POLICY BRIEF

OCTOBER 2024

THE ONGOING WAR

IN SUDAN AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
SECURITY AND STABILITY
OF THE HORN OF AFRICA
AND BEYOND

KIDANE KIROS

PB - 52/24
This policy paper examines the ongoing violent conflicts in Sudan, focusing
particularly on the war that erupted on April 15, 2023, between the Sudanese
Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The analysis
highlights the backdrop of this conflict, which stems from a failed transition to
democracy following the ousting of President Omar al-Bashir in 2019. Initially
marked by optimism, the power-sharing agreement between military and
civilian factions quickly unraveled, culminating in a military coup in October
2021. This coup stymied democratic processes and exacerbated rivalries
among military leaders, especially between General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan
of the SAF and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo ("Hemedti") of the RSF.
Their struggle for dominance has transformed cities like Khartoum into
battlegrounds, resulting in a humanitarian crisis of unprecedented scale. Over
8.5 million people have been displaced, and the conflict has led to severe
shortages of food and healthcare. Economically, the war has devastated
Sudan’s economy, causing an estimated loss of $15 billion and driving
poverty rates to alarming levels, with 65.6% of the population living below
the poverty line by the end of 2023. Furthermore, the conflict poses a risk
of further destabilizing neighboring countries as refugees flood into fragile
states, creating opportunities for organized crime and extremist groups to
gain a foothold.
Efforts to restore peace have seen limited success. Diplomatic initiatives led
by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), supported by
external powers such as Saudi Arabia and the U.S., have struggled to secure
lasting ceasefires or address the underlying political issues. Key obstacles
include fragmented peace processes, external influences that favor specific
agendas, and a lack of genuine inclusivity among Sudanese political actors.
The conflict not only threatens Sudan's stability but also poses significant
risks to regional security and humanitarian conditions. This paper emphasizes
the urgent need for a comprehensive peace process led by the African Union,
integrating all stakeholders to address the root causes of the conflict. Current
diplomatic efforts have largely fallen short, often influenced by external interests
that do not align with the needs of the Sudanese populace. The escalating
violence risks spilling over into neighboring countries, raising concerns about
broader regional instability and organized crime. A coordinated approach
that prioritizes genuine dialogue and stability is essential for fostering peace
in Sudan and the surrounding Horn of Africa region.

KIDANE KIROS
 1. INTRODUCTION
Violent conflicts and civil strife are political realities in post-independence Sudan, leading
the country to lose permanently its former southern territory (now South Sudan), after
a referendum in 2011. Moreover, a combination of violent civil conflicts and army coup
d’états has hampered attempts to transition and build democratic governance in Sudan.
More than six decades after Sudan achieved its independence, the detrimental effects of
conflicts and civil strife in the country remain unabated, and now pose an existential threat
to state survival. The country is currently experiencing crippling and tumultuous political
turmoil, marked by a fierce and bitter war that ignited on April 15, 2023, mainly between
the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by Abdul Fattah al-Burhan, and a paramilitary
group known as the Rapid Support Force (RSF), headed by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo
("Hemedti").

The potential collapse of Sudan as a functioning state would have detrimental repercussions
for not only the country and the Sudanese people, but also the wider region and beyond.
The push to restore peace, order, and stability in Sudan presupposes an understanding of
the ongoing conflict’s significance, impact, and implications for domestic, regional, and
international peace, security, and stability.

What is behind the violent conflict between the SAF and RSF? Why has the government of
Sudan (or SAF) failed to avert the dangerously consequential nationwide violence? What
attempts have been made to work towards a peaceful end to the conflict? What is the
regional effect of the conflict between the two warring parties? What are the implications of
the ongoing conflict for the security and stability of the Horn of Africa region and beyond?
This paper investigates how the country’s security architecture has been undermined
by state-parallel paramilitaries, leading to full-fledged war and a humanitarian crisis of
unprecedented scale, which threatens not only Sudan's stability but also poses significant
risks to regional security and humanitarian conditions. It also explores the significance,
prospects, challenges, and implications of the ongoing war.

2. BACKGROUND TO THE 2023 SUDAN CIVIL

WAR
Sudan has faced continuous political violence and conflicts since gaining independence
(Johnson, 2016). Most recently, war started on April 15, 2023, between two former allies,
the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Force (RSF). This conflict arose
after President Al-Bashir was removed from power by military allies on April 11, 2019, in
response to a peaceful revolution against his regime (Awad, 2022; Mustasilta, 2019). There
was hope for democracy and a united Sudan after a power-sharing agreement was signed on
August 7, 2019, between the Transitional Military Council (TMC) and the opposition Forces
of Freedom and Change (FFC) (United Nations, 2022). This agreement aimed to create
a three-year transitional government ahead of democratic elections. However, Sudan’s
political transition has stalled due to the inability of key political groups to agree, including
the military, opposition forces, and civil society groups (Tossell, 2020). The political process
was further disrupted by a military coup in 2021 and the ongoing conflict between ASF and
RSF. These conflicts reflect the struggle among Sudan’s leaders, with different interests and
priorities, preventing a smooth transition to democracy.

The October 25, 2021, military coup in Sudan was a major obstacle to the country’s path to

Policy Brief - N° 52/24 - October 2024 3

 democracy (Eltayeb, 2022). The military coup dissolved the post-Al-Bashir power-sharing
agreement, leading to a state of emergency and the arrests of Prime Minister Hamdok
and civilians. Army leader al-Burhan formed a new council without key political voices,
halting democratic progress. This upheaval harmed lives and the economy, dashing hopes
for democracy. However, al-Burhan agreed to civilian rule on November 21, 2021, with
elections planned for July 2023. Released civilians saw Hamdok reinstated, but he resigned
on January 2, 2022. These events illustrate Sudan’s democratic challenges amid military
interference, unrest, and economic difficulties.

Against this background, Sudan’s security architecture during the transition process has
been marred by divisions between the SAF and the paramilitary RSF. The monopoly on
violence (Dusza, 1989; Krahmann, 2009; Wulf 2011) is fragmented due to a relative balance
of capabilities and interests between the SAF and the paramilitary RSF. Contentious issues
such as transitional justice, accountability, and security reforms, including the integration of
the Rapid Support Forces, were discussed during a meeting of military and civilian leaders
in November 2021 and these issues were part of a plan to return to civilian-led government
by January 2023 (Reuters, 2023).

One big problem was the divide between the regular army and the RSF over integrating
forces as part of the political transition process to establish a civil state in Sudan following
the 2019 removal of long-ruling leader Omar al-Bashir. By April 2023, tensions had risen
between these groups over merging, with accusations flying from both sides. General
Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (known as Hemedti), the country’s deputy and head of the
RSF paramilitary group, criticized Al-Burhan for the 2021 coup, while the army warned
of dangerous times ahead. The strong disagreement between the two military leaders
led to fierce fighting starting on April 15, 2023, turning into a full-on war. Khartoum, the
capital, became a war zone, and it rapidly spreading nationwide so the army moved its
main operations to Port Sudan.

Although the failed political transition, military coup, integration, and control issues of the
Rapid Support Force are among the key reasons of the current conflict in Sudan, Al-Burhan
and his rival from the RSF are primarily fighting for legitimacy and support as the true
leaders of Sudan (Espanol, 2024). Now, the war is not just about control of strategic cities
and towns but about a struggle for leadership legitimacy between General Abdel Fattah
al-Burhan of the SAF and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo ("Hemedti") of the RSF, with each
side fighting to prove their claim as the rightful leaders of Sudan. The war has continued
unabated into 2024, resulting in humanitarian crisis of unprecedented scale and creating
a severe food and healthcare shortage. Economically, the conflict has decimated Sudan’s
economy, and soaring poverty rates Given the legacies of military rule and intrastate conflicts
in Sudan, and the fact that both warring sides were evenly matched in terms of power and
goals, the recent violent escalation may lead the country not only back to authoritarian
rule and state fragmentation but is also affecting the neighboring countries in the region.
Moreover, Sudan has become a battleground for proxy conflicts involving regional players
such as Egypt, Iran, and the UAE, as external powers compete for influence and resources
in the country. This geopolitical rivalry further complicates the situation, raising fears that
the conflict could spill over into neighboring countries like Ethiopia and Eritrea, potentially
escalating into a broader regional war. Addressing this intertwined humanitarian, economic,
and security challenges is crucial for stabilizing Sudan and the greater Horn of Africa.

Policy Brief - N° 52/24 - October 2024 4

 3. REGIONAL EFFECT OF THE WAR
The conflict between the SAF and RSF since April 2023 continues to spread across
Sudan, affecting the region and neighboring countries. One spillover effect is the internal
displacement and cross-border flow of Sudanese seeking safety in neighboring nations.
The conflict’s intensity has forced millions to flee within and outside Sudan. According to
the United Nation’s World Food Program (February 2024), the conflict in Sudan has created
one of the world’s largest displacement crises internally and abroad since April 2023. By
September 2024, UNHCR reported 11, 277,221 million displaced, with 2,907,470 million in
Chad, South Sudan, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the Central African Republic (UNHCR, September
29, 2024). The International Organization for Migration’s October 2 report estimated 10.8
million displaced, including 2.3 million in neighboring countries (IOM, October 2, 2024).
On the other hand, an estimated 24.8 million people, half of the Sudanese population
need humanitarian assistance (23 September 2024, OCHA). Despite UNHCR and partners
providing aid to refugees, the cross-border influx to neighboring countries is straining
host nations. Fragile neighboring countries also face worsened crises due to existing
displacements. In addition to tens of thousands of lives lost because of the violence, this
displacement—the world’s largest displacement crisis (Sen, 2023)—along with refugee
flows, has caused food and healthcare shortages, stressing regional governments and aid
providers.

Moreover, the war has triggered security concerns along Sudan’s borders, including with
countries that are themselves grappling with active domestic armed conflicts (Office of
the Director of National Intelligence, 2024). Given the current domestic instability and
proliferation of armed groups in countries sharing borders with Sudan, there is increasing
concern about arms trafficking or smuggling into the Amhara region of Ethiopia via the
Sudanese border, as reported by Ethiopian state and non-state mainstream media outlets.
This could worsen the security situation in neighboring countries, as smuggled arms might
fuel and spread violence by armed groups with contending interests, further complicating
the situation in Sudan as well. This could lead to the potential spread of violence and
combatants across borders, potentially engulfing the entire region from Somalia in the
east to the westernmost point of the continent. Although Sudan used to act as a buffer
between extremist militants in Somalia in the Horn of Africa and those in the Sahel region,
the ongoing war could create fertile ground for the establishment of collaboration among
extremist militant groups across the east-west region of the Sahel Sahara (ibid). This suggests
that this situation may create favorable conditions for the spread of violent extremism in the
region, especially given Sudan’s history as a former exporter of religiously motivated violent
conflicts. Not only could the spread of extremism and arms trafficking become a concern,
but also the involvement of numerous non-state actors is a possibility. The likelihood of
this happening is evident, as the Sudanese government’s capacity to control and manage
its borders diminishes because of the ongoing war. It is apparent that activities related to
transboundary organized crime, including arms smuggling, will continue to spread unless
efforts are made to restore peace and government institutions in Sudan.

Furthermore, the devastating war has affected every aspect of the Sudanese economy,
including the industrial, agricultural, mining, and service sectors. It has also interrupted
access to basic public services, hampered access to markets, and continued to trigger
considerable scarcity of life-saving goods and services (Guo et al, 2023). The more the
conflict escalates and continues unabated, the more it impacts the country’s economy and
people’s livelihoods. The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) has predicted
that Sudan’s economy lost about $15 billion up to the end of 2023 because of the war,

Policy Brief - N° 52/24 - October 2024 5

 which is equivalent to 48% of Sudan’s GDP. This led to declines in output from the industrial,
agricultural, and service sectors estimated to be 70%, 49%, and 21%, respectively, with an
estimated loss of 5.2 million jobs at the end of the last fiscal year, equivalent to half of the
country’s labor force (Siddig et al, 2023). The poverty rate has increased to 65.6%, which
is equivalent to 28.4 million people by the end of 2023, compared to 61.1% in 2019,
which was equivalent to 26.4 million people (Siddig et al, 2023). The economy is expected
to continue shrinking in 2024 since the war has continued to intensify unabated. Experts
at The Soufan Center (2024), a New York-based non-profit research body, have warned
that the active conflict risks spilling over into neighboring countries, with a considerable
possibility of growing into a wider regional conflict.

The greater Horn of Africa has been subject to the interplay of the preferences and goals
of external interests and local forces, including China, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Russia, Saudi
Arabia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the United States. Sudan is one of
the few countries in the Horn of Africa region that has vast arable land for large-scale
agriculture, with easy access to the seaport of Port Sudan. It is an investment attraction for
states in the Persian Gulf region because of Sudan’s immediate eastern neighborhood. As
a result, the conflict in Sudan has played into this competition for influence and access to
Sudan and the subregion. Sudan has now become an arena for a regional proxy conflict
for some of the competing regional powers, in which the main enablers of the two warring
factions in the country are reportedly from both neighboring and Middle Eastern countries,
mainly Egypt, Iran, and the UAE (International Crisis Group, 2024). Egypt and Iran are
allegedly major political backers or suppliers of arms to al-Burhan’s SAF, while the UAE is
considered the main political backer and supplier of weapons to Hemeti’s RSF.

Moreover, Reuters (Lewis, 2024) reported that while Chad and some tribal alliances from
across Sudan’s western and southern neighboring countries of Libya and the Central
African Republic back Hemeti’s RSF, the eastern neighbor Eritrea supports al-Burhan’s SAF.
Ethiopia, Israel, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, and South Sudan have maintained close ties with
both warring parties and, until now, have seemingly remained neutral, trying to bring both
conflicting parties to terms. In addition to becoming a battleground for the proxy war of
external powers from the Middle East, some neighboring countries, such as Ethiopia and
Eritrea, may be dragged into Sudan’s complex conflict if the violence spreads closer to
their border areas. However, until now, the countries have officially maintained their neutral
stance. If Ethiopia and Eritrea are dragged into Sudan’s conflict for the above reasons or
any other reason, the conflict in Sudan may transform into a regional war. Experts at The
Soufan Center (2024), a New York-based non-profit research body, have warned that the
active conflict risks spilling over into neighboring countries, with a considerable possibility
of growing into a wider regional conflict.

Ethiopia’s neutral stance over the conflict in Sudan stems from its intention not to escalate or
exacerbate the long-standing diplomatic disputes that put the country at loggerheads with
Sudan and Egypt—first over the filling and operation of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance
Dam, on the main tributary of the Nile River, and second, its border dispute with Sudan over
the Al Fashqa triangle, which is fertile farmland. However, although Ethiopia has declared
officially that it will remain neutral in the conflict in Sudan, some experts think that it is
subtly allied with the UAE because of its close relations with the latter.

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 4. REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
RESPONSES AND LIMITATIONS
Since the start of the war which continues to this day, there have been multiple diplomatic
tracks aimed at bringing an end to the extremely destructive conflict. These efforts have
mainly focused on an immediate humanitarian ceasefire but have made minimal progress.

The East African Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a sub-regional bloc

representing the Greater Horn of Africa, of which Sudan is a member, has attempted to
bring an end to the crisis in Sudan. IGAD, championed by both Djibouti and Kenya, has
been calling for a face-to-face meeting of the warring parties in Sudan, but to no avail.
About two months after the start of the war, IGAD adopted a roadmap for the resolution
of the conflict in Sudan in its 14th Ordinary Session of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of
State and Government on June 12, 2023, in Djibouti, where the IGAD headquarters is
located. Accordingly, the roadmap nominates Djibouti, Ethiopia (initially not included and
causing some diplomatic rift), Kenya, and South Sudan as members of the IGAD High-
Level Delegation for the peace process in Sudan, with President Ruto of Kenya as chair
of the Quartet countries. It called for immediate arrangement of a face-to-face meeting
between Lt. Gen. Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, the Chairperson of the Transitional Sovereignty
Council of the Republic of Sudan, and Gen. Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo (widely known as
Hemeti), the securing of a commitment from the leaderships of SAF and RSF to establish a
humanitarian corridor, and the initiating of an inclusive political process towards a political
settlement of the conflict (IGAD, 2023).

Although General al-Burhan initially opposed President Ruto’s chairmanship of IGAD’s

high-level delegation, because of issues related to Kenya’s neutrality in the Sudan conflict
and allegedly claiming Ruto had a business relationship with Dagalo (aka Hemeti), he later
withdrew his opposition after visiting Kenya, and meeting President Ruto as part of his
shuttle diplomacy to convince leaders of the need to hold an IGAD summit meeting to
speed up the Jeddah talks process for a humanitarian ceasefire. Ethiopia (which al-Burhan
initially avoided along with Kenya) was also part of his shuttle diplomacy during his visit to
Nairobi. Initially, the African countries that al-Burhan visited were Egypt, Eritrea, and South
Sudan, sidelining both Kenya and Ethiopia. African countries that al-Burhan has visited
since the war broke out in Sudan include Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, and South Sudan.

On a request from General al-Burhan, the 41st extraordinary summit of the Horn of Africa
bloc was convened on December 9, 2023, in Djibouti. General al-Burhan attended the
meeting, which was his first attendance since the outbreak of the war. During the meeting,
he was reportedly involved in a heated and tense discussion with some of the other leaders
in attendance. The emphasis of the extraordinary summit was on specific measures to end
the ongoing war. However, General al-Burhan was not comfortable with, and rejected, the
final communiqué of the extraordinary meeting, on the basis that the contents of the issued
document misrepresented the outcome of the summit. In contrast, Dagalo accepted the
summit communiqué and expressed his willingness to meet al-Burhan anytime and place
determined by IGAD. Ultimately, by the end of December 2023, these differing responses
to the outcome of the IGAD summit on the part of the two warring parties led to the
failure of the IGAD roadmap, in particular its plan to realize a face-to-face meeting between
Dagalo and al-Burhan. Despite the stalemate between the two warring parties, which has
continued into 2024, the IGAD bloc has decided to remain actively engaged in Sudan’s
affairs by deciding to establish an IGAD framework comprised of respected diplomatic and
political interlocutors (IGAD, 2023).

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 The other diplomatic effort to restore peace in Sudan is what is known as the ‘Jeddah
process’, co-facilitated by Saudi Arabia and the United States, and aimed at securing a
short-term ceasefire and humanitarian arrangements. Since the start of the war, two major
rounds of talks (from May to June 2023, and from October to November 2023) have been
held in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Towards the conclusion of the first round, the Jeddah peace
process mediated by both Saudi Arabia and the U.S. succeeded in helping broker a short
ceasefire agreement between the two warring parties in Sudan, to allow humanitarian help
to reach the needy civilians trapped in the violent conflict. The second round of talks in
Jeddah was about ceasefire, facilitating humanitarian access, and conditions for a broader
peace process. During this round of talks, IGAD, was invited to participate in the talks on
behalf of the African Union. During the November 7, 2023, Jeddah process meeting, the
SAF and RSF committed to make efforts to facilitate increased humanitarian assistance,
and to implement confidence-building measures (Joint Statement of Commitments from
Jeddah Talks Between Sudanese Armed Forces and Rapid Support Force, November 7,
2023). Despite the signing of the Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of
Sudan and the Agreement on a Short-Term Ceasefire and Humanitarian Arrangements by
the SAF and RSF, on May 11, 2023, and May 20, 2023, respectively, the two warring parties
could not keep their promises and failed to act to silence their guns. The violent conflict
has continued into 2024, heralding the overall failure of the Jeddah peace talks process,
which upset parties to the crisis in Sudan, prompted IGAD to revise its approach towards
handling the crisis, and led the African Union to enhance its efforts to restore peace and
civilian rule in Sudan. As a follow-up to the “Jeddah Process,” peace talks were jointly
convened by the US and Saudi Arabia in Geneva on August 23, 2024. These talks aimed to
facilitate a face-to-face meeting between the two warring leaders to sign a ceasefire and
pave the way for humanitarian access. However, the discussions in Geneva ended without
any visible progress due to General al Burhan’s precondition that the RSF first withdraw
from the territories it captured during the war. The talks are now expected to resume at an
unspecified future date.

Furthermore, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union has initiated the African
Union process to bring peace in Sudan by adopting the African Union Roadmap for the
Resolution of the Conflict in Sudan. The AU’s roadmap is broader in its scope as it aims to
silence the guns in Sudan by implementing an inclusive, Sudanese-owned process, which
would end the fighting and put Sudan on a path to a democratic, civilian-led government
(AU Peace and Security Council, Communiqué of the 1156th Meeting of the Peace and
Security Council, held on May 27, 2023, on the Situation in Sudan, Reference: PSC/HoSG/
COMM.1156 (2023)). The AU process called on stakeholders in Sudan and the international
community to commit themselves to the implementation of the roadmap. The key elements
of AU Roadmap are: “i) the establishment of a coordination mechanism to ensure all
efforts by the regional and global actors are harmonized and impactful; ii) an immediate,
permanent, inclusive and comprehensive cessation of hostilities; iii) effective humanitarian
response; iv) protection of civilians and civil infrastructure; v) Strategic role of neighboring
states and the region; and vi) resumption of a credible and inclusive political transition
process, that takes into account the contributory role of all Sudanese political and social
actors, as well as the signatories to the Juba Peace Agreement, towards a democratic
civilian-led government” (ibid, PSC/HoSG/COMM.1156 (2023)).

In constituting the African Union’s Expanded Mechanism for the Sudan Crisis, the inclusivity
and transparency of the process have been important aspects. Hence, the process involves
a huge number of partners, including the members of the Trilateral Mechanism AU,
IGAD and UN (the Core Group under the leadership of the African Union Commission
Chairperson); the quadrilateral mechanism Saudi Arabia, UAE, UK, and U.S.; the Troika

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 (U.S., UK, and Norway), the League of Arab States and the European Union; the states
bordering Sudan (Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Central African Republic, Chad,
and Libya), the P5 (China, France, Russia, UK, and U.S.), the A3 on the UN’s Security Council
(Gabon, Ghana, and Mozambique), and Djibouti and Kenya (in their capacities as Chairs of
the IGAD Roadmap) (AU Peace and Security Council, Communiqué of the 1156th Meeting
of the Peace and Security Council, Held on 27 May 2023, on the Situation in Sudan,
Reference: PSC/HoSG/COMM.1156 (2023)).

Despite numerous peace efforts, the two belligerent groups have remained steadfast in their
pursuit of victory through military means. Despite a proliferation of consultations, meetings,
statements, and communiqués, a lasting ceasefire has not been brokered, hindering the
efforts of humanitarian agencies to aid the needy. Consequently, the destructive conflict
and suffering of millions of people have persisted into 2024. The peace initiatives have
failed mainly because of the approaches used.

One reason for the failure of various diplomatic efforts can be ascribed to initiatives
attempted outside of continental and sub-regional frameworks, or mechanisms for conflict
prevention and resolution in Africa - the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) as
a long-term structural response to the peace and security challenges of the continent. It
includes the African Peace and Security Council—a standing decision-making organ and
component elements for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts (Articles
1 & 2 of the Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council). APSA
is therefore the AU's framework for conflict prevention, management, and resolution.

Accordingly, although ensuring international peace and security is the primary responsibility
within the context of the United Nations, the AU and regional mechanisms are expected to
play a leading role in conflict prevention and resolution on the continent. As Kofi Annan,
former UN Secretary-General, once said, “it is necessary and desirable to provide support
for regional and sub-regional initiatives in Africa. Such support is necessary because the
United Nations lacks the capacity, resources, and expertise to address all problems that may
arise in Africa. It is desirable because wherever possible the international community should
strive to complement rather than supplant African efforts to resolve Africa’s problems” (UN
Doc. A/52/871 – S/1998/318).

Accordingly, peace talks should have been initiated and conducted within the framework
of the African Peace and Security Structure and led primarily by the African Union. While
IGAD, as a regional bloc, is part of the architecture, in Sudan's particular case and given
the diverse geopolitical concerns and interests of the bloc’s members, the AU should
have taken the leading role, with IGAD playing a complementary role. Moreover, non-
African mediation processes and their outcomes may not align with established regional
mechanisms, and their outcomes will not have a longer-term effect as they will, in one
way or another, be influenced by explicit or implicit concerns and the interests of external
factors that have contributed to the fragmented processes.

The other factor has to do with the ongoing crisis in Sudan, which arose from a political
conflict that escalated into war. This implies that the root cause of the crisis is political.
However, apart from the AU, the focus of the fragmented peace processes has been on
bringing the two warring factions to the negotiating table, without due attention and
consideration of stakeholders in the political process in Sudan. A temporary ceasefire can
be brokered but may not be sustained because political stakeholders in Sudan will not
own and support its implementation. This is simply because they have not been part of the
process. The extent of inclusiveness of the peace process matters greatly for the effective

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 implementation of a possible peace deal in Sudan.

Furthermore, some of the peace initiative processes that have been attempted are vulnerable
to external interference, either directly or by proxy. Examples include the Jeddah process
and the IGAD track. Sudan has a strategic location along the Red Sea, an important maritime
trade route connecting Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, and moreover, is also located at
the center of the hydro politics of the Nile River, with huge water resources flowing through
its territory. Sudan’s vast potential for food production attracts the interest and concern
not only of the neighboring countries, but also from regional and international powers.
Some of the facilitators of the peace processes may have conflicts of interest as enablers
or detractors of either of the belligerent groups. Hence, the probability that stakeholders
in some of the peace processes would like to see a peace deal that favors their interests is
high but may be detrimental to the people of Sudan and may contribute to further conflict.

5. IMPLICATIONS FOR SECURITY AND

STABILITY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA AND
BEYOND
The Sudan war has created a crisis of previously unseen magnitude, which is causing the
nation to drift to the verge of disintegration. In addition to the stalemate in Sudan’s political
transition process, and the devastating effect on tens of millions of Sudanese people, the
war is dragging the country towards disaster and there is a question of effective survival of
the state.

The war in Sudan also has an immense significance for peace and security in the Horn of
Africa and beyond, because Sudan lies at the geostrategic cross-roads of the Horn of Africa
and the Sahel region, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East, bordering the Red Sea. It
also shares borders with many countries, including the Central African Republic, Chad,
Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Libya, and South Sudan. The war threatens transboundary spillover
effects across the region. Exerting every effort to stop the conflict-driven catastrophe and
restore peace in Sudan is in the best interests of not only Sudan, but also of the Horn of
Africa region and beyond, for the following reasons:

• an increased number of people will be displaced and will cross borders seeking
protection, a situation which put an immense pressure on host countries’ limited
capabilities to provide protection and critical life-saving assistance, including water,
food, shelter, health, and core relief items. Many of the neighboring countries were
already hosting large refuge populations before the start of the war in Sudan. This
situation can ultimately destabilize the already fragile region.

• according to the U.S. Intelligence Community Threat Assessment (2024), the more
the conflict in Sudan remains unabated, the greater the risks of the conflict spreading
beyond Sudan’s borders, leading to regional instability, especially coupled with the
internal situation in Ethiopia (Sudan’s eastern neighbor), which is currently undergoing
multiple, simultaneous, and internal conflicts, and heightening ethnic tensions (Office
of the Director of National Intelligence, 2024).

• Sudan is where the two tributaries of the Nile River—the White Nile and the Blue Nile—
meet to form the proper Nile River before the it crosses the Sudanese-Egyptian border.
Sudan is important in terms of the hydro-politics of the Nile. The instability of the
country is a major obstacle to a peaceful resolution of the current diplomatic stalemate

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 among Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, being
built across the Blue Nile, with longer-term implications for regional and international
peace and security.

• Sudan is also located along the Red Sea, one of the major maritime trades routes
the world, connecting Africa, Asia, and Europe. The continued violence in Sudan may
obstruct this important maritime passage and disrupt the movement of goods between
Europe and Asia, and specifically the global maritime oil trade, endangering global
energy security.

• a continued conflict in Sudan means the export of crude oil from South Sudan,
conducted through the Greater Nile Oil Pipeline installed across Sudan to Port Sudan,
will be disrupted or remain uncertain, affecting the economy of South Sudan, and
energy supply of importing countries, including Italy, China, and Malaysia.

• the instability of Sudan makes it a fertile ground for jihadist groups in the Horn of Africa
and the Sahel (such as al-Shabab in Somalia and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb)
to establish networks and coordinate their operations across porous borders. Given
Sudan’s history in the 1990s of hosting and giving sanctuary to Osama Bin Laden,
the founder of Al-Qaeda, coupled with its important geographical location and weak
border management and surveillance, the conflict in Sudan will undermine the efforts
that have been made by regional and international actors to address the perilous
activities of jihadist militants in the above-mentioned geopolitical sub-regions.

• increased cross-border movement and diminished border control because of the conflict
in Sudan, will create favorable conditions for the spread of organized transboundary
crime, including smuggling of small arms and light weapons, drug smuggling, human
trafficking, and money laundering, which may have a spillover effect across the Horn of
Africa and the Sahel-Sahara regions.

• the conflict in Sudan could turn into a proxy war given the competition and rivalry
between international and regional powers for influence and access in the Horn of
Africa region. Some of the external actors may become involved and support either
of the two warring sides in the Sudan conflict, which would potentially complicate
peacemaking in the country.

The prospects for peace and security in Sudan and its impact on the Horn region depend
on whether the African Union, within the framework of its conflict prevention and resolution
mechanism, can effectively spearhead and consolidate the stalled peace initiatives into an
all-inclusive AU process, in collaboration with international (such as UN) and sub-regional
(such as IGAD) partners, and Sudan’s multilateral and bilateral stakeholders. To what extent
the people of Sudan own the process and play a leading role in solving their problem also
depends on the enabling environment that would be created by the African Union. From
the perspective of trust, the parties to the Sudan conflict will be more comfortable with a
process under the auspices of the African Union rather than IGAD, in which sub-regional
geopolitical rivalries and animosities are evident. If the multiple peace processes are to
continue, the possibility of achieving peaceful resolution to the conflict in Sudan remains
bleak.

On the other hand, because of the influence of numerous geopolitically significant

factors, the Horn of Africa has increasingly become a stage for international and regional
competition and rivalry over strategic interests and concerns. This trend has fostered rivalry
and strained relations among international and regional powers, gradually turning the

Policy Brief - N° 52/24 - October 2024 11

 region into one of the world’s most militarized areas, with the potential for diplomatic and
military confrontations, directly or by proxy, undermining any peace initiative implemented
by the African Union or UN. In the context of Sudan, there might be the possibility that
some external powers provide supplies to the two belligerent groups, or any other potential
would-be party to the conflict, which will potentially complicate any future peace process
in the country.

References
• "United Nations. "Sudan Factions Start Talks on Final Transition Deal." Reuters, January
9, 2023. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudan-factions-start-talks-final-transition-
deal-2023-01-09/.
• ("Experts have warned that the active conflict risks spilling over into neighboring countries,
with a considerable possibility of growing into a wider regional conflict." The Soufan Center,
2024, https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2024-april-3/#:~:text=Experts%20have%20
warned%20that%20the,into%20a%20wider%20regional%20conflict).
• AU Peace and Security Council, "Communiqué of the 1156th Meeting of the Peace and
Security Council, Held on 27 May 2023, on the Situation in Sudan," Reference: PSC/HoSG/
COMM.1156 (2023).
• Charter of the United Nations, 1945.
• Dusza, Karl. "Max Weber's Conception of the State." International Journal of Politics,
Culture, and Society 3, no. 1 (Autumn, 1989): 71-105. Accessed March 6, 2024. https://
www.jstor.org/stable/20006938.
• Eltayeb, Amgad Fareid. "Back to Barracks: Building Democracy after the Military Coup in
Sudan." European Council on Foreign Relations. ECFR, https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/
policy_brief/back_to_barracks_building_democracy_after_the_military_coup_in_sudan,
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Arab, October 2, 2023. Accessed April 22, 2024. https://www.newarab.com/analysis/inside-
burhans-quest-international-legitimacy-sudan.
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Conflict Using Satellite Data." Defence and Peace Economics, 2023, pp. 1–17. doi:10.108
0/10242694.2023.2290474.
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resrep14522.4.
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Extraordinary IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government, 09.12.2023.
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Ordinary Session of the IGAD Assembly of the Heads of State and Government. June 12,
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 • International Crisis Group. "Time to Try Again to End Sudan’s War." July 21, 2023.
• International Organization for Migration. "Sudan - Regional Crisis Response Situation
Update #46." Accessed April 22, 2024. https://sudan.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1606/
files/documents/2024-04/sudan-regional-crisis-response-situation-update-46_0.pdf.
• Johnson, Douglas H. 2016. "The Root Causes of Sudan’s Conflicts: Old Wars and New
Wars." James Curray, USA.
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Policy Brief - N° 52/24 - October 2024 13

 ABOUT THE
AUTHOR
KIDANE KIROS
Dr. Kidane Kiros Bitsue is currently Professor-Researcher at Mohammed
VI Polytechnic University’s Faculty of Humanities, Economics and Social
Sciences and Senior Fellow at Policy Centre for the New South. He holds a
PhD degree in Development Studies.

Prior to joining Mohammed VI Polytechnic University, Dr Kidane served as

the Director of the Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) of Addis
Ababa University (AAU) from March 2014 – June 2019. In his capacity as the
Director of IPSS, he had directed the successful conduct of six (6) annual
conferences of Tana High-Level Forum on Security in Africa that took place
from 2014 – 2019. As a result of efforts done under his directorship in the
areas of academic, research and outreach activities; IPSS had been rated
among the top 50 think -tanks in sub-Sharan Africa in 2015, 2016, 2017 and
2018. Read more

ABOUT
THE POLICY CENTER FOR THE NEW SOUTH
The Policy Center for the New South (PCNS) is a Moroccan think tank aiming to contribute to the
improvement of economic and social public policies that challenge Morocco and the rest of Africa as
integral parts of the global South.

The PCNS pleads for an open, accountable and enterprising "new South" that defines its own narratives
and mental maps around the Mediterranean and South Atlantic basins, as part of a forward-looking
relationship with the rest of the world. Through its analytical endeavours, the think tank aims to support
the development of public policies in Africa and to give the floor to experts from the South. This stance
is focused on dialogue and partnership, and aims to cultivate African expertise and excellence needed
for the accurate analysis of African and global challenges and the suggestion of appropriate solutions.
Read more

All opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author.

Policy Center for the New South

Rabat Campus of Mohammed VI Polytechnic University,
Rocade Rabat Salé - 11103
Email : [email protected]
Phone : +212 (0) 537 54 04 04
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