The U.S.

Customs and Border Protections 2024

[The U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “CBP Releases June 2024 Monthly Update” 07/15/24, 2024
https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/cbp-releases-june-2024-monthly-update#:~:text=The%20number%20of
%20encounters%20at,below%201%2C900%20encounters%20per%20day.]

“Recent border security measures have made a meaningful impact on our ability to impose
consequences for those crossing unlawfully, leading to a decline of 29% in U.S. Border Patrol
apprehensions from May to June, with a more than 50% drop in the seven day average from the
announcement to the end of the month, and doubling the rate at which we removed noncitizens from
U.S. Border Patrol custody in June,” said Troy A. Miller, CBP Senior Official Performing the Duties of the
Commissioner. “We are continuing to work with international partners to go after transnational criminal
organizations that traffic in chaos and prioritize profit over human lives.”On June 4, 2024, the Secretary
of Homeland Security and the Attorney General also jointly issued an interim final rule (IFR) that,
consistent with the Presidential Proclamation, generally restricts asylum eligibility for those who
irregularly enter across the southwest land and the southern coastal border. The number of encounters
at our Southwest Border have decreased by more than 50% in the past six weeks. The Border Patrol’s
seven-day average has decreased to below 1,900 encounters per day.

C1 overstretch

affirming would add a mammoth of additional costs.

Adams, Kimberly. “Border Patrol Could Nearly Double in Size under Spending Bill.” Marketplace, 22 Mar.
2024, www.marketplace.org/2024/03/22/proposed-appropriations-border-patrol/. Accessed 7 July 2024.//JZ
The House is set to vote on Friday on a $1.2 trillion spending package just ahead of a deadline for a partial government

shutdown. It includes funding for the departments of defense, state, labor, and health and human services. And for the

Department of Homeland Security, it also includes a significant bump in funding for border

security. It was just a couple of weeks ago that Congress failed to pass a bipartisan immigration and border security bill, so

the almost $62 billion in discretionary spending for DHS now kind of looks like a border security bill lite. “This is one of the most

astounding immigration enforcement increases that we’ve seen,” said David Bier, associate director of immigration studies at the

Cato Institute, a libertarian think tank. “You’re talking about almost a 35% increase in the Border Patrol

budget.” Part of that is almost half a billion dollars to more or less double the size of the force by

hiring 22,000 more Border Patrol agents. “I’m skeptical of their ability to do that,” Bier said.
“We’ve seen Border Patrol try to recruit and be unable to do so. But this is certainly a huge amount of money.” The funding

package also includes more than $100 million for border security technology. There is also “some funding
to fight the asylum backlog at U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services,” noted Julia Gelatt, an associate director at the Migration

Policy Institute, a think tank focused on “immigration and integration policies in North America and Europe.” While there’s lots of

cash for border and immigration enforcement, “we also in the prior funding bill saw that there was a decrease in the funding for

immigration courts,” she said. That’s the opposite of what’s needed to process that backlog. Jennie Murray, president and CEO of

the National Immigration Forum, an advocacy non-profit, said that the focus on enforcement at the Southern Border ignores other

pressing immigration concerns.

CFRB 2024
[CRFB, “Income Growth Would Slow By One-Third Due to Rising Debt” 05/28/24,
https://www.crfb.org/blogs/income-growth-would-slow-one-third-due-rising-debt]
Rapidly rising debt could reduce income growth by 33 percent over the next three decades and 42
percent annually by FY 2049.

OIG
[OIG, “CBP Has Improved Southwest Border Technology, but Significant Challenges Remain” 02/23/21,
https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2021-02/OIG-21-21-Feb21.pdf]
Shifting priorities, construction delays, a lack of available technology solutions, and funding constraints
hindered CBP’s planned deployments. Consequently, most southwest Border Patrol sectors still rely
predominantly on obsolete systems and infrastructure with limited capabilities. CBP faced additional
challenges that reduced the effectiveness of its existing technology. Border Patrol officials stated they
had inadequate personnel to fully leverage surveillance technology or maintain current information
technology systems and infrastructure on site. Further, we identified security vulnerabilities on some
CBP servers and workstations not in compliance due to disagreement about the timeline for
implementing DHS configuration management requirements.

C2 - cartels
US-Mexico border cooperation is flourishing and successful. Arzt ND
Arzt ND [Sigrid Arzt, xx-xx-xxxx, “U.S.-MEXICO SECURITY COLLABORATION: INTELLIGENCE SHARING AND
LAW ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION”, Wilson Center,
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/Chapter%2012-
%20U.S.-Mexico%20Security%20Collaboration%2C%20Intelligence%20Sharing%20and%20Law
%20Enforcement%20Cooperation.pdf, accessed 7-16-2024.] //aayush

One can identify at least three types of mechanisms for cooperation between U.S.-Mexico law enforcement
and intelligence agencies: institutional agreements; leadership and personal relationships; and standardized
procedures. Institutional mechanisms refer to memorandums of understanding to exchange prisoners and the
extradition treaty signed by both governments and approved by each Senate .16 It is important to mention that
a number of agencies participate in this process. Some of the primary ones are the Mexican Ministry of Foreign
Relations, the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Department of Justice and the Mexican Attorney
General’s Office, but if the case of extradition is appealed to the Mexican Supreme Court for an amparo, a special injunction
designed to safeguard an individual’s constitutional rights, this institution can also have a say in the
process. Over time the process has been encumbered by the formal procedures defined in these agreements, and drug traffickers fighting
extradition to the U.S. often use the process itself to obstruct their extradition. Fortunately, the obstacles of the past are now
being removed for future extraditions. In fact, even the Mexican Supreme Court that in the past was
cautious about allowing extraditions has now set the terms for this legal tool to be utilized . At the time of
the Fox administration, U.S. information sharing was key in a number of cases under the jurisdiction of Daniel
Cabeza de Vaca, Mexican Attorney General, the Undersecretary for International and Judicial Affairs, Jose
Luis Santiago Vasconcelos, and also the CISEN while Eduardo Medina Mora headed this agency. Medina Mora later expanded U.S.
cooperation as the head of the Ministry of Public Security. In large part, bilateral cooperation took place among these
agencies because of the leadership and importance that those Mexican officials gave to it , especially
collaboration with the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). Additionally, personal relationships are critical
informal mechanisms of law enforcement cooperation. For example, during the Fox Administration, Mexican
officials had settled into the bureaucratic structure allowing them to build a sense of personal trust and
cooperation with U.S. counterparts, which in turn translated into increased cooperation in case
investigations. Furthermore, Mexican cooperation with the U.S. was not only a focus of civilian agencies .
Numerous interviews confirm that the army also benefitted from shared information that allowed them to go
after specific targets. Yet, it is more difficult to measure the degree of improvement and efficiency this information produced in the
army’s efforts to combat organized crime because the Mexican armed forces (National Defense) are less open about their relationship with U.S.
counterparts as a result of the historic nationalism and national sovereignty that permeate the institution. Therefore, the
second clear
characteristic of U.S.-Mexico cooperation in law enforcement has to do with the leadership of the
respective agencies and the commitment those in charge of this cooperation give to the exchange of
information, the extradition mechanisms and the building of trust between actors on each side. There is no doubt that trust remains
a key component to bilateral cooperation. The steps taken since the Zedillo Administration all the way through Calderon´s time
in office prove that a number of U.S. and Mexican officials have been in contact and collaborating all of
these years to find more effective and transparent mechanisms to target a common enemy . Finally,
there are other important arrangements, developed since the late 1990s, that have institutionalized
law enforcement cooperation. The DEA’s Mexico office, like their Colombia office, has been part of the
Sensitive Information Units’ (SIU) program since its inception in 1997.17 During the Fox administration the SIU members
came from the Mexican Federal Investigative Agency (AFI), headed by Genaro Garcia Luna, leaving law enforcement and intelligence
bilateral cooperation strongly tied to its parent agency, the PGR.18 This program allowed Mexican law enforcement
to be vetted and learn and exchange standardizing processes of intelligence and information
gathering. As personnel of both nationalities came to work together they became aware of the institutional and legal
arrangements and had to find and work out points of contact that would allow them to build a case together. While a major institutional
rearrangement has taken place within the U.S. bureaucracy since 9/11, the
DEA has grown and remains strongly linked to
Mexico in efforts to deal with DTOs. This agency’s international presence and level of interaction with its respective foreign
counterparts has increased incrementally. The DEA’s five objectives for its work with foreign counterpart agencies are: (1) to participate in
bilateral investigations, (2) to cultivate and maintain quality liaison relations, (3) to promote and contribute to foreign institution building, (4) to
support intelligence gathering and sharing efforts, and (5) to provide training opportunities. Since FY 2003
the DEA´s office in
Mexico is actively targeting a total of 212 Priority Target Organizations .19 The data indicates that the
DEA’s foreign offices were pursuing high-priority cases and have succeeded in disrupting or
dismantling a significant portion of DTOs.20
For example, CRS 23
CRS 23 [Congressional Research Service, 10-9-2023, US Congress,
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10578, accessed 7-16-2024.] //aayush

Bicentennial Framework (2021-Present) The Biden Administration has sought to reduce tensions and
rebuild the U.S. security relationship with Mexico. In October 2021, Mexico hosted the first High-Level
Security Dialogue (HLSD) since 2016. After the dialogue, the governments announced a new Bicentennial
Framework for Security, Public Health, and Safe Communities (the Framework) with three pillars: 1. Protect
people by investing in public health solutions to drug use, supporting safe communities, and reducing
homicides and other high-impact crimes 2. Prevent transborder crime by securing modes of travel and
commerce, reducing arms trafficking, targeting illicit supply chains, and reducing human trafficking and
smuggling 3. Pursue criminal networks by disrupting illicit financiers, strengthening justice sector actors
to prosecute organized crime, addressing cyber threats, and cooperating on extraditions Many
observers credit the 2021 HLSD and the Framework with restarting bilateral security cooperation. The Framework
envisions a more coordinated, “whole of government” approach to combating shared security
challenges. In March 2023, U.S. and Mexican officials announced “phase two” of the Framework , focused on
combatting fentanyl production, arms trafficking, and TCOs. Mexico has enacted a new law to detect
and punish illicit synthetic drug production; dedicated federal prosecutors to work on fentanyl cases; and extradited Ovidio
Guzmán, a major fentanyl trafficker. At the 2023 HLSD, U.S. officials highlighted increased interdictions, arrests, and indictments for arms and
fentanyl trafficking. Sanctions have become a key tool to combat both crimes and those who finance TCOs.

However, affirming decks cooperation. Sargent 23

Sargent 23 [Greg Sargent, 8-16-2023, "Why The Maga Hysteria About Bombing Mexico Is Dumber Than
You Thought", archive.is, https://archive.is/j7vHF#selection-501.0-501.12, accessed 6-27-2024.]
//aayush

Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis has declared that he’s prepared to authorize drone strikes against drug cartels in
Mexico. Bedecked in military-looking garb at the border, he recently vowed to blockade Mexican ports. DeSantis is not alone:
Many MAGA-fied Republicans are demanding stepped-up military action against the flow of
fentanyl — including inside Mexico, without that country’s assent. This talk isn’t just insanely reckless. It also
exposes a profound absurdity embedded in the MAGA worldview, one that treats migration to the United States
almost exclusively as a security problem to be “solved” with maximal force, not a hemispheric challenge that requires
international cooperation and diplomacy. You might scoff: Surely such warmongering is nothing more than GOP presidential
primary posturing. But it’s occurring in a larger context: DeSantis has also proposed a blueprint for border security
that relies heavily on restoring the “Remain in Mexico” policy. First instituted during Donald Trump’s presidency —
and wound down by President Biden — it forced asylum seekers to await hearings in Mexico, and many
Republicans see reviving it as a “border security” panacea. But doing this would require the
cooperation of Mexico. Earlier this year, the Mexican government declared that it opposes restarting the
program, and this kind of belligerent approach from Republicans, even if rhetorical, would probably make securing
cooperation much harder. “Mexico probably will refuse to continue to cooperate with a president
that threatens to use force against Mexico without Mexico’s consent,” Martha Bárcena, former Mexican
ambassador to the United States, told me. “It’s a total absurdity.” True, Republicans sometimes say they’ll seek Mexico’s permission to
wage war on its soil. The idea of more U.S.-Mexico law enforcement cooperation against drug cartels is not inherently problematic. But other
times, Republicans tout the threat of waging military action without Mexico’s consent as a badge of
their own toughness. Last week, for instance, DeSantis answered “yes” when an Iowa voter asked whether he’d use drones to “take
out” cartels in Mexico. If Mexico won’t help, DeSantis continued, the United States will “do what we have to
do.” And his suggestion of naval blockades to prevent precursor chemicals from entering Mexican ports
comes with a hint that the action would be unilateral if Mexico “drags its feet.” Meanwhile, Sen. Tom
Cotton (R-Ark.) has proposed sending in Special Operations forces and said if Mexico doesn’t want to help ,
“so be it.” Fox News’s Greg Gutfeld wants the United States to “bomb Mexico,” meaning the cartels, even “if Mexico
won’t agree.” As David Frum writes for the Atlantic, such talk addresses a political problem for Republicans. Huge numbers of the opioid
epidemic’s victims are rural and White, and a broader domestic crackdown might demonize or criminalize many
GOP constituents; threatening Mexico instead spins a tale of “virtuous middle-Americans beset by
alien villains.” But that tale runs into a problem. DeSantis recently said he would reinstate “Remain in Mexico” as the primary way of
disincentivizing migrants from seeking asylum in the United States. Many Republicans believe that if migrants can’t disappear into the interior
while waiting for hearings, they won’t come at all. But data
on border crossings during the policy’s implementation
casts doubt on whether there’s any such effect, as Aaron Reichlin-Melnick, policy director of the American Immigration
Council, has demonstrated. And the program was a humanitarian disaster for migrants. All that aside, removing migrants to Mexico
is not merely a matter of dumping them on the other side of the border. Running the program
required painstaking negotiations between the U.S. and Mexican governments, because such
removals are multilateral agreements pursuant to laws in both countries . “Mexico would have to formally agree
to restart ‘Remain in Mexico,’” Reichlin-Melnick told me. “You cannot simply send someone to a country that does not want them.” It might be
argued that “bomb Mexico” talk could exert more pressure on Mexico to restart the policy if the next U.S.
president demands it. But, with Mexico’s leftist president, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, regularly lambasting
DeSantis’s anti-immigrant policies, GOP war fever will make it politically harder for Mexico to
acquiesce, said Bárcena, who was ambassador during “Remain in Mexico” under Trump. “All cooperation will be less likely if
the Republican candidates continue with the threat of use of force ,” Bárcena said, as Mexicans will criticize
Obrador for “yielding to the U.S.” The DeSantis-MAGA understanding of migration woefully lacks any serious hemispheric vision.
Myriad factors throughout the Americas, from extreme poverty to gang violence and civil breakdown, drive migrants to seek refuge here. That’s
why they keep trying even when we make it as punishing as possible. But to DeSantis and MAGA, all that matters is whether we are “tough”
enough. If we are, migrants will give up. DeSantis’s immigration blueprint says nothing meaningful about root causes of migration or how to
address them through multilateral action, dismissing migration as an “invasion” and not a complex phenomenon with profound human rights
implications. Similarly, the fentanyl crisis has myriad complicated causes. As Ryan Cooper writes for the American Prospect, we’d do better to
redouble treatment at home and beef up technology at ports of entry — where most fentanyl enters — rather than launch new military
adventures south of the border. But as long as the war-whooping thrills the MAGA masses, that alone counts as mission accomplished.

Empirically during Trump, Christensen 17

Christensen 17 [Thomas J. Christensen, 3-1-2017, President Trump's border wall, Brookings,
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/president-trumps-border-wall/, accessed 7-16-2024.] //aayush

President Trump wants to build a wall along the U.S.-Mexico border to keep illegal immigrants from entering the
United States. Though Trump has said the wall will cost $12 billion dollars, other estimates have put it closer to $300 billion dollars. In many
places the proposed wall would have to be located within U.S. territory . In these spots, migrants would just need
to make it to the wall to enter U.S. territory and gain eligibility for asylum. This is already a problem with existing border
fencing. The narrative that President Trump has developed around the wall is jeopardizing decades of
improvement—fostered by George H.W. Bush and Barack Obama—to the U.S.-Mexican relationship. This threatens
many domains of North American integration and cooperation . The wall also poses a threat to wildlife. The border is
home to numerous endangered species such as jaguars, pronghorns, tortoises, and frogs whose habitats would be compromised, as well as
other wildlife like bees whose pollination patterns would be disrupted. Though there are problems on the U.S.-Mexico border, even if the wall
goes up, smugglers will find other ways to get around it. Smugglers will likely circumvent the wall by flying drugs by drones, by airplanes, or by
putting them will in trucks hidden among legal goods. Boats will also likely be used to transport drugs and migrants. Even under the best of
circumstances, the wall would not actually stop bad flows of illegal activities and immigration, it will simply shift the flows to other means.
Latin American instability goes nuclear – Skyrocketing cartel power linearly increases
the chance of great power interposition.
Krepinevich & Lindsey 13 [Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. is the President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, which he
joined following a 21- year career in the U.S. Army. He has served in the Department of Defense 􀂶s 􀀲􀌇ce of 􀀱et Assessment, on the personal sta􀌆 of three secretaries
of defense, the 􀀱ational Defense Panel, the Defense Science Board Task Force on Joint Experimentation, and the Defense Policy Board. He is the author of 7 Deadly
Scenarios: A Military Futurist Explores War in the 21st Century and The Army and Vietnam. A West Point graduate, he holds an M.P.A. and a Ph.D. from Harvard
University—AND—Eric Lindsey is an analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA). His primary areas of interest concern U.S. and world
military forces, both current and prospective, and the future strategic and operational challenges that the U.S. military may face. Since joining CSBA in 2009, Eric has
contributed to a number of CSBA monographs. He most recently co-authored The Road Ahead, an analytical monograph exploring potential future challenges and
their implications for U.S. Army and Marine Corps modernization. In conjunction with his research and writing, Eric has helped design and conduct dozens of
strategic and operational-level wargames exploring a wide variety of future scenarios. He holds a B.A. in military history and public policy from Duke University and
is pursuing an M.A. in strategic studies and international economics from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). “Hemispheric Defense
in the 21 Century, 2013]
ST

As the previous chapter demonstrates, for the past two hundred years the principal cause of concern for U.S. defense policymakers and
planners thinking about Latin
America has been the prospect that great powers outside the Western Hemisphere could
exploit the military weakness and internal security challenges of the states within it to threaten U.S. security.
While there is reason for optimism about the future of Latin America,58 there is also cause for concern. The region faces enduring obstacles to
economic59 and political development60 as well as signi􀂿cant internal security challenges. As General John Kelly, the commander of U.S.
Southern Command (SOUTHCOM)61 noted in his March 2013 posture statement before Congress, Latin America: 􀀾I􀁀s a region of enormous
promise and exciting opportunities, but it is also one of persistent challenges and complex threats. It is a region of relative peace, low likelihood
of interstate con􀃀icts, and overall economic growth, yet is also home to corrosive criminal violence, permissive environments for illicit activities,
and episodic political and social protests.62 The
instability and non-traditional security challenges that General Kelly cites provide
potential opportunities for the United States’ major rivals to (borrowing a term from Monroe’s declaration) “interpose”
themselves into the region and, by so doing, threaten regional stability and U.S. security. Two discernible trends
suggest that current and prospective Eurasian rivals could seek to exploit regional conditions and dynamics in ways
that could impose immense costs on the United States and divert its attention from more distant theaters
overseas. The first trend is a return to a heightened level of competition among the “great powers”
following two decades of U.S. dominance. The second trend concerns the growing cost of projecting power by traditional military means due to the proliferation of “anti-access/area-denial” (A2/AD) capabilities in general, and
precision-guided munitions (PGMs) in particular. These trends suggest that, despite a possible decline in relative U.S. power, external forces will continue to 􀂿nd it beyond their means to threaten the hemisphere through
traditional forms of power projection. Far more likely is a return of a competition similar to that which the United States engaged in with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. During that period both powers sought to avoid direct
con􀃀ict with the other, given the risks of escalation to nuclear con􀃀ict. Instead each focused primarily on gaining an advantage over the other through the employment of client states and non-state groups as proxies. Proxies were
employed for reasons other than avoiding a direct clash, such as gaining positional advantage (e.g., enabling the sponsor to establish bases in its country, as the Soviets did in Cuba). Proxies were also employed as a means of
diverting a rival’s attention from what was considered the key region of the competition and to impose disproportionate costs on a rival (e.g., Moscow’s support of 􀀱orth Vietnam as a means of drawing o􀌆 U.S. resources from
Europe). This chapter outlines trends in the Western Hemisphere security environment that outside powers may seek to exploit to advance their objectives in ways that threaten regional stability and U.S. security. This is followed
by a discussion of how these external powers might proceed to do so. Seeds of Instability Crime, Illicit Networks, and Under-Governed Areas Latin America has a long history of banditry, smuggling, and organized crime. As in the
case of Pancho Villa and the 1916-1917 Punitive Expedition, these activities have occasionally risen to a level at which they in􀃀uence U.S. national security calculations. Rarely, however, have these activities been as pervasive and
destabilizing as they are today. Although a wide variety of illicit activity occurs in Latin America, criminal organizations conducting drug tra􀌇cking are the dominant forces in the Latin American underworld today, accounting for
roughly 􀀇􀀗0 billion per year63 of an estimated 􀀇100 billion in annual illicit trade.6􀀗 Since the Colombian cartels were dismantled in the 1990s, this lucrative trade has been dominated by powerful Mexican cartels whose operations
extend across the length and breadth of Mexico, as well as up the supply chain into the cocaine-producing regions of the Andean Ridge and through their wholesale and retail drug distribution networks across the United States.65
The cartels, along with countless smaller criminal organizations, comprise what the head of SOUTHCOM has described as, 􀀾a􀁀n interconnected system of arteries that traverse the entire Western Hemisphere, stretching across the
Atlantic and Paci􀂿c, through the Caribbean, and up and down 􀀱orth, South, and Central America . . . 􀀾a􀁀 vast system of illicit pathways 􀀾that is used􀁀 to move tons of drugs, thousands of people, and countless weapons into and out
of the United States, Europe, and Africa with an e􀌇ciency, payload, and gross pro􀂿t any global transportation company would envy.66 That being said, the drug tra􀌇cking underworld is by no means a monolithic entity or
cooperative alliance. Rather, it is a fractious and brutally competitive business in which rival entities are constantly and literally 􀂿ghting to maximize their share of the drug trade and for control of the critical transshipment points,
or plazas, through which it 􀃀ows. To attack their competitor’s operations and protect their own operations from rivals and the Mexican government’s crackdown that began in 2006, the cartels have built up larger, better armed,
and more ruthless forces of hired gunmen known as sicarios. Using the billions of dollars generated by their illicit activities, they have acquired weapons and equipment formerly reserved for state armies or state-sponsored
insurgent groups, including body armor, assault ri􀃀es, machine guns, grenades, landmines, anti-tank rockets, mortars, car bombs, armored vehicles, helicopters, transport planes, and—perhaps most remarkably—long-range
submersibles.67 The cartels’ pro􀂿ts have also enabled them to hire former police and military personnel, including members of several countries’ elite special operations units68 and, in several cases, active and former members of
the U.S. military.69 These personnel bring with them—and can provide to the cartels—a level of training and tactical pro􀂿ciency that can be equal or superior to those of the government forces they face. As a result of this
pro􀂿ciency and the military-grade weapons possessed by the cartels, more than 2,500 Mexican police o􀌇cers and 200 military personnel were killed in confrontations with organized crime forces between 2008 and 2012 along with
tens of thousands of civilians.70 In the poorer states of Central America, state security forces operate at an even greater disadvantage.71 While their paramilitary forces enable the cartels to dominate entire cities and large remote
areas through force and intimidation, they are not the only tool available. The cartels also leverage their immense wealth to buy the silence or support of police and government o􀌇cials who are often presented with a choice
between plata o plomo—“silver or lead.” According to the head of the Mexican Federal Police, around 2010 the cartels were spending an estimated 􀀇100 million each month on bribes to police.72 By buying o􀌆 o􀌇cials—and
torturing or killing those who cannot be corrupted—the cartels have greatly undermined the e􀌆ectiveness of national government forces in general and local police in particular. This, in turn, has undermined the con􀂿dence of the
population in their government’s willingness and ability to protect them. Through these means and methods the cartels have gained a substantial degree of de facto control over many urban and rural areas across Mexico, including
major cities and large swathes of territory along the U.S.-Mexico border. In many of these crime-ridden areas the loss of con􀂿dence in the government and police has prompted the formation of vigilante militias, presenting an
additional challenge to government control.73 Meanwhile, in the “northern triangle” of Central America (the area comprising Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador through which the cartels transship almost all cocaine bound for
Mexico and the United States) the situation is even more dire. Approximately 90 percent of crimes in this area go unpunished, while in Guatemala roughly half the country’s territory is e 􀌆ectively under drug tra􀌇ckers’ control.7􀀗
Further south, similar pockets of lawlessness exist in coca-growing areas in Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia. In Colombia and along its borders with Venezuela, Ecuador, and Peru, much of the coca-growing territory
remains under the control of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC. A guerrilla organization founded in the 1960s as a Marxist-Leninist revolutionary movement dedicated to the overthrow of the Colombian
government, the FARC embraced coca growing in the 1990s as a means of funding its operations and has subsequently evolved into a hybrid mix of left-wing insurgent group and pro􀂿t-driven cartel.76 This hybrid nature has
facilitated cooperation between the FARC and ideological sympathizers like the Bolivarian Alliance, Hezbollah, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and other extremist groups77 as well as with purely criminal organizations like the
Mexican cartels. Although the FARC has been greatly weakened over the past decade and no longer poses the existential threat to the Colombian government that it once did, it remains 􀂿rmly in control of large tracts of coca-
producing jungle, mostly straddling the borders between Colombia and FARC supporters Venezuela and Ecuador. In summary, organized crime elements have exploited under-governed areas to establish zones under their de facto
control. In so doing they pose a signi􀂿cant and growing threat to regional security in general and U.S. interests in particular. As SOUTHCOM commander General Kelly recently observed: 􀀾T􀁀he proximity of the U.S. homeland to
criminally governed spaces is a vulnerability with direct implications for U.S. national security. I am also troubled by the signi􀂿cant criminal capabilities that are available 􀀾within them􀁀 to anyone—for a price. Transnational criminal
organizations have access to key facilitators who specialize in document forgery, trade-based money laundering, weapons procurement, and human smuggling, including the smuggling of special interest aliens. This criminal
expertise and the ability to move people, products, and funds are skills that can be exploited by a variety of malign actors, including terrorists.78 Hezbollah and the Bolivarian Alliance Hezbollah in Latin America 􀀱on-state entities
recognized by the U.S. as terrorist organizations also operate in the region, most notably Lebanon-based Hezbollah, an Iranian client group. Hezbollah maintains an active presence in the tri-border area (TBA) of South America—
the nexus of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay—stretching back to the 1980s. The TBA has traditionally been under-governed and is known by some as “the United 􀀱ations of crime.”79 Eight syndicate groups facilitate this activity in
South America’s so-called “Southern Cone,” overseeing legitimate businesses along with a wide range of illegal activities to include money laundering, drug and arms traf- 􀂿cking, identity theft and false identi􀂿cation documents,
counterfeiting currency and intellectual property, and smuggling. 􀀱ot surprisingly they are linked to organized crime and to non-state insurgent and terrorist groups, such as the FARC.80 Estimates are that over 􀀇12 billion in illicit
transactions are conducted per year, a sum exceeding Paraguay’s entire GDP by a substantial amount.81 Hezbollah achieved notoriety in the region in 1992 when it bombed the Israeli embassy in Argentina. This was followed with
the bombing of the AMIA Jewish community center in Buenos Aires two years later. Like many other terrorist organizations, as Hezbollah expanded it established relationships with drug cartels82 that it supports in a variety of
ways. For example, the cartels have enlisted Hezbollah, known for its tunnel construction along the Israeli border, for help in improving their tunnels along the U.S.-Mexican border. In 2008, Hezbollah helped broker a deal in which
one of Mexico’s major drug cartels, Sinaloa, sent members to Iran for weapons and explosives training via Venezuela using Venezuelan travel documents. 83 As the locus of the drug trade and other illegal cartel activities moved
north into Central America and Mexico, Hezbollah has sought to move with it with mixed success. In October 2011, Hezbollah was linked to the e􀌆orts of an Iranian-American to conspire with Iranian agents to assassinate the Saudi
ambassador to the United States. The plot involved members of the Los Zetas Mexican drug cartel.8􀀗 The would-be assassin, Mansour Arbabsiar, had established contact with his cousin, a Quds Force85 handler, Gen. Gholam
Shakuri. The plot is believed by some to be part of a wider campaign by the Quds Force and Hezbollah to embark on a campaign of violence extending beyond the Middle East to other Western targets, including those in the United
States.86 In early September 2012, Mexican authorities arrested three men suspected of operating a Hezbollah cell in the Yucatan area and Central America, including a dual U.S.-Lebanese citizen linked to a U.S.-based Hezbollah
money laundering operation. 87A few months later, in December 2012, Wassim el Abd Fadel, a suspected Hezbollah member with Paraguayan citizenship, was arrested in Paraguay. Fadel was charged with human and drug
tra􀌇cking and money laundering. Fadel reportedly deposited the proceeds of his criminal activities—ranging from 􀀇50-200,000 per transaction—into Turkish and Syrian bank accounts linked to Hezbollah. In summary, Hezbollah has
become a 􀂿xture in Central and Latin America, expanding both its activities and in􀃀uence over time. It has developed links with the increasingly powerful organized crime groups in the region, particularly the narco cartels, along
with radical insurgent groups such as the FARC and states like Venezuela who are hostile to the United States and its regional partners. Hezbollah’s principal objectives appear to be undermining U.S. in 􀃀uence in the region,
imposing costs on the United States, and generating revenue to sustain its operations in Latin America and elsewhere in the world. These objectives are shared by Iran, Hezbollah’s main state sponsor. The Bolivarian Alliance As
noted above, geographic, economic, and cultural factors have traditionally helped to prevent the emergence in Latin America of any real military rival to the United States. Although there are no traditional military threats in the
region, there are indigenous states whose actions, policies, and rhetoric challenge regional stability and U.S. security. Over the past decade, several states have come together to form the Bolivarian Alliance of the Americas (ALBA),
an organization of left-leaning Latin American regimes whose overarching purpose is to promote radical populism and socialism, foster regional integration, and reduce what they perceive as Washington’s “imperialist” influence in
the region.89 Since its founding by Hugo Chavez of Venezuela and Fidel Castro of Cuba in December 200􀀗, the Bolivarian Alliance has expanded to include Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Dominica, Ecuador, 􀀱icaragua, and Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines. Although the members of the Bolivarian Alliance are militarily weak and pose almost no traditional military threat to the United States or its allies in the region,90 they challenge American interests in
the region in other ways. First, they espouse an anti-American narrative that finds substantial support in the region and consistently oppose U.S. efforts to foster cooperation and regional economic integration.91 Second, in their
efforts to undermine the government of Colombia, which they consider to be a U.S. puppet, ALBA states provide support and sanctuaries within their borders to coca growers, drug traffickers, other criminal organizations, and the
FARC.92 Links to Hezbollah have also been detected.93 Perhaps of greatest concern, they have aligned themselves closely with Iran, inviting it and Syria to participate as “observer states” in the alliance. Other worrisome ALBA
activities involve lifting visa requirements for Iranian citizens and hosting large numbers of Iranian diplomats and commercial exchange members that some observers believe to be Iranian intelligence and paramilitary Quds Force
operatives.9􀀗 By hosting and cooperating with both foreign agents and violent non-state actors, the ALBA states have come to function as critical nodes in a network of groups hostile to the United States. A Coming Era of Proxy
Wars in the Western Hemisphere? History shows that Washington has often emphasized an indirect approach to meeting challenges to its security in Latin America. Yet the United States has not shied away from more direct,
traditional uses of force when interests and circumstances dictated, as demonstrated over the past half century by U.S. invasions of the Dominican Republic (1965), Grenada (1983), and Panama (1989) and the occupation of Haiti
(199􀀗).Yet several trends seem likely to raise the cost of such operations, perhaps to prohibitive levels. Foremost among these trends is the diffusion of precision-guided weaponry to state and non-state entities. 92 The Second
Lebanon War as “Precursor” War A precursor of this trend can be seen in the Second Lebanon War between Israel and Hezbollah.95 During the con􀃀ict, which lasted less than 􀂿ve weeks, irregular Hezbollah forces held their own
against the highly regarded Israeli Defense Force (IDF), demonstrating what is now possible for non-state entities to accomplish given the proliferation of militarily-relevant advanced technologies. Hezbollah’s militia engaged IDF
armor columns with salvos of advanced, man-portable, antitank guided missiles and other e􀌆ective anti-armor weapons (e.g. rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) with anti-armor warheads) in great numbers. When the IDF employed
its ground forces in southern Lebanon, its armored forces su􀌆ered severe losses; out of the four hundred tanks involved in the 􀂿ghting in southern Lebanon, forty-eight were hit and forty damaged.96 Hezbollah’s defensive line was
also well equipped with latest-generation thermal and low-/ no-light enhanced illumination imaging systems, while frontline units were connected to each other and higher command elements via a proprietary, 􀂿ber-optic based
communications network, making collection of communications tra􀌇c by Israeli intelligence extremely di􀌇cult. Perhaps most important, Hezbollah possessed thousands of short- and medium- range rockets, often skillfully hidden
below ground or in bunkers that made detection from overhead surveillance platforms nearly impossible. During the brief con􀃀ict Hezbollah’s forces 􀂿red some four thousand unguided rockets of various types that hit Israel.
Hezbollah’s rocket inventory enabled its forces to attack targets throughout the northern half of Israel. Over nine hundred rockets hit near or on buildings, civilian infrastructure, and industrial plants. Some two thousand homes
were destroyed, and over 􀂿fty Israelis died with several thousand more injured. The casualties would undoubtedly been greater if between 100,000 and 250,000 Israeli civilians had not 􀃀ed their homes. Haifa, Israel’s major seaport
had to be shut down, as did its oil re􀂿nery.97 Hezbollah also employed several unmanned aerial vehicles for surveillance of Israel, as well as C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles used to attack and damage an Israeli corvette. 98 The G-
RAMM Battlefield The brief war between Israel and Hezbollah suggests that future irregular forces may be well-equipped with enhanced communications, extended-range surveillance capabilities, and precision-guided rockets,
artillery, mortars and missiles (G-RAMM) 99 able to hit targets with high accuracy at ranges measured from the tens of kilometers perhaps up to a hundred kilometers or more. In projecting power against enemies equipped in this
manner and employing these kinds of tactics U.S. forces—as well as other conventional forces— will find themselves operating in a far more lethal battlefield than those in either of the Gulf wars or in stability operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq. Moreover, currently constituted conventional forces typically depend on large fixed infrastructure (e.g., military bases, logistics depots, ports, airfields, railheads, bridges) to deploy themselves and sustain
combat operations. These transportation and support hubs also serve as the nodes through which internal commerce and foreign trade moves within a country. This key, fixed infrastructure will almost certainly prove far more
difficult to defend against irregular forces armed with G-RAMM weaponry. Indeed, had Hezbollah’s “RAMM” inventory had only a small fraction of G-RAMM munitions, say 10-20 percent, it would have been able to in 􀃀ict far
greater damage than it did historically to Israeli population centers, key government facilities, military installations, and essential commercial assets such as ports, air 􀂿elds, and industrial complexes. An irregular enemy force armed
with G-RAMM capabilities in substantial numbers could seriously threaten Latin American governments as well as any U.S. (or external great power) forces and support elements attempting a traditional intervention operation.
Implications for the U.S. and Other Major Powers The preceding narrative suggests that the combat potential of irregular forces is likely to increase dramatically in the coming years. As this occurs, the cost of operating conventional
forces—especially ground forces—and defending key military support infrastructure is likely to rise substantially. Given these considerations the United States and other major powers external to the Western Hemisphere will have
strong incentives to avoid the use of conventional forms of military power, particularly large ground forces, in favor of employing irregular proxy forces to advance their interests. Moreover, the high cost and questionable bene 􀂿t
of the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq are likely to create strong domestic opposition in the United States to such operations for some time to come. This must be added to the United States’ greatly diminished 􀂿scal standing
that has led to large cuts in planned investments in defense. These factors suggest that Washington will be much less likely to engage in direct military action in Latin America in the coming years than historically has been the case.
At the same time, rivals of the United States like China and Russia may be incentivized by these trends, as well as the United States’ overwhelming military dominance in the Western Hemisphere, to avoid the direct use of force to
expand their in􀃀uence in Latin America. Instead, like some of the Bolivarian Alliance members, they appear likely to follow the path taken by the Soviet Union during the Cold War and Iran today: supporting non-state proxies to

This is not to say that Beijing, Moscow,

impose disproportionate costs on the United States and to distract Washington’s resources and attention from other parts of the world.

and Tehran would eschew future opportunities to establish bases in Latin America. As in the past, such bases
can support efforts to accomplish several important objectives. They can, for example, further insulate a Latin American regime from the threat
of direct U.S. military intervention, since Washington
would have to account for the possibility that the conflict
would lead to a direct confrontation with a more capable and potentially nuclear-armed power .

However, talks are only as effective as the US-Mexico relationship --- border security is at
play.
Stern 18 [Charles Stern, Specialist in Natural Resources Policy, 12-12-2018, Sharing the Colorado River
and the Rio Grande: Cooperation and Conflict with Mexico, Congressional Research Service,
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R45430.pdf, Chopstix]
Next Steps and Remaining and Emerging Topics As the IBWC Rio Grande working groups and modeling efforts advance, they may identify
opportunities for improving the predictability and reliability of Mexico’s water deliveries to the United States. A next step may be to assess the
extent of binational support for more proactive management of water deliveries. Some interests in the basin may want to tie advancements in
water management to advancements in the river’s water quality and ecological health. In addition to the persistent questions related to the
definition of extraordinary drought and other terms of the 1944 Water Treaty, there are unresolved questions related to Minute 234.153
Minute 234, established in 1969, includes a procedure whereby Mexico may pay a water debt in the Rio Grande using three different sources of
water. Minute 234 requires that deficit payments from these three sources be made concurrently with required deliveries in the following five-
year cycle. The United States and Mexico differ in their interpretation and implementation of Minute 234. For example, Mexico claimed that in
the event of extraordinary drought, only the deficit incurred during the 1992-1997 five-year water cycle needed to be repaid in the following
fiveyear cycle (i.e., by 2002) and that any deficit incurred during the 1997-2002 cycle could be deferred until the next five-year cycle. The United
States argued that Minute 234 required Mexico to make up the water debt incurred during the 1997-2002 cycle concurrently with the 1992-
1997 water debt. The disagreement over the interpretation of Minute 234 remains unresolved. Differences of interpretation related to Minute
234, extraordinary drought, or other matters are particularly likely to arise during dry conditions and when Mexico’s Rio Grande deliveries fall
below annual targets and five-year cycle requirements. Unconventional oil and gas development in northeastern Mexico could represent an
emerging water use in the Rio Grande basin that influences how Mexico uses and manages water in its portion of the basin. The use of water
for hydraulic fracturing as well as the disposal of wastewaters from oil and gas development may draw attention to border water quality
protections and monitoring. Outlook for Binational Water Sharing The tone and nature of binational water relations between
the United States and Mexico depend in part on the effectiveness of efforts to resolve water tensions and improve cooperative
management of shared rivers. Binational water relations and the work of the IBWC also may be shaped by the broader U.S.-
Mexico relationship. This broader relationship is determined by many issues such as trade, immigration,
and efforts to enhance border security,