Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:125741

CR No.3388 of 2024 (O&M)

CR No.3415 of 2024 (O&M)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

****
Reserved on: 12.09.2024
Pronounced on: 23.09.2024

1. CR No.3388 of 2024 (O&M)

Sa.sh Kumar Soni through his LRs .....Pe..oners

Vs.
Dimpy Malhotra and another .....Respondents

2. CR No.3415 of 2024 (O&M)

Sudarshan Sharma @ Komal .....Pe..oner

Vs.
Dimpy Malhotra .....Respondent

CORAM:- HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA

Present:- Ms. Jigyasa Tanwar, Advocate for the peoner

in CR-3388 of 2024.

Mr. N.C. Kinra and Mr. Harsh Kinra, Advocates

for the peoner in CR No.3415 of 2024.

Mr. Ashish Aggarwal, Senior Advocate with

Mr. Nin Kaushal, Mr. Vishal Pundir and
Ms. Aashna Aggarwal, Advocates for the
respondent(s).
****
DEEPAK GUPTA, J.
Two different tenants, namely, Sash Kumar Soni and
Sudarshan Sharma (peoners herein) of two adjoining shops forming part
of the same property, owned by same landlord Smt. Dimpi Malhotra
(respondent herein), have approached this Court by way of the present
revisions, assailing the ejectment orders passed against them by learned
Rent Controller, Ludhiana, and as affirmed by the Appellate Authority.

2. None of the counsels have any objecon to hear and decide

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both these peons together, as similar evidence has been produced in

both the cases.

3. In order to avoid confusion, pares shall be referred as per

their original status i.e. ‘landlord’ or ‘tenant’.

4. In the two ejectment peons filed by landlord - Dimpi

Malhotra on the same date in March, 2010, it was pleaded that Sardar
Didar Singh and Sardar Shamsher Singh used to be owners of the property
No.B-XIX/392 Maharani Jhansi Road, Ghumar Mandi, Civil Lines, Ludhiana.
They had rented out one shop each (tenanted/demised shops) to the two
respondents on monthly rent of ₹700/- each, as per details given in para
No.1 of the two peons. The enre property i.e. B-XIX/392 Maharani
Jhansi Road, Ghumar Mandi, Civil Lines, Ludhiana, was purchased by the
peoner from the previous owners by virtue of two registered sale deeds
dated 17.08.1995 and this way, the peoner became owner/ landlady of
the property and the respondents became tenants under her on the same
terms and condions.

5. Ejectment of the two tenants was sought on the similar

grounds i.e. non-payment of rent, the premises having become unfit &
unsafe for human habitaon, change of user and bonafide necessity of the
peoner. Same facts and circumstances have been pleaded so as to seek
the ejectment. The Rent Controller has allowed the ejectment only on the
ground of bonafide necessity of the landlord and that finding has been
affirmed by the Appellate Authority, which is assailed before this Court.

6. One of the grounds to assail the impugned orders, raised by

learned counsel for the peoners is that landlady has put forth his
necessity for the demised shops for commercial use in order to open a
departmental store, whereas the property in queson is a residenal
property and that such a change of use is not permissible.
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7. The Appellate Authority aGer considering this contenon, has

rightly rejected the same. It is not in dispute that demised shops are being
used by both the tenants for commercial purposes, as they are running
shops therein. It has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Nand Kishore
Vs. Yashpal Singh, 2009 (16) SCC 634 that where residenal building is
given on rent for commercial purpose with mutual consent, then landlord
thereof can seek evicon of the property on the ground that this residenal
building is needed for the commercial purpose. Moreover, once the
appellant/ tenant himself is running a commercial acvity at the spot, he
cannot complaint at least on this ground.

8. Similarly, in Jarnail Singh Vs. Vijay Kumar, 2018 (4) PLR 700, it
had been held by this Court that if a building is used for non-residenal
purposes, landlord cannot be deprived of possession thereof for being used
for the same purpose. This Court observed further that it would be totally
inequitable, if the landlord is deprived of an opportunity to use the building
being used for non-residenal purpose by the tenant. Same view was also
taken by this Court in M/s Bharat Electricals Vs. Dr. Sukhdev Raj Goyal,
2012 (4) RCR (Civil) 26.

9. In view of the legal posion as above, the contenon raised by

learned counsel for the peoners is hereby rejected.

10. Another contenon raised by learned counsel for the

peoners – tenants is that earlier ejectment peons filed by the landlady
in 2001 were dismissed in 2005 and even the appeals of the landlady were
dismissed by the Appellate Authority and, therefore, the present peons
are not maintainable being barred by the principle of res-judicata.

11. This Court does not find any merit in the contenon and
learned Appellate Authority, aGer considering the submissions of both the
sides, has rightly rejected the same.
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12. As per the evidence on record, earlier ejectment peons were

filed by the landlady in September, 2001 on the ground of non-payment of
rent, the premises having become unfit & unsafe for human habitaon and
bonafide necessity. However, the landlady did not lead any evidence to
support the contenons and so, her evidence was closed under Order 17
Rule 3 CPC. The peons were dismissed in March 2005. The appeal filed
by the landlady against these orders was dismissed by the Appellate
Authority in December, 2005. The present peons have been filed in
March 2010 i.e. more than four years from the dismissal of the appeals
arising out of the earlier ejectment peons and aGer more than 8 years of
the earlier peons.

13. It has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in K.S. Sundaraju

Che3ar Vs. M.R. Ramchandra Naidu, AIR 1994 SC 2129 that bonafide
requirement is a recurring cause of acon and even if the existence of such
a cause of acon had not been found in the previous proceedings for
evicon, the same cannot be discarded, if such a claim is established by the
cogent evidence adduced by the landlord in the subsequent proceedings.
Hon'ble Supreme Court clarified that subsequent applicaon can be filed by
the landlord seeking ejectment by jusfying a case of bonafide
requirement.

14. Similarly, in N.R. Narayan Swamy Vs. B. Francis Jagan (SC) Law
Finder doc Id #3610, it has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court that where
earlier evicon peon is dismissed on the ground of bonafide
requirement, fresh evicon peon can sll be filed when genuine new
necessity arises in future. In evicon peon, the ground of bonafide
requirement and non-payment of rent are recurring causes and that
landlord is not precluded from instung fresh proceedings.

15. Same view has been taken by co-ordinate Benches of this Court

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in Darshana Devi Vs. Kewal Krishan, 2015 (4) RCR (Civil) 230; Amrit Lal
Walia Vs. Bhagwant Singh, 1989 (2) RCR (Rent) 238 and Ranjit Singh Vs.
Narinder Kaur, 2008(1) RCR (Civil) 239.

16. In view of the afore-said seKled legal posion, the contenon

of learned counsel for the peoners – tenants is not tenable at all. Merely
because the earlier ejectment peons filed in 2001 were dismissed in
2005, cannot be ground to reject the subsequent peons, which have
been filed in March, 2010 i.e. more than 08 years from the date of filing of
the earlier ejectment peons, though of course, it is required to be seen
that landlord has been able to make out a case for ejectment in the
subsequent proceedings.

17. Another contenon raised by learned counsel for the

peoners- tenants is that landlady is guilty of concealing her other
properes. Learned counsel has drawn aKenon towards a leKer dated
23.11.2015 (Ex.R5), which was received by the tenant from the Returning
Officer-cum-Sub Divisional Magistrate, Vidhan Sabha, Halqa Faridkot, which
shows that the tenant Sudarshan Sharma had sought the informaon about
the properes held by the landlady Smt. Dimpi Malhotra and her husband
Deep Malhotra qua Vidhan Sabha Elecons 2012 under RTI Act, 2005. As
per this leKer, since it was a third party informaon under the RTI Act, 2005,
therefore, Deep Malhotra was asked in wring to provide the informaon
but said Deep Malhotra gave in wring that since this informaon was
personal and private, therefore, the informaon may not be supplied to
anyone. Learned counsel contends that the mere fact that the husband of
the peoner intenonally did not disclose his other properes, so
inference should be drawn that peoner owned other properes in
Ludhiana.

18. This Court does not find any merit in this contenon. As per

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the tesmony of the peoner – landlady, she does not own or possess any
other non-residenal or commercial building within the urban limits of
Municipal Corporaon Ludhiana nor had vacated any such other building
aGer coming into force of the Rent Act, 1949. There is no evidence on the
part of the tenants so as to rebut the above-said tesmony of the landlady.

19. It has been held by this Court in Kanwaljit Singh Walia Vs.
Gurcharan Kaur, Law Finder doc Id#1667239 that landlord is not obliged to
disclose premises, which are not in his occupaon. It has also been held in
Bombay Kashmir Goods Carrier Vs. Charanjit Singh, Law Finder Doc
Id#2040602 that property not in occupaon of the landlord must be
disnguished from the owned properes and that if the property is not in
occupaon, no disclosure is necessary. In yet another case tled Shammi
Kapur Vs. Raghbir Kaur (P&H), Law Finder Doc Id# 933634, it has been held
by this Court that mere ownership of other properes does not make any
difference. Secon 13 of the Act uses the terms “Use and Occupaon” and
not words “the ownership”. Therefore, on this ground alone, no
concealment can be alleged.

20. In the present case, the tenants- peoners have failed to

bring on record any details regarding the other properes in occupaon of
the landlady. As such, both the Courts below have rightly rejected the
contenon of the tenants to the effect that the landlord did not disclose
about the other properes and so, any inference should be drawn against
her. Said contenon has no merit.

21. Coming to the case put forth by the landlady regarding her
bonafide requirement, first of all, let us see the legal posion in this regard.
What is the criteria to judge the need of the landlord to be bonafide and as
to what does the term ‘bonafide need’ means, has been considered by
Hon'ble Supreme Court in plethora of authories.

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22. Reliance can be placed upon Paramjit Singh Vs. Jagat Singh
2014 (2) RCR (Civil) 774, wherein this court referred to various authories
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as of High Court and then held in para
No.9 as under:
“9. Though the terminology of `bonafide requirement' has not been
defined in the Act but in Raghunath G. Panhale v. M/s Chagan Lal Sudarji
and Company, 1999(2) RCR(Rent) 485, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has
enumerated the following guidelines:-
1. Requirement of landlord must be both reasonable and bonafide.
2. The word "reasonable" connotes that requirement is not fanciful
or unreasonable. It cannot be mere desire.
3. The word requirement coupled with the word reasonable means
that it must be something more than mere desire but need not
certainly be a compelling or absolute or dire necessity.
4. A reasonable and bonafide requirement is something in between
a mere desire or wish on one hand that a compelling or dire or
absolute necessity at the other end. 5. It may not be need in
praesen or within reasonable proximity in the future. The word
bona fide means that need must be honest and not be trained with
any oblique move.
6. Language of provision cannot be unduly stretched or strained as
to make it impossible for landlord get possession. Construcon of
relevant statutory provision must strike a balance between right of
landlord and right of tenant.

7. Court should not proceed on assumpon that requirement of

landlord was not bona fide and that tenant could not dictate to the
landlord as to how he should adjust himself without geJng
possession of tenant premises.

23. This Court then further held in paras No.10 & 11 as under:
“10. The Hon'ble Apex Court in various pronouncements had laid down
guiding principles to be followed by a court while adjudicang the

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bonafide requirement of a landlord, which should be genuine, honest and

conceived in good faith. In M/s Rahabhar Produc?ons Pvt. Ltd. v.
Rajendra K. Tandon, 1998(1) Rent Control Reporters 482, it has been
observed as under:-
"The phrase "bona fide need" or "bona fide requirement" occurs
not only in the Delhi Rent Control Act but in the Rent Control
legislaon of other States also. What is the meaning of this phrase
has been considered innumerable mes by various High Courts as
also by this Court and requires no citaons to explain its legal
implicaons. Even then reference may be made to the decision of
this Court in Ram Das v. Ishwar Chander and others, 1988(1)
RCR(Rent) 625, in which it was indicated that "bona fide need"
should be genuine, honest and conceived in good faith. It was also
indicated that landlord's desire for possession, however honest it
might otherwise be, has, inevitably, a subjecve element in it. The
"desire" to become "requirement" must have the objecve
element of a "need" which can be decided only by taking all
relevant circumstances into consideraon so that the protecon
afforded to a tenant is not rendered illusory or whiKled down.
These observaons were made in respect of the provisions
contained in E.P. Urban Rent Restricon Act, 1949."

11. The bonafide requirement of a landlord depends upon facts and

circumstances of each case and there cannot be a strait jacket
formula for this purpose. The burden lies upon the landlord to
establish that the accommodaon is bonafide required by him for
personal use. While adjudicang whether the requirement is
bonafide or not, it is to be seen objecvely and not subjecvely by
the Court though, the landlord is the best judge of his requirement.
The need of the landlord must exist so as to disnguish it from mere
wish or desire.”

24. In Sarla Ahuja Vs. United India Insurance Company Ltd. 1998

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(2) Apex Court Journal 704, it has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court that
when landlord asserts that he requires building for his own occupaon,
Rent Controller shall not proceed on presumpon that requirement is not
bona fide. Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:

“When a landlord asserts that he requires his building for his own
occupaon the Rent Controller shall not proceed on the presumpon that
the requirement is not bona fide. When other condions of the clause are
sasfied and when the landlord shows a prima facie case it is open to the
Rent Controller to draw a presumpon that the requirement of the
landlord in bona fide. It is oGen said by courts that it is not for the tenant
to dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself
without geSng possession of the tenanted premises. While deciding the
queson of bona fides of the requirement of the landlord, it is quite
unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have
adjusted himself.”

25. In the light of aforesaid legal posion, it is required to be seen

as to whether landlady in the present case has been able to prove her
bonafide need for the tenanted premises so as to order the ejectment of
the respondents – tenants.

26. When in the light of aforesaid legal posion, the evidence on

file is considered, it is found that the tenants were unable to rebut the
evidence of the landlady regarding her bonafide need. It is the specific case
of the landlady supported by evidence that family of her husband was
originally seKled in Faridkot. When the terrorism was at peak in Punjab and
the State was disturbed, Faridkot became unsafe for living and therefore,
the family shiGed to New Delhi. The landlady started business of bouque
there-at. However, the business could not run successfully in New Delhi, as
she was new to the City and with the restoraon of normalcy in Punjab, she
decided to seKle at Ludhiana, it being a centrally located city and

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commercially developed. It is further tesfied by the landlady that when

the property N: B-XIX/392 was purchased, of which the demised shops are
the part, the same was old construcon. Most of the property except the
shops on the Ghumar Mandi roadside were unoccupied. The unoccupied
poron was not being used for last several years and with the passage of
me, this poron became dilapidated and unfit and unsafe for human
habitaon. The property was purchased by the peoner -landlady for
construcng a suitable building for her business as well as her residence.
All the shop-keepers were requested to vacate the premises. Though two
shop-keepers vacated the shops in their possession but the present two
tenants i.e. Sudarshan and Sunil kept on delaying the maKer. AGer giving
details about the unsafety of the premises and the previous ligaon, the
landlady tesfied further that she requires the tenanted premises for her
bonafide need. The enre rear poron behind the shops had already fallen.
Malba thereof has since been removed. The landlady had earlier
temporarily allowed M/s Oasis Dislleries Pvt. Ltd., a company in which her
husband and sons are Directors to occupy the other shops for running a
liquor vend at the me of filing of the present peons. As of now, those
vacant shops are given to M/s Om Sons Markeng Pvt. Ltd., in which son of
landlord is Director on temporary basis. A temporary structure has been
raised on the rear side for storing the stocks, which can be removed at any
me and the building material could be re-used as the said structure is
purely temporary one. It is tesfied by the landlord further that she intends
to demolish the tenanted – demised shops along with the other shops
already vacated by the tenants and will get the property developed and
construct a Mul-Purpose Self Service Departmental Store. It is also
tesfied that she and her family have sufficient funds for raising such type
of Departmental Store and that property being situated in the commercial
hub of the city, is fully suitable for the said purpose. The property shall be
used for business purpose for her own use. It has also been tesfied by the
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landlady that her husband Shri Deep Malhotra was elected MLA from
Faridkot during the pendency of this evicon peon and that in the course
of his official funcons, he has to connuously travel between Faridkot and
Chandigarh. Ludhiana falls in between the two places and therefore it is the
most suitable place for the landlady to seKle down at Ludhiana, as demised
premises being situated in Ghumar Mandi Main Chowk, which is a
commercial hub, is most suitable for seSng up a Self Service Mul-Storeyed
Departmental Store. She has also tesfied that presently, she is maintaining
her residence at 225-B-Rajguru Nagar, Ludhiana.

27. The tenants, i.e. peoners herein could not refute the afore-
said evidence produced by the landlady by producing any cogent evidence.

28. The contenon raised by the learned counsel for the

peoners is that landlady has not produced any evidence to have taken
any step for construcng a departmental store i.e. the projected necessity.
It is also the contenon that landlady is an old lady and she belongs to a
very affluent family, polically as well as financially, and that her projected
need is fanciful, as it is not necessary that she will start any business in
Ludhiana or that she requires to start any such business there-at. It is also
the contenon that the two shops earlier got vacated by the landlady are
now in possession of the family of the landlady and therefore, the bonafide
necessity has come to an end.

29. There is no merit in the contenon and the same has been
rightly rejected by the Courts below. It is not for the tenant to dictate to
the landlord about her/ his bonafide necessity. If a landlord asserts that he
requires the tenanted premises to expand the business, his need must be
presumed as bonafide.

30. In Balbir Kaur Vs. Roop Lal, 2012 (1) RCR (Civil) 279, the
landlord was a reputed businessman having business in various countries.
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The landlord sought evicon of the tenant from the ground floor of the
shop-cum-office at Chandigarh to start a big departmental store of world
repute, for which the landlord had the financial capacity. It was held by this
Court that the need was bonafide and that it is the prerogave of the
landlord to expand his business. If the landlord asserts that he requires a
tenanted premises to expand his business, his need must be presumed as
bonafide. Rent Controller shall not proceed to presume that alleged need is
not bonafide. It is not open to the Rent Controller to say that landlords are
already having business in different countries and cies and are well seKled
in their lives and hence they do not require demised premises for seSng up
departmental store of world repute in Chandigarh.

31. Similar view was taken by this Court in M/s Satpal Vijay Kumar
Vs. Sushil Kumar, 2011 (2) RCR (Civil ) 82. In Madho Ram Garg Vs. Baldev
Singh Bath and another, 2008(3) RCR (Civil) 286, the landlord wanted shop
for business. This Court went to the extent in holding that it is not part of
the Court's duty to examine as to whether the business to be set up would
be successful or not in the tenanted premises. The success or otherwise of
a proposed business lies in the realm of speculaon and the Courts abjure
speculave conclusions. The choice of the premises, the nature or the
extent thereof rest solely with the landlord.

32. Further, simply because the landlady – respondent has grown

old, as is contended by learned counsel for the peoners, cannot be a
ground to reject the ejectment peons, once she has proved her bonafide
necessity.

33. Apart from the above, it is most important to noce that the
finding of the Courts below regarding the bonafide necessity of the landlady
is a concurrent finding of fact. Whether this Court exercising in its
revisional jurisdicon can interfere in the said finding or not, is to be seen.

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34. In Daya Rani vs. Shabber Ahmed, 2019 (2) RCR (Rent) 365, an
ejectment peon was allowed by the Rent Controller. The appeal of the
tenant was dismissed by the Appellate Authority. The revision was allowed
by High Court while exercising its power under Secon 15 (6) of the
Haryana Urban Control of Rent and Evicon Act, 1973, thus, seSng aside
the concurrent findings of the courts below and dismissing the ejectment
peon. The landlord approached Supreme Court. SeSng aside the order
of the High Court, Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:-
“10. The provisions relang to revisional powers of the High Court in other
Rent Legislaons came up for consideraon before the Constuon Bench
of this Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corpora?on Ltd. vs. Dilbahar Singh
2014(4) RCR (Civil) 162: 2014(2) RCR (Rent) 210” (2014) 9 SCC 78. The
maKer was referred to the larger Bench because of two lines of decisions
which were somewhat inconsistent as is apparent from the referral order
quoted in para 3 of the decision.

”3. The two-Judge Bench in Hindustan Petroleum Corpora?on Ltd.

Case (2014) 9 SCC 102 felt that there was conflict in the two
decisions and for its resoluon referred the maKer to the larger
Bench. In the reference order Hindustan Petroleum Corpn Ltd. v.
Dilbahar Singh 2014(9) SCC 102 (dated 27.8.2009), the two-Judge
Bench observed, thus:

”The learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on a

three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Rukmini Amma
Saradamma vs. Kallyani Sulochana, wherein Secon 20 of the
Kerala Rent was in queson. It was held in the said decision that
though Secon 20 of the said Act provided that the Revisional Court
can go into the ‘propriety’ of the order but it does not entle the
Revisional Court to reappreciate the evidence. A similar view was
taken by a two-Judge Bench of this Court in Ubaiba vs. Damodaran
(1999) 5 SCC 645.

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On the other hand the learned counsel for the respondent has relied
upon a decision of this Court in Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander
1988(1) RCR (Rent) 625: (1988) 3 SCC 131 which was also a three-
Judge Bench decision. It has been held in that case that the
expression ‘legality and propriety’ enables the High Court in
revisional jurisdicon to reappraise the evidence while considering
the findings of the first appellate court. A similar view was taken by
another three-Judge Bench of this Court in Mo? Ram vs. Suraj Bhan
AIR 1960 Supreme Court 655.

From the above, it is clear that there are conflicng views of

coordinate three-Judge Benches of this Court as to the meaning,
ambit and scope of the expression ‘legality and propriety’ and
whether in revisional jurisdicon the High Court can reappreciate
the evidence. Hence, we are of the view that the maKer needs to be
considered by a larger Bench since this queson arises in a large
number of cases as similar provisions conferring power of revision
exists in various rent control and other legislaons, e.g. Secon
397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Accordingly, we direct that
the papers be placed before the Hon’ble the Chief Jusce for
constung a larger Bench.”

“11. While approving the law laid down by a Bench of three Judges
in Rukmini Amma Saradamma vs. Kallyani Sulochana & Ors. [(1993) 1 SCC
499], the Constuon Bench in para 43 of its judgment observed:-

“43. We hold, as we must, that none of the above Rent Control Acts
entles the High Court to interfere with the findings of fact recorded
by the first appellate court/first appellate authority because on re-
appreciaon of the evidence, its view is different from the
court/authority below. The consideraon or examinaon of the
evidence by the High Court in revisional jurisdicon under these Acts
is confined to find out that finding of facts recorded by the
court/authority below is according to law and does not suffer from

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any error of law. A finding of fact recorded by court/authority below,

if perverse or has been arrived at without consideraon of the
material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or
misreading of the evidence or is grossly erroneous that if allowed to
stand it would result in gross miscarriage of jusce, is open to
correcon because it is not treated as a finding according to law. In
that event, the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdicon
under the above Rent Control Acts shall be entled to set aside the
impugned order as being not legal or proper. The High Court is
entled to sasfy itself as to the correctness or legality or propriety
of any decision or order impugned before it as indicated above.
However, to sasfy itself to the regularity, correctness, legality or
propriety of the impugned decision or the order, the High Court shall
not exercise its power as an appellate power to re-appreciate or
reassess the evidence for coming to a different finding on facts.
Revisional power is not and cannot be equated with the power of
reconsideraon of all quesons of fact as a court of first appeal.
Where the High Court is required to be sasfied that the decision is
according to law, it may examine whether the order impugned before
it suffers from procedural illegality or irregularity.”

12. It would, therefore, be relevant to consider the view taken by this

Court in the Rukmini Amma Saradamma’ case (supra). That maKer arose
from the exercise of Revisional Power by the High Court under Secon
20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, which is in
pari materia with Secon 15(6) of the Act and empowers the High Court to
call for and examine the record relang to any order passed as to the
legality or propriety of such order or proceeding. Para 20 of the decision in
Rukmini Amma Saradamma was to the following effect:

“20. We are afraid this approach of the High Court is wrong. Even the
wider language of Secon 20 of the Act cannot enable the High
Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. Otherwise the

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disncon between appellate and revisional jurisdicon will get

obliterated. Hence, the High Court was not right in re- appreciang
the enre evidence both oral or documentary in the light of the
Commissioner's report (Ext. C1 and C2 mahazar). In our considered
view, the High Court had travelled far beyond the revisional
jurisdicon. Even by the presence of the word "propriety" it cannot
mean that there could be a re- appreciaon of evidence. Of course,
the revisional court can come to a different conclusion but not on a
re-appreciaon of evidence; on the contrary, by confining itself to
legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it.
Therefore, we are unable to agree with the reasoning of the High
Court with reference to the exercise of revisional jurisdicon.”

13. In Ram Dass [(1988) 3 SCC 131] and Mo? Ram [AIR 1960 SC 655], the
scope of revisional power of the High Court under Secon 15(5) of the East
Punjab Urban Rent Restricon Act, 1949 was in issue. Said Secon 15(5) is
in pari materia with Secon 15(6) of the Act.

14. The law is thus well seKled that while exercising revisional power, the
High Court cannot reappreciate the evidence on record: both oral or
documentary. Further the consideraon while exercising revisional
jurisdicon is confined to find out whether the findings of fact rendered by
the Court or Authority below were according to law and did not suffer from
any error of law.”

35. In another case tled Vaneet Jain Vs. Jagjeet Singh, 2000(5)
SCC 1, Hon'ble Supreme Court discussed the scope of the revisional power
of the High Court. The maKer had arisen out of the ejectment peon filed
under Secon 13 of the Haryana Urban Control of Rent and Evicon Act,
1973. Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to sub-Secon (6) of Secon 15 of
the Act which confers the revisional jurisdicon upon the High Court and
which reads as under:-

“4. Sub-secon (6) of Secon 15 of the Act empowers the High Court to
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exercise its revisional jurisdicon for the purpose of sasfying itself if an

order passed by the Rent Controller or the appellate authority is in
accordance with law. The queson that arises for consideraon is whether
the High Court in its revisional jurisdicon can reassess or re-evaluate the
evidence only to come to a different finding than what has been recorded
by the Court below. This Court in the case of Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr.
Mahesh Chand Gupta ( 1999 (6) SCC 222 ) held, that the High Court
cannot enter into appreciaon or reappreciaon of evidence merely
because it is inclined to take a different view of the facts as if it were a
court of facts. However, the High Court is obliged to test the order of the
Rent Controller on the touchstone of whether such an order is in
accordance with law. For that limited purpose the High Court would be
jusfied in reappraising the evidence. In Sarla Ahuja v. United India
Insurance Co. Ltd., 1998 (8) SCC 119, it was held that the High Court while
exercising the jurisdicon can reappraise the evidence only for a limited
purpose for ascertaining as to whether the conclusion arrived at by the
fact-finding court is wholly unreasonable.

5. A perusal of sub-secon (6) of Secon 15 of the Act shows that the

power of the High Court to revise an order is not an appellate power, but it
is also true that it is not akin to power exercisable under Secon 115 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. It is no doubt true that the High Court
would be jusfied in interfering with the order passed by the appellate
authority if the legality or propriety of such order demands such
interference. We are, therefore, of the view that it is not permissible for
the High Court to reassess or reappraise the evidence to arrive at a finding
contrary to the finding of fact recorded by the Court below……….”

[underlined poron emphasised by this court]

36. Yet another case tled Ajit Singh and another Vs. Jeet Ram
and another, 2008(4) RCR (Civil) 390, reached before Hon'ble Supreme
Court out of the proceedings of evicon filed under East Punjab Urban Rent

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Restricon Act, 1949 (like the present case), wherein also it has been held
by Hon'ble Supreme Court that a finding of fact as recorded by the
Appellate Authority on the queson of bonafide requirement of the
demised shop cannot be interfered with by the High Court. The High Court
under its revisional jurisdicon could have interfered with such findings of
fact arrived at by the Appellate Authority only if the High Court had found
that the finding of the Appellate Authority on the queson of bonafide
requirement was either perverse or arbitrary.

37. The legal posion as explained above make it clear that:

x The revisional power of the High Court under Secon 15(6) of the
Rent Act is not appellate power and so, the high court cannot re-
appreciate the evidence on record, whether oral or documentary
only because it is inclined to take a different view of facts as it were a
court of facts.

x The High Court can interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by
the Rent Controller/ Appellate Authority, only if it finds that the said
finding on the queson of bonafide requirement is either perverse or
arbitrary, or there is illegality or perversity of such a nature that it
demands interference.

38. On account of enre discussion as above, it is held that none of

these peons have any merit. The Courts below have rightly appreciated
the enre evidence on record. There is no scope for interference in the
well-reasoned findings as recorded by the Courts below. This Court does
not find any illegality or perversity so as to interfere in the impugned
orders. Both the peons are hereby accordingly dismissed.

39. Both the peoners-tenants are hereby directed to vacate their

respecve demised shops on or before 30.11.2024 posively. This me is

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granted to them subject to clearance of all the arrears at the rate last
agreed between the pares. They will also make payment of user charges
up to 30.11.2024 in advance. It is further made clear that in case the
tenants-peoners herein fail to vacate the demised shops ll 30.11.2024
and the peoner – landlady is compelled to file the execuon to get the
actual physical possession of the same, the defaulng tenant will have to
pay the mesne profits/ usual charges @ ₹1 lakh per month to be effecve
from 01.12.2024 onwards ll the shop (s) is/are actually vacated. Ordered
accordingly.

40. A photocopy of this order be placed on the file of connected

case.

September 23, 2024 (DEEPAK GUPTA)

Renu JUDGE
Whether Speaking/reasoned Yes
Whether Reportable Yes

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