177 Phil.

160

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-49112, February 02, 1979

LEOVILLO C. AGUSTIN, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ROMEO

F. EDU, IN HIS CAPACITY AS LAND TRANSPORTATION
COMMISSIONER; HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; HON.
ALFREDO L. JUINIO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS MINISTER OF
PUBLIC WORKS, TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNI­‐
CATIONS; AND HON. BALTAZAR AQUINO, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS MINISTER OF PUBLIC HIGHWAYS,
RESPONDENTS.

DE CIS ION

FERNANDO, J.:

[1]
The validity of a Letter of Instruction providing for an early warning device for
motor vehicles is assailed in this prohibition proceeding as being violative of the
constitutional guarantee of due process and, insofar as the rules and regulations
for its implementation are concerned, for transgressing the fundamental principle
of non-delegation of legislative power. The Letter of Instruction is stigmatized by
petitioner, who is possessed of the requisite standing, as being arbitrary and
oppressive. A temporary restraining order was issued and respondents Romeo F.
Edu, Land Transportation Commissioner; Juan Ponce Enrile, Minister of National
Defense; Alfredo L. Juinio, Minister of Public Works, Transportation and
Communications; and Baltazar Aquino, Minister of Public Highways; were
required to answer. That they did in a pleading submitted by Solicitor General
[2]
Estelito P. Mendoza. Impressed with a highly persuasive quality, it makes quite
clear that the imputation of a constitutional infirmity is devoid of justification. The
challenged Letter of Instruction is a valid police power measure. Nor could the
implementing rules and regulations issued by respondent Edu be considered as
amounting to an exercise of legislative power. Accordingly, the petition must be
dismissed.
 The facts are undisputed. The assailed Letter of Instruction No. 229 of
President Marcos, issued on December 2, 1974, reads in full: "[Whereas],
statistics show that one of the major causes of fatal or serious accidents in land
transportation is the presence of disabled, stalled, or parked motor vehicles along
streets or highways without any appropriate early warning device to signal
approaching motorists of their presence; [Whereas], the hazards posed by such
obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international bodies concerned
with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and
the United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vienna Convention,
which was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207,
recommended the enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety
signs and devices; [Now, therefore, I, Ferdinand E. Marcos], President of the
Philippines, in the interest of safety on all streets and highways, including
expressways or limited access roads, do hereby direct: 1. That all owners, users
or drivers of motor vehicles shall have at all times in their motor vehicles at least
one (1) pair of early warning device consisting of triangular, collapsible
reflectorized plates in red and yellow colors at least 15 cms. at the base and 40
cms. at the sides. 2. Whenever any motor vehicle is stalled or disabled or is
parked for thirty (30) minutes or more on any street or highway, including
expressways or limited access roads, the owner, user or driver thereof shall
cause the warning device mentioned herein to be installed at least four meters
away to the front and rear of the motor vehicle stalled, disabled or parked. 3. The
Land Transportation Commissioner shall cause Reflectorized Triangular Early
Warning Devices, as herein described, to be prepared and issued to registered
owners of motor vehicles, except motorcycles and trailers, charging for each
piece not more than 15% of the acquisition cost. He shall also promulgate such
rules and regulations as are appropriate to effectively implement this order. 4. All
hereby concerned shall closely coordinate and take such measures as are
[3]
necessary or appropriate to carry into effect these instructions." Thereafter, on
November 15, 1976, it was amended by Letter of Instruction No. 479 in this wise:
"Paragraph 3 of Letter of Instructions No. 229 is hereby amended to read as
follows: '3. The Land Transportation Commissioner shall require every motor
vehicle owner to procure from any source and present at the registration of his
vehicle, one pair of a reflectorized triangular early warning device, as described
herein, of any brand or make chosen by said motor vehicle owner. The Land
Transportation Commissioner shall also promulgate such rules and regulations as
[4]
are appropriate to effectively implement this order.’” There was issued
accordingly, by respondent Edu, the implementing rules and regulations on
[5]
December 10, 1976. They were not enforced as President Marcos, on January
25, 1977, ordered a six-month period of suspension insofar as the installation of
early warning device as a pre-registration requirement for motor vehicles was
[6] [7]
concerned. Then on June 30, 1978, another Letter of Instruction ordered the
lifting of such suspension and directed the immediate implementation of Letter of
[8]
Instruction No. 229 as amended. It was not until August 29, 1978 that
respondent Edu issued Memorandum Circular No. 32, worded thus: "In
pursuance of Letter of Instructions No. 716, dated June 30, 1978, directing the
implementation of Letter of Instructions No. 229, as amended by Letter of
Instructions No. 479, requiring the use of Early Warning Devices (EWD) on motor
vehicles, the following rules and regulations are hereby issued: 1. LTC Adminis­-
trative Order No. 1, dated December 10, 1976, shall now be implemented
provided that the device may come from whatever source and that it shall have
substantially complied with the EWD specifications contained in Section 2 of said
adminis­trative order; 2. In order to insure that every motor vehicle, except
motorcycles, is equipped with the device, a pair of serially numbered stickers, to
be issued free of charge by this Commission, shall be attached to each EWD.
The EWD serial number shall be indicated on the registration certificate and
official receipt of payment of current registration fees of the motor vehicle
concerned. All Orders, Circulars and Memoranda in conflict herewith are hereby
[9]
superseded. This Order shall take effect immediately." It was approved for
immediate implementation by respondent Alfredo L. Juinio, as Minister of Public
[10]
Works, Transportation, and Communi­cations.
Petitioner, after setting forth that he "is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle
Car, Model 13035, already properly equipped when it came out from the
assembly lines with blinking lights fore and aft, which could very well serve as an
early warning device in case of the emergencies mentioned in Letter of Instruction
No. 229, as amended, as well as the implementing rules and regulations in
Administrative Order No. 1 issued by the Land Transportation Commission,"
[11]
alleged that said Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended, "clearly violates
the provisions of the New Constitution on due process, equal protection and
delegation of police power, [sic] * * *." For him, they are "oppressive,
unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory, nay unconstitutional and contrary to the
[12]
precepts of our compassionate New Society." He contended that they are
"infected with arbitrariness because it is harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the
[13]
motoring public;" are "one-sided, onerous and patently illegal and immoral
because [they] will make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at the
expense of car owners who are compelled to buy a set of the so-called early
[14]
warning device at the rate of P56.00 to P72.00 per set," are unlawful and
unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of a compassionate New Society [as
being] compulsory and confiscatory on the part of the motorists who could very
well provide a practical alternative road safety device, or a better substitute to the
[15]
specified set of EWDs." He therefore prayed for a judgment declaring both the
assailed Letters of Instructions and Memorandum Circular void and
unconstitutional and for a restraining order in the meanwhile.
A resolution to this effect was handed down by this Court on October 19,
1978: "L-49112 (Leovillo C. Agustin v. Hon. Romeo F. Edu, etc., et al.) –
Considering the allegations contained, the issues raised and the arguments
adduced in the petition for prohibition with writ of preliminary prohibitory and/or
mandatory injunction, the Court Resolved to [require] the respondents to file an
answer thereto within ten (10) days from notice and not to move to dismiss the
petition. The Court further Resolved to [issue] a [temporary restraining order]
[16]
effective as of this date and continuing until otherwise ordered by this Court."
Two motions for extension were filed by the Office of the Solicitor General
and granted. Then on November 15, 1978, the Answer for respondents was
submitted. After admitting the factual allegations and stating that they lacked
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to petitioner owning a
[17]
Volkswagen Beetle car, they "specifically deny the allegations in paragraphs X
and XI (including its subparagraphs 1, 2, 3, 4) of Petition to the effect that Letter of
Instruction No. 229 as amended by Letters of Instructions Nos. 479 and 716 as
well as Land Transportation Commission Administrative Order No. 1 and its
Memorandum Circular No. 32 violates the consti­tutional provisions on due
process of law, equal protection of law and undue delegation of police power, and
that the same are likewise oppresive, arbitrary, confiscatory, one-sided, onerous,
immoral, unreasonable and illegal, the truth being that said allegations are without
legal and factual basis and for the reasons alleged in the Special and Affirmative
[18]
Defenses of this Answer." Unlike petitioner who contented himself with a
rhetorical recital of his litany of grievances and merely invoked the sacramental
phrases of constitutional litigation, the Answer, in demonstrating that the assailed
Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of the police power and implementing
rules and regulations of respondent Edu not susceptible to the charge that there
was unlawful delegation of legislative power, there was in the portion captioned
Special and Affirmative Defenses, a citation of what respondents believed to be
the authoritative decisions of this Tribunal calling for application. They are
[19] [20] [21]
Calalang v. Williams, Morfe v. Mutuc, and Edu v. Ericta. Reference was
likewise made to the 1968 Vienna Conventions of the United Nations on road
traffic, road signs, and signals, of which the Philippines was a signatory and
[22]
which was duly ratified. Solicitor General Mendoza took pains to refute in detail,
in language calm and dispassionate, the vigorous, at times intemperate, accu­-
sation of petitioner that the assailed Letter of Instruction and the implementing
rules and regulations cannot survive the test of rigorous scrutiny. To repeat, its
highly-persuasive quality cannot be denied.
This Court thus considered the petition submitted for decision, the issues
being clearly joined. As noted at the outset, it is far from meritorious and must be
dismissed.
1. The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the
police power. That is conceded by petitioner and is the main reliance of
respondents. It is the submission of the former, however, that while
embraced in such a category, it has offended against the due process
and equal protection safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter
point was mentioned only in passing. The broad and expansive scope of
 the police power, which was originally identified by Chief Justice Taney of
the American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision, as "nothing more or
[23]
less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty" was
stressed in the aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: "Justice Laurel,
in the first leading decision after the Constitution came into force,
Calalang v. Williams, identified police power with state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus 'be
subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the
general comfort, health and prosperity of the state.' Shortly after
independence in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a
competence being referred to as 'the power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and
general welfare of the people.' The concept was set forth in negative
terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as 'that
inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all
things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society.' In that sense it
could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc
with the totality of legislative power. It is in the above sense the greatest
and most powerful attribute of government. It is, to quote Justice Malcolm
anew, 'the most essential, insistent, and at least illimitable powers,'
extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out 'to all the great public
needs.' Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times,
even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough
room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of
Justice Cardozo: 'Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be
interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation. What is critical
or urgent changes with the time.’ The police power is thus a dynamic
agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the
conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its govern­-
ment limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to
enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably
the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to insure communal
[24]
peace, safety, good order, and welfare."
2. It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by petitioner, compounded by
the fact that the particular police power measure challenged was clearly
intended to promote public safety. It would be a rare occurrence indeed for
this Court to invalidate a legislative or executive act of that character.
None has been called to our attention, an indication of its being non-
existent. The latest decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of
[25]
the Reflector Law, an enactment conceived with the same end in view.
Calalang v. Williams found nothing objectionable in a statute, the purpose
of which was: "To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstruction on
[26]
roads and streets designated as national roads * * *." As a matter of
fact, the first law sought to be nullified after the effectivity of the 1935
[27]
Constitution, the National Defense Act, with petitioner failing in his
quest, was likewise prompted by the imperative demands of public safety.
3. The futility of petitioner's effort to nullify both the Letter of Instruction and
the implementing rules and regulations becomes even more apparent
considering his failure to lay the necessary factual foundation to rebut the
presumption of validity. So it was held in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel
[28]
Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila. The rationale was
clearly set forth in an excerpt from a decision of Justice Brandeis of the
American Supreme Court, quoted in the opinion: "The statute here
questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police
power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific
method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the
plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may
condition the consti­tutionality of legislation of this character, the
presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some
[29]
factual foundation of record in overthrowing the statute."
4. Nor did the Solicitor General, as he very well could, rely solely on such
rebutted presumption of validity. As was pointed out in his Answer: "The
President certainly had in his possession the necessary statistical
information and data at the time he issued said letter of instructions, and
such factual foundation cannot be defeated by petitioner's naked assertion
that early warning devices 'are not too vital to the prevention of nighttime
vehicular accidents' because allegedly only 390 or 1.5 per cent of the
supposed 26,000 motor vehicle accidents that occurred in 1976 involved
rear-end collisions (p. 12 of petition). Petitioner's statistics is not backed
up by demonstrable data on record. As aptly stated by this Honora­ble
Court: 'Further: "It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a
presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is
unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face, which is
not the case here" ’ * * *. But even assuming the verity of petitioner's
statistics, is that not reason enough to require the installation of early
warning devices to prevent another 390 rear-end collisions that could
mean the death of 390 or more Filipinos and the deaths that could
likewise result from head-on or frontal collisions with stalled vehicles?"
[30]
It is quite manifest then that the issuance of such Letter of Instruction
is encased in the armor of prior, careful study by the Executive
Department. To set it aside for alleged repugnancy to the due process
clause is to give sanction to conjectural claims that exceeded even the
broadest permissible limits of a pleader's well-known penchant for
exaggeration.
5. The rather wild and fantastic nature of the charge of oppressiveness of
this Letter of Instruction was exposed in the Answer of the Solicitor
General thus: "Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive
redundancy, nor oppressive, for car owners whose cars are already
equipped with 1) 'blinking lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles,'
2) 'battery-powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles,' 3) 'built-in
reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles,' or 4)
'well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) * * * because: Being
universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna
Conventions, and visible even under adverse conditions at a distance of at
 least 400 meters, any motorist from this country or from any part of the
world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early warning device installed
on the roads, highways or expressways, will conclude, without thinking,
that somewhere along the travelled portion of that road, highway, or
expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or
disabled which obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other hand,
a motorist who sees any of the aforementioned other built-in warning
devices or the petroleum lamps will not immediately get adequate
advance warning because he will still think what that blinking light is all
about. Is it an emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car? Is it an
ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in the mind of the motorist will
[31]
thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger of collision."
6. Nor did the other extravagant assertions of consti­tutional deficiency go
unrefuted in the Answer of the Solicitor General: "There is nothing in the
questioned Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended, or in Administrative
Order No. 1, which requires or compels motor vehicle owners to
purchase the early warning device prescribed thereby. All that is required
is for motor vehicle owners concerned like petitioner, to equip their motor
vehicles with a pair of this early warning device in question, procuring or
obtaining the same from whatever source. In fact, with a little of industry
and practical ingenuity, motor vehicle owners can even personally make
or produce this early warning device so long as the same substantially
conforms with the specifications laid down in said letter of instruction and
administrative order. Accordingly, the early warning device requirement
can neither be oppressive, onerous, immoral, nor confiscatory, much less
does it make manufacturers and dealers of said devices ‘instant
millionaires at the expense of car owners' as petitioner so sweepingly
concludes * * *. Petitioner's fear that with the early warning device
requirement 'a more subtle racket' may be committed by those called
upon to enforce it * * * is an unfounded speculation. Besides, that
unscrupulous officials may try to enforce said requirement in an un­-
reasonable manner or to an unreasonable degree, does not render the
same illegal or immoral where, as in the instant case, the challenged
Letter of Instruction No. 229 and implementing order disclose none of the
[32]
constitutional defects alleged against it."
7. It does appear clearly that petitioner's objection to this Letter of Instruction
is not premised on lack of power, the justification for a finding of
unconstitutionality, but on the pessimistic, not to say negative, view he
entertains as to its wisdom. That approach, to put it at its mildest, is
distinguished, if that is the appropriate word, by its un­orthodoxy. It bears
repeating "that this Court, in the language of Justice Laurel, 'does not
pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.' As
expressed by Justice Tuason: 'It is not the province of the courts to
supervise legislation and keep it within the bounds of propriety and
common sense. That is primarily and exclusively a legislative concern.'
There can be no possible objection then to the observation of Justice
Montemayor: 'As long as laws do not violate any Constitutional provision,
the Courts merely interpret and apply them regardless of whether or not
they are wise or salutary.' For they, according to Justice Labrador, 'are not
 supposed to override legitimate policy and * * * never inquire into the
wisdom of the law.' It is thus settled, to paraphrase Chief Justice
Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, that only
congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken,
may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to be.
The principle of separation of powers has in the main wisely allocated the
respective authority of each department and confined its jurisdiction to
such a sphere. There would then be intrusion not allowable under the
Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion of a coordinate branch, the
judiciary would substitute its own. If there be adherence to the rule of law,
as there ought to be, the last offender should be courts of justice, to which
rightly litigants submit their controversy precisely to maintain unimpaired
the supremacy of legal norms and prescriptions. The attack on the validity
of the challenged provision likewise insofar as there may be objections,
[33]
even if valid and cogent, on its wisdom cannot be sustained."
8. The alleged infringement of the fundamental principle of non-delegation of
legislative power is equally without any support in well-settled legal
doctrines. Had petitioner taken the trouble to acquaint himself with
authoritative pronouncements from this Tribunal, he would not have the
temerity to make such an assertion. An excerpt from the aforecited
decision of Edu v. Ericta sheds light on the matter: "To avoid the taint of
unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very
least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays
down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication
may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its
limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it.
It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to
be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried
out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in
pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and
regulations. The standard may be either express or implied. If the former,
the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not
have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and
purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly,
the legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be attained as
in Calalang v. Williams is 'safe transit upon the roads.' This is to adhere to
the recognition given expression by Justice Laurel in a decision
announced not too long after the Constitution came into force and effect
that the principle of non-delegation 'has been made to adapt itself to the
complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within
certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation" not only in the
United States and England but in practically all modern governments.' He
continued: 'Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the
increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing
tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature and
toward the approval of the practice by the courts.’ Consistency with the
conceptual approach requires the reminder that what is delegated is
 authority non-legislative in character, the completeness of the statute
[34]
when it leaves the hands of Congress being assumed."
9. The conclusion reached by this Court that this petition must be dismissed
is reinforced by this consideration. The petition itself quoted these two
whereas clauses of the assailed Letter of Instruction: "[Whereas], the
hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by
international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna
Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations
Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vienna Convention, which was
ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended
the enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs
[35]
and devices; * * *." It cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of
Principle found in the Constitution possesses relevance: "The Philippines
* * * adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part
[36]
of the law of the land, * * *." The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road
Signs and Signals is impressed with such a character. It is not for this
country to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its word. The
concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude,
which is, moreover, at war with the principle of international morality.
10. That is about all that needs be said. The rather curt reference to equal
protection did not even elicit any attempt on the part of petitioner to
substantiate in a manner clear, positive, and categorical, why such a
casual obser­vation should be taken seriously. In no case is there a more
appropriate occasion for insistence on what was referred to as "the
[37]
general rule" in Santiago v. Far Eastern Broadcasing Co., namely, "that
the constitutionality of a law will not be considered unless the point is
[38]
specially pleaded, insisted upon, and adequately argued." "Equal
protection" is not a talismanic formula at the mere invocation of which a
party to a lawsuit can rightfully expect that success will crown his efforts.
The law is anything but that.
WHEREFORE, this petition is dismissed. The restraining order is lifted. This
decision is immediately executory. No costs.
Ruiz Castro, C.J., Barredo, Antonio, Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad
Santos, De Castro, and Malencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., dissents in a separate opinion.
Makasiar, J., reserves the right to file a separate opinion.
Aquino, J., did not take part.
Concepcion, Jr., J., on leave, concur in this decision.

[1]
Letter of Instruction No. 229 (1974) as amended by Letter of Instruction No. 479 (1976).
[2]
He was assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Ruben E. Agpalo and Solicitor Amado D.
Aquino.
[3]
Petition, par. III.
[4]
Ibid, par. IV.
[5]
Ibid, par. V.
[6]
Ibid, par. VIII.
[7]
No. 716.
[8]
Petition, par. VII.
[9]
Ibid, par. VIII.
[10]
Ibid.
[11]
Ibid, par. IX.
[12]
Ibid, par. X.
[13]
Ibid, par. XI.
[14]
Ibid, par. X.
[15]
Ibid, par. XI.
[16]
Resolution of the Court dated October 19, 1978.
[17]
Answer, pars. 1-6.
[18]
Ibid, par. 8.
[19]
70 Phil. 726 (1940). The opinion was penned by Justice Laurel.
[20]
L-20387, January 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 424. The writer of this opinion is the ponente.
[21]
L-32096, October 24, 1970, 35 SCRA 481. The writer of this opinion was likewise
the ponente.
[22]
Answer, par. 18 (a) and (b).
[23]
License Cases, 5 How. 504, 583.
[24]
35 SCRA 481, 487-488. There is no need to repeat where Calalang and Morfe are reported.
Primicias v. Fugoso is reported in 80 Phil. 71; Rubi v. Provin­cial Board, where the first
quotation from Justice Malcolm came, in 39 Phil. 660, 708 (1919); and Smith Bell and
Co. v. Natividad, his other decision cited, in 40 Phil. 136 (1919); Helvering v. Davis, with
Justice Cardozo writing the opinion, in 301 US 619 (1937).
[25]
Republic Act No. 5715 (1969).
[26]
Commonwealth Act No. 548 (1940).
[27]
Cf. People v. Lagman, 66 Phil. 13 (1938). Even earlier in United States v. Pompeya, 31 Phil.
245 (1915), this Court, by virtue of the police power, held valid a provision of the then
Municipal Code requi­ring "able-bodied males in the vicinity between certain ages to
perform patrol duty not exceeding one day each week."
[28]
L-24693, July 31, 1967, 20 SCRA 849.
[29]
Ibid, 857. The excerpt came from O'Gorman and Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 282
US 251, 328 (1931).
[30]
Answer, par. 18 (a). The excerpt came from Samson v. Mayor of Bacolod City, L-28745,
October 23, 1974, 60 SCRA 267, 270.
[31]
Ibid, par. 18 (c).
[32]
Ibid, par. 18 (d) and (e).
[33]
Morfe v. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424, 450-451. The citation from Justice Laurel may be traced to
Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 160 (1936); from Justice Tuason to
People v. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535, 548 (1947); from Justice Montemayor to
Quintos v. Lacson, 97 Phil. 290, 293 (1955); and from Justice Labrador to
Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155, 1166 (1957). Chief Justice Concepcion's reiteration
of the doctrine, paraphrased in the quoted opinion, was made by him in
Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, L-28196, November 9, 1967, 21 SCRA 774. Cf.
Province of Pangasinan v. Secretary of Public Works, L-27861, October 31, 1969, 30
SCRA 134.
[34]
35 SCRA 481, 497-498. The following cases were also cited: People v. Exconde, 101 Phil.
1125 (1957), and People v. Jolliffe, 105 Phil. 677 (1959).
[35]
Petition, par. III.
[36]
Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution reads in full: "The Philippines renounces war as an
instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of inter­national
law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,
freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations."
[37]
73 Phil. 408 (1941).
[38]
Ibid, 412.
 SEPARATE DISSENTING OPINION

TEEHANKEE, J.:

I dissent from the majority's peremptory dismissal of the petition and lifting of
the restraining order issued on Octo­ber 19, 1978 against the blanket enforcement
of the require­ment that all motor vehicles be equipped with the so-called early
warning device, without even hearing the parties in oral argument as generally
required by the Court in original cases of far-reaching consequence such as the
case at bar.
Lack of time prevents my filing an extended dissent. I only wish to state that
the petition advances grave and serious grounds for assailing "the rules and
regulations issued by the Land Transportation Commission under Administrative
Order No. 1 and Memorandum Circular No. 32 [which] do not reflect the real
intent, noble objectives and spirit of Letter of Instruc­tions No. 229, as amended by
Letter of Instructions Nos. 479 and 716, because it is oppressive, unreasonable,
arbitrary, confiscatory, nay unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of our
compassionate New Society," because of the following considerations, inter alia:
1. It is oppressive, arbitrary and discriminatory to require owners of motor
vehicles with built-in and more effec­tive and efficient E. W. D.'s such as "a)
blinking lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles, b) battery-powered
blinking lights inside motor vehicles, c) built-in reflectorized tapes on front
and rear bumpers of motor vehicles ....." to purchase the E. W. D.
specified in the challenged administrative order, whose effectivity and utility
have yet to be demonstrated;
2. The public necessity for the challenged order has yet to be shown. No
valid refutation has been made of petitioner's assertion that the "E. W. D.'s
are not too vital to the prevention of nighttime vehicular accidents.
Statistics shows that of the 26,000 motor vehicle accidents that occurred
in 1976, only 390 or 1.5 per cent involved rear-end collisions," as to require
the purchase and installation of the questioned E. W. D. for almost
900,000 vehicles throughout the country;
3. The big financial burden to be imposed on all motorists is staggering, and
petitioner's assertion that "as of 1975, there were at least 865,037 motor
vehicles all over the country requiring E. W. D.'s and at the minimum price
of P56.00 per set, this would mean a consumer outlay of P48,451,872.00,
or close to P50 million for the questioned E. W. D.'s "stands unchallenged;
4. No real effort has been made to show that there can be practical and less
burdensome alternative road safety devices for stalled vehicles than the
prescribed E. W. D., such as the common petroleum lamps "kinke" which
can be placed just as effectively in front of stalled vehicles on the
highways; and
 5. There is no imperative need for imposing such a blanket requirement on all
vehicles. The respondents have not shown that they have availed of the
powers and prerogatives vested in their offices such as ridding the country
of dilapidated trucks and vehicles which are the main cause of the
deplorable highway accidents due to stalled vehicles, establishing an
honest and fool­proof system of examination and licensing of motor vehicle
drivers so as to ban the reckless and irresponsible and a sustained
education campaign to instill safe driving habits and attitudes that can be
carried out for much less than the P50 million burden that would be
imposed by the challenged order.
I do feel that a greater "degree of receptivity and sympathy" could be
extended to the petitioner for his civic-mindedness in having filed the present
petition challenging as capricious and un­reasonable the "all-pervading police
power" of the State instead of throwing the case out of court and leaving the
wrong impression that the exercise of police power insofar as it may affect the
life, liberty and property of any person is no longer subject to judicial inquiry.