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 THE
CHOWKHAMBA SANSKRIT STUDIES
VOL LXII

THE AESTHETJC EXPERIENCE

ACCORDING TO ABHINAVAGUPTA

By
RANJERO gnoli

SECOND EDITION
REVISED, ENLARGED AND RE-ELARORATED
Bj>

THE AUTHOR
pCCp”- T"
t Jt*. 300E

THE
CHOWKHAMBA SANSKRIT SERIES OFFICE
VARANASI-I ( India )

1968
Publisher : The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, Varanasi-1

Printer : Vidya Vilas Press, Varanasi-1

Edition : Second, 1°6S.

Price : Rs. 45-00

This is a Second Edition of the work, revised, enlarged, and re-elaborated by

the Author, the First Edition having appeared in the SOU, No, XI, published
by 1SMEO ( islitulo Italiano per il Medio cd Eslremo Oricnlc ), Rome 1956.

(Q) The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office

PUBLISHERS MID ORier.TAL & FOREIGH EOOl'.-SELLERS
K. 37/99, Gopal Mandtr Lane
P. O. CHOWKHAMBA, P. BOX 8, VARANASI-1 ( India )

1968
 PUBLISHERS’ NOTE
ABHINAVAGUPTA seems to have given the final shape to the philo-
sophy of beauty in India His name is familiar to all students of Sanskrit

poetics and Indian Aesthetics His fame is still alive and his poetical

and philosophical theories hold ground even today It is no wonder

that the aesthetic thought of Abhmavagupta, one of the most profound

and keenest minds that India has ever known, captured the imagination

of Prof Ramero Gnolt who, besides being an erudite scholar, well-

known editor and able translator of various Sanskrit Texts, is a Sahrdaya

to the true sense of the term His thorough understanding and scholarly

but lucid exposition of the Rasa theory of Abhmavagupta in particular

and the aesthetic theories of other thinkers in general, are simply wonderful

In the present work, AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE ACCORDING

TO ABH1NAVAGUPTA, he has edited and translated the Com-
mentary by Abhmavagupta on the famous sutfa of Bharata, Vibfunanu-

bha\ avy abhtcansam) ogndrasanispatuh ( Nut) a tastra ) which constitutes

the most important text in the whole of Indian aesthetic thought, and

explained it in the light of the views of prominent rhetors and philo-

sophers —both ancient and modern The theory of Abhmavagupta has

actually been presented here in a garb which can very easily appeal to

the modern mind

The first edition of this work was issued some ten years back by the

iSMEOof Rome m the SER1E ORIENTALE ROMA (No XI) under

the direction of Giuseppe Tucci, and was much welcomed by the lovers
of Sanskrit literature, all over the globe. But the learned author, following

the famous maxim of Kalidasa, 'A paritosud vidusam na sudhu tnanye

prayogavijnunam, etc.’, carried on most devotedly his researches in the

field of his favourite study and as a result, could revise, enlarge and

re-elaborate the previous edition into the present one.

While presenting the second edition before the readers we fervently

hope that it will be welcomed by scholars and students alike.

Our sinccrcst thanks are due to ISMEO, Rome, Prof. G. Tucci and
Prof. R. Gnoli, the learned author, but for whose kind approval, active

encouragements and keen interest, it would have not been possible for us

to print and publish this valuable work in India.

[ iv ]
 TO MY MASTER
GIUSEPPE TUCGI
 CONTENTS

List of Abbreviations IX
Preface XIII
Introduction . . XIV
Text . 3

Translation . . . . . . 23

Appendix I . . . • . . 88

Appendix II . • • • . . 102

Appendix III 107

General Index • l!5

 ,,

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND SYMBOLS

A Eh =Abhmavagupta s Abhtnaiabharati cf Preface, p Xili

AG = Abhinavagupta,
Dasarupa = Haas, George C O ,
The Dasarupa A Treatise of Hindu
Haas Dramaturgy by Dhanamjaya Columbia University Press,

New York 1912

Dasgupta, = Dasgupta, Surendranath, A Hist or) of Indian Philosophy
// / Ph 5 vols ,
Cambridge 1932 1955
De,SK = De, Sushil Kumar, Studies in the History of Sanskrit
Poetics Luzac, 2 vols , London 1923, 1°25
DkA = Anandavardhana’s Dhi any aloha with the Locarta and
BaJapnya commentaries by Abhinavagupta and
RamaSaraka, ed by Pandit Pattablur3ma Sastri,

Chowkhamba, Benares 19*10

DhAL = Abhinavagupta s commentary { loeena ) on the D 'ma-

ny ulokaby Anandavardhatia
G = Kavi’s edition of the Abhmaiabhurati cf Preface, p XIII
He = Hemacandra’s Kavyanusasana cf Preface, p xut
hid lh s= Chandra Bhan Gupta, The Indian Theatre Motdal
Banarsidass, Banaras 1954
IPV = Abhinavagupta’s ISvarapraty abhijtwutnarsmi KSTS
2 vols , Srinagar 1918 1921
1 P VV = Abhinavagupta’s lharapraty cb! iyuan v/ itumarimi K S
T S,3 vols , Srinagar 1938 1943
J =Jayaratha, the commentator of the Ablunavagupta’s
Tantri loka
JBORS —Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society

JBU = Journal of Bombay Unuersity

JOR = Journal of Oriental Research Madras
K Ad = Dandin s Kavyadarsa edited and translated by

O Bohtlingk, Leipzig 1890

SDV = Kane, P V The Sul ityadarpo a of Visianatha Pane (
Kane,
chedas I, II, Arthalankaras ), with exhaustive Notes
and the History of Sanskrit Poetics Bombay 1951
= B ayiiei- hun-S- Kav\/vn mumsa Gaekwad Oriental Senes
KAh
Baroda 1916
KP =Mammatas Kavyaprakula, cf Preface, p XV
[1X1
 ABBREVIATIONS

K.S.T.S. Kashmir and Studies.

Series of Texts

Mahimabhatta,; The Vyaktiviveka of Mahimabhatta, cd. with a comm, of

Vyaktiviveka Ruyyaka and the Madhusudanlcomm. by Madhusudana

MiSra, Chowkhamba, Benares 1936.

M. C. ^Manikyacandra, cf. Preface, p. Xlir.

N. M. -The Nyayamahjari of Jayanta Bhatta, cd. by Surya

Niirayana Sukla, Benares 1936.
N.S. = Naira Sustra, cf. Preface, p. XIII.

P = Pandcy, cf. Preface, p. xv.

Pandcy ; Pandcy, Kanti Chandra, Indian Aesthetics, Chowkhamba,

Banaras 1950.
Pandcy, A.G. Pandcy, Kanti Chandra: Abhinavagnpta, an Historical
and Philosophical Study, Chowkhamba, Banaras 1935.
P.T.V. Abhinavagupta’s Paratriiniikavivarana, K. S. T. S.,

Srinagar 1918.
P.V. -Dharmakirti’s Pramunavartika with a commentary of
Manorathanandin ed. by Rahula Sahkrlyayana.
Appendix to JBORS, vol. XX1V-XXVI, 1938-1940.
P.V., svavitti = MS. of the commentary by Dharmaklrti on the ch. I

( svurthunumunapariccheda )
of his Pramunavurtika. This
MS. belongs to Prof. Giuseppe Tucci.
R.T. = Kalhana’s
‘
Rnjalarahgini, ed. by M. A. Stein, Bombay
1892.
S. Kn. • The Suhkhya KurikTt of Isvarakrsna with the Suhkhya
Tattvakaumudi ofVachaspati MiSra, Bombay 1940-
Somananda, = Somananda’s Sivadrsti with the vrtti of Ulpaladeva,
Sivadrsti Srinagar 1934.
Spandanirnaya - Kscmaraja’s Spandanirnaya, K.S.T.S., Srinagar 1925.
Stavacintumani -The Stava-Chintuinani of Bliatta Narayana with com-
mentary by Kscmaraja, K.S.T.S., Srinagar 1918.
T.A. = Abhinavagupta’s Tantrfiloka, with the commentary of
Jayaralha, K.S.T.S., 12vols., Srinagar 1918-1938.
Vijmmabhairava — The Vijnunabhairava with comm, partly by Kscmaraja
and partly by Sivopadhyaya, K.S.T.S., Srinagar 1918.
V.P. = Bhartrhari’s Vukyapadiya cd. by Carudcva Sastri
Lahore 1939.
ZDMG = Zcitschrift der Deufschen Morgenlandiscken Gescllscha/t.

[ X ]
 THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE
ACCORDING TO ABHINAVAGUPTA
 PREFACE
This booh was first printed in 195G Since then 1 ha\e
never relinquished my researches in the fields of Indian
Rhetoric and Aesthetics Some misinterpretations and mis
takes occurring in the first edition have already been corrected
by myself in 1957, in the paper Further Observations on the
Abbimvabharatt, East and West, year VTH, N 1 —April, 1957
pp 100 103 This new edition represents, I trust, a great im-
provement m regard to the first one The Introduction, the
critical apparatus, the translation and the notes have been
completely revised The basic text of Abhinavagupta, l e the
commentary to the famous sutra by Bharata, VI, after st 31,
vtbhatamibbai apjabbieansamj ogad rasamspnttib^ has been supple
mented by three new texts, uz die Commentaries on
NaQabasfra, I, st 107, on Vhianyaloka, I, st 18, and U, st 4

As to the text I have directly compared the MS of Abbwa

of Madras (M)
icbharati preserved in the library References to
the Kavi’s edition of the Abhwaiabbaratz are to the second edi
tion of it The letters He and M
to the tneka of C refer
Hemacandra and to the samhta of Mamhyacandra respectively
Although the additions and explanations of He do not alter
in any way the thought of AG ,
I ha\e not reproduced them
in the text, which I ha\ e tried to set forth such as it was before
the exegetical activity of the great jama scholar

In so many changes, one thing has remained unchanged m

these ten years I mean the profound debt of gratitude I one
to Prof Giuseppe Tucci, to whom, now as then, this booh is

dedicated

1
 INTRODUCTION
The Natyasdstra

1. In India, the study of aesthetics —which was at first

restricted to the drama — draws its origin from no abstract or

disinterested desire for knowledge but from motives of a
purely empirical order. The most ancient text that has come
down to us is the Ndfyasdsira (4th or 5th Century A. D. ?),

ascribed to the mythical Bharata. This is a voluminous collec-

tion of observations and rules concerned in the main with the
production of drama and the training of actors and poets. The
author, or the authors, with a certain sententiousness and ped-
antry typical of Indian thought, classify the various mental
states or emotions of the human soul and treat of their transi-
tion from the practical to the aesthetic plane. The Nafyasdsira
is a work of deep psychological insight. Drama appeals to
sight and hearing
at the same time (the only senses that are
capable, according to some Indian
thinkers, of rising above
the boundaries of the limited “
I ”) and is then considered the
highest form of art. In it both sight and hearing collaborate
in arousing in the
spectator, more easily and forcibly than by
any other form of art, a state of consciousness s/ii generis,
conceived intuitively and concretely as a
juice or flavour, called
Rasa. This typically Indian
conception of aesthetic experience
as a juice or a taste savoured
by the reader or spectator should
not surprise us. In India, and
elsewhere, sensations proper
to the senses of taste and touch,
almost devoid of any noetic
representation, arc easily taken to designate
stales of conscious-
ness more intimate and removed
from abstract representations
 INTRODUCTION

than the ordinary one-that is the aesthetic experience and va-

rious forms of religious ones

This Rasa, when tasted by the spectator, pervades and en-

chants him Aesthetic experience therefore, the act of
is,

tasting this Rasa, of immersing oneself in it to the exclusion of

all else Bharata, in a famous aphorism which, interpreted and
elaborated in various nays, forms the point of departure of all
later Indian aesthetic thoughts, says, in essence,
that Rasa is
born from the union of the play with the performance of the
actors Out of the union of the Determinants he says —
literally— the Consequents and the Transitory Mental States,
the birth of Rasa takes place” What is then the nature of
Rasa ? What are its relations with the other emotions and
statesof consciousness ^ And how ate we to understand this
word “ birth ” * The whole of Indian aesthetics hinges on
such questions, which have been an inexhaustible source of
polemic material to generations of rhetors and thinkers, down
to our own days But, before undertaking an examination of
their various interpretations, let us briefly expound here the
essentials of the empirical psychology of Bharata
According to the Nafyardsira, eight fundamental feelings,
instincts, emotions or mental states called hhava or stbajibbdid1 ,

can be distinguished in the human soul Delight (rati),

Laughter (Ami), Sorrow (soku), Anger (A/WAr), Heroism (i/tsaba).

Fear (bbaya). Disgust (jugupsa ), and Wonder (vtsmyci) These

1) The word bbai j made to derive by Bharata, VII, 342 346, from the
is

causative of bbft to be which may be intended in two different meanings,

”
that is *'
to cause to be ” (vu bring about, create, etc ) and “ to pervade
According to the first meaning that which is brought about are the purposes
of poetry, kavyartha, thatthe Rasas (cf below, p 50 n 2 <j) According to
is

the second meaning these are so called because they pervade, as a smell,
theminds of the spectators The meaning of sibajtn ispermanent, basic, etc

[ }
 ,

INTRODUCTION

eight states are inborn in man’s heart. They permanently

exist in the mind of every man, in the form of latent impressions
(vasaiia) derived from actual experiences in the present life or

from inherited instincts, and, as such, they arc ready to emerge

into his consciousness on any occasion. In ordinary life each
feeling is manifested and accompanied by three elements, causes
(, kdram), and concomitant elements ( Sahakarin).
effects (karyd)

The causes arc the various situations and encounters of life, by

which it is excited the effects, the visible reactions caused by
;

it and expressed by our face, our gestures and so on; and the

concomitant elements, the accessory and temporary mental

accompanying it. These eight bhavas indeed, do not
states

appear in a pure form. The various modulations of our mental

states are extremely complex, and each of the fundamental or
permanent states appears in association with other concomitant
mental states, as Discouragement, Weakness, Apprehension
and so on. These occasional, transitory, impermanent states

are, according to Bharata, thirty These same causes, etc.,

six.

being acted on the stage or described in poetry, not lived in

real life, give spectators the particular pleasure to which
Bharata gives the name of Rasa. The fundamental mental
states being eight in number, there arc also eight Rasas, i.c.,

the Erotic (sriigdra), the Comic (

bdsja), the Pathetic (
knrnm),
the Furious (randra), the Heroic (t’lrri), the Terrible ( bbayanaka),
the Odious (blbbatsa) and the Marvellous ( adblmta). Later
speculation generally admits a ninth permanent feeling,

Serenity (Jama)’, the corresponding Rasa is the Quietistic

(Santa). When they are not part of real life but are elements
of poetical expression, even the causes, effects and con-
comitant elements, just as the permanent mental states, take
another name and are called respectively Determinants

(
'yibhava), Consequents (antibbava) and Transitory Mental States

[
xvi
]
 , a

INTRODUCTION

{
'v)(tbbtcarihbaiay Of course, from the spectator’s point of \iew,
the consequents do not follow the feeling, as they do in the
ordinary life, but they act as a sort of causes which intensify
and prolong the feeling, brought about by the determinants
2 Dan din and Bhatta Dolfata Bharata’s text and the afore
said aphorism in particular became, as we have said, the subject
of study and analysis for a whole senes of thinkers, each of
whom was anxious to contribute to a clearer understanding of
the wotds of the Master The earliest of these were, so fat as is

known, Dandin (7th century) and Bhatta Lollata (9th Cent ),*

There is no need to insist upon the fact that all these English rende
1)
rings are fax from being satisfying According to Bharata, \ If, 346, the
term ttbbat’d has the meaning of cognition, ujnana They are so called,
because words gestures and the representation of the temperament are
determined ttbbavyaft (that i$, known, according to AG) by them The
armbbava, on their turn, are so called because the representation, in its three
aspects, that is, voice, tat, gestures, artga, and physical reactions, salti
causes (the spectators) to experience (the correspondent feeling) I have
followed here the reading accepted by AG (yad ayam an/bbaiayati
i agangasattvakrto* bhmayah tasmfid anulhawh) The commentary of AG on
this part of the NatyaSastra is, however, not available, and there arc of
this passage, many different readings

2) Dandin (7th century wrote the Katyadarfa (this work may be

?)
consulted also in the translation of O Bohtlmgk, Leipzig 1890) Bhatta
Lollafa flourished in Kashmir in the 9th or 10th century He v. rote a
commentary, now lost,on the NatyaSastra of Bharata Ksemaraja (Span
damrnaya, p 34) and AG (Af VV V 778) quote a Bhatta Lollata who
wrote a commentary (yrlti) to the Spandakartka of Vasugupta In my
opinion, it seems probable that these two Bhatta Lollatas are one and the
same person Bhatta Lollata would, in that case have lived in the reign
,

of Avantivarman (856 83 A D , Vasugupta lived tinder Avaittivatmau) or

in the reign of his successor, Sankaravarman This change, also involves
a change in the dates of Sankuka. (cf infra, p 32, n. 4), wbo could then no
longer be identified with the poet Sankuka who was a contemporary of
Ajitapida (early 9th century)

[
WII ]
 INTRODUCTION

who like his great successor, was a Kashmiri and probably a

follower of one of the Sivaite mystical schools flourishing in

Kashmir. According to them. Rasa is simply the permanent
mental state (anger, fear, etc.) raised to its highest pitch by the
combined effect of the Determinants, Consequents and Transi-
tory Mental States. Bhatta Lollata maintains that Rasa lies

both in the represented personage and in the imitating actor.

The actor he says, feels the different bbaras and rasas as though
they belonged truly, or rather personally, to him. To the
objection that, being it so, the actor would fail to maintain
’

or follow the tempo and the other dramatical conventions,

Bhatta Lollata answers that, on the contrary, the actor can
manage very well with them by virtue of annsctnidbi or anusam-
'

dhdna x
. —
Ammmdbi that literally signifies recollection, me-
-

mory and even something more than this, i.e., consciousness,

awareness, reflection, etc have tentatively rendered by .
2
and I
“ realisation ”3
—
is at the same time the power thanks to which

the actor “ becomes ” for the time being the represented or

imitated personage (e.g. Rama), feels himself as Rama, and the
faculty through which he nevertheless docs not forget his real

1) Cf. A.Bb., T, p. 264 : rasabhavdnav: apt vdsandvtSavascna naic sarvbbavdd

awnanilbiballc ca 1 ; cf.
also Db.AhL., infra p. 109
'jadyannsarandt and, on ;

all this, K. M. Vnrmn, Seven Words in Bbarafa Calcutta 195S, pp. 37, 3S. An ,

opposit view to that of Lollata was maintained by the followers of Udbhata

(a Kashmiri poet and writer at the court of King Jayapida (779-S13),

according to whom our perception of the actor as having really bbaras and
Rasas is an illusion {drstas in fafprafjayo ante bbrawah., A.Bk, T, 264).
2) Cf. f. i. A. Bb. I, 43, where niranusamdbi means uncontrolled,
thoughtless.
3) According to some later commentators, the meaning of amtsamibam
is visualization or something like that ;
cf. f.i. Prabhakara, Basapradipa,
Benares 1925, p. 23 : anrsrmdhanct?: ca karivi: aksitosjdrthdsya vdsanapd-
tavavasaf Safzsad iva karanam jj

xviii ]
[
 introduction

nature of actor Seemingly, Bhatta LoIIata's theory does not

concern the problem of how the spectators do relish Rasa
3 Sanbtka — Sankuka, a Kashmiri who lived a little later

than Lollata, disagrees 1 with this view According to him,

not as the “ ancients
**
Rasa is put it, an intensified state but an
imitated mental state In ordinary life, the mental state of a
man is revealed by the causes which excite it, 1 e the determi-
nants, by the visible effects of his feeling, i e , the consequents,
and by his concomitant feelings, i e ,
the transitory mental
states The by the actor of the characters
successful mutation
and their experiences is no doubt, Sankuka says, artificial and
unreal, but is not realized to be so by the spectators, who forget
the difference between the actors and the characters, and in
ferentially experience the mental state of the characters them
selves —
This experience which is actually a peculiar form of
—
inference is, to Sankuka, different from any other kind
of knowledge A horse, imitated by a painter, Hemacandia
observes, hinting at 3ankuka’s theory, seems to onlookers
neither real nor false, and is nothing but an image which pie
cedes any judgement of reality or unreality So far, so good
According to Abhtnavagupta, the weak point of Sankuka*s
theory is his premise that the aesthetic state of consciousness or
Rasa is nothing but the perception of an imitated mental state

1) Sankuka flourished m
Kashmir after Bhatta Lollata It is doubtful
whether he should be identified with the poet Sankuka author of a poem
called Rlmanabbpudiya w ho according to Kalhana (R T, IV 705) lived under
the reign of Ajitapida (about 830 AD) In this case his predecessor
Bhatta Lollata can no longer be identified 111111 the commentator of the
same name on the Spa idakanka and so his period should be brought back
to the end of the 8th century and the beginning of the 9th- C£ above

p WII n 1 'ainkuka wrote a commentary to Bharata now lost which is

frequently quoted by AG On Sankuka see De I P I p 38 ,

Pandey,
A G , p 128

l ^ ]
 INTRODUCTION

This concept of imitation was refuted by Abhinavagupta, as it

had been before him by his master Bhatta Tauta, the author of
the Kavjakantnht, an important work on poetics, now lost.

Their reasoning is painstaking and acute: the effect of imita-

tion (as when a clown imitates the son of a king) is in fact

laughter and mockery and has no connection with the aesthetic

experience. The imitation theory is also clearly contradicted

by certain arts — dancing, for example —which obviously do

not imitate anything in real life.

4. Bbaf/a Nojak/i .
—A third thinker who is very important
in the history of the doctrine of Rasa is Bhatta Nayaka, a
Kashmiri of about the first half of the 10th century, author
of the lost Sabrdayadarpaya ‘. His critique deals first of all

1) Bhatta Nayaka flourished in Kashmir after Anandavardhana (who

was a contemporary of King Avantivarman, 856-883 A. D.), the author of
the Dhvattyaloka , whom lie refutes. Bhatfa Nayaka is, therefore, to be
placed around 900 A.D. It is not, probably, mistaken to identify him with
the Brahmana Nayaka, who lived during the reign of Sahkaravarman
(883-902 A.D.), and who is mentioned by Kalhana (R.T., V., 159). In the
I.P.V.V., III, p. 96, A.G. quotes a stanza of saiva inspiration, which lie
attributes to Bhatta Nayaka, to whom he gives the title of tmmanisakagranth
(the same title is given by A.G., elsewhere, to Kumarila, mtad visa kapra-

vara). Another stanza of Bhatta Nayaka (taken from a slofra) is quoted by

Ksemaraja ( Spandaniruaya , p. 18). I am two inclined to think that these
Bhatta Nayakas were one and the same person. work of Bhatta The poetic
Nayaka was the Hrdayeidarpaita (or Sabrdayadarpaiiid) which has not yet come
to light. The opening stanza of this work, which contains an invocation
to Siva, has been preserved in the A-B/j., I, p. 5. The fragments of the
poetic work of Bhatta Nayaka have been collected by T.R. Chintamani,
Vol. I, pp. 267-276. On the poetic doctrine of Bhatta Nayaka
and the confutation of the dbvani, cf. T. R. Chintamani, J.B.U., vol. 17,
part 2, pp. 267-276. Bhatta Nayaka’s theory is also stated with few varia-
tions in the Db.A.L., pp. 180 (T. (infra, p. 107). On Bhatta Nayaka in ge-
neral, sec Sankaran, op. clt., pp. 86-88, 102-4 Kane, V.D.TA.pp. 212-215 ;
;

Pandey, A.G., pp. 128-130.

[ XX ]
 INTRODUCTION

v ith theword “ birth ”, used by Bharata , in what sense, he

asks, should the word be understood 3 Perception, produc-
tion, and manifestation are facts of ev eryday life, they ha\ e
nothing to do with the aesthetic fact, with Rasa Hence the
real meaning of “ birth ”, as used by Bharata, cannot be per-
ception, or production, or manifestation Theatrical per
formance (the actions of actors) or poetry (the words of a
1
poet) does not make Rasa perceptible, produce it, or manifest
it The relation between the practical, or literal meaning, and
the poetic meaning lies in none of these , rather, it lies m some-
thing entirely different from these three facts of e\ eryday life,

namely m“ rev elation ” (bbatand) This revelation, as Abhwa-

1 agupta says in his paraphrase of the Sabrdajadarpana is a
special power, different from the power of denoting, that
w ords assume in poetry and drama The specific task of this
power, which as Nayaka says, “ has the faculty of suppressing
the thick layer of mental stupor occupying our consciousness ,
is generalization or unrv ersalization of the things represented
or described “The Rasa, revealed by this power is then
enjoyed (bbttj) through a sort of enjoyment different from direct
experience, from memory etc ” The core of Bhatta Nayaka’s
doctrine is precisely this concept of generalization —one of the
mam contributions of Indian aesthetics The aesthetic state of

consciousness — whether its material be anger, love, pain, etc —

does not insert itself into the texture of everyday life but is

1) During the aesthetic experience the consciousness of the spectator

is free from all practical desires The spectacle is no longer felt in conne
non with the empirical “ I of the spectator not in connexion with any
other particular individual ,
it has the power of abolishing the limited
personality ot fne spectator, region. rramKftKrlrj ’no. iumcrcdcrtt

being not yet overshadowed by maja Moha stupor, is the specific state

aroused by tarral

2 [ ]
 —
Introduction

seen and lived in complete independence of any individual

interest. The images contemplated on the stage or read in
poetry arc seen by the man of aesthetic sensibility independently
of any relationship with his ordinary life or with the life of the
actor or of the hero of the play or poem, and appear, therefore,
in a generalized sddbdmjlkrfti , sadhanvu way, that is to say,
( )

universally and released from individuality.

The drama performed or the poem recited has the power
to raise the spectator, for the moment, above his limited ego,
c<
his practical interests, which in everyday life, like a thick layer
of mental stupor ”, limit and dim his consciousness. Things
and events that in practical life when associated with “ I ”, with
“ mine ”, repel or grieve
us, arc felt as a source of pleasure
the aestlictical pleasure or Rasa —when they arc described or
represented aesthetically, that is, when they are generalized
or contemplated universally 1
. This conversion of pain into

1) Generality ([sddharaiiya) is the principal character of aesthetic ex-

perience. The events and of which the determinants, etc., consist
facts
are independent of any relation
with any particular individual and of any
particular association. The situation represented, says Mammata, is
independent of the following specifications “
: This concerns me “ This
concerns my enemy ” “ This concerns; a person who is indifferent to me
“ " ,C " ; “ Tllis d«s
™! f not concern my enemy
..

is the
' ™"° l

^Ictleaull;'
F
*
TT "’ h ° «

T,
indifferent to me
'
Generality
Wi ‘‘' ““ i,m8incd sit “ a 'ion, devoid of
PO nt ° f
'
° f any re,1,ion »>»•**
ever with tile Umlted^df Tnd
and consequents differ from otdimt) cmscsTc
this state
d"ITl
C<rcCtS ust on account of
of generality The « rCC?
>

nSS ° f ddi ht ’ sorrow and an cr

’

which pervade ordinary • 2 S

life
* C ° mpl “ cly diffcrcnt
aesthetic state of manner in the
consciousn^Tl W
Iifc(e.g., a *! S * SCC ‘ 1C ° f ortlinary ,Css ,n °f
love scene) necessarily
of feelings (anger, *
J*
URCS 1,1 1 1 ,c s cctalor
a certain series
S (anger envy,
envv disgust,
disoi
\° P '

etc.)
proportionate (o the closeness of the

[ XXII
]
 introduction

a sort of pleasure is proved. Nayaka holds, by the fact that, as

depicted on the stage, sights and e\ ents painful in themselves

do not tepel us on the contrary, we enjoy them Rasa, the
;

aesthetic experience revealed by the power of revelation (bba-

ia.no ), is
, not noetic in character, is not a perception, but an
experience, a fruition {bbogd) This fruition is characterized
by a state of lysis (Jayd), of rest into our own consciousness 1 ,

tieswhich bind him to the protagonists of the scene in question It may

be thatheis completely indifferent to the actors in the scene and also to the
1

act which they perform, in this case he will be in a state of indifference

( which also is at the very opposite pole of the aesthetic experience,

\fatasihja) t

which is characterized by just an active participation {enupravesa) of the

cognizing subject in the event represented The same scene represented
on the stage is, on the contrary, devoid of all particular associations and
free from any extraneous interference (* tghtta) anger disgust, etc The — 1

spectator is without any pragmatic requirement, any of the interests (desire

for gain, etc), by which ordinary life is characterized He is immersed in
the aesthetic experience to the exclusion of everything else , the task of
generalization earned out by the poetic expression breaks the barrier of the
limited “ I ” and eliminates in this way the interests, demands and aims
associated with it

1) Vtsranh %
rest, derotes the fact of our being absorbed irt something,
immerged in it, to the exclusion of every other \hing{rigah!medjanfarafaja) t
without, that is, having any mental movement, any extraneous desire (in
other words no obstacle, vtghna)> which comes to break into that state of
consciousness Jn aesthetic language, vtJrant: denotes at the same Ume,
of
the fact of being absorbed in the aesthetic object, and the sensation
pleasure ssn pencvis which accompanies that state of consciousness In
exists
the Jtana metaphysics usfSntz denotes the repose of everything that
but the
in the " 1 (everything that exists is reposing ia the consciousness*
9*

it is
consciousness does not repose in any other thing different from itself,
reposed m
itself) 2 nd, implicitly, the repose of the limited
^ I " the cons- m
a ousness m its original fullness The terms “solution” {ftzirf/j),
c
lysis^faj*),

concent ration etc express the same concept (cf irfrat p 62^ They

[
xxm ]
 •

INTRODUCTION

the pervasion of consciousness by bliss and light : it belongs

to the same order as the enjoyment of the supreme brahman.
This last conception is very interesting, and even at first glance
clearly reveals its kinship with certain religious schools of
India,which must have influenced him, if only indirectly.
—
Brahman Bhartrhari said more than four centuries before
Bhatta Nayaka — is nothing but the overcoming of the knots of
“I” and of “mine” 1
. Not enough. The same idea of a
conversion of the things of reality (according to Nayaka, in the
aesthetic moment they appear, as it were, under another aspect)
is to be found, applied to the mystical rather than to the aesthetic
experience in some Buddhist schools. In religious experience
the world of reality is not suppressed but is seen otherwise.
“If it be true (the Buddhist Vasubandhu says) that things arc
unreal, lacking that substantial reality consisting in their own
nature as imagined by the ignorant, it cannot nevertheless be
denied that they do exist in that ineffable
way of being, which
Buddhas perceive” (
Vimsafika 10). The nature of things is
,

inexhaustible and they reveal more and more modes of being,

corresponding to the beholder’s varying states of conscious-
ness. Reality, in this sense, may be the matter of a revulsion
(paiavtjii), of a sort of sudden reinterpretation through which
it is revealed under a new aspect:
the painful and restless
flow of history, the samara, appears to the
saint as ineffable
quiescence, niivana. This conception, as
will be seen, will'

recur frequently in the works of the Sam schools of Kashmir. Conscious-

ness manifests and illuminates everything.
The appearing of all things
presupposes the existence of Consciousness,
which is, in this sense, light
{frakSia).
On the concept of beatitude ananda),
( see infra p. XLII-XLV.
I ak}apctjliya> I,
1) 5 (comm.), cd. c,f. : mamah am ify ahamkaragranthi
samat }hrama ma t ram hrah man ah
prapitL

f.
xxiV ]
 INTRODUCTION

be criticized and at the same time developed by Abhinat agupta

The final transfiguration of pain, it is true, is as if anticipated
and foreshadowed m the aesthetic experience (this, like the
mjstical experience, transforms realitj, converts the \ery
language, which magically reveals a new sense that exists side
by side with the practical meaning), but one must not forget
that,while the mystical experience is perfect fullness, in which
the knots of “ I ” and “ mine ” ate already completely undone,
in the aesthetic experience the process of undoing has onlj just
begun In it, the history, the pain has not yet entirely lost its
weight, it is still present, ready to break out in all its violence

The poet’s fullness is not that of the saint “That fresh outlook
of poets —declares Anandavardhana —whose activity succeeds
in enjoying Rasas and that learned outlook which proceeds
all,

towards probing the truth of objects verily— both of them we

have tried to utilize in figuring out the world, so long that have
become exhausted in the attempt O Lord sleeping on the sea,
we never obtained in any of these. Happiness comparable to
devotion for Thee1 ” Aesthetic enjoyment itself is veined by
an obscure unrest “ Often a man ”, says Kalidasa in a stanza
quoted by Abhinavagupta, “in the act of admiring in happiness
beautiful shapes or listening to sweet sounds, feels m himself
a keen disquiet Does he, perhaps, recall, mhis soul, affections
of past fives, deep within his spirit without his knowledge 2
The disquiet to which Kalidasa alludes, is, observes Abhmava
gupta, an unobjectified desire, itwhat is,
corresponds to
metaphysically, the desire which induces consciousness to deny
its original fullness and to crumble in time and space3

11, Db A. ,IEt 41 f'rjvnm.l Uuk tftjpcndjififrihfUtt. tb£- remsbifiArj. of.

K krishnamoorthy
2) See below, p 60
3) See below p 60 n 4

[
w ]
 INTRODUCTION

The religious and the aesthetic experience spring from the

same source. This is the tenor of two stanzas, almost cer-
tainly by Nayaka, quoted by Mahimabhatta, a rhetor of the
11 th century :
“ Dramatic performances and the music accom-
panying them feed the Rasa in all its fullness; hence the spec-
tator, absorbed in the tasting of this, turning inward, feels
2
pleasure through the whole performance. Sunk into his
own being, he forgets everything (pertaining to practical life).

There is manifested in him that flow of inborn pleasure, from

which the yogins draw their satisfaction
Another problem explored by Bhatta Nayaka is the didactic
value of poetry. Differing from the current opinion that drama
and poetry should instruct while they entertain, Nayaka main-
tains that instruction is completely secondary and that what
really matters is the intrinsic value of the work . The two
approaches are reconciled by Abhinavagupta, who says, in
brief, that the aesthetic experience in so far as it nourishes our
sensitivity has also a didactic value 1
.

Anandavardham
5. . These arc the outlines of the de-
velopment of Indian aesthetics toward the end of the 10th
century, as Abhinavagupta, who was one of India’s greatest
thinkers, has transmitted them. A
like his fore- Kashmiri
runners, Abhinavagupta unified the scattered
voices of earlier
philosophers into a masterful synthesis,
embracing philoso-
phical speculation and mysticism
as well as aesthetics. But,
before turning to him, we ought
to go back in time and pre-
cisely at the epoch of Avantivarman
(855-83), king of Kashmir.
At the court of this king, there lived a
great rhetor and philo-

1) See below, p. 48.

2) Sec below, App. Ill,
p. \\^
3) See below, App. IN,
p. 114 .

[ XXVI ]
 —
INTRODUCTION

sopher indeed, by the name of Anandavardhana In a justly

famous book, on which Abhina\agupta was to comment a
century and half later, called the Dhaiiyalofa tf Light of Re-
(
sonance Anandavardhana reached certain conclusions which
were accepted, with some rare exceptions, by all later Indian
rhetors The starting point of his speculation is the difference
between ordinary and poetical language The philosophy of
language has very ancient roots in India, and m various epochs
its problems have been dealt with by dnerse and radically
differing schools, yet Indian thinkers, both Buddhist and Hindu,
are in substantial agreement on one point— the instrumental
and transitive nature of ordinary speech Language is essen
tially pragmatic the words ue use exist in so fat as they $er\ e
some purpose, end after ne he \e used them they cease to be
They, Buddhists hold, are powerless to grasp the lmng reality

of things, they deal with the general, which is simply an image

of thmgs, an image out of focus, so to speak, and ultimately
unreal What is then this new nature or dimension, that speech
assumes in poetry 5 And from what is it derived 5 Accord
mg to another Kashmiri rhetor, Udbhata, flourished in the
8th century, the essence of poetical language was the secondary
or metaphorical function of the uords 1 The poetical speech
—
he must have thought at the ^ry expense of the practical
value, enriches itself with various proceedings —rhymes,
figures, inversion —conceived as useless in a purely functional

language, but essential in the poetical one One of the most

important elements of these figures of speech, differing from the
modes of practical language dominated by a direct uay of ex
pression, is undoubtedly the secondary function of vords

1) See on all that R Gnoli Ihf hi!.i s Comtrrntjrj cn ileKaij hf’Lart

of l&baTttahj Roma 1962 of which I ha\e reproduced here some passages

[
vx\n ]
 ,

INTRODUCTION

This and nothing but this will then be the very life of poetical
language, in antithesis with the practical one. Anandavardhana
disagrees. The secondary function docs not necessarily imply
poetry. Actually, all language is metaphorical. The source
of poetry must then be another sense or value that is assured
by words, altogether from the primary (i. c., historical
different
or literal) and the secondary one. “ Poetical meaning is differ-
ent from conventional meaning. In the words of great poets it

shines out and towers above the beauty of the well-known

outer parts even as charm docs in ladies ” Dbvanyalokxt I, 4).
(

This new sense — the poetical sense— irreducible, as it is, to the

literary one,
cannot however do without it, but is, as it were,
supported by it. “ The poetic meaning ”, he says,
“
is not understood by a mere learning in Grammar and
Dictionary. It is understood only by those who have an
insight into the true essence of poetry. This meaning, and
that rare word which possesses the power of conveying it,

thesetwo must be studied carefully by those who wish to

become true poets. Just as a man interested in perceiving
objects (in the dark) directs his efforts towards securing the
flame of a lamp since this is a means to realise his end, so
also docs one who is ultimately interested in the poetic
meaning first evince interest in the conventional meaning.
Just as the purport of a sentence is grasped only
through the
sense of individual words, the
knowledge of the poetic
sense is attained only through
the medium of the literal
sense. Though by its own power the word-import con-
veys the sentence-import, just as
it escapes notice once its
purpose is served, so also docs
that poetic meaning flash
suddenly across the truth-perceiving
minds of cultured
critics, when they arc
indifferent towards the conventional
meaning. To conclude,
connoisseurs give the name of

[
NX VI II ]
 —
Introduction

“ resonance ” ibumi to that particular sort of poetry in

( )
which both the com entional meaning and the conventional
word ate subordinate ” "Dbianydloka, I, 7-13) 1 (

A truly poetical word or expression is that which cannot be

replaced by other words, without losing its value Poetry
knows no synonyms This poetic meaning of words, which
coexists, paradoxically, with the historical or literal meaning

as MaheSvarananda, a philosopher of the 13th century, points

out —stands in relation to the other powers of words just as
freedom does to men’s other capacities and activities The name
by which it is known, is resonance ('dbiam ) or suggested, mani-
fested sense (tyangja) Rasa is nothing but it Poetic words
make manifest, suggest it unexpectedly and without any noti-
ceable bridge2 The theory of Ananda\ ardhana, which we

1) I have quoted here the transl of K- Ktishnamoorthy

2) When u e read a poem we become, as it were, simultaneously aware
of the Rasas, viz the sentiments not practically experienced but aesthetically
contemplated, that it suggests The temporal sequence between the cogni-
tions of the expressed and the suggested sense would be noticeable only m
case the suggested sense were opposed to the expressed one or similar to it,
that is, on the same footing See T>b , HI,
33
14
A
But this temporal se-
quence in the two function of sounds cannot be noticed when sentiments
(i e., Rasas) ate suggested, because sentiments are neither opposed to the

expressed sense norappearas similar to the other senses, they are not capable
of being conveyed by aught else and all their accessories work together
—
With lightning quickness ” (transh cited above) The concept of clcksja-
krama and the necessity of admitting it has been expounded at length by
Anandavardham hunself, Vb A , III, 33 I ate here some words of P
Valery {Vart(fe> Premttrt Lecott du Cquts dt Poettq^e^ etL at , p 13o6)
“ nn jour comment cette alteration se marque dans le language
J’cxpliquerai
des poetes, et qu’il y a un Ianga^e poetique dans leguel les mots ne sect
plus le mots de l’usage pratique et libre Us ne s’associent plus selon les
mtmes attractions, ll sont charges de deux valenrs simultan&nent engage'e
”
et d importance cquivalente leur son et leur effet psyclnque ins*actan<5

3 [ WIX ]
 INTRODUCTION

have expounded in its one of the greatest

essentials here, is

contributions of India to the aesthetic problem, and it deserves

even now all our attention. One of the most sensitive critics
of our times, Paul Valery, more than ten centuries later, ideally
connects himself to him. “ La pocsic ”, lie says,
“ cst un art du langagc. Lc langagc, ccpcndant, cst unc
creation dc la pratique. Remarquons d’abord que toutc
communication entre les hommes n’a quclquc certitude que
dans la pratique, ct par la verification que nous donne la
pratique. Je vous dcinclude du feu, J/icons me domic £ dn fen : vous
m’avez compris.
Mais, cn me demandant du feu, vous avez pu prononccr
ccs quelques mots sans importance, avee un certain ton, ct
dans un certain timbre dc voix avee unc certaine inflexion —
ct unc certaine lentcur ou unc certaine precipitation que
j
ai pu remarquer. J ai compris vos paroles, puisque, sans
mcmc y penser, je vous ai tendu ce que vous demandiez, cc
peu de feu.
Et void cepcndant que l’aflfairc n’est
pas finie. Chose
etrange: lc son, et comrae la figure
dc votre petite phrase,
revtent cn moi, sc rcpctc cn moi
comrae si cllc sc plaisait cn ;

moi et moi, aime a m’entendre la redirc,

,
j cettc petite phrase
qui a presque perdu son sens, qui a
ccssc de servir, ct qui
pourtant veut vivre encore, mais d’unc
tout autre vie. Elle
a pns unc valcur; ct cllc 1’a
priscaux depens dc sa signification
jime.' Elle a crcc lc besoin d’etre
encore cntenduc. Nous . .

voia sur le bord mcmc de 1’ctat dc

poCsic. Cette experience
minuscule va nous suflirc a decouvrir plus d’unc verite

_1) P. Valery, Varictc, Pocsic d Panic Abslrailc

La
'

Plciadc, Paris 1957). , pp. 132-1-25 (

[ XXX ]
 —
INTRODUCTION

And again •

“ La poesie n’a pas le moms du monde pour object de

commumquer a quelqu’un quelque notion ddterminee,— a quoi
la prose doit suffire Observez seulement de la prose,
le destin

comme elle expire a peine cntendue, et expire de 1’etre,

c*cst-a dire d’etre remplacee dans 1’espnt attentif par une idee
ou figure fime Cette idee, dont la prose vient d'exciter les
conditions necessaries et suffisantes, s’etant produite, aussitot
les moyens sont dissous, le langage s’evanouit devant elle
C’est un phenomene constant dont voici un double controle ,
notre memoire nous tepete le discours que nous n’avons pas
compris La repetition repond a l’lncomprebension 'Elle
nous stgmjte que Facte du langage tfa pu s'accomphr Mais au
contraire, et comme par symetne, si nous a\ ons compris, nous
sommes en possession d’exprimer sous d’autres formes 1’idee
que Ie discours avait composee en nous L’acte du langage
accompli nous a rendus maitres du pomt central qui commande
la multiplicite des expressions possibles d’une idee acquise En
somme, le sens, qui est la tendance a une substitution mentale
umforme, unique, resolutoire, est l’objet, la Id, la limite
d’existence de la prose pure
Toute autre est la fonction de la poesie Tandis que le
fond unique est exigible de la prose, c’est lei la forme unique
qui ordonne et survit C’est le son, c’est le rythme, ce sont
les rapprochements physiques des mots, leurs effets d’induction
ou leur influences mutuelles qui dominent, aux depens de leur
propnete de se consommer en un sens defini et certain II
faut done que dans un poeme le sens ne puisse l’emporter
sur la forme et la detruire sans retour, c’est au contraire le
retour, la forme cohsen ee, ou plutot exactement reproduite
comme unique et necessaire expression de I’etat ou de la
pensde qu’elle vient d’engendrer au lecteur, qui est le ressort

f
RNM ]
 :

INTRODUCTION

de la puissance poetique. Un bean vers remit indcfiniwent de

ses cendres, il redevient, — comme l’effet dc son eflet, — cause
5,1
harmonique de soi-mcnc .

Let us now listen to some lines of the great commentator

of the Dhvanyalofot Abhinavagupta
,

“ Aesthetical experience takes place, as everyone can notice,

by virtue, as it were, of the squeezing out of the poetical word.
Persons aesthetically sensitive, indeed, read and taste many
times over the same poem. In contradiction to practical means
of perception, that, their task being accomplished, arc no more
of any use and must then be abandoned 2 , a poem, indeed,
does not lose its value after it has been comprehended. The
words, in poetry,must therefore have an additional power,
that of suggestion,and for this very reason the transition from
the conventional meaning to the poetic one is unnoticcablc 3 ”.
“What some people say, namely that a phrase would then
come to have many different meanings, is due solely to their
ignorance. A sentence— they say referring to ordinary strumental
language —
which has been pronounced once and the meaning
of which has already been perceived by force of convention,
cannot lead one to perceive two different meanings. The subject,
indeed, cannot remember, at the same time, several mutually-
contrasting conventions; and if, on the other hand, these
conventions are not contrasting, the meaning of the sentence
remains, then, one. Nor can it be admitted
that the different

1) Variiii, Commentnirc dj Chatmy, p. 1510 (cd. cit.).

2) This is a quotation from the Vdkjnpadlja,
II, 38. Apart from
Bhartrhari, the practical purpose of
language has been discussed at length
and with an admirable penetration
by Dharmakirti in his Vmmdnavdrttika,
especially I, 92 ff. Dharmakirti’s
work was well-known to Abhinavagupta,
W ° C1 CS ^ r cqucntly. See, f.i.,
L
ocann, pp. 444 and 542 (Benares cd.).
^
See
3) above, p. XXIX, n. 2.

[ XXXII ]
 INTRODUCTION

meanings ate perceived one after the other, because the words,
after they have made one meaning perceptible and ha\ e thus
ceased to be efficacious, have no longer any power to render
perceptible any other meaning And even if the phrase is
pronounced a second time, the meaning remains invariably the
same, the convention and the context being the same Should
someone object that a sentence can lead one to perceive ano-
ther meaning, independently of the one perceived through
convention and context, it can be replied that, then, thereno is

longer any fixed relation between word and meaning, and

that one falls thus into the countersense, described m the stanza *

“ Therefore, what reason can one adduce for the fact that, on
hearing the phrase *
He who desires Heaven, must offer the
fire sacrifice one does not perceive the meaning ‘he must
* ?>>1
eat dog-flesh Moreover, there would be no limit to the
number of possible meanings and a general state of uncer-
tainty would exist The fact of admitting that a sentence can
have several meanings is thus a fallacy
“The case of the poetical word however different Here,
is

indeed, the aesthetical expression, etc once perceived, tends

,

to become itself an object of aesthetic experience and one has

therefore no of conventions
ulterior application Aesthetic
cognition is not, in fact, the same as the forms of perception
proper to a didactic w orL, namely “ I am commanded to do
this”, “I want to do this”, and “I have done what I had to
do” Such forms of perception tend, m fact, to an extrinsic end,
successive to them in time, and are thus of an ordinary, practical
nature In aesthetic experience, what happens is, instead, the
birth of the aesthetic tasting of the artistic expression Such an
experience, just as a flower born of magic, has, as its essence,

TK.S is pranunavjrtftka, I, 318 (ed. cit.)

XXXIII ]
[
 INTRODUCTION

solely the present, it is correlated neither with what came be-

fore nor with what comes after. This experience is therefore
different both from the ordinary experience and from the re-
ligious one 1
.”

Apart from some modern intuitions, of which Paul Valery is

perhaps the most penetrating and brilliant interpreter, in order

to find something similar in the western linguistical exegesis,
one must turn to the conception —in the West connected with
the holy scriptures — of a scnsiis historian vel litcralis, different from
the scusns spiritnalis, qtti, however, super litterakw ftmdafttr ct

cum stipponit Some passages of the Scriptures, if literaly

taken, are absurd and meaningless. They must therefore have

another sense. Every word of the Scriptures has, as a point
of fact, a hidden or spiritual sense .
3
The main difference
between India and the West is based on the fact that with us
this conception —which goes back to the Alexandrine school
and especially to Origines —has remained restricted to the
theological speculation. Had it been developed in a literary
direction, we would have had a sort of counterpart to the con-
ception of Anandavardhana. Notwithstanding the undeni-
able differences, these two conceptions have, however, as a
common foundation, the intuition that both the poetical lan-
guage, and, in another sense, the religious one, do
not exhaust
themselves in their transitive value, but, using the
very words
of Paul Valery, survive to comprehension.

1) Loc/via, I, 21 (cd. of Benares, pp. 158-160).

2) St. Thomas, Summa Tbtohgica 1 1 10.
, , ,

3) On the scriptural exegesis in the

West one may now consult the
beaunful book by H. dc Luba
c, Histoirc ct Esprit, Viniclligmcc dc PEcriis/rc
apr s rigcnc ( arisl950). This
conception has been succssivcly examined
by the same author in the three volumes,
Extghc-MWcvak, LcsQuatrc Sens
<ie PE.cn/iire, Pans, 1959-61.

[ XXXIv ]
 ixTRODtrcnoM

6 Abhmavagnpta With the only exception of the Dbvntiyd~

loka, the theories put forward by Lolkta, Sankuka and Nayaka

are known to us through the pen of Abhmavagupta. Abhi-

navagupta, son of Narasimhagupta, alias Cukhula, was born
in Kashmir during the second half of the 10th century, of an
illustrious brahmin family- His works in the field of aesthetics
which is a commentary
are two, namely, the Abbmavabbdratt,
on the Ndtyasdstra and a commentary on Anandavardh ana’s
Dhvanydhka The commentary on the Kdvyakautuha of Bhatta
.

Tota, who was his direct master in poetics is now lost The
Kdiy akuutuka itself has not come down to us The com-
mentary on Anandavardhana’s Vhianydloka constitutes one of
the most important works of the dbvam school, which Abhi-
nava played a leading role in developing. He accepts and
elaborates the core of Bhatta Nayaha’s aesthetic ideas, that is,

the concept of generalization, but he rejects Nayaka’s concepts

of the aesthetic experience as fruition rather than as knowledge,
and of assumption by poetic words of the power of revela-
tion1 According to Abhmavagupta, in whose view the
.

dham and the Rasa schools are indissolubly merged, Rasa is

not revealed, but suggested, or manifested, as Anandavardhana

was wont to say Aesthetic gustation is nothing but a percep-
tion sin generis, differing from all others
Rasa is unique 3
The division into eight or nine Rasas
corresponding to the permanent mental states (according to
Anandavardhana and Abhmavagupta there is indeed a ninth

1) See below, pp 49-51.

2) A
~Sh 1, p 271 eka era paramdribato rasap. A G
,
sap in another
passage ( A
Bb I, p 267) that all the various Rasas derive from one ‘great
,

Rasa ’ only On the uni city of Rasa, cf also V Raghavati, Tiff Number of
Rdru, pp 175-9

[ \xvv ]
 introduction

mental state, Quiet, and then a ninth Rasa, the Quictistic)

has only an empirical value. “ We think ”, he says, “ that what
is enjoyed is consciousness itself, all full of bliss. What sus-

picion of pain may be here ? The feelings of delight, sorrow,

etc., deep within our have only one function, to vary

spirit,

it, and the representation’s function is to awake them'.” “ The

aesthetic experience ”, we have seen in a passage previously
quoted, “ just as a flower born of magic, has, as its essence,

solely the present, it is correlated neither with what came before

nor with what comes after ”. These lines arc very important.
The state of universality required by Bhatta Nayaka not only
implies the elimination of any measure of time or space, but
even of any particular knowing subject. Bhatta Lollata’s
question, where lies the Rasa, whether in the actor or in the
represented character, for Abhinava is quite nonsensical.
“ The Rasa ”, he says, “does not lie in the actor. But where
then ? You have all forgotten and I remind you again (of
what I have already said). Indeed, I have said that Rasa is

not limited by any difference of space, time and knowing

subject. Your doubt is then devoid of sense. But what is
the actor ? The actor, I say, is the means of the tasting, and
hence he is called by the name of ** vessel ”. The taste of wine,
indeed, does not stay in the vessel, which is only a means
necessary to the tasting of it. The actor then is necessary
and useful only in the beginning 2 ”. This elimination of the

1) AM)., I, 292 asmanmate samvedanam erdnandagbauam

:
dsradyatc I

iatra hd dubkbdht/kd kcvalam tasyaiva citratdkaranc

|
raliiokadtidsalid-
vydpdrab \
tadadbodbane cdbbiuayddivyapdrab
|

2) A.V,b., I, 291 : ala era nafe hutra farbi

tia rasab
visviflUilo \ \

na(na) bodbya/c uktaw hi defol'ulapramdtrbheddniyanirilo

|
rasa i/i ktyatn I

dsaitka Dole larbi kirn dsrddampdjah

| | at a era ca pbtraw i/y ,icy ate
'|

[ XXXVI ]
 iNTHODtlCTioN

singular knowing subjects —that is, of the “ practical ” per-

sonalitiesof the spectators, different each from the othet—is
”
succeeded by a state of consciousness, a “ knowing subject
“ generahzed ”,
which is, unique, not circumscribed by any
determination of space, time, etc This conception goes deep
into the doctrines of the philosophical school, followed by
Abhmava According to it, the differences between the \anous
“ ego ” are illusory Actually the “ I ” or consciousness is

unique The so-called Buddhist Idealism (vtjnamvada), accord

mg to which reality is consciousness, but the various individua-
lities or “ mental series ”, saw tana, are different each from the
other, is, to the Saiva, clearly contradicted by the fact that a

thing appears in the same way to more subjects that see it in

the same place and time In other words, two or more sub
jects that see the same thing are m die same psychic condition,
*'
that is, they form a single knowing subject When more
subjects — said Utpaladeva in a work now lost— are aware of
a given thing, f e , a vessel, in the same place and time, then
about this thing, they come to make up an unity1” This
state of unity, of course, is not permanent, and, at a certain
point, the various limited ‘Ts ”, that came to constitute an
unique ” I ”, again separate themseh es The responsible
element of these unions and separations is nothing but the
Lord, the liberty of consciousness itself

This state of unity, which, in \ a nous degrees, occurs in

tut h patrt madjaSradah |

apt lit ladt payaka)? J
Una pretm khan alre
natopayoga tU (

Yj "Tms passage Yorrotred rrom fnc’iost ftka on flie ~Pratj abtsijndtanka,

has been quoted by Jayaratha in his commentary to Tantraloka S' p 67
tans iatn gtatadim ex than tkridtSaiyarrjthi/ef prrv aisrab sapsst! srmi rd,a
tavatj emit ladatkynm ipayarsti
j

4 [ \XXVII ]
 Introduction

ordinary life also, is specially evident when we are assisting,

f. i., to a performance or during certain religious ceremonies
(f. i., the tantric cakras), which must be celebrated in common.
In these assemblies, the distinction between one’s own Self
and the Self of other people, which is founded on the multipli-
cityof bodies, minds and so on, ceases for the moment to exist,
and, beyond them, takes rise a
psychological unity, correctly
realized as a subject unique and more powerful than the preced-
ing separated individualities. “
The consciousness ”, says
Abhinavagupta in the Tanira/oka, which consists of, and is
animated by, all things, on account of the difference of bodies,
enters into a state of contraction.
But, in public celebrations,
it returns to a state of expansion — since all the components are
reflected in each other. The radiance of one’s own conscious-
ness in ebullition (/.*., when it is tending to pour out of itself)
is reflected in the
consciousness of all the bystanders, as if in
so many mirrors, and, inflamed by these,
it abandons without
c ort its state of individual contraction. For this very reason,
in meetings of many
people (at a performance of dancers, sin-
gers, etc.), fullness
of joy occurs when every bystander, not
o r y one of them, is
identified with the spectacle. The cons-
ousness, which, considered
separately also, is innately made
o beatitude, attains, in
1
these circumstances
during the —

—
execution of dances, etc.—
a state of unity, and so enters into
a state of beatitude
which is full and perfect. In virtue of the
bsence of any cause
for contraction, jealousy,
envy, etc. the
BS
fCC^ f obstaclcs
>
ccs.
lnd pervaded by beatitude.
to a state

When onT’ |
,°
and’ CVe " °" C
r C^ccut,
'
of the bystanders does

share;
of consciousness
in
-
which the

[ xxxviii ]
 INTRODUCTION

other spectators are immersed, tins consciousness is disturbed,

as at the touch of an uneven surface. This is the reason why,
during the celebration of the cakra, etc ,
no individual must be
allowed to enter who does not identify himself with the cere-
monies and thus does not share the state of consciousness of the
celebrants ; this would cause, in fact, a contraction of the cons-
ciousness 1
These conceptions pose again a problem, namely, which is

the relation between the aesthetic and the mystical experience.

We have seen that Bhatta Nayaka likened them each to other.
Abhmava, while accepting, on the one hand, the solution put
forward by Bhatta Nayaka, did not fail, on the other, to show
up clearly the boundary lines which separate the state of mystical
consciousness from that of aesthetic consciousness Religious
experience, he argued, marks the complete disappearance of all
polarity, the lysis of all dialexis in the dissolving fire of God :

Sun, Moon, day and night, good and evil are consumed in the

1) Tantraloka, XXVIII, w 373 ff

samvit sarpatmikd debabbedad y a samkuctt tu sa \

mslakt 'nyoryasa ngha itat Tatibtmbad vtkasiara J|

ucebalanntjaradmyogbah samvtfsu pratibtrnbttab \

babudarpancvad diptah sarvSyetapy ayatnaiab |[

ata eva nrttagitaprdbhrtau babuparsadi |

yah sarvafan/nayibbatt binds fia is ekakasya sab JJ

dnandanirhhara sanmt pratjekam sa taiiatkatdm \

nrttadau vtsaye prapid purndnandatiam alnule JJ

irsjasftyadtsamkocakdra ndbbdvato 'fra sa \

Pikasi'ara nt{prattgbam sarnid anandayogtni |]

atanmays tu kasmnlcit tatrastbe pratibanyait \

stbaputaspariavat semtd ttjatTyatajd stbite |[

a/uJ visirdiW/TiIuj isa’ rcjahjam atarrrfujuffi {

naira prastfayet samitisamkccananthardbanani j]

$ce below, pp. 56, 57.

[
XXMV ]
 INTRODUCTION

ardent flame of consciousness. The knots of “ I ” and “ mine ”

are, in it, completely undone. The yogin remains, as it were,
isolated in the compact solitude of his consciousness, fat beyond
any form of discursive thought 1
. In the aesthetic experience,
however, the feelings and the facts of cvervdav life, even if

they are transfigured, are always present. In respect of its

proper and irreducible character, therefore, which distinguishes

it from any form of ordinary consciousness, the aesthetic ex-
perience is not of a discursive order. On the other hand, as
regards its content —which is nothing but ordinary life purified

and freed from even* individual relationship — the aesthetic

consciousness is no different from any other form of discur-
sive consciousness. Art is not absence of life — every element
of life appears in the aesthetic experience —but it is life itself,

pacified and detached from all passions .

1
Furdier devotion
(which is a preliminary and unavoidable moment of religious
experience) postulates the complete abandon of the subject
to the object of worship, God, Varamesvara ,
3
who, although
being immanent and consubstantial, according to Abhinava-
gupta, with the thought which thinks Him, becomes in tire re-
ligious moment as if transcendent to it and separate from it 1 .

1) See below, pp. 56 and 82; and I.P.V.V., III, pp. 350-1.
2) A.Bb ., I, p. 340 (cf. Raghavan, p. 104) : tatra sarcarasanaM siintci-
praja erasradafj, visayebbjo viparirrttja jl

3) The bbakJ't, religious devotion, is pararmsrarctvisayarairasjasana-

ve sarfrp a (I. P. V. V . , I, p. 25). Cf. p. 82, n. 4, below.
4) Tn the very moment that thought
sarpvil, etc.), which, in ( rinerh,
reality, is nothing but subject, becomes the
object of thought ( i.e., when
it is taught, meditated
upon, etc.), it transforms itself into the images of Ego
(a bam),Sf(alma ri), Consciousness {sapn-id), God

?\
ln AC I P -
1S

K ’ 5> ,
^ (Ifiwvr, ParamJrara, Sira),
devclo P ed and discussed in
*
the I.P.V.V., and
Cf. also the 7.P. V. V., I, pp. 55, 56.

[ XL ]
 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of the yogin is to identify himself with this

transcendental object Religious devotion implies therefore
a constant drive towards an end which is outside it and, as

such, is the very antithesis of the aesthetic experience, which

is perfect self sufficiency
In every way, whatever the difference between them may
be, they spring from the same source Both are characterized
by a state of consciousness self centered, implying the suppress-
ion of any practical desire, and hence the merging of the
subject into his object, to the exclusion of everything else The
appearance on the horizon of consciousness of desires, of practi-
cal needs, destroys ipio facto the unity of the aesthetic or of the
mystical experience Something is shattered, something cracks
within us, and extraneous, dispersive elements penetrate— the
so called “ obstacles ”, vighnj, bom of the ego’s disturbing
1
influence The aesthetical and mystical bliss, in this sense,
is nothing but a state of independence, of liberty from any
extraneous solicitation and hence of test, of “ lysis ” m our
own Self On this hand, the concepts of rest “ lysis ”, tasting,
gustation and bliss, are strictly connected But let us now listen
to Abhmavagupta himself

1) The vtghita, obstacles, ate all the extraneous elements which break
the unity of a state of consciousness (desires for gain, worry of all kinds,
etc.) The Same conception ts m-t with in connexion with religious ex
penence The ugbna are definedm the 1 P V, 1, p 18 tigbnaaft vtlum V
panft kartav')am fit t'jgh/sSb ndbjat/nihQijyd njvadhaficidt/Sudayiti ttiiidhopagbatab
tjJj ihifibitavai ca d’vuta “The
’ti'sah
|
obstacles obstruct or hinder what
one does, this ts why they are called obstacles They ace of three kinds
(inherent in the perceiving subject, etc) lack of attention etc The
divinities which preside over them are also called obstacles ” Their
principal source is lack of attention (dftai'&dhSi
j), it, the absence of a total
rest of th whole being on the object of perception
rt

2) See above, pp XXXVHI, XXXIX

[
XU ]
 INTRODUCTION
“
What wc call bliss is nothing but a full illumination of one’s
own being, accompanied by a form of cogitation which per-
vades all one’s own nature, one’s own Self. Let us consider,
for instance, a man limited by his particular incomplete ego,

defiled and contracted by the body and so on, and let us suppose
that he feels a sense of vacuity in his body and is then hungry.
Longing for food, that is, for something distinguished from
himself, will actually occupy all his mind ;
and therefore, since
the self-cogitation of which wc have spoken, docs not occur
in him in all its fullness, he is, as it were, devoid of bliss, bliss

consisting in the self-cogitation. Now let us suppose that the

belly of that very man becomes full of food. Obviously, in
this ease, the previous state of unfullncss, consisting in the
emergence of vacuity, will cease to exist. Soon after, how-
ever, he will begin to have new longings (lie will desire to em-
brace women, etc.), that, until that moment, were in a state of
latent impressions, because, as Patanjali has said, “ the fact that
Caitra is in love with one woman docs not imply that he is out
of love with the others ”, etc. Owing to this very contact
with other desires, such a bliss is then incomplete and, there-
fore, it is not the supreme
bliss. In fact, according to the
principle that, union one fears the future separation ’,
*
in the
and *
one thing breeds the longing for another how can it be
a source of happiness ? the forms of bliss which wc can enjoy
in practical life arc unable
to cut off completely the desire of a
thing distinguished from one’s
Self and this is why they arc
incomplete bliss. As to the part ‘ ’
bliss which is in them, its
determinant element is, however, as before, the afore-said sclf-
cogitation. In effect, because of
this, Bhatta Narayana has
sai Let us give a praise to
.

.
Siva All the forms of bliss !

which may be found here in these

three worlds, arc only his
drops, belonging to him, a
very ocean of bliss. (Slmmilamji,

[ xwi ]
 iN'TRODtlC'riON

v 61) Which are these kinds of bliss ? One of them, for in-
stance, arises while we are tasting a sweet flavour, etc. The man
i
who is, as it is said, enjoying ’, is in a state of consciousness
quite different from the one of a hungry man who up his
eats

food greedily He rests within himself In other words, what

in such a state is predominant, is not the exterior reality, but
the knowing subject A further form of pleasure, different from
the former and devoid of any extrinsic alteration, is tasted
when one, either through a poem or a drama, etc., is plunged
in some Rasa, as the Erotic one, and so on Owing to the
absence of any possible obstacle (longing for earning, etc ),

from the forms of bliss of practical life,

this pleasure is different

and just because it is devoid of obstacles, it is called Tasting,

Dehbatton, Lysis, Perception, Rest in the nature of the know-
ing subject The so-called aesthetic sensibility, the fact of
being possessed of heart is caused by this very predominance
of the heart,1 that is, of thought (which gives it its very

1)Not everybody, A G observes, has the intrinsic capacity to taste

a. poem Individuals possessed of aesthetic sensibility are called possessed of
heart, those who have the consent of the heart (
sahrjaya , hrdayasam'ada-*
bhak ) The fact of being possessed of heart is defined m the following
way [Db AL , p 33) yetdm k dvyan nnhndbhy asavafad viiidibhTlie mamma-
kure varnamyatanmajtbhlVanayQVyatd U stub rdayasamt adabhajah Sahrdayah \

yaihokiam (N j*, VII, v 10)

yo 'rtho hrdayasamiaii tarya bhaic rasoAbhavah j

ianram vydpyate ftnet iuska#? kdsiham ndgniftd |[

" The faculty of self identification with the events represented [the

,] demands that the mirror of the? mind should be made

Determinants, etc
completely by means of repeated acquaintance with and practice of
clear,

poetry The possessed of heart, those who possess the consent of their
ovn hearts, are theywho have this faculty For jt has been said * the
tasting of that which finds the consent of the heart arouses the Itisa The
body is pervaded by it, as dry wood bj fire JJ *
The mind and heart must
be mirror like (i tsada* vtiruild)* ready to recene all the images winch are

[ XLIII ]
 INTRODUCTION

name), and, at the same time, by a sort of indifference to the

part “light”, which consists and rests in the knowablc —which
however continues to exist. The mental movements diat arc
made the matter of such a Tasting arc the nine Rasas. They
arc devoid of obstacles and consist of a Sampling. The so-
called supreme bliss, the lysis, the wonder, is therefore nothing
but a tasting, that is, a cogitation in all its compact density, of
our own liberty. This liberty is realisshm (that is to say, not
metaphorical) and inseparable from the very nature of cons-
ciousness. We must not, however, forget that in the tasting
of a juice of sweet flavour, etc., there is, between this bliss and
us, the separating screen, so to say, of the exterior reality. In

reflected^ in them : vUnalavvikurakalpibhuSanijahrilayah, AM., 37. In

p.
'he T.s III, 200, A.G. says :

tatha hi madbnn pile sparse ra candanddikc

I

madlyas/byavigamc ydsau brdayc spandamanaia

||

anandasakt ih sairokta yatnh sabrdayo janali

j

When the cars arc filled with the sound of sweet song or the nostrils
with the scent of sandal-wood, etc., the
state of indifference (non-participa-
tion, impersonality, etc.), disappears
and the heart is invaded by a state of
vibration {spandamanala', for the
significance of the term spanda, cf. p. 60,
n. 1). Such a state is precisely the so-called
power of beatitude, thanks to
w let man is gifted with heart
According to the hive of Kashmir,
’

.
heart is consciousness itself,
thought, beatitude, etc.
Elsewhere( A.Bb ., II, p. 339), A.G. says
that poetic sensibility is the
facu ty of entering into identity
with the heart of the poet {kavihvdayaldddt-
C UrSC PC °
’ P,C "’ hosc naturc is “ gentle (inhuman?
^^
iS^w-
,°
f
f°' Cr ° tlC
P ° Ctry; P coplc of bo,dcr ™turc wil1
C no
heroic *r
Cry i0dividual has
JZ e s i
* particular nature (tendencies,
1
nCC ° rding to 'vhich hc

T^^
will feel himself
momdrawn'toT “ ”
-°
{sahrdayalvd) also plays an
case we may
imnor T
rC Ig ‘ 0US cxpcricn cc,
Scnsibilit y

but in this
not talk of aesthetic"*
religious sensibility; c f.
P.T.V.
rr
p^'s'ff
7’ ^ morc COf tcct term being

[ XLIV ]
 iK^RoDtJCTlOM

poetry, in drama, and so on, this screen is actually missing,

but it remains in a latent state Also in these forms of limited
bliss, however, those people whose hearts are carefully devoted
to cancel the part which performs the function of a screen,
succeed in reaching the supreme bliss “ Supreme bliss ”, it
has been said, “may even take place, disclosed by drinking and
eating1 ”
The aesthetic and the mystical state of consciousness are not
only characterized by a particular bliss or repose According
to Abhinavagupta and his school, they are accompanied by a
sense of wonder or surprise The word expressing this wonder,
i e. camatkfitra is frequently to be found, in its ordinary, non-
technical sense of surprise, amazement, in Indian literature
“It appears to me”— observes V Raghavan2 —“that originally
the word camaikara was an onomatopoeicword referring to
the clicking sound we make with our tongue when we taste
something snappy, and in the course of its semantic enlarge-
ments, camatkara came to mean a sudden fillip relating to any
feeling of a pleasurable type ”, The first to use this term in a

1) These last lines introduce us into the very core of the doctrines
professed by a mystical school, the so called Krama, highly esteemed by
’
Abhinavagupta According to this school the consciousness, the ‘
I

is conceived as a nucleus of energy, nourished by the images offered it by

the senses These must be, as it were, saturated and concentrated into a
unique point Saturation and concentration imply each other They
arise when the senses are absorbed in something, to the exclusion of every
other thing The objects which arouse this state may indifferently be a
food, an alcoholic drink, a drug, a sexual contact, a song, a dance and so on
See on all that my tianslation of the T
antra tara (Abhinavagupta, Bssen^a
tffv Zbr/nr, Tan no /ybuy, InttoJ ,pajjrm ana’ the AppeiftA ^ ^ J, s besets
,

1 have translated the pp 45 52 of the Paratrtmukai tiarana *

2) Some Concepts of tie Alankara Sasira, Ad} nr 1942, p 269

5 [ XLV ]
 INTRODUCTION

technical sense was probably Utpaladcva, who was the master of

1
the master of Abhinavagupta. This word is indeed unknown
to the father of the Pratyabhijha school, Somananda, and in
Anandavardhana it occurs once only, used in its ordinary sense,
without any technical connotation. Its occurrence both in the
Yogavashtha (cf. the expression ciftacawaikdra , which Dasgupta
IiiP/j, p. 236 translates ‘self-flashing of thought ’) and in the
Agrip lira i)a is of no great significance, because these works are
both later than Utpala and may be even than Abhinava. The
term cawatpdra was used, no doubt, by Bhatta Nayaka, but
probably, as appears from a passage of the Hrdayadarpam
quoted by Abhinava"-, not in its technical meaning ;
and
anyhow, he was later than Utpala. Jn the Spanda School
(Vasugupta, etc.) an idea very like to that expressed by
cawatkara is conveyed by die word viswoya, astonishment.
The yogin is penetrated by astonishment. The yogic stages
are astonishment 3
. The general idea underlying these words
(compare, in this connection, also the Pali and buddhist term
saw vega) is that both the mystical and the aesthetic experience
imply the cessation of a world the ordinary, historical world, —
the sawsdra— and its sudden replacement by a new dimension
of reality. In this sense the two are wonder or surprise. A
parallel of this idea of a kind of wonder which fills the soul
in front of the beautiful or of the scared, exists in the western
thought also. We find it in Plato and especially in Ncoplato-
nisrnus. “Souls”, Plato says, “when they sec here any likeness

1) See, f.i., the commentary to the Swadrtfi, I, 8; Sivastotravalf, p. 41.

2) Locnila, comm, on II, 1.

3) See fii’arfi/ra, I, 12 : rim.ijn j ogMilmika. Accouling to the M.V.V.,

II, 99, tlie yogin is vis/mijaviflah.

[ XLVI ]
 j

introduction

of the things of that other world, are stricken with wonder,

tmAyrrmrat and can no longer control themselves ** [Vbatdros,
250a) According to Proclus, this sense of amazement,
accompanies both the beautiful and the sacred
**
The beautiful, he sajs in the Theolagia Vlaiomca, is
appearing with wonder p f op u>j, and incites
“ all the things towards itself through desire and wonder *”
In the same work we read eventually that **
we are mated
towards the beautiful with wonder and emotion ” and that
“the soul, seeing the invisible, as it were, rejoices itself,

admires its appearing, and is astonished at it And as the mys

tics m the most saint religious rites, before the mystical visions,
are stricken with wonder, so, among the intelligibles also, the
beautiful appears in advance, before the communion with the
good, and strikes with wonder them who are seeing
According to Abhinavagupta and his school, this wonder
is form of
present, in a broader sense, in e\ ery like life, it is

consciousness itself, the element which distinguishes cons-

ciousness or spirit from inanimate matter Aesthetic sensibi-
lity, as Abhmava says, is nothing but a capacity of wonder

more elevated than the ordinary one An opaque heart does

not wonder, non obstupescit The appearance of the beautiful
does not arouse in it any shock {ksolKi) or n onder *
1) Th'cfogiz Platonic# Frankfurt 1 60S p 51
f
5 roOoy x o' *
IfJ* ct €&uy~’pov p hr*
{jcrao// lov

2) Ibid p 151
y
rpuS o t$ xa?c& t*rh fear? xa: xevra a>£ \yz pop 8a to a~oppr-oj
o*o'j EJciJtaiv itiouua { Scl foil) ) Xa pa xc? uyvrm To kat et or at
real oj o xalp *h> rcT? ^xycwzct-art "po zwv pja^tkab
rzZ^zaci
p
0 npavorj ztrXr£*$ rwv fzuojfJlaWy oltq} Srj xav zok vo rro^S ~po rrtf
to tijaQoj p£+OJG*<f* to xalsc/i '"po$aiop*isP hrXy t roifr opiwyoR9 rr)

3) Paralrtmukatirartina p 49

[
M-M 1 ]
 INTRODUCTION

While the aesthetic experience, which concerns the spectator

first of all, was receiving so much attention, Indian thought
did not neglect to examine the creative moment, in which the
poet gives life and breath to his work. The chief thinkers to
study the nature of the birth of a work of poetry were Ananda-
vardhana and Bhatta Tota and later Abhinavagupta, his direct
disciple.
“
—
In the boundless satnsiira of poetry ” —writes Ananda-
vardhana “ the poet is the true and sole Creator (lit., Praja-
pati) ;
as it pleases him to create, so the whole is transformed.
If the poet is pervaded by Rasa in his poem, the whole world
willbe suffused by Rasa. But he be void of emotion, the
if

world too will be void of Rasa. A good poet, by virtue of his

independence, freely designs even insentient objects to act as
sentient ones and sentient objects to act as insentient ones 1 ”.
The same comparison with the Creator, Prajapati has also been
reproduced by Abhinavagupta. “ Like the Creator ”, he says
in the Abhinavabharati “
, 1, 4, the poet creates for himself a
world according to his wish. Indeed, he is amply endowed with
the power of creating manifold, extraordinary things, origina-
ting thanks to the favour of the Deity, the Supreme Vocality,
called pratibha and continually shining wiliin his heart ”,
The poet is at once he who secs (the seer, rsi) and he who is able
to express in words that which he sees. The famous stanzas by
Bhatta Tota quoted by Hcmacandra, Kdvjan ida Sana, p. 37 9,
statevery clearly that the poet must have this double quality
and bear quotation. “It has been said that no non-seer can be
deservingly called a poet, and one is a seer only by virtue of his

1) Dh.A., Ill, 43.

2) On this term, sec below, p. 49, n, 4 and J. Gonda, The Vision of the
Vedic Poets. The Hague 1963, pp. 318-48.

[ XLVIII ]
 ,

INTRODUCTION

vision Vision is the power of disclosing intuitively the reality

underlying the manifold materials
{t
the world and their as- m
pects To be termed a poet in the authoritative texts it is
”
enough to be possessed of this vision of reality But in every-
day speech the world accords that title to him alone who posse
sses vision as well as expression Thus, though the first poet
(/ e , Valmiki) was highly gifted with enduring and clear vision,
he was not hailed as a poet by people until he embodied it in a
descriptive work ”
1
Rasa belongs, in reality, to the poet
alone it is nothing but his “ generalized ” consciousness
,

“ The activity of the actor”, says Abhinava in the Abhinava

bharati, 1, 294”, is depending on the poem and it is rooted
in the generalized consciousness of the poet Rasa, in reality,
is nothing but this consciousness The spectator also, in the
beginning, enchanted by this perception The determinants,
is

etc , are perceived by him only at a later time, thanks to a sub

sequent analysis This is the purpose of Bharata Thus, as
regards the dramatic performance, the poem or the mind of the
spectator, the root is only this, viz , the Rasa which lies within
the poet This is, as it were, the seed The poet is, indeed,
comparable to the spectator, for, as Anandavatdhana said,
**
if the poet is pervaded by Rasa, etc (see above, p XLVH3)
The poem, for its part, is, so to say, the tree The activity of
the actor, that is, representation, etc is, as it were, the flower,
and the tasting of the spectators, the fruit Therefore, all is

pervaded by Rasa ” 3
Rasa fills the poet entirely with itself,

1) See also Gonda op cit » p 333

2} A Bh t I, p 294 famgatasadharanihhr tasafrtnnmulai ca kattyapurct^
saro nafatjaparah \
saiva ca satmttt paramartbato rasa& f
samapkasya ca iaipra
iitya lahkriasya pnitaA ppoddbaraiuddhja ubhavudzpTaUUr ztt prayqjdnan I

natyt katye sanajtkadbtyi ca tad tva nr Ian hjasthamyah kaiigafo rasah J

kavir It
samajtkatulya tva \ tata mbJam irngau ett bni^ ttyah anandavar&hanacatytna 1

I
XLI\ ]
 INTRODUCTION

and is spontaneously translated into poetic expression, like a

liquid
—
which overflows a vase “ if a pot is not full, it cannot
—
overflow ” or like the natural manifestation of a state of mind
1
(interjections, exclamations, etc.) . In other words, artistic

creation is the direct or unconventional expression of a feeling

or passion “ generalized ”, that is, freed from all distinctions
in time and space, and therefore from all individual relationships
and practical interest by an inner force within the poet himself,
the creative or artistic intuition, pratibba. This state of
consciousness expressed in the poem, etc., is transferred to the
actor or the reciter, and to the spectator. All three —poet, actor
and spectator —
in the serene contemplation of the work of
,

art, form in reality a single knowing subject, merged together

by the same sensations and the same purified joy 2 .

The use of the term pratibba in Indian poetics is very old,

and, before Abhinavagupta, we find it in various authors of
treatises on poetics, as, f.i., Bhamaha (7th century), Dandin
(7th century) and Vamana (8th century). According to these
authorities, pratibba is, in brief, a sort of unborn genius, ima-
gination or quick-wittcdness, etc. conceived as the primary
cause of excellence in literary art 3
,
as the very seed of poetry 1
.

This intuition, to Rajasekhara (9th century) is not limited to the

poet, kaii. According to him, the word pratibba has tire double
sense of creative imagination, genius, inspiration, pdrayitri

taio rrksasthanlyarr: hnijari J

tatret puspadistbiintjo ’bbinaJildirjapFrab tatra
J

pbatcistbanijab Sarr.ajikcirasFsvadah [
tenet rasareajan: era risvam |

1) Loretta, comm, to I, 5.

2) Cf., f.i., the verse by Bhatta Tota, quoted by A.G., (Loratta, comm,
on I, 6) : najakasya kareb srofteb scmor.o *r.ubharas tatah
|

3) Cp. Bhamaha, Ktlijalatjkara, 1 , 5, and Dandin, KaijFdorsa, 1, 103.

4) Cp. Viimana, Kaijalankara, 1, 3, 16 : karitreibljeip preitibbaruim.

 , ,

INTRODUCTION

pratibha, and of aesthetic sensibility, here conceived in the

terms of an active power which permits the manifestation of
Rasa, bbavayitri pratibha 1 All these descriptions of pratibbd,
however, were superseded by the definition laid down by the
**
master of Abhmava, Bhatta Tota Intuition ”, he says, "is
a form of intuitive consciousness, prajna, which is an inex
haustible source of new forms It is by virtue of this intuition

alone that one deserves the title of ‘poet’, of one, that is, who
is skilful to express'” This definition of pratibha came to be
accepted and quoted m latex times by almost all of the Indian
rhetoricians Abhinava himself did not add very much to it

and limits himself to stress the fact that pratibha does not
exhaust itself in the poetical intu'tion, but is, in a broader
sense, the same consciousness, the same Self
In the majority of men it does not succeed in liberating
itself from, the chain of relationships and practical interests

which condition and constrict it, but, in the poet, it burns

—
with a purified light to shine out finally in all its fullness
3
in the intuition of the saints

1) Cp Rajasethara %avyamtmansa, pp 12 14
2) This stanza was a part of the Kaiyakautuka a work not extant now
It is quoted with some variants by many writers either anonymously or
mentioning the source by name Cf fi Hemacandra p 3, Manikya
candfa p 7 The text runs as follows
prajna nai anal olltkhalalttu pratibha mata (

tadanipranartajiradvarnanampimah kavtb ||

3) This concept is expressed in the T XI A pp CO-62 (cf MV V

w 1031 onwards)
yatba yalba cakrtxkam tctdrupam atincyat: j

tatha tatha caniatkaratarntamy am vibhav)atg

|[

adymuay lyaicrna itarittmagie col tarot tart

"f

satvkete pun apt namianajiant prattbhabhidah |J

aiyodrtkatnal attic pi pratibha!mam ms/hitah

J
dhrittam kaPih avaktrtyjijlttari jantt sari a tab [j
y at ad dl imam samhctanthirakal&nojjbttg |
ulrantat (tnmayt ktw kit» narttti nj karoti ca |j

[ U ]
 INTRODUCTION

111 brief, artistic intuition is a particular hypostasis of uni-

versal or total intuition, that is to say, of consciousness as a

force which creates and continually renews the Universe 1

.

After Abhinavagupta, the study of aesthetics continued

in India up to the present day, but without receiving much
creative stimulus. Anandavardhana, Bhatta Nayaka, Bhatta
Tota and Abhinava are still the most characteristic exponents
of this subject and their thought, although at times uncertain
and ingenuous, reaches, with the latter, conclusions which are
still valid today and even relatively novel to western thought.
The conception of art as an activity and an independent spiritual

experience, freed of practical interests, which the intuition

of Kant perceived for the West, was already, in 10 th century
India,an object of study and controversy. Poetry, said
Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta is inextinguishable it :

exists and will exist for ever. Like love, it has kindled and will
continue to kindle the hearts of men
new and pulsing
with
life 2 ; it is an essential and independent part of human nature
and die poets, who will never cease to tap its source, far from
exhausting it, only purify and enrich it with new and ever-
3
changing experiences .

1) Anandavardhana (Db.A., p. 91) says that poetic intuition is a parti-

cular form of praiibba (pratibb arisesam). A.G.’s comment (D/j.A.L., p.
92) is :

praiibba aptirvavaslunirjudnaksanja prajna |

iasja vilefo
rasaveiavaisadjasaundarjam Jzavjafzfamaivani |J

The concept of praiibba is identified in Zaira metaphysics with that of con-

sciousness as creative emission ( visarga ); cf., p. es., T.A., V., p. 432 :

. . .visargatwndadbarajd siktam tad eva sad visvam sasvad Havana -

|

vayatc [|

2) Db.A.L., p. 540.

3) Db.A ., pp. 545-6.

[
LH ]
 TEXT
[A. Bh I, pp, 274-287]

6
 evam kramahetum abhidhaya rasavisayalaksanasutram aha
“ vibhavanubhavavyabhicamamyogad rasamspattih ” atra |

bhattalollataprabhttayas tavad e\am \ yacakhyuh vibha- |

vadibhih samyogo ’rthat stha)inah, tato rasamspattih tatra |

5
vibhavas cittavrtteh sthayyatmikaya utpattau karanam anu- j

bhavas ca na rasajanya atra vivahsitah, tesam rasakatanatveoa

ganananarhatvat, api tu bha\ anam e\ a ye ’nubhavah vyabhi- J

cannafi ca cittavrttyatmakatvad yady api na sahabhavinah

sthayina, tathapi vasanatmateha tasya vjvaksita J drstante
’pivyanjanadimadhye kasyacid vasanatmakata sthayivad anya- 10

syodbhutata vyabhicanvat tena sthayy eva vibhavanubhava

|

dibhir upacito rasah sthayi bhavatv 1 anupacitah

[
sa cobh- |

ajor api anukarye ’nukartary api canusamdhanabalad iti s |

cirantanamm cayam eva paksah tatha hi dandina svalam- J

karalaksane ’bhyadhayi " ratih itngatatam gata rupabahulya-

15
”
yogena 3 lti,
lty aruhya* param kotirn kopo raudratmatam gatah I

ltyadi ca |

5
etaa neti Srisankukah 1
vibhavadyayoge sthayino linga-
bha\ enavagatyanupapatteh, bhavanam purvam abhidheyata- 20

ptasangat, sthitadaSayam laksanantaravaiyarthyat, mandatara-

tamamadhyasthyadyanantyapatteh, hasyarase sodhatvabha\ a-

1 bharatp G, M, tv He 13,
2 sa tebbajer apy ar.ukarjt 'nukartary

apt tan tsanihanabahi ttt G, M, the text of He is here somewhat enlarged,

sa tohbajor apt tnukhjaya trttja ratsodav anukarye ’nakartart ta nafe rapjadtru

patanusanrShanabahd ttt H 17, 5 KAD, D, v 2U t prak pnfir darhta styart
rattb srngaratam gala f
rttpababubyeyepena ted tdan ratarad raeafy il * KAD f

II, v 283 tty Sruhja (Bohtlingk’s ed.) adbtrubya G crubja M, corrected

in a second hand into adbtrubya arebya ta He

^ From this 1 to 1 14
[]

the text has been freely paraphrased and enlarged by He [j

[
3 1
 R. GNOLI

prapteh, kamavasthasu daSasv asaiikliyarasabhavadiprasarigat,

Sokasya prathamam tivratvam kalat tu mandyadarSanam,
krodhotsaharatinam amarsasthairyascvavipatyayc hrasadar-
Sanam iti viparyayasya dfSyamanatvac ca |
tasmad dhetubhir
5 vibhavakhyaih karyaiS canubhavatmabhih sahacarirupais
ca vyabhicaribliih prayatnarjitataya krtrimair api tathanabhi-
manyamanair anukaitrsthatvcna lirigabalatah pratlyamanah
sthayibhavo mukliyaramadigatasthayyanukaranarupah, anu-
karanarupatvad eva ca namantarcna vyapadisto rasah |

lO vibhava hi kavyabalad 1 anusamdheyah, anubhavah Siksatah,

'

2 J’
vyabhicarinah krtrimanijanu bhavafjanabalat sthayi tu kavya-
:(:
|

balad api nanusamdheyah |

ratih Soka ityadayo hi 3abda
latyadikam abhidheyikurvanty abhidhanatvcna, na tu vacika-
bhinayatupatayavagamayanti |
na hi vag cva vacikam api tu
15 taya nirvrttam, angair ivahgikam tcna
| |

vadavcneva jaladhib sokah krodhcna plyate- |

iti
|
tatha J

3
soketia kf'tas/awbhas
4
tatha sthiio yo ’navasthitah'andaih |

20 itycvainadau na £oko ’bhincyo ’pi tv abhidheyah |

6
bhdii pat it o Ukhaniyd

1 ”
kavyabalad lie : kavyabala G,M ||
Untiaccd source ;
the first

two packs have been given by lie and read as follows, vivrddhatviapj
agadho dnrau to ’ pi mahan api n
krtastambhas He krtah stambbah :
||

G, M \\
l
jo ’navas/hilakraudaih G : yo ’ vasibitakrandaib M : ytna Vardhitd-
kraudaib He. The two last pfidas of this stanza, whose source I have not
succeeded in identifying, arc given by He and read as follows, brdaya-
sphul anabhajartat roditum ( a.l., °rtair ardilum abhyartbyate sacivaih
) ||

c
This is Harsa, Raindva/i, 11,11 ; the complete stanza runs as follows,
bbati paiito lihbantyas tasya bdipambuSikarakaiiaiigbah\svcdodgama ira karata-
lasamsparlad efa me vapufi |l
 THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC

ity aiien a tu vakyena svartham abhidadhata udayanagatah

sukhatma tatih sthayibhavo ’bhmiyate na tueyate {
avagama-
nasaktir hy abhinayanam vacakatvad an} a ]
ata eva sthayipa-
datn sutre bhinnavibhaktikam api mumna noktam [
tena ratir
anuknyarmna srngara lti tadatmakat\ am tatprabhat at\ am ca 5
1
yuktam arthakriyapi mithyajnanad drsta
j
na catra nartaka !

eva sukhiti piaupattih, napy ay am eva rama lti, na capy

a} am na sukhiti, napi ramah sySd ia na \ayam lti, 1 na capi
tatsadrsa lti s yah sukhi rama asav ayam lti pratrnr astiti
l |

tad 4 aha i 10
pratibbati m zamdtho na iat ham na tipary ayah \

dbtr asav ayam ity ash nasav nayam tty apt [[

4 6
t truddbabuddbyasambhedad avivtcitasampUtab |

yuktyd paryarmyujyeta spburann annbhavab kaya J| iti t

tad idam apy antastattvasunyam na vimardaksamam ity 15

upadhyayah 7 tatha hy anukaranarupo rasa iti yad ucyate tat

[

1) kim samapkapratityabhiprayena, 2) uta natabhiprayena,

3) kim va * vastuvrttavivecakavyakhyatrbuddlnsamavalamba- a b»,
*
nenayathahur u vyakhyatarah khalv evam \ iv ecayanti
* ” iti,

4) atha bharatamumvacananusatena 1
20
9
1) tatradyah pakso ’samgatah
kimcid dht pramane- 1

nopalabdham tad anukaranam iti Sakyam vaktum yatha [

evam asau suram pibatiti surapananukaranatvena payahpanam

pratyaksa\ alokitam pratibhati lha ca natagatam kim tad |

1 He adds here one stanza ot Dharmikirti PV, II, 57, marttpradtpa

prabbayer na ruittddhy a blidbatato b J
mitbyajnanai iltsc 'pi vise so' rthaknjam
prati [|
* napi Tamafr syad va na i ajam tit G, He omitted in M ([

* After kim tu He adds sariydnmitbydiJmfajaiadrijiaprdtitibhyo i tlakfana

ntrafjrngadinjajttia J[
* ted G,M jad He
, j[
4 °buddbjasanhbtdad He
°bt ddbtsambbt&ad G, M JJ-
* °j'anphsveh G, hi htplcrab He H
7
upadhyajah G upadhjajah M bbattetotah He [|
* This is Dharmakirti,
PY, Sim rtfi, p 39 (ed Gnoli) [[
8 tatradjah He, M cdjab G Jj

E 5 ]
 R. GNOLI 1

upalabdham yat sa ity anukaranataya bhatlti cintyam |

5
*
taccharlram tannistham pratiSlrsakadi romahcakagadgadikadi
bhujakscpacalanaprabhrti 3 bhrukscpakataksadikam ca na rates
4
cittavrttirupataya nukaratvena kasyacit pratibhati |
jadatvena
0
5 bhinnendriyagrahyatvena bhinnadhikaranatvena ca tato
8

’tivailaksanyat |
mukhyamukhyavalokanc 7
ca tadanukarana-

pratibhasah 1
na ca riimagatam ratim upalabdhapurvinah
kecit |
etena ramanukarl nata ity api nirastah pravadah |

atha natagata cittavrttir eva pratipanna sat! ratyanukarah

10 srngara ity ucyate tatrapi kimatmakatvena sa pratiyata iti cin-
tyara nanu pramadadibhih karanaih kataksadibhih karyaih
|

dhrtyadibhiS ca sahacaribhir lirigabhutair ya laukiki karyarupa

karanarupa sahacarirupa ca cittavrttih pratltiyogya tadatma-
katvena sa natacittavrttih pratibhati hanta tarlii ratyakarenaiva I

15 sa pratipanneti dure ratyanukaranatavacoyuktih nanuvibha- |

vadayo ’nukarye paramarthika, iha tv anukartari na tatheti

0
viSesah |
astv evam, kim tu te vibhavadayo ’tatkaranatatka-
ryatatsahacarariipa api kavyaSiksadibalopakalpitah krtrimah
santah kitn krtrimatvena samajikair grhyante na va |
yadi
20 grhyante, tada taih kathara rater avagatih nanv ata eva tat |

pratlyamanara ratyanukaranam |
mugdhabuddhe 10 karanan-

1
yat sa ity anukaranataya Me, p. 69 (He in a note) : sarfanuknranat aya

G, M : yad ratyanukaranataya He : yad anukaranataya P, p. 417 ||

2
rorndticaka? G, M : romancer° He |[
3 0
caltin a 0 He :
G
va/ar,a° G, M ||

4
cittavrttir upataya G, M : cittavrttirTtpdyd He ||
5 bhiniundriyagrahyat-
vena represented in He, is possibly a later addition, and it is, as such, bracke-

ted both in G and M (in a second hand) |j

G
ca is omitted by He ||

7
Perhaps the original reading was inukhydvahkam only, and amukhya Gy
G

bracketed both in G and M and absent in He, is a later addition ||

8 kdrauarupd GM , : omitted by He J|
0
te vibhavadayo He : it hi vibhdvd-
dayo G,M |J
10
vwgdhabuddhe : ratyanttkaranabuddhcl) karayam G, M ;

vwgdha^ ddhch He ||

[
6 ]
 t

the aesthetic experience, etc.

1
tata.ptabh.ave hi karye suitkskena tatb ajfiane vastvantara-
syanumanam tavad yuktam I
asuiiksitena 2
tu tasyaiva pra-
3 vrscikavisesad gomayasyaiva.au-
siddhasya kataaasya [
yatha
4
raanam vrscikasyaiva tat param mithyajnanam yatrapi lx- |

ngajnaoam. tmthya tattapi na tadabhasanumanam yuktam s |

5
na hi baspad dhumatvena jnatad anukatapratibhasamanad
api Imgat tadanukaianutnanam yuktam dhumanukatatvena [

hi jnayamanaa nihatan nagnyanukarajapapunjapratltir 8 drsta [

* nanv akruddho ’pi natah kruddha lva bhati |

satyam, A

ktuddhena sadrsah sadrSyam ca bhrukutyadibhir got 7 | jq

iva gavayena mukhadibhir iti naitavatanukatah kascit aa [

capi samajikanam sadrsyamatir asti samajikanam ca aa j

5
bhavaSunya aattake pratipattlt ity ucyate atha ca tada- |

uukarapratibhasa iti rikta vacoyuktih f

yac coktam ramo
’yam ity asti ptatipattib, tad api yadi tadatve’ 8
tiruscitam 15
taduttarakalabhavibadhakavaidhuryabhave katham na tattva-
jfianam syat badhakasadbhave va katham na mithya-
[

jfianam vastavena ca vrttena badhakanudaye ’pi mithyi-

|

jfianam eva syat tena “ viruddhabuddhyasainbhedad 8 ” ity

j

asat nartakantare ’pi ca » tamo ’yam iti pratipattir asti

j
\ 20
t3ta$ ca ramatvam samanyarGpam. ity ayatam yac cocyate J

vibhavah kavyad anusamdhiyante tad api na vidmah

J

na hi mameyam sita kacid iti svatmlyatvena pratipattir

natasya j
atha samajikasya tatha pratltiyogyah knyanta ity

1 a
pra1?batt ht katys sutikftiena tatha jndnt He (but jndie for jflane) :

°pr<tbbavtftt ht kSrftfu itkfitena aa tatha jSane G, M [[

* tuttStkftfena He,
G . astutikfitcna M ])
3
jatha G, He tatha M |[
4
vrietkasyatvt G :

rnakasyana 13 He . vrhikas catva M j|

na yi&ant ajuktarn
He na ,aytfcam G,M [\
* °jii$apunja° He °japapnipa n GM t ||

&ar &ai(r G,M |(

8 tadiitte *
1tmscifnPi (the avjigraha added by me)
M,G {tad met (</) msettam) t again nuettam He » ^buddhysanbledat
JJ

He °bi'ddhtsan,bhtd3t G,M |J
lr>
*p t (a G,M ca omitted by He jj
 R. GNOLI

ctad evanusamdhanam ucyate, tarhi sthayini sutaram anu-

1

samdhanam syat tasyaiva hi mukhyatvena asminn ayam

I

iti samajikanam pratipattih yas tu 2 vag vacikam ityadina J

5

bhedabhidhanasamrambhagarbho 3
mahiyan abhinayarupata-
5 vivekah krtah sa uttaratra svavasarc carcajdsyate tasmat |

1
samajikapratityanusarena sthayyanukaranam rasa ity asat |

2) na capi natasyettham pratipattih ramam taccittavrttim

vanukaromiti sadrsakaranam hi tavad anukaranam anupala-
j

bdhaprakrtina na £akyam kartum atha paScatkaranam |

10 anukaranam, tal loke ’py anukaranatmatatiprasakta atha [

na niyatasya kasyacid anukarah, api tuttamaprakrteh 3okam

anukaromiti, 0 tarhi keneti cintyam na tavac chokcna tasya |

tadabhavat [
na casrupatadina £okasyanukarah, tadvailak-
sanyad ity uktam iyat tu 7 syat, uttamaprakrter ye ^oka-
|

15 nubhavas tan anukaromiti |

tatrapi kasyottamaprakrteh |

yasya kasyacid iti cct, so’pi vidstatam vina katharn buddhav

aropayitum Sakyah ya evam roditid cet, svatmapi madhyc |

natasyanupravista iti galito ’nukaryanukartibhavah ]

kim
ca natah siksavasat svavibhavasmaranac cittavrttisadharani-
20 bhavena hrdayasamvadat kevalam 8 anubhavan pradar£ayan
kavyam ucita 9 kakuprabhrtyupaskarena pathamS ccstata ity
etavanmatre ’sya 10 pratltir
11
na tv anukaram vedayatc]
kantavesanukaravad dhi na ramacestitasyanukarah |
ctac ca

prathamadhyaye ’pi darsitam asmabhih 12 |

3
1 clad G,M : cldvad He ||
2 pas tu : pat In G,M ||
°garbho :

°garbba° G,M ||
1 rasa G,M : rasa He ||
3 °prakrlind G,Iic :

0prakrltnam M ||
8
anukaromiti He : anukeroti G,M ||
7 iyat tu

G,M '.yat lu He 8
kevdiam G,M : kcvaldn He 0 ucita °Hc,
|| ||

M : upacitoP G ||
10
clavaumatrc 'spa G,M : c!availaid!raspa lie ||

» pralilir G, He : pralJliiu M ||
12
Cf. AB/j, I, p. 37 {infra,

App. I, p. 98) ||
 1
THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, £TC

3) napi vastuvittanusatena tadamiharatvam, xsarmedya-

manasya 1
\astuvmatvanupapatteh j
yac ca \ astm rttam tad
5
darsayisyamah 3
|

na ca munnaamam evamvidham asti k\acit sthay-

4) p. 2

yanuLaranam rasa lti * napi lmgam atrarthe muner upala-

{
5

bhyate [
pratyuta dhtu\ aganatalat aicitryalasyangopajivanam
mrupanadi \iparyaye lingam lti samdhyangadhyayante \ita
njsyamah 4 “ saptadvipanukaranam ” ltyadi t\ anyathapi
J

sakyagamamkam iti
f
tadanukare ’pi ca L\a namantaram
hantavesagatyanukaranad • 10
[

yac cocyate varnakair hantahdibhih samyujyamana e\a

gaur ltyadi, tatra yady abhivyajyacoana lty artho ’bhlpretas
tad asat na hi smduradibhih parainarthiko gaur abhivyajyate
J

pradipadibhir i\ a, kim tu tatsadrsah samuhat ise§o nm artyate J

tx eva 7 hi sinduradayo gavavaya\ asamnivdasadtsena samni- 15
vesavisesenavasthita gosadrg iti pratibhasasya visayo narvam
vibhavadisamuho ratisadrsatapratipattigrahyah tasmat bha- J

\ anukzranam rasa lty asat \

yena tv abhyadhayi sukhaduhkhajananasaktiyukta visaya-

samagri bahyaiva samkhyadda sukhaduhhhasvabhavo rasah { 20
tasyam ca samagryam dalasthamya \ibhavah, satnskaraka
anubhavavyabhicannah, sthayinas tu tatsamagrijanya antarah
sukhaduhkhasvabha\ a iti tena “ sthayibhavan rasattam |

upanesyama * ** ltyadav upacaram angikurvata granthaviro

dham s\ ayam
budhyamanena dusanaviskaranamaukha-
c\,a 25
ryat* pramamko janah10 panraksita iti Lim asyocyate yattv J

1 vaiiuvriSanuianna G,Hc cdtfuftaricsartna M ||

- aiarrudjaixuzjrfa
He aimiatrttdjafranaija GM |J
3 Cf p 00 |J * Cf AEb, HI,
infra,
c
i?ti "XIAIi ” J , y, v “120 j]
'^ntikMranai ^mikara pedau 1|
7 fa era He • afa e*a G, M [J
* A£
T
prose 2 fter v 45 JJ
*
He
*rrsxklaijat *r'cnkbyai G, M |[
7® pramamko jarab CM
pramamkajarab He |l
 R. GNOLI

1
anyat tatpratltivaisamyaprasangadi tat kiyad -
atrocyatam |

bhattanayakas tv aha ]
raso na pratlyate, notpadyate,
nabhivyajyate |
svagatatvcna hi pratltau karunc duhkhit-
vam syat |
na ca sa pratltir yukta shader avibhavatvat,
5 svakantasmrtyasamvcdanatj devatadau sadharanikaranayogy-
atvat, samudrollaiighanader asadharanyat [
na ca tadvato 3
ramasya smrtir anupalabdhatvat |
na ca snbdanumanadibhyas
4
tatpratitau lokasya sarasata yukta pratyaksad iva |
nayaka-
yugalakavabhasc hi pratyuta lajjajugupsasprhadisvocitacitta-
s
10 vrttyantarodayavyagrataya ka sarasatvakathapi syat |
tan
na pratltir 0
anubhavasmrtyadirupa rasasya yukta |
utpattav
api tulyam etad dusanam |
saktirupatvena purvam sthitasya
pascad abhivyaktau visayarjanataratamyapattih J
svagata 7 -
paragatatvadi ca purvavad vikalpyam |
tasmat kavyc dosa-
55 bhavagunalamkaramayatvalaksancna, natyc caturvidhabhina-
s
yarupena nividanijamohasamkatatanivaranakarina vibhava-
disadharamkaranatrnanabhidhato dvitlycnamscna bhavakatva-
p"o 7 g vyaparena bhavyamano * raso ’nubhavasmrtyadivilaksanena
5
rajastamo’nuvedhavaicitryabalad drutivistara vikasatmana
20 sattvodrekaprakasanandaraayanijasamvidvisrantilaksanena pa-
10
rabrahmasvadasavidhcna bhogcna param bhujyata iti 1

'pat tv r.rjrj /a t° lie : jat tv ctjantan rtah G.M ||

2 tat kijad He :

tat kir: pad G,M ||

3 tadvato G, INI ; tattvato lie ||
i sarasata
juktd He : sarasata prapuktd G.M (for sarasata pi pttkia ?) ||
5
ka
sarasatvakathapi spat lie : kasarasatvama thdpispd t G,M ||
0
Before tan
na pratltir, etc. He adds the following sentence, pnragatatvcr.a tit pratitau
tatasthpan era bbavet ||
7
svagata 0 He, hi : svagatafva 0 G ||
8 °sar:knta-
tdr.irarar.akarini: He : °san;hatchorine: G,M, equally possible ||
0 °vistdra°

G,M : °:’jstara° He 10
After hhnjyata iti lie adds the wordsjv.'/ sa cvdba,
||

followed by two stanzas, surely borrowed from the lost Hrdapad.arpsr.a,

abb idha bhdvanii ninja tadbhogikrtir (alia lectio, tadal’ otpk rlari) tva ca abbi-
\

dhadbamattin: Jatc sabddrtb.iiarikrti tatah blur, •n.ihh.iija e{0 pi srngirddi&nno

JJ

matah (alia lectio, hi pat)

|
tadbbojkrtariipnp : vjdppaie siddbitttan tiara p [J

[ io ]
 the aesthetic experience, etc

tatra purvapakso ’yam bhattalollatapaksanabhyupaga-

mad eva nabhyupagata lti taddusanam anutthanopahatam
eva J
pratityadivyatiriktaS ca samsare ko bhoga lti na \id-
mah |
rasaneti cet, sapi pratipattir eva, kevalam upayavai-
laksanyan namantaram piaupadyatam, dadananumitisru- 5
tyupamiupratibhanadmamantatavat j
mspadanabhivyakti-
dvayanabhyupagame ca mtyo va ’san 1 va rasa iti na trtiya
2
gatih syat |
na capratitam vastv asti vyavahare yogyam 5 j

4
athocyate pratltir asya bhogikaranam, tac ca drutyadisvaru-
pam # J
tad astu, tathapi na tavanmatram
yavanto hi rasas | lo
tavatya eva rasanatmanah* pratitayo bhogikaranasvabhavah |

gun an am 7 cangangivaicitryam anantam kalpyam iti ka tri

tveneyatta |

9
bhai'anohbiiyya eso pi Srngaradigano bi yat |

9
iti tu yat kavyena bhavyante rasa lty ucyate, tatra vibhava- 15

dijamtacatvanatmakasvadarupapratyayagocaratapadanam e\ a
yadi bhavanam tad abhyupagamyata eva J
yat tuktam (

bhdvasitnyojanavyangyaparasamvttUgoearah \

10
asvadandtmanubbai o rasah kavyartba ucyate fl

1
’salt He ’tad G,M [|
* gahh tyatHe gaijr asyarz G
gatm asyarz M []
5 asti tyavahare yogyan G,M csttt'uyaraharayogy am

He ||
4 pratttir arya He pratltir iti tarya G pratittr ttt rosya (for
5 drutyadisrarupam
rasasya ?) M, -which reading is equally possible ||

He iblltyadssvaruparz G,M ||
* rasanatmanah GM rasatmatiafy He ||

7 grinanart G,M this is explained by lie by sattiadzgUf!aziaz>z [|

8
*gr.no hi

yat He °garro hhayat G (corrected into hi yat), M |[

• iti tu yat He
itzjatG , M j]
10 This stanza is quoted in this form in the VyafJimtks,
0
p 67 (read parasamttti for parisamu/tP ) Both in
1
and we read G M
in the first pada samtdanakhya (corrected into Samredanakhyaya in G),
which is quite nonsensical. He quotes a different stanza Samsargadtr
yatla iastra ekahat plalay ogafa b \
takyartbas tadtad etatra irngaradi raso
a stab ]]
ttz tad asmakam abhimatam era f|

11
t ]
 R, GNOLI 1

iti tatra vyajyamanataya vyarigyo raksyatc J

anubhavcna ca
tadvisaya mantavyam iti ]
nanv cvam katliam rasatattvam |

astam, kim kurmah |

dwtidyasiddhc kim aptirvam cfat

5 samvidvikdsc '
dbigatdgamiivam |

iitham svayamgrdbyawnbnrbabcfu-
dvandvena him dnsayi/d na Jokab ||

[' * ltrdhvordbvam arnbya yad arihaia/ivam

2^0
dbib pasy nii hdtiiim avcdayanii |

10 pbalam
4 tad ddyaib parikalpiidndm
vivckasopdiiaparawpardndw ||

ciiram nirdlambanam cva manye

pramyasiudhan - praibamdvaldram /

tanmdrgaldbbc sail scinbandba-

15 pnrapraiisthddi na viswayaya ||

taswdt satdm aira ua dusitdni

matdm laity cva in sodbitdni \

purvapraiisfbdpifayojanasu
wii/apratistbdpba/am dmananti ||

20 tarhy ucyatam parisuddhatattvam 3

|
uktarn cva inuninn,
na tv apurvam kimcit tatha hy aha “ kavyarthan bhavayan-
|

tlti bhavah ” iti tat kavyartho rasah 3 yatha hi c< ratrim

|

asata 0 ”, “ tam agnau pradat 7 ” ityadav arthitadilaksitasya-

dhikarinah pratipattimatrad atitivraprarocitat prathamapra-
£
vrttad anantaram [adhikaivopattakalatiraskarcnaiva asai 8 *

1
raksyatc G (in the first cd.) : iakfyafe G: labhyatc M (corrected into
laksyatc) ||
3
pramjGsinihan : prameyasiddhan G, M ||
3
pariiuddbataiivam
G,M : parUuddhnm iattvam He ||
4
The entire quotation is kaiydrtbar,
bhdvayantiti bhavah (Nd, prose at the beginning of eh. VII) 3
He
||

paraphrases tasmat kavyartho rasah 0

ratrim asata
|| G: rdtrir asaie LI.
Untraccd source » Taittmya Samhitd, 8
asai as/e G
|| 2, 1, 1 ||
:

(corrected into dse), M ||

[
12 ]
 1 THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC.

‘pradadatu’ ltyadirupa samkramanadisvabhava yathadarSanam

3

bhavana V i dhi my o g a dibit asablut 5 vyavahtta pratipattih,

tathaiva kavyatmakad api Sabdad adhikarino ’dhikasti ptati-

pattih |
adhikarl catra vimalapratibhanaSalihrdayah ]
tasya ca
“ gtlvabhangabhiramam ” 1
lti “ umapi nllalaka ” m “ haras 5
tu kimcit ” ityadivakyebhyo vakyafthapratlp after anantatam
1

manas! saksatkatatmika apahastita tattadvakyopattakaladivi-

bhaga tavat pratitir upajayate |
tasyam ca yo mrgapotakadir
bhatt tasya vifesatupatvabluvad. bhtta lti trasakasya® parama-
ithikatvad bbayam eva param desakaladyanalingitam, tata 10
evabhlto ’hambhlto ’yarn iatrur vayasyo madhyastho vetya-
dipratyayebhyo duhkhasukhadikrtahanadibuddhyantarodaya-
niyamavattaya vighnabahulebhyo vilaksanam mrvighnapta-
titigrahyam saksad lvahrdaye niviSamanam7 caksusor iva vipa-
rmrtamanam bhayanako rasah ( tathavidhe hi bhaye natmaty- 15
8
antatiraskrto
na viSesata ullikhitah evam paro 'pi tata eva
| |

na parimitam eva sadharanyam api tu *vitatam, vyaptigraha “

£
iva dhumagnyot bhayakampayor eva va {
tad atta saksatka-
rayamanatve panposika natadisarnagrr, yasyam vastusatam
kavyarpitanam ca deSakalapramatraditiam niyatnahetunam 20
anyonyapratibandhabalad atyantam apasatane *sa eva sadha-
ranibhavah sutaram pusyati ata eva samsamajikanam 9 eka- J

1
bhaian* prtftbbaPan3 M (corrected tn a second hand into pratjbba-
bbaiana) : prattlhabhai^na G In my opinion prsti is simply a note by
some reader uho has not understood the expression
yathSfarfotictm
which vas later incorporated the text m
* Kalidasa, AbhmdmU- |(

hmtah, I, 2 3 Kalidasa,
pjtmamambhata,
{J HI, 62 « Kalidasa

W
||

ibid.. Ill, 67 H 3
apahastita* He, M (but corrected in a second
into apdtsiWy ipahMta & * trasakasja He,
|| G. gralaktya
1 il ntithmanam He, G rndhijamanam M ||
* afpantatiraskrto
ant omitted
.*
*!l f bE He II
* sarvasamajikanan G,M sama-
I- .
jlkanapj He [|
 »

R. GNOLI

ghanatayaiva 1 pratipatteh 2 sutaram rasapariposaya sarvesam

anadivasanavicitrikrtacetasam vasanasamvadat
3 |
sa cavighna
samvic camatkarah |
tajjo ’pi kampapulakollukasanadir vika-
ra£ camatkarah |
yatha 5

ajja vl barl catnakkai

kabct kaba vi na mam dare na dalidim f

catndakaldkamdalasac-
cbahdim lacchl'tm ctmgaim ||

tatha hi sa ca trpti'vyatirekenacchinno bhogavesa ity ucyatc |

bhufijanasyadbhutabhogaspandavistasya camatah karanam

camatkara iti sa ca saksatkarasvabhavo manasadhyavasayo
|

va samkalpo va smrtir va tathatvenasphuraty c astu yad aha | |

ramyaiti viksya madbttrams ca nUamya sabddn

paryntsnkibbavati yat snkbito ’pijantuh |

tac cetasa smarati tiumm abodhapurvam

bbavastbirdni jananantarasanb rdani ||

ityadi |
sarvatha tavad esasti pratltir, asvadatma yasyam
ratir eva bhati
tata eva visesantaranupahitatvat sa rasanlya
|

sati na laukild na mithya nanirvacya na laukikatulya na tada-

ropaditupa |
esaiva copacayavasthastu 7
dciadyaniyantranat j

anukaro py astu. bhavanugamitaya 8

karanat visayasamagry
|

api bhavatu vijnanavadavalambanat sarvatha rasanatmakavl- |

tavighnapratitigrahyo bhava eva rasah tatra vighnapasaraka |

vibhavaprabhrtayah |
tatha lii loke sakalavigh navi ni rmukta
samvittir eva camatkaranirveSarasanasvadanabhogasama-

1
eka&banalayaiva G, M (corrected in a second hand from ekagbanataiva):
e -agianataiva He || -pratipatteh He, M: G suggests pratipattih J|
3
Jaliaim G,M: kaliSim He * sa ca 1rpti 3 (sa va trpti 0
|| ?): sa catr'pti
G.M ||
5
camatah karanam : ca manahkaranam G, M « tathatvenasphuraty
M : tathatvena sphuraty G : iathatveniisphnrenty He
||

<
°vasthastu He :
||
vasthasu G,M 8
bhavanugamitaya G,M:
||
anugamitayS He ||

[
14 ]
 the aesthetic EXPERIENCE, ETC.

pra-
p at til ay avi Sr anty adi s abdai r abhidhiyate vighnas casyam 1) |

A n j
tipattav ayogyata * sambhavanaviraho nama 2) svagatatva p 232'

paragatatvaniyamena deSakalavisesaveSah 3) in] asukhadrviv a-

Sibhavah 4) pratityupayavaikalyam 5) sphutatvabhavah
6) apradhanata 7) samSayayogas ca 1
tatha hi 5

1) samvedyam asambhavayamanah samvedye samvidam

niveSayitum 2
eva na saknoti |
ha tatra visrantir lti prathamo
vighnah l
tadapasarane hrdayasamvado lokasamanyavastu-
3
visayah [
alokasamanyesu tu cestitesv akhanditaprasiddhi-
)amtagadhatudhapratyaya 4prasarakari prakhyataramadinama- 10

dheyapangrahah ]
ata eva mhsamanyotharsopadesavyutpatti-
prayojane natakadau prakhyatavastuvisayatvadi myamena luiu-
5
payisyate |
11a tu prahasacadav iti
8
(
tac ca svavasara eva
vaksyama ity astam tavat i

2) svaikagatanam ca sukhaduhkhasamvidam asvade yatha- 15

sambhavam tadapagamabliirutaya va tatpariiaksavyagrataya va
tatsadisarjijlsaya va
va tajjihasaya va tatpracikhyapayisaya
tadgopanecchaya va prakaraatarena va samvedanantarasamud-
gama eva paramo vighnah paragatatvamyamabhajam api J

sukhaduhkhanam samvedane myamena svatmam sukhaduhkha- 20

mohamadhyasthyadisamvidantatodgamaiiasambbavanad avasy-
ambhavl vighnah tadapasarane 7 “ karyo natiprasango ’tra 8 ”
j

ltyadina purvarangamguhanena 9 prastavanavalokanena 10

ca
yo natarupatadhigamas tatpurahsarah 11
pratiSfrsakadina tat-

1
G,M nagaia^ He
siagaiatva* 2
mttiayttiffl He, M vmneiayttum [[

G II
3
tu G, He omitted by M 4 *rudhapraij<#a*
G M Qrftdhatih~ \\ a

pratjaja* He 8 mrftpajs spate G,M

j]
II, ch XVIII) mrfpjaie
He 4
tft Ho
([ na G M 7 tadapasarane
He tadapakdrans G :
a |(

tadapahtram M ||
8
N$, V, v 165 |[
9
Before ptinarangdniguhamna
He adds pilriarangiudbim praity which looks like a plda of the |[

10
Before prasidi endt alokat cna He adds natt i idd$ako tdpi (n£ XX, v 30
ff) its j]
11
iaipttrehsarah G,M tatpurahsarafi He |J

[ 15 ]
 ft. GNOLl
1

pracchadanaprakaro ’bhyupayo ’Jaukikabhasadibhcdalasyanga-

rangapltliamandapagatakaksyadiparigrahanatyadharmisahitah |

tasmin hy asyaivatraivaitarhy cva ca sukham duhkliam vcti

na bhavati pratltih |
svarupasya nihnavad rupantarasya caro-
5 pitasya pratibhasasamvidviSrantivaikalycna svarupe visranty-
abhavat satyatadiyarupanihnavamatra cva paryavasanat |
tatha
hy aslnapathyapuspagandikadi. lokc na drstarn |
na ca tan na
kimcit, kathamcit sambhavyatvad iti sa csa sarvo m unin a
sadharanibhavasiddhya rasacarvanopayogitvena parikaraba-
10 ndhah samasrita iti tatraiva sphutibhavisyatiti tad ilia tavan
nodyamaniyam |
tatah sa csa svaparaniyatatavighnapasarana-
prakaro vyakhyatah j

3) nijasukhadivivasibliutas ca katham vastvantarc sanivi-

dam visramayed iti tatpratyuhavyapohanaya pratipadarthani-
15 sthaili sadharanyamahimna sakalabhogyatvasa liisnubhih :1

3
.. 205 sabdadivisayamayair -
atodyaganavicitramandapapada vida-
gdhaganikadibhir uparahjanam samaSritam ycnahrdayo ’pi
hrdayavaimalyapraptya sahrdaylkriyatc |
uktarn hi “ drsyam
sravyam ca ” iti 1
|

20 4) ldm ca pratityupayanam abhavc katham pratitih |

5) asphutaprautikarisabdaljiigasambhavc ’pi na pratitir

visramyati spliutapratitirupapratyaksocitapratyayasakariksatvat |

yathahuh “ sarva ccyam pramitih pratyaksapara n ” iti |

svasaksatkrta agamanumanaSatair apy ananyathabhavasya

svasamvcdanat j
alatacakradau saksatkarantarcnaiva balavata
0
tatavadharanad iti laukikas tavad ayam krarnah |
tasrnat
tadubhayavighnavigliatc ’bliinaya lokadharrnlvrttipravrttyupas-

1
lasmin bj G,M : lasmin hi snij He ||
2 0
mqyair He :
0mqyibbir G
(corrected into a
mayair), M ||
a n
J>ada n G,M : omitted by J-Ic ||

1 c
N$, I, v. 11 II
Njajas/7/ra, Vdtsjajanabba{ya, I, 1, 3 (the edited text
gives sa for sarva) ||
0
lailarailharayat G, M : lalpramiljapasaramt He ||

[ 16 ]
 a

THE AESTHETrc EXPERIENCE, £rfi

krtah samabhisicyante I abhmayanam hi sasabdahngavyapa-

ravisadrSam eva pratyaksavyaparakalpam lti niscesyamah 1 |

6) apradhane ca vasturn kasya samvid viframyati |

tasyaiva
pfatyayasya * pradhanantatam praty amidhavatah svatmany avi-
Srantatvat ato ’pradhanatvam jade vibh avanubha vavarge vya-
| 5
bhicannicaye ca samvidatmake ’pi myamenanyamukhapreksini3
sambhavatm tadatmktah sthayyeva tatha 4 carvanapatram tatra 1

purusartharusthah kasat samvida lti pradhanam tad yatha ratih ]

kamahadanusangidharmarthamstha, krodhas tatpradhanesvarth-

amstbab kama dha r maparyavas ito *pi, utsahah samastadharmadi- jq
paryavasitas, tattvajnanajamtamrvedaprayo ’pibhavo * mokso-
paya lti tavad esam pradbanyam yady apt caisam apy anyonyam |

gnnabhavo ’sti tathapi tatpradhane 7 rupake tattatpradhanam 8

bhavatlti rupakabhedapatyayena sarvesam pradhanyam esam
laksyate adurabhagabhtmvistadrsas 7 tv ekasminn api lupake
| is
prthak pradhanyam tatra sar\ e ’mi sukhapradhanah svasamvi-
[

ccarvanarupasyaikaghanasya prakaSasyanandasaiatvat tatha by |

ekaghanasokasamviccan ane ’pi loke strilokasya 10 hrdayaviha-

ntir antarayaSunyavisrantisatiratvat |
avi^rantirupataiva ca dull-
kham 1
tata eva kapilair duhkhasya cancalyam eva pranatveno- 20
ktam rajovrttitam vadadbhir lty anandarupata sarvarasanam (

lam tuparanjakavisayava^at kesam api katukimnasti spar£o \ira-

syeva11 sa hi kleSasahisnutadiprana eva evam ratyadinam pra-
1 ]

dhanyam 1
hasadinam tu satiSayam sakalalokasulabhavibhavata-

1 ABh, II, chapp VIII £F ||

1 pratyayasya G,M praljejasya He ||

8 °prekftni He, M ^samprekitni G |[

4 tatha GM omitted by He J|

5 kamaP kamdh GM (in M h bracketed in a second hand) kerne

He 1]
* °pra) 0 * pt bhavo (see V Raghavan Bheja, p 001 °prajo

itbhmo GM iatuti fa He f|
7 titpradlait M tattaiprail ane G,
Hc|| 8
tattatprail anam GM tatprddl a tan He ||
8 0 drfas GM
9 dr! He }|
1° stnlokasja Gllc *slt Ukasyi M j|
11 urasjifA He
ptrasya GM II

8 [ 17 ]
 R. GNOLI 1

yoparanjakatvam iti pradhanyam |

ata cvanuttamaprakrdsu
'
p. 23 1 bahulyena hasadayo bhavanti |
pamaraprayah * sarvo ’pi hasati
:
socati bibheti paranindam adriyatc alpa subhasitatvena ca sar-
vatra vismayatc |
ratyadyangataya tu pumarthopayogitvam api
4
5 syad esam j
ctadgunapradhanabhavakrta cva ca dasarupakadi-
bhcda iti vaksyamah |
sthayitvam caitavatam cva [
jata cva hi
jantur iyatlbhih samvidbhih parlto bhavati |
tathahi
3
dtibkhasamslesavidveft stihhdsvdda tiasdda > 'ah j

id nyayena sarvo riramsaya vyaptah svatmanv utkarsamanitaya

10 param upahasann abhistaviyogasamtaptas taddhctusu kopa-

paravaso ’saktau ca tato bhlruh kimcid arjijisur apy anucita 3 -
vastuvisayavaimukhyatmakatayakrantah kimcid anabhistata-
yabhimanyamanas tattatsvakartavya darsanasamuditavismayah c

kimcic ca jihasur cva jayatc |

na by ctaccittavrtdvasanasunyah
15 pram bhavati j
kevalam kasyacit kacid adhika cittavrtdh kacid
una, kasyacid ucitavisayaniyantrita kasyacid anyadta |
tat kacid
7
cva purusarthopayoginlty upadesya j
tadvibhagakrtas cottama-
8
prakrtyadivyavalaarah |
yc punar ami glanisankaprabhrtayas
cittavrttivisesas tc samucitavibhavabhavaj janmamadhye
20 ’P 4 ° na bhavanty cva [
tatha hi rasayanam upayuktavato
muncr glanyalasyasramaprabhrtayo nottisthanti 11
10
yasyapi 1

va bhavand vibhavabalat tasyapi hctupraksayc kslyamanah

samskarascsatam tavan ,= navasyam anubadhnand [
utsahadayas 13
tu sampaditasvakartavyataya prallnakalpa api samskarascsatam

1
pradhanjam He, M : (,: a) pradhanyam G ||
2 a/pa° G,M : svalpa
0

He ||
3
Untraccd source |[
J
drjijifur G,M possibly, ujjigiftir
: ||

amiciUP G : ci/a° M ||
0
°si'a/zar/aiya° G,M 0svapar-hkartavyaP
:

He ||
-
tadvibhagaP lie: tadribbdra G (corrected into tadribhaga °), M ||

glanUaiif-aprabhr/ayas G,M: dhrlyddayai lie ||

0
’pi G,M : omitted by
10
Hc|| munch G,M : omitted by He ||
”notlislhanli G,M: na bhavanti We ||

tiiran G,M : omitted by He ||

13
utsahadayas G,M : ralyadayas He ||

[
13 ]
 a

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC

nativartante kartavyantaravisayasyotsahader 1
akhandanat |

“
yathaha patanjalih na hi caitra ekasyam strij am rakta lty
anyasu viraktah 2 ” ltyadi l
tasmat s thayirupaci ttav fttis utrasy u ta

evarm vyabhicarinah svatmanam udayastamayavaicitryasata-

sahastadharmanam piatilabhamana raktamladisutrasyutavi- 5
ralabhavombhana sambhavitabhangisahasragarbhasphatihakaca
3

bhratnaka4 padmatagamarakataniahamladimay agolakavat tasmin

sutre s vas ams karavaici try am amveiayanto ’pi tatsutrakrtam upa
karasaradaibham bibhratah s vayarn ca vicitrarthahVhayisutram
ca vicitrayanto 'ntarantaraluddham api sthayisutram ptatibha- 10

savaka^am upanayanto ’pi purvaparavyabhicanratnacchaya-

Sabakmanam avaSyam anayantah pratibhasanta lti vyabhicanna
ucyante 1
tatha hi glano’yam lty ukte kuta ill hetupraSnenas-
thayitasya sutryate* i
na tu rama
utsaha^aktunan lty atra
hetupta^nam ahuh ata * eva -vibhavas tatrodbodbakah santah
| 5
p
svarupoparanjakatvam vidadhStia tatyutsShader ucitanucita-
tvamatram avahanti na tu tadabhave sarvathatva te mrupa-
|

khyah, vasanatmana sarvajantunam tanmayatvenoktatvat ]

A'yabhicarmam tu svavibhavabhave namapi nastiti vitanisyate

caitad yathayogam vyakhyavasare 7
evam apradhanatvamra- 20
|

sah sthaymirupanaya 8 **
sthayibhavan lasatvam 8 ” ltyanaya
samanyalaksana^esabhutaya visesalaksanamsthaya ca krtah 10 1

7) tatranubhavanam vibhavanam vyabhicanflam capfthak

sthayim niyamo nasti, baspader anandaksirogadijatvadarSanad

1
karfaiyanfaraitfajcisyctsa} ader G,M lastvantaraufajdsya raijader lie |[

* Yogasutra, Vjasabbasya, 2, 4 [[
3
^uratabbm tmbhana® (see on this

passage, R Gnolt, Turthcr Ob sen ationt, p 102) ralabbaioijzp) palairibhatia

i
G uralabbaio bhar.a j\f ||
4
°blramaka Q G l bran: aka M ||
8
ttetfrer-
tbab XUitTarthcP GM \\
a 6sf/’a)Uat)a Si trjats He Sihaji tsrya sfqalt

|
G sibajT ias)d utrjarie ||
Abb, cli VII ||
* *ntrtpand) He, hi
z
nirtipanq}am G |[
* Cf supra, p 9, 1 23 Jj
13 krtah G,M mnitia
kjtab He |j

[ 19 5
 )

R. GNOLI

vyaghrades ca krodhabhayadihetutvat sramacintader utsaha-

1
bhayadyanekasahacaratvavalokanat |
samagrl tu na vyabhi-
carini 1
tatha hi bandhuvinciso yatra vibhavah paridevitasru-
2
patadis tv anubhavas cintadainyadis ca vyabhicarl, so
5 ’vasyam soka eved 3
|
evam samsayodaye sankatmakavigh-
nasamanaya samyoga upattah 1

tatra lokavyavahare karyakaranasahacatatmakalingadar-

4
sanc sthayyatmaparacittavrttyanumanabhyasapatavad adhuna
tair evodyanakataksadhrtyadibhir laukiklm karanatvadibhuvam
10 atikrantair vibhavananubhavanasamuparanjakatvamatrapranair
ata evalaukikavibhavadivyapadesabhagbhih pracyakaranadiru-
pasamskaropajlvanakhyapanaya vibhavadinamadhcyavyapadc-
syair bhavadhyaye ’pi vaksyamanasvariipabhedair 6
gunapra-
dhanataparyayena samajikadhiyi samyagyogam sambandham
1 5 aikagryam va T saditavadbhir alaukikanirvighnasamvcdanatmaka-
carvanagocaratam nlto ’rthas carvyamanataikasaro na tu siddha-
svabhavas tatkalika cva na tu carvanadriktakalavaiambl stlia-
yivilaksana eva rasah na tu s yatha sankukadibhir abhyadhi-
J

yata “ sthayyeva vibhavadipratyayyo

rasyamanatvad rasa
20 ucyata ” iti 9 evam hi loke ’pi ldm na rasah , asato ’pi hi
|

yatra rasanlyata syat 10 tatra vastusatah katham na

bhavisyad 1

tcna sthayipratltir
anumitirupa vacya, 11 na rasah ata cva |

sutre sthayigtahanam na krtam tat pratyuta salyabhutam |

syat ]
kevalam aucityad evam ucyate sthayi raslbhuta id |

aucityam tu tatsthayigatatvena karanaditaya prasiddhanam

°valokand/ samagriti na vjr.bbicarinj He 0

| : h'alokana. . .tyr.bhicdrini
G,M ||
- tv
He G,M. soka ereti He, M: soka eve (ra re)
i ca ||
3

V G II
4
Variant G,M °
^arsanaja 0 He 3
°dbrtjddibbir He
:
|| :

°viksadibbir G,M AB ,^ ch vn y 7 /y7 GjM ra Hc

o

He nanu G (corrected into na /;/), M

||
o 8
^ ff/ .
(j

» iti G,M
:
omitted by He ||
:
||
sjat^ G,M. (deleted
in a secondhand) omitted by Hc 11
raejd He :
|| :
prneja (corrected into
prdpja) G : prdpjd (corrected into praejd M ||

[ 20 ]
 THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC

adhuna carvanopiyogitaya vibhavaditvlvalacnbanat 1 tatha hi

A Bk
laukikacittavrttyamimane ka fasata * tenalaukikacarnitkaratrna |
p 296

rasasvadah smttyanumanalaukikasvasamvedanavilaksana eu 1

tatha hi laukikenanumancna sawskttah ptamadadi na tatas-

thyena praupadyate, api tu hrdayasamvadatraakasahrdayatva- 5

balat putnibhavisyadtasasvadatikutibhavenanumanasmrtyadiso-

panam anaruhyaiva 1 tanmayibhavocitacarvanapranataya |

na
ca sa catvana ptaatnatvantatad yetaadhutia amruh syat \
na
catta laukikap tatyaksadip ramanavyap atah j
him tv 1 alauhjha-
\ ibhavadisamyogabalopanatai\ eyam carvana |
sa ca pratyaksa- 1U
numanagamopamanadilaukikapramanajarutaratyadya\abodhatas
tatha yogipratyaksajatatasthapatasamvittijhanat sakalavaisayiko-

patagaSunya5udcLhaparayogigatasvanandaikaghmanubh.a\ ac ca
vihsyate, 3
etcsam yathayogam a rj anadivigh nantar o daya 1 -
ta tas thya sphu ta t va vis aya vesavai vaiyakrta saunda tya virah a
1 atra 1 15
tu svatmaikagatatvamyamasambhavan svanupraveiat paragata-

tvauiyatnabhavat* tadvibhavadisadhacanyavaiasampcabuddhoci-
tamjaratyadivasanavesavaiac ca na \ ighnantaradinam sara-
bhava lty avocama bahuSah ata eva vibhavadayo na
mspatti-
1

hetavo tasasya, tadbodhapagame ’pi

rasasarabhavaprasangat
napi Jnaptihetavah, yena pramanamadhye
I
20
pateyuh, siddhasya
kasyaat prameyabhutasya fasasyabha\
at j kim tarhy etad #
vibhavadaya lti alauhka evayam carvanopayogi vbhavadi-
|

vyavahatah kvanyatrettham drstam lti ced bhusanam

\
etad
asmakam 7 alaukikatvastddhau *
panalatasasvado 'pi him |
25
1
ananthjtUz
(s « infta, p 00, 1 0 also) amhja G,M W- H<
w )|
*
I(cotr e ctediato^;»/Pm
, a secondhand) [\
3
tlesam G He
'*« ° «
Cs " l ^ M*V*£*r
»- bi <*»
^janaitughnaniaro^tna tatai
tifjahetukatbluta tna vtsa ai tfrtan6iytna ca
J
\ sauniaiyaurahat j[
s
He add

GM "
amkan
* thi, He
''
"“i Hc * GM- » ’ «**&,
’
||
a
*siddban G, He ^siddb4 M (j

r 21 ]
 R. GN’OLI

gudamaricadisu drsta samanam etat nanv cvam ra$o

iti
|

’prnmeyah sy.it, cvam yuktam bhavitum arhati, rasyataikaprano

lay asau na prameyadisvabhavah j
tarhi sutre nispattir iti

katham ncyam rasasya, api tu tadvisaya'rasanavah tannispattva

! I

:> 1
tu yadi tadckayattajivitasya rasasya nispattir ucyate na kastid
atra dosah |
sa ca rasana na pramanavyaparo na karakavya-
plrah, svavam tu napramaniki svasamvedanasiddhatvat [
rasana
ca bodharuDaiva, kim tu bodhantarebhvo laukikebhvo vila-

ksanaiva, upavanam vibhavadinam laukikavailaksanyat |

tena
10 vibhavadisamvogad rasana yato nispadyate tatas tathavidha-
J
rasanagocaro lokottaro rtho rasa iti tatparyam sutrasya 1

I.
p. z:z *avam atra samksepah mukutapratislrsakadina tavan nata-
j

buddhir acchadyate |
gadhapraktanasamvitsamskarac ca
kavyabalanlyamanapi na tatra ramadhlr visramyati [
ata cvo5 -
15 bhayadcsakalatyagah romancadayas ca bhuyasa ratipratltika-
i

ritaya drstas tatravalokita desakalaniyamena ratim 1 gama-

yanti ;
yasyarn svatmapi tadvasanavattvad anupravistah [
ata
cva na tatasthatava ratvavacamah ! na ca nivatakaranatava,
y e n a rj an ab tiisvangad i sambha.Yana |
na ca niyataparatmaika-
20 gatataya, vena duhkhadvesadyudayah 1
tena sadharanibhuta
5
samtanavrtter ckasya cva va samvido gocaribhuta ratih

srngarah 1
sadharanibhavana ca vibhavadibhir id ]

3
tsdrifsf* G,M : /.• c-'is.-jJ)J flc ([
: r.z kss:id G,M : is". r.s kssiii
He;, 3 dr. r..: G,M : ids err He [|
1
rdir: He, 21 : tetrs r.z! in G ||

3
g-rarljhfi!:: Hc,M : prcrsbbiiiJ G [j

[
22 ]
TRANSLATION
 , ,

TRANSLATION
Bharata’* sutra

1
1 After explaining the reason for the foregoing succession ,
Bharata states the sulfa defining the nature of Rasa “ Out Oi
the combination (
satttyogd) of the Determinants (ytbhata), tlie

Consequents (aimbkatd) and the Transitory Mental States (vja-

**
bhicarm), the birth of Rasa takes place

The interpretation of Bhatta 'Lolfata, etc

2 This sutra has been explained by Bhatta Lollata, etc , in the

following way —The birth of Rasa takes place out of the
combination of the permanent mental state —implicit in the
sutra —with the determinants, etc More precisely, the determi-
nants are the cause of the birth of the feeling, which consti-
tutes the permanent state of mind The consequents intended
by Bharata are not, obviously, those which arise from the
rasas —for they cannot be considered as causes of rasa® — ,
but
the consequents of the states of mind only Even if the transi-
tory states of mind, in so far as they are feelings, cannot accom-
pany simultaneously the permanent mental state, still, accord-
ing to Bharata, this is not absent, but remains in a state of

1) N $ yi, yy 1 33
2) Rasa will also produce certain effects m
the spectators it will make —
them mutter in fear, male their hair stand on end etc These effects (lit
consequents, ambhUia) cannot, of course, be considered as the causes of
Rasa The causes of Rasa can onlj be the effects of the permanent mental
states

9 [
25 ]
 it. GNOLI

latent impression
1
. In the example
2
too, some flavourings

appear in a latent state, like the permanent state, and others in

an emergent state, like the transitory states. Rasa, therefore,

is simply a permanent state, intensified by the determinants, the

consequents, etc.; but, had it not been intensified, it is only
a permanent state. This state is present both in the person

reproduced and in die reproducing actor, by virtue of the

power of realization (
'anusavidhandf .

1) It is a general principle of Indian thought that two forms of cogni-

tion cannot occur simultaneously (cf. Njajasntra , I, I, 16). To avoid a
contradiction of this rule, Bhatta Lollata remarks that there is nothing to
prevent the assumption that the permanent mental state is presented in
the state of a latent impression {samskara, vdsand). The word samskdra
“means the impressions (which exist sub-consciously in the mind) of the
objects experienced. All our experiences whether cognitive, emotional or
conative exist in a sub-conscious state and may under suitable conditions
be reproduced as memory (smrti). The word vdsand (Yogas fl/nt, IV, 24)
seems to be a later word. . .It comes from the root “ vas ” to stay. It is

often loosely used in a sense of samskdra^ and in Vjdsahhdfya they arc identi-
fied in IV, 9. But vdsand generally refers to the tendencies of past lives
most of which lie dormant in the mind. Only those appear which can find
scope in this life. But samskdras are the subconscious states which arc being
constantly generated by experience. Vasanas arc innate samskaras not
acquired in this life ” (Dasgupta, TL I. P/j ., I, p. 263).
2) The example occurs in AT just after the mentioned sutra. “ Is
.

there any example ? Yes, it is said that as taste, rasa ,

results from a com-
bination of various spices, vegetables and other articles, and as six tastes,
rasa , arc produced by articles such as raw sugar, spices and vegetables, so
the permanent states, when they come together with various other states,
attain the quality of rasa (/. c., become rasa) *\ I have here adopted, with
some changes, the translation of Manomohan Ghosh, The Nd/jasds/ra ,

Calcutta 1951.

3) Cf. the Introd., p. XVIII. The text of Hcmacandra is here somewhat

enlaigcd ;
it runs as follows “ This state is present in both the person
:

[
26 ]
 ) *

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC

This view, again, is the same as that of the ancients Dandm,

for example, in his definition of the ornaments 1, said that in

association with a number of other elements, the feeling of

delight is transformed into the Erotic Rasa (
'srngara) ”, and “ on
reaching its extreme height, the feeling of anger is transformed
into the Furious Rasa (randrd) ”, etc

The interpretation cf Sanknka and bis criticisms of Bbntta

LoIIata's view

3 This interpretation, says Sankuka, is unsound Why > —

d) Because, without the determinants, etc , the permanent mental
state cannot be known, for the determinants, etc , are the cha-
racteristic signs, l e , the logical reasons (Jingo) by means of
which knowledge of it is made possible 2
b) Because, if the

reproduced and m the reproducing actor, in the person reproduced (Rama,

etc in the primary sense (mukhyayd vrftya) and m the reproducing actor by
virtue of a recollection of the nature of Rama, etc-
M

To sum up, according to Bhatta Lollafa Rasa is a perception of the

permanent mental state of the character represented by the actor This
sthayibhavdy mtenstfied by the Determinants, etc is presented to the specta-
tor in the form of a Rasa The same thesis of Bhatta Lollata is met with in

the A^tpttrana ,
cf ,
for example, th 339, si 4
abhtmaiuid rafts sa ca panp&yam tptyust !

tyabhtcaryadisamzvyat frngara tft gtjafe ||

1) Cp The Introduction p XVII The ornaments ahmkdrat are

figures of speech

2} Here He adds tu it dhuniart vtrta dhj rajbaranta bs th o vahittr

Qvflgwyaie “If there were no smoke the fire which is within a mountain
|1

could not be perceived *' Hence the interpretation of Lollata who m

tended the sutra, as if Bharata had said " Out of the combination of the
permanent mental state with the determinants ” etc,, does not stand to
reason
 R. GXOLI

thesis of Lollata is right, Bharata should first have expounded

1
the permanent states and only afterwards the Rasas , r) Because,
the second definition of the determinants, etc. in their state of
full development, (put forward by Bharata in connexion with
Rasas, which according to Bhatta Lollata, are nothing but

permanent mental states), would become a useless waste of

words-, d) Because, ever}* feeling would come to be subdivided

into an infinity of different gradations, weak, weaker, weakest,

indifference, etc 3 , e
) Because, there would no longer be six

variedes of Comic Rasa (pdsja)*. /) Because, in tire ten states

of love (kSmd) there would be an infinite number of mental

1) If it were true tint the permanent mental states exist before the Rasa,
r
why is it that Bharata explained first Rasa (A . Chap. VI) and afterwards
(A7 . chap. VII) the mental states ?
2) If, as Lollata says, Rasa is no more than an intensified permanent
mental why
should Bharata have taken the trouble to explain the
state,

Determinants of this mental state twice over, once in connexion with it in

its non-intensified state (A7 S. chap.VII) and once again in connexion with
.

it in its intensified state (A7 S. chap. VI) ?

. It is illogical to explain the
causes of the same thing twice over, once when it is not far from its nascent
state and once when it has readied its full development. H.C. darifies :

r.a cotp.itla:t padc.rthr,r.an haranan al’&idbJyj p:isy.i!drp p!tKss tcdu!pr. Hikin'.

ahbidbaljijan, raiyartbjdpatteb
||

3) In other words, if, as Lollata says, the Rasa is nothing but a feeling
intensified, "then, as intensity admits of many degrees, similarly there ought
to be different grades in the
Rasa realized ” (Sankaran, The Thsorits of Rasa
cr.d Dbvar.i, Madras, 1929, p. 99).

- S* Orif it is urged that only when the utmost intensity is reached

"
1 Ie " 2CC^ t^len the division
of the ComicRasa into six varieties, made
b '-TUi" xlou ^ be wrong
(ibid., p. 99). As to the six qualities of laught-
VI, pp.314-16. They are
slight
smile (snitri), smile (besita),
,
-f.CV
lUg
laughter of(! ‘basila),
ridicule {jpah.-.s'ila') , vulgar laughter
, .;
; and excessive laughter
’

( atibasita). The renderings adopted

are
those of Manomohsa
ttiQ
Ghosh, op. dt.

[ 28 ]
 THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC

states and of Rasas1 g) Because we see that what

, happens
is just the contrary, in the sense that sorrow (sofea) is at first
intense and is seen to grow weaker with time, and that in the
feelings of anger krodba), heroism (utsdhi) and delight (raft) a
(
diminution is met with when the indignation ( amarsa), firmness
(stbairya) and sexual enjoyment (seva) are absent
Therefore, Rasa is simply a permanent state of mind, and,
more precisely, the reproduction (amtkaratta) of the permanent
state of mind proper to the person reproduced— Rama, etc ,

and just because it is a reproduction, it is called by a different

word, that is Rasa This reproduced mental state is perceived
by means of three kinds of elements, viz , causes, here called
by the name of determinants, effects, that is, the consequents,
and accompanying elements, constituted by the transitory states
of mind. Though these causes, etc., are brought into existence
by the conscious effort (prajntna) (of the actor), and ate thus
and unreal (<krtrima), yet they are not realised to be so.
artificial

This permanent state is perceived (and this perception is

aroused by the characteristic sigas already referred to) as lying
in the reproducing actor.
The determinants, indeed, can be realized (anusartdha)
through the power (bala) of poetry, the consequents through the
skill (siksd) of tfie actor, and the transitory mental states through

the actor’s ability to present his own artificial consequents But

1) In the Erotic Rasa there are, according to Bhatata, (XX, w 154-6)

ten stages , each of them should have different grades according to

now, tf

then intensity, there uould then be endless varieties under that Rasa and
feeling alone Cp Sankaran, op at The aforementioned ten
, pp 99
stages of love (A ama) are longmg(tfW//iM), anxiety (arfhafifita), recoLIecUon
tii uTTltWlitm *Lut lulti
(Wi'rga), raving insanity (itnmJja), fever (ijadbi)-, stupor
and death ( rttfatta ) Cf DaLirjipa, Haas, p 132

[
29 }
 R. GNOLI
1

the permanent state cannot be realized, even through the power

of poetry . The words “ delight ”, “ sorrow ”, etc., as it is

to be expected from expressing words, arc, indeed, only able

to turn the feeling of delight, etc., to which they refer into an
expressed thing, but they arc not able to communicate (avagavi)
it [in its fullness], as if they were forms of verbal representation
(I'actkabhinaya) . For verbal representation does not consist
merely in words, but rather in what effect the words produce;
in the same way gesticular representation (angikdbhinaya) does
not consist merely in the movement of the limbs but in the
effect which this movement produces. In the following
stanzas, the feeling of sorrow is not an object of representation
but simply of verbal expression :

“ Great, deep, wide, and unbounded, the ocean is never-

theless drunk by underwater fires: in the same way, sorrow
”
isdrunk by anger-
Again :

cc
He is paralysed by sorrow, motionless in this state, so that
he is begged imploringly to move by his companions, who,
filled with the fear that tears their hearts, increase their
”3
lamentations .

Examples may be multiplied. But the following stanza :

“ This multitude of droplets, fine rain of tears falling

1) The meaning appears to be that the permanent state can be ascer-

tained only indirectly, through an inferential process. The determinants,
etc., on the other hand, arc realized, ascertained, dircctly.That is why
the word “ permanent state ” ( slbajibbava) is not mentioned in the sutra.

2) Unidentified stanza.

3) Unidentified stanza. In both stanzas the word “ sorrow ” occurs.

Thus, in them sorrow is in the state of verbal expression.

[
30 ]
 the aesthetic experience, etc
1

while she painted, produces on body the effect of amy

perspiration born from the touch of her hand ”,
at the same time that it expresses what is its own sense'*,
represents, rather than expresses verbally 3 , the permanent
5
mental state of delight consisting in a form of pleasure (stikhd)
4
proper to Udayana Representation (abhinayana), indeed, is
nothing but a power of commumcation (at agamanasakii) this —
power differing from the one of verbal expression Precisely
for such reasons, Bharata did not mention at all the word
“ permanent mental state ” in the sutra, not even in a different
grammatical case . Thus the Erotic Rasa is simply the per-
manent mental state of delight imitated, so that [what Bharata
said,namely] that Rasas are made up of the permanent feelings
and are born of them is quite appropriate to® It is found
furthermore, that even mistaken cognition is, sometimes, not
without causal efficiency (
'artbakriya 7 )

1) Ilam, Katnavah, II, 11

2) Ie, its literal meaning
3) The word “ delight ” does not occur in this stanza

4) The chief character of the Katnavah

In the genitive, cf supra, p 2d
5)

6) According to Bharata, the erotic and the pathetic Rasas axe horn
{gprabbai a) of the sentiments of delight and sorrow respectively, while,
instead, the other Rasas are made up of them ( atmaka ) Cf AG, p 312
fl

7) To corroborate this statement, Hemacandra quotes here a famous

stanza of Dharmakirti, PV, H, 57 “ Between turn people approaching tu o

lights, the one produced by a jewel, the other by a lamp [without being
conscious of what they really are, but] with the idea that it is a jewel, there
exists a difference in respect of causal efficiency, but not a difference of mis
taken cognition This stanza is also quoted by Mahimabhatta, Vj akittacka,
p 78 Casual efficiency, the capacity to produce effects {arthakjiya, artla -

krijakartiia) is the basic criterion of erery form of right cognition, and,

therefore, of the real existence of a thing When, for example, a man

[
31 ]
 R. GNOLI

Furthermore, here there is none of the following percep-

tions “ The actor is really happy ” “ Rama
is really that
“ “
man ”, That man is not happy ”, Is this Rama or not ?”,
“ This is Rama ”, — but rather the
similar to perception :

“This is that Rama who was happy ”. Sarikuka 1

himself said :

“(Here) there is neither doubt, nor truth, nor error ;

the
notion which appears is, “ This is that”, not “ This is really
that ”. What sort of an argument could disprove an ex-
perience evident in and by itself— an experience wherein, being
itdevoid of any contradictory idea, one cannot distinguish
any error ?”

sees a mirage and, on going near

it, docs not find the water which he ex-

pected to find (and cannot, therefore, drink, wash himself, etc.), his percep-
tion is a mistaken one; the water which he lias seen is not
capable of appea-
sing his desires, of carrying out the functions
proper to real water. In
some eases, however, even the mistaken perception is endowed with causal
efficiency. In the present ease, for instance,
it allows the observing subject
to find a jewel which is real in other terms,
; it docs not delude the expecta-
tions of the perceiving subjects.
Even a mistake, observes Dharmaklrti,
if it docs not delude the perceiving subject, is a sourccof right knowledge,
Now, if even a mistaken cognition, observes Sankuka, can be gifted with
causal efficiency, then it is all the more reason
for a reproduced cognition,
i.c., the aesthetic cognition, to be gifted with it. The spectators do not,
in fact, remain deluded by this, but find in the spectacle the fulfilment
of their desires.

1) Here Mammata quotes and clarifies at the same time AG. “The per-
ception we have ”, he says, takes the form :
€t
This is Rama Like the
experience one has when observing a horse in
a picture, the afore-mentioned
perception neither valid perception, nor error, not doubt, nor similitude.
is

These, indeed, take respectively the forms : “This

is really Rama”, “Rama
is really this ’ “ This is Rama ” (being, vitiated, in a second
,
time, by the
perception : “ This is not Rama ”), “ Is this Rama or not “ This
”, is
similar to Rama”.

[ 32 ]
 THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC

Abhimiagiipta, following his master Bbatta Tcta, criticises the

theory of reproduction, supported by Sankuka

1
4 This thesis too, my masters say , is without intrinsic \ alue
and is incapable of resisting a dose criticism Specifically,

from what point of view, may we ask, was Sankuka saying that
Rasa has the nature of a reproduction 5 1 From the point
of view of the spectators’ perception, 2 or that of actor,
3 or that of the critics ('y)akh)atr) who analyse the real nature
( vastuvrtta (of dramatic presentation)
)
—
for it has been said that
“it is in fact, the critics who analyse in this way 2—4 or,
finally, following the opinion of Bharata himself ?

1) The expression * my masters observes He., alludes to Bhatja

Tota (or Tauta), who was the direct master of AG and, therefore, lived m
Kashmir during the second half of the 10th century Bhatta Tota wrote
a work of poetry, the Katyakauiuka, on which AG wrote a commentary
( niarana) which has not yet been found The confutation of Sankuka,
given m the following pages, goes back, therefore, to Bhatta Tota
2) This quotation is taken from the ft at rift of Dharmakirti to the svar~
tbammanapancthtda of the Prama nat artika (cf sstpnf, p 5, ed Gnok, p
39) vjakJyatdraJf khah tvam mccayanh na ijatahariarab j
ft in sralambanam
n aribaknyaj qgj am monyamana drsyavtkalpyav artbav ehkriya pratarianft
|

Practical life ( tyatahara) is based, according to Dharmakirti, on the identi

ficatton of the thing tn ft (ft alaksana) with its mental image The mind
super imposes (prop) on the thing itself the image that it has of it and the
subject believes that he is faced with reality The difference between the
thing itself, which is real, and the image
illusory character of the mental
which has been super imposed upon it is a theoretical distinction created
4 7
by the * critics and philosophers {vydkhyatr, tathjantabi) In confuting
’

this concept, A G asserts that it is impossible to explain a thing m the

theoretical moment by an explanation which contradicts one’s awareness
of it in the practical moment In other words the spectators while they are
immersed in the Rasa aroused by the spectacle do not know that they are
faced with an imitation The fact automatically confutes those who sustain
the theory that there is an imitation Cf tyfra, pp 40, 41

10 [
33 ]
 k. GNOLI
1
i. The first alternative cannot be upheld. Reproduction,
indeed, can be said to be only something perceived by a means
of cognition , as, for example, in the ease of a person drinldng
some milk being directly perceived by the specta-
(this action

tors), and saying “ Thus did so-and-so drink the wine In

this case, the action of milk-drinking reproduces the action of
3
wine-drinking. But here what is it that is perceived in the
actor, which might seem to be a reproduction of some feeling,
as, for instance, delight ? This is the problem. His body, the
headwear that crowns it, his horripilations, his faltering words,
the raising of his arms, the waving of them, his frowns, his
expressive glances, etc., certainly cannot be regarded by any-
one as the reproduedon of delight, which is a feeling. They,
indeed, being insentient®, being perceived by different organs
of sense ,
and having different substrata1 arc thus as unlike
feelings as it is possible to imagine. Consciousness of a re-
production presupposes, furthermore, perception both of the
original and of the copy; but none of die spectators has ever
in his life perceived the delight of the hero, say, Rama. So the
possibility that the actor is reproducing Rama is excluded.
c
But (someone might say) what is called erotic Rasa, the
reproduction of delight, simply the feeling of the actor, which,
is

as perceived by the spectators, appears to diem in this very

1) The explanation
is given a few lines
below.
2) they
I. c. arc not of a mental or spiritual nature.
3) Mental movements arc perceived by the internal
_
sense, mamh,
mind. All the acts, etc. listed, however, arc perceived by the external sen-
ses such as sight, etc.

4) The body, The mental states arc based on the mind. M. C,

etc.

p. 69, comments talhd hi natavapuradinam jndaivam caksurgrahjalvam,

:
rater
ajadatvm manogrdliyalvam ca pratisirsakaeliniim vapnr
| adhiharnmvi, rates
tu memo ' dhilzaramm ill
J

[
34 ]
 ,

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC.

form To this opinion, however, we object * Of what, when

perceived, does this feeling appear to consist 5 This is the
problem It may be urged that the actor’s
1
feeling appears to
the spectators to consist of just those characteristic signs
(causes, such as women, etc , effects, such as expressive glances,
etc , concomitant elements, such as contentment, etc which
)
serve to render perceptible an ordinary feeling But lo (we
reply), if this were the case, the feeling of the actor would be
perceived simply in the form of delight, so that for your idea

of a reproduction of delight there would be no more place

“ But (you can perhaps urge) the determinants, etc are real
in the reproduced characters and here, in the actors, unreal ”,
True But, even if these determinants, etc ,
are not the real
causes, effects, and concomitant elements of the feeling of the
actor, even if, that is to say, they are fashioned solely by the
power of the poem, the skill of the actor, etc., and are thus
artificial, are they so perceived by the specators or are they
perceived as real > And, if they are perceived as artificial,

how would it be possible, through them, to perceive the feeling

of delight ? If you say that for this very reason what is per-
ceived is not delight but the reproduction of delight, this
answer, we reply, could only be made by a man of dull witsh

1) I e , there -would be a perception of ordinary nature, not aesthetic

cognition
2) Bhatta Tota’s reply (set out m the following lines) may be summa-
rized • Assuming that the Determinants, etc , are perceived as unreal

or artificial (Ar/nma), they cannot legitimize the Inference of either Delight

or an imitation of Delight Trom a mistaken or apparent logical reason

(ft. % a. r on e.- ih a eJmid mistaken for a pillar of smoke the cone-shaped

doud does not stand in any cause effect relation to fire, and is thus a mis-
taken logical reason) we cannot infer fire (in this case, mistaken cognition
would occur) nor, still less, anything imitating fire (e g , as A G. says, a
 — ,

R. GNOLT

For a from the usual one can be inferred from

tiling different

more apparently similar effects, only if the effect, from which

it is inferred is reallv derived from a different cause and is re-

cognized as such by a person of experience. An inexperienced

person can infer from them the usual cause only. From some
particular scorpions, for instance, it is legitimate to infer that
their cause is cow dung and the inference, from them, of
;

another scorpion, as their cause, would be nothing but a false

cognition. But, when the cognition of the logical reason
e.g., smoke — is erroneous, the inference based on this apparent

logical reason will itself be invalid. The inference from mist

(whether it be supposed by the observer to be smoke, or whether
the latter is aware of its being only a reproduction of the true
logical reason) of something which is a reproduction of fire,

is,no doubt, unsound. Indeed, a veil of mist something —

which reproduces smoke and is recognized as a reproduction
does not legitimate the inference of a heap of red roses, namely
something that reproduces fire.

heap of red A person of experience can undoubtedly infer from two

roses).

things,which to the laymen are apparently the same, the respective causes
of each of them (example the scorpions. According to tradition there
:

are two kinds of scorpions, one kind being born from other scorpions and
the other kind from dung) ; but in the present case the logical reason is

nevertheless mistaken or apparent (the determinants, etc., are perceived as

krtrlrr.a) and as such an effect is neither of delight nor of an imitation of
delight. Thus, for a person of experience the inference of something
which imitates delight is impossible. The inference of delight made by an
inexperienced person is a form of mistaken He. explains cognition. :

cyan bbarab prasiddbad ratilaksaadt kdraaad ratyanukaranan Kama karar.anta-

ram tatprabbavas red enubbavah syt/b tathaiva ca vtsesavidd yadi jilayirar. fade
|

ratyanuharaaalaksar.asya vastvantaraydimndnary sanailjasan: syat

\
r.a caii'an
tat hr. than it’a ratyavaikarc r. apratlttb avisesevidd ca ictbdi'idbdnubbdi'adarjai:;
|

ratir-eiTmtnyate lac ca nitbySjndnan net!

[

[
36 ]
 THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC

“ Even if the actor (it may be urged) is not himself enraged,

still he seems so ” True enough, we answer, he is like some-
one who is enraged But this resemblance is due to a con-
traction of the eyebrows, etc —in 1
the same way, that is, that
the resemblance between a real ox and another ox like species
is due to the shape of the muzzle and so on, without that,

by this, any reproduction be involved Again, the spectators

3
are not conscious of this resemblance, the perception of the
spectators, while they perceive the actor — it is said — is not
without the mental which he appears to hate
state There-
fore, the thesis according to which what appears is a reproduction

is a vain discourse only”

Further, to say that the audience has the perception .

“ That is Rama ”, is not correct For if this perception,

devoid of every doubt during the play is not stultified later

by some subsequent cognition which invalidates it (badhakn) y

why is it not a true cognition > And, if it is stultified, why

is it not a false cognition > In fact, however, even if no invali-

dating cogmtion does appear, it will be always a form of false

cognition1 . Thus, Sankuka’s contention, namely, that this is
“ an experience wherein, being it devoid of any contradictory

1) In other 'words the spectators are not aware of a resemblance bet-

ween the actor and the character he represents, but only of the fact that the
actor is immersed in a certain state of consciousness shared also by them

2) M C,p 71 replaces “ ill rikta taccjukhb” by “ th si ai acar;cure-

dhah ”

3) M
C , p 71 simplifies jae coktam ramo ’jam itj ail: profitjh,
tatrapijadi no bodhakodajah tai kathon no Sapiy dgjnaflam badbakodajoi ttl
kotbaoi no mitbja
jj

4) According to Sanhuka the aesthetic experience consists of an

imitation , therefore he maintains implicitly that it is unreal

[
37 ]
 R. GNOLI

one
idea,2 cannot distinguish any error ”, is untrue 1 Further- .

“ ”
more this same perception, namely This is Rama is had in
other actors also and hence of Rama wc have only his universal
Nor “
aspect . can his other assertion, The determinants can
be recognised through the power of poetry be successfully ”,

explained. Indeed, the actor docs not have the perception, “ Sita
is the woman I love ”, as if, that is to say, Sita were a part of his

own 1
real life . If it is replied that this is the meaning of the
word realization, i.e., that this ishow the determinants arc made
perceptible to the spectators, then we answer that there ought
more reasonably to be, instead, a realization of the permanent
state. Indeed, the perception of the spectators is concerned, in a
primary sense, principally with this and is presented in the form :

“ That man (is) in this (feeling) ”. The pompous analysis of the

nature of representation made by Sankuka by the expression,
“ Word. .verbal representation ”, etc., where he emphasizes
. —
the diversity [both of verbal representation and of the simple
verbal expression] —will be discussed later at the appropriate
time and place 1
. Therefore, it is wrong to say that from the
point of view of the spectators, Rasa is a reproduction of the
permanent mental state.

2. Nor again does the actor have this notion, “ I am re-

producing Rama or his feeling ”. For a reproduction, that

1) Cf. supra, p. 32.

2) See Sankaran, op. cit., p. 101 : “ and hcncc the conception of

Rama is only in his universal aspect of a great hero
3) The actor does not identify or unite the determinants taken from
the poem with the things which arc causes ”
cc
own real life. In in his
other words, he docs not have the perception that they form part of his
real life.

4) Ch. IX of the Ar. in which A.G. discussed it, has unfortunately

not yet come to light. Cf. also Ar . chp. XIV.
 tHfe AfesTHETlC EXPERIENCE, ETC

is, a production of actions similar ( sadriakaramm) to those of

1
someone whose nature we have never perceived is not ,

possible And if you say that the meaning of the term re-
production is after production (piicatkaranam), such reproduc-
tion, we reply, would extend to ordinary life also 3 It may be
said, perhaps, that the actor does not reproduce a particular
being (niyata\ and that he has only this notion, “I am repro-
ducing the sorrow of some noble person {tittamaprakrti) But
then, we reply, by what is this reproduction performed 5 This
is the problem Certainly not by sorrow, since this is absent
in the actor It is undoubtedly not done by tears, etc, for
these, as has already been said, are of a nature other than that
of sorrow 3
Well, it may be replied, then let us say that, in
the actor, the following perception occurs . “lam reproducing
the consequents of the sorrow of a noble person ", But in this
case again, we observe, which noble person * If you say “
any
4
noble person, no matter which ", then we reply that no person
can be brought into the mind without a definite idea { uhftatam
vitiaf on other hand, you say that the actor is reproducing
If,

a person who should have wept in the manner he does, then

his personality ( svatma ) also intervenes, so that the relation of
reproduced reproducing no longer exists 5
Besides, the actor

1) It has not been percened before Every mutation presupposes a

previous perception
2) In other words, if imitation is felt in this way, there is an imitation
every time someone does something which has already been done by some-
one else

3) Cf supra, p 34
4) Cf infra, App I,
p 95
5) MC,p 71 paraphrases ja nan rodittU at, tarbs nalmanan apt
rnt to 'in hirotitj aj if am irsj p, rod m mil bat ad Ut gali to
t ’MtLarjam kartrbbat ah J|
**
If, they say, there is the notion « he who weeps thus then, we reply, we
must assume that the actor is reproducing himself as well (for the actor

[
39 1
 it. GNOLt

has no consciousness of carrying out a reproduction. The actor’s

performance, indeed, takes place only through three causes : his

skill in art, his memory of his own determinants, and the consent
of his heart, aroused by die state of generality of the feelings;

and in virtue of this, he displays the corresponding consequents

and reads the poem with suitable accompanying intonations
(kakn) of voice. Accordingly, he is conscious of this only and
not of reproducing someone. Indeed, reproduedon of the deeds
of Rama is different from reproduction of the attire of die beloved
being1 . But all this we explained before in the first chapter2 .

3. Not can it be said that there is a reproduction from the

point of view of the nature of things (
vasinvrtta); for it is im-
possible that a thing of which one not conscious, has a real
is

nature 3 . We shall explain further in what the nature of things

1
consists .

4. Nor did Bharata ever say in any passage :

“ Rasa is die
reproduction of a permanent mental state ”. Such an asser-
tion was never made by him even indirectly by means of an
indication. On the contrary, the various sub-divisions of wo-
men’s dance (Jasjd), the various musical tempi {laid) and the

himself would have to be really grieving). Thus the rcproduccd-rcproduc-

ing relation would no longer hold ”.

1) Cf. A. B/j., p. 37 A person in love, according to the Indian rhetors,

is sometimes impelled to imitate or repeat every gesture and attitude, etc.,
of his beloved. The aesthetic act has nothing to do with this imitation.
He., p. 424 : vdgvcfacctfilaih prijasyanukrlir Uhl.

2) A.Bb., eh. I, p. 37.

3) I.c., from the point of view of the analysing mind. Cf. J. P. V.,
II, p. 179 : sti mvcdannl iraskeirhjt kti khahi yi/klir vama mutpapailis ca bhdsa-
mdnasya ktlnjd bbnvi{ynti.

4) In the statement of his own thesis.

I
40 ]
 , \

trute AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC

by sre 211 indication of precisely

dhruva songs described
All this will be explained later at the
end of
the opposite'.
the chapter on the sub divisions of the junctures {smdhyangdf.
The expression met with in BharatJi every now and
again,

Drama is an imitation (of all the forms of existence in)

**
tlie

seven islands ”, etc can have also other explanations

And,
,

if even that was what would be the diffe-

a reproduction, then

rence between it and the reproduction of the attire, the walk,

4 ?
etc , of the beloved one

Other theories

5 Some people say “The pigments— otpiment, etc —

undoubtedly compose (saffiyuj) a cow ”, Now if the word
5

“ compose ” is understood in the sense of ** manifest ( ahbtvyajy

these people are also in error hoi we cannot say that minium,
etc ,
manifest a real (
paramartbika) cow like the one which
might be manifested by a lamp, etc All they do is to produce

1) They do not mutate anything in ordinaty life

2) N f XIX DaJar/tpa, Haas, 11 “ The Junctures ate the struc*

tural divisions of the drama which correspond to the dements of the plot
*
and the stages in the hero s realization of his purpose The Junctures
ate divided into sixty four sub divisions (tffigrf) Cf Ifld Tb , p 140, etc

3) N S ,1, v 120 saptadvtpsMkiranam tiatyam ttad bbavtyaU J

In.

other words drama can be an “ mutation *’

of all the forms ot existence
m the uorld (the expression “ the seven islands ’
, refers to the world with,

itsoceans continents etc cf A p 42

, ~Bh , I, sapUdtJpabbavanukarana-
The term ‘imitation
1
must be interpreted as a “ re telling
”
rapt nat)t )

{
enuklftand) and therefore as a “ re*perception ” {anuvyavasaya)

4) Text and translation both doubtful

5) A cow painted by a painter is considered concretely as a composition

of different colours mixed together and applied to a given surface

u [ u ]
 It. GNOLt

(mrvrt) a particular aggregate (samfiba) similar to a cow. The

only object of the image, “ It is like a cow ”, is simply this
minium, etc., applied so as to constitute a particular arrange-
ment (
'sai/wivcsa) similar to the arrangement of the limbs of a
cow. Ill the case of the aggregate of the determinants, etc.,

the situation is different : this —as we have said — cannot be

perceived as similar to delight 1
. Thus, it is not true that Rasa
is the reproduction of mental states.

Again, other people say 2 : — Rasa, which is made up of

pleasure and pain, is nothing but an external combination
(sdmagrt) of various elements3 —a combination possessing the
power of generating pleasure and pain. This thesis agrees
with Samkhya’s doctrine In this combination, the determi-
1
.

nants take the place of petals; and the consequents and the
transitory mental states do duty for that which garnishes it.
Out of it, again, arc born the permanent mental states. These,

1) The visual arts arc regarded in this passage as being of a different

order from poetry : the pigments, etc., arc material things which imitate
a material thing. Very well then, says A.G.
all the same, it is impossible
;

that the poetic expression (consisting of determinants,

etc., i.c., of material
elements) could imitate a mental movement, which is of a spiritual nature.
2) The
followers of this view (their names arc unknown to us) based
themselves, according to A. G. {AM.,
p. 312) on a wrong interpretation
of one stanza of Bharata (VI, 46).

3) The determinants, etc., arc external (i.c., they arc not psychic
states). The elements in question arc the dctciminants, the consequents,
and the transitory states ; the latter arc also regarded as external in the
present passage.

4) According to the Samkhya, external

objects arc a modification of
prakrl;, which is made up of pleasure,
pain and stupor. The external
objects arc, thus, also themselves
made up of pleasure, pain, etc. This
conception is cnipathically confuted by
Dharmaklrti, P. ]/., Ig 268 If.

[ 42 ]
 ,

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC

made up of pleasure and pain, are internal The supporters

of this thesis maintain that expressions such as, “ We shall
bring to the state of Rasa the permanent
1
mental states,” etc
must be understood metaphorically, i e they are themselves ,

aware that they are in flagrant contradiction with Bharata’s

text Thus the student is preserved from falling into error
by the fact that the mere statement of this thesis displays
garrulously ex ere sno its unsoundness What use is there in
replying to such people ? Let us rather state the essential
points of the other hypothesis, etc , arising out of this difficult
problem, 1 e , what is the nature of aesthetic perception

The uew of Bbatia Najdka

6 Again, Bhatta Nayaka says —

Rasa is neither perceived
(froti), nor produced (iitpad), nor manifested (ablnyyaj) For if
it were perceived by the spectator as really present in himself,

in the pathetic Rasa he would necessarily experience pain*

Again, such a perception does not stand to reason, because
Sita, etc., does not play the role of a determinant [as regards
the spectator]* , because no memory of his own beloved one
does arise in the spectator’s consciousness (while he looks at

Sita)*, because [the representation of] deities, etc, cannot

According to this theory there ts no longer any difference between

1)
Rasas and permanent mental states Its supporters are therefore forced

to give a metaphorical interpretation to all the passages in which Bharata

distinguishes Rasas from permanent mental states

2) Thus no one would go to see plays on pathetic etc , subjects any

more
3) The spectators are not Rama etc, so that it is impossible to suppose
that the fortunes of Sita can play the role of determinant m their case
4) At the same time there is no identification of the image of Sita
with that of his own beloved
 R. GNOLI
1

logically arouse (in. the spectator) the state of generality

(yddharnnikaram) required for the aesthetic experience] ;

[

because ocean-crossings, etc.,

[
arc extraordinary undertakings,
and thus] fall short of generality (sddbdr<viyd)~' Not it can
be said that what occurs is simply the memory of Rama, as
endowed of such-and-such quality 11

,
in so far as the spectator

has had no such previous experience. Moreover, even if it

is supposed that he is perceived through verbal testimony

'iabda ), inference ( nnumaua), etc., logically there
(
cannot be any
occurrence of Rasa in the audience — just as it
1
is not aroused
by a thing perceived through direct For on the knowledge .

appearance of a pair of lovers united together, the mind of

anyone present rather becomes the prey of conflicting feelings
(shame, disgust, envy, and so on); and we surely cannot say
that the onlooker in such a scene is in a state of Rasa If, on 1

the other hand, it is supposed that Rasa is perceived as present

in a third party, the spectator should be in a state of indifference.
Therefore, it is not possible to suppose that Rasa can be per-
ceived —whether this perception be a form of direct experience
or of memory. The same errors may be imputed to the thesis
which maintains that Rasa is produced. If it is supposed that
Rasa first preexists in a potential form ( Saktirfipafvcm ) and
is later manifested, then the determinants must necessarily

1) In this passage Bhatta Nayaka maintains that when the determinants

etc., arc deities, etc., they cannot be perceived as ‘general the deeds of
gods arc too different ( from human affairs )

2) Supra, Intr., pp. XXI, XXII. This assertion is confuted by A.G.,

infra, p. 58.

3) Heroism, etc.

4) In other words, Rasa could arise from a simple inference,

if all the
more should it arise from a direct perception.
 THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC

illuminate by little 1 Besides, the difficulties already

it Uttle
encountered would recur is Rasa manifested as really present
in our own self ot as present in a third patty P Therefore,

(our thesis is as follows ) Rasa is revealed (bhatyctmafta) by

a special power assumed by words in poetry and drama, the
power of revelation ( bbatana ) —to be distinguished from power
of denotation (abhidba)— consisting of the action of generalizing
the determinants, etc This power has the faculty of suppress-
ing the thick layer of mental stupor ( mobd) occupying our own
consciousness in poetry it is characterized by the absence of
defects (dota) and the presence of qualities (guna) and ornaments

(
alamkara) s
, m drama by the four kinds of representation
Rasa, revealed by this power, is then enjoyed {bhuj) with a kind

1) This objection repeats

t» tatis mfandts the objection of the Bud
dhists and of the mma/nsaka against the concept of sphota which according
to the grammarians (i atjakarand) is a vocal) ty, eternal
and without parts
distinct from the letter# and manifested by these This eternal vocality
causes the cognition of the meaning This objection is as follows is
fphota man fested entirely by the first
of a word or not ?
letter
a) If
jphota is manifested in its entirety the letters which
come after are unne
cessary In other words the first letter would be capable of
rendering
perceptible the meaning of the whole world
/>) If sphota is manifested
gradually then it could no longer be without
parts This second alter
native is therefore m contrad) etion to the very nature of sphota The same
reasoning is applied by Bhatta Nayaka to Rasa and to the %ords by
J which
it is manifested

This gradual manifestation of the Rasa has

al so been criticized by
1
Sankuka, cf supra 1% p
2) One classical definition of poetry (He
m fa *****» ka ^ra Poetry
word and content with
|i
,

is
p 33) says ados#, sagu

out defects possessing qualities and also

(but not necessarily) ornaments *

[ 45 J
 R. GNOLT

of enjoyment ( bboga), different from direct experience, memory,

etc. This enjoyment, by virtue of the different forms of con-
tact between saliva and rajah and iamb, 1 is consisting of the

1 a) The light of the self, of the consciousness, does not reveal

itself, in the samsartka existence, in immaculate purity, but is conditioned

by the three constituent elements (ffitja) of mental substance ( buidhi), saliva,

light, luminous and pleasant, rajah, mobile, dynamic and painful, taviah,
inert, obstructive and stupid. These three constituent elements arc never
present in isolation, but mingled together in unequal proportions. The
state of emergence of the element saliva, limpid and mirror-like, coincides
with a manifestation, always more distinct and evident, of the light and
beatitude proper to the Self — these indeed reflect themselves in saliva,

J.P. V.V-, I, p. 150 : sallvam prakafariipam iiirmalauahhahpraklyam sarvalo

jalathpaiahna iva varanalmana iamasa samdvr/am aslc latra ca mrtiiaslhmii-
|

yam pravyll isva hhdvam rajah hviyahnakalnyd hramcna lamojalcdam apasdraya/s

nyagbhdvayali “Saliva, which is made up of light and is like the immaculate
||

ether, completely enshrouded by (amah, the principle of obstruction, as

is

by a blanket of cloud, Rajah, which is made up of action and is, therefore,

imbued with activity, serves as a wind, which, little by little, brushes away,
dissipates, the cloud-bank of latuah ”. The three constituent elements,
saliva, rajah and lamah arc associated with three states of
consciousness
called, respectively, expansion (viktlsa), provoked by an absolute pre-
dominance of saliva, fluidity (rival 1), determined by a contact of saliva
with rajah, and dilatation (rislara) determined by a contact of saliva
with tamalu
The conception of the three gtinas> belonging, in
particular, to the Sam-
Bya and yoga systems, is accepted, without notable
modifications, by the
whole of Indian thought.
h) Dv/ilt, vistara, and v'tkasa arc
each connected with certain Rasas by
later Indian theorists. Dnili is the proper state of
consciousness of Srigiira,
/errand 1M« vhl„,„ of ,j , nand fojfoto . ofhSm,
and WmjmvU Cf. Db. A.L, comm., p. 206. llnjah predominates in
*
‘T-.S “
nd
,
in »**'»• M-C., p. 74 : jWS hi mm
It IS when Jn flmdtty ,„4 1

$ion that fruition

,s

is realized
dilatation, nnd / •„
1

[ « ]
 ^ q

the aesthetic experience, etc

states of fluidity (draft) enlargement ( vistara ) and expansion

by a resting (tiirdnti) on one’s own
vtkdsd), is characterized
(i

consciousness (saxmf), which due to the emergent state of

Satha is pervaded by beatitude (anandd) and light (prakasd) , 1

The egression sattvodnka is reproduced almost without change

1 a)

by Mammata, p 74 sattiQdrtkaprakdsjnandjmajasam tdt istantisatattvcm

It has been commented upon in se\eral v*ays I have followed, in the

translation, the commentary of Vidyacakravartm (iC P, Truandrum San-

krit Senes* LXXXVII) sathodrekdt jatt prakasanandau tanmajjam sam~

ttdi samadhivrttirupdjamjd jcgtndm vtsrdntsr ugaUtasakalasramd mstarangtnd-
tasthtfis iaisadfstna M
C, p 74* comments on saihodrtktnd pr&hdsah
prakaioja anandai tdnmayt jd sum it tasjam isrdrttih, i sd satattram Paramaribo
yasy* sa tathd Referring to Rasa A G says in Vh Ah 3 p 183, that it is

TajastamoVatcitrjdnicviddlsasaitiamJjamjdciisutbbdiantTVrtnisrdntilaktanab The
famous definition of the aesthetic experience given by Visvanatha in his
Sihitjadarpana, adds nothing to the conception of A G and Bhajta Nayaka
Visvanltha says
sattvodrekdd ckhandasvaprakdsdnandacmmajah J

ledjdntaraspafsasfmjo brahmdsvMasahodarab |[

/ hoi tarasa ma tkdr aprdnah hit kit pramat^bhib J

svdkdravad dbhmnaittndjam dst ddjate rasah jj

**
Rasa is tasted by the qualified petsons (\ e , qut raumtm artts trUlhgunt}*
It is tasted by virtue of the emergence of satha* It is made up of a full

Intelligence, Beatitude void of contact v*rhany

and Self-Luminosity It is

other kno^v able thing, twin brother to the tasting of brahftian It 1$ animated

by a camafkdra of a non-ordinary nature It is tasted as if it were our very

being, m
indivisibility *\ Cf the translation of A K. Coomaras^amy, Tic

Transformation of Nature in Art* Harvard, 1934, pp 4Sff Coomaraswamy

translates camatkdra with "lighting flash According to Vlsvamtha,
satfta is nothing but the mind or inner sense (manafi) devoid of any contact
vitb rajah and tamafy
£) The terminology used by Bhatta Nayaka and referred to by A G
is exactlj analogous to that used by Bhoja* in his definition of the sanan-
d isamadbi Jadl tit rajastamokidmtvtddbam antahknrciuisatham btdiyaic iadd
gmedtbaidc ctftsakftb {ubbaprakaJafnaja rj a sattutsjabbavjaptdnasyodrtkdi sdnan^

[ 47 ]
 \

31. GNOLt

and is similar to the tasting (

asvadd) of the supreme brahman

dah samddhir bhavci [Bhojavrlti, 1, 1 7). “ When the matter of concentration

|| (

( bhdvand is commented on by Bhoja bhdvand bhdvyasya visayanlaraparihdrena

cetasipunah ptinar mvesanam) is the saliva tinged by the rajah and tarnah proper
to the inner sense, thenby virtue both of the subordinate state of the self,
and of the emergence of saliva, which is made up of bliss and light and is the
matter of concentration, that which is called sdnandasamddhi occurs This
passage is also quoted by Pandey, I. Acs., p. 189.

1) Bhatta Nayaka was perhaps the first to associate aesthetic experi-

ence with mystical experience. The aesthetic state of consciousness is no

“ ” during the aesthetic experience
longer associated with the limited I ;

the subject is completely absorbed in the object contemplated, and the whole
of the reality which surrounds him disappears from his view. The same
thing, mul at is mutandis occurs in mystical experience ;
in this sense, aesthetic

experience is similar ( savidha 3 sabrahmaedrin , sahodara) to experience of the

Absolute or of the brahman* Bhatta Nayaka and A. G. (A. G. also accepts
Bhatta Nayaka’s opinion ; Dh. A.L., p. 190 : parabrahwdsvadasabrahwacdri-
Ivam cdstav asja rasdsvddasya), however, do not fail to emphasize the unmis-
takable characteristics of each. Bhatta Nayaka says {Dh. A.L . p. 91) :

vagdhenur dtigdha clam hi rasam jad balairpiaya |

Una ndsya samah sa sydd duhyaic jogibhir hi yah |

“ This Rasa (aesthetic pleasure) is poured forth spontaneously by the

word which is like a cow, for love of her children ;
for this reason it is

different from that which is (laboriously) milked by yogins Cf. also A.Bh
p. 5. On
the opinion of A.G., infra, pp, 82-84. Two stanzas which reflect
the same idea and which arc certainly from Bhatta Nayaka, arc quoted
by Mahimabhatta {Vyakiiviveka), p. 94 (see the translation in the Introd.
p. XXVI) :

pathjad atha dhruvagandt iatah sampuritc rase

|

tadasvddabharaikdgro hrsyaiy antarmuhhah kfanavt

||

taio nirvisajasjdsja svarupavasthitau nijah

|

vyajyalc hladanifjando yena irpyanti yogitiah ||

The association between these two states also appears in the affinities

of the terms which designate them : vUrdnti, nirvrli} laya, nirvda9 samdpatli,
camaikara , etc..

[ ^ ]
 ,

TbK AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC-

In this exposition, the thesis confuted by Bhatta Nayata are

accepted even by us — simply because we do not accept the

thesis of Bhatta Lollata Thus the errors confuted by Bhatta

1
Nayaka have been definitely put to death

As for the rest we do cot what Lind of enjoyment

see dis-

tinguishable from perception, etc , can exist in the world If,

asyou say it is tasting ( rasana), we reply that this too is a per-

ception5 , and is only called by another name on account of
the particular means {ttpajdf by which it is called into exis-
tence The same thing happens in the case of direct perception
[darsam), reasoning (ammatia), the revealed word {smti}, analogy
{
upamitl), intuition, [ppratibham),* etc, each of which tales a
different name Besides, if we do not admit that Rasa is

produced or manifested, we shall be forced to conclude that

it is either eternal or non-existent : no third possibility exists.
Again, the existence of an unperceived thing cannot be affirm-
ed The supporters of Bhatta Nayaka will perhaps reply
that the perception of Rasa is just what they call the pov er of

1} Cf Dt L., p 187 The thesis confuted by Bhatta Isayaka do

not admit the concept of generality, they distinguish between one’s own
perception and somebody else’s Cf supra, mtrod , pp XX ff
2) See below, App IH, p 112

3) The determinants, etc.

4) The term fratibha, prelibhana, is used in several senses (cf. Intr

pp XLYIII fT In the present passage, it has the sense of “ an inexplicable
intuition as to what may occur in the future, for example, ‘Tomorrow
my brother will come ” It also includes the power of understanding ah
turns ot sounas without cSort, all that may be communicated by any smsmal
in the world and also the power of having heavenly visions ” (Dasgupta,
HI P£ , V, 127) This particular form of consciousness is discussed by
Jayanta, Njajjr'arijjri (Benares 1936),
pp 97 ff

12 I « 1
 ) —
R. GNOLt

bringing about enjoyment (

bboglhtratj.if — consisting in the

states of fluidity, etc. Very well, then ! But it is impossible

that should consist solely in these three states. For there
it

exist just as many forms of perception whose nature, accord- —

ing to you, lies in this very power of bringing about fruition
consisting of a relish, as there arc kinds of Rasa. Besides, the

constituent elements, sattva, etc., can be found set out in an

infinite number of different ways : one may predominate at
one time and another at another. Thus it is absurd to limit
the forms of relish to only three.
However, if the word “ revelation ” in the expression “the
Rasas are revealed by the poem ” (what Bhatta Nayaka says
is “ The various Rasas— the erotic, etc., are revealed by the
:

power of revelation ”), is used in the sense that the poem be-

comes the matter of a perception, which consists of a tasting

made up of gustation, and which is generated by the determi-
nants, etc., it may be accepted without any question.
Again, in the stanza, “ Rasa is, it is said, the aim of poetry
( kdyyartbaf it is an experience (annbhavd) consisting of a tasting

1) If, says A. G., the expression “enjoyment” is understood in the

sense of perception (so that the power of generating enjoyment becomes
the power of generating the aesthetic perception, the Tasting), it may cer-

tainly be accepted. In this sense, the power of generating enjoyment be-

comes the same as that which followers of the dbvani school call the power of
evocation (dhvananavyapara). Cf. infra, App. Ill, p. 113.
2 a) The expression kiityartba borrowed from Bharata, IV. A, VII,
is

p. 342 : kavjart ban bbeii 'tiyantili bbiirab”. [The mental states] arc called
bbava because they bring into existence the aims of the poem ”•
( bbtiv)
Artba, A.G. comments ( A.Bb .,p. 344), in this expression docs not carry
the meaning of sense, something expressed
( abhidbeyj but means the final
causc > the a ' m
°f the poem {arthyante prSdbaujenetj ar/biib ini tv artbasalxio
’
,
bhiilbcjavaci) ; in other words. Rasa.

[ 50 ]
 THE AESTHETIC E\ PERIE NCE, ETC

and is the matter of cognition by a not ordinary form of cons-

ciousness (farasamvitti), manifested (vjartgja) by the union of
the determinants, etc ,
” Bhatta Nayaka apparently considers
Rasa as manifested —so that the theory of manifestation is
<e
rather maintained than discarded 1
By the word experi-
ence ” we must really understand the object of it
3

But, being it so, what is then the true nature of Rasa

That is enough ! Well, what shall we do 5 3

Four statists of tnterme^p

7) Why repeat truths disclosed already in the thought of

our predecessor and thus behave as no one has behaved
before 5 This double, serious and evident error will certainly
be imputed to me by the audience
Tireless, the mind of man climbs ever higher to gaze on
truth Behold 1 This is just the fruit of the doctrines which
have succeeded each other on the ladder of thought
In the beginning, the crossing of the river of the knowable
is, I know, agitated and supportless but as we advance
f) Aesthetic experience is associated with the experience of brahman^
with the supreme consciousness, cf supra p XXIV
1) The existence of dhiamlz explicitly denied by Bhatta Najaka (cf
the passage quoted by Jacobi, IZDMG, 62, p 296, Pandey, p 246 fT) In
some passages AG points out he seems nevertheless, to admit its exis

tence implicitly In thisstanza, Bhatta Najaka uses, for example, the verby**/
and therefore admits implicitly the theory of dham the sense manifested

i c ,
not expressed, that words assume m poetry
2) That is to say, that Rasa is the object of the afore mentioned
experience

3) At this point A G interrupts his examination of rejected doctrines

xu th the four following stanzas, which serve as a sort of prelude to the
exposition of his own thesis
 -

R. GNOLT

doggedly along this road, we cease to be amazed by built

bridges, city foundations, or anything else.

A rich and fruitful harvest may be culled by posterity from
the inheritance of thought left to it by its predecessors. Thus
the doctrines of the sages of antiquity will only be refined by
us here and not refuted.

The correct view

8. Let us then state what is the true nature of Rasa purified

3

of previous mistakes. has already been stated by Bharata,

It

and we shall add nothing new. For he has said “ The :

mental states arc called feelings because they make us feel the
”1 Rasa simply the aim of
aims of poetry . Therefore, is

poetry. For instance, immediately after the first perception

of tire literal sense of the following expressions, “ They lay by
night ”, “ He gave it (scil. t the omentum) to the fire 2 ” there
occurs (in a qualified person (
adhikarin) characterized by a
certain pragmatic requirement (arthita ) and so on, and possessed
of a keen interest in the object of perception involved) a second
perception eliminating the temporal data, etc., contained in the
first. This second perception consists in a transfer (sarnkra
warn), etc., of the literal sense and is presented in the form: “I
will lay,” “ I will give ”, etc. According to the various schools,
this perception is called propulsion 'hhavana ),
(
command
(
vidbi ), order (tiiyoga), etc 1
. Now, a similar thing may be said

1) See the literal translation of this quotation at p. 50, n. 2 a.

2) Two quotations taken from revelation (Jruti).

3) The past tense of the two expressions in question.

4) In other words, some scriptural sentences (c. those quoted)
g.,
awaken in the believer the need to give the omentum himself,
to the fire

[
52 ]
 ,

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE* ETC*

to happen in the case of poetry there occurs in a qualified

person a perception transcending the words of the poem
The qualified person is in this case any person whose heart
possesses a spotless power of intuition {prdftbhatia) In such

etc In this sense, their literal meaning undergoes a transformation the

past tense and the third person etc ,

used in these sentences are turned into
the present tense, etc There arises in the heart of the believer the form
tl
of consciousness {pratipatti) I will give the omentum to the fire *\ etc

Tins passing from one sense to another is given the names of propulsion
{bhatana} order and command (t tdht The terms kbaiana, udht y

and ntyoga are proper to the liturgical speculations of mimamsa (the term
bhdvana used by Biutta Kayaha 'was probably taken from the terminology
of the purvamtmamsa) The terms and nijogat observes J * T
Pidbt t A
I,
p 1 67, ate used above all by the followers of Prabhakara , Kumarila’s dis-
ciples prefer instead the word bhavana The shift of sense involved, of
course, presupposes the adherence of the subject to the sacred writings,
his desire to attain certain ends etc This shift of sense 1$ clearly explained

in three Ihkas quoted byH C, p 98 (no doubt taken from a work on

poetics existing prior to A G , perhaps the Hrdayadarpana of Bhatta
Nayaka)
crvgjam aptavan iambafy :Uitva dtvam aharpntim 1

syad affbavagati $ purvam ityadivacant yatha ([

Sat a! (Opaftakalaitnyahkarenopajayaie j

pratipattur manasy evam pratipatiir na sa msayah

jj

yah ho ’// hhaskaram staidt sa sarudpy egado bhatet

f

tasmad abam apt statms rogamrsrnkiay t Tdijm [{

“ In the sentence *Samba regained his health uhen he praised the Sun
God % etc* there occurs at first the perception of its literal sense,
and then
(and on this thereno matter of doubt) there arises in the mind of the per
is

ccivmg subject a perception which eliminates the temporal data, etc

assumed by the sentence in question Hus perception is presented in the
following form <f
Everyone who planes the Sun regains his health ,
f*
so I too will praise the Sun, so as to free myself from disease Cf
IPVVt I,
p 24, 1PV, I, p 27
 .

R. GNOLI
<c
a person hearing the following phrases, There he scil. , the
(
deer) is now, gracefully by the bending of his neck.
“ Even Uma, dropping the golden knnjikdra. 2 “ The . .
,

3
firmness of I-Iara. . .
,
there appears, immediately after the

perception of their literal sense, a perception of a different order

(an inner [mdnasi] perception, consisting in a direct experience
[sdksd/kdt'd '] which completely eliminates the temporal dis-

1) Kalidasa, Abhijfianaiaktmiala ,
1, 2 “ There he (sell, the deer) is now,
:

gracefully by the bending of his neck casting a glance ever and anon at
the chariot which pursues him, by [the contraction of] the hinder half
(of his body) repeatedly drawing himself into the fore [part of his] body
through feat of the descent of the arrow ; strewing the road with grass half-

chewed which drops from his mouth kept open from exhaustion. See I

by reason of his lofty boundings he goes chiefly in the air, and little on the
ground” (Monicr Williams, Saknntalii, Hertford, 1853, p. 9).
2) Kalidasa, Kumarasambhava, dropping the
III, 62 :
“ Even Uma,
golden karnikara flowers which glowed among her black tresses, deeply
bowed her head (while the flowers which adorned them fell from her ears)
before Siva

3) Op. cit., Ill, 67 :

“ The firmness of Hara, even, was somewhat
shaken —like the sea when the moon is just about to rise; he cast his eyes in
desire towards the face of Uma, towards her lips, red as the fruit of
the bh/ibn

4) Like to sensations of pleasure, pain, etc., the aesthetic experience is

an inner or mental perception ( wanasnpmlynk^a i.c., it is perceived through
),
the mind or inner sense. Such a perception is self-knowing svasamvedniui -
(
sithlba). In the A. lib., p. 291, A. G. observes that
the fact of tasting
( asvadana ; aesthetic perception being
conceived as a particular form of
tasting) is of a mental order : it differs from the fact of eating, which is a
purely material act ( rasanavyaparad
bbojetnad ndbiko yo tnanaso vjaparnh sn
evnmdnmm). The mind of him who tastes must be ekagra, absorbed in the
object of the tasting to the exclusion
of all else. On the contrary, lie
who cats may be also anyacitta-. he can also think of other things, etc.
Aesthetic tasting is of a non-ordinary nature alaukika
( ), sui generis .

[ 54 ]
 a

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC

tmction, etc ,
assumed by these sentences Besides, the young
deer, etc, which appears in this perception is de\oid of its

particularity (viseso), and at the same time, the actor, who

[playing the role of the deer], frightens [the spectators] (fra -

saka showing to be afraid, is unreal (apdra marthikd) As a

result, what there appears is simply and solely fear— fear m
1
itself, uncircumscribed by time, space, etc This perception
of fear is of a different order from the ordinary perceptions
(“ I am afraid, he— my enemy, my friend, anybody — is afraid”),
for these are necessarily affected by the appearance of fresh
s
mental movements (of shunning, etc ) , consisting of plea
sure, pain, etc, and just for this reason are full of obstacles

(
vtgbnct) The sensation of the fear above mentioned, on

The mind is the organ of tasting ,

during the tasting the mmd must be
free of ail obstacles devoid, that is to say, of any other sensory percep-
Uons, etc* The subject is immersed m a camatkara set apart from any
4
or " others * *
distinction of self** * Aesthetic tasting is a generalised
perception and free, therefore, of obstacles (m the A Bb
p 291 the , I,

expression asradajatift manasa N£ » VI, v 36, is commented upon the m

following manner a samaniat sadbaranibbattna run i^maprattpaftn afan
manasa w drijan tar art**/} nasambh aranasffnytna si adayanti sv aparai irehas ttnj

st adatafnatkafaparai asa )

1) In other words, the spectator (and hence the state of consciousness

by Tfthidi he is pervaded) is not in the real time and space either of the deer
or of the actor as such. la the aesthetic experience, these two temporal and
spatial orders cancel each other out On the one hand, therefore, the deer*
etc, is without any temporal or spatial determination (viz it is not felt as
an clement of ordinary life but is percetted in a generalized form), si-

milarly, the actor,and hence the impression of fear which he suggests, is

not percen ed as a constituent element of practical life- The state of cons
ciousness which does occur is therefore, unaffected by space and time,
it is a generalized permanent mental state a Rasa
**
2) Shunning etc *% J e , shunning accepting and disregarding

t 55 ]
 .

R. GNOLi

the contrary, is the matter of cognition by a perception devoid

of obstacles (
'virvigbna ), and may be said to enter directly (i/iris)

into our hearts, to dance (

viparirr/)» before our eyes : this
is the terrible Rasa. In such a fear, one’s own self is neither
completely immersed (tiraskr) nor in a state of particular
emergence (ttllihh)-, and the same thing happens with the other
selves. As a result of this, the state of generality involved
is not limited (parituita), but extended
(
vitatn ) — as happens at
the moment which is formed the idea of the invariable con-
in
comitance (vjapti) between smoke and lire or, in fact, between
trembling and fear 3 Therefore, this idea to be confronted
.

1) Viparivrl —means to move, to revolve, etc. The use of the word

is ancient. ItistobcfoundinBhartrhari(I,125,//£’<7,p.l25(cd. ofLahorc) :

buddhau viparivartate. In the same sense (that is, with buddhau) it is used by
Dharmaklrti and ICumarila also. A.G. comments on the word viparivarta *
tniinasja in the following way (7.P.K., II, p. 140) : viniratrena visvasya bbrdd-
bbediitmaud parti 'arlatudnasja span da tic na spbnrato . . .

2) In the first ease there would be no aesthetic cognition, but mystical

cognition, characterized by the total absence of discursive thought and
distinct apprehensions yikalpa). In the second ease, ordinary discursive
(

cognition would occur. In both these cases, then, the tibbajadesakalatjagnh

required by the aesthetic experience would be absent. Cf. the Ndlyadarpana
by Ramacandra and Gunacandra, Baroda, 1929, p.161. For the antithesis
betweenatmatt and para cf. PTV, pp. 71-72 air a hi madbjaniapddc alruaiva :

satttiftittle naparab . . . dlmatia eva sravatjam sjcit tin parasja . .

3) The best explanation of this passage is to be found in I.P.V.,

II, 4, 12 : iba In dariane vjdp! igraba iidvasthdjd;/! ydvantas taddesasatnbhdvyomd-
llasadbhavab prattleddras /avalam cko'san dbumdbhdsas ca vahttyabhasai ett bab-
jaiinyc iva, l aval i U$dtn para inch'arctjaibya nirrnilarnjK.. tji Ch. Pandey, Bbdskari,
vol. Ill, p. 178. translates :
“ But, according to this system,
at the time
of forming the idea of invariable concomitance, the
images of smoke and
fire arc common to all pcrccivcrs, who can possibly have their existence
at that place [he., in the kitchen, etc.],
as according to those who admit
the existence of an external objective world. For, in relation to these images,
the Lord [i.c., Isvara, the unlimited Ego, etc.] has made
the subjects one

[ 56 ]
 ,

THE AESTHETIC EKpfeRTENCE* Stfi

with a teal experience

1
is nourished by the combination of

increases when there

AG observes that the pleasure given bp a spectacle
are a large number of spectators In other words, "when each spectator 19
conscious that the spectacle is being seen at the same time by a
number of
other people T A X, v 65 ff

taiba by tkagrasakahsastajikajanehutani j

nrllam gilam sudha.sarasdgafaivtua mauyalt {{

t&U tiacjeU maUanataprtk(opad*ldtit |

sarvapramatrladatmyam purtjarupanubbavakam [[

tatanmtrartbasamitUiujtah pratytkaio ysdi J

kah sambbuya gunas Ujam pramalreikyamMme ca km [|

yaja tu tattadvedyalvadhjrmasamdarbbagarbbitam j

ta dieslit inskad pragritpad anyad yuktam tdam lada |J

“ The spectators who watch, absorbed a performance of dancing of

singing, etc ,
feel that it is a real sea of nectar (J comments “ anyone,
in fact, can observe that spectacles seen by many people at the same time
generate a greater pi easure than those which ale seem by a single individual)

It is for this reason that those who teach the true nature of petfoimaflces of
wrestling and acting say that in these, a real state of identity of all knowing
subjects takes place this state generates a perception of a full and perfect
beatitude (J comments purnarttpelt tyad tva bt pur (jam rupamjad vtgahtavt
djantarataya ialrau inati} akankjati ena paramarlatiam tiamd) If the mere
consciousness of what they see on the stage (without, that is the realization
that the performance is seen by other people) were sufficient to satisfy the
spectators taken one by one how then can the different state of conscious
fless which arises when they are together be explained ? And how could
it still be sustained that a state of identity of knowing subjects exists ?
When instead the spectator is aware that the spectacle is seen at the same
time by all others also, one can. say with reason that it appears in a different
form from the arid aspect it had before (this spectacle, then, observes
J ,
takes on another nature which generates a very high
temlkara) ' See on
all that the Introd
, pp
XXXVII ff In AG
the expression ttlafavjap/t
etc, occurs elsewhere also, and not always in a technical
sense (seefi
DbAU, p 378, J a GAS pp 110 136)
1) The aesthetic perception which
rot dependent on the concepts
is

of reality and unreality cannot be spoken of as a real experience

(that is,

13 [ 57 ]
 -

IU GNOLI

actors, etc. In this combination, indeed —in that the real

limiting causes 'niyamabetn), (time,
( space, the particularized
cognizing subject, etc.) on one side, and those afforded by
the poem on the other, neutralize each odicr and then comple-
tely disappear — the afore-mentioned state of generality is

readily nourished; so that by virtue of the very uniformity

(ckaghanata 1 ) of the spectator’s perception, it being so nourished,
readily nourishes the Rasa in all of them: and occurs, this
because the latent impressions of their minds concord with each
other, the minds being varied by
bcginninglcss latent im-
2
pressions .

the direct experience, perception of

something real, pratjakfd, sak(atkara)
but, A.G. says, it is “ like ” a real
experience sakfafkdrajamatja=sakfStkSra
(.

k dp a, prdljAkfnkalpa) Sec A.Bi, I,

.
p. 43 : the drama is pratyakfdkalpaiiib
vjavasajavtfqyoIokaprasiddhasaljasaiyadivilakfatjalval. In other terms, the
aesthetic experience is a direct
perception sni generis, free of every relation
with practical reality, etc.

1) The word ckagbanata derives from ghatta. “ Ghana, from ghan, to

strike, hinder, etc., has a primary sense of “ dense mass ”, implying a
condensation of multiple factors
without extension in space ” (A. IC.
Coornaraswamy, The Transformation
of Nature in Art, Harvard 1934 p. 209).
Hence ckagbana comes to mean “
dense ”, « compact ”, " uniform ”,
etc., in
the sense of a state of consciousness
which docs not allow the inter-
ference of “ obstacles ”
vighna). (

2) A.G. replies with this argument to the

objection of Bhatta Nayaka,
accor ing to whom the spectator can identify
himself only with a person
mi ar to nmself but not with
a being of a non-ordinary nature, as Rama,
y, c. ie identification and
therefore the state of generality required
t e acst ictic experience
postulates an affinity of nature
(latent impre-
ten encics, instincts, etc.)
between the spectator and the person
P C C " tCC replies to this objection
! '. saying that no being (animal
nr
or deny)
,
ex.sts with which man has no affinity of nature.
The saLa is

[ 58 ]
 THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC

This (form of) consciousness without obstacles is called

camatkdra 1 the physical effects of it, that is to say, trembling,
,

horripilation, joyful of limbs {ullukosana2), etc,

motions
are also camatkara 3 For example “ Visnu is still today
m a state of camatkara how, oh how is it that the limbs
of Laksmi, which are as beautiful as a piece of the moon,
have not been taken to pieces by mount Mandara4 Indeed,
camatkara may be likewise defined as an immersion in an en-
joyment {bhogat esab) which can ne\er satiate and is thus
uninterrupted (trphvjatirekenacchinnah') The word camatkarat
indeed, properly means the action being done by a tasting
subject (camatah karanam), in other words, by the enjoying

btginnmgless and every man before being that which he actually is, has
been all the other beings as well The consciousness of the spectator thus
possesses (m other words is varied by )
the latent impressions of all the
possible beings and he is therefore susceptible of identifying himself with
each of them The same concept is expounded m the Db A. -L-, p 187 ,

see below, App HI, p 112

1) Sec the Intr , pp XLV XLVI

2) The term ullukasana is explained by A G {A Bh , I,
p 330) gatrasyor
dbvam sahladam dhunanam

3} A
Bb t HI, ch XXH, p 152 iba nttavrittt era sari tddnabbumau
4t
sankranta debark api yyapnoit [[
The mental movements which are pheno-
”
mena of consciousness, ate also transmitted to the body and pervade it

4) Unidentified stanza an allusion to the churning of the

This is

ocean. The gods and demons took Mount Mandara fot a churning stick
and various precious objects were churned from the deep, amongst which
the moon and Sri (Lak$ml), the goddess of beauty The aesthetic expe-

rience of tanatkara reappears in the consciousness every time the determi-

nants, etc. {the poetic expression) by which it is aroused, are evoked, Cf
A BSt , I,
p 37 {App U) The example offered by AG
(of Visnu vrhojs
still under the influence of a tainaikard) exemplifies this very character of
aesthetic pleasure.

[
59 ]
 )

R. GNOLI

subject, he who is immersed in the vibration (

spatula) 1 of a
marvellous enjoyment (adbbnlabhoga It may be thought of
either as a form of mental cognition (tiianasadbyavasajd) consis-
3
ting of a direct experience ,
or of imagination (
sanikalpa

or of remembrance, which nevertheless, is manifested in a

different manner to its ordinary nature. For as Kalidasa
“ Often a man,
said : though happy, becomes uneasy of mind
on seeing beautiful objects and hearing sweet musics. Surely,

he remembers in his soul, though vaguely, associations of

former births deeply implanted in him 1 ”. In any case, how-
ever, it is a form of perception — a perception in which what

1) Spanda means movement, vibration, energy, etc. According to the

Saba schools of Kashmir, consciousness is vibration, the ceaseless force from

which springs all that exists. The modes of discursive thought are the
fruits of the solidification of this first, incandescent principle. This force
manifests itself in the instinctive motions of consciousness (fear, joy, etc.).

It is the energy that consents to go from word to word, from thought to

thought. It is the first moment of will ( icchd),
the initial motion of the
spirit, which is presupposed by any form of consciousness. The terms
* heart ’
(
hrdaja), thought (vim aria), bliss (
atianda), vibration, (sphuraiia,

ghni’ii), etc., express the same concept. On consciousness as movement,

etc., see, above all, the Spandakarikii by Kallata, passim ;
Sonifinandn,
Siradrfti, p. 11; I.P.V.V., I, 5, v. 14. In the present case, spanla is the
movement, the inner rhythm of the aesthetic experience. The aesthetic
experience is an inner perception like pleasure, pain, etc., and, in this
sense, is not of a discursive order (vikalpaka).

2) Cf. supra Intr., p. XXXIII.

3) I.c., it is a mental or inner perception.

4) Kalidasa, Sakttnfala, V, 96. This stanza is quoted by A.G., also

in I.P.V.V., III, p. 252. The disquiet, to which Kfdidasa alludes, is,

observes A.G., an unobjcctificd desire it corresponds to what is, metaphy-

;

sically, the desire which induces consciousness to deny its original fullness

[
«> ]
 P S
THE .AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC

appears (is just a feeling* for instance) delight, consisting of a

tasting 1
For this reason, 1 e ,
because it is not conditioned
by further specifications , this perception is apt to become the
5

object of a relish, and, as such, it is neither a form of ordinary

cognition, nor is it erroneous, nor ineffable, nor like ordinary
perception3 nor does it consist of a super imposition*
,
To

and to crumble in time and space* x e , the dnammaia I FF, III* 252
canaikanta hi bhunjanarupata sidtmausrdntifaksana sanatra icchd |
hactt tu
si dlmdi ihantir bhat dntaram nnagitri taviit sam apeksya ttifhdpyafe yaira sa uchd
tdga zfj ugait, cgurttai tiesaiajdm tu kdma ih \
adtgrabanad abhilasamah jaira
bhdVantaram samanjdkdram apt i asanas ait samatrendsie yatidha ** bidvasiltram
l&nandntarasauhtddnt ” tU *' The fact of being in a state of camaikdray of
being on the point of enjoying something (characterized by a rest m one’s
own Self) is, without any exception, a form of will [the will is the first

moment of Consciousness, before it ciystallj zes in the forms of the discursive

cognition] Sometimes such a rest in one’s own self appears in connexion
with an object in general, without any further determinations m this case,
,

appears m connexion
9
the will is called * attachment At other times it
* *
with a determined object and, in this case, there is what is called love
By the word, * etc * , Utpaladeya hints at the maculation of the desire (the
dnavamata, etc-, cf supra) , itis obtained when the ohjectiveness considered
is not only idenfimte, but in a state of latent impression (that is, when it 1 s

not yet developed and appears in a state of potentiality , the dnmamala is

therefore an unobjcctified desire, ahirmakam cbhtlasatraira^ T , p 75
“The maculation is an eager agitation consisting in the presumption of
one’s own non fullness, a mere desire without an object, a predisposition
11
to the future limitations ”] For example * the associations of former
births deeply implanted m him
1) In other words, a perception characterized by the presence of a
generalized feeling (delight, anger, etc,)

2) By no temporal, spatial, individual, etc , specification In other

words, by no obstacle
3) I e , a reproduction of it (Santuka’s doctrine)

4) “ A* when wrong knowledge follows after the right one is vitiated’'

Sec below, App I,
p 93
 R. GNOLI

conclude we may say equally well that it consists of a state of

intensification 1
— using this term to indicate that it is not limited
by space, etc.; that it is a reproduction —using this word to
2
mean that it is a production which repeats the feelings ;
and
that it is a combination of different elements — this conception

being interpreted in the light of the doctrine of the vijnanavadbP.

From whichever point of view it is examined, Rasa is, in any

case, simply and solely a mental state which is the matter of

cognition on the part of a perception without obstacles and
consisting in a relish.

The obstacles to the realisation of Rasa

9. In this connection, tbc elements which eliminate the

obstacles arc the determinants, etc. Also in the ordinary world,
indeed, the different words cawatkdra, immersion ( trirveia), relish
(rasatid), tasting
(
asvadana ), enjoyment ('bhoga), accomplishment

(
sawapatti ), lysis (Jaya), rest 'viiranti ), etc.,
(
mean nothing but
a [form ofj consciousness completely free from any obstacles
whatever. Now, the obstacles to the perception in question
are-#) the unsuitability, that is to say, the lack of verisimilitude;
b) the immersion in temporal and spatial determinations
perceived as exclusively one’s own or exclusively those of ano-
ther; c) the fact of being at the mercy of our own sensations of

1) Lollata’s doctrine.

2) Tentatively, I have so rendered the linguistic explanation of anukara

by bhavamgamiiaya karanat. Lit., “ to mean that it is
an operation tem-
porally following the feelings ”,

.
^ Scc ak°vc > P- 41
Well, says A.G. here, this theory is also true if it
•

isinterpreted in the light of the vijnanavada

,
the idealistic Buddhism, accord-
ing to which everything that exists
is pure consciousness or perception,

[ 62 ]
 , —
THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC

pleasure, etc , d) the defective state of the means of percep-

tion, e) the lack of evidence,/) the lack of some predominant
factor, £) and the presence of doubt
1

one considers the things presented as lacking

a) Indeed, if
in verisimilitude, he cannot obviously immerse (vmvtf) his
consciousness in them, so that no rest no rest, I say, in them —
can take place This is the first obstacle The means by which
it is eliminated is the consent of the heart which takes place
at the view of ordinary events When extraordinary inci-
dents have to be portrayed, it is necessary to choose personages
whose names are famous, like Rama, etc , who make us give
belief to their undertakings —a believing (pratyapd) indeed,
deeply rooted in ourselves, aroused by the uninterrupted fame
(prastddhi) which they have enjoyed since antiquity* Just for
this reason, it will be said that Hataka*t etc whose purpose
is the learning (vyutpatti ) and teaching (ttpadesd) of deeds trans-

cending the ordinary hfe, necessarily requires to deal with famous

events and so on This requirement, however, is absent m
the case of farces (prahasatia) But all that will be explained

1) An event of ail ordinary character finds a more ready response m the

spectator’s heart

2) If the same extraordinary e\ ents (crossing of the ocean etc) which

are, m fact attributed to a legendary figure (Rama etc) where referred
to an ordinary man they would arouse the incredulity of the spectators
Db L», p 331 ramadtt tu tathattdhan apt tanlam p an aprasi ddh iparam-
paropacitctsampratyajoparu&hatn usaijataja na cakasti |[
‘ But when such under
takings are referred to Rama, etc , they lose all appearance of falsehood ,

for they ate rooted in the spectator’s confidence, the cumulative result
of the uninterrupted fame enjoyed from antiquity by the character in
*
question

3) a p 64, n 1

[ 63 ]
 =
R. GN0L1

at a suitable time and place'. For the time being this is

enough.
b) of the principal obstacles regularly occurs when tire
One
spectator is at the mercy of tire tasting of pleasures, pains, etc.,
inhering in his own person. This obstacle consists in the appea-
rance of other forms of consciousness, due variously to the
fear of being abandoned by the sensations of pleasure, etc.,
to concern for their preservation, to a desire to procure other
similar sensations, to the desire to get rid of them, give diem
open expression, hide diem, etc. Even when someone per-

ceives pleasures, pains, etc., as inhering exclusively in other

persons, other forms of consciousness inevitably arise in him

(pleasures, pains, mental stupor, indifference [madbyastbya],

1) A.Bb., ch. XVm.

The appropriate subjects for the ten kinds of
play arc described and commented upon in N.S., XVIII. Nd/aka arc
plays on elevated subjects. Dasar/lpa, Haas, p. 4 “ The ten chief varie- :

ties (of drama) arc : the Na/aka, the Prakararia, the Bbana, the Prabasana,
the Dima, the Vjdjoga, the Samavakara, the Vitbi, the Alika ( U/sffti-

kanka), and the lhnti;rga CE.Ind.Tb-, p. 139 ff. In the A.Bb., p. 27,
A.G. makes the general remark : r.a ca varfamatiacari/anttkdro jttklo viv.tj5.natn
tatra ragadvefamadhjaslbataditia tanmajibbavabbave prittr abbtivena vjutpatter apj

abbavat, varlamanacarite ca dharmadikarmapbalasambandbasja pratjakjatvc prajogt

vaijartbjam “It is not fitting to imitate an event of actual life; for in

|

this case the spectator would be affected by passions (hatred, partisanship,

indifference, etc.) [extraneous to the aesthetic experience] and would thus
be unable to identify himself with the event represented. Pleasure being
thus absent, instruction would be absent as well. Besides, in the case of
an actual event, the relation between the action (its merit etc.) and the fruits
which result from it is discerned by direct experience it is, therefore, useless
;

to set it on the stage ”.

The word imitation ( antthnra) must be understood in a broad sense.
Teaching or knowledge is an accessory aim prajojar.a
) of art;
( its principal
aim is aesthetic pleasure (pri/i, ananda etc.) Cf.
App. Ill, p. 114.

[ 64 ]
 THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC

etc.) which naturally constitute an obstacle The means of

eliminating this obstacle are the so-called theatrical conven-
tions [yatydharmify u,hich include a number of things not
to be found in ordinary life, as, for instance, the zones {kdksya)
dividing the pavilion (watjdapa) the stage ( rdTigaptthci), the various
types of women’s dance, the various dialects (bbasa), used,
etc ; and last but not least, also the different dress of die
actors — the headwear, etc —by which they hide their

true identity. However, this is revealed to the spectators

during the preliminaries (
pttnaranga), (see the stanza :

"It is best not to insist too much on dance and song”),

as well as in the initial presentation (prastdtana), defined
in the stanza* “The actress, or the jester 2 ” Indeed,
the presence of the afore mentioned elements eliminates the
perception this particular individual in this particular place,
at this particular moment, feels pain, pleasure, etc. This eh-

1) The term natyadbarmt (N $ , VI, v 25 , XIH, v 70 il) refers to all

the specific expedients, of the theatre (scenery, costumes, traditional

etc.,

conventions, etc.) Cf bid To , p 15 and Lo&adbarm and Natyadbarutt, by

V Haghavan, in) 0R , Madras, vol VB, pp 359-375, voh Yffl, pp 57-74
2) The “ preliminaries *' (purtatangd) include the whole body of rites,
ceremonies, etc., celebrated at the beginning of the play They end with
the benediction starrza, nurds There is a risk of distracting or boring the
audience by a long-drawn out performance of these rites Bhatata himself
recommends that they should not be too much insisted on (NS , V 165-
ltifi,) "It is best not to insist too much on ritual dances and songs
for the very reason that if the songs, the instrumental music and the dances
arc performed far too long, the actors as \\ ell as the spectators will get tired
ofthem and, m this case, they will not be able to seize, with all then evidence,
the Rasas and the mental states which will be represented ”) The nanii
stanzas arc immediately followed by the “prologue” (prajfdta/td), giving
the name of the play, of the author, etc. The prologue generally consists
of fl dialogue between theproduceroftheplayandanassistant^ur^W/r/^ij) ,
the latter may be replaced by an actress, by the jester, etc

14 [ 65 ]
 R. GNOLI

mination takes place in so far as in the theatrical performance

there ison the one hand the negation of the real being of the
actor, —
and on the other since the spectator’s consciousness
does not rest entirely on the represented images 1
—there is no
rest on the real being of the superimposed personage 2 ; so
that, as a result of all this, there is eventually just a negation
both of die real being of the actor and of die real being of
the character he is playing. Indeed, even if dances such as

dslnapdfhja pnspagandtkd 3, etc., arc not seen in ordinary

,
life, it

cannot be said that diey do not exist at all — for it is undeniable

diat they exist in some way 4

.

1) Here the reading is uncertain see the Crit. App. I *cad praiibba-
;

sasavjviiviirantivaikalycnci and take pratibhdsa as image, etc., that is, the re-

presented images.
2) In other words, the character of Rama, etc., who is super-imposed
to the real being of the actor.

3) Daiariipa, Haas, 99 :
“ The tenfold enumeration of the sub-divisions
{anga) in the Gentle Dance (Jdsja ;
I translate : women’s dance) runs as

follows : the Gcjapada (Song), the Sibitapafhja (Recitation by one stand-

ing,) the Asinapathya (Recitation by one seated), the Jdupagandikd, the
Vracchcdafoiy die Trigudba, the one called Saindhavci, the Dvigudha, the Ulta-

vioitamaka, and the Ukiapraijukia (Amoebcan Song)

Each of these terms is defined by Bharata, *£, XIX, vv.
119-135. N .

The dance, A.G, remarks, docs not imitate anything in real life but is a
from any practical aim. It is the natural ex-
sclf-subsistcnt creation, free
pression, through the movements of the limbs, of a given state of mind.
Sl'Bb., I, p. 21 ; navtaiiaw nrttavj gciivaiiaw avgopaiigatww vildsctict kjcpo !Ut in

kcnacit kartavjamicna
|
The dance of Siva is the natural expression of his
complete and perfect bliss, free of all obstacles {irirvdra—nirvighiia) :
hfika-
rasjeva bbagavaiab panpurnatiandauirbharlbhfitadchoccaladaniaraiWTdrasundard-
karasya. . A.Bb., I, p. 21.

4) Thus, even represented is a negation of the actor

if the character
as such and of the real character represented by
the actor, it cannot be said
that lie docs not exist, that lie is a nonentity
his existence in fact is a datum ;

of one’s own consciousness.

[
66 ]
 , ,

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC

To conclude,
1
all this system of relam e and connected
matters has been adopted by Bharata, in so far as by -virtue of
the state of generality produced, it promotes the gustation of
Rasa All this will be clarified in the chapters which explain
these dances, etc and so for the time being, it is of no
use we strive after it And thus we hav e explained the w ay
to eliminate this obstacle, consisting of the perception of
temporal, etc ,
data as inhering exclusively in. one's own
person or in others

c) Again, how can any one who is overpowered by his own

happiness, etc ,
make his consciousness on something else 5rest

To avoid this obstacle there have been adopted various means

to be used at suitable times and places, such as music, vocal
and instrumental, well-decorated halls, well accomplished
courtesans, and so on 5 In virtue of the afore mentioned
state of generality these expedients phonic, etc, are such — —
as to be enjoyed by all the spectators and possess such a charm-
ing power (tparafij) that even an unaesthetic person (aBrdaja)
reaches limpidity of heart and becomes " possessed of heart ”
Indeed it has been said, ‘‘poetry is visible or audible*”
d) Moreov er, if the means of perception are absent, percep
tion itself will also naturally be absent

1) N$, XIX ff

2) The term pada after fu an dapa is not dear to me and it is not

represented in the translation

3) N£ I, v 11 The empirical division of aesthetic beauty into visible

and audible is cot unfamiliar to Indian thought. Only sense-data taken

through hearing and sight can be tasted independently of any association

with fhe tgo in a generalized way \s53harant%riii) The Otriet senses
“ ferment solely in one’s own Self 'sralmanj
(
trocchalanai , PT V p
”
48) ’
, l e , are unable to break the barrier of the limited *
I

[ 67 ]
 R. GNOLT

Even if there may be such verbal testimonies and in-

e)

ferences,
1 as to provoke an evident perception, perception,
in the
however, does not rest (in them), because there is, it,

expectancy of the certainty proper to direct experience,

which

consists in an evident perception'. For as Vatsyayana has

said :
“ All valid knowledge depends upon direct experi-

ence ”. It is well-known, indeed, that a thing which has

been directly perceived, cannot be proved to be otherwise by
any number of inferences and verbal testimonies. In cases
like die imaginary circle of fire created when a burning
sdek is swiftly revolved, our knowledge is disproved only by
a more powerful direct perception. This is quite an ordinary

process. Therefore, remove these two obstacles,

to there

are — consecrated by tradidon the four modes of — repre-

sentation, furnished with the styles (

vrtti ) 3 , the local usages

—
“Even though thus A. Sankaran, op. cit., p. 106, paraphrases
1)

this passage — there may be clear and unmistakable verbal testimony

and

inference, we do not completely rest content with the knowledge derived

therefrom for therein is lacking that perceptual cognition which alone
;

makes for clear, direct and definite knowledge ”, With A. Sankaran, I

have read here, Should I have pre-

spbutapretitikiirisctbdaUngascril'bart 'pi.

ferred the reading asphuta, the translation would have been : “ Even if
there may be verbal testimonies and inferences which, as a rule, do —
not provoke an evident perception
—” etc.

{)•’''•’
2) PPyaynsulra, VHtsy ciyar.abbfisya, I, I, 3 : sit (A.G. reads servo,)

prenitih pratyaksapara |

3) The Styles {yrtti) are four in number : kaisikl, satlvatT, arobbitli and
bbarati. Das’ar/tpa, Haas, p. 74 :
“ The Gay Style {kaiJiki) (is to be used)
in (expressing) the Erotic Rasa ; the Grandiose Style (sattrati) in (express-
ing) the Heroic Rasa ; the Horrific Style {iirabbsti), on the other hand, in
(expressing) the Furious and Odious Rasa The Eloquent Style (bhiiratl)
;

everywhere ”. On the vrtti see Tbt Vrttis, by V. Raghavan, J.O.R.,

Madras, vol. VI, pp. 346 ff. ; vol. VII, pp. 33 (F.

[
68 ]
 THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC.

[pravrtji) 1, and the realistic representation (hkadhar mTy Re-

1) The local usages (pravrtti) are four m number aivntft daksinafyj,

ttidrmagfldht, pattcah , Cf N^V I, v 26, 27 ,

SHI, v 37 and prose* pp
205 207 , p 16 "Local usages regarding costumes, languages,
InfTb
manners and professions differ in the different countries of the world
**
They are the prat ftit of local colours in drama

2) For the best explanation* see ABb * I* 292 taira je sialhaiafo

fttrmhmhifdhrdajas fa eta samsdrocttakiodbamob^bbibsaparaiaiamanaso ra

bbavanti |
issam t ithdViiba iaiarfpakak am an asamtg t sadharanarasanalmaka*
carianagrahyo rasasamcajo natyalaksaruth (G Haksana^) spbufa tva J
je tv

atathabhtlias itsam prat) aksocitdta that idbacarvanablhaja natadipraknjd svaga-

takiodhabkadtsanka tab rdayagr anth ibhanj arraya gttadipraknj a ca numnd

vtracttd
u In this connexion, the mind of those who have by nature
f

hearts like an immaculate mirror is not at the mercy of the desires, anger,
or stupor proper to samsdrtka existence (that of everyday life) The mere
fact play read is sufficient (in itself, independently of any
of heating the
acting) to induce inthem with the greatest dearness the perception of the
various Rasas which animate it , this perception consists a Sampling m
animated by a generalised Tasting To make this Tasting (which needs a
direct perception) available to people who are deprived of this faculty,
Bhi rata has, on the one hand, explained the discipline of the actors, etc ,

and, on the other—to cut the knots of the heart obscured by Anger, Sorrow,
etc , inherent in one's ownSelf-^has explained the discipline of vocal music,
etc'* Representation (and therefore drama in genetal which is founded
upon Representation) consists of a fotm of direct perception, js an acthja-
vasaja (mental cognition, etc. , also vjavasaya^ anmjavasaja^ cf App I)

that is like the direct perception (sdkfatkjrakalpa, pratyaksakalpa) A Bb ,

XXII, 150 abhttfayanam bi riffaPrtftsddbaraftatdpattipranasakjQtkarakalpa

ityavasajarctmpadandm ["Representation arouses a mental cognition which
is like a direct perception, it consists in causing the generalization of mental
movenvenU A Bb , XXII* 145 i ighnasambtai arai fbsnas$ka!aSadharana+
spastabbai asak)aikarakalpadhjai asa) asampattay t sari tsdm pro) oga jtj xkfam
|
M It is said that the acting (prayoga^parfadt prahtttkatattam> A Bb * I, 16)
of the four forms of Representation aims just at arousing a mental cognition,
which is like a direct perception It consists of a generalized state of eyi-
 .

R. GNOLI

presentation, indeed, is a different operation from that of

inference and verbal testimony; and, as we will expound later

on, it is almost equal to direct perception.

Does there exist a man whose consciousness rests on any-
f)
thing of a secondary order ( apradhana) ? Indeed, such a percep-
tion would find no rest in itself and would thus run (
antuibav)

automatically towards the predominant thing. This is the reason

why the Permanent State only can be the object of Tasting :

because, I say, the Determinants and the Consequents, which

are insentient (Jadci and the Transitory Mental States, which,
),

though not insentient, nevertheless arc necessarily depending

on the Permanent States, are all equally subordinate
1
Now, .

among the various sentiments, some are conducive to the ends

dcncc common to all the spectators and devoid of every possible obstacle
”
Drama is the object of cognition by an atunyavasdya (about this word cf.

App. I) which is like a direct perception, A.B/j., I, 43.

1) Cf. Db.A.L., p. 177 : taccarvandpi ciltavrttip era paryarasatUi

rasabbdvebhyo nadbikam carvampam “ The Tasting of the Determinants,
|

etc., necessarily terminates in the mental movements; thus, apart from the

bbdva (the matter of the Rasas) there is nothing else which can be tasted.

AM., I, p. 268 : sa cayady apy anantavibhdvdtmd tathdpi sarvesdm jadd-

niim samvidi tasyds ca bbohtari bhokfrrargasya ca pradhdne bhofjari paryarasdndn
ndyakdbbi.lbdnabboklri'isesastbdyiciitarrllisrabbdrah
|
“ Though [drama, etc.]

is by a infinite number of determinants, etc.,

constituted all the elements,
which compound it, rest, however, in the consciousness (the permanent
mental state). This rests in the enjoying subject (the limited enjoying
subject, the practical Self) and the whole of the enjoying subjects rest, in
their turn, in the principal enjoying subject [the generalized knowing sub-
ject]. Therefore, we may say that drama consists in a permanent mental
state of a particular enjoying subject, called an actor, etc. ”. Such a mental
state, continues A.G. is unique, generalized, devoid of the notions “own ”,
“ of others ”, etc. and, therefore,
pervades also the spectators it : ala era
sadbaranlbhutataya sdmdjtkam api svdtmasadbhdvena samdvciayanti
. .

[ 70 ]
 THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC

of life1 these are the predominant ones To specify, delight

is conducive to pleasure, and to the forms and profit connected

(
anusangi ) with it Anger, in people in which it predominates,
is —
conducive to profit but can also end in pleasure and merit
Energy ends in all three, merit, etc E\ entually, another
sentiment—consisting above all in the disgust aroused by the
—
knowledge of reality 5 is the means of liberation These four
sentiments only are the predominant ones Even if they are
not to be found in a predominant position all four together,
and the emergence of one of them naturally postulates the
subordination of the other three, nevertheless someone of
them is always predominant in each drama, so that all of
them are clearly recognised as being, in turn (that is, one in

1) According to a pan Indian conception, human life is motivated by

four purposes kaaa, artba, pharma, and mokfct Kama is pleasure and
love Artba is material property (economics, politics, etc , ate directed to
the fulfilment of this end) Dharma embraces moral and religious duty
Mokja is the liberation or redemption of the soul from the flow of exis
tence , it is the Paramaribo, the supreme purpose of man For an excellent
account of the four artba, sec H Zimmer, Les Pibhsopbses dc l Tnde, Payot,

pp 35 ff The principal forms of consciousness fpibajtbbaia) are those

which are necessary to the fulfilment of these purposes , they are delight
(raft), anger (krodba), energy ('utsaha), and serenity ( iama\ The end of '

delightis pleasure how rv er, through pleasure, it can bring us to the achieve
,

meat of profit and right action (Bhatata N

$ , XVIII, v 72 ff , distinguishes
three Linds of Erotic Rasa, kamabrngara, artbasrngara, and dhariroifflgaTa)

Anget and Energy ale associated w ith artba and dharma respectively, but
both of them may also contribute to the realization of all three purposes
(cf Db L, , p 309 nraraudrajos tv aijantavfrodbo pt flash samuflam j

rupam ca dbarmartbahamarjanoptpiogitram) Spiritual Freedom is the fruit

of serenity
2) The characteristics of this slhajtrbbma are discussed by A C in the
A Bb , pp 333-42 Abhtnava Gupta's text is edited with a commentary
by V Raghavan, The Number of Rasas, Adyar, 1940

[ 71 ]
 ,

R. GNOLt

this drama and the other in another one), equally predomi-

nant. Moreover, if tilings arc more closely examined, all four
of them will be seen
be present in the same drama, in
to
various passages, in a pre-eminent position.
In this connection, all these Rasas arc dominated by plea-
sure sitkba), for the
essence of the closely dense (ckagbanaf
(
light consisting of the gustation of our own consciousness, is
beatitude-. Indeed, in ordinary life also, women, even when
they are immersed in the compact ekeghana gustation of the
( )
form of consciousness called sorrow, find rest in their own

1) Uniform, without obstacles (vigbnri).

2) The intimate essence of consciousness or the “ I ”, according to

the iaiva is beatitude. The absence of beatitude and suffering arc due to a
need, privation, or desire for something separated from the Self. Beatitude
is the absence of this desire, the resting in
oneself to the exclusion of every-
thing else. The “ I ” contains all tilings; everything that exists arises from
its unconfincd liberty. It cannot be the scat of any deprivation and can
desire nothing but itself. Aesthetic experience is the tasting of one’s own
consciousness and, therefore, of one’s own essential beatitude. In this
sense, Rasa This Tasting is coloured ( anuraiijita, rufila) by latent
is single.

impressions ( vasana sanskara of the mental process of Delight, etc., aroused

)
by the determinants, etc., i.c., by poetic expression. From this point of
view the plurality of the Rasas is due to the diversity of the vibhai'a vibbava-
(
bbedam rasabbede beiuivena suiayali. . .AM., I,
p. 290). Cf. AM., I, p. 292 :

asmanmalc in samvedanam cvdnr.ndagbanam

dsvadjnlc du\)kha- ] tntra kn
Semka I kcvalnvi tasjaivn citratakarane ratiickddivasandvydpdras tadudbo-
dha/ic cdbhinayddivydpdrah “ According to us, that which is tasted is
'
/
consciousness alone which is saturated with beatitude. This fact excludes,
therefore, any suspicion of pain. This consciousness which is single in
itself, is nevertheless differentiated by the operation of the latent traces of
delight, sorrow, etc., which arc awakened by the operation of the Conse-
quents, etc. (abb indya=anubhav(i).
For the nature of this “colouring”
infused into the consciousness by the feelings
of delight, etc., cf. infra.
J
p. 82, n. 4.

[ 72 ]
 'THE aesthetic experience, etc

beatt, for this \ery sorrow consists of, and is animated by, a
1
rest without obstacles Pam, indeed, is simply and solely an
absence of rest This is precisely the reason why the disciples
of Kapila, in. explaining the activity of rajahs say that the soul
of pain is mobility (Cancalyaf All the Rasas thus consist
m beatitude But some of them, on account of the objects
by which they are coloured 3 are not free from a certain touch
,

of bitterness, this happens, for example, in the Heroic Rasa

Tor this consists of, and is animated by, precisely the firm en-
durance of misfortunes
Thus occupy a pre-eminent position Laugh-
delight, etc ,

ter, etc , on the other hand, also occupy a pte eminent position,

—
on account of the fact that these whose determinants are easily
accessible to all type of people— possess an extremely high
power of winning the heart [uparanjakati am) For this \ery
1

reason, laughter, etc ,

are mostly to be met with in people

1) The concept is as follows women, even when they are being bitten,
scratched, etc ,by their lovers (and therefore experiencing pam) find in the
pain itself the fulfilment,
the realmtion of all their desire “ they rest in
then hearts ” or consciousness to the exclusion of everything else There-
fore, this pain is pleasure, beatitude Pain occurs only when the conscious-
ness finds no rest in what ft contemplates, is not totally absorbed in the
object of contemplation, s e ,
when it desires something different from the
thingm which ills and from what it is These desires, etc , which interrupt

the homogeneity and compactness (tkaghatiaia) of consciousness, ate the

1 ighr.a, the obstacles
The same concept occurs in the Prataparsidrija (Madras 2nd, Ed ,

1931), comm , p 209 saribhogasamayt J/riiar/ cdhafadarrfanadau kr/ft

maduhkianubhaiaSitkardiad atrapy upapaUth ||

2) Cf SKa, 13
"3} The Tieterminants, etc

4) I e ,
they ate widely diffused, easily make an impression on the
consciousness

15 [
73 ]
 R. GNOLt

of inferior nature (annttamaprakrU ). Every man of low caste

laughs, grieves, is afraid, tends to despise others, and is astoni-
shed at the poorest attempts at a fine saying. All the same,
even these depend on delight, etc., and as such may be of help
in attaining the ends of man 1
. The division between the ten
types of drama is itself based on the different positions occupied
by these mental states. All this will be explained later. The
mental states of permanent nature arc solely these nine. In-
deed, every creature from its birth possesses these nine forms
of consciousness. In fact, on the basis of the principle that
all beings “ hate to be in contact with pain and are eager to
2
taste pleasure ”, everyone
by nature pervaded by sexual
is

desires [delight] ; believes himself to be superior to others, whom

he is thus led to deride [laughter]; grieves when he is forced
to partfrom what he loves [sorrow] gets angry at the causes
;

of such separation [anger]; gets frightened when he finds

—
himself powerless [fear] but still is desirous of overcoming the
danger which threatens him [heroism]; is attacked, when judg-
ing a thing to be displeasing, by a sense of
revulsion directed
just towards this ugly object [disgust];
wonders at the sight
of extraordinary deeds done by himself or
others [astonish-
ment]; and, lastly, is desirous of abandoning certain things
[serenity]. No
living creature exists without
the latent im-
pression of these sentiments. All we can
say is that some of
them predominate in some people and
others in others, and
mat in some people they originate from
the usual causes and
in othersfrom causes different from
the habitual. Thus,
only some sentiments arc able
to promote the ends of

Thc ( omic Pathctic» Marvellous and Terrible

r T
>
Rasas depend on the
Erotic, Furious, Heroic and Odious Rasas respectively.
2) Unidentified verse.

[ 74 ]
 ,

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC 2

man 1 and, as such, they are nghtly the

,
object of teaching
The current division of men into men of elevated nature, etc
isdetermined by the different position occupied by these senti-
5
ments Other sentiments, as weakness, apprehension, etc a, on
the other hand, can never possibly be manifested if the corres-
pondent determinants do not exist so, for example, a mini
who practises ra^Syana is
K
immune from weakness, indolence,
weariness, etc Even in one in whom, by virtue of the deter-
minants ,
these are present, they regularly disappear without
leaving any trace of themselves when the causes of marufesta
tion cease* Heroism, etc ,
on the contrary, even when they
apparently disappear aftet their tasks are completed, do not cease
to remain m the state of latent impressions—for other forms of
heroism, concerning other tasks, remain intact Indeed, as
Patahjali has said, “ The fact that Caitta is tn love with one
woman does not imply that he is out of love with the others ”,
7
etc Thus these transitory sentiments being, so to say,
threaded on the thread of the permanent one, appear and dis-

1) Only the nine Permanent Mental States are able to contribute to

the realization of the four ends of man The Transitory Mental States do
not have this faculty Cf H C, vtitka, p 139 (no doubt a quotation
from AG) ayam <a turttdah nrayart purusarthasiddhayt fa utsakaraiyadstat,
atyantanurafijanaya hasansmayadivart na prdbhaiattiy atyania/rmhhaprtksitvSd
rydbbtcaty

2) The object of the play is to illustrate and teach the means of realiza
tion of the four ends of man
3) The Transitory feelings

4) Rasajana (the science of art, of the rasas, or of vegetable juices etc.)

Is, more or less, the Indian equivalent of alchemy
5) I e by virtue of the presence of their causes
,

t 'a'.risRKfc. sxssniatfMg v& *£* vent xA Vsfttnft. mipnsrsitttn

7) Yogasutra> Vyasabhasya, 2 , 4 Caitra stands for any name whatever The

same quotation is used in the 7 P VV , II, p 178 , cf supra, Intr , p XLH
 —
R. GNOLI

appear an infinity of times. In some sense, they arc like the

beads of crystal, glass, magnet, topaz, emerald, sapphire, etc.,

which filling the thread on which they are threaded no matter

if red, blue, etc.
1
—so as to be set rather far apart from each
other and continuously changing their position, do not leave,
it is true, trace of themselves on this thread, but, all the same,

nourish the ornamental composition made by it

2
;
and, being
themselves various, and varying in turn the permanent thread,
let it no doubt appear at intervals, in its nudity, though, at the
same time, they affect it by their polychrome reflections — the
reflections I mean of the transitory jewels : it is for this very
reason that these sentiments arc called “ transitory ”. When,
that is to say, someone says, “ This is a form of weakness ”, it
is natural to ask: by what is it provoked ? This question
shows up precisely the instability of this mental movement.
But in the case of the expression, “ Rama is full of heroism ”,
one does not ask for the cause. The determinants (the ele-
ments which awaken the mental states) arc limited, therefore,
to bringing to actuality the permanent sentiments (delight,
heroism, etc.) corresponding respectively to their nature

1) These still allow the thread of the permanent mental state to appear
here and there. For a similar image, sec A* Bit., I, p. 340 : virahv:bhitarattuin-
taralamrbbasamnnasiiatarasutrarat . . . The colours (red, blue, etc.) of the
thread allude to the stbqyibhara. The various Rasas arc each one associated
by Bharata with a different colour (the Erotic with green, the Comic with
white, the Pathetic with ash-grey, the Furious with red, the Heroic with
orange, the Terrible with black, the Odious with dark blue, and the Mar-
vellous with yellow).

2) In other words, they arc the ornamental elements of the thread.

Bbr—pfff, nourish ; cf. the often-quoted stanza (c.g., Kavyapradipa comm.,
,

p. 61 ) :

sraksulrabhdvdd arytfdv: bhdvdtidw anttgdmakab

j

na tirodhijatc stbayl fair as an pusynfr param

||

[ 76 ]
 the aesthetic experience, etc

and they do this by infusing into them their own colouring

E\en when their corresponding determinants are absent, it

cannot be said that the permanent sentiments are non exis

tent, for ithas been said that these, in the state of latent lm
pressions, are present in all beings Of the transitory sent!
ments, howe\er, when their corresponding Determinants are
absent, not even the names remain — all this will be explained
1
more extensively at the suitable time and place
Such a refutation of the subordinate elements has been made
by Bharata also through the description of the permanent
sentiments, introduced by the words
*f
We shall now bring
” This
the permanent sentiments to the state of Rasas'
description follows on the definition of the general marts and
concerns the particular ones

g) The consequents, the determinants and the transitory

sentiments considered separately are in no definite relation to
any specific permanent sentiment, for, eg, teats, etc 3
, may
ariseout of bliss, some disease in the eye, etc , a tiger , 4
may
arouse anger, fear etc., and, as we know, weariness [/ram],
5
anxiety (ctfsta), etc , may accompany many permanent feelings,

1) In the ch. VXEI of the A Bb (which has not yet come to fight)

2) N .( VI, prose after v 50 (in a note) In this sentence Bharata

says implicitly that only the stbapibbSi a (l e., the elements of principal order)
and not the rihbata etc., are brought to the state of Rasa The general
definition {sama'Tyalakyjna) begins with the sutra vibbaianubhaiarjabfaca
rnanyogad rafannpattik The particular definition (itlualaksara) consists
of the description of the characters of each Rasa. Cf I P VV I 57
ABb , 300 Jft sihijtno bhaia lokc Ytifatrtijaimano bebitprakaraparurerrapra

tavanibattdbanak&ftavjattiprabardbabbidbajtnaS tali apt napsa Tasairen ttifefl

3) Tears are consequents

4) The tiger is an example of a determinant
5) Weariness, etc, are the transitory mental states
 R. GNOLI

as f.i., heroism, fear, etc. But the combination of these ele-

ments has an unmistakable signification. Thus, where the

death of a close relation is the determinant, wailing, shedding
tears, etc., the consequent, and anxiety, depression (daiuya),

etc., the transitory feelings, then die permanent sentiment

cannot be other than Sorrow. Therefore, considered (such
a possible) arising of doubt, combination is used, just to re-
move this obstacle.

The nature of Rasa

10. Rasa, in this connexion, is just that reality (arthd) by

which the determinants, the consequents and die transitory

feelings after having reached a perfect combination (sawyag

yoga), relation ( —where they
sambandha), conspiration ( aikagrya)
will be in turn in a leading or subordinate position— in the mind
of the spectator, make the matter of a gustation consisting of
a form of consciousness free of obstacle and different from the
ordinary ones. This Rasa differs from the permanent feelings,
consists solely in this state of gustation and is not an objective
l
thing (siddbasvabhava) , lasts exactly as long as the gustation
and does not lian on any time separate from it.
2
The deter-
minants, (which consist of garden, expressive glances,
etc.,

feelings of contentment ( dhrti), etc.), transcend on

their side
the state of causes, etc., as these are understood in ordinary life.
Their function consists solely in the fact that they colour (the
consciousness of the spectator); this function is called vibbdvaua,

1) T.c., it is not an already realized, sclf-subsistcnt thing which cm

exist independently of this tasting. Rasa is simply the particular form
of perception called tasting. Cf. infra, p. 85.

2) Cf. Dh.A.L., supra, Intr., p. XXXIV.

[
78 ]
 the aesthetic Experience, etc.

1
anubharana, etc Thus, these take the name, of a non-oidi~
nary character, of determinants, etc. 3 and this denomination
aims at expressing their dependence on the latent traces left
s
by the corresponding preceding causes, etc The particular
nature of the various determinants will be explained later4
The operation of the determinants, etc ,
presupposes, of course,
that the spectator, in the course of his ordinary life, has not
neglected to make a close observation of the characteristic
signs (effects, causes and concomitant elements) of other
people's mental processes, in other words to deduce the one
from, the other But let us return to Rasa This is, as we
[

have said, different from the permanent sentiment ] and it can-

1) The awaken
determinants, properly speaking, the spectator the w
movements corresponding to their nature Aes
latent traces of the mental
thetic experience or Rasa is coloured by these latent traces The exact
meaning of vtbbavana etc is explained by ViSvanatha as follows, S D HI
, ,

tibhawnam ratyaJtr eiJeftna asvadankuraifcyogyatanajanarR anubhatanatn

j

fiambbutatya ratyadtb samanantaram era rasadtrupataya bhatanam sancarartam

|

tatbabhfitasyattdsya t&myak taranam In other words, according to Visva-

j

natha, Tibbavam 13 the first manifestation of the germination of Rasa ,

anubharana is the gradual corroboration of the Rasa which is on the point
of appearing iaisameafatta (which is not mentioned by A,G is the intensi-
,
)
fication or consolidation of the Rasa. Samcarara according to Visvanatha,
is the Specific operation of the vjabbicanbbaia (yam can ** vjabbt carp)
The
elaboration of these three stages is due, of course, to the necessity of allotting
specific functions to the vibhava, etc. Rasa is, in reality, single, and its
manifestation does cot have earlier and later stages This division is of a
purely didactic nature.

2) In so far as they are different from ordinary causes

3} The determinants, etc arouse the latent traces of the mental process
of delight, etc , provoked by ordinary causes They, thus, demand the
presence of these traces and depend upon them
4) f , VH , Abhmava Gupta’s commentary oA this chapter has not
yet come to light

[ 79 ]
 R. GNOLI

not absolutely be maintained, as Sankuka did, that what is called

Rasa is simply a permanent sentiment, brought to our know-
ledge by the determinants, etc., and that, because this is the
object of a relish, it takes the name of Rasa 1
. For, if things
were so, why should Rasa not exist also in everyday life ? For
if an unreal thing is capable of being the object of relish2 , a
real tiling has all the more reason to be capable of it. Thus, it is

legitimate to say that the perception of a permanent mental

state consists in an inference; but we certainly cannot rightly
say that Rasa is also of this nature. This is the real reason3
why made no mention in the
Bharata has sfitra of the word
cc 99
permanent sentiment ; on the contrary, the mention of it

would have been a source of Such expressions difficulties 1 .

<c
as The permanent sentiment becomes Rasa5 ”, are due to

1) Rasa, says A. G-, docs not consist in the inference (in inferential

cognition) of someone clse’s mental state (in which case it would be a

cognition of a discursive order, savikalpa ) but is a personal experience—

the spectator identifies himself with this mental state and lives it himself.

This observation is aimed at Sankuka, who maintained that Rasa is simply a

permanent mental state deduced by the spectators by means of the deter-

minants, etc., and that the mental state perceived in this way is nothing but

an imitation by the actor of the permanent mental state of the character he

represents.

2) Therefore, the imitated permanent mental state is unreal.

3) I.e., Sankuka’s reason is not the real one ; cf. supra, p. 31.

4) Bharata did not say “ The production of Rasa is provoked by the

union of the permanent mental state (of someone else, i.e., the character
represented), with the determinants, die consequents, and the transitory
Mental Movements he had. Rasa would simply be a perception of
If

someone elsc’s permanent mental movement.

5) Bharata says sometimes (cf. c.g., I\T.£, VI, prose after v. 50 in a
note) that the Permanent Mental State becomes Rasa ; such expressions,

A.G. remarks, arc only due to the “ correspondence (analogy, etc.) Cf.

the next note.

[ 80 ]
 THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC

the correspondence (aticttyd) only This correspondence, to

specify, is due to the fact that the very same things which were
previously considered to be causes, etc, related to a given
permanent sentiment, now serve to realize the gustation, and
are thus presented in the form of determinants, etc1 "What
kind of a Rasa is thete indeed, m
the inference of an ordinary
sentiment p Therefore, the tasting of Rasa (which consists
in a camatkard different from any other kind of ordinary cogni-
tion) differs from both memory, inference and any form of
ordinary self consciousness 2 Indeed, he who possesses the
latent traces of the ordinary inferential processes, does not
apprehend a young woman, etc s as if he were indifferent to,

her4 , but, by virtue of his sensibility which quality is con- —

sisting in a consent of heart — , he rather apprehends her,
without mounting on the steps of memory, inference, etc , as
if merged in a gustation, suitable to an identification (with this
young woman, etc ), which is, so to say, the sprout of the tasting
of Rasa, about to appear in all its fullness This gustation,
again, is not already bom in the past, from some other means

1) Di A L> t p 89 hkfi ht stbayibbat je vtbhoiartubhaias ialsamicttZ

cdtavrttis carvyamunatmi rasa tty auttfyaf itbaywo rasatSpatttr tty utyats |

" Rasa is simply the tasting of the mental movement corresponding for
example, to the determinants and the consequents of the mental state of
sorrow The expression • the permanent mental state becomes Rasa ”,
7
arises solely, therefore, by correspondence

2) Forms of "ordinary self consciousness ” are, eg, pleasure,

pain, etc

3)
“ A young woman '
is a determinant , "etc n here includes the
consequents and the transitory mental states

4) Impersonally, Tatasthja or tna^hyastJya, indifference, is the exact

opposite of ant/prareh, personal or actue praticipation

16 [ 81 j
 ft, gNOLI

of knowledge, so that now, a form of memory

it is, nor 1
;

is it the fruit of the operation of ordinary means of cognition

(direct perception, etc.); but it is aroused solely by the combi-

nation ( samyoga) of the determinants, etc., which, as we have
said, are of a non-ordinary nature.

This 3gustation is distinguished a) from perception of the

ordinary sentiments (delight, etc.) aroused by the ordinary
means of cognition (direct perception, inference, the revealed
word, analogy, from cognition without active parti-
etc.); b)

cipation ( tatastha) of the thoughts of others, which is proper

to the direct perception of the yogins 2 c) and from the com- ;

pact (
ekagbana) experience of one’s own beatitude, which is

proper to yogins of higher orders (this perception is immaculate,

free from all impressions \jtparaga\ deriving from external

things ). Indeed, these three forms of cognition, being

in due order ( yatbayogcwi) subjected to the appearance of obs-
tacles (practical desires, etc.), lacking evidence and at the

mercy of the (adored) object 1

,
are deprived of beauty (satiudarja)*

1) Cf. Db. A.L., infra, App. II, p. 104.

2) Telepathy, the knowledge of other people’s minds, is one of the

yogin powers (Yogas film, III, 19: pratyayasya paracittnjnanam ;
this srl/ra is

quoted and commented by A.G. in I.P. V., I, 2, 4, 5). This phenomenon,

observes A.G., is of an order entirely different from the aesthetic experience.
In it, in fact, the distinction between one’s own self and the self of others
{svaparavibhagd) continues to exist, while the aesthetic cxpcticnce postulates
the generalization of the mental states and therefore the suppression of every
limited self.

3) Abhinava Gupta alludes, in this passage, to the highest degree of

mystical experience which is free of any trace of ordinary things.
4) Mystical experience involves the annihilation of every pair of
opposites everything reabsorbed in
; is its dissolving fire. Sun and moon,

[ 82 ]
 ,

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC

Here, on the contrary, because of the absence [of sensations of

pleasures, pain, etc ] as inhering exclusively in our own per-

mght and day, beautiful and ugly, etc , no longer exist in it The limited
fi **
I is completely absorbed into Sira or Bhairava, the adored object ,

everything vanishes from the field of consciousness Aesthetic experience,

on the other hand, requires the presence of the latent traces of delight, etc
(aroused by the operation of the determinants, etc ) In other words,
the aesthetic experience presupposes a pre constituted knowledge on the
part of the spectator, of the psychic reactions, etc , which ate normally
felt before a given situation This knowledge is, in part, innate (it forms,
that an integral part of human nature) and is, in part, acquired through
is,

the experience of one’s ovn reactions and one’s own observation of the
reactions of others

Aesthetic experience. Rasa, manifested by a poetical description of a

beautiful woman, is for example, coloured by the mental state of delight,
which is aroused by the description itself Such a mental state is supposed
to preexist m the spectator in a latent state m the form that is, of sanskara
or lasand The Determinants which manifest aesthetic experience awaken,
implicitly and of necessity, these latent traces also

The beauty, the pleasantness proper to the aesthetic experience arc due
to the colouring of these mental processes, cf AM I,
p 290 hukikat
pratjajad uparjana&n ighndbahttlad j ogiprafyayde ca tf$aydn'a$jffwjaiapaTnsdi
vilAksanak3ra$ukhjdiihkJ]adivtctirai asananut tdhepanatah rdy ataiiiaydSdmVt ccart a nai
mand bhunjatc hudhah “ Aesthetic enjoyment consists in the tasting
[

of one’s own consciousness, this tasting is endov ed with extreme pleasant

ness (beauty), which it obtains from a contact with the various latent traces
of pleasure, pain, etc It differs both from ordinary perception, which is

full of obstacles (pragmatic requirements etc ), and from the perception of

the yogins, which is not free from harshness, on account of the total lack
of any tasting of external objects ” Thus by comparison with the aesthetic
experience, the compact homogeneity ( ckdghanata ) of mystical experience
possesses a certain harshness Its pursuit, that is to say calls for uncommon
force and energy (cf the concept of tira t btrd) Aesthetic experience, on the
pthei hand, is easily attained It is particularly suitable to people endowed

[
83 ]
 R. GNOLI

son, of an active participation in our own self (svatmtmpravciaf),

of the absence [ of the afore-mentioned sensations ] as inhering

exclusively in other persons, and the immersion (amid) in the

latent traces of our own sentiments of delight, etc., reawakened
by the corresponding determinants, etc., which arc generalized—
because, I say, of all these causes, the appearance of obstacles
is impossible .
1
And all this has been said over and over
again.
For this reason (ata evd) the determinants arc not the causes

of the production (mspatti) of Rasa; otherwise, Rasa should

continue to exist even when they no longer fall under cog-
nition. Nor arc they the cause of its cognition (jfidpti) (if

with a * gentle mind ’

(snktmaramati ). In the Dh.A.L ., p. 51, A.G. defines

Rasa in the following terms : Sabdasainarpyamanahrdayasanivadasundaravibha -

vanitbhavasamuciinpragviniviftaraljiidivcisanannragasukuviarasvasamvidanandacarva-
iiavyapararasamjarfpo rasah “ Rasa is tasted through the act of tasting the
|

heatitudeof onc’sown consciousness. This tastingisplcasant(andnot/wW<t

as in mystical experience) in that the consciousness is coloured by the latent

traces of the mental states of delight, etc., pre-existing (in the minds of the

spectators). Such traces arc aroused by the corresponding determinants and

consequents, which— pleasant (beautiful, etc.,) by virtue of the consent of
the heart — arc afforded by the words ”. Cf. Dh.A.L., p. 81 anubhavan-
:

bbavavabodbanot.taram eva tanmayibhavaiiayuktya tadvibbai'iiDubbiivocitacittavrtti~

,
vdsananuraiijitasvasamvidiinandacarvatjagocaro
rtho rasatma spburaty cvn . .
. |

This passage has been somewhat modified and enlarged by I-Icma-

1)
candra (see the critical Apparatus) “ Here, on the contrary, because of the
:

absence [of sensations of pleasure, pain, etc.] as inhering exclusively in

our own person, we arc not at the mercy of
the [adored] object ; because
of an active participation in our own self
[and] the absence [of the afore-
mentioned sensations] as inhering exclusively
in other persons, there is no
lack of evidence and because of
; the immersion in the latent traces of our
own sentiments of delight, etc., reawakened
by the corresponding determi-
nants, etc., which arc generalized, there is no possible appearance of
 , ,

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC

they were, they would have to be included among the means

of knowledge (pramatta), because Rasa is not an objective
thing (
stddhri), which could function as a hnowable object
What is it, then, that is designated by the expressions, “ deter
mtnants etc We reply to this question that the expressions
“ determinants etc **
do not designate any ordinary thing, but
what serves to realize the gustation (
carvanopayog) Does
any such thing appear elsewhere ? But the fact that it does
not occur elsewhere, we reply, can do nothing but strengthen
our thesis of their non ordinary character Does the taste

of the rasa of panaka perhaps occur in molasses, peppers, etc

(of which, however, it consists) •>* The case is perfectly
analogous **
But (someone might say) in this way Rasa is not
”
an object of cognition (aprameya) That is what really occurs,

we reply and suitably Rasa, indeed, consists solely of a tasting

and has not the nature of an object of cognition, etc “ But how
then do you think that the expression which Bharata uses m
the sutra can be justified when he says * “The production of
Rasa (rasamspaiti ) ” ? This expression, we reply, must be
understood in the sense of a production not of the Rasa, but

1) See the N$ , The example of panaka

287 ff is to be found fairly
frequently in Indian philosophy Cf for example, N At p 341 am
tv

padarthebhyo *ti)a eva Pakyartbah panskadiiat yatha panakart dnrkaranagaketa-

ramaricadtbhjo rihantaram eva yatha ca stndt rabantalalakiadtbhyo ’rthantaran
’

tea cttrajfi) yatha ta fad/arfabhagandharadhanatodibhyo ’ribantaram eva grama

ragah tatha padtbbyc, iakyams padarthebhyo vjkjartbah “ “The meaning of a
|

sentence differs from the meaning of the words (as happens with panaka,
etc) Just as panaka is different from sugar, spice, pepper, etc just as a ,

paintings from minium orpiment lain etc y or

different q£ wusac.
is different from the various notes of which it is composed,
so is the meaning
of a phrase different from the meaning of the words ”,
 R. GNOLT

of the tasting which Rasa (tadvhayamsana). Like-

refers to the
wise, if the expression “ The production of Rasa ” is under-
stood in the sense of a production of a Rasa whose subsistence
is exclusively depending on the said tasting, our thesis is not
be set by any difficulty Besides, this tasting is neither the
1
.

fruitof the operation of the means of cognition nor of the

means of action. On the other hand, it can be said that, in
itself, it is not ascertained by any means of aknowlcdgc (aprattia-

nika), for its real existence is an inconfutablc datum of our own

consciousness (
svctsatuvedanasiddba).
’ This tasting, moreover,
is,no doubt, solely a form of cognition, but a form of cognition
different from any other ordinary perception. This difference
is due to the fact that the means of it, that is, the determinants,

etc., arc of a non-ordinary character. To conclude : what

is produced by the combination {sainyoga) of the Determinants,
etc., is the tasting rdsana)\ and the Rasa is the non-ordinary
(
reality, which is the matter of this tasting. This is tire sense
and purport of the sutra.
All this may be summarized in the following way: in the
first place, the identity of the actor as such is concealed by
tiaras, headwear, etc. in the second place,
; the idea that he is

Rama, aroused by the power of the poem, nevertheless

etc.,

does not succeed in imposing itself

upon the idea of the actor,
for the latent traces of the said idea
arc strongly impressed on
the spectator’s minds. For this
very reason, the spectator
is no longer living cither
in the space and time of Rama, etc.,

1) I.C., this
expression might lend itself
to interpretation in the sense
that Rasa is something different from the act of
cognition by which it is
known, so that it would be an object
of cognition. A.G.’s reply to this
objection is that Rasa is the
perception itself, and that the word Rasa does
not denote anything distinct from
the perception by which it is known,

[ 86 ]
 THE AESTHETIC EVPERlEMCE, ETC

nor in the space and time of the actor as such Acts of horripi-
lation, etc which have repeatedly been seen by the spectator
,

in the course of everyday life as indexes of delight, etc., serv e,

in this case, to make known a delight, etc , uncircumscribed
by either time or space Inthis delight, justbecause hepossesses
the latent traces of it in himself, the Self of the spectator also
actively participates For this very reason, this delight is

perceived neither with indifference, from the outside, nor as if it

were linked with a particular lungeneialized] cause —for in
this case, intrusion by pragmatic requirements, interests of
gain, etc would occur
, —
nor again as if it exclusively belonged
,

to a defined third person— for, in this case, sensations of plea-

sure, hatred, etc would occur in the spectator* Thus, the
Brotic Rasa is simply the feeling of delight a feeling, however, —
which is both generalized and the object of a consciousness,
which may be either single or develop consecutively"
The task of generalization is carried out by the determinants,
etc

t) Cf supra, Intr , p \XU, n 1

2) In the case of a play, long poem etc. various moods of the soul
occur n alternation with each other (Delight, Sorrow, etc.) , w the case of
z short poem there is generally speaking only one dominant motif

t 87 ]
 Appendix I

Commentary on N.S., I, st. 107 (A. Bb., I, pp. 35-38).

nanu caivam apy asmatprsthe kim etad yojitam ity aha

mikantato ’
it'd bbcivatdni devanoni cdnubbavtni am |

trailokyasjdsja sarmj'a natyam bhavannkirtanam ||

ayam bhavah ]
na yusmatprsthe kenacid etad yojitam |

devasurasya bahir yadiasvastham avasthanam otreti natyavede

|

na devasuranam ekantenanubhavanam [
naiva te’ nubhavyante
kenacit prakarena tatha hi tesu na tattvena dhih (
na
[

sadrsyena yamalakavat |
na bhrantatvena riipyasmrdpurvaka-
sukdrupyavat |
naropena samyagjnanabadhanantara'mithya-
3
jnanarupavat 2
|
na tadadhyavasaycna gaur vahika itivat j

notpreksyamanatvena candramukhavat [
na tatpratikrdtvena
citrapustavat |
na tadanukarena gurusi syavyakhyah evakav at 1

na tatkalikanirmanenendrajalavat [
na yukdviracitatadabhasa-
taya hastalaghavadimayavat |
sarvesv etesu paksesv asadha*
ranataya draspir audaslnye rasasvadayogat kaves ca niya-
|

tavarnanlyaniscitatve kavyasyaivasampatter anaucityavarjana-

yogat [
laukikamithunadrslva samsarikaharsakrodhanvayi-
5
1
tapatter ubhayadarsanakulataya mukhyadrstau® prayoktrdrstav
7
anusamdhisampattyabhavat |
kim tarhy etat |
aha trailo-

kasyeti |
etad uktam bhavad |

1 0
Millard G :
0
imtaram M ||
2
mthjajnanarupaval :
mithyajilSna-

r ftp am G : mitbyajfmarftpyam LI [|
3 gaur vahika itivcit M :
gaur vabikavat
G ||
4
°nvajiIr.pal'er G :
0
naiyilr.yapafter LI (corrected in a second hand
into 0 5 0 t»
nvayitatapatUr
|
darsandkttlaiayd : Harsanabt (co rrccted into
(sic) latnja G :
0
darsanekfdataya LI ||
6
mukbyadrffaa G : mtikbadrffauTsl ||

7
anusarndhisampattyabhavat is a doubtful correction of mine : taddbi

sampattya (corrected into dvUamvittyd) bhdvat G: skandbisompattyabhavat LI ||

 'THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, etc

etadt&m te tamadayo na kadacana p ratnanap atham ava~

1
tatan. te yadagamena varnyante tada tadvisesabuddhir ' yady
|

api ramayanaprayad ekasman mahavakyad ullasati tathapi

vartamanatayaiva visesanam sambhavyamanarthakriyasa-
mafthyatmakasyalaksanya3paryavasanan m ca tesam vartama-
natety upagata 1
tavad visesabuddih j
kavyesv api 6 hrdaya eva.
tavat sadharambhavo vibhavadmam jatah.
[
tatiapi kathamatre
*
sadhaiambhavah. sambhavati yady api tathapy evam ye
kurvant: tesam etad bhavati *
itivakyavad ranjanatiSayabhavan
na cittavtttit® nimayagata bhavati |
kavye tu gunalam-
karamanohara£abda3atiie lokottararasapranake 7
hrdaya samva-
davasSn nimagnakanka * tavad bhavati attavrttih kim tu
J

sarnsya pratyaksasaksatkarakalpa tatra na dhir udeti® j

natye tu patamatthikam Limcid adya me krtyara bhavisya-

tityevambhutabhisamdhisamskarabhavat sarvapansatsadha-
ranapramodasaraparyantaviiasanadaramyalokottaradarsaiia^ra -
vanayogi bhavisyamityabhisatodhisamskatad ucitagitatody-
acarvanavismrta^samsankabhavataya vimalamukurakalpi-
bhutamjahrdayah sucyadyabhmayavalokanodbhinnapramo-
daSokatamnayibhavah pithy akamanapatraatatapraveSavaSat
samutpanne desakalaviSesaveSanalingite samyanmithyasam-
iayasambhavanadijnanavijfieyatvaparamarianaspade rlmara-
vanadivisayadhyavasaye tatsamskaranuvrttikaxanabhutatatsa-
hacarahrdyavasturupagitatodyapramadanubhavasamskarasucita-

1 mat atari J
it cvatorjantt G atatan&aitt M 2
^huSihir G
°liddhir M [|
3
OjtctJa&ijttya* 9
salaksany<i° G
]]

°fjalaksan)<i 0 H I]
*
fcfa G w&u (perhaps corrected mto apagatd) U s >
|{ ir
tia (hritja era corrected from brdqjam era) G kaytrjavtbrdajedeva Rt II
(lUsxrttiT (corrected from nitairtttr) G tilistrUer M f hkott&rl*
rasapranafo G hhUorarwn prancU M |j
» nmagnakarika
)]

G nmms,
t
ta riwrfa g M
“
dt!t G ,da h M ^ (I
10
**n***itmrt* G °i terminal
l

17 89
[ ]
 R. GNOLI

saimiiugalataduktaruparamadhyavasayasamskara eva bliavan

pancasair divasaih sacamatkaras' tadiyacaritamadhyapravistasva-

tmarupamatih svatmadvarcna visvam latha pasyan pratye-
kam samajiko dcsakalaviscsanaparamarscna “ cvamkarinam
3
5 idam ” iti linatmaka"vidhisamarpaka sanivijjatiyam cva
5 c
samvidvi^esaranjakam'pranavallabhapratimam i-asasvada sahaca-
7 8
raramyagitatodyadisamskaram lasanubhavavascna hrdaya-

bhyantaranikhatam lata evotpumsana°satair api mlanima-

tram apy abhajamanam bhajams tattacchubhasubhaprep-
10 sajiliasasatatasyutavrttitvad eva subham acaraty a subham

samujjhati |

idanim upayasamvedanalabhat tad idam attukjriattain

anuvyavasayaviseso natyaparaparyayah nanukara iti bhrami-

|

Jo
tavyam anena bhandena rajaputrasyanyasya vanukrtav
|

15 anyadibuddher abhavat tad vikaranam 11

iti prasiddham
hasamatraphalam madhyasthanam yadabhiprayena munir
|

’ 1_
vaksyati “ paracestanukaranad dhasas samupajayate |

14
tatpaksyanam 13
tu tad eva dvesasuyanuvrttya diphalam |

tadbuddhyaiva hi daityanam hrdayaksobhah evambhuta

20 vayam upahasabhajanam iti upahasyatabhiravas ca nivar-
|

tante tatah |
na tupadcSena |
nanv evam tavata niyatanukaro
ma bhut apataddham na kimcid
|
anukarena tu kim |

asambhavad rtc anukara iti hi sadrsakaranam tat kasya |

|
|

1
sacamatkaras : sacamalkara 0 G,M liuatmaka 0
2 (corrected G
from lidbatmaka °) : lidbatmaka 0 M
||

3 °sa/t/arpaka° :
0samarpitam . G
||
0
°. samarpakam M ||
1
°raiijakam :
0
raiijaka 0 G,M |
6 °pratimam
' ®'pratima

G,M ||
0
rasasvada 0 G : rasasvadc M 7
°samskaram : satnskSra G,M||
8
rasauubbavasc/ia G (corrected from
||

rasavasena) : rasa . . .vasena M ||

D
fp/imana 0 M : °ipunk/ja° G |
10 nyasja vanukrtav (corrected from
viinukrtc) G : njasjavaganukrlc M ||
11
tad vikaranam : tad dbi vikaranam
(corrected from vikaranam) G : tad dbi karanam M |l
12
N.S., VII, 10 |

13
tatpaksyanam M : tatpakpjanam G ||
14 (l
nuvrlty
,n (corrected from
°nivrtij°) G : °nivrltj 0 M ||

[ 90 ]
 THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC

na tavad ramasya J
tasysmanukaryatvat |
etena piamada-
divibhavanam anukaranam parakrtam na cittavittmam |

5 okakro db adit u pan am na hi nato ramasadrsam svatmanah ]

£okam katoti sarvathaiva tasya tattabhavat

j
bhave )

vananukaratvat |
na canyad \astv astl yac chokena sadrsam
syat |
anubhavams tu karoti )
kim tu sajatiyan 1 eva )
na tu
tatsadr^an )
sadharanarupasya kah kern sadrSyarthas
tiailokyavarnnah |
sadrsatvam tu na viSesatmana yauga-
padyenopapadyate kadacit |
kramena myata evanukrtah
syat ]
samanyatmakatve ko* nukatarthah |
tasmad aniya-
tanukaro *
natyam lty api na bhtamitavyam j
asmadupa-
dhyayakrte kavyakautuke *py ayam evabhiptayo mantavyah f

na tv amyataftukaro ’pi |
teninuvyavasayaVisesavisayikaiyam
natyam |
tatha hy ahatyaviiesadina nlvrtte tadde&kala-
caittamaitradinatavis'esapratyaksabhimane vifesaleiopakra-
meaa ca vina pratyaksapravttter spate 4
ramadisab dasyatro-
payogat prasiddhatadarthatayadaranlyacantavacakasyasambha-
*
vanaraatramrakaranenanuvyavasayasya pratyaksakalpata,
hrdyagltadyanusyutataya camatkarasthanatvad dhrdaya-
nuprave^ayogyatvam, abhinayacatustayena svarupapraccha-
danam, prastavanadina natajnanajasamskatasaavyam, tens
ranjakasamagrimadhyanupravis tena pracchaditasvasvabhavena
*
pfakpravrttalaukikaptatyaksanumanadi] amtasamskatasahayena
natajnanasamskatasacivena hfdayasamvadatanmayibhavana-
sahakatma prayoktra drSyamanena yo ’nuvyavasayo janyate
7
sukhaduhkhadyakaratattacattavrttirusita mjasamvidanandapra'
klSamayo *ta eva vicitro rasanasvadanacamatkaracarvana-

1
Sajatijaji G jattjan M [J
* tjsmsi ani/jafa a G iasyayal# M [j
s O/myatMtaja °/? nywasajarat GMf 4
^apjatt %jate G.M |

* pratyaksakalpatS pratjakiakalpjnatjt G bratjaksakdlpana M [(

* D/aismjyihBarana q
'‘tjnmqtvbav'incP GM (|
7
^rufitaP ^rupari itfa*
P Jrupjruptta^ M )]

[
91 3
 R. GNOLI 1

nirvesabhogadyaparapatyayah, tatra ya avabhasate vastu

tan natyam |

tac ca jnanakaramkramaropitam svatupatn 3 samanyatmakam

tatkalanirmitarupatn canyad va 3 kimcid astu |
natraprastu-

5 talekhanenatmano darsanantarakathapaticayaprakatanaphalcna
prakrtavastunirupanavighnam acarantah sahrdayan khcdayamah |

tasmad anuvyavasayatmakatn Idrtanam rusitavikalpasamvc-

danam natyam |
tadvcdanavedyatvat |
na tv anukarana-
tupam |
yadi tv evam mukhyalaukikakarananusarltaya
c
10 nukaranam ity ucyatc tan na kakid dosali |
sdiitc vastuto
bhedc sabdapravrttcr avivadaspadatvat |
ctac ca yathavasa-
ram vitanisyata ity astam tavat |
yatas cedam nanukaranam
tato yat kaikic coditam tad anavakakm |

1
vastu G : V///M ||
2
svarupam G : svarupam. . .M |J
3
cattyad va
G : eanyathcfi M |

[
92 ]
 ,

TRANSLATION
“
Bat how is it that this burden (viz the defeat) has been
imposed on outback ? ”1 To this question the author replies

Here, by no means, i s there a representation oj you and the gods

(N S, I v 107 a)

The sense intended in this verse nobody has imposed

is that
such a burden on your back Both the demons and the gods
stay outside, at ease Here, that is, in the Natyaveda anyway,

those who are seen are not the real demons and the gods As
to them, indeed, there arises neither the idea of reality, nor of
similitude, as in the case of twins , nor of illusion, as in the

case of the illusion of a piece of mother-of pearl, preceded by

knowledge of a piece of silver , nor of super imposition, as
when wrong knowledge follows after vitiating the right one ,
nor of identity, as when one says * this peasant is a cow * ,

nor of a poetical fancy, as when the moon is fancied as the face

of the night, etc , nor of copy, as in the case of a painted model
nor of reproduction, as in the case of the counterfeit re
presentation of the instruction imparted by a teacher to his
students ,
not of sudden creation, as in magic, nor of an appea
ranee effected by tricks, as in sleight of hand, etc In all these
cases, indeed, there is a lack of generalization so that the on

1) According to , NS w
99 106, Drama has not been instituted by
Brahma to cast an unfavourable light on the demons (Daitya, Vjghna
etc but to represent impartially acts and ideas both of gods and demons
),

Demons have no reason to be afraid of it and to spoil the dramatic per

formance Here the objector is a hypothetical dditjti and the ‘burden*
is Vac ieJea't or ’Vue ietnons'oy lint gu&s, lint 'iigutKtTft, Vnt

first dramatical production ( see AT S ,vv 54 ff)

 Jl. gnoli

looker, being consequently in a state of indifference, will not

logically be able to be pervaded by die relish of Rasa. Again,
if the poet aims at a too specific (
myata) subject-matter, poetry
will not be accomplished, and he will not be able to avoid the
fault of impropriety anancilya).* Further, as it happens at the
(

sight of a pair of lovers united together, the mind of onlookers

will rather became the prey of the ordinary, actual feelings
2
of delight, rage, and so on. Eventually, (we may here add)
that whenever the mind of the spectators is troubled by the
sight of two different individuals, viz. the represented personage
and the actor, the (necessary) unification (
annsamdhi) between
them cannot take place.

What is then drama ? The author answers :

Drama is the re-narration of the things of all the three worlds (N.
I, v. 207 b).

The sense intended in this verse is as follows. These

personages, Rama, etc., have never come down into the
i.e.,

path of our means of knowledge. Now, when they are des-

cribed in the scriptures there is no doubt, it is true, that the
Ramayana-like narrations, that is to say, these unique great
3
sentences, give rise to the idea of the individual essence

on the idea of aucilja, V. Raghavan, Some Concepts of the Ahmkara

1) See,
Sastra, Adynr, 1942, pp. 194-257. “Proportion and harmony’’ says V. —
—
Raghavan, ib. p. 208 “form an aspect of Aucitya, which is propriety, adap-
tation,and other points of appropriateness. From the point of view of the
perfect agreement between the parts and the chief clement of Rasa, from
the point of view of this proportion and harmony, I think, Aucitya can be
rendered in English into another word also viz., * Sympathy ’, which as a
word in art-criticism means ‘mutual conformity of parts”.
See supra, p. 44.
2)

3) “ The principal clause and the subordinate clauses which are mutually
connected together by expectancy, consistency and proximity form a
 , ,

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC-

(vtsefa) of each of them This idea, however, is not contrasting

with the concept of generalization and its presence causes
therefore no difficulty The individual essences* indeed,
amount to a real individuality (svalaksanja), possessed of a
corresponding causal efficiency (drthakrty <z) y only when they ate
—
contemporary with us which contemporaneity, in this case,
docs not e^ist 1
This state of generalization of the deter-
minants, etc arises even in poems proper and, m this case, it

penetrates directly into the heart Even then, although the ge-
neralization can occur m mere tales (kaiba)* nevertheless there

5
mahavakja, when they serve a single purpose (K, Kunjunm Raja, Indian
Theories of hUantng^ Adyar 1963, p 161)

1) d) The perception of the particular names and shapes of Rama, etc

(therefore of their qualifications of time, space, etc }, does not involve that
they cannot be perceived in a generalized form A personality, etc in
serts itself into our practical life (develops, so to say, its causal efficiency)
only when it is contemporary with us, l e , connected with the present and
therefore with the practical interests, etc , of our oun Ego When these
personalities are not contemporary, they cannot develop their natural
causal efficiency In the aesthetic perception, they are independent from
the concepts both of reality and non reality, and are thus perceived as
44
generalized ” In this sense, their particularity (i ttefd) is not contrasting
with the concept of generality
b) In this content, sialakfanjx is simply a sjnonym of starupa, one’s
own form or shape, one’s ov,n peculiar nature, hence individuality, etc
StafakfatQa is commented on by AG in this vay in the Dh AL , p 538
The causal efficiency (arthabnja , on this concept, cf p 31, n 7 ) in the
sense of practical or pragmatical functionality belongs to the real individua-
lity (i e ,
contemporary with the spectator} onlv The generalized image
of the aesthetic experience has no practical efficiency, ic, does not insert
itself in practical life The concept of causal efficiency in connexion with
the one of individuality (in the sense of a particular essence contrasting with
the general essence, the saM<inyahksand) has a Euddlmt origin and, freely

interpreted, became part of the common philosophical vocabulary

[ 95 j
 THfe AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, £tC

of sorrow, delight, etc, sprung from the sight of the gestures

and of the other species of representation Listening to the
recitation makes the spectator enter into the life of a character
different from himself, and, as a result, there grows up la him
a cognition whose Rama, Ravana and so on This
object is

cognition is not circumscribed by any limitation of space and

time, and is free from all those forms of thought concerning
which is the matter of knowledge, which is either mistaken,
or uncertain, or probable, etc That is not all The spectator
is accompanied by the impressions of this cognition (whose
object was Rama, etc ) and then by a kind of camatkara for
several days 1 These impressions are evidenced, in their
turn, by other ones, deposited within him by the direct percep-
tion of the various pleasure-producing things—women, vocal
—
and instrumental musics which accompanied the performance
These last impressions are the very cause of the continuation of
the first ones But let us revert to the spectator His own
self continues to be merged in the represented exploits, and
through he goes on seeing everything in this light This
it,

impression of the vocal and instrumental musics and of the other

—
delightful things that, as we have seen, accompany the relish
of Rasa, are not to be compared to [the pleasure givento us by
the sight of] our beloved one, and colour the consciousness in
a special way — gives birth, within him, to a kind of injunction

suitable to be expressed by the optative mode, that is *

Such
and such a thing (must happen) to those who do such-and-such
a thing \ Hus injunction is free and temporal
of every spatial

specification The afore mentioned impression by virtue of

T
1) Cf Mrccbakahka, III, 5 j at sal) art Urate ’pi gitasamaye gaCthart
irntann ita *'
To tell the truth, although the song is ended, I seem to hear
|

it as I walk ”,

18 [
97 ]
 It. GNoLt

the Rasa-experience, remains deeply fixed in the heart, like an

arrow, in such a way that by no possible effort can it be eased,
1
let alone extracted. Thanks to it, the desires of attaining
thegood and abandoning the bad arc constantly present in the
mind of the spectator, who accordingly docs the good and
avoids the bad.

Now then, as there is no awareness of (the actor being) a

means, tire meaning of the term re-narration, found in the stanza,
is a particular re-perception (the word ** drama ” is but a synonym
for it), and not a reproduction. We deserve not to be deceived
by the latter. When, indeed, a prince or some other personage is
reproduced in jest, the spectators do not have the idea that
tire actor is some one other, etc. Such a performance is known,
indeed, as a “ deformation ”, and, as such, gives rise to nothing
but laughter in the onlookers. This was just the purpose of
Bharata, who said Laughter arises from a reproduction of
:
‘

other people’s actions (N.S, , VII, 10) In the reproduced

personages, on the other hand, this mimicry gives rise to feel-
ings of hatred, indignation and so on. The agitation of heart

in the Demons was caused, indeed, by this very drought:

2
*
We have thus become a vessel of derision .’ Their absten-
tion too [from spoiling the drama] is caused by this fear of
becoming an object of derision and trot by the teaching (of
Bralrnra).
‘ Well ’, someone might say, ‘
let nrc even admit that drama
is not a reproduction of specific things ; however, of which is

1) A similar expression is to be found in the I.P.V.V., I, p. 37 :

prasiddbUataptlrm jivalokc kasyacit kacid eva prasiddbib “ lineva pratibiwbiteva

tikhilcvantarnikhalcva ca {MalaiJmadbaVft, v. 10) ” it; nyayena bl'dajabbitlnit
ulpatanaiatair apt brdayavi animmfdya napasarpati
||

2) Cf. supra, p, 6,

[
98 ]
 , —
the aesthetic experience etc

reproduction tout eonr guilty To this question we answer

that, surely, it is guilty of nothing, with the only exception of
a logical impossibility The word reproduction, indeed, means
the production of similar things But similar to whom ?

Surely, not to Rama, etc because it is not possible to reproduce

him And, by this very argument, the reproduction, too, of
his particular determinants (women, etc ) is refuted Further,
even his state of mind, as, f1 ,
sorrow, anger, etc The actor,

indeed, does not produce, within him, a sorrow similar to that

of Rama, because such a sorrow is totally absent in him, and, if
itwere actually in him, it would no more be a reproduction
Nor, again, is there some other thing which may be similar to
the sorrow of Rama *
Perhaps ’, some might say, * the con-
sequents he produces are similar to those of Rama * But to
this question too we answer that they are not similar, but of
the same species As to a universal thing ('sadbaram), common
to all the three worlds , 1
what is, in fact, the sense of this
term *
similarity — similarity to what
* 5 ? Similarity, indeed

similarity to a particular thing — cannot ever take place simul-

taneously, only a specific thing be reproduced, and that may
also only gradually What is then the sense of reproduction,
as to a generic thing ? Therefore, we deserve not to be de

ceived by this theory viz , that drama is a reproduction of non

specific things This what our master intended to say in his
is

Kaiyahautuka too, and not, surely, that drama is a reproduction

of non specific things

Drama then a matter of cognition by a special form

is

of re perception (amtvjtnastya) In the first place, indeed,

1) A rd therefore simultaneously present m all individuals

Consequents are a universal reality, common to all people

2)

[
99 1
 R. GNOLI

thanks to garments, make-up and the other forms of represen-

per-
tation, the presumption to be confronted with the direct

ception of a particular actor (Caitra, Maitra, etc.) and of his

particular space and time ceases to exist ;

in the second place,

since direct perception cannot take place without at least a

minimum of particularization, recourse is had to such names
as "Rama, etc. The names of famous
fact that these are the

personages eliminates indeed the possibility that one who

declaims their exploits deserving of attention might provoke
in the spectators the hindrance of unverisimilitude. Owing
to all this, this re-perception is like a form of direct perception.

Further, because the scene represented, being accompanied by

pleasure-giving vocal musics, etc., is a source of camalkara , it
is possessed of a natural suitability to penetrate into the heart.
Again, the four forms of representation hide the true identity
of the actor. Eventually, the prologue, etc., give to spectators
the [constant] impression that they have to do with an actor.
The actor, being seen, arouses, then, in the spectators, a re-
perception (called, too, tasting, sampling, camatkdra, relish,

immersion, enjoyment, etc.), which, though consisting in the

light and bliss of our own consciousness, is still affected by
various feelings, and is therefore varied. Drama is only what
appears in this re-perception. In this connexion, the actor is

immerged in the afore-said colouring combination (of deter-

minants, etc.); his real identity is hidden; he possesses mental
impressions arising from direct, inferential and other forms of
ordinary perception which have occurred in the past; he is

provided with mental impressions of the awareness of being an

actor, and he partakes in creating the identification of the spec-
tators with the representation, and that through their heart’s
consent. But let us revert to what appears in the aforemen-
tioned re-perception. This may equally be considered either as

[
100 ]
 ‘'HE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC.

an inner image of our own knowledge, or as a generic super-

imposed image, or again as a sudden creation, or even as some
other thing Anyway, we have no intention of boring here
our sensible readers with these discussions, removed from the
chief subject matter They, indeed, would only amount to
showing off our acquaintance with other systems, and to be a
hindrance to the subject under discussion
To sum up, drama is only a * narration * (hrtana ), made up of
a re perception, a form of consciousness affected by discursive
cognitions (rttsitavtkalpasam dam ) — it is, indeed, thus per-
ceived —and not a form of reproduction If, however, you
say that it is a reproduction, in the sense that it follows the
“ production ” of real, ordinary life, there is no fault Once
facts have been clearly determined, words do not deserve to be
a source of disagreement But we will expound that later
For the time being, this is sufficient

t
im ]
 APPENDIX II

Commentary on Dh. A., I, 18 .

As to poetry, which conveys the determinants and the conse-

quents, there no possible appearance of any element which
is

could provoke the unsuitability of the primary meaning ; and,

therefore, there is in this sense little room for metaphor
1
.

—
“ But ” someone might argue what has it to do with un- —
suitability ? The nature of metaphor has indeed been defined
as follows. “ The metaphor is said to be the apprehension of a
sense connected widi the sense directly expressed
2
. Now in
poetry, we see that the Rasas arc connected with the determi-
nants, the consequents etc., which are directly expressed;

indeed, the determinants and the consequents are respectively

the causes and the effects of Rasas, and the transitory states

co-operate with them ” . Your obj ection, I reply, does not stand
to reason. If it be right, indeed, when, thanks to the word

1) Sec, on the nature of the metaphor, the study of K. Kunjunni Raja,

op. r/7.,pp. 229-273.
**
The three essential conditions — he says, pp. 231-32 —
generally accepted by the later Alamkurikas as necessary in laksatjii or
transfer arc(rf) the inapplicability or the unsuitability of the primary mean-
ing in the context, some relation between the primary and the actual
(b)

referent of the word, and (c) sanction for the transferred sense by popular
usage, or a definite motive justifying the transfer. Of these three conditions
the two
first by all writers but the motive clement justifying
arc accepted ;

the use of a metaphor which has not received the sanction of established
usage is not stressed by the earlier writers; even later writers belonging to
the other school of thought are not interested in the motive element in
laksit/ja it is only the literary critics who give great prominence to it ”.
;

2) Kumarila, Tantravarttika, I, 4, 23. See on all that, R. Gnoli,

Udbhata s Commentary on the Kavyalamkara of Bhdmaha, Roma 1962, pp.
XXXIV-XXXV.

[
102 ]
 THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC

* smoke the smoke has been apprehended, there would arise

also the idea of fire, just effected by the afore said metaphor,
and again, from there
would arise the idea of removing
fire,

coldness,and so on, so that words could no more have any

fixed meaning On the other hand, if you answer to this,
saying that, since the word ‘
smoke ’
is reposed in its own sense,
its power cannot actually extend to fire and so on, then the
consequence of your argumentation is one only, namely, that
the seed of the metaphor is the unsuitability of the primary
meaning, because, only if this is present, the afore said repose
of a word in its own sense can be lacking Now, in the con-
veying of the determinants, etc , thereno element which can is

provoke the unsuitability of the primary meaning

At this point, someone ought perhaps urge that the appre-
hension of the feelings of delight, etc ,
immediately follows the
apprehension of the determinants, etc ,
just as the idea of fire

immediately follows the perception of smoke, and that, being

it so, there is little room, in this case, for a power inherent in
words But, instead of answering to this objection, I will
pose a question to this clever logician, who knows so well the
nature of perception, and it is the following . Do you think
that the apprehension of Rasa
merely the apprehension of
is

the feelings of some other person ? You do not deserve to

fall into such a mistake In this case, indeed, the said appre
hension u ould be but an inference of the feelings proper to
such and such people what sort of a Rasa could it then possess >
,

But the tasting of Rasa, which is made up of a non ordinary

camatkara and is animated by the gustation of the determinants,
etc ,
proper to poetry, cannot certainly be so contemned as to
be placed on the same level as the ordinary processes of memory,
inference, etc Rather, the ttuthis that he whose heart possesses

the latent traces of the ordinary inferential process from the

[ 103 ]
 —
R. GNOLI

effect to the cause, etc., docs not apprehend the determinants

and so on, as if he were indifferent; being instead at the mercy
of his own sensibility —which quality is also called consent of

heart —he rather apprehends them without mounting on the

,

path of memory, inference, etc., as if merged in a gustation,

suitable to an identification (with the determinants, etc.), which
is, so to say, the sprout of the tasting of Rasa, about to appear
in all its fullness. This tasting, again, is not already bom
from some other means of knowledge, so that it is,
in the past,
now, a form of memory; nor is it arisen now from some other
means of knowledge, for as to a non-ordinary thing, the direct
perception, etc., are devoid of any power. Hence, the ex-
pressions *
determinant ’, etc., are of a non-ordinary nature ;

for as Bharata himself has said “ The word * determinant ’ :

is used for the sake of clear knowledge ” \ In everyday life,

they are called causes, not determinants. The term ‘
conse-
quent ’
is, it too, non-ordinary. ‘Because the representation”
Bharata says
— “ by
means of words, gestures and the tem-
perament, makes one experience (the mental states) it is called
“
consequent ” 2 This experiencing, provoked by the conse-
.

quents, is nothing but an identification with the said feelings.

In everyday life, they are called effects, not consequents.

Therefore, just with this view in mind, namely, that we do not
apprehend a feeling of others, Bharata has made no mention
of the permanent mental states in the sutra “ Out of the union :

of the determinants, the consequents and the transitory mental

states, the birth of Rasa takes place On the contrary, the

1) N.tf., VII, prose after st. 3.

2) NJ., VII, prose after st. 4.

[
104 ]
 — ,

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE ETC

mention of it would have been a source of difficultySuch

expressions as “ The permanent mental state becomes Rasa ”
are due to correspondence only —because, that is to say, the
gustation arises, beautiful as it is, thanks to the trace, latent

within us, of the feeling correspondent to the determinants and

the consequents and because in wordly life, in the stage, that
,

is, of the knowledge of the feelings of others a knowledge, —

let us say, truly indispensable as regards the consent of heart
we are able to apprehend the permanent feelings of delight, etc
from things as gardens, bristling of the hairs, and so on The
transitory mental state, is no doubt a feeling, but, since it is en
joyed in so far as it is entirely dependent on the principal one,
it is reckoned by Bharata amongst the determinants and the
consequents 1
Therefore, the Rasa *, mentioned in the sutra,
‘
birth of
must be intended as the birth of a relishing 2 which relishing —
is a sort of immersion in a gustation, appearing as superior to

all the other ordinary feelings of delight, etc ,

that may be aroused
by different causes, as, f i ,
meeting with a friend, and appear
to develop gradually This gustation, therefore, is only a
manifestation, not a revelation — which is the operation of the
means of knowledge —
and not even a production
,
— which is the
operation of the means of action

“But” — at this point someone might argue

— “if this gusta-
tion is neither a cognition nor a production, then what is

it But we reply —have we not said that this Rasa is of a

?
non ordinary nature 5 What are, then, these determinants

The menjUan- of it thtrefare gives. me ta no difficulty

2) If we take literally the expression of the sutra the result would be
that the Rasa is no more a non-ordinary reality The birth indeed, requires
some means of action and these as such are of an ordinary nature

19 [
105 ]
 R. GN'OLI

Are they revealing causes or producing causes ? We reply

to this question that they are neither revealing nor producing,
but -only something which serves to
. realize the gustation.

Does any such thing appear elsewhere ? But for the very
reason why it does not appear we say that it is of a non-ordinary
nature. But (someone might say) in this way Rasa is not an
object of cognidon (
apramyd). Let us admit it, we reply— and
what of it ? For, since from its gustadon, pleasure and
instrucdon derive, what other do you desire ? But, you might
say, it is not ascertained by any means of knowledge. This is

untrue, we reply, because its real existence is an unconfutable

datum of our own consciousness ; besides, this gustadon is
only a particular form of knowledge. And that is enough.
Therefore, the said Rasa is of a non-ordinary nature — so that
even alliterations of harsh or soft sounds can be suggestive
of it, though they are of no use as to meaning. Here, then,
there is not even the shadow of the metaphor.

[
106 ]
 ,

APPENDIX El
Commentary on Dh A II, 4
Now, Bhatta Najaka says 1
— If the Rasa were perceived as
present in a third party, the spectator should be in a state of
indifference On the other hand, the —
poem which, f 1 ,

might describe the story of Rama — does not make the reader
to perceive it as really present in him, because that would imply
this admission, namely that there is a birth of Rasa his m
own self Now this birth does not stand to reason, because
Sita does not play the role of a determinant as regards the specta-
**
tor But ** —someone may perhaps say—** that which causes
her to be a determinant is the general idea of loverness, which,
shared by her, is the cause of the awakening of the latent im-
pressions ” But —
I reply to this objection how can that —
happen as regards a description of deities, etc ? Further, no
memory of his own beloved one does arise the spectator’s m
consciousness (while he looks at Sita) Again it is possible that
the construction of a bridge on the ocean and the other deter-
minants of this kind, proper to some extraordinary personages
as Rama and so on, may become general ^ Nor it can be said
that what occurs is simply the memory of Rama, as endowed of
heroism, etc., in so far as the spectator has had no such pre-
vious experience Even assuming that he is perceived through
Verbal testimony (Jabda) y theie cannot be any birth of Rasa,
just as mthe case of a pair of lovers united together, perceived
through direct knowledge Moreover, according to the thesis
which maintains that Rasa is produced, the birth of the Pathetic

1) Sec on the exposition of Bhatta Nayaka’s theory, supra, Introd ,

p XX, ff

t
W7 1
 It. GNOLt

Rasa would make the perceivcr to experience pain, and, conse-

quently, he would go no more to pathetic representations.
Therefore, that is not a production and not even a manifesta-
tion. Indeed, if it is supposed that a Rasa— £ £, the Erotic
one— first pre-exists in a potential form and is later manifested,
then (the determinants must necessarily) illuminate it little

by little. Besides, the difficulties already met with would recur :

is Rasa manifested as really present in our own self, or as present

in a third party ? Therefore, Rasa is neither perceived, nor
produced, nor manifested by the poem. The truth is diat the
poetic word is from the other ones. This happens
different

thanks to three distinct powers, which are so to speak, its parts

{amid) that is to say, the power of denotation, which has,
:

as its object, the expressed sense power of revelation,

; the
which has, as its object, the Rasa; and the power of bringing
about enjoyment, which has, as its object, die individuals who
are possessed of heart. If in poetry there were, indeed, one
power only, i.e., the power of denotadon, without die odier
ones, what a difference would
remain between the various
still

ornaments, as and die treatises illustrating

alliteration, etc.,
diem ? And together with the ornaments the various styles
also would result useless. And, again, what would
be the
purpose of avoiding cacophony, etc ? Therefore, there is a
second power, called ‘revelation of Rasa’, thanks to which the
language of poetry is different from any other. This power,
the so-called revelation, proper to poetry is nothing but die
faculty of generalizing die determinants. Once die Rasa has
been revealed, diere is die enjoyment of it. This enjoyment,
which is from any other kind of perception, as direct
different

knowledge and memory, consists of the states of fluidity,

en-
largement and expansion, is characterized by a resting, 'by a
lysis, in our own consciousness, constituted by satttva and

[
108 ]
 THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC

intermixed with rajah and tamahi and is similar to the tasting

of the supreme brahman The chief member of poetry is

only this, quite perfect The so called instruction has only a

secondary place

This is only one of the theories The critics indeed do

not agree about the true nature of Rasa Indeed, some of them
say that, in the first stage, we have only a permanent state of
mind, which, being later nourished by the transitory states of
mind, etc , is experienced as Rasa This Rasa, they add, is

perceived as really present in the reproduced personage only,

and, being displayed in the theater, is called “ theater rasa ” 1
This theory is criticized by others in the following way What is
indeed, they say, the sense of this intensification of a state of
mind by another one, as regards a mental state, which naturally
develops in a succession 3 Surely, neither astonishment, nor
sorrow nor anger, etc are seen to grow more intense wLth time t
,

Therefore, your thesis, viz that Rasa is [perceived as really]

present in the reproduced personage, does not stand to reason
If you,on die other hand, say it is in the reproducing actor,
obviously he could not follow the tempo, etc * If, finally,
you say that* it is in the spectators, what a camatkara would
sail subsist 3 On the contrary, in front of a pathetic scene,
the spectators would necessarily feel in pam Therefore, this
thesis is not sound Which is then the right one 3 Here,
because of the infinitude of gradations, no reproduction of a
defined (nijatd) permanent feeling must be made * , this, besides,
would be purposeless, because at the sight of this excessive

1) This is Bha$ta Lollata’s theory Cf supra Introd , pp XVII &

V.) U supra p "XVIH
3) Namely, The Rasas and hbavas
4) That is characterized by a particular stag*

l
109 ]
 R. GNOLI

particularity, the 'spectators would remain indifferent, so that

there could not be any useful teaching. The true nature of

Rasa is therefore the following. When the determinants,

the consequents and the transitory states are joined together

•with reference to a permanent state of mind, devoid of any
defined stage (tviij.itav.istbstffxh there arises a perception,

different from memory, viz. “ This is Rama who was happy

This perception has, as its object, the permanent feeling, is made
up of a tasting, is ultimately founded on the reproducing actor

and is to be found in theater only. Rasa is nothing but that.

It does not require any separate support, but, on the contrary,

the spectator is tasting it in the actor, who is considered as
identical with the reproduced personage. This is, in brief,

the nature of aesthetic experience. Therefore, Rasa lies in the

1 2
theater only, not in the represented personage, etc . .

Some others say :

“ The image of die permanent state of
mind appearing in the reproducing actor is produced by the
assemblage of the different forms of representation, etc., just

as the image of a horse, appearing on a wall, is produced by

die various pigments, as orpiment, etc. This image is tasted
by a perception of a non-ordinary nature, named also sampling,
and is therefore called Rasa . The meaning of the expression
c
*
theater-Rasa ’, is dien die Rasas which are caused by the
theater \
According to others. Rasa is nothing but the whole of the
determinants and the consequents, supplied by a particular
assemblage, connected with determinate latent impressions
suitable to thepermanent state of mind— which is the object
of the acting of the afore-mendoned determinants and conse-

1) That
is to say, in the natas, actors, only.

2) This the theory of Sankuka.

[
no ]
 ,

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC

quents —and characterized by an intimate relish or lysis.

According to this theory, the Rasas, are nothing but the drama
Some others say that Rasa is the mere determinant or, again,
the mere consequent, according to others it is nothing but the
permanent state of mind , others say that it is the transitory
mental state , to others, it is a combination of these ,
others say
that it is the situation to be reproduced , and others, finally,
that it is an aggregate of all that But enough of these lucu-
brations I

The afore mentioned Rasa occurs in poetry also, which, in

the place of the realistic representation and of the theatrical
conventions, possesses the natural and the extraordinary mode
of speech 1
The combination of the determinants, etc ,
by which
it is produced, is, in poetry, afforded by words of a non-ordinary
character, endowed with theof clearness (prasanm),
qualities
sweetness { madhtira) and powerfulness (c/asvm) Even if it be
admitted that m
poetry the Rasa-percepuon is someway differ-
ent from drama, because of the means which are different,
the process, however, is the same.
Being it so, these faults concern the prtma facte view only,
for, according to it, perception is subjected to the distinctions
proper to oneself to others, etc Anyhow, no matter which the
thesis is. Rasa results to be a perception This is unavoidable.
Indeed, the existence of an unperceived thing, as, for instance,
a goblin, cannot be affirmed The fact that this perception
is called by the names of relish, tasting, or enjoyment,does not
amount to any difficulty We know indeed that the direct

cognition, the inference, the tradition, the intuition, the super-

normal espenence, under their different names caused by the —
different means which manifest them, are equally but forms

1) On the tvabbm oktt, etc., see V Ra£havan,i’pa'i Concepts of the Ahnkara

Sastra Adyar 1942, pp 92 116

[
in ]
 ,

it. GNOLI

of perception. Nothing then forbids us to admit that tire same

occurs in the case of Rasa also, for the very reason that the
means by which it is manifested, viz. the combination of the
determinants, etc., assisted by the consent of heart and so on,
are of a non-ordinary nature. The use of the expression,
‘
The Rasas are perceived ’, is just like the one *
the porridge
is being cooked ’. The Rasa, indeed, is merely perceived.
The relishing is only a particular perception. This perception,
in drama, is different from an ordinary inferential perception;

yet, in the beginning, this is required, as a means. Likewise,

the afore-said perception, in poetry, is different from die other
verbal perceptions ;
yet, in the beginning, these are required,
as a means.
Therefore, the pr'wia facie views are put to dcadi. But if

you say that the exploits of Rama, etc., do not earn the consent
of heart of everybody, that, I answer, is a great mark of rash-
ness Everybody’s mind is indeed characterized by the most
!

various latent impressions; for as it has been said, “As the

desire is permanent, these are beginningless ”, and, “ On die
ground that the remembrances and the impressions are homo-
geneous there is an uninterrupted succession of latent impress-
ions, even if they are separated by birth, space, and time 1 ” .

Therefore, it is established that Rasa is perceived. This per-

ception, in its turn, presents himself in the form of a relishing.
This relishing produced by a new power, different from
is

the power of denotation, which the expressed sense and the

expressing words come to possess, that is the power of tune,
of suggestion. The so-called power of bringing about enjoy-
ment, proper to poetry, according to you, consists, actually,
of this power of suggestion only, and has, as its object, the
Rasa. The other power also, viz, the power of effectuation,

1) Yogastilra IV, sutras 10 and 9.

[
H2 j
 THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC

is actually based on the usage of appropriate qualities and

ornaments We shall explain it diffusely It is nothing new On
the other hand, if you say that poetry is effecting the Rasa,

then you, by this very statement, resuscitate the theory of pro-

duction Besides, this power of effectuation can be proper
neither to the poetical words only, because, if the express sense
is not known, the afore said power cannot logically exist,
nor to the express sense only, because, this being com eyed
by other words, it does not longer exist We, on the contrary,
maintain that this power of effectuation pertaining to the
two of them, as it is confirmed in the stanza “ That kind
of poetry, wherein either the sense of the word suggests the
implied meaning ”, etc 1 Further, the effectuation process
(let us here remember) is endowed with three distinguished

parts, that is, the means, the necessary measures, and the end
Therefore, if we make the power of manifestation correspond
to the means, the appropriate qualities and ornaments to the
necessary measures, and the Rasas to the end, produced by the
effecting poem, it is quite clear that the power of suggestion will
correspond to the first part, viz the means The enjoyment,
m its turn, is not produced by the poetical word, but by this

non-ordinary power of suggestion only, through the suppress-

ion of our thick pall of mental stupor and blindness This
enjoyment consists, according to you, of the states of fluidity,
enlargement and expansion, is called also “ tasting ”, and is of
a non-ordinary nature In other words, having once established
that Rasa is suggested, the afore mentioned power of bringing

1) Db A,\, 13 “ That kind of poetry, wherein either the (conven

tional) meaning or the (conventional) word renders itself or its meaning
secondary (respectively) and suggests the Implied meaning is designated
by the learned as dbiattt or ‘
Suggestive poetry ’
” (Translation of K.
Knshnamoorthy, ed cit)

20 [ 113 ]
 —
R. GNOLI

about enjoyment is, it too, fatally established, The enjoyment,

indeed, is identical with the camtkara arising from the Rasa-
,

experience itself. Further, as the constituent elements sativei,

etc., can be found set out in an infinite member of different

ways, according to the predominance of the one or the other,

it isabsurd to limit the forms of tasting to fluidity, etc., only.
As to the theory, according to which the tasting of Rasa is
similar to the tasting of the supreme brahma, we have nodiing

to object. Moreover, the teaching to be derived from poetry

is different from the injunedons and instruedons imparted by
religious treatises and historical narratives. However, to

them, who maintain that poetry produces at die end a teaching,

which differs from usual analogy, viz. “ as Rama, so I ”, and
consists in an enrichment of our own power of intuition —the
instrument which allows the tasting of Rasa—, we have nodiing
1
to reproach . Therefore, this is definitely established
namely, that Rasas are manifested and are tasted through a per-
ception.

1) See, in this connexion, the A.Bb., I. p, 41: tiann kirn guruvad upa-
desam kdroi i, neiyaha, bnddbim vh'ardhayati, svnpraUbham cram ladrsttn
kinlii

viiaraii || Elsewhere (Db.A.L., p. 40) A.G. says that the principal dementis
not knowledge (for in that ease there would be confusion with works on
ethics and historiography) but pleasure ( priti, ntiaiida). The pleasure and
knowledge, both sui generis, aroused by poetry arc not distinct from each
other but arc two aspects of the same thing (jia cnite pritivyulpatti bhimuiriips
eva, dvayor apy ckavifajatvat, Db.A.L., p. 336).

t U4 ]
 a 1

GENERAL INDEX
The numbers refer to pages

cbhdha cf Power of denotation Anandavardhana XX XXV, 1

,

Abh jbunaSal unlal 54 l XXVI XXVII XXV1U XXIX,

abhila*a cf Longing XXXIV XXXV, XLVJ XLIX,
Abhinavabharatl XXXV,XLVIII Lll
XLIX anm amala cf Maculation of
Abhinavagupta XIX, et passim desire
abhmaya cf Representation anaucitya cf Impropriety
Absolute brahman 47 lb anga cf Gestures
Accessory arm pro) ojcma 64 1 Anger kroffia XV 29 7 1
, 74
Accomplishment samapatti 62 ungikzb! inaya cf Gestacular re-
adbhuta cf Marvellous Rasa presentation
adbhutabhoga cf Marvellous cn Anka 64 1
joyment amibhu\a cf Consequents

ad! Ikunn cf Qualified person

anubhma cf Experience
an ubfunana 79
adh) in asd) cf Mental cognition
amtkura cf Imitation
Aesthetic cognition, 562
aniikarana cf Imitation
Aesthetic Experience, XV, XXII’,
anukarana cf Reproduction
XXXVI 47 )b , 60\ 82'
anukirtana cf Re telling
Aesthetic perception, 43, 50', 54* attumarta cf Inference
Aesthetic pleasure, pr ti or attan Ja
cnumarn cf Reasoning
1
59*, 64
antipraieka cf Personal parti
After production paScatkarcna 39 cipation
Agmpurana, XLVI 26 3 anttsamdhana cf Realization
Aggregate sarnuha 42 anusamdhi (
or anusamd! ana ) cf
aham cf Ego Realisation
ahrdaya cf Unaeslhetic person anusamd! i cf Unification
mkagr}a cf Conspiration anusmrti cf Recollection
Aim of poetry, kciv}art!a 50 cnuttamaprakrti cf Inferior nature
AjUaplda, XVir, XIX 1
Amnycnascj)# 60 3
alaksyakrama XXIX 2 Anxiety, arihacmii) 29'
alamkara cf Ornaments Anxiety a n tu 77, 78
amarsa cf Indignation apehasita cf Vulgar laughter
cnanda cf Beatitude apcramarthika cf Unreal
Znanda cf Bliss urabhati ( vrtti ) cf Homfic style

21
 , \ ,

116 GENERAL INDEX

Arrangement, samnivesa, 42. [

Bhatta Narayana, XLII.
artha, cf. Material property. Bhatta Nayakaj XX, XX\ XXI,
artha, cf. Reality. XXIII, XXIV, XXVI, XXXV,
arthacinta, cf. Anxiety. XXXVI, XLVI, L1I, 43, 44',
1
arthahriya, cf. Causal efficiency. 45 1 47’“, 49, 50, 51.51 , 52
,
1
,

arthitu, cf. Requirement. 5S\ 107, 107'.

Artificial, kitrima, 29. Bhatta Tauta, XX,
Artistic intuition, pratibha, 4. Bhatta Tota, XXXV, XLVIII, LI,
Assistant, plriptinvika, 65-. LI I, 33, 33', 35-.
Astonishment, vismaya, XLVI. bhavo, cf. the matter of Rasa.
asvTidana, cf. Tasting. bhuvanu, cf. Propulsion.
atihasita . cf. Excessive laughter. bhuvami, cf. power of revelation.
ctman, cf. Self. bhrivyamT.ua, cf. Revealed.
cutcitya cf. Correspondence. bhaya, cf. Fear.
Atujramdgadhi ( pravitti ), 69 1 . bhayunaka, cf. Terrible Rasa.
avagamonaSakti cf. Power of com- bhoya, cf. Enjoyment,
munication. bhoga, cf. Fruition.
Avanti pravitti ),
69’. bhogikarona, cf. Bringing about
(
Avantivarman, XVI l 2 , XX', enjoyment.
XXXI. Bhoja, 47 la
.

Ttvesa, cf. Immersion. :a

Bhojavitti, 47 .

bala, cf. Power.

Bhuvanabhyudayn, XIX 1 .

Beatitude, ananda, XXIII 1

, 47.
bibhatso, cf. Odious Rasa.
Beauty, soundarya, 82.
Bliss, Tmatida, 60'.
Benediction stanza, itaiuli, 65-.
Brahma, 93 1 ,
98.
Bhairava, 82 1
.
brahman,XXIV, 115.
Bhfimaha, L, 103 J
Brahmann Nay a ha,
.
i.c., Bhatta
bhakti, cf. Religious devotion.
Nayaka.
BltZna, 64
Bringing about enjoyment, bhogi-
Bharata, XIV, XVI, XVII, XXI, karana, 50.
XL1X, 25, 27 2 , 28, 28\ 29 1

, buddhi, cf. Mental substance.

31°, 33, 40, 41, 42 2 ,
50'-, 52, Buddhist, XXIV, XXVII, 95 1
.

65 2 , 66 3 , 67, 71', 76 1
, 77, 77 2 , Buddhistic Idealism, Vijfianavada,
4
80, 80 , 98, 104, 105. XXXVII.
bhuralt ( vrtti ), cf. Eloquent style. camatkTira, cf. Wonder.
Bhartrhari, XXIV, XXXll 2 ,
56 1 . camathura, 54 4 , 59, 59'*, 62, 81,
bhasu, cf. Dialect. 97, 100, 104, 114.
Bhaskarl, 56". cuiicaJya, cf. Mobility. 3
Bhatta XVII,
Lollata, XVII 2
Capacity to produce effects, artha-
XVIII, XIX, XIX', XXXV, hriyakaritva, 31
7
.

XXXVI, 25, 26', 26 3

, 27, 28, Casual efficiency, arthahriya, 31,
28 2, 49, 62 1 , 109 1 . 95,95’.
 1 '

GENERAL INDEX 117

Cause, Karana, XVI. Devoid of obstacles, ntrngl na, 56.
cinta,cf Anxiety Marina, cf Moral and Religious
cittacamatkara, cf SelfOashing of duty
thought
,

Dharmakirti, XXXII 2 , 37 7 , 33 2 ,
Clearness, prasama, 111
42, 5 6\
Cognition, jnapti, 84 dh fit, cf Contentment
Cognition, \ijnftna, XVII' dhruiTi, 40
Combination, scmyoga, 25, 82, 86 dlnananavytpUra, cf power of evo-
Comic Rasa, hrisya, XVI, 28, 76 1 cation
Command, \idtn, 52, 52* dfnani cf Resonance
Compact ness ekaghanata
, 731 din am, cf Suggestive poetry
Conscious effort, pray atria 29 Dhvanyaloka, XX 1
, XXVII,
Consciousness, samud, XL*, 34, xxvm, xix, xxxv
47, 51 ,

i
Dialect, bhaia, 65
Consequent, anuWiava, XVI, 25,
i
Dilatation, rtlcro 46 * 47
26, 29, 39, 42, 70, 72 ", 77, 78,
104,110 Dima 64 1
Conspiration, aikagrya, 78 Direct experience, sSksatkcra, 54
j

Constituent elements, gtma l * Direct perception, darsana, 49

46
Conientment, dhtii, 78 |
D rect perception, pratyaksasdk
lutkarakalpa, 96
Conventional meaning, XXVIII
Disgust, jugapset, XV, 74
Correspondence, aucitya 81
Creative inspiration, Jiuroyitn prn- Distinct apprehensions, ukafpa,
tiblm, L 56 2
Creator, Prajapati, XLVlll Distress, tthega, 29 1

Critics, \yakhyatr, 33 doia cf Defects

j

Daitya, 94 l . Drama, 41
Dakunatya ( pravitti ), 69 1 druti cf Fluidity
Dandm, XVlf, XVII 2 , L, 27 Effects, kary a, XVI
Da$arupa, 29\ 42 J, 64\ 66 1 Ego, aharn, XL 4
Death, tnarana, 29 1 ekaghanata cf Compactness
Defects, do*a, 45 Elements of principal order, stha-
Defined, my ata, 109 y ibhUui, 77’
2
Delight, ratt, 19, 35 , 71 1 , 73, 74 Eloquent style, bharati vitti, 68 3.
Demons, 98 Emotions, Bhj\a (or sthaytbhasd),
Depression, dainya, 78 XV.
Determinant, ubha\a, XVI, XLIX, Energy, ut sal a, 71’
25, 26 27, 28, 2S 3, 29, 35 35 £nio yn.va eil blwja 46 50 1 62
i y.
38, 42, 42 l , 44, 45, 51, 59*,
Enumeration of the lo\ed one’s
62, 70, 72 J, 73, 73 s 76, 77, 78, ,

79‘, 80, 81,82, 84, 86, 87, 100, merits, gimakirtana, 29 1

102, 103, 104, 105, 110, 111 , I Erotic Rasa, trngTra, XVI, 27, 29 1 ,
31®, 34, 6S\71',76 ! ,87.
 1 1

no GENERAL INDEX

Excessive laughter, atibasita, 28'. luma, cf. Laughter.

Expansion, vikasa, 46 1 ", 47. basita, cf. Smile.
Experience, anubhava, 50. Jiasya, cf. Comic Rasa.
1
Extended, \itata, 56. Heart, htdaya, 60 .

External combination,.'tfniagri, 42. Ilcmacandra, XIX, XLVIII, LI’,

Extraneous interference, vighna, 26 2, 3 7
,
84 1 .

XXII 1
. Heroic Rasa, vira, XVI, 68^, 73,
Fame, prasiddhi, 63. 76 1
.

Farce, prdhasana, 63. Heroism, ulsTdia, XV, 29, 75, 76.

Fear, hhaya, XV, 74. Historical world, so ins nr a, XLVI.
Fever, vyadhi, 29 1 3
. Horrific style, Zirabhati vitti, 68 .

Firmness, slhalrya, 29. hidaya, cf. Heart.

Fluidity, (htli, 46’ a , 47, 50. Hrdayadarpana ( i.c., Sahrdaya-
Form darpana ), XX
’
of consciousness, pratipatti, 1
,
XLVI, 52'.
4
52 . icchu, cf. Will.
Fruition, bhogn, XXII 1. Idealistic Buddhism, vijiiunavuda,
Furious Rasa, ratidra, XVI, 27, 62\
:5
68 76’. , lhanv.ga, 64 1 .
Gay style, haisiki vitti, 68\ Imagination, samkaipa, 60.
Generality, stidharauya, XX ll 1
, 44. Imitation, anukarana, 4 n 64 1 . ,

General definition, si:m anya- la- Imitation theory, XIX.

ic sana, 77L Immersion, nirvesa or Ttvda, 62,
General essence, sZmanya-hkwna, 84.
95 1 . Immersion in an enjoyment, bho-
Gentle laughter, uhasita, 28*. gavda, 59.
Gentle mind, sukumuramati, 82 1
.
Impressions, itparnga, 82.
Gcslacular representation, a agi- Impressive feeling, ranjana, 96.
le ‘ bhinaya, 30. Impropriety, anaucitya, 94.
Gestures, anga, XVII 1
.
Indifference, Tutasthya or nuidh-
ghurni, cf. Vibration. yasthya, 64, 81 4 .
God, Paramdvara, XL, XL 4 .
Indignation, amarsn, 29.
Goddess of beauty, £ii, 59’. Individual essence, vile.[a, 94.

Grammarian, Vaiyukarana, 45. Individuality, svTdaksanya, 95.

Grandoisc style suttvad villi, 68 :i Ineffable quiescence, nirvana.

.

gma, XXIV.
cf. Constituent elements.
gn Quality.
Inference, anumum, 44.
ii
a, cf.
Inferior nature, anuttamaprahti,
Gunacandra, 56-.
74.
gi'nakirlona, cf. Enumeration of Initial presentation, prastwenu,
etc,
65.
Hara, 54.
Inner perception, mlnasapratya-
Ilarsa, 31 '.
ksa, 60L
 GENERAL INDEX no
Inner sense manah 47 Ta Kttvyarmsasatia, XLVIII
Insanity, unntiida 29' havyapradipa, 76’
Intonation, kfiku 40 Kavyartha, cf Aim of poetry
Intuition, praUbhuna LI, 49, 53 kavyartha cf Purpose of poetry
Intuitive consciousness jtojiiw, Airtona, cf Narration
LI k rodha, cf Anger
Invariable concomitance, vyvptl, Ks-maraja, XVII 3 XVIII, , XX 1

56 ksobha, cf Shock
1
Isxara, cf Unlimited Ego, or God Kumarasambima, 54
Jadatii, cf Stupor Kumanla XX 1
, 52*, 56', 102’

Jayapida, XVIII' !ah r on.i, cf Transfer

Jayaratha XXXVJI 1 LaksmI, 59

jt'iapSi , cf Cognition lasya cf Women s dance
jugupsa, cf Disgust Latent impression
i asanu or
Juncture, santdliyauga 41 41 samskara XVI, 26' 72
haaiki ( vitti ), cf Gay style Laughter, Imsa XV, 73, 74
kaktyTi, cf Zones Laughter of ridicul" upahasita,
kaku, cf Intonations 28*

Kalham XlX\ XX 1 laya, cf I ysis

Kalidasa, XXXV, 54’, 60, 64

4 Learning vyutpath 63,
1
Kallata, 60 1 Liberation, rnok ^a, 71
kuma cf Love Light, prakcua, XXiW 47
Kama, cf Pleasure Limited, panmita, 56
Kant, LII Limiting causes m l amahetu 57
Kapila 73 Logical reasons
Itnga, ct

karana cf Cause Local usages prautU, 68

kcrayitn praUbhti cf Creative Lo-’ana, XXXII 2 , XXXIV 1
inspiration Logical reasons, It/iga 27
lokadharmi , cf Realistic repre-
karya, cf Effects
sentation
karuna, cf Pathetic Rasa
Kashmir, XVU 3
,
XIX 1
, XX 1
,
-Lollata re, Bhatti Lollata
XXIII 1
, XXVI, XLIII 1
, 3J\ Longing, abhtbw, 29 l
60 1 Love Kama, 28 29 1
katho, cf Tales Lysis, laya, XX11I, XXIII , XLI, 1

3
L
KavyadarSa, XVII 3 , 62
myakautuka, XX, XXXV, LI 3 ,
Maculation of desire, tnavamala,
33 1 , 99 60*

K< \yalanksra (of Bhamaha ),

madhura cf Sweetness
3 trudhy a 5 thy a cf IndifTerenc"
XXVII 1
, L , 102
havydankcra ( of Varna na ), L* Miheivarananda, XXIX
Ktivyamimamsu, Ll l Mahimabhatta, XXVI, 3l 7 , 47 lb
120 GENERAL index

MulatiinTnlhava, 98'. Musical tempi, cf. Tala.

Mammal., XXII', 32', 47' a. Mystical cognition, 56’.
man ah, cf. Inner sense. n~n:li, cf. Benediction stanza.
manah, cf. Mind. Narasimliagupta, alias CliuKlmln,
nvinasadhyavasaya, cf. Mental cog- XXXV.
nition.
Narration, kirtana, 101.

mlmasaprat yaksa, cf. Inner per- Naluka, 63, 64 1 .

Nature, of things, vasluviita, 40.
ception.
manJapa, cf. Pavilion. Natyadarpana, 56-.
l nTityadharmi, cf. Theatrical con-
Mandara, 59, 59 .

ventions.
Manifested, vyahgya, 51.
Natyaiastra, XIV, XV, 26".
Manifested sense, vvahgya, XXIX.
2 NatyaveJa, 93.
Mtinikyacandra, LI .
lamina, cf. IncITeblc quiescence.
mar ana, cf. Death.
nirvesa, cf. Immcrssion.
Marvellous enjoyment, adbhuta-
uirvighna, cf. Devoid of obstacles.
bhoga, 60.
nirvrti, cf. Solution.
Marvellous Rasa, albhnla, XVI,
nirpatti, cf. Production.
76'.
niyaniahctu, cf. Limiting causes.
Material propci ly, arlha, 71\
nivata, cf. Defined.
matter of Rasa, bhura, 70'.
niyata, cf. Particular being.
may a, XXI'.
niyoga, cf. Order.
Means, itpiiya, 49.
Noble person, uttamaprakiti, 39.
Means of Knowledge, pramvnn, 4
Non-ordinary nature, 54 .

S5.
Nyuvan lahjari , 4 9 4 .
Memory, sniiti, 26'.
Nyayasutra, 26 ', 68-.
Mental cognition, munasrulhya-
;!
Objective thing, siddha, S5.
rasuyo, 60, 60 69'. ,
Obstacle, vighna, XX 111', XLI,
Mental perception, inanasapratya-
-1
XLI 1
, 55, 58'-, 62', 64, 67, 73,
ksa, 54 .
73'.
Mental Series, Santana, XXXVII. Odious Rasa, bibhatsa, XVI, 68",
Mental stupor, moha, XXII, 45. 76'.
Mental substance, bnddhi, 46' n . ojasvin, cf. Powerfulness.
Mimumsaka, 45. Order, niyoga, 52.
Mind, manah, 34". Ornaments, alamkara, 2V, 45.
Mobility, cancalya, 73. pTmaka, 85.
moha, cf. Stupor. Pahctili ( pravrtti ), 69'.
moksa, cf. Liberation. Paramaribo, cf. Supreme purpose.
Moral and Religious duty ,dharma, parmarthika, cf. Real.
71'. Paramesvara, cf. God.
Micchakatika, 97. parasanmtti, cf. Consciousness.
mukhyavijti, cf. Primary sense. paruvrtti, cf. Revulsion.
 ,

GENEFAL INDEX 1 21

panmita, cf. Limited Prajapittl, cf Creator.

psripurhlka, cf. Assistant Prakararu r, 64 1
Particular being, my ala, 39 prakasa, cf. Light.
Particular definition* cf uie<a- Prakrti, 42*
z prajna, cf Intuitive consciousness.
laksana, 77 .
,

Particularity, wieca, 55, 95. Praka&i, cf Light

Patafljali, XL1I pram^rta, cf Means of knowledge.
Pathetic Rasa, karma, XVI, 31®, Framanavarttika, XXX II 2 ,
33"’.

43, 76\ 107. prasanno, cf Clearness

Pavilion, martdapa, 65 prasiJdju cf Fame
Perfect combination, samyagyoga, prasUnanT< cf Initial presentation
1* prattipciTiidny a, lV.
Permanent, sthyayi, XV ?
rrattbhu, d Artistic intuition
Permanent feeling, 77, 110 pratibha cf Supreme Vouality
Permanent mental movement, 84* praUpatti cf Form of Conscious-
Permanent mental state, stfmyh ness

Mow, 26, 27, 30 1 , 31, 38, 40, Pratyabhijiia karika, XXXVII 1

75\ pratyak wsaktTtkiiratalpa, cf Di-

42, 43, 43', 80, 80\ 106
rect experience
Permanent participation, cnvpra~
premtti cf. Local usage
\da, 81 *.
prayatna cf Conscious effort
Personality, s^TiimP, 39
rroyojana, cf Accessory aim
Philosophers, tafhflCiHfnkti 33^
Preliminaries, pnnaranga, 65
Poetical meaning, XXVIII
Primary sense, mukhya v/tli 26’
Power, boh, 29
Principal forms of consciousness,
Powerfulness, ojasun. 111
sthrn ifehuin, 71 1
Power of communication, a\a
priti, cf Aesthetic pleasure
gmnanaSakti, 31.
Production, m^patii, 84
Power of denotation, cf atfudha
Production of actions similar,
45
sadnakarana, 39
Pow er ofevocation, dhananavyz-
Production of Rasa, rasa-nispatn,
pura 50’.
85, 86
Power of revelation, bfmanZ, 45
Propulsion, bfjmanu, 52, 52*
Plato, XLVI
Purpose of poetry, kuvyartha, XV 1 .
Pleasure, kZma, 7I 1 .
POrvamlrtiamsa, 52*.
Pleasure, priti ur Znanda, 114
ptinaranga, cf Preliminaries
Pleasure, sukho, 31, 72, 115 1 .
Qualified person, adhikann, 52,
Prabhakara, XV311’, 52 4 , 64 l. 53
Practical existence, siimsanka- Quality, guni, 45
bha\a, 96 Quiet, iama, XXXVI.
Practical lire, vy Sahara, 33 2. Quietistic Rasa, santo, XVI,
preJtasana, cf. Farce. XXXVI,
 f
, , 1

122 GENERAL INDEX

Rajas'ekhara, L, L1 T . Relish, rcscr.r, 62 .

Rama, XVIII, 26\ 32, 34, 37, 38, Re-perception, cr.:r.yerasure, 4 5,

40, 43", 44, 5S 5, 63, 63=, 66% 99, 101.
97, 9 3
l
76, $6, 95 , , 100, 107, Representation, abkincya, 31, 105.
110, 112, 114. Reproduction, anukcrcna. 29, 34.
Ramacandra, 56-. Requirement, ertkith, 52.
RUmZiycr.a 9-1. Resonance, Ckvcr.i, XXIX.
rcr.gcritka, cf. stage. Rest, viirhr.ti. XXIII 1
, 47, 63.
rckjcna, cf. Impressive feeling. Re-telling, enu’drtena, 41 5 .

Rasa, XIV, XT, XVI, XVIII,XX, Revealed, bkhvycmhnc. 15.

XXI, XXV, XXIX, XXXV, Revealed word, srnii. 49.

XXXVI, XLVIII, XLIX, 25, Revelation, bkhranh, XXI, XXIII,

26 :
, 2S, 2 D , 33, 38, 42, 43, 44, 50.
4
44 4 , 49, 50, 52, 54 , 58, 62, 67, Revelation, srirti. 52.
69-, 72, 73, 76', 77, 77-, 7S, Revulsion, paravrtti, XXIV.
79, 79
l
,
SO, SO 1
, Sl,S4, S5, S6, ic&ia, Verbal testimony.
cf.

So 1
, 94, 96, 102, 103, 104,105, SaJkhranya, cf. Generality.
It 6, 107, 103, 109, 110, III, Shkityaiarpana. 47'*.
112, 113, 114. Schrdayadcrpana, XX, XXI.
rcscnh, cf. Relish. sekrdayatva. cf. Sensibility.

rcscnh, cf. Tasting. Saiva schools, 60'.

rcscrJifXti, cf. Production of Sakimtdu, 66 -.
Rasa. sav.a. cf. Serenity.

Rcsapra.it <?, XVIII 5. Sumagri, cf. External combination.

Rasayana, 75'. slmhnya !c kscnc , cf. General defi-

rati, cf. Delight. nition.

Rctnhsak, 31'. samhpatli, cf. Accomplishment.
raudra, cf. Furious Rasa. Scrr.axakhra 64'.
Ravana, 97. f?ambn, 52*.
Raving, vikalpa, 29'. sambardkn, cf. Relation.
Real, pZramcrtkika, 41. ScrncZrar.a, 79 l .
Real nature, vastuvrtta, 33. sarrdkydnga, cf. Junctures.
Realisation, anusarrdki, XVIII. samkalpa, cf. Imagination.
Realistic representation, lo’:c- Samkhya, 42, 42 ',46' .
a

dkcrmi, 69. samkremenh, cf. Transfer.

Reality, artka, XXIV, 7S. samnivesa, cf. Arrangement.
Realization, cnusamdkhna, 26. semshrn, cf. Historical world.
Reasoning, crMrr.hr. a, 49. shmshrikabkhva, cf. Practical ex-
Recollection, anzismrti, 29*. perience.
Relation, sambar.d -a, 78. :
shmshrika existence. 46T
Religious devotion, bhakti, XL5 . samskura, cf. Latent Impression.
 ) 1

GENERAL INDEX 123

samUha cf Aggregate Somanandi, XLVI, 60 1

samnd cf Consciousness Sorrow, sola XV, 29, 74
samyagyoga cf Perfect combi spanda, cf Vibration
nation
Spandakanka, XIX 1 , 6Q 1
Samyoga cf Combination
spandamanata, cf State of vibra
Sankaravarman, XVII 2 , XX 1
tion
Sankuka, XVII 2 , XIX, XIX 1 J
, Span mrnaya Bhatta Lollata quot
XXXV, 27, 3 7
32, 33 37,
,
ed, XVll a , Bhatta Nayaka
37*, 38, 45’, 61 3 , 80, SO 1 Sl\
no quoted XX 1

ianta cf Quietistic Rasa Span da school, XLVI

Sphota 45
sanfdna cf Mental senes
salUa 115 Sphuraita cf Vibration

Satt \oU
srama cf Weariness
( vrtti cf Grandoise
style Sri ( Laksmi ) cf Goddess of
saundarya cf Beauty beauty
Self, alman XL4 smgara, cf Erotic Rasa
Self flashing of thought, ci//cz-
Stage, ran gaps t ha, 65

camatklra XLVI State of Indifference, tatasthya,

Self knowing, s\nsam\edanasiddha XXIII,
54* State of vibration, spandamanata,
Sensibility, sahrdayat\a, XLIII 1 XLIII 1
Serenity, Sana, XVI, 71 1 StaiaantTmam, XLII
serti, cf Sexual enjoyment sthairya cf Firmness
Sexual enjoyment, se\u 29 sthayi, cf Permanent
Shock, ksobha XLVII Sthayibhava, 76'
siddhtt,cf Objective thing sthayibhma, cf Elements of pnn
Siksa, cf Skill cipa! order
Similitude, 32 l sthuyibfma, cf Emotions
Slta 38, 43, 43 3, 107 sthay ibhaya, cf Principal forms of
$Ua, cf God , consciousness
Siva, 54 2 , 82 l Stupor, jadata, 29 1
Sivadrsji,XLVI 1 , 60 1 Stupor, moha XXI1
Sivastotravah, XLVI 1 Style, vrtti, 68, 68 3
Siyasutra, XLVI* Suggestive poetry, dhant, 1 13

Skill, siksu, 29 sitfJta, cf Pleasure

Slight smile, smtta, 28* sukumararmti, cf Gentle mind
smtta, cf Slight smile Sun God, 52*
1
Smile, hasita, 28* Supreme purpose, paramorfhr 72
smrti, cf Memory Supreme Vocal lty, pratikha,

ioka, cf Sorrow XLVII1

Solution, mrvrti, XXIII 1 svalaksanya, cf Individuality

22
 1

124 GENERAL INDEX

SvTirthTinumTnwparicchcda, 33-. [ upadesa, cf. Teaching.

svatma, cf. Personality. tipahasita, cf. Laughter of ridicule.
Sweetness, madhura, 111. upamlti, cf. Analogy.
Talcs, katha, 95. uparaga , cf. Impression.
tamah, XXI 1
. upuya, cf. Means.
XXXVII XXXV11I. 60 4
1

Tantrahka, 1
, Utpaladcva, XXXV11, XLVI, .

7'nntrnsUra, XLV. tilsTiha, cf. ‘Heroism or Energy.

Tantravurtika, 102 2 .
1
trtsrstikunka, 64 .

1
Tasting, asvada, 4S, 50 , 54 62. ! uttamaprakrti , cf. Noble person.
Tasting, rasanu, 49, S6. vac, cf. Voice.
|

tutasthya, cf. State of indifference. v7:cik<:bhinaya, cf. Verbal repre-

tattvacintaka, cf. Philosophers. sentation.
|

Teaching, upadesa, 63. I

vaiyckcra'ja, cf. Grammarian.
Terrible Rasa, bhayunaka, XVI, Vukvapadiya, XXIV XXXII 2 1
,
.

56, 76 1
. Vamana, L.

Theatrical conventions, milya- vasana, cf. Latent Impression.

j

dharnu, 65. ’

vastuvitta, cf. Nature of things.

Thought, vimarsa, XL 60
-1

,
1
. Vasubandhu, XXIV.
2
Three constituent elements, gwww, Vasugupta, XVII XLVI. ,

46>». Vatsyayana, 6S.

2
Transfer, laksann, 102 1 . |
VdtsyTiyonabhasya, 6S .

Verbal representation, vacikTddii-

Transfer, sanikramana , 52.
Transitory feelings, 7S. naya, 30.
Transitory mental movement, SO 4 , Verbal testimony, iabda, 44, 107.
8 3. vibhava, cf. Determinant.
Transitory Mental Stale, l
vvnblii- vibhavana, 78, 79 .
cfiribliTm, XVJ, XVII, 25, 29, Vibration, spanda, 60.
1
42, 75 . Vibration,.sphuratta or ghTirm, 60'.
1

Transitory slate, 26, 110. vidhi, cf. Command.

Transitory sentiments, 77. Vidyficakravartin, 47 u .
Udayana, 31. vigbna, cf. Extraneous interference.

Udbhata, XVIII 1
,
XXVII 1
,
102-. viglma, cf. Obstacle.
udvega, cf. Distress. vihasita, cf. Gentle laughter.
ullukasana, 59, 59-. rijfiana , cf. Cognition.
Uma, .54, vijiianavTida, cf.- Buddhistic Idea-
Unacsthctic person, ahrdaya, 67. lism.
Unification, anusamdhi, 95. Vijfla n avad in 62,
Uniformity, ckaglumatu, 58. vikalpa, cf. Distinct/apprchcnsion.
Unlimited Ego, 56*. vikalpa, cf. Raving.
ttnmtida, cf. Insainty. vikasa, cf. Expansion.
Unreal, apuraniurthika, 55. vimarSa, cf. Thought.
 GEtsERAt, INDEX 125
vra, cf Heroic Rasa,
v}ii’
r.h)atr, cf
Critics
\isma)a, cf Astonishment
\yakti\mka, 31 7, 47 lb
usmaya, cf Wonder.
v)Qn&ya, cf Manifested sense
usesa cf Individual essence
,
vjSplf, cf Invariable concom -
wii’.vc, cf Particularity
tance
vsesalak'ana, cf Part cular defi-
V) i sabha\) a, 7
nition 26\ 75
Vtsnu, 59 vycnaham, cf Practical life
usrZnti, cf Rest V) a) oga, 64 1
Mstara, cf Dilatation vyutpatU, cf learning
ViSvanatha, 47’\ 79' Weariness, srama, 77
ufo/d, cf Extended Will, icchri, 60'
DrW, 64’ Women’s dance, lasya, 40, 66 3
Vo ce, iac, XVII 1
Wonder, usmaya. XV ,

vrtti, cf Style Wonder, camatkara, XLV

Vulgar laughter, apabasita 2S 4 Yogasvtra, 26’, 75 7 , 82 J , 112'
vyah}ncaribha\a, cf Transitory Yoga system, 46'*
Mental State Yogmashtha, XLVI
vyadhi, cf Fever Zones, kaksya, 65