NAVAL

POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

AN ASSESSMENT OF PHILIPPINE COUNTERINSURGENCY

STRATEGIES: WHY HAS COMMUNIST INSURGENCY
CONTINUED TO EXIST IN THE PHILIPPINES?

by

Michael G. Yuson

June 2021

Thesis Advisor: Kalev I. Sepp

Co-Advisor: Sandra R. Leavitt
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AN ASSESSMENT OF PHILIPPINE COUNTERINSURGENCY
STRATEGIES: WHY HAS COMMUNIST INSURGENCY CONTINUED TO
EXIST IN THE PHILIPPINES?
6. AUTHOR(S) Michael G. Yuson

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13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
After more than five decades and despite several successes, the Philippines is still fighting a communist
insurgency within its country. This study compared and analyzed four counterinsurgency campaign plans
implemented by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) after the 1986 EDSA People Power Revolution:
Oplan Lambat Bitag during the Corazon Aquino and Ramos administrations, Oplan Bantay-Laya during the
Arroyo administration, the Internal Peace and Security Plan Bayanihan during the Benigno Aquino III
administration, and the current Development Support and Security Plan Kapayapaan led by the Duterte
administration. This study found that inadequate sustainment capability, lack of support from government
institutions, and challenges to political leadership constitute the primary factors that have hindered the AFP
campaigns. The current government recognizes these problems and has instituted several initiatives to overcome
them, including a Community Support Program implemented by the AFP that increases intra-governmental
collaboration, an enhanced partnership with civil society, and the creation of a national task force to help
consolidate the diverse efforts of multiple national agencies, local government units, and civil society to improve
security, good governance, and economic conditions and opportunities. Building on these, this thesis recommends
further improvements to strengthen support for the current campaign and areas for future study.

14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF

Counterinsurgency, CPP-NPA-NDF, AFP, Communist Party of the Philippines, New PAGES
People’s Army, National Democratic Front, Armed Forces of the Philippines, Oplan Lambat 107
Bitag, Oplan Bantay-Laya, Internal Peace and Security Plan Bayanihan, IPSP Bayanihan, 16. PRICE CODE
Development Support and Security Plan Kapayapaan, DSSP Kapayapaan, CSP, Community
Support Program
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 Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

AN ASSESSMENT OF PHILIPPINE COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGIES:

WHY HAS COMMUNIST INSURGENCY CONTINUED
TO EXIST IN THE PHILIPPINES?

Michael G. Yuson
Major, Philippine Army
BS, Philippine Military Academy, 2002

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS

(IRREGULAR WARFARE)

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

June 2021

Approved by: Kalev I. Sepp

Advisor

Sandra R. Leavitt
Co-Advisor

Douglas A. Borer
Chair, Department of Defense Analysis

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 ABSTRACT

After more than five decades and despite several successes, the Philippines is still
fighting a communist insurgency within its country. This study compared and analyzed
four counterinsurgency campaign plans implemented by the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) after the 1986 EDSA People Power Revolution: Oplan Lambat Bitag
during the Corazon Aquino and Ramos administrations, Oplan Bantay-Laya during the
Arroyo administration, the Internal Peace and Security Plan Bayanihan during the
Benigno Aquino III administration, and the current Development Support and Security
Plan Kapayapaan led by the Duterte administration. This study found that inadequate
sustainment capability, lack of support from government institutions, and challenges to
political leadership constitute the primary factors that have hindered the AFP campaigns.
The current government recognizes these problems and has instituted several initiatives
to overcome them, including a Community Support Program implemented by the AFP
that increases intra-governmental collaboration, an enhanced partnership with civil
society, and the creation of a national task force to help consolidate the diverse efforts of
multiple national agencies, local government units, and civil society to improve security,
good governance, and economic conditions and opportunities. Building on these, this
thesis recommends further improvements to strengthen support for the current campaign
and areas for future study.

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1
A. LITERATURE REVIEW .........................................................................2
B. RESEARCH DESIGN ...............................................................................6
C. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE ..............................7

II. UNDERSTANDING THE COMMUNIST INSURGENCY THREAT ............9

A. PARTIDO KOMUNISTA NG PILIPINAS AND THE HUK
REBELLION ............................................................................................10
B. COMMUNIST RE-EMERGENCE ........................................................10
C. CPP-NPA OBJECTIVES, STRATEGIES, AND TACTICS ...............12
1. Objectives......................................................................................13
2. Protracted People’s War: CPP-NPA’s Three-Stage
Insurgency Strategy .....................................................................13
3. Three Main Weapons ..................................................................14
D. CPP-NPA STRUCTURE, ORGANIZATION, AND
LEADERSHIP .........................................................................................16
1. Structure and Organization ........................................................16
2. Trends and Strength ....................................................................21
3. Leadership ....................................................................................23

III. THE CAMPAIGNS AND THEIR RESULTS ...................................................27

A. OPLAN LAMBAT BITAG (NET TRAP) ................................................28
1. Campaign Objectives and Strategies .........................................29
2. Operational Accomplishments....................................................29
3. External Support..........................................................................31
B. OPLAN BANTAY-LAYA (GUARDING FREEDOM)...........................32
1. Campaign Objectives and Strategies .........................................33
2. Operational Accomplishments....................................................33
3. External Support..........................................................................35
C. INTERNAL PEACE AND SECURITY PLAN—IPSP
BAYANIHAN (CIVIC UNITY) ...............................................................36
1. Campaign Objectives and Strategies .........................................38
2. Operational Accomplishments....................................................38
3. External Support..........................................................................39
D. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................40

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IV. ANALYZING THE CAMPAIGNS: WHY THE CPP-NPA HAS NOT
YET BEEN DEFEATED.....................................................................................43
A. SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS....................................................43
1. Oplan Lambat Bitag (Net Trap) ..................................................44
2. Oplan Bantay Laya (Guarding Freedom)...................................46
3. Internal Peace and Security Plan—IPSP Bayanihan
(Civic Unity) .................................................................................49
B. FACTORS THAT HINDERED THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE AFP CAMPAIGNS.........................................................................50
1. Inadequate Sustainment Capability ...........................................51
2. Lack of Support from Government Institutions .......................52
3. Challenges to Political Leadership .............................................54
C. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................56

V. DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT AND SECURITY PLAN— DSSP

KAPAYAPAAN (PEACE) ....................................................................................57
A. OVERVIEW OF DSSP KAPAYAPAAN ................................................57
Campaign Objectives and Strategies .....................................................58
B. NEW AFP-LED INITIATIVES TO SUPPORT THE
CAMPAIGN .............................................................................................61
1. Community Support Program ....................................................61
2. Enhanced Cooperation with Government Agencies and
Civil Society ..................................................................................64
3. National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed
Conflict ..........................................................................................65
C. CAMPAIGN COMPARISON ................................................................67
1. Addressing Inadequate Sustainment Capability ......................67
2. Lack of Support from Government Institutions .......................69
3. Challenges to Political Leadership .............................................70
D. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................71

VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...............................................73

A. MAJOR FINDINGS ................................................................................73
1. Reasons for the Communist Insurgency’s Re-emergence
and Sustainment ...........................................................................74
2. Why the CPP-NPA Has Not Yet Been Defeated .......................74
B. RECOMMENDATIONS .........................................................................76
1. Addressing the Inadequate Sustainment Capability ................76
2. Addressing Lack of Government Institution Support and
Lack of Civil Society Support .....................................................78

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 3. Addressing Challenges with Political and Military
Leadership ....................................................................................79
C. FUTURE STUDIES .................................................................................79

LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................81

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ...................................................................................89

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 LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. CPP-NPA-NDF Organizational Structure. ................................................18

Figure 2. Typical Regional Party Committee Organizational Structure. ..................19

Figure 3. Regional Operational Commands of the NPA. ..........................................20

Figure 4. NPA Resources from 1981 to 2019, Relative to Major Events. ................22

Figure 5. Trend in CPP-NPA Capabilities (1989–1998)...........................................30

Figure 6. Trend in CPP-NPA Capabilities (2001–2010)...........................................34

Figure 7. Trend in CPP-NPA Capabilities (2011–2016)...........................................39

Figure 8. Development-Governance-Security Framework. ......................................59

Figure 9. Community Support Team (CST) Composition. .......................................62

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 LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADF Australian Defense Force

AFP Armed Forces of the Philippines
AFPSOCOM Armed Forces of the Philippines Special Operations Command
ASG Abu Sayyaf Group
BIN Barangay Intelligence Network
C-H-C-D Clear-Hold-Consolidate-Develop
CMO Civil-Military Operations
CPP Communist Party of the Philippines
CSP Community Support Program
CSO Civil Society Organization
CST Community Support Teams
DILG Department of Interior and Local Government
DND Department of National Defense
DSWD Department of Social Welfare and Development
DSSP Development Support and Security Plan
EASTMINCOM Eastern Mindanao Command
EDCA Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement
EU European Union
FC [Communist] Front Committees
GF Guerilla Fronts
GWOT Global War on Terror
ID [Communist] International Department
IFC [Communist] International Finance Commission
IPSP Internal Peace and Security Plan
ISO Internal Security Operations
ITDS Integrated Territorial Defense System
LGU Local Government Unit
NDF National Democratic Front
NED [Communist] National Education Department
NFC [Communist] National Finance Commission
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NMC [Communist] National Military Commission
NOD [Communist] National Organizational Department
NPA New People’s Army
NTF-ELCAC National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict
NUC [Communist] National Unification Commission
NUFC [Communist] National United Front Commission
PDT Peace and Development Team
PO People’s Organization
POLITBORO Political Bureau
PNP Philippine National Police
PPW Protracted People’s War
PRWC Philippine Revolution Web Central
RCSP Retooled Community Support Program
ROC Regional Operational Commands
RPC Regional Party Committees
SOF Special Operations Forces
SOFA Status-of-Forces Agreement
SOLCOM Southern Luzon Command
SOT Special Operation Team
SPSGs Southern Philippines Secessionist Groups
UC Unified Command
UGMO Underground Mass Organization
VFA Visiting Forces Agreement
WNA Whole-of-Nation Approach

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 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My sincerest gratitude to the following who in one way or another have made my
journey here at the Naval Postgraduate School meaningful and rewarding:

To the Great Architect of the Universe, who continuously blessed me and my

family…

To my thesis advisors, Dr. Sandra R. Leavitt and Dr. Kalev I. Sepp, your guidance
and patience have made this thesis possible…

To Dr. Cheryldee Huddleston and Daniel Lehnherr, for painstakingly looking at my

rough drafts…

To my superiors, peers, and colleagues in the AFP, for helping me become the
person that I am today…

To my seniors and classmates here at NPS, especially Marco, Ray, Ian, and Jun, for
the support and encouragement…

Above all to my wife, Jerame, and my sons, Yohann Nikolai, Yuan Dominic, and
Yosef Mikael, for your love, patience, and support. You will always be my source of
happiness and inspiration.

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 I. INTRODUCTION

This thesis sheds light on why communist insurgency has continued to exist in the
Philippines. The Philippines is not new to facing insurgency. Indeed, its people have been
fighting and participating in insurgency since the Spanish colonization of the country. One
of the most notable Philippine counterinsurgency successes occurred during the time of
President Ramon Magsaysay when his administration defeated the Hukbalahap insurgents
in 1955. 1 Nevertheless, communist insurgents reemerged in the late 1960s, and the
Philippines has been fighting them ever since. Subsequent presidential administrations
have implemented various counterinsurgency strategies to address this insurgency problem
as well as the concurrent Moro-Muslim insurgencies. Although there have been notable
successes, the problem of insurgencies remains.

Many counterinsurgency experts believe that to develop an effective

counterinsurgency strategy, governments must first identify their own strengths and
weaknesses in facing their adversaries. This study compares and analyzes four
counterinsurgency campaign plans implemented by the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) after the 1986 EDSA People Power Revolution: Oplan Lambat Bitag (Net Trap)
during the Corazon Aquino and Ramos administrations, Oplan Bantay-Laya (Guarding
Freedom) during the Arroyo administration, the Internal Peace and Security Plan
Bayanihan (Civic Unity) during the Benigno Aquino III administration, and the current
Development Support and Security Plan Kapayapaan (Peace) led by the Duterte
administration. This study found that inadequate sustainment capability, lack of support
from government institutions, and challenges to political leadership constitute the primary
factors that have hindered the AFP campaigns.

The results of this study help us understand the underlying reasons why the
communist insurgency has continued to exist in the Philippines, despite the fall of the
Soviet Union, China’s move to a hybrid economy, and the demise of nearly all other

1 Philippine Army, Aspect of Insurgency, ST-015 (Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City: Philippine Army,
2005), 2–2.
1
communist insurgencies around the world. Focusing on the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), this thesis also develops recommendations for improving and
developing an effective and efficient implementation of the military’s holistic
counterinsurgency strategy.

A. LITERATURE REVIEW

The Philippines has been fighting Communist insurgents since the 1950s. Although
there have been several successes, the insurgency problem remains, fueled especially by
the emergence of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) in December 1968 and the
formation of the New People’s Army (NPA) in March 1969. 2 To come up with a sound
and effective counterinsurgency strategy, one must understand the different dynamics of
insurgency warfare, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of one’s own government,
military, and society. In the case of the Philippines, communist insurgents have capitalized
on societal gaps, such as the stark divide between rich and poor, the power of some family
clans at the expense of many, and the perceived government inactions on the delivery of
basic social services to the populace. Effective counterinsurgency strategies integrate
government actions to address these gaps while also mounting sound efforts in intelligence
gathering and defeating militants.

There is a vast literature on insurgency, counterinsurgency, and communist

insurgencies. These works present several arguments on the reasons why insurgency trends
rise, decline, and then resurge over decades. Identifying the root causes of the problem,
political leadership, and military actions are the common points of discussion in the
different literature available.

In his book, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, author David Galula
seeks to provide a guide for counterinsurgents as useful as that which Mao Tse Tung
provided for the revolutionary actor. 3 Galula described four laws for counterinsurgency

2 Philippine Army, The Communist Party of the Philippines, PAM 2-00011 (Fort Bonifacio, Taguig
City: Philippine Army, 2005), 2–8.
3 David Galula, Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York, NY: F.A. Praeger,
1964), xii.
2
and emphasized the importance of the popular support for an effective counterinsurgency
strategy. The first law is that public support is paramount in any counterinsurgency
campaign. Second, support of the masses can be obtained with the help of an active friendly
minority. Third, popular support may be lost if not properly, humanely, and effectively
protected. Fourth, right action, such as building infrastructure and establishing long-term
relationships with the populace, and adequate resources are needed in key areas. 4

Sir Robert Thompson, in his book Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons
of Malaya and Vietnam, discussed the basic principles of counterinsurgency and described
how these principles were applied in Malaya and Vietnam. 5 The first principle states that
the government should have a clear political aim, not just a military aim. Second, the
government should function within the law. Third, the government should have an overall
plan with identified methods for carrying out that plan. Fourth, the government should
prioritize defeating political subversion rather than the guerillas. Last, in the guerilla phase
of a campaign, the government should secure its base area first. Thompson further argued
the importance of seizing the initiative from the insurgents for a successful
counterinsurgency strategy.

In his book, The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines, author
Benedict Kerkyliet offered several explanations as to how the Huk Rebellion emerged and
grew. 6 First is that the traditional patron-client relationship between the landlords and
peasants had broken, with the landlords not sufficiently serving the well-being of their
clients. Second, the neglect of basic political issues such as justice, human rights, and an
acceptable level of distribution of wealth and resources contributed to the problem. Third,
with the exception of the Ferdinand Marcos regime in the 1960s, government leaders did
not cause the rebellion; they only shaped it. Last, class antagonism heightened and
prolonged the struggle.

4 Galula, 55–59.
5 Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, 1st ed. (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1966).
6 Benedict Kerkyliet, The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines (Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 1977).
3
 Unlike the works just described, Counterinsurgency in Paradise: Seven Decades of
Civil War in the Philippines, by Aaron Morris, was the first to cover the military history of
the Philippines and explore how the Armed Forces of the Philippines has had to adapt to
different insurgency movements in the country. 7 It takes a deeper look into how the AFP
transformed from a conventional military fighting an external threat during World War II
to develop elite forces and other means necessary to suppress revolts and address the
evolving internal threats to the integrity of the state. Morris argued that political solutions
are the only viable route to defeating the major separatist and insurgent groups because of
the AFP’s inability to break the back of insurgencies.

Taking a similar perspective, in his books The Accidental Guerilla and

Counterinsurgency, David Kilcullen uses three 21st-century battles to explain why
insurgency occurs. In The Accidental Guerilla, he argued that conventional warfare has
repeatedly failed to produce constructive results in complex, multisided conflicts such as
the war in Iraq. 8 Kilcullen recommended five ideas that the United States should consider
to adapt to the changing paradigm of conflict. First is the need for a new lexicon that will
describe the new threats. Second is the need to have a grand strategy that can be sustained
by the people, administration, and key allies and partners. Third, imbalance in government
capability, heavily skewed toward military might at the expense of socio-economic and
political approaches, must be remedied. Fourth, new strategic services are needed that
would help identify and prioritize interagency efforts. Fifth is the need to develop a
capacity for strategic information warfare that integrates interagency efforts and develops
a national-level strategic information campaign.

In Counterinsurgency, Kilcullen asserted that every counterinsurgency operation

should be tailored to the operational environment and the populace. 9 He also argued for
the importance of accounting for the cultural and governmental aspects that gave rise to

7 Aaron Morris, Counterinsurgency in Paradise: Seven Decades of Civil War in the Philippines (West
Midlands, England: Helion & Company Limited, 2016).
8 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2009).
9 David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).

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insurgency, which he believes are unique to each situation. Authors Lawrence Cline and
Paul Schemella, in The Future of Counterinsurgency, echo several of Kilcullen’s points.
They explain that insurgencies and other forms of internal security problems often become
more complex and difficult to manage over time and that it is critical to understand the
lessons from the different counterinsurgency strategies employed, both more broadly and
in each particular case. 10

Several books from the Philippines also provide insight for this study.
Author Victor Corpus in his book, Silent War, presented an overview of the tactics of
communist insurgents and recommended a holistic Philippine counterinsurgency
strategy. 11 In fact, the ideas in his book influenced the reorientation of the Philippine
counterinsurgency effort in the late 1980s and early 1990s, influencing efforts from 1989
to 1996. Both Corpus and Morris agree on the need for the AFP to develop and evolve to
address the insurgents in the country. Morris, however, believes that a political solution is
more viable than a military one while Corpus argues for the need to have a holistic
counterinsurgency strategy that integrates government and military actions. Meanwhile,
Soliman M. Santos Jr., Paz Verdades M. Santos et al., authors of the book Primed and
Purposeful: Armed Group and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines, emphasized the
importance of the domestic political context, which plays a significant role in an effective
counterinsurgency strategy. 12

Overall, the various literature available has emphasized the importance of

integrating actions of the government, winning and maintaining popular support, and
providing consistent and capable leadership to achieve a successful counterinsurgency
strategy.

10 Lawrence Cline and Paul Shemella, The Future of Counterinsurgency Contemporary Debates in
Internal Security Strategy (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO LLC, 2015).
11 Victor N. Corpus, Silent War (Quezon City, Philippines: VNC Enterprises, 1989).
12 Soliman M. Santos et al., Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the
Philippines (Geneva, Switzerland: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and
Development Studies, 2010).
5
B. RESEARCH DESIGN

This thesis uses the case study method to better understand the intransigence of the
communist insurgency in the Philippines. It focuses on the strategies, tactics, and resources
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in combating the communist insurgency in the
Philippines to assess the different factors that affect these strategies and recommend how
the AFP can improve its strategies to defeat the communist insurgents.

Specifically, this study compares and analyzes four campaign plans that were
implemented by the AFP after the 1986 EDSA People Power Revolution: first, the Oplan
Lambat Bitag (Net Trap) that was implemented by the AFP during the Corazon Aquino
and Fidel V. Ramos administrations (1989–1996); second, Oplan Bantay-Laya (Guarding
Freedom) during the Arroyo administration (2001–2010); third, the Internal Peace and
Security Plan (IPSP) Bayanihan (Civic Unity) during the Benigno Aquino III
administration (2010–2016); and fourth, the Development Support and Security Plan
(DSSP) Kapayapaan (Peace) that is currently being implemented by the AFP under the
Duterte administration. This study uses data available from the AFP, independent reports
and assessments about the counterinsurgency operations in the Philippines from think tanks
and nongovernmental organizations, books and theses related to the Philippine communist
counterinsurgency, government reports from the Philippines and United States, and the
author’s experience as a military officer in the AFP.

In analyzing the four AFP campaign plans, this thesis explores the different factors
that affect their implementation and effectiveness. First, it examines the socio-political
situations at the time of the implementation of the campaign. Second, it analyzes and
compares the different operational accomplishments in terms of enemy neutralized,
firearms recovered, areas recovered, and underground mass organizations co-opted. Third,
this study examines external involvement in terms of support given to the AFP in the
implementation of the campaign. Lastly, this thesis compares and analyzes leadership
factors in terms of the political and military leaders who were setting and implementing
the campaigns. While this may not cover all the factors affecting the counterinsurgency
strategy in the Philippines, better understanding these factors can help us know why the

6
communist insurgency continues to exist in the Philippines and develop recommendations
as to how the AFP can improve its counterinsurgency strategy.

C. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE

This study is organized into six chapters to provide readers with a clear
understanding of the communist insurgency and the efforts of the AFP to defeat it. Chapter
I offers a brief background of the study and the main research question it endeavors to
answer. It also explains why this question is significant and discusses the relevant literature
available and the research methodology used in the study. Chapter II provides the reader
with a brief history of the communist insurgency, including its organization, strength,
leadership, and strategies used against the Philippine government. This study then focuses
on four campaigns implemented by the AFP. Chapter III analyzes and compares the first
three campaign plans by looking at each campaign’s objectives and strategies, its
operational accomplishments, and the external support that each campaign received.
Chapter IV focuses on the various factors that hampered the implementation of the AFP’s
campaigns. In turn, Chapter V compares the three previous campaigns to the current
campaign, the DSSP Kapayapaan. Finally, Chapter VI brings these analyses together,
presents conclusions, and provides recommendations for policy and further research.

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 II. UNDERSTANDING THE
COMMUNIST INSURGENCY THREAT

The Philippine government has been fighting two long-running insurgencies: a

Moro-Muslim conflict since the early 1970s and a communist struggle since the 1950s.
The Philippine communist insurgency is the longest-running communist insurgency in
Asia. 13 Communist ideology was first introduced to the Philippines in the 1930s, drawing
support from farmers in Central Luzon and workers and disgruntled elites in Manila. 14
Since then, two communist parties have organized in the country. First came the Partido
Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP), founded by Crisanto Evangelista in the 1930s, which was
heavily influenced by Marxist-Leninist ideology; it and the associated Huks were defeated
in the 1950s. 15 The second, the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), led by Jose
Maria Sison, broke away from the PKP, looked to Maoist ideology, and formally
reestablished a communist insurgency in the late 1960s.

This chapter focuses on the CPP and its military arm, the New People’s Army
(NPA), by first tracing their roots and the causes of their emergence. Political and economic
inequality and abuses by government security forces and the elites represent the main
reasons why the communist insurgency re-emerged in the country. 16 Second, this chapter
describes the CPP-NPA’s objectives, which were to replace the Philippines’ political and
socio-economic systems with those based on communist principles and structures, along
with their protracted people’s-war strategy. Lastly, the chapter discusses the CPP-NPA’s
organization, structure, and leadership, which have been important for its continued
existence.

13 “Philippines’ Communist Rebellion Is Asia’s Longest-Running Insurgency,” South China Morning

Post, September 16, 2019, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3027414/explained-
philippines-communist-rebellion-asias-longest-running.
14 Ricardo C. Morales, “Perpetual War: The Philippine Insurgencies” (Master’s thesis, Monterey, CA,
Naval Postgraduate School, 2003), 19.
15 Philippine Army, Aspect of Insurgency, 2–2 and 2–4.
16 Philippine Army, Aspect of Insurgency, ST-015 (Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City: Philippine Army,
2005), 2–5.
9
A. PARTIDO KOMUNISTA NG PILIPINAS AND THE HUK REBELLION

The first Philippine communist insurgency traces its roots to an affinity with
communist Russia. Crisanto Evangelista, a labor leader and former member of the
Nacionalista Party [Nationalist Party], led the establishment of the Partido Komunista ng
Pilipinas (PKP) [Communist Party of the Philippines] on November 7, 1930. 17 As part of
their activities, the PKP conducted labor organizing and boycotted the electoral process. 18
Since its founding, the group also organized a guerilla force against U.S. colonialism (until
independence in 1946), Japanese colonialism (1941–1945), and the Filipino elites. 19
During the Japanese invasion, the PKP merged with the Hukbong Bayan Laban sa mga
Hapon, or People’s Army, more popularly known as the Hukbalahap, or Huks, against the
Japanese. After World War II, still well-equipped and organized, the PKP and the Huks
continued to fight, this time against the Philippine government.

The Huk Rebellion was considered the first organized rebellion against the newly
established Philippine government and lasted from 1946 to the mid-1950s. 20 To quell the
rebellion, the government first launched a series of counterinsurgency campaigns that
emphasized military campaigns to destroy the armed insurgents. By the 1950s, the
government, then under President Ramon Magsaysay, implemented the strategic concept
“all out friendship-all out force” to arrest the growing revolutionary threat. 21 One of its
key features was mass resettlement of landless tenant farmers to Mindanao. With the
United States’ help, Magsaysay’s campaign broke the backbone of the PKP and its armed
wing.

B. COMMUNIST RE-EMERGENCE

In his book, The Red Revolution, author Gregg Jones described the Philippine
communist insurgency as a result of “classical third-world fusion of peasant unrest and

17 Philippine Army, The Communist Party of the Philippines, 2–4.

18 Philippine Army, 2–5.
19 Philippine Army, 2–5.
20 Morales, “Perpetual War: The Philippine Insurgencies,” 19.
21 Philippine Army, The Communist Party of the Philippines, 2–7.

10
nationalism.” 22 Jones primarily attributed the communist insurgency’s re-emergence in the
Philippines to the different global forces that were at work during the 1960s, including the
war in Vietnam, the political radicalism that was sweeping college campuses in different
parts of the world, and the cultural revolution in China. He further mentioned corruption
in the government, abuses by state forces, and increasing poverty as among the primary
contributors to the spread of communist insurgency in the country.

The communist insurgency in the Philippines formally re-emerged in the late 1960s
as the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) under the leadership of Jose Maria Sison.
The reestablishment of the CPP took place in the second week of January 1968, when the
party congress was convened, but the founding members decided to mark its organization
as December 26, 1968, to coincide with the 75th anniversary of Mao Zedong’s birthday.23
The 15 founding members were from lower- and middle-class society: seven were students,
three were workers/laborers, and five were professionals. 24 Indicative of their weak start,
only 12 members actually showed up to formally establish the CPP. 25

Realizing the need to create a people’s army to launch an armed struggle, and
believing armed struggle was necessary to realize the transformation of Philippine society,
Sison met with Bernabe Buscayno, who commanded some of the remnants of the Huks
operating in Central Luzon. 26 The meeting resulted in the establishment of the NPA, the
CPP’s armed wing, on March 29, 1969, with Bernabe Buscayno as its founding leader. 27
With only 60 combatants and 35 rifles, the CPP-NPA was first organized and based in the

22 Gregg Jones, Red Revolution: Inside the Philippine Guerilla Movement (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press Inc., 1989), 5.
23 Philippine Army, The Communist Party of the Philippines, 2–8; Jones, Red Revolution: Inside the
Philippine Guerilla Movement, 17.
24 Philippine Army, The Communist Party of the Philippines, 2–8.
25 Jones, Red Revolution: Inside the Philippine Guerilla Movement, 18–19.
26 Philippine Army, The Communist Party of the Philippines, 2–9.
27 Santos et al., Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the
Philippines, 261.
11
small city of Capas on the Philippines’ largest island, Luzon. 28 While engagement with
government forces was unavoidable, the CPP-NPA avoided unnecessary engagement with
government forces; they instead focused on conducting propaganda campaigns and
organizing work to strengthen the support of the masses and the group’s growth. 29 This
newer manifestation of Philippine communist insurgents proudly waged an indigenous
revolution without international aid. Although China gave a token amount of aid in the
early stages, it was quickly cut off, because China wanted improved relations with the
Philippines, thus leaving the communist insurgents to fend for themselves. 30

C. CPP-NPA OBJECTIVES, STRATEGIES, AND TACTICS

Unlike its predecessor, the PKP, which used the Russian model for its revolutionary
struggle, the CPP followed Mao Zedong’s model for armed revolution. The lessons learned
from the failures and shortcomings of the PKP have greatly influenced the CPP-NPA,
particularly its leader, Jose Maria Sison, and compelled him to further study Philippine
society. 31 He identified three conditions within the Philippine society that could be
exploited to further the revolutionary situation in the country: “the contradiction between
the Filipino nation and imperialism, contradiction between the great masses of the people
and feudalism, and the contradiction between the people’s interest and the present
government acting on behalf of U.S. imperialism and the feudal landlords.” 32 These
conditions reflected the CPP’s ongoing grievances. Their primary grievances are economic
exploitation by international business interests, economic exploitation by landed elite
families, and political exploitation by the same elite families.

This analysis led the CPP to adopt three basic concepts in carrying out the
revolution: first to launch a protracted people’s war, second to establish guerilla bases in

28 Mapping Militant Organizations, “MMP: Communist Party of the Philippines - New People’s
Army,” Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, accessed April 29, 2021,
https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/communist-party-philippines-new-peoples-army.
29 Mapping Militant Organizations.
30 Jones, Red Revolution: Inside the Philippine Guerilla Movement, 8–9.
31 Philippine Army, The Communist Party of the Philippines, 3–15.
32 Philippine Army, 3–16.

12
the countryside, and lastly to establish a united front. 33 The United Front, as conceived by
Mao Zedong, would utilize organizing and propaganda efforts to mobilize the masses
against the government. 34

1. Objectives

The CPP-NPA has two primary objectives: to seize political power through armed
and legal struggle and to supplant the “country’s democratic form of government with
communist-party rule.” 35 To achieve this, the CPP-NPA has divided its strategies into two
categories: first, a general strategy that pertains to war as a whole; and second, a specific
strategy that focuses on counter-campaigns within a specific guerilla front or base area. 36

2. Protracted People’s War: CPP-NPA’s Three-Stage Insurgency

Strategy

The lessons learned from the premature shift to conventional operations by the
Huks, led the CPP-NPA to realize the importance of the protracted nature of their
struggle. 37 When the CPP-NPA started the insurgency in 1969, the balance of forces was
heavily against its favor and, as such, for the CPP-NPA, the most important factor to
measure insurgency success was to view the revolution as a stage-by-stage process. 38 The
CPP has looked upon Mao Zedong’s three-stage strategy of protracted war as their path to
victory and adopted it meticulously. In his book, Silent War, Victor Corpus discussed the
Strategy of Protracted People’s War (PPW) being divided into three major stages: Strategic
Defensive, Strategic Stalemate, and Strategic Offensive. 39 For the CPP-NPA, the Strategic
Defensive stage is their initial stage of the protracted war and is a critical period for “party

33 Philippine Army, 3–18.

34 Philippine Army, 3–19.
35 Philippine Army, Aspect of Insurgency, 3–7.
36 Corpus, Silent War, 25.
37 Alvin H. Bernstein and Armando B. Heredia, “Communist Insurgency in the Philippines,”
Comparative Strategy 8, no. 3 (January 1, 1989): 281, https://doi.org/10.1080/01495938908402784.
38 Philippine Army, Aspect of Insurgency, 3–9.
39 Corpus, Silent War, 27.

13
building, army building, base building, and the organization of the united front.” 40
According to Corpus, during this stage, the CPP-NPA believes that they are on the
defensive since their strength is small while the government forces are relatively big. They
see their forces and base areas as vulnerable against government forces, which they believe
are on the offensive against them.

Strategic Stalemate is the second stage of PPW as described by Corpus. This stage
is achieved when CPP-NPA forces are able to gather and organize forces that are able to
achieve relative parity with government forces, at least in areas they seek to hold. 41
According to Corpus, this stage does not mean that insurgent forces should be at par or
equal with that of the government forces. Instead, the insurgents believe that only a portion
of the government forces are actually engaged in counterinsurgency operations. 42 Corpus
further explained that for this stage to be attained, more and more government forces are
tied down to defend towns, vital government functions, and private installations.

According to Victor Corpus, the last stage of the protracted war is the Strategic
Offensive. He stated that this is achieved when the balance of forces reverses. 43 The CPP-
NPA forces are capable of launching offensive campaigns against government forces,
while the government forces are forced to defend key areas and facilities such as towns,
cities, and military installations. At this stage, Corpus further explained, the insurgents
believe that it is just a matter of time before the regime falls.

3. Three Main Weapons

To attain their objectives, the CPP uses three main weapons, which is in line with
Mao Zedong’s principles: the party, which provides the brains and leadership for the
struggle; an army, which provides a military force to implement the party’s plans; and a
united front, acting as a shield to defend the party against its adversaries. 44 The CPP acts

40 Corpus, 27.
41 Corpus, 29.
42 Corpus, 29.
43 Corpus, 30.
44 Philippine Army, The Communist Party of the Philippines, 3–20.

14
as the party, the force that advances the communist cause. 45 It should comprise a “highly
disciplined group of professional revolutionaries dedicated to the overthrow of government
and the existing social system.” 46 The CPP provides the necessary leadership and guidance
to direct the actions of the NPA in the countryside and the United Front in urban areas.

The New People’s Army, known as the NPA, acts as the principal military force of
the party and is tasked with waging and eventually winning armed struggle against
government forces, which it primarily defines as military forces. To achieve its task, the
NPA needs to be both an ideological force engaged in political struggle under the CPP and
a peasant-based guerilla army. 47 As an ideological force, the NPA acts as the private army
of the CPP, providing the party with the necessary political support, such as propaganda
and organizing work in the countryside. 48

As a guerilla army, the NPA is organized and trained to confront a larger and better-
equipped counterinsurgency force. 49 It utilizes four echelons of fighting units to implement
PPW. 50 First is the Regular Mobile Force, which has the primary function of defending its
guerilla bases and launching relatively large tactical offensives against government forces.
Second is the Guerilla Forces, which are tasked to defend the broader guerilla zones and
act as an advance party of the regular mobile force in targeted areas. The third echelon
consists of the Militia and Self-defense Corps, which are mostly composed of able-bodied
men from the local barrios or villages. Their primary function is to be the eyes and ears of
the regular mobile force against government forces and informants. These barrio members
also act as guides to the regular mobile force.

Following Mao’s concept, the United Front is conceived as a social movement

which uses the masses to unleash its energy against the government. The United Front is

45 Philippine Army, Aspect of Insurgency, 3–6.

46 Philippine Army, The Communist Party of the Philippines, 3–20.
47 Philippine Army, Aspect of Insurgency, 6–2.
48 Philippine Army, The Communist Party of the Philippines, 3–21.
49 Philippine Army, 3–21.
50 Philippine Army, Aspect of Insurgency, 6–2.

15
the CPP’s organizational effort to mobilize, unite, and restructure the basic social classes
in Philippine society against the government. 51 The United Front, led by political cadres
of the CPP, is tasked with organizing the different sectors of society, such as farmers,
workers, women, youth, and labor, into a well-structured mass organization to create a
multiplier effect in urban areas.

These mass organizations are used by the CPP-NPA to achieve four objectives:
first, the CPP-NPA creates organizations that seek to neutralize organizations and
institutions that support the government; second, it legitimizes the insurgent causes by
demonstrating popular support and claiming to fight for members’ interests; third, it
facilitates information and intelligence gathering in urban areas that is then used for
propaganda campaigns; and fourth, it generates mass support for anti-government protests
and provides a pool of recruits for the CPP and the NPA. 52 The CPP’s National United
Front has a formal structure called the National Democratic Front (NDF). It is comparable
to the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam, which led the insurgency during the
Vietnam War. 53

D. CPP-NPA STRUCTURE, ORGANIZATION, AND LEADERSHIP

Although the CPP-NPA started as a small and ill-equipped organization, it

gradually evolved into a complex and well-organized anti-government force. The CPP-
NPA has been able to adapt to the changing situation in the country and to use this situation
to its own advantage. The CPP-NPA has been effective in implementing its policy of
centralized leadership and de-centralized operations.

1. Structure and Organization

Since its reestablishment in 1968, the CPP has implemented several major
organizational changes in response to the changing socio-political-economic situation in

51 Philippine Army, 4–1.

52 Philippine Army, 4–2.
53 Philippine Army, 4–4.

16
the country and to ensure that the revolutionary struggle continues to advance. 54 The CPP-
NPA is composed of distinct organs that have different tasks to support the party. At the
national level, the CPP-NPA has an organizational set-up that is streamlined to steer the
party administration and operation from the national point of view. 55 The first of these
institutions is the National Congress, which acts as the supreme leadership of the party and
is normally convened by the Central Committee every five years to discuss, review, and
ratify the CPP’s constitution and plan of action and to decide the political approach of the
party. 56 The second is the Central Committee, which is the highest-ranking CPP
committee in the country. Its chairman serves as the principal ideological and political
leader of the party. 57 The General Secretariat is the administrative body that takes charge
of the management and day-to-day activities of the party at the national level. It is under
the leadership of the Political Bureau (POLITBORO) and Executive Committee. 58

Directly under the POLITBORO, several functional commissions perform distinct

tasks to support the party and exemplify the extensive, complex nature of the CPP-NPA.
The National Military Commission (NMC) is in charge of formulating and issuing the
party’s policy on military affairs. 59 The National United Front Commission (NUFC) is
primarily tasked to formulate programs of action to attract the middle class and independent
political groups to support the party’s cause in urban areas supported by National
Organizational Department (NOD), which organizes and develops open mass
movements. 60 The National Finance Commission (NFC) is in charge of formulating plans
and policies to generate funds for the party, while the International Finance Commission
(IFC) focuses on all financial dealings of the party, including those involving foreign

54 Philippine Army, The Communist Party of the Philippines, 4–1.

55 Philippine Army, 4–2.
56 Philippine Army, 4–2.
57 Philippine Army, 4–3.
58 Philippine Army, 4–4.
59 Philippine Army, 4–4.
60 Philippine Army, 4–4, 4–5.

17
supporters and resources. 61 The International Department (ID) carries out an international
propaganda campaign and maintains ties with communist parties abroad. 62 Meanwhile, the
National Education Department (NED) is tasked with ensuring that the political and
ideological consciousness of cadres is maintained. 63 Figure 1 illustrates the CPP-NPA
organizational structure.

Figure 1. CPP-NPA-NDF Organizational Structure. 64

To implement the policy of centralized leadership and de-centralized operations,

the CPP created territorial committees that oversee the party’s activities and expansion
nationwide. Territorial committees or Regional Party Committees (RPC) are the highest

61 Philippine Army, 4–4.

62 Philippine Army, 4–5.
63 Philippine Army, 4–5.
64 Source: Philippine Army, 4–3.

18
organ of the party in their area of jurisdiction. 65 Similar to the national organ, the RPCs
also maintain their respective functional staffs with tasks similar to those of their national
counterparts, differing only by the jurisdiction that they cover. Each RPC exercises control
and supervision over the different Front Committees (FC) and Guerilla Fronts (GF)
operating under its jurisdiction. A typical RPC exercises control and supervision of three
or four Front Committees/Guerilla Fronts with each FC consisting of at least two
platoons. 66 A GF is the politico-military geographical unit of the CPP-NPA that carries out
party building and armed struggle in the countryside. 67 Figure 2 illustrates the typical
organizational structure of an RPC.

Figure 2. Typical Regional Party Committee Organizational Structure. 68

65 Philippine Army, 4–5.

66 Philippine Army, 5–18.
67 Philippine Army, 5–19.
68 Source: Philippine Army, 4–7.

19
 In the CPP-NPA’s effort to use the island environment of the country to its
advantage, the CPP-NPA has established bases in remote mountain areas found throughout
the country to force government forces to engage them on multiple fronts. 69 According to
Philippine Revolution Web Central (PRWC), the official internet portal of the CPP-NPA,
by the mid-1990s, the NPA was able to establish 14 Regional Operational Commands
(ROC): five are operating in each of Luzon and Mindanao, while four operate in the
Visayas (see Figure 3). Together, these give the CPP/NPA both broad reach and protection.
Each ROC is composed of five to seven guerilla fronts, with each GF having two platoons,
which, in turn, has three squads of five to seven personnel. 70

Figure 3. Regional Operational Commands of the NPA. 71

69 Bernstein and Heredia, “Communist Insurgency in the Philippines,” 284.

70 Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operation, J3, AFP Campaign Assessment (Camp
Aguinaldo, Quezon City, Philippines: Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operation, J3, 2020).
71 Source: “PRWC on Twitter,” Twitter, accessed January 21, 2021,
https://twitter.com/prwc_info/status/1310774806846025728.
20
 2. Trends and Strength

As already noted, the communist insurgents have used the geographical situation
of the country to their advantage. The geographical make-up of the country naturally favors
the PPW principle of encircling the cities from the countryside. The numerous mountain
ranges and dense forests are well suited to provide the insurgents with stable guerilla bases
in the countryside that help them to gradually advance to urban centers. 72

Further, the communist insurgents in the three main island groups of the Philippines
have different tasks. Those in Luzon serve as the link of the CPP-NPA to other provinces
and regions throughout the country. Luzon also houses the national organizations of the
insurgents. Visayas facilitates the movement of CPP-NPA cadres from Luzon to Mindanao
and vice versa, by providing sanctuaries for the insurgents. While Mindanao draws the
attention of counterinsurgent forces from Luzon, this region also provides material
resources, such as money from the revolutionary taxation to support the communist
insurgency in the different parts of the country.

Figure 4 illustrates trends in NPA strength from 1981 to 2019, as measured by the
number of NPA members, firearms, and captured barangays (villages). From the NPA’s
initial strength of 60 members in 1968, the organization has steadily grown to
approximately 6,000 key personnel and 3,000 arms, and it controlled approximately 1,000
barangays by 1981. The NPA reached its peak of approximately 25,000 members in 1987.
This drastic rise is attributed to abuses during martial law in the 1970s and first half of the
1980s, worsening poverty, and deepening corruption in the country. 73

Although the NPA’s growth through the 1980s resulted in greater military and
political success for the insurgents, their rapid expansion also spawned new problems for
the communist insurgents, such as logistics and communication. Their larger formations
also made it more difficult for them to move undetected. Moreover, difficulty in hiding
their forces made them vulnerable to intensified offensive campaigns by the government

72 Emmanuel L. Navarrete, “An Assessment of the Philippine Counterinsurgency Campaign,”

Maxwell Air Force Base: U.S. Air War College, 1990. 25.
73 Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operation, J3, AFP Campaign Assessment.

21
forces in the late 1980s. At the same time, an internal rift within the CPP-NPA organization
posed a significant problem, with some Central Committee members in the northern part
of the country advocating for an intensified offensive against the government forces. But
perhaps a lack of foreign support constitutes one of the most conspicuous weakness of the
CPP-NPA, and it has hindered their expansion and provided an opportunity for the
government forces to exploit. 74

Figure 4. NPA Resources from 1981 to 2019, Relative to Major Events. 75

A steep decline in CPP-NPA membership between 1989 and 1995 saw its numbers
significantly reduced to around 6,000. The NPA’s decline continued in the 1990s due to
various setbacks, which were attributed to several factors, including sustained government
military operations, internal rifts within the organization, the arrest of key leaders, financial
constraints, negotiations with the government, and the fall of socialist regimes in Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union, which reduced their legitimacy. 76 These setbacks forced the
CPP-NPA leadership to study and reconsider their approach.

74 Bernstein and Heredia, “Communist Insurgency in the Philippines,” 283.

75 Source: Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operation, J3, AFP Campaign Assessment.
76 Philippine Army, The Communist Party of the Philippines, 2–25.

22
 In December 1991, the CPP Central Committee issued a directive from its
Chairman Jose Maria Sison entitled “Reaffirm Our Basic Principles and Rectify the
Errors.” 77 The document clarified several basic principles that the party needed to adhere
to in order to regain ground. Foremost is upholding the Marxist-Leninist and Mao Zedong
ideologies and the continued reliance on the strategy of PPW. 78

By the late 1990s to early 2000s, a rise occurred in the number of communist
insurgents in the country. The Ramos administration deemed it necessary to transfer the
primary responsibility of internal security operations to the Philippine National Police
(PNP) to allow the AFP to focus on external defense. 79 These actions proved to be a
mistake, since the PNP was unsuccessful in accomplishing their task. The resurgence of
the NPA was observed by the AFP in 1995, with the CPP stating in 1997 that it was able
to recover its 1983 mass base level. 80 According to Santos et al., this resurgence was
attributed to CPP’s reaffirmation of the PPW and the NPA’s focus on conducting mass
efforts in the countryside. By 2001, the CPP-NPA membership had grown to around
12,000, which Santos et al. attributed to the shift in the focus of the government forces
from the communist insurgency to terrorism and the Muslim insurgency in the southern
part of the country. By 2009, the government and AFP had reduced the number of CPP-
NPA members to around 4,000, a level that held steady for the next decade.

3. Leadership

Jose Maria Sison, the founding leader of the CPP-NPA, was born to an affluent
landowner in the province of Ilocos Sur in the northwestern part of Luzon. 81 He studied

77 Philippine Army, 2–26.

78 Philippine Army, 2–27.
79 Ryan Nebres Severo, “Philippine Counterinsurgency during the Presidencies of Magsaysay,
Marcos, and Ramos: Challenges and Opportunities,” (Master’s thesis, U.S. Army Commany and General
Staff College, 2016 90; Leonardo I Peña, “Finding the Missing Link to a Successful Philippine
Counterinsurgency Strategy” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007), 12–13,
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/3393.
80 Santos et al., Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the
Philippines, 23.
81 Jones, Red Revolution: Inside the Philippine Guerilla Movement, 20.

23
the works of nationalist writers, such as Teodoro Agoncillo and Claro Recto, and the works
of Karl Marx and Vladimir Lenin. Nonetheless, Sison was most heavily influenced by
Mao’s teachings. 82

After several years of insurgent activities, 1976 was a challenging year for the CPP,
with several of its top leaders arrested. Among those were Central Committee members
Juanito Canlas, Cesario Diego, Saturnino Ocampo, Victor Corpus, Bernabe Buscayno, and
Renato Casipe. 83 In November the following year, CPP Chairman Jose Maria Sison was
also captured. 84 Despite these setbacks in leadership, the CPP-NPA continued in its armed
struggle as new leaders emerged. After Sison’s capture, Rodolfo Salas assumed leadership
of the CPP. 85 Under Salas’ leadership, the CPP decided to strengthen its United Front
machinery as it formally introduced the National Democratic Front to the public. 86
Subsequently, Sison was reelected to Executive Committee of the CPP after his release
from prison in 1986. 87 The CPP’s POLITBORO, however, did not allow Sison to assume
the chairmanship of the party since he had relocated to the Netherlands. 88

During the 10th CPP plenum in October 1992, Sison was again re-elected as
chairman of the CPP with Benito Tiamzon as vice-chairman and Wilma Austria-Tiamzon
as secretary general. 89 Their election started an internal rift within the organization, with
several high-ranking CPP-NPA leaders opposing Sison’s leadership and his rectification
campaign. Among them were Romulo Kintanar, Ricardo Reyes, and Benjamin De Vera. 90
The rift resulted in a split of the party into two factions, the “reaffirmist” faction under

82 Jones, 22–24.
83 Philippine Army, The Communist Party of the Philippines, 2–12.
84 Philippine Army, 2–12.
85 Philippine Army, 2–12.
86 Philippine Army, 2–12.
87 Francis Domingo, “The Leadership Crisis in the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s
Army,” Small Wars Journal, accessed January 21, 2021, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-
leadership-crisis-in-the-communist-party-of-the-philippines-new-people%E2%80%99s-army.
88 Domingo.
89 Philippine Army, The Communist Party of the Philippines, 2–27.
90 Philippine Army, 2–25.

24
Sison and the “rejectionist” faction under the three opposition leaders. This internal split
greatly affected not only the party but also the NPA and the NDF. 91 Sison’s group
eventually emerged successful. Since the launching of the rectification campaign, the CPP-
NPA gradually recovered and expanded its influence in the countryside. 92

This chapter has discussed the origins and the reemergence of communism in the
Philippines, both of which were driven by deeply rooted inequities in land ownership, labor
rights, and access to political and social power. Since the reestablishment of communist
insurgency in the Philippines in 1969, the CPP-NPA has gradually evolved into a more
potent threat against the Philippine government. From a small town in Capas, Tarlac, in
the northern Philippines, the CPP-NPA was able to expand its influence in the country,
stretching as far as Mindanao in the South. Although its numbers have been significantly
reduced, its continued existence is attributed to its ability to adapt to the changing situation
in the country, tap into the fundamental grievances of society, and establish a highly
structured and disciplined organization. The CPP-NPA’s ability to mobilize the masses
through agitation and propaganda activities, hit and run tactics against government security
forces, and its well-established organizational structure represent the primary reasons why
the CPP-NPA remains a potent security threat in the Philippines.

91 Philippine Army, 2–29.

92 Philippine Army, 2–32.

25
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26
 III. THE CAMPAIGNS AND THEIR RESULTS

The Philippine government has adopted various counterinsurgency strategies to

defeat the communist insurgency in the country. After the 1986 EDSA People Power
Revolution, the Corazon Aquino and Ramos administrations adopted a strategy that they
called “national reconciliation with justice” in dealing with the communist insurgents. 93
The Gloria Macapagal Arroyo administration implemented a holistic approach, while
President Benigno Aquino III, the son of the former president, adopted a people-centered,
multi-stakeholder approach in dealing with the communist insurgents. To support the
different administrations’ counterinsurgency strategies, the AFP implemented several
campaign plans.

This chapter examines the campaigns implemented after the 1986 EDSA People
Power Revolution, specifically the AFP’s Oplan Lambat Bitag (Net Trap), Oplan Bantay-
Laya (Guarding Freedom) and Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) Bayanihan (Civic
Unity). It first describes the campaigns’ geographic presence, objectives, strategies,
targeted concerns and resources. Oplan’s Lambat-Bitag and Bantay-Laya primarily
focused on military actions to destroy the armed group and the political structures of the
communist insurgents in the barangays using the Clear-Hold-Develop-Consolidate (C-H-
D-C) model. IPSP Bayanihan introduced a paradigm shift from the military-centric to a
people-centered security approach. The chapter then examines the different operational
accomplishments of each of the campaigns, concluding that the three campaigns were
successful in reducing the CPP-NPA’s military capabilities; however, the AFP failed to
completely defeat the insurgents because of shifts in the AFP’s and government’s priorities.
Lastly, it lays out the external support that the Philippine government received during the
implementation of each campaign, finding that the international security partnerships that
the Philippine government entered into focused on maritime security and counterterrorism
operations, not counterinsurgency operations. Thus, such security partnerships did little to
help the AFP defeat the communist insurgency in the country.

93 Morales, “Perpetual War: The Philippine Insurgencies,” 29–30.

27
A. OPLAN LAMBAT BITAG (NET TRAP)

Oplan Lambat Bitag (Net Trap) was first implemented from 1989 to 1992 as part
of the counterinsurgency efforts of the Aquino administration and continued under the
Ramos administration from 1992 to 1996. At the beginning, most activities were carried
out in Luzon where the CPP-NPA had established strong guerilla fronts, which eventually
spread to Mindanao. 94 The campaign was primarily led by the Philippine Army and, to a
lesser degree, involved the government and private sector, putting an emphasis on the
“right” mix of civil-military operations, intelligence, and combat operations against the
insurgents. Combining these coercive and persuasive strategies, the “Clear-Hold-
Consolidate-Develop (C-H-C-D)” concept was also first introduced as a means to counter
the insurgents’ strategy in the countryside. 95

As described by Stephen Watts et al., under C-H-D-C operational methodology,

during the Clear Stage, the AFP employed its mobile forces to destroy armed groups and
dismantle the insurgents’ politico-military structures in insurgency-affected areas. The
authors explained that the Hold stage used territorial forces to secure cleared areas and
facilitate the reestablishment of government control by elected and appointed officials.96
In the Develop stage, government agencies conducted activities to pursue progressive
activities such as infrastructure development. 97 Finally, Watts et al. summarized the
Consolidate stage as involving the collaboration of several national and local government
agencies to strengthen government. The Development and Consolidation Stages were
designed to begin addressing the socio-economic and political grievances of those targeted
by the CPP-NPA. At the time of the campaign’s implementation, the AFP also initiated
reforms as part of an effective counterinsurgency operation to reeducate soldiers on the

94 Santos et al., Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the
Philippines, 22.
95 Roy Devesa, “An Assessment of the Philippine Counterinsurgency Operational Methodology”
(master’s thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2005),”40.
96 Stephen Watts et al., “Counterinsurgency in the Philippines,” in Countering Others’ Insurgencies,
Understanding U.S. Small-Footprint Interventions in Local Context (Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation, 2014), 84, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt5vjvmn.12.
97 Watts et al., 84.

28
importance of adhering to the principles of human rights and winning population support
for an effective counterinsurgency operation. 98

1. Campaign Objectives and Strategies

Under Oplan Lambat Bitag, the AFP’s strategy was focused on dismantling the
communist insurgency’s political and military structures in barangays. 99 The campaign
was to be implemented by the different Area Commands combining combat operations,
intelligence operations, and civil-military operations (CMO). To most effectively utilize
its forces, the AFP tasked specific units to perform specific functions. Combat operations
were primarily conducted by infantry battalions to target selected strategic guerilla fronts
and aimed at inflicting heavy casualties among the armed insurgents. 100 The infantry
battalions of the Philippine Army were deployed to target the armed groups in the
countryside with the support of the different intelligence units under the Intelligence
Service of the AFP. 101 In doing so, intelligence officers concentrated efforts at recruiting
informants to track the insurgents’ movements and discover their plans. CMO were focused
on targeting insurgents and their supporters through psychological warfare to break their
will to fight, induce mass surrender, and eventually provide an avenue for peace and
reconciliation. 102 To effectively utilize its forces, the AFP tasked specific units to perform
specific functions. CMO units utilized the media—print, radio, and television—to address
and cover a wide area of audiences, emphasizing the gains of the government’s initiatives.

2. Operational Accomplishments

Of the three campaigns, Oplan Lambat Bitag seemed to be the most effective in
terms of achieving military objectives, since it was successful in reducing the number of

98 Peña, “Finding the Missing Link to a Successful Philippine Counterinsurgency Strategy,”44.

99 Morales, “Perpetual War: The Philippine Insurgencies,” 29.
100 Armed Forces of the Philippines, AFP Campaign Plan (Lambat Bitag), Letter of Instructions 23–
88 (Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City: Armed Forces of the Philippines, 1988), 6.
101 Armed Forces of the Philippines, 6.
102 Armed Forces of the Philippines, 6.

29
CPP-NPA combatants from about 25,200 in 1987 to 14,800 in 1991. 103 This plan was
initially successful because it focused on addressing the different tactics being
implemented by the NPA fighters in the countryside. 104 Figure 5 shows the trend in CPP-
NPA capabilities from 1989 to 1998, the periods when the AFP implemented Oplan
Lambat Bitag. The figure shows the trend in the number of communist insurgents
neutralized, which include those who were killed, apprehended, or surrendered, and the
number of firearms gained, which included those that were captured or recovered by the
government forces. 105

Figure 5. Trend in CPP-NPA Capabilities (1989–1998). 106

In terms of enemy neutralized, 1991 proved the most productive year for the AFP,
as it neutralized 36 percent more communist insurgents (1,258 total) that year than it did
in 1990. In terms of firearms gained by the government, 1989–1993 reflected the greatest

103 Severo, “Philippine Counterinsurgency during the Presidencies of Magsaysay, Marcos, and
Ramos: Challenges and Opportunities,”89.
104 Corpus, Silent War, 109.
105 Philippine Army, “Philippine Army Counterinsurgency by the Numbers” (Fort Bonifacio, Taguig
City: Philippine Army, 2013), 5.
106 Adapted from Philippine Army, 45, 47, 49, 51.

30
government gains with a steady increase of recovered firearms by government forces,
starting at 496 and peaking at 676. Beginning in 1993, however, there was a decline in
terms of reduction of CPP-NPA military capabilities, the lowest being observed in
1996 when the number of combatants neutralized totaled 81 and arms obtained totaled 64.
This low point is attributed not to a severely neutralized opponent but to the transfer of
Internal Security Operation (ISO) responsibility from the AFP to the PNP during the
Ramos administration. 107

After the transfer of ISO responsibility to PNP in 1996, a gradual increase in terms
of CPP-NPA military capabilities was observed. This trend began in 1997 and extended to
the early 2000s. According to Roy Devesa, this gradual increase was attributed to the lack
of preparedness on the part of the PNP to take over the ISO responsibilities, because the
PNP was preoccupied with anti-criminality operations, which is detached from the
counterinsurgency efforts of the government. 108 Author Soliman Santos also attributes the
CPP-NPA’s resurgence in 1997 to the groups’ reaffirmation of the protracted nature of the
war and the NPA’s renewed focus on organizing work. 109 The rectification that the CPP-
NPA members had made within their organization allowed them to reorganize and
consolidate support in their base areas.

3. External Support

During Oplan Lambat-Bitag, President Corazon Aquino’s administration primarily

received military support from the United States in its counterinsurgency operations. In
1988, when the CPP-NPA was at its peak strength, the United States advised the
administration to launch a total war against the CPP-NPA. 110 Acting on this advice, the
Aquino administration intensified its counterinsurgency strategy, and the AFP for its part
implemented Oplan Lambat-Bitag, primarily the Clear stage and first half of the Hold

107 Roy Devesa, “An Assessment of the Philippine Counterinsurgency Operational Methodology”
(master’s thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2005), 36.
108 Devesa, 37.
109 Santos et al., Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the
Philippines, 23.
110 Santos et al., 21.

31
stage. This resulted in the drastic reduction in CPP-NPA capabilities, particularly in
manpower and firearms.

The 1991 country-study report about the Philippines for the U.S. Library of
Congress indicated that in 1990 U.S. foreign aid to the Philippines reached nearly US$500
million. 111 It further revealed that, during the 1990s, the United States and Japan were key
donors to the Philippine Assistance Plan, which was a multilateral aid initiative that
included debt relief and new credit. This foreign aid, however, focused on aiding the
Philippines in its structural reforms and not particularly to aid the AFP in the
implementation of its counterinsurgency campaign.

B. OPLAN BANTAY-LAYA (GUARDING FREEDOM)

The Oplan Bantay Laya (Guarding Freedom) campaign was adopted by the Arroyo
administration and executed in two iterations: Oplan Bantay-Laya I (2002–2006) and
Oplan Banta-Laya II (2007–2010), the latter of which was intended to provide the AFP
and its subordinate units strategic guidance for ISO. 112 The plans represented the AFP’s
strategic orientation that links to national plans and strategy. 113 Under the campaign, the
AFP’s mission was to “conduct ISO nationwide to destroy Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
soonest, decisively defeat the armed group of the Local Communist Movement and contain
Southern Philippines Secessionist Groups (SPSGs) in order to establish a physically and
psychologically secured environment conducive to national development.” 114 As this
mission statement suggests, defeating the communist insurgents was not the government’s
highest priority, but a valiant effort was made against this ongoing threat.

111 Ronald E. Dolan, Philippines: A Country Study (Washington, D.C.: GPO for the Library of
Congress, 1991), http://countrystudies.us/philippines/.
112 Armed Forces of the Philippines, AFP Campaign Plan (Bantay Laya), AFP ISO Plan 02–01
(Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City: Armed Forces of the Philippines, 2002), 1.
113 Armed Forces of the Philippines, 1.
114 Armed Forces of the Philippines, 3.

32
 1. Campaign Objectives and Strategies

The overall objective of Oplan Bantay Laya was to neutralize and dismantle the
political and militant machinery of the communist insurgency in the countryside. 115 As
with its predecessor, Oplan Lambat-Bitag, the main implementors of the campaign were
the different Area Commands. Oplan Bantay Laya also added the Clear-Hold-Support (C-
H-S) methodology in consonance with the C-H-D-C method to neutralize the insurgents in
key areas and allow for the transfer of security responsibility from the AFP to the local
government units. In C-H-S operational methodology, during the Clear Stage, the AFP
used its mobile forces to destroy the armed component of the insurgents. 116 The AFP
further explained that in the Hold Stage it uses the different territorial forces to secure the
cleared areas and facilitate the entry of other government agencies for consolidation and
development activities. The AFP described the Support stage as involving the AFP and
other national and local government agencies collaborating to implement developmental
activities that would address the root causes of conflict. 117

2. Operational Accomplishments

Under Oplan Bantay-Laya, the AFP further intensified its operations against the
CPP-NPA to defeat the communist insurgents by 2010. The premature transfer of ISO
responsibility to the PNP during the Ramos administration resulted in the CPP-NPA
recovering its lost grounds both in terms of number of combatants and territory.
Consequently, the ISO responsibility reverted to the AFP. Figure 6 shows the trend in
AFP’s effort to reduce CPP-NPA military capabilities during the implementation of Oplan
Bantay-Laya I and II. Whereas the AFP neutralized 104 communist combatants at the end
of Oplan Lambat-Bitag in 1998, by 2002 it had removed 889 combatants from the theater.
At the end of Oplan Lambat-Bitag in 1998, 218 weapons had changed hands, as compared
to 476 weapons in 2002 at the start of Oplan Bantay-Laya I.

115 Angel Rabasa et al., From Insurgency to Stability: Volume II: Insights from Selected Case Studies
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2011), 38, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-
nps/detail.action?docID=777017.
116 Armed Forces of the Philippines, AFP Campaign Plan (Bantay Laya), 5.
117 Armed Forces of the Philippines, 5.

33
 Figure 6. Trend in CPP-NPA Capabilities (2001–2010). 118

During the early implementation of the campaign there was a decline in the
neutralization of CPP-NPA combatants. According to an AFP campaign assessment in
2003, this was attributed to the AFP’s and government’s focus being on Abu Sayyaf Group
(ASG) and separatists in the southern part of the country. 119 The number of weapons seized
also experienced an early retrenchment after initial success. Yet, the campaign gained
ground to have its most significant military successes from 2005 to 2007, removing in these
three years a total of 4,519 NPA combatants and 2,284 firearms. 120 The AFP attributed
this progress to more effective utilization of combat, intelligence, and psychological
operations.

These operational successes, however, were short lived as the Arroyo

administration faced several challenges that involved the military, drawing the attention of
both the administration and the AFP away from the campaign. As illustrated in Figure 6,
in the last years of the campaign, the number of neutralized combatants fell from 1,296 in

118 Adapted from Philippine Army, “Philippine Army Counterinsurgency by the Numbers,” 45, 47,
49, 51.
119 Philippine Army, 47.
120 Philippine Army, 45, 47, 49, 51.

34
2008 to 597 in 2010, while the number of weapons seized or turned over to the government
held steady for the campaign’s final four years, ranging between 747 and 805 each year.

In 2006, a coup plot was discovered and forced President Arroyo to declare a state
of emergency on February 24, 2006. 121 This was followed by the Manila Peninsula
Rebellion in which detained Magdalo mutineers from the 2003 Oakwood Mutiny seized
the hotel for which the event is named. 122 Another factor that contributed to the decline in
accomplishment is the frequent change in AFP leadership. Jaemark Tordecilla, in his report
for the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, indicated that during the nine-year
tenure of President Arroyo, she appointed a total of 12 generals as AFP Chief of Staff,
seven of whom only held the position for less than a year, with one general serving for just
69 days. 123 Tordecilla further argues that this frequent change in leadership hindered the
AFP from pursuing needed reforms within the organization.

3. External Support

The Arroyo administration continued to work with the United States and other
regional security partners to pursue the administration’s national security agenda. In 2001,
the Philippines was among the first countries in Southeast Asia to support the George W.
Bush administration’s global war on terror (GWOT). For example, the Philippines allowed
the use of its airspace and seaports in the efforts to support the U.S. military operations in
Afghanistan. 124 In 2007, the government signed the Philippine-Australia Status-of-Forces
Agreement (SOFA), which was similar to the Philippine-U.S. Visiting Forces Agreement
(VFA). 125 Under the agreement, the Philippine government provided legal assurances in

121 Inquirer Research, “What Went Before: Oakwood Mutiny and Trillanes’ 2nd Try to Oust Arroyo,”
Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 4, 2018, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1028406/what-went-before-the-
oakwood-mutiny.
122 Inquirer Research.
123 Jaemark Tordecilla, “A Politicized Military,” Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism,
February 23, 2011, https://pcij.org/article/2785/a-politicized-military.
124 John Roberts and Peter Symonds, “Political Turmoil Surrounds Philippines President Arroyo,”
World Socialist website, accessed May 3, 2020, https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2005/06/phil-j22.html.
125 Renato Cruz De Castro, “The Role of Middle Powers in the Modernization of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP): The Case of the Special Japan–Australia Strategic Partnership and the Philippines,”
The Korean Journal of Defense 31, no. 1 (March 2019): 151.
35
the conduct of joint-counterterrorism exercises between the AFP and the Australian
Defense Force (ADF). It also gave the ADF the opportunity to advise on the logistics and
acquisition policy of the AFP. 126

While the Arroyo administration received a boost in its campaign against

communist insurgents in 2004, when the CPP-NPA was blacklisted for its terrorist
activities by several countries—notably, the United States, Australia, Britain, and the
European Union (EU)—most military partnerships that the Arroyo government entered
into did not focus on the communist insurgency and instead compelled an AFP shift in
forces to other areas. The U.S.-Philippines partnership in 2001, for instance, focused on
defeating terrorist groups in the southern Philippines while the Philippines-Australia SOFA
also focused on counterterrorism primarily in Mindanao and development of maritime
security capabilities. The United States in particular has directly supported the Philippine
military and police in their counterterrorism efforts, deploying 1,200 advisors as early as
2001, most of them in the southern Philippines. 127 In line with this effort, a U.S. Joint
Special Operations Forces (SOF) Task Force was deployed in Mindanao purposely to
provide antiterrorism training, assist in intelligence gathering using state-of-the-art
equipment, and provide advice to AFP forces deployed in the area. 128 The equipment and
expertise shared by the Task Force had significantly contributed to the AFP’s capability in
pursuing terrorist threats in Mindanao.

C. INTERNAL PEACE AND SECURITY PLAN—IPSP BAYANIHAN (CIVIC

UNITY)

From 2011 to 2016, the AFP implemented IPSP Bayanihan (a Tagalog word that
translates roughly as “civic unity”) as part of the security agenda of the Benigno Aquino
administration, which was said to be a paradigm shift on how the AFP viewed its role and

126 Castro, 151.

127 Fran Beaudette, Philippine Counterinsurgency Success: Implications for the Human Domain of
Warfare (Carlisle, PA: United States Army War College, 2013), 23–24.
128 Mely Caballero-Anthony, “The Winds of Change in the Philippines: Whither the Strong
Republic?,” Southeast Asian Affairs, 2003, 219.
36
performed its functions. 129 The plan was crafted to guide the AFP in performing its
functions of protecting the people and the state, which represented a major shift for the
AFP from a primarily militaristic mindset to “a people-centered security strategy.” 130 It
required the AFP to set up a stronger mechanism for transparency and accountability and
to provide a venue for security convergence at the tactical level. 131

The AFP did not craft the IPSP Bayanihan alone; instead, it involved the academe,
other government agencies and civil society organizations, in the development of IPSP
Bayanihan. Under the campaign, the AFP’s mission was to “conduct support operations to
win the peace in order to help the Filipino nation create an environment conducive for
sustainable development and a just and lasting peace.” 132 It was prescribed to be not only
“whole of government” but “whole of nation,” unlike the Oplan Bantay-Laya, which had
a stronger focus on combat and eventually was diverted primarily to counter threats in the
southern Philippines.

The six-year time frame of IPSP Bayanihan was divided into two phases. In the
first phase (2011–2013), the AFP was focused on addressing the armed threat groups,
particularly the CPP-NPA. 133 This early focus on military action was not much different
from the two previously described campaigns. However, in the second phase (2014–2016),
the AFP was to devote its efforts and resources to handing over responsibilities to
concerned local government units, which were to play a principal role in ensuring the
internal peace and security, as well as provision of government services. This deliberate
focus on empowering locals represented a significant shift.

129 Armed Forces of the Philippines, AFP Campaign Plan (Bayanihan) (Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon
City: Armed Forces of the Philippines, 2011), 24.
130 Armed Forces of the Philippines, 24.
131 National Economic and Development Authority, Philippine Development Plan 2011–2016
Midterm Update with Revalidated Results Matrices (Ortigas Center, Pasig City, Philippines: National
Economic and Development Authority, 2014), 186.
132 Armed Forces of the Philippines, AFP Campaign Plan (Bayanihan), 22.
133 Armed Forces of the Philippines, 23.

37
 1. Campaign Objectives and Strategies

Rather than the traditional defeat of the enemy’s armed group, IPSP Bayanihan’s
primary objective was winning the peace by engaging the different stakeholders in the
government’s peace and security efforts. 134 The published IPSP Bayanihan document
states that to accomplish this, the campaign was anchored on two strategic approaches: “the
whole-of-nation approach (WNA) and the people-centered security approach.” The
document further described the WNA as based on the concept that security is not just the
responsibility of security forces and government institutions. Rather, it is a shared
responsibility that also involves the community and civil society. 135 The people-centered
security approach focuses on the people, putting primacy on human rights and exploring
different ways to promote security and safety locally, based on specific needs and realities
on the ground. 136 The implementation of the campaign does not only involve external
application of engaging the different stakeholders. Internally, the AFP as an institution has
also implemented measures to ensure that soldiers understand and appreciate the strategic
concept of the campaign. IPSP Bayanihan became part of the modules being taught to
soldiers in their units and individual trainings.

2. Operational Accomplishments

From 2011 to 2016, IPSP Bayanihan was successful in reducing CPP-NPA

capabilities, as signified by the number of active combatants and firearms and the affected
barangays freed. Figure 7 shows that in terms of the number of personnel neutralized,
which includes those who were apprehended, killed, and surrendered, the AFP was
successful in reducing the NPA’s strength. For the entire period, a total of 4,722 CPP-NPA,
averaging 787 per year, were neutralized, which was attributed to the increased operational
tempo in the conduct of combat operations by the various Area Commands. 137 In terms of
firearms gained, the AFP was able to capture a total of 2,750 weapons, an average of 458

134 Armed Forces of the Philippines, 2–3.

135 Armed Forces of the Philippines, 25.
136 Armed Forces of the Philippines, 26.
137 Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operation, J3, AFP Campaign Assessment.

38
per year. The campaign, however, lagged in terms of reducing the number of affected
barangays, with 579 barangays declared as cleared with local control in place, which is an
average of 97 per year. Although 167 barangays were cleared in 2011, just 71 were
rehabilitated in 2016. The AFP attributed the decline in reduction of CPP-NPA capabilities
from 2014 to 2015 to the shift in focus in the AFP from internal defense to external defense
in a dispute in the South China Sea. 138

Figure 7. Trend in CPP-NPA Capabilities (2011–2016). 139

3. External Support

As with the previous administrations, the Aquino administration continued to

develop and enhance its security partnership with the United States and its regional security
allies, Australia and Japan. As with previous administrations, these international
agreements focused on counterterrorism operations—not counterinsurgency operations—
and maritime security but did little to support the AFP’s efforts against the communist
insurgency.

138 Renato Cruz De Castro, “Developing a Credible Defense Posture for the Philippines: From the
Aquino to the Duterte Administrations,” Asian Politics & Policy 9, no. 4 (2017): 546,
https://doi.org/10.1111/aspp.12353.
139 Source: Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operation, J3, AFP Campaign Assessment.

39
 In 2014, the Philippines and United States signed the Enhanced Defense
Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) to further deepen the defense cooperation between the
two countries. 140 The agreement allows the U.S. military rotational access to Philippine
bases. After the agreement was signed, it was reported that the United States allocated
US$50 million and US$40 million in military aid to the Philippines for 2014 and 2015,
respectively. 141 In addition to this military aid, the U.S. government also provided the
Philippines another US$50 million for the AFP’s military training and intelligence
operations to support its counterterrorism operations. 142

In 2016, the Philippines and Japan signed a new defense pact to further bolster the
defense and security cooperation between the two countries. 143 According to Renato Cruz
De Castro, the agreement established the “legal parameters that allows the transfer of
defense equipment and technology from Japan to the Philippines.” De Castro further argues
that this agreement is mutually beneficial for the two countries: for the Philippines, it will
facilitate the “transfer of defense equipment and technology” from Japan; for Japan, it will
“advance the development and establishment of technological bases of Japan’s growing
defense industry.” 144

D. CONCLUSION

AFP’s Oplan Lambat Bitag and Oplan Bantay-Laya campaigns had focused on
defeating and destroying the armed group and the political structures of the communist
insurgents in the barangays, using the C-H-D-C model. IPSP Bayanihan, on the other hand,
introduced a paradigm shift that implemented a WNA and people-centered security
strategy. During this time, Philippine government received significant support from its

140 Carl Thayer, “Analyzing the US-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement,”
Diplomat, accessed April 10, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2014/05/analyzing-the-us-philippines-
enhanced-defense-cooperation-agreement/.
141 Siddhartha Mahanta, “The Philippines to the United States: We Want You Back,” Foreign Policy
(blog), accessed April 10, 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/01/philippines-china-military-carter/.
142 Mahanta.
143 Castro, “The Role of Middle Powers in the Modernization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP): The Case of the Special Japan–Australia Strategic Partnership and the Philippines,” 151.
144 Castro, 151.

40
allies and security partners, particularly the United States, Australia, and Japan. This
support, however, was not focused on defeating communist insurgents but instead on
counterterrorism, maritime security operations, and developing defense industry. All three
campaigns had positive results in terms of reducing the CPP-NPA capabilities. Despite
this, they fell short in accomplishing their objectives of defeating the communist
insurgents. The next chapter analyzes the factors that contributed to the shortcomings of
these three AFP campaigns.

41
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42
 IV. ANALYZING THE CAMPAIGNS: WHY THE CPP-NPA
HAS NOT YET BEEN DEFEATED

Unresolved social, political, and economic conditions in the country provided the
CPP-NPA with grievances to exploit and to rally the masses to their cause. Widespread
poverty and corruption, ignorance, and injustices—including neglect and coercion—by the
government brought increased suffering and dissatisfaction among the people, making
them vulnerable to CPP-NPA’s agitation and propaganda. 145 To address these issues, the
Philippine government launched several whole-of-government counterinsurgency
strategies, which were only partially implemented and thus only partially successful. The
AFP, for its part, implemented several campaign plans to support the different
administrations’ national security agendas, with three of the most significant efforts being
the campaigns studied in this thesis.

This chapter examines the factors that hampered the implementation of AFP’s
Oplan Lambat Bitag, Oplan Bantay-Laya, and IPSP Bayanihan. This chapter argues that
inadequate sustainment capability, lack of support from government institutions, and the
challenges to political leadership are the primary factors that hindered the AFP campaigns
and their overriding objective of defeating the CPP-NPA. The chapter begins by describing
the socio-economic conditions during the implementation of each campaign. It then
discusses and analyzes the different factors that hindered the implementation of the three
broadly scoped AFP campaigns.

A. SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

The campaigns being implemented as part of the government’s overall

counterinsurgency strategy encountered similar socio-political and economic problems that
hindered their implementation. Oplan Lambat-Bitag (Net Trap), was implemented during
the Aquino (1986–1992) and Ramos (1992–1998) administrations, Oplan Bantay Laya
(Guarding Freedom) during the Arroyo administration (2001–2010), and IPSP Bayanihan

145 Navarrete, “An Assessment of the Philippine Counterinsurgency Campaign,” 34.

43
(Civic Unity) during the Benigno Aquino (2011–2016) administration. This section
analyzes the different socio-political and economic factors that each administration faced
and how they affected the implementation of the campaigns.

1. Oplan Lambat Bitag (Net Trap)

The deep and systemic problems that paved the way for the reemergence of the
CPP-NPA in the late 1960s were still present during the 1980s. Poverty, corruption, and
inequality were among the problematic socio-economic conditions when the AFP’s Oplan
Lambat Bitag was first implemented in 1989, and little progress was made in overcoming
them. 146 When Corazon Aquino came into power after the People Power Revolution,
which overthrew Ferdinand Marcos’ dictatorship, she inherited a bankrupt economy and
debt-ridden country. 147

The Philippines was among the poorest countries in the region, and the country’s
per capita GDP growth averaged close to zero during the Aquino administration. 148 Ronald
Dolan, in his country report about the Philippines for the U.S. Library of Congress,
indicated that the countryside had the highest concentration of the poor, with more than 80
percent of the poorest families living in rural areas. 149 The majority of them were landless
farmers, fishermen, and manual laborers. He further indicated that during martial law under
Marcos, from 1971 to 1985, urban poverty had increased by 13 percent, with a majority of
the urban poor living in crowded slums. 150 Capitalizing on the perceived government
neglect, CPP-NPA agitation and propaganda efforts targeted the rural and urban poor. The
poverty incidence rate in the Philippines was 44 percent in 1986 when Aquino became
president and 32 percent in 1997 before the end of the Ramos administration. 151

146 Rabasa et al., From Insurgency to Stability, 34.

147 Santos et al., Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the
Philippines, 4.
148 Human Development Sector Unit East Asia and Pacific Region, “Philippines Fostering More
Inclusive Growth,” World Bank Open Knowledge Repository, 2011, 1.
149 Dolan, “Philippines: A Country Study.”
150 Dolan.
151 Karin Schelzig, Poverty in the Philippines: Income, Assets, and Access (Mandaluyong City, Metro
Manila, Philippines: Asian Development Bank, 2005), 17.
44
 Initially, after the overthrow of the Marcos dictatorship, the Philippines entered a
new and successful phase of counterinsurgency, as measured by the steep drop in CPP-
NPA capabilities between 1991 and 1995 and which were held at low levels throughout
the Ramos administration (see Figure 7). 152 The Aquino administration promoted
“national reconciliation with justice,” which increased focus on diplomatic solutions.153
The AFP’s new counterinsurgency strategy continued its offensive operations against
combatants, while the concept of civilian protection was incorporated into government
action, although not well implemented. 154 President Aquino tried to pursue reconciliation
with communist insurgents by engaging in peace negotiations as part of her
administration’s broader internal stability strategy. To demonstrate the government’s
sincerity, she ordered the release of all political prisoners who were imprisoned during the
Marcos administration, including the top two leaders of the CPP, Jose Maria Sison and
Bernabe Buscayno. 155 Increased involvement by civilian government agencies and non-
governmental organizations was part of the Aquino administration’s plan to defeat the
insurgents and attain socio-economic development. 156

When President Ramos was elected in 1992, he continued the AFP’s “Clear-Hold-
Consolidate-Develop (C-H-C-D)” activities as well as expanded the government’s political
policies of peace and national reconciliation. 157 He created and organized the National
Unification Commission (NUC), which had helped in reducing the high numbers of
political prisoners, including those allegedly linked to the CPP. 158 The NUC is composed
of diverse members coming from the legislative and executive branches of the government
and the private sector. NUC’s primary purpose is to investigate and recommend solutions

152 Mike Fowler, “Philippine Counterinsurgency Strategy: Then and Now,” Small Wars Journal,
January 18, 2011, 15.
153 Watts et al., “Counterinsurgency in the Philippines,” 87.
154 Fowler, “Philippine Counterinsurgency Strategy: Then and Now,”12.
155 Peña, “Finding the Missing Link to a Successful Philippine Counterinsurgency Strategy,” 44.
156 Peña, 44.
157 Watts et al., “Counterinsurgency in the Philippines,” 2014.
158 Gary J. Morea, “From Enduring Strife to Enduring Peace in the Philippines,” Military Review 88,
no. 3 (June 2008): 40.
45
to address the root causes of armed conflicts and social unrest. 159 The commission became
the primary government unit responsible for overseeing the execution of the National
Program for Unification and Development (NPUD), which ran the amnesty program for
secessionists, coup plotters, and insurgents willing to surrender. 160 Furthermore, as part of
the government efforts to show sincerity toward reconciliation, the Ramos administration
repealed the Republic Act 1700, also known as the Anti-Subversion Law. 161 As a result,
the Communist Party became a legal political party and was allowed to participate in the
government to express its social and political goals.

Although the Aquino and Ramos administrations implemented several changes to

fight corruption, the government, society, and politics were still perceived as highly
corrupt. In the first corruption index published by Transparency International in 1995, the
Philippines ranked 36 out of 41 countries, with a score of 2.77 in the corruption perception
index, where a score of 10 reflected the least-corrupt countries. 162 Transparency
International’s corruption perception index “measures the levels public sector corruption”
as perceived by international business people and financial journalists. 163 By the end
of the Ramos administration in 1998, the Philippines ranked 55 out of 85 countries with a
score of 3.3, which was slightly higher than the 2.7 in 1995. 164 Since then, the succeeding
administrations have made several efforts to curb corruption, but little progress has
been made.

2. Oplan Bantay Laya (Guarding Freedom)

When Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo became the president in January 2001, poverty

and social inequality persisted in the country. According to a 2009 poverty statistics report

159 Severo, “Philippine Counterinsurgency during the Presidencies of Magsaysay, Marcos, and
Ramos: Challenges and Opportunities,” 79.
160 Severo, 80–81.
161 Severo, 82.
162 Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 1995 for the Philippines,” accessed
April 14, 2021, https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/1995.
163 Transparency International.
164 Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 1998 for the Philippines,” accessed
April 14, 2021, https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/1998.
46
published by the Philippine Statistics Authority, the poverty rate had increased to 26
percent, compared to 22 percent in 2003. 165 As was the case under the Aquino
administration, which dealt with multiple coup attempts and ongoing civil unrest, political
instability was also rampant during the Arroyo administration. 166 Several impeachment
cases were hurled at the president, and several mass, predominantly nonviolent protest
actions were launched by left-leaning and other civil-society organizations during her nine-
year term.

Upon assuming the presidency, Arroyo envisioned establishing a strong republic to

restore the nation’s credibility and stability in the eyes of its citizens and the world. 167 Her
administration recognized that insurgency still “posed a serious threat to national security”
and that a need existed to institutionalize a government response to address it. 168 The
administration implemented what it called a Strategy of Holistic Approach, with Arroyo
proclaiming Executive Order Number 21 in June 2001. Otherwise known as the “National
Internal Security Plan,” this approach was “to integrate the political, economic, security
and psycho-social response of the government in addressing the insurgency threats and root
causes of conflict.” 169 The Arroyo administration set three political objectives for its
counterinsurgency strategy:

First to enhance good governance by fighting corruption and promoting

transparency and accountability. Second, accelerate programs to reduce
poverty and promote respect for human rights and right to development.
Third is to implement the left-hand and right-hand efforts which combines
military operations and government agencies focused on socio-economic
and psycho-social developments. 170

165 National Statistical Coordination Board. 2009 Official Poverty Statistics of Philippines (Makati
City, Philippines: National Statistical Coordination Board, 2010), v, accessed April 3, 2021,
https://psa.gov.ph/sites/default/files/2009%20Poverty%20Statistics.pdf.
166 Roberts and Symonds, “Political Turmoil Surrounds Philippines President Arroyo.”
167 Peña, “Finding the Missing Link to a Successful Philippine Counterinsurgency Strategy,”61.
168 “Executive Order No. 21, s. 2001,” accessed May 3, 2020,
https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2001/06/19/executive-order-no-21-s-2001/.
169 “Executive Order No. 21, s. 2001.”
170 Peña, “Finding the Missing Link to a Successful Philippine Counterinsurgency Strategy,” 23–24.

47
Despite these stated political objectives, the Arroyo administration focused on military
objectives to defeat the communist insurgents, unlike the Aquino and Ramos
administrations which focused on “national reconciliation with justice.”

Political scientists John Roberts and Peter Symonds emphasized that the corruption
problem continued to persist in the Arroyo Administration, which was hounded by several
corruption scandals of its own. 171 The first corruption scandal centered around the claims
that several of Arroyo’s relatives, specifically her husband, son, and brother-in-law,
received jueteng (illegal numbers game) money. The second involved claims of fraud in
the election in 2004, where it was alleged that Arroyo used her position to bolster her
campaign and rig the election. The third involved the national broadband project known as
the NBN-ZTE deal, which again involved her husband, who allegedly received kickbacks
from the deal. 172

In the corruption index published by Transparency International, the Philippines

ranked 65 out of 91 countries in 2001, with a score of 2.9, which was lower than the Ramos
Administration’s 3.3 score in 1998. 173 The Philippines continued to slip in global rankings
during the Arroyo Administration, with the Philippines being ranked 146 out of 178
countries, with a score of 2.4 by the end of her term. 174 This was the lowest relative score
that the Philippines received since Transparency International started publishing its global
corruption perception index in 1995.

171 Roberts and Symonds, “Political Turmoil Surrounds Philippines President Arroyo.”
172 Jun Ledesma, “Letters from Davao: The National Broadband Network,ˮ Philippine News Agency,
accessed April 14, 2021, https://www.pna.gov.ph/opinion/pieces/123-the-national-broadband-network.
173 Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2001 for the Philippines,” accessed
April 14, 2021, https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2001.
174 Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2010 for the Philippines,” accessed
April 14, 2021, https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2010.
48
 3. Internal Peace and Security Plan—IPSP Bayanihan (Civic Unity)

When Benigno Aquino III assumed office in 2011, a perception of poor governance
and massive corruption existed in the country. 175 The national security agenda of President
Aquino’s administration focused on the people and took a multi-stakeholder approach in
addressing the peace and security concerns of the country. It emphasized four specific
elements, namely “good governance, delivery of basic services, economic and sustainable
development and security sector reform.” 176

Aquino instituted several reforms in the government to restore the public trust in
the government and its institutions. For instance, the administration made significant gains
in its fight against corruption. In the corruption perception index published by
Transparency International, the Philippines ranked an average of 115 out of 178 countries
during the B. Aquino III administration, compared to 146 in 2010 at the end of the Arroyo
administration. 177 By the end of the Aquino administration, the Philippines was ranked
101. This gradual climb in the global rankings is attributed to the positive effects of several
anti-corruption policies that the administration had implemented.

IPSP Bayanihan acknowledged the large effect of the social and economic
conditions on peace and security in the country. At the time the campaign was
implemented, the country remained marred by unequal distribution of wealth and economic
opportunities, which resulted in a wide income gap between social classes. 178 The
Philippine economy grew stronger before and after Aquino took power, with the national
poverty rate declining from 26.6 percent in 2006 to 21.6 percent in 2015, despite the global
economic recession of 2008–2009. 179 From 2011 to 2016, the Aquino administration

175 Maria Fe Villamejor-Mendoza et al., “The Performance of the Aquino Administration (2010-
2016): An Assessment,” National College of Public Administration and Governance, 2018, 6.
https://ncpag.upd.edu.ph/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/PerformanceOfAquinoAdmin.pdf
176 General Headquarters, Army of the Philippines, International Peace and Security Plan
“Bayanihan,” accessed May 3, 2020, https://www.army.mil.ph/home/images/bayanihan.pdf.
177 Transparency International. “Corruption Perceptions Index 2016 for the Philippines,” accessed
May 4, 2021, https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2016.
178 Armed Forces of the Philippines, AFP Campaign Plan (Bayanihan), 7.
179 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Making Growth Work for the Poor: A
Poverty Assessment for the Philippines (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2018), 17.
49
continued to implement actions to reduce poverty and improve the living conditions of the
people.

The Aquino administration also faced several political challenges. The first was the
Manila Hostage crisis in 2010, where eight Hong Kong tourists were killed by a lone
gunman. 180 The second was the Scarborough Shoal incident with China in 2012, a military
stand-off that forced the Aquino administration to realize the need to fast track the AFP’s
territorial defense capability build-up. 181 These two incidents resulted in a shift in focus
of the AFP from internal security to territorial defense. Lastly, the Mamasapano clash in
January 2015, which was a botched Philippine National Police (PNP) operation against the
foreign terrorist Marwan in Mamasapano, Maguindanao, that led to 67 deaths, 44 of them
among the security forces. 182 Aquino suffered a severe backlash because of this incident,
with his approval rating crashing from 59 percent to 38 percent favorability, according to
a Pulse Asia survey conducted after the incident. 183 A Philippine Senate inquiry was
conducted to investigate the incident, which included in its report that President Aquino
committed an unlawful act for bypassing the chain of command when he allowed the
suspended chief of the PNP to manage the operation. 184

B. FACTORS THAT HINDERED THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AFP

CAMPAIGNS

Although the three AFP campaigns studied here made significant gains in reducing
the CPP-NPA capabilities, they still fell short of achieving their objectives of defeating the
communist insurgency. This section analyzes how inadequate sustainment capability, lack

180 “Hong Kong Hostages Killed in Manila Bus Siege,” BBC News, August 23, 2010, sec. Asia-
Pacific, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11055015.
181 Castro, “The Role of Middle Powers in the Modernization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP): The Case of the Special Japan–Australia Strategic Partnership and the Philippines,” 150.
182 Rigoberto Tiglao, “The Mamasapano Massacre: The Worst Crime Ever Committed by a
Philippine President,” The Manila Times, November 10, 2017, sec. Opinion on Page One,
https://www.manilatimes.net/2017/11/10/opinion/columnists/topanalysis/mamasapano-massacre-worst-
crime-ever-committed-philippine-president/361800/.
183 Trefor Moss, “Philippine President Aquino Attempts to Quell Criticism Over Botched Raid; The
Philippine President’s Approval Ratings Have Plunged since the Debacle,” Wall Street Journal (Online),
March 26, 2015, sec. World.
184 Moss.

50
of support from government institutions, and challenges to political leadership hindered
the implementation of all three AFP campaigns.

1. Inadequate Sustainment Capability

In the three campaigns implemented after 1986, the AFP fell short in its objective
of defeating the communist insurgents, in part, because of the lack of sustainment
capability. In the three campaigns reviewed, it should be noted that the AFP had been
implementing the government’s counterinsurgency efforts alone. An International Crisis
Group (ICG) report published in February 2011 indicated that senior AFP commanders
attributed the failure of the AFP to defeat the CPP-NPA to the lack of sufficient resources,
specifically in terms of personnel and equipment. 185 The report further stated that to
cope with the demands for the sustainment of the campaign, the AFP had to rely on
“tribal militias and paramilitary forces.” 186 Many of these groups were not properly trained
and were poorly supervised, which made them susceptible to commit abuses damaging to
the campaign.

In his thesis, Col. Ricardo C. Morales argued that the weakness of Oplan Lambat-
Bitag was its inability to provide a suitable force/entity to sustain the gains in the
barangays. 187 Once the soldiers transferred to the next village, the barangay relapsed back
under NPA control, since there was little to no effort from various government agencies to
sustain the gains made by the AFP. This was also true for Oplan Bantay-Laya and IPSP
Bayanihan where both campaigns also failed to capitalize on the gains made in cleared
areas.

Further aggravating these inadequate resources was the constant shifting of focus
in the AFP. In his thesis, Lt. Col. Roy T. Devesa argued that the initial gains of Oplan
Lambat Bitag had shifted the focus of the AFP to external and Moro-Muslim threats when

185 International Crisis Group, The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and Talks, Asia
Report N202 (New York: International Crisis Group, February 2011), i.
186 International Crisis Group, i.
187 Morales, “Perpetual War: The Philippine Insurgencies,” 29.

51
it prematurely transferred the ISO responsibility to the PNP. 188 He further identified that
the PNP was not prepared to handle ISO responsibility, because it was more preoccupied
with criminality, drugs, and kidnappings that were also hounding the country. As a result
of this decision, the last two stages of Oplan Lambat-Bitag were not fully implemented and
gave the insurgents the opportunity to reorganize. Devesa also argued that the shift in focus
of the AFP and the government toward external threats, the Moro-Muslim secessionists,
and Muslim terrorists have placed the communist insurgents as a secondary or even tertiary
priority. 189 Fighting violent internal unrest on two different fronts had spread the AFP’s
forces too thinly, especially after 9/11. Meager AFP resources were reallocated to the fight
against Moro-Muslim secessionists, ASG, and other terrorist groups in the south. The
vacuum left by the pull-back in government forces represented the primary reason why
communist insurgents were able to return, because there was no effective security presence
to hold cleared areas once the soldiers transferred to another area. 190

2. Lack of Support from Government Institutions

In the three campaigns implemented since 1992, the AFP has been implementing
the government’s counterinsurgency efforts with inadequate support from the rest of the
government. In Oplan Lambat Bitag, for instance, the consolidate and develop aspects of
the campaign relied heavily on the ability of the different government agencies to perform
their community development tasks. 191 The persistent shortcomings of the different
government agencies to deliver the necessary development activities for the community
after the AFP soldiers had left an area hindered the implementation of the campaign. 192 In
his thesis, Lt. Col. Pena argued that the civilian agencies’ lack of understanding and

188 Devesa, “An Assessment of the Philippine Counterinsurgency Operational Methodology,” 36.
189 Devesa, 37.
190 Rabasa et al., From Insurgency to Stability, 44.
191 Watts et al., “Counterinsurgency in the Philippines,” 2014, 86.
192 Watts et al., 85.

52
appreciation of AFP efforts have contributed to their failure to perform their tasks in the
consolidate and develop stages of the campaign. 193

The various national and local government agencies needed to deliver basic goods
and services in conflict-affected areas to ensure that operational gains are sustained, that
the community is insulated from communist insurgents, and that grievances are being
addressed. A 2011 RAND report covering several case studies of insurgency found that the
inability of successive administrations to deliver a competent and honest government has
been a primary contributing factor to the persistent communist insurgency in the
Philippines. 194 According to Santos et al., in the three AFP campaigns, the government
attributed the ongoing problem to the communists, because they exploit the social and
political conditions in the countryside. 195 Santos et al. also observed that, while this may
be true, it is actually more complex, since the CPP-NPA cannot exist without the support
of the people, particularly in the countryside, and underlying grievances have been strong
motivating factors for alignment with the insurgents.

A lack of understanding of the nature of the communist insurgency has contributed

to the lack of government-agency support. Despite the whole-of-government approach laid
out by multiple administrations, the insurgency has been viewed by many officials as a
problem for the military. 196 During the C. Aquino administration (1986–1992), the house
of representatives had differing opinions about the insurgency problem. Some believed that
it was a “purely local phenomena,” while others believed that it was solely a problem for
the military to solve. 197 The Ramos administration (1992–1998), which continued Oplan
Lambat Bitag, faced the same problem as the previous administration: government
agencies remained “poorly coordinated, under-sourced, and lacking in the training and

193 Peña, “Finding the Missing Link to a Successful Philippine Counterinsurgency Strategy,” 52–53.
194 Rabasa et al., From Insurgency to Stability, 33.
195 Santos et al., Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the
Philippines, 20.
196 Watts et al., “Counterinsurgency in the Philippines,” 2014, 86.
197 Watts et al., 86.

53
doctrine for counterinsurgency.” 198 As a result, the government failed to deliver the
necessary support in the consolidation and development stages of Oplan Lambat Bitag,
which was quickly exploited by the CPP-NPA to recover and regain lost mass base. 199

The Arroyo administration (2001–2010) had a promising start as it implemented

the Strategy of Holistic Approach (SHA) in implementing the revitalized campaign against
communist insurgents. Devesa has argued that the SHA strategy addressed the government
inactions that were being exploited by the CPP-NPA, since it recognized the need for an
“unconventional and multi-dimensional response.” 200 This strategy included four major
components: “political-legal-diplomatic; socio-economic-psychosocial; peace and order-
security; and information with specific government agencies leading each component.” 201
Yet, the stated strategy was not necessarily reflected in the views of politicians and
government officials, and other government agencies may not have been resourced to
deliver. The main problem during the Arroyo administration, however, was that it focused
government counterinsurgency efforts at the ASG, Moro-Muslim secessionists, and
terrorist groups that rendered the communist insurgency as a lower priority. In fact, this
concentration on counterterrorism and Mindanao was driven by the funding and priorities
of the United States, on which the Philippines was partially dependent. 202

3. Challenges to Political Leadership

Different political challenges in the government further hindered the

implementation of the AFP campaigns and the whole-of-government response. The
effectiveness of the counterinsurgency effort by the government relies on the commitment
of the political leadership at the national and local levels. 203 This section discusses failed

198 Watts et al., 88.

199 Watts et al., 89.
200 Devesa, “An Assessment of the Philippine Counterinsurgency Operational Methodology,” 40.
201 Devesa, 39.
202 Rommel C. Banlaoi, Philippine Security in the Age of Terror (New York: CRC Press, 2010), 62,
107.
203 Robert B. Stephan, Counterinsurgency in the Philippines. Problems and Prospects (Langley AFB,
VA: Army-Air Force Center for Low-Intensity Conflict, October 1989), 9.
54
peace negotiations with the communists, bureaucratic inefficiency, and political instability
as among the political leadership challenges faced by the different administrations.

Each administration studied here tried to negotiate with the communist insurgents
but ultimately failed because of the insurgents’ unrealistic demands and insincerity. 204 It
is important to note that the goal of the CPP is to replace the democratic government with
a communist government. The CPP used peace negotiations as a means to reorganize and
strengthen its ranks and gain political concessions from the government, which was
manifested at the time of President C. Aquino when she ordered the release of all political
prisoners, Jose Maria Sison and Bernabe Buscayno included. 205 Several administrations
followed this strategy. For example, President Ramos repealed the anti-subversion law,
granted amnesty, and implemented the party-list voting system, which gave the CPP an
opportunity to participate in the political affairs of the country. 206 As a result, the CPP now
had representation in the Philippine Congress, giving them the opportunity to destroy the
government from within or, if they chose, fight for gains within the system. President B.
Aquino also started his administration trying to negotiate peace with the communist
insurgents.

Bureaucratic inefficiency further contributed to the failure of the counterinsurgency

strategies. All four administrations were hindered in fully implementing their
counterinsurgency strategy because of the fragmented government structure and corrupt
leaders. At the time of Presidents C. Aquino and Ramos, the “Philippine bureaucracy was
perceived as generally weak, uncommitted to reform, uncoordinated, corrupt, financially
burdened and incapable of coping with the needs of development and reform.” 207 The
inefficiency, inability, and unwillingness of the government to provide basic services to
the people, particularly the impoverished masses in the countryside, provided the

204 Watts et al., “Counterinsurgency in the Philippines,” 2014.

205 Peña, “Finding the Missing Link to a Successful Philippine Counterinsurgency Strategy,” 94.
206 Severo, “Philippine Counterinsurgency during the Presidencies of Magsaysay, Marcos, and
Ramos: Challenges and Opportunities,” 117.
207 Peña, “Finding the Missing Link to a Successful Philippine Counterinsurgency Strategy,”60.

55
communist insurgents with narratives to agitate, arouse, organize, and mobilize masses
against the government.

Political instability also proved a significant factor that affected the implementation
of counterinsurgency strategy. Emmanuel Navarrete has argued that President C. Aquino’s
peace and reconciliation policy was never fully realized because her administration faced
several attempted coups. 208 According to Navarrete, political survival became a central
concern, one furthered by building alliances with various factions within the military,
regardless of their effectiveness in the field or in carrying out the administration’s strategy.
President Arroyo’s administration was also hounded by political instability, having faced
several impeachment attempts and politically motivated rallies against her administration.
Although President B. Aquino’s administration did not face any coup or impeachment
attempts, his administration faced several destabilizing events—the Manila Hostage crisis,
Scarborough Shoal incident, and Mamasapano clash—where their occurrence and the
government response were heavily criticized by political opposition and the public. 209

C. CONCLUSION

This chapter has compared the three primary AFP campaigns implemented after the
1986 EDSA People Power Revolution. This examination has found that the inadequate
sustainment capability by AFP and follow-on security forces, lack of support from
government institutions, and centralized challenges to political leadership are the three
common factors that negatively affected the AFP’s implementation of the campaign and
accomplishment of its objectives. These, in turn, were caused by inadequate resources, lack
of systemic reform, lack of a unified force within the government, instability, and other
internal and external threats.

208 Navarrete, “An Assessment of the Philippine Counterinsurgency Campaign,” 55.

209 Nile Villa, “10 of Aquino’s Biggest Hits and Misses, as Seen through Social Media,” Rappler,
June 18, 2016, https://www.rappler.com/technology/social-media/president-aquino-term-social-media-
reactions.
56
 V. DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT AND SECURITY PLAN—
DSSP KAPAYAPAAN (PEACE)

The various communist counterinsurgency campaigns launched by the AFP have

gained significant headway over the years; however, they still fell short of accomplishing
their objectives of defeating the communist insurgents. Using the lessons learned in the
past campaigns, the AFP has implemented a new campaign, the Development Support and
Security Plan (DSSP) Kapayapaan (Peace). This chapter describes the DSSP Kapayapaan
campaign’s objectives, strategy, and new initiatives. It then argues that three new
initiatives—creation of the National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict
(NTF-ELCAC), the Community Support Program (CSP), and the enhanced civil society
partnership—are the primary factors contributing to recent gains made by the AFP and the
Philippine government. In comparing the current campaign to previous AFP campaigns,
the chapter finds that elements of DSSP Kapayapaan have made significant strides and
have continuing potential to overcome two of three major shortcomings identified in the
earlier campaigns. The chapter also finds that the creation of the NTF-ELCAC is providing
the necessary structure to direct national and local government agencies to collaborate and
converge counterinsurgency efforts with the AFP.

A. OVERVIEW OF DSSP KAPAYAPAAN

The DSSP Kapayapaan campaign is currently being implemented by the AFP

against the CPP-NPA and other internal security threats. It is anchored in the President
Rodrigo Duterte administration’s focus on “compassion and radical change encompassing
the institutionalization of peace and order, ensuring inclusive socio-economic growth and
development, streamlining bureaucracy, and pursuing an independent foreign policy.” 210
DSSP Kapayapaan started in January 2017 and is expected to culminate in June 2022, after
the term of President Duterte has ended. As with the previous campaign, IPSP Bayanihan,
DSSP Kapayapaan is a result of collaboration of the AFP with other government agencies

210 Armed Forces of the Philippines, AFP Development Support and Security Plan Kapayapaan
(Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City: Armed Forces of the Philippines, 2017), 5, https://mronline.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/09/AFP-Development-Support-and-Security-Plan-Kapayapaan-2017-2022.pdf.
57
and civil society. Under the plan, the AFP puts emphasis on the possible areas of
collaboration and convergence of the different local government units (LGUs) and other
stakeholders. It also recognizes the importance of collaboration and convergence of
different national government agencies and LGUs for realizing development, governance,
and security. 211 Like the previous AFP campaigns, DSSP Kapayapaan is intended to guide
the AFP in performing its functions to support the overall national security and
development initiatives of the government. 212

Campaign Objectives and Strategies

The campaign adopted the Development-Governance-Security Framework (see

Figure 8), which places national well-being at the center, recognizing the importance of
having “a shared understanding of concept development, good governance, and security
with all communities and all stakeholders.” 213 The framework emphasizes sustainable
development, human security, and good governance as a means of ending the communist
insurgency. It also recognizes that “security should be an integral part of national
development and good governance in order help foster the foundation for inclusive
economic and human development.” 214

211 Armed Forces of the Philippines, 6.

212 Armed Forces of the Philippines, 10.
213 Armed Forces of the Philippines, 31.
214 Armed Forces of the Philippines, 10.

58
 Figure 8. Development-Governance-Security Framework. 215

Under the plan, the government includes the national government agencies which
emphasize the importance of each agency being able to fulfill its mandate and
responsibility to the people. It also includes the local government units, which tend to be
the principal advocates of good governance and are considered the most essential links in
the development and security of communities in their respective localities. 216 Non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), civil society organizations (CSOs), and peoples’
organizations (POs) are also considered “vital partners as they bridge the service-delivery
gaps in providing the basic needs of the people.” 217 Academe includes those who are in
the education community, who play a major role in development and security through their
contributions in the fields of “technology research, conflict resolution, information

215 Adapted from Armed Forces of the Philippines, 30.

216 Armed Forces of the Philippines, 20–21.
217 Armed Forces of the Philippines, 21.

59
campaign, and values education.” 218 The religious sector includes the various religious
groups in the country, which are also considered vital to development and security because
of their legitimacy, reach, and capacity to mobilize and facilitate support for peace and
reconciliation. 219

Under the DSSP Kapayapaan campaign, the AFP’s mission is as follows:

Conduct “development support operations” to sustain the peace, ensure

security, and help maintain public order in order to foster the foundation for
inclusive economic and human development of the Filipino people. 220

The published DSSP Kapayapaan document defines development support operations

broadly as “AFP operations and activities conducted in support of civil authorities and
other stakeholders.” 221 It has placed emphasis on the AFP being in a support role as
opposed to a leadership role in the development aspect; however, it remains the lead in
terms of security.

The campaign features four strategic concepts with a broad mandate for the AFP:
“sustained military operations to defeat terrorist groups and deter armed peace spoilers;
promotion of peace; active support to law enforcement; and contribution to nation-
building.” 222 Under the plan, sustained military operations focus on the deliberate
employment of forces and capabilities of the AFP to defeat all the armed groups in the
country. 223 In contributing to the promotion of peace, the AFP is to support and actively
participate in the government’s peace negotiation efforts. 224 Active support to law
enforcement means that the AFP will also support the PNP and other law enforcement
agencies in their campaign against illegal drugs and the dismantling of organized crime

218 Armed Forces of the Philippines, 22.

219 Armed Forces of the Philippines, 22.
220 Armed Forces of the Philippines, 28.
221 Armed Forces of the Philippines, 28.
222 Armed Forces of the Philippines, 7.
223 Armed Forces of the Philippines, 33.
224 Armed Forces of the Philippines, 35.

60
groups and private armed groups. 225 In contributing to nation building, the AFP is to
perform tasks in collaboration with civil authorities to help address socio-economic
issues. 226 These activities include protection of the environment, climate change
adaptation, and delivery of basic services.

B. NEW AFP-LED INITIATIVES TO SUPPORT THE CAMPAIGN

The DSSP Kapayapaan document published by the AFP states that the government
and the AFP recognize that the effective delivery of basic services and governance to the
communities is hampered by continued structural problems, despite the government’s
efforts. 227 Among these structural problems are the lack of a national body to integrate the
efforts of the various national and local government agencies and the lack of government
collaboration with civil society organizations that are also implementing CSPs in the
barangays.

With the recognition of these structural problems, the government and the AFP
have instituted several initiatives that will help support the implementation of the
campaign: first, the CSP, which is being implemented by the AFP as part of its
counterinsurgency operations; second, an enhanced partnership with civil society; and
third, the creation of a national task force that will help consolidate all the different national
agencies’ and LGUs’ efforts against communist insurgency.

1. Community Support Program

The CSP is a “community- and issues-oriented operational concept employed in

conflict areas” that was first implemented mid-2016 in the AFP’s Eastern Mindanao
Command. 228 It is a “multi-stakeholder, community-based, and people-oriented peace and
development effort aimed to establish and develop disaster and conflict resilient

225 Armed Forces of the Philippines, 38.

226 Armed Forces of the Philippines, 38–39.
227 Armed Forces of the Philippines, 5.
228 OU3, Eastern Mindanao Command, “Primer on Community Support Program” (Eastern Mindanao
Command, AFP, 2017), 3.
61
communities.” 229 The CSP primer published by the Eastern Mindanao Command states
that CSP places a premium on engagement with LGUs to identify, examine, and address
primary issues being exploited by the CPP-NPA to fuel their ideological, political, and
organizational efforts. 230 The primer further states that community support is implemented
by Community Support Teams (CSTs) organized at the battalion level (see Figure 9). A
CST is composed of one infantry rifle squad (nine soldiers) that is trained to conduct
community immersions, such as dialogue with barangay residents, livelihood trainings,
and community support activities in collaboration with LGUs. Team leaders are selected
based on their leadership capabilities and their ability to ensure that the CSP objectives in
the communities are timely achieved. 231 CSTs have their own respective cells, such as
operations, intelligence, and CMO to ensure that each team can perform its tasks and
individuals are supported in their specialty areas.

Figure 9. Community Support Team (CST) Composition. 232

229 OU3, Eastern Mindanao Command, 4.

230 OU3, Eastern Mindanao Command, 5–7.
231 OU3, Eastern Mindanao Command, 24.
232 Adapted from OU3, Eastern Mindanao Command, 23.

62
 The Doctrine and Capability Integration Center of the Training and Doctrine
Command of the Philippine Army highlights some of the best practices for implementing
CSP in eastern Mindanao, and it is expected that these lessons will effectively transfer to
the rest of the CSP teams deployed in communist insurgent-affected communities. 233 The
Center states that CSP operations in the 4th and 10th Infantry Divisions have been
successful because they have been able to peacefully engage the communities and work
with locals from multiple sectors to identify the key issues in the community that need to
be addressed.

Although the Mindanao-based CSP operations have been successful, the

Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) identified that a lack of
resources and low or nonexistent participation by national government agencies have
limited the positive effects and sustainability of its operations. 234 In October 2019, the
DILG published Memorandum Circular No: 2019–169, Guidelines on the Implementation
of the Retooled Community Support Program (RCSP), which aimed to strengthen the CSP
initiatives of the AFP. 235 RCSP, according to the memorandum, is an inclusive program
aimed at addressing the governance and development gaps in the community by ensuring
that local chief executives implement “programs, projects, and activities that are geared
towards institutionalizing sustainable peace and development” in their respective
localities. 236 The memorandum further directs all LGUs to implement and support RCSP
in their respective localities.

233 Doctrine and Capabilities Integration Center, “Community-Support-Program-Best-Practices-in-

Eastern-Mindanao-Command-AOR,” Training and Doctrine Command, Philippine Army, accessed April
13, 2021, http://doctrinecenterpa.com/posts/Community-Support-Program-Best-Practices-in-Eastern-
Mindanao-Command-AOR.
234 Department of the Interior and Local Government, “Guidelines on the Implemntation Fo the
Retooled Community Support Program (RCSP),” Department of the Interior and Local Government,
Republic of the Philippines, October 11, 2019, 2,
https://dilg.gov.ph/PDF_File/issuances/memo_circulars/dilg-memocircular-20191011_08564fdfd5.pdf.
235 Department of the Interior and Local Government, 2.
236 Department of the Interior and Local Government, 2.

63
 2. Enhanced Cooperation with Government Agencies and Civil Society

In the previous AFP campaigns, particularly Oplan Lambat-Bitag (Net Trap) and
Oplan Bantay-Laya (Guarding Freedom), there was little to no civil society involvement
and government-agency cooperation in the implementation of the campaign. To eliminate
public support for the communist insurgency, one of the key purposes of DSSP
Kapayapaan is to harness nationalist sentiment and rally the support of civil society. 237

Since the implementation of the campaign, the AFP and its subordinate units have
initiated and conducted various stakeholder-engagement activities, mainly with civil
society, NGOs, and the religious sector but also with the various people’s organizations
that are present in the communities. In her article, “The Security Reform Agenda for the
AFP and PNP in 2018,” political scientist Jennifer Santiago Oreta noted a shift in the AFP
and civil society organization (CSO) collaboration. 238 She stated that, although avoided
and distrusted at first, more and more CSOs are now involved and collaborating with the
AFP. Oreta noted, in particular, the Bantay Bayanihan (BB) network, which started with
seven organizations in 2010 and now has 250 member organizations representing various
CSOs, religious, academe, and people’s organizations. BB started during the
implementation of the AFP’s IPSP Bayanihan with a primary focus on having a “critical
but constructive engagement with the AFP.” 239

Another important aspect of AFP collaboration with civil society that Oreta noted
is the establishment of the Multi-Sectoral Governance Council (MSGC), whose primary
purpose is to guide the AFP in its professionalization and modernization agenda. 240 MSGC
is composed of various respected stakeholders from different sectors of society. The
General Headquarters, Major Services, Unified Commands, and other major units of the
AFP now have their respective MSGC that helps them to professionalize and improve their

237 The Center for International Human Rights, The Closing of Civic Space in the Philippines (New
York, NY: John Jay College of Criminal Justice, January 2020), 5.
238 Jennifer Santiago Oreta, “The Security Reform Agenda for the AFP and PNP in 2018,”
BusinessWorld, January 8, 2018, https://www.bworldonline.com/security-reform-agenda-afp-pnp-2018/.
239 Oreta.
240 Oreta.

64
collaboration with the diverse sectors of society. They have worked on issues such as
human rights violation, community engagements, and strategic communications with other
stakeholders.

3. National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict

On December 4, 2018, as part of the nation’s counterinsurgency strategy, President

Duterte signed Executive Order No. 70, s.2018 “institutionalizing the Whole of Nation
approach in attaining inclusive and sustainable peace, creating a national task force to end
local communist armed conflict and directing the adoption of a national peace
framework.” 241 Through this executive order, the National Task Force to End Local
Communist Armed Conflict (NTF-ELCAC) was created to orchestrate and ensure that the
whole-of-nation approach is effectively implemented. It is composed of representatives
from various national government agencies, such as the DILG and Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD), and two representatives from the private sector who
are appointed by the president for a one-year term. 242 The President of the Philippines
serves as Chairman while the National Security Adviser serves as Vice-Chairman. 243 Such
high-level involvement bodes well for government engagement.

The NTF-ELCAC, as stated in Section 4 of the executive order, has the following
powers and functions:
a. Within six (6) months from the issuance of this
Order, formulate and start to implement in coordination
with relevant national government agencies, LGUs, the
civil society and other stakeholders, a Whole-of-Nation
approach-driven National Peace Framework;

b. Ensure inter-agency convergence in the

implementation of the Framework in conflict-affected and
vulnerable communities;

241 Official Gazette, “Executive Order No. 70, s. 2018,” Government of the Philippines, accessed May
3, 2020, https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2018/12/04/executive-order-no-70-s-2018/.
242 Official Gazette, 3.
243 Official Gazette, 2.

65
 c. Enlist the assistance of any department, bureau,
office, agency or instrumentality of the government in
accordance with their respective mandates;

d. Evaluate, define, modify or integrate policies,

programs and activities contained in the Framework;

e. Organize ad hoc inter-agency and multi-sectoral

clusters, councils, committees and groups in national,
regional and local levels, or modify existing ones,
whenever necessary to fulfill its mandates;

f. Develop strategic communication, advocacy, and

peace constituency plans in case of ceasefire, as well as
capacity-building measures, to enable local chief
executives and local peace bodies to engage and facilitate
local peace engagements or negotiations and interventions;

g. Review the mandates and functions of offices

undertaking peace efforts to avoid duplication of function
and programs, and submit its recommendation/s to the
President for approval;

h. As may be necessary, issue supplemental

guidelines, protocols or policies in furtherance of this
Order;

i. Recommend to the Office of the Presidential

Adviser on the Peace Process projects and conflict-
affected areas where the PAyapa at MAsaganand
PamayaNAn (PAMANA) Program may be implemented,
subject to the provisions of the General Appropriations
Act; and

j. Perform such other duties and functions as the

President may direct. 244

The powers and functions of the task force highlight the government’s commitment in
providing a national structure to ensure that collaboration and convergence of the different
national government agencies, LGUs, AFP, and other stakeholders is achieved. It also
emphasizes the whole-of-nation approach in resolving the communist insurgency.

244 Official Gazette, 3–4.

66
 Since its activation, the task force has been committed in its campaign against the
communist insurgency. Journalist J.C. Gotinga found that AFP senior military officers
believe that NTF-ELCAC is the government’s response to the “socio-politico-economic
dimension of the counterinsurgency campaign.” 245 Gotinga explained that the NTF-
ELCAC is intended to integrate the government’s efforts to address the varied strategies
being used by the communist insurgents. Journalist Marita Moaje reported that NTF-
ELCAC has received positive feedback from the Senate Committee on National Defense
and Security, Peace, Unification and Reconciliation. 246 Quoting from the committee’s
report, she argued that “the whole-of-nation approach by NTF-ELCAC could be the most
effective anti-insurgency program as evidenced by the continuous and consistent reduction
of the influence and strength of the CPP-NPA.” 247 The activation of NTF-ELCAC was a
welcome development for the AFP, since an organization could now lead the coordination
of governance, security, and development initiatives in the community.

C. CAMPAIGN COMPARISON

DSSP Kapayapaan builds on the gains that were made in the previous AFP
campaigns, particularly IPSP Bayanihan. It recognizes the need for the AFP to conduct
development, governance, and security operations that support civil authorities in their
initiatives in the communities. This section outlines how DSSP Kapayapaan attempts to
address the three shortcomings of the three campaigns discussed in Chapter IV, namely
inadequate sustainment capability, lack of support from government and civil society, and
challenges of political leadership.

1. Addressing Inadequate Sustainment Capability

Because of a lack of personnel and equipment in the previous campaigns,

inadequate sustainment has been one of the AFP’s key challenges to achieving its

245 J.C. Gotinga, “Duterte’s Final Gambit to End Insurgency: Task Force vs Communists,” Rappler,
May 14, 2020, https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/in-depth/duterte-final-gambit-task-force-against-
communists.
246 Marita Moaje, “NTF-ELCAC Whole-of-Nation Approach vs Reds Most Effective: Senate,”
Philippine News Agency, February 26, 2021, https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1131914.
247 Moaje.

67
counterinsurgency objectives. The Duterte administration has made several attempts to
increase the strength and improve the capabilities of the AFP. In August 2017, Duterte
asked Philippine lawmakers to approve the recruitment of an additional 20,000 soldiers to
address the security threats within the country. 248 In 2018, the AFP activated the Armed
Forces of the Philippines Special Operations Command (AFPSOCOM), which took control
of all the special operations units of the Philippine Army, Air Force, and Navy. 249 Later
that year, the Philippine Army activated the 11th Infantry Division to address the terrorism
threats in the southern part of the country. 250 This activation meant that the AFP was no
longer required to shift its forces from Luzon to address the threats in the south. In 2019,
Duterte ordered the recruitment of an additional 25,000 soldiers who will be tasked to
address the communist insurgency and terrorism. 251 As of 2020, the AFP was estimated
to have 151,400 active duty personnel and about 62,300 paramilitary forces. 252

In terms of capability development, the AFP has continued to pursue its

modernization program to augment its existing capabilities. The 2019 Department of
National Defense (DND) report revealed that a total of PhP 16.8 billion (US$336 million)
was allocated for capability, material, and technology development projects in the AFP. 253
Most of this equipment was intended to bolster the AFP’s internal security operations
capabilities. Equipment was paired with dedicated time for training and maintenance to
bolster impact and sustainability.

248 Guillaume Lavallee, “Duterte: AFP Needs 20,000 More Troops Due to Greater Threats,” Rappler,
August 6, 2017, https://www.rappler.com/nation/duterte-afp-20000-troops-greater-threats.
249 Nikko Dizon, “AFP Puts Special Ops under One Command,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 9,
2018, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/981029/afp-puts-special-ops-under-one-command.
250 Priam Nepomuceno, “Army Formally Activates 11th Infantry Division,” Philippine News Agency,
December 19, 2018, https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1057022.
251 Frances Mangosing, “PH Military Needs 25,000 New Soldiers Mostly to Fight Insurgency,
Terrorism,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 4, 2019, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1173635/ph-military-
needs-25000-new-soldiers-mostly-to-fight-insurgency-terrorism.
252 International Institute of Strategic Studies, “Chapter Six: Asia,” The Military Balance 121, no. 1
(January 1, 2021): 294, https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2021.1868795.
253 Department of National Defense, Department of National Defense Accomplishment Report CY
2019 (Quezon City, Philippines: Department of National Defense, 2019), 62,
https://www.dnd.gov.ph/FilesUploaded/Ckeditor/file/AR_2019-2.pdf.
68
 2. Lack of Support from Government Institutions

Unlike predecessor campaigns that lacked sustained support from government

institutions, DSSP Kapayapaan has enjoyed full, ongoing backing from the administration.
Duterte signed Executive Order (EO) No. 70 in 2018 to institutionalize a whole-of-nation
approach within the government’s counterinsurgency strategy. A key effect of this
executive order is that national government agencies and LGUs are actively collaborating
to support the AFP in its campaign. A senior AFP official has acknowledged that “good
governance practices and efficient delivery of basic services for their constituents create
resilient communities that thwart the return of the communist terrorist groups,” 254 which
is the dynamic that the executive order aimed to facilitate. The AFP official further added
that with such developments, the AFP could now focus on those who continued to persist
with armed struggle.

Although there were similar attempts made in previous administrations, like the
Ramos administration’s National Reunification Policy and Arroyo’s Strategy of Holistic
Approach, they ultimately fell short without a comprehensive, government-wide plan to
support the campaign. 255 Unlike the previous campaigns in which the AFP was the
frontline in the government’s counterinsurgency strategy, EO 70 puts the local
governments in the frontlines. 256 Reporter Marit Cabugon has observed that “EO 70
strikes a balance between the two extremes: concessions—through peace talks and
ceasefire—to the Communist Party of the Philippines, and a purely military option.” 257
Cabugon has also reported that lack of support from civilian government was a primary
source of major frustration for the military in insurgency-infested areas. Unlike previous
administrations, which designated a Cabinet Secretary, EO Nr. 70 places the President as
the Chairman of the National Task Force, which represents the full commitment of the
administration to the counterinsurgency strategy.

254 Marit Stinus-Cabugon, “EO 70: A Good Move,” The Manila Times, December 17, 2018, sec. Op-
Ed Columns, https://www.manilatimes.net/2018/12/17/opinion/columnists/eo-70-a-good-move/483800/.
255 Devesa, “An Assessment of the Philippine Counterinsurgency Operational Methodology,” 66.
256 Gotinga, “Duterte’s Final Gambit to End Insurgency.”
257 Stinus-Cabugon, “EO 70.”

69
 3. Challenges to Political Leadership

Unlike previous administrations, Duterte’s has not experienced political instability

and challenge from a strong, well-organized opposition. The president’s popularity with
the general public has remained high. 258 However, like the previous administrations, the
Duterte administration has been challenged by corruption, criminality and drugs,
insurgency, and terrorism. Duterte was catapulted into the presidency based on campaign
promises to overcome these issues. Despite the administration’s effort to curb corruption
in the country, the Philippines was ranked 115 out of 180 countries by Transparency
International in 2020, which was nearly identical to the country’s ranking when the Duterte
administration began in 2016. 259

Like his predecessors, Duterte put peace negotiations with insurgents at the top of
his agenda. His administration entered into peace negotiations with the CPP-NPA and the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), with the latter in the final stages of cementing a
plan for implementation of a peace agreement. 260 To demonstrate his sincerity, Duterte
offered four cabinet positions to the leftist organization and guaranteed the safety of CPP
founder Jose Maria Sison and Luis Jalandoni if they choose to return to the Philippines.261
He also approved the conditional release of communist leaders who would be part of the
CPP’s negotiating team. The initial peace stance of the government, however, changed
when the NPA persistently launched attacks against unwary police and military personnel
in the countryside. 262 After these attacks, Duterte withdrew these offers.

258 Mark R. Thompson, “The Early Duterte Presidency in the Philippines,” Journal of Current
Southeast Asian Affairs 35, no. 3 (December 1, 2016): 3, https://doi.org/10.1177/186810341603500301.
259 Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2020 for Philippines,” accessed May
18, 2021, https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2020.
260 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Philippine Peace Talks,” Redaksjonellartikkel, Republic of
Philippines, December 2, 2019, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/foreign-affairs/peace-and-
reconciliation-efforts/norways_engagement/talks_philippines/id2522232/.
261 Manuel Mogato, “Duterte Readies for Philippine Peace Talks Restart as Rebel Team Arrives,”
Reuters, May 17, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-politics-idUSKCN0Y819Y.
262 Ruth Abbey Carlos-Gita, “Duterte Can’t Ignore NPA Attacks,” Philippine News Agency,
December 19, 2019, https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1089149.
70
 Another significant difference between the Duterte administration and its
predecessors has been the perceived “militarization” of his government. In a special report
for the Sunstar Manila, investigative reporter Ruth Gita revealed that as of 2019 Duterte
had appointed 46 former military and police officers to key positions in the government,
including ten Cabinet-level positions. 263 She reported that Duterte’s reasoning behind
these appointments was his dissatisfaction with the sluggish work of some of the civilians
in the government agencies.

D. CONCLUSION

Although the initial results of DSSP Kapayapaan have been promising, it remains
to be seen whether this campaign will achieve its objective of defeating the communist
insurgents by the end of Duterte’s term in 2022, or even if its six-year timeline is
reasonable. The new initiatives that the Philippine government and the AFP are
implementing seem to address sizable gaps and shortcomings of the previous campaigns.
The creation of the NTF-ELCAC has so far been successful in ensuring that the AFP has
been receiving the necessary collaboration and convergence that it needs with the national
government agencies, LGUs, and civil society. The CSP operations being conducted by the
AFP have also been effective in identifying community issues that need to be resolved.
Finally, although the Duterte administration faces the same socio-economic problems as
those of his predecessors, it has not yet had to contend with political instability, which
hindered previous administrations’ counterinsurgency plans.

263 Ruth Abbey Gita, “Special Report: A ‘Militarized’ Government,” Sunstar, July 20, 2019,
https://www.sunstar.com.ph//article/1815070/Manila/Local-News/Special-Report-A-militarized-
government.
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 VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

After more than five decades, the Philippines is still fighting a domestic communist
insurgency. To this date, the CPP-NPA remains the primary threat confronting the AFP. 264
Although the AFP data show that the CPP-NPA military capabilities have been
significantly reduced since their peak in the mid- to late 1980s, it is insufficient to rely on
these statistics alone to measure the government’s counterinsurgency success. This chapter
summarizes the reasons why the CPP-NPA re-emerged in the 1960s and offers three
primary explanations for why the CPP-NPA has not yet been defeated, despite the
end of the Cold War in the early 1990s and continual efforts by the AFP. This chapter also
provides recommendations to address the major factors that have hindered the AFP
campaigns in defeating the communist insurgents and makes recommendations for
future studies.

A. MAJOR FINDINGS

The Philippine government has implemented four primary counterinsurgency

strategies since the Marcos dictatorship was defeated in 1986 and democracy reinstated:
the National Reunification Policy implemented during the President Corazon Aquino and
President Ramos administrations (1988–92 and 1992–98, respectively); Strategy of
Holistic Approach implemented by the President Arroyo administration (2001–2010); the
people-centered security strategy during the President Benigno Aquino administration
(2010–2016); and the whole-of-nation approach currently being implemented by the
Duterte administration (2016–present). 265 In each, the AFP, in particular, has played a
central role, not just in combat operations but in governance itself.

264 Dencio Severo Acop, “The Expanded Nontraditional Role of the AFP,” Prism 3, no. 2 (March
2012): 105.
265 Armed Forces of the Philippines, AFP Campaign Plan (Bayanihan), 5.

73
 1. Reasons for the Communist Insurgency’s Re-emergence and
Sustainment

The reasons for the communists’ re-emergence are closely linked to the reasons
why the insurgency has continued for the past five decades. From its humble beginnings in
Capas, Tarlac, in 1969, the CPP-NPA gradually evolved to become a potent threat to the
Philippine government for three primary reasons. 266 First, the presence of severe political
and economic inequality within the country provided widespread grievances for the CPP-
NPA to exploit. In particular, the government’s inefficiency, corruption, and inability to
deliver basic services to the people, particularly to those in the countryside, have provided
the communist insurgents with narratives to use against a state that is expected to foster
democratic ideals, justice, and opportunity. 267

Second, the CPP-NPA identified and committed to the Protracted People’s War
(PPW) strategy. Since its beginning, the CPP-NPA divided its struggle into three major
stages: strategic defensive, strategic stalemate, and strategic offensive. 268 Although the
CPP-NPA did not seem to move past the strategic defensive stage, PPW remains an
effective strategy for prolonging the conflict against the Philippine government.

Third, the CPP-NPA has effectively exploited social and political conditions in the
country. The group has demonstrated its capability to mobilize the masses through agitation
and propaganda activities, as well as local politics and regular leadership changes in
government and the military. Deeply rooted inequities in land ownership, labor rights, and
access to political and social power worsened during the Marcos era and remain
unresolved.

2. Why the CPP-NPA Has Not Yet Been Defeated

By examining four major AFP campaigns—Oplan Lambat-Bitag (Net Trap) from

1989 to 1998, Oplan Bantay-Laya (Guarding Freedom) from 2001 to 2010, IPSP

266 Mapping Militant Organzations, “MMP: Communist Party of the Philippines - New People’s
Army.”
267 Philippine Army, The Communist Party of the Philippines, 3–16.
268 Corpus, Silent War, 27.

74
Bayanihan (Civic Unity) from 2011 to 2016, and DSSP Kapayapaan (Peace) from 2016 to
the present—this research has identified inadequate sustainment capability, lack of support
from government institutions, and challenges to political leadership as the primary factors
that hindered the AFP campaigns from achieving their overriding objective of defeating
the CPP-NPA.

Inadequate sustainment capability, particularly in terms of equipment and

personnel, was the primary reason cited by AFP senior commanders in a report published
by the International Crisis Group in 2011. 269 The inability to provide adequate forces to
sustain the operational gains in the barangays was a main weakness of Oplan Lambat-
Bitag. 270 The AFP encountered the same problem of inadequate sustainment capability
during the implementation of its Oplan Bantay-Laya and IPSP Bayanihan, again leading
to the AFP’s inability to capitalize on the gains made in cleared areas.

Lack of crucial support from government institutions has also significantly

hindered the implementation of the AFP campaigns. This research identified three factors
contributing to this lack of support: first, a lack of understanding and appreciation among
various government institutions for the AFP’s counterinsurgency efforts. This led to
persistent shortcomings of these agencies to deliver the necessary development activities
in areas cleared by the AFP. 271 Second, government officials lacked a common
understanding of the communist insurgency. Despite adjustments made over the years by
the government to implement a whole-of-government counterinsurgency strategy, the
insurgency was, and perhaps still is, viewed by many officials as a problem solely for the
military to solve. Further, although the Philippine government and even the AFP have
received significant support from its allies and security partners, this support has not been
focused on defeating communist insurgents but instead on counterterrorism, maritime
security, and developing the defense industry.

269 International Crisis Group, “The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and Talks,” i.
270 Morales, “Perpetual War: The Philippine Insurgencies,” 29.
271 Peña, “Finding the Missing Link to a Successful Philippine Counterinsurgency Strategy,” 52–53.

75
 Finally, centralized challenges to political leadership have hindered the
implementation of the campaigns and whole-of-government response. All four
administrations were hindered in fully implementing their respective counterinsurgency
strategy because of fragmented government structure and corrupt leaders. In addition,
ongoing and widespread political instability from other sources regularly threatened the
central government, thus distracting from the implementation of the counterinsurgency
strategy. For instance, Presidents Corazon Aquino and Arroyo both faced several coup
attempts that shifted the AFP’s focus and bred distrust between civilian and military
leaders. President Benigno Aquino also faced several destabilizing events—the Manila
hostage crisis, Scarborough Shoal incident, and Mamasapano clash—that weakened his
political legitimacy and power. 272

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

Having identified the three main factors that hindered the implementation of the
AFP’s campaign, this section provides the author’s recommendation on how these factors
can be addressed.

1. Addressing the Inadequate Sustainment Capability

The Philippine government has found ways to address the AFP’s lack of resources
in terms of material, personnel, and equipment but has yet to be able to sustain these gains.
The recent recruitment of additional personnel, procurement of equipment, and activation
of additional units of the AFP are welcome developments. While it can be argued that the
AFP still lacks the number of personnel and the equipment needed to address the threats,
the current AFP deployment of forces has proven to be effective in significantly reducing
the CPP-NPA military capabilities.

Yet, this is only a first step. The AFP also needs to focus on establishing a conflict-
resilient community that ensures previously cleared areas remain free from insurgent
threats. Conflict-resilient communities can be established at the barangay level and
initiated by Community Support Teams deployed in the area. The CSTs, however, cannot

272 Villa, “10 of Aquino’s Biggest Hits and Misses, as Seen through Social Media.”

76
do this alone and should partner with LGUs, the PNP, civil society, faith-based groups, and
the community. To be effective, the AFP should first ensure that conflict-affected
communities understand that soldiers will have to transfer out and eventually move to clear
other areas. The local PNP should be capable of securing the community. LGUs,
particularly their leaders, and civil society should be fully integrated into supporting the
various peace and security initiatives in the barangay.

Second, is the establishment of an Integrated Territorial Defense System (ITDS).

The ITDS is designed to secure previously cleared areas from communist insurgents’ re-
entry by providing ongoing security. 273 The ITDS concept was previously implemented
during Oplan Bantay-Laya. At that time, however, ITDS was mostly composed of
paramilitary forces and did not have adequate support from the LGU, civil society, and the
community.

A best practice being implemented in the EASTMINCOM area that can be

implemented in other Area Commands is organizing former rebels and former supporters
of CPP-NPA in the barangays as a people’s organization. These groups are organized by
the CSTs deployed in the barangays and awarded livelihood programs by LGUs and
national government agencies. This action has proven to be effective, because it has made
the communist insurgents’ recovery efforts in the area difficult, given that there are fewer
community grievances to exploit. The existence of people’s organizations also serves to
counter the insurgent’s propaganda in the barangays. Aside from depriving the CPP-NPA
of manpower resources, these people’s organizations can also be utilized to form part of
the ITDS. As such, the livelihood programs provided by the government become part of
the sustainment effort of the AFP against communist insurgents in the barangays.

Third, the AFP needs to enhance its intelligence operation. The success of CSP is
heavily reliant on information provided by the intelligence community, which is highly
reliant on community participation. All the campaigns have focused on improving the
intelligence system of the AFP, resulting in a decline in CPP-NPA military capabilities.
Yet, the intelligence operations should also focus on identifying supporters and

273 Devesa, “An Assessment of the Philippine Counterinsurgency Operational Methodology,” 68.

77
underground mass organizations established by the CPP-NPA. These underground groups
provide structure that supports the insurgents, politically and economically, in the
community. To bolster sustainability, the intelligence community should be able to
capitalize on the gains made by CSTs in conflict-affected communities.

2. Addressing Lack of Government Institution Support and Lack of

Civil Society Support

It is very important for political and military leaders to understand the urgency of
destroying the communist insurgents’ infrastructures. Paul Melshen, a professor of
Strategic Studies and Military History at the National Defense University, argues that
“without the elimination of both the political and economic infrastructure, it is almost
impossible to defeat insurgents.” 274 Yet, without the support of government institutions
and civil society, it would be very difficult for the AFP to do this alone.

Three programs being implemented by the current administration offer promise in

this area: first is the implementation of the Community Support Program, being
implemented by the CSTs in conflict-affected areas, which places the program in an
important role that can serve as a link between the community and government institutions.
This access should help ensure that the grievances and concerns of the community are
addressed by the right government agencies and should help minimize community issues
that the CPP-NPA can exploit.

Second, the establishment of the Multi-Sectoral Governance Council, or MSGC,

should help the AFP in its professionalization and modernization agenda. 275 Significantly,
the MSGC provides a venue for civil society to engage the AFP in various areas, such as
human rights and disaster relief, not solely in the implementation of the military campaign.
Third, the National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict, or NTF-ELCAC,
a specific government entity, should help ensure more effective implementation of the
government’s whole-of-nation counterinsurgency strategy.

274 Paul Melshen, “Mapping Out a Counterinsurgency Campaign Plan: Critical Considerations in
Counterinsurgency Campaigning,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 18, no. 4 (December 1, 2007): 670,
https://doi.org/10.1080/09592310701778522.
275 Oreta, “The Security Reform Agenda for the AFP and PNP in 2018.”

78
 3. Addressing Challenges with Political and Military Leadership

An effective counterinsurgency strategy should start with a clear political policy,

grounded in a shared understanding of the root causes of the conflict and long-term
commitment to tackling those root causes. Paul Melshen has argued that a strategy should
evolve from political policy and not the other way around. 276 Strong political leadership
is necessary to ensure that any counterinsurgency strategy is implemented and supported
in earnest. It is thus very important for the AFP to ensure that political leaders are properly
apprised and advised of the root causes, conditions, needs, resources, and strategy, just as
it is important for the AFP to be properly apprised of government priorities and challenges.

In addition to clear communication and plans, political leaders must demonstrate a

strong political commitment to defeating the communist insurgents. The creation of the
NTF-ELCAC demonstrated the determination of the Duterte administration to end the
communist insurgency through a whole-of-nation approach. The AFP, for its part, should
ensure that it is able to capitalize on the political support that it is receiving and ensure that
this support remains true down to the local level. Even as leaders face other or unexpected
challenges, they must publicly reiterate their ongoing commitment to the
counterinsurgency plans.

Furthermore, political and military leaders should both realize that effective
counterinsurgency requires involvement of a high number of personnel and greater
cooperation among the different government agencies and the community. Some political
leaders believe that insurgency is solely a problem for the military to solve. This mindset
must change, especially since it has contributed to the lack of cooperation between the AFP
and political leaders on the ground.

C. FUTURE STUDIES

Although the Philippine government has demonstrated its capability to defeat

communist insurgents, as in its defeat of the Huks in the mid-1950s, it remains to be seen
whether the government can succeed in resolving the five-decade-long communist

276 Melshen, “Mapping Out a Counterinsurgency Campaign Plan,” 668.

79
insurgency in the country. The current DSSP Kapayapaan campaign has made significant
strides toward this goal. Nevertheless, it is unclear whether the current administration will
achieve its objectives by the end of President Duterte’s term in 2022 and, if not, whether
the strides already made can be sustained.

Future studies could expand on the specific stumbling blocks that the AFP needs to
address, such as inadequate sustainment capabilities in confronting the multiple security
threats surrounding the country. Future studies could also explore the vital role of civil
society in helping the counterinsurgency campaigns of the AFP and government. The
current strides that the AFP has made in engaging and involving civil society in crafting
and implementing its campaign represent a significant shift from a purely militaristic
mindset to solve insurgency. Future studies could also explore the DSSP Kapayapaan in
more depth after it has had more time to operate. This study has examined the early efforts
made in the implementation of the campaign to address the identified gaps in the previous
campaigns. It is important to understand whether, and to what degree, these changes have
resulted in significant gains that could benefit the AFP and the Philippine government’s
counterinsurgency strategy. Such future studies could also help us understand why certain
changes were successful and whether the counterinsurgency strategy helped address the
roots causes of the conflict.

The security and development approach being implemented today has been a
proven formula. It worked in favor of the Philippine government when it defeated the Huks
in the mid-1950s. Nevertheless, it is important to note that these earlier counterinsurgency
successes were also enabled by both the people’s support and strong political and military
leadership. Any current or future strategy, based on time-tested methods, will still require
these qualities to defeat any insurgency. The current whole-of-nation approach has the
potential not just to rally this necessary support but to institutionalize new approaches to
governing.

80
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