Kindergarten Soldier: The Military Thought of Lawrence of Arabia

Author(s): J. A. English
Source: Military Affairs, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Jan., 1987), pp. 7-11
Published by: Society for Military History
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 HAIFA Tb DFW*gm

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"I feel a fundamentalcripplingincuriousnessabout thatthe chronologicaldevelopmentof his militarythought

our officers.Too much body and too littlehead." shouldbe of interest to practicingmilitaryprofessionals.
Notwithstanding thatLawrence'sArabcampaign was essen-
tiallya sideshowto a sideshow,a "tusselin a turnip field,"he
THE slightironyin theforegoing
expressionof concernby wrote,its aura of highadventure and glamourthrusthiminto
Lawrenceof Arabiawas thathe was physically a rather legend.Withover30 bookswritten abouthim,he remainsafter
smallishmanwitha largerthannormalhead.He was described, WinstonChurchill arguably themostrenownedEnglishman of
nonetheless, as being"incredibly tough." For two yearshe the20thcentury. His ownSevenPillarsofWisdomwas ranked
livedandfought withtheArabs;heworeArabclothes,ateArab by the latteramong"the greatestbooks ever written in the
food,and suffered Arab diseases and fleas. Thoughhe con- Englishlanguage." Whileliteraryqualityalone ensuresits
sideredhimself "nota manofaction,"he madea pointofdoing placeinthiscategory, to standas an essentially
italso continues
anything theArabscoulddo and doingitbetter.Ableto ridea accurateaccountoftheArabRevolt.Yet it is morethanepic
camelfasterthanmanyof them,he couldreputedly also run history, forhiddenwithinitspagesis a profundity of military
alongsideone thatwas movingand swingtheroughly ninefeet thought thatremainsrelevantto thisday. Lawrence'smilitary
intoitssaddleeasierthanmostothers.Becauseoffeatslikethis, leadership,moreover, has been comparedwiththatof Marl-
theArabsreadilyacceptedhimandwereprepared tofollowhim borough andNapoleon,onwhosebirthdate hewasborn.He has
to theendsoftheearth.Yet,whilehe might havesteppedfrom beenhailedas theprogenitor ofmodern warfare
guerrilla andas
thepagesofKipling,Lawrencewas morethanan imperial hero; themasterfromwhomOrde Wingateand Lord Wavelldrew
hewas also a prophet,whosemessagewasthatwarwas notonly lessonsofstrategy and tactics;themanto whom,according to
anaffairoffleshandblood,butoneofideas.1 Itis forthisreason Sir Basil LiddellHart,thewidespread use ofguerrilla warfare
JANUARY 1987 7

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fromWorldWarII onwardscanbe indirectly Byhis
attributed.2 threatened. In January1917,therefore, Lawrenceand Feisal
ownadmission, however,Lawrence"was unlikea soldier"and turned theirbacksonMecca andRabeghandmarched 200miles
an Oxfordintellectual
'3; he was essentially
"hated soldiering' northvia Yenboto captureWejh,fromwheretheythought they
who remained"obduratelyand ofteninfuriatingly civilianbe- couldbettercutTurkishrailcommunications. Theirattention,
neathhis uniforms."4 clearly,remainedfixedon Medinaand on how to renderit
vulnerableto captureby severingits umbilicalcord, the
IN a trulyprofessionalmilitarysense, however,Lawrence Damascus-Medina believedthatthe
railroad.It was generally
was muchinadvanceofmostregularofficers. Andthiswas fallof Medinawas a necessarypreliminary pro-
to thefurther
due to thedepthand breadthofhispersonallearning.
directly gressof theArabRevolt.7In thepracticaldomainofwarfare,
hebegantoreadwhathe subsequently
Aroundtheage offifteen Lawrencewas obviouslystilla neophyte. Thiswas to changein
describedas "the usual schoolboy stuff":Creasy'sFifteen thecourseof theHejaz campaign.
Decisive Battles of the World; Napier's Historyof the War in While engaged in making "every effort ... to capture
thePeninsula; Coxe's Marlborough;Mahan's Influenceof Sea- Medina,"Lawrencefellpainfully illfora ten-dayperiodat Abu
Power Upon History;and Henderson's Stonewall Jackson (the Markha.Claimingthat"as usual in such circumstances" his
last,accordingto LiddellHart,"the boundsof manya Staff mindclearedand his sensessharpened, he beganseriouslyto
Collegestudent'shorizon").Mixedwiththese,Lawrenceread reviewand contemplate the natureand course of the Arab
manytechnicaltreatisesby scholarsof antiquity such as the Revolt. It quicklydawnedon himthatthe Hejaz War had
RomanVegetiusand the ByzantineProcopius,military sec- actuallybeen won withthecaptureof Wejh,butthatno one
retaryto Belisarius,whopracticed avoidanceofpitchedbattles. "had had witto see it":8
Beforeand duringhis stayat Oxford,Lawrencealso travelled
fivetimesto Franceto studycastlesandbattlefields. He visited We werein occupationof 99 percentof theHejaz. The
Crecy,Agincourt,Rocroi, Malplaquet,Valmy,Sedan, and Turkswerewelcometo the otherfraction tillpeace or
fieldsof battle.He studiedthe doomsday . . . This part of the war was over, so why
severalotherFranco-Prussian botheraboutMedina?It was no base forus likeRabegh,
tacticsof Henryof Navarreand triedto re-fight thewholeof no threatto theTurkslike Wejh:just a blindalleyfor
Marlborough's wars.In pursuitofinterests thatwereprimarily both. The Turkssat in it on the defensive,immobile,
medieval,he also claimedto havevisited"every12thCentury eatingforfoodthetransport animalswhichwereto have
castleinFrance,England,andWales,andwentelaborately into movedthemto Mecca,butforwhichtherewas nopasture
siegemanoeuvres...." Increasingly, theCrusadesbecamethe lines.Theywereharmlesssitting
in theirnowrestricted
subjectof his special interest,ultimatelyprompting his 1909 there;if we took themprisonertheycost us foodand
four-month touroftheLevantto studyCrusadercastles.On his guardsin Egypt;ifwe drovethemnorthward intoSyria,
return he submitted histhesison "The Military Architectureof theywouldjoin themainArmyblockingus in Sinai.9
theCrusades,"whicharguedthattheCrusaders hadtakentothe
of military that
architecture The movementto Wejh, in fact,modulatedthe enemy's
MiddleEast thoseveryprinciples action"like a pendulum";ratherthanenterRabeghtheTurks
certainscholarshad previously claimedtheCrusadersbrought
(whowerealmostthere)fellback to Medina.Theretheysplit
fromtheMiddleEast.5 theirforces:one halfentrenched aboutthecity;theotherdis-
Lawrence'sOxfordcuriosityeventually took himpast the
persedthroughout thelengthoftheHejaz railwayto protectit
tacticalcampaignsof Hannibal,Belisarius,and Napoleonto fromArabirregular action.Lawrencecouldnowsee thateven
"Clausewitzand his school,to Caemmerer and Moltke,Goltz
to cut therailwaywouldbe folly;the "ideal was to keephis
and the recent[post-1870] Frenchmen,"all of whose books railway justworking, butonlyjust,withthemaximum loss and
seemedto himto be "very partial" or "one-sided." After discomfort. " 10
lookingat Jominiand Willisen,he discovered"broaderprin- Not surprisingly, Lawrencebeganto acceptthatitwas pos-
ciples" in Guibert,Bourcet,de Saxe, and 18th-century think-
so much sible to followthe directionof de Saxe and attainvictory
ers.Clausewitz,however,provedtobe "intellectually withoutbattle.He postulated,moreover,thatbecause Arab
themasterofthemandhisbookso logicalandfascinating," that
andcame irregulars constituted no organizedforce,a "TurkishFoch"
Lawrence"unconsciously ... acceptedhisfinality"
couldnotreallyhavean aim.It appearedto him,consequently,
"to believe in him." Thus it was thathe also came to be thatthe Fochianideal represented but one highly"extermi-
"obsessed by the dictumof Foch" thatthe aim in modem native" varietyof war, "no moreabsolutethananother."
"absolute"warwas to seek "the destruction oftheorganized all sortsof
Reminding himselfthat"Clausewitzenumerated
forcesoftheenemybytheoneprocess- battle."To thispoint, war ... personalwars,joint-proxy duels,fordynasticreasons
ofcourse,Lawrence'sconcernscentred mainly on theabstract, thatthe
... commercial wars,fortradeobjects,"he ventured
"the theoryand philosophyof warfareespeciallyfromthe Arab aim "was geographical, to extrudethe Turksfromall
metaphysical side." Withthe outbreakof theArabRevoltin Arab-speaking lands." In accomplishing thisaim,Turksmight
June1916,theywouldbecomemoreconcrete.He wouldfind be killed,fortheyweredislikedverymuch,butthekillingof
himselfas eminencegriseto EmirFeisal "compelledsuddenly Turksinitselfwouldneverbe anexcuseoraim.Iftheywouldgo
to action, to find an immediateequation between . . . book- theArabRevoltwouldend;ifnot,bloodwouldbe shed
quietly,
readingand ... [tactical] movements.''6 drive themout,butas littleas possible.II
to
The Revoltbegan withabortiveattacksby inexperienced
Arab tribesmen on Turkishgarrisonsin Medinaand Mecca.
Whilepoor road communications shortlyforcedtheTurksto HAVING generally determined thepropercourseoftheArab
abandonMecca,theychoseto dispatchan expeditionary force Revolt,Lawrenceproceededto juxtapose "the whole
to Medina,whichwas linkedbyrailto themainTurkishArmy houseofwarin itsstructural aspect,whichwas strategy, inits
in Syria.Thisforcesubsequently beganto advanceon Mecca arrangements, whichweretactics,and in the sentiment of its
and theRed Sea portof Rabegh,consideredby manyBritish inhabitants, whichwas psychology."The firstconfusionhe
officersto be thekeyto Mecca. The actualdefenceofRabegh, suspectedwas a seemingly falseantithesisbetweenstrategy and
however,was thought to dependlargelyon theavailabilityof tactics.To Lawrence,thesewere "onlypointsof viewfrom
regulartroopsactingin concertwiththe Red Sea Fleet. Un- whichto ponderthe elementsof war." Like J.F.C. Fuller,
fortunately, thesewerenotforthcoming number, Lawrenceagreedtherewerethreeelements,buthe declared
in sufficient
and whenthe Turksroughlysweptaside Feisal's defending themto be the Algebraicalelementof things,the Biological
Arab irregulars deployedin whatLawrencehad erroneously elementof lives,and thePsychological elementof ideas. The
assessedas "impregnable" hills,bothRabeghandYenbowere firstelement, orhecasticsas Lawrencedelighted interming it,

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appearedto be purelyscientific,subjectto thelaws of math- LawrenceconcludedthattheAlgebraical elementtranslated
ematics,devoid of humanity, and essentiallyformulable. It intotermsofArabia"fittedlikea glove." Bionomics,in turn,
dealtwithknowninvariables, fixedconditions,space andtime, determined the tacticalapproachmostappropriate forArab
inorganicthingslike hills and climatesand railways,with tribesmen.Battlesin Arabiawere considereda mistake,the
mankind in massestoo greatforindividual varietyassistedby onlydirectbenefitemanating fromtheamountof ammunition
mechanicalmeans. In the Arab case, thisaspect meantfo- firedoffbytheenemy.Theyseemedto Lawrence"impositions
cussingonhowtheTurkswoulddefendtheareastobe liberated. on the side whichbelieveditselfweaker,hazardsmade un-
In Lawrence'sview, it wouldno doubttake the formof "a avoidableeitherbylackoflandroomorbytheneedtodefenda
trenchline across the bottomif we came like an armywith materialproperty dearerthanthelivesof soldiers."Thiswas
banners."But,he reasoned, hisrefinement ofde Saxe, to whom"irrational battleswerethe
refugeoffools."Clearly,theArabslackedhitting power,butas
... suppose we were an influence... an idea, a thing theyhad no material to lose, theyhadnothingreallyto defend.
invulnerable,intangible, withoutfrontor back, drifting Theirstrength lay in speedand time,in bullybeefratherthan
aboutlikea gas? Armieswerelikeplants,immobile as a gunpowder. 17
whole,firm-rooted, nourished throughlongstemsto the
head. We mightbe a vapour,blowingwherewe listed.
Ourkingdoms layin each man'smind,andas we wanted A CCORDING to LiddellHart,Lawrence"was moredeeply
nothing materialtoliveon,so perhapswe offerednothing steepedinknowledge ofwarthananyothergeneralofthe
materialto thekilling.It seemeda regularsoldiermight [Great]war." He was also, in the assessmentof Brigadier
be helplesswithout a target.He wouldownthegroundhe ShelfordBidwell,able to say "as muchin one paragraphas
sat on, and whathe couldpoke his rifleat.12 Clausewitzsays in a chapter.""8But if Lawrence's highly
intellectualapproachenabledhimto masterstrategy, his tact-
Lawrenceultimately appreciated thattheTurkswouldrequire ical skillwas foundedupon practicalexperienceand an im-
roughly 600,000mentosubjugate Arabterritory; as theyhadbut pressiveabilityto appreciatea situationlogically.Whenever he
100,000troops available, however,the process would be "took a decisionor adoptedan alternative," it was onlyafter
"messyand slow,likeeatingsoup witha knife." 13 "studying everyrelevant- and manyan irrelevant - factor.
Lawrence'ssecondelement, whichhe calledbionomics, had Arabtribalstructure, religion,social customs,language,and
to do with"the breakingpoint,lifeand death,or less finally, appetites,as wellas geography, wereall at his "finger-ends.A19
wearandtear." In hisopinion,Foch andotherphilosophers of He also hadan excellenteyeforground.He quicklypointedout,
warhadmadean artofitandelevatedoneaspect,theshedding forexample,thatan attempt to takeAkabafromtheseaward
ofblood,as thepriceofvictory. It was "humanity inbattle,"a would disgorgeattackingforcesonto a beach where they
leaveningof "sensitive and illogical" variability,against "wouldbe as unfavourably placedas on ... Gallipoli... [and]
which"generalsguardedthemselvesby the device of a re- under observationand gun-firefromcoastal . . . granitehills,
serve."Itwas notthe"nine-tenths oftactics... certainenough thousandsof feethigh,. . . impracticableforheavy troops: the
to be teachablein schools,"butratherthe "irrational tenth" passes through thembeingformidable defiles,verycostlyto
thatcouldbe "felt"mainly byinstinct andremained foreverthe senseLawrence's
assaultor to cover."20One can additionally
testofgenerals.Bionomicswas notlimitedto humanity, how- feel forgroundfromthe following topographicaldescription
ever,andcarriedoverintomaterial. In Lawrence'sopinion,the thebattleof Tafileh:
relatedto his greatestvictory,
keywas to attack,nottheTurkishArmybutitsmaterials; the
destructionofa Turkishbridgeor railway,machineor gun,or The road dippedintoa groveoffig-trees, knotsof blue
cacheofhighexplosivewasfarmoreprofitable thanthedeathof snakyboughs;bare,as theywouldbe longaftertherestof
a Turkishsoldier.In theArabArmy,on theotherhand,mate- naturewas growngreen.Thenceit turnedeastward,to
rials were easier to replace than casualties.This naturally windlengthilyinthevalleyto thecrest.I leftit,climbing
dictated a "'war of detachment"in which attacks were straightup the cliffs.... [This] ... shortenedmy time
launched,not necessarilyagainstenemyweaknessesor even appreciably,andverysoon,at thetop,I founda levelbit,
theplateau.
and thena last ridgeoverlooking
strengths,but,instead,againsthis mosttacticallyaccessible bank,withByzantinefoundations
Thislast straight in
material.Therethus"developedan unconscioushabitofnever it, seemedveryproperfora reserveor ultimate line of
engagingtheenemyat all."14 The Turkishsoldierwas rarely defenceforTafileh.To be sure,we hadno reserveas yet
givena target. ... but ... here was theirplace....
Borrowinga word fromXenophon'sAnabasis, Lawrence was abouttwo
Thetinyplain[ofthecomingbattlefield]
describedhisthirdor Psychological elementas diathetics.The milesacross,boundedby low greenridges,and roughly
scopeofdiathetics was unbounded; itencompassed propaganda withmyreserveridgeas base.21
triangular,
and the motivation and conditioning of one's own soldiersin
groupsand as individuals.Essentially,it dealtwith"uncon- Infact,onecoulddrawa parallelbetweenLawrence'smasterful
with-subjects
trollables, incapableofdirectcommand."Begin- descriptionsofgroundinSeven Pillars of Wisdomanda soldier
ningwithhis own troopsLawrenceplaced diatheticsin per- trainingforthesnipertradedrawing panoramas.The firstuses
spectiveas follows: words;thesecond,sketches.Bothare worksof art.
As Lawrencesaw it,strategy was "eternal,andthesameand
We had to arrangetheirmindsin orderofbattle,just as true,"buttacticswere"the ever-changing languagesthrough
carefullyand as formally
as otherofficers
arrangedtheir whichitspeaks." Whilea generalcouldlearnfrom"Belisarius
bodies:notonlyourownmen'sminds,thoughthemfirst: as fromHaig," soldierscouldnot- theyhad "to knowtheir
themindsoftheenemy,so faras we couldreachthem:and means."22ThatLawrenceknewhis meanstherecan be little
themindof thenationsupporting
thirdly, us behindthe
and themindofthehostilenationwaitingthe
firing-line, doubt.He was wellacquaintedwiththeuse ofdemolitions and
verdict,and theneutralslookingon.-" mines,andhe tooka keeninterest inweaponry. Whilerejecting
massesofsteel,generally
bayonetsas "unintelligent fataltothe
In Lawrence'sview,the diathethicwas "more thanhalfthe foolbehindthem,"he embracedthelightautomatic rifle.Ma-
command."He saw war as notjust a matterof weaponsand chinegunsproper,exceptwhenmounted inarmoured vehicles,
bloodshedbutofideasandintellect.
In theArabRevoltregular weretoo heavyforthe"tempi"ofhisbattles;automatics such
forceswereso scarcethat"irregularscouldnotlet themeta- as theLewis lightmachinegunor Hotchkiss(moreresistant to
physicalweaponrustunused."The effectivenessof theArab mudandsand)werehispreference. Atonepointhisbodyguard
armywas based on thepersonaleffectiveness
oftheindividual of48menpossessed21automatics. Manifesting a presciencefar
fighter.
16 inadvanceofhisera,he also saidthatwerehetogaincontrol of
JANUARY 1987 9

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a factory thatmadeHotchkissguns,he wouldhavethemsuper- notedthatGeneralLu Cheng-ts'ao,commander oftheCentral
sede therifle.Finaltestament to Lawrence'stacticalaucumen, Hopei Communist had a copy of Seven Pillarsof
guerrillas,
however,is thathe was ultimately able to coordinate combined Wisdomat hiselbow.The generalreputedly statedat thetime
operations of camelry,armouredcars,and aeroplanes.23 commanders
thathe andotherguerrilla consideredittobe "one
WhenLawrencepublished"The Evolutionof a Revolt"in of the standardreferencebooks on strategy."Thereis also
thefirstissueoftheArmyQuarterly inOctober1920,itexerteda reasonto believethat,evenmorethanSun Tzu, Lawrencehas
profound and seductiveinfluence uponLiddellHart,whowas formany years "been discreetlyplagiarizedby . . . Mao Tse-
alreadydisillusioned by the seemingsenselessattrition of the tung,and his cohorts.""8
GreatWar.Thoughhe wouldlaterrecordin hisMemoirsthat WhatLawrencereallydid,however,was notdevisea pre-
theyhadbut"a briefexchangeofletters in 1921about. .. [this] scriptionformodemguerrilla warfare;his methodwas essen-
reflective article,"he had by 1934publisheda detailedbiog- to thecompartmentalization
tiallyantithetic ofwar.Instead,he
raphyof Lawrence.In it he debunkedClausewitzand linked lookedatthewholeofwarfare toconfirmthestrategical-tactical
Lawrenceto de Saxe, who always"kepthis mindon theul- coursesof actionhe adaptedto theArabianscene. To Law-
timateaim of war, to whichbattleis onlya means." Here, rence,warwas "antinomian" - subjectto rules,perhaps,but
rudely,can be seentherootsofthe"IndirectApproach,"that certainlynotlaws- andinaccordwithde Saxe's conception of
pervasivephilosophy ofwardevelopedlaterat somelengthand waras "obscureandimperfect." FromClausewitzhealsoknew
in reasonablyspecifictermsby LiddellHarthimself.Essen- that"two wars seemedseldomalike," and thatoften"the
tially,it reiteratedthe same messageas "The Evolutionof a partiesdid notknowtheiraimandblundered tillthemarchof
Revolt" - the generalavoidanceof pitchedbattles,the in- eventstookcontrol."He thusmobilizedhis intellect to com-
fluenceofideas,theuse ofindirect pressures,and thevalueof pensateforinferior military He was creativerather
strength.
small,highlymobileforcesof intensefirepower. To Shelford thanmethodical in his approach,and he deliberatelyadopted
Bidwell,LiddellHartwas "a synthesizer as muchas an orig- thetacticsoftheweak.Had be beena Turk,hewoulddoubtless
inator";he was "themedium, buttheghostwas Lawrence."24 havereactedquitedifferently, thoughprobably notlessbrillian-
In thisregard,ofcourse,itis significant to recallLiddellHart's tly."We kindergarten soldiers,"hewrote,"werebeginning our
comment thatofall peoplehe hadknownpersonally, including artofwarintheatmosphere ofthetwentieth century,receiving
WinstonChurchill, he "wouldrateT.E. Lawrenceand David ourweaponswithout prejudice.To theregularofficer,withthe
LloydGeorgethemostinteresting and gifted.'
'25 traditionoffortygenerationsofservicebehindhim,theantique
It was worthfurther notation,moreover, thatin 1927Law- armswerethemostfavoured."Not surprisingly, this"kinder-
rencewas invitedby LiddellHart,thenmilitary editorto the gartensoldier"strongly recommended that"new soldiers. ..
Encyclopaedia Britannica, to write an article on "guerilla readand markand learnthingsoutsidedrillmanualsand tact-
warfare." The latter,"rememberingthatarticleof his .. . felt ical diagrams,"forhe knewmuchbetterthanmostthat,"with
thatno one was so wellfittedto deal withthe subject."For 2,000yearsof examplesbehindus we have no excuse,when
whateverreason,Lawrencewas unableto producesuch an fighting,fornotfighting well."29
article,buthe did offersomeextremely comment.
significant
Statingthathe onlylimited warfare"
whathe saidto "irregular
to "provoke . . . soldiers to battle on my own ground," he REFERENCES
1. PhillipKnightley and ColinSimpson,TheSecretLivesof
venturedthat"for 'irregularwar' you could write'war of Lawrenceof Arabia (New York: McGraw-Hill,1970),9, 89;
movement' innearlyeveryplace,andfindtheargument fitted
as B.H. LiddellHart,T.E. Lawrence(London:Jonathan Cape,
well or ill as it did." In short,the philosophicalsubstance 1934),25-26;Shelford Bidwell,ModernWarfare(London:Al-
Lawrencegave to his methodswas intendedto have more len Lane, 1973), 197; and T.E. Lawrence,Seven Pillars of
universalapplication.He was, afterall, one of thefewwho Wisdom(London:Jonathan Cape, 1940),580.
reallyknewhisClausewitzand perceivedthatthereweresev- 2. SecretLives, 1, 87-88,260;RobertGravesandB.H. Lid-
eral "varieties"of war. His majorcriticism of thegreatPru- dell Hart, T.E. Lawrence to his Biographers(London: Cassell,
ssiantheorist was thatthe"logicalsystemof Clausewitz. . . Meyers,The WoundedSpirit(London:
1963),49; and Jeffrey
leadsastrayhisdisciples- thoseofthem,at least,whowould MartinBrian& O'Keffe,1973),22, 28,94-95.
3. Seven Pillars, 117. Chapter 33 of Seven Pillars is based
ratherfightwiththeirarmsthanwiththeirlegs." Quiteobvi- almostcompletelyonLawrence's"The Evolutionofa Revolt,"
ously, Lawrence balanced Clausewitzwithde Saxe, who ArmyQuarterly,1 (October 1920), 55-69.
warnedof theperilsof theblind,unthinking adoptionof mili- 4. JamesMorris,Farewellthe Trumpets (Bungay,Suffolk:
tarymaxims.26 comment
In thiscontext,thefollowing ofLaw- Penguin,1980),255.
renceto LiddellHartis mostapt: 5. T.E. Lawrence, 21, 164-166;Secret Lives, 25-28;Biogra-
phers, 50; and see also RichardAldington,Lawrence ofArabia
of the"hit" schoolbringson an attackof the
A surfeit (London: Collins, 1955), 120-122.Lawrence also reputedly
"run"method;andthenthependulum swingsback.You, studiedthecampaignsof Mohammed,Saladin,and Egyptian
at prestnt,are trying(withverylittlehelp fromthose generalIbrahimPasha. WoundedSpirit,17.
toput
whosebusinessitis to thinkupontheirprofession) 6. SecretLives, 25-28;Seven Pillars, 117, 193-194;T.E. Law-
thebalancestraightaftertheorgyofthelatewar.When rence,165-166;and "The Evolutionofa Revolt,"ArmyQuar-
you succeed . . . your sheep will pass your bounds of by
terly,1 (October1920),58. Lawrencewas greatlyaffected
and have to be chiviedback by some later
discretion, Belisarius,partsof whose campaignshe translatedfromthe
Back and forward
strategist. we go.27 historiesofProcopius,whichfocuson them.Biographers,130.
influenced
He also appearsto have been strongly by Lt-Gen.
IT would appear,then,thatLawrence'sdepthof military Rudolphvon Caemmerer,who wroteThe Developmentof Stra-
tegicalScience in whichwere coveredJomini,Clausewitz,
thoughtmakeshimmorethanjust the fatherof modem
warfare.The chargethatLiddellHart'stheoryofthe
guerrilla Wilhelmvon Willisen(juniorto Clausewitzby tenyearsand
IndirectApproachfoundersbecause it is based on a limited authorofTheory ofGreatWar),MoltketheElder,andColmar
von der Goltz (who wrotetheConductof War and The Nation in
of irregular
interpretation warfareand appliedto regularwar- Arms). See Rudolph von Gaemmerer, The Development of
fare,mustbe dismissedaccordingly. This is not to say, of Science(London:HughRees, 1905).ComteJacques
Strategical
course,thatLawrenceis undeserving of beingcalled the in- de Guibert wrote Essai general de tacticque (Liege,
tellectualapostleoftheguerrilla exploitation
and deliberate of de Bourcetwas an expertinmountain
1775).Pierre and
warfare
insurgency phenomena.Thereis indeedreasonablyhardevi- advocatedsmallermobilegroupingsof divisionalsize.
dence to indicatethatthe philosophically inclinedChinese 7. Secret Lives, 57-58; John E. Mack, A Prince of our
tookhis ideas seriously.As earlyas 1936a Westernobserver Disorder(Boston: Little,Brown, 1976), 113, 129, 148-151;

10 MILITARYAFFAIRS

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"Evolution," 55-57; and Col. A.P. Wavell, The Palestine Cam- 23. Ibid., 130 (Graves);Memoirs,348; Seven Pillars,346;
paigns(London:Constable,1933),54. and Wavell,203.
8. "Evolution,"57; and Seven Pillars, 194-195.Lawrence 24. Bidwell, 194-199;Memoirs,84; and T.E. Lawrence,
suffered fromfever,dysentry, and boils at Abu Markha,but 160-171.
meditated whenit grew"too hotfordreamlessdozing." See 25. Memoirs,339.
also DesmondStewart,T.E. Lawrence(New York:Harper& 26. Ibid., 84-85;and T.E. Lawrence,160-161.
Row, 1977),245. 27. Memoirs,85.
9. "Evolution,"58. 28. JamesMrazek,TheArtof Winning Wars(London:Leo
10. Ibid., 57; SevenPillars,232; and Wavell,55, 203. Cooper,1968),126-133,137-141;WoundedSpirit,29; Bidwell,
11. "Evolution,"58-59;and Seven Pillars, 195-196."The 47; and Lt. Col. FrederickWilkins,"GuerrillaWarfare,"5-7,
TurkishArmywas an accident,nota target." and WalterD. Jacobs,"Mao Tse-tungas a Guerrilla- A
12. "Evolution,"59-60;andSevenPillars,197-198.Bidwell Second Look," 167-168,bothin FranklinMark,ed., Modern
statesLawrenceborrowed the"gas" metaphor fromClausewitz GuerrillaWarfare(Glencoe:Free Press, 1962).
(see MichaelHowardandPeterParet,eds.,On War(Princeton: 29. SevenPillars, 196,200-201;"Evolution,"61; and Let-
University Press,1976),481),butitwouldappearhegotitfrom ters,769.
John3:8. WoundedSpirit, 148.
13. SevenPillars,198.
14. Ibid., 198-200;and "Evolution,"60-61.
15. "Evolution,"61-62;and Seven Pillars, 200-201.Law- LtCol,J.A.Englishhas been a
rencewas obviously heavilyinfluencedbyClausewitz'sidea of memberoftheDirecting Staffat
"friction,"countlessminorinstancesand individualscom- the Canadian Land Forces
biningtolowerthegenerallevelofperformance. On War,119.
16. Seven Pillars, 201, 348. Command and Staff College
17. Ibid., 200-202. since July1985. A graduateof
18. Bidwell,197. the Royal MilitaryCollege of
19. David Garnett,ed., The Letters of T.E. Lawrence (Lon- Canada, he receivedhis MA in
don:Jonathan Cape, 1938),769; B.H. LiddellHart,MemoirsI HistoryfromDuke University
(London:Cassell, 1965),348; and WoundedSpirit,22. and his MAin WarStudiesfrom
20. Seven Pillars, 173. Lawrence's epic 600-mileride theRoyalMilitaryCollege.He is
throughthedesertto takeAkabaearnedforhima recommend- theauthorofOn Infantry (Prae-
ationforthe VictoriaCross. It was an extremely important ger,1985)and principaleditorof
victoryfortheBritishat thistime,forinMarchandApril1917,
theyhadsuffered twodisastrous defeatsunderthecommandof The Mechanized Battlefield:A
GeneralArchibald Murray(to be replacedbyGeneralEdmund Tactical Analysis (Pergamon-
Allenby)andhad lost 10,000men.WoundedSpirit,22-23;and Brassey's1985).Thisarticlewas
Secret Lives, 91. accepted for publication in
21. SevenPillars,486-487.Lawrencewas awardedtheDSO March1986.
at Tafileh.Prince,158.
forhis leadership
22. Biographers, 132.

JANUARY 1987 11

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