The Rif War 1921–26

Morocco’s Berber Uprising

PHILIP JOWETT
ILLUSTRATED BY MARK STACEY
& MARTIN WINDROW
Elite • 257

The Rif War 1921–26

Morocco’s Berber Uprising

PHILIP JOWETT & ILLUSTRATED BY MARK STACEY

MARTIN WINDROW Series editors Martin Windrow & Nick Reynolds
CONTENTS
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 4

SPANISH FORCES, 1909–21 6

Peninsular forces n The Regulares n The Tercio

OPERATIONS, 1909–21 13
The East, 1909–12 n Forces n Operations: The Gurugu, 1909 n The river Kert, 1911–12
The West, 1911–21

ANNUAL, 1921 18
Silvestre’s advance n Collapse n The cost

AFTERMATH, 1921–24 25
Tizzi Azza and Tifarauín n Armoured units n 1923–24: Primo de Rivera’s retreat in the west
Spanish air power

ABD EL KRIM’S ZENITH, 1924–25 32

Political status n Rifian forces n Weapons

ABD EL KRIM’S GAMBLE, APRIL 1925 38

French precautions n La Coloniale and l’Armée d’Afrique n Shock attacks, April–May 1925
French air power n Central and western fronts, May–July 1925 n Eastern front, June–July 1925

ENTER PÉTAIN, JULY–AUGUST 1925 48

Reinforcement and ‘re-articulation’

COORDINATED OPERATIONS, SEPTEMBER–OCTOBER 1925 50

Planning n Kudia Tahar n The Alhucemas landings n French counter-offensive

THE FINAL OFFENSIVE, MAY 1926 56

Planning and forces n Operations n The end

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 63

INDEX64
THE RIF WAR 1921–26

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The term ‘Rif War’ is sometimes used loosely, of different periods of fighting
in northern Morocco. In this text we summarize the events of 1909–21 as
the background to a fuller account of the campaigns of 1921–26. The latter
began with Abd el Krim’s near annihilation of a Spanish army retreating
from Annual to Melilla in July and August 1921 – the greatest-ever defeat
of a white colonial army by tribal enemies – which put the Berber leader’s
uprising on the front pages of newspapers the world over.

* * *

In 1900 Spain was a backward country, governed (under

King Alfonso XIII, r. 1886–1931) by an autocratic alliance
of the land-owning nobility and the Catholic Church, which
was opposed by nascent socialist, republican and anarchist
movements. A humiliating defeat by the USA in 1898 had
cost Spain its colonies of Cuba and the Philippines. Virtually
its only remaining overseas territories were two small coastal
enclaves in northern Morocco: Ceuta, on the south coast of
the Straits of Gibraltar, and Melilla, on a promontory about
150 miles further east. (These had been held since the 17th
and 15th centuries respectively, and are held to this day by
agreement with Morocco.)
Spain had expanded these footholds in 1857–60 and
1893, but had hardly exploited either of them. However,
early in the 20th century an ‘africanista’ pressure group
identified northern Morocco, with its potentially valuable
mineral resources, as an arena for both colonial exploitation
and the redemption of military pride. At that time the almost
bankrupt government (Makhzen/ Maghzan) of the Sharifian
sultans of Morocco had only uncertain control over regional
leaders, while Madrid, Paris, Berlin and London all juggled
their diplomatic and financial dealings with the Makhzen
and regional rulers for best advantage. At the same time
as Spain’s revival of interest, Germany was also making
ambitious trade penetrations, while, from its neighbouring
colony of Algeria, France was exerting military pressure
on the ill-defined SE Moroccan border. Grudgingly, Spain
agreed to align its own and French interests by the Act of

4
 A Berber warrior shows off
his horsemanship; judging
from the fine quality of his
mount, he is a caid chieftain,
whose authority rests upon
traditional family loyalties. His
heavy, hooded chilaba robe
(Fr., djellaba), worn over a white
turban and gandoura, is typical
of highland Berbers. Apart from
such leaders, their bodyguards
and mounted couriers, virtually
all the rebels were light
infantry. There was no cavalry
tradition in the mountainous
Rif itself, although there was
among the Metalsa tribe
around and SW of the upper
Kert river, and among Arabs on
the south-eastern front such
as the Beni Bou Yahi. (Courtesy
Cody Images)

Algeciras in 1906, and in 1911 France bought off German ambitions in

Morocco by ceding West African territories to Berlin.
With the Treaty of Fes on 30 March 1912 the Sultanate finally conceded
a full French Protectorate over Morocco, and that November France and OPPOSITE
1921 studio portrait of a
Spain concluded an illogical but pragmatic agreement. Henceforth each Spanish infantry corporal of
would occupy, as ‘protecting powers’ for France’s puppet sultan, separate Regimiento de Línea No 54
zones of Morocco. The Spanish got the northern littoral, roughly 300 miles Isabel la Católica (compare with
long and of varying depth south of the Mediterranean coast. From about 65 Plate A1). He wears the M1917
chambergo sun-hat, M1914
miles where it met the Atlantic coast in the west, it averaged 50–30 miles
‘avellano’ (‘hazelnut’) khaki
deep as it meandered eastwards, finally curving up to the Mediterranean at uniform, brown leather belt
the mouth of the river Muluya/ Moulouya, the northern end of the frontier and Y-straps with brass fittings,
with Algeria. South of this interzonal border France’s commissioner resident- and strap-on rope-soled canvas
espadrilles. (‘Alpargatas’ is
general in Fes, the renowned colonial soldier Gen Hubert Lyautey, treated
the Spanish term for both
Sultan Mulay bin Yusef with ostensible respect, but was in practice the these open-top ‘slippers’ and
political and military governor of the much larger French zone stretching the laced white canvas field
down to the Sahara. shoes.) On both forearms note
Although under a single Spanish military high commissioner, the two the cabo’s three diagonal red
rank stripes, and on the collar
comandancias of Ceuta and Melilla were both administratively and physically and belt-buckle plate large
separate, their only practical link being by sea. Between them lay an extensive regimental numerals. His
uncolonized area centred on the rugged Rif (‘Edge’) mountains. This was rifle is the bolt-action 7mm
inhabited by many tribes of Berber (Imazhigen/ sing. Amazigh) highlanders, M1893 Spanish Mauser with a
five-round magazine. (Museo
who had earned over centuries a reputation for being almost ungovernable. Arqueologíco Municipal
Most Rifians were subsistence farmers living in scattered, loopholed family Cayetano de Mergelino, Yecla;
homesteads and pursuing a culture of blood feuds. Their character has been donor Amparo Muñoz Forte)

5
OPPOSITE compared to that of the equally formidable Pathans of the Indian/ Pakistani
Map 1: Northern Morocco, North-West Frontier.
c. 1909–21. (Map by John
Richardson, © Martin Windrow)
South of the mountains, the regions from west to east were the Yebala/
Djibala (a name also used collectively of the local tribes); the Gomara/
Ghomara; and the Guelaya/ Gareb. The western hinterland is partly hilly,
wooded, but fertile terrain, resembling parts of southern Europe, but the
east is more arid. The Sultanate historically (and now the new colonizers)
benefited from the fragmented nature of local resistance. The tribes were
disunited and competitive, and thus vulnerable to being (temporarily)
pacified one-by-one by alternating warfare and negotiation.
Nevertheless, pacifying northern Morocco in the early 20th century
would take Spain (briefly allied with France) 18 years of fighting notable for
its savagery (for example, both Rifians and Spanish paraded severed heads
as trophies; the Rifians killed thousands of prisoners out of hand; and the
Spanish employed poison gas against defenceless villages). Final success cost
both countries immense expenditure, and the deaths of perhaps as many as
50,000 Spanish troops and some 8,600 French.

SPANISH FORCES, 1909–21

Peninsular forces
In 1909 the conscript ‘Peninsular’ army (i.e. raised on the Spanish mainland
and islands) had 70 numbered and named regiments (sing., regimiento) of
Infanteria de Linea, each commanded by a coronel and theoretically with
about 3,000 men in a staff, band and three battalions. In practice, many
had only two and some only a single battalion (batallón, commanded by a
teniente-coronel) actually under arms, while the rest were partly embodied
reservists. Initially whole regiments were sent to Morocco at need; later
only the 1st Bns were deployed, alongside other assembled expeditionary

Ten light cavalry sergeants and

a warrant officer (subofficial,
centre rear), presumably posing
at some date before summer
1921. Seven of them wear the
fleece-trimmed, black-frogged
pelissa in varying shades of
blue (see Plate A2), and the
others the light blue M1909
tunic. All the sargentos wear
light blue barracks caps with
white top piping and a narrow
white central stripe, and display
three cavalry-silver stripes on
their forearms; the subofficial
has two vertical silver bars on
his cuffs. A later hand has inked
black crosses above eight of
their heads to mark those who
would die in action – a stark
reminder of the high casualty
rate among junior leaders.
(Courtesy of Cody Images)

6
7
1922: Spanish replacements
embarked for Morocco at the
Basque port of Pasaia, wearing
the M1914 khaki uniform with
the infantry barracks cap. This
had a dark blue top half with
red top piping, above double
red stripes on the lower half.
For artillery the band was
halved dark blue over red (see
Plate C1); engineers wore black
caps with a central red stripe;
and each cavalry branch had its
own combination.
After the heavy losses on
the retreat from Annual the
army began sending unarmed
replacements out in batches of
20–25, hoping on their arrival
to be given the rifles of men
who were being repatriated.
(Courtesy of Cody Images)

battalions. By 1914 a 4-gun Hotchkiss machine-gun company had been

added to each battalion’s four rifle companies (sing. compañía), plus two
platoons (sing. sección) of specialists. A rifle company (under a capitán) had
a warrant officer (subofficial), a corporal flag-bearer, 2 medical orderlies,
2 combat engineers (gastadores), 2 buglers and a drummer, and 3 platoons
(or 2, if company strength fell below 72 men). The platoon had a lieutenant

A series of photos of mobilized

reserves taken in Spanish ports
in 1922–24 show haphazard
mixtures of uniform items
illustrating the chaotic results
of shortages and poor logistics,
and (while probably an
extreme case) this 1924 scene
of artillerymen after their arrival
confirms this. Dark blue M1909
tunics are worn with khaki
granaderos and espadrilles. The
single forearm star (right) of an
alferez/ ensign is displayed on a
grey September 1909 ‘Russian
greatcoat’ (capote ruso) with
a blue-faced collar; this coat
was ordered replaced in 1911
with an archaic-looking blue
pattern. All wear the ‘pillbox’
barracks cap, unsuitable for
field use in Morocco due to its
lack of an eye-shading peak or
neck protection. (Fondo Car
Kutxa Fototeca; public domain)

8
(alferez or teniente), 2 sergeants, 4
corporals and officially 32 rankers,
divided into four 8-man squads
(sing. escuadra).
In 1909 there were also some
21 named (not yet numbered)
conscript light-infantry battalions
of Cazadores (‘hunters’), enjoying
a higher reputation than the Line;
6-unit Cazadores brigades were
used as spearhead formations in
Morocco until they were largely
superseded in that role by the
later-formed Regulares and Tercio
(see below). Cazadores battalions
had 6 rifle companies plus later an
MG company.
The cavalry rotated to Morocco
usually consisted of Cazadores de Caballeria (light horse), of which there The first native troops raised
were 17 regiments in 1919, plus single independent squadrons (escuadronas in Spanish Morocco from 1908
were the Policia Indigena; by
sueltos) at Melilla, Ceuta and later Larache. Each regiment had three sabre 1913 both they (foreground),
squadrons plus, by 1919, an MG squadron (later a ‘mixed’ squadron, with and the Regulares (background)
the addition of M1922 Hotchkiss light machine guns), plus depot and reserve raised from 1912, were wearing
squadrons. Squadron strength varied between 100 and 132, in four platoons the same ‘garbanzo’ (‘chickpea’)
-coloured uniforms with very
each comprising a lieutenant, a sergeant, 3 corporals, a farrier a trumpeter
loose-cut knee-length trousers
and at least 19 troopers. (see Plate B2). In this Rif War
Field and mountain artillery batteries were also rotated, often in mixed photo at least two of the
regiments. The most common of their varied equipment were 7cm and policemen are wearing knee-
high, two-buckle brown leather
7.5cm/ 75mm Krupp, Schneider and St Chamond field pieces and 65mm
gaiters as originally issued to
mountain guns. infantry Regulares.
By World War I the basic garrisons in the Moroccan Comandancias were Moroccans show a wide
as follows: range of ethnic characteristics
Ceuta (from 1913, Ceuta & Tetuán): and complexions, from pale
Berber to dark African and
Inf Bde: Line Inf Regts Nos 60 Ceuta & 69 Serrallo (each 3x bns); Cazadores anything between. (Courtesy of
Bde: (4–6x bns); 2x Regulares groups (each 2x inf bns + cav bn); Cazadores Cody Images)
de Caballeria Regt No 28 Vitoria; mixed or mountain Artillery regt;
Engineer regiment.
Larache (from 1912–13):
Marine Inf Regt (3x bns): 2x Cazadores bns; Regulares group; Caz de Cab
Regt No 29 Taxdirt; Arty regt; Eng battalion.
Melilla:
1st Inf Bde: Line Inf Regts Nos 59 Melilla & 68 Africa; 2nd Inf Bde: Line
Inf Regts Nos 42 Ceriñola & 11 San Fernando (all 3x bns); Cazadores Bde
(4–6x bns); Regulares group; Caz de Cab Regt No 14 Alcántara; Arty regt;
Eng regiment.
It is widely recognized by Spanish historians that the all-conscript
Peninsular army was badly paid and treated, poorly trained and supplied,
often incompetently led, and endemically corrupt; consequently, it was weak in
skills, logistics and morale. (A few examples from rankers’ memoirs will suffice
here. In Morocco, the misappropriation of money, supplies and equipment
was so common that even junior officers were known to sell weapons and
ammunition in local markets simply in order to buy fresh food. Many officers

9
 were routinely absent from their units, spending more time in debauchery than
on duty; and many had never even bothered to learn map-reading.)

The Regulares
The Spanish first attracted allied irregulars from tribes hostile to their current
opponents, and between 1908 and 1912 they formed a Polícia Indigena, at
first in companies (sing: mia) and then in small battalions (sing: tabor).
From 30 June 1911 the first tabor of regular native troops (Fuerzas Regulares
Indigenas) was formed by LtCol Dámaso Berenguer Fusté in Melilla, and
during 1912 a second and a third in Melilla and Ceuta. Each unit initially had a
20-strong Peninsular cadre, 300 native infantry and 127 native cavalry, in four
companies and one squadron. From January 1912 the rifle companies in a tabor

SPANISH TROOPS, 1921 Spanish-American War. In Morocco (1904–12) he rose to full

A colonel and command at Larache, and in June 1913 he was
(1) Cabo, Regimiento de Infanteria de Linea No 42 Ceriñola promoted to brigadier-general. Disputes with colleagues led
Introduced from 1917, by 1921 this chambergo sun-hat (also to his recall to Spain, as a royal ADC, in July 1915. He returned
nicknamed the ‘Americano’) was widespread throughout the to Morocco as GOC Ceuta in July 1919, becoming GOC Melilla
army in Morocco. Photos show variations in details of in February 1920.
manufacture and in the way it was worn, with brims turned up The officers’ khaki gorra de plato (‘teresiano’) service-dress
or down at front, back or side. cap was introduced for ‘undress’ duties in October 1908, and
The first khaki uniforms appeared in Morocco from 1908, by 1921 was often worn on campaign by senior officers. With
introduced by an order of May 1906, and one of June 1914 gold piping and a gold lace chinstrap, it bore a crown badge
extended the use of khaki to all branches and theatres. This (often hidden under the ‘overhang’ of the stiffened top) above,
corporal’s M1914 tunic (guerrera) has seven brass – or brown for general officers, a crossed baton-and-sword badge on the
composition – front buttons; plain shoulder straps; patch band with one to four large 4-point stars. In the cold desert
breast pockets; and a squared standing collar bearing brass night many light cavalrymen chose to wear as an overjacket
regimental numbers (we choose the ‘42’ of Ceriñola simply their M1909 sky-blue pelissa, lined with black astrakhan and
because of its strong presence at Annual). Line soldados de trimmed and frogged with black silk lace, cords and toggles.
primera were distinguished by a narrow point-upward Note the protruding ends of double gold aiguillettes worn on
chevron in branch-colour red (green for Cazadores) extending his tunic. Khaki breeches and mahogany-brown boots
from the shoulder seam to the elbow on the left sleeve only. complete the uniform. Silvestre’s left arm was affected by old
Corporals and sergeants wore, respectively, triple red and wounds. (Composite, after photos in Garcia de Gabiola, Vol 1.)
triple gold diagonal stripes on both forearms, and warrant
officers (brigadas and subofficiales) one and two vertical gold (3) Cazador, Regimiento de Cazadores de Caballeria No 14
bars on the cuff. The distinctive M1914 granadero trousers Alcántara
were fastened down the outside calf with small buttons, and This was reportedly the regiment that fought the most
incorporated ‘spats’. Later photos also show trousers effectively while covering the retreat from Annual, but,
shortened to the knee and worn with puttees or canvas according to Garcia de Gabiola, from a strength of 691 only
gaiters. On campaign, these rope-soled canvas strap-on about 67 would survive.
espadrilles were commonly worn instead of leather boots. As well as the sun-hat, this gorra de cuartel barracks cap
The brown belt equipment replaced a black set from was worn in the field by all ranks and branches – by light horse
about 1911; it supports three cartridge ‘boxes’, and the units, in sky blue. By regulation Regt No 14 rankers’ caps
frogged bayonet (either the 1892/ 93 11-in blade, or M1913 should have had a central band-stripe in white, but Bueno
17-in) for the 7mm M1893 Spanish-made bolt-action Mauser mentions variations for six units granted special distinctions;
rifle. Infantrymen wore an off-white or khaki haversack and a by comparison with its twin regiment, No 30 Calatrava, we
cloth-covered water bottle slung to the hips, and just visible is guess that Alcántara might have displayed double green
a ‘semi-flattened’ tin mug strapped in front of his brass belt bottom stripes. Shades of the M1914 khaki uniform in photos
plate. For marching order an off-white canvas knapsack with vary due to dispersed manufacture, and fading from wear and
H-straps was added, and, over all, a brown blanket in a washing. His unit’s special badge (four conjoined fleur-de-lys
‘horseshoe roll’. (After photos, & Bueno, La Infanteria de Linea.) forming a cross) is displayed as green cloth cut-outs on the
tunic collar. Black one-strap leather leggings seem to have
(2) General de Brigada Manuel Fernández Silvestre, GOC been non-regulation but quite widespread at this date. The
Melilla Command sabre, normally slung from the left of the saddle, is worn here
Born in Cuba, Silvestre graduated as a 22-year-old cavalry from the belt. This M1895 sabre, officially superseded by the
subaltern in 1893, and in 1895 was posted to Cuba in an M1907 in 1918, remained in wide use throughout the Rif War
expeditionary unit to fight insurgents. Spirited charges – as did the ‘snub-nose’ M1895 version of the German M1888
brought him renown, and multiple wounds; he was a major by cavalry carbine, although officially replaced from November
January 1898, but seems to have played no part in the 1916. (After Bueno, Los Cazadores de Caballeria, and photos.)

10
1

11
 were increased to six and the cavalry
squadrons to three. At first the officers,
sergeants and some specialist rankers
were all Spanish, but a few Moroccans
were gradually promoted to sergeant
and second lieutenant. The status of
professional soldiers was attractive to
the local warrior culture, and the recruits
offered valuable fieldcraft and local
knowledge. The Regulares soon earned a
good reputation, which in turn attracted
the more energetic and professional
minority of Spanish officers.
From 1914 four regiment-equivalent
Grupos de Regulares were organized,
each under a lieutenant-colonel, with
two (three, from April 1915) three-
company infantry tabors and a now
separate three-squadron cavalry tabor.
The magazine Grafico Mundo These were designated 1st Group of Melilla (became 1st of Tetuán in December
published portraits of many 1916), 2nd Group of Melilla, 3rd of Ceuta, and 4th of Larache (which would
casualties, including this photo
of Alferez Jaime Gil Mejuto
receive a fourth tabor in 1921, due to its large operational area). In 1919 each
of Regulares Grupo No 4 de Group received an additional all-Spanish four-gun MG company. In 1921
Larache, who was wounded each infantry tabor had three rifle companies and an MG company, and from
twice during February 1921. 1922 each cavalry tabor had three sabre squadrons and a 6-gun mixed MG/
For details of the red-crowned
LMG squadron.
cap and khaki M1920 uniform,
see commentaries to Plates B3 An infantry tabor’s Spanish cadres in the staff and the rifle companies then
and C2 respectively. Note the comprised a major commanding, 3 captains, 9 subalterns (including both
crossed-rifles-and-crescent alferez and teniente ranks), 3 warrant officers, 9 sergeants, 20 corporals, 2
collar badges of Regulares
buglers, 5 privates 1st class and 67 2nd class. The Moroccan establishment
infantry worn with the upper
crown tilted outwards. was 3 subalterns, 9 sergeants, 19 corporals, 10 buglers, 19 privates 1st class
(Courtesy of Cody Images) and 284 2nd class. The Spanish MG company had a captain, 2 subalterns,
1 warrant officer, 4 sergeants, 4 corporals, a bugler, 2 privates 1st Class and
42 2nd class, with 19 pack-mules. A Regulares infantry tabor thus officially
comprised 520 all ranks, of whom 175 were Spanish.
Finally among native units, Peninsular officers and NCOs served as
instructors in Mehalas Jalifianas – two-battalion regiments in the army of
the Moroccan Sultanate and Makhzen. In 1915 there were six infantry and
two cavalry Mehalas.

The Tercio
From 1918, the failures of the conscript army led to pressure from highly
motivated officers of the Regulares – led by LtCol José Millán Astray Terreros
– for the formation of professional, long-service European infantry units
to head up offensive operations. In September 1920 Millán Astray secured
authorization to form the first three battalions of the Tercio de Extranjeros
(‘Tercio’ in reference to the infantry regiments of Spain’s 16th/ 17th-century
supremacy). This corps was open to both Spanish and foreign volunteers –
although, unlike in France’s Légion Étrangère, the latter (mostly Portuguese
or Latin Americans) actually made up only a minority of recruits.
The Tercio (which its soldiers in fact always called ‘la Legión’) was organized
in 600-man Banderas (‘flags’, i.e. battalions). Each Bandera had an HQ company,

12
2 rifle companies (3, from October 1921), and a 6-gun MG company. The first
three battalions were established by the end of 1920 at Dar Riffien near Ceuta,
the 1st being commanded by Millán Astray’s 2ic (and the future dictator of Spain)
Maj Francisco Franco Bahamonde. Recruits were offered an enlistment bounty
and about three times the pay of conscripts; they were given serious local training,
and were inculcated with an aggressive esprit de corps (Millán Astray hailed them 1924 studio portrait of Maj José
as ‘the betrothed of death’). During November 1920 all three battalions were sent Villalba Rubio, commanding
the 2nd Bandera of the Tercio
south into the Yebala to campaign against the warlord Mulay Ahmad el Raisuli.
(contrast with Plate H1), and
evidently one of the officers
who chose to display a small
royal crown badge above the
OPERATIONS, 1909–21 rank star on his ‘isabelino’ cap.
He has the badge of ‘la Legión’
on his gold-piped shoulder
THE EAST, 1909–1912 straps; three gold-lace officers’
wound chevrons on his left
Forces sleeve; and on his forearm what
may possibly be the badge of
In June 1909 Gen José Marina’s Melilla Command comprised the reinforced the Collective Military Medal,
5,500-strong Melilla Brigade: Line Inf Regts Nos 68 Africa & 59 Melilla awarded to units. An infantry
(each 3x bns), plus a Disciplinary Bn (ex-convicts); Caz de Cab Sqn Melilla; veteran of the 1909 campaign,
2 artillery units; and an engineer company. Villalba would serve under
Col Franco in the Alhucemas
During the June–November 1909 campaign (see below), Marina would (Al Hoceima) landings of
receive reinforcements multiplying that strength by nearly ten times, as follows: September 1925. (Courtesy of
(By 31 July 1909) 3rd Mixed Bde, Barcelona: Cody Images)
Cazadores Bns Alfonso XII, Barcelona, Estella,
Reus, Alba de Tormes, Mérida
2x MG platoons; sqn, Caz de Cab Regt No 26
Treviño; 3x arty batteries.
1st Mixed Bde, Madrid:
Caz Bns Madrid, Barbastro, Figueras, Arapiles, Las
Navas, Llerena
2x MG ptns; sqn, Caz de Cab Regt No 12 Lusitania;
3x arty batteries.
2nd Mixed Bde, Campo de Gibraltar:
Caz Bns Cataluña, Tarifa, Ciudad Rodrigo, Segorbe,
Chiclana, Talavera
MG group; sqn, Caz de Cab Regt No 24 Alfonso
XIII; arty group (bn).
Total strength then c.23,000 men, and 1st & 2nd
Mixed Bdes formed Cazadores Div.
(By 12 August) 1st Reinforced Div:
1st Bde: Line Inf Regts Nos 1 Inmemorial del Rey
& 38 León (each 3x bns); arty group.
2nd Bde: Line Inf Regts Nos 6 Saboya & 50 Wad
Ras (each 3x bns); MG group.
2x sqns, Caz de Cab Regt No 27 Maria Cristina; 3x
arty batteries.
3x sqns, Regt Húsares de la Princesa.
In Spain, the call-up of reservists for Morocco caused
serious civil unrest in several cities. In Barcelona,
‘Tragic Week’ (26 July–2 August) saw bloody riots
led by Catalan ‘revolutionary councils’, at a cost of
up to 150 killed, 440 wounded and 1,700 arrested.

13
 (By 14 September) 2nd Organic Div:
1st Bde: Line Inf Regts Nos 3 Principe & 36 Burgos (each 3x bns)
2nd Bde: Line Inf Regts Nos 27 Cuenca & 53 Guipúzcoa (each 3x bns)
2–3 sqns, Caz de Cab Regt No 24 Alfonso XIII.
Total strength then c.44,000 men.
(From early October) part 3rd Organic Div:
1st Bde: Line Inf Regts Nos 42 Ceriñola & 11 San Fernando (each 3x bns),
plus Disciplinary Bn
1st Cav Bde: Regt Lanceros de la Reina, Regt Húsares de Pavía.

Operations: The Gurugu, 1909

In June 1909, warriors led by Mohammed Amezian (‘El Mizzián’) of the Beni Bu
In the heat of the day this
Ifrur tribe attacked workers building mining infrastructure in the rugged Gurugu
resting warrior has slipped
down his heavy chilaba, massif, which filled much of the promontory SW of Melilla (see Map 1). When
revealing the shorter-sleeved punitive raids on villages failed to discourage the rebels, piecemeal advances
white gandoura worn beneath into the mountains were attempted. Reconnaissance was inadequate, and in this
it; note also his simple rolled
broken terrain the rebels could easily dominate the high ground and launch costly
turban, and sandals. In the early
years of Berber resistance many ambushes. Spanish troops were trained only in European linear tactics, and most
tribesmen were armed with commanders proved incompetent in this asymmetric warfare, while the rebels
this single-shot 11mm French manoeuvred across country with ease. Early Spanish operations achieved only
M1874 Gras rifle, among other the establishment of vulnerable outposts; meanwhile the opposition increased
obsolescent French, Belgian,
Spanish and British types. Of
and spread, as tribes encouraged by local successes coordinated their efforts.
simple, sturdy construction, Although the Spanish achieved some successes their casualties were often in the
and accurate at any realistic hundreds, leading to the successive shipping-in of major Spanish reinforcements
battle range, this antique was (see above). The highly unpopular mobilization of unprepared reservists finally
still being used by Greece in
1941, and was even seen in
brought down the Madrid government on 21 October.
the Yemen in the early 2000s. Consequently, the greatly reinforced Gen Marina did not launch his final
(Courtesy of Cody Images) converging offensive until 26–27 November, with 17,800 men from the
Cazadores Div, the 1st, 2nd & 3rd Divs and the
Melilla Brigade. The campaign officially ended
with the submission of about 5,000 warriors from
seven main tribes (though not El Mizzián himself).
Total Spanish casualties for the campaign were
reported as 7,424: of these, 259 were killed in
action, 1,523 wounded, 200 died of disease, and
5,142 sick survived.

The river Kert, 1911–12

The practical front line was now the river Kert
SW of the Melilla promontory, where Gen José
García Aldave commanded. By October 1911 he
had about 41,500 troops, in a Melilla Div and
a division-equivalent of Expeditionary Forces.
These totalled some 30 battalions of infantry,
about 800 Native Police and Regulares, 4 MG
groups, 10 squadrons and 17 batteries.
Initially concentrating on the as-yet undelineated
interzonal frontier with the French, García Aldave
soon faced raiding from across the Kert by strong
war-parties from the central Rif stirred up by El
Mizzián. See-saw fighting continued on both banks
between May and October, and in November the

14
 Spanish stretcher-bearers
on campaign in the Melilla
Comandancia in 1909; note the
characteristic ‘semi-flattened’
tin mug strapped over the
central soldier’s belt buckle.
This stiff black ‘ros’ shako,
with a white or light khaki cover
and sun-flap (see right), was
worn in Morocco from about
1909 until 1914. It was then
replaced with both the British
M1898 Wolesley sun-helmet
with a khaki cover, and the
French M1886 equivalent (both
called a ‘salacot tropical’ in
Spanish). Khaki uniforms were
ordered for use in Morocco
in May 1906 and introduced
from 1908, initially being worn
alongside this previous white-
and-blue ticking ‘rayadillo’.
Compliance with all such orders
took time, despite the priority
given to equipping the troops
in Morocco. (ullstein-bild via
Getty Images)

Spanish built a defensive line of posts along the middle Kert. After abortive truce
talks, in late December El Mizzián led large mixed tribal forces across the Kert
on a wide front, penetrating the east bank deeply with dispersed groups which
proved hard to locate, and even harder to fix.
García Aldave reorganized his reinforced forces into an Organic Div and
a Provisional Div of Line troops, and a Reserve of Cazadores and Regulares.
El Mizzián continued to outmanoeuvre the Spanish until 15 May 1912,
when some 14,250 troops in six converging columns pinned his force down
at Ulad Gannen, where he was killed in battle. The tribes began to disperse
during the summer, and – at the cost of some 500 Spanish dead and 1,900
other casualties – the Kert frontier would then remain quiet for some years.

THE WEST, 1911–1921

In the larger territory south of Ceuta and into the Yebala, the strongest
warlord was Mulay Ahmad el Raisuli (spellings differ). The forename Mulay/
Moulay identifies Sharifian families claiming descent from the Prophet’s line,
and in 1908 the sultan’s government had been obliged to recognize Raisuli
as the regional governor (pasha) of the Yebala. This brave, ruthless robber-
baron was also a master of manipulative diplomacy. Over some 15 years
he exploited his status to play the Sultanate and the Spanish off against
one another, alternately encouraging rebellion and pretending loyalty to the
Makhzen. Given these political complications, Spanish operations on the
Ceuta, Tetuán and Larache fronts would be intermittent and complex.
From March 1911 the GOC Ceuta, Gen Felipe Alfau, began a diplomatically
agreed penetration southwards towards Tetuán. That June, marines landed at

15
 Larache on the Atlantic coast and marched inland along the Lucus/ Loukos
river to occupy Alcazarquivir. From there, Col Manuel Fernándes Silvestre’s
force moved east and north in August to secure communications with Ceuta.
In February 1913 Gen Alfau’s troops occupied Tetuán (which would become
the regional capital) without a fight, and in June–August Silvestre’s reinforced
command fought around Larache, Alcazarquivir, and also further north behind
the Atlantic coast. There were now some 22,000 Spanish troops around Ceuta
and Tetuán, while the now-Gen Silvestre had another 14,000-odd, holding
territory west of a line very roughly from Tangier down to Alcazarquivir.
In August 1913 command at Ceuta passed to Gen Marina, who mounted
punitive columns but remained essentially on the defensive.

POLICIA INDIGENA & REGULARES, 1921–25 infantry badge (a brass crown, above a silver crescent set on
B brass crossed rifles) was worn on the collar, and NCOs’ stripes
(See errata, imprint page) followed Spanish practice. Initially all Regulares had knee-high
brown leather leggings and ankle boots, but, except for formal
(1) Ascari, Policia Indigena; Tifaraouín, August 1923 occasions, infantrymen soon adopted puttees and alpargatas
On his red chéchia cap this native policeman displays a blue shoes. Here, the standard belt with three ‘box’ pouches has an
tassel, and silver badges of a 5-point star over a crescent. The attached bandolier of clip pouches; how the belt pouches
uniform beneath his chilaba robe is that also worn by the were attached to hang below the sash is puzzling, but Bueno
Regulares (see B2), of a warm sand-khaki shade called illustrates this arrangement more than once. In place of both
garbanzo (‘chickpea’), worn with the popular rope-soled white greatcoat and blanket, Regulares carried a chilaba in a
canvas alpargatos shoes. The chilaba of highland tribesmen ‘horseshoe roll’. Its colour was often dark brown or blue, and
was heavily woven from wool sometimes mixed with goathair, those of rankers seldom displayed decoration. Some men
of voluminous cut and with a large hood. This blue example seem to have had the same haversacks and water bottles as
with minimal paler blue trimming has been illustrated for Peninsular infantry, but others local satchels and water-skins.
Native Police. Among native troops, the combination of a (Composite, after Bueno, Los Regulares, and photos.)
waist belt with ‘box’ pouches and a bandolier of smaller clip
pouches appeared in about 1912, and was common after (3) Spanish Capitán, II/ Grupo de Regulares No 2 de
1918. The exact types and arrangement of pouches varied; Melilla; Tetuán front, September 1925
sometimes five clip pouches also replaced those on the belt. Officers of Regulares wore uniforms of the same colour as their
A plain example of a general-purpose skala satchel is slung to men, tailored according to Army regulations – so, from 1920/22,
his hip. His weapons are a family heirloom koummya jambiya cut in British style (see Plate C2). Their field headgear was usually
dagger, and a Spanish M1893 rifle; unlike the British pre-1914, the chéchia, sometimes the chambergo. On campaign some also
the Spanish did not limit native troops to obsolescent firearms. favoured chilaba robes, typically displaying the grupo colour as
edging braid and a galleta left chest-tab bearing their rank stars.
(2) Soldado, Grupo de Regulares No 3 de Ceuta; Bueno remarks particularly on this captain’s non-
Melilla, autumn 1921 regulation campaign use of the peaked cap, given a rakish
The chéchia’s black tassel and the coloured faja sash show that look by the removal of its internal stiffener. For officers of
this soldado moro is about to take part in some mundane daily Regulares it had a scarlet crown with gold piping at the crown
ceremony, such as mounting guard. For his study in 1989, José seam, down all four sides, and around the top edge of the
Maria Bueno was unable to locate the dress regulations for garbanzo-coloured band. An order of June 1920 specified a
native troops issued in April 1914, so his research relied largely leather chinstrap, but many officers chose to keep bullion lace.
on photos and memoirs. Alternative headgear was the taller, Gilt badges showed the crown above crossed rifles with a
stiffer tarbouche. The infantry only wore a rexa turban in large superimposed silver crescent (for the cavalry tabors, all
combination with the cap for some ceremonial honour- in silver, with crossed lances). The pale khaki shirt of June 1920
guards, but it was often worn in the cavalry tabors. The regulations lacked shoulder straps and pockets, but bears
coloured waist sash was not worn in combat. From 1914 its here a left-breast galleta in Grupo No 2’s red, with the three
colour identified the grupo: according to Bueno, No 1 de 6-point gold stars of captain’s rank. The garbanzo-coloured
Tetuán = royal blue; No 2 de Mellila = bright red; No 3 de Ceuta breeches are worn with leather leggings and ankle boots.
= green; No 4 de Larache = dark blue, and No 5 de Alhucemas Field equipment typically included a 9mm semi-automatic
= burgundy-red (later, green). Here we choose the green of pistol (Astra 400, or Campo Giro M1912 or M1913), binoculars,
Grupo No 3, which was the first to rush units to Melilla after a mapcase, and a sturdy metal-shod walking stick.
Annual. He still wears the 1914-pattern tunic, without pockets Bueno apparently bases this figure on a photo of Capt
and with a fly front. Miguel Rodrigo Ramirez, who distinguished himself while
The tunic and baggy knee-length trousers were made in leading 3rd Co, II Tabor of Grupo No 2 in LtCol Balmes’s
this garbanzo shade. Pockets and visible front buttons (as successful relief of Kudia Tahar on 11–12 September 1925.
already worn by Peninsular NCOs), and even some turn-down (After Bueno, Los Regulares; Garcia de Gabiola, The Rif War Vol
collars, would start to appear in 1922–23. The Regulares 2; & Muñoz Bolaños in Desperta Ferro Contemporánea No 10.)

16
 1

3
2

17
A staged photo of Spanish
infantry ‘attacking’ near
Melilla, c. 1909; the contrast in
shade between shako-covers
and uniforms suggests that
the latter are still made of
‘rayadillo’. Close-order linear
formations proved costly
when unprepared Peninsular
troops were deployed against
guerrillas in broken terrain.
(ullstein-bild via Getty Images)

During World War I (in which Spain remained neutral) the Spanish sought
to reduce unrest over mobilizations by increasing their formation of Regulares,
Native Police and Makhzen units. From September 1915 Madrid ordered Gen
Marina’s successor, Gen Gómez Jordana, to subsidize Raisuli, who then focused
on intertribal fighting in the region between Tetuán and the holy southern city
Probably in spring 1921 in the
Yebala region, a legionary of of Xauen/ Chefchaouen. At first coordinating his operations with a Spanish
the Tercio helps a wounded offensive, in 1917–18 he roused rebel bands further north to harass the Ceuta-
NCO to the rear. Both wear the Tetuán route. Raisuli was now juggling simultaneous dealings with the Sultanate,
‘isabelino’ cap with red piping Spain, France and Germany, and double-crossing them all. Although Gen Larrea’s
and tassel. Note the contrast
between the private’s new
Ceuta-Tetuán Comandancia had about 32,000 Spanish and 8,000 Moroccan
greenish-khaki uniform and troops by 1918, the road and new railway between those cities were often cut,
the paler shade of that worn and venturesome units – even in battalion strength – often ran into trouble.
by the sargento, of which the Following the 1918 Armistice in Europe the Spanish high commissioner,
tunic seems to be a faded
M1914 modified with a turn-
Gen Dámaso Berenguer, determined to pacify the Yebala once and for all, and
down collar. (Courtesy of began by stripping Raisuli of his Makhzen governorship and declaring him
Cody Images) outlaw. In October 1920 Gen Larrea launched a major operation southwards
and occupied Xauen (where Spanish troops
earned a reputation for cruel indiscipline), thus
cutting off Raisuli’s base at Tazarut/ Tazrut in
the Beni Aros hills from the Gomara country
to the south-east. Final converging attacks on
Tazarut from 25 June 1921 were spearheaded by
Nos 1, 3 & 4 Grupos of Regulares. On 22 July
they were within sight of their objective when
shocking news from Melilla halted the operation.

ANNUAL, 1921
Silvestre’s advance
From mid-1919 the Melilla Comandancia, with
some 26,000 Spanish and 5,100 Moroccan
troops, had been gradually extending outposts
SW up the Kert river. The following year
command passed to Gen Manuel Fernándes
Silvestre; this headstrong cavalryman was a
royal favourite, prone to insubordination,
who epitomized a military culture that valued
‘boldness’ over detailed planning and logistics.
In May 1920 Silvestre ignored experienced

18
local advice, and thrust aggressively westwards
with a majority of his command. He aimed to
divide tribes to the north from those to the south,
and his objective for 1921 was Alhucemas (Al
Hoceima) Bay in the central Rif. As Silvestre’s
columns advanced some clans changed sides,
some were forced into resentful submission,
while others withdrew to seek allies further west.
The most important of the latter were the Beni
Urriaguel/ Ait Waryaghar tribe. Some 40,000
strong in nine clans, they inhabited the central
Rif west of the Nekor river, around Alhucemas
Bay and up the Rhis river to the Djebel Hammam
and Targuist.
Since spring 1919, two sons of a renowned
Beni Urriaguel leader – Mohammed bin Abd
el Krim el Khattabi, a respected Islamic judge
of stern orthodoxy, then about 40 years old;
and his younger brother M’hamed – had
been gathering followers in the hills. Both
were educated and relatively worldly men:
Mohammed had worked for the Spanish
as a functionary and journalist in Melilla,
while M’hamed had trained as an engineer in
Madrid. The elder brother (hereafter simply
called Abd el Krim) was a charismatic political visionary, who preached The Abd el Krim el Khattabi
not just resistance to the Spanish but the creation of a unified Rifian state brothers (the younger,
M’hamed, left, and Mohamed
independent of the Sultanate. He gathered followers by the traditional centre), photographed with
mixture of religious inspiration, the promise of victories and loot, and members of their entourage
simple coercion. By summer 1921 he had attracted between 3,000 and after their eventual surrender
6,000 tribesmen, mainly (clockwise from the Oued Rhis) of the Beni in May 1926. While Mohammed
was the charismatic political
Urriaguel, Temsaman, Ait (or Beni) Tuzin, Metalsa, Gzinnaya, Beni
visionary who created the
Ammart/ Ait Ammarth, and Bocoya/ Ibuqquyen. rebel alliance, his younger
By June 1921, Silvestre’s discontinuous advanced line ran roughly south brother was the abler military
from Sidi Driss on the coast, via Annual and Midar, down to Zoco el Telata/ leader; he was the organizer
of the Rifian ‘regulars’, and
Souk el Tleta on the upper Kert (see Map 2, page 37). His strength in the
often commanded in the field,
forward zone has been calculated as just over 20,000, of whom up to 5,000 particularly on the western
were Moroccans. The historian Javier Garcia de Gabiola gives the following front. All photos of the brothers
approximate strengths and units then in the main camps and detachments show them in modest clothing,
(though some had moved by mid-July): without any visible trappings of
their power and wealth.
Annual (c.5,100 men): Gen Silvestre’s HQ; Line Inf Regts Nos 11 San Note (right) the caid wearing
Fernando (5 inf cos + 2 MG cos), 42 Ceriñola (3 bn HQs, 7 inf cos + MG a large white tagelmust head-
co) & 68 Africa (4 inf cos); Regulares Grupo No 2 de Melilla (3 bns + 3 cloth over his hooded white
sqns); 3 arty batteries. Detached to Cheif, c.22 miles to SE (c.950 men): Line djubba, under a chilaba striped
in at least three colours.
Inf Regt No 59 Melilla (Bn HQ, 4 inf cos + MG company). Detached to Ben (ullstein-bild via Getty Images)
Tieb gorge, c.6 miles to NE (c.700 men): 3 inf cos, 1 cav squadron.
Dar el Qebdani, rear depot c.12 miles to E (c.1,200 men): Line Inf Regt No
59 Melilla (2 bn HQs, 5 inf cos + MG company).
Dar Drius (c.1,350 men): Line Inf Regts Nos 58 Alcántara (regt HQ + bn)
& 11 San Fernando (2 cos); Caz de Cab Regt No 14 Alcántara (4 sabre sqns
+ MG squadron).
Zoco el Telata (c.850 men): Line Inf Regt No 58 Africa (4 inf cos + MG company).

19
An officers’ group convened However, roughly the same number of troops (c.10,000) were also
by Gen Silvestre (centre, in dispersed in about 38 outposts and some 50 tiny ‘blocaos’. These platoon
‘teresiano’ cap and rough-pile
woollen coat – contrast with
or even squad ‘blockhouses’ were rudimentary cabins of timber, sandbags
Plate A2) shows the freedom and corrugated iron with a few strings of barbed wire, in which handfuls
in clothing enjoyed by Spanish of neglected soldiers suffered from wretched conditions. Their dispersal
officers in the field, particularly achieved no useful purpose, while denying Silvestre any concentrated
in cold weather. The partly seen
operational reserve. Moreover, from main camps down to blockhouses,
man in the left foreground
has a leather coat; standing many positions were badly sited for defensibility and (crucially) water access.
beyond, an officer of native On his side, Abd el Krim then had perhaps 3,000 battle-ready warriors,
troops with a red tarbouche of whom only a minority had modern rifles. However, their innate culture
wears a pale civilian trench
made them expert guerrilla fighters; they were stealthy and highly mobile
coat; right of him, note the
non-regulation beret and dark across country, alert to any opportunity to cut Spanish communications,
(civilian?) jacket; and the man and never tried to hold any captured objective for longer than was needed
in the right foreground has a to loot it. In the face of stronger enemies they fell back behind leapfrogging
civilian trilby hat, worn with a rearguards, only to concentrate again elsewhere: ‘tough, valiant and
woollen cardigan. (Courtesy of
Cody Images)
resourceful, [they could] march up to 30 miles a day across difficult terrain’.

Collapse
On 1 June the Native Police providing most of a 250-strong post garrison
at Abarrán SW of Sidi Driss mutinied in alliance with Temsaman rebels; few
of the Spanish escaped, leaving behind four Krupp guns and 200 rifles. The
next day Sidi Driss itself suffered 100 casualties while holding off an attack,
despite having naval gunfire support.

20
 By 15 July at least 1,500 Rifians were approaching Annual, from where A 1921 postcard, showing
Silvestre then planted some 250 men of Line Inf Regt No 11 and a battery Spanish troops guarding
the southbound motor road
at Igueriben, about three miles south-west. On 17 July a relief column between Nador and Tauima.
to Igueriben was almost wiped out; others in successively increasing The fall of Nador on 3 August
strength all failed, and on 21 July only 25 survivors from the outpost condemned troops holding
reached Annual. That camp was itself poorly sited, being overlooked, out further south – notably
those at Zelouan airfield, and
and with ‘dead ground’ masking some approaches close to the wire; the
the refugees at Monte Arruit
garrison was numerous, but reportedly had only enough ammunition for – to surrender, followed by
40 rounds per man. massacre. (Culture Club via
Silvestre’s previous overconfidence had utterly collapsed, and his orders Getty Images)
on 22 July were contradictory. At first he told unit commanders to prepare
for a costly retreat via Ben Tieb, but later he countermanded this, ordering
them to stand fast. A false report that the Rifians were advancing on
Annual in overwhelming strength
then caused panic; the chain of
command dissolved, and the
beginning of a disorderly retreat
via Ben Tieb soon became a rout. Berber warriors sorting through
captured Spanish rifles. Sources
In this chaos, many irregulars,
naturally differ over the exact
Native Police and some Regulares numbers of various weapons
changed sides, firing on the lost by the Spanish after
Spanish. Staff officers were among Annual, but there were enough
to equip some 20,000 rebels
those killed, and Gen Silvestre
with the same firearms as the
may have shot himself. Spanish army they faced, with
Units retreating under fire plentiful ammunition (note
broke up into separated parties, crates in background).
without flank or rear guards. Those Reportedly, Spanish troops
who surrendered at once and
who survived the last purposeful handed over their rifles were
actions at Ben Tieb gorge (notably, more likely to be killed out of
by Cavalry Cazadores Regt No hand than the survivors of post
14 Alcántara, and some Melilla garrisons who had fought to
the last cartridge, who might
Regulares) simply fled, often occasionally be spared in
discarding equipment. Meanwhile, appreciation of their courage.
although Abd el Krim had initially (Courtesy of Cody Images)

21
 faced odds of at least 3 to 1 against, increasing numbers of tribesmen now
joined the hunt from all sides, blocking the routes of retreat. Outpost garrisons
either joined the flight (some actually handing over their weapons in the vain
hope of buying safe passage out) or were wiped out, and over the following
days Silvestre’s entire command fled towards Melilla piecemeal.
On 23 July his 2ic, Gen Felipe Navarro, fell back from Dar Drius towards
Monte Arruit (about 20 straight-line miles to his east) with some 2,500
troops, but these were reduced to about 900 during their slow retreat. On the
23rd/24th the high commissioner, Gen Berenguer, arrived in Melilla almost
alone, to find only about 1,800 mostly service troops, and magazines emptied
by sales on the black market. However, on the 24th the arrival from Ceuta
of Gen José Sanjurjo with a battalion of Line Inf Regt No 71 and the 1st
and 2nd Banderas of the Tercio began to calm the civilians’ panic, and these
were soon followed by two tabors of Regulares from Ceuta’s Grupo No 3.
On the 29th, under fire, Navarro finally reached Monte Arruit, where he
tried to hold out under appalling conditions with about 3,000 accumulated
fugitives. Meanwhile, local tribes from the Gurugu and the surrounding
plains had joined the rising, and were threatening Melilla itself. Navarro

SPANISH TROOPS, 1923–24 – their 6-point stars above it. (After Bueno, Los Cazadores de
C Caballeria.)
(1) Artillero, 4a Regimiento Ligero de Artilleria, 1923
This gunner’s branch-of-service is identified by the halved dark (3) Cabo, Tercio de Extranjeros, 1924
blue-over-red barracks cap, and the flaming shell badges on his While this legionario wears the Tercio’s common summer
tunic collar and belt plate. For night sentry duty he carries a shirtsleeve order, its uniform differed from the Line’s in several
Spanish Mauser 7mm M1916 ‘short rifle’, and for this static task details (see also Plate H1). The four-pocket tunic in a greenish
he wears only one belt pouch and the bayonet. Reflecting khaki shade had a turn-down collar, worn by all ranks with that
inefficient Spanish logistics, the artilleryman has acquired a of the Tercio’s pale green shirt open and folded down outside it.
chilaba for lack of a practical greatcoat. In August 1921 troops The shoulder straps bore the corps’ badge in brass – a crossed
in Africa were ordered issued a long khaki hooded cloak with a arquebus and crossbow set against a vertical halberd. This NCO
deep separate collar (capote-manta), but this was little seen – displays a khaki breast-patch with three red bars representing
apart from private purchases by officers – before the order was the corporal’s tunic forearm stripes. On his left sleeve is one of
repeated in July 1926. the Spanish Army’s red wound chevrons, awarded for each
separate wound. On the right of his chambergo a vertical 3-bar
(2) Teniente, Regimiento de Cazadores de Caballeria patch pointed at the top indicates his rank, and he has pinned
No 22 Victoria Eugenia; Xaouen, 1924 the Tercio’s badge to the front. Frequently seen alongside or
An order of 19 April 1920 specified all-year-round khaki replacing the chambergo in group photos was the Tercio’s then-
uniforms, and introduced extensive changes to officers’ unique ‘isabelino’ field cap (see Plate H1). For rankers this had
regulations, but the latter were countermanded on 18 June. red piping along the top edge of the flap and the top ‘ridge’
However, officers who had ordered new uniforms in the terminating in a red frontal tassel; the same NCOs’ rank patches
interim were permitted to wear them, and an order of 12 were worn on the right of the flap.
June 1922 confirmed this as service dress. The ‘British-style’ Another unique feature was the Tercio’s Mills webbing
open-collar, 4-pocket tunic with four brown leather front equipment, purchased from the British in Gibraltar. Although
buttons is worn with a pale khaki shirt; light brown necktie Britain had huge surplus stocks of its World War I Pattern 1908
(often knitted), and gold tiepin beneath the knot; all-khaki set, this does not seem to be shown in Spanish photos. Records
breeches (including the crotch reinforcement), and riding are incomplete as to which set (or sets) the Tercio received, but
boots. A brown ‘Sam Browne’ belt supported a personal photos from 1921 onwards clearly show these ‘reducing width’
choice of revolver or semi-automatic pistol, holstered on the shoulder braces; cartridge carriers with one pouch above three
right. The cap badges were the crown above a branch-of- on each side; and the 1919-patent belt buckle used by the
service badge on the band (for cavalry, all silver, with crossed British up to and including their 1958 set. These details are all
lances), and unit numbers were worn above a smaller version compatible with both a ‘Canadian 1919’ set, and one which was
on the upper collar. However, the six light-horse regiments later designated as the ‘RAF 1925’ pattern. Photos show
granted special distinctions displayed instead their own cartridge pouches with both 1908 snap-fastened flaps and the
badges on the cap band and collar; that of Regt No 22 1914 Mk II with an upwards strap. British water bottles were
incorporated Queen Victoria Eugenia’s Battenberg family also supplied, and ‘small packs’ to be worn on the back. By the
arms. Field officers – comandante to coronel – wore their Alhucemas landings in 1925 the first Spanish leather copies of
8-point stars on the cuff, and subalterns – alferez to capitán the webbing set were coming into use.

22
1
2

23
 was soon cut off and surrounded by up to
5,000 mixed tribesmen. He was eventually
persuaded to surrender on 9 August by a
promise that prisoners would be spared;
he and his officers were, but at least 2,600
prisoners were butchered on the spot. Life
or death were decided by individual rebel
leaders: when Nador fell on 3 August its
small garrison was spared, but some 500
men at Zeluan airfield were not. In all, of
roughly 570 prisoners taken from the field
alive, 326 would survive to be ransomed in
January 1923.

The cost
This disaster reduced the Melilla
Comandancia to its 1908 size, and cost
Spain at least 8,000 soldiers killed among
some 13,000 total casualties. The tribes
had taken a vast amount of military loot:
at least 20,000 Mauser rifles, perhaps up
to 400 machine guns, great quantities of
ammunition, and up to 130 artillery pieces
(three of which they immediately used to
shell Melilla, manned by coerced prisoners).
Regulares cavalry standard- In Madrid, the Spanish government fell on 3 August. Abd el Krim’s name
bearer of the bodyguard of the soon went around the world; on 17 August his portrait occupied the front
Spanish high commissioner,
Gen Dámaso Berenguer, after
cover of TIME magazine in the USA, and in September he proclaimed a
the recapture of Nador on Rifian state.
13 August 1921. Berenguer Melilla Command, briefly under Gen Cavalcanti, was reinforced up to
was one of those who reacted some 47,000 men by early September, but, lacking necessary equipment,
to the massacres, and what he
most of this disorganized crowd were green Peninsular reservists quite
regarded as Rifian treachery,
by advocating the use of unready for battle. The hard-fought recapture of the Gurugu and the rest of
poison gas; this began the the promontory during September–November was achieved by only about
following autumn. (Courtesy of half that number, of whom the infantry comprised:
Cody Images)

Spanish prisoners in Rifian

hands moving a captured
artillery piece. As many as 80
of the 130-odd guns lost after
Annual remained serviceable.
One source lists 70mm
Schneiders (x19); 75mm St
Chamonds (x19), Schneiders
(x4), and 7.5cm Krupps (x4);
8cm Krupps (x20); and 9cm
Krupps (x14). Spanish prisoners
were coerced into teaching
their captors how to serve the
guns, alongside deserters from
the Sultanate’s notoriously
badly paid army, and later
foreign mercenaries. (ullstein-
bild via Getty Images)

24
Tercio: 1st, 2nd & 4th Banderas; Regulares: 2–3
tabors of Ceuta’s Grupo No 31
Line Inf Regts: reconstituted Nos 68 Africa & 59
Melilla (each 3x bns). Either 1 or 3 bns each from:
Nos 11 Borbón, 36 Burgos, 15 Extramadura, 34
Granada, 23 Valencia and 71 Corona.
Cazadores Bns Alcántara & Almanza; Disciplinary
Bde; irregular harkas of Beni Sicar (x2), Beni Sidel
& Frajana.
Abd el Krim’s hard core pulled back westwards
with their loot during October, while local tribes
continued resistance. As the Spanish advanced
they established new defensive outposts, which
left only about 10,000 men in 12 battalions to
push on to and up the Kert river. The lost territory
as far as Dar Drius was only re-occupied (under
the new Melilla GOC, Gen Sanjurjo) in January
1922. Meanwhile, new clans flocked to ally
themselves with Abd el Krim, and for the next
three years this would enable him to dominate all
territory west of a line roughly from Afrau on the
coast down to Zoco el Telata on the upper Kert.

AFTERMATH, 1921–24 The renowned Tercio officer

Maj Francisco Franco (right
– see also Plate H1) seen in
conversation with a cavalry
Tizzi Azza and Tifarauín colonel wearing the chambergo
In October 1921 M’hamed Abd el Krim led a Rifian force west across the and, over his khaki uniform,
Gomara region as far as the river Lau, seeking anti-Spanish alliances at the the sky-blue pelissa (see Plate
A2). Franco has purchased
expense of Raisuli. A year later Madrid ordered Raisuli’s reappointment as
a locally made heavy wool
governor of the Yebala; he continued his habitual double-dealing with the winter coat with a noticeably
Spanish, while rightly fearing the extension of Abd el Krim’s power westwards. rough pile; its sleeve ranking is
During 1922–23 most Spanish conscripts held defensive positions while perhaps confused by blemishes
on the photo, but the date
the strengthened Tercio and Regulares dominated active operations (to the
is uncertain. This photo was
resentment of many Peninsular officers). Seven months of Rifian pressure around allegedly taken at Dar Drius
the strategic Tizzi Azza pass culminated in early June 1923, when a major in 1921, but no Tercio units
attack was only driven back at a final cost of some 2,000 Spanish casualties – took part in Silvestre’s spring
including the then-commander of the Tercio, LtCol Rafael de Valenzuela, killed advance; if the location is
correct , it must date from Dar
in close combat. (Major Franco’s excellent record then led to his promotion Drius’s reoccupation in January
to succeed Valenzuela.) In this period total strength in Morocco was about 1922, when Maj Franco led
63,000, of whom 50,000-plus were in 63 single Peninsular battalions. Mehala 2nd and part of 1st Bandera
Jalifiana battalions of the Sultanate’s army would be expanded in 1924, and of ‘la Legión’. (Courtesy of
Cody Images)
additional auxiliary harkas and mehallas were also raised.

1 The increasingly key part played by these two elite corps was emphasized by their
expansion. In October 1921 the Tercio formed a new 4th Bandera, and each battalion
received a fourth company. Companies were numbered sequentially, i.e. 1st Bandera = 1, 2,
3 (MG) & 13 Cos; 2nd Bandera = 4, 5, 6 (MG) & 14 Cos, etc. The 5th and 6th Banderas
were formed in November 1921 and September 1922 respectively, and a 7th in May 1925,
all headquartered in the Ceuta Command but deployed wherever needed. The Regulares
Groups (Nos 1 of Tetuán, 2 of Melilla, 3 of Ceuta & 4 of Larache) were joined from July
1922 by No 5 of Alhucemas.

25
Soldiers of the Tercio holding
a sandbag position during
the January 1922 fighting
at Dar Drius. Note (left) a
Hotchkiss MG team, and (right)
an overheated and replaced
barrel being cooled with
water. Only one rifleman (right
background) wears the sun-hat,
and all others the ‘isabelino’.
On the rear of the British
Mills web equipment, P1908
water bottles and the ‘small
pack’ are visible, but the belt,
shoulder-braces and cartridge
carriers are of a later pattern –
see commentary to Plate C3.
(Courtesy of Cody Images)

In August 1922 the high commissioner, Gen Ricardo Buerguete, pushed

troops both south and west, and eventually reached Midar (7 September saw
the first use of gas shells, by Spanish 155s in Dar Drius). By 7 November

Armoured units
Spain The army was eager for armoured fighting deliveries of 13 conversions of the Latil heavy
vehicles, and the government persuaded France to artillery truck, and in 1925 of another nine of an
sell it 11 Renault FT-17 machine-gun tanks plus one improved model. These and a handful of other
equipped for radio communication, which arrived in conversions all varied in details, and only some had
January 1922 to form a Compania Renault de Carros 7mm MG turrets. Their cross-country performance
de Asalto Infanteria. Spain also purchased six was poor, limiting them mainly to road escort work.
Schneider CA-1 75mm-gun heavy tanks to be used as
mobile artillery. The Schneiders went into action first France After Moroccan trials with FT-17s of the
on 14 March 1922, followed on the 18th by the 337th Tank Co in 1920–22 these returned to France,
Renaults; during fighting at Ambar and Tugunz two and tanks next arrived in May 1925, when a two-
of the latter were disabled, one being lost. Thereafter company Special Tank Bn of FT-17s was sent out. In
the light tanks were mostly employed for convoy July they were followed by a second battalion of
escort; Spain’s poverty and France’s reluctance three companies; one company had experimental
delayed further purchases, but by 1925 the Spanish Renault NC tanks with a new kégresse suspension
had managed to buy another 6 Renaults to replace with rubber rollers and track pads, but these proved
losses. too vulnerable for the terrain, and were withdrawn.
The Spanish made considerable dispersed efforts to For the September 1925 offensive the two battalions
convert civilian vehicles into armoured cars, but most were designated the 517th Tank Regt, each with
were badly underpowered for their increased weight. three 15-tank companies; each company had four
In 1921 the first protected truck and four conversions 3-tank fighting platoons, each platoon having two
of Landa touring cars reached Morocco, as did the MG-armed tanks and one with the Puteaux 37mm
first three Nash Quads built on the chassis of the gun. A number of White-Laffley M1918 armoured
2-ton Jeffrey Quad truck. Two more Quads arrived cars were also deployed in separate companies, but
in April 1922, but of eight others ordered only three these, like their Spanish counterparts, had limited
were delivered. During 1923–24 there were piecemeal cross-country performance.

26
 One of the six French Schneider
CA1 heavy tanks purchased
by Spain, armed with a 75mm
main gun at right front and
two machine guns; they
formed an Artillery Assault
Battery to provide rear support
for the Renault light tanks
of the Infantry Tank Assault
Company. The camouflage
scheme is a dark sand-yellow
ground overpainted with
angular areas of red-brown,
which are irregularly edged
with dark green. (Courtesy of
Cody Images)

1922 a line was stabilizing between Afrau and Midar, with a Spanish salient
around the Tizzi Azza pass. Abd el Krim’s retaliatory counter-offensive would
last for many months, centred on Tizzi Azza but including attacks elsewhere.
Spanish reactions would be hampered by the replacement of Gen Burguete
in February 1923 by a civilian high commissioner, Luis Silvela, who limited
military operations while attempting to negotiate (although he would also
authorize gas-bombing of Moroccan villages that July and August).

Battle of Tizzi Azza, June 1923:

the driver of a Renault FT-17
is helped to climb out after
suffering a head wound. Tanks
were used to protect Spanish
convoys carrying reinforcements
to the beleaguered positions
guarding the pass, which had
been under enemy pressure
since the previous November.
Although the armour gave
protection from snipers,
the summer heat made it
unbearable for crews to travel
for long with the hatches closed.
(Courtesy of Cody Images)

27
 It was also in February 1923 that Abd el Krim had himself proclaimed
Amir/ Emir (‘prince’) of the Rif. Thereafter he gathered a reported 9,000
warriors to surround Tifarauín, SW of Afrau. In mid-August 1923 two relief
attempts by 12-plus battalions were repulsed with heavy Spanish losses, and
Gen Sanjurjo then launched a major effort north of Tizzi Azza. General
Fernández Pérez’s main attack would deploy 6 Peninsular battalions, 3 of
the Tercio led by LtCol Franco, 6 of Regulares, plus 3 auxiliary harkas. In
support and diversion, Gen Pardo landed at Afrau on 21 August, with a
Peninsular battalion and three harkas. Converging columns then drove the
Rifians out of the hills around Tifarauín, which was relieved on the 22nd by
an elite column from Fernández’s force.

1923–24: Primo de Rivera’s retreat in the west

Despite the success at Tifarauín, in summer 1923 Spanish morale was low,
with some officers as well as many of the public favouring an ‘abandonista’
policy. Government authority was collapsing amid anti-mobilization mutinies
and riots in Barcelona and Malaga. In October, a coup installed Gen Miguel
Primo de Rivera as dictator at the head of a military government. He had
combat experience in Morocco and was generally trusted, but he made no
secret that he favoured at least partial military withdrawal and negotiations
with Moroccan regional leaders. He bought time by making ambiguous
speeches about his intentions, while introducing some popular reforms.

BERBER WARRIORS, 1921–26 (2) Rifleman, Abd el Krim’s Rifian bodyguard, 1924–25
D (See errata, imprint page) This mostly speculative reconstruction represents the warriors
selected for their skills and loyalty from M’hamed Abd el Krim’s
(1) Berber tribal levy, 1921 trained regular brigade, and generously paid. The bodyguard
This generic figure represents the poorer-class tribal warriors (and senior Rifian government officials) wore green turbans.
who made up the great majority of Abd el Krim’s followers. For the regular brigade, sources mention a blue turban with an
The loosely rolled and coiled white turban often left the scalp attached white patch bearing a number in Arabic – in this case
bare, but sometimes covered it with a single layer of cloth. ‘twenty’– but here, lacking photographic evidence, we frankly
Under the chilaba most wore a lighter-weight white or off- take a guess that displaying it on the chilaba would be more
white garment: a long, round-necked, shorter-sleeved practical. This chilaba, with white trim showing tufted knots, is
gandoura, or a long, hooded, full-sleeved djubba – either or from a 1921–22 photo showing two clearly senior warriors
both might be worn, depending upon conditions. This chilaba both wearing very similar clothing. His shoes are the heelless
is of solid brown wool with minimal decoration; as usual, the ‘babouches’ slippers which he can now afford, in traditional
hoods of both djubba and chilaba are thrown back over the yellow-tanned leather. He is armed with a French 8mm Lebel
shoulders. Loose-cut white trousers end just below the knee, M1886/ 93 rifle, of which some 18,000 were reportedly landed
and this levy in his 50s wears the most basic plaited-grass by a British gun-runner in June 1924 in the Bocoya tribal
sandals. His only visible equipment is an all-purpose skala country west of Axdir. Prized for its 8-round magazine, accuracy
slung to his hip, to carry ammunition, rations of bread or grain and stopping-power, the Lebel was the priority choice for the
and dates, and other small necessities; most were of leather, Rifian ’regulars’ and other well-funded groups. If this rifleman is
often with decorative patterns on the flap and hanging a Bocoya, he would have been selected for the bodyguard
fringes. Before Annual, rifles were in short supply and of from either the 4th or 5th tabor of the regular brigade.
elderly but still lethal types. This one is a French 11mm single-
shot M1874 Gras rifle, a type widely stolen and/ or traded (3) Rifian regular artilleryman, 1925–26
from Algeria since the 1890s. (Other obsolescent types in use The trained artillerymen (and, according to one source,
included a few ancient M1866 Chassepots, and more machine-gunners) of the Rifian regular brigade were reportedly
numerous M1871 Remingtons and Martini-Henrys, M1873 distinguished by black turbans; such men presumably
Albinis, and M1874 Martini-Peabodys.) By the 1920s dispersed when qualified, to spread their skills among other
tribesmen with such antique arms usually had to rely on local crews. Otherwise this figure is simply a composite from period
re-loaders of expended brass cartridges, who refilled them photos. The gunner holds a shell for a captured French 75mm
with black powder and used ground-down red matches and M1897 field gun; between late April and the end of June 1925
petrol to replace the percussion caps. While Rifians were the French lost a reported 51 artillery pieces (mostly ‘75s’) and
noted for their marksmanship, misfires were therefore nearly 17,000 shells. For close-quarter combat he carries an old
common. Oviedo-made M1871 Remington ‘rolling block’ carbine.

28
 2

29
Three men of Regulares Grupo
No. 2 de Melilla killed in the
fighting at Tizi Azza, about to
be loaded from stretchers into
an ambulance. It was important
to strictly observe the dictates
of their religion: fatalities were
taken directly to a sanctified
Muslim cemetery, and buried
within 24 hours of their death.
(Courtesy of Cody Images)

General Miguel Primo de

Rivera (right), installed at the
head of Spain’s government by
the military coup of October
1923, meets field officers
in Morocco. The latter wear
the officers’ superior variant
of the chambergo with a
stitching-reinforced band,
which sometimes displayed
a rank patch on the left side.
Many Tercio and Regulares
officers strongly objected to
Rivera’s decision to abandon
roughly half of Spain’s western
territory in autumn 1924, but
he managed to avoid a mutiny
– partly by increasing army pay,
among other popular reforms. In NW Morocco, spring–summer 1924 saw both sides obliged to commit
(Courtesy of Cody Images) reinforcements during months of fighting along the river Lau SE of Tetuán.
There a young Regulares veteran named Ahmed
Heriro, of the Beni Hozmar tribe, distinguished
himself as a combat leader against the Spanish
while also encouraging shifts in tribal loyalties
from Raisuli towards Abd el Krim. In July 1924,
while this campaign was raging, Primo de Rivera
made a tour of inspection, and was shocked by the
poor state of army readiness and morale.
Consequently, on 8 September he announced
his decision to withdraw troops in the Ceuta
Command westwards and northwards, to occupy
a strong new ‘Estella Line’ of posts defending only
about half of Spain’s previous western territory (see
‘Primo Line’, Map 2). This decision enraged many
officers, particularly of the Regulares and Tercio,
but Primo de Rivera’s skilful diplomacy averted
the threatened mutiny. From October to mid-
December 1924 he personally oversaw the difficult
and costly process of withdrawal from some 180
posts. This culminated in a 40,000-man operation
to manage the retreat from Xauen to Tetuán in
November–December. The composition of the
enlarged garrison and its supporting elements was
representative of the Spanish army in Morocco at
that date:

30
 Spanish air power

In Morocco, by 1921 four Spanish units of varying Spanish, both military and civilian, who believed
strength totalled 16x British DH-4s, 8x French that it excused Spain from any humanitarian scruples
Breguet 14 A2s, and 3x French Farman F-50s. In the over bombing civilian targets and burning vital
Ceuta Command, by April 1922 1a Grupo at Tetuán crops. Pilots naturally sought military targets as a
had two squadrons of Breguets and a flight of priority, but the nature of this war meant that
Farmans, and 2a Grupo at Larache had two Breguet civilian casualties were often inevitable. Nor was
squadrons. In the Melilla Command, 3a Grupo had Spain alone during the interwar period in employing
three DH-4 squadrons, and 4a Grupo two squadrons even poison gas against rebels and civilian targets
of British Bristol F2Bs, one of DH-9As and one of (viz the Soviet Union, Japan and Italy). The Army
Martinsyde F4s. The latter were single-seat fighters, had first used gas shells in September 1922; Spain
the others all two-seat reconnaissance/ light bomber acquired mustard gas and tear gas agents from
types. A naval air arm was also established in 1922, Germany and technical assistance from France, and
with various Italian seaplanes. Given the relatively manufactured ordnance (in secrecy, to avoid public
short distances, units based in either Command flew protest) at a chemical factory near Madrid. Aerial
missions wherever air support was needed. Over four gas-bombing of military and civilian targets began in
years, aircrews learned the hard way how to operate 1923, by a few Farman F60 Goliaths purchased from
in the most challenging conditions and terrain. They France. It appears to have ceased in 1925, after a
became battle-hardened, establishing a culture of League of Nations ban on the use of chemical
low-altitude attacks, and it was claimed that they weapons.
were more feared by the rebels than the French pilots
they would face in 1925–26. The ‘phantom’ Rif air force Spanish aircrew were
By September 1925 several more modern types had ordered to destroy their machines if they survived
been acquired. Spanish air support for the Alhucemas crash-landings in enemy territory, and bombers
landings would come mainly from two of three successfully located and destroyed others. However,
formations then designated as Escuadras. The 1a Abd el Krim persisted in efforts to acquire aircraft
Escuadra had 25x Breguet 14s, 6x DH-4s, 4x DH-9As, and hire mercenary pilots. In December 1923 his
6x Potez 15s, and 15x Bristol F2Bs, while 3a Escuadra agents managed to buy a Dorand AR2 in Algeria
operated 15x Fokker CIVs and 15x Breguet 19s. from a bankrupt French company. A company pilot
Additionally, the seaplanes numbered 7x Dornier J Wals, flew it to eastern Morocco, and in January 1924 it
14x Savoia S16s, 6x Macchi M18s and 6x Supermarine was spotted south of Alhucemas (but was then lost
Scarabs. Of these, 15 flew from Melilla’s Atalyón base, track of for two months). Re-located at Tizzi
and the rest from the Spanish Navy seaplane tender/ Moren, it was such a high priority target that on
carrier Dédalo, which could carry 18 at a time. 22–23 March squadrons of DH-9As and Bristol
F2Bs dropped 540 bombs and strafed the wreckage.
Bombing & gas The grisly fate of so many soldiers in The Rifians failed to acquire any other flyable
the retreat from Annual horrified and enraged many aircraft.

Xaouen garrison-plus, September–November 1924

Tercio: 1st–6th Banderas. Regulares: Grupos Nos 1 de Tetuán, 3 de Ceuta, 4
de Larache & 5 de Alhucemas.
Peninsular Line Inf Regts: Nos 49 Otumba, 60 Ceuta & 69 Serrallo.
Single bns from regts: Nos 10 Córdoba, 36 Burgos, 41 Gravelines, 47 San
Quintin, 55 Asia, 63 Mahón, 68 Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, 73 Badajoz,
74 Valladolid, & 77 Military Orders.
Expeditionary bns from regts: Nos 6 Saboya, 16 Castilla, 27 Cuenca &
34 Granada.
1st Cazadores Bde – Bns: Nos 1 Madrid, 4 Barbastro, 6 Figueras, 9 Arapiles
& 11 Llerena.

31
De Havilland DH-4
reconnaissance-bomber of the
Aeronáutica Militar Española.
Spain had bought 45 DH-4s
in 1919, and in spring 1922
still had three squadrons
operational in the Melilla
Command. Some were DH-4Bs,
which mounted a forward-
firing machine gun as well as
the gunner’s twin Lewis guns.
This machine is believed to be
that named ‘Santa Teresa de
Rolls’, fin-marking ‘AVILA’ (the
city whose subscriptions paid
for it), and rudder-number ‘H-
48’. (Courtesy of Cody Images)

Separate Cazadores Bns: Nos 3 San Fernando, 12 Segorbe, 15 Ceriñola &

18 Talavera.
Allied irregular Mehalas: Larache, Tetuán & Xaouen. Harkas: Xaouen,
Muñoz Grandes de Melilla.
Peninsular cavalry: sqn, Caz de Cab Regt No 22 Victoria Eugenia.
M’hamed Abd el Krim and Ahmed Heriro, already on the spot with
powerful forces, flexibly exploited the difficulties of the withdrawals to
the maximum, and the fighting by Spanish relief and break-out columns
was often desperate. After leaving Xaouen on 12 November the garrison
was attacked in strength, and when its rearguard of Tercio and Regulares
battalions was badly mauled it had to halt at Zoco el Arbaá for three tense
weeks. However, it resumed its march on 10 December, and reached Tetuán
on the 15th. Meanwhile, in the Larache sector, Gen Riquelme manoeuvred
skilfully to relieve and extract westwards many more garrisons by 16
December. In all, Spanish casualties (exaggerated in some sources) seem to
have totalled between 7,000 and 10,000, with many weapons lost. However,
although it seems counter-intuitive, Primo de Rivera’s determination and
competence in organizing this major retreat and establishing his Estella Line
steadied military morale.
In January 1925 M’hamed Abd el Krim captured Raisuli, his armoury
OPPOSITE
The Chicago Tribune and treasury. Shipped to the central Rif, Raisuli died that April.
reporter Larry Rue (centre)
photographed while visiting
Abd el Krim’s headquarters
at Axdir. The Amir kept
himself well informed about
ABD EL KRIM’S ZENITH, 1924–25
international events, and made
use of foreign correspondents
to spread a favourable image. Political status
While he granted them access,
he carefully controlled what
At the turn of 1924/ 25 the Spanish retreat in the west, and the elimination
they saw and heard. (ullstein- of Raisuli, had handed the Abd el Krims the initiative. They were free to
bild via Getty Images) operate in the whole area outside a Spanish western front shaped roughly

32
like an upside-down ‘L’ south of Tetuán and
east of Alcazarqivir; as far eastwards as Tizzi
Azza; and southwards almost to the French
zonal border.
Abd el Krim had already created a
functioning regime (in Arabic, the Jumhūriyya
ar-Rif) based at his birthplace of Axdir/
Ajdir just inland from Alhucemas Bay, with
ministers – particularly those responsible for
finance, logistics and military equipment –
chosen mostly from among his Beni Urriaguel
relatives. Unifying instinctively independent
caids into a pan-tribal alliance involved a
constant interplay of power relationships, but
both his military and his religious prestige
strengthened him. A general tax was levied on
the harvests of all tribes under Rifian control,
and fines for collective disobedience also
swelled the exchequer. Further finance came
from European mining and other commercial
interests which were willing to gamble on Abd
el Krim’s eventual success.
He kept himself well informed about world
affairs, and exploited the foreign press to create
the image of a reasonable statesman seeking
national self-determination. His agents were
active overseas in repeated attempts to gain
some measure of international recognition,
but, despite encouragement from both French anti-colonialists and British Spanish officer losses during
businessmen, these were unsuccessful. Naturally, Britain, France and Italy the retreats of late 1924 had
been serious. On 18 November
were all concerned that Abd el Krim’s example might encourage Muslim 1924 LtCol Claudio Temprano
risings in their own colonies. Domingo was killed while
leading a charge by troopers
of Regulares Grupo No 3 de
Ceuta in the hard-pressed
rearguard of the retreating
Xaouen garrison. (That day
also cost the lives of two
battalion commanders, and
Gen Serrano Orive.) Temprano
was posthumously awarded
Spain’s highest decoration, the
Laureate Cross of San Fernando.
This portrait dates from 1922,
when he commanded the
cavalry tabor of Regulares Grupo
No 5 de Alhucemas. Note his
unbadged red tarbouche; the
shirt collar worn ‘Tercio-style’,
above the crowned silver
lances-and-crescent badges of
Regulares cavalry on his tunic
collar; and the comandante’s
single embroidered silver rank
star on his cuffs. (Courtesy of
Cody Images)

33
Fine 1923 portrait of a Berber Rifian forces
caid, reportedly a man named The Spanish could never
Ben Chel-lal of the Beni Bu Ifrur
tribe; note that he displays
believe that Abd el Krim did
the triple red head-cords of a not have European military
tribal tabor commander (see staff advisers. In fact, the only
Plate E1). Although the Beni Europeans he employed were
Bu Ifrur had been the original
a handful of deserters and
rebels south of Melilla in 1909,
and played a prominent part soldiers-of-fortune who were
in the massacres of 1921, this used purely as technicians and
chieftain surrendered in 1923. instructors – e.g., the Germans
The alliances orchestrated
Otto Noja and Joseph Klemms,
by Abd el Krim were always
provisional, and he had to who established his telephone
exercise careful vigilance to and mapping systems
maintain control of tribal respectively. While the press
leaders. (Courtesy Cody of exaggerated the significance
Images)
of the few European renegades
in his service, Abd el Krim
never allowed them any
independent authority, and his
most influential and respected
training officer was in fact a Regulares veteran known as Caid Bohut.
Opinions about Rifian strength still vary, since a system of rotating
mobilization makes any figures difficult to date or verify. One plausible
source is a 1932 book by Gen Manuel Goded Loppis, who had interviewed
Abd el Krim after his surrender.2 While others have disputed his figures,
Goded states that the Abd el Krim brothers’ total potential armed strength

2 Marruecos: Las Etapas de la Pacificación; reprinted by Salamina Ediciones, 2021.

BERBER WARRIORS, 1923–26 (2) Rifian standard-bearer, May 1926

E (See errata, imprint page) This standard of the Rifian state is one captured by Spanish
troops as the war ended; note that the white diamond is
(1) Caid of tribal levies, 1923 slightly off-set towards the ‘fly’. We show the bearer wearing a
This is a composite figure from photos of two unrelated small, tightly wound white turban often seen in photos of
leaders. The portrait and costume are taken from photos of Moroccans of some standing. A posed photo of a standard-
Ben Chel-lal of the Beni Bu Ifrur, who surrendered to the bearer includes a simple solid-coloured chilaba with plain pale
Spanish Gen Riquelme in 1923. He wears on his head a white trim including visible buttoning all the way down the front
skull cap and djubba, under a large tagelmust head-cloth. The (see also photo of German mercenaries on page 57). Note the
latter shows the three red cords identifying the status of a method of slinging his weapon (here a French 8mm Berthier
tabor commander; two and one cords, respectively, identified M1916 carbine) horizontally across behind his shoulders, as
the leaders of a 100-man company and a 50-man half- often seen in photos.
company. This system may also have been employed in the
Rifian ‘regular’ brigade, but one source describes for regular (3) Regulares deserter weapons-instructor, 1924
officers a similar sequence of green stripes sewn to turbans, This probable former NCO of the Spanish Regulares cavalry is
including a half-stripe for leaders of 25-man platoons. Photos employed by the Rifian government. He wears a white knit
suggest that chilabas woven in striped patterns – usually of skull-cap to emphasize his Muslim faith, and retains his
two or three alternating colours, in narrow and/ or medium- ‘chickpea’ breeches with brown leggings and ankle boots,
width stripes – seldom bore applied trimming, but note the under a white djubba and a chilaba. His weapon is the 7mm
commonly seen horizontally striped upper sleeves and Spanish Oviedo-made licensed version of the French
vertical striping elsewhere. Ben Chel-lal’s photos are among Hotchkiss M1922 light machine gun, of which Spain produced
several showing the satchel being worn slung under rather about 3,000, fed from a 20-round top-mounted magazine
than over the chilaba. From a separate photo we copy a highly instead of the usual Hotchkiss horizontal cartridge strip. In
decorated example of a (seldom worn) waist belt, into which Spanish service these were issued to the ‘mixed’ squadrons
are tucked a jambiya dagger slung on cords and (speculatively) armed with both MGs and LMGs, which began to replace each
a captured Spanish 9mm Campo Giro M1912 pistol. tabor’s former MG squadron from 1922.

34
1

35
 was up to 80,000, but – crucially – that they could never
field more than about 20,000 at any one time.
Well aware of the fragile loyalty of many of his allies,
Abd el Krim entrusted his younger brother with creating
a ‘regular’ five-battalion brigade of up to 7,000 picked
infantry (plus artillery), of which the first three units
were exclusively Beni Urriaguel, and the others mainly
Temsaman, Bocoya, Ait Tuzin and Gzinnaya (in roughly
proportional order). These men were trained with
modern weapons, and paid on a sliding scale according
to rank and specialist skills. They were organized in
25-man hamsain u ashreen platoons, 50-man hamsain
half-companies, 100-man mia companies, and tabor
battalions of a few hundred.
Apart from these regulars, the Rifian forces consisted
of unpaid part-time tribal levies, routinely stiffened for
operations with heavily armed detachments from the
regular brigade. Men aged between about 16 and 60,
from territories nearest to a campaign objective, were
called up via their tribal elders for only between seven
and 15 days at a time in successive months, so as to allow
vital agricultural work to continue. Their officers were
chosen from among the most able caids, approved by the
leadership and trusted to exercise direct discipline. Rifian
government agents supervised the levies; strict rules of
service were established, and even circulated in handbooks
A Berber machine-gunner for the small literate minority. A central prison at Axdir – one of three – often
manning a captured Spanish held tribal leaders awaiting trial for desertion or insubordination, and death
7mm M1914 Hotchkiss,
apparently of the variant with
sentences were not uncommon. Any peripheral clans which refused Rifian
a shoulder stock and pistol- service were ruthlessly punished: for instance, in May 1925 Abd el Krim
grip trigger group. Sources reportedly set an example by having some 400 reluctant allies shot and their
differ; one states that only leaders beheaded.
about 60 such guns were
captured in 1921, another
claims as many as 400. The Weapons
rebels also used ransoms paid The military booty from 1921 and 1924, and turncoat or mercenary
for Spanish officer prisoners to instructors, had greatly increased the Rifians’ tactical impact, and the
buy more. Trained in their use
often-quoted figure of about 20,000 modern rifles in their hands seems to
by local veterans, the rebels
initially had about one MG be a considerable underestimate. Apart from the captures of Spanish rifles,
to every 100–200 riflemen, gun-runners hired in Tangier often evaded the Spanish naval blockade. For
and French combat officers example, by June 1924 French intelligence estimated that 16,000 German
praised their skilful handling Mausers had already been shipped in from Hamburg, which also provided
in battle. Although amateur
maintenance and shortage of
Lee-Metfords captured from British naval troops in Antwerp in 1914. In
spare parts must have taken a June 1924 a British vessel reportedly landed 18,000 of the prized French
steady toll, the Spanish alone Lebels in the Bocoya country west of Axdir. Initially ammunition had had
would retrieve more than 200 to be gathered from the battlefield, but Abd el Krim’s government bought in
machine guns in spring 1926.
(ullstein-bild via Getty Images)
any local surpluses as well as importing supplies; the main government depot
at Targuist distributed ammunition by pack-mule trains. The Taghzat clan
OPPOSITE of the southern allied Senadja Srir confederation specialized in recycling the
Map 2: Northern Morocco, explosive from dud or captured Spanish ordnance to produce hand grenades
1921–26; (detail) Oued
Ouergha front, 1925–26.
in considerable numbers.
(Map by John Richardson, In addition to many machine guns, from 1921 the Abd el Krims seem to
© Martin Windrow) have had about 80 serviceable captured artillery pieces in calibres ranging

36
37
 from 65mm to 105mm (but mostly 75mm), and more after 1924. Reportedly
some 350 Rifian regulars were trained to use them, by former gunners of the
Sultanate’s army and a few European mercenaries led by a Serbian former
captain of Austro-Hungarian artillery. At first they tended to use their guns
in ones or twos at close range, delivering effective direct fire on flimsily built
European outposts. From simply ‘walking’ shells towards the target they later
became more sophisticated, and there is even a mention of airbursts over one
French post in 1925. Facing Tetuán on the western front, M’hamed Abd el
Krim deployed dug-in artillery in battery strength and with considerable
effect, and also managed to move guns across country.

The mixture of French soldiers

manning this observation post
on a rocky summit suggests
one of the early Mobile Groups.
ABD EL KRIM’S GAMBLE, APRIL 1925
The majority are North African
tirailleurs, with khaki turbans
wrapped loosely around their French precautions
red caps. Sitting (centre) is Apart from extending his networks of intelligence agents, Marshal
a Foreign Legion sergeant Lyautey had insisted on remaining aloof from Spain’s problems, and
wearing a chèche scarf, and
displaying the two gold
intermediaries had repeatedly assured him that Abd el Krim had no designs
upwards-pointing forearm on French Morocco.
chevrons of a re-enlisted The most important of the tribes straddling the zonal frontier south of
NCO. His comrade (far right), the Gomara were the grain-rich Beni Zeroual on either side of the Ouergha
showing a single rank bar
on his cuffs, is probably an
river valley, who were wooed by both Abd el Krim and Lyautey. Since the
adjudant warrant officer. (De former’s methods were the more heavy-handed, from April 1924 some clan
Agostini/ Getty Images) leaders accepted French subsidies to resist him. During May to July, with

38
their agreement, Lyautey established 40
small ‘doorbell’ outposts on hills north
of the Ouergha.
From September 1924 the Spanish
retreat in the west prompted Lyautey
to increase these to 66 posts. He was
responsible for protecting the Sultanate,
and, although Abd el Krim always
denied any ambition to depose the
sultan, the potential threat only about
40 miles north of his capital, Fes, could
not be ignored. Lyautey had some 50
infantry battalions among about 54,000
troops in the whole of French Morocco,
many of them necessarily committed to
the recently penetrated Middle Atlas
to the south. In 1924 Lyautey pressed
Paris for reinforcements, but the War
Ministry dragged its feet. The first to
arrive were the young French conscripts
of the Morocco Colonial Infantry Regt
(RICM) from the Rhineland, who would
only reach the north Moroccan front in
mid-April 1925.
Abd el Krim’s reasons for dragging France into his war have been In hot sunlight, a Berber
endlessly debated. He apparently perceived a serious threat in the French rifleman aims his Mauser from
the cover of rocks. He wears
moves north of the Ouergha towards the zonal border, and, although some only a white gandoura; French
Beni Zeroual clans supported him, he had lost much of his access to that witnesses often mention Rifians
tribe’s important ‘breadbasket’. Finally, perhaps, it may simply have been fighting in this white ‘burnous’,
the fact that a ‘rolling’ or ‘serial’ alliance like Abd el Krim’s could only be despite its high visibility. Note
also the patterned flap and
held together by the rewards of repeated victories. He may have hoped to
hanging fringe of the skala
surprise the French badly enough to actually take Fes and/ or Taza; although satchel at his hip, and his light
shoes. (ullstein-bild via Getty
Images)

Rebels manning a captured

Spanish gun. While Rifian
artillery was used effectively
on all fronts, the younger
Abd el Krim achieved the
most impressive results in
the west. Gathering guns in
battery strength in protected
emplacements close to Tetuán,
he was able to shell the city,
nearby Spanish posts and
batteries, and even ships off
shore. In March 1922 other
guns emplaced at Alhucemas
Bay sank the Spanish warship
Juan de Juanes. (Hulton
Deutsch Colln./ CORBIS via
Getty Images)

39
 ‘La Coloniale’ and l’Armée d’Afrique

The Troupes Coloniales included both white and African one eight-gun MG company. Each nominally 170-man
units, but the RICM was their only white infantry rifle company had a command element and four
regiment to fight in the Rif (though a mixed Morocco 35-strong platoons (sections), each of three 11-man
Colonial Artillery Regt, RACM, also took part). squads (groupes); two of these squads were riflemen-
During 1923–26 several black Colonial Régiments de grenadiers, and the third was a light machine-gun squad
Tirailleurs Sénégalais (RTS) were redesignated Régts de built around a single M1915 CSRG ‘Chauchat’.
Tirailleurs Coloniaux (RTC). In all, about 16 African However, the immediately available rifle strength was
battalions would fight in northern Morocco (from e.g. reduced by the need to assign mule-handlers: each
the 1st RTSM and 8th, 10th, 13th & 15th RTCs), plus company had a ‘combat train’ of 11 mules, and nine
the Madagascan 41st Regt of Tirailleurs Malgaches. more per company formed the rear ‘battalion train’, so
The Armée d’Afrique or XIX Army Corps, based in a company in battle might have as few as 120 rifles.
Algeria and Tunisia, included some European regiments: In all, nine-plus Legion battalions, six of Zouaves and
volunteers of the Foreign Legion (1st–4th REIs) and to two Bats d’Af would fight in the Rif at times between
a lesser extent conscript Zouaves (1st & 2nd RZs), plus April 1925 and May 1926. Sources for native units are
two penal conscript battalions of Africa Light Infantry harder to reconcile, but about 14 regular Algerian and
(3rd & 4th BILA, ‘Bats d’Af’ ). Tunisian Skirmisher battalions and 16 of Moroccans
North African ‘skirmisher’ regiments of Tirailleurs seem to have been deployed in northern Morocco, along
Algériens, Tunisiens & Marocains (RTAs, RTTs & with some 15 native cavalry squadrons from Spahi
RTMs) were at this date of mixed conscripts and regiments (RSAs, RSTs & RSMs).
volunteers. The term de Marche (‘marching’) in a unit These were importantly supplemented by many semi-
title (e.g. 19e BMTA) indicated a task-organized force regular Moroccan goums (short-term volunteer units of
drawn from more than one parent unit. roughly squadron size), as well as bands of irregular
Bataillon d’infanterie type Marocaine tribal partisans fighting in return for rifles and the
Such units had an establishment of 700 men (but a field chance to loot. The former were led by, and the latter to
strength of only about 600) in three rifle companies and some extent coordinated by, French officers.

40
 LEFT
On 12 June 1925, at
Freydenberg Mobile Group’s
HQ at Gara de Mezziat, the
French prime minister, Paul
Painlevé, decorated the flag
and 50 individual légionnaires
of Maj Cazaban’s VI/ 1st REI. This
battalion had suffered about 25
per cent battle casualties since
early May, including some 60
officers and men killed during
a failed night sortie only 36
hours before this parade. The
troops are wearing sand-khaki
képi-covers and M1921 tenue de
toile, with khaki wool puttees,
brown boots and M1916
belt equipment – see Plate
G1. (Photo12/ UIG via Getty
Images)

he could never have held these cities in positional warfare, it was plausible
BELOW LEFT
that this would persuade northern tribes in the French zone to rise and join The French made considerable
him, giving him an important advantage in any subsequent negotiations – the use of local ‘partisans’,
traditional pattern of Moroccan warfare. especially in winter 1925/26.
Photographed earlier, in
May 1925 near Ait Maatouf,
these fighters (possibly of
the Beni Ouarain) are clearly
from the poorest class. The
youngster reporting to a French
intelligence officer carries an
old single-shot 11mm Spanish
M1871 Remington ‘rolling
block’ rifle on a cord sling, and
the bearded man (right) seems
to have a satchel of woven
wickerwork rather than leather.
(Photo12/UIG via Getty Images)

OPPOSITE
French artillery in action, 4–6
June 1925, in the Taounate
sector – by then, one of only
two groups of posts still
holding out north of the
Ouergha. Beyond ‘short 155mm’
howitzers (foreground) are a
field battery of M1897 ‘75s’.
During the first few months
of the French campaigns
the difficulty of transporting
sufficient ammunition across
country between rapidly
changing battlefields often
limited the support that
gunners could provide for the
infantry. (Photo12/ UIG via
Getty Images)

41
 Shock attacks, April–May 1925
For lack of concrete or even much mortar, the French platoon posts north of
the Oued Ouergha were constructed of mostly dry-stone walls and sandbags,
within double belts of ‘apron’ and ‘concertina’ barbed wire. They had
rudimentary internal buildings, water cisterns which had to be topped up
from outside sources, and sometimes a linked external MG position to cover
‘dead ground’ or a water point.
Held by Colonial Infantry garrisons from the 1st Morocco Regt of
Senegalese Tirailleurs or ‘Skirmishers’ (1st RTSM), the posts were grouped in
company sectors. For example, that of 8th Co, II/ 1st RTSM consisted of no
fewer than six posts spread across seven-plus miles and some two miles deep,
commanded by three officers and three sergeants. The furthest north (see Map
2, detail) was Beni Derkoul; the others were Achirkane, Tafrant (Capt Pietri’s

FRENCH TROUPES COLONIALES & D’AFRIQUE, 1925 This private (‘rifleman-grenadier’) wears the cork sun-
F helmet also issued to Metropolitan troops; formerly termed
(1) Fusil-mitrailleur, 1er Régiment de Tirailleurs the M1890, it is now identified as a late-production M1886.
Sénégalais du Maroc The Colonial and African troops’ mustard-khaki woollen
During the post-1918 reductions African units of the Troupes M1915 or virtually identical M1920 greatcoat is worn over the
Coloniales were widely redesignated, and those stationed in sand-khaki linen M1921 rankers’ tenue de toile (see under
the colonies (as opposed to Europe) displayed no unit Plates F3 & G1), both with M1917 collar patches bearing two
numbers with their yellow fouled-anchor badge. The 1st RTSM, upper-edge pipings (soutaches) and the Colonials’ anchor in
whose platoons held outposts on the Oued Ouergha front, garance red. Field marching order (see F3) is based on M1916
was a composite regiment (redesignated 5th RTS in 1926). belt equipment, and his rifle is the 8mm M1886/ 93 Lebel.
This ‘skirmisher’ wears the African troops’ red chéchia, with (Composite, after Bouchery, Lachaux & Vauvillier in Militaria
the pre-1900 collarless 4-button paletot de toile sans col and No 88; Bernard & Lachaud, No 297; and Contamine, No 372.)
pantalon-culotte trousers in sand-khaki linen. He displays the
anchor on ‘mustard-khaki’ neck patches; yellow neck braid (3) Tirailleur, 19e Bataillon de Marche de Tirailleurs
below a black edging; and a yellow ‘scooped’ chevron on the Algériens; GM Colombat
forearms (a badge of his branch rather than rank). The red After 1918 the Algerian/ Tunisian and Moroccan ‘marching
waist sash was worn under the jacket when in action. His regiments of Skirmishers’ formed in World War I were broken
equipment is dictated by the fact that he carries his platoon’s up into regiments and some independent battalions. Major
8mm M1915 CSRG ‘Chauchat’ light machine gun. On his belt Stephani’s 19th BMTA took 125 casualties during the re-supply
are a single canvas magazine pouch at right front, a tool wallet of Bibane on 25 May. By 8 June it had lost about 70 per cent
at left front, and at his right hip a Spanish 7.65mm Ruby semi- killed, wounded or missing, and was later disbanded.
automatic pistol in an M1916 holster. In anticipation of a In May–August 1925, exhausting forced marches were as
desperate action, he has slung on his left side an 8-magazine much of an ordeal for the Mobile Groups as combat itself, and
LMG haversack. He lacks the Y-straps of rifleman’s belt this Algerian Berber rifleman illustrates field marching order.
equipment, and has laid aside his personal musette haversack, Many tirailleurs in the field wore a pale khaki turban loosely
but would carry his water-bottle (bidon) at all times. wound around the unbadged chéchia, but this ‘turco’ does
(Composite after various sources, including Vauvillier & Deroo not. His uniform is the rankers’ sand-khaki tenue de toile modèle
in Militaria No 54, and Bernard & Lachaux in No 297.) 1921, of which the pantalon-culotte actually dated from 1915.
The orders of 31 March 1921 prescribed a linen tunic following
(2) Fusilier-grenadier, II / Régiment d’Infanterie the cut of the mustard-khaki woollen vareuse de drap of
Coloniale du Maroc, GM Freydenberg 10 July 1920. On the spread fall collar (but obscured at this
Colonel Barbasatt’s three-battalion RICM – composed largely of angle), the mustard-khaki M1917 collar patches of North
21-year-old French conscripts – was transferred from the Army African infantry bore two soutaches and the unit number in
of the Rhine in February 1925. The 2nd Bn reached Ain Aicha bright blue branch-colour. In field order the M1916 belt
on the Ouergha front on 28 April, only to be heavily ambushed equipment was worn with the slung 2-litre, two-spout M1877
during a night march to Tissa on the 29th/ 30th. The 1st Bn held bidon and the musette haversack. Marching order added an
posts in the Teroual sector from May, while 2nd and 3rd Bns M1893/ 14 canvas knapsack; attached externally are a khaki-
saw frequent action with GM Freydenberg. In late June and July painted gamelle messtin; a folded tent-cloth, blanket and
the 2nd Bn was tested in hard fighting north of Ouezzane – spare tunic; spare boots; and, as part of the squad’s bivouac
where by late July they were ‘thin and in rags’, all companies gear, a collapsible canvas bucket (other men would carry
were down to two platoons, and the battalion had only one 10-litre water cans, cooking pans, tools, etc. on their packs).
captain and three lieutenants. In September all three battalions The 8mm five-shot M1907/ 15 Berthier rifle was often issued
provided security in the Ain bou Aissa and Teroual sectors, and instead of the Lebel. (Composite, mainly after Catteau &
they were spared the autumn and spring offensives. Vauvillier in Militaria No 129.)

42
 1

43
By far the most numerous type company HQ), Aoudour, Dar Remich, and the dominating hill of Bibane.
used by the French Aviation Beni Derkoul’s garrison was typical: the 21-year-old S/Lt Pol Lapeyre had a
Militaire was the Breguet 14A2;
this aircraft was photographed
French sergeant and two gunners, two West African NCOs and 34 rankers,
at Fes, with a subaltern or with a single 75mm gun for mutual support between neighbouring posts,
warrant officer inspecting 10kg two Hotchkiss MGs, at least one M1915 ‘Chauchat’ LMG, Lebel or Berthier
anti-personnel bombs stacked rifles, and rifle- and hand-grenades.
ready for loading. By mid-June
1925 the 37e RAO’s strength
on the northern fighting front * * *
had been reinforced from 10
to 18 squadrons, deployed in On the night of 12/13 April 1925, Abd el Krim launched advances south
Western, Central and Eastern
across a discontinuous front of about 75 miles. On the middle Ouergha, strong
tactical commands. Their
original units’ squadron insignia regular detachments headed the first 4,000-strong wave of Djibala warriors,
were not changed. (ullstein-bild Senadja Srir and Beni Mestara; these were followed by a second wave of
via Getty Images) roughly equal strength. The Rifians raced south into Beni Zeroual country
along three separate routes, killing tribesmen and burning villages but at first
maintaining momentum by bypassing French posts. To the east, two other
OPPOSITE
strong harkas of Ait Waryaghar/ Beni Urriaguel and Gzinnaya/ Gueznaya
A French NCO air mechanic
posing with a Breguet 14Tbis began pushing south towards the Kifane group of posts, NE of the strategic
variant, which could evacuate city of Taza on the eastwards route to Oujda and the Algerian frontier.
two casualties lying on the The clans north of the Ouergha all collapsed within a couple of days,
floor of the heightened forward
sending refugees fleeing south. Those that submitted had to provide hostages;
fuselage – note the added
windows. The first of these their chiefs were replaced or supervised, and they were taxed for Abd el Krim’s
innovative ‘limousines’ arrived for war chest and conscripted for his levies. Meanwhile, groups of regulars were
the 37e RAO in 1922, two being digging in around the French north-bank outposts. They kept up heavy fire on
dispersed to each of its then-10 the defenders; some dug approach trenches to within 50 yards, and mounted
escadrilles. After the outbreak
of war, in May 1925 monthly
assaults; and some had Spanish artillery pieces. Soon all the garrisons were
air ‘medevacs’ to rear hospitals taking increasing casualties, and appealing for reinforcement and resupply,
increased to 278, and by the end casualty evacuation, and – in temperatures rising to 54o C (130o F) – for
of that year they totalled 987. water, which could only be provided by aircraft dropping sacks of ice-blocks.
Some Hanriot HD 14s were also
modified, but these could carry
Throwing a pontoon bridge across the Ouergha, Lyautey scrambled his
only one casualty. (Courtesy of limited forces together for attempts to relieve the north-bank posts. The
Cody Images) first reinforcements from Algeria and Tunisia were two African Colonial

44
 French air power

The command echelon for all French aviation in in November–December was 22 squadrons; of these,
Morocco was Col Armengaud’s 37th Air Observation one was a mercenary unit (see below), and the 37e
Regt (37e RAO), headquartered in Rabat. In April 1925 RAO’s 22e Esc was actually a six-plane flotille of
this had 10 squadrons (escadrilles), each of 8–12 Breguet Farman F60 Goliath twin-engine heavy bombers from
14A2 single-engine, two-seat biplanes: six squadrons the Aéronavale. (Untrained for low-level flying in ‘hot
along the northern front Fes – Ouezzane – Taza – Guercif, and high’ mountainous terrain, they lacked many
and the other four further south. Between 30 April and targets for long-range ‘strategic’ missions.) From mid-
mid-June these were reinforced with six squadrons from October 1925 bad weather often reduced air
36e RAO in Algeria and Tunisia, and two specialist operations, and in January 1926 the six 36e RAO
bomber units of 11e RAB from Metz, France. Early reinforcement squadrons were withdrawn.
summer saw two of the southern reserve squadrons The ‘Second Lafayette Escadrille’ was the press’s
brought north, taking strength on the Rif front to some nickname for an American volunteer squadron raised
190 machines, of which about 120 were operational at during May–August 1925 at Ouezzane by Col Charles
any one time. Their sortie rate was high, with some crews Sweeney, at a time when the demand for French
flying up to an astonishing eight missions in 24 hours. aircrew led to many reservists being mobilized. With
Attacks were usually made from dangerous 300–600ft mercenary aircrew and French groundcrew for its
altitudes, and ground commanders praised the Breguet Breguets, this squadron had an ambiguous character:
crews’ close support. officially part of the Sultan of Morocco’s Garde
Two more squadrons, from 32e RAO in France, Chérifienne, it was numbered 19e Esc in 37e RAO, but
arrived during Pétain’s build-up in September, when operated over both French and Spanish zones. There
nine ‘sector’ squadrons were put at the disposal of was international criticism of its bombing of civilian
front-line ground commanders, with another nine in targets in the latter during September 1925, and it was
‘strategic reserve’ at the C-in-C’s disposal. Peak strength disbanded in November.

battalions, II/ 15th RTC and I/ 10th RTC, which were

fed into the outpost line late in April. These, and
the three-battalion RICM, were among 19 infantry
units that Lyautey gave to Gen Chambrun for his
northern front, of which the other 14, all Colonial
or Africa Army (see page 40), formed an inadequate
mobile reserve. On 25 April this was divided between
three Mobile Groups (GMs): those of Gen Arthaud
Colombat in the west, Col Henry Freydenberg in the
centre, and Gen Albert Cambay in the east. Their
relative strengths would vary, but in late May, for
example, GM Freydenberg would have VI/ 1st REI,
II/ RICM, one Moroccan and two Algerian Tirailleur
battalions, and an ad hoc mixed battalion of Zouaves
and Senegalese.

Central and western fronts, May–July 1925

The GMs were constantly on the march, often
outpacing their logistics and any available artillery, as
they fought one urgent action after another to resupply
or extract dwindling Colonial garrisons. There was
no defined front line: while units fought to save one
garrison north of the Ouergha, other posts miles to
the south might already have fallen, or been destroyed

45
 and abandoned as indefensible. For
example, on 30 May, while other units
of GM Freydenberg were busy on the
north bank around Tafrant, some
33 miles to the SE the mauled II/ 1st
RTSM platoon holding Ait Maatouf
east of Ain Aicha had to be withdrawn
(see Map 2, detail). Since Freydenberg
Group’s HQ had left Ain Aicha for
Gara de Mezziat to its north, the former
was itself then considered dangerously
exposed, and the French conscripts of
II/ RICM, newly arrived there, were
ordered south to Tissa. Their night
march ran into a heavy ambush, costing
them 42 casualties.
After sparse artillery preparation,
légionnaires and tirailleurs often suffered
significant losses during successive relief
attacks up the same hills, fighting their
way through double rings of Rifian
trenches with machine guns facing
inwards and outwards. For instance, a
resupply of Bibane on 25 May, by the
Legion’s II/ 1st and part of II/ 2nd REI,
The pivotal moment in the the 19th Algerian Marching Bn and a West African unit, cost GM Colombat
French conduct of the war: on about 100 killed and 300 wounded (see commentaries to Plates F3 & G1).
17 July 1925, Marshal Hubert
Lyautey (left) greets Marshal
The Colonial garrisons often showed heroic endurance; always short of
Philippe Pétain on his arrival water and food, and often under shellfire, they drove back repeated assaults,
in Morocco by air. Lyautey and sortied to raid the attackers’ trenches. A few garrisons were ordered
had already been stripped of to break out by night, and handfuls of men did sometimes manage to trick
military command on 6 July;
their attackers and reach temporary safety. When all hope was gone, others
humiliated by his demotion
to civil high commissioner, he – determined not to be taken alive – chose a quick death by blowing up
would resign that post on 24 ammunition magazines (reportedly, the Berbers treated black prisoners with
September. (Photo12/ UIG via particular cruelty). Sergeant Bernez-Cambot’s garrison on Bibane would fight
Getty Images)
to the last man when that post finally fell on 5 June, after 11 consecutive days
of bombardment by two guns firing 30–40 shells a day.
Lyautey still stubbornly ignored the Spanish authorities north of the
now operationally meaningless zonal border, but on 14 May Prime Minister
OPPOSITE LEFT Painlevé sent envoys to Madrid to negotiate cooperation. On 25 May, Gen
Lyautey’s military replacement
Albert Daugan took over from Chambrun as GOC northern front, with Gen
was Gen Stanislas Naulin,
who accepted the apparently Gaston Bilotte as his chief of staff. General Colombat was then obliged to
‘poisoned chalice’ of react to a new threat towards Fes by Ahmed Heriro’s Djibala rebels, and
consolidating the front line, on 29 May – four days after their ordeal at Bibane – II/ 1st REI began an
and deploying the new exhausting forced march 60 straight-line miles NW all the way to Ouezzane.
reinforcements, in the ten
weeks remaining before the
Colombat’s partial shift westwards, and the abandonment of more posts
autumn rains. His M1913 tunic north of the river, prompted a new Rifian thrust on the central Ouergha.
shows the British-style pockets The loss of Astar post on the north bank on 2 June unbalanced the French
popular during World War I, and line west of Taounate. Astar’s brief recapture on 4–5 June, undertaken to
seven gold left-sleeve chevrons
marking his four years at the
protect other movements, suffered from bad GM Freydenberg staff work,
front during 1914–18. (Courtesy and Maj Cazaban’s VI/ 1st REI suffered 71 casualties. A failed night sortie
of Cody Images). from Gara de Mezziat to rescue Mediouna airfield’s garrison on 10/11 June

46
cost Cazaban another 60 officers and men killed outright, bringing his unit’s
cumulative casualties since 4 May to nearly 200.
While Lyautey’s shortage of troops made them unavoidable, such
operations by his ad hoc columns had only patchy success, and new rebels
were still joining Abd el Krim in large numbers. By 10 June the only posts
holding out on the north bank were Ain bou Aissa, Beni Derkoul, Tafrant
and Taounate, while north of Ouezzane GM Colombat were simultaneously
hard pressed to sustain those along the Loukos river and the zonal border.
However, on 17 June French and Spanish troops met up for the first time
near Rihana border post, and thereafter the two armies would begin to
BELOW
undertake if not joint, then at least mutually informed operations.
26 August 1925: two tribal
By the end of June, 43 of the 66 original posts north of the Ouergha emissaries come in to seek
had fallen or been abandoned – with a total estimated loss of some 5,000 surrender terms from Gen
rifles and 200 automatic weapons, 35 mortars, 51 artillery pieces, 17,000 Boichut (left), commander of
Pétain’s eastern corps based
shells and mortar bombs and 60,000 grenades, in addition to small-arms
on Taza.
ammunition. (The French made only modest use of Stokes-type mortars, One reason that Abd el
being short of ammunition for them.) Fighting went on around Tafrant and Krim’s alliance unravelled when
Taounate during July; Ain Aicha was only definitively relieved on the 20th, his early successes ceased was
and on the 30th Ain bou Aissa was the last north-bank post to fall, when the absence of racial solidarity.
When a Moroccan clan were
a Rifian shell hit its magazine. While Fes now seemed to be safe, individual defeated, whether by fellow
Rifian attacks continued both north and south of the Ouergha. Muslims or Europeans, they
routinely sought terms, and
Eastern front, June–July 1925 since the French were careful
to show respect for Islam, clans
In June the most serious threat was in fact posed by some 4,000 Ait Waryaghar might change sides to fight
and Gzinnaya, under Abd el Krim’s eastern regional general Haddu n’Muh alongside them. (Photo12/UIG
Amyzzan. These were active around the Kifane group of posts, only about via Getty Images)

47
The authors have been unable 20 miles north of the road and rail links with Algeria through Taza. In this
to identify all of the relatively sector the rebels were faced by the relatively weak GM Cambay built around
few Metropolitan infantry units
sent to Morocco during Pétain’s
LtCol Giraud’s 14th RTA, though importantly backed by Spahis, and by
build-up, but they included semi-regular tribal goumiers led by officers such as the renowned Lt Henri de
the 15th, 23rd–25th & 27th Bns Bournazel (see Plate H3). The Rifians’ aim here was to inflame the previously
of Alpine Chasseurs (BCAs). submitted Tsouls and Branès tribes. If rebels could dominate the Beni Bou
These troops are identified as
Yahi country around the Oued Msoun, and get south across the highway,
Chasseurs Alpins by their large
dark blue berets. Their uniforms they might cut access from Algeria – and, conceivably, even link up with the
are mixed: several wear M1915 still unconquered ‘Taza Pocket’ further south (see Map 1, ‘Tache de Taza’).
tenue de toile without breast They made considerable progress west of Taza, tearing up the railway
pockets, but modified with
tracks, and during a crisis of 23–27 June Gen Cambay actually suggested
turn-down collars. (Courtesy of
Cody Images) abandoning Taza and withdrawing eastwards. Lyautey dismissed this
strategically perilous idea, and Gen Bilotte juggled units to fight along the
Oued Leben, which linked the central and eastern fronts. By 7 July the Beni
Bou Yahi had been defeated, and during July–September reinforcements
including five more Legion battalions would arrive from the Atlas front.
However, these were dwarfed during August by elements of the newly
disembarked Moroccan and 11th Divs (see below), which soon neutralized
the threat in this sector.

ENTER PÉTAIN, JULY–AUGUST 1925

French troops in Morocco still totalled only about 60,000, and, embarrassed
by repeated failures and mounting casualties, Paris had lost faith in Lyautey’s
pre-1914 tactics. On 6 July the War Ministry informed him of the imminent
arrival of the whole Moroccan Div from the Rhineland occupation army – but
also that, while remaining the political high commissioner, he should now pass
his military duties over to Gen Stanislas Naulin. During 15–30 July, Marshal
Philippe Pétain (vice-chairman of the Supreme War Council, and professional
head of the French Army) undertook a searching personal inspection, and
Paris would quickly give him what he demanded for his ‘re-articulation of our
order of battle’.

48
 Aerial photo of the large French
fort on the Djebel Amseft in
Tsouls tribal territory north of
Taza, which was re-occupied
on 26 August 1925 by troops
of the newly arrived Moroccan
Division. There are relatively
few interior buildings, but
plentiful space for tents and
pack-mules. The general outline
roughly resembles that of the
much smaller outposts on the
Ouergha front. (Photo12/ UIG
via Getty Images)

Crucially, Pétain was determined that this war would no longer be fought
by ad hoc colonial columns, but by complete divisions with a conventional
chain of command, equipped with all the tools of 1918, and in planned
cooperation with the Spanish. The first fruits of Pétain’s meetings with
Primo de Rivera came during 2–18 August, when Spanish fire supported
Freydenberg’s operations north from Ouezzane to clear Djibala rebels from
heights above the river Loukos. Here French Renault FT-17 tanks were
deployed for the first time, and on 14 August Freydenberg’s troops linked
up successfully with those of the Spanish Gen Riquelme.

Reinforcement and ‘re-articulation’

Pétain returned to Morocco on 18 August to exercise supreme military
command. By the end of that month the first 14 of an eventual 36 fresh

The use of M1886 sun-helmets

identifies this battery of ‘75s’ in
action as Metropolitan Army
reinforcements, most of whom
were support and service
troops rather than infantry.
Despite the hydraulic recoil
system for which this rapid-fire
M1897 field gun was famous,
note that a shallow pit has still
been dug behind it for the trail.
(Courtesy of Cody Images)

49
 battalions and many Metropolitan support
units had arrived, and by mid-September
French forces in Morocco totalled 120,000
on Gen Naulin’s northern front and 35,000
elsewhere. Naulin’s forces were deployed as
follows (note that the divisions de marche
pragmatically mixed Colonial, Africa Army
and some Metropolitan units according to
need and availability):
Western sector (Gen Pruneau, GOC 35th
Div), Ouezzane:
128th Div (255th & 256th Bdes, each 2 regts
= 6 bns); 35th Div (69th & 70th Bdes); 2x
cav sqns; 2x tank squadrons.
Central sector (Gen Marty, GOC Moroccan
Div), Fes:
2nd Marching Div (3rd & 4th Bdes); 3rd
Marching Div (5th & 6th Bdes); Spahi regt;
tank sqn; reserve, Moroccan Div (7th &
8th Brigades).
Eastern sector (Gen Boichut, GOC XIX
Army Corps), Taza:
11th Div (21st & 22nd Bdes); 1st Marching
Div (1st & 2nd Bdes); 1st Spahi Bde;
tank squadron.
The fresh infantry from the Army of the
August 1925: the Spanish Gen Rhine were very largely Colonial and Africa Army units; only perhaps a
José Riquelme (left) confers dozen Metropolitan French infantry battalions were sent (sources differ),
with the French Col Henry
Freydenberg, commander of
and those seem to have been held in reserve. Divisions had been completely
the formerly central Mobile reconstituted since 1918; they were weaker in cavalry and artillery, but after
Group. Both were then fighting arrival some had incorporated a few of Lyautey’s veteran units. For instance,
Ahmed Heriro’s forces in the Gen Herault’s 128th Div now comprised European, Moroccan, Algerian and
region north of Ouezzane,
Colonial Senegalese units: 1st RZ (2x bns); 3rd Bat d’Af; 65th RTM (3x bns);
where garrisons and relief
columns close to the Spanish/ 12th RTS (3x bns); 9th RSA (2x sqns); and 5x field batteries. Meanwhile,
French zonal border were Gen Marty’s Moroccan Div consisted of: 2nd REI, 2nd RZ (each 2x bns);
under extreme pressure. 4th Bat d’Af; 14th RTA, 64th RTM (each 2x bns); 4th REI (1x, later 2x bns);
Freydenberg’s British Wolseley
5th RSA (2x sqns); and 5x field batteries.
sun-helmet is a personal
choice (Photo12/ UIG via Getty
Images) COORDINATED OPERATIONS,
SEPTEMBER–OCTOBER 1925

Planning
Pétain and the Spanish Gen Sanjurjo intended to push deep into the Rifian
heartland until winter prevented further movement. In this campaign the
Rifians would not only be heavily outnumbered and outgunned, but would
to some extent suffer from trying to copy their enemies’ tactics. Alongside
their always-effective mobile guerrilla methods, they had constructed some
entrenched defensive positions on European lines, which in 1925–26 would
make them more vulnerable to European artillery and air support.
The Spanish had long been planning and rehearsing an ambitious landing
operation at Alhucemas Bay. French staff officers, at first dubious, later

50
 A Rifian caid named as Sarkash
(left) and his son posing with
their weapons – respectively,
a French Berthier M1916
carbine and a Spanish M1893
rifle. Few photos show
tribesmen wearing waist belts
or sashes over the chilaba,
but note (right) this highly
decorated example. (Courtesy
of Cody Images)

recognized that these preparations demonstrated a new Spanish competence.

The landings, commanded by Gen Sanjurjo, were to be made by c.17,000
troops from Ceuta and Melilla, in 63 transport ships with British-supplied
landing barges, plus prefabricated floating docks. They would be supported
by 32 Spanish and 18 French warships, some 90 land-based aircraft and 18
seaplanes. In addition to strong divisional artillery, the combat units would
be as follows:
Ceuta Bde (Gen Saro y Marin):
Tercio: 6th & 7th Banderas. Regulares: Grupo No 1 de Tetuán.

Although the French pioneered

the use of specialist medical-
evacuation aircraft, getting
the wounded back from the
front line to a practical airstrip
was still a slow, difficult and
agonizing process. Here a
North African tirailleur leads
a pack-mule with a cacolet
saddle, providing a seat for a
casualty on each side. (Courtesy
of Cody Images)

51
 Cazadores Bns; Nos 3 Arapiles, 5 Segorbe, 8 Tarifa.
Mehalas: Tetuán & Larache (each c.600 men). Harka: Col Muñoz Grandes
(Melilla, 900 men).
Artillery: 2x 75mm batteries, 1x 105mm bty. Tank sqn (Renault FT-17s).
Melilla Bde (Gen Fernández Pérez):
Tercio: 2nd & 3rd Banderas. Regulares: Grupo No 2 de Melilla.
Marine Inf Bn; Cazadores Bn No 16 Africa; II/ Line Inf Regt No 68 Africa,
I/ Line Inf Regt No 59 Melilla.
Mehala Melilla. Harka Col Varela (each 600–750 men).
Arty: 1x 75mm bty, 1x 105mm battery.

FRENCH TROUPES D’AFRIQUE & AVIATION MILITAIRE, (2) Lieutenant navigant, 37e Régiment d’Aviation
G 1925–26 d’Observation, 1925
The 37th RAO’s Breguet 14A-2 biplanes undertook the whole
(1) Sergent, II/ 1er Régiment Étranger d’Infanterie; GM range of combat missions, from reconnaissance and aerial
Colombat, 1925 photography, to ground support with MGs and 10kg bombs. This
On 25 May 1925 some 2,000 men of one Algerian, one aircrew (navigant) officer wears the Army’s 1919 ‘polo’ model of
Senegalese, and one-and-a-half Legion battalions attacked the commissioned and warrant officers’ képi. For the Aviation
the large hill of Bibane to re-supply the Senegalese platoon Militaire it was entirely black, with gold trim: a narrow quatrefoil
holding the post on the summit. Rebels held the rocky, knot and ‘circumference’ piping on the countersunk top; for this
overgrown slopes in strength; they had loop-holed village rank, double soutaches around the rim, and over it at front, back
houses, dug trenches facing both inwards and outwards, and and sides; a gold lace false chinstrap with slides and gilt buttons;
built stone ‘nests’ for machine guns providing crossfire. The and, for aircrew, the épervier (sparrowhawk) frontal badge, here
French artillery’s inadequate barrage fell partly on the Algerian beneath the regimental number. Over flying overalls this pilot
19th BMTA in the first line (see under Plate F3). When Maj wears a double-breasted leather coat and gauntlets; in his left
Deslandes’ II/ 1st REI were brought up to bypass them, their hand he carries his flying helmet, goggles and mapcase, and is
repeated attacks were all checked by enemy fire. Finally, armed with an M1892 revolver in a hard-shell ‘jambon’ (‘leg of
Deslandes summoned his remaining seven officers; carrying a ham’) holster. (After Chapelle, Militaria No 173.)
haversack of grenades, he told them to do the same, and to
follow him in a 1918-style trench charge. At the whistle, they (3) Lieutenant, 2e Régiment de Zouaves; Division
broke cover; their légionnaires leapt forwards behind them, Marocaine, Groupement Taza, 1926
and eventually the unit broke through, at the cost of 60 The Morocco veteran Gen Pierre Ibos’s division arrived during
casualties.3 August 1925, and went into action in September. In May 1926
This sergeant – note the single short diagonal gold-lace its infantry comprised 3 battalions of the Legion, 2 of Zouaves,
‘campaign’ bar on his forearms – carries F1 grenades in a 2 of Algerian and 2 of Moroccan Tirailleurs, plus one ‘Bat d’Af’.
standard-issue musette (it seems unlikely that the complex Officers enjoyed latitude in their barracks and campaign
M1917 musette speciale pour grenades would have been dress; some anticipated regulations by adopting the latest
widely available ). The Legion had replaced rankers’ képis with fashionable details, while retaining older patterns for field use.
a khaki bonnet de police in 1915. Képis of 1914–15 manufacture However, this Zouave platoon commander wears officers’
(height 115mm rear, 80mm front) in plain bleu clair or khaki regulation 1920 tenue de toile. The dark blue patches on the
(and, for re-engaged NCOs, in pre-war colours) began to closed stand-and-fall ‘Saxe’ collar display the Zouaves’ double
reappear from 1920, all with sand-khaki field covers. This red soutaches and, in gold, the regimental number above a
uniform is the rankers’ M1921 vareuse de toile and M1915 crescent (the last being non-regulation, but tolerated). Two
pantalon-culotte. The khaki M1917 collar patches show the short gold lace bars just above each cuff identify his rank.
Legion’s two green soutaches and the grenade à sept flammes. Officers of entitled regiments often wore in the field
The buttons are of pale brass ‘tombac’ alloy; the patch breast fourragères (collective unit award lanyards); this elaborate
pockets in this case have hemmed open tops (some had example, with ‘floating’ tours-de-bras, is in the red-flecked
pointed flaps), and the waist pockets rectangular flaps. Note green of the Croix de Guerre ribbon, marking three citations
the captured Mauser bayonet in his belt; this was preferred in Army orders during 1915–18. Officers might wear either
over the flimsy Lebel needle-bayonet for hand-to-hand leather leggings or puttees with ankle boots. The campaign
combat. (Composite after various sources, including Catteau cover of the M1919 képi has a cut-out exposing part of the
& Vauvillier in Militaria No 129, and Chapelle in No 173.) rank soutaches and the unit identity. Other personal choices
are sunglasses, and a traditional chèche desert scarf. Sabres
were not carried in the field, but walking sticks typically were.
His ceinturon à baudrier (‘Sam Browne’) and several slings
3 On 18 July, near Bab Hoceine south-east of Ouezzane, support his M1892 revolver holster and other field equipment:
Maj Marcel Deslandes – a commissioned former Line a binocular case, and, hidden behind him, a mapcase, bidon,
Infantry sergeant – would be mortally wounded while and perhaps a musette. (After Dagnicourt, Militaria No 127.)
again leading his men in a successful up-hill assault.

52
 2
1

53
 Kudia Tahar
Signs of preparation in both Comandancias had warned the Abd el Krims,
and in the west M’hamed sent Ahmed Heriro to launch a diversion. Some
4,000 men with nine 75mm and 105mm guns moved across country to the
important company post of Kudia Tahar, in a salient of the Estella Line
south of Tetuán. Heriro placed blocking forces to command all routes from
that city, and installed his guns on a dominating height. On 3 September he
opened an accurate bombardment, followed by infantry assaults with strong
MG support.
The original garrison were 130 men under Capt Goméz Zaracibar of Line
Inf Regt No 5 Infante, plus artillery Lt Ángel Mejón with 23 men serving four
70mm guns. The first day’s shellfire devastated the post’s defences, knocked
out three guns, and killed two officers and 15 rankers. Reinforcement was
immediately attempted from the west, by two companies of Cazadores Bn
No 6 Africa and 21 artillerymen led by Lt Fuentes Pila, but only Pila and 11
of his men got through the inevitable ambushes, while of 40 sappers also sent
1925: French infantry wearing with Lt Sevillano Cousillas only 26 arrived. On 4 September, 500 Regulares
pale khaki chéchia-covers – failed to break through; the last gun was put out of action, shells destroyed
so probably Zouaves – pass the water drums, and the effective defenders were reduced to 48 men. On
a crash-landed Breguet
5 September, Capt Goméz was killed and command passed to the wounded
14A2, which they may be
ordered to destroy to prevent Lt Sevillano. Further relief attempts by Regulares and Line troops during
its capture. Aerial attacks 6–9 September all failed, and the defenders were reduced to drinking the
were made from only a few urine of ration cows.
hundred feet altitude, so MG Frustrated, Primo de Rivera then ordered the temporary detachment
and concentrated small-arms
fire from the ground was
of three elite battalions – 2nd & 3rd Banderas of the Tercio, and II Tabor
dangerous. It is estimated from Regulares Grupo No 2 – from the waiting Melilla landing brigade.
that during the course of the Remarkably, both he and Gen Sanjurjo accompanied them to Tetuán, and
campaign some 40 French on 11 September these units spearheaded a thrust from the north by LtCol
aircrew were killed, or roughly
14 per cent of the total
Amado Balmes. Fighting their way through fierce resistance, they finally
deployed. (ullstein-bild via relieved Kudia Tahar on the 12th – by which date the surviving defenders
Getty Images) numbered 34, only 12 of them unwounded.

54
The Alhucemas landings
On 8 September, following naval bombardments, the Ceuta Bde began
landing on Cebadilla beach outside the bay’s western headland. The first
wave was led by Col Franco with the Tercio’s 6th Bandera, flanked on their
right by Muñoz Grandes’ harquenos. Franco then struck eastwards to take
the headland and three Rifian guns, while Muñoz Grandes covered the west
and began to push inland. Successive landings extended the beachhead, and
by nightfall Gen Saro was ashore with some 8,000 men and three batteries,
at a cost of 103 casualties. On 9 September the tanks were landed, and the
brigade’s artillery began to counter Rifian guns. On the 10th, no fewer than
nine more 105mm and 155mm batteries of divisional artillery were landed
on an island in the centre of the bay. Apart from artillery duels, something of
a stalemate then ensued in the absence of Gen Sanjurjo. Bad weather delayed
until 11 September the first landings at Cebadilla of the weakened Melilla
Bde, and that night the Rifians counter-attacked. From 13 September Spanish
artillery and aircraft increased their efforts (including mustard-gas bombs)
against Rifian guns concealed in caves and gulleys.
Primo de Rivera and Sanjurjo arrived only on the 19th; by the next day
some 15,000 troops were ashore, but on the 22nd an attempted advance Near Msila north of Taza, at
was driven back. What became a three-week campaign would subject the the beginning of Pétain’s
landing force to a gruelling advance against strong resistance, in rocky September 1925 offensive,
two French officers ascend
terrain studded with defended heights, entrenchments, and even minefields. in the basket of a tethered
However, on 23 September the Melilla Bde on the left flank reached the observation balloon. (ullstein-
western shore of the bay itself, while the Ceuta Bde attacked a major Rifian bild via Getty Images)
position on the heights of Malmusi
Alto. In both brigades the Tercio and
Regulares led the assaults and took their
objectives, but that day alone cost some
700 Spanish casualties.
For the next attacks, on the heights
of Las Palomas and Tramara, Gen
Sanjurjo broke the brigades up into
infantry columns each with integral
sapper and artillery support. On the
right (west), Ceuta Bde’s 1st & 2nd
Columns (Cols Franco & Martin) were
spearheaded by the Tercio, Regulares
and Cazadores, and the 3rd (LtCol
Losada) by Cazadores, each backed
by auxiliaries. The Melilla Bde on the
left (east) formed two columns: the
1st (Col Goded) had two Banderas, a
mehala and a harka, and the 2nd (Col
Vera) Melilla Regulares Grupo No 3
and II/ Line Inf Regt No 68. Aircraft
located many Rifian gun positions, and
on 30 September, after artillery and air
preparation, Franco’s column led the
Ceuta Bde forwards in the west, with
Col Losada on his right and Col Martin
in reserve. The Melilla Bde to the east
was led by Col Goded, with Col Vera

55
 on his left. Under rotating air cover, and with tank support, the heights
were taken.
On the eastern flank on the morning of 1 October, Col Goded’s leading
troops crossed from Bocoya into Beni Urriagel tribal territory; later counter-
attacks were driven off, and the line was consolidated. The next day Goded’s
and Varela’s men occupied Abd el Krim’s deserted capital at Axdir, and
burned it down. The campaign had cost Spain 361 soldiers killed and 1,875
wounded, but Gen Sanjurjo’s division had demonstrated a transformational
improvement, and their victory was greatly celebrated and rewarded.

French counter-offensive
On 10 September, as soon as Sanjurjo’s beachhead was secure, Pétain
launched his own offensive across the western and central Ouergha, with
strong artillery and air support. Most Rifians were fighting the Spanish, and
after brief resistance those remaining on the Ouergha fell back everywhere.
On 27 September Gen Boichut’s right wing was committed to the final phase,
aiming to advance NE from around Kifane as far as the river Kert, to meet
a Spanish force under Gen Gonzáles Carrasco advancing from the east. On
8 October French and Spanish patrols did meet up on the Kert, at Souk
el Tleta, but then two weeks of appalling weather – and the failure of the
French Spahi Bde, at Sidi Ali bou Rekbar on the 11th – prevented a solid
conjunction. General Boichut pulled back to Es Sebt, and built a line of posts
facing the Djebel Rekbaba and extending west along the Djebel Nador.
There, most of the French infantry would spend a wretched winter, with
many casualties from disease and exposure. Most active operations between
November 1925 and March 1926 fell to goumiers and partisans armed by
the French and receiving some air support. Their several successes served
to detach increasing numbers of clans from Abd el Krim’s alliance. On the
western front, major Spanish forces had pushed SE to the river Loukos by
15 March.
In December 1925 the French government finally released its casualty
figures for the period 15 April–15 October 1925. These totalled 11,419 of
all ranks: 2,640 killed, 7,569 wounded severely enough to be evacuated to
the rear, and 1,220 missing in action. Of the last, only 158 would survive.

THE FINAL OFFENSIVE, MAY 1926

Planning and forces

Faced by an inevitable joint spring offensive, Abd el Krim offered to
negotiate, and both Spain and France agreed to do so. The talks finally began
at Oujda on 27 April 1926, but broke down on 6 May, mainly over Abd
el Krim’s unshakable demand for independence from the Sultanate. French
and Spanish orders went out immediately; with perhaps 40,000 French and
52,000 Spanish troops concentrated, their joint aim was the encirclement
and elimination of the remaining rebels in the eastern and central Rif.
General Naulin had been replaced in January by Gen Boichut, whose
assets were divided between a western Fes Group and an eastern Taza
Group, both with artillery, air and, where appropriate, tank support. They
comprised the following infantry divisions (from west to east):

56
Fes Group (Gen Dufieux):
128th Div (Gen Monhoven; 9x inf bns);
4th Marching Div, ex 35th Div (Gen
Goubeau; 13x inf bns); 2nd Marching Div
(Gen Théveney; 12x inf battalions).
Taza Group (Gen Marty):
1st Marching Div (Gen Vernois; 12x inf
bns); Moroccan Div (Gen Ibos; 12x inf
bns); 3rd Marching Div (Gen Dosse; 12x
inf battalions).
Taza Group would head from their Es
Sebt line NW across the Djebel Rekbaba
to link up in the upper Kert valley with
a Spanish eastern force from Midar
(see below); then north from the Djebel
Nador to the Nekor river; NW via the
Djebel Iskritten and Djebel Timersgat,
and finally to the Djebel Hammam and
the river Rhis (see Map 2). Meanwhile,
Dufieux’s Fes Group would push NE from
around Ouezzane to link up with Marty’s
left flank.
Two Spanish commands would
advance from the north: three columns
southwards from the Alhucemas
lodgement (Gen Castro Girona, c.28,000
men), and another SW from Afrau (Col
Pozas Perea, 3,000–4,500 men). Meanwhile, an eastern command (Gen These two mercenaries,
González Carrasco, 8,000-plus men) would push west from Midar and up supposedly ‘German
artillerymen’, were captured
the Kert river to link up with Castro and the French on the Nekor. The by Spanish troops when Axdir
finally fell to the Alhucemas
landing force on 2 October
1925. Josef Klemms – a self-
publicizing Foreign Legion
deserter who carried out
mapping work for the Abd el
Krims – also claimed to have
instructed and commanded
Rifian artillery, but he is known
to have been an incorrigible
liar. (Bettmann/ Contributor via
Getty Images)

Five Portuguese legionaries of

the Tercio pose for the camera.
From a few dozen initially,
during 1923–26 the number of
Portuguese serving at any one
time remained steady at about
300, making them the most
numerous foreign nationals in
Col Franco’s corps. (Courtesy of
Cody Images)

57
 bulk of these forces were as follows (it is noteworthy that almost the only
manoeuvre units of Peninsular infantry were Cazadores):
Northern front (Gen Castro Girona):
Axdir perimeter garrison (Col Vásquez): Cazadores Bn No 2; 16x cos Line
Inf; 4x MG cos, 7x batteries.
Col Fixer’s column: 2x Tercio Banderas; tabor from Larache Regulares
Grupo No 4; Cazadores Bns Nos 7, 8 & 9; 4x batteries.
Col Balmes’s column: 2x Tercio Banderas; tabor from Larache Regulares; 2x
tabors Tetuán harka; 2x batteries.

PERSONALITIES quarter-pipings over the rim; a gold lace false chinstrap, and a
H gold-embroidered Legion 7-flamed grenade. Full dress for
(1) Comandante Francisco Franco Bahamonde, Tercio Troupes Coloniales and d’Afrique was this long stand-collar
de Extranjeros; Tizi Azza, October 1922 khaki tunic, here with Legion collar patches. Major’s rank
Graduating from the Infantry Academy in 1910 aged only 17, (either ‘commandant’, or ‘chef de bataillon’ if holding a
in Morocco Franco soon distinguished himself by fearless and battalion command) was identified by four 8mm gold lace
professional leadership in Grupo de Regulares No 1 de Melilla/ sleeve rings, the top ring slightly separated. Pechkoff wears
de Tetuán. As a captain in 1916 he was dangerously wounded, the double Légion d’Honneur/ Croix de Guerre lanyard
but returned to Morocco as a major in 1920, and was chosen awarded to the Foreign Legion Marching Regt (RMLE) for its
as 2ic of the new Tercio. From command of the 1st Bandera, he nine citations on the Western Front, and inherited by the 3rd
succeeded to that of a field brigade, and finally of the whole REI. By 1926 his medal ribbons were probably those of the
‘Legión’ as a lieutenant-colonel in June 1923. He was promoted Légion d’Honneur, Médaille Militaire, Croix de Guerre & C de G
colonel after the 1924 Xaouen retreat, and in 1926 became TOE, Russian St George Medal, 1918 Allied Victory Medal, 1917
Europe’s youngest general officer, aged 33. Here he wears his Wound Medal with two stars, Colonial Medal with ‘Maroc’
usual unshowy campaign dress, without decorations: an clasp, and two Moroccan decorations. Note the 50mm ‘dark
officer’s gold-and-red-piped isabelino cap with a field officer’s khaki’ trouser sidestripe, and the dark brown silk ceinturon à
all-gold tassel, and an 8-point rank star; the Tercio’s folded-out béliere with gilt snake-and-Medusa clasps. (After photo, and
light green shirt collar; a 4-pocket tunic, bearing the Tercio’s Dagnicourt & Jouineau in Militaria Nos 151, 153 & 155.)
gilt badge on gold-piped shoulder straps, and a cuff star; and
granaderos. His Mills webbing is compatible with the (3) Lieutenant Henri de Bournazel (‘L’Homme Rouge’);
‘Canadian 1919’ set. (After photo in Gabiola, The Rif War, Vol 2.) 22e Régiment de Spahis Marocains, detached to 16e
Goum, 1925–26
(2) Commandant/ Chef de bataillon Zinovi Pechkoff; Born in 1898, De Bournazel enlisted in the 4th Hussars as soon
3e Régiment Étranger d’Infanterie, 1926 as he turned 18. He was posted to the front in June 1917;
Born Yeshua Sverdlov in Nizhni-Novgorod in 1884, he took a commissioned in March 1918; and earned a Croix de Guerre
new name when adopted as a teenager by the writer ‘Maxim on 10 November 1918. In June 1923 he was detached from the
Gorki’ (A.M. Pechkoff). By the time he joined the Legion in Italy 22nd Moroccan Spahis to the 16th Goum, and at once
in August 1914 he was already a world traveller and distinguished himself at El Mers in the Middle Atlas. He
accomplished linguist. Corporal Pechkoff was badly wounded charged on horseback under fire, at first alone, wearing his red
during the assault on Vimy Ridge on 9 May 1915 (Médaille regimental tunic and with his face soon masked with blood
Militaire). He adapted resiliently to the loss of his right arm, and from a scalp wound. The tribesmen nicknamed him ‘the Red
in 1916 his background and skills attracted the interest of the Man’ in admiration for his baraka (the favour of Allah, earned
Foreign Ministry. As a commissioned interpreter, he took part in by courage). He would exploit this notoriety thereafter by
military/ diplomatic missions to the USA and Russia in 1917–19. repeatedly wearing a red tunic in the field (but was not
Promoted to captain in the Legion, Pechkoff joined Lyautey’s wearing one on 28 February 1933, when he was mortally
staff in May 1920, and saw fierce fighting as a company wounded in the Djebel Sahro).
commander in the Middle Atlas and Rif campaigns, 1923 and Although he had a very active combat career, among
1925. The English légionnaire Adolph Cooper served with him located photos only one poor-quality snapshot shows De
in the Rif, and greatly admired his brave and humane leadership. Bournazel in the field during the Rif War, so our reconstruction
Wounded again on the Oued Leben front on 26 June 1925, he is slightly tentative. His pale blue and garance regimental képi
served on, both as a chef de bataillon and in staff appointments. bears a gold ‘22’ and 5-point star. His pre-1931 Moroccan Spahi
His later distinguished military/ diplomatic career under Gen de officers’ garance tunic prematurely features a long ‘Aiglon’
Gaulle lasted from 1940 to 1964, but in 1966 Gen Pechkoff’s collar (only authorized from 1929), and lacks collar patches.
gravestone at St Geneviéve-de-Bois, Paris, bore only his chosen Three-button scalloped cuff flaps interrupt two gold rank
inscription: ‘Zinovi Pechkoff – Légionnaire’. rings. In other photos De Bournazel wears regimental
A 1926 photo shows Pechkoff in the undress tenue de ville breeches and often puttees, but in the snapshot some kind of
version of officers’ June 1922 grande tenue, minus epaulettes leather leggings. His field equipment seems to be a ‘Sam
or sword. The ‘dark blue’ M1919 képi was actually black, with a Browne’ with holstered revolver, a black slung mapcase,
garance-red top. It bears this rank’s four gold soutaches; three binoculars and a water bottle. (After various photos.)

58
 1

59
Nine French Foreign Legion
battalions from the 1st, 2nd,
3rd & 4th REIs played full parts
in Pétain’s September 1925
and May 1926 offensives.
This shows a 2-gun Hotchkiss
section from a battalion’s 8-gun
MG company; sections were
routinely dispersed to support
individual rifle companies.
The commander – apparently
an adjudant rather than the
regulation sergent – wears the
tunic of the ‘mustard khaki’
wool tenue de drap with pale
linen tenue de toile trousers.
One légionnaire wears the
khaki M1915 bonnet de police,
and the others képi-covers
bleached to various degrees.
At this date bleaching was
against regulations but was
tolerated by some battalion Col Mola’s column: 2x Tertio Banderas; 3x tabors + 2x sqns from Melilla
commanders, since this link
with the old pre-1914 ‘Légion
Regulares Grupo No 2; Cazadores Bns Nos 13, 14 & 15; harka; 1x battery.
du papa’ boosted morale. Reserve – Gen Dolla: 1x Tercio Bandera; Cazadores Bn No 4 & part No 7;
(Courtesy of Cody Images) 2x tabors Tetuán mehala; 6x batteries.
Cavalry – Col Monasterio, later Col Ponte: 1x tabor Regulares; 3x tabors of
mehala; 2x MG companies.
Col Pozas’ column: Cazadores Bn No 18; miscellaneous mehalas & harkas;
1x battery.
Eastern front (Gen González Carrasco):
1x Tercio Bandera; 3x inf & 1x cav tabors of Alhucemas Regulares Grupo
No 5; 2x bns Line Inf Regt No 68 Africa; Cazadores Bn No 16; 4x sqns
reconstituted Caz de Cab Regt No 14 Alcántara; mtd cos from Tafersit
mehala; c.1,000 irregulars; 6x batteries.

* * *

By May, Abd el Krim’s potential remaining strength in the eastern theatre may
have numbered up to 24,000 warriors: c.14,000 facing the Alhucemas front,
4,000 south of Tizzi Azza facing Gen González to their east, and about 6,000
(mostly Gzinnaya and Beni Ammart, stiffened by Ait Waryaghar regulars)
facing the French to their SE. Many others had distanced themselves from
Abd el Krim, submitted, or openly changed sides, often attracting merciless
reprisals. However, his hard core remained defiant.

Operations
On the French far right, on the wet, foggy night of 6/7 May, 3rd Marching
Div seized its objectives in the Djebel Rekbaba, and battalions from 1st
REI, 62nd RTM and 22nd RTA repulsed fierce counter-attacks on the
8th. That day French tanks linked up with Spanish troops from the east
at Souk el Tleta. On 11 May, 3rd Marching Div reached the Nekor river,
and the Moroccan Div on their left entered the Djebel Iskritten. Against
further counter-attacks, légionnaires of 4th REI held out in the crags for
three days and nights without support. Significantly, on 14 May the first
elements of the Ait Waryaghar themselves came in to seek terms. Meanwhile,

60
 In May 1926, Abd el Krim faced
the final Spanish and French
assaults on the eastern and
central Rif with perhaps 24,000
hard-core fighters, but after a
week’s fighting even his own
Ait Waryaghar/ Beni Urriaguel
tribesmen began to surrender.
This group resting in an alley
have all received the prized
French 8mm M1886/ 93 Lebel
rifle. (Courtesy of Cody Images)

on the French left, Fes Group’s 128th and 4th Marching Divs pushed NE on
10–11 May, and on 12 May its right-flank 2nd Marching Div linked up with
the 1st Marching Div forming Taza Group’s left flank, to create a quasi-
continuous French front.
In the Spanish sectors, during 8–10 May troops from Alhucemas paid
1,188 casualties for the capture of the strategic Morabos hills, but eventually
forced the Ait Waryaghar southwards. The four columns from Axdir and
Afrau met and kept up their momentum, eventually pushing the Rifians right
back up the Rhis river and into the Djebel Hammam. On the 17th, Gen
DolIa took Abd el Krim’s fall-back base at Targuist; a final counter-attack
by some 200 warriors was driven off, and thereafter mass surrenders among
the Temsaman, Beni Tuzin and Ait Waryaghar began. From the east, Gen
González’s command advanced more slowly up both banks of the Kert, but
on 20 May linked up with Castro’s troops from the north.

The end
Abd el Krim and his last followers were now encircled in the village
of Snada, while several tribes were offering to sell him to the Spanish or
French. He would clearly be safer in the hands of the latter: for the sake of
wider Franco–Muslim relations, Paris was determined that he be treated
leniently, while many Spanish still craved vengeance for past massacres. His
offer to surrender on terms reached Col Corap of the Moroccan Div’s 8th
Bde, and was rapidly passed up the chain of command, while goumiers took
up protective positions near Snada. On 25 May, Gen Ibos’s summary of
the French terms was delivered to Snada. On the 27th, both Abd el Krim
brothers, their families and immediate entourage rode into Gen Ibos’s camp
with 270 mule-loads of their wealth and possessions; and on 30 May, Abd
el Krim made his formal submission to Gen Boichut at Taza.
The Spanish government made furious demands for his extradition, but
in vain. On 16 September his party were shipped from Casablanca to begin
20 years of comfortably subsidized exile on Réunion island in the Indian

61
 Ocean.4 Meanwhile, France took the opportunity to annex some former
Spanish territories.
Local Spanish mopping-up continued until 10 June, and their eventual
count of captured and surrendered weapons was 14,500 rifles, 216 machine
guns, 113 artillery pieces and 6 mortars. It would take sizeable Spanish
forces until 10 July 1927 to complete pacification of pockets of defiance in
the western Rif, the Gomara and Yebala. Ahmed Heriro fought to the last,
dying of wounds on 3 November 1926, by which time about 85 per cent of
the clans in the Spanish zone had reportedly submitted. Primo de Rivera’s
orders that Spanish troops should exercise restraint during the re-occupation
of 1926–27 seem to have been more-or-less obeyed. (In line with Moroccan
custom, many ex-rebels – even Ait Waryaghar – had joined Spanish-allied
harkas almost immediately, and subsequently the Spanish administration
would employ several of Abd el Krim’s leading followers in senior roles.)
Reliable figures for total Spanish casualties are not available; estimates
often fail to distinguish between fatalities and all casualties, or to define dates,
but seem to concentrate on the period from 1921 onwards. One Spanish
official source in the late 1920s apparently claimed only 43,500 casualties
of all categories, while an unsourced estimate in the International Review of
the Red Cross (June 2023) seems to suggest that as many as 63,000 died. It
therefore seems plausible to guess at anything up to 50,000 Spanish dead and
missing during 1909–27. A convincing calculation of French casualties of all
categories during their 13-month war stands at about 16,000, and a study
by the veteran Gen Antoine Huré puts the deaths among those at 8,628.
Comparable figures for Abd el Krim’s forces and the Moroccan population
are, of course, unknown.
Dated 1921, so possibly
photographed during
Silvestre’s spring advance, this
postcard shows two officers of
Regulares seated on an artillery
piece surrounded by their
men. The soldier standing at
2 o’clock from the right-hand
officer displays the narrow,
upwards-pointing, red elbow-
to-shoulder left sleeve chevron
of a private 1st class.
When well led the Regulares
were elite troops, but in the
panic following Annual those
still at Melilla were wrongly
suspected of treachery, and
disarmed. Apart from irregulars,
most of the Moroccans who
changed sides were in fact
Policia Indigena. (Culture Club
via Getty Images)

4 In 1947 the French government agreed to Abd el Krim’s request that he and his extended
family be transferred to southern France for reasons of health care and education, but while
en route via the Suez Canal he was more-or-less kidnapped in Egypt by Moroccan
nationalists seeking to manipulate his fame. After Morocco achieved independence in 1956,
Abd el Krim refused an invitation to return; he died in Cairo on 6 February 1963, aged
about 81. His name is greatly honoured in Morocco to this day.

62
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books: Militaria Magazine

Brayley, Martin J., British Web Equipment of the
(Histoire & Collections, Paris):
Two World Wars, Europa-Militaria No 32
(The Crowood Press, 2005) Bernard, Gilles, & Gérard Lachaux, Le Poilu de
Bueno, José Maria, Los Cazadores de Caballeria 1917…, in No 297 (April 2010)
(Barreira, 1983) Bouchery, Patrice, Gérard Lachaux & François
– La Infanteria de Linea (Barreira, 1983) Vauvillier, Zouaves et Tirailleurs 1916–1918,
– Los Regulares: Uniformes y Organizacion de las in No 88 (Nov 1992)
Trupas Regulares Indigenas de Marruecos Catteau, Jean-François, & François Vauvillier, Les
(Aldaba Militaria, 1989) Zouaves en tenue de drap et en tenue de toile
Clerisse, Henry, La Guerre du Rif et La Tache de 1939–42, in No 129 (April 1996)
Taza 1925–26 (G. Desgrandchamps, 1927) Chapelle, Bruno, Le 37e Régiment d’Aviation
Coune, Frédéric, Képi, Une Coiffure française; dans le Rif…, in No 173 (Dec 1999)
Tome 1, 1830–1939 (Histoire & Collections, Contamine, Bruno, Les Casques Coloniaux
2022) Français, in No 372 (Sept 2016)
Gabiola, Javier Garcia de, The Rif War, Vol 1: Dagnicourt, Eric, L’Officier Français 1920–1940;
From Taxdirt to the Disaster of Annual, 1909– les tenues de toile…, in No 127 (Feb 1996)
1921 (Helion & Co Ltd, 2021) – Les Sous-Officiers en tenue de toile 1920–1940,
– Vol 2: From Xauen to the Alhucemas Landing in No 131 (June 1996)
and Beyond, 1925–1927 (Helion & Co Ltd, Dagnicourt, Eric, & André Jouineau, L’Officier
2023) Français des Années 20; La grande tenue…I,
Pennell, C.R., A Country with a Government and in No 151 (Feb 1998)
a Flag: the Rif War in Morocco (MENAS – L’Officier Français des Années 20; La grande
Press, 1986) tenue…II, in No 153 (April 1998)
Scurr, John, illust. Bryan Fosten, The Spanish – L’Officier Français des Années 20; La grande
Foreign Legion, Men-at-Arms 161 (Osprey tenue…III, in No 155 (June 1998)
Publishing, 1985) Vauvillier, François, & Eric Deroo, Les Tirailleurs
Windrow, Martin, Our Friends Beneath the Sénégalais de 1919 à 1940, in No 54 (Feb
Sands: The Foreign Legion in France’s Colonial 1990)
Conquests 1870–1935 (Weidenfeld &
Nicolson, 2010)
Woolman, Donald S., Rebels in the Rif: Abd el
Krim and the Rif Rebellion (Oxford University
Press, 1969)

Articles:
Krugler, Gilles, ‘La puissance aérienne dans la
guerre du Rif’ in Revue Historiques des Armées
No 268 (2012)
Muñoz Bolaños, Roberto, ‘The defense of Kudia
Tahar, the prelude to Al Hoceima’ in Desperta
Ferro Contemporánea No 10 (consulted on-
line 16 June 2023)
Wanaim, Mbark, ‘La France et Abdelkrim: de
l’appaisement politique à l’action militaire,
1920–26’, in Cahiers de la Mediterranée, 85
(2012)

63
INDEX
References to illustrations are in bold, with Bataillon d’infanterie type Marocaine 40 sashes 17 (16), 43 (42), 51
captions in brackets coordinated with Spanish 49–62 satchels (skala) 17 (16), 29 (28), 35 (34), 39, 41
Foreign Legion 38, 40, 46, 48, 52, 59 (58), 60 Senegalese 40, 43 (42), 45, 50, 52
Abd el Krim 19, 19, 20, 21–22, 24, 25, 27–28, goums 40, 48, 56, 59 (58), 61 Sevillano Cousillas, Lt 54
30, 31, 56 Moroccan Div 48, 50, 57, 60, 61 shirts 17 (16), 23 (22), 33, 59 (58)
final offensive and surrender 60–62 partisans 40, 41, 56 Sidi Driss 20
gamble 38–48 RICM 38, 40, 43 (42), 45 Silvela, Luis 27
Kudia Tahar 54 tirailleurs 38, 40, 42, 43 (42), 46, 51, 53 (52) Silvestre, Gen Manuel Fernándes 11 (10),
political status 32–33 Troupes Coloniales 40, 43 (42), 53 (52), 58 18–22, 20
zenith (1924–25) 32–38 uniforms 43 (42), 53 (52), 54, 59 (58) Snada 61
Abd el Krim, M’hamed 19, 19, 25, 28, 32, 36, Zouaves 40, 53 (52), 54 Souk el Tleta 56, 60
38, 54 Freydenberg, Col Henry 45, 46, 49, 50 Spanish forces 6–18
aircraft 31, 32, 44, 45, 45, 52, 54 1st–7th Banderas (Tercios) 22, 25, 31, 51, 54
Alcazarquivir 16 Gabiola, Javier Garcia de 10, 19 air power 31
Alfau, Gen Felipe 15–16 gandoura 14, 29 (28), 39 armoured units 26, 27
Algeria/Algerians 4, 5, 40, 43 (42), 44,45, 46, García Aldave, Gen José 14–15 Cazadores 6, 9, 10 (11), 13, 14, 15, 21, 23
48, 50, 52 Gil Mejuto, Jaime 12 (22), 25, 31–32, 52, 54, 55, 58, 60
Alhucemas landings 31, 50–52, 55–56 Goded, Gen Manuel 34, 55–56 Ceuta Bde 51–52, 55
American forces 45 Gomara/ Ghomara 6, 7, 18, 25, 38, 62 coordinated with French 49–62
Annual (1921) 18–25 Gómez, Gen Jordana 18 early operations 13–25
Axdir/ Ajdir 33, 33, 36, 56 González Carrasco, Gen 56, 57, 60, 61 Melilla Bde 52, 55–56
Gurugu 14, 22, 24 Peninsular forces 6–10, 12, 24, 25, 28, 31,
badges 11 (10), 12, 13, 17 (16), 23 (22), 33, 53 Gzinnaya 19, 36, 47–48, 60 32, 58
(52), 59 (58) Policia Indigena 9, 10, 17 (16), 20
Balmes, LtCol Amado 16, 54, 58 Haddu n’Muh Amyzzan 47–48 Regulares 9–12, 14, 15, 17 (16), 18–19,
belts 5, 11 (10), 15, 17 (16), 23 (22), 26, 35 haversacks/knapsacks 11 (10), 17 (16), 43 (42), 21–25, 28, 30–32, 33, 35 (34), 51–52,
(34), 41, 43 (42), 51 53 (52) 54–55, 58, 60, 62
Ben Chel-lal 34, 35 (34) headwear Tercio 9, 12–13, 18, 23 (22), 25, 26, 28,
Beni Ammart/ Ait Ammarth 19, 33, 36, 60 Berber 14, 19, 29 (28), 35 (34) 30–32, 51–52, 54–55, 57, 58, 59 (58), 60
Beni Bou Yahi 48 French troops 38, 41, 43 (42), 48, 49, 50, 53 uniforms 11 (10), 17 (16), 23 (22), 59 (58)
Beni Bu Ifrur 14, 34, 35 (34) (52), 59 (58), 60 Sultanate army 12, 24, 25, 32, 38, 52, 55, 60
Beni Derkoul 42, 44, 47 Spanish troops 4, 6, 8, 11 (10), 12, 13, 15, Sweeney, Col Charles 45
Beni Urriaguel/ Ait Waryaghar 19, 44, 47–48, 17 (16), 18, 20, 23 (22), 25, 26, 30, 33,
56, 60, 61, 62 59 (58) Tafrant 42, 46, 47
Beni Zeroual 38, 39, 44 Heriro, Ahmed 30, 32, 46, 54, 62 Taghzat 36
Berbers 5–6 Huré, Gen Antoine 62 tanks 26, 27, 49
clothing 5, 14, 29 (28), 35 (34), 39, 51, 61 Taounate 40, 47
Berenguer, Gen Dámaso 10, 18, 22, 24 Ibos, Gen Pierre 52, 57, 61 Taza 7, 44, 48
Bibane 44, 46, 52
Temprano, LtCol Claudio 33
Bilotte, Gen Gaston 46, 48 jackets 4, 6, 8, 9, 11 (10), 20, 43 (42), 48, 53 Temsaman 19, 20, 36, 61
Bocoya/ Ibuqquyen 19, 28, 36 (52), 59 (58)
tenue de toile 41, 43 (42), 48, 53 (52)
Boichut, Gen 47, 50, 56, 61
Tetuán 9, 15–16, 18, 30, 32, 38, 54
breeches 11 (10), 17 (16), 23 (22), 35 (34), Kert, river 14–15
Tifarauín 28
59 (58) Kifane 44, 47–48
Tizzi Azza 25, 27, 30
Bueno, José Maria 11 (10), 17 (16) Kudia Tahar 54
trousers 4, 6, 8, 9, 11 (10), 17 (16), 23 (22), 29
Buerguete, Gen Ricardo 26, 27
Larache 9, 15, 16, 32 (28), 43 (42), 53 (52), 59 (58), 60
Cambay, Gen Albert 45, 48 Larrea, Gen 18 trucks 26
cars 26 leggings 11 (10), 17 (16), 35 (34), 53 (52) tunics 6, 8, 11 (10), 17 (16), 18, 23 (22), 43
cartridge carriers 11 (10), 23 (22), 26 Lyautey, Gen Hubert 5, 38–39, 44–45, 46, 46, (42), 47, 59 (58), 60
Castro Girona, Gen 57, 58, 61 47, 48, 50
casualties, final 6, 62 Varela, Col 52, 56
Cazaban, Maj 41, 46–47 Marina, Gen José 13, 14, 16 Vera, Col 55–56
Ceuta 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 15–16, 18 Marty, Gen 50, 57 Villalba Rubio, Maj José 13
Chambrun, Gen 45, 46 medals 13, 59 (58)
chilaba robes 14, 17 (16), 19, 23 (22), 29 (28), Melilla 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 13, 16, 18, 22, 24 water bottles 11 (10), 17 (16), 23 (22), 26, 43
35 (34), 51 mercenaries 31, 36, 38, 45, 57 (42)
coats 20, 23 (22), 25, 43 (42), 53 (52) Millán Astray, LtCol José 12–13 weapons 9, 36, 38, 39, 44
Colombat, Gen Arthaud 45, 46, 47 Mills webbing 23 (22), 26, 59 (58) 7.65mm Ruby semi-automatic pistol 43 (42)
colonialism 4–5 Muñoz Grandes, Col 55 9mm semi-automatic pistol 17 (16)
Cooper, Adolph 58 155mm howitzers 40
Nador 21, 24 bayonets 11 (10), 23 (22), 53 (52)
Dar Drius 25, 25, 26 Naulin, Gen Stanislas 47, 48, 50, 56 captured/lost 20, 21, 24, 36, 47, 62
de Bournazel, Lt Henri 48, 59 (58) Navarro, Gen Felipe 22, 24 daggers 17 (16), 35 (34)
de Valenzuela, LtCol Rafael 25 F1 grenades 53 (52)
deserters 34, 35 (34), 57 Painlevé, Paul 41, 46 Hotchkiss machine gun 9, 26, 35 (34), 44, 60
Deslandes, Maj Marcel 52 Pardo, Gen 28 M1866 Chassepots 28
djubba 19, 29 (28), 35 (34) Pechkoff, Gen Zinovi 59 (58) M1871 Remington ‘rolling block’ 29 (28), 41
Pétain, Marshal Philippe 46, 48–50, 56 M1873 Albinis 28
El Mizzián 14–15 poison gas 6, 31 M1874 Gras rifle 14, 29 (28)
Primo de Rivera, Gen Miguel 28, 30, 30, 32, M1874 Martini-Peabodys 28
Fernández Pérez, Gen 28, 52 49, 54, 55, 62 M1886/93 Lebel rifle 29 (28), 43 (42), 61
footwear prisoners of war 24, 24 M1892 revolver 53 (52)
Berber 14, 29 (28), 35 (34), 39 puttees 41, 53 (52) M1893 rifle 4, 11 (10), 17 (16), 51
French and Spanish 4, 11 (10), 17 (16), 23 M1895 sabre 11 (10)
(22), 41, 53 (52) Raisuli, Mulay Ahmad el 13, 15, 18, 25, 30, 32 M1897 field gun 29 (28), 40, 49
Franco, Maj Francisco 13, 25, 25, 55, 59 (58) Rif War background and origins 4–6 M1907/15 five-shot Berthier rifle 43 (42)
French forces 40, 42–48 Rifian forces 34–36 M1912 Cam Giro pistol 35 (34)
1st REI 41, 45, 46, 52, 60, 60 Riquelme, Gen José 32, 49, 50 M1915 ‘Chauchat’ LMG 40, 43 (42), 44
1st RTSM 42 Rue, Larry 33 M1916 Berthier carbine 35 (34), 51
3rd Marching Div 50, 57, 60 M1916 Spanish Mauser 23 (22)
air power 44, 45, 53 (52) Sanjurjo, Gen José 22, 25, 28, 50–51, 54, 55,
Armee d’Afrique 40, 43 (42), 53 (52), 58 56 Yebala/ Djibala 6, 7, 13, 15, 18, 25, 44, 46,
armoured units 26 Saro y Marin, Gen 51, 55 49, 62

64
OSPREY PUBLISHING Acknowledgements
Bloomsbury Publishing Plc
Kemp House, Chawley Park, Cumnor Hill, Oxford OX2 9PH, UK The authors wish to record their debt to the published works of the
29 Earlsfort Terrace, Dublin 2, Ireland following authors (see Select Bibliography):
1385 Broadway, 5th Floor, New York, NY 10018, USA Javier Garcia de Gabiola, whose recent two-volume work is the most
E-mail: [email protected] detailed English-language study of the Spanish campaigns, and is
www.ospreypublishing.com particularly valuable for orders-of-battle; José Maria Bueno, whose 1980s
works on Spanish uniforms, based on both photographic and archival
OSPREY is a trademark of Osprey Publishing Ltd research, remain extremely useful; and David S. Woolman, whose narrative
history is essential reading.
First published in Great Britain in 2024 We are also grateful to Ramon San Emiterio for his patient translation work.
This electronic edition published in 2024 by Bloomsbury Publishing Plc
Editor’s note
© Osprey Publishing Ltd, 2024 Spellings: The transcription of Arabic names and terms (which lack vowels)
into any European language can only be approximate, and since versions
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or found in separate Spanish, French and English sources inevitably differ we
transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, cannot claim consistency in this text.
including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval We have generally stuck to Spanish spellings in the passages describing
system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Spanish operations, and French versions in passages on the French 1925–
26 campaigns. At first mention, usually in the early Spanish chapters, we
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. give both versions in the sequence Spanish/ French – e.g. the ‘Yebala/
Djibala’ region, the ‘Gueznaya/ Gzinnaya’ tribe, the placenames ‘Axdir/ Ajdir’
ISBN: PB 9781472862471; eBook 9781472862488; ePDF 9781472862457 and ‘Zoco el Telata/ Souk el Tleta’, etc.
XML 9781472862464 Most names on the maps on pages 7 and 37 are in French spelling;
common geographical terms are Oued (river valley, abbreviated ‘O.’), and
Editor: Martin Windrow Djebel (mountain range or massif, abbreviated ‘Dj.’).
Index by Sharon Redmayne In prefixes to tribal names, the traditional distinction between ‘Ait’ (Berber/
Maps by John Richardson Imazhigen) and ‘Beni’ (Arabic) is unreliable as a guide to ethnicity – both
Typeset by PDQ Digital Solutions, Bungay, UK because of inconsistent sources, and because several Berber tribes had
become ‘Arabised’, and vice versa.
Osprey Publishing supports the Woodland Trust, the UK’s leading woodland
conservation charity. Errata: On Plates B1, C1, D2, D3, E1, E2 and E3, the interior of the chilabas,
visible where the hoods are thrown back, should match the exterior colours
To find out more about our authors and books visit and striping. This error is the responsibility of Martin Windrow, not of the
www.ospreypublishing.com. Here you will find extracts, author illustrator Mark Stacey.
interviews, details of forthcoming events and the option to sign up for our
newsletter.
Abbreviations in the text:
2ic second in command
Arty artillery
Capt Captain
Caz de Cab Spanish Light Horse
Col Colonel
Eng Engineer
Gen General
GOC General Officer Commanding
LMG light machine gun
Lt Lieutenant
LtCol Lieutenant-Colonel
Maj Major
MG machine gun
NE, NW north-east, north-west
SE, SW south-east, south-west
S/ Lt French sous-lieutenant, 2nd Lt