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 Brief Contents

Boxes ​  xx
Preface ​  xxi

Chapter 1 What Is Anthropology? ​  3

Module 1: Anthropology, Science, and Storytelling ​  21

Chapter 2 Why Is Evolution Important to Anthropologists? ​  31

Chapter 3 What Can Evolutionary Theory Tell Us about Human Variation? ​  59
Module 2: Dating Methods in Paleoanthropology and Archaeology ​  85

Chapter 4 What Can the Study of Primates Tell Us about Human Beings? ​  97
Chapter 5 What Can the Fossil Record Tell Us about Human Origins? ​  119
Chapter 6 How Do We Know about the Human Past? ​  163
Chapter 7 Why Did Humans Settle Down, Build Cities, and Establish States? ​  193
Chapter 8 Why Is the Concept of Culture Important? ​  229
Module 3: On Ethnographic Methods ​  247

Chapter 9 Why Is Understanding Human Language Important? ​  261

Module 4: Components of Language ​  285

Chapter 10 How Do We Make Meaning? ​  289

Chapter 11 Why Do Anthropologists Study Economic Relations? ​  323
Chapter 12 How Do Anthropologists Study Political Relations? ​  349
Chapter 13 Where Do Our Relatives Come From and Why Do They Matter? ​  373
Chapter 14 What Can Anthropology Tell Us about Social Inequality? ​  415
Chapter 15 How Is Anthropology Applied in the Field of Medicine? ​  447
Module 5: Background to the Global Political Economy of the Twenty-First Century ​  475

Chapter 16 What Can Anthropology Tell Us about Globalization? ​  479

Glossary ​  510
References ​  519
Credits ​  532
Index ​  537

vii

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 Contents

Boxes ​  xx
Preface ​  xxi

Chapter 1 What Is Anthropology? ​  3

What Is Anthropology? ​  5
What Is the Concept of Culture? ​  6
What Makes Anthropology a Cross-Disciplinary Discipline? ​  7
Biological Anthropology ​  8
In Their Own Words: Anthropology as a Vocation: Listening to Voices ​  9
Cultural Anthropology ​  11
Linguistic Anthropology ​  13
Archaeology ​  14
Applied Anthropology ​  15
Medical Anthropology ​  16
The Uses of Anthropology ​  17
In Their Own Words: What Can You Learn from an Anthropology Major? ​  18
Chapter Summary ​ 19
For Review ​ 19
Key Terms ​ 20
Suggested Readings ​ 20

Module 1: Anthropology, Science, and Storytelling ​  21

Scientific and Nonscientific Explanations ​  21
Some Key Scientific Concepts ​  23
Module Summary ​ 29
For Review ​ 29
Key Terms ​ 29

Chapter 2 Why Is Evolution Important to Anthropologists? ​  31

What Is Evolutionary Theory? ​  32
What Material Evidence Is There for Evolution? ​  33
Pre-Darwinian Views of the Natural World ​  33
Essentialism ​ 33
The Great Chain of Being ​  34
Catastrophism and Uniformitarianism ​  35
Transformational Evolution ​ 37
What Is Natural Selection? ​  38
Population Thinking ​ 39
Natural Selection in Action ​  40
viii

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 Contents ix

How Did Biologists Learn about Genes? ​  41

Mendel’s Experiments ​ 42
The Emergence of Genetics ​  43
What Are the Basics of Contemporary Genetics? ​  43
Genes and Traits ​  44
Anthropology in Everyday Life: Investigating Human-Rights Violations
and Identifying Remains ​  46
Mutation ​ 48
DNA and the Genome ​  49
Genotype, Phenotype, and the Norm of Reaction ​  51
In Their Own Words: How Living Organisms Construct
Their Environments ​ 53
What Does Evolution Mean? ​  54
Chapter Summary ​ 55
For Review ​ 56
Key Terms ​ 57
Suggested Readings ​ 57

Chapter 3  hat Can Evolutionary Theory Tell Us

W
about Human Variation? ​  59
What Is Microevolution? ​  60
The Modern Evolutionary Synthesis and Its Legacy ​  60
The Molecularization of Race? ​  63
The Four Evolutionary Processes ​  66
In Their Own Words: DNA Tests Find Branches but Few Roots ​  67
Microevolution and Patterns of Human Variation ​  70
Adaptation and Human Variation ​  72
Phenotype, Environment, and Culture ​  77
What Is Macroevolution? ​  78
Can We Predict the Future of Human Evolution? ​  82
Chapter Summary ​ 83
For Review ​ 83
Key Terms ​ 84
Suggested Readings ​ 84

Module 2: Dating Methods in Paleoanthropology and Archaeology ​  85

Relative Dating Methods ​  85
Numerical (or Absolute) Dating Methods ​  88
Modeling Prehistoric Climates ​  93
Module Summary ​ 95
For Review ​ 95
Key Terms ​ 95

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 x Contents

Chapter 4  hat Can the Study of Primates Tell Us

W
about Human Beings? ​  97
What Are Primates? ​  98
How Do Biologists Classify Primates? ​  98
How Many Categories of Living Primates Are There? ​  100
Strepsirrhines ​ 100
Haplorhines ​ 101
In Their Own Words: The Future of Primate Biodiversity ​  106
What Is Ethnoprimatology? ​  108
Are There Patterns in Primate Evolution? ​  109
In Their Own Words: Chimpanzee Tourism ​ 110
How Do Paleoanthropologists Reconstruct Primate
Evolutionary History? ​  112
Primates of the Paleocene ​  112
Primates of the Eocene ​  112
Primates of the Oligocene ​  113
Primates of the Miocene ​  114
Chapter Summary ​ 115
For Review ​ 116
Key Terms ​ 116
Suggested Readings ​ 116

Chapter 5  hat Can the Fossil Record Tell Us

W
about Human Origins? ​  119
What Is Hominin Evolution? ​  120
Who Were the First Hominins (6–3 mya)? ​  120
The Origin of Bipedalism ​  120
In Their Own Words: Finding Fossils ​  124
Changes in Hominin Dentition ​  126
Who Were the Later Australopiths (3–1.5 mya)? ​  127
How Many Species of Australopith Were There? ​  127
How Can Anthropologists Explain the Human Transition? ​  128
What Do We Know about Early Homo (2.4–1.5 mya)? ​  130
Expansion of the Australopith Brain ​  130
How Many Species of Early Homo Were There? ​  130
Earliest Evidence of Culture: Stone Tools of the
Oldowan Tradition ​ 130
Who Was Homo erectus (1.8–1.7 mya to 0.5–0.4 mya)? ​  133
Morphological Traits of H. erectus ​ 134
The Culture of H. erectus ​ 135
H. erectus the Hunter? ​  136
What Happened to H. erectus? ​  137
How Did Homo sapiens Evolve? ​  138
What Is the Fossil Evidence for the Transition to Modern
H. sapiens? ​ 138
Where Did Modern H. sapiens Come From? ​  139

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 Contents xi

Who Were the Neandertals (130,000–35,000 Years Ago)? ​  140

What Do We Know about Middle Paleolithic/Middle Stone
Age Culture? ​  142
In Their Own Words: Bad Hair Days in the Paleolithic:
Modern (Re)Constructions of the Cave Man ​  143
Did Neandertals Hunt? ​  145
What Do We Know about Anatomically Modern Humans
(200,000 Years Ago to Present)? ​  145
What Can Genetics Tell Us about Modern
Human Origins? ​ 146
What Do We Know about the Upper Paleolithic/Late Stone Age
(40,000?–12,000 Years Ago)? ​  148
What Happened to the Neandertals? ​  150
How Many Kinds of Upper Paleolithic/Late Stone Age Cultures
Were There? ​  151
Where Did Modern H. sapiens Migrate in Late Pleistocene
Times? ​  152
In Their Own Words: Women’s Art in the Upper Paleolithic? ​  153
Eastern Asia and Siberia ​  155
The Americas ​ 155
Australasia ​ 157
Two Million Years of Human Evolution ​  157
Chapter Summary ​ 158
For Review ​ 160
Key Terms ​ 161
Suggested Readings ​ 161

Chapter 6 How Do We Know about the Human Past? ​  163

What Is Archaeology? ​  164
Surveys ​ 166
Archaeological Excavation ​ 169
Archaeology and Digital Heritage ​  171
How Do Archaeologists Interpret the Past? ​  172
Subsistence Strategies ​ 172
Bands, Tribes, Chiefdoms, and States ​  173
Whose Past Is It? ​  176
How Is the Past Being Plundered? ​  179
In Their Own Words: Rescue Archaeology in Europe ​  181
What Are the Critical Issues in Contemporary Archaeology? ​  183
Archaeology and Gender ​  183
Collaborative Approaches to Studying the Past ​  185
Anthropology in Everyday Life: Archaeology as a Tool
of Civic Engagement ​  186
Cosmopolitan Archaeologies ​ 187

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 xii Contents

Chapter Summary ​ 189
For Review ​ 190
Key Terms ​ 191
Suggested Readings ​ 191

Chapter 7  hy Did Humans Settle Down, Build Cities,

W
and Establish States? ​  193
How Is the Human Imagination Entangled with the Material
World? ​  194
Is Plant Cultivation a Form of Niche Construction? ​  196
How Do Anthropologists Explain the Origins of Animal
Domestication? ​  199
Was There Only One Motor of Domestication? ​  203
How Did Domestication, Cultivation, and Sedentism Begin in
Southwest Asia? ​  204
Natufian Social Organization ​  204
Natufian Subsistence ​ 205
Anthropology in Everyday Life: Çatalhöyük in the Twenty-First Century ​ 206
Domestication Elsewhere in the World ​  208
What Were the Consequences of Domestication
and Sedentism? ​  210
In Their Own Words: The Food Revolution ​  212
How Do Anthropologists Define Social Complexity? ​  213
Why Is It Incorrect to Describe Foraging Societies as “Simple”? ​  214
What Is the Archaeological Evidence for Social Complexity? ​  215
Why Did Stratification Begin? ​  217
How Can Anthropologists Explain the Rise
of Complex Societies? ​  218
In Their Own Words: The Ecological Consequences of Social Complexity ​  220
Andean Civilization ​ 221
Chapter Summary ​ 225
For Review ​ 227
Key Terms ​ 227
Suggested Readings ​ 227

Chapter 8 Why Is the Concept of Culture Important? ​  229

How Do Anthropologists Define Culture? ​  230
In Their Own Words: The Paradox of Ethnocentrism ​  231
In Their Own Words: Culture and Freedom ​  233
Culture, History, and Human Agency ​  234
In Their Own Words: Human-Rights Law and the Demonization
of Culture ​ 235

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 Contents xiii

Why Do Cultural Differences Matter? ​  237

What Is Ethnocentrism? ​  237
Is It Possible to Avoid Ethnocentric Bias? ​  238
What Is Cultural Relativism? ​  239
How Can Cultural Relativity Improve Our Understanding
of Controversial Cultural Practices? ​  239
Genital Cutting, Gender, and Human Rights ​  240
Genital Cutting as a Valued Ritual ​  240
Culture and Moral Reasoning ​  241
Did Their Culture Make Them Do It? ​  242
Does Culture Explain Everything? ​  243
Culture Change and Cultural Authenticity ​  244
The Promise of the Anthropological Perspective ​  245
Chapter Summary ​ 245
For Review ​ 246
Key Terms ​ 246
Suggested Readings ​ 246

Module 3: On Ethnographic Methods ​  247

A Meeting of Cultural Traditions ​  247
Single-Sited Fieldwork ​  247
Multisited Fieldwork ​  249
Collecting and Interpreting Data ​  250
The Dialectic of Fieldwork: Interpretation and Translation ​  251
Interpreting Actions and Ideas ​  251
The Dialectic of Fieldwork: An Example ​  253
The Effects of Fieldwork ​  254
The Production of Anthropological Knowledge ​  256
Anthropological Knowledge as Open-Ended ​  257
Module Summary ​ 258
For Review ​ 258
Key Terms ​ 258
Suggested Readings ​ 259

Chapter 9 Why Is Understanding Human Language Important? ​  261

How Are Language and Culture Related? ​  262
How Do People Talk about Experience? ​  263
In Their Own Words: Cultural Translation ​  266
What Makes Human Language Distinctive? ​  266
What Does It Mean to “Learn” a Language? ​  268
How Does Context Affect Language? ​  268
How Does Language Affect How We See the World? ​  269
Pragmatics: How Do We Study Language in Contexts of Use? ​  271
Ethnopragmatics ​ 271
What Happens When Languages Come into Contact? ​  272

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 xiv Contents

What Is the Difference between a Pidgin and a Creole? ​  273

How Is Meaning Negotiated? ​  273
What Is Linguistic Inequality? ​  274
What Are Language Habits of African Americans? ​  274
In Their Own Words: Varieties of African American English ​  275
What Is Language Ideology? ​  276
What Is Lost If a Language Dies? ​  277
Anthropology in Everyday Life: Language Revitalization ​  279
How Are Language and Truth Connected? ​  281
Chapter Summary ​ 282
For Review ​ 283
Key Terms ​ 284
Suggested Readings ​ 284

Module 4: Components of Language ​  285

Phonology: Sounds ​  285
Morphology: Word Structure ​  285
Syntax: Sentence Structure ​  286
Semantics: Meaning ​  287
For Review ​ 287
Key Terms ​ 287

Chapter 10 How Do We Make Meaning? ​  289

What Is Play? ​  290
What Do We Think about Play? ​  290
What Are Some Effects of Play? ​  290
What Is Art? ​  291
Is There a Definition of Art? ​  291
“But Is It Art?” ​ 295
In Their Own Words: Tango ​ 297
“She’s Fake”: Art and Authenticity ​  298
How Does Hip-Hop Become Japanese? ​  299
What Is Myth? ​  300
How Does Myth Reflect—and Shape—Society? ​  301
Do Myths Help Us Think? ​  302
What Is Ritual? ​  303
How Can Ritual Be Defined? ​  303
How Is Ritual Expressed in Action? ​  303
What Are Rites of Passage? ​  304
In Their Own Words: Video in the Villages ​  305
How Are Play and Ritual Complementary? ​  306
How Are Worldview and Symbolic Practice Related? ​  307
What Are Symbols? ​  307
What Is Religion? ​  308

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 Contents xv

How Do People Communicate in Religion? ​  311

How Are Religion and Social Organization Related? ​  311
Worldviews in Operation: Two Case Studies ​  312
Coping with Misfortune: Witchcraft, Oracles, and Magic among
the Azande ​ 312
Are There Patterns of Witchcraft Accusation? ​  314
Coping with Misfortune: Listening for God among Contemporary
Evangelicals in the United States ​  315
In Their Own Words: For All Those Who Were Indian in a Former Life ​  315
Maintaining and Changing a Worldview ​  316
How Do People Cope with Change? ​  317
In Their Own Words: Custom and Confrontation ​  318
How Are Worldviews Used as Instruments of Power? ​  318
Chapter Summary ​ 320
For Review ​ 321
Key Terms ​ 321
Suggested Readings ​ 321

Chapter 11 Why Do Anthropologists Study Economic Relations? ​  323

How Do Anthropologists Study Economic Relations? ​  324
What Are the Connections between Culture and Livelihood? ​  324
Self-Interest, Institutions, and Morals ​  324
How Do Anthropologists Study Production, Distribution,
and Consumption? ​  325
How Are Goods Distributed and Exchanged? ​  329
Capitalism and Neoclassical Economics ​  329
What Are Modes of Exchange? ​  329
In Their Own Words: “So Much Work, So Much Tragedy . . . and
for What?” ​ 331
Does Production Drive Economic Activities? ​  331
Anthropology in Everyday Life: Producing Sorghum and Millet in Honduras
and the Sudan ​  332
Labor ​ 332
Modes of Production ​  332
In Their Own Words: Solidarity Forever ​  334
What Is the Role of Conflict in Material Life? ​  335
Why Do People Consume What They Do? ​  335
In Their Own Words: Questioning Collapse ​  336
The Internal Explanation: Malinowski and Basic Human
Needs ​ 338
The External Explanation: Cultural Ecology ​  338
How Is Consumption Culturally Patterned? ​  338
In Their Own Words: Fake Masks and Faux Modernity ​  341

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 xvi Contents

How Is Consumption Being Studied Today? ​  342

The Anthropology of Food and Nutrition ​  343
Chapter Summary ​ 345
For Review ​ 346
Key Terms ​ 346
Suggested Readings ​ 346

Chapter 12 How Do Anthropologists Study Political Relations? ​  349

How Are Culture and Politics Related? ​  350
How Do Anthropologists Study Politics? ​  352
Coercion ​ 352
Power and National Identity: A Case Study ​  354
Can Governmentality Be Eluded? ​  356
In Their Own Words: Reforming the Crow Constitution ​  357

Anthropology in Everyday Life: Anthropology and Advertising ​  358

How Are Politics, Gender, and Kinship Related? ​  359
How Are Immigration and Politics Related in
the New Europe? ​  360
Hidden Transcripts and the Power of Reflection ​  364
In Their Own Words: Protesters Gird for Long Fight over Opening
Peru’s Amazon ​ 365
Anthropology in Everyday Life: Human Terrain Teams
and Anthropological Ethics ​  368
Chapter Summary ​ 369
For Review ​ 370
Key Terms ​ 370
Suggested Readings ​ 370

Chapter 13 W
 here Do Our Relatives Come From and Why Do
They Matter? ​ 373
What Is Kinship? ​  374
Sex, Gender, and Kinship ​  375
What Is the Role of Descent in Kinship? ​  378
What Roles Do Lineages Play in Descent? ​  379
Lineage Membership ​ 379
Patrilineages ​ 380
What Are Matrilineages? ​  382
In Their Own Words: Outside Work, Women, and Bridewealth ​  383
What Are Kinship Terminologies? ​  384
What Criteria Are Used for Making Kinship Distinctions? ​  384
What Is Adoption? ​  385
Adoption in Highland Ecuador ​  385
European American Kinship and New Reproductive
Technologies ​ 386

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 Contents xvii

How Does Organ Transplantation Create New Relatives? ​  388

Marriage ​  388
Toward a Definition of Marriage ​  389
Woman Marriage and Ghost Marriage among the Nuer ​  389
Why Is Marriage a Social Process? ​  390
Patterns of Residence after Marriage ​  390
Single and Plural Spouses ​  391
In Their Own Words: Two Cheers for Gay Marriage ​  392
How Is Marriage an Economic Exchange? ​  395
What Is a Family? ​  396
In Their Own Words: Dowry Too High. Lose Bride and Go to Jail ​  397
What Is the Nuclear Family? ​  398
What Is the Polygynous Family? ​  398
Extended and Joint Families ​  399
In Their Own Words: Law, Custom, and Crimes against Women ​  400
How Are Families Transformed over Time? ​  400
Divorce and Remarriage ​  400
How Does International Migration Affect the Family? ​  401
Families by Choice ​  402
In Their Own Words: Why Migrant Women Feed Their Husbands Tamales ​  403

Anthropology in Everyday Life: Caring for Infibulated Women Giving Birth

in Norway ​ 404
Friendship ​ 406
How Are Sexual Practices Organized? ​  406
Ranges of Heterosexual Practices ​  407
Other Sexual Practices ​  407
Sexuality and Power ​  411
Chapter Summary ​ 411
For Review ​ 412
Key Terms ​ 413
Suggested Readings ​ 413

Chapter 14  hat Can Anthropology Tell Us

W
about Social Inequality? ​  415
Gender ​  416
In Their Own Words: The Consequences of Being a Woman ​  417
Class ​  419
Class and Gender in Indonesia ​  420
Class and Caste in the United States? ​  420
Caste ​  421
Caste in India ​  422
In Their Own Words: Burakumin: Overcoming Hidden Discrimination
in Japan ​ 422

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 xviii Contents

In Their Own Words: As Economic Turmoil Mounts, So Do Attacks on

Hungary’s Gypsies ​ 424
Race ​  426
Colorism in Nicaragua ​  428
In Their Own Words: On the Butt Size of Barbie and Shani: Dolls and Race
in the United States ​  429
Ethnicity ​  430
In Their Own Words: The Politics of Ethnicity ​  431
Nation and Nationalism ​  434
Australian Nationalism ​ 435
Anthropology in Everyday Life: Anthropology and Democracy ​  436
Naturalizing Discourses ​ 439
The Paradox of Essentialized Identities ​  439
Nation Building in a Postcolonial World: The Example of Fiji ​  440
Nationalism and Its Dangers ​  442
Chapter Summary ​ 443
For Review ​ 444
Key Terms ​ 444
Suggested Readings ​ 445

Chapter 15 How Is Anthropology Applied in the Field of Medicine? ​  447

What Is Medical Anthropology? ​  448
What Makes Medical Anthropology “Biocultural”? ​  448
In Their Own Words: American Premenstrual Syndrome ​  449

In Their Own Words: The Madness of Hunger ​  451

How Do People with Different Cultures Understand the Causes
of Sickness and Health? ​  452
Kinds of Selves ​  452
Decentered Selves on the Internet ​  453
Anthropology in Everyday Life: Lead Poisoning among Mexican American
Children ​ 454
Self and Subjectivity ​  455
Subjectivity, Trauma, and Structural Violence ​  457
How Are Human Sickness and Health Shaped by the Global
Capitalist Economy? ​  460
In Their Own Words: Ethical Dilemmas and Decisions ​  461
Health, Human Reproduction, and Global Capitalism ​  464
Medical Anthropology and HIV/AIDS ​  466
The Future of Medical Anthropology ​  470
CHAPTER SUMMARY ​ 470
FOR REVIEW ​ 473
KEY TERMS ​ 473
SUGGESTED READINGS ​ 473

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 Contents xix

Module 5: Background to the Global Political Economy of the Twenty-First

Century ​  475
What Happened to the Global Economy after the Cold War? ​  475
Cultural Processes in a Global World ​  476

Chapter 16 What Can Anthropology Tell Us about Globalization? ​  479

What Does It Mean to Live in a Global World? ​  480
Cultural Imperialism or Cultural Hybridity? ​  480
What Is Cultural Imperialism? ​  480
What Is Cultural Hybridity? ​  481
Are There Limits to Cultural Hybridity? ​  482
How Does Globalization Affect the Nation-State? ​  483
Are Global Flows Undermining Nation-States? ​  483
In Their Own Words: Slumdog Tourism ​  484
Migration, Transborder Identities, and Long-Distance
Nationalism ​ 485
How Can Citizenship Be Flexible? ​  487
What Is Territorial Citizenship? ​  489
Are Human Rights Universal? ​  490
Human-Rights Discourse as the Global Language
of Social Justice ​  490
Rights versus Culture? ​  491
Rights to Culture? ​  492
Are Rights Part of Culture? ​  493
How Can Culture Help in Thinking about Rights? ​  493
Anthropology in Everyday Life: Anthropology and Indigenous Rights ​  494
What Is the Relationship between Human Rights
and Humanitarianism? ​ 498
In Their Own Words: How Sushi Went Global ​  499
Can We Be at Home in a Global World? ​  501
What Is Cosmopolitanism? ​  501
What Is Friction? ​  501
In Their Own Words: Cofan: Story of the Forest People
and the Outsiders ​  503
What Is Border Thinking? ​  505
In Their Own Words: The Anthropological Voice ​  506
Why Study Anthropology? ​  507
Chapter Summary ​ 507
For Review ​ 509
Key Terms ​ 509
Suggested Readings ​ 509

Glossary ​  510
References ​  519
Credits ​  532
Index ​  537

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 Boxes

Anthropology in Everyday Life In Their Own Words

Investigating Human-Rights Violations and Identifying Anthropology as a Vocation: Listening to Voices 9
Remains 46 What Can You Learn from an Anthropology Major? 18
Archaeology as a Tool of Civic Engagement 186 How Living Organisms Construct Their Environments 53
Çatalhöyük in the Twenty-First Century 206 DNA Tests Find Branches but Few Roots 67
Language Revitalization 279 The Future of Primate Biodiversity 106
Producing Sorghum and Millet in Honduras Chimpanzee Tourism 110
and the Sudan 332 Finding Fossils 124
Anthropology and Advertising 358 Bad Hair Days in the Paleolithic: Modern
Human Terrain Teams and Anthropological Ethics 368 (Re)Constructions of the Cave Man 143
Caring for Infibulated Women Giving Birth in Norway 404 Women’s Art in the Upper Paleolithic? 153
Anthropology and Democracy 436 Rescue Archaeology in Europe 181
Lead Poisoning among Mexican American Children 454 The Food Revolution 212
Anthropology and Indigenous Rights 494 The Ecological Consequences of Social Complexity 220
The Paradox of Ethnocentrism 231
Culture and Freedom 233
Human-Rights Law and the Demonization of Culture 235
EthnoProfiles Cultural Translation 266
Varieties of African American English 275
Tswana 238 Rione Monti (Rome) 360 Tango 297
Blackston 249 “Sedaka” Village 364 Video in the Villages 305
El Barrio 249 Nuer 381 For All Those Who Were Indian in a Former Life 315
Komachi 253 Navajo 382 Custom and Confrontation 318
Sidi Lahcen Lyussi 255 Zumbagua 386 “So Much Work, So Much Tragedy . . . and for What?” 331
Aymara 264 Nyinba 395 Solidarity Forever 334
Java 269 Mende 399 Questioning Collapse 336
Margi 294 Alaskan Inuit 401 Fake Masks and Faux Modernity 341
Japan 300 Los Pinos 402 Reforming the Crow Constitution 357
Trobriand Islanders 302 Tikopia 407 Protesters Gird for Long Fight over Opening Peru’s Amazon 365
Yoruba 307 Dani 407 Outside Work, Women, and Bridewealth 383
Dinka 309 Mobasa Swahilis 408 Two Cheers for Gay Marriage 392
Azande 313 Managua 409 Dowry Too High. Lose Bride and Go to Jail 397
Kwaio 318 Haiti 416 Law, Custom, and Crimes against Women 400
Somalis (Northern) 324 Gopalpur 423 Why Migrant Women Feed Their Husbands Tamales 403
Boran 325 Guider 432 The Consequences of Being a Woman 417
Nootka 330 Samoa 436 Burakumin: Overcoming Hidden Discrimination in Japan 422
Ju/’hoansi (!Kung) 339 Fiji 440 As Economic Turmoil Mounts, So Do Attacks on
Sinhalese 354 Hawaii 497 Hungary’s Gypsies 424
Tamils 355 On the Butt Size of Barbie and Shani: Dolls and Race in
the United States 429
The Politics of Ethnicity 431
American Premenstrual Syndrome 449
The Madness of Hunger 451
Ethical Dilemmas and Decisions 461
Slumdog Tourism 484
How Sushi Went Global 499
Cofan: Story of the Forest People and the Outsiders 503
The Anthropological Voice 506

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 Preface

T his book emerged out of our increasing dissatisfac-

tion with all the available general anthropology
texts. We found that they either overwhelmed begin-
anthropology—biological anthropology, archaeology,
linguistic anthropology, and cultural anthropology—
as well as from applied anthropology. We have made
ning students with detail and the sheer volume of ma- every effort to provide a balanced perspective, both in
terial or provided overly brief introductions that failed the level of detail we present and in our coverage of the
to convey the richness of the field. We therefore set major subfields.
out to write a book that introduces this broad field The questioning approach not only sparks curios-
concisely yet thoroughly, providing diverse perspec- ity but also orients students’ reading and comprehen-
tives and examples to foster not only an appreciation sion of each chapter, highlighting the concepts every
of anthropology but also a deeper engagement with student should take away from a general anthropology
it—one that helps students better understand them- course. For example, students need to know about evo-
selves and the world around them. We (and our stu- lutionary theory, human variation, and the biological,
dents) needed a general anthropology text that struck social, and cultural critique of the concept of race, since
the right balance, fit into a 15-week semester, and came knowledge in these areas is one of the great achieve-
with a complete package of ancillary materials includ- ments of the discipline of anthropology. No other dis-
ing quizzes, exams, suggested videos, and supplemen- cipline (and possibly no other course) will teach about
tal readings. these matters the way anthropologists do. Students
Throughout the process of writing the first edi- need to know about the fossil evidence for the evolu-
tion and revising for the second and now the third tion of Homo sapiens, which they are not likely to learn
edition, two central questions have guided our deci- about elsewhere. Students need to know what archaeol-
sions on what material to include. First, what is the ogy can tell us about the human past, as well as what
essential material that a balanced introduction to ethnography can teach us about social complexity and
four-field anthropology must cover? Second, how inequality. They need to know that culture isn’t just the
much detail on any particular topic could we include Festival of Nations and unusual foods and interesting
without overwhelming beginning students? Most traditional costumes. They need to know about lan-
general anthropology textbooks are essentially cul- guage and cognition and the central role of learning in
tural anthropology textbooks that have bulked up, human development. They need to understand the
but we decided to start anew and build a general an- wellsprings of human creativity and imagination. It is
thropology text chapter by chapter. We address the valuable for them to see the panoply of forms of human
central issues of the discipline, highlighting the con- relatedness, and how people organize themselves. They
troversies and commitments that shape contempo- need to know about globalization from the bottom up
rary anthropology and that make it interesting and and not just the top down. They need to see how all the
exciting. subfields of anthropology together can provide impor-
tant, unique insights into all these topics and so many
more and how anthropology can provide a vital foun-
dation for their university education.
The world we face as anthropologists has changed
Approach dramatically in the last quarter century, and anthropol-
ogy has changed, too. We have always felt it necessary
This book may be concise, but we cover the field effec- to present students with a view of what contemporary
tively and in a way that is intellectually honest. We anthropologists are doing; we therefore address the
take a question-oriented approach that illuminates most current issues in the field and have thoroughly
major concepts for students and shows them the rel- updated the text accordingly for this edition. Your stu-
evance of anthropology in today’s world. Structuring dents will take away from the book an appreciation of
each chapter around an important question and its how these areas of specialization have developed over
subquestions, we explore what it means to be human, time and how they contribute to our understanding of
incorporating answers from all four major subfields of the world in the twenty-first century.
xxi

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 xxii Preface

Organization the topic of gender is tightly woven into the fabric

of the book, and includes (for example) material
Divided into 16 chapters and 5 modules, this book is the on gender and feminist archaeology, controversies
ideal length for one semester. After Chapter 1, which over female genital cutting, supernumerary sexes
introduces the entire field, 6 chapters are devoted to bio- and genders, varieties of human sexual practices,
logical anthropology and archaeology: evolutionary the- language and gender, women and electoral poli-
ory (Chapter 2); human variation (Chapter 3); the tics, gay marriage, women and colonialism, and
primates (Chapter 4); the fossil record and human ori- contemporary forms of social inequality.
gins (Chapter 5); the human past (Chapter 6); and the • “In Their Own Words.” New voices, including
first farmers, cities, and states (Chapter 7). Topics in cul- those of indigenous peoples, anthropologists,
tural and linguistic anthropology are covered in c­ hapters and nonanthropologists, are presented in the
on culture (Chapter 8); language (Chapter 9); symbolic text in commentaries called “In Their Own
practices (Chapter 10, covering play, art, myth, ritual, and Words.” These short commentaries provide alter-
religion); economics (Chapter 11); politics (­Chapter 12); native perspectives—always readable and some-
kinship, marriage, and sexuality (­ Chapter 13); social times controversial—on topics featured in the
inequality (Chapter 14, covering gender, class, caste, race, chapter where they appear.
ethnicity, and nationalism); the anthropology of medi- • “EthnoProfiles.” These text inserts provide a con-
cine and health (Chapter 15); and globalization sistent, brief information summary for each soci-
(­Chapter 16). In addition, brief methodological modules ety discussed at length in the text. They emerged
after Chapters 1, 3, 8, 9, and 15 discuss anthropology, sci- from our desire as teachers to supply our students
ence, and storytelling; dating methods for paleoanthro- with basic geographical, demographic, and po-
pology and archaeology; ethnographic methods; the litical information about the peoples anthropol-
components of language; and background to the global ogists have worked with. Each EthnoProfile also
political economy of the twenty-first century. Through- contains a map of the area in which the society is
out the book, we incorporate discussions of gender and found. They are not intended to be a substitute
pay special attention to issues of power and inequality in for reading ethnographies, nor are they intended
the contemporary world. to reify or essentialize the “people” or “culture”
in question. Their main purpose is simply to pro-
vide a consistent orientation for readers, though
Key Features of course it is becoming more and more difficult
to attach peoples to particular territories in an
• We take an explicitly global approach. In addi-
era of globalization. How does one calculate pop-
ulation numbers or draw a simple map to locate a
tion to the substantially revised chapter on glo-
global diaspora? How does one construct an
balization, we systematically point out the extent
­EthnoProfile for overseas Chinese or transborder
to which the current sociocultural situation of
Haitians? We don’t know how to answer these
particular peoples has been shaped by their par-
questions, which is why EthnoProfiles for those
ticular histories of contact with capitalism, and
groups are not included in the textbook.
we highlight ways that the post–Cold War global
spread of capitalism has drastically reshaped the • “Anthropology in Everyday Life.” Following the
local contexts in which people everywhere live suggestions of reviewers, we have provided selec-
their lives. tions on anthropology in practice throughout the
• We incorporate current anthropological text; topics include agricultural development,
a­ pproaches to power and inequality through- archaeology and community engagement, doing
­
out the text. We explore how power is manifested business in Japan, Human Terrain Teams, and foren-
in different human societies, how it permeates all sic anthropology and human rights, among others.
aspects of social life, and how it is deployed, re- • Additional learning aids. Key terms are bold-
sisted, and transformed. We discuss issues of faced in the text and defined in a running glos-
trauma, social suffering, and human rights. sary on the page where they appear, in addition
• Material on gender and feminist anthropology to in a glossary at the back of the text. Each
is featured throughout the text. In addition to ­c hapter ends with a list of the key terms in alpha-
the discussion of gender inequality in Chapter 14, betical order with page references, a numbered

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 Preface xxiii

chapter summary, review questions, and anno- medical anthropology. A brief history of the field
tated suggested readings. Maps are featured ex- is followed by a series of examples of contempo-
tensively throughout the text. rary studies in medical anthropology. This chapter
• Use of citations and quotations. In our discus- highlights the importance of structural violence
sions, we have tried to avoid being omniscient and illustrates how this plays out in cases of pop-
narrators by making use of citations and quota- ulation displacement, women’s health, and the
tions in order to indicate where anthropological treatment of HIV/AIDS. It also touches on research
ideas come from. In our view, even first-year stu- in the anthropology of science, technology, and
dents need to know that an academic discipline medicine relating to global pharmaceuticals.
like anthropology is constructed by the work of • Expansion of discussion of species concepts in
many people; no one, especially not textbook evolutionary biology, as well as other new work
authors, should attempt to impose a single voice in biological anthropology, such as ethnoprima-
on the field. We have avoided, as much as we tology and studies that focus on issues surround-
could, predigested statements that students must ing the molecularization of race.
take on faith. We try to give them the informa- • Discussion of material culture in the culture
tion that they need to see where particular con- chapter and discussions of new developments in
clusions come from. In our experience, students archaeology theory and practice.
appreciate being taken seriously. • Substantial revision and updating of discussion
• Supplemental chapter materials provide flexi- of fossil record.
bility for instructors. As we considered how to • New module providing historical background to
create a new book for this course, we realized we the rise of globalization processes and neoliber-
would have to omit material that you may want alism following the end of the Cold War.
your students to know about or that might inter-
• Several new “In Their Own Words” and “Anthro-
est them. To offer you flexibility, we decided to
pology in Everyday Life” boxes.
include some of that material on the Instructor’s
CD and on the Companion Website (www.oup
.com/us/lavenda). Each entry ranges in length Chapter-by-Chapter Improvements
from one or two paragraphs to about three pages
• Chapter 1: What Is Anthropology? We have revised
and can easily be used either for lecture topics or
as handouts. For example, if you’d like to stress and extended the definition of culture to include
the different routes that led to the rise of civiliza- material culture, a topic that has become increas-
tion, you could assign the reading about the rise ingly significant in contemporary anthropology;
of civilization in Mesopotamia to supplement many examples will be found throughout the book.
the textbook’s discussion of the rise of civiliza- We explicitly introduce and briefly discuss global-
tion in the Andes. If you’re looking for more ex- ization, cyborg anthropology, and science studies,
amples to illustrate ritual and cultural patterns theoretical perspectives that are now well estab-
in the United States, you could assign the selec- lished in contemporary anthropology. We intro-
tion on children’s birthday parties in the United duce some of the remarkable recent scientific
States. The bulk of the supplemental chapter ma- advances in paleoanthropology with a brief discus-
terial on the Instructor’s CD and website is sion of the extraction of biomolecules from fossils,
linked to the cultural chapters, and many entries a topic treated in greater detail in Chapter 5.
are additional ethnographic examples. • Module 1: Anthropology, Science, and Storytelling.
This module now has an expanded discussion of
science studies, introduced in Chapter 1.
• Chapter 2: Why Is Evolution Important to Anthropolo-
What’s New gists? This chapter has been edited for clarity,
in the Third Edition? based on teaching experience with the book. The
discussion of niche construction has been
In addition to updating the text throughout, we have expanded.
made a number of key changes to this edition: • Chapter 3: What Can Evolutionary Theory Tell Us
• A new chapter on medical anthropology (Chapter about Human Variation? We have added exten-
15). This entirely new chapter is devoted to sive new material that compares the biological

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 xxiv Preface

species concept with other species concepts panded discussion of material culture through-
used by biologists who are not studying living out the chapter.
populations of organisms. The second edition • Chapter 9: Why Is Understanding Human Language
discussion of the molecularization of race has Important? Following many reviewers’ suggestions,
been expanded and updated, featuring recent material on cognitive anthropology has been
work by Ann Pollock, and Clarence Gravlee. dropped from this chapter, making it easier for in-
• Module 2: Dating Methods in Paleoanthropology and structors to focus on language when teaching this
Archaeology. We have brought discussions of AMS, chapter. Some of the material about self and sub-
thermoluminescence, and ESR up to date. jectivity formerly in this chapter has now been in-
• Chapter 4: What Can the Study of Primates Tell Us corporated into the new medical anthropology
about Human Beings? We have updated and ex- chapter. The chapter closes with new sections on
panded our discussion of primate taxonomy, in- language death and revitalization, as well as lan-
cluding new sections on strepsirrhines and New guage and truth.
World monkeys. We provide further discussion of • Chapter 10: How Do We Make Meaning? New ex-
the recovery of DNA from fossilized bones. A new tended section on listening for God among Chris-
section on ethnoprimatology has been added. All tian evangelicals, taken from the work of T. M.
headers within chapter have been transformed Luhrmann.
into questions. • Chapter 11: Why Do Anthropologists Study Economic
• Chapter 5: What Can the Fossil Record Tell Us about Relations? Updated discussion of the connection
Human Origins? The chapter has been updated to between theories of human nature and making a
take into account the most recent research and dis- living, drawn from Wilk and Cliggett.
coveries concerning the hominin fossil record. • Chapter 13: Where Do Our Relatives Come From and
Fossil nomenclature now reflects current usage. In- Why Do They Matter? Added discussion of work
creased discussion of Ar. ramidus, as well as new by Cymene Howe on female sexual practices in
thinking about australopith species, including Au. Managua, Nicaragua.
garhi and Au. sediba. Location for earliest stone • Chapter 14: What Can Anthropology Tell Us about
tools at Gona, Ethiopia. Expanded discussions of Social Inequality? Section on inequality and struc-
Dmanisi H. erectus populations, H. heidelbergensis, tural violence in Haiti moved to new chapter on
and ­Denisovans. New materials on physical ori- medical anthropology. New “In Their Own
gins of H. sapiens, including implications of Omo Words” box about gender inequality in the Cen-
Kibish discoveries. Much expanded section on an- tral African Republic from Bonnie Hewlett’s eth-
cient DNA, interbreeding of Neandertals and nography, Listen, Here Is a Story (OUP 2013). New
human beings, including a discussion of the work section on (middle-) class and gender in contem-
of Svante Pääbo and his team. porary Indonesia, based on work by Carla Jones.
• Chapter 6: How Do We Know about the Human Past? • Chapter 15: How Is Anthropology Applied in the
Most headers are now questions. New discussions Field of Medicine? This entirely new chapter is de-
of biomolecular evidence of past diets and the use voted to medical anthropology. A brief history
of LiDAR in Central American surveys, as well as of the field is followed by a series of examples of
Ian Hodder’s theoretical notion of “interpretation contemporary studies in medical anthropology.
at the trowel’s edge.” Extensive new coverage of ar- This chapter highlights the importance of struc-
chaeology and digital heritage. Update on the tural violence and illustrates how this plays out
Kennewick skeleton and the Anzik site in Mon- in cases of population displacement, women’s
tana. New “In Their Own Words” feature on rescue health, and treatment of HIV/AIDS. It also
archaeology in Europe, by Jean-Paul Demoule. touches on research in the anthropology of sci-
• Chapter 7: Why Did Humans Settle Down, Build ence, technology, and medicine relating to
Cities, and Establish States? Most headers are now global pharmaceuticals. This chapter includes a
questions. Extended “In Their Own Words” on new “In Their Own Words” box that concerns
the work of Ian Hodder’s team at Çatalhöyök. ethics in ethnographic research, with a special
• Chapter 8: Why Is the Concept of Culture Important? emphasis on medical advertising.
Discussion of socialization/enculturation has • Module 5: Background to the Global Political Econ-
been moved to this chapter, and there is an ex- omy of the Twenty-First Century. This new module

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Other documents randomly have
different content
of absolutely erroneous intelligence. Hence it was not till Marmont
was able to say, without any possible chance of error, that
Wellington was across the Agueda, and had advanced to Salamanca
at the head of at least 40,000 men, that the King and his Chief-of-
the-Staff at last recognized the true seat of danger. Long after they
had detected it, they continued (as we shall see) to receive
preposterous dispatches from Soult, still maintaining that they were
mistaken, and still discovering excuses for not obeying the
peremptory orders that they sent him.
 SECTION XXXIII: CHAPTER IV
THE SALAMANCA FORTS. TEN DAYS OF
MANŒUVRES,
JUNE 20th-30th, 1812

Wellington’s conduct on reaching Salamanca was not that which

might have been expected. When a general has, by a careful and
well-arranged concentration, collected all his own troops into one
solid mass, and then by a rapid advance has thrown himself into the
midst of the scattered cantonments of an enemy who has no
superiority to him in numbers, it is natural for him to press his
pursuit vigorously. Far the most effective way of opening the
campaign would have been to cut up the two divisions which
Marmont had just led out of Salamanca, or at least to follow them so
closely that they could be brought to action before all the outlying
divisions had come in. This would certainly have been Napoleon’s
method.
Wellington, however, wanted to fight a battle in one of his
favourite defensive positions, and he thought that he had a means
of compelling Marmont to attack him, by laying siege to the
Salamanca forts. After Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, no French
marshal would like to see a third important post captured ‘under his
nose.’ The British general judged that Marmont would fight him, in
order to save his prestige and his garrison. And since he believed
that Bonnet would not evacuate the Asturias, and that Caffarelli
would send help late, if at all, he thought that he could count upon a
superiority of numbers which rendered victory certain.
This seems to be the only rational way of explaining Wellington’s
conduct on June 17th. On arriving in front of Salamanca his army
made a majestic encircling movement, Picton’s column crossing the
Tormes by the fords of El Canto below the city, Beresford’s and
Graham’s by those of Santa Marta above it. The use of the unbroken
town-bridge was made impossible by Marmont’s forts. The heads of
the two columns met on the north side, and they then moved three
miles on, and took up a long position below the heights of San
Cristobal, which lie outside Salamanca on its northern and eastern
front. These formed the chosen defensive fighting-ground which
Wellington had already in his mind.
Only the 14th Light Dragoons and Clinton’s infantry of the 6th
Division turned into Salamanca by the Toro gate, and acted as
Wellington’s escort, while he was received by the municipality and
made his arrangements for the attack on the forts, which, though
they commanded the bridge, had no outlook on the spacious
arcaded Plaza Mayor, where the reception took place. It was a lively
scene. ‘We were received with shouts and vivas,’ writes an eye-
witness. ‘The inhabitants were out of their senses at having got rid
of the French, and nearly pulled Lord Wellington off his horse. The
ladies were the most violent, many coming up to him and embracing
him. He kept writing orders upon his sabretash, and was interrupted
three or four times by them. What with the joy of the people, and
the feeling accompanying troops about to attack a fortress, it was a
half-hour of suspense and anxiety, and a scene of such interest as I
never before witnessed[422].’
Head-quarters were established that night in the city, and
Clinton’s division invested the forts, which looked formidable enough
to require close study before they were attacked. The rest of the
army took up its bivouacs, with the cavalry out in front, and
remained practically without movement on the ground now selected,
for the next two days, till Marmont came to pay his expected visit.
The three Salamanca forts were built on high ground in the
south-west corner of the city, which overlooks the long Roman
bridge. To make them Marmont had destroyed a great part of the
old University quarter of the place, levelling the majority of the
colleges—for Salamanca, till 1808, had been a university of the
English rather than the usual continental type, and had owned a
score of such institutions. Nearly all the buildings on the slopes had
been pulled down, leaving a wide open glacis round three massive
convents, which had been transformed into places of strength. San
Vincente occupied the crest of the knoll overlooking the river, and lay
in the extreme angle of the old city wall, which enclosed it on two
sides. The smaller strongholds, San Cayetano and La Merced, were
separated from San Vincente by a narrow but steep ravine, and lay
close together on another rising-ground of about the same height.
The three formed a triangle with crossing fires, each to a large
extent commanding the ground over which the others would have to
be approached. The south and west sides of San Vincente and La
Merced overhung precipitous slopes above the river, and were
almost inaccessible. The north sides of San Cayetano and San
Vincente were the only fronts that looked promising for attack, and
in each elaborate preparations had been made in view of that fact.
Marmont had originally intended to enclose all three forts and many
buildings more—such as the Town Hospital, the convent of San
Francisco, and the colleges of Ireland and Cuenca, in an outer
enceinte, to serve as a large citadel which would contain several
thousand men and all his magazines. But money and time had
failed, and on the slopes below the forts, several convents and
colleges, half pulled to pieces, were still standing, and offered cover
for besiegers at a distance of some 250 yards from the works. The
garrison consisted of six flank-companies from the 15th, 65th, 82nd,
and 86th of the line and the 17th Léger, and of a company of
artillery, under the chef de bataillon Duchemin of the 65th. They
made up a total of 800 men, and had thirty-six guns in position, of
which, however, the greater part were only light field-pieces: two
guns (commanding the bridge) were in La Merced, four in San
Cayetano, the remaining thirty in San Vincente, the most formidable
of the three.
Wellington had come prepared to besiege ‘three fortified
convents,’ and had been sent a confused sketch of them drawn by
an amateur’s hand[423]. They turned out much stronger than he had
been led to expect, owing to the immense amount of hewn stone
from the demolished colleges and other buildings that was available
to build them up. The walls had been doubled in thickness, the
windows stopped, and scarps and counterscarps with solid masonry
had been thrown around them. The roofs of the two minor forts had
been taken off, and the upper stories casemated, by massive oak
beams with a thick coating of earth laid upon them. This surface was
so strong that guns, protected by sandbag embrasures, had been
mounted on it at some points. There was also an ample provision of
palisades, made from strong oak and chestnut beams. Altogether it
was clear that the works would require a systematic battering, and
were not mere patched-up mediaeval monasteries, as had been
expected.
It was, therefore, most vexatious to find that the very small
battering-train which Wellington had brought with him from Ciudad
Rodrigo was obviously insufficient for the task before it; there were
no more than four iron 18-pounder guns, with only 100 rounds of
shot each, at the front; though six 24-pound howitzers, from the
train that had taken Badajoz, were on their way from Elvas to join,
and were due on the 20th. It was not, however, howitzers so much
as more heavy 18-or 24-pounders that were required for battering,
and the lack of them at the moment was made all the more irksome
by the known fact that there were plenty of both sorts at Rodrigo
and Almeida, five or six marches away. The mistake was precisely
the same that was to be made again at Burgos in the autumn—
undervaluation of the means required to deal with works of third-
class importance. Whether Wellington himself or his artillery and
engineer advisers were primarily responsible is not clear[424].
The responsibility for the working out of the little siege with
inadequate means fell on Lieut.-Colonel Burgoyne, as senior
engineer (he had with him only two other officers of that corps and
nine military artificers!), and Lieut.-Colonel May, R.A., who was in
charge of the four 18-pounders. The latter borrowed three howitzers
from field-batteries to supplement his miserable means, and
afterwards two 6-pounder field-guns, which, of course, were only for
annoying the garrison, not for battering.
It looked at first as if the only practicable scheme was to build a
battery for the 18-pounders on the nearest available ground, 250
yards from San Vincente to the north, and lower down the knoll on
which that fort stood. There was good cover from ruined buildings
up to this distance from the French works. On the night of the
occupation of Salamanca 400 workmen of the 6th Division
commenced a battery on the selected spot and approaches leading
to it from the cover in the ruins. The work done was not satisfactory:
it was nearly full moon, the night was short, and the enemy (who
knew well enough where the attack must begin), kept up a lively fire
of artillery and musketry all night. Unfortunately the 6th Division
workmen had no experience of sieges—they had never used pick or
shovel before, and there were only two engineer officers and nine
artificers to instruct them. ‘Great difficulty was found in keeping the
men to work under the fire: the Portuguese in particular absolutely
went on hands and knees, dragging their baskets along the
ground[425].’ By daylight the projected line of the battery was only
knee-high, and gave no cover, so that the men had to be withdrawn
till dusk. An attempt had been made during the night to ascertain
whether it were possible to creep forward to the ditch, and lay mines
there, to blow in the counterscarp. But the party who tried to reach
the ditch were detected by the barking of a dog, who alarmed the
French out-picket, and the explorers had to retire with several men
wounded.
Seeing that the fire of the garrison was so effective, the officers
in charge of the siege asked for, and obtained from Wellington, three
hundred marksmen to keep down the tiraillade. They were taken
from the Light Brigade of the King’s German Legion, and spread
among the ruins to fire at the embrasures and loopholes of the
French. They also hoisted, with some difficulty, two field-guns on to
the first floor of the convent of San Bernardo, which lies north-west
of San Vincente, and kept up a lively discharge ‘out of the drawing-
room window, so to speak. We fired for some hours at each other,
during which time an unlucky shot went as completely through my
captain’s (Eligé’s) heart as possible. But considering how near we
were, I am much surprised that our loss was so slight—one killed
and one wounded at my own gun[426].’ But the fire of the San
Vincente artillery was by no means silenced.
On the night of June 18th-19th the working party of the 6th
Division succeeded in finishing the battery which was to breach the
main fort, and also commenced two smaller batteries, to right and
left, in places among the ruins, one by the College of Cuenca, the
other below San Bernardo[427]. On the morning of the 19th the four
18-pounders and three howitzers opened, and brought down the
upper courses of the masonry of that part of San Vincente on which
they were trained. But they could not move its lower part, or reach
the counterscarp. Wherefore two howitzers were put into the second
battery, near the College of Cuenca, which could command the
counterscarp. The play of these guns proved insufficient, however, to
shake it, and the garrison concentrated such a fire upon them,
mainly from musketry at loopholes, that twenty gunners were killed
or hurt while working the two howitzers.
Next morning Dickson’s six howitzers from Elvas came up, and
served to replace those borrowed from the field companies,
wherefore there was only an addition of three pieces net to the
battering-train. Two of the 18-pounders were moved round to the
battery (No. 2) which had been so hard hit on the preceding day:
their fire proved much more effective than that of the howitzers, and
brought down an angle of the upper wall of San Vincente and part of
its roof, which fell on and crushed many of the French.
But on the 21st it was impossible to continue the battering, for
the ignominious reason that there were hardly any more shot left to
fire. Only sixty balls remained in store for the 18-pounders, and a
little over one hundred for the howitzers[428]. The calculations of the
besiegers had been so erroneous that they had used up their stock
just as the critical moment had arrived. On the previous day
Wellington, seeing what was coming, had sent a hurried message to
Almeida for more shot and powder—but the convoy, though urged
on with all possible speed, did not arrive at Salamanca till the 26th.
Meanwhile the general engagement for which Wellington had
prepared himself seemed likely to come off. Marmont had all his
army, save Bonnet alone, collected by the 19th, at Fuente Sauco. On
the following day he came boldly forward and drove in the British
cavalry vedettes. He showed three columns moving on a parallel
front, which observers estimated at 18,000 foot and 2,000 horse—
but there were more behind, still invisible. At four in the afternoon
he was drawing so close that Wellington assumed his battle position.
Five divisions and the two independent Portuguese brigades formed
the fighting-line, from San Cristobal southward to Cabrerizos on the
bank of the Tormes: the order was (from right to left) 1st-7th-4th-
Light-3rd-Pack and Bradford. The reserve was composed of the 5th
Division, of Hulse’s brigade of the 6th (of which the remainder was
left to blockade the Salamanca forts), and of Carlos de España’s
3,000 Spaniards. Alten’s cavalry covered the British right,
Ponsonby’s[429] the left, Bock’s and Le Marchant’s heavy squadrons
were in reserve.
It looked at first as though Marmont intended to force on the
battle that Wellington desired. Moving with great order and decision,
his three columns deployed opposite the heights, and advanced to
within a very moderate distance of them—not more than 800 yards
at one point. They were extremely visible, as the whole country-side
below the British position was a fine plain covered with ripening
wheat. The only breaks in the surface were the infrequent villages—
in this part of Spain they are all large and far apart—and a few dry
watercourses, whose line could be detected winding amid the
interminable cornfields. Warning to keep off the position was given
to the French by long-range fire from several of the British batteries
on salient points of the line. The enemy replied noisily and with
many guns: Wellington’s officers judged that he was doing his best
to make his approach audible to the garrison of the besieged forts.
 At dusk the French occupied the village of Castellanos de
Morisco, in front of the right centre of the heights, and then
advanced a regiment to attack Morisco, which was absolutely at the
foot of them, and had been occupied by Wellington as an advanced
post. It was held by the 68th regiment from the 7th Division, a
battalion which had come out from England in the preceding
autumn, but had, by chance, never been engaged before. It made a
fine defence, and beat off three attacks upon the village: but after
dark Wellington called it back uphill to the line of the position,
abandoning Morisco[430]. Apparently he was glad to see the French
pressing in close, and looked for an attack upon his position next
morning. Standing on the sky-line above Castellanos at dusk, with a
map in his hand, he demonstrated to all the assembled generals
commanding divisions the exact part which they were to play, till
several French round-shot compelled him to shift his position a little
farther back[431]. The whole army slept that night in order of battle,
with strong pickets pushed down to the foot of the slopes.
There was, however, no attack at dawn. Marmont’s two rear
divisions (those of Foy and Thomières) and a brigade of dragoons
were not yet on the ground, and only got up in the course of the
afternoon: hence he was naturally unwilling to move, as he had a
certain knowledge that he was outnumbered. It would seem that
Wellington had, that morning, an opportunity of crushing his enemy,
which he must have regretted to have lost on many subsequent days
of the campaign. Marmont’s position was one of very great risk: he
had pushed in so close to the British heights, that he might have
been attacked and brought to action in half an hour, and could not
have got away without fighting. His position was visible from end to
end—it had no flank protection, and its only strong points were the
two villages of Morisco and Castellanos de Morisco on its left centre.
Behind was an undulating sea of cornfields extending to the horizon.
Wellington (after deducting the two missing brigades of the 6th
Division) could have come down in a general charge from his
heights, with 37,000 Anglo-Portuguese infantry, and 3,500 horse—
not to speak of Carlos de España’s 3,000 Spaniards. Marmont had
only five divisions of infantry (about 28,000 bayonets) on the ground
at daybreak, and less than 2,000 horse. He was in a thoroughly
dominated position, and it is hard to see what he could have done,
had Wellington strengthened his left wing with all his cavalry and
delivered a vigorous downhill assault on the unprotected French
right. The opportunity for an attack was so favourable that
Wellington’s staff discussed with curiosity the reasons that might be
preventing it, and formed varying hypotheses to account for his
holding back[432]. As a matter of fact, as his dispatch to Lord
Liverpool explains[433], the British Commander-in-Chief was still
hoping for a second Bussaco. He saw that Marmont was not going to
attack till his rear had come up, but hoped that he might do so that
afternoon or next morning, when he had all his men in hand. The
daring way in which the Marshal continued to hold on to an
untenable position, within cannon shot of his enemy’s line, seemed
to argue an ultimate intention to bring on an action.
Nor was Wellington very far out in his ideas: Marmont was in a
state of indecision. When the missing 10,000 men came up he called
a council of war—the regular resort of generals in a difficulty. We
have concerning it only the evidence of Foy, who wrote as follows in
his diary.
‘At dusk on the 21st there was a grand discussion, on the
problem as to whether we should or should not give battle to the
English. The Marshal seemed to have a desire to do so, but a feeble
and hesitating desire. Remembering Vimeiro, Corunna, and Bussaco,
I thought that it would be difficult to beat the English, our superiors
in number, on such a compact position as that which they were
occupying. I had not the first word: I allowed Maucune, Ferey[434],
and La Martinière to express their views, before I let them see what
I thought. Then Clausel having protested strongly against fighting, I
supported his opinion. Because we had left a small garrison in the
Salamanca forts, we were not bound to lose 6,000 killed and
wounded, and risk the honour of the army, in order to deliver them.
The troops were in good spirits, and that is excellent for the first
assault: but here we should have a long tough struggle: I doubted
whether we had breath enough to keep it up to the end. In short, I
saw more chances of defeat than victory. I urged that we ought to
keep close to the English, “contain” them, and wait for our
reinforcements; this could be done by manœuvring along the left
bank of the Tormes above and below Salamanca. Clausel and I set
forth this policy from every aspect. The Marshal was displeased: he
fancied that his generals were plotting to wreck his plan: he wanted
to redeem the blunder which he saw that he had made in leaving a
garrison in Salamanca: he dreads the Emperor and the public
opinion of the army. He would have liked a battle, but he had not
determination enough to persist in forcing it on[435].’
It seems, therefore, certain that Wellington nearly obtained the
defensive general action that he had desired and expected, and was
only disappointed because Marmont was talked down by his two
best divisional generals. If the Marshal had made his attack, it is
clear that his disaster would have been on a far more complete and
awful scale than the defeat which he was actually to endure on July
22. For he would have had behind him when repulsed (as he must
have been) no friendly shelter of woods and hills, such as then
saved the wrecks of his army, but a boundless rolling plain, in which
routed troops would have been at the mercy of a cavalry which
exceeded their own in the proportion of seven to five (or slightly
more).
On the morning of the 22nd, the British general, who had now
kept his army in position for thirty-six hours on end, began to guess
that he was not to be attacked. Was it worth while to advance, since
the enemy refused to do so? The conditions were by no means so
favourable as at the dawn of the 21st, when Marmont had been
short of 10,000 men. But the allied army still possessed a
perceptible superiority in numbers, a stronger cavalry, and a
dominating position, from which it would be easy to deliver a
downhill attack under cover of their artillery.
Wellington, however, made no decisive movement: he threw up
some flèches to cover the batteries in front of the 1st and 7th
Divisions, of which the latter was pushed a little nearer to the
Tormes. He brought up the six heavy howitzers which had been used
against the forts, and placed them on this same right wing of his
position. Then he commenced a partial offensive movement, which
was apparently designed to draw Marmont into a serious bickering, if
he were ready to stand. The 7th Division began to make an advance
towards Morisco: the skirmishers of the Light Brigade of the King’s
German Legion moved down, and began to press in the pickets
opposite them, their battalions supporting. Soon after the 51st and
68th, from the other brigade of the division, that of De Bernewitz,
were ordered to storm a knoll immediately above Morisco, which
formed the most advanced point of the enemy’s line. Wellington
directed Graham to support them with the whole 1st and Light
Divisions, if the enemy should bring up reinforcements and show
fight. But nothing of the kind happened: the two battalions carried
the knoll with a single vigorous rush, losing some 30 killed and
wounded[436]. But the French made no attempt to recapture it, drew
back their skirmishing line, and retired to the village, only 200 yards
behind, where they stood firm, evidently expecting a general attack.
It was not delivered: Wellington had been willing to draw Marmont
into a fight, but was not intending to order an advance of the whole
line, and to precipitate a general offensive battle.
There was no more fighting that day, and next morning the
whole French army had disappeared save some cavalry vedettes.
These being pressed in by Alten’s hussars, it was discovered that
Marmont had gone back six miles, to a line of heights behind the
village of Aldea Rubia, and was there in a defensive position, with
his left wing nearly touching the Tormes near the fords of Huerta.
Wellington made no pursuit: only his cavalry reconnoitred the new
French position. He kept his army on the San Cristobal heights, only
moving down Anson’s brigade of the 4th Division to hold Castellanos,
and Halkett’s of the 7th Division to hold Morisco. Hulse’s brigade of
the 6th Division was sent back to Salamanca, as were also Dickson’s
six howitzers, and Clinton was directed to press the siege of the forts
—notwithstanding the unhappy fact that there was scarcely any
ammunition left in the batteries.
Marmont had undoubtedly been let off easily by Wellington: yet
he hardly realized it, so filled was his mind with the idea that his
adversary would never take the offensive. His report to King Joseph
shows a sublime ignorance of his late danger. As the document has
never been published and is very short, it may be worth quoting.
‘Having concentrated the greater part of this army on the
evening of the 19th, I marched on Salamanca the same day. I seized
some outlying posts of the enemy, and my army bivouacked within
half cannon-shot of the English. Their army was very well posted,
and I did not think it right to attack yesterday (June 21) without
making a reconnaissance of it. The result of my observations has
convinced me that as long as my own numbers are not at least
equal to theirs, I must temporize, and gain time for the arrival of the
troops from the Army of the North, which General Caffarelli has
promised me. If they arrive I shall be strong enough to take an
enterprising course. Till then I shall manœuvre round Salamanca, so
as to try to get the enemy to divide his army, or to move it out of its
position, which will be to my advantage. The Salamanca forts are
making an honourable defence. Since we came up the enemy has
ceased to attack them, so that I have gained time, and can put off a
general action for some days if I think proper[437].’
Marmont’s plan for ‘manœuvring around Salamanca’ proved (as
we shall see) quite ineffective, and ended within a few days in a
definite retreat, when he found that the succours promised by
Caffarelli were not about to appear.
Meanwhile the siege of the Salamanca forts had recommenced,
on the 23rd, under the depressing conditions that the artillery had
only 60 rounds (15 apiece!) for the four heavy 18-pounders, which
were their effective weapons, and 160 for the six howitzers, which
had hitherto proved almost useless. The two light field-guns (6-
pounders) were also replaced on the first floor of San Bernardo to
shell the enemy’s loopholes—they were no good at all for battering.
This time the besiegers placed one of their heavy guns in the right
flanking battery near San Bernardo, to get an oblique enfilading fire
against the gorge of the San Cayetano fort. The new idea was to
leave San Vincente alone, as too hard a nut to crack with the small
supply of shot available, and to batter the lesser fort from flank and
rear with the few rounds remaining. The entire stock, together with
a hundred rounds of shell, was used up by the afternoon, when no
practicable breach had been made, though the palisades of San
Cayetano had been battered down, and its parapet much injured.
Nevertheless Wellington ordered an attempt to storm (or rather to
escalade) the minor fort at 10 p.m. on the same evening. It was to
be carried out by the six light companies of Bowes’s and Hulse’s
brigades of the 6th Division, a force of between 300 and 400 men.
‘The undertaking was difficult, and the men seemed to feel it,’
observes the official historian of the Peninsular sieges[438]. The major
of one of the regiments engaged remarks, ‘the result was precisely
such as most of the officers anticipated—a failure attended with
severe loss of life.’ The storming-column, starting from the ruins
near the left flanking battery, had to charge for the gorge of San
Cayetano, not only under the fire of that work, but with musketry
and artillery from San Vincente taking them in the rear. The
casualties from the first moment were very heavy—many men never
got near the objective, and only two ladders out of twenty were
planted against the fort[439]. No one tried to ascend them—the
project being obviously useless, and the stormers ran back under
cover after having lost six officers and 120 men, just a third of their
numbers[440]. Among the killed was General Bowes, commanding the
second brigade of the division, who had insisted on going forward
with his light companies—though this was evidently not brigadier’s
work. Apparently he thought that his personal influence might
enable his men to accomplish the impossible. He was hit slightly as
the column started, but bound up his wound, and went forward a
second time, only to be killed at the very foot of the ladders, just as
his men broke and retired.
 This, as all engaged in it agreed, was a very unjustifiable
enterprise; the escalade was impracticable so long as San Vincente
was intact, and able to cover the gorge of San Cayetano with an
effective fire from the rear. The siege now had a second period of
lethargy, all the shot having been used up. It was only on the
morning of the 26th, three days later, that the convoy from Almeida,
ordered up on the 20th by Wellington, arrived with 1,000 rounds
carried by mules, and enabled the battering to begin once more.
Meanwhile Marmont had been making persistent but ineffective
diversions against Wellington. The advantage of the position to
which he had withdrawn was that it commanded the great bend, or
elbow, of the Tormes, where (at the ford of Huerta) that river turns
its general course from northward to westward. Troops sent across
the river here could threaten Salamanca from the south, and, if in
sufficient strength, might force Wellington to evacuate part of the
San Cristobal position, in order to provide a containing force to
prevent them from communicating with and relieving the besieged
forts. The Marshal’s own statement of his intention[441] was that he
hoped, by manœuvring, to get Wellington either to divide his army
or to leave his strong ground, or both. He aimed, no doubt, at
obtaining the opportunity for a successful action with some isolated
part of Wellington’s force, but was still too much convinced of the
danger of fighting a general action to be ready to risk much.
Moreover he was expecting, from day to day, the 8,000 men of the
Army of the North whom Caffarelli had promised him: and it would
be reckless to give battle before they arrived—if only they were
really coming.
Wellington could see, by his own eyes no less than by the map,
for he rode along Marmont’s new front on the 23rd, that the French
position gave good possibilities for a passage of the elbow of the
Tormes at Huerta: wherefore he detached Bock’s brigade of German
Dragoons to the south of the river, with orders to watch the roads
debouching from the fords, and to act as a detaining force if any
hostile cavalry crossed them. He also threw forward Alten’s hussars
to Aldea Lengua, a village and ford half-way between Cabrerizos and
Aldea Rubia, with the object of keeping a similar close watch on any
attempt of Marmont’s to move north of the river. One brigade of the
Light Division came forward to support Alten—the other was
écheloned a little back, on hills above Aldea Lengua.
On the late evening of the 23rd Marmont sent a squadron or two
across the Huerta fords, which turned back after running into Bock’s
vedettes. This was merely an exploring party to test the practicability
of the passage; but next morning, in a heavy fog, skirmishing fire
and occasional reports of cannon told Wellington that some more
important detachment was across the Tormes, and engaged with the
Germans. The British head-quarters staff rode to the hill above Aldea
Lengua, which commands a wide view over the south bank, and,
when the morning vapours rolled up at 7 o’clock, saw Bock retiring
across the rolling plain in very good order, pressed by a heavy force
of all arms—two divisions of infantry headed by a light cavalry
brigade with a horse artillery battery, which was doing some harm to
the two dragoon regiments as they retired in alternate échelons
across the slopes.
Fortunately there was excellent defensive fighting-ground south
of the Tormes, in prolongation of the San Cristobal position north of
it. The ravine and brook[442] called the Ribera de Pelagarcia with
wooded heights above them, run in front of Santa Marta and its
ford, for some miles southward from the Tormes. There was a
similar line of high ground facing it, with the villages of Pelabravo
and Calvarisa de Ariba on its top, which the French might occupy,
but on passing down from them they would run against a formidable
position. Along these hills, indeed, Wellington’s first line of defence
was to be formed a month later, on the day of the battle of
Salamanca. On seeing Bock’s careful retreat in progress, the
Commander-in-Chief ordered Graham to cross the Tormes at Santa
Marta with the 1st and 7th Divisions, and to occupy the ground in
front of him. This was a short move, and easily accomplished while
the French detachment was pushing the German dragoons slowly
backward. The 4th and 5th Divisions moved down to the north bank
of the Tormes, ready to follow if Marmont should support his
advanced guard, by sending more men over the Huerta fords. Le
Marchant’s heavy brigade crossed the river with a horse artillery
battery, and went to reinforce Bock, whom the French could now
only push in by bringing forward infantry. Their advance continued
as far as the village of Calvarisa de Abaxo, and a little beyond, where
the whole 9,000 or 10,000 men deployed, as if intending to attack
Graham. But just as observers on the Aldea Lengua heights were
beginning to think that serious fighting was probable[443], the whole
fell back into column of march, and, retiring to Huerta covered by
their chasseurs, recrossed the river.
The state of affairs at nightfall was just what it had been at
dawn. Graham and Le Marchant went back to their old ground north
of the river, and south of it cavalry alone was left—this time Alten’s
brigade, for Bock’s had had a heavy day, and needed rest. So ended
a spectacular but almost bloodless manœuvre—the German
dragoons lost three killed and two wounded: the French light horse
probably no more.
In a dispatch written the same night Marmont frankly owns that
he was foiled by Wellington’s counter-move. This hitherto
unpublished document is worth quoting. It is addressed to General
Caffarelli, and runs as follows[444]. ‘The movement which I have
made toward Salamanca has caused the enemy to suspend his
attack on the forts of that town. [An error, as it was not the
movement but the lack of ammunition which stopped the
bombardment.] This consideration, and the way in which I found
him posted to keep me off, and not least your assurance that your
powerful reinforcements would reach me very soon, have
determined me to suspend the attack which I was about to deliver
against him. I stop here with the object of gaining time, and in the
expectation of your arrival.’ From this it is clear that if Graham had
not been found so well posted, in a position where he could readily
be reinforced from San Cristobal, Marmont would have followed up
his advanced guard with the rest of his army, and have struck at
Salamanca from the South. But finding the ground on the left bank
of the river just as unfavourable to him as that on the north, he gave
up the game and retired. He risked a serious check, for Wellington
might have ordered Graham to follow and attack the retreating
divisions, who would have had great difficulty in recrossing the
Tormes without loss, if they had been pursued and attacked while
jammed at the fords. But Wellington was still in his defensive mood,
and took no risks, contented to have foiled most effectively his
enemy’s manœuvre.
On the 25th Marmont remained stationary, waiting for further
advices from Caffarelli, which failed to come to hand. Nor did
Wellington make any move, save that of sending orders that the
siege of the forts was to be pressed as early and as vigorously as
possible. The guns were back in their batteries, waiting for the
ammunition which was yet to appear. All that could be done without
shot was to push forward a trench along the bottom of the ravine
between San Vincente and the other two forts, to cut off
communication between them. The French fired fiercely at the
workers, where they could look down into the ravine, and killed
some of them. But there was much ‘dead ground’ which could not
be reached from any point in the forts, and by dawn on the 26th the
trench was far advanced, and a picket was lodged safely in it, close
under the gorge of San Cayetano.
On the morning of the 26th the convoy of powder and shot from
Almeida reached the front, and at three in the afternoon the
besiegers recommenced their fire. This time no guns were placed in
the original battery opposite the north front of San Vincente; the
four 18-pounders all went into the right flank attack, and were
concentrated on the gorge of San Cayetano. Four of the howitzers
were placed in the left flank battery, near the College of Cuenca, and
directed to fire red-hot shot into the roof and upper story of San
Vincente. The field-guns in San Bernardo, aided by one howitzer,
took up their old work of trying to keep down the fire of the forts.
The battering in of the gorge of San Cayetano made considerable
progress, but the most effective work was that of the red-hot shot,
which before night had set the tower of San Vincente and several
points of its roof in flames. By heroic exertions the garrison
succeeded in extinguishing them, but the besiegers’ fire was kept up
all night, and from time to time new conflagrations burst out. The
governor afterwards informed the British engineers that eighteen
separate outbreaks were kept down within the twenty-four hours
before his surrender[445]. The fort was very inflammable, owing to
the immense amount of timber that had been used for casemating,
traverses, barricades, and parapets, inside its walls. Still it was
holding out at daybreak, though the garrison was nearly exhausted:
the governor signalled to Marmont that he could not resist for more
than three days—a sad over-estimate of his power, as was to be
shown in a few hours. As a subsidiary aid to the work of the guns
two mines were commenced, one from the ravine, destined to
burrow under San Cayetano, the other from the cliff by the river,
intended to reach La Merced. But neither was fated to be used,
other means sufficing.
After four hours’ pounding on the morning of the 27th, the gorge
of San Cayetano had been battered into a real and very practicable
breach, while a new fire had broken out in San Vincente, larger than
any one which had preceded it. It reached the main store of gabions
and planks within the fort, and threatened the powder magazine.
The garrison were evidently flinching from their guns, as the
counter-fire from the place, hitherto very lively, began to flag, and
the whole building was wrapped in smoke.
Thereupon Wellington ordered San Cayetano to be stormed for
the second time. The column charged with the operation crept
forward along the trench at the bottom of the ravine, fairly well
covered till it had reached the spot immediately below the gorge of
the fort. Just as the forlorn hope was about to start out of the
trench, a white flag was shown from the breach. The captain
commanding in San Cayetano asked for two hours’ truce, to enable
him to communicate with his chief in San Vincente, promising to
surrender at the end of that time. Wellington offered him five
minutes to march out, if he wished to preserve his garrison’s lives
and baggage. As the Frenchmen continued to haggle and argue, he
was told to take down his white flag, as the assault was about to be
delivered. When the stormers ran in, San Cayetano made practically
no defence, though a few shots were fired, which caused six
casualties in the assaulting column: the greater part of the garrison
threw down their muskets and made no resistance.
SALAMANCA FORTS
 At the same moment the white flag went up on San Vincente
also: here the conflagration was now burning up so fiercely that the
French had been able to spare no attention for the storming-party
that captured San Cayetano. The governor, Duchemin, asked for
three hours’ suspension of arms, and made a proposal of terms of
surrender. Wellington, here as at the smaller fort, refused to grant
time, as he thought that the fire would be subdued and the defence
prolonged, if he allowed hours to be wasted in negotiations. He sent
in the same ultimatum as at San Cayetano—five minutes for the
garrison to march out, and they should have all the ‘honours of war’
and their baggage intact. Duchemin, like his subordinate, returned a
dilatory message, but while his white flag was still flying, the 9th
Caçadores pushed up out of the ravine and entered the battery on
the east side of the work. They were not fired on, no one in San
Vincente being prepared to continue the defence, and the French
standard came down without further resistance.
Not quite 600 unwounded men of the garrison were captured.
They had lost just 200 during the siege, including 14 officers[446].
The casualties among the British were, as might have been
expected, much heavier, largely owing to the unjustifiable assault of
June 23rd. They amounted to 5 officers and 94 men killed, and 29
officers and 302 men wounded. A considerable store of clothing,
much powder, and 36 guns of all sorts were found in the three forts.
The powder was made over to Carlos de España, one of whose
officers, having moved it into the town on the 7th July, contrived to
explode many barrels, which killed several soldiers and twenty
citizens, besides wrecking some houses[447]. The three forts were
destroyed with care, when they had been stripped of all their
contents.
The fall of the Salamanca forts happened just in time to prevent
Marmont from committing himself to a serious offensive operation
for their succour. It will be remembered that, on June 24th, he had
used the plea that Caffarelli’s troops must be with him, ere many
days had passed, as a justification for not pushing on to attack the
British divisions in front of Santa Marta. And this expectation was
reasonable, in view of that general’s last dispatch from Vittoria of
June 14th[448], which spoke of his appearance with 8,000 men as
certain and imminent. On the 26th, however, the Marshal received
another letter from the Army of the North, couched in a very
different tone, which upset all his plans. Caffarelli, writing on the
20th, reported the sudden arrival on the Biscay coast of Sir Home
Popham’s fleet, whose strength he much exaggerated. In co-
operation with the English, Longa, Renovales, and Porlier had all
come down from their mountains, and Bilbao was in danger from
their unexpected and simultaneous appearance. It would probably
be necessary to march to drive off the ‘7th Army’ and the British
expedition without delay. At any rate the transference of any infantry
towards the Douro for the succour of the Army of Portugal had
become impossible for the moment. The brigade of light cavalry and
the guns might still be sent, but the infantry division had become
indispensable elsewhere. ‘I am sorry,’ ended Caffarelli, ‘but I could
not have foreseen this development, and when I spoke of marching
towards you I was far from suspecting that it could arise.’
This epistle changed the whole aspect of affairs: if the infantry
division from Vittoria had been diverted into Biscay for an indefinite
period, and if even the cavalry and guns (an insignificant force so far
as numbers went, yet useful to an army short of horse) had not
even started on June 20th, it was clear that not a single man would
be available from the North for many days. Meanwhile the governor
of the forts signalled at dawn on the 27th that seventy-two hours
was the limit of his power of resistance. Thereupon Marmont came
to the desperate resolve to attempt the relief of San Vincente with
no more than his own 40,000 men. He tells us that he intended to
move by the south side of the Tormes, crossing not at Huerta (as on
the 24th) but at Alba de Tormes, seven miles higher up, where he
had a small garrison in the old castle, which protected the bridge.
This move would have brought him precisely on to the ground where
he ultimately fought the disastrous battle of July 22nd. He would
have met Wellington with 7,000 men less than he brought to the
actual battle that was yet to come, while the Anglo-Portuguese army
was practically the same in July as it was in June[449]. The result
could not have been doubtful—and Marmont knew that he was
taking a serious risk. But he did not fathom its full danger, since he
was filled with an unjustifiable confidence in his adversary’s aversion
to battle, and thought that he might be manœuvred and bullied out
of his position, by a move against his communications[450]. He would
have found out his error in front of the Arapiles on June 29th if he
had persevered.
But he did not persevere: in the morning of June 27 the firing at
Salamanca ceased, and a few hours later it was known that the forts
had fallen. Having now no longer any reason for taking risks, the
Marshal changed his whole plan, and resolved to remove himself in
haste from Wellington’s neighbourhood, and to take up a defensive
position till he should receive reinforcements. Two courses were
open to him—the first was to retire due eastward toward Arevalo,
and put himself in communication, by Avila and Segovia, with the
Army of the Centre and Madrid. The second was to retire north-
eastward toward Valladolid, and to go behind the strong defensive
line of the Douro. Taking this line the Marshal would sacrifice his
touch with Madrid and the South, but would be certain of picking up
the reinforcement under Bonnet which he was expecting from the
Asturias, and would also be able to receive with security whatever
succour Caffarelli might send—even if it turned out to be no more
than cavalry and guns.
This alternative he chose, probably with wisdom, for in a position
on the Douro he threatened Wellington’s flank if he should advance
farther eastward, and protected the central parts of the kingdom of
Leon from being overrun by the Army of Galicia and Silveira’s
Portuguese, who would have had no containing force whatever in
front of them if he had kept south of the Douro and linked himself
with Madrid. His retreat, commenced before daybreak on the 28th,
took him behind the Guarena river that night: on the 29th he
crossed the Trabancos, and rested for a day after two forced
marches. On the 30th he passed the Zapardiel, and reached Rueda,
close to the Douro, on the following morning. From thence he wrote
to King Joseph a dispatch which explains sufficiently well all his
designs: it is all the more valuable because its details do not entirely
bear out the version of his plans which he gives in his Mémoires.
‘The Salamanca forts,’ he said, ‘having surrendered, there was no
reason for lingering on the Tormes; it was better to fall back on his
reinforcements. If he had not done so, he would have been himself
attacked, for Wellington was preparing to strike, and pursued
promptly. He had detached one division [Foy] towards Toro and the
Lower Douro to keep off Silveira, who had passed that river at
Zamora. Moreover the Galicians had blockaded Astorga, and crossed
the Orbigo. He felt that he could defend the line of the Douro with
confidence, being aided by the line of fortified posts along it—
Zamora, Toro, and Tordesillas. But to take the offensive against
Wellington he must have 1,500 more cavalry and 7,000 more
infantry than he actually had in hand—since the Anglo-Portuguese
army was nearly 50,000 strong, and included 5,000 English horse.’
This reinforcement was precisely what Caffarelli had promised, but
by the 28th not one man of the Army of the North had reached
Valladolid. ‘If the general can trump up some valid excuse for not
sending me the infantry, there is none for keeping back the cavalry—
which is useless among his mountains—or the artillery, which lies
idle at Burgos.’ Would it not be possible for the Army of the Centre
to lend the Army of Portugal Treillard’s division of dragoons from the
valley of the Tagus, since Caffarelli sent nothing? If only the
necessary reinforcements, 1,500 horse and 7,000 foot, came to
hand, the Army of Portugal could take the offensive with a certainty
of success[451]; in eight days Wellington’s designs could be foiled, and
Salamanca could be recovered. But without that succour the Marshal
must keep to the defensive behind the Douro—’I can combat the
course of events, but cannot master them[452].’
This interesting dispatch explains all that followed. Marmont was
prepared to fight whenever he could show a rough numerical
equality with Wellington’s army. He obtained it a few days later, by
the arrival of Bonnet with his 6,500 infantry, and the increase of his
cavalry by 800 or 900 sabres owing to measures hereafter to be
described. On July 15th he had got together nearly 50,000 men of
all arms, and at once took the offensive, according to the
programme which he had laid down. It is, therefore, unfair to him to
say that he declared himself unable to fight till he should have got
reinforcements either from Caffarelli or from Madrid, and then (in
despite of his declaration) attacked Wellington without having
received them. He may have been presumptuous in acting as he did,
but at least he gave his Commander-in-Chief fair notice, a fortnight
beforehand, as to his intentions. It was the misfortune of the French
that some of their dispatches miscarried, owing to the activity of the
guerrilleros, while others came to hand very late. Marmont and King
Joseph—as we shall see—were very imperfectly and intermittently
informed as to each other’s doings. But the Marshal cannot
reasonably be accused of betraying or deluding the King out of
jealousy or blind ambition. When he had collected a force very
nearly equal to Wellington’s in numbers, and far superior in national
homogeneity, he cannot be blamed over-much for attacking a foe
whose fighting spirit and initiative he much undervalued. That his
conception of Wellington’s character and capacity was hopelessly
wrong cannot be denied: the estimate was to prove his ruin. But it
had not been formed without much observation and experiment:
after what he had seen on the Caya, and at Aldea da Ponte, and
recently on the heights of San Cristobal, he thought he could take
liberties with his opponent. He was to be undeceived in a very rude
fashion before July was out.
 SECTION XXXIII: CHAPTER V
MARMONT TAKES THE OFFENSIVE. JULY 1812

On July 2nd Wellington had arrived at the end of the first stage of
his campaign. He had cleared the French out of the whole of
southern Leon as far as the Douro, had taken the Salamanca forts,
and had beaten off with ease Marmont’s attempts to meddle with
him. All this had been accomplished with the loss of less than 500
men. But the success, though marked, was not decisive, since the
enemy’s army had not been beaten in the open field, but only
manœuvred out of the considerable region that it had evacuated.
The most tangible advantage secured was that Marmont had been
cut off from Madrid and the Army of the Centre: he could now
communicate with King Joseph only by the circuitous line through
Segovia. All the guerrilleros of Castile, especially the bands of Saornil
and Principe, were thrown on the Segovia and Avila roads, where
they served Wellington excellently, for they captured most of the
dispatches which were passing between King Joseph and Marmont,
who were really out of touch with each other after the Marshal’s
retreat from the Tormes on June 27th.
But till Marmont had been beaten in action nothing was settled,
and Wellington had been disappointed of his hope that the Army of
Portugal would attack him in position, and allow him to deal with it
in the style of Bussaco. The Marshal had retired behind the Douro
with his host intact: it was certain that he would be joined there by
Bonnet’s division from the Asturias, and very possible that he might
also receive succour from the Army of the North. The junction of
Bonnet would give him a practical equality in numbers with the
British army: any considerable reinforcement from Caffarelli would
make him superior in force. And there was still a chance that other
French armies might intervene, though hitherto there were no signs
of it. For it was only during the first fortnight of the campaign that
Wellington could reckon on having to deal with his immediate
adversary alone. He was bound to have that much start, owing to
the wide dispersion of the French, and their difficulty in
communicating with each other. But as the weeks wore on, and the
enemy became more able to grasp the situation, there was a
growing possibility that outlying forces might be brought up towards
the Douro. If Marmont had only been defeated on June 21st this
would have mattered little: and Wellington must have regretted
more and more each day that he had not taken the obvious
opportunity, and attacked the Army of Portugal when it placed itself,
incomplete and in a poor position, beneath the heights of San
Cristobal.
Now, however, since Marmont had got away intact, everything
depended on the working of the various diversions which had been
prepared to distract the other French armies. One of them, Sir Home
Popham’s, had succeeded to admiration, and had so scared Caffarelli
that not a man of the Army of the North was yet in motion toward
the Douro. And this fortunate expedition was to continue effective:
for another three weeks Marmont got no succours from the army
that was supposed to constitute his supporting force by the
instructions of the Emperor and of King Joseph. But Wellington—not
having the gift of prophecy, though he could see further into the fog
of war than other men—was unable to rely with certainty on
Caffarelli’s continued abstinence from interference. As to Soult, there
were as yet no signs of any trouble from Andalusia. The Duke of
Dalmatia had somewhat reinforced D’Erlon’s corps in Estremadura,
but not to such an extent as threatened any real danger to Hill, who
reported that he could keep D’Erlon in check on the Albuera position,
and was not certain that he might not be able to attack him at
advantage—a move for which he had his chief’s permission[453]. If
only Wellington had been fortunate enough to receive some of
Soult’s letters to King Joseph, written in the second half of June, he
would have been much reassured: for the Marshal was (as we shall
see) refusing in the most insubordinate style to carry out the orders
sent him to move troops northward. Two minor pieces of intelligence
from the South were of no primary importance—though vexatious
enough—one was that Ballasteros had ventured on a battle at
Bornos on June 1, and got well beaten: but his army was not
destroyed. The second was that General Slade had suffered a
discreditable check at Maguilla on June 11th in a cavalry combat
with Lallemand’s dragoons. But neither of these events had much
influence on Soult’s general conduct at the time, as we shall show in
the proper place.
There remained one quarter from which Wellington had received
information that was somewhat disturbing. An intercepted letter
from King Joseph to D’Erlon showed that the latter had been
directed to move towards the Tagus, and that the King himself was
evidently thinking of bringing succour to Marmont, so far as his
modest means allowed[454]. But since this projected operation
seemed to depend on assistance being granted by Soult, and since it
was doubtful in the highest degree whether Soult would give it,
Wellington was not without hopes that it might come to nothing. ‘I
have requested the Empecinado,’ he writes to Lord Liverpool, ‘to
alarm the King for the safety of his situation about Madrid, and I
hope that Marshal Soult will find ample employment for his troops in
the blockade of Cadiz, the continued operations of General
Ballasteros, and those in Estremadura of Lieut.-General Hill, whose
attention I have called to the probable march of this corps of the
Army of the South through Estremadura.’ As a matter of fact Soult
prevented D’Erlon from giving any help to the King or Marmont; but
a contingency was to arise of which Wellington, on July 1st, could
have no expectation—viz. that, though refused all help from the
South, Joseph might come to the desperate but most soldier-like
determination to march with his own little army alone to the Douro,
in order to bring to bear such influence as he possessed on what
was obviously a critical moment in the war. The King and Jourdan
were the only men in Spain who showed a true appreciation of the
crisis: but they made their move too late: the fault was undoubtedly
Soult’s alone. However, on July 1st, Wellington was justified in
doubting whether any danger would arise on the side of Madrid.
Joseph could not move the Army of the Centre to the Douro, without
risking his capital and abandoning all New Castile. As late as July
11th Wellington suspected that he would not make this extreme
sacrifice, but would rather push a demonstration down the Tagus to
alarm central Portugal, a hypothesis which did not much alarm
him[455]. The King and Jourdan knew better than to make this
indecisive move, and marched where their 14,000 men might have
turned the whole course of the campaign—but marched too late.
There was still a chance that Suchet might be helping the King—
this depended entirely on an unknown factor in the game, the
diversion which Lord William Bentinck had promised to execute on
the coast of Catalonia. If it had begun to work, as it should have
done, by the second half of June, there was little chance that any
troops from the eastern side of Spain would interfere in the struggle
on the Douro. But no information of recent date was yet
forthcoming: it was not till July 14th that the vexatious news arrived
that Lord William was faltering in his purpose, and thinking of plans
for diverting his expeditionary force to Italy.
The situation, therefore, when Marmont went behind the Douro
on July 1st, had many uncertain points: there were several
dangerous possibilities, but nothing had yet happened to make
ultimate success improbable. On the whole the most disappointing
factor was the conduct of the Army of Galicia. It will be remembered
that Wellington had arranged for a double diversion on Marmont’s
flank and rear. Silveira, with the militia of the Tras-os-Montes and
D’Urban’s Portuguese cavalry brigade, was to cross the Esla and
besiege Zamora. Santocildes, with the Army of Galicia, had been
directed to attack Astorga with part of his force, but to bring the
main body forward to the Esla and overrun the plains of northern
Leon. Silveira had but a trifling force, and the task allotted to him
was small: but on July 1st he had not yet reached Zamora with his
infantry, and was only at Carvajales on the Esla[456]. On the other
hand D’Urban’s cavalry had pushed boldly forward in front of him,
had swept the whole north bank of the Douro as far as Toro, and