SR.

MGR
ENGR. AM VP
Fire Cause Report: .

Crusher Building Fire

October 9, 2024 Eugene, E. / Cañalita, Eo, Ki Sung Hyun
Labajo, J. M. Sung Im

I. Causes of Fire and Explosion:

 Initial Fire Detection:

o Location & Time of Detection:
- CHS Crusher Building September 17, 2024 at 1955H

 Method of Detection:
o The fire was first discovered by Mr. Lester Igot at 1955H, as
verified by CCTV footage. He witnessed an explosion
originating from the Crusher Building and, upon checking
outside, noticed flames. Mr. Igot promptly informed the CCR
Shift Assistant Manager, Mr. Rizalito Cobol, about the
situation.
o Heavy Equipment Operator Mr. Eddie Layasan quickly
retrieved the fire truck and proceeded to the CHS site.
Auxiliary workers and utility personnel responded swiftly to
contain the fire before the arrival of BFP units from Naga
and Minglanilla.

(Please Refer to the attached report from Mr. Lester Igot for more
details)

 Fire Spread:
o The fire explosion was initially observed at the CV-06A
discharge transfer chute on the 5th floor and the CV-04B
exit door on the 4th floor. The interconnected structure of
the Crusher Building allowed the fire to spread rapidly
through all floors, from the 1st to the 9th. The presence of
coal, a highly flammable material, significantly contributed
to the fire's intensity.
o Additionally, all doors and windows facing Cebu, Naga, and
the mountains were fully closed, which restricted ventilation
and facilitated the movement of flames and smoke. This
condition allowed the fire to engulf various areas quickly.
The high temperatures present can ignite surrounding
materials, further exacerbating the situation.
 Equipment Involved:
o Basement (Lighting fixture was short circuit)
o Damaged CV-04B Motor
o CV-06 counterweight damage door & shattered glass
window
o Damaged & detached G.I sheet walling of CHS Crusher Bldg.
o Coal Yard screen net partially burned (Coal Shed A/ Cebu
Side)

 Evaluation of Existing Fire Safety Measures:

o Inadequate Ventilation:
- The strict closing of windows and doors led to poor
airflow, resulting in the buildup of flammable gases
and heat. This environment significantly facilitated the
spread of the fire.
o Accumulation of Coal Dust:
- Excessive accumulation of coal dust created a highly
combustible atmosphere, which greatly increased the
risk of ignition and contributed to the severity of the
fire.
o Failure to Follow Safety Protocols:
- Established safety procedures were not adhered to,
particularly during hot work activities. This neglect of
protocols escalated fire risks, especially in areas
where ignition sources were present.
o Inadequate Pressure in the Suppression System:
- The firefighting supply line did not maintain sufficient
pressure to effectively reach all sprinkler systems,
with noted deficiencies particularly on the 4th floor.
This limitation hindered the fire suppression efforts
and contributed to the fire’s spread.

 Possible Ignition Source of Fire:

o Welding Works on Bucket Elevator BE-01B (prior to the fire
incident)
- The fire incident in the CHS Crusher Building is linked
to welding activities conducted on the Bucket Elevator
BE-01B casing without the use of a fire blanket.
Welding generates sparks and intense heat, posing a
significant ignition risk in environments with
flammable materials, particularly coal dust.
- The absence of a fire blanket meant that sparks could
easily ignite combustible surfaces, potentially igniting
coal dust or other flammable debris in the vicinity.
Additionally, conducting hot work without proper
precautions indicates a lapse in safety protocols, such
as failing to conduct a hazard assessment or obtain a
hot work permit. Stringent safety measures must be
 enforced during maintenance operations, especially in
high-risk environments.

o Fumes Observed During Coal Transfer from LIBOR Offsite

(Prior to the Fire Incident)
- During the coal transfer from the LIBOR offsite, visible
fumes were noted. These fumes suggest the presence
of volatile compounds or moisture in the coal, creating
conditions conducive to ignition.
- Accumulated gases during coal delivery and
subsequent reclamation could pose significant ignition
risks, especially in confined spaces. If volatile coal was
processed in the crusher without adequate ventilation,
the risk of creating an explosive atmosphere
increases, particularly when coupled with sparks
generated from the crushing process.
 o Friction in Reclaiming Line Equipment
- Friction generated by reclaiming line equipment can
lead to overheating. Components such as belts,
rollers, and bearings may experience wear and tear,
increasing the risk of ignition if not properly
maintained. Accumulated coal dust can serve as
additional fuel, transforming a minor overheating
issue into a significant fire risk.

 Material Hazard:
o Coal Dust: Fine particles generated during coal handling,
transportation and storage.
- Contribution to Fire: When suspended in the air, coal
dust can create an explosive atmosphere. Dust
accumulations on surfaces can also ignite from sparks
or heat sources

o Dust Collector BF-01 Operation:

- During a recent incident, an explosion occurred while
Dust Collector BF-01 was offline for safety reasons.
Earlier that day, welding work was conducted on
Bucket Elevator BE-01A. Had BF-01 been operational
at the time of the explosion, the situation could have
escalated significantly. This is due to the suction line
configuration, which is positioned before the discharge
line leading into the transfer chute for CV-06A. If
burning coal had been captured in this system, it
could have resulted in a much larger explosion.
 Fire Incident - September 17, 2024 at exactly 1955H

- The decision to keep BF-01 offline underscores the

critical need for strict adherence to safety protocols,
especially after activities such as welding or any hot
work that can produce sparks. This precaution likely
played a vital role in preventing further escalation of
the incident.

- Potential Consequences:
- Damage to Infrastructure: An explosion could cause
substantial structural damage to the facility, leading
to costly repairs and extended operational downtime.

- Injury and Fatalities: The human impact of an

explosion in a coal handling facility can be severe,
posing significant risks to workers, particularly those
involved in utility cleaning or conducting hourly
patrols in the CrusherBuilding.

 Maintenance Records:
o Prior to the fire incident, hot work activities were conducted
in the coal handling system without the presence of fire
blankets, representing a significant violation of safety
protocols.
o The CO2 actuator for the automatic release of Dust Collector
BF-01 was condemned by Electrical Maintenance due to
damage incurred during the fire incident on May 30, 2015,
at the CHS Crusher Building.
- Although the CO2 system for BF-01 can be manually
activated, it is challenging to determine when this
may be necessary, as fire occurrences are
unpredictable.
 - Electrical Maintenance is currently conducting a line
trace to resolve the issue with the grounded CO2
actuator for BF-01.

 External Factor:
o Weather Conditions
- Dry and Windy:
 The incident occurred during dry and windy
weather, which increased the risk of fire ignition
and allowed flames to spread more rapidly.

o Safety compliance:
- Lack of adherence to Safety Rules:
 Maintenance activities did not follow established
safety protocols, notably:
 Absence of Fire Blankets: Fire blankets
were not in place during hot work
operations, which are essential for
preventing sparks from igniting flammable
materials in the area.

II. Details of Fire Damage

Location/Equipment/
Photo
Descriptions
1. Basement (Lighting fixture
was short circuit)

2. Damaged CV-04B Motor

but already replaced
 3. CV-06 Counterweight
damaged door & shattered
glass window

4. Damaged & detached G.I

sheet walling of CHS Crusher
Bldg.

5. Coal Yard screen net

partially burned (Coal Shed A
/ Cebu Side)

III.Progress of action Taken:

 Safety Measures:

- Fire Fighting Drill Simulation: Conducted simulations

to enhance preparedness for fire incidents.
- Familiarization Training:
o Training on fire truck operation has been
completed.
o Familiarization with the CV-06 or Gallery Tripper
Deluge System has been conducted.
- Inspection Protocols:
o Provided a checklist report for cleaner
inspections to ensure thorough monitoring.
 o Increased the frequency of inspections in the
Crusher Building to proactively identify potential
hazards.
- Operational Changes:
o Implemented a prohibition on filling coal during
reclaiming operations that pose a risk of
spontaneous combustion.
o Revised procedures for reclaiming operations
during hot work activities (refer to Internal
Memo KEPCOSPC-OD-24-144).
o Updated operating procedures for the Dust
Collector System during hot work activities
(refer to Internal Memo KEPCOSPC-OD-24-144).
- Infrastructure Proposals: Proposed the installation of
platforms in previously unreachable areas of the
Crusher Building.

 Recommendation:
- Implement regular training and drills focused on fire
safety protocols, ensuring all personnel understand
and comply with established procedures.
- Establish a routine cleaning schedule to minimize coal
dust accumulation and improve overall safety.
- Conduct a comprehensive inspection of the fire
suppression system to ensure adequate pressure and
coverage throughout the facility, especially in critical
areas.
- Upgrade the Vacuum Cleaning System: It is recommended
to upgrade to a larger-capacity vacuum cleaning system to
enhance cleaning efficiency within the coal handling
system. This improvement will facilitate the more effective
removal of coal dust and debris, thereby reducing potential
hazards and minimizing operational downtime. A larger-
capacity vacuum will also allow for quicker cleaning of
expansive areas, ensuring that equipment operates
smoothly and efficiently. Furthermore, this upgrade can
contribute to improved air quality and safety in the
workplace by minimizing dust accumulation.

IV. Measures for Preventing Recurrence:

 BFP Requirements
o Please refer to the attached BFP Findings and
Recommendations on the Fire Coal Crusher Incident for
detailed requirements.
 Operational Sequence: CV-06 Belt Conveyor Followed by Magnetic
Separator
o The operational sequence has been revised from the
previous order, which had the Magnetic Separator first
followed by the belt conveyor. This change is a response
to concerns raised after the recent fire incident.
 o The primary focus of this adjustment is to mitigate the risk
of foreign materials or metal debris being conveyed to the
coal silos. Such materials can cause wear and tear on
equipment parts, potentially leading to detachment or
blockages within the transfer chute.
o In rare instances, this issue may coincide with the startup
of CV-06, creating the risk that metal debris could become
lodged in the frame of the conveyor before the magnetic
separator operates, leading to belt laceration and
significant operational problems.
o Therefore, we recommend adhering to the previous
sequence. If the new standard must be implemented, we
will exercise heightened caution and remain vigilant
during inspections of the reclaiming line equipment to
prevent unexpected issues.
 Operational Sequence: Dust Collector BF-01 Followed by CV-06
Belt Conveyor
o It is crucial for Dust Collector BF-01 to start before the CV-06
belt conveyor, but only when there are no hot work
maintenance activities occurring inside the crusher building.
This ensures that there are no risks associated with fire or
spontaneous combustion.
o The high-risk factor arises during hot work activities within the
coal crusher building or coal handling system, as these can
potentially lead to explosions. The recent fire incident
demonstrated that had Dust Collector BF-01 been the first to
start, it could have triggered a significant explosion with severe
consequences.
o The dust collector has suction lines connected to various
equipment, where even a small spark can ignite a fire. If the
dust collector were to vacuum burning materials, it could lead
to a massive fire and explosion, rapidly spreading throughout
the Coal Crusher Building, which is particularly vulnerable due
to the presence of coal.
o Therefore, it is recommended to refrain from starting the dust
collector for 24 hours following any hot work activities
conducted on the same day. This precaution is essential to
prevent potential fire incidents and mitigate risks.