This essay combines Schmitt’s Nomos and the Concept of the Political to give a

clear picture of Schmitt’s critique of liberalism and what his solution to its problem is.

Namely, that a private and the public sphere merge that should not, leading to the

possibility of a genocidal European federation hostile to non-Euroean peoples. Schmitt

comments that St. Augustine “discusses the frightful difficulty in distinguishing correctly

between friend and enemy,”1and seems to be under the impression that Augustine is in

agreement with Schmitt’s uneasiness about the just cause on the basis of “human

imperviousness.” 2 That is, Schmitt thinks he is on Augustine’s side and is offering

helpful answers to problems that another fellow Catholic has shared with him.

Augustine’s work on public and private spheres in his City of God will be explained in

order to see how a non-modern writer would conceive of these spheres. This essay will

argue that in trying to separate from private sphere from the public

Schmitt observes that European states could war against each other in a manner

much like “a duel.”3 This is made possible because European sovereigns saw other

European sovereigns as a “Justus hostis,”4 or simply a just enemy. A just enemy is

another sovereign state that is granted certain rights as other European sovereigns.

Borders could be redrawn, but the eradication of a just enemy is never permissible. This

allowed for the “possibility of Neutrality for third party states.”5 Schmitt likened this

1
Schmitt, nomos, 155.

2
Schmitt, nomos, 155.

3
Schmit, Nomos, 141

4
Schmit, Nomos, 142.

5
Schmit, Nomos, 142.
European environment to a duel,6 something that was not seen as aggressive or criminal

by those observing the duel. That is, even though there is harm done to the two who are

dueling each other, no one interfered or sought to reprimand the duelers on account of the

harm. This is true no matter what the third parties believed of the duelers’ reasons to duel.

They had a “Justa causa,”7 or a just cause to war, on the account that they were a just

enemy. Schmitt does like this idea, but there was an uneasiness Schmitt has on account of

this just enemy concept.8

However, the just enemy concept transformed by the non-political is what Schmitt

believes makes possible the eradication of nations. This is because the existence of the

just enemy leaves open the possibility for its opposite, the “unjust enemy.”9 The unjust

enemy could be punished or even eradicated, much like criminals outside of any

protective rights. Schmitt saw this unjust enemy utilized most clearly with religious wars,

when religion was able to take the reins and decide who was an enemy, and so “by

nature… [religious wars became] wars of annihilation wherein the enemy is treated as a

criminal and a pirate.”10 The religious authorities saw their enemies as breaking some

kind of moral/religious code that results in the enemy being labeled as evil. For this

reason the killing of an enemy can be seen as good for the purpose of the propagation of

the good.

6
Schmit, Nomos, 143. Schmitt writes, “One should not exaggerate the analogy of war between
states and a duel, but it largely is accurate and provides many illuminating and heuristically useful
viewpoints.”

7
See Schmitt, Nomos 154.

8
Schmitt is clearly satisfied that war can be waged without moral reprimandation from others,
and it is not that he disagrees that it is repulsive for states to eradicate each other.
9
See Schmitt Nomos, 169-172.

10
Schmitt, Nomos 142.
 Schmitt was concerned that the liberal state falls into this same problem, writing

that “liberal thought evades or ignores state and politics” 11 and so the state “potentially

embraces every domain”12 such as religion.13 Here, it seems there is the worry that liberal

concepts allow religion to become political and so make decisions it should not. The on

looking liberal states will see something they deem unjust or evil and so seek intervention

into the state of affairs that they disagree with even though it is outside of their sovereign

control. Thus, they seek to advance what they think is good, and utilize the instruments

they have at their disposal to do so (which we will see is war).

This essay now offers a reason why Schmitt’s concern is legitimate. Schmitt

suggests that liberal thought is concerned with the private sphere of life.14 What is of

outmost importance to the liberal is the private sphere. That is, the liberal is concerned

with the individual along with what concerns and satisfies the individual. War has

negative effects on the private citizens of states because one’s ability to satisfy

themselves is hampered. This fact is why there is so such interest and motivation by

liberal thinkers such as Kant for developing a theory of perpetual peace based on the

concept of humanity. A doctrine Schmitt says is open to “imperialist expansion,”15 and so

the eradication of non-liberal states. Kant writes of a worldwide liberal federation of

states as only possible when one “imagin[es] himself… as a citizen of a supersensible

11
Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. George Schwab. Expanded ed. (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2007), 70.

12
Ibid., 22.

13
Ibid., 23.

14
Schmitt, The concept, 28.
15
Schmitt, Concept of the political, 54.
world”16 for the establishment of “innate rights, which necessarily belong to

humankind.”17 When one participates in such an activity, they are imagining what the

good life should be for citizens in other nations (and all over the world). But as Schmitt

comments, when Kant’s conception of politics becomes “human wide,” it is not humanity

that actually in view. For what the liberal means “‘by humanity’… [is] understood, above

all, [as] European humanity.” 18 The nations that do not meet these conceptions of the

good European (liberal) life are then able to be seen as “semi-civilized, and barbarian

peoples.”19 They are under the danger of being seen as subhuman, and so they become the

unjust enemy to the liberal federation and its states. Remember that this essay said that

for Schmitt, the political sphere meddling in the private sphere and vice versa is the main

issue, because this will be important when we get to St. Augustine.

The very real possibility is liberal persecution of other sovereign states, not

because one is an enemy, but because they become “an outlaw of humanity.”20 The

liberal federation has no respect for borders and so blurs them because it conceptualizes

everyone as part of this world as a wide human society, and so its authority and power

become a potential tool to “right wrongs”21 within its world-human-citizenry. The

concerned liberal states can interject however they need to in order to stop war activities

they see as unjust. Much like how concerned citizens might jump in to protect the duelers

16
Kant, 74.

17
Kant, 74.

18
Schmitt, Nomos, 228.

19
Ibid.

20
Schmitt, Concept of the Political, 54.

21
Schmitt does not talk like this. However, this is how I am interpreting his concerns.
as they now see the duel as a crime against humanity. Thus, the ability to live as a distinct

peoples even within one’s own borders would be impossible if the liberal federation came

into being and gained quite a large amount of power.

For this reason, Schmitt’s lifelong project is to set up this concrete definition of

“political” from abstract and other “private” matters in order to offer an alternative to the

consequences of liberal democracy. Schmitt’s definition of “political” boils down to the

state being able to make a particular kind of decision. Schmitt writes, “The specific

political distinction to which political action and motives can be reduced is that between

friend and enemy.”22 More specifically, what Schmitt has in mind is an entity that will

decide for a nation who belongs to the nation within its borders23 (friends) and who does

not (enemies). A friend cannot be defined as another partner nation, even if there were to

be a strong and long lasting alliance. For, the mere possibility of an alliance brings to our

attention two separate entities since both have a separate existence from one another. For

this reason, each is the enemy of one another, even though there are no hostilities shared

between the two. Furthermore, the one (or the group) who is political is the sovereign.24

On account of this, the political entity has under it the “Jus Belli,”25 the power to

decide who will possibly be the target of war, and who has the right to fight enemies and

utilize the political entities resources. For this reason, there is no more moral criteria for

22
Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. George Schwab. Expanded ed. (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2007), 26.

23
Minca notes that in Carl Schmitts final works Schmitt predominately and clearly saw the border
as “inscribing a division between an inside and an outside” (MINCA, 758). TODO: saw what work it was

24
See Carl Schmitt, Political Theology, 1.

25
Schmitt, the Concept of the Political, 45.
war,26 and Schmitt thinks this is the way it should be or else we can end with the imperial

expansion of the liberal federation. Strictly speaking, Schmitt claims the criteria for

making decisions of war is whether “the adversary intends to negate his opponent’s way

of life.”27 In other words, the question to ask is whether another political entity threatens

the existence of a people? If so, then the act of war is necessary. There is no criteria

needed to go to war other than this, no questions of “just cause” or “unjust cause” or

whether an enemy is a just enemy or unjust enemy that will bring a federation into

conflict with nations it deems as unjust. Furthermore, “The political” is built on a

“concrete and existential”28 case. Here, the terms “friend” and “enemy” are words that

should already bring concrete experience and persons to mind, but ultimately, a nation’s

borders are in view. Thus, if one is to look at Germany and ask who the political entity is,

they need look not at concepts or abstract political theories. Instead, all they need to

observe is who decides who is a German and who is not a German.

The friend/enemy distinction to be made must be in a different sphere that the

average citizen would operate. This is most clear when Schmitt gives us his exegesis of

Matthew 5:44, which reads, “love your enemies.” Schmitt claims that the enemy within

this passage is a “private adversary that one hates.”29 Namely, those who one happens to

find themselves in conflict with because of some self-interest. In order for one not to

conflate the political need to war against enemies with this Matthew command, Schmitt

26
Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 27.

27
Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 27.

28
Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 27.

29
Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 28.
brings to us two Latin terms “hostis” and “inimicus.”30 Inimicus is the latin word used in

the Matthew passage. It is the Hostis would be when the Muslim nations that wished to

conquer territory of Europe. Since Hostis is not in view, Schmitt reasons that there is no

reason to love or support those what the sovereign declares an enemy.31 Thus,

Christianity’s command to love the enemy has been completely bracketed from the public

sphere of the political, and we will see that this is. We will see soon that Augustine’s

conception of love is vital to St. Augustine’s concept of the duty of religion for the public

good and shows the problem with Schmitt’s bracketing of these spheres.

First, this exegesis offered by Schmitt does not work because the passage does

refer to Schmitt’s political public sphere.32 That there is a distinction in the Latin term is

of no consequence to the Greek and Hebrew languages that this passage comes from.

That is, the passage has in mind both friend and “‫ַע ם‬,” which means a people and not

merely a private connection to someone. Likewise in Leviticus 19:10 there is the call by

God for justice33 for the “‫ ”ִּג ּיֹור‬which is the “stranger” or sojourner, or the temporary

dweller.34 Likewise, the Greek word used in Matthew is “ἐχθρός,” and it is the same word

used to describe political enemies in the LXX. For example, Genesis 14:20 has

Melchizedek bless Abraham after God “delivered [his] enemies into [his] hand.” The

30
Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 28.

31
That’s a scary thought, and another reason why it’s hard to see this political sovereign work.

32
Derrida, Jacques. The Gift of Death. Trans. David Willis. (Chicago: University of Chicago
Publishing, 19995), 104. Derrida writes, “The sphere of the political in Schmitt’s sense is already in play.”

33
Elisabeth Weber, Living Together:: Jacques Derrida's Communities of Violence and Peace, 133.
Weber basically brought the idea to my attention, but she did not use these exampes.

34
Francis Brown, Samuel Rolles Driver, and Charles Augustus Briggs, Enhanced Brown-Driver-
Briggs Hebrew and English Lexicon (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 158. See also, Christianity and Politics,
569.
enemies happen to be outside of Abraham’s own people. Whether Plato envisioned the

word differently is of little consequence. Thus, for Christians it appears that it is not

possible to bracket this love of the enemy to a private sphere.

Augustine’s city of men and city of God give more reason why Schmitt’s

privatization is not possible. Ultimately, the two cities are “one composed of the good,

the other of the wicked, angels or men indifferently.”35 Notice that for Augustine that that

the city of men does not exist merely because it is political. That is, whether or not the

city of men make decisions about government is not ultimately in view. Rather, the cities

are ultimately founded upon what is good and what is evil. Evil, Augustine claims, is like

the Angels when their “wills and desires”36 have gone wrong. They have “lapsed to…

[the] private good of their own, from the higher and beatific good which was common to

all.”37 Instead of continuing as the ministering Spirits for the sake of leading men to God,

they chose to make alliances with Men for their own gain. The Angel’s concern is solely

on “their own power.”38 Thus, evil is the elevation of the private sphere, their interest has

turned away from God.

And it is only love of God and love of neighbor that can be this evil’s contrast.39

St. Augustine observes that “The cause of the blessedness of the good is the adherence to

God. And so cause of the others’ misery will be found in its contrary, that is, in their not

35
Augustine, City of God, 12.1;342.

36
Augustine, City of God, 12.1;342.

37
Augustine, City of God, 12.1;342.
38
Augustine, city of God --- FROM THAT GUYS ESSAY, 380, Public and Privtate Responsibility, 566
39
Schmitt would not have much disagreement with Augustine regarding this, for it has already
been shown that Schmitt is not fond of the liberal tendency to focus on the private sphere. It is the wrong
focus of the political into the private for Schmitt that is problematic.
adhering to God.” 40 And adherence to God in Book 19 is “the Love of God and the love

of our Neighbor”41 since it is what “the divine Master, inculcates,”42 which means it is

what God teaches, and so implies an expectation of adherence to these teachings. It is for

this reason elsewhere that St. Augustine writes, “two cities have been formed by two

loves, the earthly love of self, even to the contempt of God; the heavenly love of God,

even to the contempt of self.”43 What Augustine means by this is quite similar to what he

has already been said, that pulling from the public good and turning inward is evil. And

so its contrast is the public good, which is God himself and the loving him. This means

that St. Augustine has conceived of two spheres, the public and the private. It seems that

what this shows is that Schmitt conceives the private and public sphere improperly. Just

because a decision is “political” it does not follow that the decision is not self-interested.

Sure, men live as a “pilgrim”44 from the world which sounds quite private, but

since these pilgrims do live in the city of men, St. Augustine emphasizes that the

pilgrims’ life “is inevitably a social one.”45 The Christian is never envisioned as retreating

from the world. What follows from this is that the heavenly pilgrims who find their abode

in this life should take their social responsibility and say what needs to be said in

opposition to the private good. Namely, they have much responsibility in ensuring the

political endeavor’s object of contemplation is God, since he is the only one who is able

40
Augustine, City of God, 12.1;318.

41
Augustine, City of God, 19.14;692. ---

42
Augustine, City of God, 19.14;692. ---

43
Augustine, City of God, 14.28;477. ---

44
Augustine, City of God, 19.17

45
Augustine, City of God, 19.17
to perfectly order. To interject the true God into all spheres of life is something of use to

the earthly city for the purpose of bodily peace, which is the “harmony [that] is preserved

between”46 the earthly city and the city of God. That is, both the pilgrim and those of the

earthly city are interested in an orderly city or nation for the purpose of temporal peace,

but only the pilgrim has anything to offer that brings about the best earthly peace. This is

because he is exhorted to give up love of the private sphere and all its pleasures and to

seek the love of God and Neighbor.

Yet, as we have seen, Schmitt gives the love of Neighbor over to a private realm.

What follows is that Schmitt’s image of religion actually turns out to be evil. Even more,

Schmitt thinks that he has successfully separated the political sphere from the private

sphere, the political from the moral. Schmitt has not just separated a decision on who is in

and who is out of a nation from the public Good (the public good is God), but the “Jus

Belli,”47 has been bracketed as well. That is, the entity that defines what actions are due to

an enemy have been bracket from the public good. Yet in bracketing these from the

public good Schmitt has by default brought the political entity and its ability to define the

required actions to other human beings into the realm of evil right from the beginning. As

St. Augustine would see it (and it seems he would be right), it was a moral action on

Schmitt’s part from the beginning. In other words, even though Schmitt thinks he is

cleanly separating religion from the politics and so preserving the sovereign state from

moral considerations and those consequences he perceives, he is in reality actively

promoting the political to evil. Thus, Schmitt’s advice to bracket the political from the

46
Augustine, City of God, 19.17
47
Schmitt, the Concept of the Political, 45.
religious will not have the outcome he thinks, because he has not truly given us a political

entity that is not moral or religious.

Schmitt’s bracketing of the love command dehumanizes the enemy. Hence why

the wise man abhors a “just war” in the city of God.

“distinction of friend and enmy denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a union

or separation”48 but for Augustine it is the common final good that make a people.

Schmitt thinks he has separated two spheres, instead he has merely turned the

political insto another private sphere.

For Augustine , “if they were not just, he would not have to wage them.”49 Here it

seems to indicate that it is only because it is the wrong religion. A war that is just and

nation justified if and only if it is waged for the public Good. Namely, war can only be

waged if it is for a temporal peace that is a part of the order for the proper worship of

God. It is for this reason that Augustine thinks that the heavenly city should “dissent from

the earthly”50 with regard to the sacrificing to other Gods. For if Christians were to do so,

it would not be in the interest of the public good, because it directs one to things that are

not Gods at all.

48
Schmitt, concept of the political, 26.
49
Augustine, City of God, 19.7
50
Augustine, City of God, 19.17