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888065

research-article2019
ARPXXX10.1177/0275074019888065The American Review of Public AdministrationRuijer et al.

Article

American Review of Public Administration

The Politics of Open Government Data: 2020, Vol. 50(3) 260­–274


© The Author(s) 2019

Understanding Organizational Responses Article reuse guidelines:


https://doi.org/10.1177/0275074019888065
to Pressure for More Transparency sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/0275074019888065
journals.sagepub.com/home/arp

Erna Ruijer1 , Francoise Détienne2, Michael Baker2, Jonathan Groff2,


and Albert J. Meijer1

Abstract
This article contributes to the growing body of literature within public management on open government data by taking
a political perspective. We argue that open government data are a strategic resource of organizations and therefore
organizations are not likely to share it. We develop an analytical framework for studying the politics of open government
data, based on theories of strategic responses to institutional processes, government transparency, and open government
data. The framework shows that there can be different organizational strategic responses to open data—varying from
conformity to active resistance—and that different institutional antecedents influence these responses. The value of the
framework is explored in two cases: a province in the Netherlands and a municipality in France. The cases provide insights
into why governments might release datasets in certain policy domains but not in others thereby producing “strategically
opaque transparency.” The article concludes that the politics of open government data framework helps us understand open
data practices in relation to broader institutional pressures that influence government transparency.

Keywords
Open government data, transparency, organizational strategic responses, politics

Introduction den Broek, 2011; M. Janssen et al., 2012; Nam, 2015). These
elements are of great importance, but they ignore a key
Public organizations around the world have increasingly aspect of OGD: its strategic nature and the purposive actions
released datasets as Open Government Data (OGD; Attard, of government organizations resisting the pressure from
Orlandi, Scerri, & Auer, 2015). OGD are non-privacy- external stakeholders to publish their data. This article chal-
restricted and non-confidential data, produced with public lenges the assumption that a lack of willingness to make data
money and made available without any restrictions on available to the public is an aberration or a type of behavior
their usage or distribution (M. Janssen, Charalabidis, & that can be changed through culture interventions, by high-
Zuiderwijk, 2012). OGD are expected to strengthen trans- lighting the politics of OGD.
parency and democratic processes, to stimulate economic Cleveland (1985, p. 185) points out that in the informa-
growth and innovation, and to lead to more effective pub- tion age, “information (organized data, the raw material
lic services and programs (Borzacchiello & Craglia, 2012; for specialized knowledge and generalist wisdom)” has
Gonzalez-Zapata & Heeks, 2015; Margetts, 2014; Peled, become a key strategic resource of organizations. And
2011; Ruijer, Grimmelikhuijsen, & Meijer, 2017; Worthy, exactly for that reason, organizations are not likely to share
2015; Zhang, Puron-Cid, & Gil-Garcia, 2015). However, it: “When information is the primary unit of organizational
so far a large share of the potential for society of OGD is currency, we should not expect its owners to give it away”
yet to be realized (Attard et al., 2015; Smith & Sandberg, (Davenport, Eccles, & Prusak, 1992, p. 54). Davenport
2018; Worthy, 2015). et al. (1992) speak of “information politics” and argue that
Several empirical studies show that resistance by govern-
ment organizations to data-driven transparency is one of the
“barriers” that needs to be dealt with, for OGD to reach its 1
Utrecht University, The Netherlands
full potential (Huijboom & Van den Broek, 2011; M. Janssen 2
Telecom ParisTech, France
et al., 2012; Zuiderwijk, Janssen, Choenni, & Alibaks, 2012).
Corresponding Author:
Leadership, a clear account of the benefits of OGD, and a Erna Ruijer, Utrecht University School of Governance, Utrecht University,
change of government culture are indicated as options to Bijlhouwerstraat 6, 3511 ZC Utrecht, The Netherlands.
overcome the resistance to release data (Huijboom & Van Email: [email protected]
Ruijer et al. 261

information is a source of power and indispensability. general insights derived for public administration and for
According to them, information politics is an inherent practitioners.
aspect of organizational life and when consciously man-
aged, true information-based organizations will emerge
Political Perspective of OGD
(Davenport et al., 1992).
This argument can also be translated to OGD because data Our political perspective of OGD builds upon the political
and information are intricately tied together. Data in their perspective of organizations: the idea that organizational
raw state are without meaning, but if they are given meaning interactions can be understood as a struggle for the alloca-
within a context, it becomes information (Mandinach, 2012). tion of scarce resources (Bolman & Deal, 2008; Elg &
OGD are perceived as valuable strategic assets (Michener & Johansson, 1997; Tushman, 1977). Politics in this view
Ritter, 2017; Peled, 2011). If these datasets are crucial to refers to the structure and process of the use of authority
government organization’s existence, can we expect organi- and power to effect definitions of goals and directions of
zations to give data away? Our key assumption is that the the organization (Tushman, 1977). From this perspective,
politics of OGD is a natural aspect of organizational behav- organizational decisions are the results that emerge from
ior (Bolman & Deal, 2008; Davenport et al., 1992; Elg & bargaining and negotiating among competing stakeholders
Johansson, 1997). This does not imply that we need to accept about resources (Bolman & Deal, 2008; Elg & Johansson,
secrecy and opaqueness as a given. It means that we do not 1997; Tushman, 1977). Organizational survival then
assess this behavior in moral terms but that we study it depends on the ability to strategically acquire and maintain
empirically to have a better understanding of this type of the flow of resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). This prob-
strategic behavior. lem would be simplified if organizations were in control of
The aim of this study is to obtain a better understanding these resources. However, organizations are embedded in
of the strategic responses of government organizations to an environment (DiMaggio & Powell, 2003; Pfeffer &
the push of OGD. Our study’s contribution is twofold. First, Salancik, 2003). Organizations are not autonomous but
we contribute to the ongoing debate of government trans- often depend on external demands and pressures by other
parency by using a political perspective of organizations. organizational actors (Handel, 2003). According to
This political perspective implies that organizational inter- Cleveland (1985), information can be viewed as a power
actions can be understood as a power struggle for the allo- resource. Yet it is different from other resources in that it is
cation of resources (Bolman & Deal, 2008; Elg & Johansson, inherently more accessible, and that once accessed it
1997). Organizational action results from bargaining and unlocks other resources (Cleveland, 1985, p. 193). The
negotiation among competing stakeholders about these more information or knowledge is spread, the more power
resources. We will develop an analytical framework by gets diffused (Cleveland, 1985). Consequently, according
combining Oliver’s (1991) work on strategic responses to to Meijer (2013), “efforts to change the distribution of this
institutional processes with more recent analyses of the resource often trigger intense strategic interactions” (p.
complex dynamics of transparency (Fox, 2007; Meijer, 431). Meijer (2013) argues that transparency can be consid-
2013) and the current literature on OGD (Birchall, 2015; ered as a strategic response that is the outcome of a com-
Longo, 2011; Michener & Ritter, 2017; Peled, 2011; plex political game influenced and shaped by the interaction
Worthy, 2015). The framework helps to better understand between different internal and external actors. Transparency
why institutional pressure on government organizations to is defined in this article as “the availability of information
release OGD can result in full access to government data about an organization or actor allowing external actors to
but also in partial access. Second, we demonstrate based on monitor the internal workings or performance of that orga-
a systematic empirical analysis, that sharing data is in fact nization” (Grimmelikhuijsen & Meijer, 2012, p. 139).
a strategic action resulting from external pressures and This argument can also be translated to OGD. So far, the
negotiations. It shows that governments release datasets in OGD literature has mainly focused on different social and
certain policy domains but not in others, thereby producing technical considerations for OGD programs: from data-
“strategically opaque transparency.” and program-oriented perspectives to more complex user
The article is structured as follows. The next section and ecosystem perspectives (Dawes, Vidiasova, &
describes the political perspective of OGD, resulting in a Parkhimovich, 2016; Zuiderwijk, Janssen, & Davis, 2014).
framework: The Politics of Open Government Data These perspectives have shed a light on the benefits of OGD
Framework. Following, we apply the framework in two and on the technical, organizational, and legal challenges
different European countries using action research and an that need to be addressed to reap the benefits of OGD
embedded case design (Yin, 2003). Data were collected via (Huijboom & Van den Broek, 2011; Zuiderwijk & Janssen,
a qualitative mixed method, using an abductive research 2014). Recently, some scholars (Birchall, 2011; Keen,
approach (Kovacs & Spens, 2014). The findings of the Calinescu, Paige, & Rooksby, 2013; Keen et al., 2013;
case studies are presented and analyzed using process trac- Worthy, 2015) have concluded that politics also play a role in
ing. The discussion and conclusion focus on the more open data policies and programs. They point out that OGD
262 American Review of Public Administration 50(3)

can be viewed as valuable strategic assets (Michener & fuzzy transparency refers to information that does not reveal
Ritter, 2017; Peled, 2011). Government agencies labor hard how institutions actually behave in practice, in terms of how
to create these datasets and therefore, they are reluctant to they make decisions, or the results of their actions (Fox,
release these datasets for free (Peled, 2011). By releasing 2007). In the OGD literature, we find that there are several
data, organizations fear a loss of control of datasets by hav- ways for organizations to appear transparent to outside
ing to hand responsibility over to others and in some cases observers but keep certain practices opaque, for instance, by
potentially losing their reason for being (Barry & Bannister, releasing incomprehensible datasets (Birchall, 2011), by
2014). Moreover, agencies have their own agenda and objec- releasing minimal amounts of datasets (Lassinantti, Bergvall-
tives and compete with other agencies over resources, influ- Kareborn, & Sahlbrost, 2014), or by only publishing those
ence, and autonomy (Peled, 2011). These studies address the datasets that are considered relatively “safe” to publish
politics of open data, but they do not systematically examine (Zuiderwijk & Janssen, 2014). Bureaucrats, according to
the strategic actions of government organizations resulting Peled (2011), know when and how to release data as part of
from external pressures and negotiations. their efforts to increase their agencies autonomy and reputa-
So, who is exerting pressure on government agencies to tion (Peled, 2011, p. 2089). Furthermore, Longo (2011)
release OGD? National governments all around the world argues that governments can selectively release data, and
have developed OGD programs, pushing (local) govern- therefore it could even be expected that governments will be
ment agencies to make their data available to the public more supportive of opening data related to policy successes
(Dawes et al., 2016). These programs consist of soft mea- than to policy challenges. Thus, organizations might not
sures such as financial aids and the communication of best release all datasets or none, but they might decide to release
practices but also of formal legislation and regulation some datasets. Creating certain forms of data-driven trans-
(Dawes et al., 2016; Huijboom & Van den Broek, 2011). In parency may therefore be a deliberate strategy of an organi-
Europe, the European Directive on the reuse of public sec- zation to generate strategic gains. To enhance our
tor information, for example, has had some influence on the understanding of these strategic responses of organizations,
opening of OGD, but the impact varies among European we will develop a framework based on Oliver’s (1991) work
Union (EU) Member States (K. Janssen, 2011). In the on strategic responses to institutional processes.
United States, the Obama Administration pushed OGD by
requiring the release of machine-readable datasets as the Politics of Open Government Data
default for government information and by setting up the
Global Open Government Partnership together with seven
Framework
other countries (Bertot, Gorham, Jaeger, Sarin, & Choi, Oliver’s work on strategic responses has been highly influen-
2014). The Global Open Government Partnership is a mul- tial in the study of organizations and has spurred a stream of
tilateral initiative that currently has 79 participation coun- publications (Bigelow & Stone, 1995; Delmas & Toffel,
tries and stimulates transparency, including open data 2008; Greenwood et al., 2011; Hyvonen, Jarvinen, Pellinen,
initiatives (Piotrowski, 2017). A legal framework for public & Rahko, 2009; Rautiainen & Jarvenpaa, 2012; Standing,
information access is a membership criterion for the Global Sims, & Love, 2009), including empirical replications
Open Government Partnership (2018). In addition, there is (Clemens & Douglas, 2005; Ingram & Simons, 1995). Oliver
a push for more OGD by a broad range of other societal challenges the notion that institutional pressure will always
actors such as citizens (Piotrowski & Van Ryzin, 2007), the result in conformist behavior of organizations. Based on an
media, nongovernmental organizations, and research insti- integration of the resource dependency perspective (Pfeffer
tutes (Mulgan, 2014). In general, the pressure can take the & Salancik, 2003) and the institutional theory perspective
form of sanctions (the stick), financial incentives (the car- (DiMaggio & Powell, 2003), she demonstrates that the reac-
rot), or convincing communication (the sermon) tion of organizations depends on the (perceived) nature of
(Bemelmans-Videc, Rist, & Vedung, 1997). The expecta- external institutional pressure (Oliver, 1991).
tion is that this push will result in the release of datasets. Oliver (1991) distinguishes five different types of
However, the political perspective results in other expec- responses to institutional pressures. Organizations may
tations (Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & fully comply with pressures (acquiesce), may partially
Lounsbury, 2011; Oliver, 1991). This literature highlights comply and bargain with stakeholders (compromise), may
that responses to institutional pressures are more complex avoid pressures through precluding the necessity of confor-
than the complete compliance often expected by regulators mity, may actively refuse (defy), and finally, they may
or funding sources (Bigelow & Stone, 1995). It might in fact actively change or exert power over institutional pressures
explain why organizations not always release all information (manipulate). These responses may sometimes partly over-
or none at all (Birchall, 2011). In the transparency literature, lap or coexist without a clear domination (Rautiainen &
Fox (2007) makes a distinction between clear and opaque Jarvenpaa, 2012). In addition, Oliver (1991) identifies five
transparency. Clear transparency refers to information that institutional factors that influence these strategic responses
sheds light on institutional behavior, whereas opaque or of organizations: cause, constituents, content, control, and
Ruijer et al. 263

context. Cause refers to the underlying rationale or expec- (in)formal rules and organizational goals support OGD
tations associated with institutional pressures (Goodstein, practices. Organizations will more likely comply when
1994; Oliver, 1991). When the demands can enhance orga- there is a low multiplicity of stakeholders, when the depen-
nizational legitimacy and efficiency, the organization will dence on these stakeholders is high, and when the environ-
show less resistance (Oliver, 1991). Constituents refer to mental context is highly uncertain and unpredictable.
interest groups, other public agencies, and the general pub- Proposition 2: Government agencies for whom the legiti-
lic. When there are multiple stakeholders involved with macy and economic gains of OGD practices are less clear
conflicting interests, resistance to pressures will be greater. and for whom constraining organizational factors influ-
Moreover, the lower the dependence on these pressuring ence OGD practices, will more likely use compromise,
constituents by the organizations, the greater the resistance avoidance, or even defiance and manipulative strategies,
will be (Oliver, 1991). The content of the demand is a criti- especially when the environmental uncertainty and inter-
cal determinant of organizational responsiveness connectedness is low as well.
(Goodstein, 1994, p. 353). When the demands conflict
with organizational goals or constrain the ability of an In the next section, we will present qualitative empirical
organization to reach its goals, resistance is more likely. research that we conducted to explore these propositions and
Control refers to legal coercion and voluntary diffusion, to further investigate whether our theoretical framework can
the extent through which a practice has already voluntarily indeed explain the strategic responses of government organi-
spread through the organization (Oliver, 1991, p. 168). If zations to a push for OGD.
powerful institutions impose regulation or institutional
demands, there will be less resistance. Furthermore, when
norms and expectations are adopted voluntarily, there will Research Methods
also be less resistance. Finally, the context refers to envi-
ronmental uncertainty; the degree to which future states of
Research Design
the world cannot be accurately predicted (Pfeffer & The empirical research aims to explore whether the frame-
Salancik, 2003) and to interconnectedness; the density of work for studying the politics of OGD can help to understand
interorganizational relations (DiMaggio & Powell, 2003; the strategic responses of organizations to the push for OGD.
Oliver, 1991; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). High environ- We used an embedded case design: We analyzed the OGD
mental uncertainty will motivate organizations to attempt practices of two local governments in two different European
to reduce uncertainty by complying with institutional pres- countries (Netherlands and France) that participated in the
sures or compromising with groups. Furthermore, when same OGD innovation project.1 An embedded case design
there is high interconnectedness among organizations, the consists of more than one unit of analysis. The case may con-
likelihood of conformity is high (Goodstein, 1994; Oliver, sist of an overarching public program, such as an EU project,
1991). Translating Oliver’s work to OGD practices results that consists of several embedded units, for example, partici-
in the following analytical framework for studying the pating local governments (Yin, 2003). The data were col-
politics of OGD (see Table 1). lected at a province in the Netherlands and a municipality in
The Politics of Open Government Data Framework shows France. The cases were selected not with the aim of compar-
that compliance with national OGD policies is only one of ing countries or localities but as two separate exploratory
the strategic responses of (local) government. Strategic tests for the explanatory potential of the framework. The pur-
responses can vary in their degree of compliance and organi- pose is replication (Yin, 2003). It allows us to test our frame-
zations can use the strategy of manipulation to change the work and propositions in two settings and to analyze whether
institutional pressures on OGD. While “acquiescence,” the cases work as predicted and whether based on the cases,
“defy,” and “manipulate” are relatively straightforward, the theory must be modified (Yin, 2003).
“compromise” and “avoid” are more complex categories. Our research data are based on action research. Action
Organizations can respond by releasing data in safe domains, research is an approach in which researchers and members
but they can also limit what data are made available, how of a social setting collaborate (Bryman, 2012). In our study,
these data are made available, when these data are made we used an abductive research approach, which fits well
available, and how easily they can be retrieved. What the with action research (Kovacs & Spens, 2014). Abductive
politics of OGD framework adds to the current literature is reasoning is commonly used when theory development and
that we can formulate expectations on how government orga- data collection occur simultaneously, implying a loop
nizations will respond to pressures to publishing OGD (see between theory and empirical data (Kovacs & Spens, 2014).
Table 1): Abduction uses probability thinking to draw temporarily,
plausible propositions that can help to improve the process
Proposition 1: Government agencies will more likely of knowledge production. Based on this process, the best
comply with OGD practices when these practices enhance possible inferences and conclusions are selected (Van
the legitimacy and efficiency of the organization, and when Buuren, 2017).
264
Table 1. Politics of Open Government Data Framework.

Strategic response

Acquiesce: Fully Compromise: Only Avoid: Preclude the Manipulate: Try


comply with OGD OGD in “easy” and necessity of conformity, Defy: Refuse to open to change OGD
Institutional antecedents practices “harmless” domains pretend to release OGD up data regulation and policies
Cause: High legitimacy, high Low legitimacy, low Low legitimacy, low Low legitimacy, low Low legitimacy, low
The degree to which OGD practices can efficiency efficiency efficiency efficiency efficiency
enhance efficiency, legitimacy of organization
Constituents: Low multiplicity, high High multiplicity, high High multiplicity, moderate High multiplicity, low High multiplicity, low
Multiplicity of stakeholders involved dependence dependence dependence dependence dependence
or interested in OGD practices and
dependence on these stakeholders
Content: High consistency, low Moderate consistency, Moderate consistency, high Low consistency, Low consistency, high
Consistency of OGD practices with constraint moderate constraint constraint high constraint constraint
organization goals, constraints with goals
Control: High coercion, high Moderate coercion, Moderate coercion, Low coercion, low Low coercion, low
Formal and informal rules, norms, and values diffusion high diffusion moderate diffusion diffusion diffusion
that influence OGD practices
Context: High, uncertainty, high High, uncertainty, high High, uncertainty, moderate Low uncertainty, low Low uncertainty, low
Uncertainty of how other organizations interconnectedness interconnectedness interconnectedness interconnectedness interconnectedness
might use OGD. Interconnection among
organizations for OGD practices

Note. OGD = open government data.


Ruijer et al. 265

Table 2. Data Collection.

Data collection Province Netherlands Local government France


Workshop Workshop with 16 participants: 8 public administrators One workshop with 7 public administrators
and 8 stakeholders One workshop with 8 stakeholders
Interviews 8 interviews: 5 stakeholders, 3 public administrators 3 interviews with public administrators
Document analysis Policy documents, coalition agreement, regulation Policy documents, regulation

The research project started with the identification of pol- relationship with citizens and civil society actors. The
icy domains within the two participating government organi- municipality relies on the digital economy, and by extension,
zations. To be able to participate in the overarching EU on the potential partnerships and innovations that they pro-
program, the responsible policy domain in the organization duce to promote the development of e-democracy. Today, the
had to be willing to release and work with OGD. The cases municipality hosts approximately 100 companies in the field
reflect the search for the policy domains within the govern- of information and communication technologies. It has
ment agencies. During our action research, we took a politi- numerous digital services concerning, for example, smart
cal theoretical perspective as our point of departure and mobility. The municipality has become one of the most rec-
noticed differences in responses of the organization regard- ognized smart/cyber cities of France. In line with its ambi-
ing different policy domains, following we searched for suit- tion of being a cyber-city, the municipality actively publishes
able theories that we had observed empirically (Kovacs & OGD. Since 2012, it started publishing OGD on the national
Spens, 2014), which led to the five responses and anteced- portal data.gouv.fr. The municipality created its own OGD
ents distinguished by Oliver (1991), and to the propositions portal in early 2015. At the time we carried out our study
that we explored empirically. (2015-2016), the portal contained 140 open datasets.

Case Descriptions Data Collection and Analysis


The Dutch case consisted of a province, one of the 12 pro- Our empirical data consisted of three focus groups with in
vincial government agencies in the Netherlands. In the total 31 participants, 11 semistructured interviews, and
province, we collected data for the policy domains: popula- document analysis between March 2015 and November
tion decline, gas drilling, and finances. These domains were 2016 (see Table 2). At each site, a focus group was held
identified by the government organization as high priority with both public administrators and stakeholders with the
topics. For the province, keeping up the livability in the aim to identify options and barriers for releasing and work-
area is a high priority because it is currently one of the areas ing with OGD (Hogan et al., 2017). The public administra-
with the highest population decline in the Netherlands. In tors consisted of open data experts, information managers,
some areas, the population will have declined by 20% in communication experts, and policy experts. The stakehold-
2040. The recent economic recession and the consequences ers consisted of journalists, grassroots initiatives, nongov-
of natural gas drilling, causing earthquakes in the province ernmental organizations, and industry. Following, in-depth
and damage to citizen housing, have impacted these devel- interviews were held with public administrators and stake-
opments as well (D62). Like other provinces in the holders and questions related to the motives for releasing
Netherlands, this province was, at the time of our research, (certain types of) datasets, the expected benefits and possi-
in the process of opening its data. The province had an ble disadvantages of opening data, the involved stakehold-
OGD portal, which contained more than 70 open datasets. ers and their roles, but also to what extent OGD is in line
The province had released several datasets related to finan- with the ambitions and goals of the government organiza-
cial transparency (D1) and health concerns. However, few tion and the formal and informal rules that influence OGD
available datasets on the portal directly related to the theme programs. In addition, government documents such as pol-
population decline or gas drilling. icy documents, the coalition agreement, and regulations
In the French municipality, our analysis focused on two were studied. The study used process tracing to analyze the
interrelated policy domains that were identified as a priority collected data (George & Bennett, 2005). Process tracing is
by the municipality: digital economy and mobility. The a method that attempts to trace the links between possible
French municipality adopted in the mid-1990s, a series of causes and observed outcomes. One form of process tracing
measures with the aim of transforming the city into a cyber- is the analytical explanation, couched in explicit theoretical
city. In 1996, it adopted a Local Information Plan to develop forms. It provides the ability to explore whether the
Information and Communication Technology (e.g., e-gov- observed processes match those predicted by the theory
ernment, electronic voting, opening of datasets) to efficiently (George & Bennett, 2005). The interviews, documents, and
respond to the challenge of building a new and better transcripts of the workshops were analyzed and coded,
266 American Review of Public Administration 50(3)

guided by the definition of the OGD strategic responses population decline. In the next section, we zoom in on the
(acquiescence, compromise, avoid, defy, and manipulate) institutional factors that are expected to influence these
and the five institutional antecedents (cause, constituents, responses based on our framework.
content, control, and context) as defined in Table 1.
Institutional antecedents. First, regarding the cause or legit-
imacy, the coalition agreement of the province mentions
Empirical Findings that the present society demands an open management
style in which collaboration, service, and transparency are
Province in the Netherlands essential for trust between government and society. How-
At the time of our study, the province in cooperation with an ever, if we analyze the policy domains more closely, some
NGO had published general financial data on a separate por- similarities and differences between the three domains can
tal and on www.openspending.nl, to increase transparency be observed. The cause for financial information is high
(D7). On the website www.openspending.nl, financial infor- because the information is used as an accountability instru-
mation regarding the income and expenses of provinces and ment (www.rijksoverheid.nl). Since 2009, provinces and
cities in the Netherlands are published. In this domain, the cities in the Netherlands must report financial information
province is complying with OGD standards. Moreover, after to the national government and to third parties via an open
releasing the initial general financial information as OGD, format that specifies which financial information should
the province decided together with the NGO to release more be provided (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, 2009).
detailed financial information. In fact, the province was the Population decline and gas drilling are high on the agenda
first in the Netherlands to publish detailed financial informa- and explicitly mentioned in the coalition agreement as one
tion that specifies how government money is spent (D7, D9). of the main tasks of the province (D7). Moreover, both
In this domain, the province fully complied with OGD prac- domains are not just a local but also considered an issue of
tices. The OGD response in the domain of financial transpar- national importance (D9). Until then OGD had not yet
ency can, therefore, be characterized as acquiescence. been used as an instrument for population decline and its
Another policy issue high on the agenda of the province at value was unknown. For the field of gas drilling, OGD was
the time of our study was consequences of natural gas drill- perceived as possibly undermining legitimacy (R7). Hence,
ing. Natural gas drilling had caused earthquakes in the prov- for these two domains, the perceived gain can be consid-
ince and damage to citizen housing and discussion regarding ered low.
compensation was debated. The province indicated that it Second, concerning constituent involvement some differ-
was reticent to start an OGD initiative concerning this topic ences can be observed for the three domains. Regarding the
due to the political sensitivity of the issue. The province financial information, there is low constituent involvement
attempted to preclude the necessity to conform, buffering because the third parties involved largely have a similar
themselves from institutional pressures. This OGD response interest using financial information as an accountability
regarding the domain of natural gas drilling can be character- instrument. The third parties are the National Government,
ized as avoidance. the Central Bureau of Statistics, the EU, the financial regula-
Finally, the policy domain “population decline” was also tory agency but also other local governments and finally
high on the agenda of the province. OGD was not yet used as journalists (www.rijksoverheid.nl, R6). The external depen-
an instrument for solving population decline issues. The dency in this domain is high because the province receives
province decided to focus on this issue for the OGD innova- budget from the national government based on their financial
tion project. The participating stakeholders indicated that information. In the policy domain, consequences of gas drill-
there were insufficient data available of interest and that the ing, there is a high degree of constituent involvement with
data were difficult to find because the data are spread out conflicting interests. Citizens are organized in action groups
over different organizations (D3, workshop). Despite these who demand release of information (r3b, D6) and would like
shortcomings, ways were sought by the province to meet the to use OGD for their initiative (R7). The external depen-
expectations of citizens (D3, D4). The province involved dence can be considered moderate because in the domain of
stakeholders of citizens’ initiatives and discussed with them gas drilling, a new separate government agency was estab-
which type of data could contribute to their projects. In this lished at the time of our study, specifically focused on the
domain, the province decided to balance and bargain with consequences of gas drilling. In the new agency, the national,
external constituents. This response in the domain of popula- province, and local governments joined forces and partici-
tion decline can be characterized as compromise. pated together. In the policy domain population decline, sev-
Hence, at the start of the innovation project when the eral citizens’ initiatives had been developed and many
province was to decide in which policy domain OGD prac- diverse actors are involved because policy decline effects
tices were to be developed, we can observe three different housing, education, health care, and so on. Conflicts, how-
responses: acquiescence for the financial domain, avoidance ever, were less of an issue and constituent complicity can
for the consequences of gas drilling and compromise for therefore be considered moderate. The dependence is high
Ruijer et al. 267

because the province depends on collaboration with citizens collect information about population decline and gas drill-
and stimulates citizens’ initiatives by taking a specific bot- ing but there is no general overview of all information col-
tom-up policy approach (D9). lected. Within the organization, information or OGD is not
Third, in terms of the content, the coalition agreement yet seen as an instrument, like other instruments such as
supports openness of data; however, it does not specify law or subsidies (R1). The voluntary diffusion can there-
which type of data when, where, or how it should be pub- fore be assessed as moderate.
lished. In general, there is political pressure and support Finally, in terms of the context all three domains require
within the province for OGD practices (R1 and R2), but multilevel governance, which demonstrates a high level of
support for OGD within the organization, at the manage- interconnectedness. Some differences between the domains
ment level, is moderate to low (R1, R3b, D5). As one can be observed for the different policy domains. For finan-
respondent noted, cial data, the environmental uncertainty can be assessed as
low. There was some initial fear of losing control.
Even though OGD is one of the objectives, it is not followed Nevertheless, it was decided to systematically release
through in practice because resources are lacking. (R2) financial data as OGD because the information was already
part of the organizations’ work processes and was already
OGD requires a different way of thinking and a culture made public, however not yet in machine-readable formats
change within the organization (D4). Again, some differ- (R2). Furthermore, once the first government organizations
ences between the domains can be observed, collecting started to publish their information, others followed: “It is a
financial data was already part of the organizations’ work ripple effect” (R6). In the domain population decline, coop-
process and was already made public, however not yet in eration between the ministry, the province, and municipali-
machine-readable formats (R2). Hence, we can speak of ties, and with stakeholders such as companies, health care
high consistency in this domain and low constraints. Data and education facilities, and citizens are required (Bikker,
regarding the consequences of natural gas drilling were 2012). There is moderate uncertainty in this domain due to
considered sensitive and are therefore considered highly fear of privacy issues, especially once different datasets are
constraining. The value of OGD regarding population linked together. In the domain of gas drilling, a new sepa-
decline was not yet clear for the organization at the start of rate government body was established in which the central,
the project and can therefore be considered as moderately province, and local governments participate together. The
constraining. policy issue “was considered politically sensitive and there
Fourth, in terms of control, the Dutch national OGD pol- was a fear for reputation damage” (R7). Due to the politi-
icy applies to the provinces which is based on the Dutch cally sensitivity of the topic and the uncertainty of what
Freedom of Information Act (Wet Openbaarheid Bestuur, stakeholders would do with the information, the environ-
Wob), implemented in 1980, and the 2003 Directive of the mental uncertainty and interconnectedness can be assessed
European Parliament and the Council of the European Union as high.
on the reuse of public sector information, implemented in
Dutch law in 2015. The National Wob also applies to the Analysis. In line with the Politics of Open Government
provinces. The Wob does not specificy which type of infor- Data Framework, we found different organizational strate-
mation should be proactively released. However, for the gic responses acquiesce, compromise, and avoidance for
domain finances, the legal coercion is high because addi- three different policy domains, respectively, financial
tional financial law requires that financial information should information, gas drilling, and population decline, within
be released, and it states how it should be released. one government organization. Largely in line with Oliver’s
Information is structurally collected, and the voluntary diffu- framework, the institutional antecedents for the three
sion can be considered high. Next to formal rules that apply domains show a different pattern (see Table 3). The factor
to government organizations, the province also stated in a cause is different for the domains with a high-perceived
memo (D10) that in general the OGD quality and access of gain for the domain financial data, but not for the other two
data of the province should be improved and that it should be domains. The policy domains population decline and gas
systematically mapped out within the organization which drilling are a priority but the value of OGD in relation to
data might be relevant for reuse: these domains was perceived as limited or undermining at
the time of our study. The factors constituents, content, and
The re-use of data should become part of policy proposals, control also show a pattern largely in line with our expec-
project assignments and agreements. (D10) tations. However, for the factor context, we observed an
opposite pattern regarding the dimension uncertainty. In
However, civil servants are not always aware of the impor- the case of the financial domain the environmental uncer-
tance and usefulness of releasing information (D4), nor is tainty was low; there was some initial fear of releasing
information always structurally collected within the orga- data, but because the data were already available in a dif-
nization (workshop1). Parties outside the province often ferent format, the organization decided to pursue OGD
268 American Review of Public Administration 50(3)

Table 3. Overview of Strategic Responses and Antecedents Netherlands.

Province in the Netherlands


Policy domains Budget Population decline Gas drilling

Strategic response Acquiesce Compromise Avoidance


Cause
Perceived social Accountability (high) Population decline high on Gas drilling high on agenda
legitimacy agenda (high) (high)
Perceived economic Information used as an instrument OGD not yet used as an Releasing information can lead
gain (high) instrument (low) to reputation damage (low)
Constituents
Constituent National government, EU, financial Many stakeholders involved Many stakeholders involved
multiplicity regulator & people interested in with partly different interests with different interests (high)
financial data mostly other cities and (moderate)
provinces, some journalists similar
interests (accountability) (low)
External Province and cities receive budget Policy implementation depends There is a new separate
dependence from national government (high) on stakeholders and research institute responsible for
reports and data collected by dealing with the consequences
others (high) of gas drilling (moderate)
Content
Consistency Collecting financial data is part of the OGD in general is part of OGD in general is part of
work process (high) organizational goals but not organizational goals but no
yet in relation to population mentioning in relation to gas
decline (moderate) drilling (moderate)
Constraints Information already open, Lack of management support, Lack of management support
management and political support unknown relevance of OGD and highly politically sensitive
(low) for policy field (moderate) (high)
Control
Legal coercion Regulated by law and information is General Freedom of Information General Freedom of Information
already public on a national website law, not specified (moderate) law, not specified (moderate)
(high)
Voluntary diffusion Information structurally collected Information partly structurally Information partly collected
(one format for all) collected and collected by by other organizations
(high) other organizations (moderate) (moderate)
Context
Uncertainty Data were already available Some fear due to privacy issues Highly politically sensitive
elsewhere (moderate) New government body, fear of
(low) releasing data (high)
Degree of Multilevel governance Multilevel governance Multilevel governance
interconnectedness (high) (high) (high)

OGD = open government data; EU = European Union.

practices nevertheless. In the case of gas drilling because of complying especially if it is perceived to undermine
of the political sensitivity of the topic and the fear of the legitimacy.
consequences of releasing data, it was decided to not pur-
sue OGD practices in this domain at the time of our study
A Municipality in France
because it could undermine legitimacy. Based on our prop-
ositions, we expected that a highly uncertain and unpre- At the time of our study, the French municipality had orga-
dictable environment would exert greater effort by an nized and taken on the leadership of an OGD group, con-
organization to reestablish the reality of control and stabil- sisting of civil servants of local municipalities with the aim
ity over future organizational outcomes. We expected in to develop good OGD practices. Furthermore, the munici-
this case that organization would be more likely to comply pality promoted the digital economy: Companies were
with demands imposed on them, thereby protecting them encouraged to transform OGD into economic resources.
from environmental turbulence. However, in the case of Geo-located data were particularly considered as having
OGD that expected turbulence withholds the organization high value for the digital economy. The OGD response for
Ruijer et al. 269

the digital economy in general can be characterized as a economic impact on health services. The economic gain is
case of “acquiescence”: The municipality fully complied perceived as moderate. Furthermore, the policy domain
with OGD practices. However, when we zoom in more transportation is also chosen as a priority based on public
closely in this broad domain, it can be observed that the consultation: citizens had voted public transportation and
municipality is in fact reticent to publish data that might accessibilities as one of the main problems in the city (R3).
have a negative effect on the attractiveness of the city, in Second, in terms of the antecedent constituents, we can
terms of economics or safety. They attempted to preclude observe some differences between the policy domains. For
the necessity for conformity. Hence, within the policy the policy domain digital economy, the participating cities
domain of the digital economy we can observe both acqui- would like to find a common solution. The external depen-
escence and avoidance as strategic responses. Mobility is dence is considered high because the city depends on tech-
another high priority policy domain of the municipality. In nical developers and experts in computer sciences to make
this domain, the municipality is more a facilitator than a this work. In the policy domain transportation, the con-
producer of OGD and the municipality must negotiate with stituency is more diverse and is highly dependent on effec-
external stakeholders for the release of data. In general, the tive transportation. In mobility, data in general are not
strategic OGD responses for mobility can be considered as perceived as difficult to release because partners share
compromise. However, if we zoom in on data concerning their data on demand.
access to public transport for people with disabilities, there
again reluctance can be found. Publishing this type of OGD Concerning transport, it was politically easy to have access to
could allow local pressure groups to criticize the local gov- data. We faced only some technical problems for collecting data
ernment, for example, regarding a lack of services. Hence, from services in charge of producing it. (R1)
within the policy domain of mobility, we can observe both
compromise and avoidance as response strategies. In the However, the data availability and the potential lack of
next section, we will analyze the antecedents that are access for people with disabilities depend on many stake-
expected to influence these responses. holders (e.g., private companies, regional institution, local
governments). Publishing such OGD could allow local
Institutional antecedents. In terms of the first antecedent pressure groups to criticize the local government with
cause, we can observe that in both domains there is a high respect to a lack of services for which the city is not
degree of legitimacy. The digital economy is of high priority directly responsible.
for the municipality. It is a way to create employment and to Third, regarding the content, there is a high degree of con-
attract new inhabitants. As one of the first smart cities in the sistency between institutional norms and organizational
world (2009) and one of the most recognized cyber cities of goals for the digital economy. The municipality is working
France, the municipality aims to keep its leadership in this on a political and economic plan for promoting digital action
domain. For that purpose, it encourages developers who (R3). The digital economy is a priority of the municipality
work in information and communications technology (ICT) because it wants to keep its leadership position as a cyber
companies established in the city, start-ups, and big compa- city. An OGD project on transportation is also in accordance
nies, to participate in events around the ICT economy such as with the digital strategy of the municipality. The city pub-
conferences and hackathons. OGD can be used for improved lishes data provided by transport companies. In addition,
services and applications and the perceived economic gain is some constraints can be pointed out for both domains. The
considered high. By defending its leadership, the municipal- municipality faces a lack of employees for data management
ity wants to generate new forms of relationships between the and digitalization. This raises two recurring barriers: (a) dif-
administration and citizens, among others by using OD plat- ficulties in identifying available datasets and (b) a limited
forms. This benefits the municipality: interoperability of the data format.
Fourth, in terms of control the respondents referred to the
It is a question of communication. We want to propose a service French “Lemaire Law.” This law is aimed at enhancing the
that is useful for citizens. availability of OGD and obliges administrations of 50 agents
or more to release data that are already digitalized. However,
Regarding transportation, the municipality is a key city in the the respondents pointed out that the law did not influence
domain of “connected mobility,” and civil servants would their project because they had begun opening their data
also like to keep this leadership. De facto, they comanage a already before the law. In addition, in the area of mobility,
consortium devoted to mobility, consisting of private compa- the public administrators also use OGD to reduce traffic to
nies and public institutions. Within this context, OGD are comply with the EU directive 2010/40/UE. The legal coer-
namely used as instruments for improving traffic: (a) to opti- cion can therefore be considered moderate for the digital
mize business productivity by reducing time spent by economy and high for mobility. Diffusion can be assessed as
employees in transport, (b) to respect the EU directive high in both domains because they already published data
2010/40/UE, and (c) to reduce air pollution and limit before the law. Moreover, participants involved in the policy
270 American Review of Public Administration 50(3)

domain transport explicitly referred to the diffusion of OGD specific areas within the domains that are perceived as poten-
in other cities: tially harmful for the legitimacy of government.

a major part of big cities did it in Europe. For example:


Santander in Spain. In this city, traffic decreased by 40% with Discussion and Conclusion
the exploitation of OD by PAs and local companies. In Paris, The purpose of this article was to develop a better under-
PAs tried to do the same thing in some areas. (R1) standing of strategic responses of organizations to the push
for OGD by highlighting the politics of open data.
We are behind schedule compared to the cities (. . .) and (. . .)
Government organizations are complex adaptive systems
which have already developed projects and applications. (R2)
that interact dynamically with their environment
(Baumgartner & Jones, 2015; Meijer, 2013). Two separate
Finally, in terms of context, regarding both domains there
cases in two countries, The Netherlands and France, who
is high degree of interconnectedness due to the different lay-
both participated in the same OGD innovation project, were
ers of involved administrations and supplier services.
analyzed for the explanatory potential of the Politics of Open
Regarding the digital economy, the municipality has made
Government Data Framework.
data accessible to stakeholders (including other cities and
Our key contribution to the public administration litera-
citizens) that does not generate controversy and preserves the
ture is that the organizational push for OGD can lead to vary-
economic and political interests of the city. We can assess
ing strategic responses per policy domain resulting in hybrid
this as low uncertainty. However, there is reticence to for
organizational OGD practices. Our study contributes to the
instance release air pollution data, because it could nega-
ongoing transparency debate. We term such strategies involv-
tively impact real estate prices. Here we observed high
ing restricting the available data or else distributing it across
uncertainty in the same domain. In terms of access to public
disparate datasets, strategically opaque transparency (cf.
transportation, there is low uncertainty due to a strong coop-
Groff, Baker, & Détienne, 2016). We define strategically
eration between civil servants and transport companies.
opaque transparency as the purposive action of revealing
However, for data concerning people with disabilities, a
information about the internal workings or performance of
higher degree of environmental uncertainty can be observed.
an organization in certain domains but not revealing infor-
Publishing these data could allow local pressure groups to
mation in other domains. It confirms Longo’s (2011) assump-
oblige public administrators to engage in time-consuming
tion that governments can selectively release OGD. Our
discussions, with respect to a lack of services for which the
findings are also in line with Roberts’ (2006) argument that
city is not directly responsible.
the increase in transparency should not be understood as
homogeneous. Our findings imply that the transparency
Analysis. Hence in the French case we found different strate- debate needs to focus more on the differences between types
gic responses for different domains (see Table 4). In line with of datasets and between policy domains. Our study shows
Rautiainen and Jarvenpaa (2012), we observed coexisting that OGD are especially released in “easy” and “harmless”
responses within the domains. It can be observed that the domains.
municipality prefers to publish OGD in “harmless” domains Furthermore, three of the five identified strategic
that would not enable or encourage political dispute or spe- responses were found in both cases: acquiescence, compro-
cific demands from groups of citizens. At the same time the mise, and avoid. We did not find strategies of defiance and
municipality is reticent to publishing data that might have a manipulation. One possible reason could be the setting in
negative effect on the attractiveness of the city, in terms of which this study took place: two local governments in demo-
economics, ecology, safety, or access of public transport for cratic European countries that both score rather low on the
people with disabilities. If we analyze the factors that affect international corruption perceptions index (Transparency
the response, then we can observe that for the factor cause International, 2017) and high on the international Open Data
(see Table 4) the digital economy follows our propositions Barometer (2016). Perhaps in other (nondemocratic) coun-
but in the domain mobility we assessed the economic gain as tries, other responses might be found. This requires further
“moderate” instead of the expected score “low.” The factor research. Another reason of not finding these strategies might
constituents follows the politics of OGD framework for the be due to the mostly in person methods used which might
domain digital economy but for the domain mobility a mixed lead to more socially desirable answers (Bryman, 2012).
score can be observed. In general, in the field of mobility the The five institutional antecedents cause, constituents,
stakeholders have similar interest, but this is different for the content, control, and context can explain the different
area of people with disabilities. Content and control are in responses of local governments in terms of eagerly opening
line with our expectations. Finally, in terms of context, it can certain types of data but much less willing to open others.
be observed that for the dimension of uncertainty we again Largely, in line with our propositions, we found that govern-
see a mixed opposite score because there is a general percep- ment agencies will more likely comply with OGD practices
tion of pursuing the releasing data for the domains but not in when these practices enhance the legitimacy or efficiency of
Ruijer et al. 271

Table 4. Overview of Strategic Responses and Antecedents France.

Municipality in France

Policy domains Digital economy Mobility

Strategic response Mixed: Acquiesce & avoidance Mixed: Compromise & avoidance
Cause
Perceived social One of the first smart city in the world (2009)— A key city in the domain of “connected mobility”: Co-
legitimacy and—leadership, in France, in the development management of a consortium devoted to mobility—
of good practices relating to OGD. gathering private companies and public institutions.
PAs would like to maintain the position of their (high)
city in these domains.
(high)
Perceived economic OGD are used (by the city)—as a means to OGD in transportation are used as instruments for
gain create sustainable businesses by transforming improving traffic: to optimize business productivity—
raw data into services and application. to reduce air pollution
It’s a means to create employment and to (moderate)
attract new inhabitants.
(high)
Constituents
Constituent EU, conurbation, private companies involved Private companies, and competitive cluster association
multiplicity in digital economy (international companies), of citizens, developers of mobile application with
who would like common solutions (moderate) similar interest in general but different interests
regarding access for people with disabilities
(low and high)
External Dependence on technical developers, experts in The municipality is a facilitator of OGD and not
dependence computer sciences producer
(high) (high)
Content
Consistency Digital economy is a priority and releasing data The city publishes data provided by transport
in this area is therefore in line with city’s goals companies (in line with the strategy to facilitate
(high) mobility by using OGD)
(moderate)
Constraints Lack of human resources for managing data Lack of (technical) human resources for developing
collection and digitalization system devoted to dynamic data
(moderate) (moderate)
Control
Legal coercion General law on OGD constrains— General law on OGD does not concern a specific
administration of 50 agents and more—to field and so transport companies have no specific
release data already digitalized (only) obligation.
(moderate) EU directive 2010/40/UE
(high)
Voluntary diffusion Diffusion of information already released Diffusion of information (concerning static data) already
Other information is collected by organizations collected and published by transport companies
(private/public partners) for a specific project Information (concerning spaces for transport as
(high) car parks) already released by the city (within the
framework of the general law)
Transport companies provide some of their data on the
“city OGD platform”
(high)
Context
Uncertainty Fear of releasing some data related to political Limited fear due to a strong cooperation between PAs,
or economical strategy competitive cluster and transport companies but
(high and low) fear in terms of releasing data regarding people with
disabilities (high and low)
Degree of Multilevel governance Multilevel governance
interconnectedness (high) (high)

OGD = open government data; EU = European Union; PAs = public administrators.


272 American Review of Public Administration 50(3)

the organization, when the formal and informal rules and release of environmental information. Without institutional
organizational goals support OGD practices and when there incentives or pressures, local governments will selectively
is a low multiplicity of stakeholders. Contrary to our propo- pick certain harmless policy domains but avoid releasing sen-
sitions, however, we found that when the environmental sitive OGD. We suggest that a better understanding of spe-
context is highly uncertain and unpredictable and when cific institutional responses is crucial to enhancing OGD
there is a high multiplicity of constituents and high legiti- practices in public administration.
macy stakes, organizations tend to compromise and avoid
open data practices in the policy domain. A possible expla- Acknowledgments
nation for this surprising finding could be that information The authors would like to thank their ROUTE-TO-PA colleagues
is not like other resources (Cleveland, 1985). Information is for their valuable contributions.
sharable and expandable in ways we cannot imagine
(Cleveland, 1985). Open data have no value in itself but Declaration of Conflicting Interests
become valuable when used (M. Janssen et al., 2012).
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect
Others can use data in ways that organizations cannot imag- to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
ine or foresee. Organizations also fear that stakeholders are
actively seeking for negative accomplishments or data Funding
might be abused or misinterpreted (Barry & Bannister,
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support
2014; Fung, 2013). These findings indicate that a modifica-
for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This
tion of our theoretical framework is necessary: Low contex- project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon
tual uncertainty might, in fact, lead to more willingness to 2020 research and innovation program under grant agreement No.
release data, whereas high uncertainty and high legitimacy 645860.
lead to more resistance. However, this study was based on
an exploratory qualitative analysis. Further research is ORCID iD
encouraged to determine causal links between antecedents
Erna Ruijer https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2907-1454
and institutional responses regarding the release of OGD
based on quantitative analyses to further test the politics of
Notes
OGD framework.
This article highlights that the incentive created by the 1. European Horizon 2020 project ROUTE-TO-PA Raising Open
institutional environment for OGD should be understood as and User-Friendly Transparency-Enabling Tools for Public
Administration.
an incentive for the release of specific types of data by gov-
2. D refers to documents that were studied. D1 refers to docu-
ernment organizations. The perceived incentives focus on ment 1 and so on. R refers to respondents interviewed. R1
policy domains that are rather harmless such as budget data refers to Respondent 1.
in the Netherlands and data about the digital economy in
France. The incentives for opening more sensitive data are
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Public Administration, 37, 306-323. Françoise Détienne got her Masters in Cognitive Ergonomics, and
Rautiainen, A., & Jarvenpaa, M. (2012). Institutional logics and PhD in Cognitive Psychology, Habilitation, Psychology. She is a
responses to performance measurement systems. Financial tenured research professor of the Centre National de la Recherche
Accountability & Management, 28, 164-188. Scientifique, working in the Social and Economic Sciences depart-
Roberts, A. (2006). Blacked out: Government secrecy in the infor- ment of Telecom Paris. Her research focusses on technology-medi-
mation age. New York: Cambridge University Press. ated collaboration, online epistemic communities, design and cre-
Ruijer, E., Grimmelikhuijsen, S., & Meijer, A. (2017). Open data ativity. She is member of the editorial board of the CoDesign
for democracy: Developing a theoretical framework for open journal and Activites journal.
data use. Government Information Quarterly, 34, 45-52.
Smith, G., & Sandberg, J. (2018). Barriers to innovating with open Michael Baker got his PhD in Cognitive Science, Habilitation,
government data: Exploring experiences across service phases Psychology. He is a tenured research professor of the Centre
and user types. Information Polity, 23, 249-265. National de la Recherche Scientifique, working in the Social and
Standing, C., Sims, I., & Love, P. (2009). IT non-conformity in insti- Economic Sciences department of Telecom Paris. His research
tutional environments: E-marketplace place adoption in the gov- focusses on analysis of interactions produced in computer sup-
ernment sector. Information & Management, 46, 138-149. ported collaborative learning and work situations. He is a member
Transparency International. (2017, January 25). Corruption percep- of the editorial committee of the International Journal of Computer
tions index 2016. Available from www.transparency.org Supported Collaborative Learning.
Tushman, M. (1977). A political approach to organizations: A Jonathan Groff got his PhD in Cognitive Psychology and has
review and rationale. The Academy of Management Review, 2, worked as a post-doctoral researcher on the EU-funded “ROUTE-
2016-2216. TO-PA” project, with the Centre National de la Recherche
Van Buuren, M. (2017). Vormgeven aan uitnodigend bestuur: Scientifique at Telecom Paris. His research aims to understand the
Pleidooir voor een ontwerpgerichte bestuurskunde (Oratie cognitive processes underlying the understanding of graphical
ed.). Rotterdam: Erasmus University Rotterdam. animations.
Worthy, B. (2015). The impact of open data in the UK: Complex,
unpredictable and political. Public Administration, 93, 788-805. Albert J. Meijer is professor of public innovation at the Utrecht
Yin, R. (2003). Case study research: Design and methods (3rd ed.). University School of Governance. His research focuses on transpar-
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. ency, open government data, coproduction and social media.

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