my function as a H.I.T.S. investigator, I tend to
limit the number of investigators I contact within each agency so that
all of my work is channeled through a main point of contact.” Four
H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts disagreed with the statement, and another
did not respond. The operative part of this statement, limited contact
within each agency, indicates that those who agreed with this statement
might be narrowing their contact within each agency to a funneling
point of contact.
A third statement requested a response to inform evaluators on this
same topic of character of contact maintained between H.I.T.S.
analysts/investigators and client law enforcement agencies. Only one
investigator/analyst responded that he/she finds it difficult to connect
with a replacement when one of his/her investigator contacts is no
longer available to them. The responses to this statement, along with
those of the prior statements on this topic, suggested to the W.S.U.
program evaluation team that the H.I.T.S. program’s
investigator/analysts diligently work to ensure that they are in regular
contact with many of the intended local law enforcement agency-based
users of H.I.T.S. program services. Asked, “When one of my contacts
within a specific agency retires, promotes, or otherwise moves on, I
find it difficult to connect with a replacement,” over 75% responded
that they somewhat or strongly disagree.
It is the case, however, that data gathered in the criminal
investigator survey, in the supervising investigator survey, in the Police
Chief and Sheriff survey, and in the on-line survey of H.I.T.S. Bulletin
recipients indicate that the H.I.T.S. team is to some extent missing the
opportunity to make contact with a sizeable portion of potential users of
H.I.T.S. services. That conclusion is mostly supported by the
significant number of voluntary comments written by survey
respondents stating that they are unaware of what the H.I.T.S. unit does
or what services it offers.
Police Technologies, People, and Professional Culture 129

A component of relationship building that will help to ensure the

more effective use of H.I.T.S. services by the majority of those it
intends to serve involves calls for service. A measure of the likelihood
that criminal investigators will think of and call upon H.I.T.S. unit
investigator/analysts when they need assistance in their criminal
investigations was built into the following question: “All investigators
within each agency within my H.I.T.S. jurisdiction know that they may
contact me directly if they need assistance.”
Four of the responding investigator/analysts indicated that
they believe that investigators within their respective jurisdictions
know that they may contact that investigator/analyst directly if they
desire assistance in carrying out their major crime investigations. Two
investigator/analysts did not express agreement with the statement, and
one did not respond to this question. Another way W.S.U. evaluators
gauged the relationship between H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts and
those they serve was through questions that directly addressed attitudes
toward the fostering of such relationships. Most of the H.I.T.S.
investigator/analysts believe they are successful in building
partnerships with criminal investigators in a collaborative and mutually
beneficial crime-fighting effort. Six of the seven (85.7%) respondents
to this question agreed that the H.I.T.S. program is successful at
building partnerships among various homicide and rape/sexual assault
investigative units within Washington state. No explanation was
offered by the one survey respondent who strongly disagreed with the
statement.
One aspect of the role the H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts that was
challenged by some criminal investigators was the degree to which the
H.I.T.S. team would “control” any given investigation. A situation
arose at a local police department that illustrates this point of
contention between a criminal investigator and a H.I.T.S.
investigator/analyst over the logistics of completing a crime input form.

He [the H.I.T.S. investigator/analyst] showed up unannounced

at my police department, like I have time in the middle of a
homicide investigation, and he was real pushy, real pushy.
And so there was a real personality conflict. He’s like, “well,
I will just take your case and go through it.” I was like, you
will NOT go through my case. I’ve got original evidence
130 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

statements in there and you are not going to sit there and pop
through my case.

The role played by investigator/analysts has been the subject of

numerous conversations between H.I.T.S. staff members and members
of the W.S.U. evaluation team. Based on those conversations, and
supported with data gathered from the following survey question, the
W.S.U. evaluation team came to the conclusion that the H.I.T.S.
investigator/analyst respondents understand their role well as it applies
to the H.I.T.S. mission.
All six investigators responded that they disagree with the
statement, “As a H.I.T.S. investigator I believe I am obligated to take
the lead in investigating homicides or sexual assaults in cases where it
is obvious that investigators are ‘in over their heads,’” which affirms
their understanding that one goal of the H.I.T.S. unit is to assist local
law enforcement in their effort to solve crimes, and not to “control” or
“take over” a local case. The W.S.U. evaluation team examined the
issue of H.I.T.S. investigator imposition another way. Asked, “In
approaching detectives regarding cases, I sometimes feel a sense that
my efforts are an imposition on their work,” H.I.T.S.
investigator/analysts were split on their response to the statement. As
depicted in the previously discussed, H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts are
sometimes seen by local criminal investigators as unwelcome outsiders.
That can prove to be a frustrating situation to H.I.T.S. team members
who see also themselves as a fresh set of eyes in an investigation, all
the while being seen as a potential distraction to those they are trying to
help. A concern to the W.S.U. evaluation team was that negative
pushback from field investigators could lead to the systematic under-
utilization of H.I.T.S. program services by their local law enforcement
agency. The following data, combined with earlier findings on local
agency visitation patterns reported by H.I.T.S. staff members, suggest
that H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts do not substantiate the speculation
that they tend to avoid visiting certain local jurisdictions because they
feel they are unwelcome guests there. In response to the statement,
“There are agencies within my jurisdiction that I simply avoid because
I do not feel welcome,” all six investigator/analysts indicated that they
do not avoid certain local law enforcement agencies due to feeling
unwelcome.
Police Technologies, People, and Professional Culture 131

The W.S.U. evaluation team examined another area of practice by

the H.I.T.S. investigator/analyst team to determine if their efforts to
assist criminal investigators were being stymied due to internal H.I.T.S.
program policy pressures. Asked, “I sometimes feel that the time spent
on some cases prevents me from spending time contacting all of the
investigators within my jurisdiction,” three of the five
investigator/analysts who responded to the statement regarding time
constraints agreed that they sometimes feel that the time spent on some
cases prevents them from spending time contacting all of the
investigators within their service area. The other two H.I.T.S.
investigator/analysts disagreed with the statement. A measure of the
ability of H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts to succeed in the H.I.T.S. unit
mission of assisting local law enforcement officers “in small
jurisdictions with big cases first, and in big jurisdictions with small
cases last” was addressed next by the W.S.U. evaluation team. A major
complaint by local criminal investigators was that they want to see also
their H.I.T.S. team representatives more often, and that they want to
know more about what the H.I.T.S. team can do for their local,
relatively small agency. To get at this issue the H.I.T.S.
investigator/analysts were asked about their frequency of visitation to
local agencies within their respective service areas. Asked to respond
to the statement, “There are agencies within my jurisdiction that I don’t
get out to at least every six months,” most (five out of six)
investigator/analysts agree that they do not visit every agency within
their jurisdiction at least every six months. These additional statements
from the field support those made above, with one important
distinction; these statements were made in response to the question, “If
you no longer use any of the services provided by H.I.T.S., but you did
so in the past, please explain the reasons for discontinuing your use of
H.I.T.S. program services.”

From a criminal investigator: “After Dick Steiner retired from

H.I.T.S., I have never seen his replacement, ___(removed for
privacy)_________ who is reportedly assigned to our area.”
From a supervising investigator: “Have not been contacted by
our Rep since Dick Steiner retired.”
132 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

From a criminal investigator; “Used to have regular contact

with H.I.T.S. representatives. Since change in personnel,
never see also them.”
From a criminal investigator; “Our primary investigator left,
so we have little contact with H.I.T.S.”
From a supervising investigator; “The assigned H.I.T.S.
investigator does not meet with them [his subordinate criminal
investigators] - he'd rather meet with Admin.”
From a supervising investigator; “Not familiar with what they
do. In 1996 we had monthly contact with our H.I.T.S. person.
Now we don't have any contact and, frankly, we forget they
exist.”

The following comment from a criminal investigator adds to the

discussion. It was made in response to a solicitation for suggestions to
make improvements on H.I.T.S. program service delivery. The
statement read, “The H.I.T.S. program would be better if it…:”

From a criminal investigator; “Have more investigators like

Dick Steiner. He always stopped by our detective unit to see
also how he could help us. Our current investigator has
stopped to speak to us one time in the past several years. That
could be due to many reasons, but it is true.”

Some of the most telling comments drawn from a survey question

soliciting comments on what changes would improve the H.I.T.S.
program relate to the need for personal contact and more effective
sharing of information on the services of the H.I.T.S. program. The
following set of comments made by criminal investigators document
their desire to receive frequent visits by H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts:

From a criminal investigator; “Had time to consult with each

investigator on every case. A fresh look by a seasoned
investigator can bring new ideas to any investigation. They
could use more investigators for (doing) better consultation.”
From a criminal investigator: “Would come to the agency and
meet with those charged with investigations and let us know
Police Technologies, People, and Professional Culture 133

what H.I.T.S. is, and can do -- and how to do it -- so we are

familiar with it and would use it more.”
From a criminal investigator: “More of you… guys are spread
too thin!”
From a criminal investigator: “Promote H.I.T.S. itself! I am
not aware how it can help a city our size; we tend to think that
it's (sic) services only really help the large city areas…our
population is about 40,000.”
From a criminal investigator: “Contact in some way (mail,
email or phone) every 6 months or so to remind agencies of
the resource and hw to access it. Something to keep us aware
H.I.T.S. is still active. Valuable resource I support, but have
not had an opportunity to use.”
From a criminal investigator: “Stop in more often - review
cases with detectives - more face-to-face contact!”
From a criminal investigator: “As with everything else in
Washington, all of the resources are in the Puget Sound area.
Merely having face-to-face contact would be a huge benefit.”
[From Clark County]
From a criminal investigator: “I would like to know more
about H.I.T.S.: I seldom use H.I.T.S., and have only spoke
(sic) with [investigator/analyst name deleted] three times.”
From a supervising investigator: “H.I.T.S. needs to be more
assertive in staying in contact with smaller agencies.”
From a supervising investigator: “Having another H.I.T.S.
investigator assigned to SE Washington - Yakima/Tri-
Cities/Walla Walla.”
From a supervising investigator: “If we heard from them on a
regular basis and not only after we had a homicide so they
could collect their data.”
From a criminal investigator: “H.I.T.S. is currently out of
touch with Eastside agencies. It’s viewed as a place where
refined investigators go to work, and help put together
bulletins. Their other services are not widely advertised.
134 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

Glad to see also the A.G. is considering revision of the current

offering.”

Evaluators juxtaposed those statements with the following reasons

given by the H.I.T.S. program investigator/analysts as justification for
not visiting every local law enforcement agency within their service
area more often than they do:

Comments from H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts

They are located a long distance from my office and don’t

have a large number of cases for H.I.T.S. contacts.
I may not know all investigators in my area. The jurisdictions
I have more contact with have more activity, thus, I have less
reason to contact some agencies.
Their workloads and mine preclude contact; they do not
experience violent crime.

Time and lack of murders.

H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts are each responsible for relatively large

geographical areas. The six investigator/analysts provide coverage for
the entire state of Washington. As indicated several times in previous
comments from criminal investigators, there is a general consensus that
additional investigators are needed if the H.I.T.S. unit wishes not only
to continue the current level of assistance it provides local law
enforcement, but to increase those services to the levels needed to
respond to its current and potential service clientele. The evaluators
asked H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts about the need for additional team
investigators. All the H.I.T.S. program investigator/analysts are in full
agreement that the H.I.T.S. unit needs more investigator/analysts in
order to serve the H.I.T.S. program mission more faithfully.
The working relationship between H.I.T.S. team members and
their clients in the local law enforcement agencies they serve, as well as
those new clients whom they wish to serve, currently relies on a system
that is quite resource-strained. The development of relationships
between members serving each entity (H.I.T.S. and local law
enforcement) relies heavily on a balance of needs for service and the
Police Technologies, People, and Professional Culture 135

delivery of that service. In the present case, the H.I.T.S. program staff
must be in a position to deliver services in the way of training,
expertise, and professional guidance, to name a few, to members of
local law enforcement agencies in their time of need. The needs of
criminal investigators in the field and the ability of H.I.T.S. to deliver
can be viewed as a proverbial “Catch-22” in that if criminal
investigators don’t know that H.I.T.S. assistance and other services are
available, they don’t know to ask for help. All the while, H.I.T.S.
investigator/analysts, the link to the important services needed by local
law enforcement, skip regular contact with those investigators who do
not have regular on-going cases. The W.S.U. evaluation team
recommended a constant, on-going grooming of local law enforcement
investigators by H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts so that as services are
needed, the H.I.T.S. unit comes to the minds of those in need.
In another attempt to learn about the effective use of technologies
available to the H.I.T.S. unit, the evaluation team probed the opinions
of the users of H.I.T.S. services regarding the H.I.T.S. database and the
gaining access to information contained therein. The results of that
important inquiry follow.
H.I.T.S. Bulletin recipients (those who identified themselves as
investigators) were asked to respond to the statement, “The lack of
direct access to the H.I.T.S. database has hindered criminal
investigations in my department.”
The responses are offered with a caveat. While it is true that only
5.5% of the respondent criminal investigators indicated that the lack of
direct access to the H.I.T.S. database has hindered criminal
investigations, the answer to whether direct access is important remains
unanswered, however. A full 47% of those responding were not sure if
their investigations had or had not been impaired. Answers to the next
question were assessed by the W.S.U. H.I.T.S. program evaluation
team regarding attitudes held by H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts toward
H.I.T.S. program policy and team practice with respect to data input
into the H.I.T.S. program database. First, H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts
were asked to respond to the following statement: “The input forms for
inclusion of a crime in the H.I.T.S. database should be completed
by…”
H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts are nearly evenly split on the
important issue of data input to the H.I.T.S. database. Four (57.1%)
H.I.T.S. staffers responded that H.I.T.S. investigators should complete
136 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

the crime input forms, while the remaining three (42.9%) replied that
the detective handling the case should perform that function. When
asked to comment on H.I.T.S. unit current practices in this regard, the
responses of these same individuals flipped. Three H.I.T.S.
investigator/analysts reported that the H.I.T.S. input forms are usually
completed by H.I.T.S. investigators, while the remaining four indicated
that the detective usually completes the form. These findings are
important considering the results of the questions pertaining to the
question of who should input data into the H.I.T.S. database. Criminal
investigators and their supervisors are obviously cautious about
protecting valuable time resources, thus they would reasonably want
H.I.T.S. investigators to input data for them. The fact that H.I.T.S.
investigators are about evenly split in their opinion about who should
input data and who actually inputs data gives reason to recommend that
the H.I.T.S. team reevaluate their handling of data input. Provided
adequate staffing resources are available, the H.I.T.S. team should
make the input of data from the homicide and sexual assault input
forms a top priority, thus relieving field investigators of that duty so
that they may focus their efforts on their pressing cases. Interface with
the H.I.T.S. database has an output side as well.
Criminal investigators in local law enforcement agencies weighed
in on the accessibility of H.I.T.S. data. During a focus group session
held on March 14, 2006, a detective summed up a common feeling
among field investigators:

It doesn’t seem that there is a real user-friendly interface to

the H.I.T.S. database. It sounds to me like you have to contact
someone at H.I.T.S., there’s no on-line access to it, there’s
no…it’s easier to me at least in doing investigations to hop on-
line and find out what I need there rather than to make phone
calls and hopefully get somebody there or leave a message
and wait for them to call me back…it’s just that when you
want information you want it now, and I can get it now in a lot
of other arenas. But, maybe they have that and I just don’t
know, but I didn’t hear that yesterday. That seems to me as a
fairly big gap to access, maybe there’s a reason and I just
don’t know.
Police Technologies, People, and Professional Culture 137

The discussion now examines specific issues within the police culture
that impact the efficient flow of information.

Environment

The culture in which police carry out their work contributes negatively
to the effective flow of information. This is the case for a number of
reasons related to the way police officers tend to view their roles in the
crime control process, and to the way they tend to view others in the
crime control arena. “Police officers continue to exert considerable
control over the intelligence process” which is an inhibitor to the flow
of information (Cope: 197). Other scholars have noted quite properly
that information itself is power, and a major inhibitor of the efficient
transfer of knowledge (Willem: 582). Willem elaborates on this theme,
stating the following: “Sharing of knowledge between departments
relies on not only formal systems, but lateral coordination combined
with high levels of trust and verification, clear incentives, and the
absence of power games” (598).
Cope has identified another area of police culture that weighs
down the potential for change; namely mistrust of non-sworn
personnel. According to Cope, some police officers are uncomfortable
accepting recommendations from non-sworn police personnel,
suggesting that doing so would encroach on their role (Cope: 191-192).
Other scholars and practitioners alike have made similar observations.
A common theme was observed in the transition to COP and the
transition to ILP, demonstrating inhibitors to change. “The success of
community policing depends on the police officers who are responsible
for implementing the program. In essence, their attitudes, perceptions,
and behaviors must be substantially changed before community
policing can be put into practice” (Lurigio and Skogan, 1994: 315).
Lurigio and Skogan also note “They [police officers] are resentful
when the community is consulted about internal police business…”
(316).
These observations give the serious observer of the H.I.T.S.
program reason for pause. If there is mistrust on the part of police
officers and non-sworn analysts, is there also mistrust between criminal
investigators in the field and H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts? After all, it
was noted that some investigators fear their cases will be “taken over”
by the H.I.T.S. team. One police chief commented with regard to the
138 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

value of H.I.T.S. thusly: “The fact that there is a dedicated H.I.T.S.

investigator assigned to our unit bolsters our relationship and led us to
work on lots of cases together.” The general tendency for local law
enforcement criminal investigators to decide to not utilize the H.I.T.S.
team may not be an issue of trust, but rather one of pride. This
response by a criminal investigator at a focus group session raises this
possibility: “I saw it as a pride issue among some new administrators
and some senior officers that we would take care of our own. It was a
conscious decision not to seek out an expertise (sic) on some issues
because—and that part is self-perception—pride issues. Now it’s going
to a cold case and we are going to have to have to do it another way.
Now this one is probably eight years old by now.”
As discussed in chapter two, Goldstein identifies five major
impediments to the progress of POP. These same impediments can
also be cited as troublesome as the police community enters the ILP
era. As a reminder, they are: (1) the absence of a long-term
commitment on the part of police leaders to strengthening policing and
the police as an institution; (2) the lack of skills within a police agency
that are required to analyze problems and to evaluate strategies for
dealing with those problems; (3) the lack of a clear academic
connection; (4) the absence of informed outside pressures; and (5) the
lack of financial support (Goldstein, 2003: 26-34).
Observations from the H.I.T.S. program evaluation support point
number one, and at the same time offer a solution. Goldstein’s
contention in point number one is that: “Police and, it follows, their
leaders, are under extraordinary pressure in these times to respond most
directly to the urgent concerns of the moment—be it a serious crime
that awaits clearance, a crime wave that is generating widespread fears,
or a much larger and amorphous threat such as, most recently,
terrorism” (Goldstein, 2003: 27).
The issue Goldstein makes of point number two is the following:
“Many police agencies of sufficient size have, over the past half-
century, established units or designated individuals to engage in
research, planning, and crime analysis. The scope and quality of work
of these units is quite uneven…but even the most advanced of the
crime analysis efforts have not extended their work to analyzing in
depth…the common problems that the police are required to handle”
(Goldstein, 2003: 29). As pointed out in chapter three, the vast
majority of police agencies in Washington State are so small that they
Police Technologies, People, and Professional Culture 139

lack the manpower and ability to conduct serious criminal

investigations. This is a prime example of a need being filled by the
H.I.T.S. unit. Goldstein’s third point is elaborated herein:

From among the universe of studies, even fewer focus on

strategies for responding to those problems [that police
routinely handle] and, particularly, on the relative
effectiveness of those strategies. [Additionally] an array of
complex issues in the relationships between practitioners and
academics and other researchers impede initiating more such
studies. These same issues greatly limit the use of that
knowledge that has already been acquired. The most critical
needs, upfront, are: (1) to increase the number of academics
willing to study the problems of concern to the police and
willing to work on the development of the methodologies for
doing so; (2) to increase the number of practitioners who are
willing to engage with academics involved in this work and to
open their agencies to research; and (3) to develop university-
level training for students interested in a career working
within the police field in the newly denned position of problem
analyst. (Goldstein, 2003: 31).

Goldstein’s fourth point, the absence of informed outside pressures, is

an important one. What he is referring to is the fact that the police
often will not change until pressures from outside the agency force it to
do so. Goldstein points out that, “Good, rigorously developed data,
carefully presented, can be very powerful in altering public attitudes
and pressures. Affected citizens can become an important force in
support of good practice” (Goldstein, 2003: 34). This is a good point
for H.I.T.S. administrators to heed, judging from the findings of the
W.S.U. evaluation team. The H.I.T.S. program has helped
investigators solve cold case homicides, including both single violent
crime incidents and serial cases. Survivors of the victims can become
champions of the H.I.T.S. unit as producers of quality work which
allows the right to justice which the victims of crime deserve.
The fifth point Goldstein makes regarding the impediments of POP
is the lack of financial support. He specifically addresses the lack of
adequate analyst staffing as an issue. He sums up his point by stating,
“With the passage of time and changes in administration, it is
140 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

increasingly difficult to point with confidence to a single agency in

which there is a continuing concentration of high quality work in
addressing pieces of its business” (Goldstein, 2003: 39). H.I.T.S. is
poised to assist local agencies over the time continuum without regard
to changes in mission and personnel at the local agency level.
A consideration for the present study was to determine
communication hindrances in the processing of incident-critical
information. One issue under examination was how criminal
investigators in the field “connected” with H.I.T.S. unit investigators.
Another issue was the nature of the communication flow existing
between H.I.T.S. investigators and the H.I.T.S. unit crime analyst.
Cope (2004) discovered in the course of her work the following:
“Police officers felt uncomfortable accepting recommendations from
non-police personnel, suggesting this encroached upon their role”
(191).
One concern of this research was whether the work of crime
analysts would go unused, or “overlooked” as Cope reported from her
field work with two police departments. If so, it is important to
identify where in the communication process between crime analyst
and field investigators a disconnection occurs, and determine the reason
for that disconnect if possible. Cope’s findings were that crime
analysts were not included in the entire crime incident process, thus
their work was often sidelined because it did not include the results
anticipated. This is a key finding that supports the observations
recorded in the H.I.T.S. evaluation report that H.I.T.S. analysts and
investigators can only work with the information they are given from
the field. If they do not have accurate and complete information in
their database, it is not possible to formulate the “big picture.”
Communications in this regard must improve. Cope expounds on the
problems that arise when the entire team does not get all the
information needed in the crime analysis process:

As the computer intelligence databases were the primary

source of information for analysts, the quality of analysis was
integrally linked to the quality of information on intelligence
system. Consequently the poor quality information and lack of
detail on the systems inevitably limited their analytical
insights so that they focused on what had happened and
provided statistical summaries of crime data. It was unclear
Police Technologies, People, and Professional Culture 141

whether officers understood the extent analysts relied on their

inputs, although in an urban borough a criminal database
supervisor comments that: “Nobody trusts the analysts’ stuff
because they get their information from the [computer
systems] and officers know they put crap in the system.”
(Cope, 2004: 193)

A disturbing breakdown in the flow of information occurred in

Washington State, as discovered during the focus group session
conducted on March 14, 2006. A detective stated that he caught a
suspect that the U.S. Marshals were looking for on an attempted
homicide committed in Seattle. He recounted that the person in
question had been on the H.I.T.S. Bulletins for about 14 months when
he killed his in-laws in Kennewick, Washington. The suspect then
went back to Western Washington and killed two more people. The
detective turned to other detectives in the focus group from Kennewick
and asked if they knew who the suspect was when he was featured on
the H.I.T.S. Bulletins. The Kennewick detectives, who were patrol
officers at the time of the incident, stated the suspect was not known to
them because they were not privy to the H.I.T.S. Bulletins as patrol
officers.
The final analysis of the data discovered in the H.I.T.S. evaluation
report involves the methods used by the H.I.T.S. program
administrators to measure unit performance. To fulfill its mission, the
Criminal Justice Division in the Office of the Attorney General cites
the following performance measures on a memorandum that was not
included in its entirety in the W.S.U. program evaluation report due to
information of a confidential nature appearing on that memorandum.
The pertinent text reads as follows:
■ Number of cases entered into the database:
-Type of crime (i.e., homicide, sexual assault, other)
-Where the crime occurred (outside or inside Washington)
-If inside Washington, if the crime was solved or unsolved
■ Record data entered from other sources (i.e., DOL, DMV, DOC)
■ Number of open investigations with active H.I.T.S. participation:
-Type of case
-Requesting agency
-Amount of time applied
142 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

-Description of assistance rendered

-Investigator assigned
■ Requests for Information:
-Number of requests
-Source of requests
-Nature of requests and data requested
-Investigator assigned
-Response time in supplying information/data requested
■ Distribution of Bulletins:
-Number of requests
-Source of requests
-Current crime information contained in bulletin
■ Specialized training classes:
-Type of class (e.g., Basic or Advanced Homicide Inves.)
-Location of class
-H.I.T.S. instructors
-Number of attendees
■ To record other services as provided:
-Participation in research and studies funded by federal grants
-Criminal profiling
-Mapping
-Preparation of time-lines

H.I.T.S. Performance Reports

The following performance data, provided by the Criminal Justice

Division management, summarizes the activity of the H.I.T.S. unit
between July 1, 2005 and April 26, 2006.11

Scott;
This Memorandum is in response to your request for a summary of
H.I.T.S. activity for the period July 1, 2005 to the present.

11
Internal Attorney General memorandum from Darryl Roosendaal and
Tamara Matheny to Scott Blonien, Chief, AGO-CJD on April 26, 2006
Police Technologies, People, and Professional Culture 143

Activity Number

Cases entered into the Murder file of the database 214

Cases entered into the Rape file of the database 45
Cases entered into the Crime Data file of the database 2,397
Law Enforcement Agency (LEA) contacts:
Telephone: 2,288
In-Person: 1,365
3,653

LEA CEO contacts (approximately) 300

Training sessions (CJTC, WVCIA, H.I.T.S. Demos, Others) 37
LEA personnel trained: CJTC/WVCIA: 666
H.I.T.S. Demos: 122
788
Attendees at H.I.T.S. Demos to Student/Community Groups 545
Attendees at other H.I.T.S.-related presentations 125
Requests for Information (RFI’s) from LEA’s 536
Bulletins (H.I.T.S., CJD, U.S. Probation) issued 404
“Cold Case” reviews, consultations, etc. 10-12

It was noted earlier that the H.I.T.S. unit maintains a mission-

driven focus on murders that remain unsolved, and rapes/sexual
assaults that are other than familial in nature. There were 214 cases
entered into the H.I.T.S. murder file during the period July 1, 2005 and
April 26, 2006. Though there are no official statistics for that exact
time frame, the F.B.I. Uniform Crime Reports (U.C.R.) for the year
2005 cite 205 murders and non-negligent manslaughters for the state of
Washington. Any discrepancy in the numbers of actual murders and
the numbers of cases entered into the H.I.T.S. murder file could easily
be explained as cases that occurred at some previous time, or in a
jurisdiction that borders Washington State. It should also be noted that
the period between July 1 and April 26 is nearly ten months, and not a
year – the period of time covered by the U.C.R. statistics. It is believed
by the W.S.U. evaluation team that the H.I.T.S. team knows about
virtually all of the murders that have occurred in Washington State
during the time the H.I.T.S. team has existed. The degree of attention
given to rapes/sexual assaults by the H.I.T.S. unit is somewhat less
satisfying, however.
144 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

The F.B.I. notes that 2,811 forcible rapes were reported in

Washington State during 2005. Only 45 rapes were entered into the
H.I.T.S. rape file during the ten-month period ending on April 26,
2006. An important clarification is warranted with regards to the
reporting of rape/sexual assault. The U.C.R. figure of 2,811 includes
only reported rapes, but it includes forcible rape regardless of whether
or not the victim knows the offender. In many cases involving
domestic violence and other incidents involving victims who know
their perpetrator, rape reports are often withdrawn at some point
following the event. The H.I.T.S. program focuses on non-familial
rape/sexual assault so that their time is best directed toward those cases
that warrant their expertise in locating a perpetrator. The rape/sexual
assault data suggest that the H.I.T.S. team could likely benefit from
devoting more effort to the identification of rape/sexual assault
investigations that could take advantage of the vast amount of data
maintained in the H.I.T.S. database and benefit from the expertise of
the team of H.I.T.S. investigator/analysts. With the principal
components of the H.I.T.S. unit mission accounted for, the W.S.U.
evaluation team identified some additional areas of outcome
assessment against which the H.I.T.S. program should be judged.
The staff at the H.I.T.S. unit are guided by a mantra-like saying
that goes something like, “Help the smaller agencies with big problems
first, and the big agencies with small problems last.” That saying has
been mentioned numerous times previously in this text, but its essence
has no better place to be discussed than in this section. H.I.T.S. is a
relatively unique program that provides a valuable clearinghouse of
archival data on past crimes that often prove to be the link to future
crimes. The value of the H.I.T.S. program extends to the provision of a
link between criminal investigators at local law enforcement agencies,
and other criminal investigators in other jurisdictions who are likewise
looking for a mutual link that will assist him/her in solving a serious
crime against persons. The majority of those criminal investigators
work with only a couple of others in their agency, exacerbating the
problem of reaching out for investigative assistance.
The W.S.U. H.I.T.S. evaluation program report currently contains
many comments from local law enforcement CEOs, supervising
investigators, and criminal investigators attesting to the value of the
H.I.T.S. program for two important reasons. First, there were so many
heartfelt comments, both solicited and unsolicited, that it became
Police Technologies, People, and Professional Culture 145

apparent to the evaluation team members that H.I.T.S. is a program

about which many people are passionate; and, second, the comments
are likely so positive because they reflect the fact that the intended
users of the H.I.T.S. program understand its value and they want more
access to its services. Indicative of these comments are the following:

From a supervising investigator: “H.I.T.S. has been valuable

to me from day one as a detective. Networking is what it is all
about for a small agency and I'm glad H.I.T.S. is there. Dick
Gagnon has specifically been very helpful to me in my
professional development. He is an encourager and a great
source of inspiration.”
From a bulletin recipient: “Please remember that urban law
enforcement needs can be completely different from rural
communities. The bigger agencies have the manpower to
participate in the development of information systems that are
tailored to their needs. Hopefully someone would
appropriately represent small agencies.”
From a Police Chief or Sheriff: “We are a very small agency
that has very little need for H.I.T.S. – but we know it’s there
and will not hesitate to use [it] when needed.”
From an on-line survey: “This is a very small jurisdiction with
low crime rates. I feel H.I.T.S. is excellent and would use it
when needed.”
From a criminal investigator: “This program could be the
best tool within the State if it was expanded to a more useful
degree. We have the same problem as a lot of small agencies
manpower; time and money.”
From a criminal investigator: “H.I.T.S. is a great resource for
small agencies around the state.”
From a criminal investigator: “I just do not feel H.I.T.S.
promotes itself well or advises what it has to offer! I have
always thought of it as trying to help in just catching the serial
killer or serial rapist or someone of many crimes (the same
crime). Also I'm sure it can help the smaller jurisdictions - let
146 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

us know how they can assist! The H.I.T.S. info is so vast - let
us know what that info is and how it can help us!”

The H.I.T.S. program, it is indeed clear, does more than maintain a

database of information about murders and stranger rapes/sexual
assaults. The survey data gathered in this evaluation study strongly
suggest that staff members of the H.I.T.S. unit give considerable peace
of mind to local law enforcement investigators who would otherwise be
left pretty much to their own meager devices to produce leads to
serious crimes against persons in their jurisdiction. The link provided
by the H.I.T.S. program, therefore, is crucial in the crime-solving effort
for many law enforcement agencies of limited size.
An important component of the theory behind the H.I.T.S. unit is
its ability to build partnerships between and among local law
enforcement officials in an effort to prevent criminals from moving
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, staying one step ahead of justice. It is
widely accepted in criminal justice studies that offenders often move
beyond the jurisdictional boundaries of an area in which they commit a
crime. Serial killer Ted Bundy committed his crimes against young
women not only in Washington, but in other states as well. He was
eventually tried and executed in the state of Florida. Washington State
was home to another serial killer who committed his crimes in several
areas within the state. Robert Yates lived in the Walla Walla area when
two young people were murdered. He was not immediately identified
as a suspect in that case, but he was connected to those crimes years
later. By then, Yates had moved to Western Washington where law
enforcement officials would later link him to crimes in that area. Yates
ultimately settled in Spokane, where he committed several additional
murders.
Effective partnerships, or networks, of local law enforcement
officials and criminal investigators can serve as a web in which
offenders who try to move out of one jurisdiction to avoid detection
will surely move into another part of the web. Having sufficiently
reported an analysis of the principal relevant findings from the W.S.U.
H.I.T.S. program evaluation report, this report now concludes with
observations drawn from that study about the future of data sharing and
effective communications within the American law enforcement
community.
CHAPTER 5

Lego® Blocks: The Future of

Intelligence Led Policing

In his excellent analysis of the state of intelligence-led policing,

Manning (2001a, 2008) challenges us to consider the “basic
contradictions in the [police] mandate—that policing can control crime,
reduce the fear of crime, and yet be an almost entirely responsive,
demand-driven, situational force dispensing just in time and just
enough, order maintenance” (101). My thesis has been based largely
on this challenge because the author believes that Manning’s premise—
namely, that “an information-based policing, focusing on risk
management, and enhancing security is both premature and flawed”
(101) was accurate at the time it was written. However, the end of the
year 2001 ushered in a new era in our collective societal thinking about
how police collect, store, use, and share data. This post-911 era offers
the police community, including sworn officers, civilian employees,
and others such as academics involved in the practical or theoretical
application of police services to chart the future of policing. We should
not see also ourselves in the midst of a “paradigm shift” as we begin to
embrace intelligence-led policing. What is needed instead is a new
way of thinking about the future without abandoning the past, for there
is much to be garnered from what has already been learned.
Observers of the police in American society have conveniently
attached labels on the police based on perceived public mandates. As
American society has changed over succeeding generations, so too has
the police mandate has taken on new contours. Born of necessity for
order maintenance, police in due course became increasingly
147
148 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

professional as their multifaceted social role became more clearly

defined. Eventually, cultural clashes between the police and the society
in which they carried out their work led to a move away from the arms
length and detached professional model to a “warmer and fuzzier”
community-oriented model of operation. Unable to sustain itself as a
viable model, either because of the inability of administrators to secure
essential community buy-in (e.g., The R.C.M.P. in Canada) or the lack
of sustained financial commitments to the model (e.g., the United
States), many community-oriented law enforcement agencies began to
re-define the police mandate once again. Problem-oriented policing
(POP) was seen as the solution for many careful observers because it
incorporated both components of hotspots policing and community-
oriented policing (COP) into a synthesized effort by putting officers in
geographically targeted areas which were prone to particular types of
criminal activity.
As information collection and data storage, data retrieval and data
analysis technologies improved and police budgets allowed, police
agencies began to collect data on everything ranging from traffic stops
to suspicious activity to criminal complaints. The first concerted effort
to use the POP theory in combination with new technologies occurred
in New York City with the introduction of Compstat. The problem of
directing sources to respond to documented needs for police
administrators became even more difficult with the advent of all these
new forms of information. Compstat is designed to help administrators
identify the areas where crime occurs, and document the types of
crimes committed at those locations; it does not make connections
between crime scenes, criminals and their associates, and criminal
evidence available on crimes committed. Administrators are left with
the daunting task of figuring out what to do with all of the data that has
now been gathered and stored using the new technologies afforded the
police agency. As has been aptly noted, “The U.S. government has a
weak system for processing and using what it has” (Government
Accounting Office: 416). Use of field interrogation reports (FIRs) is a
good place to start in this regard.
Thomas H. Davenport holds the President’s Chair in Information
Technology and Management at Babson College. In 2005 Davenport
was named one of the world’s top three “Business/Technology
Analysts” by Optimize magazine, and in 2007, he was named one of the
100 most influential people in the information technology industry by
Lego® Blocks: The Future of Intelligence Led Policing 149

Ziff-Davis magazines. He also holds the honor of being the highest-

ranked business academic in the information technology area
(Davenport and Jarvenpaa: 2008: 32). Davenport and his colleague
Sirkka Jarvenpaa have studied private industry and public sector
organizations to determine how effectively they make use of analytics
in the pursuit of their respective missions.
Davenport and Jarvenpaa describe analytics broadly as “business
intelligence” (2008:4). In their work they argue that “…analytics is the
extensive use of data, statistical and quantitative analysis, explanatory
and predictive models, and fact-based management to drive decisions
and actions” (2008: 6). Davenport and Jarvenpaa point to the Compstat
program as an appropriate example of the use of analytics in the law
enforcement community. “Many government agencies have
considerable data at their disposal from various forms of transactions,
but they do not often analyze the data in detail to identify opportunities
for better service or more revenue” (2008: 28).
Davenport’s recommendation to overcome what he sees as a
manpower shortage is that those public agencies, especially those in the
well-funded terrorism-fighting arena, establish partnerships with
private sector firms that can fill the labor gap. Another
recommendation proposed by Davenport and Jarvenpaa is that public
agencies work harder at partnering with other similar agencies to
increase their analytical sophistication. His feeling is that such
strategic partnering will help to bridge the fragmentation gaps that are
so prevalent in the highly fragmented government sector (Nice and
Fredericksen, 1995: 225-253). Davenport and Jarvenpaa support their
viewpoint by citing their findings from the government sector analysis
they conducted primarily in the areas of health care, logistics, and
revenue management, noting that: “On the whole, while we found
many examples of the successful use of analytics, we did not find the
elements of leadership, an enterprise orientation, and long-term
strategic targeting that would characterize both managerial innovation
in general and a strategic focus on analytics in particular” (2008: 7).
In his ethnographic study Analytic Culture in the U.S. Intelligence
Community, Rob Johnston comments:

The conflict between secrecy, a necessary condition for

intelligence, and openness, a necessary condition for
performance improvement, was a recurring theme I observed
150 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

during this research. Any organization that requires secrecy

to perform its duties will struggle with and often reject
openness, even at the expense of efficacy. Despite this, and to
their credit, a number of small groups within the Intelligence
Community have tasked themselves with creating formal and
informal ties with the nation’s academic, non-profit, and
industrial communities. In addition, there has been an
appreciable increase in the use of alternative analyses and
open-source materials. These efforts alone may not be
sufficient to alter the historical culture of secrecy, but they do
reinforce the idea that the Intelligence Community itself has a
responsibility to reconsider the relationship between secrecy,
openness, and efficacy. This is especially true as it relates to
the community’s performance and the occurrence of errors
and failure. External oversight and public debate will not
solve these issues; the desire to improve the Intelligence
Community’s performance needs to come from within. Once
the determination has been found and the necessary policy
guidelines put in place, it is incumbent upon the Intelligence
Community to find and utilize the internal and external
resources necessary to create a performance improvement
infrastructure. (Johnston, 2005: 3)

In an intriguing discussion on the topic of intelligence data, CIA

Directorate of Science and Technology analyst Stephen C. Mercado
persuasively argues that the Intelligence Community would be wise to
reconsider the distinction between open information and official
secrets. Says Mercado in this regard, “Too many policymakers and
intelligence officers mistake secrecy for intelligence and assume that
information covertly acquired is superior to that obtained openly”
(Mercado, 2008: 1).
Mercado argues the value of open sources based on six important
points of assessment: speed, quantity, quality, clarity, ease of use, and
cost. Using these assessment points, let us examine how the law
enforcement community might benefit from information obtained from
open sources. Mercado points out the following: “When a crisis erupts
in some distant part of the globe, in an area where established
intelligence assets are thin, intelligence analysts and policymakers alike
will often turn first to the television set and Internet” (3). The need for
Lego® Blocks: The Future of Intelligence Led Policing 151

speedy information flow is essential for police officials as well. Police

dispatchers often rely on eye-witness accounts at the scene of incidents
in their collection of information to pass on to responding officers. The
public, therefore, is a good open information source for the collection
of speedy details that can later either be discounted or verified by
police officers.
On quantity Mercado opines, “There are far more bloggers,
journalists, pundits, television reporters, and think-tankers in the world
than there are case officers. While two or three of the latter may, with
good agents, beat the legions of open reporters by their access to
secrets, the odds are good that the composite bits of information
assembled from the many can often approach, match, or even surpass
the classified reporting of the few” (3). Law enforcement could make
great use of a couple of analysts trained in decoding information posted
on public MySpace and Facebook accounts. Employers are already
making use of these open sources of information to screen job
applicants. Additionally, progressive police agencies could benefit
from blogs that allow the public to make their rants and raves known.
The issue of clarity as pointed out by Mercado is present in secret and
open sources of information alike. Mercado cautions that information
must be triangulated whenever possible so as to not rely on a single
source as gospel. Scrutiny of information from blogs and other
community networking sites would still be necessary, but that
screening could be accomplished by trained analysts.
Mercado cites the ease of use of information obtained from open
sources by contrasting it with the difficulty of using information that is
“Secrets, hidden behind classifications, compartments, and special
access programs” (3). His point is that “secrets” are “difficult to share
with policymakers and even fellow intelligence officers” (3). Though
Mercado does not specifically mention silo-thinking, his description
certainly connotes Manning’s idea that law enforcement personnel are
more productive when they share information within and across agency
boundaries. The final component Mercado highlights with respect to
the value of open sources is the cost of such information. He states, “A
reconnaissance satellite, developed, launched, and maintained at a cost
of billions of dollars, can provide images of a weapon’s factory’s roof
or a submarine’s hull. A foreign magazine with an annual subscription
cost of $100, may include photographs of that factory’s floor or that
submarine’s interior” (3). It is apparent that a new police model for
152 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

information gathering and use in “analytics” is needed given these

considerations.
A hybrid model of policing should incorporate the key elements of
previous policing models in ways that take advantage of the successes
we have learned from past experience. Such a model can be viewed as
adding layers, one upon another, as in building a model using Lego®
blocks. The command and control tenets of the professional model
should remain as the backbone of the police organization. The police
mission should continue to embrace the public as it did under the COP
model, but a new emphasis must be placed on developing partners in
the community that can assist local law enforcement in the collection
and analysis of data that can effectively direct police actions a la POP
to reducing crime and the fear of crime. Weisburd and Eck posit
“Strongest evidence of police effectiveness in our review is found
in…focused policing efforts” (58).
One impediment to change for the police is the way they see also
their role in incident management. Manning cites this as one of the
most important areas to address if change is to occur (2001a: 87).
Manning correctly concludes that, even with new technologies,
challenges to the present structure of policing exist because “Proactive
crime control, in the form of investigation, intelligence gathering and
application—and to a lesser extent vice, have been underfunded
relative to the other functions and are poorly developed and resourced”
(2001a: 89). Claiming that COP (and probably POP) cannot solve the
police paradox currently faced by the police—that “the police aims to
protect lives and property, yet loss of these, as well as complex
disorders or urban freedom…[and that] ‘Responsiveness’ now
incorporates the idea that citizens have a direct obligation, like the
police, to react to and perhaps even anticipate the dynamics of crime
and disorder in their neighborhoods” (2001: 89)—Manning challenges
the institution to use dominant technologies for more than mere
recordkeeping systems by incorporating new analytical methods.
Moving forward with an intelligence-led policing model will
require top-down buy-in. Administrators must lead by example, and
they must be willing to embrace new technologies, both fiscally and in
reality (via active use). Says Manning regarding requirements for ILP
to move from its “premature” state to the forefront, “[the] need for an
infrastructure; easy distribution of information; and integrated
databases” (2001a: 93, see also 2008). He continues, “While the
Lego® Blocks: The Future of Intelligence Led Policing 153

apparent issue is the effects of technology, the more vexing issue lies in
the use and interpretation of the materials produced rather than the
means” (93). Deukmedjiian reminds us to get to the organizational
challenges of adoption of new strategies: “Indeed, police agencies are
reestablished as sources of analytical expertise” (2006: 531).
McGarrell, et al. (2007) caution that the use of ILP must not be seen as
a separate and sole provider of intelligence within an organization,
rather it must be conceptualized as part of the overall mission of the
police agency—including line officers from virtually all significant
organizational sub units.
McGarrell and his associates echo the notion that ILP must be
embraced by all levels of command within the police structure, and
should never be viewed as a non-core sub agency of the department.
“Information procedures should provide incentives for sharing, to
restore a better balance between security and shared knowledge”
(Government Accounting Office: 417). The Commission continues,
“We propose that information be shared horizontally, across new
networks that transcend individual agencies. A decentralized network
model…agencies would still have their own databases, but those
databases would be searchable across agency lines” (Government
Accounting Office: 418). For the adaptation of ILP to move forward,
change must come from within police agencies. That could be a
stumbling block to many agencies if John Crank is right about the
underlying motivations for the prevailing institutional alignments. He
gives strong evidence that police organizations drift from their primary
mission of crime control in favor of other sub optimizing pressures,
both internal and external to the organization (Crank: 2003).
The present study examines an as yet unique component within the
policing institution in an attempt to determine to what extent
communications in policing tend to constrain the police to
counterproductive information silos. The H.I.T.S. unit works behind
the scenes to help criminal investigators solve cases that local law
enforcement agents probably could not solve without the help of the
unit. In the context of police management the question of unit
justification would come naturally, but in the case of H.I.T.S. a bigger
picture develops. Goldstein outlined three key elements of POP that
must be adhered to in moving forward with the ILP concept: Problems
must be defined more specifically (by that he means that burglaries and
robberies must include critical elements of time and location of
154 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

occurrence, motivation if known, behavior of offenders). H.I.T.S. takes

these into account in homicide and rape/sexual assault input
forms…and they go farther to include known associates, contacts,
network of participants; information about the problem must be
collected from outside sources and not just internal police sources;
police officers must engage in broad search for solutions. We must
draw on the resources of the public (Weisburd and Eck, 2004: 46).
In these times of tightened financial resources it will be difficult,
but nonetheless clearly necessary, for police administrators and those
local government officials in charge of police budgets to look beyond
traditional resource allocation as highly valued work (“value work”)
associated with building a foundation for ILP. Crank (2003: 187) puts
it this way, “Value work does not convert easily into economics.
Consider the following question: how much money is it worth for a
police officer to save a citizen’s life?” The value of H.I.T.S. cannot be
assessed fully in dollar terms, but its importance as a model crime-
solving tool in a national criminal justice system of highly fragmented
law enforcement organizations cannot be ignored. Adoption of this
new Lego® block approach to policing can help American law
enforcement accomplish its mission without appearing to be simply
conducting their business in line with the newest of “mere
circumlocutions whose purpose is to conceal, mystify, and legitimate
police distribution of non-negotiable coercive force” as posited by
Klockars (1988: 91). We now consider specific lessons gleaned from
the W.S.U. research team H.I.T.S. program evaluation report and make
recommendations for further research.

Implications of the H.I.T.S. Program Evaluation for Further

Research

The W.S.U. H.I.T.S. evaluation report has shed light on several

important areas related to removing key barriers to the process of
effective communication among personnel in law enforcement agencies
that have also been identified in the academic literature reviewed for
this book. Some of these barrier-broaching ideas warrant consideration
for further research. A brief review of some of the key findings drawn
from the W.S.U. H.I.T.S. evaluation report will add to the presently
limited research available that addresses impediments to effective
Lego® Blocks: The Future of Intelligence Led Policing 155

communication among law enforcement practitioners and between

police agencies in an era of enhanced information technologies.
The single most pressing issue for progressive police managers is
one of effective communication both within their respective agencies
and horizontally across law enforcement agency boundaries. The
greatest challenges to overcoming this impediment are: 1) silo-thinking
among police practitioners, and associated motives such as the desire to
possess “power;” 2) issues related to the collection, storage, access, and
use of information; and 3) trust issues. These points will now be
addressed together because they are very much intertwined.
If police officers, criminal investigators, and others working in the
policing environment want to fully employ the myriad new information
technologies that are emerging they must learn to work together and not
simply get caught up in the rhetoric of working as a team. Findings
derived from the W.S.U. H.I.T.S. evaluation report clearly point to the
need for further research that will assist the law enforcement
community to come to an agreement as to the types of information they
need to assist them in criminal investigations. That information must
be stored in databases that are easily accessible by those investigators
who have a need to know about it, and that access must be made
available to them at their remote locations by means that are universally
defined. Further research on rules of conduct must be carried out and
guidelines agreed upon regarding the handling of information that is
gathered and stored by criminal justice agencies. The agreed upon
rules must strike a balance between society’s need to know and each
individual’s right to privacy. Perhaps a meeting of the minds in this
area will help to overcome control issues, power-based hostilities, and
silo-thinking.
Largely because success in the career of law enforcement
personnel is defined principally by production-based promotions,
professional influence and power often is developed by commanding
information that leads to successful case closure by linking suspects
with specific crimes. Information, given this setting for police work, is
indeed power. There exists a natural inclination on the part of career-
minded police practitioners to gather information and to hoard it until
its value is made significant by a specific criminal incident or until the
agency is encouraged by an external force to seek outside help.
Hoarding is done at the unit and the agency level as well. The W.S.U.
H.I.T.S. evaluation report was successful in identifying multiple
156 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

instances wherein such systematic information hoarding led to silo-

thinking, itself a barrier to effective communication. Only when lines
of communication are open can trust be established, be cultivated and
become sustainable.
One of the key findings emerging from the H.I.T.S. program
evaluation report was that communications between criminal
investigators from different agencies, including those from the H.I.T.S.
unit, were crucial in developing a culture of trust among like-minded
people where work could be mutually beneficial. Further research on
the factors that help to foster higher levels of trust among people with
similar goals is imperative if the goal of building a community of
intelligence-led policing is to be achieved. Further discussion of this
important concept of trust levels is carried out in the following section
that is aimed at informing practitioners in states other than Washington
of useful tips if they want to replicate the successes of the Washington
State H.I.T.S. unit in their own state.

Lessons for Other States Considering H.I.T.S.-Like Units

The H.I.T.S. program was largely the brainchild of Robert Keppel,

Ph.D. and former King County, Washington detective who recognized
the need for a statewide centralized unit that would have a vested
interest in filling the investigation gap that plagues most local law
enforcement agencies in the United States. This specialized
Washington state unit, modeled after the F.B.I.’s nationwide Violent
Criminal Apprehension Program (ViCAP), serves hundreds of local
law enforcement detectives and their respective agencies who would
potentially fail to connect offenders to homicides and rapes/sexual
assaults in the absence of H.I.T.S. The H.I.T.S. program, therefore,
serves as a model that should be considered for emulation by the many
law enforcement practitioners in other states wherein many small local
law enforcement agencies are in need of professional assistance in
solving and preventing serious violent crimes.
Large police agencies (conventionally defined as those with 100 or
more sworn officers) generally have numerous detectives who
specialize in solving homicides (murders) and rapes/sexual assaults.
Smaller agencies many times lack the workforce to sustain specialized
units, and sometimes that model works because smaller agencies tend
to encounter fewer such crimes. The law enforcement quandary for
Lego® Blocks: The Future of Intelligence Led Policing 157

those agencies begins when their need to address such crimes is not
matched with capable investigators. Not only do these smaller agencies
generally lack the skills required to meet the challenges posed by the
occasional serious violent crime, but they lack the investigative tools as
well. The presence of a state-level specialized unit such as H.I.T.S. can
make the difference between investigation success and failure. Police
administrators contemplating whether or not they would benefit from
such a state-level unit are encouraged to heed a few cautionary notes
before they make their final decision.
What sets the H.I.T.S. program apart from any other crime
investigation model is that it is housed within the Criminal Justice
Division of the Washington State Office of the Attorney General.
Funding for the H.I.T.S. program is at the sole discretion of the
Governor, thus much of the financial politics over program sustenance
are removed from a competitive environment. This can be both a good
thing and a bad thing. On the positive side, if the sitting Governor both
recognizes the need for and approves funding for the program it is
sustained. If there is either a lack of understanding of the H.I.T.S.
program, or lack of appreciation of its capabilities or its outcomes the
program is subject to losing its funding. Given this status of executive
discretionary funding it is critical that unit leaders build into the
program a robust evaluation component that will enable periodic
independent review of the program, one that will document its
successes and identify its weaknesses at predetermined intervals. The
resulting evaluation report can be an important asset for program
administrators, as was the case for the W.S.U. H.I.T.S. program
evaluation as evidenced in this post-evaluation report submission
comment from the then-director of H.I.T.S., Scott Blonien:

I wanted to again thank all of you [W.S.U. H.I.T.S. evaluation

team members] for the excellent work you did on the H.I.T.S.
study. As I have mentioned before because of your hard,
conscientious work we can easily plot a course for H.I.T.S. for
the future. You can be proud of what you’ve accomplished (S.
Blonien, personal communications, February 9, 2007).

In this instance the evaluation report identified areas of potential

mission drift not readily recognized by program managers, and
subsequent recommendations for corrective action were made.
158 Police Use of Intelligence Networks for Reducing Crime

Another key consideration in the creation and development of a

H.I.T.S.-like unit is that a workable, if as yet imperfect, model has been
cast and there is no need to re-invent it. Specifically, key elements that
include the maintenance of a centralized database of information that
contains myriad data from multiple sources, and the availability of
analysis personnel to help turn information into intelligence cannot be
overstated. Comments from criminal investigators and their
supervisors who work in the field reportedly pointed to the availability
of H.I.T.S. investigators/analysts as being the foundation blocks to
building a productive investigative community. Finally, a brief
discussion of the development of a community of trust is appropriate
and timely.
As mentioned in the section above on recommendations for further
research, the development of a culture of trust is absolutely essential if
law enforcement managers wish to fully embrace new information
technologies in their work. This culture of trust concept is one of the
most crucial components to be established among law enforcement
agencies if a H.I.T.S.-like unit is to be developed in another regional or
statewide jurisdiction. When Dr. Keppel created the H.I.T.S. program
in Washington he built relationships between investigator-practitioners
and himself using his credentials as a like-minded retired detective.
The bond of common training, experience and goals between Dr.
Keppel and local government criminal investigators created trust
between the H.I.T.S. unit and local law enforcement; the fact that these
relationships grew over time is clear evidence of that early bond. Out
of those original relationships other new relationships were forged as
new investigators from each agency replaced retiring detectives.
Similar relationships are needed beyond the police detective brethren.
Relationships must be forged between law enforcement and others in
their working environment to create a culture of trust that will enhance
the bond between the communities with law enforcement. Those
relationships will result in the development of information that can be
analyzed to create intelligence.
As evidenced by the Washington H.I.T.S. program, community
building must have the blessing of top executive managers within the
home jurisdiction for it to succeed. For Washington state, the Office of
the Governor held by Christine Gregoire, a former Washington State
Attorney General, proved a good place to start the state’s effort to
promote Information Led Policing. As in so many areas of progressive
Lego® Blocks: The Future of Intelligence Led Policing 159

governmental management, Washington’s early innovation in the

H.I.T.S. program deserves careful consideration by other states wherein
ILP’s promise is constrained by a lack of timely information sharing
and the absence of a culture of trust within and among the law
enforcement community.
Appendix 1: Criminal
Investigator Survey

NOTE: For those who have already completed the H.I.T.S. BULLETIN
RECIPIENTS SURVEY administered by e-mail, this is a different survey
which we would also like you to complete.
The Division of Governmental Studies and Services at Washington State
University is conducting this detained survey of crime investigators in
Washington. A team of researchers at the university has been contracted by the
Attorney General’s office to assess the operation of the H.I.T.S. program
(Homicide Investigation and Tracking System) and to recommend how
program services might be enhanced or improved. The research team is
composed of one Criminal Justice and one Public Administration faculty
member at W.S.U., and one Criminal Justice doctoral student responsible for
the field research interviews to follow up on the collection of survey data.
Thank you in advance for your participation.
SECTION 1: Background and Professional Judgment
The following questions concern your background in crime investigation
and your views on a number of professional issues related to the
investigation of serious crimes. In the following section please place an
“X” in the brackets to the left of the best answer for each question. Unless
otherwise requested, please mark only one answer for each question.
[editor’s note: brackets removed]

161
162 Appendix 1: Criminal Investigator Survey

Q–1. Do you have investigative authority for homicides, sexual assaults, or

other violent and non-violent crimes within the state of Washington?
Yes No
Q–2. What percentage of your job-related activities is normally taken up
with the investigation of homicides?
I do not investigate homicides.
1—24% 25%—49% 50%—74% 75%—100%
Q–3. What percentage of your job-related activities is normally taken up
with the investigation of sexual assaults (including rapes)?
I do not investigate sexual assaults.
1—24% 25%—49% 50%—74% 75%—100%
Q–4. How long have you been a homicide investigator?
I do not investigate homicides.
Less than 6 months
Between 6 months and one year
Between 1 and 5 years
Over 5 years
Q–5. How long have you been a rape/sexual assault investigator?
I do not investigate rape/sexual assault.
Less than 6 months
Between 6 months and one year
Between 1 and 5 years
Over 5 years
Q–6. Regarding your own work as a homicide or rape/sexual assault
investigator, please rank the following criminal databases with
respect to their utility to you
[1 = highest; 7 = lowest].
RANKING
ViCAP (Violent Criminal Apprehension Program)
H.I.T.S. (Homicide Investigation Tracking System)
MATRIX (Multi-state Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange)
N.C.I.C. (National Crime Information Center)
COPLINK®
RAIN
LInX
OTHER
Q–7. In your opinion, of the following persons described below, who
should have direct, unfiltered access to the H.I.T.S. database?
Any person, public or private, whose job it is to investigate crimes
Appendix 1: Criminal Investigator Survey 163

Any commissioned official employed by an agency vested with the

responsibility to prevent, investigate, or intervene in criminal activity,
including police patrol officers
Only those commissioned officials assigned to investigative units
within a criminal justice agency
Only one designated person within a criminal justice agency vested
with the responsibility to prevent, investigate, or intervene in criminal
activity
Q–8. If a public entity gathers crime-related data from various sources and
maintains that data in a central repository, in your opinion, who can
be said to “own” the data in that repository?
The agency that gathers and maintains the data
The public served by the agency in question
The individual to whom the data relate
Q–9. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “Having
access to Field Investigation Reports (FIRs) generated by patrol
officers on persons who are under the supervision of the Department
of Corrections would probably assist investigators in clearing
homicides and rapes/sexual assaults.”
I strongly agree I somewhat agree Undecided
I somewhat disagree I strongly disagree
Q–10. Which of the following statements best reflects your agency’s
operations with respect to a cold case squad/unit?
No such unit exists, and no plans are in place to create one.
No such unit currently exists, but plans are in place to create one.
The agency has such a unit, but it is not effective.
The agency has a somewhat effective unit of this type.
The agency has a quite effective cold case squad/unit.
Q–11. Specifically focusing on H.I.T.S., which of the following best
represents your level of information?
I am not at all familiar with H.I.T.S., nor have I heard much about it.
I am familiar with H.I.T.S., but I do not use it.
I use H.I.T.S., but it is not my primary investigative database.
H.I.T.S. is my primary investigative database.
Q–12. For criminal investigations generally, which of the following major
crime database resources do you see also as being the best overall
database for crime scene, criminal, and victim information? (Please
mark only one selection.)
ViCAP (Violent Criminal Apprehension Program)
H.I.T.S. (Homicide Investigation Tracking System)
164 Appendix 1: Criminal Investigator Survey

MATRIX (Multi-state Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange)

N.C.I.C. (National Crime Information Center)
COPLINK®
RAIN
LInX
Section 2: Resources Available and Desired for Effective Crime Inves.
The following statements concern the resources and tools available to you
as well as those you would like to have available. Using the scale shown
below, please offer your opinion.
1 = Strongly Agree 2 = Somewhat Agree 3 = Uncertain
4 = Disagree 5 = Strongly Disagree
Q–13. [ ] DNA evidence is important but not critical in
clearing rapes/sexual assaults.
Q–14. [ ] Criminal investigators who use public records to
clear crimes do not violate the privacy rights of members of
the public whose information is accessed.
Q–15. [ ] Access to timelines (chronological sequence
events) in a homicide or rape/sexual assault investigation is
often important.
Q–16. [ ] Timelines are available to me for every
investigation of a homicide or rape/sexual assault.
Q–17. [ ] Archival motor vehicle records are available to
me even if they have been purged from publicly available
records.
Q–18. [ ] Archival driver license information is available to
me even if records have been purged from publicly
available records.
Q–19. [ ] Investigators should use available victim self-
report data even if the victim did not file a police report.
Q–20. [ ] Investigators from different agencies have
adequate means by which to share information with one
another for the purpose of clearing homicides and
rapes/sexual assaults.
Q–21. [ ] Knowing the gang affiliation of suspects/victims,
if any, could prove helpful in clearing homicides and
rape/sexual assaults.
Q–22. [ ] As an investigator for a criminal justice agency, I
embrace any technology that helps my agency become
more efficient or effective in its functions.
Appendix 1: Criminal Investigator Survey 165

Q–23. [ ] Gang affiliation data are readily available to me

or my team for use in investigations.
Q–24. [ ] I communicate with criminal investigators
outside of my agency on most of my investigations of
homicides or rapes/sexual assaults.
Q–25. [ ] I have help from outside of my agency in nearly
every instance of homicide or rape/sexual assault that has
turned “cold” (cases that have stalled).
Q–26. [ ] As I see also it, a repository of personal data that
includes records from the Washington State Patrol, the
Department of Licensing, the Department of Corrections,
and other public sources is a valuable tool for criminal
investigators.
Q–27. [ ] I believe it is critical that law enforcement
agencies share any information they have access to with
allied law enforcement agencies.
Q–28. [ ] Mapping by crime type/location is available to
me within my agency.
Q–29. [ ] Mapping by crime type or location is available to
me from an entity outside of my agency. (Please list:
_____________________________________)
Q–30. [ ] Criminal profiling services are available to me
within my agency.
Q–31. [ ] Criminal profiling is available to me from an
entity outside of my agency. (Please list:
______________________________________)
Q–32. [ ] The ability to connect known inhabitants with
specific addresses would be useful in the investigation of
homicides and rapes/sexual assaults.
Q–33. [ ] Forensic computer crime investigation capability
is important in the investigation of homicides.
Q–34. [ ] Forensic computer crime investigation capability
is important in the investigation of rapes/sexual assaults.
Q–35. [ ] Forensic computer crime investigators are
available to me within my agency.
Q–36. [ ] Investigators from different agencies do a
relatively good job of sharing information with one another
in an effort to facilitate the clearance of homicides and/or
rapes/sexual investigation assaults.
Q–37. [ ] The availability of a third-party team of
investigators to assist in guiding, directing, or counseling
166 Appendix 1: Criminal Investigator Survey

my agency’s investigators in some instances of homicide or

rape/sexual assault investigation would be beneficial.
Q–38. [ ] Investigators of homicides and/or rapes/sexual
assaults would benefit from in-service training on basic
homicide investigation, advanced homicide investigation,
rape/sexual assault investigation, and blood spatter
analysis.
Q–39. [ ] Investigators I am aware of do a relatively good
job of sharing information with one another across sub-
units within their agency in an effort to facilitate the
clearance of homicides and/or rapes/sexual assaults.
Section 3: Crime Analysis Database Awareness
For each of the following investigative databases, using the scale shown
below, please tell us about the extent of your reliance upon these crime
investigation resources.
1 = This is our primary database 2 = This is our secondary dbase
3 = We sometimes use this dbase 4 = We rarely use this database
5 = We never use this database
Q–40. [ ] ViCAP (Violent Criminal Apprehension Program)
Q–41. [ ] H.I.T.S. (Homicide Investigation Tracking System)
Q–42. [ ] MATRIX (Multi-state Anti-Terrorism Info Exchange)
Q–43. [ ] COPLINK®
Q–44. [ ] HALT (Homicide Inves. & Lead Tracking – NY)
Q–45. [ ] ViCLAS (Royal Canadian Mounted Police)
Q–46. [ ] ATAC (Pennsylvania State)
Q–47. [ ] Iowa State Sex Crimes Analysis System
Q–48. [ ] MINN/SCAP (Minn. Sex Crimes Analysis Program)
Q–49. [ ] RAIN (King County, Washington)
Q–50. [ ] LInX
Q–51. [ ] Other __________________________ (please specify)
Section 4: H.I.T.S. Program Awareness and Impact
In this section you are asked to respond to a series of statements specific to
the AG’s H.I.T.S. program using the scale shown below. [Your answers
will provide important information for our assessment of the H.I.T.S.
program.]
1 = Strongly Agree 2 = Somewhat Agree 3 = Uncertain
4 = Somewhat Disagree 5 = Strongly Disagree
Appendix 1: Criminal Investigator Survey 167

6 = I have not had enough experience with H.I.T.S. to answer

Q–52. [ ] I do not know what H.I.T.S. is, nor have I ever used it. If
true, please indicate with an X in the brackets.
(If you checked X for Q–52 above, please advance to Section 7 on page 11.)
These statements assume that you have been exposed, in some form, to the
H.I.T.S. program or its database, even if you do not currently make
frequent use of it as an investigative resource.
Q–53. [ ] H.I.T.S. has had a significant effect on the clearance rate of
homicides in Washington state.
Q–54. [ ] H.I.T.S. has had a significant effect on the clearance rate of
rapes/sexual assaults in Washington State.
Q–55. [ ] H.I.T.S. is successful at building partnerships among
various homicide and rape/sexual assault investigative units
within Washington state.
Q–56. [ ] I feel that I have received helpful attention from at least one
member of the H.I.T.S. office when I needed assistance
during an investigation.
Q–57. [ ] I would prefer to be able to input data from my
investigations directly into the H.I.T.S. database without
having to go through the H.I.T.S. team.
Q–58. [ ] The assistance I receive from H.I.T.S. investigators is likely
to be useful in clearing homicides and/or rapes/sexual
assaults.
Q–59. [ ] The information I receive from my H.I.T.S. queries is
useful in clearing homicides and/or rapes/sexual assaults.
Q–60. [ ] I have been given the opportunity to provide feedback
regarding my experience with H.I.T.S..
Q–61. [ ] I have a high level of confidence that my requests for
H.I.T.S. queries will result in information that will assist
me in clearing a crime.
Q–62. [ ] My level of satisfaction with H.I.T.S. and H.I.T.S.
investigators encourages me to continue using H.I.T.S. as
an investigative tool.
Q–63. [ ] I have used H.I.T.S., but I prefer to make use of an
alternative resource(s). (Please specify)
Q–64. [ ] Regarding turnaround time, I am satisfied with the timely
manner in which I receive responses to my H.I.T.S queries.
Q–65. [ ] H.I.T.S. has helped me to clear at least one “cold case”
(stalled) homicide.
168 Appendix 1: Criminal Investigator Survey

Q–66. [ ] H.I.T.S. has helped me to clear at least one “cold case”

(stalled) rape/sexual assault.
Q–67. [ ] Information would flow from my agency to H.I.T.S. in a
more efficient manner if investigators from my agency
could input homicide or rape/sexual assault data directly
into the H.I.T.S. database and bypass the H.I.T.S.
investigative team.
Q–68. [ ] I am aware that the H.I.T.S. database includes information
on missing children.
Q–69. [ ] I am aware that the H.I.T.S. database is part of the Amber
Alert System.
SECTION 5: H.I.T.S. Program Services and Training Programs
In the following section you are asked to respond to another series of
statements specific to the H.I.T.S. program using the scale shown below.
Your answers will provide important information for our assessment of
the H.I.T.S. program.
1 = I am familiar with it and I have used it
2 = I am familiar with it but have not used it
3 = I am not familiar with it but would use it
4 = I would not use it
Q–70. [ ] H.I.T.S. offers training on basic investigations.
Q–71. [ ] H.I.T.S. offers training on basic homicide investigations.
Q–72. [ ] H.I.T.S. offers training on advanced homicide
investigations.
Q–73. [ ] H.I.T.S. offers training and support for cold case (stalled)
unit development.
Q–74. [ ] H.I.T.S. offers assistance to homicide investigators for
determining how death occurred.
Q–75. [ ] H.I.T.S. offers assistance to investigators on techniques for
interrogating known offenders.
Q–76. [ ] H.I.T.S. offers expert witness testimony in court cases.
Q–77. [ ] H.I.T.S. offers assistance on homicide and rape/sexual
assault cases that have stalled.
Q–78. [ ] H.I.T.S. offers suspect profiling assistance to homicide
investigators.
Q–79. [ ] H.I.T.S. offers assistance in DNA analysis for homicide or
rape/sexual assault cases.
Q–80. [ ] H.I.T.S. should offer training/service for (please list)
Appendix 1: Criminal Investigator Survey 169

SECTION 6: H.I.T.S. Assistance/Agency Information

In the following section you are asked a series of questions specific to your
agency’s interaction with H.I.T.S. Your answers will provide important
information for our assessment of the H.I.T.S. program. For each of the
following questions, please place an “X” next to the appropriate answer.
Q–81. How many times have your investigations been assisted by access to
the H.I.T.S. database?
[ ] 0 [ ] 1—5 [ ] 6—10 [ ] 10 + [ ] Unk.
Q–82. How many times have you communicated with a H.I.T.S.
investigator by phone, fax, mail or e-mail?
[ ] 0 [ ] 1—5 [ ] 6—10 [ ] 10 + [ ] Unk.
Q–83. If you have used any of the services provided by the H.I.T.S. team,
how would you rate your level of satisfaction with those services?
[ ] I have never used the services of the H.I.T.S. team.
[ ] Highly satisfied [ ] Satisfied [ ] Dissatisfied
[ ] Highly dissatisfied
Q–84. If you have used any of the services provided by the H.I.T.S. team,
were you offered the opportunity to provide feedback regarding your
satisfaction with those services?
[ ] I have never used the services of the H.I.T.S. team.
[ ] Yes [ ] No
Q–85. What is the name of the H.I.T.S. investigator assigned to your
agency?
[ ] Don’t know
[ ] Richard “Dick” Gagnon
[ ] George Fox
[ ] Marvin Skeen
[ ] Tamara Matheny
[ ] Rick Grabenstein
[ ] Jim Hansen
Q–86. What percentage of your agency’s active sex crime cases is submitted
to H.I.T.S.?
[ ] None [ ] 1–24% [ ] 25–49% [ ] 50–74%
[ ] 75–100% If unknown, check this box
Q–87. What percentage of your agency’s active homicide cases is submitted
to H.I.T.S.?
[ ] None [ ] 1–24% [ ] 25–49% [ ] 50–74%
[ ] 75–100% If unknown, check this box
Q–88. What percentage of your agency’s cold (stalled) homicides and sex
crimes is submitted to H.I.T.S.?
170 Appendix 1: Criminal Investigator Survey

[ ] None [ ] 1–24% [ ] 25–49% [ ] 50–74%

[ ] 75–100% If unknown, check this box
Q–89. What percentage of your agency’s missing persons (age 18 and over)
cases is submitted to H.I.T.S.?
[ ] None [ ] 1–24% [ ] 25–49% [ ] 50–74%
[ ] 75–100% If unknown, check this box
Q–90. What percentage of your agency’s missing children (under age 18)
cases are submitted to H.I.T.S.?
[ ] None [ ] 1–24% [ ] 25–49% [ ] 50–74%
[ ] 75–100% If unknown, check this box
Q–91. In what ways, if any, has H.I.T.S. helped improve your investigative
strategies?
Q–92. If you no longer use any of the services provided by H.I.T.S., but did
so in the past, please explain the reason(s) for discontinuing your use
of H.I.T.S. program services:
Q–93. If you are aware that H.I.T.S. has helped other investigators in your
agency to improve their investigations of homicides and/or
rapes/sexual assaults, please indicate how that service was beneficial
to their investigation(s):
Q–94. H.I.T.S. would be even more effective IF IT…. (please describe the
kinds of additional information, knowledge, or support H.I.T.S. could
incorporate in its services that would be helpful in your
investigations):
SECTION 7: Agency Information
In the following section you are asked a series of questions specific to your
agency. For each of the following questions, please place an “X” in the box
next to the appropriate answer.
Q–95. To the best of your knowledge, how many full-time investigators
(including homicide and rape/sexual assault specialists) are employed
by your agency?
[ ] 0 [ ] 1–5 [ ] 6–10 [ ] 10 +
Q–96. Which of the following describes the nature of the agency that
employs you?
[ ] Municipal [ ] County [ ] State [ ] Federal
[ ] Tribal [ ] Private
Q–97. Which of the following describes the primary function of the agency
that employs you?
[ ] Corrections [ ] Law Enforcement [ ] Prosecution
[ ] Other (please specify)
Appendix 1: Criminal Investigator Survey 171

Q–98. Would you like to be invited to take part in a group discussion of the
H.I.T.S. program?
Yes [ ] No [ ]
Please use this space to write additional comments you have regarding the
H.I.T.S. program or this survey.
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR CONTRIBUTING TO THIS
IMPORTANT EFFORT TO ASSESS AND ENHANCE THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE H.I.T.S. PROGRAM.
Appendix 2: Supervising
Investigator Survey

NOTE: For those who have already completed the H.I.T.S. BULLETIN
RECIPIENTS SURVEY administered by e-mail, this is a different survey
which we would also like you to complete.
The Division of Governmental Studies and Services at Washington State
University is conducting this detained survey of Supervising Investigators in
Washington. A team of researchers at the university has been contracted by the
Attorney General’s office to assess the operation of the H.I.T.S. program
(Homicide Investigation and Tracking System) and to recommend how
program services might be enhanced or improved. The research team is
composed of one Criminal Justice and one Public Administration faculty
member at W.S.U., and one Criminal Justice doctoral student responsible for
the field research interviews to follow up on the collection of survey data.

Thank you in advance for your participation.

SECTION 1: Background and Professional Judgment
The following questions concern your background in law enforcement and
your views on a number of professional issues related to the investigation
of serious crimes. In the following section please place an “X” next to the
best answer for each question. Unless otherwise requested, please mark
only one answer for each question.

173
174 Appendix 2: Supervising Investigator Survey

Q–1. Do you have investigative authority for homicides, sexual assaults, or

other violent and non-violent crimes within the state of Washington?
[ ] Yes [ ] No
Q–2. Please mark the option that best describes your main role within your
agency.
[ ] I supervise investigators of homicides and/or rapes/sexual
assaults, and I actively participate in investigations.
[ ] I supervise investigators of homicides and/or rapes/sexual
assaults, but I do not actively participate in investigations.
Q–3. Which of the following most closely represents your attitude toward
new technologies?
[ ] I am often confused by new technologies, and I prefer to
leave decisions to adopt them to others in the organization.
(Please specify to whom you defer such decisions
____________________________)
[ ] I am not technologically inclined, but I am willing to learn
new technologies if they show promise for helping my
agency meet its mission and/or goals.
[ ] I am comfortable with new technologies, and I embrace
their use in crime solving and crime prevention.
Q–4. Which of the following statements best represents your perspective
on the proper place of new technologies in criminal justice?
[ ] I believe that law enforcement has access to all of the
technological tools it needs to clear crimes, but agencies
have to make greater efforts to learn to use them properly.
[ ] I believe that new technologies for crime solving and crime
prevention have been over-sold. There is no substitute for
good old-fashioned detective work.
Q–5. Regarding you/your investigators’ work as homicide or rape/sexual
assault investigators, please rank the following criminal databases
with respect to their utility to you/your investigators [1 = highest; 7 =
lowest].
RANKING
[ ] ViCAP (Violent Criminal Apprehension Program)
[ ] H.I.T.S. (Homicide Investigation Tracking System)
[ ] MATRIX (Multi-state AntiTerrorism Info Exchange)
[ ] N.C.I.C. (National Crime Information Center)
[ ] COPLINK®
[ ] RAIN
[ ] LInX
[ ] Other ___________
Appendix 2: Supervising Investigator Survey 175

Q–6. In your opinion, of the following persons described below, who

should have direct, unfiltered access to the H.I.T.S. database?
[ ] Any person, public or private, whose job it is to
investigate crimes
[ ] Any commissioned official employed by an agency vested
with the responsibility to prevent, investigate, or intervene
in criminal activity, including police patrol officers
[ ] Only those commissioned officials assigned to investigative
units within a criminal justice agency
[ ] Only one designated person within a criminal justice
agency vested with the responsibility to prevent,
investigate, or intervene in criminal activity
Q–7. If a public entity gathers data from various sources and maintains that
data in a central repository, in your opinion, who can it be said to
“own” the data in that repository?
[ ] The agency that gathers and maintains the data
[ ] The public served by the agency in question
[ ] The individual to whom the data relates
Q–8. Which of the following statements best reflects your agency’s
operations with respect to a cold case squad unit?
[ ] No such unit exists, and no plans are in place to
create one.
[ ] No such unit currently exists, but plans are in place to
create one.
[ ] The agency has such a unit but it is not effective.
[ ] The agency has a somewhat effective unit of this
type.
[ ] The agency has a quite effective cold case squad/unit.
Q–9. For criminal investigations generally, which of the following major
crime database resources do you see also as being the best overall
database for crime scene, criminal, and victim information? (Please
mark only one selection.)
[ ] ViCAP (Violent Criminal Apprehension Program)
[ ] H.I.T.S. (Homicide Investigation Tracking System)
[ ] MATRIX (Multi-state Anti-Terrorism Information
Exchange)
[ ] N.C.I.C. (National Crime Information Center)
[ ] COPLINK®
[ ] RAIN
[ ] LInX
176 Appendix 2: Supervising Investigator Survey

Q–10. Specifically focusing on H.I.T.S., which of the following best

represents your level of information?
[ ] I am not at all familiar with H.I.T.S., nor have I heard
much about it.
[ ] I am familiar with H.I.T.S., but neither I nor my
investigators use it.
[ ] My investigators and I both use H.I.T.S., but it is not our
primary investigative database.
[ ] H.I.T.S. is my investigators’ primary investigative
database.
Q–11. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “Having
access to Field Investigation Reports (FIRs) generated by patrol
officers on persons who are under the supervision of the Department
of Corrections would greatly assist investigators in clearing
homicides and rapes/sexual assaults.”
[ ] I strongly agree [ ] I somewhat agree
[ ] Undecided [ ] I somewhat disagree
[ ] I strongly disagree
Section 2: Resources Available and Desired for Effective Crime
Investigation
The following statements concern the resources and tools available to you
and those you supervise as well as those you would like to have available.
Using the scale shown below, please offer your opinion.
1 = Strongly Agree 2 = Somewhat Agree 3 = Uncertain
4 = Disagree 5 = Strongly Disagree
Q–12. [ ] DNA evidence is important but not critical in clearing
rapes/sexual assaults.
Q–13. [ ] Criminal investigators who use public records to clear
crimes do not violate the privacy rights of members of the
public whose information is accessed.
Q–14. [ ] Access to timelines (chronological sequence events) in a
homicide or rape/sexual assault investigation is often
important.
Q–15. [ ] Timelines are available to me and/or my team for every
investigation of a homicide or rape/sexual assault.
Q–16. [ ] Archival motor vehicle records are available to me and/or
my team even if they have been purged from publicly
available records.
Appendix 2: Supervising Investigator Survey 177

Q–17. [ ] Archival driver license information is available to me

and/or my team even if records have been from publicly
available records.
Q–18. [ ] Investigators should use available victim self-report data
even if the victim did not file a police report.
Q–19. [ ] Investigators from different agencies have adequate means
by which to share information with one another for the
purpose of clearing homicides and rapes/sexual assaults.
Q–20. [ ] Knowing the gang affiliation of suspects/victims, if any,
could prove helpful in clearing homicides and rapes/sexual
assaults.
Q–21. [ ] As an investigator/investigative supervisor for a criminal
justice agency, I embrace any technology that helps my
agency become more efficient or effective in its functions.
Q–22. [ ] Gang affiliation data are readily available to me and/or my
team for use in investigations
Q–23. [ ] My homicide and rape/sexual assault investigators
communicate with investigators outside of my agency on
most of their investigations.
Q–24. [ ] My homicide and rape/sexual assault investigators have
help available from outside of my agency in every instance
of homicide or rape/sexual assault that has turned “cold”
(stalled).
Q–25. [ ] As I see also it, a repository of personal data that includes
records from the Washington State Patrol, the Department
of Licensing, the Department of Corrections, and other
public sources is a valuable tool for criminal investigators.
Q–26. [ ] I believe it is critical that law enforcement agencies share
any information they have access to with allied law
enforcement agencies.
Q–27. [ ] Mapping by crime type/location is available to me or my
team from within my agency.
Q–28. [ ] Mapping by crime type or location is available to me or my
team from an entity outside of my agency. (Please
list_________________________)
Q–29. [ ] Criminal profiling services are available to me or my team
within my agency.
Q–30. [ ] Criminal profiling is available to me or my team from an
entity outside of my agency. (Please
list_______________________________________)
178 Appendix 2: Supervising Investigator Survey

Q–31. [ ] The ability to connect known inhabitants with specific

addresses would be useful in the investigation of homicides
and rapes/sexual assaults.
Q–32. [ ] Forensic computer crime investigation capability is
important in the investigation of homicides.
Q–33. [ ] Forensic computer crime investigation capability is
important in the investigation of rapes/sexual assaults.
Q–34. [ ] Forensic computer crime investigators are available to me
or my team within my agency.
Q–35. [ ] Investigators from different agencies do a relatively good
job of sharing information with one another in an effort to
facilitate the clearance of homicides and/or rapes/sexual
assaults.
Q–36. [ ] The availability of a third-party team of investigators to
assist in guiding, directing, or counseling my agency’s
investigators in some instances of homicide or rape/sexual
assault investigation would be beneficial.
Q–37. [ ] Investigators of homicides and/or rapes/sexual assaults
would benefit from in-service training on basic homicide
investigation, advanced homicide investigation, rape/sexual
assault investigation, and blood spatter analysis.
Q–38. [ ] Investigators I am aware of do a relatively good job of
sharing information with one another across sub-units
within their agency in an effort to facilitate the clearance of
homicides and/or rapes/sexual assaults.
Section 3: Crime Analysis Database Awareness
For each of the following investigative databases, using the scale shown
below, please tell us about the extent of your reliance upon these crime
investigation resources.
1 = This is our primary database 2 = This is our secondary dbase
3 = We sometimes use this dbase 4 = We rarely use this database
5 = We never use this database

Q–39. [ ] ViCAP (Violent Criminal Apprehension Program)

Q–40. [ ] H.I.T.S. (Homicide Investigation Tracking System)
Q–41. [ ] MATRIX (Multi-state Anti-Terrorism Info Exchange)
Q–42. [ ] COPLINK®
Q–43. [ ] HALT (Homicide Inves. & Lead Tracking – NY)
Q–44. [ ] ViCLAS (Royal Canadian Mounted Police)
Appendix 2: Supervising Investigator Survey 179

Q–45. [ ] ATAC (Pennsylvania State)

Q–46. [ ] Iowa State Sex Crimes Analysis System
Q–47. [ ] MINN/SCAP (Minn. Sex Crimes Analysis Program)
Q–48. [ ] RAIN (King County, Washington)
Q–49. [ ] LInX
Q–50. [ ] Other ________________________ (please specify)
Section 4: H.I.T.S. Program Awareness and Impact
In the following section you are asked to respond to a series of statements
specific to the AG’s H.I.T.S. program using the scale shown below. [Your
answers will provide important information for our assessment of the
H.I.T.S. program.]
1 = Strongly Agree 2 = Somewhat Agree 3 = Uncertain
4 = Somewhat Disagree 5 = Strongly Disagree
6 = I have not had enough experience with H.I.T.S. to answer

Q–51. [ ] I do not know what H.I.T.S. is, nor have I ever used it. If
true, please indicate with an X in the brackets.
(If you checked X for Q–52 above, please advance to Section 7 on page 11.)
These statements assume that you have been exposed, in some form, to the
H.I.T.S. program or its database, even if your staff does not currently
make frequent use of it as an investigative resource.

Q–52. [ ] H.I.T.S. has had a significant effect on the clearance rate of

homicides in Washington state.
Q–53. [ ] H.I.T.S. has had a significant effect on the clearance rate of
rapes/sexual assaults.
Q–54. [ ] H.I.T.S. is successful at building partnerships among
various homicide and rape/sexual assault investigative units
within Washington state.
Q–55. [ ] I feel that my investigators have received helpful attention
from at least one member of H.I.T.S. when they have
needed assistance during an investigation.
Q–56. [ ] I would prefer that my investigators input data from their
investigations directly into the H.I.T.S. database without
having to go through the H.I.T.S. team.
Q–57. [ ] The assistance my investigators receive from H.I.T.S.
investigators has been useful in clearing homicides and/or
rapes/sexual assaults.
180 Appendix 2: Supervising Investigator Survey

Q–58. [ ] The information my investigators have received from

H.I.T.S. queries has been useful in clearing homicides
and/or rapes/sexual assaults.
Q–59. [ ] My investigators have been provided with the opportunity
to provide feedback regarding their experience with
H.I.T.S.
Q–60. [ ] I have a high level of confidence that requests by my
investigators for H.I.T.S. queries will result in information
that will assist him/her in clearing a crime.
Q–61. [ ] My level of satisfaction with H.I.T.S. prompts me to
continue to encourage my investigators to use H.I.T.S. as
an investigative tool.
Q–62. [ ] I have personally used H.I.T.S., but I prefer to make use of
an alternative resource(s). (Please specify
____________________________________)
Q–63. [ ] Regarding turnaround time, I am satisfied with the timely
manner in which my investigators receive responses to
H.I.T.S. queries.
Q–64. [ ] H.I.T.S. has helped my investigators to clear at least one
“cold ” (stalled) homicide.
Q–65. [ ] H.I.T.S. has helped my investigators to clear at least one
“cold” (stalled) rape/sexual assault.
Q–66. [ ] Information would flow from my agency to H.I.T.S. in a
more efficient manner if investigators from my agency
could input homicide or rape/sexual assault data directly
into the H.I.T.S. database and bypass the H.I.T.S.
investigative team.
Q–67. [ ] My investigators are aware that the H.I.T.S. database
includes information on missing children.
Q–68. [ ] My investigators are aware that the H.I.T.S. database is part
of the Amber Alert System.
SECTION 5: H.I.T.S. Program Services and Training Programs
In the following section you are asked to respond to another series of
statements specific to the H.I.T.S. program using the scale shown below.
Your answers will provide important information for our assessment of
the H.I.T.S. program.
1 = Familiar with, and I have used it 2 = Familiar but have not used it
3 = Not familiar with, but would use it 4 = I would not use it
Appendix 2: Supervising Investigator Survey 181

Please place a 1, 2, 3, or 4 in the brackets to the left of each statement.

Q–69. [ ] H.I.T.S. offers training on basic investigations.
Q–70. [ ] H.I.T.S. offers training on basic homicide investigations.
Q–71. [ ] H.I.T.S. offers training on advanced homicide
investigations.
Q–72. [ ] H.I.T.S. offers training and support for cold case (stalled)
unit development.
Q–73. [ ] H.I.T.S. offers assistance to homicide investigators for
determining how death occurred.
Q–74. [ ] H.I.T.S. offers assistance to investigators on techniques for
interrogating known offenders.
Q–75. [ ] H.I.T.S. offers expert witness testimony in court cases.
Q–76. [ ] H.I.T.S. offers assistance on homicide and rape/sexual
assault cases that have stalled.
Q–77. [ ] H.I.T.S. offers suspect profiling assistance to homicide
investigators.
Q–78. [ ] H.I.T.S. offers assistance in DNA analysis for homicide or
rape/sexual assault cases.
Q–79. [ ] H.I.T.S. should offer training/service for
_________________________.
SECTION 6: H.I.T.S. Assistance/Agency Information
In the following section you are asked a series of questions specific to your
agency’s interaction with H.I.T.S. Your answers will provide important
information for our assessment of the H.I.T.S. program. For each of the
following questions, please place an “X” next to the appropriate answer.
Q–80. How many times have your investigations/investigators been assisted
by the H.I.T.S. program/team?
[ ] 0 [ ] 1—5 [ ] 6—10 [ ] More than 10
[ ] Don’t know
Q–81. In your opinion, who “owns” the data retained in the H.I.T.S.
database repository?
[ ] The office of the Attorney General, since H.I.T.S. is
part of that agency
[ ] The public
[ ] The individual to whom the data relates
[ ] The agency or entity from which the data originated
Q–82. If you/your investigators have ever used the services of the H.I.T.S.
team, how would you or your investigators rate the level of
satisfaction?
182 Appendix 2: Supervising Investigator Survey

[ ] I/we have never used the services of the H.I.T.S. team.

[ ] Highly satisfied [ ] Satisfied [ ] Dissatisfied
[ ] Highly dissatisfied
Q–83. If you/your investigators have ever used the services of the H.I.T.S.
team, were you or your investigators offered the opportunity to
provide feedback regarding the satisfaction of the services
performed?
[ ] I/we have never used the services of the H.I.T.S. team.
[ ] Yes [ ] No
Q–84. What is the name of the H.I.T.S. investigator assigned to your
agency?
[ ] Don’t know
[ ] Richard “Dick” Gagnon
[ ] George Fox
[ ] Marvin Skeen
[ ] Tamara Matheny
[ ] Rick Grabenstein
[ ] Jim Hansen
Q–85. What percentage of your agency’s active sex crime cases is submitted
to H.I.T.S.?
[ ] None [ ] 1–24% [ ] 25–49% [ ] 50–74%
[ ] 75–100% If unknown, check this box
Q–86. What percentage of your agency’s active homicide cases is submitted
to H.I.T.S.?
[ ] None [ ] 1–24% [ ] 25–49% [ ] 50–74%
[ ] 75–100% If unknown, check this box
Q–87. What percentage of your agency’s cold (stalled) homicides and sex
crimes is submitted to H.I.T.S.?
[ ] None [ ] 1–24% [ ] 25–49% [ ] 50–74%
[ ] 75–100% If unknown, check this box
Q–88. What percentage of your agency’s missing persons (age 18 and over)
cases is submitted to H.I.T.S.?
[ ] None [ ] 1–24% [ ] 25–49% [ ] 50–74%
[ ] 75–100% If unknown, check this box
Q–89. What percentage of your agency’s missing children (under age 18)
cases are submitted to H.I.T.S.?
[ ] None [ ] 1–24% [ ] 25–49% [ ] 50–74%
[ ] 75–100% If unknown, check this box
Q–90. If you/your investigators no longer use any of the services provided
by H.I.T.S., but did so in the past, please explain the reason(s) for
discontinuing your use of H.I.T.S. program services:
Appendix 2: Supervising Investigator Survey 183

Q–91. How has the H.I.T.S. program helped investigators in your agency
improve their investigations of homicides and/or rapes/sexual
assaults? (please be specific):
Q–92. H.I.T.S. has helped to increase my confidence in my own or my
investigators’ abilities to clear homicides and/or rapes/sexual assaults
because (please be specific):
Q–93. H.I.T.S. would be more helpful to me or my team’s investigations if
(please describe in detail the kinds of information, knowledge, or
support that would be helpful to you/your investigators):
SECTION 7: Agency Information
In the following section you are asked a series of questions specific to your
agency. For each of the following questions, please place an “X” in the box
next to the appropriate answer.
Q–94. How many full-time investigators (including homicide and
rape/sexual assault specialists) are employed by your agency?
[ ] 0 [ ] 1–5 [ ] 6–10 [ ] 10 +
Q–95. Which of the following describes the nature of the agency that
employs you?
[ ] Municipal [ ] County [ ] State [ ] Federal
[ ] Tribal [ ] Private
Q–96. Which of the following describes the primary function of the agency
that employs you?
[ ] Corrections [ ] Law Enforcement [ ] Prosecution
[ ] Other (please specify_________________)
Q–97. Would you like to be invited to take part in a group discussion of the
H.I.T.S. program?
[ ] Yes [ ] No
Please use this space to write additional comments you have regarding the
H.I.T.S. program or this survey.

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR CONTRIBUTING TO THIS

IMPORTANT EFFORT TO ASSESS AND ENHANCE THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE H.I.T.S. PROGRAM.
Appendix 3: Police Chief and
Sheriff Survey

NOTE: For those who have already completed the H.I.T.S. BULLETIN
RECIPIENTS SURVEY administered by e-mail, this is a different survey
which we would also like you to complete.

The Division of Governmental Studies and Services at Washington State

University is conducting this detained survey of Police Chiefs and Sheriffs in
Washington. A team of researchers at the university has been contracted by the
Attorney General’s office to assess the operation of the H.I.T.S. program
(Homicide Investigation and Tracking System) and to recommend how
program services might be enhanced or improved. The research team is
composed of one Criminal Justice and one Public Administration faculty
member at W.S.U., and one Criminal Justice doctoral student responsible for
the field research interviews to follow up on the collection of survey data.

SECTION 1: Background and Professional Judgment

The following questions concern your background in law enforcement and
your views on a number of professional issues related to the investigation
of serious crimes. In the following section please place an “X” next to the

185
186 Appendix 3: Police Chief and Sheriff Survey

best answer for each question. Unless otherwise requested, please mark
only one answer for each question.

Q–1. Please mark the option that best describes your main role within your
agency.
[ ] Chief of Police or Sheriff
[ ] Bureau Chief or Undersheriff
[ ] Deputy/Assistant Chief/Sheriff
[ ] Other (please specify______________________)
Q–2. Which of the following most closely represents your attitude toward
new technologies?
[ ] I am not technologically inclined, but I am willing to adopt
new technologies if they show promise for helping my
agency meet its mission and/or goals.
[ ] I am comfortable with new technologies, and I embrace
their use in crime solving and crime prevention.
Q–3. Which of the following statements best represents your perspective
on the proper place of new technologies in criminal justice?
[ ] I believe that law enforcement has access to all of the
technological tools it needs to successfully clear crimes;
however, agencies have to make greater efforts to learn to
use them properly.
[ ] I believe that new technologies for crime solving and crime
prevention have been over-sold. There is no substitute for
good old-fashioned detective work.
Q–4. Regarding the tools available to your homicide and/or rape/sexual
assault investigators, please rank the following criminal databases
with respect to their utility to your own agency [1 = highest; 7 =
lowest].
RANKING
[ ] ViCAP (Violent Criminal Apprehension Program)
[ ] H.I.T.S. (Homicide Investigation Tracking System)
[ ] MATRIX (Multi-state AntiTerrorism Info Exchange)
[ ] N.C.I.C. (National Crime Information Center)
[ ] COPLINK®
[ ] RAIN
[ ] LInX
[ ] OTHER
Appendix 3: Police Chief and Sheriff Survey 187

Q–5. In your opinion, of the following persons described below, who

should have direct, unfiltered access to criminal investigation
databases?
[ ] Any person, public or private, whose job it is to
investigate crimes
[ ] Any commissioned official employed by an agency vested
with the responsibility to prevent, investigate, or intervene
in criminal activity, including police patrol officers
[ ] Only those commissioned officials assigned to investigative
units within a criminal justice agency
[ ] Only one designated person within a criminal justice
agency vested with the responsibility to prevent,
investigate, or intervene in criminal activity
Q–6. If a public entity gathers crime-related data from various sources and
maintains that data in a central repository, in your opinion, who
“owns” the data in that repository?
[ ] The agency that gathers and maintains the data
[ ] The public served by the agency in question
[ ] The individual to whom the data relates
Q–7. For criminal investigations generally, which of the following major
crime database resources do you see also as being the best overall
database for crime scene, criminal, and victim information? (Please
mark only one selection.)
[ ] ViCAP (Violent Criminal Apprehension Program)
[ ] H.I.T.S. (Homicide Investigation Tracking System)
[ ] MATRIX (Multi-state AntiTerrorism Info Exchange)
[ ] N.C.I.C. (National Crime Information Center)
[ ] COPLINK®
[ ] RAIN
[ ] LInX
Q–8. Specifically focusing on H.I.T.S., which of the following best
represents your level of information?
[ ] I am not at all familiar with H.I.T.S., nor have I heard
much about it.
[ ] I am familiar with H.I.T.S., but neither I nor my
investigators use it.
[ ] My investigators use H.I.T.S., but it is not their
primary investigative database.
[ ] H.I.T.S. is my investigators’ primary investigative
database.
188 Appendix 3: Police Chief and Sheriff Survey

Section 2: Resources Available and Desired for Effective Crime

Investigation
The following questions concern the resources and tools available to your
agency and those your agency would like to have available. Using the scale
shown below, please offer your opinion.
1 = Strongly Agree 2 = Somewhat Agree 3 = Uncertain
4 = Disagree 5 = Strongly Disagree
Q–9. [ ] DNA evidence is important but not critical in clearing
rapes/sexual assaults.
Q–10. [ ] Criminal investigators who use public records to clear
crimes do not violate the privacy rights of members of the
public whose information is accessed.
Q–11. [ ] Field Investigation Reports (FIRs) generated by patrol
officers on persons under the supervision of the Department
of Corrections would greatly assist investigators in clearing
homicides and rapes/sexual assaults.
Q–12. [ ] My agency’s homicide and rape/sexual assault investigators
communicate with investigators outside of my agency on
most of their investigations.
Q–13. [ ] My homicide and rape/sexual assault investigators have
help available from outside of my agency in every instance
of homicide or rape/sexual assault that has turned “cold”
(stalled).
Q–14. [ ] The way I see also it, a repository of personal data that
includes records from the Department of Motor Vehicles,
the Department of Licensing, the Department of
Corrections, and other public sources is a valuable tool for
criminal investigators.
Q–15. [ ] Investigators from different agencies do a relatively good
job of sharing information with one another in an effort to
facilitate the clearance of homicides and/or rapes/sexual
assaults.
Q–16. [ ] The availability of a third-party team of investigators to
assist in guiding, directing, or counseling my agency’s
investigators in some instances of homicide or rape/sexual
assault investigation would be beneficial.
Q–17. [ ] Investigators of homicides and/or rapes/sexual assaults
would benefit from in-service training on basic homicide
Appendix 3: Police Chief and Sheriff Survey 189

investigation, advanced homicide investigation, rape/sexual

assault investigation, and blood spatter analysis.
Q–18. [ ] Investigators I am aware of do a relatively good job of
sharing information with one another across sub-units
within their agency in an effort to facilitate the clearance of
homicides and/or rapes/sexual assaults.
Section 3: Crime Analysis Database Awareness
For each of the following investigative databases, using the scale shown
below, please tell us about the extent of your agency’s reliance upon these
crime investigation resources.
1 = This is our primary database 2 = This is our secondary dbase
3 = We sometimes use this dbase 4 = We rarely use this database
5 = We never use this database

Q–19. [ ] ViCAP (Violent Criminal Apprehension Program)

Q–20. [ ] H.I.T.S. (Homicide Investigation Tracking System)
Q–21. [ ] MATRIX (Multi-state AntiTerrorism Info.Exchange)
Q–22. [ ] COPLINK®
Q–23. [ ] HALT (Homicide Inves. & Lead Tracking – NY)
Q–24. [ ] ViCLAS (Royal Canadian Mounted Police)
Q–25. [ ] ATAC (Pennsylvania State)
Q–26. [ ] Iowa State Sex Crimes Analysis System
Q–27. [ ] MINN/SCAP (Minn. Sex Crimes Analysis Program)
Q–28. [ ] RAIN (King County, Washington)
Q–29. [ ] LInX
Q–30. [ ] Other__________________ (please specify)
Section 4: H.I.T.S. Program Awareness and Impact
In the following section you are asked to respond to a series of statements
specific to the AG’s H.I.T.S. program using the scale shown below. [Your
answers will provide important information for our assessment of the
H.I.T.S. program.]
1 = Strongly Agree 2 = Somewhat Agree 3 = Uncertain
4 = Somewhat Disagree 5 = Strongly Disagree
6 = I have not had enough experience with H.I.T.S. to answer
These statements assume that you have been exposed, in some form, to the
H.I.T.S. program or its database, even if your agency does not currently
use it as an investigative resource.
190 Appendix 3: Police Chief and Sheriff Survey

Q–31. [ ] The H.I.T.S. program has had a significant effect on the

clearance rate of homicides in Washington state.
Q–32. [ ] H.I.T.S. has had a significant effect on the clearance rate of
rapes/sexual assaults in Washington state.
Q–33. [ ] H.I.T.S. is successful at building partnerships among
various homicide and rape/sexual assault investigative units
within Washington state.
Q–34. [ ] I feel that my investigators have received adequate
attention from at least one member of H.I.T.S. when they
have needed assistance during an investigation.
Q–35. [ ] I would prefer that my investigators input data from their
investigations directly into the H.I.T.S. database without
having to go through the H.I.T.S. team.
Q–36. [ ] The assistance my investigators receive from H.I.T.S.
investigators has been useful in clearing homicides and/or
rapes/sexual assaults.
Q–37. [ ] The information my investigators have received from
H.I.T.S. queries has been useful in clearing homicides
and/or rapes/sexual assaults.
Q–38. [ ] My investigators have been provided with the opportunity
to provide feedback regarding their experience with
H.I.T.S.
Q–39. [ ] I have a high level of confidence that requests by my
investigators for H.I.T.S. queries will result in information
that will assist him/her in clearing a crime.
Q–40. [ ] My level of satisfaction with H.I.T.S. prompts me to
continue to encourage my investigators to use H.I.T.S. as
an investigative tool.
Q–41. [ ] Regarding turnaround time, I am satisfied with the timely
manner in which my investigators receive responses to
H.I.T.S. queries.
Q–42. [ ] H.I.T.S. has helped my investigators clear at least one
“cold” (stalled) homicide.
Q–43. [ ] H.I.T.S. has helped my investigators clear at least one
“cold” (stalled) rape/sexual assault.
Q–44. [ ] Information would flow from my agency to H.I.T.S. in a
more efficient manner if investigators from my agency
could input homicide or rape/sexual assault data directly
into the H.I.T.S. database and bypass the H.I.T.S.
investigative team.
Appendix 3: Police Chief and Sheriff Survey 191

Q–45. [ ] My investigators and I are aware that the H.I.T.S. database

includes information on missing children.
Q–46. [ ] My investigators and I are aware that the H.I.T.S. database
is part of the Amber Alert System.
Section 5: H.I.T.S. Assistance/Agency Information
In this final section you are asked a series of seven questions specific to
your agency’s interaction with the H.I.T.S. program. Your answers will
provide important information for our assessment of the H.I.T.S. program.
For each of the following questions, please place an “X” next to the
appropriate answer.
Q–47. How many times have your investigations/investigators been assisted
by the H.I.T.S. program/team?
[ ] None [ ] 1–5 [ ] 6–10 [ ] 10 +
Q–48. In your opinion, who “owns” the data retained in the H.I.T.S.
database repository?
[ ] The office of the Attorney General, since H.I.T.S. is
part of that agency
[ ] The public
[ ] The individual to whom the data relates
[ ] The agency or entity from which the data originated
Q–49. How would you rate your energy’s level of satisfaction with the
services provided to your investigative team by the H.I.T.S. program?
[ ] We have never used the services of H.I.T.S..
[ ] Extremely satisfied
[ ] Somewhat satisfied
[ ] Uncertain
[ ] Somewhat dissatisfied
[ ] Extremely dissatisfied
Q–50. Would you like to be invited to take part in a group discussion of the
H.I.T.S. program?
[ ] Yes [ ] No
Q-51. Would you like to receive a summary of the results of this particular
survey of Chiefs and Sheriffs in Washington?
[ ] Yes [ ] No
Q-52. Would you like to receive a summary of the results of a survey on the
H.I.T.S. program conducted among criminal investigators in law
enforcement agencies in Washington?
[ ] Yes [ ] No
192 Appendix 3: Police Chief and Sheriff Survey

Q-53. Would you like to have a session at WASPC devoted to the findings
derived from the Washington State University assessment of the
H.I.T.S. program?
[ ] Yes [ ] No
Please use this space to write additional comments you have regarding the
H.I.T.S. program or this survey.

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR CONTRIBUTING TO THIS

IMPORTANT EFFORT TO ASSESS AND ENHANCE THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE H.I.T.S. PROGRAM.
Appendix 4: H.I.T.S.
Investigator/Analyst Survey

The Division of Governmental Studies and Services at Washington State

University is conducting this detailed and probing survey of crime investigators
in Washington. A team of researchers at the university has been contracted by
the Attorney General’s office to assess the operation of the H.I.T.S. program
(Homicide Investigation and Tracking System) and to recommend how
program services might be enhanced or improved. The research team is
composed of one Criminal Justice and one Public Administration faculty
member, and one Criminal Justice doctoral student responsible for the field
research interviews to follow upon the collection of survey data.
Thank you in advance for your participation.
SECTION 1: Background and Professional Judgments
The following set of 3 questions concern your own background in crime
investigation and your views on a number of professional issues related to
the investigation of serious crimes. In the following section please place an
“X” next to the best answer for each question. Unless otherwise requested,
please mark only one answer for each question.
Q – 1. Would you agree or disagree with the following statement? “Having
access to Field Investigation Reports (FIRs) generated by patrol
officers on persons who are under the supervision of the Department
of Corrections would probably assist investigators in clearing
homicides and rapes/sexual assaults.”

193
194 Appendix 4: H.I.T.S. Investigator/Analyst Survey

[ ] a. I strongly agree [ ] b. I somewhat agree

[ ] c. Undecided [ ] d. I somewhat disagree
[ ] e. I strongly disagree
Q – 2. In a criminal investigation, which of the following do you see also as
being the “hub” for crime scene, criminal, or victim information? (Please mark
only one selection)
[ ] a. VICAP (Violent Criminal Apprehension Program)
[ ] b. H.I.T.S. (Homicide Inves. Tracking System)
[ ] c. SMART (Superv. Mgmt & Recidivist Tracking)
[ ] d. CATCH (Computer-Aided Tracking &Characterization of
Homicides)
[ ] e. MATRIX (Multi-state AntiTerrorism Info.
Exchange)
[ ] f. N.C.I.C. (National Crime Information Center)
[ ] g. COPLINK®
[ ] h. Other (please specify) __________________
Q – 3. I feel my employment background, including training and experience,
qualify me to assist law enforcement detectives in their investigations involving
homicides.
[ ] a. I strongly agree [ ] b. I somewhat agree
[ ] c. Undecided [ ] d. I somewhat disagree
[ ] e. I strongly disagree
SECTION 2: Resources Available and Desired for Effective Crime
Investigation
The following set of 7 questions concerns the resources and tools available
to you and those resources you might like to command. Using the scale
shown below, please offer your opinion on the following section of
questions:
1 = Strongly Agree 2 = Somewhat Agree 3 = Uncertain
4 = Disagree 5 = Strongly Disagree
Q – 4. [ ] Criminal investigators who use public records to clear
crimes do not violate the privacy rights of members of the public whose
information is accessed.
Q – 5. [ ] Knowing the gang affiliation of suspects/victims, if any,
could prove helpful in clearing homicides and rape/sexual assaults.
Q – 6. [ ] As I see also it, a repository of personal data that includes records
from the Department of Motor Vehicles, Department of Licensing, Department
of Corrections, and other public sources, is a valuable tool for criminal
investigators.
Appendix 4: H.I.T.S. Investigator/Analyst Survey 195

Q – 7. [ ] I believe it is critical that law enforcement agencies share any

information they have access to with allied law enforcement agencies.
Q – 8. [ ] The ability to connect known inhabitants with specific addresses
would be useful in the investigation of homicides and rapes/sexual assaults.
Q – 9. [ ] Investigators from different agencies do a relatively good job of
sharing information with one another in an effort to facilitate the clearance of
homicides and/or rapes/sexual assaults.
Q – 10. [ ] Investigators I am aware of do a relatively good job of sharing
information with one another across sub-units within their home agency in an
effort to facilitate the clearance of homicides and/or rapes/sexual assaults.
SECTION 3: H.I.T.S. Program Awareness and Impact
The following section poses a series of questions specific to the H.I.T.S.
program. Your answers will provide important information for our analysis of
the H.I.T.S. program. For each of the following questions, please place the
appropriate number next to the corresponding question.
1 = Strongly agree 2 = Somewhat agree 3 = Uncertain
4 = Somewhat disagree 5 = Strongly disagree
Q – 11. [ ] H.I.T.S. has had a significant effect on the clearance rate of
homicides in Washington state.
Q – 12. [ ] H.I.T.S. has had a significant effect on the clearance rate of
rapes/sexual assaults in Washington state.
Q – 13. [ ] H.I.T.S. is successful at building partnerships among various
homicide and rape/sexual assault investigative units within Washington state.
Q – 14. [ ] I would prefer that investigators be able to input data from their
investigations directly into the H.I.T.S. database without having to go through
the H.I.T.S. team.
Q – 15. [ ] Information would flow from law enforcement agencies to
H.I.T.S. in a more efficient manner if investigators from those agencies could
input homicide or rape/sexual assault data directly into the H.I.T.S. database
and bypass the H.I.T.S. investigative team.
Q – 16. [ ] In my function as a H.I.T.S. investigator, I tend to limit the
number of investigators I contact within each agency so that all of my work is
channeled through a main point of contact.
Q – 17. [ ] All investigators within each agency within my H.I.T.S.
jurisdiction know that they may contact me directly if they need assistance.
Q - 18. [ ] When one of my contacts within a specific agency retires,
promotes, or otherwise moves on, I find it difficult to connect with a
replacement.
196 Appendix 4: H.I.T.S. Investigator/Analyst Survey

Q. - 19. [ ] As a H.I.T.S. investigator I believe I am obligated to take the lead

in investigating homicides or sexual assaults in cases where it is obvious that
investigators within the agency of jurisdiction are “in over their heads.”
Q - 20. [ ] I am qualified to run my own queries in the H.I.T.S. databases.
Q - 21. [ ] I am confident that I would obtain satisfactory results from queries
if I personally ran queries in the H.I.T.S. databases.
Q - 22. [ ] I feel my employment background, including training and
experience qualify me to assist law enforcement detectives in their
investigations involving sexual assaults.
Q - 23. [ ] H.I.T.S. bulletins include all amber alerts that are generated in
Washington state.
Q - 24. [ ] In approaching detectives regarding cases, I sometimes feel a sense
that my efforts are an imposition on their work.
Q - 25. [ ] There are agencies within my jurisdiction that I don’t get out to at
least every six months.
Q - 26. [ ] The H.I.T.S. team would benefit from additional H.I.T.S.
investigators.
Q - 27. [ ] I sometimes feel that the time spent on some cases prevents me
from spending time contacting all of the investigators within my jurisdiction.
Q - 28. [ ] I think the communication of information from agency to agency
through the H.I.T.S. databases would be improved if detectives could run their
own queries without H.I.T.S. personnel assistance.
Q - 29. [ ] I would prefer that detectives input their crime data directly into
the H.I.T.S. system without coordinating that effort through me.
Q - 30. [ ] Crime investigation information gathered and maintained by the
H.I.T.S. program and its members remains confidential, and detectives that
share their information should feel confident that such information is only
shared on a need-to-know basis.
SECTION 4: H.I.T.S. Assistance/Agency Information
In the following section you are asked a series of questions specific to the
interaction between agencies within your support jurisdiction and H.I.T.S..
Your answers will provide important information for the successful analysis of
H.I.T.S. and the assessment of its effectiveness. For each of the following
questions, please place an “X” next to the appropriate answer.
Q – 31. What percentage of the active sex crime cases of the
agencies within your support jurisdiction is submitted to
H.I.T.S.?
[ ] a. None [ ] b. 1 – 24% [ ] c. 25 – 49%
[ ] d. 51 – 74% [ ] e. 75 – 100%
If unknown, check this box
Appendix 4: H.I.T.S. Investigator/Analyst Survey 197

Q – 32. What percentage of the active homicide cases of the

agencies within your support jurisdiction is submitted to
H.I.T.S.?
[ ] a. None [ ] b. 1 – 24% [ ] c. 25 – 49%
[ ] d. 51 – 74% [ ] e. 75 – 100%
If unknown, check this box
Q – 33. What percentage of the active cold case (stalled) homicide
cases of the agencies within your support jurisdiction is
submitted to H.I.T.S.?
[ ] a. None [ ] b. 1 – 24% [ ] c. 25 – 49%
[ ] d. 51 – 74% [ ] e. 75 – 100%
If unknown, check this box
Q – 34. What percentage of the missing persons (age 18 and over)
cases of the agencies within your support jurisdiction is
submitted to H.I.T.S.?
[ ] a. None [ ] b. 1 – 24% [ ] c. 25 – 49%
[ ] d. 51 – 74% [ ] e. 75 – 100%
If unknown, check this box
Q – 35. What percentage of the missing persons (under age 18)
cases of the agencies within your support jurisdiction is
submitted to H.I.T.S.?
[ ] a. None [ ] b. 1 – 24% [ ] c. 25 – 49%
[ ] d. 51 – 74% [ ] e. 75 – 100%
If unknown, check this box
Q – 36. Regarding agencies within your H.I.T.S. jurisdiction, what
percentage do you feel would say that they understand what
the H.I.T.S. program can do for their agency?
[ ] a. less than 10% [ ] b. 11 – 24%
[ ] c. 25 – 49% [ ] d. 50 – 74% [ ] e. 75 – 100%
Q – 37. Regarding investigators of agencies that have authority to
conduct homicide, sexual assault, or other violent crimes
within your H.I.T.S. jurisdiction, what percentage do you
feel know you by name?
[ ] a. less than 10% [ ] b. 11 – 24%
[ ] c. 25 – 49% [ ] d. 50 – 74% [ ] e. 75 – 100%
Q – 38. Which of the following best describes your contact with
field investigators when offering H.I.T.S. assistance?
[ ] a. I have a main contact person within each agency
[ ] b. I contact different investigators within each agency
for input
198 Appendix 4: H.I.T.S. Investigator/Analyst Survey

Q – 39. Of the H.I.T.S. bulletins you assisted in generating during

the time frame of December 1, 2004 through November 30,
2005, please indicate the approximate percentages related
to each topic below (please be sure your total equals
100%):
[ ] a. Homicide [ ] b. Sexual assault
[ ] c. Robbery [ ] d. Aggravated assault
[ ] e. Vehicle theft [ ] f. Burglary
[ ] g. Other (please list)
Q – 40. The input forms for inclusion of a crime in the H.I.T.S.
database should be completed by (please mark only one
response):
[ ] a. H.I.T.S. investigators
[ ] b. H.I.T.S. support staff
[ ] c. Detective handling the case
[ ] d. Other
Q – 41. The input forms for inclusion of a crime in the H.I.T.S.
database are usually completed by (please mark only one
response):
[ ] a. H.I.T.S. investigators
[ ] b. H.I.T.S. support staff
[ ] c. Detective handling the case
[ ] d. Other
Q – 42. If additional H.I.T.S. investigators were added to the team,
they would most benefit us in the area of (please mark all
that apply):
[ ] a. Homicide investigations [ ] b. Training
[ ] c. Sexual assault investigations [ ] d. Other
Q – 43. There are agencies within my jurisdiction that I simply
avoid because I do not feel welcome.
[ ] a. I strongly agree [ ] b. I somewhat agree
[ ] c. Undecided [ ] d. I somewhat disagree
[ ] e. I strongly disagree
Q – 44. Please indicate by percentages the amount of time you
spend assisting each of the following agency types (please
be sure your total equals 100%):
[ ] a. Federal [ ] b. State
[ ] c. Municipal [ ] d. Tribal
Q – 45. Please list reasons you do not regularly communicate with
some investigators within your jurisdiction.
Appendix 4: H.I.T.S. Investigator/Analyst Survey 199

Q – 46. H.I.T.S. would be even more effective if, as a H.I.T.S.

investigator, I could (please describe in detail the kinds of
information, knowledge, technologies or support that would
be helpful in assisting you in the performance of your job):
Q – 47. Please briefly describe ways in which you attempt to
increase voluntary compliance by agencies in both
reporting applicable crimes to H.I.T.S., and in soliciting
H.I.T.S. team assistance.
ADDITIONAL COMMENTS
Please use this space to write additional comments you have regarding the
H.I.T.S. program or this survey.
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR CONTRIBUTING TO THIS
IMPORTANT EFFORT TO ASSESS AND ENHANCE THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE H.I.T.S. PROGRAM
Appendix 5: H.I.T.S. Bulletin
Recipients (On-line) Survey

The Division of Governmental Studies and Services at Washington State

University is conducting this survey of H.I.T.S. Bulletin recipients. A team of
researchers at the university has been contracted by the Attorney General’s
office to assess the operation of the H.I.T.S. program (Homicide Investigation
and Tracking System) and to recommend how program services might be
enhanced or improved. The research team is composed of one Criminal Justice
and one Public Administration faculty, and one Criminal Justice doctoral
student responsible for the field research interviews to follow-up on the
collection of survey data.

Thank you in advance for your participation.

H.I.T.S. Bulletin Recipient Survey12

Please mark the most appropriate answer for each of the following questions..
Thank you.
1. Regarding H.I.T.S. Bulletins, which of the following applies?
I currently receive them via e-mail.
I no longer receive them, but I received them via e-mail in the past.
I have never received H.I.T.S. Bulletins, via e-mail or otherwise.
2. Which of the following best describes how you were introduced to
H.I.T.S. Bulletins?

12
Although the format of the boxes changed slightly upon transferring this on-
line document to the appendices, the questions remained intact.

201
202 Appendix 5: H.I.T.S. Bulletin Recipients (On-line) Survey

They started appearing in my e-mail without my solicitation.

I heard about them from a co-worker, and I requested to receive
them.
I heard about them from a colleague, and I requested to receive them.
I do not receive the H.I.T.S. Bulletins.
3. Do you have investigative authority for homicides, sexual assaults,
and other violent and non-violent crimes within the state of
Washington?
Yes
No
4. Which of the following best describes your job?
Patrol officer
Criminal investigator
Supervisor of criminal investigators
Community corrections officer
Crime analyst AND criminal investigator
Crime analyst but NOT a criminal investigator
Criminal Justice Agency support staff
None of the above
5. What percentage of your job-related activities includes the
investigation of homicides?
0 - I do not investigate homicides
1 - 24%
25% - 49%
50% - 74%
75% - 100%
6. What percentage of your job-related activities includes the
investigation of sexual assaults (including rapes)?
0 - I do not investigate sexual assaults.
1 - 24%
25% - 49%
50% - 74%
75% - 100%
7. How long have you been a homicide investigator?
0 - I do not investigate homicides.
Less than 6 months.
More than 6 months, but less than a year.
1 - 5 years.
Over 5 years.
8. How long have you been a sexual assault investigator?
0 - I do not investigate sexual assaults.
Appendix 5: H.I.T.S. Bulletin Recipients (On-line) Survey 203

Less than 6 months.

More than 6 months, but less than a year.
1 - 5 years.
Over 5 years.
9. In your opinion, of the persons described below who should have
unfiltered access to the H.I.T.S. database?
Any person, public or private, whose job it is to investigate crimes.
Any commissioned official employed by an agency vested with the
responsibility to prevent, investigate, or intervene in criminal activity,
including police patrol officers.
Only those commissioned officials assigned to investigative units
within a criminal justice agency.
Only one designated person within a criminal justice agency vested
with the responsibility to prevent, investigate, or intervene in criminal
activity.
Only H.I.T.S. investigators
10. The lack of direct access to the H.I.T.S. database has hindered
criminal investigations in my department.
Yes
No
Unknown
11. Please rank in order of utility in your crime investigation.
VICAP (Violent Criminal Apprehension Program)
H.I.T.S. (Homicide Investigation Tracking System)
MATRIX (Multi-state Anti-terrorism Information Exchange)
N.C.I.C. (National Crime Information Exchange)
COPLINK®
RAIN
LINX
12. If a criminal justice agency gathers data from various sources and
maintains that data in a central repository, in your opinion who
"owns" the data?
The agency that gathers and maintains the data
The public served by the agency in question
The individual to whom the data relates
13. How many times have you contributed data for inclusion in the
H.I.T.S. database?
0
1-5
6 - 10
More than 10.
204 Appendix 5: H.I.T.S. Bulletin Recipients (On-line) Survey

If none, please tell us why.

14. Which of the following obstacles have prevented your criminal
investigation from more fully benefiting from the H.I.T.S. database?
Lack of familiarity with H.I.T.S.
I have had a bad prior experience with H.I.T.S.
Management at my agency hinders my exposure to H.I.T.S.
Time constraints prevent me from maximizing my use of H.I.T.S.
None of these obstacles apply to me
15. Which of the following best describes how useful H.I.T.S. Bulletins
are in assisting you in your job or on your investigations?
Very useful.
Somewhat useful.
Undecided.
Not very useful.
Not useful at all.
16. How many times has one of your investigations been assisted by a
H.I.T.S. Bulletin?
Not applicable, as I am not an investigator.
0
1-5
6 -1 0
More than 10.
17. How many times has one of your investigations been assisted by the
H.I.T.S. team, not including H.I.T.S. Bulletins?
Not applicable, as I am not an investigator.
0
1-5
6 - 10
More than 10.
18. How many times have you communicated with a H.I.T.S.
investigator, either by phone, fax, e-mail, or regular mail?
Not applicable, as I am not a criminal investigator.
0
1-5
6 - 10
More than 10
19. In your opinion, who "owns" the data retained in the H.I.T.S.
database repository?
The office of the Attorney General, since H.I.T.S. is part of that
agency.
The public.
Appendix 5: H.I.T.S. Bulletin Recipients (On-line) Survey 205

The individual to whom the data relates.

The agency or entity from which the data originated.
If you have used the services of the H.I.T.S. team, how would you rate your
level of satisfaction with each of the following services?
Please use the scale provided. If you have never used this service of the
H.I.T.S. team please mark the NA option
Extremely satisfied Satisfied Undecided Not satisfied
Somewhat disappointed Extremely Disappointed NA
20. Collection of violent crime data
21. H.I.T.S. training-instructional presentation
22. H.I.T.S. training-course curriculum
23. Consultation
24. Investigation assistance
25. Hands-on assistance on open and active violent crimes
26. Facilitation of cold case meetings
27. Investigation of cold cases involving violent crimes
28. Coordinator of multi-jurisdiction task forces
29. If you have used the services of the H.I.T.S. team, were you offered
the opportunity to provide feedback regarding your satisfaction with
the services performed?
I have never used the services of the H.I.T.S. team.
Yes
No
30. How many full-time homicide or rape/sexual assault investigators are
employed by your agency?
0
1-5
6 - 10
More than 10
I don't know.
31. How many part-time homicide or rape/sexual assault investigators are
employed by your agency?
0
1-5
6 - 10
More than 10.
I don't know.
32. Which of the following describes the nature of the agency that
employs you?
City
County
206 Appendix 5: H.I.T.S. Bulletin Recipients (On-line) Survey

State
Federal
Tribal
Private
33. Which of the following describes the function of the agency that
employs you?
Law enforcement, including patrol or investigations.
Corrections.
Prosecution.
If other please specify.
34. Would you agree or disagree with the following statement? "Having
access to Field Investigation Reports (FIRS) generated by patrol
officers on persons who are under the supervision of the Department
of Corrections would greatly assist investigators in clearing
homicides and rapes/sexual assaults."
I strongly agree.
I somewhat agree.
Undecided.
I somewhat disagree.
I strongly disagree.
35. What is the name of the H.I.T.S. investigator assigned to your
agency?
Richard "Dick" Gagnon
George Fox
Marvin Skeen
Tamara Matheny
Rick Grabenstein
Jim Hansen
I don't know.
36. What percentage of your agency's active sex crime cases are
submitted to H.I.T.S.?
None
1 - 24%
25 - 49%
50 - 74%
75 - 100%
I don't know.
37. What percentage of your agency's active homicide cases are
submitted to H.I.T.S.?
None
1 - 24%
Appendix 5: H.I.T.S. Bulletin Recipients (On-line) Survey 207

25 - 49%
50 - 74%
75 - 100%
I don't know.
38. What percentage of your agency's cold case (stalled) homicide cases
are submitted to H.I.T.S.?
None
1 - 24%
25 - 49%
50 - 74%
75 - 100%
I don't know.
39. What percentage of your agency's missing persons (age 18 and over)
cases are submitted to H.I.T.S.?
None
1 - 24%
25 - 49%
50 - 74%
75 - 100%
I don't know.
40. What percentage of your agency's missing children (under age 18)
cases are submitted to H.I.T.S.?
None
1 - 24%
25 - 49%
50 - 74%
75 - 100%
I don't know.
41. Regarding H.I.T.S. Bulletins, which statement reflects your
experience?
This does not apply to me since I do not receive the bulletins.
The bulletins always open properly.
Sometimes the bulletins do not open properly.
The bulletins rarely open properly.
The bulletins never open properly.
42. If H.I.T.S. Bulletins do not open properly, what action do you take?
This does not apply to me since I do not receive the bulletins.
This does not apply to me since the bulletins always open properly.
If they open in a text format, I still read them.
If they open in a text format, I discard them without reading them.
208 Appendix 5: H.I.T.S. Bulletin Recipients (On-line) Survey

43. Please check the boxes below if you would like to receive the results
from this survey or participate in a follow up survey.
I would like the results from this survey.
I would like to participate in a follow up survey.
44. If you would like the results from this survey or are willing to participate in
a follow up survey please provide your name and mailing address in
the box below.
45. If you have any additional comments, please provide them in the box
below.
46. If you prefer to be contacted by email, please provide your address in the
box below.

Thank you for completing the survey

Appendix 6: Investigator/Analyst
Biographies

Tammee Matheny: Joined the AGO-CJD as a student intern in May 1989, and
became the first Crime Analyst in the H.I.T.S. Unit in May 1989; promoted to
an Investigator/Analyst position in the H.I.T.S. Unit in 2002.

Marv Skeen: A total of 36 years in law enforcement, 28 years working violent

crimes; previously worked for the Bellevue P.D.; involved with over 200
homicide and sexual assault investigations; cases of interest---
Pohlreich/Beethe/Levine serial murder case, Undi (60 year old female)
kidnapping case in 1987; joined the H.I.T.S. Unit in 1994.

Jim Hansen: A total of 32 years in law enforcement, 18 years working violent

crimes; previously worked for the Spokane County Sheriff’s Office.; involved
with over 250 homicide and sexual assault investigations; cases of interest---
Robert L. Yates serial murder case; joined the H.I.T.S. Unit in 1999.

209
210 Appendix 6: Investigator/Analyst Biographies

George Fox: A total of 35 years in law enforcement, including 18 years

working homicide investigations, 5 years as the Supervisor of the Homicide
Unit; previously worked for the Long Beach (CA) P.D.; was lead investigator
or assisted in over 500 homicide investigations; cases of interest---murder of
Gen. Carl Marion (OR), Jeremy Strohmier case (murder of young girl in a
Nevada casino), Randy Kraft serial murder case, Martin James Kipp serial
murder case; joined the H.I.T.S. Unit in 2000.

Dick Gagnon: A total of 36 years in law enforcement, including 16

years working violent crimes and 3 years on a “Cold Case” team; previously
worked for the Seattle P.D.; was lead investigator or assisted in over 100
homicide investigations; “Cold Case” team obtained convictions in 21 unsolved
murder cases; cases of interest---DeWayne Lee Harris (aka “Chilly Willy”)
serial murder case; Kevin Cruz (“Shipyard” murder case), singer Mia Zapata,
Kristen Sumstad (“Envelope” case); joined the H.I.T.S. Unit in 2004.

Rick Grabenstein: A total of 34 years in law enforcement, including 14 years

working Major Crimes; previously worked for the Coeur d’Alene P.D. (3
years) and the Spokane County S.O. (29 years); was lead investigator or
assisted in approximately 300 homicide and sexual assault/child sexual abuse
investigations, including 14 capital murder cases as part of Spokane’s
Homicide Task Force; cases of interest---Robert L. Yates serial murder case,
Duane Woods double murder case, 1996 Spokane bombings/arrest of four
Aryan Nations sympathizers; joined the H.I.T.S. Unit in 2004.
Appendix 7: H.I.T.S. Input Form
(Murder)

Please complete the questions on the Murder form to the best of your
knowledge.

The HIGHLIGHTED questions must be completed on all cases (missing

person, unidentified found bodies, and all non-stranger murders). (Note: Gaps
exist in the numbering system to coincide with the fields inside the H.I.T.S.
database). Stranger cases should have most of the questions completed to assist
in determining MO and signature of the offender and in linking cases.

After completing a form, save it to a file with a name that is

recognizable to you, and e-mail it as an attachment to your H.I.T.S.
Investigator.

Information on your homicide case is as important to us in the H.I.T.S.

Unit as it is to you. When you have a homicide within your jurisdiction, you
need to submit a H.I.T.S. form as soon as possible so we can help you with
your investigation, especially when the offender is not known.

211
212 Appendix 7: H.I.T.S. Input Form (Murder)

• We can and will search for other cases that could match your
case.
• We will look for similar cases where a suspect was convicted
and perhaps has completed his prison time and been released.
• We can give you a list of persons with criminal history that live
in a certain area or near a certain address.
• We can assist with other suspect information.
• We can search for vehicles by partial license number or by
make, model and color of a suspect vehicle.

If you have a suspect at large or one that has not been identified, we can
assist by sending out a bulletin to all law enforcement agencies statewide,
including Oregon.
If you have any questions you should call your H.I.T.S. investigator or the
general phone number: 206-464-6209 or 800-345-2793.
I. CASE ADMINISTRATION
1. Date received or completed:
2. H.I.T.S. report ID#:
3. Reporting agency ORI#:
4. Reporting agency:
5. Phone:
6. Reporting agency’s case/incident #:
7. Officer/Det. Last name: 8. First name:
10. Case status:
1. Open - Unsolved (active investigation)
2. Suspended (inactive investigation)
3. Open - Warrant issued
4. Cleared by arrest – Solved
5. Exceptionally cleared
11. Evidence suggests the victim in this case is a:
1. Single victim 2. Multiple victims 3. Victim in a possible series
4. Is a series victim; Series name:
CLASSIFICATION
12. (editor’s note: data missing)
13. Check the response(s) that most closely fit the main classification or major
motivation that compelled the offender to commit this murder. (check all that
apply)
1. Accidental 2. Arson 3. Burglary 4. Child abuse murder
5. Conspiracy 6. Cult (ritualistic) 7. Domestic violence
Appendix 7: H.I.T.S. Input Form (Murder) 213

8. Drug related 9. Financial gain 10. For hire

11. Fun/Amusement 13. Hate/Bias 12. Gang 14. Heat of anger
15. Homosexual 16. Justifiable homicide 17. Kidnap
18. Love triangle 19. Mass 20. Mental/Insane
21. Mercy killing 22. Missing person presumed dead
23. Murder to conceal another crime
24. Murder to prevent testimony/ident 25. Officer killed
26. Psychopathic 27. Rape 28. Reckless/Negligent
29. Revenge 30. Robbery 31. Self-defense
32. Serial/Possible serial 33. Sex related (other) 34. Sniper
35. Torture (not sexual) 88. Other 99. Unable to determine
CRIME SCENE
14. If the initial contact or assault on the victim was in a building, how did the
offender gain entry?
1. Building open to public 2. Non-forced entry
3. Let in by victim 4. Forced entry 5. Let in by 3rd person
6. Offender lived/had right to be there 7. Unknown 88. Other
15. Did the offender(s) disable the telephone, security system, or other utilities?
1. Yes 2. No
16. The property at the crime scene was: (check all that apply)
1. Undisturbed 2. Disturbed 3. Ransacked 4. Vandalized
5. Burned
17. Did the offender(s) destroy/attempt to destroy evidence at the crime scene?
1. Yes 2. No (if NO, go to #20)
OFFENDER’S WRITING OR DRAWING AT SCENE
18. Was there writing or drawing at the crime scene(s)?
1. Yes (describe) 2. No (if NO, go to #20)
19. Instrument used to write or draw at the crime scene(s):
1. Knife or sharp instrument 2. Blood 3. Lipstick
4. Writing instrument (pen, etc.) 88. Other
SYMBOLIC ARTIFACTS
20. Did evidence suggest a deliberate or unusual ritual, act, or thing that had
been performed on, with, or near the victim (such as orderly formation of rocks,
burnt candles, dead animals, defecation, etc.)?
1. Yes (describe) 2. No
20a. (131) Were significant item(s) taken from the victim or the crime scene?
(Items usually taken in burglaries--TV, stereo, money.)
1. Yes (describe) 2. No
214 Appendix 7: H.I.T.S. Input Form (Murder)

EVIDENCE
From the case file or evidence form/log (including items of evidence developed
by the crime lab or medical examiner/coroner), list all evidence of possible
importance to this case and/or evidence that could possibly link this case with
other similar cases.
E.G.: Blood, Hair, Fibers, Weapon(s), Spent ammunition, Shoe impressions,
Tire tracks, Trace evidence, or other significant item(s).
21. Evidence item #: 22. Description (include model, ser. #, etc.):
FINGERPRINTING ID
23. Were comparable latent fingerprints obtained in this case?
1. Yes 2. No
24. Were fingerprints sent to the print lab for comparison?
1. Yes (classification) 2. No
25. What were the results of the fingerprint comparison?
1. Positive 2. Negative 3. Incomplete
DNA
26. Were blood, other fluid, body specimens, or other items preserved for or
DNA tested?
1. Yes 2. No
Fluids/Specimens/Items: DNA label:
II. VICTIM INFORMATION
28. This is victim #___ of _____ victims in this incident:
29. Status of the victim is:
1. Murdered - victim deceased - victim identified.
2. Unidentified dead body where manner of death is known or suspected to be
homicide.
3. Missing or kidnapped person with evidence of foul play. (Victim still
missing)
4. Attempted murder
DATE AND TIME PARAMETERS
30. Victim last seen prior to death: To:
31. Death/Major assault: To:
32. Victim/Body found: To:
VICTIM IDENTIFICATION & CHARACTERISTICS
33. L Name: 34. F Name: 35. M Name:
Appendix 7: H.I.T.S. Input Form (Murder) 215

36. AKAs:
37. Street: 38. City: 39. County:
40. State: 41. Zip:
42. Prev. street address: 43. City: 44. County: 45. State:
46. DOB: 47. Age: 48. Race: 49. Sex:
50. Hgt: 51. Wgt: 53. Hair color: 54. Hair length:
55. Eye color:
55. Did the victim have outstanding physical features or was there something
about the victim that would attract attention?
1. Yes 2. No
VICTIM BACKGROUND
56. SS#: 57. SID#: 58. FBI#
59. Marital status:
1. Single 2. Married 3. Divorced 4. Widowed 5. Separated
60. Occupation (legitimate or non-legitimate):
61. Employer & city:
RELATIONSHIP TO OFFENDER
62. Using the list below, pick the selection that best describes the relationship
between the victim and the offender(s). Victim was the offender’s: (check all
that apply)
1. Acquaintance (business, drugs, etc.)
2. Acquaintance (first time, just met) 3. Acquaintance (one way)
4. Babysitter/child 5. Family member (other) 6. Friend/Neighbor
7. Guardian/Dependent 8. Hitchhiker/Person providing ride
9. Lover 10. Lover (Ex-) 11. Parent/Child
12. Parent’s boy/girlfriend 13. Parent (Grand)/Grandchild
14. Parent (Step-)/Step-child 15. Prostitute/John 16. Sibling
17. Spouse 18. Spouse (Ex-) 19. Spouse (Common-law)
20. Spouse (Estranged) 21. Total stranger 88. Other
99. Unable to determine
63. General lifestyle. (check all that apply)
1. Described as “average citizen” 2. Described as a “party animal”
3. Engages in criminal activity 4. Reclusive 5. Transient
6. Alcohol abuser 7. Drug user/abuser 8. Drug dealer
9. Homosexual 10. Bisexual 11. Bondage 12. Promiscuous
13. Prostitute 14. Gang Member 88. Other
66. Is or was the victim a member of a gang?
1. Yes (If YES, check the appropriate box and describe) 2. No
Gang Name Subset
216 Appendix 7: H.I.T.S. Input Form (Murder)

1. Asian 2. BGD 3. Bikers 4. Blood 5. Crip

6. Hispanic 7. Samoan/Filipino 8. White Supremacist
9. Terrorist 10. Miscellaneous 88. Other
III. UNIDENTIFIED DEAD VICTIM OR MISSING PERSON
67. N.C.I.C. number if victim is a missing person or an unidentified dead body:
68. Did the victim have any scars or birthmarks?
1. Yes 2. No
69. Did the victim have any tattoos?
1. Yes 2. No
70. Location:
71. Description:
72. Abnormalities of the teeth: (check all that apply) (if victim is
IDENTIFIED, go to #78)
1. None 2. Braces 3. Broken or chipped 4. Crooked
5. Decayed 6. Noticeable gaps 7. Some or all missing
8. Stained 9. Partial plates and/or bridges 88. Other
73. Wears glasses: (check all that apply)
1. Regular glasses 2. Sunglasses 3. Rimless 4. Plastic frames
5. Metal frames 6. Contacts 88. Other
VICTIM CLOTHING
If this is an UNIDENTIFIED DEAD or a MISSING PERSON CASE where
foul play is suspected, list victim’s clothing, clothing color, and description. If
the clothing item is multi-colored, list each of the predominate colors. (use all
that apply)
1) Whites 2) Yellows 3) Greens 4) Blues 5) Purples/Violets
6) Reds/Oranges 7) Browns/Tans 8) Grays/Blacks
74. Clothing item: 75. Color:
Characteristics (rips, brand, logos, etc.):
VICTIM MEDICAL IDENTIFICATION
If the victim is a MISSING PERSON and foul play is suspected, please attempt
to obtain the following medical information.
76. Doctor or medical facility that has the victim’s medical records:
Dr.’s Name: Medical Facility: Address:
77. Dentist or dental facility that has the victim’s dental records/x-rays:
Dr.’s Name: Dental Facility: Address:
Appendix 7: H.I.T.S. Input Form (Murder) 217

IV. METHOD OF OPERATION: GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION(S)

Complete all addresses even if they are the same as previous.
Last known location of identified victim or missing person: (prior to
assault/murder or disappearance)
78. Street: 79. City: 80. County:
81. State: 82. Zip:
83. At the time of initial contact with the offender, or when last seen, what was
the victim doing?
Location of body find: identified, unidentified, or skeletal remains:
84. Street: 85. City: 86. County:
87. State: 88. Zip:
LOCATION OF INCIDENT SITES:
Questions 89-91 refer to types of sites such as House, Apartment, Vehicle,
Woods, River, Dumpster, Park, Tavern, Roadway, etc. (The same location may
apply to all incident sites or a few sites, or each may be different.)
89. Victim last seen site:
90. Body recovery site:
91. Death/Assault site:
For questions 101 through 104, please write in the approximate distance
between the indicated sites (ft, ¼, ½, ¾ miles).
101. Initial contact site to body recovery site
102. Victim last seen site to death/major assault site
103. Victim last seen site to body recovery site
104. Death/major assault site to body recovery site
105. Was the body recovery site in or about the victim’s residence?
1. Yes 2. No
106. If applicable, the victim’s work place was: (check all that apply)
1. Last known location of the victim prior to assault/murder
2. Initial contact site between the offender and victim
3. Murder or major assault site
4. Victim found or body recovery site
V. CONDITION OF VICTIM WHEN FOUND
BODY DISPOSITION
107. How did the offender dispose of the body?
1. Openly displayed or placed to ensure discovery
2. Concealed, hidden, or placed in order to prevent discovery
3. Unconcerned as to whether or not the body was discovered
218 Appendix 7: H.I.T.S. Input Form (Murder)

108. Did the offender intentionally place the body in an unusual position?
(e.g., staged or posed)
1. Yes 2. No
OFFENDER’S WRITING OR CARVING ON THE BODY
109. Was there writing or carving on the body?
1. Yes 2. No
110. What instrument was used to write or carve on the body?
1. Knife or sharp instruments 2. Blood 3. Lipstick
4. Writing instrument (pen, etc.) 5. Fingernail polish 88. Other
111. Is there reason to believe the offender moved the body from the
assault/death site to the body recovery site?
1. Yes 2. No
112. The body was discovered: (check all that apply)
1. In a building 2. In vehicle 3. Buried completely
4. Buried partially 5. Dumped in wooded area 6. Bagged
7. Hanging 8. In water completely 9. In water partially
10. In a container (box, dumpster, trunk, etc.)
11. Concealed/Covered completely 12. Concealed/Covered partially
13. Not concealed/In plain view 88. Other
113. Condition of body when found: (check all that apply)
1. Fresh 2. Burned 3. Decomposing
4. Parts scattered, not skeletal 5. Mummified 6. Skeletal remain
7. Parts scattered, skeletal
114. If the body was weighted, then thrown or placed in water, how was it
weighted? (check all that apply)
1. N/A 2. Rocks 3. Chain 4. Metal 5. Cement
88. Other
RESTRAINTS USED ON VICTIM
115. Is there evidence that the victim was bound?
1. Yes 2. No (if NO, go to #120)
117. What was used to bind the victim? (check all that apply)
1. Nylons, Pantyhose 2. Socks 3. Scarf 4. Nightgown/Negligee
5. Underclothing 6. Other clothing 7. Rope 8. Wire
9. Coat hanger 10. Tape 11. Electrical cord 12. String/Twine
13. Cord 14. Chain 15. Belt 16. Shoelaces 17. Leather
18. Handcuffs 19. Plastic ties/Flexcuffs 88. Other
118. Parts of the victim that were bound: (check all that apply)
1. None 2. Hands (in front) 3. Hands (in rear) 4. Legs
5. Feet/Ankles 6. Neck 7. Hands & ankles bound together
Appendix 7: H.I.T.S. Input Form (Murder) 219

8. Arms bound to torso 88. Other

119. The restraining device(s) was: (check all that apply)
1. Brought to the scene by the offender
2. Found at the scene by the offender 3. Unknown
120. Was the body tied to an object or other victim?
1. Yes 2. No
121. Was there evidence of an object or a gag having been placed in or over the
victim’s mouth?
1. Yes 2. No
122. Was a blindfold placed on or over the victim’s eyes?
1. Yes 2. No
123. In your opinion was the victim’s face covered or turned away in a manner
that would indicate that the offender was uncomfortable with the victim’s eyes
staring at him/her?
1. Yes 2. No
CLOTHING AND PROPERTY OF VICTIM
124. Clothing on victim when found:
1. Dressed (appropriately dressed for the occasion, time/location)
2. Partially undressed 3. Nude
125. Is there evidence the victim was re-dressed by the offender?
1. Yes, same clothing 2. Yes, different clothing 3. No
126. Is there evidence to suggest that some or all of the victim’s clothing had
been ripped or torn by the offender?
1. Yes (which items) 2. No
127. Is there evidence to suggest that the offender had cut some or all of the
victim’s clothing from the body?
1. Yes (which items) 2. No
128. Victim’s clothing (not on the body) found at the body recovery site:
1. None 2. Piled neatly 3. Scattered 4. Dumped 5. Hidden
129. Were items of the victim’s clothing missing from the body recovery site?
1. Yes (describe) 2. No
130. Did the offender take small personal items from the victim? (This
question focuses on trophies and/or souvenirs and may or may not be valuable-
-e.g., bra, panties, photos, driver’s license, real or costume jewelry, etc.)
1. Yes 2. No
ELEMENTS OF TORTURE OR UNUSUAL ASSAULT
132. Is there evidence to suggest that the offender disfigured the body in order
to delay identification of the victim? (e.g., burned the body;
destroyed/removed hands, feet, head, etc.)
220 Appendix 7: H.I.T.S. Input Form (Murder)

1. Yes 2. No
133. Were body parts removed by offender?
1. Yes 2. No (if NO, go to #136)
134. Dismemberment method:
1. Bitten off 2. Cut - Skilled/Surgical 3. Cut - Unskilled/Rough-cut
4. Hacked/Chopped off 5. Sawed off 88. Other
135. Body parts removed: (check all that apply)
1. Head 2. Scalp 3. Face 4. Teeth 5. Nails 6. Eye(s)
7. Ear(s) 8. Nose 9. Hand(s) 10. Finger(s) 11. Arm(s)
12. Leg(s) 13. Feet 14. Toe(s) 15. Breast(s) 16. Nipple(s)
17. Anus 18. Genitalia 19. Internal organs 88. Other
136. Unusual or additional assault upon victim: (check all that apply)
1. None 2. Mutilated/Disfigured 3. Victim whipped
4. Burning of victim 5. Victim run over by vehicle
6. Body parts removed 7. Body or parts of body skinned
8. Offender explored, probed, mutilated cavities/wounds of the victim
9. Evidence of cannibalism/vampirism 10. Drugged/Sedated
88. Other
SEXUAL ASSAULT
137. Is there evidence of sexual assault to victim or any of the victim’s organs
or body cavities?
1. Yes 2. No 3. Unable to determine
138. Evidence suggests sexual assault was:
1. Antemortem 2. Postmortem 3. Both 4. Unable to determine
139. Was there evidence of other ejaculation?
1. No 2. On the body of the victim 3. Elsewhere at the scene
140. Type of sexual assault, or attempt: (check all that apply)
1. Offender performed oral sex on victim
2. Victim performed oral sex on offender 3. Vaginal 4. Anal
88. Other
141. Was semen found in body cavity(s) of the victim? (check all that apply)
1. No 2. In vagina 3. In anus 4. In mouth 88. Other
142. Foreign objects inserted into openings of the victim’s body and present
when the victim was discovered.
OBJECT
1. Bathroom implements 2. Bottle 3. Curling iron
4. Dildo/Vibrator 5. Dirt/Rocks 6. Feces/Dirt/Rocks, etc.
7. Flashlight 8. Food item - Real/Plastic 9. Gun
10. Hammer/Bat/Broom handle, etc. 11. Kitchen implements
Appendix 7: H.I.T.S. Input Form (Murder) 221

12. Knife 13. Mechanics tools 14. Pencil/Pen/Marker, etc.

15. Pipe/Metal object 16. Stick/Piece of wood
17. Unknown hard object 18. Wire/Hanger/TV antenna
88. Other
BODY OPENING
1. Anus 2. Ear 3. Eye 4. Mouth 5. Nose
8. Hole cut in victim’s body 7. Vagina 6. Penis
143. Sexual insertion of foreign objects into openings of the victim’s body,
removed before victim was discovered.
OBJECT
1. Bathroom implements 2. Bottle 3. Curling iron
4. Dildo/Vibrator 5. Dirt/Rocks 6. Feces/Dirt/Rocks, etc.
7. Flashlight 8. Food item - Real/Plastic 9. Gun
10. Hammer/Bat/Broom handle, etc. 11. Kitchen implements
12. Knife 13. Mechanics tools 14. Pencil/Pen/Marker, etc.
15. Pipe/Metal object 16. Stick/Piece of wood
17. Unknown hard object 18. Wire/Hanger/TV antenna 88. Other
BODY OPENING
1. Anus 2. Ear 3. Eye 4. Mouth 5. Nose 6. Penis
7. Vagina 8. Hole cut in victim’s body
BITE MARKS ON VICTIM
144. Did the offender bite the victim? 1. Yes 2. No
145. Location of bite marks: (check all that apply)
1. Face 2. Neck 3. Breasts 4. Abdomen 5. Chest
6. Back 7. Buttocks 8. Groin 9. Genitalia
10. Arms/Hands 11. Legs/Feet 12. Thighs 88. Other
CAUSE OF DEATH
146. What was the Medical Examiner’s or Coroner’s officially listed cause of
death?
TRAUMA
147. Extent of blunt force injury:
1. None
2. Minimal (minor bruising only; e.g., caused by offender’s slapping to control
the victim)
222 Appendix 7: H.I.T.S. Input Form (Murder)

3. Moderate (injury insufficient to cause death by itself)

4. Severe (injury sufficient to cause death, whether the actual cause of death or
not)
5. Extreme (injury beyond that necessary to cause death, overkill)
148. Estimated number of stab wounds:
149. Estimated number of cutting wounds:
150. Estimated number of blunt force wounds:
151. Estimated number of gunshot wounds:
Please complete 152 & 153 for all wounds inflicted. If a firearm was used,
please complete questions 154 & 155 to provide information about the range
and caliber. If more than one firearm was used, fill in the information for each
firearm.
RANGE = 1) Distant or with no stippling/tattooing present 2) Close or with
powder residue/tattooing present 3) Intermediate or with stippling/tattooing
present 4) Contact
152. Location of Wounds: 153. Number of wounds: 154. Range
155. Caliber/gauge
WEAPONS
159. The weapon was:
1. Recovered at the scene 2. Recovered elsewhere 3. Not recovered
160. Type of weapon(s) used by the offender in this assault: (check all that
apply)
1. None 2. Firearm 3. Stabbing or cutting weapon
4. Bludgeon or club 5. Ligature 6. Hands or feet
7. Unable to determine 88. Other weapon
161. Weapon(s) used: (check all that apply)
STABBING OR CUTTING WEAPON/FIREARM
1. Pocket knife 2. Hunting knife 3. Folding knife
4. Kitchen knife 5. Ice pick 6. Screwdriver 7. Razor blade
8. Other cutting 9. Unknown cutting 10. Shotgun
11. Rifle 12. Semi-auto pistol 13. Revolver
14. Handgun – Unknown if auto or revolver
15. Military type - AK-47, AR-16, etc 16. Other firearm
17. Unknown firearm
BLUDGEONING WEAPON/LIGATURE
18. Hammer 19. Tire iron 20. Club 21. Stick 22. Ball bat
23. Rock 24. Bottle 25. Other bludgeon
26. Unknown bludgeon 27. Rope/Cord 28. Belt
Appendix 7: H.I.T.S. Input Form (Murder) 223

29. Necktie 30. Sock(s) 31. Nylons 32. Pantyhose

33. Scarf 34. Wire 35. Telephone cord 36. Shoestrings
37. Other ligature 38. Unknown ligature
162. Assault weapons(s) used by the offender: (check all that apply)
1. Found at the scene by the offender 2. Brought to scene by offender
VI. OFFENDER INFORMATION
For the purposes of the H.I.T.S. analysis report, “offender” is defined as and
includes arrestee(s), perpetrator(s), suspect(s), or any person the investigator
has reasonable cause to believe is responsible for the commission of this crime.
163. This is offender # of offender(s) in this incident.
OFFENDER STATUS
164. The offender is:
1. Unknown - Not seen 2. Unknown - Seen
3. Identified (named) - Not arrested or charged in this case
4. Was arrested and/or charged as a suspect in this case
5. Deceased
OFFENDER IDENTIFICATION, (if not seen, go to #223)
168. L. Name: 169. F. Name: 170. M. Name:
171. AKAs: 172. POB State: 173. DOB:
174. Age: 175. Race: 176. Gender:
177. Hgt: 178. Wgt: 179: Build:
180. Hair shade: 181 Hair Color: 182. Length:
183. Eyes:
184. Street: 185: City: 186: County:
187. State: 188: Zip:
189. Prior address (street): 190. City: 191. County:
192. State: Zip:
OFFENDER OUTSTANDING PHYSICAL FEATURES
193. Did the offender have outstanding physical features or was there
something about the offender that would attract attention?
1. Yes 2. No
194. Appeared well groomed?
1. Yes 2. No
195. Wore a disguise or mask?
1. Yes 2. No
196. Facial hair: (check all that apply)
224 Appendix 7: H.I.T.S. Input Form (Murder)

1. N/A (female, young male) 2. Clean shaven 3. Unshaven (stubble)

4. Mustache 5. Goatee 6. Long sideburns 7. Beard
197. Wears glasses: (check all that apply)
1. Regular glasses 2. Sunglasses 3. Rimless 4. Plastic frames
5. Metal frames 6. Contacts 88. Other
OFFENDER SCARS, BIRTHMARKS, OR TATTOOS
198. Did the offender have any scars or birthmarks?
1. Yes 2. No
199. Did the offender have any tattoos?
1. Yes 2. No
201. Type, Location, Description
OFFENDER BACKGROUND (if offender was SEE ALSON BUT IS
UNKNOWN, go to #221)
202. SS# 203. SID#: 204. FBI#
205. Was the offender employed at the time of incident?
1. Yes 2. No
206. Occupation (legitimate or non-legitimate):
207. Employer & City:
208. Marital status:
1. Single 2. Married 3. Divorced 4. Widowed 5. Separated
209. General lifestyle: (check all that apply)
1. Described as “average citizen” 2. Described as a “party animal”
3. Engages in criminal activity 4. Reclusive 5. Transient
6. Alcohol abuser 7. Drug user/abuser 8. Drug dealer
9. Homosexual 10. Bisexual 11. Bondage 12. Promiscuous
13. Prostitute 14. Gang Member 88. Other
OFFENDER CRIMINAL HISTORY
211. At the time of this incident, the offender was:
1. On parole or probation 2. On furlough 3. On work release
4. In a halfway house 5. An escapee 6. Out on bail, appeal, or PR
7. In a halfway house 8. Wanted on warrant or other charge
9. In prison or jail 10. On release from a mental hospital
11. Prior Conviction 12. Registered Sex Offender
13. Non offender status
Offender admits other serious crime(s):
212. Crime: 213. City / State: 214. Date of crime:
215. Is or was the offender a member of a gang?
1. Yes (If YES, check the appropriate box and describe) 2. No
Appendix 7: H.I.T.S. Input Form (Murder) 225

Gang Name Subset

1. Asian 2. BGD 3. Bikers 4. Blood 5. Crip
6. Hispanic 7. Samoan/Filipino 8. White Supremacist
9. Terrorist 10. Miscellaneous 88. Other
List the cities, states, and countries the offender has visited during those years
he/she has not been in custody:
216. City: 217. County: 218. State: 219. Country:
220. When:
VISUAL ID
222. Was there a composite or Identikit made of the offender/suspect in this
case?
1. Yes 2. No
OFFENDER COMMUNICATIONS
Did the offender initiate any communication with respect to this case?
EXAMPLES: Offender sends a letter, tape recording, or ransom note to the
police or media claiming responsibility for the crime; or a suspicious
communication received by the victim prior to the crime. (This is not referring
to conversations between the offender and victim during the commission of the
crime.)
223. Was there any communication from the offender before or after the crime?
1. Yes (include synopsis in summary) 2. No
VII. VEHICLE INFORMATION
Complete vehicle information if: 1) a vehicle was used by the offender in this
case; 2) if this is a missing person case and the vehicle is still missing; 3) if this
is an unidentified dead case and the vehicle has been connected with the victim;
or 4) if the vehicle is in any way significantly involved in this incident.
224. Was a vehicle used in or as a significant part of this incident?
1. Yes 2. No
225. The vehicle was under the control or owned by:
1. Offender 2. Victim
226. Vehicle Body Style:
1. Passenger Car 2. Van 3. Pick-up truck 4. Jeep type / SUV
5. Tractor/Trailer 6. Motorcycle 7. Bus 8. Bicycle 88. Other
227. Lic #: 228. State: 229. Year: 230. Make: 231. Model:
232. Color: (top) (bottom) 233. Unusual characteristics:
234. If this case is unsolved, list those persons, if any, that are believed to be
good suspects. (Please copy this page if additional suspect space is needed.)
L. Name: F. Name: M. Name: AKAs:
226 Appendix 7: H.I.T.S. Input Form (Murder)

POB State: DOB: Age: Hgt: Wgt: Sex: Build: Hair shade:
Hair color: Length: Eyes: SS# SID#: FBI#:
Scars/Tattoos/Birthmarks:
Address:
Prior address:
Additional Info:
Gang Member Possible gang member Name of gang: Sub-set:
L. Name: F. Name: M. Name:
AKAs:
POB State: DOB: Age: Hgt: Wgt.
Build: Hair shade: Hair color: Length Eyes:
SS#: SID#: FBI#:
Scars/Tattoos/Birthmarks:
Address:
Prior address:
Additional Info:
Gang Member: Possible gang member Name of gang: Sub-set:
VIII. SUMMARY
235. The space below is provided for a narrative summary of this incident.
Please give a general overview, details, unusual characteristics, and the
sequence of events. Also include any other pertinent information re: victim(s),
suspect(s), evidence, etc. that was not captured elsewhere in this form.
236. The following spaces are for the names of persons that you feel are
important to or are associated with the suspect(s) or victim(s) in this or other
related cases. If more space is needed, copy this page as many times as
necessary.
Appendix 8: H.I.T.S. Input Form
(Sexual Assault)

Information on your rape case is as important to us in the H.I.T.S. Unit as it is

to you. When you have a rape within your jurisdiction, you need to submit a
H.I.T.S. form as soon as possible so we can help you with your investigation,
especially when the offender is not known.
Please complete the questions on the Rape form to the best of your
knowledge.
The HIGHLIGHTED questions must be completed on all cases (date rape,
statutory rape, non-stranger, etc). Stranger rape cases should have most of the
questions completed to assist in determining MO and signature of the offender
and in linking cases. (Note: Gaps exist in the numbering system to coincide
with the fields inside the H.I.T.S. database).
After completing the forms, save it to a file with a name that is
recognizable to you, and e-mail it as an attachment to your H.I.T.S.
Investigator.
• We can and will search for other cases that could match your case.
• We will look for similar cases where a suspect was convicted and
perhaps has completed his prison time and been released.
• We can assist with other suspect information.
• We can provide you with a list of persons with a criminal history
living within an area or near a certain address.
• We can search for vehicles by partial license number or by make,
model and color of a suspect vehicle.

227
228 Appendix 8: H.I.T.S. Input Form (Sexual Assault)

• If you have a suspect at large or one that has not been identified, we
can assist by sending out a statewide bulletin, including Oregon, to
all law enforcement agencies.
If you have any questions you should call your H.I.T.S. investigator, the
general phone number, 206-464-6209 or 800-345-2793.
SEXUAL ASSAULT REPORT - ADMINISTRATIVE
1. Date received or completed: 2. H.I.T.S. report ID#:
3. Reporting agency ORI#: 4. Reporting agency: 5. Phone:
6. Reporting agency’s case/incident #:
7. Officer/Det. Last name: 8. First name: 9. (editor’s note: data missing)
10. Date of crime: 11. Time of crime
12. Case status: 1. Solved 2. Unsolved

13. Offender was known by or an acquaintance of the victim:

1. Yes 2. No
14. Evidence suggests this incident:
1. Is NOT a series 2. Is one of a possible series
3. Is one of a series; Series name:
15. Prior to, or at the time of the initial contact between the offender and
victim, was there an event or activity in the area that may have contributed to
the opportunity for the crime (carnival, street dance, street fair, convention,
etc.)?
1. Yes (explain) 2. No
16. Crime classification: (check all that apply)
1. Rape 2. Attempted rape 3. Child rape 4. Gang rape
5. Robbery/Rape 6. Burglary/Rape 7. Incest
8. Indecent liberties 9. Kidnapping 10. Attempted murder
11. Other sex offense 12. Drug induced rape
RELATED CASES
List other sex related cases possibly committed by this offender:
17. Victim: 18. Date: 19. Crime:
20. Case number: 21. Agency:
EVIDENCE
23. Were comparable latent fingerprints obtained in this case?
1. Yes 2. No
24. Were blood, other fluid, body specimens, or other items preserved for or
DNA tested?
Appendix 8: H.I.T.S. Input Form (Sexual Assault) 229

1. Yes 2. No
Fluids/Specimens/Items: DNA label:
25. Physical evidence possibly related to the offender that is suitable for
comparison: (check all that apply)
1. None 2. Hair 3. Blood 4. Semen 5. Saliva 6. Fibers
7. Clothing 8. Bullets 9. Latent prints 10. Shoe prints
11. Shell casings 12. Tire castings 13. Trace evidence
14. Handwriting 15. Bite mark impressions 16. Voice recordings
17. Composite available 18. Rape kit 88. Other
VICTIM INFORMATION
26. This is victim ___ of ___ victim(s) in this case.
27. L. Name: 28. F. Name:
29. M. Name: 30. AKAs: 31. DOB: 32. Age: 33. Race: 34. Sex
35. Hgt 36. Wgt: 38. Hair color: 39. Hair length: 40. Street:
41. City: 42. County: 43. State: 44. Zip:
45. Prev city: 46. State:
47. Distinguishing physical features:
1. Yes (describe) 2. No
48. General lifestyle: (check all that apply)
1. Described as “average citizen” 2. Described as a “party animal”
3. Engages in criminal activity 4. Reclusive 5. Transient
6. Alcohol abuser 7. Drug user/abuser 8. Drug dealer
9. Gang member 10. Homosexual 11. Bisexual 12. Bondage
13. Promiscuous 14. Prostitute 88. Other
49. (editor’s note: data missing)
50. Normal mode of transportation: (check all that apply)
1. Walks 2. Drives 3. Hitchhikes 4. Bicycle 5. Public
transportation 6. Relies on others 88. Other
51. SS#:
52. Marital status: 1. Single 2. Married 3. Divorced
4. Widowed 5. Separated
53. Occupation:
54. Employer & City / State:
55. Has the victim been previously sexually assaulted?
1. Yes (specify) 2. No
56. Has the victim been the victim of any other crime within the past six (6)
months?
1. Yes (specify) 2. No
230 Appendix 8: H.I.T.S. Input Form (Sexual Assault)

INITIAL CONTACT SITE

57. Was the initial contact site: 1. Indoors 2. Outdoors
58. Describe the initial contact neighborhood:
1. Commercial/Industrial 2. Residential 3. Mixed
4. Farm/Agricultural 5. Uninhabited/Wilderness
59. Describe the initial contact community:
1. Rural 2. Urban 3. Suburban 4. Unknown
60. If the initial contact or assault on the victim was in a building, how did the
offender gain entry?
1. Building open to public 2. Non-forced 3. Let in by victim
4. Forced entry 5. Let in by 3rd person
6. Offender lived/had right to be there 7. Unknown 8. Other
62. Was the initial contact site the victim’s residence? 1. Yes 2. No
63. Was the initial contact site the victim’s workplace? 1. Yes 2. No
64. Were there multiple sexual assault sites? 1. Yes 2. No
65. Are there indications the offender was familiar with the initial contact site?
1. Yes 2. No
66. Activity at the time of initial contact with offender(s):
67. Victim’s incapacitation at time of initial contact with offender(s):
1. None 2. Disabled physically 3. Disabled mentally
4. Alcohol 5. Drugs 6. Poor health 7. Pre-adolescent
8. Old age 9. Sleeping 88. Other
68. Describe the type of location where the victim and offender FIRST MADE
CONTACT. (e.g.: bar, apartment, bus stop, parking lot)
Location type:
What was the address of the initial contact site?
69. Street: 70. City: 71. County: 72. State: 73. Zip:
FIRST SEXUAL ASSAULT SITE
74. Was the first sexual assault site the same as the initial contact site?
1. Yes 2. No
75. Was the first sexual assault site the victim’s residence?
1. Yes 2. No
76. Are there indications the offender was familiar with the first sexual assault
site?
1. Yes 2. No
77. Was the first sexual assault site the victim’s workplace?
1. Yes - Type of business: 2. No
78. The first sexual assault site was: 1. Indoors 2. Outdoors
79. Describe the first sexual assault site neighborhood:
1. Commercial/Industrial 2. Residential
Appendix 8: H.I.T.S. Input Form (Sexual Assault) 231

3. Mixed commercial-residential 4. Farm/Agricultural

5. Uninhabited/Wilderness
80. Describe the first sexual assault site community:
1. Rural 2. Urban 3. Suburban 4. Unknown
81. Describe the type of location of FIRST SEXUAL ASSAULT. (E.g.: bar,
apartment, bus stop, parking lot)
Location type:
What was the address of the first sexual assault site?
82. Street: 83. City: 84. County:
85. State: 86. Zip:
VICTIM RELEASE / ESCAPE INFORMATION
87. How did the victim/offender contact end?
1. Released 2. Escaped 3. Other
88. Was victim release/escape site and first sexual assault site the same
1. Yes 2. No
89. Was victim release/escape site and initial contact site the same?
1. Yes 2. No
90. Describe the release/escape site neighborhood:
1. Commercial/Industrial 2. Residential
3. Mixed commercial-residential 4. Farm/Agricultural
5. Uninhabited/Wilderness
91. Describe the release/escape site community:
1. Rural 2. Urban 3. Suburban 4. Unknown
92. Describe the type of location where VICTIM WAS RELEASED. (e.g.:
bar, apartment, bus stop, parking lot)
Location type:
What was the address of the release site?
93. Street: 94. City: 95. County: 96. State: 97. Zip:
APPROACH
98. How far did the offender transport the victim?
1. No transportation 2. Less than one mile 3. One mile
4. One to ten miles 5. More than ten miles
99. Prior to the sexual assault, were the victim and offender together mutually?
1. Yes 2. No
101. What were the circumstances?
1. Date rape 2. Victim hitchhiking 3. Offender hitchhiking
4. Victim jogging/cycling 5. Offender happened upon victim
6. Babysitting 7. Committed during burglary
8. Committed during robbery 9. During another crime
232 Appendix 8: H.I.T.S. Input Form (Sexual Assault)

10. Party 88. Other

102. Describe the offender’s initial approach to the victim: (check all that
apply)
DECEPTIVE APPROACH
1. Posed as an authority figure 2. Posed as a business person
3. Asked victim to pose/model for photos
4. Offered job, money, treats, toys
5. Implied family illness or emergency
6. Wanted to show something to victim
7. Asked for or offered assistance 8. Caused/staged traffic accident
9. Phony police traffic stop 10. Solicitation for sex
11. Offered ride or transportation 12. Other deception
SURPRISE APPROACH
13. Lay in wait - Out of doors 14. Lay in wait - In a building
15. Lay in wait - In a vehicle 16. Victim sleeping
17. Other surprise
DIRECT OR IMMEDIATE ASSAULT TYPE OF APPROACH
18. Immediately and physically overpowered victim (picks up, carries away,
etc.)
19. Immediately hit victim with hand, fist, or clubbing weapon
23. Threatened with weapon 21. Immediately stabbed victim
22. Other direct assault 20. Grabbed and immediately choked victim
WEAPONS
103. Was a weapon or threats of a weapon used?
1. Yes 2. No (if NO, go to #109)
104. Rate the use of a weapon by the offender.
1. None 2. Implied 3. Displayed 4. Threatened with
5. Used
105. Weapon recovered:
1. Recovered at the scene 2. Recovered elsewhere 3. Not recovered
106. Type of weapon used by offender in this assault: (check all that apply)
1. None 2. Firearm 3. Stabbing or cutting
4. Bludgeon or club 5. Ligature 6. Hands or feet
88. Other weapon
107. Weapon(s) used: (check all that apply)
Appendix 8: H.I.T.S. Input Form (Sexual Assault) 233

STABBING OR CUTTING WEAPON/FIREARM

1. Pocket knife 2. Hunting knife 3. Folding knife
4. Kitchen knife 5. Ice pick 6. Screwdriver 7. Razor blade
8. Other cutting 9. Unknown cutting 10. Shotgun 11. Rifle
12. Semi-auto pistol 13. Revolver
14. Handgun - Unk if semi-auto or revolver
15. Military type - AK-47, AR-16, etc 16. Other firearm
17. Unknown firearm
BLUDGEONING WEAPON/LIGATURE
18. Hammer 19. Tire iron 20. Club 21. Stick 22. Ball bat
23. Rock 24. Bottle 25. Other bludgeon
26. Unknown bludgeon 27. Rope/Cord 28. Belt
29. Necktie 30. Sock(s) 31. Nylons 32. Pantyhose
33. Scarf 34. Wire 35. Telephone cord 36. Shoestrings
37. Other ligature 38. Unknown ligature
108. Assault weapons(s) used or displayed by the offender: (check all that
apply)
1. Found at the scene by the offender 2. Brought to scene by offender
STATEMENTS
109. Did the offender make any specific statements about himself?
1. None 2. Very little 3. Moderately 4. Quite a bit
5. Excessively
110. Did the offender ask specific questions about the victim or her/his
personal life?
1. None 2. Very little 3. Moderately 4. Quite a bit
5.Excessively
111. Rate the image the offender projected.
1. Very sensitive 2. Sensitive 3. Neutral 4. Macho
5. Very Macho
112. Rate the demeanor of the offender.
1. Complimentary 2. Neutral 3. Demeaning
113. Rate the effort made by the offender to reassure the victim.
1. Repeated attempts 2. Attempts 3. No attempts
114. Rate the extent of negotiation between offender and victim.
1. Extensive 2. Some 3. None
BINDINGS
115. Is there evidence that the victim was bound?
234 Appendix 8: H.I.T.S. Input Form (Sexual Assault)

1. Yes 2. No (if NO, go to #120)

116. Did the offender take the bindings from the scene?
1. Yes 2. No
117. What was used to bind the body? (check all that apply)
1. Nylons/pantyhose 2. Socks 3. Scarf
4. Nightgown/Negligee 5. Underclothing 6.Other clothing
7. Rope 8. Wire 9. Coat hanger 10. Tape
11. Electrical cord 12. String/Twine 13. Cord 14. Chain
15. Belt 16. Shoelaces 17. Leather 18. Handcuffs
19. Plastic ties/Flexcuffs 88. Other
118. Parts of the victim that were bound: (check all that apply)
1. None 2. Hands (in front) 3. Hands (in rear) 4. Legs
5. Feet/Ankles 6. Neck 7. Gagged
8. Hands & ankles bound together 9. Arms bound to torso
10. Hands & feet bound to object 11. Hands (unk. front/back)
88. Other
119. The restraining device(s) was: (check all that apply)
1. Brought to the scene by the offender
2. Found at the scene by the offender 3. Unknown
ASSAULT
120. Sexual acts (check all that apply)
1. Kissing 2. Vaginal rape 3. Anal rape
4. Offender performed oral sex 5. Offender fondled victim
6. Offender masturbated 7. Victim performed oral sex
8. Victim forced to masturbate
9. Victim forced to fondle/masturbate offender
10. Insertion of foreign object(s) 11. Attempt only 88. Other
121. Additional unusual assault on victim: (check all that apply)
1. Victim whipped 2. Burns on victim 3. Disfigured
4. Body parts removed 5. Drugged/Sedated 88. Other
122. Did the offender exhibit any sexual dysfunction during the sexual assault?
1. No (if NO, go to #124) 2. Premature ejaculation
3. Retarded ejaculation 4. Unable to ejaculate
5. Unable to maintain an erection 6. Unable to penetrate
88. Other
123. What did the offender do to overcome the dysfunction? (check all that
apply)
1. Nothing 2. Masturbated self 3. Victim forced to oral copulation
4. Victim forced to fondle/masturbate offender 88. Other
124. Did the offender bite the victim? 1. Yes 2. No
Appendix 8: H.I.T.S. Input Form (Sexual Assault) 235

125. Location of bite marks: (check all that apply)

1. Face 2. Neck 3. Breasts 4. Abdomen 5. Chest
6. Back 7. Buttocks 8. Groin 9. Genitalia
10. Arms/Hands 11. Legs/Feet 88. Other
126. Clothing removed: (check all that apply)
1. N/A 2. Offender disrobed victim 3. Offender disrobed self
4. Victim disrobed offender 5. Victim disrobed self 88. Other
127. How was the victim’s clothing removed?
1. N/A 2. Ripped/Torn 3.Cut/Slashed
4. Without damage 88. Other
FETISH
128. Did the offender display any obvious special sexual interest (fetish) in
some part of the victim’s body or in a non-sexual or artificial object?
1. Yes (describe) 2. No
NOTE: Some sex offenders live out their sexual fantasies by requiring the
victim to say specific words (e.g., “Say, ‘I love you,’” or “Say, ‘I want you.’”)
or require the victim to perform specific acts (e.g., putting on a negligee). This
is generally referred to as “scripting” and is often difficult to distinguish from
commands given simply to complete the crime.
129. Did the offender require the victim to say specific words, as if he used a
“script”?
1. Yes (specific language used) 2. No
130. Did the offender require the victim to perform specific act or
movements, as if he used a “script”?
1. Yes (describe) 2. No
131. Did the offender physically torture the victim just to see also the victim
suffer?
1. Yes (if YES, explain in the summary) 2. No
132. Did the offender mentally abuse the victim just to see also the victim
suffer?
1. Yes (if YES, explain in the summary) 2. No
133. Were special props used by the offender (vibrators, dildos, photos, etc.)?
1. Yes (describe) 2. No
134. Insertion of a foreign object into an opening of the victim’s body:
OBJECT
1. Bathroom implements 2. Bottle 3. Curling iron
4. Dildo/Vibrator 5. Dirt/Rocks 6. Feces/Dirt/Rocks
7. Flashlight 8 Food item - Real/Plastic 9. Gun
236 Appendix 8: H.I.T.S. Input Form (Sexual Assault)

10. Hammer/Bat/Broom handle, etc. 11. Kitchen implements

12. Knife 13. Mechanics tools 14. Pencil/Pen/Marker
15. Pipe/Metal object 16. Stick/Piece of wood
17. Unknown hard object 18. Wire/Hanger/TV antenna 88. Other
BODY OPENING
1. Anus 2. Ear 3. Eye 4. Mouth 5. Nose
6. Penis 7. Vagina 8. Hole cut in victim’s body
FORCE USED
135. Describe the physical force used by the offender.
1. None
2. Minimal (for the purpose of intimidation rather than punishment)
3. Moderate (repeated slapping or hitting, even in absence of resistance)
4. Excessive (victim beaten to point of possibly needing hospitalization)
5. Extreme (torture, severe pain/injury inflicted, probable hospitalization
needed)
136. Victim’s resistance:
1. No resistance
2. Passive resistance (did not comply, but did not physically resist)
3. Verbal resistance (verbally refusing, screaming, pleading, negotiating)
4. Physical resistance (attempts to prevent attack, bites, kicks, runs, etc.)
137. Physical injuries inflicted by the offender:
1. None 2. Minor (required no medical treatment)
3. Moderate (required outpatient treatment)
4. Excessive (required hospitalization; was not life threatening)
5. Extreme (life threatening, whether fatal or not)
138. The physical injuries inflicted by the offender appeared to be:
1. Accidental/Inadvertent 2. Intentional/Deliberate
139. Rate the extent of the offender’s anger.
1. None 2. Minor 3. Moderate 4. Excessive 5. Extreme
140. When was force used during the assault? (check all that apply)
1. Immediately upon victim contact 2. After victim contact; prior to assault
3. During actual sexual assault 4. After sexual assault 5. As offender was
leaving
AFTER RELEASE
141. Time lapse between offender’s initial contact with and release of victim:
142. Time lapse between last sexual assault and victim’s release:
143. After leaving the scene, did the offender attempt to re-contact the victim?
(check all that apply)
Appendix 8: H.I.T.S. Input Form (Sexual Assault) 237

1. No 2. By phone 3. By letter/note 4. In person

5. Through third party 88. Other
CRIME SCENE
144. Did the offender record the crime in any way? (check all that apply)
1. No 2. Photographs 3. Audio recordings 4. Made notes
5. Video recordings 88. Other
145. Precautions used by the offender to avoid apprehension: (check all that
apply) 1. None 2. Wore a mask 3. Wore a disguise
4. Wore gloves 5. Covered victim’s eyes/face 6. Gagged victim
7. Disabled utilities 8. Disabled victim’s vehicle
9. Used police scanner 10. Used lookout
11. Used a warning system to warn of intrusion
12. Removed or destroyed forensic evidence
13. Removed or destroyed bedding 14. Made victim douche or bathe
15. Used condom 88. Other
146. Were significant item(s) taken from the victim or the crime scene? (TV,
stereo, coin collections - items usually taken in burglaries)
1. Yes (describe) 2. No
147. Did the offender take small personal items from the victim? (Trophies
and/or souvenirs; may not be valuable.)
1. Yes (describe) 2. No
OFFENDER INFORMATION
148. This is offender___of ___offenders in this case.
149. L. Name: 150. F. Name: 151. M. Name:
152. AKAs 153. POB State 154. DOB: 155. Age: 156. Race:
157. Sex: 158. Hgt: 159. Wgt: 160. Build: 161. Hair color:
162. Eyes: 163. (editor’s note: data missing)
164. Scars/Tattoos/Birthmarks:
165. Facial hair: 1. N/A (female, young male) 2. Clean shaven
3. Unshaven (stubble) 4. Mustache 5. Goatee
6. Long sideburns 7. Beard
166. Street: 167. City: 168. County: 169. State: 170. Zip:
171. Prev. Street: 172. City: 173. County: 174. State & Zip:
(if the OFFENDER IS UNKNOWN, go to #203)
175. SS#: 176. SID#: 177. FBI#:
178. Marital status: 1. Single 2. Married 3. Divorced
4. Widowed 5. Separated
179. Occupation:
180. Employer:
238 Appendix 8: H.I.T.S. Input Form (Sexual Assault)

181. Did the offender have lists of names, addresses, or photographs that are
possibly related to this or other sex crimes?
1. Yes (if YES, please attach a list of names and addresses to this form)
2. No
182. General lifestyle: (check all that apply)
1. Described as “average citizen” 2. Described as a “party animal”
3. Engages in criminal activity 4. Reclusive 5. Transient
6. Alcohol abuser 7. Drug user/abuser 8. Drug dealer
9. Gang member 10. Homosexual 11. Bisexual
12. Bondage 13. Promiscuous 14. Prostitute 88. Other
183. Living with: (check all that apply)
1. Alone 2. Spouse, Ex-spouse 3. Children
4. Parent/Guardian 5. Relatives 6. Boy/Girlfriend
7.Roommate(s) 88. Other
184. Normal mode of transportation:
1. Walks 2. Drives 3. Hitchhikes 4. Bicycle
5. Public transportation 6. Relies on others 88. Other
185. Sex items or collections related to or owned by the offender: (check all
that apply)
1. Sexual devices 2. Sexual photos 3. Sex films/videos
4. Pornography 5. Child pornography 88. Other
192. Was the offender wearing eye glasses?
1. Yes 2. No
193. Type of glasses worn: (check all that apply)
1. Regular glasses 2. Sunglasses 3. Rimless
4. Plastic frames 5. Metal frames 6. Contacts 88. Other
194. General appearance:
1. Very neat 2. Average 3. Unkempt
195. Noticeable odor about the offender’s person:
1. Yes (describe) 2. No
196. Did the offender appear to have used alcohol/drugs?
1. Yes (describe) 2. No
197. Was there a noticeable speech impediment or accent?
1. Yes (describe) 2. No
198. Distinguishing clothing, jewelry, or physical features:
199. At the time of this incident, the offender was:
1. On parole or probation 2. On furlough
3. On work release 4. In a halfway house 5. An escapee
6. Out on bail, appeal, or PR bond 7. Wanted on warrant(s) or other charges
8. In prison or jail 9. On release from a mental hospital
10. Prior conviction 11. Registered sex offender
Appendix 8: H.I.T.S. Input Form (Sexual Assault) 239

12. Non offender status

Offender admits other serious crime(s):
200. Crime: 201. City / State: 202. Date of crime:
VISUAL ID
203. Was there an Identikit or Composite Drawing made of the
offender/suspect in this case?
1. Yes - Identikit code: 2. No
VEHICLE
205. Was a vehicle used in or as a significant part of this incident?
1.Yes 2.No
206. The vehicle was under the control or owned by:
1. Offender 2. Victim
207. Vehicle Body Style:
1. Passenger Car 2. Van 3. Pick-up truck
4. Jeep type / SUV 5. Tractor/Trailer 6. Motorcycle
7. Bus 8. Bicycle 88. Other
208. Lic #: 209. State: 210. Year: 211. Make: 212. Model:
213. Color: (top) (bottom)
214. Unusual characteristics:
215. If this case is unsolved, list those persons, if any, that are believed to be
good suspects. (Copy this page if additional space is needed.)
CASE SUMMARY
216. The space below is provided for a narrative summary of this incident.
Please give a general overview, details, unusual characteristics, and the
sequence of events. Also include any other pertinent information re: victim(s),
suspect(s), evidence, etc. that was not captured elsewhere in this form.
OTHER ASSOCIATED NAMES LIST
217. The following spaces are for the names of persons that you feel are
important to or are associated with the suspect(s), victim(s) in this or other
related cases. If more space is needed, copy this page as many times as
necessary.
References

Akgul, A. (2007). Implementation of Geographic Information Systems in

Policing: A Case Study of the Spokane Police Department (Doctoral
dissertation, Washington State University, 2007).
Aldrich, H. (1999). Organizations evolving. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
Publications.
Allen, R. (2002). Assessing the impediments to organizational change: A view
of community policing. Journal of Criminal Justice, 30 (6), 511-517.
Almond, G. (1988). Separate tables: Schools and sects in political science.
PS: Political Science and Politics, 21 (4), 828-42.
Andrews, K. & Delahaye. B. (2000). Influences on knowledge processes in
organizational learning: The psychosocial filter. Journal of Management
Studies, 73, 797-810.
Audit Commission. (1993). Helping with enquiries: Tackling crime
effectively. (Police Paper 12). London: HMSO.
Bayley, D. (1994). Police for the future. New York: Oxford University Press.
Bittner, E. (1971). The functions of the police in modern society. Washington,
D.C.: National Institute for Mental Health.
Bittner, E. (1991). Aspects of police work. Boston: Northeastern Publishers.
Braga, A., Weisburd, D,.Waring, E., Mazerolle, L., Spelman, W. & Gajewski,
F. (1999). Problem-oriented policing in violent crime places: A
randomized controlled experiment. Criminology, 37, 541-80.

241
242 References

Bratton, W. (1998). Turnaround: How America’s top cop reversed the crime
epidemic. New York: Random House.
Bureau of Justice Assistance. (2005). National criminal intelligence sharing
plan., Washington, D.C.: Government Accounting Office.
Cabrera, A. & Cabrera, E. (2002). Knowledge-sharing dilemmas.
Organization Studies, 23, 687-710.
Carter, D. (2004). Law enforcement intelligence: A guide for state, local, and
tribal law enforcement agencies. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of
Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.
Chan, J. (1997). Changing police culture. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge
University Press.
Clark, C. (2006). Proactive policing: Standing on the shoulders of community-
based policing. Police Practice and Research, 7 (1), 3-17.
Collier, P., Edwards, J. & Shaw, D. (2004). Communicating knowledge
about police. International Journal of Productivity and Performance
Management, 53 (5), 458-67.
Cope, N. (2004). Intelligence led policing or policing led intelligence. British
Journal of Criminology, 44, 188-203.
Crank, J. & Langworthy, R. (1992). An institutional perspective on policing.
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 83, 338-63.
Crank, J. (2003). Institutional theory of police: A review of the state of the art.
Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management,
26 (2), 186-207.
Davenport, T. & Jarvenpaa, S. (2008). Strategic use of analytics in
government. Washington, D.C. IBM Center for the Business of
Government.
Dillman, D. (2000). Mail and internet surveys: The total design method. New
York: John Wiley and Sons.
Douthit, N. (1975). August Vollmer, Berkeley’s first chief of police, and the
emergence of police professionalism. California Historical Quarterly,
(54), Spring, 101-124.
Dukmedjian, J. (2006). From community to intelligence: Executive
realignment of the RCMP mission. Canadian Journal of Criminology and
Criminal Justice, July, 524-42.
Eck, J. & Maguire E. (2000). Have changes in policing reduced violent crime?
An assessment of the evidence. In A. Blumstein & J. Wallman (Eds.), The
crime drop in America (207-265). Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge
University Press.
Ericson, R. & Haggerty, K. (1997). Policing the risk society. Oxford, U.K.:
Oxford Clarendon Press.
References 243

Eterno, J. & Silverman, E. (2005). The New York City police department’s
compstat: Dream or nightmare? International Journal of Police Science
and Management, 8 (3), 218-31.
Felson, M. (1998). Crime and everyday life (2nd Ed.). Thousand Oaks: Pine
Forge Press.
Fletcher, R. (2000). An intelligent use of intelligence: Developing locally
responsive information systems in the post-Macpherson era. In A.
Marlow & B. Loveday, (Eds.), After Macpherson: Policing after the
Stephen Lawrence inquiry (113-125). Dorser, U.K.: Russell House
Publishing.
Fyfe, J., Greene, J., Walsh, W., Wilson, O. & McLaren, R. (1997). Police
administration (5th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill Publishers.
Garland, D. (2001). The culture of control. Oxford, U.K.: University of
Oxford Press.
Garrett, L. (2000). Betrayal of trust: The collapse of global public health.
New York: Hyperion Press.
Gill, P. (2001). Rounding up the usual suspects? Developments in
contemporary law enforcement intelligence. Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate
Publishers.
Gill, P. (1998). Making sense of police intelligence? The use of a cybernetic
model in analysing information and power in police intelligence processes.
Policing and Society, 8, 289-314.
Goldstein, H. (1979). Improving policing: A problem-oriented approach.
Crime and Delinquency, 25, 236-58.
Goldstein, H. (1990). Problem oriented policing. New York: McGraw-Hill
Publishers.
Goldstein, H. (2003). On further developing problem-oriented policing: The
most critical need, the major impediments, and a proposal. Crime
Prevention Studies, 15, 13-57.
Government Accounting Office. (2004). 911 Commission report.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Grover, V. & Davenport, T. (2001). General perspectives on knowledge
management: fostering a research agenda. Journal of Management
Information Systems, 18 (1), 5-21.
Hale, C., Heaton, R. & Uglow, S. (2004). Uniform styles? Aspects of police
centralization in England and Wales. Policing and Society, 14 (4), 291-
313.
Heaton, R. (2001). The prospects for intelligence-led policing: Some historical
and quantitative considerations. Policing and Society, 9, 337-55.
244 References

Henry, V. (2002). The compstat paradigm: Management accountability in

policing, business and the public sector. Flushing, N.Y.: Looseleaf Law
Publications.
IALEIA, Inc. (1997a). Intelligence led policing: International perspectives on
policing in the 21st century. Newark, N.J.: IALEIA, Inc.
IALEIA, Inc. (1997b). Intelligence-led policing in the United States: A
software vendor’s view. In IALEIA, intelligence led policing: International
perspectives on policing in the 21st century. Newark, NJ: IALEIA, Inc.,
24-27. Basara, J.
Innes, M. & Fielding, N. (2002). From community to communicative
policing: ‘Signal crimes’ and the problem of public reassurance.
Sociological Research On-line, 7 (2). Retrieved August 8, 2008, from
http://www.socresonline.org.uk/home.html.
Innes, M., Fielding, N. & Cope, N. (2005). The appliance of science? The
theory and practice of crime intelligence analysis. British Journal of
Criminology, 45, 39-57.
Innes, M., Lowe, T., MacKenzie, H., Murray, P., Roberts, C. & Twyman, L.
(2004). Signal crimes and control signals: Towards an evidence based
framework for reassurance policing. Guildford, UK: University of
Surrey.
International Association of Chiefs of Police. (2005). Intelligence-led
policing: The new intelligence architecture. Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Department of Justice.
John, T. & Maguire, M. (2003). Rolling out the national intelligence model:
Key challenges. In K. Bullock & N. Tilley (Eds.). Crime reduction and
problem oriented policing (33-68). Collumpton, U.K.: Willan Publishers.
Johnston, R. (2005). Analytical culture in the U.S. intelligence community: An
ethnographic study. Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency.
Käser, P. & Miles, R. (2002). Understanding knowledge activists’ successes
and failures. Long Range Planning, 35, 9-28.
Kelling, G., Pate, T., Dieckman, D. & Brown, C. (1974). The Kansas City
preventive patrol experiment: Technical report. Washington, D.C.: The
Police Foundation.
Kelling, G. (1988). Police and communities: The quiet reform. Perspectives
on Policing. Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice.
Kelling, G., & Sousa, W. (2001). Do police matter? An analysis. In J.
Greene & S. Mastrofski (Eds.), Community Policing: Rhetoric or Reality?
(27-45). New York: Praeger Publishers.
Klockars, C. (1988). The rhetoric of community policing. In J. Greene & S.
Mastrofski (Eds.), Community policing: Rhetoric or reality? (47-62).
New York: Praeger Publishers.
References 245

Kuhn, T. (1962). The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago: University

of Chicago Press.
Lurigio, A. & Skogan, W. (1994). Winning the hearts and minds of police
officers: An assessment of staff perceptions of community policing in
Chicago. Crime and Delinquency, 40 (3), 315-30.
Maguire, E. & King, W. (2004). Trends in the policing industry. Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 593, 15-41.
Maguire, M. (2000). Policing by risks and targets: Some implications of
intelligence-led crime control. Policing and Society, 9, 315-36.
Maguire, M. & John, T. (2006). Intelligence led policing, managerialism and
community engagement: Competing priorities and the role of the national
intelligence model in the UK. Policing and Society, 16 (1), 67-85.
Manning, P. (1991). Community policing as a drama of control. In J. Greene
& S. Mastrofski (Eds.), Community Policing: Rhetoric or Reality? (64-
82). New York: Praeger Publishers.
Manning, P. (1997a). Police work (2nd ed.). Prospect Heights, Ill.: Waveland
Press.
Manning, P. (1997b). The social organization of policing (2nd ed.). Prospect
Heights: Waveland Press.
Manning, P. (2001a). Technology’s ways: Information technology, crime
analysis and the rationalizing of policing. Criminology and Criminal
Justice, 1, 83-103.
Manning, P. (2001b). Theorizing policing: The drama and myth of crime
control in the NYPD. Theoretical Criminology, 5, 315-44.
Manning, P. (2008). The technology of policing. New York: New York
University Press.
Mastrofski, S. (2006). Community policing, A skeptical view. In D.Weisburd
& A. Braga (Eds.), Police innovation: Contrasting perspectives (44-73).
Chicago: Cambridge University Press.
Mercado, S. (2008). Reexamining the distinction between open information
and secrets. Retrieved September 26, 2008, from
http://cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications.
Merton, R. (1940). Bureaucratic structure and personality. Social Forces, 18,
560-68.
McGarrell, E, Freilich, J. & Chermak, C. (2007). Intelligence-led policing as a
framework for responding to terrorism. Journal of Contemporary
Criminal Justice, 23, 142-158.
Bureau of Justice Assistance.
Nice, D. & Fredericksen, P. (1995). The politics of intergovernmental
relations (2nd ed.). Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers.
246 References

Pawson, R. & Tilley, N. (1994). What works in evaluation research? British

Journal of Criminology, 34, 291-206.
Pratt, T., Gaffney, M., Lovrich, N. & Johnson, C. (2006). This isn’t CSI:
estimating the national backlog of forensic DNA cases and the barriers
associated with case processing. Criminal Justice Policy Review, 17, 32-
47.
Ratcliffe, J. (2001). Intelligence-led policing and the problems of turning
rhetoric into practice. Policing and Society, 12 (1), 53-66.
Ratcliffe, J. & McCullagh, M. (2001a). Chasing ghosts? Police perceptions of
high crime areas. British Journal of Criminology, 41, 330-41.
Ratcliffe, J. (2005). The effectiveness of police intelligence management: A
New Zealand case. Police Practice and Research, 6 (5), 435-51.
Ratcliffe, J. (2007). Integrated intelligence and crime analysis: Enhanced
information management for law enforcement leaders. Washington, D.C.:
The Police Foundation.
Ratcliffe, J. & Guidetti, R. (2008). State police investigative structure and the
adoption of intelligence-led policing. Policing: An International Journal
of Police Strategies and Management, 3 (1), 109-128.
Ratcliffe, J. (2008). Intelligence-led policing. Cullompton, U.K.: Willan
Publishers.
Rattigan, T. (1955). Separate Tables. New York: Random House.
Reuss-Ianni, E. & Ianni, F. (1983). Street cops and management cops: The
two cultures of policing. In T. Newburn, (Ed.), Policing: Key Readings
(297-314). Portland: Willen.
Ritti, R. & Mastrofski, S. (2002). The institutionalization of community
policing (final report), unpublished manuscript.
Roberg, R. & Kuykendall, J. (1993). Police organization and management.
Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing.
Schweitzer, N. & Saks, M. (2007). The CSI effect: Popular fiction about
forensic science affects public expectations about real forensic science.
Jurimetrics 47, 357-364.
Sheptycki, J. (1998). The global cops cometh: Reflections on
transnationalization, knowledge work and policing. The British Journal of
Sociology 49 (1), 57-74.
Sheptycki, J. & Ratcliffe, J. (2004). Setting the strategic agenda. In J.
Ratcliffe (Ed.). Strategic thinking in criminal intelligence (194-216).
Sydney, Australia: Federation Press.
Sheptycki, J. (2008). Organizational pathologies in police intelligence
systems: Some contributions to the lexicon of intelligence-led policing.
European Journal of Criminology, 1 (3), 307-32.
References 247

Skolnick, J. & Bayley, D. (1986). The new blue line: Police innovations in six
American cities. New York: The Free Press.
Skogan, W. (2006). The promise of community policing. In D. Weisburd &
A. Braga (Eds.), Police innovation: Contrasting perspectives (27-43).
Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
Bureau of Justice Assistance. (2005). The national criminal intelligence
sharing plan. Washington, D.C.
Tilley, N. (2003). Community policing, problem-oriented policing and
intelligence-led policing. In T. Newburn (Ed.), Handbook of Policing
(311-339). Cullompton, U.K.: Willan Publishers.
Townsley, M., Johnson, S. & Pease, K. (2003). Problem orientation, problem
solving and organizational change. In J. Knutsson (Ed.), Crime
Prevention Series, 15, (183-212). New York: Criminal Justice Press.
Tremblay, P. & Rochon, C. (1991). Police organizations and their use of
knowledge: A grounded research agenda. Policing and Society, 1, 269-
283.
Trojanowicz, R. & Bucqueroux, B. (1990). Community Policing: A
Contemporary Perspective. Cincinnati: Anderson Publishing Company.
Trojanowicz, R., Kappeler, V., & Gaines, L. (2002). Community Policing: A
Contemporary Perspective (3rd ed.). Cincinnati: Anderson Publishing
Company.
Tyler, T. (2006). Viewing CSI and the threshold of guilt: managing truth and
justice in reality and fiction. Yale Law Journal, 115, 1050-1085.
Walsh, W. (2001). Compstat: An analysis of an emerging police managerial
paradigm. Policing, An International Journal of Police Strategies and
Management, 24 (3), 347-62.
Walters, J. & Ussery, W. (2007). Police stress: history, contributing factors,
symptoms, and interventions. Policing: An International Journal of
Police Strategies and Management, 30 (2), 169-188.
Weber, M. (1978). Economy and Society (2 vols.). (Guenther Roth & Claus
Wittich, Trans.). Berkeley: University of California Press. (Original work
published 1922).
Weisburd, D., Mastrofski, D. McNally, A., & Greenspan, R. (2001). Compstat
and organizational change: Findings from a national survey.
Washington, D.C.: The Police Foundation.
Weisburd, D., Mastrofski, S., McNally, A., Greenspan, R., & Willis, J. (2003).
Reforming to preserve: Compstat and strategic problem solving in
American policing. Criminology and Public Policy, 2 (3), 421-56.
Weisburd, D. & Eck, J. (2004). What can police do to reduce crime, disorder,
and fear? Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science, 59,: 42-65.
248 References

Willem, A. & Buelens, M. (2007). Knowledge sharing in public sector

organizations: The effect of organizational characteristics on
interdepartmental knowledge sharing. Journal of Public Administration
Research and Theory, 17, 581-606.
Willis, J., Mastrofski, S., & Weisburd, D. (2004). Compstat and bureaucracy:
A case study of challenges and opportunities for change. Justice
Quarterly, 21 (3), 463-96.
Wilson, J. (1968). Varieties of police behavior. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
Wilson, O. (1953). Police science: August Vollmer. Journal of Criminal Law
and Criminology, 44, 91.
Zhao, J, Thurman, Q. & Lovrich, N. (1995). Community-oriented policing
across the U.S.: Facilitators and impediment to implementation. American
Journal of Police, 1, 11-28.
Zhao, J., Lovrich, N. & Robinson, H. (2001). Community policing: Is it
changing the basic functions of policing? Findings from a longitudinal
study of 200+ municipal police agencies. Journal of Criminal Justice 29,
365-77.
Zhao, J., Scheider, M. & Thurman, Q. (2002). Funding community policing to
reduce crime: Have COPS grants made a difference? Criminology and
Public Policy, 2 (1), 7-32.
Ziegler, S. (2006). Increasing response rates in mail surveys without
increasing error: A research Note. Criminal Justice Policy Review, 17 (1),
22-31.
Index

9/11 Commission Report, 5, 6, 8, COPLINK®, 55-56, 59, 62-64,

25 66-67, 70, 72, 153
al Qaeda, 4 Crank, John, 153
Almond, Gabriel, 9 crime mapping, 5, 20, 95
ATAC, 60,70 assistance with, 95-96, 100
Basara, Jim, 32 criminal profiling assistance, 93-
Bittner, Egon, 13 94
Blonien, Scott, 35,42,47,157 CSI effect, 14
blood spatter analysis, 77, 79, 127 data access, 124
calls for service, 1, 2, 11, 129 impediments to, 124
cold case assistance, 28-33, 73, Davenport, Thomas, 148-149
75, 77, 80-88, 94, 100, Department of Licensing
127, 138 availability of archived data,
Compstat, 6, 14, 23, 28-32, 54-55, 97-98
148-149 availability of motor vehicle
community-oriented policing records, 97
(COP), 1, 10, 12-19, 23, DNA anaylsis assistance, 85, 92,
29-30, 57, 137, 148, 152 100
Cope, Nina, 23-24, 27, 127, 137, Eck, John, 12-13, 15, 17, 152, 154
140 Eterno, John, 29

249
250 Index

F.B.I., 54, 63, 76, 115 intelligence led policing (ILP), 2,

Fielding, Nigel, 17-18, 27 4, 7, 8, 10, 14-15, 18,
focus group participants 24-26, 28, 33, 53, 55,
demographic information, 57, 66, 147, 152, 156
36-37, 52 International Association of
Fosdick, Harry, 11 Chiefs of Police (IACP),
Fox, George, 48 19, 31
Gagnon, Dick, 48 International Association of Law
gang affiliation assistance, 92 Enforcement
Gill, Peter, 22 Intelligence Analysts,
Global Intelligence Working Inc (IALEIA), 6
Group (GIWG), 6, 31 Keppel, Robert, 156, 158
Global Justice Information King County, 42, 45, 59, 60, 106,
Sharing Initiative, 6 156
Goldstein, Herman, 11, 13, 16-18, King, William, 15
30, 33, 138-139, 153. knowledge sharing, 22
See also problem- Kuhn, Thomas, 12
oriented policing Law Enforcement Information
Grabenstein, Rick, 48, 85 Exchange (LInX), 55,
H.I.T.S Investigator Analysts 56, 59-60, 63-64, 66-67,
demographic information, 61, 70
130, 132-133, 138 Lego® block model, 147, 152,
Homicide Investigation Tracking 154
System (H.I.T.S.), 7, 35, Leonard, V.O., 11
56 Lovrich, Nicholas, 13
available assistance topics, Maguire, Mike, 3, 5, 16, 22, 27-28
86-88, 91, 100 Manning, Peter, 5-6, 11, 14, 19-21,
program description, 21, 35 124, 127, 147, 151-152
H.I.T.S. Bulletins, 36-37, 101 Mastrofski, Stephen, 12-13. 29, 31
impact on crime, 113 Matheny, Tammee, 48, 141
purpose, 101, 103, 105 McCullagh, Michael, 24
survey data, 101-117 McKenna, Rob, 56
HALT, 60, 70 McNamara, Joseph, 11
Hansen, Jim, 48 McVeigh, Timothy, 21
Homeland Security Coordination Memex, Inc., 22
District, 38 Mercado, Stephen, 150-151
information sharing, 4, 5, 15, 19, National Crime Information
26, 31. See also Center (N.C.I.C.), 54,
knowledge sharing 58-60, 62-67, 70, 72, 75
Police Chiefs and Sheriffs
information silos. See silo
demographic information, 37
thinking
police mandate, 4, 20, 21, 24, 147-
Innes, Martin, 27
148
Index 251

problem-oriented policing (POP), Silverman, Eli, 29

2, 4, 10, 12, 1, 16-18, Skeen, Marv, 48
21, 23-24, 57-58, 139, Smith, Bruce, 11
148, 152-153. See also Tilley, Nick, 23
Goldstein, Herman Violent Criminal Apprehension
Project Safe Neighborhoods Program (ViCAP), 7,
(PSN), 23 54, 56, 60, 62-64, 66-70,
R.C.M.P., 14-15 75, 156
RAIN, 59, 60, 62-63, 66-67, 70 ViClas, 60
Ratcliffe, Jerry, 18-19, 24, 27, 33- Vollmer, August, 10, 11
34 Washington State Attorney
Ritti, Richard, 12 General, 7, 34-35, 37,
Robinson, Hank, 13 158. See also
Roosendaal, Darryl, 47, 142 McKenna, Rob
sharing of data, 22, 25-27, 31-35, Weber, Max, 32
49, 57, 68, 72, 122, 127, Weisburd, David, 152
132, 137, 146, 153, 159 Willis, James, 31-32
Sheptycki, James, 25-26, 80, 118 Wilson, James Q., 1
silo-thinking, 2-3, 22, 25-26, 33- Wilson, O.W., 11
34, 151, 153, 155-156. working silos, 2-3
See also working silos Zhao, Jihong, 14