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 THE THIRD
REVOLUTION
•
 THE THIRD
REVOLUTION
•
XI JINPING AND THE NEW
CHINESE STATE

Eliz abeth Economy

A Council on Foreign Relations Book

1
 1
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers
the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University
Press in the UK and certain other countries.

Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press

198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America.

© Elizabeth Economy 2018

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in

a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted
by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction
rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the
above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above.

You must not circulate this work in any other form

and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer.

CIP data is on file at the Library of Congress

ISBN 978–​0–​19–​086607–​5

1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Printed by Edwards Brothers Malloy, United States of America
The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is an independent, nonpar-
tisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher dedicated
to being a resource for its members, government officials, business ex-
ecutives, journalists, educators and students, civic and religious leaders,
and other interested citizens in order to help them better understand
the world and the foreign policy choices facing the United States
and other countries. Founded in 1921, CFR carries out its mission by
maintaining a diverse membership, with special programs to promote
interest and develop expertise in the next generation of foreign policy
leaders; convening meetings at its headquarters in New York and in
Washington, DC, and other cities where senior government officials,
members of Congress, global leaders, and prominent thinkers come
together with CFR members to discuss and debate major international
issues; supporting a Studies Program that fosters independent research,
enabling CFR scholars to produce articles, reports, and books, and
hold roundtables that analyze foreign policy issues and make concrete
policy recommendations; publishing Foreign Affairs, the preeminent
journal on international affairs and U.S. foreign policy; sponsoring
Independent Task Forces that produce reports with both findings and
policy prescriptions on the most important foreign policy topics; and
providing up-to-date information and analysis about world events and
American foreign policy on its website, www.cfr.org.
The Council on Foreign Relations takes no institutional positions on
policy issues and has no affiliation with the U.S. government. All views
expressed in its publications and on its website are the sole responsi-
bility of the author or authors.
For David, Alexander, Nicholas, and Eleni
 CONTENTS

•
Map of China and its Provinces viii
Preface ix
Acknowledgments xiii

1. Introduction 1
2. Heart of Darkness 20
3. Chinanet 55
4. The Not-​So-​New Normal 91
5. Innovation Nation 121
6. War on Pollution 152
7. The Lion Awakens 186
8. The Road Forward 231

Notes 251
Index 327

vii
 RUSSIA
Lake Baikal

KAZAKHSTAN
Heilongjiang
MONGOLIA
Lake Harbin
Balkhash
Ürümqi Changchun
Inner Mongolia Jilin
Shenyang
KYRGYZSTAN Liaoning
Xinjiang Huhhot Beijing
Gansu Beijing
Tianjin NORTH
Taiyuan Hebei Tianjin KOREA
Yinchuan
Ningxia Shanxi Shijiazhuang
Jinan SOUTH
Yellow KOREA
Xining Shandong
Qinghai Lanzhou
Xi'an Sea
Zhengzhou
C H I N A Shaanxi Henan Jiangsu JAPAN
Xizang Hefei Nanjing
(Tibet) Hubei Anhui Shanghai
Chengdu Chongqing Shanghai
Lhasa Sichuan Wuhan
Hangzhou East
Chongqing Changsha Zhejiang
NEPAL Nanchang China
BHUTAN Guiyang Hunan Jiangxi Sea
Guizhou Fujian
Fuzhou PACIFIC
INDIA Kunming
Guangxi Guangdong OCEAN
BANGLADESH Yunnan Nanning TAIWAN
Guangzhou
Hong Kong S.A.R.
0 km 300 MYANMAR VIETNAM Macau S.A.R.
LAOS South
Haikou
Bay of Hainan China
THAILAND Sea
0 miles 300 Bengal PHILIPPINES

Map of China and Its Provinces

Credit: mapsopensource.com
 P R E FAC E

•
China’s rise on the global stage has been accompanied by an explosion
of facts and information about the country. We can read about China’s
aging population, its stock market gyrations, and its investments in
Africa. We can use websites to track the air quality in Chinese cities,
to monitor China’s actions in the South China Sea, or to check on the
number of Chinese officials arrested on a particular day.
In many respects, this information does what it is supposed to
do: keep us informed about one of the world’s most important powers.
From the boom and bust in global commodities to the warming of
the earth’s atmosphere, Chinese leaders’ political and economic choices
matter not only for China but also for the rest of the world; and we can
access all of this information with a few strokes on our keyboards.
Yet all these data also have the potential to overload our circuits.
The information we receive is often contradictory. We read one day
that the Chinese government is advancing the rule of law and hear the
next that it has arrested over two hundred lawyers and activists without
due process. Information is often incomplete or inaccurate. In the fall
of 2015, Chinese officials acknowledged that during 2000–​2013, they
had underestimated the country’s consumption of coal by as much as
17 percent; as a result, more than a decade of reported improvements in

ix
x Preface

energy efficiency and greenhouse gas emissions were called into ques-
tion. We are confused by dramatic but often misleading headlines that
trumpet China’s every accomplishment. More Americans believe (in-
correctly), for example, that China, not the United States, is the world’s
largest economic power. It is a country that often confounds us with
contradictions.
The challenge of making sense of China has been compounded in
recent years by the emergence of Xi Jinping as Chinese Communist
Party general secretary (2012) and president (2013). Under his leader-
ship, significant new laws and regulations have been drafted, revised,
and promulgated at an astonishing rate, in many instances challenging
long-​held understandings of the country’s overall political and eco-
nomic trajectory. While previous Chinese leaders recognized nongov-
ernmental organizations from abroad as an essential element of China’s
economic and social development, for example, the Xi-​led government
drafted and passed a law to constrain the activities of these groups,
some of which Chinese officials refer to as “hostile foreign forces.” In
addition, contradictions within and among Xi’s initiatives leave obser-
vers clamoring for clarity. One of the great paradoxes of China today,
for example, is Xi Jinping’s effort to position himself as a champion of
globalization, while at the same time restricting the free flow of cap-
ital, information, and goods between China and the rest of the world.
Despite his almost five years in office, questions abound as to Xi’s true
intentions: Is he a liberal reformer masquerading as a conservative na-
tionalist until he can more fully consolidate power? Or are his more
liberal reform utterances merely a smokescreen for a radical reversal
of China’s policy of reform and opening up? How different is a Xi-​led
China from those that preceded it?
I undertook this study to try to answer these questions for my-
self and to help others make sense of the seeming inconsistencies and
ambiguities in Chinese policy today. Sifting through all of the fast-​
changing, contradictory, and occasionally misleading information that
is available on China to understand the country’s underlying trends is
essential. Businesses make critical investment decisions based on as-
sessments of China’s economic reform initiatives. Decisions by foun-
dations and universities over whether to put down long-​term stakes
in China rely on an accurate understanding of the country’s political
 Preface xi

evolution. Negotiations over global climate change hinge on a correct

distillation of past, current, and future levels of Chinese coal consump-
tion. And countries’ security policies must reflect a clear-​eyed view of
how Chinese leaders’ words accord with their actions in areas such as
the South China Sea and North Korea.
As much as possible, I attempt to assess the relative success or short-
comings of the Chinese leadership’s initiatives on their own merits. In
other words, I ask, what is the Chinese leadership seeking to accom-
plish with its policy reforms and what has it accomplished? I begin
with Xi Jinping himself and lay out his vision for China and its his-
torical antecedents. I then dive into six areas the Xi government has
identified as top reform priorities—​politics, the Internet, innovation,
the economy, the environment, and foreign policy. In some cases, there
are competing interests and initiatives to tease out. Nonetheless, taken
together, these separate reform efforts provide a more comprehensive
picture of the arc of Chinese reform over the past five years and its im-
plications for the rest of the world. I conclude the book with a set of
recommendations for how the United States and other countries can
best take advantage of the transformation underway to achieve their
own policy objectives.
 AC K N OW L E D G M E N T S

•
Writing a book is both a solo and a collective endeavor. For over two
decades, I have been privileged to call the Council on Foreign Relations
a second home. For this, I thank both Leslie A. Gelb, who hired me
as a newly minted PhD and nurtured me through my first decade,
and Richard Haass, who has supported me ever since by giving me the
room to make mistakes, learn from them, and find my voice in the
process. My colleagues have been an integral part of my intellectual
journey as well—​Adam Segal, always my best sounding board, but also
Max Boot, Irina Faskianos, Shannon O’Neil, Micah Zenko, and my
terrific Asia Studies colleagues, Alyssa Ayres, Jerome Cohen, Yanzhong
Huang, Josh Kurlantzick, Ely Ratner, Sheila Smith, and Scott Snyder.
All of them set a high standard of quality and productivity that I strive
to meet. Amy Baker, Nancy Bodurtha, and Patricia Dorff also all pro-
vided important support in the process of writing the book. Outside
the Council on Foreign Relations, Winston Lord and Orville Schell,
two outstanding leaders in U.S.‒China relations, inspire me both for
their intellectual integrity and their generosity of spirit. Arthur Kroeber
read part of the manuscript and provided invaluable advice.
The actual process of writing this book was facilitated by many
people. Certainly, I owe an enormous debt to those Chinese scholars,

xiii
xiv Acknowledgments

activists, businesspeople, and officials who took the time to meet

with me and share their perspectives. In some cases, our conversa-
tions spanned a decade or more. I am fortunate as well that two out-
side reviewers, as well as CFR Director of Studies James Lindsay and
President Richard Haass took the time to read the manuscript carefully
and pushed me to make it better. Their contributions cannot be over-
stated. I am grateful to David McBride for his support and guidance
throughout the publication process. The Starr Foundation also has my
deepest gratitude for providing the financial support that enabled me
to research and write this book. My two research associates, Rachel
Brown and Gabriel Walker, provided invaluable research assistance
and brought intellectual rigor and an attention to detail that aided me
throughout the process of research and writing. I was fortunate that
when they went off to graduate school, two more outstanding research
associates, Maylin Meisenheimer and Viola Rothschild, stepped into
their shoes and helped me complete the process of fact-​checking and
proofreading. Natalie Au, who interned during the final editing stages,
also provided critical support. All translations and any mistakes, of
course, are my own.
Last, but never least, I would like to thank my family. My parents,
James and Anastasia Economy; my siblings, Peter, Katherine, and
Melissa; and above all my husband, David; and our children, Alexander,
Nicholas, and Eleni. They all remind me on a daily basis what really
matters in life.
Elizabeth C. Economy
New York City
 THE THIRD
REVOLUTION
•
 1
•
Introduction

In mid-​November 2012, the World Economic Forum hosted a

breakfast in Dubai for several dozen prominent Chinese scholars,
businesspeople, and government officials.1 The Chinese had traveled
there to discuss pressing global matters with their counterparts from
around the world. I was one of a few non-​Chinese citizens at the break-
fast and soon noticed that the attention of most of the participants
was not on climate change or youth unemployment but instead on
the dramatic news from home. After months of suspense, the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) had just revealed the membership of the
Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC)—​the seven men selected to
lead the country for the next five years.
Strikingly, most of the Chinese at the breakfast could say little about
the new leaders. In contrast to the American and other democratic polit-
ical systems, which are designed to strip bare the political and personal
inclinations of public officials, the selection of Chinese leadership takes
place almost entirely behind closed doors. It combines a bargaining and
bartering process among former top leaders with a popularity contest
among the two hundred or so members of the Communist Party who
comprise the powerful Central Committee.
The run-​up to this particular selection process had been particularly
fraught. It was the first time in two-​and-​a-​half decades that the general
secretary of the CCP had not been hand-​picked by Deng Xiaoping,
the transformative leader of the country from the late 1970s until his
death in 1997. Deng had led China out of the turmoil of the Cultural

1
2 Third Revolution

Revolution and set the country on its historic path of economic re-
form and opening up. Since the mid-​1980s, he had anointed each of
the CCP’s previous four general secretaries: Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang,
Jiang Zemin, and finally Hu Jintao. Without Deng’s imprimatur, the
selection process appeared not only opaque but also at times chaotic.
One top contender, Bo Xilai, the charismatic head of Chongqing and
son of one of China’s original revolutionary leaders, Bo Yibo, had
fallen in scandal during spring 2012, eventually landing under arrest
for corruption. Xi Jinping, the heir-​designate and eventual winner in
the political sweepstakes, had disappeared for a period of two weeks in
September, giving rise to a raft of rumors concerning his fate. Until the
group of seven men walked onto a stage in the Great Hall of the People
in Beijing shortly before noon on November 15, 2012, the Chinese
people could not state with complete certainty who would be leading
their country.
When I asked the Chinese at my table what they made of the new
PBSC members, they pointed out that, overall, they appeared to rep-
resent the older, more conservative element within the party. Sixty-​
six-​year-​old former Guangdong Party Secretary Zhang Dejiang, for
example, possessed a degree in economics from North Korea’s Kim Il-​
Sung University and was known above all for his poor handling of the
early 1990s SARS epidemic and his repressive approach to the media.
In contrast, fifty-​seven-​year-​old Wang Yang, Zhang’s dynamic and
reform-​oriented successor in Guangdong, was left waiting in the wings.
(He was selected for the still prestigious, but less powerful, Politburo.)
Beyond such generalities, however, my Chinese colleagues could say
little. Indeed, Xi Jinping, who at fifty-​nine years of age now stood at the
apex of the Communist Party as general secretary and would just four
months later become president of the country and head of the military,
was largely an unknown quantity. Despite three decades of government
service, Xi’s accomplishments, temperament, and leadership qualities
remained a question mark.

The Xi Vision
The new general secretary did not leave the Chinese people or the rest
of the world wondering for long. Speaking at a press conference shortly
 Introduction 3

after the new leaders made their appearance at the Great Hall of the
People, Xi outlined his priorities. He spoke of the need to address the
endemic corruption that plagued the Communist Party and to ensure
that the party served the people. Fighting corruption would soon be-
come the signature issue of his first years in office.
The essence of Xi Jinping’s vision, however, was his call for the great
revival or rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. Reflecting on China’s five
thousand years of history, Xi referenced the country’s “indelible con-
tribution” to world civilization.2 At the same time, he acknowledged
that efforts by successive Chinese leaders to realize the great revival of
the Chinese nation had “failed one time after another.”3 The rejuve-
nation narrative is a well-​understood and powerful one in China. It
evokes memories of the country as the Middle Kingdom demanding
tribute from the rest of the world; China as a source of innovation, cre-
ating paper, gunpowder, printing, and the compass; and China as an
expansive, outward-​facing power, with Ming dynasty Admiral Zheng
He commanding a naval fleet of more than three hundred ships and
sailing throughout Asia to the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. Left
out of the rejuvenation narrative, but etched deeply into the minds of
many Chinese, are those periods of Chinese history that evoke shame,
such as the one hundred years of humiliation (1849‒1949), when China
was occupied and invaded by foreign powers, or the periods that re-
main the black holes of contemporary Chinese history, in which the
Chinese people suffered at the hands of their own government, such as
the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, and the Tiananmen
Square massacre.
During his tour of “The Road toward Renewal” exhibition at the
National Museum of China just two weeks later, Xi again underscored
the theme of China’s rejuvenation, calling it “the greatest dream for
the Chinese nation in modern history.”4 The site of Xi’s speech at the
National Museum was not accidental. While much of Chinese history
is marked by revolutions, political and social upheaval, and discontinu-
ities in leadership and political ideologies, the museum celebrates the
ideal of continuity in Chinese history. Quoting from both Mao and
ancient Chinese poets, Xi used the museum as a backdrop to make
clear the linkages between an imperial China and a China led by the
Communist Party.
4 Third Revolution

In the following months, Xi elaborated further on his vision for the

country. He equated his call for rejuvenation with the “Chinese Dream”
(Zhongguo meng,中国梦). For Xi, the Chinese Dream was premised
on the attainment of a number of concrete objectives: China should
double its per-capita GDP from 2010 to 2020; it should have a military
“capable of fighting and winning wars”; and it should meet the social
welfare needs of the people. There also should be no doubt concerning
the country’s ideological future: Xi declared, “The selection of path is
a life-​or-​death issue for the future of the CPC. We should unswerv-
ingly uphold socialism with Chinese characteristics . . . the superiority
of our system will be fully demonstrated through a brighter future.”5
To this end, a robust Communist Party at the forefront of the political
system was of paramount importance. Xi was also careful to distin-
guish the Chinese Dream, rooted in collective values, from the more
individualistic American Dream, noting that the great rejuvenation of
the Chinese nation “is a dream of the whole nation, as well as of every
individual,” and that “only when the country does well, and the nation
does well, can every person do well.”6
Not all Chinese shared Xi Jinping’s particular understanding of the
Chinese Dream. Some argued that the Chinese Dream was a dream of
political reform or constitutionalism, in which the Communist Party
would not be above the law but instead would be bound by it. Others
said that it was a dream to better Chinese society through improve-
ments in food safety or the quality of the environment. And still others,
drawing on the American Dream, called for individual dreams and
pursuits to be respected. Over the course of his first year in office, Xi
began to incorporate some of these other elements, such as opportun-
ities for better education, higher income, and a cleaner environment,
into his dream narrative.7 Yet it remained at heart a call for a CCP-​led
China to reclaim the country’s ancient greatness.
Xi is not the first modern Chinese leader to use the theme of rejuve-
nation to remind the Chinese people of past glories in an effort to bind
them to modern China. Deng Xiaoping talked about the “invigoration
of China,”8 and his successors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao both called
for the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”9 Over the course of
more than three decades as China experienced a dizzying period of eco-
nomic and political reform and opening up to the outside world, all of
 Introduction 5

China’s modern leaders sought to build a China that could reclaim its
place as a global power.
Yet in seeking to realize this common vision, Xi and the rest of the
Chinese leadership have parted ways with their predecessors. They
have elected a way forward that largely rejects the previous path of re-
form and opening up: instead there is reform without opening up. In
a number of respects, the leadership has embraced a process of insti-
tutional change that seeks to reverse many of the political, social, and
economic changes that emerged from thirty years of liberalizing re-
form. The Chinese leaders have also shed the low-​profile foreign policy
advanced by Deng Xiaoping in favor of bold initiatives to reshape the
global order.
These dramatic shifts reflect in large measure a belief on the part of
Xi Jinping that China at the time of his ascension was at an inflection
point. The post-​Mao era of reform and opening up had yielded signif-
icant gains: double-​digit growth for more than two decades, and in-
ternational admiration for China’s economic and other achievements.
Yet as Xi rose up through the party ranks, he also had a front-​row seat
to the mounting challenges facing the country: the Communist Party
had become corrupted and devoid of an ideological center, the provi-
sion of public goods had fallen dramatically behind society’s needs, and
even the economy needed a new infusion of reform. In the eyes of Xi,
nothing less than dramatic, revolutionary change could save the party
and the state and propel China forward to realize its full potential as a
great power.

Xi’s Inheritance
By the time of Mao’s death in 1976, the Chinese leadership had just
begun the process of recovery from the political strife, social upheaval,
and economic impoverishment that marked much of his quarter-​cen-
tury tenure. Xi Jinping himself had experienced some of the worst of
Mao’s excesses. In the early 1960s, his father, a leading revolutionary
figure and former vice-​premier of the government, was branded a
traitor and jailed for his bourgeois background. Soon after, fifteen-​year-​
old Xi was “sent down” to a remote village where he labored for several
years on an agricultural commune. Rather than feel bitter toward the
6 Third Revolution

Communist Party for his family’s difficulties, Xi became determined to

join the party, applying for membership multiple times before finally
being accepted in 1974. And in 1975, when Premier Zhou Enlai set out
the Four Modernizations (agriculture, industry, science and technology,
and military) to begin the process of revitalizing China’s economy and
society, Xi Jinping began his own journey alongside that of the country.
He returned to Beijing that same year as a worker-​peasant-​soldier stu-
dent to study chemical engineering at Tsinghua University, one of
China’s most prestigious academic institutions. Xi’s university educa-
tion during this time, however, was still shaped by Mao’s revolutionary
impulses, with significant periods of time devoted to learning from
farmers and the People’s Liberation Army, as well as studying Marxism-​
Leninism. (Only in 1977, with the reintroduction of exams for univer-
sity entrance, did academics begin to reclaim a more dominant place in
Chinese university life.)
The deaths of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai in 1976 were followed
by a brief and bloodless power struggle that resulted, by 1978, in the
ascension to power of Deng Xiaoping. Deng and his supporters ce-
mented the Four Modernizations as the direction of the country and
initiated a wholesale reform of the country’s economic and political
system—​a transformative process that Deng would later call “China’s
Second Revolution.” In the early 1980s, the Chinese leadership began
to relax the tight state control that, in one way or another, had de-
fined China’s economic and political system since the 1950s. In the
economic realm, this signaled the beginning of a transition from a
command to a more market-​driven economy. Deng devolved signif-
icant economic authority to provincial and local officials, removing
political constraints on their economic activities and diminishing
Beijing’s ability to influence the development and outcome of these
activities. China also invited participation from the international
community in China’s economic development through foreign di-
rect investment and trade. By 1984, the government had opened up
fourteen port cities along China’s coast to foreign investment in spe-
cial economic zones. In the mid-​to-​late 1990s, the state began in ear-
nest to dismantle many of the state-​owned enterprises, which had
been the foundation of the urban economy, to encourage the expan-
sion of private and cooperative ventures, and to energize the rural
 Introduction 7

economy through the development of smaller scale township and vil-

lage enterprises. The result was dramatic: average growth rates that
exceeded 8 percent annually for more than two decades—​elevating
hundreds of millions of Chinese out of poverty, and earning China
significant respect internationally.
Jiang Zemin, who assumed the position of general secretary of the
Communist Party in 1989 and president of the country in 1993,10 further
elevated the role of the private sector in the Chinese political system,
actively welcoming successful businesspeople into the party for the
first time. China’s turn outward to the rest of the world also expanded.
China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, and Jiang, along
with Premier Zhu Rongji, encouraged the country’s state-​owned en-
terprises and other economic actors to “go out” in search of natural
resources to fuel China’s continued economic growth. Hundreds of
thousands of Chinese relocated throughout the world for work and
study. By 2008, China’s reputation as an economic heavyweight was
established and further burnished by its strong standing in the midst of
the global financial crisis.
Changes in the economic realm were matched by reforms in the
political sphere. A collective leadership and more institutionalized suc-
cession process replaced the highly personalized nature of governance
at the top of the political system; significant political authority was de-
volved from central to local officials; and China embraced assistance,
policy advice, and financial support from the international commu-
nity. Moreover, as the government retreated from the market, it also
retreated from its traditional role as social welfare provider, encour-
aging private, nonstate actors to fill the gap in areas such as educa-
tion, medical care, and environmental protection; in the mid-​1990s,
Beijing allowed the establishment of formally approved and registered
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), enabling the rapid develop-
ment of civil society. The advent of the Internet also elevated the role of
civil society in Chinese governance. Despite maintaining controls over
certain types of political content, by the mid-​to-​late 2000s, the web
had become a virtual political space, with greater transparency, polit-
ical accountability, and rule of law (in which Chinese citizens used the
Internet to investigate crimes, seek justice for victims, and even push to
overturn wrongful convictions) than existed in the real political system.
8 Third Revolution

The era of President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao (2002‒2012)

also marked the beginning of a more concerted public diplomacy effort.
The leadership proclaimed China’s “win-​win” philosophy and worked
hard to reassure Beijing’s neighbors and the rest of the world that
China’s rise would be peaceful and, as its fortunes grew, so too would
those of its partners. In summer 2008, Beijing hosted a world-​class
Olympic Games that earned accolades internationally and cemented
the reputation inside Chinese political circles of the senior official who
oversaw preparations for the games, new Politburo member and rising
political star Xi Jinping.
The continued strength of the Chinese economy throughout the
global financial crisis also introduced a new element into the country’s
foreign policy. Increasingly there were calls within China for the country
to assume its rightful place on the global stage as a world leader, ca-
pable of shaping international norms and institutions. As the United
States struggled to climb out of economic recession, senior Chinese
economic, military, and foreign policy officials argued that the decline
of the United States and the rise of China—​long predicted to occur at
some time during the twenty-​first century—​had begun. China’s mil-
itary, the beneficiary of double-​digit budget increases for more than
a decade, started to grow its ambitions alongside its capabilities. By
the late 2000s, the Chinese leadership had progressed from rhetorically
staking its claims to maritime sovereignty in the East and South China
Seas to using its military prowess to realize them. Sitting at the helm
of a small group of senior officials overseeing these moves in the South
China Sea was Xi Jinping.
China’s economic and foreign policy triumphs notwithstanding, by
the time of Xi’s ascension to power, there was also a growing sense
within the country that significant contradictions had emerged in the
political and economic life of China. The Communist Party had lost its
ideological rationale and, for many of its more than 80 million mem-
bers, the party served as little more than a stepping-​stone for personal
political and economic advancement. Corruption—​an issue that Xi
put front and center as he moved up the party ranks—​was endemic
throughout the party and the economy. And while three decades of
“go-​go” economic growth had brought significant economic benefits to
the Chinese people, Beijing had failed to attend to the need for public
 Introduction 9

goods such as environmental protection and healthcare. The social wel-

fare net, dismantled along with many of the state-​owned enterprises,
had not been fully replaced, and, critically, distribution of social wel-
fare benefits had not kept up with changing work patterns: more than
200 million migrant workers, who toiled in the city’s factories or con-
struction sites, could not legally live, receive medical care, or educate
their children in the cities in which they worked. The number of pop-
ular protests in the country rose to more than 180,000 by 2010. Even
the Chinese economy, while still posting growth rates well beyond
those of any other country, began to slow. A few outlier economists in
China and the West sounded alarm bells about structural weaknesses.
Investment-​led growth was taking its toll, contributing to skyrocketing
levels of public and corporate debt. And for all its impressive economic
gains in low-​cost manufacturing, China had little to show in the way
of innovation or the development of the service sector, the markers
of the world’s advanced economies. By the time of Xi’s ascension to
the top job, despite a number of noteworthy economic and foreign
policy achievements, the Hu Jintao era had become known as the “lost
decade.” Xi Jinping took power determined to change China’s course.

Charting a New Course

In a 2000 interview in the Chinese journal Zhonghua Ernu, Xi Jinping
then governor of Fujian Province, shared his perspective on leadership.
A new leader, he stated, needed to “continue working on the founda-
tions” laid by his predecessor but at the same time “come in with his
own plans and set an agenda during the first year.” He likened leader-
ship to a relay race, in which a successor has to “receive the baton prop-
erly” and then “run it past the line.”11 More than a decade later at his
first press conference in 2012, Xi reiterated the baton analogy, stating
that the responsibility of the party leadership is to “take over the relay
baton passed on to us by history” to achieve the “great renewal of the
Chinese nation.”12
In receiving the baton, however, Xi and his team have set out to
run the race differently from their predecessors—​with a distinctive
new strategy and at an accelerated pace. They have moved away from
a collective leadership to elevate Xi as the preeminent leader, deepened
10 Third Revolution

the role of the Communist Party and state in society and in the
economy, and sought to elevate China’s role in world affairs. Not every-
thing is new. Some of the initiatives, such as the heightened attention
to corruption within the Communist Party and more assertive behavior
in the South and East China Seas, reflect impulses and tendencies that
emerged during the latter stages of Hu’s tenure (2007‒2012) or even
before. Yet Xi and the rest of the Chinese leadership have amplified
these efforts in ways that have transformed China’s domestic political
landscape and its role on the regional and global stage. (While pro-
vocative actions by China and other claimants in the South China Sea
were commonplace, for example, Beijing’s massive land reclamation
and militarization of the islands in the South China Sea did not begin
until 2014.) In describing China today, dean of Peking University’s
School of International Relations, Jia Qingguo, suggested to me that Xi
Jinping had ushered in the third, thirty years of contemporary Chinese
history—​crystallizing my sense that Deng’s “second revolution” had
drawn to a close. Xi Jinping’s “third revolution” was underway.

The Revolution Has Begun

The ultimate objective of Xi’s revolution is his Chinese Dream—​the
rejuvenation of the great Chinese nation. As noted earlier, however,
Xi’s predecessors shared this goal as well. What makes Xi’s revolution
distinctive is the strategy he has pursued: the dramatic centralization
of authority under his personal leadership; the intensified penetration
of society by the state; the creation of a virtual wall of regulations and
restrictions that more tightly controls the flow of ideas, culture, and
capital into and out of the country; and the significant projection of
Chinese power. It represents a reassertion of the state in Chinese polit-
ical and economic life at home, and a more ambitious and expansive
role for China abroad.
Over the course of Xi Jinping’s tenure as CCP general secretary and
president, he has accrued progressively more institutional and personal
power. Unlike his immediate predecessors, he has assumed control of all
the most important leading committees and commissions that oversee
government policy; demanded pledges of personal loyalty from mili-
tary and party leaders; eliminated political rivals through a sweeping
 Introduction 11

anticorruption campaign; and adopted the moniker of “core” leader,

which signifies his ultimate authority within a traditionally collective
leadership. By many accounts, Xi is the most powerful leader since Mao
Zedong.
Xi and the rest of the Chinese leadership have also expanded the role
of the state in society and increased the power of the organs of party and
state control. Writing in 2000 about the transition from Mao Zedong
to Deng Xiaoping, China scholar David Shambaugh noted, “If one of
the hallmarks of the Maoist state was the penetration of society, then
the Dengist state was noticeable for its withdrawal. The organizational
mechanisms of state penetration and manipulation were substantially
reduced or dismantled altogether.”13 The current Chinese leadership,
however, has launched an aggressive set of reforms that augments rather
than diminishes the party’s role in political, social, and economic life.
For example, while the government welcomes NGOs that help fulfill
the objectives of the Communist Party, advocates for change or those
who seek a greater voice in political life, such as women, labor, or legal
rights activists, increasingly risk detention and prison. Moreover, while
promising a continued opening up of China’s market, the Chinese
leadership has nonetheless moved to support and strengthen the role of
the party and state in the economy.
This enhanced party control also extends to efforts to protect China’s
society and the economy from foreign competition and influence. Xi
Jinping has increasingly constrained the avenues and opportunities by
which foreign ideas, culture, and, in some cases, capital can enter the
country by building a virtual wall of regulatory, legal, and technolog-
ical impediments. Yet the wall is selectively permeable. While progres-
sively less is permitted in, more goes out. Xi has pushed, for example,
to enhance significantly the flow of ideas and influences from China
to the outside world, through the Chinese media, Confucius Institutes
(Chinese government‒sponsored language and cultural centers), and
think tanks. Similarly, the Xi government encourages capital targeted
at specific sectors or countries to flow out of China (although at times
restricting the flow of capital to other sectors or countries).
And finally, Xi Jinping’s call for the rejuvenation of the great Chinese
nation has accelerated the nascent shift begun during Hu Jintao’s
tenure to move away from a commitment to maintaining a low profile
12 Third Revolution

in international affairs to one that actively seeks to shape global norms

and institutions. He has established China’s first overseas military logis-
tics base; taken a significant stake in strategic ports in Europe and Asia;
championed China as a leader in addressing global challenges, such as
climate change; and proposed a number of new trade and security in-
stitutions. Xi seeks to project power in dramatic new ways and reassert
the centrality of China on the global stage.
Many elements of these reforms—​the strong drive of the current
Communist Party leadership to control the flow of information or to
exert control over economic actors, for example—​and Beijing’s efforts
to be more proactive internationally are hallmarks of various periods
throughout Chinese history. Nonetheless, they run counter to recent
Chinese history. Xi seeks his own model of politics and foreign policy: a
uniquely Chinese model that he believes will deliver his Chinese Dream
and perhaps become a standard bearer for other countries disenchanted
with the American and European models of liberal democracy.

The Third Revolution Takes Hold

To understand the nature and magnitude of the People’s Republic of
China (PRC)’s third revolution, I took a journey through scores of Xi
Jinping’s speeches and commentaries to understand how he prioritized
his agenda for change. The next six chapters, outlined below, reflect
the range of his reform priorities, beginning with the political and
cyber arenas, continuing to a set of economic concerns—​innovation,
state-​owned enterprises, and the environment—​and concluding with
a broad look at Xi’s foreign and security policies. Each chapter explores
how the Chinese leadership has moved forward to advance its object-
ives, as well as the intended and unintended consequences of its new
approach. The final chapter lays out a set of recommendations for the
United States and the international community to cooperate or coor-
dinate with and—when necessary—confront this transforming and
transformative power.
Chapters 2 and 3 explore the centralization of power and the growing
presence of the Communist Party in political life. Chapter 2 focuses
on the real-​world applications of Xi Jinping’s transformation of po-
litical institutions and processes—​the elevation of his personal power,
Exploring the Variety of Random
Documents with Different Content
Destiny or Heimarmene, the sphere of, in Pistis Sophia, ii. 137 n. 2,
143 n. 1, 153, 154;
in Texts of Saviour, ii. 174, 184;
in Mithraism, ii. 255 sq.
See Moira
Diadochi, the, or Successors of Alexander, i. 14, 52
Diagram, the Ophites’, ii. 66-71;
prayers to powers depicted in, ii. 71-74;
place of Ophiomorphus in, ii. 77
Diana Dictynna, Cretan goddess identified with Isis, i. 56
Didache, the, source of Apostolical Constitutions (Duchesne), ii. 7 n.
2
Dieterich, Prof. Albert, quoted, i. 141, 142; ii. 255.
See Mithraism, Orpheus
Dill, Sir Samuel, quoted, i. lvii, lix, 24, 54 n. 3; ii. 87, 272, 359
Dinkard, the, quoted, i. 134 n. 1
Diocletian, the Emperor, makes Mithraism state religion, i. 81, 119 n.
1, 228, 271;
his persecution of Christians, ii. 12, 23;
his victories over Persians, ii. 226;
his adoption of Persian ways, ii. 228
Diodorus Siculus, authority for Oriental religions, i. 9;
quoted, i. 31 n. 1, 43 n. 3
Diogenes, the Cynic, his saying about Patecion quoted, i. 131
Dionysia, the, peculiarly popular in Northern Greece, i. 136
Dionysion, temple of Dionysos at Athens, i. 42
Dionysius, the Areopagite, his orders of angels, i. 188 n. 1
Dionysos, a Thracian or Thessalian god, i. 17;
legend of Cretan, i. 37, 46;
diaspasm or tearing to pieces of, i. 37, 125;
identified with Iacchos, i. 39, 40;
 and with Zagreus, i. 42, 125;
legend of, told in Little Mysteries, i. 42;
identified with Osiris, i. 43, 48;
his relations with Demeter and Persephone, i. 47; ii. 39;
identified with Hades, i. 47, 48, 130;
with Apollo, i. 48;
god of dead to Alexandrians, i. 49;
Boeotian worship of, i. 52;
his mystic marriage with Demeter, i. 61 n. 1;
called the Vine, i. 64 n. 3;
his temple at Alexandria demolished by Theophilus, i. 83;
the Liberator, i. 90 n. 1;
sacrifices to, i. 95;
his likeness to Tammuz, i. 122 n. 3;
his legend centre of Orphic teaching, i. 123;
identified with Orphic Phanes, i. 124, 144;
with Zeus, i. 125 n. 2;
Orphics connect his death with man’s creation and rebirth, i. 126;
soul of man part of, i. 127, 133;
omophagy chief rite of worship of, i. 128; ii. 112;
soul of man united with, i. 129, 144;
called Eubuleus, i. 133;
widespread worship of, i. 135;
identified with Adonis, i. 137;
and Sabazius, i. 138;
and Attis, i. 139;
Orphic hymns to, i. 142 n. 3, 143;
son of Semele, i. 145;
an androgyne deity, 145, 185;
all Graeco-Roman gods tend to merge in, i. 146, 147;
will succeed Zeus, i. 186;
jealousy of, cause of diaspasm, i. 190 n. 2;
spouse of Persephone and her son, ii. 39;
the soul of the world, ii. 50 n. 2;
called Pappas, ii. 57;
and Iao, ii. 71 n. 1.
See Bacchus, Iao
Diotima, gives traditional view of Platonic affinity, i. 195 n. 1
Discourse, The True, of Celsus, probable date of, ii. 66
Docetism, a mark of heresy, ii. 17;
Marcion’s adherence to, ii. 210;
Manichaeans profess, ii. 318, 348
Dodecad, the, of Valentinus, ii. 101 sqq.;
its duplication explained, ii. 145 n. 8;
Egyptian parallel to, 176
Doinel, Jules, founder of modern Valentinianism, ii. 133 n. 1
Döllinger, Dr, quoted, i. 140 nn. 2, 3; ii. 164 n. 3, 168, 169, 172
Dositheus the heresiarch, founder of sect (Eusebius), ii. 6 n. 3
Dove, in Pistis Sophia, emblem of Holy Spirit, ii. 135 n. 3;
and of Great Goddess, ibid.;
in Manichaeism, 302 n. 1
Drexler, Prof. Anton, quoted, i. 85
Drogheda, Cromwell’s letter after Siege of, ii. 85 n. 2
Dualism, distinguishing feature of Manichaeism, ii. 289
Duchesne, Mgr Louis, quoted, i. 89 n. 1; ii. 1 n. 5, 4, 5 n. 2, 7 n. 2, 11
n. 2, 14 n. 1, 22 n. 2, 122 n. 1, 178 n. 1, 202 n. 2
Dyaus, the god, worshipped in Vedas and by Persians, i. 73 n. 4; ii.
231 n. 1

Ebionites, the, their connection with the Church at Pella, ii. 5 n. 1;

with the Clementines, ii. 82
Ecbatana, one of the four Persian capitals, i. 3
Ecclesia or Church, the incorruptible aeon or Pleroma of the Ophites,
ii. 43, 60;
used for assembly of souls, ii. 75;
member of third Valentinian syzygy, ii. 98, 100, 102;
Italic school make her mother of Dodecad, ii. 119;
 power breathed into man in Pistis Sophia, ii. 179
Ecclesiasticus, member of Valentinian Dodecad, ii. 101
Ecpyrosis or Destruction of the world by fire, doctrine common to
Stoics and Persians, ii. 250;
symbolized by lion-headed figure in Mithraism, ii. 251;
in Manichaeism, ii. 297;
in Mazdeism, Pistis Sophia, and Texts of Saviour, ii. 297 n. 1
Ectroma or Abortion. See Sophia (2)
Edessa, King of, protects Bardesanes, ii. 120;
Valentinians of, persecuted by Arians, temp. Julian, ii. 132;
Gnosticism comes into Persia from, ii. 283
Edfu, Horus worshipped at, i. 45;
Ptolemies restore temple of, i. 52
Egypt, Greek gods derived from (Herodotus), i. 16;
assigned to Ptolemy on Alexander’s death, i. 28 sqq.;
priestly character of religion of, i. 31 sq.;
totemistic character of early religion of, i. 37;
its influence on its conquerors, i. 51;
religion of, degenerates into sorcery, i. 57;
inspires Alexandrian views on next world, i. 60;
Osiris-worship in, temp. Pharaohs, i. 64 n. 3;
daily services in temples, i. 66;
early cosmogonies of, i. 73; ii. 36, 175;
Ptolemy endows Alexandrian religion in, i. 76;
Alexandrian religion in, temp. Julian, i. 83;
pre-Christian features surviving in, i. 85 sq.;
triune god worshipped in Pharaonic, i. 88;
magicians of, use foreign words, i. 93;
Magic Papyri found in, i. 97 sqq.;
Gnosticism in, quickly decays, i. 111;
earth goddess worshipped in, i. 126;
Orphic hymns perhaps composed in, i. 141;
suzerain of Solomon, i. 160 n. 4;
lower classes in, first become Christian, ii. 8 n. 5;
 Ophites in, ii. 76 sqq.
See Christians, Eleusis, Enoch, Jews
Egyptians, the, sacred books of, translated into Greek, i. 9;
opposed to monotheism before Alexander, i. 11;
priests of, oppose innovations, i. 24;
theocrasia known to earliest, i. 33, 46, 54;
their Osiris-worship bond with Greeks, i. 38;
their worship of animals, i. 45;
most superstitious and fanatic of men in Philhellenic times, i. 50;
oppose Alexandrian religion, ii. 51;
respect paid to, in Alexandrian religion, i. 56, 73, 74;
use foreign words in magic, i. 93;
think earthly Nile copy of heavenly river, i. 116 n. 1;
their idea of eating gods to get powers, i. 125 n. 3;
their obligation to Hebrews ap. Artapanus, i. 173;
their worship of mortal gods absurd to Greeks, ii. 16;
gods of, husbands of their mothers, ii. 39;
their addiction to mapping-out invisible world, ii. 109;
think only rich happy after death, ii. 112 n. 1;
origin of their triune god, ii. 121 n. 3;
their use of allegory, ii. 123;
their anxiety about nature of god and future of soul, ii. 131;
embrace monastic life in great numbers, ii. 175;
Pistis Sophia unintelligible without knowledge of religion of
Pharaonic, ii. 177;
their horror of Amenti, ii. 195, 196;
their enthusiasm for life of priest, ii. 200;
degradation of Christianity and Gnosticism by, ii. 201;
the wisdom of, taught to Manes’ predecessor, ii. 285.
See First Man, Jews
Egyptians, Gospel according to, said to contain Ophite doctrine of
transmigration, ii. 65, 79;
possible source of passage in Pistis Sophia, ii. 161 n. 4
Eieazareie, a word used in magic, ii. 33 n. 2.
See Yahweh of Israel
Elephantine, mixed religion of Jews at, ii. 32 n. 4, 43 n. 2
Eleusinia, the Festivals following Mysteries, i. 136
Eleusinion, the Athenian, sacred things deposited in, i. 39
Eleusis, scene of goddesses’ trials, i. 16;
Mysteries of, described, i. 38-41;
initiation at, preceded by Little Mysteries, i. 41 sq.;
likeness of Legend of, to that of Osiris, i. 43;
date of reformation of Mysteries of, ibid.;
theocrasia result of, i. 46;
Calathos or basket-crown of Serapis borrowed from, i. 49;
Mysteries of, rob death of its terrors, i. 59;
mystic marriage of god and goddess crowning scene at, i. 61 n. 1;
formula repeated by initiates at, i. 62 n. 2;
Alexandrian mysteries more popular than those of, i. 66;
initiates at, carry rods, i. 68 n. 2;
hereditary priesthood of, i. 76;
worshippers of other gods consecrated to those of, i. 83;
Baubo a personage in Mysteries of, i. 100;
the God and the Goddess of, i. 126; ii. 39;
entry of Dionysos into, i. 130;
gods of, worshipped outside Attica, i. 135;
reason for secrecy of Mysteries of, i. 139 n. 2;
priestesses of, called bees, i. 143 n. 4;
part of Dionysos at, after Orphic reform, i. 145;
sacramental grace of Mysteries of, i. 147;
baptism among Gnostics borrows features from, ii. 22;
Phrygian deities identified with those of, ii. 31;
Ophites borrow doctrines from, ii. 54;
Ophites’ opinion of Mysteries of, i. 57
Eleutherna, Orphic gold plates found at, i. 131, 132
Eli, Eli, lama sabachthani, called names of God in magic, ii. 33 n. 2
Elijah, the Prophet, his soul in Pistis Sophia placed in St John
Baptist, ii. 137, 149, 150;
in Paradise of Adam, ii. 179;
 ascension of, inspires Mithraic monuments, ii. 248
Elizabeth, mother of St John Baptist, her conception arranged by
Sophia ap. Ophites, ii. 53;
by Virgin of Light in Pistis Sophia, ii. 137
Eloaeus, ruler of planetary sphere in Diagram, ii. 47, 73;
corresponds to Hebrew Elohe, ii. 71 n. 1.
See Ailoaios
Elpis or Hope, member of Valentinian Dodecad, ii. 101
Emanation, defined, i. 181 n. 2;
doctrine common to all post-Christian Gnostics, ii. 19 n. 1
Empedocles, derives everything from four roots or elements, i. 197
Encratites, the, sect said to be founded by Tatian, ii. 220
En-ki or Ea, the god, creator of pattern man, i. lxiii n. 1
Ennead, the Egyptian, its irregular number of gods, ii. 92
Ennoia, second of Simon Magus’ six “Roots,” i. 180;
Simon Magus’ called Epinoia by Hippolytus, i. 180 n. 4; ii. 20 n. 1;
in Great Announcement first female power, i. 182;
her Orphic and Jewish analogues, i. 185;
produces angels who make universe, i. 187, 195;
seized by world-making angels and condemned to transmigration,
i. 190, 196;
identified with Helen of Tyre, ibid.;
redeemed by Simon, i. 191;
inconsistency of stories regarding, i. 193;
in Ophite system, name of Second Man, ii. 38;
Ophiomorphus called, ii. 49;
spouse of Bythos according to some Valentinians, ii. 97
Enoch, mass of Apocrypha connected with name of, i. 159, 160, 164;
dates of same, i. 162 n. 1, 163, 164 n. 1;
connection of Essenes with, i. 168;
in Pistis Sophia, author of books written in Paradise, ii. 147 n. 5,
194 n. 2
Enoch, Book of, fall of angels in, i. 191 n. 1; ii. 154;
quoted in Pistis Sophia, ii. 155;
quoted, i. 160, 161, 162 n. 2, 165, 169; ii. 155
Enoch, Book of the Secrets of, seven heavens arranged as in
Mithraism, ii. 257
Epaminondas, suffers in Hades because not initiated, i. 131
Ephesus, many-breasted goddess of, i. lvi, 17; ii. 40;
worship of Alexandrian gods at, i. 53;
Nicolaitans at, ii. 25
Ephrem Syrus, finds Valentinianism in Bardesanes’ hymns, ii. 120;
his date, ibid.;
quoted, ii. 316 n. 1
Epicurus, his statement of the problem of evil, ii. 217
Epimenides, introduces Orphic myths into Athens, i. 121
Epinoia. See Ennoia
Epiphanius, bishop of Constantia, a Nicolaitan in his youth, i. 112 n.
1; ii. 21 n. 5;
his ignorance about the Essenes, i. 155;
his date and work, ii. 10, 77;
quoted, i. 190, 191, 193, 197, 198, 199; ii. 10, 11, 14, 27, 46 n. 3,
61, 79, 80, 81, 90 n. 1, 92 n. 3, 93 nn. 1, 2, 95, 205, 213, 215,
219, 279 n. 2
Epitaph, Valentinian, in Via Nazionale, ii. 129
Erataoth, name of power in Diagram, ii. 71
Eratosthenes, studies at Museum of Alexandria, i. 45
Ergamenes, King of Ethiopia, his massacre of priests of Amen, i. 31
n. 1
Eris-ki-gal or Ereshchigal, the goddess, Sumerian counterpart of
Persephone, i. 100
Eros, Horus takes attributes of, i. 50;
first-born god of Orphics, i. 123;
 Orphic, known to Aristophanes, i. 124;
his likeness to Valentinian Agape, ii. 98 n. 1;
and to Marcion’s Supreme Being, ii. 210;
hymns to, sung by Lycomidae, ii. 210 n. 1
Esaldaios, variant of Ialdabaoth or El Shaddai, ii. 46 n. 3
Esculapius. See Asklepios
Essarts, M. Fabre des, head of L’Église Gnostique, ii. 133 n. 1
Essenes, the, third party among Jews, temp. Josephus, i. lv, 152;
perhaps borrow from Buddhism, i. 20;
a “philosophic” sect, i. 151;
meaning of name, i. 152;
Josephus’ account of, i. 152-154;
Philo’s, i. 154, 155;
girdle used by them like Parsis’ kosti, i. 153 nn. 1, 4;
description of, by Pliny, Hippolytus, and Porphyry, i. 155;
wild theories about, i. 155, 156;
their connection with Orphics, i. 156, 168;
essentially Gnostics, i. 157;
use of Cabala by, i. 157, 158, 169;
names of angels kept secret by, i. 158;
Enochian literature due to, i. 159, 167;
peculiar interpretation of Scripture, i. 168, 171;
probably extinct after Hadrian, i. 170;
divisions among, possible, i. 175 n. 3;
Simon Magus’ teaching opposite to that of, i. 202;
connection with Ebionites doubtful, ii. 5 n. 1;
points in common with Christians, ii. 6.
See Ritschl
Ethiopia, priests of Amen flee to, i. 31;
Thueris the hippopotamus goddess called “Cat of,” i. 37 n. 1
Ethiopians, their rule in Egypt, i. 31, 51;
worship Isis, i. 56;
Psammetichos expels them, i. 101
Etymologicum Magnum. See Gaisford
Eubouleus or Eubuleus, a name of Dionysos, i. 133, 137 n. 1, 142,
143;
identified with Adonis by Orphics, i. 137.
See Zeus Chthonios
Eubulus, author of lost work on Mithras, ii. 236
Eucharist, the, rite resembling it among Serapiasts, i. 87;
simple mode of celebration in Primitive Church, i. 87 n. 1;
thaumaturgic accompaniments among heretics, ibid., and ii. 129,
187;
obscene parody of, i. 198;
magical efficacy of, among Gnostics, ii. 22, 63;
in Apostolic times follows baptism immediately, ii. 22 n. 1;
Ophite additions to, doubtful, ii. 61;
Ophite ideas concerning, i. 63;
Marcus’ profanation of, ii. 129;
called a mystery, ii. 165;
views of Primitive Church as to, ii. 171;
Döllinger’s remarks on, ii. 172;
rite described in Texts of Saviour and Bruce Papyrus probably
Marcosian, ii. 187;
celebrated with water among certain sects, ii. 188, 215;
ceremony resembling, in Mithraism, ii. 247, 260;
in Manichaeism probably confined to Elect, ii. 348.
See Pistis Sophia, Bruce Papyrus, Huysmans
Eudemos of Rhodes, earliest authority for Zervanism among Magi, ii.
236 n. 4, 252 n. 2
Eudoxos of Cnidos, his use of acrostics in astronomical work, i. 169
Euhemerus of Messene, his theory that gods were deified men, i. 19
Eukles, name of god in Orphic gold plate, i. 133
Eumenides, the, said by Orphics to be children of Persephone, i. 142
Eumolpidae, exegetes attached to, i. 44 n. 1;
hereditary priests of Mysteries of Eleusis, i. 76
Euphrates, the heresiarch, founder of Ophites ap. Origen, ii. 25;
 called the “Peratic” or Mede, ii. 26 n. 1
Euripides, Parthians act plays of, i. 8;
represents Dionysos as androgyne, i. 47 n. 4;
supports identification of Dionysos and Apollo, i. 48;
Orphic doctrines well known to, i. 123;
quoted, i. 39, 128, 149 n. 1
Europe, Alexander’s marriage of, with Asia, i. lviii;
Oriental religions pass into, i. 20;
after Alexander, Egypt becomes granary of, i. 28;
Alexandrian religion passes into, i. 77;
Phrygia invaded by celibate warriors from, ii. 40
Eusebius of Caesarea, quoted, i. 199, 200; ii. 4 n. 3, 6 n. 4, 10 n. 1,
12 n. 5, 18 n. 3, 23 n. 2, 83 n. 1, 88 n. 2, 96 n. 2, 120 n. 2, 132 n.
2, 206 nn. 2, 5, 220 n. 3, 221 n. 1, 359
Euxitheus, the Pythagoric, authority for Orphic doctrine of burial of
soul in body, i. 127 n. 1.
See Philolaos
Evander, bishop of Nicomedia, rabbles Ophites, ii. 77
Eve, the protoplast, confusion of name of, with Evoe, ii. 20 n. 1;
Ophite legend of, ii. 52, 58, 70;
and Manichaean, ii. 299, 306
Evoe, word used in Mysteries of Sabazius, i. 138;
in those of Attis, i. 139 n. 1; ii. 54 n. 6;
Clement of Alexandria connects it with Eve, ii. 20 n. 1
Ezekiel, the Prophet, shows hatred of Jews for Gentiles, i. 167 n. 4;
quoted, i. 186 n. 2; ii. 32, 43 n. 2
Eznig of Goghp, quoted, ii. 217, 285
Ezra, the Prophet, Apocalypse attributed to, quoted, i. 163, 164, 165,
167 nn. 3, 4; ii. 81

Farrah (Seistan), probably Prophthasia of Arrian, i. 4 n. 1

Fatak. See Patecius
Father, Mithraic priests addressed as, ii. 261;
name of highest Mithraic degree, ii. 262, 267
Father-and-Son, Dionysos the double of his father, i. 47;
name of Ophite Supreme God, ii. 38, 39, 67;
First Mystery of Pistis Sophia, ii. 144;
Mithras may be, ii. 248
Fathers of the Church, their writings neglected till lately, i. 1;
call all early heretics Gnostics, i. lviii, 171;
say Simon Magus parent of Gnosticism, i. 176, 200;
know little of many heresies, i. 200; ii. 9;
agree as to Ophites, ii. 36;
their account of Marcus the magician, ii. 128, 167;
their hostility to Gnosticism justified, ii. 199;
say devil inspires Mithraists to imitate Church, ii. 247;
ascribe Apocrypha of Thomas and Andrew to Manichaean
Leucius, ii. 351
Faventinus, Ulpius Egnatius, priest of Isis and other deities, i. 83
Fihrist, the, of Muhammad ben Ishak or En-Nadîm, quoted, ii. 279 n.
3, 280, 287 n. 4, 289 n. 2, 290 n. 3, 291 n. 1, 292, 293 n. 1, 294 n.
1, 295 n. 1, 296 n. 1, 299 n. 2, 300 n. 2, 302 n. 1, 304 n. 1, 309,
310, 312 nn. 1, 2, 313, 314, 322 n. 2, 332, 333, 342 nn. 1, 2
Fîrûz. See Peroz
Foakes-Jackson, Canon, quoted, ii. 215 n. 1, 216 n. 4, 223
Forefather, the Great Unseen or Propator, member of ruling Triad of
Left or material powers in Pistis Sophia, ii. 142, 150, 155
Foucart, M. George. quoted, i. 91
Foucart, M. Paul, his works on Mysteries of Eleusis, i. 38 n. 3;
quoted, i. 17 n. 1, 21 nn. 1, 2, 22 n. 2, 23 n. 2, 25 nn. 2, 3, 39 nn.
1-3, 40 nn. 3, 4, 41 nn. 1-3, 42 nn. 1, 2, 43, 44 n. 1, 47 n. 1, 48
n. 2, 52 n. 3, 59 n. 4, 61 n. 1, 65 n. 6, 130 n. 1, 133 n. 1, 137 n.
5, 143 n. 4
France, Isiac monuments found in, i. 53;
and Mithraic, ii. 230
Fravashis, the, or Ferouers in Mazdeism, ii. 110 n. 1
Frazer, Sir James G., quoted, i. 43, 91, 96 n. 4, 158 n. 2
Freemasonry, Catholic accusation of obscene rites against, ii. 18 n.
2;
Mithraism a Pagan (Renan), ii. 264

Gabinius, Proconsul of Syria, rebuilds Samaria after destruction by

Jews, i. 177
Gabriel, the angel, in Book of Daniel, i. 158;
named in Magic Papyri, ii. 34;
name of sphere in Diagram, ii. 70;
in Pistis Sophia, Jesus assumes shape of, at Annunciation, ii. 137,
138;
with Michael bears Pistis Sophia out of Chaos, ii. 156, 355 n. 1
Gaea or Gê, the Orphic earth goddess, i. 123, 133, 185; ii. 45 n. 1
Gaisford, Dean, his notes to Etymologicum Magnum quoted, i. 137
n. 3
Galatae, the, their settlement in Asia Minor, ii. 28
Galerius, the Emperor, speech of Persian ambassador to, ii. 226;
affects state of Persian Shah, ii. 228 n. 2
Galli, the, eunuch priests of Cybele, ii. 30 n. 3
Ganymede, burlesqued in procession of Isis, i. 71
Garôtman, abode of Infinite Light in Mazdeism, ii. 249
Gaumata, the Magian pseudo-Smerdis in Behistun inscription, ii. 233
Gayômort, the First Man in Mazdeism, i. lxi;
slain by Ahriman, i. 126 n. 3;
his legend in Bundahish, ii. 246
Geb, the Egyptian earth-god, father of Osiris, Isis, Set and Nephthys,
i. 33, 133 n. 1
Gehenna, in Enochian literature, i. 165, 167;
 in Diagram, ii. 69
Genghiz Khan, his invasion and conquests, i. 5 n. 1, 14
Gentiles, the, their relations with Jews in earliest Christian centuries,
i. lv, lvi;
hostility of Jews against, partly due to Roman taxation, i. 163 n. 1;
final fate of, ap. Jews, i. 164, 165, 166, 167;
rebellion of Jews against, i. 172;
Jewish hatred recognized by, after Titus, ii. 5;
non-Jewish Christianity necessary for conversion of, ii. 21
George the Syncellus, quoted, i. 124 n. 3.
See Monogenes
Gerizim, Mount, temple of, rival to that of Jerusalem, i. 177
Germany, i. 7;
Isiac monuments found in, i. 53;
and Mithraic, ii. 230
Gibbon, Edward, the historian, his Decline and Fall (Bury’s ed.),
quoted, i. 1, 85, 86 n. 2; ii. 7 n. 1, 12 n. 5, 96 n. 3, 127 n. 4, 226
nn. 1-6, 227 n. 1, 228 n. 2, 271 n. 2
Gilgamesh, the Babylonian hero, ii. 287 n. 4
Giraud, Father François, his Ophitae quoted, i. 100 n. 1; ii. 26 n. 5,
41 n. 2, 44 n. 2, 64, 68, 70, 71 n. 2, 79 n. 2
Gladstone, Mr, his controversy with Huxley, i. liii
Glaucias, the interpreter of St Peter and teacher of Basilides, ii. 90 n.
3.
See Ptolemy, son of Glaucias
Glaucothea, mother of Aeschines and priestess of Sabazius, i. 22,
138
Glory, the Column of, in Manichaeism, ii. 296, 308, 309, 332
Glory, the King of, in Manichaeism, ii. 148 n. 3;
in neo-Manichaeism, ii. 325
Glycon, the god worshipped at Nicomedia, temp. Gordian, i. 24.
 See Alexander of Abonoteichos
Gnosticism, ideas at root of, opposed to religion, i. 90;
the importance of knowledge of the spiritual world, i. 111;
Christianity may be only episode in history of, ibid.;
impulse given to, by rise of astrology, i. 119;
earliest pre-Christian form of, i. 120;
Simon Magus said to be parent of all later, i. 176;
a hydra, i. 200;
does not compete with orthodox Christianity till IInd cent., ii. 2;
early converts from, ii. 21;
its services to Church, ii. 21, 202;
alleged necessity for forcible suppression of, ii. 23;
Montanism and, only formidable heresies in early centuries, ii. 29
n. 1;
likeness of, to Cabala, ii. 36 n. 1;
becomes ethical after contact with philosophers, ii. 87;
first form of Egyptian, unknown, ii. 89;
Valentinus transforms Christian, ii. 93;
degenerates into magic in Egypt, ii. 199;
rotten before it was ripe (Inge), ii. 199 n. 3;
bridge between Paganism and Christianity, ii. 200;
its suppression by Church, ii. 359
Gnostics, generic name for many different sects, i. lviii, 171;
worship of Greek confraternities resembles that of, i. 21;
form of Christian sacraments borrowed from, i. 87 n. 1;
Tertullian’s views on Trinity influenced by, i. 89 n. 2;
their use of magic (Hippolytus), i. 109;
points common to Orphics and post-Christian, i. 148;
Essenes, Gnostics in larger sense, i. 157;
conceal themselves during persecution, i. 200;
symbolic construction of Gospels by, ii. 6;
our sources of information as to, ii. 10;
“the great Gnostics of Hadrian’s time,” ii. 12;
writings of, ii. 13;
call Jesus Monogenes, ii. 15;
magical ideas of pre-Christian, ii. 18;
 exchange of doctrines among, ii. 20;
introduce statues, incense, etc., ii. 22;
term Homoousios first used by, ii. 23 n. 1;
Barbeliotae etc. so called by Epiphanius, ii. 27, 77;
Carpocratians first call themselves, ii. 27;
the “perfect Gnostics” of the Naassenes, ii. 56 n. 1;
become active after St Paul’s preaching in Asia Minor, ii. 85;
Mithraists perhaps copy certain doctrines of, ii. 248;
may get ideas of destiny from Babylon, ii. 256
Gonds, the, sorcerers of Aryan races, i. 92
Gordian III, the Emperor, Glycon worship in reign of, i. 24
Goshurun or Goshurvan, the Heavenly Bull of the Avesta, ii. 243;
in Bundahish, slain by Ahriman, ii. 246
Gospel, the Fourth, its date, ii. 178;
not quoted in Pistis Sophia, ii. 177;
nor by Marcion, ii. 208 n. 1;
quoted, i. 177 n. 5; ii. 117 n. 1, 123 n. 3, 161 n. 4, 177, 190
Goths, of Dacia, converted en masse, ii. 271
Gracchus, Urban Prefect of Rome, temp. Gratian, ii. 272
Graecia, Magna, overthrow of Pythagoreans in, i. 122;
Orphic gold plates found in, i. 169
Granicus, the, Greek troops on Persian side at, i. 7
Gratian, the Emperor, Epiphanius’ Panarion written in his 7th year, ii.
10;
spread of Marcionism in his reign, ii. 205;
Mithraea wrecked with his sanction, ii. 272;
financial measures against Paganism, ii. 358
Gratidia or Canidia of Horace, her sister witch a Thessalian, i. 108
Great Britain, Isiac monuments found in, i. 53;
and Mithraic, ii. 230
Greece, Persians repulsed in their attack on, i. 1;
Alexander in Seistan receives grapes from, i. 4 n. 1;
 theocrasia in, i. 15, 16;
gods of, coalesce with those of Asia Minor, i. 17;
its religious confraternities, i. 21;
Dionysos-worship brought into, from Egypt, i. 43;
Orphic teaching first appears in, i. 112;
comes into, from Thrace, i. 122;
Dionysos youngest of gods of, i. 123;
popular theology of, i. 124;
propagation of Orphic ideas in, i. 135;
no regular association called Orphic in, i. 139 n. 3, 141;
mysteries of Chthonian deities in, attended by Gnostics, ii. 21;
great goddess worshipped in, ii. 45 n. 1;
Ophites have settlements in, ii. 77;
Mithraism keeps out of, ii. 230.
See Hellas
Greeks, the, rush of, to Asia after Alexander’s conquests, i. 7;
adopt foreign gods in IVth cent. B.C., i. 15, 16;
Alexander’s deification a shock to, i. 18;
rise of Euhemerism among, i. 19; ii. 28;
no priestly caste among, i. 24, 76;
theocrasia popular among, i. 33, 54, 56;
Osiris myth common to Egyptians and, i. 38;
Alexandrian religion careful of susceptibilities of, i. 44;
think Demeter and Persephone one, i. 46;
Apollo always a sun-god among, i. 48;
mistake of, as to Harpocrates, i. 50;
their fear of gods temp. Homer, i. 57;
Homeric flattery of gods, i. 95;
turn to magic rites Vth cent. B.C., i. 121;
asceticism of Orphics foreign to, i. 127;
their view of Mysteries changes after Orphic reform, i. 130;
Orphism greatest religious movement among pre-Christian, i. 145;
religion of, and Jews contrasted, i. 149;
adoption of acrostics and word-puzzles among, i. 168, 169 n. 1;
Jews forge works of well-known authors among, i. 173;
Simon Magus uses religious traditions of, i. 185, 186;
laugh at wailing for Dying God, ii. 16;
 Ophites take doctrines from Mysteries of, ii. 54;
unlike Persians, think gods have nature of men, ii. 234;
make astrology popular, ii. 235
Gregory the Great, Saint, his advice to assimilate heathen practices,
i. 85
Grünwedel, Dr, his expedition to Turfan, ii. 316
Guards, the Nine of Treasure-house in Pistis Sophia, ii. 142, 193
Gundisabur or Djundi-sâbur, place of Mani’s execution, ii. 281 n. 7

Habakkuk, the Prophet, inspired by Jaldabaoth according to Ophites,

ii. 81 n. 2
Hades, the god, his temple at Eleusis, i. 39;
his Rape of Persephone shown in Mysteries, i. 40;
in Homer shares universe with Zeus, i. 46;
identified with Zeus Chthonios and Dionysos, i. 47, 130, 144, 147;
ii. 39;
his name perhaps ineffable, i. 47 n. 1;
called Eubuleus, i. 47, 133, 142;
identified with Osiris, i. 48;
his epithet of Adamas, ii. 39 n. 1;
on Mithraic monuments, ii. 238;
identified with Ahriman, ii. 239, 253
Hades, the place or House of, passwords through, taught in
Mysteries, i. 41;
happy lot of initiates in, i. 59;
Amenti, the Egyptian, i. 102 n. 1, 104;
in Orphic gold plate, i. 132;
pains of uninitiated in, i. 140;
like Jewish Sheol, i. 150
Hadrian, the Emperor, his letter to Servian, i. 86;
the great Gnostics of his reign, i. 111; ii. 12;
his war of extermination against the Jews, i. 163, 170, 172 n. 1; ii.
5, 203;
 Celsus a contemporary of, ii. 66;
reign of Roman Law begins temp., ii. 86;
Gnosticism enters Alexandria temp., ii. 89;
gives back Trajan’s Persian conquests, ii. 225;
books on Mithras worship written temp., ii. 236
Haggai, the Prophet, hatred of Jews for Gentiles shown in, i. 167 n. 4
Halicarnassus, Alexandrian worship in, i. 52
Ham, the patriarch, identified with Titan, i. lx
Harnack, Prof. Adolf, quoted, i. xlix n. 1; ii. 161 n. 4, 207, 215 n. 1,
216, 286 n. 5
Har-pa-khrat or Harpocrates, the Alexandrian Horus the Child, i. 50
Harris, Dr Rendel, his discovery of the Odes of Solomon, i. 164 n. 1;
ii. 157 n. 2;
and of the Apology of Aristides, ii. 204 n. 1
Hartland, Mr E. S., his theory of mana, i. 91 n. 2
Harvey, W. W., editor of Irenaeus, quoted, i. 181 n. 1; ii. 138 n. 1
Hasis-adra. See Xisuthros
Hatch, Dr Edwin, quoted, i. lvii, lviii n. 1, 47 n. 4, 87 n. 1, 168 n. 3,
174 n. 2; ii. 23 n. 1, 37 n. 1, 83 n. 1, 165 n. 3, 168 n. 6, 169 n. 1,
170, 172 n. 3, 191 n. 2, 202 n. 1, 222 nn. 2, 3
Haurvetât, the Amshaspand, i. 181 n. 1;
his and Ameretât’s possible analogues in neo-Manichaeism, ii.
355
Hebdomad, the, in system of Simon Magus and Clementines, i. 181;
among Ophites, ii. 64;
Valentinus’ name for the Demiurge or god of the Jews, ii. 107, 109,
114 n. 3
Hebrews, the, i. 173, 185.
See Jews
Hebrews, the Gospel according to the, perhaps identical with that
according to the Egyptians, ii. 79
Hecataeus of Abdera, Jewish forgery in name of, i. 173
Hecate, the goddess, identified with Isis, i. 56;
priest of Isis also hierophant of, i. 83;
Orphic hymns to, i. 142 n. 2, 147 n. 1;
patron saint of sorcerers till Renaissance, i. 147;
ii. 186 n. 3, 276;
her relation to lion-headed god of Mithraism, ii. 252
Heddernheim, revolving bas-reliefs in Mithraeum at, ii. 247;
concealment of lion-headed statue in same, ii. 251
Hedone or Pleasure, member of Valentinian Decad, ii. 101
Hegemonius, his Acta Archelai, Beeson’s edition of, ii. 280 n. 3;
quoted, i. 178 n. 2; ii. 277 n. 1, 279 n. 2, 280 n. 3, 287 n. 3, 288
nn. 1, 2, 3, 289 n. 1, 293 n. 1, 294 n. 1, 295 n. 2, 297 n. 2, 298
nn. 1, 2, 299 n. 4, 302 n. 1, 306 nn. 1, 2, 307 n. 1, 308 nn. 1-4,
312 n. 2, 316 n. 1, 318 n. 1, 322 n. 2, 323 n. 4, 326 n. 1, 330 n.
2, 352 n. 2
Hegesander, quoted from Athenaeus, i. 8 n. 3
Hegesippus, his date, ii. 6 n. 4;
quoted, ii. 2 nn. 1, 2, 6 n. 4, 8 n. 3.
See Eusebius
Heimarmene. See Destiny
Helen of Troy, Simon Magus’ mistress said to be reincarnation of, i.
178, 190, 196
Helena of Tyre, name of Simon’s mistress, i. 190;
redeemed by Simon, i. 191;
inconsistency of patristic story about, i. 193;
typifies the soul in transmigration, i. 196;
image of, as Athena, i. 198;
said to have been called Sophia, ii. 45 n. 1
Heliogabalus, the Emperor, a high-priest of the sun-god, ii. 228
Heliopolis. See Annu or On
Helios, classical type of, represented on Indian coins, i. 17 n. 2;
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