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 Tomasz Kamiński – University of Łódź, Faculty of International and Political Studies
Department of East Asian Studies, 90-131 Łódź Poland, 59a Narutowicza St.

INITIATING EDITOR
Agnieszka Kałowska

REVIEWER
Ewa Trojnar

TYPESETTING
AGENT PR

CORRECTION
Aneta Tkaczyk

TECHNICAL EDITOR
Leonora Wojciechowska

COVER DESIGN
Katarzyna Turkowska

Cover Image: © Depositphotos.com/sepavone

The Open Access version of this book has been made available under a Creative Commons
Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license (CC BY-NC-ND)

© Copyright by Authors, Łódź 2017

© Copyright for this edition by Uniwersytet Łódzki, Łódź 2017

Published by Łódź University Press

First edition. W.07686.16.0.K

Publisher’s sheets 14.0; printing sheets 14.5

ISBN 978-83-8088-758-9
e-ISBN 978-83-8088-759-6
http://doi.org/10.18778/8088-758-9

Łódź University Press

90-131 Łódź, 8 Lindleya St.
www.wydawnictwo.uni.lodz.pl
e-mail: [email protected]
tel. (42) 665 58 63

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 Table of Contents

Introduction...................................................................................................... 7

Internal and regional outlook

Dmitry V. Kuznetsov, The Chinese Nationalism and Foreign Policy Component
in Mass Consciousness in China............................................................... 13
Agnieszka Batko, Womenomics: The Assumptions and Effects of Abenomics’
Third Arrow.............................................................................................. 39
Karol Żakowski, Failed Attempts at Sino-Japanese Security Cooperation.......... 55
Kahraman Süvari, North Korea’s Fourth Nuclear Test...................................... 71
Péter Klemensits, Defence Reform and Military Modernization in the
Philippines in the perspective of the South China Sea Conflict................. 87

Global outlook
Dorota Roszkowska Emilia Matlaszek, Europe–China economic cooperation
after official Belt and Road initiative announcement................................. 107
Gu Hongfei, Opportunities Amidst Uncertainties. China–EU Security
Cooperation in the context of the ‘One Belt One Road’ initiative.............. 123
Lukáš Laš, Bridging the Visegrad Group and East Asia Through Cooperation..... 137
David A. Jones, Cooperation or Confrontation? Assessing the American ‘Pivot’
to Asia in Context – Is It a Western ‘Neo-Liberealism’ Response to China’s
New ‘Open Door’ Approach to Europe?..................................................... 155
Kamer Kasım, The impact of the US Rebalancing Policy toward Asia Pacific on
International Relations in the region......................................................... 175
Mateusz Smolaga, Asian Development Bank and Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank – is cooperation possible?............................................... 191
Joanna Wardęga, Constructing a desired image of China: Picture of territorial
controversies in Chinese language textbooks............................................... 215

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Introduction

Controversies, sometimes bitter controversies, are an inherent

element of international relations. Conflicting interests, different values,
overlapping spheres of influences… all this make dispute settlement
mechanisms crucial elements of international system. Searching
for cooperation mechanisms that may help in overcoming existing
controversies in Asia is the main topic of this monograph.
The monograph is based on the case studies in which authors analyse
disagreements as well as collaborations between different actors in Asia.
They are chosen different point of views that might be roughly divided
into two groups. The first set of authors tries to look at regional or even
internal problems that have international impact. The second group gives
an outlook on the controversies linked to rising global presence of Asian
countries, in particular China.
The opening chapter, written by Russian scholar Dmitry Kuznetsov,
describes the phenomenon of rising Chinese nationalism in the context
of the foreign relations. This process is, at least partially, controlled by
the PRC authorities, who try to use it for their political purposes. In
particular growing anti-American and anti-Japanese sentiments might be
instrumentally used by the Chinese Communist Party.
The second chapter, by Agnieszka Batko, presents the Japanese policy
of ‘Womenomics’. This idea, part of the famous ‘Abenomics’, concentrates
on persuading Japanese women to act more actively on the job market and
seek for the opportunities to advance their careers. This highly controversial
idea poses a series of evident challenges to the traditional concept of the role
of women in Japanese society. However, what is even more important, it is
a crucial part of Abe’s reform package and its success or failure will have the
consequences for Japanese position in the region and in the world.
In the next chapter Karol Żakowski analyses the reasons of failure
in establishing a stable framework for Sino-Japanese security cooperation
after the end of Cold War. The author argues that both countries have
been unable to develop a full-fledged cooperation in the security field
due to history problems, contrasting visions of regional security system,
territorial disputes and rivalry for leadership in East Asia.

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 8 Introduction

Kahraman Süvari examines North Korea’s January 2016 nuclear test.

He put it in historical perspective and also analyses the possible reasons
behind the North Korean aggressive behaviour. In this chapter it is argued
that North Korea’s leadership carried out the fourth nuclear test mainly
because it wants to strengthen its nuclear deterrent against the perceived
regional threats.
The last chapter in this part of the book is dedicated to the South
China Sea conflict, one of the most important international disputes in the
regions. Hungarian analyst Péter Klemensits examines the main aspects of
the defence reforms in the Philippines. He argues that the changes of the
international and domestic security environment force the government
to upgrade the armed forces capabilities and achieve a minimum credible
defence posture.
The global outlook starts with study of the flagship Chinese initiative
One Belt One Road (OBOR), written by Dorota Roszkowska and Emilia
Radkiewicz. They analyse this programme, or maybe better strategy, in the
context of the EU–China relations. The controversial Chinese initiative
is undoubtedly a priority in Beijing’s foreign policy but the Europeans are
reluctant or at least indecisive.
In the next chapter young Chinese researcher Gu Hongfei analyse also
OBOR but in the context of EU–China security relations He identifies the
major challenges and discusses opportunities that might be created by
the implementation of Chinese grand plan. He predicts that, however
controversial OBOR might be in Europe, it will lead to closer cooperation
between the EU and China in the field of security.
Tightened cooperation in economic sphere between Europe and China is
presented in the chapter written by Lukáš Laš. On the basis of Visegrad Four
(V4) trade relations with East Asian partners he shows that not only China
matters but also Japan and other countries from the region. He also advocates
for building a particular ‘Visegrad Brand’ in Asia as a part of economic
diplomacy. That might be helpful for V4 actors (countries, regions, cities and
companies) to implement their business plans in East Asia.
The next three chapters are dedicated to China–US rivalry. David
Jones assesses the American ‘Pivot’ to Asia arguing that “Neo-realist
security traditions appear to have been blurred with neo-liberal trade
temptations, the result forming a ‘neo-liberealism’ paradigm that could
work if it contained the best ingredients of each.” He predicts that only
by focusing on opportunities for Sino-American cooperation the much
wanted military de-escalation might happen.

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His position is strengthened by Kamer Kasım that also analyses

consequences of America’s rebalancing towards Asia. He stressed that
further economic integration and continuation of regional economic
growth will help the rebalancing strategy and to improve relations between
China, the US, and its allies.
Mateusz Smolaga approaches the topic of US–China confrontation
from a different perspective. He makes comparative analyses of the
Asian Development Bank (ADB) (Japan-led multilateral institution with
strong American presence) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
(AIIB) (Chinese-led multilateral institution with no US membership).
He identifies and explains possible scenarios of ADB-AIIB relationship,
trying to predict if we should anticipate strong rivalry between these two
institutions, as political realism would suggest, or will the ADB and the
AIIB find a way to offer their best to the Asia-Pacific countries without any
major conflict?
In the last chapter Joanna Wardęga confronts the controversies
arousing around Confucius Institutes. They are seen as government-
backed institutions present on Western universities and use as instruments
of Chinese soft power. She analyses one particular aspect of language
education in the Confucius Institutes: how the Chinese territory is shown
to the students of the Chinese language in the textbooks. Contrary to her
hypothesis it turns out that the names associated with controversy, such
as Tibet, Taiwan, and Xinjiang, are not particularly emphasized in the
analysed textbooks.
Obviously the list of controversies in the region is much longer but
this book does not pretend to present the comprehensive catalogue. We
rather aim in this monograph, based on case-studies, to illustrate the
complexity of controversies in Asia and different paths to overcome them.

TOMASZ KAMIŃSKI, Ph.D. in humanities, assistant professor at

the Faculty of International and Political Studies, University of Lodz.
His research activities are concentrated mainly on various aspects of the
EU–China relations, the Sovereign Wealth Funds and regional/local
authorities who develop paradiplomatical relations with foreign partners.
He is also an active blogger and regular contributor to the magazine
Liberté!, leading Polish political quarterly. His publications can be find
at academia.edu or researchgate.net. Contact at [email protected].

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Dmitry V. Kuznetsov
(Blagoveshchensk State Pedagogical University)

The Chinese Nationalism

and Foreign Policy Component
in Mass Consciousness in China

Abstract

The research describes the phenomenon of Chinese nationalism in the context

of the foreign policy component of the mass consciousness of residents in China.
The ideas of Chinese nationalism become more popular both on the individual
level and the level of mass consciousness. This is according to opinion polls, data
from the media, as well as views widely spread among the intellectual elite.
Between 2000–2010 there was a significant rise of nationalism in China. The
reason was the transformation of Chinese public opinion. Under the influence of
progress in the development of China, people have come to realize that modern
China certainly plays a crucial role in world politics and economics.
A characteristic feature of modern Chinese nationalism is that it proliferates
far outside of China. Currently, its main content is a growing anti-American and
anti-Japanese views.
The ideas of modern Chinese nationalism have become most prevalent
among the younger generation of Chinese citizens. These processes are partially
controlled by the PRC authorities, who need the population to have certain
ideological orientation.
Considering the rise of nationalism in China we can see the appearance of
the ‘Chinese Dream’ concept in 2012.

Key words: China, nationalism, foreign policy, public opinion, ‘new Chinese
nationalism’, ‘old Chinese nationalism’, concept of ‘Chinese Dream’.

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Introduction
As evidenced by numerous facts, in recent years, nationalist ideas
have been increasingly spreading in China not only at the level of the
individual, but also at the level of mass consciousness. This is according
to opinion polls, data from the media, as well as views widely spread
among the intellectual elite (Кузнецов 2014).
This article attempts to examine the phenomenon of Chinese
nationalism in the context of the foreign component of the mass
consciousness of the Chinese people, predominatly focused on the period
between 2000–2010 However, attention is paid to the earlier periods of
the 20th century during which the observed processes associated with the
evolution of Chinese nationalism are noticeable.
So far domestic and foreign sciences have achieved significant results
in the study of the problems of nationalism in general and Chinese
nationalism in particular.
Sinology in the Russian Federation and other countries has been enriched
with scientific works – monographs, articles, doctoral researche – dedicated to
the phenomenon of Chinese nationalism. Among these works, the articles of
A.A. Moskalyov (1930–2006) are of particular importance (Москалёв 2001a;
2001b; 2001с; 2002; 2005; 2009), whilst coming in close behind are those
by authors studying Chinese nationalism as a whole (Goodman & Segal
1996; Unger & Barmé 1996; Safran 1998; He & Guo 2000; Chang 2001;
Karl 2002; Guo 2004; Liew & Wang 2004; Leibold 2007; Russell 2013; Zhao
2014), and in the context of foreign policy of the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) (Xiaoqu 2000; Mirams 2009; Shan 2013).
Y. Zheng, for example, explores the complicated nature of revived
nationalism in China and presents the reader with a very different
picture to that portrayed in Western readings on Chinese nationalism.
He argues that China’s new nationalism is a reaction to changes in the
country’s international circumstances and can be regarded as a ‘voice’
over the existing unjustified international order. Y. Zheng shows that the
present Chinese leadership is pursuing strategies not to isolate China, but
to integrate it into the international community. Based on the author’s
extensive research in China, the book provides a set of provocative
arguments against prevailing Western attitudes to and perceptions of
China’s nationalism (Zheng 1999).
G. Wei and X. Liu argue that Chinese nationalism is a multifaceted
concept. At different historical moments and under certain circumstances,

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it had different meanings and interacted with other competing motives

and interests (Wei & Liu 2001; 2002).
Among these authors, S. Zhao and his monograph A nation-state by
construction: Dynamics of modern Chinese nationalism is of particular
note. This is the first historically comprehensive and up-to-date analysis
of the causes, content, and consequences of nationalism in China, an
ancient empire that has struggled to construct a modern nation-state and
find its place in the modern world (Zhao 2004).
Peter Hays Gries in his monograph China’s new nationalism: Pride,
politics, and diplomacy offers a rare, in-depth look at the nature of China’s
new nationalism particularly as it involves Sino-American and Sino-
Japanese relations (Gries 2004).
S. Shen’s monograph Redefining nationalism in modern China: Sino-
American relations and the emergence of Chinese public opinion in the 21st
century explores the possibility of whether the contemporary nationalist
movement in China, a movement that is non-unitary, segmented and
practised by different people for different purposes, could be reshaped
and absorbed by neighbouring regions. He selects recent case studies
such as the Chinese response to the September 11 attacks in the United
States as well as the war in Iraq and includes a detailed discussion on the
intellectual battle in China (the Liberals versus the ‘New Leftists’). Using
a variety of previously untapped sources, including a range of news sources
within China itself, weblogs, and interviews with prominent figures, Shen
makes a powerful new argument about the causes and consequences of
the new Chinese nationalism (Shen 2007).
The specific form of modern Chinese nationalism is linked with the
sphere of high technologies: X. Wu, S. Shen and Sh. Breslin examination
of the Chinese segment of the Internet (for example, Sina Weibo) is an
arena for intense discussions on current issues in contemporary China
(Wu 2007; Shen & Breslin 2010).
Christopher W. Hughes examines the problems which will inevitably
arise as a result of China’s claims on Taiwan, and analyses Taiwan’s ‘post-
nationalist’ identity (Hughes 1997; 2006).
Also of interest is Z. Lu’s Sport and nationalism in China. This
book examines the relationships between sport, nationalism, and nation
building in China. By exploring the last 150 years of Chinese history, it
offers unparalleled depth and breadth of coverage and provides a clear grasp
of Chinese sports nationalism from both macro and micro perspectives.
Moving on to the era of Communist China (1949–present), the book

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scans the whole spectrum of both modern and contemporary Chinese

nationalism and interprets the most important issues on the course of
China’s nation building, explaining why sport is so tightly bound up
with nationalism and patriotism, and how sport became an essential part
of nationalists’, politicians’, and educationalists’ strategy to revive the
Chinese nation (Lu 2014).
Further, of considerable interest are the monographs in which the state
of the Chinese public opinion is revealed (Tang 2005; Reilly 2012; Young
2012; Hollihan 2014; Lee 2014). The focus of these research papers is
that the state of public opinion in modern China is experiencing a period
of significant changes in the socio-economic, political, and cultural areas.
Nationalism refers to the ideology and politics, according to which
a nation is treated as the highest form of social cohesion as a harmonious
entity with identical fundamental interests of all the components of its
social strata.
Nationalism includes not only the idea that a country shares common
interests, but that it should and must promote its interests over and
against those of other nations.
Nationalism is directly linked to the term ‘nation’. It is a widespread
concept in science and politics, which represents the totality of the
citizens of the state as a political community. The members of the nation
are characterized by a general civil identity (e.g., Americans, Chinese,
Russians), with a sense of common historical destiny and a common
cultural heritage, and in many cases – with a common language or even
religion.
Taking into consideration everything that has been said before, Chinese
nationalism can be understood as a set of ideological and theoretical
guidelines, ideology, and politics, according to which the Chinese nation
is treated as the highest form of social cohesion as a harmonious entity
with identical fundamental interests of all the components of its social
strata, a uniting principle for the cultural unity of China. In fact, this is
the form of identification with the nation, with a lot of people who belong
to one community that is mostly united with culture, in this case – the
Chinese culture.
This research describes the phenomenon of Chinese nationalism in
the context of the foreign policy component of the mass consciousness
of residents in China including the historical retrospective. For a deeper
understanding of the essence of modern Chinese nationalism it was
necessary to look at the history of its occurrence.

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We studied the history of Chinese nationalism, Chinese nationalism

in the 1990s, 2000–2010, and the role of the Communist Part of China
(CPC) in the management of processes in the development of Chinese
nationalism. Special attention is paid to the concept of the ‘Chinese Dream’
(2012), which is a continuation of the previously formulated idea of “the
great renaissance of the Chinese nation.”

Origins of Chinese Nationalism

The origin of Chinese nationalism as a movement in social and
political life belongs to the late period of the Qing Dynasty (1644–1912)
in China. In the 19th century China was forcibly ‘opened’ by the Western
powers, and transformed into a semi-colonial country. The cooperation of
the rulers of the Qing Dynasty and the Western powers led to the growth
of nationalist sentiment. The ideas of national liberation and national
independence in the international arena became widespread in China.
Those ideas were relevant, taking into consideration the defeat of the Qing
Empire in the First (1840–1842) and the Second (1856–1860) Opium
War, as a result of which China signed unequal treaties with the Western
powers and partially lost its sovereignty (Wang 2005, pp. 1–2).
Chinese nationalism emerging in the 19th century originally had
two components – anti-Manchu and anti-Western. These components
of Chinese nationalism showed up during major armed uprisings – the
Taiping rebellion of 1850–1864 (with a predominance of anti-Manchu
element – antimanchzhurizm) and the Boxer Rebellion between 1899–
1901 (with a predominance of anti-Western elements – anti-imperialism)
(Kuhn 1978).
The defeat of the Qing Empire in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–
1895, which resulted in signing the Treaty of Shimonoseki (April 17,
1895) – a humiliating treaty for China, only strengthened the position of
those who advocated the idea of Chinese nationalism (Hsu 1980).
The Xinhai Revolution started in 1911 and resulted in the fall of the
Qing Empire and the establishment of the Republic of China. It became
the apotheosis of the Chinese nationalist movement (meaning Han
nationalism, which sought to create their own nation-state) at the turn
of 19th and 20th centuries. Moreover, it was the main driving force of
the revolutionary process that started in China. A great contribution to
the development of these processes was made by Sun Yat-sen, as well

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as a number of organizations, established with his direct participation

(‘China Revival Union’, among others). The ‘Three People’s Principles’
– a political doctrine developed by Sun Yat-sen – should be considered
in the same context. It is a part of political philosophy aimed at making
China a free, prosperous and strong state. The three principles entailed:
nationalism, democracy, and the people’s well-being (Bastid-Bruguiere
1980; Gasster 1980).
After the victory of the Xinhai Revolution, during the 20th century,
and up until now, Chinese nationalism has gone through several stages of
development. In our opinion, before the start of the 1960s, the development
of Chinese nationalism was limited to the inner frame, without going
beyond the borders of China. In the 1960s and 1970s, as China became
a global player in the world arena, their nationalist impulses reached
neighboring countries.
Initially, the development of Chinese nationalism was mostly
associated with the activities created with the participation of the
National Sun Yat-Sen Chinese party – the Kuomintang (KMT). However,
the process of putting into practice the idea of the unity of the Chinese
nation was delayed for a long period due to the soon started acute internal
power struggles in China (the ‘era of the warlords’, 1916–1928, ‘Nanjing
Decade’, 1928–1937, within which the civil war between the forces of
the KMT and the CPC, which lasted with interruptions until 1949 and
culminated in the proclamation of the PRC). A powerful factor that caused
the increase in Chinese nationalism was the Sino-Japanese War of 1937–
1945 (Sheridan 1983; Wilbur 1983; Eastman 1986a; 1986b).
The KMT and the CPC put forward various concepts on the future
of the Chinese state. There was a clash of two alternative lines of the
development in China, personified by the KMT and the CPC. Each of
these parties had its own approach to the national unity of China. The
CPC Party has put forward a fundamentally different program for solving
the national question in the country. It was based on the recognition of
the rights of all non-Han peoples to self-determination up to the secession
and the formation of the nation-state, the creation of China’s future on
the basis of a free union of equal nations.
Since the mid 1950s, China gradually started facing the new tendency
manifested in the significant growth of Chinese nationalism, including
those aimed at the neighboring countries. The new phenomenon was
that Chinese nationalism proliferated into the international arena. The
Chinese nationalist waves reached the countries bordering with China.

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Between 1959–1965 there were many articles and books published

in China with basically idealistic concepts on the Mongol conquest and
the personality of Genghis Khan, about the power of the Manchu Qing
Dynasty and its representatives – the reign of Emperor Kangxi, about the
special role of China in world history, about the eternal revolutionary spirit
of the Chinese peasantry, etc. Rénmín Rìbào wrote: “Dynasty, founded
by Genghis Khan, played a progressive role in the history of China […].
Genghis Khan broke the boundaries between nationalities and restored
again the great multinational state, which had not been since the Han and
Tang dynasties” (Rénmín Rìbào, 10.08.1961).
At the same time there was a reassessment of several social movements
and the role of individuals in the history of China: the assimilation of
small nations, forcibly included at various times in the Chinese empire,
became portrayed as a blessing for those nations, the idea of a ‘classics’
aura belonging to all Chinese became popular, the role of China in world
history was emphasized, the growing trend towards the coverage of many
historical events in the pro-Chinese spirit became explicitly vivid. All
those factors strengthened the trends associated with increased Chinese
nationalism.
Thus, in the 1960s and 1970s there was another surge of Chinese
nationalism. At this time, the viewpoint in the Soviet Union was emerging
that it was the period of a temporary transformation of Chinese nationalism
into the fundamental concept of public policy. Chinese nationalism received
its most concentrated expression in a chauvinist and hegemonic line of
Maoism.
In this case, it refers to some of Mao’s ideological installations, in
particular, the theory of ‘Three Worlds’, which stated that three political-
economic worlds took shape in the field of international relations: The
First World – ‘superpowers’ like the Soviet Union and the United States
(US), The Second World – allies of the ‘superpowers’, and The Third
World – developing Asia, Africa, and Latin America, which during the
years of ‘Cold War’ clung to the Non-Aligned Movement. China, as
a part of the ‘Third World’, according to the plans of Mao Zedong, was
to lead the struggle against the ‘hegemony’ of ‘superpowers’ – American
imperialism and the Soviet revisionism (Nakajima 1987).
The PRC leadership tried to approve China as the leader of the
countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America that recently had become
independent from colonial rule. China was declared as the outpost, the
vanguard of the world revolution. Mao Zedong and his supporters justified

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their avaunt-garde aspirations in the following way: “Wind from the East
prevails over the wind from the West” (Мао Цзэдун 1969). Asia, Africa,
and Latin America comprised the zone of future revolutionary storms. In
those backward peasant areas revolution would develop according to the
Chinese pattern. The center of the world revolution had moved further
to the East – to China. Beijing was depicted as something akin to a new
Mecca for all ‘orthodox’ followers of the line of the Chinese leadership and
Mao Zedong – ‘leader’ if the world revolutionary forces.
The involvement of China in the Korean War, Vietnam War, Taiwan
crises (first Taiwan Strait crisis of 1954–1955 and the Second Taiwan Strait
Crisis of 1958), armed conflict between China and India (1962, 1967),
between China and Vietnam (1979) – all provided the opportunity for the
external output of Chinese nationalism, which was mainly aimed against
the US, Japan, and Taiwan.
Against the backdrop of a serious deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations,
the apogee of which was a series of armed conflicts on the Soviet-Chinese
border (Damanskii island, March 2–15, 1969; Lake Zhalanashkol, August
13, 1969), trends in external manifestations of Chinese nationalism only
intensified. However, in this case it turned out to be aimed against the
Soviet Union (Whiting 1987; Robinson 1991).
The weakening trends in the external manifestations of Chinese
nationalism became visible only with the end of the period of ‘Cultural
Revolution’ in China. In 1978 after Deng Xiaoping’s initiative on the
transition to ‘reforms and openness’ policy which meant wide-range
reforms undertaken in the PRC in order to upgrade the quality of individual
areas of Chinese society under the concept of ‘socialism with Chinese
features’, the level of Chinese nationalism in the foreign component of
the mass consciousness decreased significantly.
At the same time due to the successes that had been achieved in
the modernization of the traditional structures of Chinese society the
following trend gradually began to take shape in the world and Chinese
public opinion: the foreigners and the Chinese public gradually came
to understand that this modern China, which was epitomized by the
PRC, of course, played an important role in world politics and economy
(Кузнецов 2013).
China’s leadership was trying to consolidate among the citizens
the idea of transformation of China into a great power, able to exercise
significant influence on the processes in world politics and economy. Using
various means of propaganda (including visual agitation), the government

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consistently pursued the idea of strengthening the power of the Chinese

state and its revival as a great power (Кузнецов 2011; 2012).
The most important idea that PRC leaders sought to convey to citizens
of the country was the continuity of the various epochs in the history of
Chinese civilization, each contributing their specific contribution to the
development of China’s greatness.
Particular attention was paid to the modern period in China’s
history, which began on October 1, 1949. The PRC period, according to
the official position, is an essential stage in the progressive development
of the Chinese civilization. The progress made since 1949, contributed
a lot to the strengthening of the Chinese state. Accordingly, the history
of China consists of individual periods which are in some measure
successful. Each of these periods is associated with Chinese leaders
– Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping.
Already by 1999, when China celebrated the 50th anniversary of the
PRC’s foundation, this idea had penetrated deeply into the mass
consciousness of the Chinese people.

Chinese Nationalism in the 1990s

In the 1990s, there was again a fairly significant growth of nationalism
in China. The growth of nationalist sentiment in China was conditioned
by a number of other reasons and circumstances, both internal and
external. Of course, the landmark event was the Tiananmen uprising in
1989. The West’s reaction to that event (the subsequent sanctions, etc.)
caused a backlash in China as an anti-Western (primarily anti-American)
nationalist sentiment. Subsequent events and the general course of Western
policy toward China that was perceived by the Chinese government as
a ‘policy of containment’ retained the vector of Chinese nationalism
development, directed outwards (Москалёв 2001a).
As A.A. Moskalev underlines, the CPC’s position toward emerging
wave of nationalism in the country also played its role. The CPC did
not directly participate in the public debate on nationalism, but the fact
that it did not prohibit this discussion was rather obvious. As pointed
out by A.A. Moskalev, nationalism that became the subject of discussion
in China, in the 1990s went outside the scope of the official doctrine of
the two ‘hold-over’ nationalisms (i.e., the Great Han nationalism and
local nationalism). This is quite different nationalism. This is ‘Chinese

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nationalism’ – nationalism “in all of China”, “for the whole nation”, i.e.,
the ‘Chinese nation’ (Москалёв 2001a).
A characteristic feature of Chinese nationalism was that impulses
from it, as was the case previously, in the 1960s and 1970s, began to
proliferate out of China. Their main contents were gradually intensifying
anti-American views.
A number of serious crises affecting US–China relations strengthened
the anti-American component in Chinese public opinion in the 1990s.
The thorniest of them was the Hainan Island incident (April 1, 2001).
This incident with US Air Force military spy plane EP-3, which carried out
a reconnaissance flight in the immediate vicinity of China’s airspace and
eventually broke it. The Chinese fighter pursuing the spy plane collided
with it, with the Chinese pilot being killed. The intruder was urged to land
on the airfield on Hainan Island. The incident led to a serious diplomatic
crisis in Sino-US relations. Then the Internet forums were overflown with
angry posts calling to make America pay a ‘blood debt’ for the martyred
Chinese fighter pilot Wang Wei. Combined with the US-related events
that took place in the previous decade Chinese anti-Americanism received
extra fuel (Brookes 2002, pp. 101–110).
Referring to earlier events, it’s necessary to mention a very strong
reaction of the US leadership to the tragic events in Tiananmen Square
(1989), which led to a large number of casualties among Chinese students.
The US support of Taiwan (especially arms shipments) contributed
a lot to the rise of anti-Americanism in China. Periodically emerged
Taiwanese crises, the sharpest of which occurred in the years 1995–1996,
when the US demonstrated its support for the Taiwan authorities and
even dispatched their warships to the conflict area, only intensified the
critical attitude of the Chinese people against the United States.
The trend towards the normalization of Sino-US relations emerged
in 1997–1998 and culminated in the mutual visits of representatives of
the top leadership of China (Jiang Zemin) and the US (William J. Clinton)
in 1999 again faced serious problems associated with the incident that
occurred during the military operations of NATO against Yugoslavia.
The accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy building in
Belgrade on May 7, 1999, which led to casualties among the Chinese
staff (3 dead and 20 wounded), caused a storm of indignation among the
Chinese people, contributing to the strengthening of anti-Americanism
in Chinese society. Thousands protest demonstrations were held then in
front of the US Embassy in Beijing and the US Consulates (in Shanghai,

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Guangzhou, Chengdu, Shenyang, etc.) showed a very emotional reaction

of the Chinese citizens to the tragedy (Wong & Zheng 1999).
There were other incidents that contributed to the deterioration of
the atmosphere of US–China relations and, as a consequence, caused an
increase of anti-Americanism among the Chinese people.
The abovementioned events unsealed China’s bitter memories of
the 19th century Western imperialism, when the ‘foreign devils’ were
oppressing and humiliating China, running roughshod over a once-proud
people. Echoes of the past humiliations were clearly evident in the stream
of popular anti-American editions, published in the late 1990s, with titles
such as “Evil Plans of America”, “China can not be intimidated” and
others. Those and other publications used the 19th century term ‘guochi’
– ‘national humiliation’ that expressed a fair Chinese resentment against
mocking imperialist powers. By the end of the 1990s, the majority of
Chinese citizens regarded America as their primary enemy (Baum 2002).
On the other hand, the tragic events of September 11, 2001, have led
to a temporary weakening of the anti-American component in the Chinese
public opinion. However, soon a critical attitude toward the United States
began to grow again in the Chinese society, as a result of steps taken by
the US in the international arena (Iraq war, for example) (Mansfield Asian
Opinion Poll Database 2006; Lowy Institute China Poll 2009; Pew Global
Attitudes Project 2007; 2016a; 2016b).

Chinese Nationalism in 2000–2010

In the 2000s, there was a new surge of Chinese nationalism. This
surge was largely caused by the changing role that China played in world
politics and economy.
The social and economic development of China accelerated in the
conditions of the 2000s was not even hampered by the global financial and
economic crisis that began in 2008. That fact contributed to a widespread
conviction in the inevitable transformation of China into the largest world
power in the near future. In this regard, M. Leonard, author of What Does China
Think? said that at present “in almost every global event there is the impact
of the Chinese factor.” And further: “China’s position affects the dynamics of
a number of issues […]. China has ceased to be just a big country, a business
partner, or the subject of diplomatic relations. China has started the process of
becoming a real factor of world politics […]” (Leonard 2008).

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In addition, the active foreign policy conducted by China in the past

decade has received wide response among the Chinese public and the world,
and one way or another, it contributes to strengthening trends associated
with the surge in Chinese nationalism. The restoration of sovereignty
over Hong Kong (1997) and Macao (1999), and their joining China on the
rights of the Special Administrative Regions under the principle of ‘One
country, two systems’, only strengthened this trend.
Other factors that, in my opinion, contribute to the growth of Chinese
nationalism are: China’s achievements and progress in the fields not
related to politics and economics.
Among them – the strengthening of China’s military power. It is
known that at present, China, being a nuclear power, has the largest army
in the world and is modernizing its armed forces, creating and acquiring
new types of weapons and military equipment.
A successful performance of China’s team at the XXIX Olympic
Games in Beijing spawned a huge-scale growth of pride among the Chinese
population. The fact that the Chinese team won 100 medals (51 gold,
21 silver and 28 bronze), which allowed the Chinese team to take 1st place
in the team event and thereby outperform its main competitor – the US
team, was regarded as evidence of China’s significant success.
The development of China’s space program should be considered in
the same vein.
In my view, all of the above, strengthens the confidence of China’s
population that now their country is in fact playing an increasingly
important role in world politics and economics, affects the growth of
nationalism in China, and forms the proper configuration of the Chinese
public opinion concerning the place, role and policy of China in modern
international relations.
The most important characteristic of Chinese nationalism is a sense of
national superiority. In one way or another, it is inherent in many nations
of the world – Americans, Russians, as well as other nations, naturally.
Nevertheless, it seems that in China this feeling is largely intensified by
the changes that relate to the place and role of modern China in world
politics and economics.
A kind of ‘feeding’ for Chinese nationalism comes from the widespread
basic values, acting as a foundation of China’s foreign policy mentality
among the Chinese residents. It seems that at present these basic values
actually determine the state of the Chinese public opinion about the place,
role and policy of China in modern international relations. In this case,

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these are the concepts of China and the outside world – Sinocentrism
(中国中心主义) (Ретунских 2006).
Of course, there are no grounds to assert that now the mass
consciousness of the Chinese people is fully imbued with the spirit of
Sinocentrism. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to ignore the impact of this
concept on Chinese public opinion. As pointed out by E.P. Bazhanov,
Sinocentrism, conviction in own superiority inherent in the Chinese
since ancient times, is not some exception to the general rules of conduct
of states in the international system. China, unlike other hegemons
(Ancient Rome etc.) ‘indefinitely’ was a hegemon among its neighbors,
that is why “Chinese behavior is particularly striking to the researchers,
and seems unique” (Бажанов 2007).
In general, China’s foreign policy has historically inherent Sinocentrism,
which is characterized by vertical connections in international relations. In
modern conditions the Sinocentrict tradition may be well fed by China’s
great-power ambitions in its resurgence as an influential and independent
factor in the international arena. However, in a ‘new world order’
Sinocentrism is characterized by greater economic, than political, influence.
Now China can really be and is becoming the center of the ever
dynamic Asia-Pacific Region. In addition, China has a robust geopolitical
framework (vast territory with abundant resources and a large population),
to play the role of a natural center of attraction for the surrounding
countries and peoples, which in addition to East Asian countries include
the countries of South and Central Asia.
In recent years, the growing Chinese nationalism has been acquiring
a very specific manifestation in anti-American and anti-Japanese sentiment.
At the level of mass consciousness of China’s inhabitants, individual
manifestations of Chinese nationalism in relation to the Western countries
have been identified. And it was not just about the anti-American
component.
For example, in 2008 after the unrest in Tibet and the calls of the
French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, to boycott the Summer Olympic
Games in Beijing, a wave of anti-French demonstrations spread over
China. Among the protest actions – the boycott of the French retail chain
Carrefour (Jacobs 2008).
However, during the period of 2000–2010, perhaps most of all the
individual manifestations of Chinese nationalism penetrated the mass
consciousness of Chinese residents when it came to their attitude towards
Japan.

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This was followed by the fact that the beginning of the 21st century was
characterized by a sharp aggravation of relations between China and Japan.
This was caused by China’s discontent with Japan’s position on Taiwan
(the Koizumi government for the first time since World War II, openly
supported the US position, announcing that it stood against attempts to
change the situation in the Taiwan Strait by force); the visits of Japanese
Prime Minister Koizumi to the Yasukuni Shinto Shrine, dedicated to “the
souls of the heroes who died for Japan”. where the remains of Japanese
war criminals were buried; publication of a new history textbook that
justified Japan’s aggressive expansion in 1930–1940; and Japan’s desire
to be a permanent UN Security Council member. Of equal concern from
China were Japan’s plans to create their own missile defense system with
the assistance of the US.
In 2005, thousands of anti-Japanese protests swept through China,
when Japan published a new edition of its history textbooks, which,
according to Chinese authorities, insufficiently covered the story of the
Japanese invasion of China and partial occupation of the country in 1931–
1945. The invasion of the Japanese army was rephrased as an ‘entry’ into
China. The textbooks contain only a cursory mention of the events of 1937,
commonly known as the ‘Nanjing Massacre’, which resulted in 300,000
civilian victims – according to the Chinese side (Selden & Nozaki 2009).
An unprecedented crisis in relations between China and Japan ignited
in 2010–2012. In this case about it was caused by the escalation – (in
2010 and 2012) around the Senkaku Islands (Chinese name Diaoyu) the
East China Sea – which de facto belong to Japan (Дьячков 2013, pp. 97–
101). Two waves of massive anti-Japanese demonstrations involving
tens of thousands of people (August 18–19, 2012, and September 15–16,
2012) scattered across China. Turmoils broke out in major Chinese cities
characterized by burning Japanese flags, disorders in residential areas
where Japanese diplomats lived (including near the building of the Japanese
Embassy in Beijing), acts of vandalism, pogroms of Japanese shops and
restaurants, the destruction of Japanese-made cars. Thousands of people
chanted “Give us back the Diaoyu Islands,” “Japan should confess to their
crimes,” “Smash the Japanese imperialists!” and others. People called for
a boycott against Japanese goods. On September 18, 2012, the streets
of almost a hundred Chinese cities once again were filled with giant
crowds. The aggravation of the conflict coincided with the anniversary
of the Mukden incident (September 18, 1931) – the beginning of Japan’s
aggression against China (Lai 2014).

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As a result, the Senkaku archipelago crisis revealed an unprecedented

growth of Chinese nationalism, the impulses of which due to the growing
role of China in the international arena became tangible in surrounding
countries, specifically in Japan.

Chinese Nationalism and the Role of the CPC

So the rise of nationalism in China in recent years has been proven.
The nationalistic views are mostly rooted among the representatives of
the younger generation. These processes are partially controlled by the
Chinese authorities, who are largely interested in the fact that the citizens
have a certain ideological orientation and follow it.
In general, we can agree with the opinions expressed by some experts
on China. They say that nationalist views have been cultivated by Chinese
authorities since the early 1990s. The main reason for such a policy
was the fact that the brutally repressed student protest in Tiananmen
Square in June 1989 made the Chinese leadership realize that the ideas
of Marxism-Leninism had more and more weakening influence on the
minds of the younger generation. Subsequent events associated with
the collapse of the world socialist system and the collapse of the Soviet
Union convinced the country’s leadership that Chinese society needed
a new idea that would strengthen the legitimacy of the regime based on
the undivided rule of the CPC in the national political system. As a result,
Chinese nationalism has become a kind of alternative to the conceptions
that formerly prevailed in the sphere of ideology.
Thus, Chinese nationalism has filled the ideological vacuum created
in China after the start of market reforms. In other words, there was an
actual shift from socialism to nationalism. Considering that ‘socialism
with Chinese characteristics’ is increasingly acquiring the features of
capitalism, the reference to the ideas of Chinese nationalism, especially
to the cultural and national superiority of the Chinese people with their
5,000-year history above other societues, as well as the need to restore the
national greatness and repay old humiliations, has become an important
mechanism that can strengthen the unity of the Chinese people.
Along with this, an important role is played by another point. As
underlined by I.Y. Rozhkov, in order to make citizens not perceive as sharply
the many problems they face, the government suggests both nationalistic
and idealistic ideas that explain their ‘difficult past’ and promises a ‘bright

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future’. It can be briefly stated as follows: “Before the revolution in 1949

China had undergone humiliation from the capitalist powers (for example
– the ‘Opium Wars’). The country suffered much from the semi-colonial
state of fragmentation. The multi-party system of the KMT was not
acceptable for the country under such circumstances. Only the will and
wisdom of the Communist Party of China and Mao Zedong liberated and
united the country, ‘raised it from its knees.’ The purpose of the reforms
proclaimed by Deng Xiaoping – to return China the greatness and power,
which it had possessed for ages” (Рожков 2006, рр. 26–27).
As a result, by the reference to the ideas of Chinese nationalism,
the Chinese government may try to use them to deflect public anger,
switching it to ‘foreign enemies’ while there are growing economic and
social problems which cause instability in Chinese society.
The national spirit in China is also reinforced through the mass
media. For example, there are various articles in the local press that serve
to strengthen the national identity of the people. This, for example, refers
to Rénmín Rìbào, where such articles repeatedly appear: “The eyes of the
world glued to the Chinese way” (September 25, 2009), “On the way to
greatness China is not afraid of difficulties” (October 4, 2012), “Great
historical relay race” (January 16, 2013), and others.
The article “Does China have the will to greatness?’ that was published
on June 26, 2004, in China Daily, drew readers’ attention to the fact that
“the desire to acquire the status of a great world power can succeed only
if China has the strong determination to do so.” “A country the size of
China – the third largest state in the world – is simply obliged to become
a great world power, whether it wants to or not” (Lau Guan Kim 2004).
Chinese leaders have given a positive assessment of the raising
national consciousness, as it helps to strengthen the internal order in the
country, promotes social cohesion, and intensifies political life.

Chinese Nationalism and the Concept

of ‘the Chinese Dream’
The growth of nationalism in China has become the foundation
for the concept of ‘the Chinese Dream’ (中国梦 simplified Chinese;
中國夢 traditional Chinese; Zhōngguó mèng in pinyin), which is essentially
a continuation of the previously formulated idea of “the great revival of
the Chinese nation” (Гельбрас 2003, рр. 80–90).

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The ideas that appeared within the concept of ‘the Chinese Dream’ are
spreading rapidly both on the level of individual and mass consciousness.
Moreover, they are turning into a key direction of social thought in modern
China (Кузнецов 2013, рр. 185–252).
The concept of ‘the Chinese Dream’ is a continuation of the previously
formulated idea of ‘the great revival of China’. After ripening for quite
a long period of time, the concept of ‘the Chinese Dream’ formed only in
the 21st century. Colossal changes in terms of the place of China in the
world and outstanding economic growth have boosted the formulation of
the concept of ‘the Chinese Dream’.
The concept of ‘the Chinese Dream’ was initially coined up by
Xi Jinping in November 2012, two weeks after the completion of the 28th
Congress of the CPC, when he and other representatives of the Chinese
leadership visited the exhibition “By the road of revival” (Fuxing zhi
lu) at the National Museum of Chinese History. The exposition was
devoted to the period of China’s struggle to achieve national sovereignty
and independence (1840–1949) and the subsequent development of the
country. Xi Jinping urged “to implement the Chinese dream of a great
national revival” and used the term ‘revival’ for the first time in the
modern political context (Газета Жэньминь жибао он-лайн 2012).
The two dates have been set as the key milestones in achieving ‘the
Chinese Dream’ ideals: 2021 – the 100th anniversary of the CPC, and in
2049 – the 100th anniversary of the founding of the PRC. The first date
presupposes the creation of the society with medium income, the second
– the creation of a rich, strong, and culturally developed socialist country,
based on the principles of democracy, harmony and modernization
(Кондрашова 2014).
Xi Jinping’s broad interpretation of ‘the Chinese Dream’ includes
‘rich and strong country’, ‘national raise’, and ‘happiness of the people’
(“Си Цзиньпин о «китайской мечте»” 2013).
The important peculiarity of ‘the Chinese Dream’ is that it is based on
conceptually fundamental principles. Firstly, ‘the Chinese Dream’ concept
insets into the concept of ‘Socialism with Chinese characteristics’ which
is based on the ideas formulated by Deng Xiaoping, as well as the ideas
formulated by Jiang Zeming (three represents), and Hu Jingtao (scientific
concept of development).
The concept of ‘the Chinese Dream’ can be seen in the context of
individual aspirations of each individual resident of China, which is very
well correlated with the set goals and objectives focused on improving the

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welfare of the Chinese people. For the majority of Chinese people ‘the
Chinese dream’ is something each individual Chinese is trying to achieve
(Китайский информационный Интернет-центр 2013).
In order to promote the concept of ‘the Chinese Dream’ among people
from every walk of life, the Chinese leadership is taking various steps.
The most important of them relate to the propaganda of the separate
elements that the concept comprises.
The Chinese leadership is translating ‘the Chinese Dream’ to the
outside world, i.e. is explaining to the world the essence and content of
the concept of ‘the Chinese Dream’, revealing its individual components
and drawing attention to the fact that “the dream of the great revival of
the Chinese nation” does not pose a threat to the world.
The concept of ‘the Chinese Dream’ received its official recognition
during the 1st session of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the 11th
convocation of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political
Consultative Council (CPPCC) (March 3–17, 2013) (XVIII Всекитайский
съезд КПК. Китайская мечта и мир 2013).
The new head of the Chinese state, Xi Jinping, outlined the priority
objectives for country development in the coming years. The main content
of his speech was the thesis of the implementation of the concept of ‘China
dream’, which was positioned as a national idea of Chinese society in the
future (Си Цзиньпин 2013).
Speaking about ‘the Chinese Dream’ and referring to the national
feelings of the Chinese people, Xi Jinping primarily meant the process of
further strengthening of the Chinese state, its progressive socio-economic
and political development, and the growth of the welfare of the Chinese
nation (Си Цзиньпин 2014).
The emergence of ‘the Chinese Dream’ concept has led to its multiple
interpretations in a broader context. As pointed out by S.G. Luzianin,
“the problem for Beijing is that there are many alternative readings
and interpretations of the ‘dream’ overseas today which not always add
advantages to a carefully created positive image of China. One of the versions
popular in the West now is the ‘historical version’ which hypothetically
can collide the West with China in the further implementation of the new
doctrine” (Лузянин 2013; 2014).
The Chinese position in this concept is about the “national humiliation
of the Chinese people” when, since 1840, after unleashing the ‘Opium Wars’
and imposing ‘unfair contract’ for an extended period (up to 1949), the West
would not allow China to realize the idea of national revival. As a result, the

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‘China Dream’ in its historical part wittingly or unwittingly ignites some

resentment among the Chinese, urging them to decisive actions, the aim
of which should be the revival of Chinese power, and this in turn can have
a negative impact on the states surrounding China, for bilateral relations,
and likely for the Russian-Chinese relations (Лукин 2011).
In this regard, there have been growing concerns about the emergence
of conflicts in the Asia-Pacific region, where China will be an active
participant (Throop 2013).

Conclusion
Of course, the role of nationalism in Chinese history can be evaluated
as significant. Throughout the 20th century the ideas of nationalism were
a powerful source of mobilization in Chinese society. It is due to the
strengthening of Chinese nationalism that the country and its inhabitants
were able to overcome the legacy of the era of imperialism, strengthen the
national independence and national sovereignty, create a powerful state,
which is now rightly one of the world leaders in terms of politics and economy.
However, the ‘new Chinese nationalism’ that has been developing in
the last decade is significantly different from the ‘old Chinese nationalism’.
Unlike the latter, it is mainly the result of a rapidly strengthening of
China’s power in recent years.
On the other hand, the ‘new Chinese nationalism’ similar to the ‘old
Chinese nationalism’ is fueled by still continuing people’s memories of
the period when China was subjected to humiliation. Thus, as a result
of sociological research among students, university graduates and
others conducted in the Chinese city of Ningbo, scientists came to the
following conclusion: “The growing Chinese nationalism is a populist,
mass movement, rather than a product of the official policy. Its sources
are partially concealed in the memory of the humiliation of the colonial
era, and partially in the new self-confidence because of the growth of
Chinese economic power. The most obvious manifestation of growing
nationalism can be seen in the spontaneous and genuine public outrage
that accompanies China’s conflicts in the international arena” (Тавровский
2013; 2015).
In modern conditions the positive effect from the Chinese nationalism
stems from the fact that at critical moments, thanks to its powerful force
it can help in strengthening the unity of the country, resulting in readiness

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to effectively respond to emerging challenges, such as was the case with

the Sichuan earthquake in 2008.
However, there is a risk that the development of Chinese nationalism,
the edge of which is pointed at the Western countries, especially the
USand Japan (for example, in China, Russia is not mentioned at all or
called among the potential allies in the struggle with the West) can get
out of control. As a result, Chinese nationalism will become a destructive
factor that could destabilize the situation in China and abroad, aggravate
relations with the surrounding countries (especially with those China
has unresolved territorial issues) and thus have a negative impact on
regional security. In the most negative scenario nationalism can obtain
a militant character, pushing China to pursue a rigid foreign policy in the
international arena, and even (in case the majority of Chinese population
will be dissatisfied with the promotion of China’s interests in the world),
channelize its power against the national government. For example, Sina
Weibo has become a platform to cast doubt on China’s government policy
in the international arena. This is illustrated by the people’s reaction
to the official Chinese position regarding the most acute international
problems of today. The polls conducted on Sina Weibo, showed that the
majority of netizens are skeptical of the low-key Chinese policy in the
Syrian issue (Parello-Plesner 2012).
Therefore, it seems that the Chinese leadership must approach this
issue with great responsibility. Currently, through the support of China’s
national pride, civic nationalism, and fight with ethnic nationalism, the
country’s government in general tries not to cross the ‘red line’ beyond
which it can face uncontrolled and destructive processes. It is important
that this course will be followed in the future.

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 The Chinese Nationalism and Foreign Policy Component in Mass... 37

DMITRY V. KUZNETSOV, Ph.D. in History, Associate Professor, Department

of Universal History, Philosophy and Culture Studies, Blagoveshchensk State
Pedagogical University. Research interests: History of International Relations.
Foreign Policy and Public Opinion Interaction. Public Opinion and the
International Problems. Professional memberships: The Russian Association
of Political Sciences (2009), Russian International Studies Association (2016).
Dmitry V. Kuznetsov is the author and co-author of books: China in the Mirror
of Public Opinion. Blagoveshchensk: BSPU. (2013); Contemporary China: Social
and Economic Development, National Policy, Ethnopsychology. Moscow: URSS.
(2011); Contemporary China in the System of International Relations. Moscow:
URSS. (2012); Traditional China on the Road to Modernization. Moscow: URSS.
(2013); Contemporary China and its Environment. Moscow: URSS. (2014);
Modern China in the Conditions of Transformation. Moscow: URSS. (2015);
Contemporary China: Pages of History. Moscow: URSS. (2016); China and World
War Two. Moscow: URSS. (2017). In 2015–2016 at the initiative of Dmitry
V. Kuznetsov were implemented projects to study the public opinion: Russia,
the United States and China in the Modern World: Mutual Representations of
Russian, American and Chinese Youth and Russia and Poland Through the Eyes
of Young People: Perceptions of Each Other, Ideas About Politics, Culture and
Religion.

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 http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/8088-758-9.03

Agnieszka Batko
(Jagiellonian University)

Womenomics: The Assumptions

and Effects of Abenomics’ Third Arrow

Abstract

In 2012, after being sworn in as the Prime Minister of Japan for the second
time, Shinzō Abe introduced his plan of reviving the Japanese economy. This
set of reforms, named Abenomics after the PM’s name, was designed to secure
the state’s position within the region. This agenda consists of the three so-
called ‘arrows’ that concern the changes in the fiscal policy, monetary policy,
and fundamental structural changes. One of the key concepts of the third arrow
is Womenomics, which concentrates on persuading Japanese women to act
more actively on the job market and seek opportunities to advance their careers.
Despite being one of the most developed countries in the world, the gender gap is
apparent with regards to the workforce and it does have a significant impact on
the state of the Japanese economy.
The purpose of this article is to present the assumptions of the Womenomics
concept and to determine how it is being applied by the current Japanese
government. This analysis will then focus on estimating the already perceptible
effects of introducing Womenomics with regards to two aspects. Firstly, the study
will evaluate the consequences for the Japanese economy through applying the
statistical data in quantitative research. Secondly, it will also contain references to
the social level as this model poses a series of evident challenges to the traditional
concept of the role of women in Japanese society.

Key words: Japanese economy, abenomics, womenomics, Japanese job

market.

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 40 Agnieszka Batko

Introduction
Japan represents one of the largest economic successes after World
War II. This success has been accomplished because of several factors,
such as: close cooperation between government and private companies,
relatively small expenses regarding the military as well as Japanese people
whose work ethic and a sense of duty toward rebuilding their country
remained at a high level. Those determinants led to Japan’s impressive
economic growth of 10% in the 1960s, 5% in the 1970s, and 4% in the
1980s (The World Factbook 2016).
Despite the fact that from the beginning of the 1990s, the country’s
economy has stalled significantly, has gone through recession four times
since the global financial crisis in 2008 and bore severe consequences of
the 2011 earthquake, Japan remains the fourth largest economy in the
world after the United States (US), China, and India, according to the
purchasing power parity indicator (The World Factbook 2016). Therefore,
it continues to be at the centre of focus and interest of the global and
regional economic institutions as well as neighbouring states.
However, even though Japan accounts for one of the most developed
countries, the situation of its women remains surprising, if not troubling,
due to their low representation not only on the job market but also in
leadership positions both in the public and private domains. Within career-
track hires, Japanese women still occupy 20% of those positions, partially
due to the gender norms picturing women as primarily responsible for
childcare and housework (Brinton & Mun 2016). The current government
of Japan under Prime Minister (PM) Shinzō Abe, after winning the general
election in 2012 with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), took this issue
under consideration and linked it to Japan’s economic revitalisation plan
(Abe 2014), drawing attention to the idea of ‘womenomics’, which was
coined by analysts at Goldman Sachs in 1999 (Matsui et al. 2005).
The article’s main focus is to characterise the Japanese government’s
plan of increasing female participation on the job market in order to
support the state’s economic growth as well as estimate the changes
made so far concerning this issue. It will be argued that ‘womenomics’
should be perceived not only in the narrow economic sense but also be
promoted as one of the key components of societal change in Japan.
Therefore, it will also be stated that PM Abe’s plan regarding women
should also target traditional male roles and positions within the
Japanese population.

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 Womenomics: The Assumptions and Effects of Abenomics’ Third Arrow 41

The article has been divided into three main parts. The first one
is concerning Japan’s demographic and economic situation to which
‘Abenomics’ – Japan’s plan of economic revitalisation and its so-called ‘Three
Arrows’ is a response to. The second part is focusing on specific programs
and reforms whose primary goal is to increase women’s role in securing
Japan’s economic growth. The last section is concerning key challenges to
‘womenomics’ success both in the public as well as private domains.
The issue of PM Abe’s government plan concerning the advancement
of the female position on the job market is yet to be assessed, as its
implementation only began in 2013. Nevertheless, there have been several
attempts made by scholars to analyse this matter, either through linking
it to the demographic trends in Japan (Coleman 2016) or to established
business practices, such as ‘tenkin’ (moving for job) (Fujita 2016). This
article, while also looking at those aspects, draws additional attention to the
government’s attempts of influencing the private sector. Hence, a number
of government initiatives aimed to encourage private companies to increase
the female representations within its structures will be considered.
With regards to the sources, the main ones are the extensive plans
of economic revitalisation published by the Japanese government, such
as Japan is Back from 2013 and Japan’s challenge for the future from
2014. The arguments will also be supported by public speeches made by
PM Abe and other members of the government, reports issued by the
private sector as well as public opinion polls and a variety of academic
sources emphasizing both the economic and societal aspects of structural
reforms in Japan.

Why does Japan need Abenomics?

As most developed countries, Japan also suffers from an aging and
declining population. However, this occurs faster than in other states,
causing severe shrinkages in the labour force. The tables below represent
those trends in Japanese society. The first table illustrates the overall
population including the forecast until year 2020. Comparing the number
for 2015 and 2020 it can be seen that the number of inhabitants is
projected to decrease by around 2.5 million within this relatively short
period of time, which naturally will cause further difficulties for the
internal job market with regards to avoiding labour shortages in key
sectors for upcoming years such as infrastructure or shipbuilding

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Table 1. The overall population of Japan including forecast until 2020

Year Number of inhabitants (millions)

2013 127,296
2014 126,848
2015 126,597
2016 126,193
2017 125,738
2018 125,236
2019 124,688
2020 124,099

Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Statistics 2016.

The situation regarding the population in working age is also troubling.

As seen in Table 2 below, the number of people above the age of 65 is
increasing significantly whereas the numbers for the groups both in the
working age and young people up 14 years of age continues to shrink. This
means that the growing sum of retired and elderly people will gradually
cause a larger burden on the national budget due to social benefits and
care. As it was already pointed out by the analysts from Goldman Sachs
in 2005 (Matsui et al. 2015, p. 2), Japan would only have two people
working for each retiree within the next 30 years and this was projected
to worsen further in the long-term forecast since by 2050 there would be
three workers for every two retirees.

Table 2. The percentage of people in different age groups in Japan relative to the entire
country’s population

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
People below
15 years old 14 13.9 13.8 13.6 13.5 13.5 13.3 13.1 13.1 13 12.9
(%)
People
between
66.9 66.6 66.1 65.5 65 64.5 63.9 63.8 63.6 62.9 62.1
15–64 years
old (%)
People above
65 years old 19 19.5 20.2 20.8 21.5 22.1 22.7 23 23.3 24.1 25.1
(%)
Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Statistics 2016.

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 Womenomics: The Assumptions and Effects of Abenomics’ Third Arrow 43

Obstacles to Japan’s economic growth arise not only from the aging
population and decreasing labour force. The situation of women in the
working age also seems to impede it due to their low participation on
the job market. It is also particularly concerning in comparison with other
developed states.
Japan represents the trend called the ‘M-curve’ which refers to the
number of working women in the working age. As seen on the graph
below, this is rather unique for developed states.
The labour participation is significantly higher in the United States
(US), Germany and France compared to Japan where women between age
of 30–40 decide not to return to work after having a child and raise it.
This occurs due to a variety of reasons which will be analysed in detail in
the following sections.

Graph 1. Japan’s ‘M-curve’. Comparison of female labour participation rates

by age groups (%)

Source: Matsui et al. 2005, p. 6.

Further issues with female participation in Japanese workforce, prior

to the announcement of ‘Abenomics’, have repeatedly been highlighted
by The Global Gender Gap Report (2015) published yearly by World
Economic Forum, which is based on three concepts. Firstly, it focuses
on resources and access to opportunities within listed countries rather
than actual levels of such resources in those states which means that
the emphasis is not being put on the development level. Secondly, the
aim is to provide a comparison between men and women with regards to

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certain basic rights such as education, health, political empowerment, or

economic participation. Lastly, the Index ranks states according to gender
equality and notwomen empowerment. In a report from 2012, Japan
was ranked 101st out of 135 countries. As for the comparison, France
was ranked 57th, Germany 13th, and the US 22nd (Hausmann, Tyson &
Zahidi 2012). The main concerns for Japan that can be drawn from this
report concentrate on subsections regarding economic participation and
opportunity as well as particularly political empowerment. With reference
to the first one, Japan needs to improve the number of women in positions
of legislators, senior officials, and managers as the male-female ratio is
only 10:1. As for political empowerment, the number of women both in
parliament and in ministerial positions was at a low level. Respectively
the data for 2012 show 11% of women participation in parliament and
12% for ministerial positions (Hausmann, Tyson & Zahidi 2012, p. 216).
All those unfavourable indicators as well as other domestic factors
linked to social care and immigration issues, which will be mentioned
in the next sections, induced the increasing need for the government to
address Japanese female participation in the workforce. As a result, after
the LDP won the election in 2012, the new government under PM Abe
started to widely promote the idea of ‘womenomics’ (Abe 2013) included
it into the ‘Abenomics’ agenda and encouraged women to act more actively
on the job market and seek for opportunities to advance their careers. He
also promised to spend more than 3 billion dollars between 2013–2016
for the purpose of female empowerment, also beyond Japan (Abe 2013).
‘Abenomics’ refers to the complex of reforms that have been proposed
and implemented since 2012 under PM Abe’s government. It consists
of the so-called ‘three arrows’: (1) changes in fiscal policy, (2) monetary
policy’s regime change, and (3) structural reforms (Hausman & Wieland
2014, pp. 2–3). ‘Womenomics’ has been announced as a key component of
‘Abenomics’’ third pillar and Japanese women became the country’s most
‘underutilised resource’ (Chanlett-Avery & Nelson 2014, p. 4). However,
the third arrow does not only concern women as such but also includes
a wide range of improvements and changes relating to private companies,
social care, and immigration policies that are also linked to the concept
of ‘womenomics’. Therefore, the last part of PM Abe’s plan constitutes
not only more of ‘a thousand darts’ rather than a single arrow but also
is the most complicated and demanding to achieve as it challenges the
entire well-established system, deeply embedded in Japanese tradition and
culture (Patrick 2014, p. 4).

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‘Womenomics’ as a fundamental aspect

of the ‘Third Arrow’
The idea of ‘womenomics’ that is now being implemented and widely
promoted by the current government of Japan is not a concept that only
appeared as a part of national economy plan after 2012. It was first
presented as a whole concept and described in detail in 1999 by Kathy
Matsui, Goldman Sachs’s (GS) strategist in Japan in 1999 (Chanlett-
Avery & Nelson 2014, p. 2). Since then the analysts team at GS have been
working on it further and published similar reports in 2005, 2010 and
2014. The analyses presented in those documents focus on several aspects
of increasing female participation in the workforce, such as: comparisons
with other developed countries as well as examples of women-oriented
policies implemented overseas, estimates of potential GDP growth,
as well as reforms proposals that should be considered by the Japanese
government in order to boost women presence on the job market.
With regards to the correlation between GDP and ‘womenomics’,
analysts from GS evaluate that closing the gap between employed men
and women could have a highly positive impact on a country’s economic
growth indicators. As for 2013, the female’s employment rate was 62.5%
compared to 80.6% for males. If that difference could be eliminated and
Japanese working population increased by around 7 million women then
Japan’s GDP could increase by 12.5% (Matsui et al. 2014, p. 5).
Such an optimistic vision was intercepted by PM Abe. In his speech at
Davos Economic Forum in 2014 he recalled a conversation with Hillary
Clinton who, while encouraging him to advance the women agenda, also
suggested that Japan’s GDP could grow by 16% if the employment rates
between men and women were at the same level (Abe 2014).
After the LDP won the general election in December 2012, the newly-
formed government started launching initiatives and publishing agendas
for implementing ‘Abenomics’. The complex program of economic
revitalisation entitled Japan is Back was published in June 2013. The
document contains several notions regarding Japanese working women
and includes several proposals of how to advance their participation on
the job market.
The report points out that the employment and education systems in
Japan, which have been constructed after the Secon World War, are no longer
suitable for recent times and that they have become one of the obstacles for
women’s potential to be fully applied. The rhetoric concerning Japanese

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women is clear and unambiguous as they are perceived as the country’s

‘greatest potential’ and increasing their participation within the workforce
is a key aspect of securing and supporting future growth. In order to secure
the future growth of Japan, the government pledged to “raise the women’s
labour participation rate to the world’s highest level by providing childcare
arrangements and other services so that working couples can raise their
children with a sense of security and by supporting women’s return to the
workplace following their childcare leave as well as promoting the proactive
recruitment of women” (Japan is Back 2013, p. 44).
The document also contains specific targets that the government
under PM Abe would aim to achieve on the ‘womenomics’ matter.
First and foremost, the employment of women between age 25–44 is
to increase up to 73% by 2020 (during the time of report publication in
2013, female employment at the age group between 25–44 was at 68%)
(Japan is Back 2013, p. 44). To support the return of women to work after
having a child, the government also introduced the so-called ‘zero waiting
policy’ which refers to childcare waiting lists. So far, one of the arguments
against implementing the idea of ‘womenomics’ was the lack of childcare
institutions. PM Abe’s plan outlined in the report mentions creating
400,000 places in childcare institutions by the end of 2017 (Japan is Back
2013, p. 46).
The next crucial arrangements supporting increasing women’s
participation in the workforce involve private sectors. The government
aims not only to urge companies to employ more women, especially in
managerial positions but also wants to actively support units that promote
women’s participation themselves. In order to achieve this goal, a variety of
initiatives have been launched. Since 2013, Japanese Ministry of Economy,
Trade and Industry (METI) has promoted two policy programs: Diversity
Management Selection 100 and the Nadeshiko Brand (Song 2015, p. 121).
The first program was created to honour the employers, large as well as
small and medium-sized enterprises, that voluntarily implement the idea of
a diverse working environment and improve their productivity by employing
women, overseas workers, people with disabilities, and the elderly (Ministry
of Economy, Trade and Industry 2016). Despite the fact that the program
was designed to award corporations that have been the most successful in
introducing diversity in human resource management, the main emphasis
has been put on women in particular and advancing their positions within
the companies. Such a conclusion can be drawn from looking at the lists of
rewarded companies published by METI, particularly the column entitled

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“Key points that examiners looked for when selecting the winners” where
the majority of comments refers to female employment (Forty Six Winners
of the FY2013 Diversity Management Selection 100 Project 2013; Fifty-
Two Winners of the FY2014 Diversity Management Selection 100 Project
2015; New Diversity Management Selection 100 in FY2015, 2016).
Since its initiation, Diversity Management Selection 100 has rewarded
132 companies: 46 in fiscal year (FY) 2013, 52 in FY2014, and 34 in FY2015.
The second initiative, the Nadeshiko Brand, also seeks to distinguish
corporations that increase their female employment rate and that are
listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. The difference between Diversity
Management Selection 100 and the Nadeshiko Brand is that in the first
initiative the companies send their application materials in order to
participate. In the second one, the program chooses corporations themselves
(Song 2015, p. 123). It was introduced in FY 2012 and has been continued
since then. Through the Nadeshiko Brand, METI seeks to list enterprises
“that are outstanding in terms of encouraging the empowerment of
women in the workplace as attractive securities investment opportunities
to investors who put emphasis on improving corporate value in the mid-
and long-term, in an aim to promote investment in such enterprises
and accelerate efforts encouraging women’s success in the workplace”
(Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 2016).
Another issue that has been raised in the Japan is Back plan (2013)
targets the country’s working system as a whole. Hence, it has been
underlined that changes in working environment are essential in order
to match it to the lifestyle of women. This is particularly concerning
nonflexible working hours and parental leave. The government aims to
reform the system so that both parents could take a childcare leave should
they wish for it or select short-time working hours until the parents’ child
reaches the age of three. What is more, not only will the adjustable hours
of work be gradually implemented but also flexible ways of working such
as telework. Last but not least, the report also seeks to undertake a series
of steps in order to ensure the re-learning and internship programs for
women who wish to return to work after having a child (Japan is Back
2013, p. 45).
After introducing the complex plan of economic revitalisation in
2013, the government took a year to evaluate and correct it in order to
adapt to changing circumstances more accurately. Hence, the second
report entitled Japan’s challenge for the future was published (2014) that
also concerns matters closely related to ‘womenomics’.

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The second revitalisation strategy confirms, to a large extent, what

has been stated in the first report. However, there are several factors that
are either new or that have been emphasised more strongly after reviewing
the first document.
With regards to childcare and its link to ‘womenomics’, the most
crucial problem is concerning the so-called ‘1st Grade Barrier’ which is
concerning the problem of children’s entrance to elementary schools.
Furthermore, the issue of reviewing tax and social security system so that
they can be neutral to how women decide to work, as well as the spouse
allowance, are equally essential in increasing women’s participation in the
workforce (Japan’s challenge for the future 2014, pp. 9–10).
Close cooperation with the private sector is also being widely advertised.
The government encourages enterprises to disclose information regarding
women’s recruitment and provide the number of women in the company
who occupy the executive and management positions. With this policy,
a specific target has been compiled. By 2020, 30% of leadership positions
are to be held by women. The percentage rate of women occupying
executive and managerial positions in Japan is still very low, although
this number has been slightly increasing recently. According to the data
provided by the Japanese government, in 2012, the proportion of women
in leadership was at the level of 6.9% whereas in 2013 it rose to 7.5%.
Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that compared to other developed
countries, the numbers for Japan are rather unfavourable. Compared with
the US, where the percentage of women in managerial, legislator, and
senior official positions was 43% in 2013, Japan’s result is particularly low
since it was only 9% (Chanlett-Avery & Nelson 2014, p. 2).
The next factor being perceived as an opportunity to increase women’s
participation in labour force, that has been broadly highlighted in revised
growth strategy, is linked to migration. The report mentions that it will
be willing to accelerate accepting foreign housekeeping support that
would allow Japanese women to return to work. To enforce that plan, the
government considered including foreign care workers and housekeepers
into the National Strategic Special Zones on a trial basis that is to be
managed by local authorities (Matsui et al. 2014, p. 7).
PM Abe’s plans regarding ‘womenomics’ are a vital part of ‘Abenomics’
and can be summarised in several targets highlighted in both revitalisation
strategies. Those goals include: increasing female representation in
leadership, activating particularly women between age 24–44 on the job
market; securing the return to work for women after their first child, raising

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that number from 38% in 2010 to 55% by 2020, implement ‘zero waiting’
policy regarding childcare; and encouraging fathers to take paternity leave
(Matsui et al. 2014, p. 7).
Since ‘womenomics’ has started to be widely promoted under the
current government, some positive outcomes can be observed. In 2013
the female participation in the labour force reached 62.5% which is the
highest result so far achieved. Consequently the ‘M-curve’ has been slowly
decreasing, as presented on the graph below.

Graph 2. The evolution of Japan’s ‘M-curve’. Female employee rate by age (%)

Source: Matsui et al. 2014, p. 9.

However, despite several favourable numbers regarding ‘womenomics’

and complex reforms that are under debate and implementation, many
obstacles, that still need to be addressed, remain. Key challenges to success
of those amendments don’t seem to be concerning only purely economic
issues but also or, arguably, primarily, major transformations in social
system.

Key challenges to ‘womenomics’ success

‘Abenomics’ was already confronted with a traditional perception of
women in Japan, as those being responsible primarily for childcare and
household. As a result, certain figures from the original government plans,
e.g. those regarding targets for women occupying leadership positions,
have been changed. For the national bureaucracy sector the target high-
position employment has been lowered from 30% to only 7%. The target for

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private companies has also been lowered, though to 15% (Rafferty 2015).
What is more, it seemed to encounter a firm resistance towards the
proposed changes in the private sector. The problem of target female
employees was especially concerning. Some companies, while preparing
their voluntary action plans on the improvement on female employment,
aimed to eliminate the numerical target introduced by the government.
Many companies also argued that the plans regarding the increase of the
female employment should not be unified but rather based on individual
enterprises’ circumstances (Song 2015, p. 126).
The companies’ rather sceptical reception of the government’s agenda
is also closely linked to Japan’s entire working and social system which
relies, to a greater extent, on regular male employees that, in turn, arises
from hierarchy and the culture of ‘salarymen’ (Macnaughtan 2015a).
The male breadwinner model, which relies on men being responsible for
productive roles within the society, still characterises the Japanese working
environment (Macnaughtan 2015b). However, the lack of flexibility and
long working hours led to a situation of men participating in parenthood to
a radically lower degree and at the same time, being more often employed
on a regular basis. The study conducted by Helen Macnaughtan (2015b)
shows that, while regular employment for women is only at the level of
almost 42%, the same type of employment for men is significantly higher
and oscillates around 75%. Regular employment is still oriented more
towards men than women who, due to a number of reasons, mostly the
possibility of having and raising a child, often can only find non-regular
employment. This is closely related to the argument raised by some
scholars that if the idea of ‘womenomics’ is to be successfully implemented,
it also needs include men. Such arguments are particularly concerning the
issue of enhancing men to take parental leave, for companies to consider
more flexibility, reform of the spousal income tax, and expanding social
security insurance to non-regular workers (Miyamoto 2016).
Another challenge for the success of ‘womenomics’ is containing the
social troubling phenomenon of ‘matahara’ which refers to the maternity
harassment at work and discriminating pregnant women. This issue is
now being broadly debated in Japan and it also seems to fuel civil society
initiatives such as Matahara Net, a non-profit organisation established by
Sayaka Osakabe who was a victim of ‘matahara’ herself. It also sparkled
the need for a discussion of securing women’s maternity laws and may be
perceived as a catalyst of a broader social shift within the Japanese society
(Stewart 2015).

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The most recent report issued by Goldman Sachs (Matsui et al.

2014) also includes a set of recommendations for a better adaptation of
‘womenomics’. Among the proposals concerning the government and
business sector, the ones referring to society seem to be crucial in order
to achieve a long-term change. The GS report emphasises particularly
the issue of Japanese men not being involved in child upbringing due
to extensive working hours as well as the gap between Japanese women
receiving high education and yet not being able to promote female scholars
and researchers. As authors of the report indicate, the developments
should include gender equality, but also acting against certain myths that
may be halting women from returning to work or entering the job market.
The arguments, that do not seem to have reference in reality contain
opinions such as those that: (1) women quit work because of factors such
as giving birth to a child or taking care of the eldery, (2) women do not
wish to return to work after having a child, (3) activating women on the
job market will automatically cause the reduction of jobs for men, and
(4) the more women work, the lower the birth-rate will be (Matsui et
al. 2014, pp. 24–25). The research shows, that the primary reason for
women leaving their workplace is their dissatisfaction with it. Next, public
opinion surveys show that the desire of Japanese women to return to work
after childbirth is similar to other developed states such as Germany or
the US. The apparent difference appears when it comes to measuring how
many women were able to actually find employment as the percentage
rate is much higher for Germany or the US than for Japan. The desire for
Japanese women to return to work after giving birth to a child is estimated
at 77% (89% for the US and 78% for Germany). However, only 43% of
women in Japan were able to find employment in those circumstances
against 73% in the US and 68% in Germany (Matsui et al. 2014, p. 26).
Therefore, it also seems to refer to the problem of the lack of flexibility
within companies in Japan rather than one with Japanese women’s
willingness to work.

Conclusion
‘Abenomics’ is a fresh idea of securing Japan’s position within the
regional and global system, which ‘womenomics’ is a crucial part of. It
is difficult to estimate its results yet, considering the narrow timeline of
implementation that only began with the publication of the Revitalisation

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Strategy in June 2013 and was then reevaluated a year later with a revised
document. The government seems to respond to the dynamic changes
within the global economic system and introduced a variety of programs
enhancing the increase of participation of Japanese women within the
workforce. The first positive results can also be observed, especially in
the area of migration and childcare facilities. Nevertheless, while being
deeply focused on the potential numbers that ‘womenomics’s’ success could
bring into the Japanese economy, the LDP’s politicians seem to omit or
forget about much more complicated and time-challenging issues. As long
as the whole traditional social system, where women are being perceived
first and foremost as mothers and men as those responsible for making
money, is not transformed, the favourable outcome of ‘Abenomics’s’ third
arrow can only be limited.
This article has drawn attention to two main aspects of ‘womenomics’.
The focus of the government, targeting the business sector, resulted
in introducing initiatives, such as Nadeshiko Brand and Diversity
Management Selection 100. Those programs aim to influence private
enterprises and encourage greater representation of women within the
companies. Hence, it provides a starting point to advancing the female’s
position on the job market. Nevertheless, such programs do not seem to be
sufficient, as the other aspect of the article highlights challenges to success
of the ‘womenomics’. Taking them into account, it has been argued that
the government’s actions should be concentrated more on launching
initiatives that will be focused on Japanese society itself. Clearly, some
dangerous occurrences like ‘matahara’ demand some nation-wide social
programs in order to change women’s position in Japan. Although such
initiatives and actions may not and will not change the system rapidly,
they may have a significant impact on the transformation of Japanese
people in the long term.

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AGNIESZKA BATKO is a PhD Candidate in Political Science at the Institute

of Political Science and International Relations of Jagiellonian University. She
graduated from Jagiellonian University and received her MA in International
Relations in 2015. She also studied at Griffith University (Australia) and The
University of Hull (United Kingdom). In her research, she is focusing on the Japan–
South Korea reconciliation process from the perspective of non-governmental
organisations in both states.

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 http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/8088-758-9.04

Karol Żakowski
(University of Lodz)

Failed Attempts at Sino-Japanese

Security Cooperation1

Abstract

The aim of this chapter is to analyze the reasons of failure in establishing

a stable framework for Sino-Japanese security cooperation after the end of
Cold War. Since the 1990s both countries have tried many times to strengthen
mutual trust, institutionalize military exchange or create a telephone hotline for
emergency situations, but so far these efforts have remained futile. While in 2006–
2010 it seemed that China and Japan started overcoming mutual prejudices, the
situation deteriorated after the two East China Sea incidents in 2010 and 2012.
The article argues that both countries have been unable to develop a full-fledged
cooperation in the security field due to history problems, contrasting visions of
regional security system, territorial disputes, and rivalry for leadership in East
Asia.

Key words: Sino-Japanese relations, security policy, foreign policy.

Introduction
After the “Nixon shock” in 1971 and normalization of Sino-Japanese
official diplomatic contacts in 1972, Japan managed to establish a mutually
beneficial relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). While
bilateral relations focused mainly on the economic dimension, Tokyo and
Beijing treated each other as potential partners in competition against the

1 This article is a result of research conducted as a part of a project financed by the

Polish National Science Centre based on decision No. DEC-2013/11/B/HS5/04005. In
2017 the author received the prize of the University of Lodz Foundation.

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Soviet Union. However, the situation changed after the end of Cold War.
Since the mid-1990s China and Japan gradually started perceiving each
other as a threat. Tokyo was concerned with China’s “missile diplomacy”
towards Taiwan, incursions of research vessels and naval ships in Japanese
waters in the East China Sea, rapid increase in Chinese military budget, and
growing anti-Japanese feelings in the PRC. Beijing, in turn, was dissatisfied
with the strengthening of the US–Japanese alliance, Tokyo’s attempts at
revising the pacifist Article 9 of the constitution, or more assertive posture
in territorial disputes. Meanwhile, reoccurring incidents, mainly in the
East China Sea, showed a necessity for establishing a reliable channel of
communication between both countries in emergency situations.
Despite the need for the institutionalization of security exchange,
however, Sino-Japanese cooperation in this field remained much less
pronounced than in the economic, political, or cultural dimensions. The
aim of this paper is to explain the reasons for this situation. It is argued that
while there were several opportunities at strengthening mutual security
exchange, they were spoiled by political circumstances in both countries
as well as external factors. Due to the rise of nationalism in Japan and
China, contradictory national interests and random incidents in the East
China Sea, both sides were unable to overcome mutual prejudices in order
to institutionalize the security dialogue.
Because of the contentious nature of Sino-Japanese security relations,
it is disputes rather than cooperation between both countries that have
attracted interest from researchers. This article analyzes several attempts
at institutionalization of bilateral security exchange since the 1970s,
with emphasis on the post-Cold War era. Separate sections are devoted
to description of four periods of mutual dialogue: 1) until the Koizumi
administration, 2) under the cabinets of Abe, Fukuda, and Asō, 3) during
the reign of the DPJ, as well as 4) under the current Abe administration.

1. First Initiatives in Security Cooperation

Between Japan and China
During the Cold War, Japan maintained close security cooperation
with its powerful ally, the US, but Tokyo was very reluctant to initiate
formal exchange in this field with other governments. Kanemaru Shin
who visited Belgium and Western Germany in 1978 was the first Japan
Defense Agency director-general ever to pay a different visit abroad than

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in Washington. At that time, Tokyo made its first attempts at initiating

security dialogue with China as well. In 1974 Japan sent a military attaché
to its embassy in Beijing, and in 1978 Deputy Chief of Chinese General
Staff Zhang Caiqian for the first time unofficially visited Tokyo. In the
1970s, however, mutual exchange in the security field remained very
sporadic and irregular (Hirose 2011, pp. 86–115). As pointed out by Wan
(2006, pp. 31–34), lack of any notable bilateral activity in this area during
the Cold War contrasted with Sino-Japanese interaction in other fields,
as well as with the security exchange conducted by both governments
with third countries. One of the reasons was Tokyo’s concern that more
pronounced military contacts with Beijing could provoke the Soviet Union
and alarm the governments in Southeast Asia.
The first meeting between the Japan Defense Agency director-general
and Chinese minister of national defense took place in Tokyo in July
1984. Director-General Kurihara Yūkō and General Zhang Aiping agreed
to intensify the mutual exchange of military staff. Indeed, in the following
years high-ranking bureaucrats from the Chinese Ministry of National
Defense and Japan Defense Agency started meeting on a more regular
basis. Both sides even promised to commence cooperation in the field of
training and exchange of information. Nevertheless, when Japan Defense
Agency Director-General Kurihara Yūkō for the first time visited Beijing in
May 1987, he stressed that Tokyo should display prudence in establishing
close security cooperation with any other country than the US. In fact,
the budding Sino-Japanese exchange in this field was suspended after the
Tiananmen shock only two years later (Hirose 2011, pp. 115–117).
Interestingly, it is Japan, concerned with a dynamic increase in
Chinese military spending, who proposed to resume bilateral security
discussions. The first meeting at the bureau-chief level took place in
Beijing in December 1993. Nevertheless, the new security dialogue
platform was suspended by China in 1997. It was a way of protesting
against Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Kajiyama Seiroku’s statement
that the new guidelines for the US–Japan alliance would cover Taiwan, as
well as against Tokyo’s plans to cooperate with Washington regarding the
construction of the theatre missile defense system (Wan 2006, pp. 36–37).
Meanwhile, in the mid-1990s the bilateral relationship was further
exacerbated by China’s nuclear tests, series of Chinese military maneuvers
near Taiwan, excursions of Chinese and Japanese nationalists to the
Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands, and growing tension over the exploration of
natural resources in the East China Sea. All these incidents compelled

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both sides to seek a reopening of mutual dialogue in the security field. In

February 1998, Chinese Minister of National Defense Chi Haotian paid
the first official visit to Japan, followed by Japan Defense Agency Director-
General Kyūma Fumio’s visit to Beijing in May 1998. Both ministers
inspected their counterpart’s military bases and agreed to continue mutual
visits on ministerial, general staff, and army levels on a more regular basis.
Moreover, they even admitted the necessity for promoting joint research
between the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) National Defense University
and the Japanese National Institute for Defense Studies as well as starting
negotiations on mutual visits of military ships (Hirose 2011, pp. 118–119).
Despite these ambitious goals, Sino-Japanese cooperation in the
security sphere kept being hindered by China’s increased activity in the
East China Sea. The PRC’s maritime survey ships appeared in the disputed
waters as many as 16 times in 1998, 30 times in 1999 (including four
times near the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands), and 24 times in 2000. Their
crews continued excursions despite the calls from Japanese patrol vessels
to leave the disputed area. Moreover, PLA Navy ships started infringing
Japanese waters as well. In May 1999, as many as 12 Chinese vessels
were spotted 110 kilometers north of the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands. In
July 1999, ten military ships were observed 130–260 kilometers north
of the disputed archipelago. In addition, in 2000 several Chinese vessels
demonstratively circumnavigated the Honshu, Shikoku, Kyushu, and
Ryukyu Islands, gathering oceanographic data on the waters surrounding
the Japanese Archipelago that could be used for military purposes.
Eventually, in February 2001 Beijing and Tokyo signed a marine research
prior notification agreement. Both sides promised to inform each other at
least two months before their vessels entered waters near the other country
(Valencia & Amae 2003, pp. 196–202).
Nevertheless, Sino-Japanese relations further deteriorated under the
Koizumi administration in 2001–2006. Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichirō
visited the controversial Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo annually during
his term in office, which provoked increasingly decisive protests from
China.2 The dispute over history problems contributed to the escalation
of frictions between Tokyo and Beijing in the security field as well. Feeling
that Koizumi was ignoring Chinese demands on the Yasukuni issue, the

2 Yasukuni is devoted to all Japanese who died in service of their country. Since 1978
also class-A war criminals sentenced to death by the Tokyo Tribunal in 1948 have
been worshipped in this controversial shrine. For that reason, since 1985 China and
South Korea have protested Japanese prime ministers’ visits to Yasukuni.

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PRC became more assertive towards Japan. All these factors destabilized
the security situation in the region. For example, Tokyo strongly protested
after spotting a Chinese submarine in Japanese waters in November 2004.
The atmosphere in bilateral relations became particularly tense in early
autumn 2005, when China sent a whole fleet of navy ships to protect the
Chunxiao/Shirakaba drilling rig in the East China Sea.3 One of Chinese
destroyers even trained its guns at the nearby Japan Maritime Self-Defense
Force P-3C patrol aircraft (Manicom 2008, pp. 462–463).
Obviously, the above problems hindered the institutionalization of
Sino-Japanese security exchange. In July 2001 the Japanese Defense White
Paper mentioned for the first time that the PRC’s military potential had
exceeded levels necessary for national defense. Bilateral security dialogue
was suspended by China in response to Koizumi’s first visit to Yasukuni in
August 2001. Vice-ministerial security meetings were resumed in Tokyo
in March 2002. Both sides agreed to arrange mutual visits of navy ships
starting from May 2002, but China once more suspended all security
exchange with Japan after Koizumi’s second homage to Yasukuni in April
2002. Moreover, Japanese Defense Attaché in Beijing Aono Hiromasa was
recalled in November 2002 due to accusations on gathering intelligence in
a restricted military zone near Ningbo. It seemed that an opportunity for
resuming security dialogue appeared after Hu Jintao assumed the office
of Chinese president in March 2003. In September 2003 Japan Defense
Agency Director-General Ishiba Shigeru visited China, where he agreed to
re-launch mutual navy port calls. As a symbol of good will, in the same
month a PLA officer started a training course in the Japanese National
Institute for Defense Studies. Yet, just as in previous years, the plans of
institutionalizing security exchange were suspended after Koizumi’s visit
to Yasukuni in January 2004. In August 2005 Tokyo published the new
Defense White Paper, in which it warned that the modernization of the
PLA might shift the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait in Beijing’s
favor (Wan 2006, pp. 38–43).
The normalization of Sino-Japanese official diplomatic relations
in 1972 created conditions for initiation of bilateral security dialogue.
Nevertheless, numerous factors inhibited the deepening of mutual
exchange in this field. Interestingly, in the Cold War period it is Japan

3 China started preparing for the exploitation of the Chunxiao/Shirakaba gas field in
2003. While the field was situated on the Chinese side of the median line between
Chinese and Japanese Exclusive Economic Zones, Japan claimed that the Chinese
drilling rig would suck up oil from the Japanese side.

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who displayed prudence in strengthening security ties with China, while

since the 1990s it is Beijing who started distancing itself from the plans
of institutionalizing bilateral dialogue. This change reflected China’s
strengthened position vis-à-vis Japan, but also growing anti-Japanese
sentiments in Chinese society.

2. Sino-Japanese Security Cooperation under

the Abe, Fukuda, and Asō Administrations
Sino-Japanese security cooperation was eventually re-launched after
Koizumi stepped down from office in September 2006. Prime Minister
Abe Shinzō, though being a nationalist, treated the improvement of
relations with China as one of priorities of his cabinet. By not stating
clearly whether he would pay homage to the Yasukuni Shrine or not,
he managed to convince the Hu Jintao administration to accept his
visit to Beijing in October 2006. Regarding security issues, both leaders
“confirmed that they would accelerate the process of consultation on
the issue of the East China Sea, adhere to the broad direction of joint
development and seek for a resolution acceptable for the both sides.”
In addition, Abe and Hu agreed to “enhance mutual trust in the area of
security through Japan-China security dialogue and defense exchange,”
and they reaffirmed that they would “cooperate and make utmost efforts
through dialogue and consultation for achieving denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula and maintaining peace and stability in Northeast Asia”
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2006).
In August 2007 Chinese Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan visited
Tokyo where he met his Japanese counterpart Kōmura Masahiko. For the
first time both sides issued a joint press release, in which they reconfirmed
their will to continue their mutual exchange of defense ministers and
regular security meetings, return to the initiative of mutual visits of navy
ships, create a work team for establishing a communication mechanism
between both ministries, strengthen research and training cooperation as
well as sports and cultural exchange, coordinate efforts in case of natural
disasters, and even send observers to military exercises. As a result, in
September 2007 for the first time ever Self-Defense Forces functionaries
were allowed to watch military maneuvers in China. Meanwhile, Fukuda
Yasuo, known for his sympathy towards China, assumed a prime
ministerial post in Japan. Under his leadership the security exchange with

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Beijing flourished. In November 2007 the Shenzhen missile destroyer,

as the first Chinese military vessel ever, paid a four-day long visit to the
Tokyo port (Hirose 2011, pp. 121–122).
At the beginning of May 2008 President Hu Jintao visited Tokyo,
where he signed the Joint Statement between the Government of Japan
and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Comprehensive
Promotion of a “Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common
Strategic Interests.” Both governments admitted that “Japan and China
now have great influence on and bear a solemn responsibility for peace,
stability, and development of the Asia-Pacific region and the world.”
Moreover, “The two sides recognized that they are partners who cooperate
together and are not threats to each other.” Among the five pillars of
dialogue and cooperation that were specified by both leaders, three directly
referred to security issues. In the first pillar (Enhancement of mutual trust
in the political area) it was decided to “enhance the exchange of high-
level visits in the area of security, promote various forms of dialogue and
exchange, and further enhance mutual understanding and trust.” The
third pillar (Enhancement of mutually beneficial cooperation) contained
commitment to “work together to make the East China Sea a ‘Sea of
Peace, Cooperation and Friendship’.” In the fourth pillar (Contribution
to the Asia-Pacific region), in turn, China and Japan agreed to “jointly do
the utmost to maintain peace and stability in the Northeast Asia region
and to together promote the Six Party Talks process” (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Japan 2008).
Immediately after returning from Japan, in mid-May 2008, President Hu
had to face a serious humanitarian crisis caused by a large-scale earthquake
in Sichuan Province. Despite initial reluctance, for the first time ever, Beijing
accepted Japanese disaster-relief teams who provided aid for the victims.
The efforts of the Japanese rescuers were widely transmitted by the Chinese
media, which to some extent improved the image of Japan in that country
(Shiroyama 2009, pp. 43–46). The Fukuda government also proposed to
use Japanese Air Self-Defense Force for sending supplies to the disaster
areas. Beijing was initially willing to accept this proposal, but unfortunately
it had to change its mind when a wave of anti-Japanese protests appeared
on the Internet as well as among some of senior Communist Party of China
(CPC) officials. The protests were caused by anti-Japanese feelings deeply
embedded in Chinese society (Shimizu 2009, pp. 72–73). This incident
clearly showed that even when political relations between both countries
thrived, history problems kept hindering mutual exchange in the security

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field. Nevertheless, in June 2008 the Japanese convoy Sazanami visited

Zhanjiang in the Guangdong Province. It was the first ever visit to China
by a Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force vessel. The convoy brought
blankets, food, and other supplies for the victims of the Sichuan earthquake
(Hirose 2011, pp. 122–123).
The greatest achievement of cordial relationship between Fukuda
Yasuo and Hu Jintao was the signing of the East China Sea resources joint
exploitation agreement in June 2008. Although the joint development
zone covered only a small part of the disputed area, it stretched both
east and west of the median line, which was consistent with Japanese
demands (Manicom 2008, pp. 466–469). Unfortunately, the agreement
was never ratified due to anti-Japanese protests in China, which were
probably to some extent incited by President Hu’s competitors in the
CPC. Nevertheless, bilateral security cooperation was continued under
the administration of Fukuda’s successor, Asō Tarō, who became the
Japanese prime minister in September 2008. In March 2009 Defense
Minister Hamada Yasukazu visited Beijing. He agreed with his Chinese
counterpart Liang Guanglie to continue a high-level exchange in the
security field, broaden it to junior officers, investigate the possibility of
sharing intelligence on piracy off the coast of Somalia, start a second
round of negotiations on establishment of a maritime communication
mechanism, as well as strengthen research and educational cooperation.
Subsequently, in July 2009 Chief of Staff of Japanese Maritime Self-
Defense Force paid a visit to China (Hirose 2011, p. 125).
Koizumi’s successors on the post of Japanese prime minister managed
to achieve a rapid amelioration of relations with China. Bilateral security
exchange peaked under the administration of Fukuda Yasuo, who was
considered a pro-Beijing politician. Both sides not only realized mutual
navy port calls, but also started negotiations on the establishment of
a maritime communication mechanism. Nevertheless, protests against
accepting Japanese Air Self-Defense Force in Sichuan or against ratification
of the East China Sea resources joint exploitation agreement showed that
in order to overcome all obstacles, political plans had to be backed by
a stable environment for long-term cooperation.

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3. Failed Attempt at Sino-Japanese Rapprochement

under the DPJ Government
When the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won parliamentary election
and formed new government in September 2009, it seemed that Sino-
Japanese security cooperation would thrive. Prime Minister Hatoyama
Yukio admitted that Japan in the past had been overly dependent on
the US and that Tokyo should increase efforts towards building the East
Asian Community with the neighboring countries, including China. Yet,
two incidents in the East China Sea in 2010 and 2012 quickly caused
unprecedented deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations.
Before the incidents, however, mutual exchange thrived indeed.
The Chief of Staff of Japanese Air Self-Defense Force participated in
ceremonies of the 60th anniversary of establishment of the PLA Air Force
in November 2009. In the same month, PLA Navy training ship visited
Japan. Chinese recruits not only made acquaintance with the recruits
of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, but they also participated in a tour
to the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum. Moreover, at the verge of
November and December 2009 Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie
met in Tokyo with his Japanese counterpart Kitazawa Toshimi. They
confirmed they would hold mutual conversations on an annual basis,
continue exchange of all kinds of military forces, envisage joint maritime
rescue exercises, and cooperate on security issues on multilateral forums.
Minister Liang also met Prime Minister Hatoyama, to whom he promised
that China would increase transparency of its security policy. In addition,
he visited the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force base in Sasebo, where he
was allowed to inspect the Aegis-equipped missile destroyer Chōkai. The
series of mutual high-level exchanges was continued in February 2010,
when China was visited by Chief of Staff of Japanese Ground Self-Defense
Force (Hirose 2011, pp. 125–126).
In June 2010 Hatoyama was succeeded by Kan Naoto. While the new
prime minister was not an as eager supporter of creating the East Asian
Community as his predecessor, it seemed that the cordial relationship
between Japan and China would be maintained. After all, Kan was
opposed to visits to the Yasukuni shrine as he wanted to avoid frictions
with neighboring countries. At the beginning of September 2010, however,
a dangerous incident occurred in the East China Sea. A Chinese trawler
collided with a Japanese Coast Guard vessel near the disputed Senkaku/
Diaoyutai Islands. Prime Minister Kan ignored Beijing’s demands for the

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release of the captain of the Chinese fishing boat, which led to a drastic
escalation of the dispute. The PRC not only halted all diplomatic and
cultural exchange with Japan, but also suspended export of rare earth
metals to that country and detained four Japanese citizens accused of
espionage in Hebei Province. Tokyo eventually extradited the Chinese
captain at the end of September 2010, but at that point bilateral relations
had been exacerbated beyond quick repair. Anti-Japanese demonstrations
continued all over China until November 2010, and Chinese vessels
started infringing Japanese waters in the East China Sea on a semi-regular
basis (Żakowski 2015, pp. 134–140).
In addition, Japan spoiled an opportunity at re-launching security
cooperation with the PRC after the Great East Japan Earthquake that
ravaged the Tōhoku region on March 11, 2011. Beijing sent rescue teams
to the disaster areas and most Chinese people felt solidarity with the
victims. On the other hand, China was concerned with the effects of
the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant crisis and dissatisfied with
the fact that Japan refused to accept a Chinese hospital ship to the disaster
region. Moreover, the Chinese government felt offended that condolences
offered to Japan by President Hu Jintao who visited Japanese embassy in
Beijing were not sufficiently appreciated by Tokyo.4
Despite Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko’s visit to China in December
2011, the bilateral relationship was still characterized by a lack of
mutual trust when another diplomatic incident occurred in 2012. In
April 2012 Tokyo Governor Ishihara Shintarō announced his plans to
purchase three of the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands from a private owner,
which compelled the government to nationalize them in September 2012.
Beijing reacted very harshly to this decision, and a wave of violent anti-
Japanese demonstrations spread over the whole country (Żakowski 2015,
pp. 185–192). Sino-Japanese diplomatic and cultural exchange was once
more suspended, and Chinese military vessels started regularly patrolling
the disputed waters in the East China Sea.
Interestingly, despite many successes in strengthening security
cooperation with China since the first Abe administration, LDP politicians
were unable to convince Beijing to establish an emergency hotline between
the navies of both countries. After the end of Cold War Japan had managed

4 In fact, Japan refused the acceptance of the Chinese hospital ship for technical rea-
sons, as it would not be able to approach the ravaged seashore. See: Matsumoto 2014,
pp. 37–46.

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to create a similar communication mechanism with South Korea and

Russia, and China had done so similarly with Russia and the US (Hirose
2011, p. 128). In this light, there were no technical obstacles against
establishing a Sino-Japanese hotline as well. Nevertheless, several rounds
of negotiations on that matter did not lead to any significant progress. As
admitted by Nukaga Fukushirō, former director-general of Japan Defense
Agency, preparations for creating such mechanism were advanced before
the 2012 Senkaku/Diaoyutai incident, but they were spoiled by the
diplomatic crisis.5 According to former Ambassador to China Miyamoto
Yūji, China’s reluctance resulted from the fear that whoever answered
a phone call from Japan could be held responsible for the response.6
The two East China Sea incidents occurred at the least expected
moment. It seemed that Sino-Japanese rapprochement would be continued
under the DPJ government, but the sudden diplomatic crises broke the
fragile thread of trust between the leaders of both countries. Under these
circumstances, all achievements of the Fukuda administration in security
exchange with China were nullified.

4. Sino-Japanese Frictions under the Second

Abe Cabinet
Instead of trying to ameliorate Sino-Japanese relations, Abe Shinzō
who returned as prime minister in December 2012 employed an assertive
posture towards Beijing. Not only did he exclude the possibility of making
any compromises on the Senkaku/Diaoyutai dispute, but he also visited
the controversial Yasukuni Shrine in December 2013. Concurrently, Abe’s
efforts towards the strengthening of alliance with the US and establishing
security cooperation with other countries in the region were perceived as
a way of encircling and containing China. Under these circumstances, it
is easy to understand why the Sino-Japanese security cooperation was not
reinitiated.
One day after formation of his cabinet, Abe proposed a concept of
“Asia’s democratic security diamond” that encompassed Japan, India,
Australia, and the US state of Hawaii. Pointing to the China threat,
he emphasized that the four states of the geopolitical diamond should

5 Authors interview with Nukaga Fukushirō, Parliament of Japan, February 27, 2013.
6 Author’s interview with Miyamoto Yūji, Tokyo, July 12, 2013.

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“safeguard the maritime commons stretching from the Indian Ocean

region to the western Pacific” (Abe 2012). During his visit to ASEAN
countries in January 2013, in turn, Abe announced the Five Principles
to Build the Future. The second principle encompassed “ensuring that
the seas, which are the most vital commons to us all, are governed
by laws and rules, not by might” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
2013). Obviously, it was a reference to the incursions by Chinese ships in
Japanese waters in the East China Sea. At the same time, Abe emphasized
the need for strengthening the defense capabilities of Japan. As he
stressed, it was physical force, not negotiations, that would be vital in
protecting the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands (Abe 2013, p. 248). Apart from
the US, Australia, and India, Abe strengthened security dialogue with the
undemocratic states of Russia and Vietnam. Soon after assuming office
he launched a wide-scale diplomatic offensive by visiting until May 2013
Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, the US, Mongolia, Russia, Saudi Arabia,
the United Arab Emirates, and Turkey (Ogawa 2013, pp. 204–216).
At the end of 2013, the Abe administration established the
National Security Council. The new institution, administered by
former Administrative Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Yachi Shōtarō,
became an organ in charge of coordinating Japan’s security policy. In
December 2013 Abe coined the concept of “Proactive Contribution to
Peace” (sekkyokuteki heiwashugi) that was included in the National
Security Strategy. The new doctrine was to strengthen Japan’s deterrence
capabilities, enhance alliance with the US and improve stability on the
global level based on universal values. As for relations with Beijing,
the Strategy warned that “China has been rapidly advancing its military
capabilities in a wide range of areas through its continued increase in
its military budget without sufficient transparency. In addition, China
has taken actions that can be regarded as attempts to change the status
quo by coercion based on their own assertions, which are incompatible
with the existing order of international law, in the maritime and aerial
domains, including the East China Sea and the South China Sea”
(Cabinet Secretariat 2013, p. 12). While perceiving China as a threat,
the Strategy stated that Japan would strive to enhance the mutually
beneficial relationship with Beijing in all areas, including security.
Regarding China’s use of coercion towards neighboring countries, the
document declared that “Japan will urge China to exercise self-restraint
and will continue to respond firmly but in a calm manner without
escalating the situation” (Cabinet Secretariat 2013, p. 25).

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China responded assertively to Japan’s initiatives. In November 2013

it established the Air Defense Identification Zone extending over the
disputed areas in the East China Sea. Since then, Chinese military aircrafts
have started regularly patrolling the disputed region. In April 2014 China
was to host the international naval review during the Western Pacific
Naval Symposium in Qingdao. While it invited as many as 20 countries to
join the event, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force was not invited.
As an act of solidarity with Tokyo, Washington cancelled the participation
of US navy ships, which prompted Beijing to cancel the whole review
(Yomiuri Shinbun Seijibu 2015, pp. 33–34).
One year after Abe’s visit to Yasukuni, China and Japan started
mending bilateral relations. Prime Minister Abe and President Xi held
a brief meeting during the APEC summit in Beijing in November 2014 and
a longer conversation during the Asia–Africa Summit in Jakarta in April
2015. In a joint statement issued in Beijing, both sides agreed “that they
had different views as to the emergence of tense situations in recent years
in the waters of the East China Sea, including those around the Senkaku
Islands, and shared the view that, through dialogue and consultation,
they would prevent the deterioration of the situation, establish a crisis
management mechanism and avert the rise of unforeseen circumstances.”
Moreover, they confirmed their intention to “gradually resume dialogue in
political, diplomatic and security fields and make an effort to build a political
relationship of mutual trust” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2014).
In Jakarta, in turn, Abe expressed his hope for “early commencement of
the implementation of a maritime and aerial communication mechanism
between the defense authorities” of both countries and he welcomed “the
resumption of the Japan–China Security Dialogue after four-year interval”
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2015).
Despite these declarations, however, so far no significant progress has
been made in establishing a durable framework for security cooperation.
One of obstacles was Japan’s indirect engagement in the territorial
disputes in the South China Sea. Responding to Beijing’s provocative acts
in the waters surrounding the Spratly Islands, Tokyo strengthened its
security cooperation with ASEAN countries. In July 2013 Abe promised
to use Official Development Assistance to provide 10 patrol vessels to the
Philippine Coast Guard. In June 2015, in turn, Maritime Self-Defense
Force for the first time participated in joint exercises with the Philippine
Navy. Japanese P-3C maritime patrol aircraft even demonstratively flew
over Palawan Island that is situated close to the area disputed with China.

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In addition, in August 2014 Japan signed an agreement with Vietnam,

in which Tokyo promised to donate six old military ships to that country
(Yomiuri Shinbun Seijibu 2015, pp. 78–81). Obviously, such actions did
not contribute to melting the ice in security cooperation with Beijing.
Instead of repeating his endeavors in promoting amelioration with
China from his first administration, Prime Minister Abe put emphasis on
strengthening Japan’s power of deterrence. Lack of trust in Sino-Japanese
contacts made the deepening of bilateral security exchange impossible.

Conclusions – Analyzing Obstacles

in Sino-Japanese Security Cooperation
Japan and China are two main powers in East Asia who have been
haunted by numerous disputes in the security field. The account of failed
attempts at institutionalization of bilateral security exchange confirms
that even a strong will by top decision makers in both countries may not
be enough to overcome mutual prejudices. In each of the analyzed periods
different factors hindered the strengthening of Sino-Japanese security
cooperation. During the Cold War, it is reluctance by Japan to develop
military exchange with countries other than the US that slowed down the
process of enhancing mutual ties in this field. At the verge of the 20th and
21st centuries, in turn, China’s growing assertiveness in the East China
Sea became both an obstacle in institutionalizing security cooperation and
an incentive for Tokyo to seek a more reliable emergency communication
channel with Beijing. Paradoxically, when China displayed more
willingness to initiate a constructive dialogue on security issues under
the Hu Jintao administration in 2003, Prime Minister Koizumi’s regular
visits to Yasukuni spoiled this chance.
The years 2006–2010 provide perhaps the most interesting example
of progress in Sino-Japanese security cooperation. Beijing and Tokyo not
only displayed strong conviction that both countries should cooperate
in the security field, but they also intentionally avoided any decisions
that could exacerbate tensions in bilateral contacts. There were some
results of this rapprochement, such as the realization of mutual port
calls or signature of the agreement on joint development of East China
Sea resources. However, the budding security exchange was abruptly
suspended due to the Chinese trawler collision crisis in 2010 and
nationalization of the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands in 2012. Abe’s and Xi’s

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 Failed Attempts at Sino-Japanese Security Cooperation 69

assertive stances on the territorial dispute and history problems buried

any chance at the continuation of security cooperation. Despite decades of
negotiations, even such an essential task as the creation of an emergency
hotline between both governments has not been realized.
The analysis conducted in this chapter seems to indicate that while
China and Japan may build friendly security relationship, this process
is likely to be gradual and long lasting. Mere good intentions by both
governments are only a necessary prerequisite, they have to be backed by
a stable environment for mutual cooperation. Unfortunately, numerous
history problems, mutual prejudices, and contradicting national interests
can easily mar any attempts at a lasting reconciliation.

References
Abe, S., 2012, “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond,” Project Syndicate, December 27.
Available online: http://www.project-syndicate.org/print/a-strategic-alliance-for-japan-
and-india-by-shinzo-abe (accessed January 23, 2015).
Abe, S., 2013, Atarashii Kuni e. Utsukushii Kuni e. Kanzenban [Towards a New Country.
Towards a Beautiful Country. Complete Edition], Bungei Shunjū, Tokyo.
Cabinet Secretariat 2013, “National Security Strategy,” December 17. Available online:
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/131217anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf (accessed April 17, 2016).
Hirose, Y., 2011, “Nihon no Anzen Hoshō, Bōei Kōryū no Rekishi” [History of Japan’s
Security and Defense Exchange], [in:] Akiyama M. & Zhu F. (eds), Nicchū Anzen
Hoshō, Bōei Kōryū no Rekishi, Genjō, Tenbō [History, Presence and Perspectives of
Sino-Japanese Security and Defense Exchange], Aki Shobō, Tokyo, pp. 85–139.
Manicom, J., 2008, “Sino-Japanese Cooperation in the East China Sea: Limitations and
Prospects,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 455–478.
Matsumoto, K., 2014, Kantei Kiki – Naikaku Kanbō San’yo toshite Mita Minshutō
Seiken [Kantei Crisis – DPJ Government Seen from the Perspective of Advisor to the
Cabinet], Chikuma Shobō, Tokyo.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2006, “Japan–China Joint Press Statement,”
October 8. Available online: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/joint0610.
html (accessed March 25, 2016).
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2008, “Joint Statement between the Government of Japan
and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Comprehensive Promotion
of a ‘Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests’,” May 7.
Available online: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/joint0805.html (accessed
March 25, 2016).
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2013, “The Bounty of the Open Seas: Five New
Principles for Japanese Diplomacy,” Jakarta, January 18. Available online: http://
www.mofa.go.jp/announce/pm/abe/abe_0118e.html (accessed January 23, 2015).
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2014, “Regarding Discussions toward Improving
Japan-China Relations,” November 7. Available online: http://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/c_
m1/cn/page4e_000150.html (accessed March 28, 2016).

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 70 Karol Żakowski

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2015, “Japan–China Summit Meeting,” April 23.
Available online: http://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/c_m1/cn/page1e_000041.html (accessed
March 28, 2016).
Ogawa, E., 2013, Kokka no Meiun. Abe Seiken Kiseki no Dokyumento [Fate of the Country.
Document on the Abe Government’s Miracle], Gentōsha, Tokyo.
Shimizu Y., 2009, “Chūgoku Mondai” no Kakushin [The Core of the “China Problem”],
Chikuma Shobō, Tokyo.
Shiroyama H., 2009, Chūgoku Kyōsantō “Tennō Kōsaku” Hiroku [Secret Record of
“Emperor Manipulation” by the Chinese Communist Party], Bungei Shunjū, Tokyo.
Valencia, M.J. & Amae, Y., 2003, “Regime Building in the East China Sea,” Ocean
Development & International Law, vol. 34, no. 2, pp. 189–208.
Wan, M., 2006, Sino-Japanese Relations. Interaction, Logic, and Transformation, Woodrow
Wilson Center Press, Stanford University Press, Washington and Stanford.
Yomiuri Shinbun Seijibu, 2015, Abe Kantei vs. Shū Kinpei. Gekika Suru Nicchū Gaikō
Sensō [Abe’s Residence vs. Xi Jinping. Intensifying Sino-Japanese Diplomatic War],
Shinchōsha, Tokyo.
Zakowski, K., 2015, Decision-Making Reform in Japan: The DPJ’s Failed Attempt at
a Politician-Led Government, Routledge, London–New York.

KAROL ŻAKOWSKI, PhD (2010) and habilitation (2016) in political science,

is Associate Professor at the Department of Asian Studies, Faculty of International
and Political Studies, University of Lodz. He was a visiting scholar at the Kwansei
Gakuin University (2008–2009), Keio University (2012–2013, Japan Foundation
Japanese Studies Fellowship), and National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
(GRIPS) in Tokyo (2016). His research focuses on the evolution of the Japanese
political system and foreign policy. He is author of Decision-Making Reform in
Japan: The DPJ’s Failed Attempt at a Politician-Led Government (Routledge,
2015), as well as other books, journal articles, and book chapters.

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 http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/8088-758-9.05

Kahraman Süvari
(Yildiz Technical University)

North Korea’s Fourth Nuclear Test

Abstract

North Korean state media announced on January 6, 2016 that North Korea
had successfully conducted its fourth underground nuclear test. Most importantly,
it was also claimed by the North that it was a hydrogen bomb test. It is already
known that North Korea previously performed three underground nuclear
tests in 2006, 2009, and 2013. Despite all the pressure from the international
community, why did North Korea conduct the fourth nuclear test? The main aim
of this study is to examine North Korea’s 2016 nuclear test. The study consists
of three parts. Firstly, the four nuclear tests performed by the North since 2006
will be analyzed. Although it is highly controversial that North Korea’s fourth
nuclear test was a hydrogen bomb test, as a matter of fact it was a test of a nuclear
explosive device. But, how was the last nuclear test different from previous tests?
In the second section, the possible reasons behind the fourth nuclear test will be
discussed. Different factors might drive the North to perform the nuclear testing.
However, in this study, it is argued that North Korea’s leadership carried out the
fourth nuclear test mainly because it wants to strengthen its nuclear deterrent
against the perceived threats to itself. Lastly, the study will end with a general
assessment about the main findings.

Key words: North Korea, nuclear weapons, nuclear testing.

Introduction
On January 6, 2016, international seismic monitoring stations
detected an ‘unusual’ earthquake on North Korean territory. A couple of
hours after the detection, North Korea’s Korean Central News Agency
(KCNA) state media outlet announced that the country (formally known
as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, DPRK) had successfully

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conducted a nuclear weapon test. Notably, North Korea also claimed it

had been a hydrogen bomb test. In fact, this was North Korea’s fourth
nuclear weapon test. Three previous underground nuclear tests in 2006,
2009, and 2013 are already well known. The main aim of this study is
to examine the fourth of North Korea’s nuclear tests. Is this nuclear test
different from previous ones? What factors motivated North Korea to carry
out the fourth nuclear test, despite all the pressure from the international
community? These are the main questions addressed in this study, which
will consist of three sections. Firstly, the four nuclear tests performed by the
North since 2006 will be analyzed. Although there is plenty of controversy
over whether North Korea’s fourth nuclear test was in fact a hydrogen
bomb test, it was, all the same, a test of nuclear explosive device. But,
how was the last nuclear test different from previous tests? In the second
section, I will discuss North Korea’s possible reasons for carrying out
the fourth nuclear test. I argue that the North Korean leadership’s main
aim was to strengthen its nuclear deterrent against perceived threats.
However, there are also other factors that might contribute to the drive to
conduct nuclear testing, for example, the need for technical development,
or for reasons of domestic politics. Finally, I will conclude the study with
a general assessment of its main findings. Due to the striking statement
of the North Korean leadership about its nuclear test, the first reactions
in the academic field to the North’s fourth nuclear test were mostly about
the technical characteristics of the nuclear weapon test (Albright 2016;
Nikitin 2016; Vishwanathan et al. 2016). However, the findings of this
study show that the fourth nuclear test carried out by the North was not
only a scientific experiment but also a political tool that sent signals to
both the international and its domestic community.

1. North Korea’s Nuclear Tests

In 2003, North Korea became the only country to have withdrawn from
the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). Two years later, Pyongyang
publicly announced that it possesses nuclear weapons for the first time.
North Korea’s nuclear weapon claims rested on proven nuclear testing.
Apart from this fourth nuclear weapon test, North Korea has conducted
three nuclear tests, in 2006, 2009, and 2013.

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1.1. The First Nuclear Test

The first nuclear bomb test took place at the Punggye-ri underground
test site in the northern part of the country on October 9, 2006. The
KCNA announced that the DPRK had performed a nuclear test at
the underground test site. It was officially declared that, “the field of
scientific research in the DPRK successfully conducted an underground
nuclear test under secure conditions on October 9” (DPRK Successfully
Conducts Underground Nuclear Test 2006). As North Korea is one of
the most secretive nations in the world, confirming whether the blast
had occurred from a nuclear explosion would be difficult. Therefore, the
following technologies were used to verify the underground nuclear test:
“seismology, radionuclide monitoring and satellite imagery analysis”
(Fedchenko 2009, p. 1). Following measurements from different research
centers all around the world, it was concluded that a nuclear test explosion
had created a substantial blast with an average magnitude of 4.2 on the
Richter scale and a yield of approximately 1 kiloton (Hui 2007, p. 121).
Moreover, it was also determined that the fissile material of the nuclear
device used in the test was plutonium (Fedchenko & Hellgren 2015).
North Korea’s first nuclear weapon test was strongly condemned by
the international community. Five days after the nuclear test, the United
Nation Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1718, which
condemned the nuclear test and stated that it was a threat to international
peace and security. The resolution stated that North Korea must leave all
its weapons of mass destruction and its related delivery systems. Moreover,
the resolution imposed sanctions on North Korea, which included banning
the export of luxury goods to North Korea, although without any threat of
use of force (UN slaps sanctions on North Korea 2006).

Table 1. North Korea’s Nuclear Tests

Date Seismic Type of Bomb Est. Yield

9 October 2006 4.2 Plutonium ~1 kt
25 May 2009 4.7 Plutonium (?) 2–4 kt
12 February 2013 4.9–5.1 HEU (?) 5–15 kt
6 January 2016 4.85–5.1 (?) (?)
Note. Data for the first nuclear test from Hui (2007), Fedchenko and Hellgren (2015);
for the second nuclear test from Eckert (2009), Fedchenko (2009); for the third nuclear test
from Whun (2013), Nikitin (2013), Zhang (2013); for the fourth nuclear test from USGS
(2015), Vishwanathan (2016).

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1.2. The Second Nuclear Test

On May 25, 2009, North Korea declared that it had successfully

detonated its second nuclear bomb. A 4.7 magnitude quake on the Richter
scale was detected near the test site by The United States (US) Geological
Survey. According to nuclear scientist Siegfried Hecker, the explosion yield
was in the range of 2 to 4 kilotons (Eckert 2009). The fissile material of
the experiment was not verified because unlike the first nuclear test in
2006, there was no radioactivity detected immediately after the nuclear
explosion. However, a Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI) report states that “due to the absence of detected radioactive
effluents from the explosion, it is not possible to establish whether the
North Korean test in 2009 used uranium or plutonium. It is widely
assumed that it used plutonium” (Fedchenko 2009, p. 5).
The international community reacted with outrage to North Korea’s
second nuclear experiment. On 12 June 2009, the United Nations Security
Council unanimously adopted resolution 1874, tightening the sanctions
and calling upon United Nations member states to control suspected
ships and airplanes carrying military materials in or out of the North
(Macfarquhar 2009).

1.3. The Third Nuclear Test

In 2013, KCNA announced that North Korea had conducted its

third nuclear test on February 12 at the Punggye-ri underground test site
(KCNA Report on Successful 3rd Underground Nuclear Test 2013). The
third nuclear test exhibited significant differences from the previous two
nuclear tests carried out by the North. Firstly, the yield of the third nuclear
test was more powerful than that of previous tests. It was registered as
a 4.9 to 5.1 magnitude quake on the Richter scale near the test site and
the explosion yield was estimated to be in the range of 5 to 15 kt, two
to three times more powerful than the second test. Such an estimated
explosion yield put it close to the level of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima
in 1945 (Whun 2013). The second difference was that although no
radioactivity, needed for verification of the fissile material of an explosive
device, was detected after the explosion, many experts determined that,
the source of the third nuclear test could have been highly enriched
uranium (HEU) (Nikitin 2013, p. 14; Zhang 2013). This reasoning has
two bases. Firstly, North Korea might not want to use its limited amount

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of plutonium for experiments. Secondly, after official announcements in

2009, it was already known that the North had a HEU program. The
third main difference emerged in the official North Korean statement.
It was stated that, “The test was conducted in a safe and perfect way on
a high level with the use of a smaller and light A-bomb unlike the previous
ones” (KCNA Report on Successful 3rd Underground Nuclear Test 2013).
Therefore, it was possible to interpret the announcement as a claim that
North Korea had obtained the ability to miniaturize nuclear warheads for
its ballistic missiles.
As a response to North Korea’s third nuclear test, the United Nations
Security Council issued Resolution 2094, on March 7, 2013, aiming to
reinforce and broaden the scope of the previous United Nations sanctions
against the DPRK (Security Council Strengthens Sanctions on Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea, in Response to 12 February Nuclear Test 2013).

1.4. The Fourth Nuclear Test: A ‘Hydrogen Bomb’

On January 6, 2016, the DPRK conducted its fourth underground nucle-

ar test. This time, however, the North Korean state media announced that
“the first H-bomb test was successfully conducted in the DPRK […]. The
DPRK fully proved that the technological specifications of the newly devel-
oped H-bomb for the purpose of test were accurate and scientifically verified
the power of smaller H-bomb” (North Korea hydrogen bomb test: Statement
from North Korean government in full 2016). For the first time, North Korea
claimed that a smaller H-bomb was detonated. However, for many analysts,
the claim of the North Korean regime is highly controversial because hydrogen
bombs or ‘thermonuclear devices’ which should release an incredible amount
of energy, measured in megatons, are more powerful than fission bombs and,
therefore, the blast should have been easier to detect than the other three
nuclear detonations. The seismic recordings of this nuclear test determine
that the nuclear test caused a seismic event with a magnitude of 4.85 to 5.2
on the Richter scale, which is a similar figure to the third nuclear test (Poster
of the North Korea Nuclear Explosion of 06 January 2015 – Magnitude 5.1
2016; Technical Findings: CTBTO Preparatory Commission 2016.1 Another
indicator able to provide evidence to confirm the North Korean claim would
be found in analyzing the types of gases released into the atmosphere after the

1 For CTBO, the nuclear explosion caused a seismic event of 4.85 on the Richter scale.
However, a 5.1 magnitude quake was detected by The US Geological Survey.

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nuclear explosion (Vishwanathan et al. 2016, p. 8).2 However, as in the cases

of the previous two nuclear tests, no radioactive gases have yet been detected
by radionuclide monitoring stations.
So, what did North Korea test? Open sources put forward some
hypotheses about North Korea’s fourth nuclear test.
The first possibility is that this nuclear test was just a fission bomb as
with previous tests (Albright 2016). The North Korean leadership might
have deliberately declared it as a hydrogen bomb test for domestic reasons
or in response to external factors.3 According to nonproliferation expert
Mary Beth Nikitin, nuclear scientists might even have exaggerated the
nuclear experiment to the North Korean leadership (Nikitin 2016).
For most experts, taking into account the DPRK’s announcement
about the nuclear test, the bomb that was tested may have been
a boosted fission bomb (Pearce 2016; Yan 2016). The working principle
of a boosted fission bomb can be described as follows:

A boosted-fission device uses a fission explosion to cause a small amount of deuterium

and tritium gas to undergo nuclear fusion. This fusion produces energy and extra
neutrons that cause more fissions in the fissile material, which results in a greater
explosive yield and a more efficient use of the fissile material. (The Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 2012, p. 204)

In other words, a boosted-fission device is more powerful than a fission

bomb, but not as destructive as we know an H-bomb to be.
Another possibility is that the North might have tested some parts of
an H-bomb. For some US officials, it is also possible that North Korea may
have tested the components of a thermonuclear device. Based on analysis
of the nuclear test, they argue that the last nuclear test was carried out
deeper underground than originally assessed – “at a depth consistent with
what might be needed for a hydrogen bomb” (Starr 2016).
Lastly, for some, the North performed an H-bomb test, but one that
resulted in failure. In other words, contrary to North Korea’s statements,
it was a failed hydrogen bomb test. Jeffrey Lewis, a non-proliferation
expert, is among those who believe it was a possible failed thermonuclear
test (Faith 2016).
Meanwhile, the international community responded to the
nuclear testing of North Korea with United Nations Security Council

2 For instance, Argon-37 a radioactive gas releases after a thermonuclear explosion.

3 These factors will be mentioned in the next part of the study.

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Resolution 2270 which roundly condemned North Korea’s nuclear

activities and imposed heavy sanctions on the DPRK (UN Security
Council 2016).
After the three previous nuclear weapon tests, North Korea did not
need to show that it has a workable nuclear explosive devices. So, why did
the North needed this fourth test? In the next part of this study, possible
factors that might have forced the North to conduct its fourth nuclear test
will be discussed.

2. Possible Reasons behind the North’s Nuclear

Test Decision
Three major factors may have motivated the North to conduct its
fourth nuclear test; external factors, technical development needs, and
domestic politics.

2.1. External Factors

The basic logic of a deterrence strategy is to dissuade an opponent actor

from attacking. Here, the credibility of deterrence is very important, because
if the potential aggressor is not convinced that it will face ‘unacceptable
damage’ as a result of a military confrontation, the deterrence strategy
fails. Therefore, a state that maintains its security through a deterrence
strategy like North Korea always needs to strengthen its deterrence forces.
When the deterrence capabilities of North Korea are examined, it
could be said that its nuclear capabilities (nuclear warheads as well as
ballistic missiles as delivery systems) play a dominant role in maintaining
its national security because the North’s other military tools do not meet
its security needs. For instance, although North Korea has one of the
largest armies in the world, it has qualitative problems in its conventional
forces. Because of its isolated position in the international system, North
Korea’s military preparedness, combat effectiveness and capabilities have
declined, especially since the demise of its main ally, the Soviet Union.
The problems with North Korea’s conventional military forces can be
summarized as follows:

North Korea’s military capabilities are limited by an aging weapons inventory, low
production of military combat systems, deteriorating physical condition of soldiers,
reduced training, and increasing diversion of the military to infrastructure support.

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Inflexible leadership, corruption, low morale, obsolescent weapons, a weak logistical

system, and problems with command and control also constrain the KPA capabilities
and readiness. (IISS 2011, p. 54)

Therefore, with inferior conventional capabilities compared to its

adversaries, nuclear deterrence plays a crucial role in North Korea’s
security strategy to counter external threats in the region. In this context,
nuclear testing can be viewed as a ‘show of nuclear force’ also aimed at
strengthening its nuclear deterrence against possible threats. This may be
the North’s main motivating factor in conducting its fourth nuclear test.
The military presence of the US in the region, its nuclear umbrella
aimed at protecting its main allies in the region, and South Korea as
a rival Korean state are the main sources of threat for North Korea. In
recent years, the US has increased its military commitments on the
Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia, mainly responding to its ‘pivot
to Asia’ strategy (Mehta 2014). In order to increase the role of the US
in the Asia-Pacific, the Obama administration has defined the region as
one of its geostrategic priorities by announcing its ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy.
Under this strategy, the US would bolster its military cooperation with
its allies in the region. For instance, in January 2014, the US announced
that “it would send 800 more soldiers and about 40 Abrams main battle
tanks and other armored vehicles to South Korea as part of a military
rebalance to East Asia” (United States sending more troops and tanks to
South Korea 2014).
Another important development based on this US rebalancing
strategy and directly related to the North Korean nuclear issue occurred in
December 2014 when the US, Japan, and South Korea signed a trilateral
information-sharing agreement to counter the North Korean threat. In
the agreement, Japan and South Korea, for the first time, agreed to share
military intelligence about North Korea’s missile and nuclear weapons
programs via the US (Fackler 2014).
There is no doubt that all these developments have reduced North
Korea’s security and could push it to demonstrate its nuclear force to deter
a US-led military attack. In this regard, China also blames the increasing
US military activities for the North’s fourth nuclear test. For instance,
the state-run news agency Xinhua states that, “the DPRK’s defiance
was deeply rooted in its strong sense of insecurity after years of hostility
with the United States, whose pivot to Asia appears much like a show of
muscles” (Dongdong 2016).

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The other major source of military threat to the North is South

Korea. South Korea too has changed its security calculations vis-à-vis
North Korea, following military actions taken by the latter against the
South. In 2010, the Cheonan South Korean navy destroyer, sank in
the Yellow Sea and resulted in the deaths of 46 sailors. South Korea
blamed the North for this tragic incident. In the same year, North
Korea fired artillery shells at South Korea’s Yeonpyeong Island. These
developments made South Korea begin to question the US’ security
commitments aimed at deterring North Korean threats.4 Thus, in
March 2011, South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense introduced
a new defensive reform plan named DRP 307. In line with this plan,
South Korea changed its defensive doctrine from ‘Defense by Denial’ to
‘Proactive Deterrence’. With this new doctrine, the South Korean Army
would use force in response to unprovoked attacks by the North against
South Korea. For instance, the exchange of artillery fire between North
and South Korea in August 2015 can be viewed as an implementation
of this doctrine by South Korea (Sang-Woo 2011). The defense ministry
of the South announced that the South Korea’s army responded to the
North’s shelling with ‘tens’ of 155 mm artillery rounds (North and
South Korea ‘exchange fire’ at border 2015).
These developments on the South Korean side may have lead North
Korea to believe that it needs to strengthen its deterrence against the
South, as a rival Korean state on the Peninsula. Any military confrontation
with the US or its allies, such as South Korea, as a result of the failure of
deterrence may bring an end to the existence of North Korea.
It should be also noted in this study that another external factor
motivating the North to pursue nuclear testing is related to China.
Although Beijing has been Pyongyang’s most important ally since
the end of the Cold War, it also presents a source of concern for North
Korea. China is the main food and energy supplier to North Korea and
this asymmetrical relationship between the two neighboring countries
increases Chinese leverage over North Korea. China’s rapprochement with
South Korea in recent years also increases the security concerns of North
Korea. In July 2014, Chinese president Xi Jinping visited South Korea,
the first time a Chinese leader has visited South Korea before Pyongyang.

4 In order to assure South Korea and to counter North Korean threatening actions, after
2010 incidents, the US Secretary of Defense and the South Korean Minister of Defense
also established the Extended Deterrence Policy Committee in the same year.

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During the visit, the leaders of both states emphasized the need for the
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (China and South Korea oppose
North Korea nuclear tests 2014).
Therefore, by testing a nuclear bomb despite Chinese opposition,
North Korea might be trying to send a message to its Chinese friends
that “China should not ignore the existence of North Korea and, more
importantly, North Korea is not a province of China and will not be.” This
fourth nuclear test is the first time Pyongyang has not informed Beijing
prior to carrying out a test.

2.2. Technical Needs

The second factor driving North Korea to conduct a nuclear test is

related to its technical development needs. Nuclear weapon testing is
the last stage of a nuclear weapons program. As Table 2 indicates, all
‘declared’ nuclear weapon states have tested their nuclear explosive
devices numerous times.

Table 2. Nuclear Weapon Tests

The Number of
The Declared Nuclear Weapon
Nuclear Tests
States
(1945–2016)
The United States of America 1,032
The Soviet Union 715
The United Kingdom 45
France 210
China 45
India 3
Pakistan 2
The Democratic People’s Republic
4
of Korea
Source: “World Overview: CTBTO Preparatory Commission,” CTBO, accessed
May 22, 2016, https://www.ctbto.org/nuclear-testing/history-of-nuclear-testing/world-
overview/.

But, why have North Korea and these states needed to conduct nuclear
test? There are three basic explanations for this question.
Firstly, nuclear weapons are weapons and as with any other weapons,
their reliability is important. Reliability in terms of weapons means, “to be

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certain that a weapon type will work as intended” (Bailey & Barker 2003,
p. 132). Here, nuclear testing answers the basic question: does the nuclear
explosive device work? It should be clear that nuclear weapons work and
will work under emergency conditions, especially, for states that rely on their
ultimate deterrent force to protect their vital interests. It should also be noted
that because of their unique destructive characteristics, nuclear weapons are
the world’s most dangerous weapons. Therefore, reliability and effect need to
be strictly analyzed by countries who are developing nuclear weapons.
Secondly, nuclear tests have been conducted by nuclear weapon
states to produce new types of weapon systems. According to Josephine
Anne Stein, a mechanical engineer from the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, nuclear testing is necessary, even when designing new
warheads. Stein argues that nuclear tests are needed to collect data for the
development of new nuclear weapons (Stein 1986, pp. 8–9). Therefore,
nuclear testing allows states to improve their existing nuclear stockpile.
This is important, especially for recent nuclear weapon states that want
to obtain second strike capability for effective deterrence.
Thirdly, nuclear testing might be carried out by states in order to
analyze the performance of other weapons that might have a role in
the nuclear environment. In other words, nuclear testing provides the
necessary conditions for states to understand the survivability of their
non-nuclear weapons when they are exposed to a nuclear explosion (Stein
1986, p. 11). It is essential for states to examine which military tools will
function in the nuclear environment in order to defend their national
security after the use of nuclear weapons by another nuclear weapon state.
Taking the above into account and looking at North Korea’s fourth
nuclear test, it becomes clear that, the reliability of its nuclear weapons
is an important factor. For North Korea, nuclear weapons play a crucial
role in strengthening its national security. We can also interpret this from
the official DPRK announcements, stating that the fourth nuclear test
was carried out to test an H-bomb and thus develop a new type of nuclear
weapon for the North.
If it is true that North Korea tested components of an H-bomb, it
could be that the fourth nuclear test was also performed to provide data
for more powerful and more effective nuclear weapon designs. It is already
known that North Korea has long tried to achieve nuclear bombs small
enough to fit in the head of its ballistic missiles.
On the other hand, it is also possible that North Korea might have
conducted the nuclear test in order to understand the effects of nuclear

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explosion on its other weapons systems. From North Korea’s point of

view, they have lived under nuclear threat from the US since the Korean
War. During the Cold War, the US did not hesitate to explicitly threaten
the use of nuclear weapons against North Korea in any confrontation.
Nuclear threats from the US toward North Korea have continued during
the Obama administration. For instance, the Nuclear Posture Review
(NPR) which was published, in April 2010, states that “the United States
will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear
weapon state that is both party to the NPT and in compliance with
its non-proliferation obligations” (The Nuclear Posture Review Report
2010, p. ix). Thus, the 2010 NPR has emphasized that North Korea was
excluded from the negative security assurances of the US, meaning that
North Korea was still subject to US nuclear threat. Therefore, North
Korea might believe it necessary to prepare national defenses for a nuclear
environment.
In short, technical needs may have also motivated North Korea to
conduct its fourth nuclear weapon test in January 2016.

2.3. Domestic Politics

While nuclear testing may have enhanced North Korea’s nuclear

deterrent in the region; it is also true that developments in the nuclear field
have strengthened the position of the Kim Jong-un regime within the
country.
North Korea has been ruled by the Kim Dynasty since its establishment.
However, the new leader, Kim Jong-un, has only been in power since
2011. Kim Jong-Un, like his father Kim Jong-Il, has decided to continue
development of the country’s nuclear weapons program. In part this could
be a seen as a bid to bolster his leadership position.
Under Kim Jong-un’s leadership, the Supreme People’s Assembly of
North Korea declared on April 1, 2013, that it was launching a dual policy
of simultaneous development of the economy and of nuclear weapons
capability, known as the ‘byungjin’ doctrine (Choi 2013, p. 107). Under this
doctrine, North Korea aimed to strengthen its nuclear weapons capabilities
and bolster its national economy. Thus, the achievement of this policy
would not only increase support from the people of the DPRK, but would
also attract support from the military and elites for the Un regime.
On October 30, 2015, the KCNA declared that in early May 2016,
the 7th Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) would take place

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(Frank 2015). As the last party congress, as is known, was convened in

1980, this 7th Congress marks an important event for the North Korean
administration.
In light of these developments, a new and successful nuclear test would
be viewed as a product of the successful implementation of ‘byungjin’
doctrine and would enhance Kim Jong-un’s domestic support within the
party congress. In this regards, Lee Cheol-woo, a member of South Korea’s
parliamentary intelligence committee notes that, “North Korea needed
a good result to celebrate at the congress and that was the hydrogen bomb
test” (Pearson & Park 2016).

Conclusion
On January 6, 2016, the North Korean administration announced
that it had successfully conducted a hydrogen bomb test. Whether or
not it was a hydrogen bomb, it was the North’s fourth nuclear test. In
this study, it is argued that there are three main factors that might have
motivated the North to show its nuclear force. These are external factors,
technical development needs, and domestic politics. It could be said that
North Korea’s primary aim in conducting its fourth nuclear test was to
enhance security by strengthening deterrence against possible threats in
the region. However, in evaluating this North Korean nuclear weapon test,
the Chinese factor should not be ignored. The nuclear test might have
also been performed for reasons of technical development. Whether the
experiment is a success or failure, there is no doubt that it delivers some
technical results for North Korea that might be used for further nuclear
development. Additionally, in this study, it is asserted that the nuclear test
has helped strengthen Kim Jong-un’s position within the country.
In conclusion, the fourth nuclear test indicates that North Korea’s
nuclear capabilities are advancing and that it has no intention of
eliminating its nuclear weapons.

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KAHRAMAN SÜVARI is a Ph.D. candidate in International Relations at

Yildiz Technical University, Turkey. He holds a Master’s degree in International
Relations from Yildiz Technical University and a Bachelor’s degree in
International Relations from Eastern Mediterranean University, North Cyprus.
He serves as a Research Assistant at Yildiz Technical University since 2013.
His research interests include proliferation and non-proliferation issues, North
Korean nuclear politics and security studies.

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 http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/8088-758-9.06

Péter Klemensits
(PAGEO Foundation, Central Bank of Hungary)

Defence Reform and Military Modernization

in the Philippines in the perspective
of the South China Sea Conflict

Abstract

By the end of the 20th century, the Philippine military became one of the weakest
armed forces in Southeast Asia. For the past five decades, the Philippine military has had
to fight and contain communist insurgents and Islamist groups alike, and thus the army
has long been focussed on internal defence. However, after several incidents with China
in the South China Sea, the presidency of Benigno S. Aquino III brought about significant
changes, and serious steps have been taken to reform the defence establishment and
upgrade the military.
The author examines the main aspects of the defence reforms then the political-
military aims of the government in the context of the South China Sea conflict. In
conclusion, the article argues that the change of the international and domestic security
environment compels the cabinet to try to upgrade the armed forces capabilities and achieve
a minimum credible defence posture. The process however required careful balancing from
the cabinet between the strategic directions and development options, not forgetting the
financial constraints and the political factors as well.

Key words: the Philippine military, South China Sea, military modernization.

Introduction
Recent studies argue that at present in Southeast Asia the Philippines
have one of the weakest armed forces of the region (Storey 2007; De
Castro 2012). For decades, the Philippine military has been compelled
to fight with communist insurgents and Islamist groups alike, and the
focus was on the internal defence concerning the army. In the Cold War
era, the external defence of the country was guaranteed by the United

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States (US), but in the first half of the 1990s, resulting from the removal
of the US bases on Philippine soil, defending the state against internal
threat re-emerged as one of the main task of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP). Nevertheless, years of neglect and corruption passed,
then the slow process of the modernization due to lack of funds, the
armed forces’ capabilities remained extremely weak. However, due to
China’s aggressive foreign policy, the presidency of Benigno Aquino III
heralded important changes, and serious steps have been taken to reform
the defence establishment and upgrade the military, mainly the navy
and air force, with modern technology, while the country’s strategic
maritime interests in the South China Sea have been prioritized (De
Castro 2012, p. 78). Observers are divided on the rationality and value
of these efforts that demand high financial capacity and all-out reforms
by the government.
This article starts off with a review of the main aspects of the defence
reforms introduced since 1990. After that it examines the present state
of the AFP, the results of the modernisation programmes initiated
after 2010, and the medium- and long-term political-military aims of
the Aquino administration relating to the South China Sea with the
possible options as well. In doing so, for reasons of space my study does
not comprise a detailed analysis of the Philippine military’s capabilities
such as cyberwarfare, which became increasingly relevant in the 21st
century.
I argue and state that the very limited capabilities of the AFP affected
by the international and domestic security situation leave no other option
to the government, but to try to transform the national defence system to
become more efficient and capable in the future.

The Philippine military and the start

of the reforms
In the Marcos era, the armed forces became the main supporter of
the regime, for this reason the president made great allowances to secure
the loyalties of the generals and by instituting numerous self-reliance
programs, the AFP’s expansion could be achieved. Since 1951 under
the Mutual Defense Treaty, the US provided the external defence of the
country and gave serious help in financial aid and military hardware. In
the 1970s, the fight against the secessionist Moro in the South and the

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Communists insurgents laid heavy tasks on the army but due to the US
interests by the end of the Cold War the Philippines became one of the
most equipped military in Southeast Asia (Ferrer 2013, pp. 139–148).

Figure 1. Philippine Military Expenditure 2000–2014

Source: Abuza 2014.

After 1990, the change of the international and domestic situation

caused dire consequences for the Philippine armed forces. The 1947
Military Base Agreement provided the use of military bases like Subic
Bay for the US, which led to a very close cooperation between the US and
Philippine military. Beyond the financial aid – which in 1992 peaked at
$200 million per year – the AFP received significant technical and training
assistance from the US, by the way of keeping the armed forces operational
against the insurgencies in the post-Marcos period (Comer 2010, p. 5).
However, in 1992 the process ended as the Philippine Congress, in order
to demonstrate the country’s sovereign status in the post-Cold War order,
rejected the extension of the US military presence by voting down the
new Base Treaty. The US withdrawal resulted in the loss of the direct
support, without which the AFP’s capabilities declined rapidly, and to
make matter worse, the government kept the budget allocations of armed
forces at minimum, “making the Philippines one of the most chronically
underfunded militaries of the world” (Comer 2010, p. 5).
President Fidel Ramos was not preoccupied by the AFP’s problems,
but the events in the South China Sea instantly shed light on the meagre
capabilities of the armed forces. In February 1995, after China had
occupied Mischief Reef (part of the Philippine claimed Spratly Islands),
all the country could do was watch the Chinese expansion helplessly,
as the armed forces, specifically the Navy and the Air Force, no longer

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possessed real power. The need for reforms and modernization became
evident, and the Ramos cabinet planned to spend $7.7 million over
15 years for military modernization (Fisher 2012); the Republic Act
No. 7898 or the “AFP Modernization Act” as approved by the Congress,
aimed to declare “the policy of the State to modernize the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP) to a level where it can effectively and fully perform
its constitutional mandate to uphold the sovereignty and preserve the
patrimony of the Republic of the Philippines” (Republic Act No. 7898
1995, p. 2). This included the following thrusts: “Development of a self-
reliant and credible strategic armed force along the concept of a Citizen
Armed Force”; development in doctrines; reforms in the training and
recruitment of AFP personnel; upgrading technology and equipment;
providing suitable bases; and other facilities for the AFP (Republic Act
No. 7898 1995, p. 2). Without stable economic foundations, however,
the plan had no chance to succeed: the 1997 Asian financial crisis
eliminated most of its results and the deterioration of the nation’s
defence capability continued.

The Philippine Defense Reform and the Capability

Upgrade Program
The withdrawal of US troops from Philippine land did not result in
the end of military-military relations, as the US was interested in the
preservation of its positions in Southeast Asia and bolstering its ally.
The occupation of Mischief Reef by China, the al-Qaeda attacks in
2001, then the War on Terror moved the US to revitalize the old alliance
by deepening the two countries’ security-military relations.1 In 1999
a policy level consultation, the Joint Defence Assessment (JDA), began to
formulate between the Philippine Department of National Defense and
the US Department of Defense. Followed by the 2001 JDA report, in 2003
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo officially requested US “assistance in
conducting a strategic assessment of the Philippine defence system as
a part of a larger defence reform agenda” (Comer 2010, p. 7). The 2003
JDA revealed serious deficiencies in the institutional and strategic sphere,

1 As resulted from the ‘Chinese threat’, the Philippine–US military cooperation was
placed on firmer institutional foundations, concluding in the 1999 Visiting Force
Agreement, which provided the legal framework for the US military activities in the
country (De Castro 2009, p. 400).

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it also declared that the “AFP was only partially capable of performing
its most critical missions” (Comer 2010, p. 7). To implement the JDA
recommendations, the Arroyo cabinet worked out the Philippine Defense
Reform (PDR) as a multilayer plan for the coordination of the all-out
military reforms. The main ingredients of the PDR, constructed by the
Priority Program necessitated introducing “comprehensive, institutional
and systemic reforms in the defence establishment” (Comer 2010, p. 12).
The reform process was divided into three mutual based phases: 2004–
2005 creating the suitable environment for the reforms; 2005–2008
empowering the defence establishment; and 2008–2011 institutionalizing
and implement the reform. The funding of the programs was to be
accomplished by the allocation of US and Philippine national funds, but
the expenses mostly charged the Philippine government. Between 2004
and 2008, the US paid $51 million, while the Philippines made a $514
million allowance (Comer 2010, pp. 16, 26–27).
The PDR was aligned with the National Internal Security Plan
(NISP) released in 2001, which gave the necessary policy guidelines and
framework for the administration security actions for the 21st century.
According to the Plan, the main security threats were of domestic origin,
meaning the insurgencies. These could be broken down to three major
challenges: the communist New People’s Army (NPA), the Moro Islam
Liberation Front (MILF) in Mindanao, and the terrorist groups such as the
Jemaah Islamiya and the Abu Sayyaf. The counter-insurgency operations
against these organizations were prioritized over the AFP’s other tasks,
so as to defeat the insurgent groups decisively, while simultaneously
instituting the military reforms was an endless task for the military.
The armed forces were not able to crush the communist and Islamist
resistance even if the external defence developments were sidelined
and significant financial sources were transferred to combat operations
and personnel cost to the disadvantage of the modernization process. In
the second half of the 2000s, an average of 70% of the defense budget
was spent on personnel services, leaving only 29% for operational and
technical maintenance (De Castro & Lohman 2012, pp. 2–3).
By 2010 the progress of the PDR went more slowly than had been
hoped, because the early assumptions based on “steady rise in economic
growths coupled with an equally steady decline in the military threat
from terrorists and separatists” did not come true (Comer 2010, p. 34).
Moreover, the underfunding of the reforms by the Philippine government
continued, which also had its negative effect.

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The Capability Upgrade Program (CUP) started in 2006, based on

three six-year plans aimed to provide the AFP with the necessary hardware
for internal security operations, which in reality meant the upgrading of
the existing capabilities. The three periods of the project (2006–2011,
2012–2018, and 2019–2024) strategically focus on the containment of
domestic rebels, but for the first time since a long term, it included the
shift to “the full consolidation of territorial defense” (Chalk 2014, p. 3).

The Philippine Defense Transformation

Despite the abovementioned reforms and modernization efforts, by
the time President Benigno Aquino assumed office in June 2010, the
Philippine defence establishment remained “Southeast Asia’s military
laggard” (De Castro 2012, pp. 70–71). The former administrations
reckoned, that the internal security operations to suppress the rebels
could have been prioritized, because until 2018 at least, an external enemy
would not menace the country. Looking even in this way the AFP’s dire
condition became striking. The Air Force, the weakest in Southeast Asia,
in 2005 decommissioned the last F5A fighter planes in service, this way
denuding the state of all air offensive-defensive capabilities. The 2010 audit
report concluded that all the Air Force could muster were 31 antiquated
airplanes and 54 helicopters, thus the service had become “ill equipped
to be operationally responsive to national security and development”
(Romero & Ponungbayan 2011). This fact was no better illustrated than
the May 2011 incident, when the patrolling Philippine planes above the
South China Sea met unidentified jet fighters, but knowing they had
no chance against the enemy, watched haplessly the manoeuvres of the
foreign fighters (Laude 2011).
The Philippine Navy was also in a forceless state. Until 2011, the
flagship was a 1943 vintage ex-US anti-submarine destroyer, the Rajah
Humabon, which was reclassified as a patrol frigate. Only in recent years
has the Navy succeeded in procuring two Gregorio del Pilar class frigates
from the US, with other minor warships from the United Kingdom and US
(Chalk 2010, p. 7). The Army was in a little better shape, but the President
pledged himself immediately to overhaul and upgrade the military and
defence establishment. In consequence, the preceding programs like PDR
and CUP were to be accomplished as planned, although in terms of the
latter the modification according to the shift from internal operations to

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external territorial defence was inevitable (Republic of the Philippines

Department of National Defense 2012, pp. 6, 26).
From 2010, the new reform program, named the Philippine Defense
Transformation (PDT) had to build upon the PDR and the 1995
Modernization Plan, and the PDT had to continue those aims they
involved. As the 2012 White Paper summarized: while “the Modernization
Program focused on the improvement of material and technological
capabilities […] the PDR Program focused on addressing the systemic
deficiencies in the defence establishment […] the PDT Program shall
wrap these two as an integrated program and are thus synchronized”
(Republic of the Philippines Department of National Defense 2012,
p. 1). The PDR was finished by 2010 and the Modernization Plan was
officially terminated in 2011, but the results were far from those that
had been originally hoped for. In 2012, to help to achieve the goals of
the PDT, the Congress approved Republic Act No. 10349 or the “Revised
Modernization Act” declaring that the foremost aim of the state is “to
develop and transform the AFP into a multi-mission oriented force capable
of effectively addressing internal and external security threats” (Republic
Act No. 10349 2012, p. 1, (2)). For the full implementation of the act,
15 years were envisaged with a budget of at least P75 billion for the first
five years. The Aquino-cabinet clearly attached the greatest importance to
the following article: “to develop its capability to uphold the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of the Republic and to secure the national territory
from all forms of intrusion and encroachment” (National Defense College
of the Philippines 2013).
The 2010 National Internal Security Plan (IPSP) – Oplan Bayanihan
(Operational Plan Community Spirit) also revealed the need to overhaul
the AFP. It provides a three-year transition period in which the armed
forces have to develop the capabilities required for multilateral offensive
operations against internal and external aggression (Armed Forces of the
Philippines 2010, pp. 19, 35–36). To modernize the AFP’s technical and
equipment assets in accordance with the immediate shift from internal
to external defence, a joint DND-AFP group was established, which
formulated the Long Term Capability Development Plan, calculating
in detail the necessary procurement and acquisition, especially for the
Navy and the Air Force, with an annual rolling budget of $160 million for
five years. As the AFP’s Chief of Staff Lieutenant-General Jessie Delloso
announced, the Defense Transformation will focus on four main areas:
“strengthening territorial defence particularly in terms of developing the

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capabilities of the Philippine Navy to ensure maritime security in the West

Philippine Sea;2 full implementation of the Internal Peace and Security
Plan”; organizational reforms, aiming fiscal transparency; and greater
disaster preparedness (Atencio 2011).
In 2012, the DND prioritized the maritime security and territorial
defence and the reduction of the Army formations to the advantage of the
other services still conceived (De Castro 2013, p. 156). But for the nation’s
maritime interest to be effectively protected, this necessitated new innovations,
which can be summarized as follows: creation of “appropriate strategic
response forces”, establishment commanding central communications,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance system (C4ISR), according to
the National Coast Watch System (Republic of the Philippines Department of
National Defense 2012, pp. 10–12).3 It is also necessary to build security and
defence infrastructure on the Philippine-controlled islands on the Western
Philippine Sea and to develop modern satellite network communication,
maybe together with other nations as well.
The foremost aim of the government was that by the end of President
Aquino’s term in 2016, the AFP has to be “capable of conducting joint
maritime surveillance, defence and interdiction operations” (Chalk
2010, p. 7). Therefore, the cabinet started several interconnected
procurement projects, including the acquisition of fighter jets, patrol
aircrafts, naval helicopters, frigates, patrol ships, and multipurpose
attack vessels. On the top of this program, the Navy planned to purchase
three decommissioned Hamilton-class cutters from the US, from which
two already were put into service as Gregorio del Pilar-class frigates (De
Leon 2012) (The third, USCG Boutwell, will arrive in 2016).4 Japan
promised the construction of 10 multi-purpose response vessels by
2018 with the total cost of $200 million. The Air Force contracted the
Korea Aerospace Industries for 12 FA-50 Golden Eagle fighter jets worth
around $440 million (Jacobson 2013). The government up to now has

2 In 2009 the Philippine Congress in a legal manner renamed the South China Sea as
the West Philippine Sea.
3 The National Coast Watch System (NCWS), established in September 2011, consists
of more than 20 coast watch stations and centres that aim to achieve effective
interagency cooperation, related to maritime security.
4 In December 2014, the Navy confirmed that in the near future steps will be taken to
procure three guided missile fast attack craft, two missile stealth frigates, two anti-
submarine helicopters and three submarines, with the total costs of $885 billion.

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tried in vain to purchase F-16 fighters from the US but an agreement

may be reached in the future.
By 2016, the progress of the defence transformation is perceptible in
several aspects, but the Armed Forces capabilities to defend the country
from external threats has left much to be desired.

The domestic security situation and the South China issue

From 2010 the Aquino administration’s new policy marked a serious

shift from focusing exclusively on the internal security threats to
concentrating almost entirely to the maritime security and territorial
defence (De Castro 2012, pp. 82–83). Two main factors can be identified,
which made this change of course possible: the internal security risks
decreased to a large extent, while the external dangers due to China’s
assertive policy in the South China Sea increased.
The fight against the communist New People’s Army has always been
given precedence, as its adherents tried to overthrow the central government
and establish a socialist order. By transferring major resources for these
operations the aim was to achieve a strategic victory by 2010, which could
not be thoroughly materialized yet although the New People’s Army is
now weaker than before and the militants have been driven out from most
of the country (Chalk 2014, p. 7). The Moro secessionist ambitions to
create an independent Islamic state in the southern part of the islands also
represented a constant threat for the nation and put great strain on the
AFP. Recently, in accordance with the president’s plan through prolonged
negotiations, MILF accepted the proposed comprehensive autonomy and
an agreement was signed in March 2014, putting an end to a 30-year war
(Diola 2014). After 2001, within the scope of the global war on terror,
the armed forces, with US assistance, started a campaign to crush the
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) (an extremist Muslim organization fighting for
an Islam state in the South, and responsible for several terrorist attacks),
which led to the conclusion that the terrorists could no longer pose
a serious threat to the government. Meanwhile, its Indonesian based
partner organization, the jihadist Jemaah Islamiyah, also lost its influence
in the region and almost ceased to operate on Philippine territory (Chalk
2014, pp. 9–10).
In the 2000s China somewhat departed from the previous ‘good neighbour
policy’ in terms of managing the various territorial and maritime disputes,
and started to become assertive, meaning the exploration of energy resources

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and increasing military activities in the South China Sea.5 As China claims
around 90% of the territory based on historical rights, the collision with other
claimants (like the Philippines) became inevitable, and beyond the access to
energy resources, the strategic factor started to step forward as the main drive
of the conflict (Schofield 2015, pp. 26–31). The tensions between China and
the Philippines centred on the jurisdiction on the Spratly Islands, Macclesfield
Bank, and Scarborough Shoal, delineating the theatre of a potential military
clash.6 Aquino’s term has witnessed several serious incidents with China,
starting in March 2011, when a Philippine seismic ship was threatened of
ramming by the Chinese, and has continued in April 2012 with a five-month
standoff at the Scarborough Shoal. In March 2014, the Chinese Navy blocked
two civil supply ships, allocated to deliver supplies to the Philippine marines
on Second Thomas Shoal. In consequence of the incidents, although the
Aquino cabinet did not seek war with China, it ordered the speeding-up of
the AFP’s modernization program and “the protection of Philippine claims
in the South China Sea” was proclaimed as the nation’s “highest external
defense priority” (Chang 2012, p. 7).
In response to China’s heavy-handed behaviour, the Philippines
attempted to reaffirm the security ties with its traditional ally, the US,
and to get full support for the AFP’s modernization. In 2003, the George
W. Bush administration ranked the country as a major non-NATO ally
and invested serious efforts to the PDR. Some years later the emergence of
China and its strategic containment have been prioritized in Washington,
thus by the time President Barack Obama took office, the US had already
openly backed the Philippine claims and in order to settle the South China
Sea disputes advised multilateral negotiations. In 2011 the US confirmed
that the two countries are ‘longstanding treaty allies’ and ‘strategic partners’
(Torode 2011). The Mutual Defense Treaty obligations were reaffirmed
and the Philippines could count on at least $40 million in financial aid to
“enhance maritime domain awareness” and expeditious power in the South
China Sea.7 In recent years through regular joint military exercises based
on the interoperability of the US and Philippine troops, great emphasis was

5 Exact data are unavailable, but the nominal resources in the South China Sea are es-
timated as 28 billion barrels of crude oil (Schofield 2015, p. 30).
6 The Philippines, complying with the United Nations Convention of the Law of Sea
claims the disputed islands and reefs as parts of the continental shelf that lies within the
200 miles of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the country (De Castro 2009, p. 418).
7 Actually, this is not a big sum, considering that in 2014 the total Philippine defense
expenditure was $3.3 billion (Abuza 2014).

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placed on the development of joint defence operations and disaster relief

missions (Chalk 2014, p. 15). In April 2014, the partnership was sealed by
the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement between the parties, which
provides for US troops to “access and use facilities […] at the invitation of
the Philippines” on rotational bases, with the goals of modernizing the AFP
and promoting interoperability. The agreement has a term of 10 years and
officially is not aimed against China, although alongside the disaster relief
missions, the enhanced maritime security is involved in the document as
well (Thayer 2014).

Modernizing the Armed Forces: possible courses

and solutions
The Aquino cabinet deserves credit for not only realizing the
pressing need to reform and upgrade the military, but also after more
than 15 years it committed to build a modest maritime and territorial
defence system. By now, significant financial resources have been spent
to shift the focus from domestic security to external defence, aiming to
deter Chinese assertiveness. In just the first 17 months in office of the
Aquino cabinet, $387 million was spent on military modernization (De
Castro 2012, p. 81). As the ‘Chinese threat’ is the main factor behind the
modernization process, the possible responses by the Philippines need
further examination. Obviously, strictly speaking in military terms, the
two nation’s capabilities are not comparable.8 In the case of a major war
the Philippines would have no chance against China, indeed no amount
of US assistance will enable the country to stand up against the Asian
Great Power in the South China Sea. The only rationale realized by the
cabinet is to establish a minimum credible deterrence force as a modest
border patrol system (De Castro 2012, p. 82).
Nevertheless, it means a vague concept imagined by the government,
which moved the analysts and experts to guess what could be the ideal
strategy of the AFP’s modernization, regarding the expected results (Jacobson
2013). As Richard D. Fisher correctly summarized, the credible deterrence
to meet China’s limited ambitions in the South China Sea would require

8 In 2013, China’s military expenditures comprised a total of $117 billion, against

the Philippines’ budget of $3.208 billion (Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute 2014, pp. 232–233).

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“up to four squadrons (48) of F-16s upgraded to a 4+ generation capability

[…] to support this capability the PAF [Philippine Air Force] would also
need more […] long-range radar and airborne radar to better manage
combat operations. The PN [Philippine Navy] would also need more well-
armed frigates and smaller corvette-size combatants and minesweepers.
An affordable force of four to six mini-submarines could be obtained
from South Korea or Russia” (Fisher 2012). However, the procurement of
these weapon systems would outstrip seven times the planned military
expenditures (Chalk 2014, p. 12). Beyond doubt, billions of dollars would
be needed to transform the Philippine military to a credible defence force,
but due to the meagre congressional appropriations and AFP modernization
funds, this is not very likely to succeed. Even if the Congress would approve
the funds needed, the 1987 Constitution prohibited the state to spend more
money on the AFP than for education (Jacobson 2013). For the reduction of
costs, the government took steps to enter into partnership with government
agencies and private firms, but as the cooperation is still in its initial phase,
in the short term results for the military could not be expected. The second
option open for the administration is to “lease rather than buy the military
equipment” (Chalk 2014, p. 13). Although this concept would also be
ideal to save expenses as the US would provide the necessary hardware,
they would never come under full Philippine control. Furthermore, this is
beyond the country’s financial power.
Felix Chang pointed out a less costly alternative, saying that the
modernisation of the Air Force and the Navy does not necessarily mean
the acquisition of new planes and vessels, but the effective cooperation
between the arms and services can produce the necessary capabilities. In
terms of procurement, he suggests to set up a land-based system of long-
range anti-ship missiles (ASM) in Palawan Island, from where the network
of cruise missiles could cover most of the disputed islands and surrounding
seas. The mobile platforms with the necessary airborne surveillance assets,
provided by naval helicopters would present a serious menace to the
Chinese navy, whilst creating an effective maritime defence at a lower price
than the other alternatives. Of course, this solution seems to be the most
advantageous, but to upgrade the Navy and the Air Force to a minimum level
is inevitable: “this core defensive force of missile batteries and surveillance
aircraft could be supplemented with a small contingent of air superiority
fighters and high-endurance cutters” (Chang 2012, pp. 10–14).
The modernisation of the Navy requires taking into account some other
considerations as well. ASEAN started to put emphasis on the development

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of new amphibious capabilities, based on security and Human Assistance

Disaster Response (HADR), which the Philippine Government willingly
supported (Collin 2014). Creating ‘specialized amphibious ground forces’
involves the procurement of amphibious vessels (landing platform docks,
amphibious troop carriers, amphibious helicopter docks etc.) “To assert
airlift and sealift capabilities in addressing the rapid responses needs of
[…] human made and natural disasters” (Salvador 2014). However, due
to fiscal problems, the country has no potential to develop territorial and
HADR-oriented defences simultaneously. In consequence, the cabinet is
compelled mainly to acquire dual-purpose vessels, like modern frigates,
which can be used “in realpolitik terms and humanitarian assistance
alike” (Salvador 2014). In theory, President Aquino has laid great stress
on the defence against non-traditional security threats, like disaster
response, although this was not considered by the budget allocations.9
In November 2013, Typhoon Hainan demonstrated in full reality the
AFP’s unpreparedness, when the Navy and the Air Force almost remained
inactive during the critical period and only the immediate foreign (mainly
US) help could save the situation10 (Lee 2013).
The US alliance also influences the modernization process in two
different ways, in political and economic considerations; Washington has
an interest in the success of the Philippine Defense Transformation, which
comprises an important segment of the US strategic planning in Southeast
Asia (Fisher 2012). However, the advantage of being allied with a Great
Power, is associated with several commitments, in this case the need to
upgrade the country’s defence, needs more than just count on the great ally.
As Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario remarked: “For the Philippines to
be normally reliant upon the U.S. regional partner […] it therefore behoves
us to resort to all possible means to build at the very least a most minimal
credible defence posture” (De Castro & Lohman 2012, p. 9). Of course,
for the support of the regional partners such as Japan, South Korea, and
Australia would likewise be relied upon (Amador 2013).

9 In 2011–2012, from the operations budget of the Army and the Navy, disaster response
obtained less than 1% share (Salvador 2012).
10 Because of Typhoon Hainan, 5719 people died and more than 4 million were displaced
(Wood 2013, p. 3).

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Conclusion
By the end of the Cold War, the once strongest military in Southeast
Asia, the AFP became the region’s military laggard. With the closure of
the US bases in 1992, followed by the departure of the US, the AFP lost
its direct support necessary to be effective, whilst the underfunding by the
government and the fight against the rebels continued. Not until China
had occupied the Mischief Reef in 1995 did the Ramos cabinet realize the
need for military reforms and modernization. The AFP modernization act,
aiming to modernise the Armed Forces, however, could not succeed, as
the Asian financial crisis compelled the process to a standstill. Resulting
from the growing Chinese threat and the global war on terror, the US
tried to reaffirm the old partnership, which led President Macapagal-
Arroyo to request US assistance in reforming the Philippine military. This
cooperation resulted in the start of the PDR, but the domestic security
operations continued to consume up the greatest part of the defence
budget, and lack of funds hampered the process. CUP was arranged to
upgrade the military with the necessary hardware, although developing
new capabilities remained only a vision.
The real watershed, in regard to the Philippine military policy arrived
by the inauguration of President Aquino. Realizing the AFP’s weakness, the
President immediately stressed the need for modernization, at the same
time giving new guidelines for the development. From 2010, the Philippine
Defense Transformation, supported by the 2012 Revised Modernisation
Act, was set off as the continuation of the terminated PDF and CUP.
The connected CUP was to coordinate the procurement and acquisition
for the services, whilst the shift to focus on external / maritime defence
from domestic security has been prioritized. The internal and external
political situation greatly affected the decisions of the administration and
in reality left only one alternative: stabilizing the situation at home must
be followed by securing the country’s interests in the South China Sea.
Since the Aquino cabinet assumed office serious procurements have started
to bolster the Navy and the Air Force, with the aim of establishing the
needed minimum credible deterrent force. The analysts are divided in
view of its progress. Although the Philippine government had been in a
difficult position when it tried to set a course for the military modernisation
program, the necessity of the reforms was beyond doubt. Due to the limited
resources, upgrading the services requires cautious balancing between the
procurement of alternative weapon systems (traditional military hardware

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vs. cruise missiles network) and the different strategic directions (territorial
defence or HADR), considering the economic and political factors as
well. The development in the field of technology is just one segment of
the process. However, the human resources, force structure and doctrine
development, are also important not forgetting the battle against corruption
and bureaucracy. In sum, the future of the military modernization greatly
depends on the decisions of the government, and its capability to reform the
government system, whilst securing the appropriate funds alike.

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PÉTER KLEMENSITS, Ph.D., M.S.C. is a Senior Analyst at the Pallas

Athene Geopolitical Foundation, Central Bank of Hungary, in Budapest. From
2015 he is a Temporary Lecturer at the Department of International Studies,
Institute of International Studies and Political Science, Pázmány Péter Catholic
University, Budapest. He works also as a Part-Time Researcher for the Modern
East Asia Research Group, Pázmány Péter Catholic University. Péter has earned
his M.S.C. in History and his Ph.D in Military Science. His research interests
include the modern history and security policy of Southeast Asia, specializing on
the Philippines.

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 Global outlook

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 http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/8088-758-9.07

Dorota Roszkowska, Emilia Matlaszek

(University of Bialystok, Professio Trade & Consulting)

Europe–China economic cooperation

after official Belt and Road initiative
announcement

Abstract

The official announcement of the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative in
September 2013 opened a new chapter, not only in the economic and political
history of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), but also at least 60 other countries,
including European ones. Therefore, the OBOR initiative can be considered as
an instrument enabling greater Sino-European economic connectivity. There
are a few different forms of high-level meetings, organized to create space for
European-China discussions. The most significant are EU–China Summits,
Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM), and 16+1 Summits (China–Central Eastern
Europe Initiative). The guiding documents, agreed during those events shape
in a significant way, future political and economic relations. After September
2013, important conclusions, which are consistent with OBOR presumptions,
were made. For example, the the EU–China discussion on a Comprehensive
Agreement on Investment (CAI) has started, EU–China Connectivity Platform,
has been created. In October 2013, the Peoples Bank of China and the European
Central Bank signed a bilateral local currency swap arrangement. Finally, at the
beginning of 2016, China became the 67th member of the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development. Despite those achievements, most of European
Union’s (EU’s) countries represent different interests, what can hinder further
developments. China’s B&R Initiative is undoubtedly a priority in Beijing’s
foreign policy. European countries should make their best to capitalize on the
opportunities it provides. It seems to be possible only if European countries would
have a common position vis-à-vis Beijing.

Key words: economic cooperation, Belt and Road, European economic policy,
Europe–China cooperation.

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Introduction
According to the opinion of Fu Ying, chairperson of Foreign Affairs
Committee of National People’s Congress, connectivity is the shortcut
to prosperity. That statement also explains why the Silk Road Economic
Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, named as the Belt and
Road (B&R) or One Belt One Road (OBOR), have a profound economic
meaning and should be considered as the most important of China’s
foreign economic policy instruments. The successful realization of that
initiative will influence not only Chinese but also many other economies,
including European Union (EU) countries.
Although B&R is a relatively new concept, it has already been widely
discussed during dedicated events, conferences, in scientific papers, and
articles. However, most of the publications concentrate on describing
the main presumptions and general, potential effects of that initiative
(Swaine 2015; Weidong 2015; Li 2015), or analyze China’s involvement
in selected countries, including European ones (Sanfilippo 2014; van der
Putten 2014). Those approaches do not contain an analysis of B&R’s
effects on economic relations with Europe, while from the European
perspective it is important to assess future implications for China’s
activity in that region and especially in EU countries. These kinds of
complex analyses are very rare in the literature (Casarini 2015; Bendini
& Barone 2015). Authors of these paper see the need for further scientific
research in that field, as the OBOR initiative is dynamically evolving.
This paper analyzes forms of official Europe–China negotiations and
institutional instruments created to shape and influence China’s relations
with European economies. The main goal of this paper is to summarize
so far the effects of the OBOR initiative on China’s investment and
financial cooperation with European countries, as well as to show how
the institutional framework for economic relations between China and
European countries is shaped.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section the genesis and
main assumptions of B&R are reviewed. The second part of the paper
analyzes the institutional framework for economic relations between
European countries and China. It includes characteristics of the Asia
Europe Meeting (ASEM), the 16+1 initiative and UE–China Summits,
as well as description of interrelationships between the abovementioned
dimensions of Europe–China cooperation. The main effects of the Europe–
China investment cooperation are presented in the third part of the paper.

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Section four is dedicated to the analyses of financial cooperation between

China and European countries. The paper ends with recommendations
and conclusions.

1. The genesis and main assumptions of the B&R

initiative
The B&R initiative was announced by Chinese president Xi Jinping in
2013. During one of his first foreign visits as a president, on September 7,
2013, in Kazakhstan, he delivered a speech using official Silk Road
Economic Belt terminology. President Xi was calling the whole Eurasian
region to “take an innovative approach and jointly build an economic belt
along the Silk Road.” At the same time, he proposed five necessary steps
that need to be undertaken to turn this vision into reality. These steps cover
policy consultation, improvement of road connections (infrastructure),
promotion of unimpeded trade, enhancement of monetary circulation,
and cultural understanding along the road (Xi Jinping 2014, pp. 315–319).
On October 3, 2013, Xi Jinping proposed the 21st-Century Maritime Silk
Road. This time he addressed this concept to all the ASEAN countries.
During his speech at the People’s Representative Council of Indonesia,
he strongly emphasized the following steps: common trust and good-
neighborly ties through respect; common work for mutual cooperation
benefits with strengthening maritime cooperation in ASEAN; common
assistance within regional security issues; as well as mutual understanding
and friendship, openness and inclusiveness to all the countries along the
way (Xi Jinping 2014, pp. 320–323).
During the Boao Forum for Asia (BFA), in March 2015, the B&R
official action plan proposed by China was issued by the China National
Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, and authorized
by China State Council. The action plan points out the necessity of global
adjustments in international trade and investment scope. Furthermore,
the plan creates a new direction in the multipolar world with an open
economy, free trade regime, deepened regional cooperation, and major
changes in international economic policies that influence global peace
and development. OBOR directives clearly state that the abovementioned
goals can be achieved through infrastructure improvements, trade
enhancements, and investment facilitation. Cooperation priorities are

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defined in five crucial areas: policy coordination, facilities connectivity,

unimpeded trade, financial integration, and people-to-people bonds.
Countries involved in the initiative should improve their geopolitical
policies and adjust them to the regional cooperation, which can boost
trade and communication mechanism.
Infrastructure construction plays a big role in B&R. All the
infrastructure projects should be based on particular technical standard
systems, promotion of green and low-carbon solutions, increase the
effectiveness of customs clearance, and standardization of transport rules.
Connectivity should be undertaken on land (roads, railways, trains),
on the sea (ports and vessels), and in the air (airports, airplanes). This
complex connectivity should also include cooperation within energy
(power grids, power transmissions) and communications (optical cables
and satellites). International trade on the Silk Road should be improved
in the areas of the international trade policy, bilateral and multilateral
agreements, information exchange, removing investment and trade
barriers, and customs cooperation. Wide liberalization of trade should
bring also improvements in trade structure, integrate investment and
trade, and promote trade through investment.
Financial integration has an indisputable role in the implementation
of B&R. The plan assumes a huge responsibility in building a currency
stability system, financing and investment system, as well as a credit
information system. A major role will be played by the newly established
financial entities: Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), BRICS
New Development Bank, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO),
Silk Road Fund, and China–Eurasia Economic Cooperation Fund. The
action plan of B&R also recognizes the need of providing public support in
a wide spectrum of culture exchanges, media cooperation and information
exchange, which are strongly connected to each other (The State Council
the People’s Republic of China 2016).
From the European perspective, important is the fact that the geographical
scope of OBOR includes Asia, Europe, and Africa. The Silk Road Economic
Belt aims to connect China, Central Asia, Russia, and Europe (the Baltic
area) through the Persian Gulf, Mediterranean Sea, and Southeast Asia.
The 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road starts from China’s coast to Europe
through two different ways: from the South China Sea and Indian Ocean
and from China’s coast to the South China Sea and South Pacific. It means,
that the EU is just one piece of the Chinese global puzzle. To make that
initiative beneficial it must undertake an adequate and consistent strategy.

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2. The institutional framework for economic

relations between EU countries and China
The legal documents concerning international economic relations
between EU countries and China are mainly shaped by discussions and
negotiations during high-level meetings. The most objective effects of such
meetings are documents of strategic importance for shaping the long-term
relationship. The most significant forums which enable discussions among
state officials from European countries are EU–China Summits, but there
are also other types of important meetings. ASEM and 16+1 Summits
(China–Central Eastern Europe Initiative) also lead to important political
decisions, but do not impact the EU as a whole, but only selected groups
of EU states. There is also a number of bilateral negotiations between
China and European countries being conducted. This instrument used
to shape the future collaboration is considered as the most effective. It is
conducted parallel to other forms of official negotiations.

2.1. Characteristics of ASEM, 16+1 initiative

and EU–China Summits

ASEM is internationally considered as a key forum for dialogue

and cooperation between Europe and Asia. Only 15 EU member states
participate in ASEM. The EU is represented there by the Commission.
ASEM summits each year concentrate on different issues. The summit
in 2014 arranged sessions about promoting financial and economic
cooperation through enhanced Europe-Asia connectivity and Europe–Asia
partnership in addressing global matters in an inter-connected world (10th
ASEM Summit, 4.04.2016). The choice of such themes confirms that the
participation in B&R is an important issue for EU countries.
Another international forum which aims to strengthen cooperation
between China and Europe is the 16+1 initiative. In 2012 China approached
the countries of Central Eastern Europe countries (CEEC) with a proposal
concerning regional cooperation. The effect of that cooperation is the
implementation of the Bucharest Guidelines for Cooperation between
China and Central and Eastern European Countries. The 16+1 initiative
is intended to be a new platform for mutually beneficial cooperation. It
is officially claimed that China–CEEC cooperation is in line with China–
EU relations and should help in the implementation of the EU–China
2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation (The Belgrade Guidelines for

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Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries

2014). Chinese Premier Li Keqiang in January 2015 pointed out that China
and CEEC enjoy a broad prospect in their cooperation on infrastructure
construction. What is more, during the fifth China and Central-Eastern
European Countries Economic and Trade Forum on November 24, 2015,
Chinese Premier Li Keqiang said that China will create an investment
fund of 3 billion USD to facilitate financing in CEEC.
The most important documents shaping the future of UE–China
economic cooperation are the outcomes of the UE–China Summits. These
documents present effects of the EU and China negotiations. EU–China
Summits, which normally take place every year, define long-term goals
for economic cooperation. Projects complementing the OBOR initiative
are the most important issues discussed during last two summits (the
16th and 17th, taking palce on November 21, 2013, and June 29, 2015,
respectively). During each summit, High Level Dialogues are conducted.11
Among others, from the economic perspective, the High Level Economic
and Trade Dialogue is the most important one. At the 17th EU–China
Summit officials from both sides agreed, that of key importance is to
identify the synergies between the Juncker Plan and the OBOR initiative
(Tomorrow’s Silk Road: Assessing an EU–China Free Trade Agreement.
Executive Summary 2016). As the tangible results of the last two EU–
China Summits, two important documents were published. The first is:
EU–China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation; and the second: The
joint statement of the 2015 China–EU Summit: The way forward after
forty years of China–EU cooperation. The analysis of the abovementioned
documents highlights issues which are the priorities for EU economic
policy toward China in the upcoming years. The most important events
and agreements which strengthen economic cooperation between the EU
and China refer to and implement these documents.

2.2. Interrelationships between different dimensions

of Europe–China cooperation

It has to be mentioned that there is no coherent EU guiding policy

toward China’s OBOR initiative. Most EU countries represent different
interests. The EU’s answer to the OBOR initiative was assessed by the
Chinese government as very moderate. As a result, China can search

11 Discussions dedicated to a specific topic conducted between high-level government

officials.

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for more active partners or strengthen the cooperation with particular

European economies, which makes the EU’s position weaker. In the
present situation, China negotiates with Europe on a few different
organizational levels: bilateral, the EU forum, and 16+1 initiative. That
situation is favorable for China, but not for the UE as a whole. The People’s
Republic of China’s Ministry of Commerce pursues bilateral discussions
with Germany and Poland, as well as enhanced cooperation between
China and the CEEC under the 16+1 framework at the same time. The
regional multilateral platform in the 16+1 framework enabled the CEEC,
which are particularly interested in economic cooperation with China,
to strengthen their economic tights with China. Officially, both Chinese
experts and the government in Beijing emphasize that cooperation in the
16+1 format complements and strengthens the China–EU 2020 Strategic
Agenda for Cooperation (Kaczmarski 2015).
It does not change the fact that some countries, such as Germany,
Poland, and the Netherlands, are ready to do more than other EU
countries to connect their infrastructure and transportation development
with China’s plans. For example, China’s new rail connection linking
Northwest China and Germany, which will open in the first half of 2016,
is built as an effect of bilateral Chinese and German negotiations.

3. The main effects of the Europe–China

investment cooperation
3.1. China’s outward FDI in Europe

China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001 also

started Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in Europe. Since then,
Chinese companies invested about 65 billion euro of accumulated capital
in EU countries (Hanemann & Huotari 2016, p. 7). Chinese motivation
for investments in Europe is undeniably related to acquiring new
technologies, brands, new capabilities, and intricate competitiveness on
European market (Clegg & Voss 2012, p. 21). Chinese investors so far are
mostly attracted to Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. Till 2009
these three countries were receiving 36.8% of annual Chinese investments
(Clegg & Voss 2012, p. 22). In the last few years, Chinese investors became
interested in other parts of Europe, especially Southern Europe, the Benelux
countries, and CEEC. It is important to notice that Chinese outward FDI

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(OFDI) is not only opportunistic, beginning after the economic crisis in

Europe, but an integral part of a new economic strategy that China started
to realize with the 12th – Five Year Plan in 2010 and is going to extensively
continue with the 13th – Five Year Plan till 2020. The plan clearly aims
to invest in new and advanced technologies. Therefore, the European
market became a very important part of acquiring new technologies and
safe investments for their capital.
Since the B&R initiative became an official part of China’s expanding
strategy, many countries along the Road observed dynamic growth in the
inflow of Chinese FDI. In 2015 there was a 44% increase in investments
made by Chinese companies in the EU, rising in value from around
14 billion euro in 2014 to 20 billion euro in 2015. The biggest contribution
in this record value was the acquisition of the Italian company Pirelli,
specialized in tire production. It is also the biggest Chinese acquisition
made in EU up to date (Hanemann & Huotari 2016, p. 3). Other big
takeovers made by Chinese companies in Europe are mainly concentrated
in agriculture and food, automotive, energy, real estate and hospitality,
finance & business services, machinery, and ICT. The biggest and
strategic contracts between the EU and China were signed by state-owned
enterprises, even though the role of Chinese private sector companies on
the European market is increasing.
There is a huge possibility that many European economies will
further benefit in the increasing volume of these kinds of investments.
Presumably, Chinese FDI will cover mainly acquisitions, but also global
law firms, accounting agencies, and public relations companies (The
State Council the People’s Republic of China 2016). China’s Premier,
Li Keqiang announced, that China expects to deploy 1 trillion USD of
OFDI over the next five years. It makes China the second largest global
exporter of FDI and may further result in significant FDI imbalances with
European countries, as FDI from EU countries is declining (Hanemann
& Huotari 2016, pp. 3–10). The B&R initiative may also further boost
the impact of Chinese state owned subsidiaries. Their role is well rooted
in the policy of banks, sovereign wealth funds and commercial entities in
order to finance large-scale projects (Hanemann & Huotari 2016, p. 5).

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3.2. Effects of the OBOR announcement on investment

cooperation between China and the EU

The joint statement of the 2015 China–EU Summit, confirmed both

sides’ interest in the Investment Plan for Europe and B&R. Beijing’s plan
to invest in the EU investment fund came after the decision of several
European countries to join the China-led AIIB. This implies strengthening
cooperation in improving infrastructure links through developing smart,
upgraded and fully interconnected infrastructure systems. It includes
project bonds, project shareholding, joint contracting and co-financing,
and further coordination of the cooperation among China, the EU, and
its member states. Joint implementation of infrastructural projects needs
further improvements in institutional conditions. The CAI between the
EU and China is planned to be one of the key instruments to realize that
goal. The agreement is intended to provide a simpler and more secure
legal framework to investors of both sides by securing predictable long-
term access to the EU and Chinese markets, providing strong protection
to investors and their investments. The EU–China discussion on a CAI
started in September 2012. The official launch of the negotiations on
that agreement is the major outcome of the EU–China Summit in 2013.
The joint statement released during Xi Jinping’s visit to Europe in 2014
confirmed the importance of negotiations on the Comprehensive EU–
China CAI. In January 2016, the UE and China announced that there
would be a wide scope of the CAI negotiations. It means that both parties
want to improve market access opportunities for their investors as well as
a balanced level of protection for investors and their investments. The EU
is determined to see a good outcome from the CAI negotiations, which
can enable negotiations on Free Trade Agreement (FTA). China has in
fact already asked the EU to begin negotiations on an FTA. However, the
Commission and most member states were reluctant about it. An FTA is
considered to be a long-term perspective. Both the EU and China perceive
the ongoing investment agreement negotiations as one of the most
important issues in EU–China bilateral economic and trade relations.
The CAI will replace the existing bilateral investment treaties between
China and EU member states with one single comprehensive agreement
covering all EU member states (The EU–China Comprehensive Strategic
Partnership: Working for You, 2013).
It should also be noted that EU foreign economic policy is not
concentrating inclusively on the investment relations with China. The EU

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has also put a strong emphasis on concluding FTAs with other dynamic
East Asian economies. The EU is also negotiating the Transatlantic Trade
and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the United States. What is
more, o February 4, 2016, the United States signed trade a agreement
with 12 Asian countries (the Trans-Pacific Partnership, TPP). If the TTIP
will be successful, China could change the scope and dimension of its
cooperation with EU, which now seems to be mutually beneficial.
China and the UE also agreed to set up a joint working group
to increase cooperation between the EU and China on all aspects of
investment. The working group will include experts from China’s Silk
Road Fund, the Commission, and the European Investment Bank (EIB).
Another example of effective cooperation is a new Strategic Framework
for EU–China Customs Cooperation for 2014–2017, signed in May 2014.
It focuses on border enforcement of IPR, supply chain security, anti-
fraud and trade facilitation, and external trade statistics. The European
Commission and the Chinese government in June 2015 additionally
signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the establishment of EU–
China Connectivity Platform. The EU–China Connectivity Platform
is created to enhance synergies between China’s OBOR initiative and
the EU’s connectivity initiatives such as the Trans-European Transport
Network policy. The Platform will promote cooperation in areas such as
infrastructure, equipment, technologies, and standards (Investment Plan for
Europe goes global: China announces its contribution to #investEU 2015).
Another milestone on the way to strengthening economic cooperation
is a joint statement on EU–China Strategic Cooperation in the 5G Area
(Joint declaration on strategic cooperation in the area of the fifth generation
of mobile communication networks between the European Commission
and the ministry of industry and information technology of the People’s
Republic of China 2015). An example of trade relations improvement
is an event that occured in November 2015, when China was given EU
Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) status. The AEO was launched in
2008. It is offers simplified customs procedures to companies that prove to
be safe, reliable, and compliant with security standards. In effect, EU and
Chinese trusted traders enjoy lower costs, simplified procedures and greater
predictability in their activities. The implementation of the AEO in Europe
is an example of an instrument that aims to foster bilateral trade, which is
a fundamental mechanism of OBOR development. Trade incentives given
to European entities increase European interest in the B&R initiative’s
realization and active participation in its financing.

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4. Financial cooperation between China

and the EU in light of OBOR
Through the progressive implementation of the B&R initiative
China aims also to support RMB internationalization. European
financial entities may play a very important role in that process.
European financial institutions are the oldest and the most experienced.
This advantage will be surely used in order to support all the advanced
transactions and all other financial processes (The State Council the
People’s Republic of China 2016).
In October 2013, the People’s Bank of China and the European Central
Bank signed a bilateral local currency swap arrangement for the purpose of
supporting bilateral economic and trade activities. That should ensure the
stability of financial markets and facilitate trade and investment activities
between China and Europe. It can also be recognized as an announcement
of further monetary and financial cooperation between the People’s Bank of
China and the European Central Bank. According to the Joint Statement
of the 2015 China–EU Summit, cooperation between China and the
European Investment Bank should deepen. To realize that goal, the EU–
China Economic and Financial Dialogue and the Working Group between
People’s Bank of China and the European Central Bank were established.
The EIB in 2015 invested a record sum in 10 big projects in China.
The projects mainly focused on transportation, communication, forest
development, energy conservation and, environmental protection. The EIB
is a member of the official working group set up by the EU and China to
boost investment cooperation between the world’s second largest economy
and the EU. The EIB has an office in Beijing. The EU also supported China in
cooperation with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(EBRD). In result, on January 15, 2016, China became the 67th member
of the EBRD. The EBRD will support Chinese companies as they invest in
the EBRD regions. EBRD membership will impact implementation of the
B&R initiative in countries which are members of the EBRD.
Chinas economic involvement in Europe, as well as European
countries’ activity in Asia, are also connected with the AIIB’s founding.
The Articles of Agreement of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
were opened for signature on June 29, 2015. Fourteen EU countries
joined AIIB as founding members. Those countries are: Austria,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

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The International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and Asian Development

Bank also indicated cooperation with the AIIB. When it comes to the EU,
there was no coordinated EU response for that initiative. The AIIB case
highlights the lack of a common strategy among EU member states, as
well as between the EU and its closest allies. (The Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank. A New Multilateral Financial Institution or a Vehicle
for China’s Geostrategic Goals 2015).
Along with realization of the B&R initiative, China’s authorities also
admit the need of financial policy adjustments. The State Administration
of Taxation (SAT) unveiled ten measures supporting and improving
services for investors under the B&R initiative. Those measures should
protect investor’s rights, promote development and support equal benefit
interests for all the parties. SAT predict further improvements on bilateral
tax agreements, including double taxation and other risks (The State
Council the People’s Republic of China 2016).

Recommendations and conclusions

All the abovementioned and analyzed agreements, legal acts, and
initiatives can be considered as effects of China’s strategy of the OBOR
initiative’s implementation, as they should support and ease bilateral
investments and trade, which constitutes the B&R initiative. Taking under
consideration, that it has been only about three years since OBOR initiative
was officially announced, progress in investment and financial cooperation
between Europe and China has been made. OBOR’s announcement has
worked as a factor that caused deepening economic cooperation, reflected
by the number of agreements. Before 2013 such forms of cooperation were
less frequent and more ad hoc than long-term. OBOR’s announcement
also influenced the strategic planning for economic development but only
in selected European countries.
The B&R initiative showed that the EU is divided and unable to
effectively negotiate on behalf of all EU countries. The participation of
only selected European countries in the AIIB as well as ASEM and 16+1
summits show that quite vividly. There is, till now, no coherent EU
guiding policy toward China’s OBOR initiative.
To maximize the economic benefits of China’s involvement in Europe,
the EU, as well as each European country that would like to participate in
that initiative, has to make B&R its own and strategic priority. The EU, to

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be an important partner for China, should offer concrete proposals and make
OBOR implementation a common initiative. If the EU wants to use China’s
OBOR initiative as an economic growth engine, a strong and strategic
relationship with China must be a priority. The most important issue,
which needs to be addressed, is the further creation of favorable institutional
conditions, such as financial, political, and legal, for effective infrastructure
project realization. The EU should also deepen negotiations on the EU–
China Investment Agreement. The EU institutions need to recognize more
actively the benefits of the current trade exchange and pursue a policy of
openness in bilateral commerce. Additionally, an FTA should be reached as
soon as possible. Another action to be taken by the European Commission is
organizing a meeting with the current EU member states that are also AIIB
founding members in order to rethink the EU’s participation in the AIIB.
The EU should rethink the creation of an EU–China investment
fund to support infrastructure projects that in turn support OBOR’s
implementation. China has already created such financing institutions as
the New Silk Road Fund and New Development Bank. It is very important
for European collaboration with China to take deep and constructive
negotiations, which will enable the OBOR initiative’s implementation
into European development strategy. Negotiations between European
countries and China should lead to mutual benefits, which is only possible
if all EU states have a common voice and strategy.
The analysis conducted in the paper shows, that European relations
with China, after official announcement of the B&R initiative, has been
strengthened, though the importance of that initiative is different for
different European countries. There is still a need for creating professional
and well-founded institutions, not just discussion groups and guiding
documents, which should be considered as an important, but first step for
sustainable economic cooperation.

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 122 Dorota Roszkowska, Emilia Matlaszek

DOROTA ROSZKOWSKA, Ph.D. in economics, is a research fellow at

the Faculty of Economics and Management at the University of Bialystok. She
specializes in innovation economics, international economics, Chinese economy.
Her Ph.D. thesis, titled: “International technology transfer and national
innovation performance on the example of the People’s Republic of China”,
received very good reviews. She is an author of numerous publications, mainly
on Chinese economy and technology transfer. She also has an experience as
a business consultant.

EMILIA ELŻBIETA MATLASZEK is a candidate of PhD in Economics;

she has master in Economics from the University of Białystok. Since 2012 she
lives in China and works in Professio Services Limited as a business consultant,
doing diverse market research, establishing and coordinating businesses between
Poland and China; speaks intermediate level Chinese. She focuses her interests
on controversy of innovation in China and China’s international investments.

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 http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/8088-758-9.08

Gu Hongfei
(University of Lodz)

Opportunities Amidst Uncertainties

China–EU Security Cooperation
in the context of the ‘One Belt One Road’
initiative1

Abstract

How does China seek security cooperation on the vast Eurasian continent?
For China, this geopolitical border is becoming more and more important. A new
generation of Chinese leaders put forward the ‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR)
Initiative for the Eurasian continent has brought new opportunities for cooperation,
but it also brings new security challenges. Is it possible for Europe to have more
security cooperation and interaction with China? As an important power worldwide,
China and the European Union (EU) could share common interests in maintaining
international and regional peace and stability. As the security challenges are
becoming increasingly complex and transnational, the EU and China will assume
more responsibility for peace and security matters. This paper aims to have a general,
yet strategic assessment of China’s security cooperation towards the European
Union. It starts with a brief overview of China–EU security cooperation during the
past decade, then analyze the opportunities and challenges of China and the EU’s
security cooperation in the context of OBOR Initiative, and put forward some feasible
suggestions for the future cooperation.

Key words: China–EU relations, security cooperation, OBOR Initiative.

1 Thanks for Dr. Thomas Kaminski’s valuable suggestions on revision, the writer is
responsible for the consequences of this article.

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 124 Gu Hongfei

Introduction
The new generation of Chinese leaders has shown strong interest in
developing relations with European countries since its takeover of power
in October 2012. In recent years, China–EU relations of cooperation are
more closed. Numerous policy papers have been adopted during the last
decade. In April 2014, China’s government released the second Policy
Document to the European Union: Deepen the China–EU Comprehensive
Strategic Partnership for Mutual Benefit and Win-win Cooperation
(MFAPRC 2014). China and the European Union, with frequent exchanges
of leadership between the two sides and the bilateral relationship, is
really warming up and making progress in these years. At the same
time, China’s government proposed the ‘One Belt, One Road’ Initiative
(Yidai, Yilu in Chinese, referred to as OBOR hereinafter) that focuses on
the possibility of cooperation among countries, primarily in Eurasia. It
aims to enhance China’s position and influence global cooperation and
economic development, which will have a positive effect in stabilizing
the situation and preventing security issues of extremism and terrorism.
It would also act as an opportunity for closer cooperation between China
and the European Union (EU). On the other hand, its focus is for a strong
Europe to strengthen the close and comprehensive cooperation. This is
seen as a fundamental shift in Europe’s diplomatic and security policy
since 2003, and it is foreseeable that it will have a strong impact on the
international security situation. In particular, the new strategy in the care
of the surrounding areas of Europe at the same time, for Asia has also been
clearly reflected (The Finnish Institute of International Affairs 2016).
When reviewing the Sino–EU relations, most of the analysis focuses on
economic and trade issues, however, it could also provide an opportunity
for security cooperation between China and the EU. Based on previous
studies, analysis and perspective are mostly negative in the field of security
cooperation between China and the EU. In spite of many common interests,
there is no evidence that shows that security is becoming a solid pillar of
the partnership (Holslag 2015). Diverging interests, competing structures,
and external influences are obstacles for China–EU cooperation on security
and in other related areas. From a geopolitical point of view, the EU in the
Asia-Pacific region, there are no direct military interests, in addition, unlike
the United States (US), the EU has not provided any policies yet, such
as the ‘Pivot to Asia’ (Oliver 2014). Moreover, many uncertainties exist
in the Sino–EU security cooperation, among all the dialogues established

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between China and the EU, more than two-thirds fall under the second
pillar, serving bilateral economic and trade ties (Men 2014).
Thus, this paper aims to examine the following arguments. First,
during the past decade, what are the successful experiences of cooperation
between China and the EU in the field of security? Second, what challenges
will be encountered by Sino–EU cooperation in the field of security? Third,
by China’s proposed OBOR Initiative, will it bring any opportunities for
security cooperation to both sides? This paper aims to have a general, yet
strategic assessment of China’s security cooperation towards the EU. It
starts with a brief overview of China–EU security cooperation during the
past decade, then focuses on the following issues. First, it analyzes various
motivations and interests in Chinese and EU security cooperation during
the past decade. Second, it identifies the major challenges and obstacles
in China’s pursuit of its interests in Sino–EU security relations. Third, it
discusses opportunities of China–EU security cooperation in the context
of OBOR.

1. Evolution of China–EU Security Cooperation

during the past decade
In April 2014, China carried out the second Policy Paper to the
European Union: Deepen the China–EU Comprehensive Strategic
Partnership for Mutual Benefit and Win-win Cooperation. China
and the EU with frequent exchanges of leadership between the two
sides and the bilateral relationship is really warming up and making
progress in these years (MFAPRC 2014). Over the past decade, China
and the EU have expanded their relations from a dominant focus
on economic and trade issues to the sphere of politics. But security
cooperation, as a new area of Sino–EU cooperation, is becoming
a major aspect of China–EU relations. In view of the fact that today’s
major international issues cannot be solved by unilateral action,
the cooperation between the two sides is increasingly critical in
maintaining regional and global security (EEAS 2016). Since 2003,
when the two sides established a strategic partnership, during that
year, two policy papers on bilateral relations were issues respectively
by the EU and China. The EU’s policy paper “A Maturing Partnership:
Shared Interests and Challenges in EU–China Relations”2 stated
2 http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2005/september/tradoc_124565.pdf.

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that “EU and Chinese interests converge on many issues of global

governance, in particular as regards the key role of multilateral
organizations and systems.”3 In November 2013, both sides jointly
adopted the EU–China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation
(EEAS 2013). It provides a blueprint for the next decade based on four
key pillars, with peace and security as the priority (Mariani 2016),4
in the context of such a framework, new areas of cooperation are
emerging, highlighting the roles and responsibilities of China and
the EU as global transaction participants, as well as the wishes of
both sides to further deepen the comprehensive strategic partnership.
Specifically, “Hold regular dialogues on defense and security policy,
increase training exchanges, and gradually raise the level of EU–
China dialogue and cooperation on defense and security, advancing
towards more practical cooperation” as one of the key initiatives
would be achieved.5 Moreover, China–EU high-level strategic
dialogue is also as a new way for deepening the cooperation. During
the Chinese president’s visit to Europe in March 2014, President Xi
met with the presidents of EU institutions,6 and the ensuing Joint
Statement reaffirmed and confirmed the outcome of the China–
EU summit in November 2013.7 In order to further promote the
institutionalization and regularization of China–EU cooperation, in
2014, China issued the second Policy Document to the European
Union: Deepen the China–EU Comprehensive Strategic Partnership
for Mutual Benefit and Win-win Cooperation (MFAPRC 2014), this
document is highly consistent with the EU–China 2020 Strategic
Agenda for Cooperation (EEAS 2013), which defines motivations
and interests in Chinese policymakers’ mindset when dealing with
Europe, including anti-terrorism. Generally, ‘security’ encompasses
both rigid measures, such as national and military security, as well
as soft elements, such as personal, environmental, and economic
security. Therefore, what outcomes have been made during the
past decade? As Bernardo Mariani in his speech in the China–EU

3 Ibid.
4 Namely peace and security, trade and investment, sustainable development, and peo-
ple-to-people exchanges.
5 http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/china/docs/eu-china_2020_strategic_agenda_en.pdf.
6 President of European Council Herman van Rompuy, President of European Commis-
sion Manuel Barroso, and President of European Parliament Martin Schulz.
7 http://www.eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2014/140331_02_en.pdf.

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Think-tank Summit in 2016 pointed out, there are currently four

areas of cooperation that are constructive: nuclear non-proliferation,
peacekeeping, anti-piracy, and cyber security (Mariani 2016).
First, in nuclear security, China has made great progress not only in
the construction of its nuclear safety system, but also has made great
contributions to nuclear safety cooperation on a global scale.8 This is in
line with the EU’s so-called ‘effective multilateralism’ nonproliferation
policy (Kissack 2010), which is committed and supports multilateral
nonproliferation mechanisms and assists non-EU countries that join the
relevant non-proliferation regime to live up to their commitments. China
and the EU recognized the necessity for strategic cooperation in the field of
disarmament and non-proliferation and signed a joint statement on non-
proliferation and arms control at the 2004 China–EU Summit,9 which
proposed a range of priorities to prevent the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction. The Iranian nuclear issue’s cooperation is one
example of this positive strategic partnership. Meanwhile, China and the
EU cooperation on nuclear safety was officially launched in early 2014.
The project aims to enhance and strengthen the Chinese nuclear safety
regulatory framework to enhance its nuclear safety regulatory capacity
building. This cooperation, while further deepening China–EU nuclear
safety exchanges and cooperation, also contributed to the maintenance
and improvement of the global nuclear safety level. In May 2015, China
and the EU affirmed their cooperation on the Iranian nuclear issue. On

8 China has signed a number of international treaties and conventions for the nuclear
security cooperation, such as the Antarctic Treaty, Convention on Nuclear Safety,
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), Convention
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons (BTWC), Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on
Their Destruction (CWC), Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched in
Outer Space (Launch Registration Convention), International Convention on the
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel
Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, Proposed Fissile
Material (Cut-off) Treaty (FMCT), Proposed Internationally Legally-Binding Negative
Security Assurances (NSAs), Proposed Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC), Protocol
for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gasses,
and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva Protocol), Treaty on Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty), Treaty on the Prohibition
of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on
the Seabed and Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (Seabed Treaty), etc.
9 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/82998.pdf.

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July 14, 2015, Iran, the five permanent members of the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC), Germany, and the European Union jointly
signed the Joint Comprehensive Action Plan (JCPOA),10 also known as
the ‘Iran Nuclear Agreement’. This was called a ‘New Page’ by the High
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affair and Security Policy, Ms.
Federica Mogherini. While cooperation between the two sides in the field
of nuclear security is still at an early stage, the efforts of both sides in this
regard are still visible.
Second, peacekeeping operations are also a good example of China–
EU security cooperation. China is playing an increasingly important role
as an important force in the maintenance of international peace, and it
has attracted the attention and support from the EU. On the question
of the importance of peacekeeping operations, China and the EU are
important forces in the world to maintain peace, it fully demonstrates the
common interests of China and the EU in peacekeeping capacity building
and cooperation (Mariani 2016). The EU and China have considerable
potential for cooperation in conflict prevention and peacekeeping. China
is increasingly involved in the United Nations peacekeeping mission,
plans to set up a standing force of 8,000 people.11 The EU is a major
supporter of the African Union and its peacekeeping activities. The two
sides are ready to cooperate in the fight against piracy on the coast of
Africa. China’s peacekeeping operations in Mali have demonstrated
that its new commitment to United Nations peacekeeping security
cooperation. This action is worthy of attention because this is the first
time the Chinese peacekeeping forces provide security services to foreign
troops. China and the EU began to launch a vice-ministerial dialogue
on international and regional security issues by the end of 2005, and in
2009, China began to participate in the escort activities in the Gulf of
Aden and Somalia as required and authorized by the UNSC. Although
not all of the reports on such cooperation are positive (Putten 2015),
these developments show that with the continued expansion of China’s
participation in peacekeeping operations, the cooperation between China
and the EU in peacekeeping will be further enhanced.
Third, the EU–China 2020 Strategic Agenda and the second Policy
Document to the European Union all highlighted maritime security

10 https://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/docs/iran_agreement/iran_joint-comprehen-
sive-plan-of-action_en.pdf.
11 From the United Nations.

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cooperation, including anti-piracy. The degree of convergence of policy

and practice between China and the EU is increasing. In 2009, in order
to jointly carry out the anti-piracy mission in Somalia and maintain
the safety of maritime access, China and the EU jointly launched the
‘Atlanta Action’, which achieved good results, accumulated strategic
mutual trust, and increased cooperation experience, resulting in a good
demonstration effect. Actions include extensive information sharing and
joint exercises with the Chinese Navy, and are committed to enhancing
China’s organizational and commanding capabilities, cooperation and
tactical capabilities, and the ability to carry out escort missions.12 At the
same time, China, the EU, and the joint maritime armed forces, which
are composed of multiple countries, have also led international special
forces to fight outside the Somali coast and pirates. It is expected that
with the development of OBOR, China and the EU will further strengthen
maritime security cooperation.
Fourth, another common interest between China and the EU
points to the field of cyber security. China and the EU now established
working groups aimed at enhancing networking, it is not only focusing
on practical cooperation in the prevention and response to cybercrime
but also in building a broader global governance and security norm,
specifically targeting cyberwar and cybercrime. Such cooperation not only
benefits for the positive role for both sides in global governance, but also
promotes the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for both sides. In
addition, the United Kingdom, and China have signed a cyber security
agreement with the aim of ensuring that the two sides do not tolerate and
do not engage in intellectual property and trade espionage.13 During the
past, the interaction between EU member states and China in this area
has been controversial, especially for China to launch network attacks
accusations. Cyber security is a matter of concern for both China and the
EU. More cooperation in this area also helps to resolve Europe’s concerns
about the so-called ‘China threat’. It is time for both China and the EU
to deepen their ties so that bilateral relations become more stable and
more sustainable. Pragmatic cooperation on major projects is helpful in
deepening bilateral relations.

12 Such as Rear Admiral Barbieri and Rear Admiral Chen Qiangnan concluded the visit
with talks on the EU and Chinese Navy’s common efforts to strengthen maritime
security in the region through joint planning and counter-piracy exercises.
13 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-china-joint-statement-2015.

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2. The Uncertainties of China–EU Security

Cooperation
China and the EU in security cooperation is still a weak link in bilateral
relations, currently limited to a small number of policy summits. For
example, China regularly participates in multilateral forums such as the
Munich Security Conference, nuclear security is also limited to scientific
and technological cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
Although many positive examples have been mentioned above, China and
the EU still have much room for development in the field of security, such
as promoting global peace and security. For example, compared with the
extensive cooperation between China and the EU in trade and commerce,
the practical cooperation in security in the EU–China 2020 Strategic Agenda
for Cooperation (EEAS 2013) has not yet seen more concrete measures.
Although both China and the EU are committed to multilateralism, but
in the context of different political systems, different ideologies, China and
the EU have different and even contradictory explanations on the values
and principles, such as the fundamental human rights, humanitarian
intervention, etc. (Mariani 2016). Moreover, the EU arms embargo against
China as the main obstacle that cannot usually be resolved in discussions
on security cooperation between China and the EU. The EU is growing
ties with China, yet it also has an ‘alliance’ with the US, the EU’s most
important international ally. This has led to sometimes conflicting views in
the EU on regional and international security issues.
During President Xi Jinping’s visit to the EU headquarters in 2014,
President Xi proposed to develop partnerships for peace, growth, reform,
and civilization (Xi 2014),14 but little progress has been made in this area,
and without any further details. China’s Ministry of Public Security and
the European Criminal Police Organization have established links, but
China and the EU in the fight against transnational crime are still weak.
The official outreach activities of the EU in the field of conventional arms
and dual-use control in China have not yet transformed into concrete
cooperative actions. China and the EU have not taken joint practical
measures to contain the millions of illegal light and small arms circulating
between the African continent, non-state armed groups, pirates, and other
criminals. For the EU and its member states, there is no agreement on the
arms control issues (Wendy 2014). In addition, the EU has not yet reached

14 http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1351157.shtml.

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an agreement with China on the issue of weapons, while the US believes

that if the EU lifted the ban on China, there will be a technology transfer,
giving the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s military considerable
strength. This is an opportunity to bridge the gap in the export of
conventional arms, with a clearer definition of internationally accepted
standards, and to raise common national standards in this field. So far,
China has not signed and acceded to the treaty. In addition, although the
dialogue between China and the EU on cyber security is regarded as an
important measure to jointly combat cybercrime and prevent cyberwar,
the differences in cyber policy between China and the EU cannot be
ignored. This also raises issues such as content and information control,
among other controversial issues (Mariani 2016).

3. The Opportunities of China–EU Security

Cooperation in the context of OBOR
In the context of globalization, the degree of interdependence
between China and Europe has deepened in the 21st century, the contacts
between China and Europe in the field of non-traditional security have been
increasing, and bilateral communication and consultation mechanisms
have been improved. Nowadays, the EU has maintained a low profile on
hard security issues in Asia and the Pacific. Geopolitical competition,
disputes over islands and waters, and historical disputes between countries
have created a marginal political form that makes a dangerous risk of
inter-state conflict. Escalating military action and expansion of defense
spending, as well as militant remarks on the issue of South China Sea
have confirmed this point. Whether the EU can use its ‘soft power’ to be
involved in the Asia-Pacific region, or whether the EU’s involvement in
regional security policies could be perceived as unrelated, unpopular, or
even rejected by China’s government, differences exist among Western
scholars on these issues.15 However, some scholars believe that China

15 See China, Japan and the European Community (Taylor 1990); Europe and the
Challenge of the Asia Pacific: change, continuity and crisis (Bridges 1999); European
and Asia-Pacific Integration: Political, Security, and Economic Perspectives (Shaw
1998); the European Union and East Asia: Inter-regional Linkages in a Changing
Global System (Dent 2003); the European Union’s Commercial Policymaking towards
China (Tseng 2001); and the European Union and East Asia: Inter-regional Linkages
in a Changing Global System (Preston 2001).

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is interested in the EU’s security policy and experience in the field of

security multilateralism (Men 2014). The EU has some room for more
active participation in Asian security matters, such as ASEAN. While
the EU would normally be present at these occasions, it may sometimes
have dispatched lower-levels of delegation. However, it has reasons to be
optimistic for the cooperation in the field of security. In the case of the
EU, for example, it has already supported the enhancement of ASEAN
capabilities, such as the establishment of the situation room, which
facilitated a range of emergency information sharing, including violent
escalation, geopolitical instability and epidemic outbreaks, as well as
a more rapid and consistent response to the early warning (Mariani 2016).
The OBOR initiative proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping
(Xi 2012) that aimed at connecting Eurasia, is a new opportunity for
cooperation between China and Europe. This initiative includes rail,
road, aviation and navigation, pipelines, and transmission networks,
will be a better to link China and Europe, and even a wider world,
which will make it easier for China and the EU to develop a strategic
partnership at the practical level. As many countries along the OBOR
may be affected by conflict, it is a new way for closer cooperation
between China and the EU. At the official level, it is an inevitable
that the first step for China and the EU will exchange information
on how to carry out activities in unstable regions and countries along
OBOR. Such analysis is particularly important when it comes to the
bridge between China and Europe. The OBOR links west of China with
neighboring Central Asian countries. It should be noted that although
China has a territorial dispute with India, generally its borders are
relatively stable in the Central Asian region. At the same time, China
insists by the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs to
the other countries, which limits its ability to protect its interest and
citizens in crisis zones abroad. Similarly, China and EU cooperation by
institutions could set opportunities for introducing more information
exchange and collaboration mechanisms that promote joint efforts in
upstream conflict prevention and development.
OBOR is a new bridge between China and the EU, although many areas
of cooperation have been carried out, there are still differences, especially
for such a sensitive area as is security. How to take OBOR to achieve
further cooperation between China and the EU? It will be easier if existing
mechanisms were used to find a commonality between China and the EU
in strategy or policy. Such mechanisms could be combined with reality and

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built by the 2030 agenda for sustainable development.16 This agenda could
have proposed goals for the creation of cooperation as both China and the EU
member states for the future sustainable development. As one of the focuses
of the agenda is peace, such as Goal 16,17 the EU and China have agreed to
closer cooperation for the achievement of sustainable development goals.18
Moreover, from China’s perspective, territorial disputes with neighboring
countries are one of the most important security challenges facing OBOR, the
deeper involvement of the EU in exploring is supporting the ‘road map’ process
(Wendy 2014) to reduce regional tensions and build mutual trust, therefore,
countries in the Asia-Pacific region have been able to take appropriate step-
by-step corrective measures in all aspects to manage and minimize conflict
sources and mutual mistrust.19 Obviously, the progress of this roadmap will
be gradual and it will not eliminate all the contradictions, but it will enhance
the trust between China and the EU.
With the gradual development of the OBOR Initiative, China and
the EU could focus on the more consensual interests of global security,
in particular, the non-traditional security threats of growing importance
in China and the EU, such as, among others, climate and energy issues.
China and the EU should understand the common causes to alleviate
crises, in order to prevent conflicts and establish peace and stability in
conflict countries. In terms of further cooperation, crisis response is
a relatively uncontroversial good starting point. How to work together
to deal with terrorism, religious and cultural conflict will be a good
opportunity in the context of OBOR, especially in the context of Central

16 The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development adopted by world leaders in September
2015 at an historic United Nations Summit officially came into force. Over the next
fifteen years, with these new goals that universally apply to all, countries will mobilize
efforts to end all forms of poverty, fight inequalities, and tackle climate change, while
ensuring that no one is left behind.
17 Goal 16: Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide
access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all
levels. http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/1&Lang=E (last
accessed by Dec 10th, 2016).
18 For example, China and the EU adopted a joint statement in 2015 for the way forward
after forty years, and “agreed to explore operational development coordination in syn-
ergy with local partners, including in Africa.”
19 The ‘road map’ should focus on the issues of common interest and concern to the countries
of the region, which include but are not limited to: non-proliferation, strategic arms control,
maritime security, in particular the management of military ships in exclusive economic
zones, prevention of unnecessary arms competition, including arms race in outer space
and networks, military policy, and posture for regional and global security influences.

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Ausa. For example, in 2015, a Chinese warship helped hundreds of foreign

nationals, including European citizens, evacuate from the war in Yemen.
In 2011, Chinese citizens also helped with evacuations during the crisis
in Libya. This action was as a great model for the security cooperation
between China and the EU (Mathieu & Bates 2012), which also laid the
foundation for future cooperation between the two sides.
As the global agenda for human security evolves from a military
peacekeeping mission to a more comprehensive peace-building process,
China, and the EU, will be the key powers in promoting post-conflict countries.
Closer cooperation is possible in areas, such as deepening consultations and
theoretical discussions, providing staff training and examining the building
of local peacekeeping capacity in conflict-affected areas, such as the Middle
East. This will help to achieve the new vision of international peacekeeping,
such as reduce military-oriented responses and reflect human-centeredness
more. In particular, both China and the EU need to consider increasing
civilian concerns and civil expertise in peace support operations and invest
more in crisis prediction and the protection of civilians. The current review
of United Nations peacekeeping systems and operations provides an
international context for future of EU–China cooperation. The increasingly
focused conflict prevention operations are the complementary to the needs
of militarily-oriented peacekeeping operations, even in the ideal situation
where the former takes precedence over the latter. China may enhance their
role and play a greater part the wider United Nations-led conflict prevention
operations, though this depends on whether China maintains a constructive
participation in the arms trade treaty process. The EU is likely to share more
experience with China, thereby enhancing China’s practical capacity in
arms and dual-use export controls, in particular, to prevent the transfer and
compliance of commercial export controls (Mariani 2016).

Conclusion
The EU is China’s comprehensive strategic partner. During President
Xi’s visit, the EU, together with the EU leaders, decided to build the four major
pillars of the Sino–EU partnership for peace, growth, reform and civilization,
and pointed out the strategic direction for the Sino–EU relations in the new
era. During the 40th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations
between China and the EU in 2015, the two sides decided to push forward the
development strategy of the OBOR initiative with the European Investment

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Plan, and set up the China–EU co-investment fund and the interconnection
platform to further establish a new framework for EU–China pragmatic
cooperation. Today, China–EU relations are in the best period of historical
development, facing an unprecedented historical opportunity.
In the context of OBOR, Sino–EU relations can be confined not only
by trade and investment, but also in the field of security. It is also a great
opportunity to deepen mutual trust between China and the EU. There are
many factors that affect China and the EU’s cooperation on the issues of
peace and security in the context of the OBOR initiative. It is clear that
China and the EU are divided and sometimes have different priorities in
terms of what peace and security should include and the issues of sovereignty
and non-intervention, however, the strategic partnership between Beijing
and Brussels is evolving over time, and the EU is also China’s largest trading
partner. While the current cooperation is fruitful and there is a possibility
of further cooperation, substantial progress will depend on whether the
parties can make reasonable arrangements for the focus in the competitive
field. There is no doubt that the partnership has created a number of
useful cooperation projects for both parties, but whether the partnership
arrangement is comprehensive and whether the strategy is reasonable is
still a question that needs to be answered in the future.

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HONGFEI GU, is a Ph.D. Candidate at the University of Lodz in Poland,

he received a master’s degree in European Studies from the University of Macau.
He serves as a trainee at the Center for Asian Affairs at the University of Lodz,
and a researcher at the Central and Eastern European Center for Asian Studies in
Hungary.

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 http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/8088-758-9.09

Lukáš Laš
(University of Ostrava)

Bridging the Visegrad Group

and East Asia Through Cooperation

Abstract

The re-emergence of East Asia brought more interactions of Asian capital

and peoples with the countries of the Visegrad Group (V4). China, the Republic
of Korea, Japan have a history of relations with Czechia, Hungary, Poland,
and Slovakia. The moderate discovering of Asia by the V4 in the last decade
is being substituted by growing Central European governmental initiatives to
attract capital, products, tourists, and to cultivate cooperation with East Asia.
The paper is devoted to a review of Visegrad–East Asia relations with a focus on
trade cooperation. Its goals are to reflect on current trends and to popularize the
Visegrad brand of the EU in Asia.

Key words: Visegrad Group (V4), cooperation, trade, East Asia.

Introduction
The Visegrad Group (V4) is a Central European platform of quadrilateral
cooperation among Czechia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. Visegrad
cooperation celebrated its 25 years in 2016 (Czech Presidency of the
Visegrad Group 2016), having been for 12 years a dynamic region of European
Union (EU). With the recent challenges that the EU is facing, any idea of
bridging East Asian economic powers appears ever more natural in these fastly
growing Central European economies. It appears meaningful to promote
cooperation, awareness, trust, acknowledgment, and exchange among
Visegrad/the EU and East Asian states, as it brings positive externalities.
According to classic theory, the international cooperation was
influenced by realist, liberal, and socialist paradigms (Siitonen 1990). The

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term ‘cooperation’ may also imply an apolitical representation, when the

“solution to social problems tends to cover the mechanism of dominance
and power stuggle as operating through cooperative relations” (Siitonen
1990 p. 5). The theory argued that international cooperation works
thanks to a smaller number of countries engaged and it can be sustained
by the equilibrium of a non-cooperative game in strategies of reciprocity in
which “only a small number of countries can sustain the full cooperative
outcome” (Barret 1997). However modern patterns in business with Asia
have been complex, often encompassing many countries into a tight
network of global economy and security.
East Asia as a region in global economy has been home to successful
transnational business networks such as the Chinese qiyejituan, Korean
chaebol, and new entities after the former Japanese keiretsu (cf. Peng
2000; Aukia & Laš 2013). Corporate East Asian transnational economic
actors contributed to a steady economic development in Asia and to the
emergence of the discourse on the ‘Asian Century’ (e.g. ADB 2011). East
Asian economies drive trade and development, and compete for resources
across Asia and in the world. The EU has major business relations with
Asia, of which the main business partners come from China and Japan.
Czechia, Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland developed bilateral relations
and cooperation with China, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan in often
separate contexts. The V4 has an existing formalized cooperation with
Japan, Taiwan, and the Republic of Korea. This cooperation will be
reviewed in the paper, but particular attention will be paid to the dynamic
cooperation with China. The aim of the paper is to contemplate on the
cooperation and relations of V4 countries with East Asia mainly after
2000 and towards 2020. A partial goal is to promote a ‘Visegrad brand’
and consider a ‘Visegrad–East Asia’ platform.
The paper is built on literature regarding the V4 and East Asia,
data, governmental, and other websites. V4 history was analysed by
Afana 2006, V4 relations with China and East Asia by e.g. Gregušová
(2005), Grabowski (2015), Turcsányi et al. (2015), Kopecký et al.
(2016). Economic relations of V4-East Asia were analysed by Éltető &
Szunomár (2015). This paper adds further views based on statistical data
(International Trade Centre 2016). The paper is built on ideas of the
theory of international cooperation (e.g. Siitonen 1990; Barret 1997),
the French school of geo-economics (Lorot et al. 1998), and of networks
in Asia (Peng 2002; Aukia & Laš 2013).

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Why Does the V4 Matter?

From a geographical view, the V4 is situated among the Baltic region
and the Balkans, Germany, and Ukraine. This strategic location in Europe
attracted business attention in East Asia. From a social-economic view,
the total population of over 60 million includes a skilled and cheap labour
force and market opportunities with EU standards, as well as unique
historic experience from socialist models of politics and economics. The
V4 constitutes a stable region with firm economic growth as a continuation
of economic integration within the EU.
Origins of Visegrad cooperation among Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
and Poland dates back to the period of Soviet influence. With breakdown
of the Iron Curtain, a common cultural heritage led to convergence in
a ‘geopolitical endeavour’ for collective return to Europe, embracing Euro-
Atlantic values (Czech V4 Presidency 2016). Experience from the Central
European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) whose members were the V4
states until 2004, reflected these efforts. The entrance of the V4 states into
the EU brought stability, prosperity, and capital. After admission to the EU,
V4 initiatives seemed to have lost their main purpose at first glance.
Today, the V4 has become “the most efficient and visible format for
political dialogue and sectoral cooperation in Central Europe” (Czech V4
Presidency 2016, p. 7). The V4 economies constitute an entity being an
equivalent of the 15th largest economy in the world, with a gradually value-
added-oriented economic growth based on engineering background. The V4
is valued for its support of democratic values in the EU. Optimism follows
positive multiplications, cultural integration, and a sense of responsibility
for EU stability, social cohesion, and prosperity. However, critics see the
as V4 ‘stuck’ in a “temporary period of reform politics in transition from
post-soviet to democratic capitalist societies” (Najman & Zanko 2016).
The latest criticism of the V4 was aimed at some divisive view within
the group on EU policies (such as the EU security and migration crisis or
refugee quota allocation refusal).
Economic crisis from the ‘Lehman Shock’ in 2008 shifted the
business attention of V4 countries to opportunities in East Asia
(cf. Éltető & Szunomár 2015). A peripheral economic position of Central
European countries within the EU next to Germany makes the V4 an
attractive gateway for Asian production to Western markets. East Asian
investments enlarge industrial capacities, and helped the V4 to integrate
into the regional and global economy. Cultural exchanges encouraged

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tourism and mobilities, food and beverage culture, but also education
and shopping. But what prospects of V4–East Asian relations are on the
horizon? Are there any gaps to be bridged? How do China, Korea, Japan,
and Taiwan approach individual V4 countries?

On Trade of the V4 and East Asia

A particular role of international transborder behaviour is represented

by economic entities formed into networks of inter-business relations
within the global economy. A segment of these relations constitutes
the transborder production chains that economically integrate Asia
with Europe. Trade between the V4 and East Asia is influenced by value
chains that vary in intensity and forms in Visegrad economies (Éltető &
Szunomár 2015; 2016). Visegrad trade with East Asia has been growing,
possibly at the expense of V4 intra-European trade, displayed in Chart 1.

EU Asia

Czechia 3.74 3.91

Hugary 2.09 1.99

Poland 4.01 5.31

Slovakia 5.72 9.45

Chart 1. Dynamics of EU and Asian exports to V4 states in a decade (2004–2014)

processed from data reviewed by Éltető & Szunomár (2016). Secondary data based on
Eurostat. The graph and table of Chart 1 show rising trade indexes of Czechia, Poland
and Slovakia with Asia, and relative trade balancing approach of Hungary within the
decade 2004–2014

Integration of the V4 in global value chains transformed national

production structures of V4 countries in the late 1990s. East Asian
investments emerged in the V4 region mainly after 2000. The V4
increased high-tech imports from East Asia in contrast with general EU
trade, possibly due to various degrees of integration of V4 economies in
production chains (Éltető & Szunomár 2015). Hungary, Czechia, and
Slovakia are linked in chains, while the Polish economy is less integrated
with its export structure more dispersed. There is geographic and product
concentration with changing product specialization towards East Asia
among V4 countries.

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 ##7#52#aSUZPUk1BVC1QdWJsaW8vQWdvcmE=
SLOVAKIA JAPAN CHINA REPUBLIC OF KOREA TAIWAN

2013 2014 2015 2013 2014 2015 2013 2014 2015 2013 2014 2015

Export 135,441 104,506 71,226 1,596,454 1,373,789 1,018,382 83,502 108,660 109,309 22,244 31,461 39,023

Import 838,557 788,233 661,801 4,571,602 5,022,405 5,795,459 5,264,042 4,453,719 4,349,166 456,631 474,836 584,594

Difference –703,116 –683,727 –590,575 –2,975,148 –3,648,616 –4,777,077 –5,180,540 –4,345,059 –4,239,857 –434,387 –443,375 –545,571

CZECHIA

Export 655,339 768,266 769,652 1,442,995 1,533,394 1,666,233 434,238 453,060 454,649 113,502 134,330 185,243

Import 1,999,236 1,917,551 2,057,468 11,659,060 13,109,885 17,115,640 2,261,345 2,340,412 3,027,267 837,684 807,241 821,362
8157
Difference –1,343,897 –1,149,285 –1,287,816 –10,216,065 –11,576,491 –15,449,407 –1,827,107 –1,887,352 –2,572,618 –724,182 –672,911 –636,119

HUNGARY

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Export 447,088 527,921 744,435 1,502,477 1,619,941 1,618,715 224,891 254,700 434,681 104,189 110,770 148,171

Import 923,511 925,776 1,129,338 3,999,920 3,839,154 4,687,026 852,966 1,071,558 1,288,479 729,024 600,318 593,469

Difference –476,423 –397,855 –384,903 –2,497,443 –2,219,213 –3,068,311 –628,075 –816,858 –853,798 –624,835 –489,548 –445,298

POLAND

Export 508,397 497,248 515,067 1,595,822 1,693,440 1,817,436 544,672 381,004 382,667 118,593 127,991 128,238

Import 2,139,838 2,350,197 2,354,078 14,530,730 17,297,440 20,162,594 3,150,393 3,252,045 2,959,891 903,707 1,140,561 1,140,676

Difference –1,631,441 –1,852,949 –1,839,011 –12,934,908 –15,604,000 –18,345,158 –2,605,721 –2,871,041 –2,577,224 –785,114 –1,012,570 –1,012,438

Chart 2. Overal trade in thousands of EUR in Slovakia, Czechia, Hungary, and Poland with Japan, China, Republic of Korea, and Taiwan in 2013,
2014, and 2015 (data from International Trade Centre 2016)
 142 Lukáš Laš

Tight production links between the regions are implemented to serve

the Western segment of the EU market in first place. EU businesses
import electronic parts and components from Asia and implement them
in their production in the V4 region, mainly in the automotive industry.
There are Asian firms and societies that invested in V4 countries and
have intensified sourcing from Asia which increased mutual trade with
V4 states (Éltető & Szunomár 2015).
The core of the trade structure among countries of the V4 and East
Asia was developed before 2007. In Visegrad’s trade with Asia, a major
increase has been with East Asia (China) for all V4 countries. China
has become the most important trade partner of East Asia (Éltetős &
Szunomárs 2016, p. 6). Japan and Taiwan play smaller roles in bilateral
trade flows, while the share of South Korean trade is significant for the V4
in imports. V4 trade with East Asia is more high-tech intensive than the
V4 trade with the EU. For Slovakia, over 73% of exports to East Asia flow
thanks to China’s demand for car products. In investments, South Korea
dominates in all V4 countries except Poland, where Japan is number one.
Japan is the second largest investor in Czechia, Hungary, and Slovakia
(Éltetős & Szunomárs 2016, p. 7). The V4 has a growing trade deficit with
East Asia as displayed in Chart 2. With the exception of Hungary, there is
a lack of a trade strategy for the V4 to trade with East Asia.
Éltetős and Szunomárs described 3 models in V4 trade patters with
East Asia. For Slovakia an export model concentrated on automotive
industry, for Poland an export model on copper (e.g. Grabowski 2015),
and for Czechia and Hungary more diversified export patterns that aim
to integrate into global value chains are in place (cf. Éltetős & Szunomárs
2016). The commercialization of high-tech helps V4 countries to gather
experience and technological know-how, builds production capacities and
communications, and brands this experience as exporting states.

Japan and the V4

Japan has a history of bilateral relations with each V4 country. The V4
and Japan celebrated 10 years of cooperation in 2014, enjoying a successful
partnership. Japan has been a partner and donor of Official Development
Aid (ODA). Foreign Minister Taro Aso, during Abe’s first term in 2006,
presented a vision of democratic and market development along Euroasia’s
coast up to the Central Europe, the ‘Arc of Freedom’ (Ministry of Foreign

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Affairs of Japan 2006) that is based on democratization and promotion of

market principels. These principles are supported also in Eastern Europe
and the Western Balkans in the interest of both Japan and the EU.
Next to economic cooperation, trade is defined by a deficit for all
V4 states with Japan. The perpective cooperation fields include science,
academia, culture, peace, and security. V4 Eastern Partnership by the
International Visegrad Fund (IVF) is welcomed by Tokyo as it helps
“to facilitate systematic transformation and democratization” of the
Eastern Parnership countries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2013).
Japan expresseed appreciation of the V4’s role in the Community of
Democracies, the International Center for Democratic Transition, and
European Endowment for Democracy.
In the security field, there is the NATO-Japan cooperation, or the
Common Security and Defence Policy that V4–Japan refer to. Japan and
the V4 reflected on the North Korean nuclear programme and raised mutual
concerns. Both sides expressed also concerns over the humanitarian
situation in Sahel, North Africa, and the Middle East (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Japan 2013). Parties highlighted maintenance of order on the
seas and oceans based on international law.
For the V4 private professional organizations and corporations,
Japanese partners are often seen as highly innovative and somewhat
conservative. The support of embassies is very useful. Japanese partners
are seen as loyal and their decision making takes time. There exists an
exchange of goodwill ambassadors. The ‘Cool Japan’ or the Japanese ‘soft
power’ diplomatic initiative is praised by the V4. The IVF for professional
mobilities and projects has successful cooperation with the Yosai University
Education Corporation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2016). Travel
agencies and the Internet promote tourism thanks to available flights for
citizens of the V4 to Asia.

Republic of Korea and the V4

The meeting of the V4 prime ministers and President Park of the
Republic of Korea (RoK) was held in Prague in 2015. Both sides appreciated
support for freedom, liberty, market economy, and democracy in the
world. These values are compatible with Japanese and Taiwanese, as well
as European, values. However, the RoK is the only country from East Asia
that signed three fundamental bilateral agreements with the EU. As in

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the case of Japan with the V4, there is a convergence in political and
security agendas present in talks with the V4. The RoK invested in the
IVF while positive EU–Korea Free Trade effects happen. A framework for
a EU–Korea free trade area is being implemented (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Czech Republic 2015).
South Korea is interested in cooperation in transport and infrastructure
(e.g. Intelligent Transport System), and similarly to Japan, the RoK
supported small and middle enterprises (SME) in sub-supply production
chains. The V4-RoK decided to make efforts in exploration for cooperation
in national defense and the defense industry. There is a cultural exchange
and professional mobility in place. Cooperation implies partnerships
among the RoK and Visegrad regions and cities. Addtionally, there is also
the professional mobility of students, holiday programme agreements, as
well as the V4-Korean language education (cf. Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the Czech Republic 2015).
The V4 and RoK reflected on global and regional issues including
security, as in the case of V4–Japan, the RoK and V4 see the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea as a security risk and urged for the
denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and for peaceful reunification.
The RoK recognized the experience of the V4’s successful transition in the
1990s. The V4 supported the RoK’s Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation
Initiative (NAPCI).
The V4–RoK proceeded to cooperate in inter-modal transportation
and logistics, ICT and knowledge sharing. The pro-reform course of
Ukrainian development was a topic which makes South Korea another
partner in politial discourse with neighbouring countries of the V4. Security
issues and cooperation in the United Nations, Asia Europe Meeting, and
NATO are areas of common interest (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Czech Republic 2015). The V4 welcomed the RoK’s Eurasian Initiative to
enhance connectivity in region through innovation, peace and stability in
Eurasia.

China and the V4

China has been the most quoted topic in relation to East Asia today.
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been diplomatically present
in states neighbouring Central Europe. This brought more contacts with
China in regional and global affairs. China shares 10% of the global trade

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in goods. In trade, China is the EU’s 2nd partner after the Unites States
(US). For China, the EU is the first trade partner and the main importer.
The EU has a large trade deficit with China, so do the V4 countries, mainly
due to unbalanced market access opportunities limited for EU businesses
in China. Mutual trade of the EU and China is over €1 billion per day,
but services only make one-tenth of total trade. EU–China 2020 Strategic
Agenda for Cooperation plans to strengthen cooperation that will lead to
a free trade area in the long term (European Commission 2016).
China became quickly the third largest investor in the world after
the US and Japan. While foreign direct investment (FDI) from developed
states dropped after the financial crises, Chinese outward investments
have increased there. In weak or unstable states, China tends to invest
in the mining industry or natural resources, in bigger economies with
low labour costs close to large markets China invests in manufacturing
sectors. The Chinese networks seek brands, technologies, distribution
channels, and strategic assets. However, the Chinese approach to Central
Europe differs from China’s investment approaches in developed countries
(cf. Éltető & Szunomár 2016).
Geo-economics play a role in Chinese projects (Grabowski 2015; cf.
Turcsányi et al. 2015), mainly in strategic instrastructural projects such
as railway communications from China to Europe. Chinese projects bring
opportunities to redefine Europe–China relations. Some see it optimistically,
others with suspicion. For instance, when it comes to Eurasian transport
communications involving Asia and Africa, the main corridors may bypass
Europe in the future (van der Putten & Meijnders 2015). For the EU, the
Russian project of the Eurasian Union is seen to be less attractive as the new
Chinese Silk Road projects (Kopecký et al. 2016).
The V4 observes opportunities in China’s huge market, capital, and
expanding global economic role. For the V4, Chinese investments flow
into Hungary, Poland, Czechia, and Slovakia. Chinese FDI is a result of
governmental policy by the state. Initiatives are operated by the Chinese
firms – State Owned Enterprises (SOE) in close links to the Communist
Party of China (cf. van der Putten & Meijnders 2015, p. 6). These firms
are crucial factors in Chinese FDI in the world with advantages among
global corporations from Chinese government facilitation of their
internationalization and expansion abroad (cf. Éltető & Szunomár 2015;
2016), as the theory of geo-economics suggests (cf. Lorot 1998).
China supports the free transfer of economic sources, market
integration, coordination of economic politics and regional cooperation.

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The One Belt One Road (OBOR) project has become China’s branding tool
in accordance with the ‘march West’ doctrine (Tiezzi 2013). It is committed
to the development of communications in Eurasia. The two main projects
are the Initiative Silk Road Economic Belt (ISREB) and the Maritime Silk
Belt (MSB). OBOR wants to support the export of competitive Chinese
infrastructure-related projects overseas (Yanfei 2016), as a competitor to
Japan, South Korea, or France. Roads and railways bring market access for
Chinese products. Due to increasing costs in China there is a removal of
production capacities to abroad states to seek low-cost and proximity to
markets (Kopecký et al. 2016).
The MSB is an ambitious long-term programme for economic
integration of a vast zone including Europe, Africa, and most of Asia by
infrastructural development (van der Putten & Meijnders 2015; Poláček
2015). For the V4 what matters are Chinese investments in the Greek
port of Piraeus that may serve as a logistical crossroads in Europe for
adjacent regions by railways and sea. It would redefine the importance of
maritime logistic hubs in Europe (Shepard 2016). It will help the V4 to
develop logistical roles. Positive externalities may give the V4 a new hub
function to be expanded to the Baltic Sea region (e.g. Baltic Container
Terminal in Gdynia, Poland).
ISREB provides a framework to connect China across Central Asia with
Eastern Europe over land. It includes communication infrustructure and
pipelines. Kazakhstan and Belarus have cooperated with China and Russia
for transporting goods from China to Europe. There are currently around
40 train connections between Chinese and European cities, including
cities in Poland. Yet the Russian Federation is engaged in Chinese railways
in a small part. China tends to build new connections across Eurasia. To
be engaged in ISREB appears to be of attractive economic interest for the
V4 as well as for the EU.
The OBOR initiative fits in the ‘concept’ of ‘connectivity’ that is
present at regional forums, including the ASEM (a biannual summit
between the EU and most Asian countries), and China–16+1 (16 Central
and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) and China). It is believed that
interconnectivity generates trade, economic progress, and reduces security
risks. The V4 region may see an opportunity to take part in connecting
Eurasian regions in frame with economic and trade interests of the EU
and China.
As anticipated over a decade ago, the EU membership confirmed
a great improvement of performance of the V4 in building relationships

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with China (Gregušová 2005). Today China is catching up with South

Korea, Taiwan and Japan in engagement with he V4 in all spheres. From
European countries engaged in the Chinese 16+1 platform, the V4
countries constitute over Four-fifthsof the trade volume (Turcsányi et al.
2015). Yet the strategy of V4 for China has not been introduced. Only
individual agreements and memoranda with China exist in the V4.
Export from V4 countries to China has been increasing since 2003, but
it stagnated in Hungary and Slovakia in 2014. At present there is a deficit
with China in each V4 country as seen in Chart 2. Poland as the largest
V4 country has the highest trade figures from the V4. Important trade
share with China is with Czechia, Hungary, and Poland. An exception is
Slovakia where China has a smaller role than South Korea (cf. Éltető &
Szunomár 2016).
Liu, a Chinese scholar, referred to Central Europe and its role in
China’s international politics as a ‘window of opportunity’ for a certain
period of time. Given to asymmetric nature between China–CEEC
cooperation, the V4 has not been seen of strategic importance (Liu 2013).
Developing relations between China and the CEEC is seen ‘suspicious’ for
possible undermining the EU by some EU member states (Liu 2013). In
East Asia, FDI and trade are interconnected. Chinese firms gained shares
of companies in Central Europe that propelled trade and mobility. There
is experience with some firms from China that seek to obtain 5% shares
in EU companies just to drain a firm’s strategy and market know-how,
which is not a win-win in a long term (cf. Staněk 2014). Such cases may
result in protectionist measures. What is necessary is coordination and
transparent discourse.
The ‘European perspective’ and ‘regional approach’ are embedded in
Chinese pragmatism (Liu 2013). A Chinese market oriented ‘win-win’
approach is seeking a pratical relationship, not an alliance. The Chinese
Ministry of Foreign Affairs established a secretariat for cooperation with
the CEEC (Grabowski 2015). As in the case of Japan, China wins with
a soft power approach present in the 16+1, such as initiatives by Asian
Infrastructure and Investment Bank to which over 15 European states co-
funded, including Poland from the V4. An idea of a Eurasia Land Bridge
(e.g. Davydenko, Landa Maxta, Martens, Nesterova, Wark et. al. 2012)
made the V4 an aspiring target of consideration for logistical crossroads.
The 16+1 format’s beginnings emerged after 2011. The Belgrade
Guidelines followed by the Suzhou Guidelines presented a new vision for
cooperation and OBOR started to be quoted in the memoranda signed,

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as with Hungary or Czechia. Areas of modernization, environmental

projection and economy revival were on the agenda of the Warsaw 16+1
meeting in 2015 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland 2016). Chinese
President Xi said on “Our cooperation on the ‘Belt and Road’ […] will create
even greater impetus and potential for ‘16+1’ cooperation” (Engel 2016,
p. 9). Chinese investors have already shown interest in the Odra–Labe–
Donau canal project (Shepard 2016). Yet such projects are hypothetical.
Qualified CEEC financial institutions are welcomed to apply for
participation in the Renminbi Cross-border Inter-bank Payment System,
and maybe in future also in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2015), thus
another item for a mutual approach of the V4 and EU. There are measures
in place for cooperation on crisis management, but it takes time. China
seeks market economy status, which is a frozen point in memoranda with
the V4 in line with EU policy (cf. Elliot & Yan 2013).
To sum up, interaction and trade with China have been on the
increase and show new opportunities. The current 16+1 format
intensifies interactions with China on its ambitious projects of railroad
communications. It will take efforts among the V4 and Balkan states to
coordinate realization of the initiative, thus a dialogue will be useful in
groups, such as the V4 group in the 16+1 initiative. The trade deficit
draws a question of a strategy to a V4 approach to China within the EU.

Taiwan and the V4

Taiwan or the Republic of China (RoC) was among the first from Asian
partners in Central Europe that discovered Czechia, Hungary, Slovakia,
and Poland after the fall of the Iron Curtain. In the 1990s, Taipei enjoyed
closer links with Warsaw and Prague, and weaker links with Bratislava and
Budapest. Taiwan provided investments to secure economic objectives,
but later there was a shift to a political concessions strategy (Tubilewicz
2007), when Taiwanese interests were rewarded with larger political gains
at small costs. On the other hand, Taipei was a facilitator that established
offices while investments and trade came quite easy for Taipei.
The double taxation avoidance played a role in the establishment of
Taiwanese business networks in the V4. There was a limited political
clout to influence policy vis-à-vis Taipei. Taiwan provided soft loans, its
exports included computers, bikes, machinery, and electronic components.

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Establishing business networks in the region, Taiwanese corporations

benefited more from emerging markets in Central Europe than contributed
to their development.
In Czechia, President Václav Havel supported Taiwanese initiatives,
and this brought Czech firms to Taiwan (e.g. the Škoda Group). Prague
supported the RoC in their World Trade Organization accession and
promoted trade, but later disappointment came due to Taiwanese
preference for the US, Japan, and RoK. Poland enjoyed a trade surplus,
Hungary and Czechia overcame Poland in trade volume after 1999. The
first Slovak government of the 1990s prioritized the PRC over RoC.
The Slovak Economic and Cultural Office in Taiwan and the Taiwanese
Representative Office in Slovakia contributed to the exchange of students,
or quasi-consulates and governmental staffers. With accession to the EU,
V4 countries became a more attractive subject of interest for Taiwanese
capital.
The RoC opened channels to Taiwanese markets (Tubilewicz 2007).
Enhanced cultural cooperation and mobility contributed to mutual
promotion. The Visegrad–Taiwan Fund has become a model of cooperation,
exchange of ideas, and is an example of good practice. However, today
Taiwanese investments are under competition from Mainland China. In
relation to the current Chinese OBOR initiative, it seems unlikely that
Taiwan will profit from these opportunities (cf. Kopecký et al. 2016). China
is more active in that V4 than Taiwan. The V4 may consider a balanced
approach for cooperation of both Chinese economies in V4 projects.

Identifying Gaps, Identifying Bridges

Countries of the V4 and East Asia enjoy convergent relations with
a growing space for deeper cooperation. The V4 has signed memoranda
of understanding and strategic documents with Japan and the RoK,
covering various areas of cooperation, supporting mutual values
(freedom, democracy, market-oriented), security issues, and academic
and cultural exchange (as in case of Taiwan). A decade ago Japan
presented its diplomatic initiative, the Arc of Freedom. China on the
other hand came out with OBOR that focused on communication and
trade. It is in the interest of the V4 to keep cultivating relations, trade,
and exchange with East Asia.

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Speakers from the Asia Innovation Forum in Prauge in 2016 revealed

experience with East Asia as a business location. In their eyes, Korean
partners are perceived as flexible, open for new ideas and good in languages.
Japanese partners often have language barriers, and there is a demand for
interpreters. The Japanese are not seen as flexible as the Chinese that
push for sales, market, and demand. Partners from Japan, Taiwan, and
South Korea communicate more concrete ideas than Chinese partners.
V4 professionals enjoy living in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and China.
Conferences like the Asia Innovation Forum are great venues for the
dissemination of empirical experience to the V4 audiences. It needs to be
supported by the V4.
Among the gaps to be bridged and addressed by the V4 is a growing
trade deficit with the countries of East Asia as displayed in the Chart 2.
All V4 states show a growing trade deficit with East Asia. This trend has
been steep in the case of Poland and Czechia in 2015. Only the case of
Hungary does it show a moderate development of trade deficit, as seen in
Chart 3. A rising gap in trade leads to an outflow of wealth from the V4 to
East Asia. Here the V4 has space to fill.
A growing trade deficit is visible in all V4 countries, particularly for
Czechia, as displayed in Chart 4. The V4 will recognise a need for a strategy
for more balanced trade opportunities with Asia. Investments are welcome
in V4 countries. Japanese, South Korean, and Taiwanese investments help
to create industrial capacities, integrate V4 economies to European and

Chart 3. Development of year-on-year trade deficit of Slovakia, Poland, Hungary and

Czechia with East Asia in thousands of EUR in the period of 2013, 2014, and 2015
(Statistics of International Trade Centre 2016)

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global production chains with positive externalities such as stimulation

of consumption, rise of savings, or increase of employment rate. The
geographic location of the export-oriented V4 economies reduces risk from
fluctuation of the global demand for products which brings a certain degree
of stability. However, large profits from Asian investments and production
in the Visegrad region go back to Asia. China kept up with other East Asian
states in engagement with the V4. Its initiatives such as OBOR, and mainly
ISREB, provides the V4 with fresh cooperation prospects.

State/Year/% 2013 2014 2015

Czechia 28.60 30.98 40.42
Hungary 32.76 30.41 36.83
Poland 28.47 33.84 37.69
Slovakia 32.53 31.93 35.54
Chart 4. Development of year-on-year trade deficit of V4 states with East Asia in
percentage points (%) in 2013, 2014, 2015
(Statistics of International Trade Centre 2016), cf. chart 3

Cooperation with East Asia contributes to the creation of positive

economic externalities. The V4 border regions of Ostrava–Katowice–
Žilina, or Brno–Bratislava–Vienna–Budapest are EU transregional growth
zones that will provide new capacities to attract East Asian capital. The V4
may consider to invite these business in specific communication projects
in which the ‘Visegrad Development Fund’ can play a role. Prospects of V4–
East Asia toward 2020 look promising in investments, trade and exchange
within EU cooperation with Asia. The trade deficit of the V4 countries
should be addressed to stabilize the trend of growing trade deficit.
Information access about East Asian and Central European countries
spreads mutual awareness and understanding. Here the V4 Think-Tank
Platform may mediate the latest findings. It appears useful to promote the
V4 platform within European Studies, and build capacities for education
offered to Asian students in Central European studies under a common
brand within the EU in Asia. On the other hand, there is a demand
for Chinese, Korean, and Japanese language skills in the V4 and EU.
Promoting language education and student mobility will strengthen the
exchange of ideas at universities, and intensity of business interactions.
Building a particular ‘Visegrad Brand’ in Asia will be helpful for V4
actors, regions, and cities. Visegrad branding in the economic diplomacy
of V4 countries would make it easier for individual actors to implement

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their business plans in East Asia. Signing a memorandum of understanding

between China and the V4 will open channels for exchange. The V4
should identify East Asia among priority regions of cooperation, such as it
does with Benelux countries, the Eastern Partnership, or Western Balkans.
The V4 has much to learn from East Asia for the sake of the EU. Enabling
such a cooperation platform will make the V4 more recognised in Asia
and the world.
It appears useful to popularize the Visegrad ‘brand’ in East Asia, as V4
states are relatively small and ‘hidden’ in the EU. Branding in the sense of
a ‘soft power’ push can be created along a designed strategy. The V4 can
brand its Central European culture, EU membership, geography, nature,
market, skilled labour, growing middle class (that is able to discover East
Asia), and offer original high-quality products. With the upcoming Korean
Winter Olympic Games in 2018, Summer Olympic games in Tokyo
2020, and Winter Olympic Games in Beijing 2022, the V4 could promote
cooperation in sport and tourism with China, Korea, and Japan. These
events will be opportunities for the V4 countries to learn about East Asia.

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 154 Lukáš Laš

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland, 2015. Viewed on 17 November 2015, http://www.

msz.gov.pl/en/p/msz_en/news/6th_meeting_of_national_coordinators_of_central_
and_eastern_europe_china_in_16_1_format.
Najman, B. & Zanko Y., 2016, Anti European Union Politics in the Visegrad group: What
is the rationale? Viewed 30 March 2016, http://futureofeurope.eu/user/pages/agenda-
day-one/Najman_Anti_EU_rationale.pdf.
Peng, D., 2000, ‘The Changing Nature of East Asia as an Economic Region’, Pacific Affairs,
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Putten van der, F-P. & Meijnders, M., 2015, China, Europe and the Maritime Silk Road.
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Forbes, Asia, http://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2016/01/21/china-is-moving-
mountains-for-the-new-silk-road-literally/#619c89416729.
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Tiezzi, Sh., 2013, China ‘Marches West’ – To Europe, The Diplomat. Viewed on 21 March
2016, http://thediplomat.com/2013/11/china-marches-west-to-europe/.
Tubilewicz, Cz., 2007, Taiwan and Post-Communist Europe: Shopping for Allies,
Routledge.
Turcsányi, R.Q., Matura, T. & Fürst, R., 2015, The Visegrad Countries’ Political Relations
with China: Goals, Results and Prospects, pp. 127–142.
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Viewed on 6 March 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/can-new-keynesianism-
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LUKÁŠ LAŠ, Ph.D., Mgr. is a Lecturer of Political Geography with a focus on

East Asia at the Department of Human Geography and Regional Development,
and an International Officer at the Faculty of Science, University of Ostrava in
Czechia. He provides teaching of two courses; Japan in Political Geography of East
Asia since 2016 and Limits of Development in India and China since 2011. He
co-authored the article ‘Japanese Geopolitics of the Imperial Period’, Geografie,
vol. 119, no. 4, pp. 364–383 in 2014 and defended the doctoral thesis “Geopolitics
of Japan and Strategic Effects of Emergent Asia” in 2015. His research interests
deal with cooperation between the EU and East Asia, and with political geography
of Indo-Pacific Asia.

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 http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/8088-758-9.10

David A. Jones
(University of Warsaw)

Cooperation or Confrontation? Assessing

the American ‘Pivot’ to Asia in Context
– Is It a Western ‘Neo-Liberealism’
Response to China’s New ‘Open Door’
Approach to Europe?

Abstract

Much attention has surrounded ‘America’s Pivot to Asia’, hyped in fanfare,

castigated by China, welcomed by smaller Asian states in the context of wishful
maritime security, all involving an air and naval pivot to Asia by the United States.
Less attention has focused on a Western economic pivot to Asia, a significant
American financial presence, including World Bank (WB) cooperation under
American leadership with the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) under
Chinese leadership. Although the AIIB stands to become theoretically an antithesis
of the WB, recently the AIIB changed course quietly, grounding its funding in US
dollars instead of Chinese RenMinBi, itself borrowing from the WB to support
derivative loans from the AIIB to developing nations! This chapter addresses the
significance of what appears facially to be a ‘carrot and stick’ approach, focusing
particularly on opportunities for Sino-American and Sino-European cooperation
instead of confrontation, then forecasting ways such cooperation will promote
progressive military de-escalation. Is this financial cooperation a form of 21st century
‘Dollar Diplomacy’ that will result in an American military pivot away from Asia? If
so, it contains some hallmarks of what some might consider ‘Structural Liberalism’
or neo-liberalism in a neo-realist package, possibly to be labeled ‘neo-liberealism’.1
Key words: China, ‘Dollar Diplomacy’, ‘Neo-Liberealism’, ‘Open Door’,
‘Structural Liberalism’.

1 This paper was presented at the 12th Lodz East Asia Meeting on 2–3 June 2016 at the
University of Lodz Department of East Asian Studies in Lodz, Poland, where the au-
thor coined the words ‘neo-liberealism’.

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Introduction
Much attention has surrounded ‘America’s Pivot to Asia’, hyped in fanfare
and hyperbole based partially on United States (US) Presidential candidate
Hillary Clinton’s launch of this concept as US secretary of state in a feature
article published in Foreign Policy on October 11, 2011, under the title of
“America’s Pacific Century” (Clinton 2011). That position was followed and
buttressed swiftly by President Barack Obama on November 17, 2011, in
a speech delivered before the Australian Parliament in which he said “Let
there be no doubt: in the Asia-Pacific in the 21st century, the United States
of America is all in”, that this was a “deliberate and strategic decision” that
America is “here to stay” (America in the Asia-Pacific, We’re back 2011).
That position has come under fire many times since then when it became
castigated by China but welcomed by many smaller Asian states in the
context of wishful maritime security, all involving a US military, including
air and naval, pivot to Asia and especially into the Western Pacific. It came
under fire from a European perspective, also, with former US ambassador
to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Kurt Volker, raising the
question “where’s Europe” in the wake of the US pivot to Asia (Volker 2011).
At the end of September 2016, the US announced through its defence
secretary, Ashton Carter, aboard an aircraft carrier in the Western Pacific
rim that soon the US “will sharpen its ‘military edge’ in Asia” (Burns
2016). Less attention has focused on a Western economic pivot to Asia
that includes a significant American financial presence, including World
Bank (WB) cooperation under American leadership, alongside of the Asia
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) under Chinese leadership. As
announced initially by China’s President Xi Jinping, the AIIB stands to
become the antithesis of the WB and International Monetary Fund (IMF)
combined, with their ‘Western’ dominated influence that originated at the
1944 Bretton Woods Economic Conference that included a vocal presence
from the Chinese Nationalist Party, the Kuomingtang. More recently,
the AIIB caused a ‘blowback’ to the US when the United Kingdom
led most of Europe to become founding members of the AIIB over the
objections of US President Barack Obama and many Republican members
of Congress (Morley 2015). Then, very quietly, the AIIB changed course
in two respects, grounding its funding in US dollars (USD) instead of
Chinese RenMinBi (RMB), as announced originally (AIIB to use U.S.
dollar 2015), and successfully structuring a co-financing agreement with
the WB (AIIB and World Bank 2016) to support derivative loans from the

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AIIB to developing nations. This paper addresses the significance of what

appears facially to be a ‘carrot and stick’ approach, focusing particularly on
opportunities for Sino-American and Sino-European cooperation instead
of confrontation, and also forecasting ways in which such cooperation is
likely to diffuse an already existing and escalating confrontation in the
East and South China Seas and elsewhere, by progressive de-escalation. Is
this financial cooperation a form of 21st century ‘Dollar Diplomacy’ that
will result in a US military pivot away from Asia? If so, it contains some
hallmarks of what one might construe to be ‘Structural Liberalism’ akin
to ‘Structural Realism’ (Mearsheimer 2006, pp. 71–88) or, said differently,
neo-liberalism2 in a neo-realist3 package, possibly to be labeled ‘Neo-
Liber-Realism’ or more conveniently ‘neo-liberealism’, where nations
subscribing to this paradigm will assess each other in terms of economic
instead of military capability, and each will predict the future course of
its competitor economically in addition to, if not actually in the stead
of, militarily.
This chapter endeavours to explore two seemingly current phenomena:
an ‘open door’ in Europe to Asian (as well as other) foreign direct investment
(FDI), that includes an ‘open door’ in Russia to Western FDI, coupled with
a ‘closing door’ in China to FDI, at least to unrestricted FDI from the West. It
is almost a horizontal ‘hour glass’ effect, as Europe opens, Asia closes. More
than merely that, in many ways Europe is de-militarising (except for Ukraine)
just as Asia is re-militarising, especially, but not only, in the South China
Sea region. Such comparison must be addressed directly as in this paper and
undoubtedly will be implemented into foreign policy by the incoming US
President Donald J. Trump, evidenced by his nomination of Exxon Mobil
chief executive Rex W. Tillerson as secretary of state, forecasting an emerging
‘Dollar Diplomacy’ unwitnessed since the administration of President
William Howard Taft, 1909–1913, with the US government turning to global
private enterprises to invest dollars into strategically important areas of the
world to purchase peace through calculated FDI. On this score, the US will be
trailing the lead taken already by China and its AIIB, particularly across West

2 To review Neo-Liberalism, see Keohane, Robert O. & Joseph S., Nye, Jr., 2011, Power
and Interdependence, 4th ed., Pearson Longman Classics in Political Science, Boston.
3 Neo-Realism has been divided into two types: defensive and offensive. To review ‘de-
fensive’ Neo-Realism, see Waltz, Kenneth N., 2001, ‘Structural Realism after the Cold
War’, International Security, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 5–41, especially 5, n.1. To review ‘offen-
sive’ Neo-Realism, see Mearsheimer, John J., 1994, ‘The False Promise of Internation-
al Institutions’, International Security, vol. 19, no. 3, pp. 5–49.

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Asia and extreme Eastern Europe, undoubtedly frustrating to the Russian

Federation that appointed itself as the successor to the Soviet Union, and that
designated EurAsia as being a largely Russian protectorate sector.

Europe’s ‘Open Door’

Europe generally, and the European Union (EU) in particular, is an
‘Open Door’ environment for Asian businesses. China’s international
investment position increased steadily from 2004 through 2011, as
Figure 1 below reflects, impressing some global partners with a sense of
opportunity through cooperation with Chinese businesses (Kolstad &
Wiig 2012, p. 26), creating its own ‘open door’ in Europe in reverse from
the way some European countries did in China across the second half
of the 19th century. Undoubtedly, this has been startling to other global
actors, particularly Russia, as they witness China rising economically
and seeking to invest its newly acquired wealth in countries or territories
with poor institutions but vast natural resources. An expansion of what
one might term Europe’s ‘Open Door’ policy toward Chinese enterprises,
both the large and heavily subsidized state-wwned enterprises (SOEs)
and the often under-capitalised private sector small- to medium-size
enterprises (SMEs), has provoked some signs of backlash, more in some
European countries such as England and France than in others, such as
the Netherlands (Meunier, Burgoon & Jacoby 2014).
Europe generally, the EU in particular, have extended an ‘Open
Door ’ policy effectively, inviting Asian countries and China especially to
invest in Europe. This is quite evident in Poland, from word of mouth
as well as online advertisements by Central and Eastern European
Countries (Second Contact 2014), most notably by the Polish Agency
for Information and International Investment (PAIiIZ), reflected in its
newsletters (PAIiIZ Newsletter 504 2016). In reality, Europe craves
Chinese investment although it is surrounded by many issues including
corruption and human rights violations inside of China and money
laundering globally. Europe’s apparent desire for Chinese investment
does not mean, necessarily, that the US shares that objective. In fact, it is
opposed even within Europe, perhaps spearheaded by University of Leeds
scholars in England who have expressed concern that foreign investors
from China that largely is unregulated have been unprepared for the
burdens of doing business in the over-regulated environment of Europe

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Figure 1. China’s International Investment Position (2004–2011)

* Other Investment category includes trade credit, loans, currency and deposits and
other investment.
Source: PBOC, SAFE, RHG.

(Clegg & Voss 2012), and that many Chinese SMEs operating in Europe
tend to ‘round top’ by seeking European locations for their outward FDI
(OFDI) operations as tax havens, but ending up as business failures
(Buckley et al. 2014). Does this evidence European, especially Western
European, protectionism in the light of data documenting that most of
China’s OFDI since 2010 has been earmarked to Europe? For example,
since 2010 Chinese OFDI in Europe has increased 102% in comparison
to 74% in the US and only 15% in emerging economies (Godement
2012, p. 1), with Chinese OFDI in Europe increasing geometrically from
slightly more than €6.1 billion in 2010 to €27 billion in 2012 (Hansakul
& Levinger 2014), a four time increase in only two years. Accordingly,
this huge influx of Chinese OFDI in Europe has divided Europe East from
West and within Western Europe, with far more Dutch supporting it and
French opposing it, facially on a protectionist basis (Meunier, Burgoon &
Jacoby 2014), although such fears have been criticised as being overblown
(Nicolas 2014). Different perceptions by the Dutch and French could
be accounted for by different degrees of competition in manufacturing.
That alone would not explain German support for Chinese OFDI in
Europe. An explanation might be that China is investing more OFDI
in Germany than in any other non-Asian country except the US, more in
Germany than elsewhere in the EU, more in the Netherlands than in the
United Kingdom or France (Hoffman 2014). An additional explanation

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may be that in 2012 China surpassed France to become Germany’s

largest trading partner (Chinese Ministry of Commerce 2012). Overall,
this portrait appears to be accurate, although statistical details vary,
with Chinese statistics being at odds with European statistics frequently.
Confounding this measurement is the fact that some (possibly much) of
China’s OFDI tends to leave China through Hong Kong, some of what
reaches Luxembourg tends to end up elsewhere in Europe, not always
earmarked as having come from China originally.
Derivatively, does it signal a potential explanation for the US pivot to
Asia, arguably at the behest of European voices that disagree with Europe’s
burgeoning China imports, or equally arguable in its own interests, as
a combination of both US and European interests, or as one in the context
of a pretext for another, or is this pivot only a pretense? Increased Chinese
OFDI (by Deal Value, Mergers and Acquisitions only) from 2012 to 2013,
clearly in the immediate aftermath of the US’s pivot to Asia, documents
the benefits the US has received and Europe has lost, seemingly the one’s
gain at the other’s expense:

Europe
Industry 3,813,000,000 5,034,000,000
Resources 3,064,000,000 4,430,000,000
Services 5,689,000,000 1,028,000,000
North America
Industry 1,700,000,000 7,179,000,000
Resources 5,847,000,000 18,706,000,000
Services 3,013,000,000 300,000,000
Asia
Industry 979,000,000 1,225,000,000
Resources 80,000,000 5,425,000,000
Services 5,689,000,000 3,841,000,000

Figure 2. Chinese OFDI, 2012 and 2013 Compared (USD, by Deal Value, Mergers and
Acquisitions only). 2012 2013

Source: A Capital 2014, p. 1.

As Figure 2 reflects, Europe improved slightly on Chinese industrial

and resources investment, lost heavily to Asia on Chinese services
investment. More startling, in a single year the Chinese investment
in North American industrials rose by a factor of four to USD 7,179
billion, and Chinese investment in North American resources increased
threefold to USD 18,706 billion, making it difficult not to notice that

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most North American gains came at the expense of European losses

(A Capital 2014, p. 4), most heavily at the expense of the United
Kingdom, with Chinese OFDI by reason of mergers and acquisitions
dropping from USD 5.150 billion in 2012 to USD 1.410 billion in 2013
(A Capital 2014, p. 6). Chinese investment in North American services
fell by a factor of 10 to USD 300 million, and Asia appears to have
picked up some of the Chinese investment in services that fell off in
both North America and Europe.
What appears to have increased are the European together with
Brazilian and Canadian contributions to the AIIB, or more accurately their
promised contributions that have been far less than actual contributions,
as Figure 3 below reflects, obviating additional ‘blowbacks’. Without actual
contributions, the AIIB must fund the loans it plans to disburse from some
other source(s), either Chinese sovereign wealth or, as has come to pass
recently, from the AIIB itself borrowing from the WB, the latter creating
a ‘blowback’ for China or for the US, depending upon the viewpoint. Is
the US pleased to be the de facto source of AIIB funding, either for the
control this may impart, or for the damage it may cause to China’s global
prestige?

Figure 3. AIIB Capital Contributions, Total and Paid, Selected Countries

Source: Tombe & Treavor 2016, ‘How much will the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank Cost Canada?’, Maclean’s, 08 Sep, http://www.macleans.ca/economy/
economicanalysis/how-much-will-the-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank-cost-canada/.

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Russia’s Open Door

Much as Europe seems to have extended an ‘open door ’ to China,
Russia appears to have done so even more, although most visibly
within its energy sector. On May 30 and 31, 2016, China’s Vice
Premier Zhang Geoli visited the Russian Federation to attend the 13th
China–Russia Energy Cooperation Meeting and the 2nd Forum on
China–Russia Small- and Medium-sized Companies, at which Russia’s
Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich observed that China is
Russia’s main trading partner, and that “[a]t the meeting on energy
cooperation, we plan to discuss all the issues that are at the center of
our attention, namely the interaction and implementation of projects
in the fields of oil, gas, electric energy, nuclear power, coal and some
others” (Energy Cooperation 2016). On the horizon for Sino-Russian
cooperation, according to Konstantin Simonov, director of the National
Energy Security Foundation in Moscow, China’s desire to source Russian
energy supplies from Western fields then transport them to its Eastern
regions is costly, although the price of energy has plummeted, and that
this will come on top of the 30-year Sino-Russian agreement signed in
May 2014 allowing China to take energy from along Russia’s ‘Power
of Siberia’ route that will generate an annual gas supply of 38 billion
cubic metres from 2018, adding to the 42.43 million metric tonnes of
petroleum products Russia exported to China in 2015, up 28% from the
year before once China became Russia’s leading oil supplier, overtaking
Germany (Energy Cooperation 2016).
On the other hand, what the Russian Federation needs much more
is an end to sanctions and an improvement of trade with the West,
and almost certainly that is what Russia can expect to receive from the
Trump administration. Western, particularly US, FDI must be welcomed
into Russia, such that the Russian Federation diminishes exporting raw
materials and commences to manufacture finished products for sale abroad
much more so than it has done. This should be possible, given that from
2014 the Russian Federation became the third most attractive nation for
FDI after the US and China, in first and second positions respectively
(UNCTAD 2014, p. 6, Figure 5), clearly evidencing its own ‘opening’, but
also forecasting an increase in its competition with China and other Asian
countries.

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Asia’s Closing Door

If as appears at least facially that Europe’s and Russia’s doors are
opening to Chinese OFDI, Asia’s door is closing one way or another
to non-Chinese interests. According to China, the West is attempting
to ‘encircle’ it by infringing on its traditional prerogative of acting as
primus inter pares in the region. Vietnamese historian Tran Duc Anh
Son discovered maps that have reposed for more than a century at Yale
University and the US Library of Congress in Washington that seem to
confirm Vietnam’s traditional sovereignty over the islands in the South
China Sea that Vietnam calls Truong Sa and Hoang Sa but that others call
the Spratly and Paracel islands (Daiss 2016). This raises questions why
China is grasping at straws? According to Japan, China is attempting to
curtail free trade on the high seas by constructing a ‘strategic triangle’ of
island fortresses across its ‘nine-dash line’ in the East and South China
Seas region, waterways upon which Japan relies upon for importing energy
and other necessary commodities from Africa and the Middle East, and
for exporting its finished products to Europe (Mollman 2016). In response,
the Chinese leadership contends that the rock islands in the East and
South China Seas traditionally have belonged to China, that it is merely
reclaiming them, an argument the United Nations (UN) Permanent
Arbitration Court sitting in The Hague rejected unanimously on July 12,
2016, in the landmark international law case of The Philippines vs. China
in which Vietnam joined but that China refuses to recognise (Ku 2016).4
To some Western countries and most Asian countries besides
China, the Western Pacific rim is closing as China strives to become the
dominant force along much of the East and South China Sea region, with
China’s navy, coast guard, and ‘maritime militia’ operating together to
enforce ‘air defence identification zones’ that extend far beyond Chinese
territorial waters, even demanding that the US ‘keep away’ (Sridharan
2016). This behavior by China stands in violation of international
laws including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) in particular (Chan 2016). If the waters along the Western
Pacific rim are closing to other Asian nations and to the West, they appear
to be staying open to the Russian Federation, partially, if not largely,

4 Case No. 2013–19, also captioned as “The South China Sea Arbitration”, filed on Jan-
uary 22, 2013, and in which Vietnam joined on December 11, 2014, that was argued
on July 7, 2015, and decided on July 16, 2016, unanimously.

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because China requires Russian energy products in large quantities, and

Russia is desperate for cash that can be realized from selling its energy
supplies. Russia’s public position on the East and South China Seas is
that nations from outside the region should steer clear because their
involvement “will only hurt the resolution of these issues […] [and] is
detrimental and counterproductive” (Thayer 2016), a posture that may
contain some merit hypothetically. On the matter of the UN arbitration
decision in The Philippines vs. China, Russia has voiced support for
China’s position. By so doing, Russia has been adopting a peculiar and
meretricious posture that the decision is non-binding because China
boycotted the case as it was being argued and determined in The Hague
at the Court of Arbitration. As lawyers and graduates of Leningrad (now
St. Petersburg) State University, Russia’s oldest, both President Vladimir
Putin and Premier Dmitry Medvedev should understand clearly that
procedures established pursuant to Annex VII to Article 9 of UNCLOS,
definitively recite that the “absence of a party or failure of a party to
defend its case shall not constitute a bar to the proceedings.” Evidently,
the Russian Federation desires to improve its ‘structural’ relations with
China economically in addition to militarily, presumably to corral China
as its energy market.
In 2013, former US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell and former White House Aide Brian
Andrews explained US objectives with its ‘pivot’ to Asia, criticising
officials who have “mistakenly described the rebalance as a ‘return’ to
Asia” by noting that “nothing could be further from the truth because,
in reality, the United States had never left. It is, however, a vast and
dynamic increase in US focus and depth of engagement in the region”
(Campbell & Andrews 2013, p. 2). Going further, they went on to
portray the US as striving with its allies “to create a stable security
order that builds strategic confidence within the region and provides
the context for states to build closer ties with each other” by pointing
to India, Japan, and Thailand, emphasizing that the latter is America’s
‘oldest alliance in Asia’ (Campbell & Andrews 2013, pp. 3–4), boasting
that the US has positioned itself to ‘play a pivotal role’ across the 21st
century in Asia (Campbell & Andrews 2013, p. 8). However, it seems
that it is more the opposite that is true from the evidence. An analysis
in the prestigious magazine The Atlantic suggested that “[s] imply
put, the pivot is meant to be a strategic ‘re-balancing’ of U.S. interests
from Europe and the Middle East toward East Asia” and so “in a way

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the ‘Pivot to Asia’ is just placing a name on a trend that has been
going on for years” because the US has done very little substantively
apart from deploying 2,500 marines to Northern Australia, annoying
China (Schiavenza 2013). Another analysis, from the CATO Institute,
reckoned that the Obama administration could not figure out whether
neo-realist ‘dragon slayers’ or neo-liberal ‘panda huggers’ accurately
forecasted the consequence of an economic rise by China (Logan 2013,
p. 3), so they charted a course midway between perceptions of each
camp, firmly resolving to construct a “China policy with three major
components: economic engagement; military containment; and using
U.S. deployments, diplomatic reassurance about American security
guarantees, and Washington’s own military spending to prevent U.S.
allies from taking more control over their defense policies” (Logan 2013,
p. 6). By this account, the US has done nearly everything it could do
wrong, actually weakening its longtime alliances by triggering a drop in
security assistance to them (America’s Pivot to Asia 2016).
Whatever be one’s perspective, America’s pivot to Asia has not
brought significant security assistance gains to most Asian countries,
and both Europe and the Middle East have continued to be larger
recipients of the US’s largesse, as Figure 4 and Figure 5 below reflect,
notwithstanding concerns voiced by Ambassador Volker and others. Most
economic assistance increases from the US to Asian countries since the
US’s pivot to Asia have been to Vietnam, followed by smaller increases to
Laos and Myanmar (Burma), with huge reductions to once key allies such
as the Philippines falling by nearly 9% and Thailand falling by almost
80% since 2010 (America Pivots to Asia 2016). It should not be startling
therefore when actors such as Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte jump
ship, cursing President Obama, grudgingly honouring but functionally
repudiating an “Agreement on Enhanced Defense Cooperation” (AEDC)
that his predecessor negotiated with the US (Ople 2014), then admonishing
that the 2016 joint maneuvers with US naval forces will mark the last for
his country (VOA 2016). Such drama makes it difficult to realise Zbigniew
Brzezinski’s 2012 ‘Grand Strategy’ envisioning the US “Balancing the
East, Upgrading the West”, and more likely prove his alternative forecast
to be correct: “the West and the East cannot keep aloof from each other:
their relationship can only be either reciprocally cooperative or mutually
damaging.”

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Figure 4. U.S. Assistance to Europe and the Middle East Dwarfs Aid to Southeast Asia

Source: America Pivots to Asia 2016.

Figure 5. US Security Assistance to Southeast Asia: Only Three Countries Received

a Rise in Aid

Source: America Pivots to Asia 2016.

On the other hand, over the past half decade India has offered a divided
perspective, at once welcoming an increased or at least an increasingly
visible US presence in Asia, but all the while wishing to steer clear of
a potential Sino-American ‘cold war’, and fearing that the US pivot to Asia
may serve as a pretext for a premature US withdrawal from Afghanistan,
viewed by India as being unhelpful (Hathaway 2012). Meanwhile, ASEAN

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bloc countries have turned to Latin America, half a world away, and become
interested in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) (Meacham 2013). More
ominously for the West, China and Russia have at least used the pivot to
Asia by the US as a pretext for forging closer Sino-Russian ties (RT 2016).

‘Neo-Liberalism’ Follows ‘Neo-Realism’

in ‘Structure’
When he articulated the concept of ‘neo-realism’ in 1977, Kenneth
N. Waltz termed it as ‘structural’ realism to contrast it from ‘classical’
realism and alliances in the context of Thucydides or from modern ‘political’
realism and power as advanced by Morgenthau and others earlier in the 20th
century. An important and even seminal difference between ‘neo-realism’
and other interpretations of realism is the concept of ‘structure’ that Waltz
articulated exists in a world of international anarchy: “States do not willingly
place themselves in situations of increased dependence. In a self-help
system, considerations of security subordinate economic gain to political
interest” (Waltz 1979, p. 107). That dependence is thrust upon states by
their relative weakness or strength in relation to other states existing at the
time. To this, Alexander Wendt added that identities and interests of states
are socially constructed by the states themselves: “self-help and power
politics are institutions, and not essential features of anarchy. Anarchy
is what states make of it” (Wendt 1987, p. 395), adding a ‘constructivist’
approach. Whatever the nomenclature, in neo-realism a limited number
of states share world domination, usually one state controls a region. This
falls at the root of conflict in the East and South China Seas as China,
demanding over East Asia and the Western Pacific region, concedes that at
the moment the US dominates the world as a ‘hegemon’.
Then comes international trade, and an effort to introduce ‘structure’
to it as well. In 1977, also, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr.
advanced the theory of ‘neo-liberalism’ by expanding a 1930s-era notion
in Austrian liberal economic theory (Mirowski & Plehwe 2009). Across
the last part of the 20th century from the collapse of the Soviet Union
in 1989 together with the first decade and a half of the 21st century,
economic considerations have exceeded state security considerations
in most international relations, with China and the West (the EU, US)
becoming each other’s largest trade partner. That is changing currently,
and not for the better. Part of the problem is that China is bent on closing

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Asian shoreline waterways along the Pacific rim to free access without its
oversight. Another part is the effort to manage trade globally, especially
trans-continental (to Europe) and trans-oceanic (to the Americas) trade
with Asia, as China is constructing its ‘New Silk Road’ and ‘New Maritime
Silk Route’ across Eurasia, and as various partners of the US, led by the
latter, have tried to form the TPP. Less critical but related to this paradigm
is an effort led by the United Kingdom to form a Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership (TTIP), primarily between the US and Europe. Such
‘partnership’ agreements are forms of ‘structure’ aimed at managing trade
much in the same ways that NATO and similar alliances have managed or
tried to manage state security cooperation in the post-1945 period.
By deliberately excluding China from participation, the originators
of the TPP and TTIP have precipitated what may be called a form of
‘negative constructivism’ that will prove soon to be, as Wendt observed in
the context of neo-realist state security, “what states make of it” (Wendt
1987, p. 395). This form of trade management is dividing the United
States on non-traditional axes, with Democratic Party financial stalwarts
such as ‘Big Labor’ joining both 2016 Presidential candidates opposing
the partnerships, leaving the Barack Obama administration supporting
them. An end result may be chaotic, but for the moment another theory of
international relations appears to be emerging: ‘neo-liberealism’, with both
the East and West desiring not to interrupt the free flow of trade upon which
each relies economically, while China makes an effort to flex its muscles
across Asia in the guise of state security, with the US joined by other Asian
nations determined to hold China back militarily without undermining it
economically, or undermining themselves also economically in the process.
At the end of September 2016, China warned that the US that if it deploys
its Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system as
planned in the Republic of Korea, the US will ‘pay the price’ in the form
of a ‘counter attack’ because “[l]ike any other country, China can neither
be vague nor indifferent on security matters that affect its core interests,
[…] [and] [t]he deployment will severely damage regional strategic security
interests and harm the regional strategic balance” (Blanchard 2016). Does
this mean that increased military cooperation between the West and its
Asian Allies will be followed by a decrease in Chinese economic cooperation?
It does seem to underscore the accuracy of Waltz when he wrote in 1979:
“In a self-help system, considerations of security subordinate economic
gain to political interest” (Waltz 1979, p. 107), because, said differently,
it means that in a more rational system, considerations of economic gain

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should come ahead of political interest. In a sense, this means that mutual
economic interests create political interest, and this is what is meant by
‘Liberealism’. Will it mean additionally that economic cooperation between
China and the Russian Federation with China and Russia as a captive
buyer and captive seller respectively of Russian energy take precedence over
their mutual security fears born in mutual distrust along their long and
intermittently unstable common border?

Conclusion
The US’s pivot to Asia on balance in the ultimate analysis has harmed
traditional Allies of the West along the Western Pacific Rim, largely by
spawning resurgence of an earlier Sino-Russian alliance that had remained
dormant. By providing key Asian allies of the West with an excuse for
complacency, the US encouraged countries of the EU to depend on the US
and NATO instead of upon themselves for defence, as well as by cutting
security-related financial assistance even by almost 80% to the US’s oldest
Asian ally, Thailand, the US has harmed its Asian allies as well. The US
has attempted to hedge between neo-realism security concerns and neo-
liberal trade prosperity, functionally trying to have its proverbial cake and
eat it also. That seldom will work. It has not worked in this context very
well. Neo-realist security traditions appear to have been blurred with neo-
liberal trade temptations, the result forming a ‘neo-liberealism’ paradigm
that could work if it contained the best ingredients of each, appears more
to contain some of the worst elements of each, making it difficult to
prosper. Confrontation more than cooperation seems to have become the
unwanted end result. Either the US’s next president will have to increase
the military commitment substantially to the Western Pacific Rim or turn
tail and ‘pivot’ away to somewhere else. If Asia is becoming a ‘closing
door’ to the West, then Europe’s door of opportunity to China will have
to close in response, proportionally if feasible. Better that ‘doors’ to both
Asia and Europe remain open. With all that said, strength fosters peace, as
President Ronald W. Reagan showed the world with his Strategic Defense
Initiative, and the momentary confrontation in the East and South China
Seas may yet inspire cooperation between China on the one hand and its
Asian neighbours in partnership with the West on the other. If so, the risk
and tribulations will be worth the cost eventually. Only time will tell, but
this should be evident within the first one thousand days of the. Trump
administration.

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DAVID A. JONES, Ph.D., D.Jur., M.B.A. is Professor of International Law,

International Management, and Foreign Policy at University of Warsaw Institute
of The Americas and Europe, where also he holds appointments at the Faculty
of Political Science Institute of International Relations, and at the Faculty of
Management International Business Programme. He serves as Senior Graduate
Lecturer at Norwich University, the Military Academy of the State of Vermont,
United States where he has offered a course Intercultural Management in the
International System multiple terms each year since 2006, and occasionally
its capstone course, Global Corporate Diplomacy. Professor Jones is the author
of a recent book, Four Eagles and a Dragon: Successes and Failures of Quixotic
Encirclement in Foreign Policy, An Analysis (London: Bloomsbury Publishing,
Plc. & New Delhi: Bloomsbury Publishing India, Pvt. Ltd. 2015).

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 http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/8088-758-9.11

Kamer Kasım
(Abant Izzet Baysal University)

The impact of the US Rebalancing Policy

toward Asia Pacific on International
Relations in the region

Abstract

The importance of Asia-Pacific region in United States (US) foreign policy

increased in recent years. The US paid special attention to the region during
the Obama era declaring the region as a ‘pivot’. The US rebalancing policy has
economic, political/diplomatic, and military dimensions aimed to increase the
US presence in the region and close cooperation with the US’s allies. The growing
influence of China in combination with the South and East China Sea problems
led to the US administration coming up with the rebalancing strategy. The US
conducted this policy together with its engagement with China. Therefore,
China’s perception of the US rebalancing as a kind of containment strategy
would not be helpful for the continuation of the strategy. Lack of harmony and
disagreements among the US allies in the region challenged the rebalancing
policy. The increasing importance of the region in the world economy and the
existence of problems in South and East China Sea mean that the US would
continue political, economic and military engagement in the region. This paper
analyses the main parameters and shortcomings of the US rebalancing strategy
in Asia-Pacific and its regional and global implications.

Key words: U.S., China, Asia-Pacific, rebalance, Obama, China Sea.

Introduction
United States (US) President Obama is well known for giving priority
to South and East Asia in US foreign policy. The increasing importance
of the Asia-Pacific region is the main reason for the US declaration that it

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would ‘pivot’ to the region. The Asia-Pacific economically and politically

is taking a central place in world politics. China’s active involvement and
growing influence in the region and its stand on the South and East China
Sea disputes are considered as challenge by the US administration. The
US rebalancing policy aimed at strengthening the US ties with its regional
allies and expanding the US military presence in the region. There are
economic, politic/diplomatic and military aspects of the strategy. The
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) includes countries that encompass 40% of
the global GDP and thus is one of the most important economic aspects
of the rebalancing strategy. In the diplomatic field the US administration
followed policy of deepening engagement with regional multilateral
organizations like the ASEAN Regional Forum. The military aspect is
an important part for the rebalancing policy. The US conducted joint
military exercises with its allies and took serious steps to increase its
naval presence in Asia-Pacific.
In this paper the US rebalancing policy will be analyzed dealing with
its shortcomings and the US relations with key regional actors. The US
position regarding the South and East China Sea problems will also be
evaluated with the parameters of the rebalancing strategy. The paper aims
to try to understand the reasons of the US rebalancing policy and the
difficulties of following the policy while continuing its current engagement
with China. To conduct the rebalancing policy without creating at least
the perception of containment is the difficult job. The paper evaluates
this policy whilst stressing the fact that the world is quite different than
the Cold War era in which the US engaged in an active containment
strategy against the Soviet Union. On the one hand, the paper explains
the interest of the parties in the region with the realist and neo-realist
view, on the other hand it accepts that regional and global parameters,
especially the current relations between the US and China, have different
aspects than realist arguments envisaged.
As Robert Shutter, Michael Brown, Timothy Adamson, Mike
Mochizuki, and Deepa Ollapally argued, that despite the fact that there
has been considerable continuity in US policy toward Asia-Pacific region,
the US reestablished its regional priority and the rebalancing policy
should be considered significant shift in the US policy. Obama considered
the region as a geostrategic priority and showed this with increasingly
high-level diplomatic engagements (Sutter et al. 2013, pp. 6–7). Although
the rebalancing policy has political/diplomatic and economic dimensions,
some just emphasized its military dimension. Robert Ross considered

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rebalancing policy as shifting in strategy in order to bolster the US

defensive ties with countries and expand its naval presence. He argued
that US enhanced presence in the region will reassure ally states (see Ross
2012, pp. 70–82). Arguments emphasized the military dimension of the
strategy generally view the rebalancing as a kind of containment policy
against a rising China. In China some considered the rebalancing strategy
as ‘peaceful containment’ like Zhu Feng, who argued that the US will
continue its engagement policy with China while trying to consolidate
its leadership. Some, like Jin Canrong and Wang Yizhou, argued that this
is betting on both sides and not simply a containment. They evaluated
the rebalancing policy as it includes both engagement and precautionary
measures (Dong & Chengzhi 2013, pp. 9–12).
Hillary Clinton explained the US rebalancing policy in her article titled
“America’s Pacific Century.” She described the Asia-Pacific as a key of global
politics. She emphasized the necessity to improve allies’ defense capacities
and to upgrade security and stability, the US will redistribute its forces in
Asia in order to be more effective towards security threats. She also described
the policy as the US strategic return of Asia-Pacific. Clinton also focused
on economic importance of the region and economic aspects of the US
strategy. She stated that “a focus on promoting American prosperity means
a greater focus on trade and economic openness in the Asia-Pacific.” She
links the region’s economic growth and its potential for continued growth
in the future with security and stability. She emphasized the US’s military
role for that and argued that territorial and maritime disputes as well as
new threats for the freedom of navigation requires the US to have politically
sustainable force posture in the region (Clinton 2011, pp. 56–63).
The US Freedom of Navigation Operations in the South and East
China Sea were viewed by China similar to a Hollywood blockbuster.
China also considered the operations as undermining the authority of
China. Hu Bo argued that these operations exert pressure on China and
also appeases US allies in the region and serves as useful diplomatic tools
for the US (Bo 2016). Glaser stated that China needs a favorable regional
security environment and China will try to reach an understanding with
its neighbors. However, China should face pressure and US backing of
ASEAN members is necessary. The US should have clarified the limits
of its involvement in regional disputes to its allies so they would know
how to deal with China (Glaser 2012, p. 8).
This paper anticipated the fact that the US rebalancing policy has
multidimensional aspects and it cannot be considered as just a military

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strategy to contain China. However, the character of the South and East
China Sea disputes dictated the overemphasized notion of the military
aspect of the strategy. This caused additional difficulty for the US to
follow the rebalancing policy together with the engagement with China.
The success of the strategy necessitated more emphasis of diplomatic
and economic aspects of rebalancing. There is also another issue which
would impact the direction of rebalancing, in that how the policy will
be perceived by China. That is why to analyze China’s perception and
evaluation of rebalancing policy is necessary to assess the impact of the
rebalancing policy in the region.

How is the US Asia-Pacific Policy Shaped?

The Reasons for Rebalancing
The US administrations throughout history have been interested in
the Asia-Pacific region. During the Cold War era the region was important
to prevent the Soviet influence and invasion from the view of the US.
After the Cold War, the Asia-Pacific became important in the political and
economic standing of the US in the world. However, there are developments
which forced the US policy makers to pay attention to the Middle East. For
example, just before the formal end of the Cold War, the US engaged in
a war in Iraq, due to the Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. In 2001,
the US faced the 9/11 terrorists attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom
conducted in Afghanistan (Kasım 2013a, pp. 35–36). Following this, the
US invasion of Iraq in 2003 was another element, which increased the US’s
focus to the Middle East. This does not mean that before the Obama era
the US totally neglected the Asia-Pacific. Post-Cold War US Presidents Bill
Clinton and George W. Bush also actively engaged in the Asia-Pacific. For
example, Clinton declared the New Pacific Community Initiative in 1993.
Bush promoted bilateral cooperation with regional allies and encouraged
free trade agreements with them. In 2006 the US conducted the largest
Pacific Ocean military exercise since the Vietnam War (see Sutter et al.
2013, pp. 5–6). However, Obama’s focus on the region was much more
extensive and assertive. President Obama had a new approach towards the
Asia-Pacific region. He announced a renewed US focus on the region and
Obama reoriented significant elements of the US foreign policy towards the
Asia-Pacific (Campbell and Andrews 2013, p. 2). Obama launched the US
policy of a ‘strategic pivot’ or ‘rebalancing’ during his landmark address to

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the Australian Parliament on November 17, 2011. Obama stated that “Our
new focus on the region reflects a fundamental truth – The United States
has been, and always will be, a Pacific nation.” “Here, we see the future. As
the world’s fastest-growing region – and home to more than half the global
economy – the Asia Pacific is critical to achieving my highest priority, and
that’s creating jobs and opportunity for the American people.” Obama
further emphasized that he made a deliberate and strategic decision that
the US will play a larger and long-term role in shaping the Asia-Pacific
region and its future (Remarks by President Obama to the Australian
Parliament, 17 November 2011).
One of the main reasons for the shift of US policy towards Asia-
Pacific was the economic success of the Asia-Pacific countries. Security
aspects combined with the rise of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC)
was another reason for the US’s new engagement. In fact, Obama
underlined the importance of security during his speech in the Australian
Parliament saying that “we seek security, which is the foundation of
peace and prosperity.” Obama also mentioned that the US modernized
its defense posture across the Asia Pacific and it would be more broadly
distributed and maintaining the US strong presence in Japan and Korea
while enhancing the US presence in Southeast Asia (Remarks by President
Obama to the Australian Parliament, 17 November 2011).
The US’s first priority in order to implement its rebalancing policy
was to strengthen the US alliances. The US particularly paid attention
to its relations with Japan and the South Korea. The US-Australian
relations have been focused also in this context. The US also tried to
improve its relations with other regional states and emerging powers.
The US-PRC relations, its relations with India and the US-Taiwan
relations are important to build understanding and enhance cooperation
in the Asia-Pacific for the US strategy. The US’s rebalancing policy has
an economic aspect, which aims to facilitate Asia-Pacific economic
integration. The US paid special attention to the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) and the TPP. The US joined negotiations for the
TPP in 2010 and the agreement was signed on February 4, 2016. The US
also focused on improving multilateral institutions of the region. The
US acknowledged that a strong and integrated ASEAN is in the US’s
national interest (Campbell & Andrews 2013, pp. 4–7).
The US attended at a record level key Southeast Asian diplomatic
conferences and increased military and economic engagement in the Asia
Pacific countries. Despite the fact that the rebalancing strategy has not

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only military component, it also has economic and political dimensions, it

was perceived by the PRC as the US’s containment strategy. The military
aspect of the rebalancing required strong military ties with Australia,
Singapore, and the Philippines (see Sutter et al. 2013, pp. 11–13). In
2011, the US signed an agreement with Australia, which includes the
deployment of 2,500 US marines to Australia. The agreement represented
the first long-term expansion of US military presence in the Asia-Pacific
since the end of the Vietnam War (Calmes 2011). The US signed a 10-year
agreement with the Philippines which gave the US military greater access
to the bases in the Philippines. The US receivedthe the right to rotate
troops and other military assets throughout Philippine territory without
the ownership of bases, which is prohibited according to the Philippine
Constitution. The US also reached an agreement with South Korea to
improve the joint operation of the existing missile defense system (Kasım
2014). In fact, the other regional countries, which feel suspicious about
the PRC’s activities in the region, demanded active US involvement and
they seek opportunity to train, exercise, and interact with the US military.
However, the US engagement in the Asia-Pacific embedded a broader
national agenda including diplomacy, trade, development, values, and
multilateral institutions (Campbell & Andrews 2013, p. 8). Economic
aspects of the rebalancing are mainly presented with the TPP, which
includes 12 states and their GDP encompassing 40% of the global GDP.
Although the TPP was signed on February 4, 2016, the ratification process
of the agreement in the parliaments of the signatory countries continued.
The question raised about the TPP’s sustainability regarding the
establishment of a regional trade network, since the PRC is not a part of it
(see Atlı 2016, p. 63). In fact the TPP was introduced as a tool to limit the
uncontrollable spread of Chinese economic expansion. President Obama
in his State of Union Address to Congress in January 2015 stated that
“China wants to write the rules for the world’s fastest-growing region.
That would put our workers and our businesses at a disadvantages. Why
would we let that happen? We should write those rules. We should level
the playing field” (see Remarks by the President in State of the Union
Address, 20 January 2015). Some argued that Chinese participation in
the TPP should be considered. This is similar to Clinton’s strategy to
support the PRC’s integration into the World Trade Organization. The
US could continue economic and diplomatic engagement with China and
try to display the benefits of cooperation. China on the other hand might
try to persuade US allies that it will not pose a threat to countries in

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the region while placing more emphasis on diplomatic efforts (Hsu 2015;
Sutter et al. 2013, p. 5).
The US new engagement of the Asia-Pacific was the response of the
rise of the region and increasingly assertive policy of the PRC. As a result
the US rebalancing policy was generally perceived an attempt to contain
China. However, there were problems and shortcomings of this policy
and the perceptions which later resulted in criticism of the US’s new
engagement in the region.

Shortcomings of the US Rebalancing Policy

Obama’s rebalancing policy had some risks and shortcomings.
One question should be asked is how this policy would be conducted
together with engagement with China. If the US would continue in
engagement policy toward China, the rebalance strategy requires careful
implementation. Despite the statements that the US would not want to
exclude China from regional initiatives, China perceived the US policy
as a containment strategy. The difficult job for the US administration is
that while the US continues its commitment toward regional allies, it
must also avoid provoking China and continue to pursuing constructive
engagement. However, the rebalancing strategy might face budgetary
restrictions since military engagement in Asia-Pacific requires a large
naval presence and active military support of the US allies. To avoid
this obstacle, budget cuts is to be minimized to the navy. The US also
faced criticism from Europe as neglecting European allies following the
rebalancing strategy in Asia-Pacific (see Kasım 2015, pp. 90–91).
The rebalancing policy is supposed to restrict ‘rising China’s’ influence
in the Asia-Pacific. However, China’s stand on the regional issues has not
changed and the US regional allies increased their demands for support
from the US. Although some argued that the rebalance does not mean
just to contain China, it is viewed as a way to contain China in the Asia-
Pacific and the world. Therefore, some argued that the US strategy has
failed because it has not been hard enough on China (Connelly 2015,
pp. 2–5). The US allies also expected from the US at least to restrict
China if not a total containment strategy. The US foreign policy and
Obama’s statements about the rebalancing may not be considered as
enough reassurance for the US allies since they need to see definite US
commitment in a time of the crisis. That is why conjectural problems in

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the US would impact on its allies. For example, Obama did not attend
APEC Forum in 2013, which questioned the US commitment to the Asia-
Pacific, although Obama did not participate because of the domestic crisis.
Countries like Vietnam would shape its China policy through measuring
the US support and commitment (see Parlez & Cochrane 2013).
In the case of massive trade between the US and China, the US
rebalancing policy could not be evolved into a Cold War type containment
strategy, as Joseph Nye argued that the US containment strategy of the
Soviet Union refers to virtually no trade and little social contact. Yet the
US currently maintains a massive trade agreement with the PRC and
extensive social contacts including 157,000 Chinese students at US
universities (Nye 2013). The US direct investment to the region is over
700 billion USD and annual US exports more than 400 billion USD.1
Therefore, the conditions are very different from the Cold War era.
One of the obstacles for the effective US rebalance strategy to the
Asia-Pacific is the lack of interest towards the region within the US
Members of Congress. They are interested in the region just due to a large
immigrant or ethnic population in their district. The Asia-Pacific, despite
the Obama administration’s over focus on the region, has captured very
little attention of the US public and media. For example during President
Obama’s travel to China, Myanmar, and Australia in November 2014, the
press plane charted for the trip was half full (Connelly 2015, p. 11).
Another US shortcoming in the rebalance strategy was lack of harmony
among US allies. For example, while the US is trying to establish triple
special alliance among US-Japan-South Korea, however, disputes between
Japan and South Korea regarding the so-called ‘comfort women’ issue to
the territorial dispute, weakened the US position in the region and gave
greater movement to act for China (Çolakoğlu 2016, pp. 60–61).

South and East China Sea Problems: The Headache

for the US Rebalancing Strategy
Another dispute, which creates a rift among the US allies, is the South
and East China Sea problems. Particularly the South China Sea dispute
became a widely discussed problem due to its potential to cause armed

1 http://www.statista.com/statistics/188604/united-states-direct-investments-in-the-
asia-pacific-region-since-2000/.

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conflict in the region. The PRC, Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia,

Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan have clashing sovereignty claims
over the South China Sea.
The South and East China Sea disputes put the US in a difficult
situation due to the disputes between Taiwan and Japan and Taiwan
and Philippines, which are the US allies in the region. For example,
a Taiwanese fisherman was shot by the Philippine coast guard in the
disputed Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which created tension between
Taiwan and the Philippines in 2013. Taiwan demanded a formal apology
from the government of the Philippines, compensation for the fisherman’s
family, cooperative investigation and punishment of the perpetrators, as
well as the launching of talks on a bilateral fishery arrangement in order
to prevent similar incidents to be repeated in the future. The US also put
effort so these types of incidents were not to be repeated among its regional
allies. The last thing the US wants is conflict between two important
partners in the region: Taiwan and the Philippines (Kasım 2013).
The conflict takes place around Spratly (Nansha) and Paracel (Shisha)
islands as well as the Pratas (Tungsha), Natuna, and Scarborough Shoal. The
PRC claims sovereignty on the map with a U-shaped line referred to as the ‘nine-
dash line’ (Tsirbas 2016). Actually the ‘nine-dash line’ was originally identified
as the ‘eleven-dash line’. In 1947, the Kuomintang (KMT) government of
China released a map titled “position of the South China Sea Islands.” The
eleven-dash line was used to define a scope of Chinese sovereignty over the
South China Sea at that time. After the Chinese communists took power of
the mainland, they cancelled the two intermittent lines and the PRC started
to use the nine-dash line to support its sovereignty claims over the South
China Sea. The reason for that was basically the ideological cooperation
between the PRC and the regime in North Vietnam (Pu 2015).
Taiwan presented similar arguments regarding sovereignty over the
South China Sea. Taiwan’s argument bases itself on historical grounds to
justify its claims over the area. However, there are differences between the
PRC’s and Taiwan’s positions. Taiwan upholds its claims to sovereignty over
the South China Sea. However, Taiwan does not fully support the PRC’s
South China Sea policy. Taiwan adheres to the notion that the dispute to
be solved through international law since it does not support territorial
sovereignty through the man-made islands. Taiwan promotes cooperation
among regional countries to solve the dispute and does not support the
unilateral extraction of sand from the seabed or the reclamation of land
from underwater reefs (Yann-Huei Song 2015).

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Overlapping claims regarding the Paracel (Shisha) islands have caused

conflict between Vietnamese troops and the PRC. As a result, the PRC
seized the Paracel (Shisha) Islands, killing more than 70 Vietnamese
soldiers in 1974. In 1988, 60 more Vietnamese soldiers died in the
conflict. Natural resources, especially oil and gas reserves, are the key
factors that triggered the sovereignty dispute in the South China Sea.
In May 2014, the PRC’s drilling operations near the Paracel (Shisha)
Islands carried out by maritime vessels were intercepted by Vietnam’s
vessels. Thus, a collision occurred between the Vietnamese and the PRC
vessels and caused riots targeted against the Chinese living in Vietnam.
As a result, Taiwanese factories were also attacked (Chubb 2014). Similar
problems have occurred between the PRC and the Philippines over the
Spratly Islands (Nansha). The Philippines applied to the Permanent Court
of Arbitration and called for a halt on all construction projects in the
South China Sea. The US would be pushed to be involved in the China-
Philippines conflict because of the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty between
the US and Philippines. Despite that fact that the treaty states

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Par-
ties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to
meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes. Any such
armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported
to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated
when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain
international peace and security.2

The US is not inclined to take sides in the territorial disputes in

the South China Sea. On the other hand, regarding the dispute between
Japan and China about the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands, the US president
expressed clear support for Japan, stating that Article 5 of the US–Japan
Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty included the disputed islands
(Panda 2014).
The South China Sea dispute caused tension among the US and the
PRC. In October 2015, a US destroyer vessel passed through the PRC’s
artificially constructed islands, and the PRC intercepted their vessels.
Freedom of navigation in the region caused a rift between the US and PRC
over the right of US military vessels to operate in China’s 200 mile EEZ.
The US is based its argument about the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and stated that nothing in UNCLOS and
2 See http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/phil001.asp.

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state practice prevents the right of military forces of all nations to conduct
military activities in EEZ’s without coastal state notice or consent. The
US reconnaissance flights conducted in China’s EEZ are intercepted
routinely by the PRC. A possible miscalculation may cause military
escalation and an unexpected acceleration of political crisis (Glaser 2012,
pp. 1–2; Larter 2016). Despite the fact that the US bases its arguments on
UNCLOS, the US Congress declined to ratify UNCLOS, which weakens
the US role regarding the subject matter (Connelly 2015, p. 11). The US
military presence and passage near the China’s artificial islands each time
caused China to emphasize its claims and a harsh response to the official
level. For example after the five-day patrol of the US Stennis Carrier Strike
Group in the South China Sea, PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated that
“like the tide that comes and goes, none of these attempts will have any
impact. History will prove who is merely the guest and who is the real
host” (Larter 2016).
As part of its policy of rebalancing, the US tried to promote close
cooperation among its allies. The Philippines and Japan signed an
important defense agreement on February 29, 2016. The agreement
allowed the transfer of defense equipment and technology from Japan
to the Philippines and it made possible for the Philippines and Japan to
conduct joint research and development, and even joint production of
defense equipment and technology (Castro 2016). Taiwan proposed the
South China Sea Peace Initiative on May 26,, 2015, by urging all parties to
comply with international law and reduce tension. In 2013, Taiwan and
Japan managed to sign a fishing agreement over the East China Sea that
granted Taiwanese vessels access to the disputed waters of the Senkaku
(Diaoyu) Islands. Taiwan’s initiative for the South China Sea bore its first
fruit on November 5, 2015, when Taiwan and the Philippines signed
the Facilitation of Cooperation on Law Enforcement in Fishery Matters
agreement that reduced fishery tension between the two (Kasım 2016).
However, the dispute, particularly regarding Taiping Island, continues
between Taiwan and the Philippines. Historically, Taiwan claimed that
Taiping (Itu Aba) Island qualified as an island according to the specifications
of Article 121 of UNCLOS. Taiwan argued that Taiping Island can sustain
human habitation and economic life of its own. But, the Philippines
argued that Taiping is not an island because of its lack of water supply and
fertile soil making it inconvenient for habitants. However, Taiwan stated
that Taiping Island is the only island in the Spratly (Nansha) Islands to
have its own sources of potable water. The US has not clarified its position

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regarding on Article 121 and arguments of Taiwan and the Philippines.

Some in the US administration argued that the US is entitled to claim an
EEZ around all its possessions, whether inhabited or not, without regard
to size or location (Song 2016; Kasım 2016). Taiwan did not recognize
the Philippines application to the Permanent Court of Arbitration on
the South China Sea disputes. Taiwan stated that the Philippines did
not extend an invitation to Taiwan to participate in its arbitration with
mainland China, since the arbitral tribunal did not solicit Taiwan’s views.
Therefore, Taiwan refuses to recognize the arbitration or any agreements
since it will not affect Taiwan (Tiezzi 2015). The Philippines won the
arbitration case against China. The Permanent Court of Arbitration
decided that the Philippines has exclusive sovereign rights over the West
Philippine Sea in the South China Sea and that China’s nine-dash line
is invalid. However, China and Taiwan do not recognize the arbitration
(Santos 2016).
The success of the US rebalancing strategy is very much dependent on
the relations among its allies. Therefore the relations among the Philippines,
Taiwan, Japan, Vietnam, Australia, Malaysia, and Indonesia will indicate
the future of US regional policy. In fact most regional states supported
the US rebalance policy although some like Thailand and Malaysia avoid
choosing sides between the US and China. Countries which have territorial
and security disputes with the PRC, such as Japan, the Philippines, and
South Korea, gave open support to the US policy. The real challenge for
the US is to provide strategic reassurance to its allies without provoking
a strategic backlash from the PRC (Sutter et al. 2013, p. 3).

Conclusions
The US foreign policy paid attention to the Asia-Pacific due to the
region’s strategic and economic importance for the US. During the Cold
War era, Asia-Pacific policy focused on preventing communist expansion.
After the Cold War the US policy focused on economic integration
and protect of freedom of navigation in the South and East China Sea.
Although Bill Clinton and George W. Bush also paid attention to the
region, the Obama era was important in terms of its rebalancing policy
which has diplomatic/political, economic, and military dimensions. The
US declared its objective to play a larger and extensive role in shaping
the future of the region. However, as we discussed in the paper there

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are risks and shortcomings in the US strategy. To conduct the policy at

the same time the engagement with China is difficult and challenging.
China perceived the US strategy as containment of China. The US allies
in the region expected the US to reduce China’s influence whatever the
means necessary. However, another difficulty is the lack of cooperation
and harmony among the US allies. This even carries risk of conflicts
among them. The US also has domestic constraints to carry out the
rebalancing policy. One constraint is budgetary, which may become an
issue regarding having a large naval presence in the region permanently.
Another constraint is the lack of interest towards the region in the US
Congress. The US has also been criticized by its European allies for giving
too much emphasize on the Asia-Pacific and neglecting Europe.
The US rebalancing policy was the result of the increasing influence
of China and the region’s growing impact on world politics. The US
aimed to show that it would continue to engage in the Asia-Pacific and
continue to support its allies, with domestic problems not diverting
the US from its policies. The US worried that the maritime territorial
disputes will negative have impact on trade across the Asia-Pacific region.
To prevent this, the rebalancing policy was implemented using political/
diplomatic, economic and military means. As this paper clearly indicates
that the rebalancing strategy is mainly analyzed by many by just focusing
on the military part of it. However, the rebalancing, as it was mentioned
in this paper, can only have a meaningful result if other aspects of the
strategy are also being used. If the strategy is not all about containing
China, the US should put more emphasis on diplomatic and economic
means and institutions in the Asia-Pacific region. Since the US does not
want to be involved directly in the military conflict in the region, it would
be an option for the US to help the Philippines, Vietnam, and other allies
to enhance their capabilities to defend their maritime claims.
In the near future China cannot match the hard and soft power capacities
of the US. Therefore to keep peace and security in the Asia-Pacific is in the
interest of both the US and China. The US should give more attention on
how China perceives the rebalancing strategy. As long as China perceives
it as a containment strategy it will concentrate on increasing its military
presence in the region. However, military confrontation and any kind of
interruption of the trade in Asia-Pacific would not be the interest of China.
This fact may force the parties of the South and East China Sea problem to
reach a kind of consensus at least to prevent military conflict from erupting.
The US rebalancing policy and its support of its allies may give China

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a message to compromise with other regional actors. The challenge for the
US is to do that without provoking China. The economic integration and
continuation of regional economic growth will help the rebalancing strategy
and to improve relations between China, the US, and its allies.

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Kasım, K., 2015, ‘Turkey–Taiwan Relations in the Context of Turkey’s Asia Pacific Policy’,
Uluslararası İlişkiler/International Relations, vol. 12, no. 45, pp. 83–100.

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pacific-region-since-2000/.

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 190 Kamer Kasım

KAMER KASIM, Ph.D., is Professor of International Relations at Abant

Izzet Baysal University. He is Head of Department of International Relations
at the Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences. He had Ph.D. from
Manchester University/UK in 2000. He was visiting scholar at Michigan State
University/US in 2011 (April–July) and National Chengchi University, Institute
of International Relations/Taipei in 2014 (February–May). He teaches various
courses including introduction of international relations, globalization and
security, Caucasus in world politics, Turkish Foreign Policy and communication
in international relations. He is focused on foreign policies of the Caucasus and
Central Asian republics, security in Asia-Pacific and security studies. He has
publications of articles and books in English and Turkish. His recent edited book
titled Turkmenistan published in 2016.

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 http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/8088-758-9.12

Mateusz Smolaga
(University of Szczecin)

Asian Development Bank and Asian

Infrastructure Investment Bank
– is cooperation possible?

Abstract

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) is a well-known financial institution

operating in the Asia-Pacific region since 1966. The rise of this multilateral
organization was sponsored mainly by Japan, for which, no doubt, it is still
an important instrument of external policy. However, nowadays the ADB
constitutes 67 members (48 regional and 19 non-regional), including PR China.
With an impressive budget (ca. $20 billion) and focus areas ranging from social
development to information technologies, the ADB is an important source of
development funding.
The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is a rather new initiative,
only opening up for business in January 2016. Based in Beijing, it is a multilateral
organization comprising 57 founding members (37 regional members and 20 non-
regional partners), excluding Japan and the United States. The creation of the AIIB
is a reaction to the fiasco of the transformation of global financial institutions like
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Group. China’s intentions
in initiating the AIIB are clearly something other than altruism. It might be
seen as part of a win-win economic cooperation strategy that could benefit both
regional and national development processes. Like the ADB, the AIIB focuses on
the development of infrastructure and other productive sectors in the Asia-Pacific
region.
The question is, should we anticipate strong rivalry between these two
institutions, as political realism would suggest, or will the ADB and the AIIB find
a way to offer their best to the Asia- Pacific countries without any major conflict?

Key words: ADB, AIIB, development banks, Asia.

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Introduction
The very idea of setting up a new multilateral financial institution
was met with scepticism and harsh criticism from the outset. This was
followed by a negative media campaign launched mainly by the United
States (US) and Japan. Despite these attempts to suppress the Chinese
proposal, various other countries, including some of Washington’s and
Tokyo’s closest partners, were convinced of the merits of the newly
proposed initiative. Although still in its infancy, the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank, hereafter referred to as the AIIB, will almost certainly
play an increasingly important role, not only in Asia, but also in the
broader global context.
The justification for such strong opposition towards the creation
of the AIIB was based on concerns over the perceived additional risk
to the already established Asian Development Bank (ADB). The ADB
and the AIIB are both international organizations with the mission
of promoting social and economic development in Asia. This is done
through capital lending to member countries. The former institution
is often described as being dominated by the US and Japan, while the
latter is presented in Western media as an instrument of Chinese foreign
policy. This allowed alarmist observers to paint the picture as one of
the AIIB threatening ADB’s position by creating political and economic
alternatives for various Asian nations. Arguably, this negative analysis
is far too narrow in investigating the possibilities of further fruitful
cooperation between these two entities.
The aim of the paper is to examine the feasibility of successful
cooperation between the AIIB and the ADB. This examination needs to
ask:
1. Are there any major differences between the ADB and the AIIB
in terms of strategic goals, membership, governance, and financial
capabilities that would make cooperation impossible?
2. Is conflict of interests inevitable? If not, what is the whole spectrum
of possible relationship models between both organizations?
3. Do the first months of the AIIB’s existence prove initial criticism
to be accurate or rather far-fetched?
The main part of the text is divided into three sections. The first one
is a basic comparative analysis of both banks. The second identifies and
explains possible scenarios of ADB–AIIB relationship. The final section
takes the realistic view of the actual ongoing relationship between the two

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banks and how this differs from the projections of the concerned voices
raised at the very thought of AIIB’s arrival on the scene. Having consider
the various possible scenarios, the author presents his opinion of the most
likely outcome as to the interaction between the two banks in the future.
The paper identifies six logically possible scenarios of future ADB–AIIB
relations, listed in order of probability. They are presented on a spectrum
of possible outcomes ranging from the absolutely negative, “Sino-Japanese
full scale rivalry via AIIB–ADB confrontation,” to the idealistic, “Extensive
cooperation and coordination.” The advantages and disadvantages for the
various players involved are presented, including non-regional and local.
Based on their current economic and political interests, non-regional actors
could either stimulate ADB–AIIB cooperation, or use their resources and
political clout to escalate regional conflict.
As the AIIB started its operations in January 2016 there is not
a sufficient number of sources covering the real ADB–AIIB interactions
or even comparing these two banks. The existing texts are mainly press
articles speculating on the nature of the Chinese proposal and its influence
on regional geopolitics in Asia. This is why this analysis is based mainly
on information shared by both organizations in the form of reports, official
documents and posts on their websites. This sort of data is far from
conclusive, but it helps to capture current processes and real intentions
of decision makers, not just opinions of other authors. Future analyses
will allow the formulation of more sophisticated and further developed
conclusions that will be based on the long term experience of ADB–AIIB
relations and hard data on the financial activity of the latter. This article
offers a quick snapshot of both institutions, as they stand at the beginning
of their relationship. It helps to compare these organizations and realize
that, contrary to alarmist calls from some media, rivalry is just one
option on offer to their main shareholders. The choice between further
cooperation and/or hostility remains in the hands of the nations involved,
rather than media and political commentators.

1. ADB and AIIB – the comparison

Even a cursory glance at the backgrounds of the ADB and the AIIB
offers some indications as to the future relationship between these two
organizations. To what extent might existing differences between the ADB
and the AIIB hinder their cooperation?

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Both institutions are multilateral development banks with very

similar objectives. The ADB’s aim is to promote social and economic
development through the provision of loans, technical assistance, grants,
and equity investments, while the AIIB focuses on “the development
of infrastructure and other productive sectors in Asia” (ADB’s website;
AIIB’s website; Nelson 2015, pp. 3, 17).
The comparison of these banks is undoubtedly complicated. Having
only opened for business in January 2016, the AIIB could be considered
the “New kid on the block”, when compared to the ADB (‘The old guard’),
which has been in operation since 1966, with traditional relations all
across Asia and an established position within the international system of
development assistance (Haas 1974, pp. 281–296; AIIB’s website; Wildau
& Mitchell 2016).
The ADB constitutes 67 members (48 regional and 19 non-regional),
including the People’s Republic of China (PRC), compared to the AIIB
with 57 founding members (37 regional members and 20 non-regional
partners), excluding Japan and the US. As of the end of June 2016, 48
Prospective Founding Members had confirmed their will to join the AIIB
by ratifying the Articles of Agreement. The eight remaining countries have
until the end of 2016 to ratify (ADB’s website; Asian Development Bank
2015b; AIIB’s website; Berwin, Leighton & Paisner 2016, p. 1; Xinhua
News Agency 2016b).1
Several ADB members are noticeable by their absence from the AIIB,
some perhaps more surprising than others: the US, Japan, and Canada,
all important ADB shareholders, have shown no interest in joining, for
obvious political reasons. Taiwan was refused membership because of
its diplomatic rivalry with the PRC. Hong Kong SAR has expressed an
interest in joining, but has been put on hold due to its non-state status.
We can see the focus of the AIIB being Asia rather than Asia-Pacific, when
we note the absence of 13 Pacific states from its membership.
Looking from another perspective, we can see several founding
members of the AIIB are not members of the ADB: Brazil, Russia, and
South Africa from the BRICS block, as well as various players from
the Middle East, and, perhaps more surprisingly, Iceland, Malta, and
Poland.

1 Brazil, Egypt, Iran, Italy, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Africa, Spain, and Uzbeki-
stan.

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There are no major, structural differences between the ADB and the
AIIB, both adopting the templates of the World Bank:
1) Board of Governors – composed of representatives of each member
state;
2) Board of Directors – elected by the Board of Governors;
3) Senior Management – President, vice-Presidents and other top
executives.
The international nature of the management structure should prevent
the dominance of any single state within both institutions and allow
for a more business oriented style of management and communication
(ADB’s website; 2015 Annual Report: Asian Development Bank 2015a,
pp. 4–5; Asian Development Bank 2016; AIIB’s website; Berwin, Leighton
& Paisner 2016, pp. 1–2; Morris 2015; Qing 2015).
ADB’s capital is USD 147 billion compared to AIIB’s USD
100 billion of original authorized capital stock (sum of all shares).2 Both
institutions want to do business within sovereign and non-sovereign
sectors (the vast majority of the ADB’s activity is in government loans
and logic suggests that the same will apply to the AIIB). Despite this
similarity there is an enormous disparity in the scale of financial activity
of each organization. In 2015 the ADB approved USD 27.17 billion
of financial operations, mainly in the form of loans, but also grants,
equity investments, guarantees, technical assistance, and co-financing
(including trust funds). During its first six months in operation the AIIB
had signed up to just five projects (Asian Development Bank 2015a,
pp. 3, 6–7; Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 2015, art. 3; AIIB’s
website; Middleton 2016).
The total value of these projects is USD 2.66 billion, with AIIB’s
contribution being USD 0.66 billion. The AIIB has expressed its intention
to raise its level of involvement to USD 10–15 billion per year and only
time will tell if this ambition can be realized. Three out of five of the
existing projects are to be co-financed by other development banks,
including the ADB who will take the leading role in administration. It
is unclear whether the AIIB intends to use these relationships as part of
a short term strategy to compete with, even possibly replacing, the ADB,

2 As of 26th of June 2016 the AIIB has gathered capital subscriptions totaling USD
85.91 billion, the remaining capital will be guaranteed as soon as the other Prospective
8 Founding Members ratify the AIIB’s Articles of Agreement (Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank 2016b).

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at some point in the future. Alternatively, it could use these joint ventures
as part of a longer term plan to improve, strengthen and reduce the cost
of the existing development framework in Asia. The co-financing and
cooperation between the ADB and the AIIB has not only been shown to be
possible, but has already started. The continued success or failure of this
depends on both banks’ main shareholders’ ongoing assessment. Almost
certainly, it will take years for the AIIB to equal the financial operating
capabilities of the ADB. The more established ADB can be rest assured
that any ‘threat’ posed by the development and growth of the AIIB is
a long way off.

Table 1. AIIB’s projects as of end of June 2016

AIIB’s
Total Value Co-financing
# Title contribution
(USD) institution
(USD)

Indonesia: National
1. Slum Upgrading 1.74 billion 216.50 million World Bank
Project

Bangladesh: Power
Distribution System
2. 262.29 million 165 million none
Upgrade and
Expansion Project

Tajikistan: Dushanbe-
European Bank for
Uzbekistan Border
3. 105.90 million 27.5 million Reconstruction and
Road Improvement
Development
Project

ADB and the

Pakistan: National
United Kingdom’s
Motorway M-4
4. 273 million 100 million Department for
(Shorkot-Khanewal
International
Section) Project
Development

India: Transmission
5. System Strengthening 282.9 million 150 million none
Project – Tamil Nadu

Source: AIIB’s website.

Both organizations share similar goals and their focus areas are almost
parallel.

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Table 2. The ADB’s and AIIB’s focus areas

Asian Development Bank Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

Main: infrastructure (water, energy,

transport, urban development, information nfrastructure and other productive sectors
and communications technology), in Asia, including: energy and power,
environment, regional cooperation and transportation and telecommunications,
integration, finance sector development rural infrastructure and agriculture
and education development, water supply and sanitation,
environmental protection, urban
Additional: health, agriculture and natural development, logistics
resources, public sector management

Source: ADB’s website; Asian Development Bank 2015a, pp. 10–15; AIIB’s website;
Asian Development Bank Xinhua News Agency 2016b.

Such a high degree of convergence may prove to be a help or a hindrance

for the cooperation between the two banks moving forward.
The division of voting power within the AIIB is one of the most
contentious issues under discussion. Under the existing voting system
the PRC have 29.9% of voting power within the organization. Once all
57 Founding Members have ratified the AIIB’s Articles of Agreement,
the PRC’s voting power will settle at around 26%. Even with this sharp
reduction China will still maintain a de facto veto power in a limited
number of Super Majority vote decisions. This does not mean that the
PRC will be able to unilaterally impose any decisions on the AIIB’s
operations and bank members’ status. As in other multilateral banks, even
main shareholders have to persuade other states to accept their ideas and
create a coalition before voting takes place. When we compare the PRC’s
position within the AIIB to other influential members (India’s current/
projected voting power is 8.63%/7.51%; Russia 6.81%/5.93%; Germany
4.77%/4.15%, and South Korea 4.03%/3.5%), Beijing’s advantage is
evident. Even BRICS countries, voting together (around 43% of cumulated
voting power) are not going to be strong enough to steer AIIB’s operations
on their own (AIIB’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 2016b; Morris
& Higashikokubaru 2015).
This could be compared with the governance of the ADB where the top
five members by voting power are: Japan 12.8%, the US 12.71%, the PRC
5.46%, India 5.37%, and Australia 4.93%. Basically, the PRC’s influence
within the AIIB’s structures is equal to US-Japanese dominance over the
ADB. The votes of Washington and Tokyo supported by Australia, New

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Zealand, and the ADB’s European members are enough to take a binding
decision (Asian Development Bank 2015b).
Ironically, the easiest way to decrease the power of the PRC within
the AIIB’s structures would be the joining of the bank by Japan and/or the
US. Their accession would lead to a significant reduction in the existing
voting power of current shareholders, i.e. would neutralize the Chinese
de facto veto power. However this opportunity has not been taken by the
Japanese and US governments.
Clear similarities, in terms of their statutory goals, management
structures, focus areas, and governance systems, will undoubtedly
influence the future relations of the ADB and AIIB. These factors could
potentially lead towards rivalry or, in a more optimistic scenario, closer
collaboration between these two organizations. Differences also exist in
terms of experience, financial capabilities and membership. The limited
experience of the AIIB will make expressions of rivalry unlikely, at the
moment. The membership of each bank will support projects in keeping
with their broader geopolitical and geoeconomical visions. This might
push the ADB towards the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the AIIB to the
One Belt, One Road initiative.

2. Possible scenarios for the ADB–AIIB relationship

The future of ADB-AIIB relations are not written in stone. This
relationship will fall into one of three broad categories: out and out
rivalry; neutrality; and maximum cooperation. The character of the
relationship will be defined by each player ’s level of commitment, their
attitude towards and acceptance of structures put in place to achieve
agreed mutual goals.
Hostility between the two institutions could take the form of absolute
rivalry, or some less exaggerated form of non-cooperation and competition.
Neutrality could result from calculated decision to leave rivalry aside
and simply concentrating on fulfilling economic tasks, or even as an
unintentional outcome of doing business (assisting Asian countries) in
a different way, leaving less incentive for interference. Finally, cooperation
between the ADB and the AIIB does not necessitate full partnership and
complete coordination. It can also be expressed through technical dialogue
and limited joint initiatives in areas of common interest, while at the
same time allowing for the autonomy of each bank.

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Figure 1. Possible ADB–AIIB relationship patterns and its subtypes

Source: based on author’s estimation.

Out of these broad categories we can imagine six possible scenarios,

as presented below. They are presented on the axis of possible outcomes
from the most pessimistic ‘Sino-Japanese full scale rivalry via ADB–AIIB
confrontation’ to the extremely idealistic ‘Extensive cooperation and
coordination’.

Figure 2. Spectrum of possible outcomes

Source: based on author’s estimation.

How the ‘Sino-Japanese full scale rivalry via AIIB–ADB confrontation’

scenario might play out? Both financial institutions set extremely high
levels of credit in competition for business and reduced their function to
instruments of foreign policy. The setting of strict eligibility criteria for
potential borrowers, restricting access to funds from the ‘rival’ institution,
would be used for political gains. This ‘politics over economics’ approach
would have a direct negative effect on the quality of services provided. This
could escalate regional rivalry and exacerbate existing tensions within the
global South.

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Table 3. Pros and cons of the ‘Sino-Japanese full scale rivalry via AIIB–ADB
confrontation’

Pros Cons
Substantial financial
Donors (banks and main Powerful enhancement of
costs; strong international
shareholders) foreign policies
criticism
Rapid inflow of additional Regional political
Recipients
capital destabilization
Maintenance of the West’s
Risk of future loss of trade
Non-regional parties central position in the
options
World economy
Source: based on author’s estimation.

There are at least three situations that could trigger this scenario:
• an extreme escalation of political tension between the PRC and
Japan – both countries undoubtedly have influence over the AIIB
and ADB respectively. The severe crisis in their mutual political relations
would probably result in the decision to use all bilateral and multilateral
channels, including these financial institutions, to gain the support of
other Asian states and diminish the political clout of the other side;
• a real threat to main shareholders’ geo-economic projects (One Belt,
One Road initiative/Trans-Pacific Partnership) – similar to the reaction
in the case of a political crisis, the strategy of full scale rivalry using all
available means could be introduced by Japan and the PRC due to some
perceived serious economic threat. Such dangerous conditions might be
brought about by one of these regional powers attempting to convince
other Asian states to be bound only to his existing trade agreements,
thereby putting the success of any alternative venture at great risk;
• extreme competition for scarce resources – the future possibility of
crucial resources becoming less and less available might result in both
development banks morphing into structures to gain access to these
assets. If this happened the scenario of harsh rivalry would very likely
follow.
The second possible scenario, ‘Non-cooperation with some
competition’, would involve the relationship between the AIIB and ADB
being redescribed as a competition rather than a fierce rivalry. This more
relaxed relationship would still involve a significant degree of competition
and reluctance to develop joint initiatives and principals. This reluctance
to cooperate because of political differences could result in wasteful

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duplication of energy and resources in attempts to achieve the same

economic ends. A reduction in the rivalry of this scenario will allow for
recipients to access funds from both banks, but the norms and procedures
of each institution would differ, resulting in high transaction costs for
the borrowing nations. Each bank would continue to ask its members
for funds to increase its capital stock to gain a comparative advantage over
its ‘rival’.

Table 4. Pros and cons of the ‘Non-cooperation with some competition’

Pros Cons
Moderate support for
Donors (banks and main Some international
foreign policy goals and
shareholders) criticism
economic strategies
Lack of coordination of
Easy and stable access to
Recipients national and regional
additional sources of capital
investments
Additional capital
Incompatibility of
subscriptions and special
Non-regional parties development policies in
funds as a means of
Asia
evidencing bilateral profits
Source: based on author’s estimation.

Potential causes for the level of competition suggested in this scenario are:
• a reduction in the perceived influence of the ADB within the
region – if the first years of the AIIB’s operations resulted in reducing
the position and general impact of the ADB, the latter would surely reject
any cooperation with the newcomer and move towards political and
economic competition;
• the perception, over time, of the AIIB as ineffective – in case of
a discontent of major AIIB stakeholders about the bank’s efforts to
achieve set goals and visions, the bank’s board would have to implement
slightly more ‘aggressive’ market strategies to improve its effectiveness in
maintaining and developing its political influence;
• worsening political tensions over the regional economy – should
efforts to stimulate the local Asian economy be hit by another major
economic crisis, a great demand for both capital flows and political
leadership would inevitably follow. In such circumstances each individual
bank would have to undertake emergency measures to try to save the
economies of their borrowing nations, as there would be insufficient
time to negotiate joint programs and procedures. At the first signs of any

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economic growth both organizations would argue about its own crucial
role in getting the regional economy ‘back on track’, claiming that its role
had been more productive than its rival’s;
• absolute incompatibility of strategic goals of China and Japan – the
likelihood of growing competition between these two banks is directly
related to the yawning gap between the foreign policies of their two major
funders.
The ‘Neutral coexistence’ is more of an ‘economics over politics’
scenario, based on an assumption that both organizations would
concentrate on their development goals rather than furthering any purely
political agenda. Acting individually, and without interfering with the
other, each bank accepts the absence of common interest, but does not
allow this difference to fuel any rivalry. This stabilizes the volume of
credit allowing both institutions to concentrate on quality over quantity
of service. The differences in norms and procedures between the ADB and
AIIB still results in high transaction costs for borrowing nations.

Table 5. Pros and cons of the ‘Neutral coexistence’

Pros Cons
Opportunity to concentrate Reduction in effectiveness
Donors (banks and main
on grand geo-economic of support for foreign
shareholders)
projects policies
Lack of investment
Recipients Regional stability coordination; reduction in
capital available
Stability crucial for import/ Less opportunities
export; (no pretext) for political
Non-regional parties
constant incentives for interference into Asian
global GDP growth affairs
Source: based on author’s estimation.

The scenario of ‘Neutral coexistence’ would be a direct consequence

of such factors as:
• concern over the projected cost of the ADB–AIIB rivalry as per the
previous two scenarios – there is no doubt that rivalry and competition
are costly options, as they involve a significant volume of credit and
the need for additional capital subscriptions from bank shareholders.
Therefore, it is more likely that the ministries of finance, and other
decision makers, are going to support neutrality rather than any ADB–
AIIB confrontation;

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• realization that a pragmatic approach will best achieve long-term

strategic goals – assuming that the real agenda of each bank is not to work
in direct opposition to its counterpart, it is going to be cheaper and safer,
at least up to certain point, to avoid direct disputes;
• recognition by member nations that the long term economic goals
of the ADB and AIIB are not mutually exclusive – the future strategies of
both organizations are dependent on their shareholders’ perception of the
global situation and how the operation of each bank can minimize threats
to their individual economies. Each bank’s ability to achieve this without
interfering in the business of the other institution, will have a direct effect
in the avoidance of any areas of conflict.
The scenario of ‘Sub-regional or thematic specialization’ suggests that
a conflict of interest can also be avoided by the banks choosing separate areas
of specialization; this could be geographical specialization or a difference in
focus areas. In each case both banks would work towards separate economic
goals determined by major stakeholders, any foreign policy goals being
noticeable by their absence. While a steady volume of credit and quality of
service would contribute towards a pro-effectiveness agenda, the lack of any
shared procedures would still prove to be a nuisance for borrowing nations.

Table 6. Pros and cons of the ‘Sub-regional or thematic specialization’

Pros Cons
Precision in designing
Very limited support for
Donors (banks and main solutions vital to the
current foreign policies of
shareholders) success of grand geo-
Japan and China
economic projects
Improvement in
Some recipient countries
Recipients development cooperation
may feel neglected
quality
Availability of reliable
Limitation of political
Non-regional parties instruments through which
influence in Asian affairs
donors can offer aid
Source: based on author’s estimation.

Reasons for this scenario becoming a reality may include:

• an apparent divergence of the practical involvement of each bank
based on differences in chosen priorities – the recognition that actual flows
of money prove both institutions are, in fact, interested in tackling different
issues, or concentrating their efforts in different parts of Asia could be seen
as a the implementation of a neutral strategy in their mutual relations;

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• perceived improvement in effectiveness brought about by division of

labour – different specializations might occur as a consequence of general
agreement between international development actors and result in an
increase in the effectiveness of ongoing social and economic cooperation;
• preference for pragmatism over the pursuit of short term goals – the
notion that the member countries of each bank can benefit more from
the banks’ more standard economic activities than embarking on any
impulsive and potentially destabilizing political struggles for a position
within the region.
The next scenario, ‘Limited technical dialogue and cooperation’,
is a move towards ‘full cooperation’, while limiting shared activities in
technical dialogue and co-financing agreements. In this case several
joint workshops, conferences, agreements, other forms of exchange of
knowledge would take place. Both banks would provide each other with
analytical support, technical consultations and a flow of information.
Frequent negotiations would allow co-financing of various projects. The
trilateral nature of such cooperation would enable all parties to exchange
resources, experience and ideas, enriching both banks’ services, while
expanding the AIIB’s capabilities. The ADB would gain some influence in

Table 7. Pros and cons of ‘Limited technical dialogue and cooperation’

Pros Cons
Donors (banks and main Stability, opportunity to Possibility of skewing
shareholders) learn and improve own the original purpose and
services character of certain crucial
projects as a result of
dialogue and negotiations;
increased limitations of
support for shareholder
foreign policy
Recipients Coherent and more Significant delays in
effective assistance; trilateral negotiations
stability; substantial
decrease of transaction
costs
Non-regional parties Economic stability and Potential long term
a degree of influence over loss of influence due to
ongoing investment plans; increasingly successful
stimulation of global GDP cooperation between Asian
nations
Source: based on author’s estimation.

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the shaping of the AIIB’s activities and standards, but both organizations
would still remain independent in the field of strategic goals and core
operations. Obviously, this sort of relationship between the ADB and
AIIB would involve their engagement in further extensive dialogue on the
effectiveness of their financial activity.
The above scenario could be triggered by:
• recognition by all parties of the potential gains in moving away
from more competitive attitudes towards a more cooperative approach to
business – to achieve that, shareholders of both institutions need to work
towards building mutual trust. Certainly, this shift would also require time
for all parties to closely monitor the development of both banks’ activities
and make several serious assessments to weigh up mutual benefits or
otherwise before reaching a conclusion of adopting this model or not;
• the AIIB’s strategy to counter initial criticisms and create a new and
more positive image on the world stage – this provides the opportunity
for the AIIB to quickly allay concerns expressed by its critics, proving its
reliability as a serious development actor;
• the ADB’s hope to avoid criticism of political motivation in its
perceived reluctance to accept the AIIB as a regional actor – the perception
of ‘the old financial guard demonstrating an irrational ‘knee-jerk’ reaction
to the ‘new kids on the block’ is something the ADB might like to avoid;
• an easing of Sino-Japanese political tensions – undoubtedly, the
removal of stumbling blocks between the major shareholders, or at
least to the point at which they could be excluded from any multilateral
development negotiations, would go a long way to facilitating long-term
fruitful ADB–AIIB cooperation.
In the final scenario, called ‘Extensive cooperation and coordination’,
we would expect to see intensive dialogue, leading to a shared stance on
priorities, agreement on what each bank wants to achieve and how they
will cooperate to meet these objectives. This might also promote the idea of
a new body whose function would be to coordinate activities and establish
norms, standards, and procedures, to be adopted by both banks (as was done
in the case of the Coordination Group of Arab and OPEC aid institutions).
This body might also provide a platform for further dialogue between Asian
Pacific emerging donors (the PRC, India, Taiwan, Thailand, Singapore) and
OECD Development Assistance Committee members active in the region
(Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zeeland, the US, and the EU). This
could be the first step towards long-term regional economic integration,
potentially resulting in a new pan-Asian free trade agreement.

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Table 8. Pros and cons of the ‘Extensive cooperation and coordination’

Pros Cons
Constraints on foreign
policy options due to
Reduced operational costs;
the perceived conflicting
proving international
Donors (banks and main interests of banks and
criticism to be false;
shareholders) politicians; possible loss of
incentive for further
focus in financial support
integration
for long term geo-economic
projects
Effective and coordinated
assistance; possible further Potential conditionality
Recipients
benefits from regional requirements
integration and stability
Opportunity to develop Long-term risks related
interregional dialogue as to the shift in the global
Non-regional parties a counterbalance to the economy (dynamic
dominance of any single empowerment of various
nation Asian economies)
Source: based on author’s estimation.

This optimistic, and perhaps idealistic, scenario could become

a reality as a consequence of:
• banks’ agreement of shared interests and strategic goals – this
consensus would be reached through labourious negotiations aimed at
maximizing the benefits to the region as a whole;
• the recognition of cooperation as a form of anti-crisis regional
response, thereby avoiding wasteful competition – initiated as a response
to substantial financial problems, not only of aid recipients, but also
the main sponsors of both institutions. Extensive cooperation between
the ADB and AIIB, in this case, would be out of necessity rather than
choice, in order to save the Asian economy;
• the elimination of major political tensions between banks’ main
shareholders – should be considered as a sine qua non condition of this
scenario.

3. Reality check
Serious doubts were expressed with the very first proposals of setting
up a new regional development institution in Asia. To its doubters, the
AIIB was seen as a potential rival for the existing financial institutions:

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the World Bank and ADB. Western criticisms were based on concerns as to
whether or not the AIIB would follow international standards, particularly
on environmental and social safeguards. Concerns were also expressed
on the governance of the bank – the possibility of Chinese domination
and concentration on Beijing strategic goals, the effectiveness of anti-
corruption measures and transparency of decision making. The absence
of conditionality to loans offered by the AIIB is perceived as a threat to the
existing neoliberal practices of the World Bank practices et al, something
clearly at odds with the Washington Consensus. The unofficial diplomatic
campaign – led by the US and Japan – concentrated on generating fears
over the geopolitical effects of the AIIB’s establishment: presenting the
organization as an instrument of Chinese soft power and being a part
of a broader strategy of countering US ‘leadership’ in the region. It was
even suggested that the AIIB’s investments in ports and harbours could
potentially be used to expand Chinese naval presence in different parts
of Asia. The initial goal of the campaign was to discredit the very idea of
setting up the bank, later becoming an exercise of discouraging the West’s
international partners from accessing the bank. Washington and Tokyo
failed to achieve any of these targets (Nelson 2015, pp. 17–18; Qing 2015;
S.R. 2014; Bastin 2015; Domínguez 2014; Sobolewski & Lange 2015;
Asia News Network 2015; Watt, Lewis & Branigan 2015).
As a response to the criticism the AIIB initiated its own media and
diplomatic campaigns and took the more important step of clarifying its
various social and economic policies: Environmental and Social Policy,
Operational Policy on Financing, General Conditions for Sovereign-
Backed Loans, Procurement Policy, and Policy on Prohibited Practices.
The implementation of these regulations should ensure the high
standards and quality of AIIB’s operations and “ensure that the Bank does
business with trustworthy parties who adhere to the highest integrity
standards.” According to Sir Danny Alexander, the AIIB’s Vice-President,
the “management of the bank will ensure that all those policies are
implemented in detail on each and every project.” A similar attitude
was expressed by Jin Liqun, the bank’s president, who, speaking on the
possibility of co-financing projects with established donors, said that
the criteria for cooperation with the AIIB must include gains for local
people and adherence to the highest possible social and environmental
standards. The adoption of policies close to those of the World Bank and the
ADB helped the AIIB to counter initial criticisms and to convince various
governments to join (AIIB’s website; Asian Infrastructure Investment

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Bank 2016a; 2016c, 2016d; 2016e; 2016f; 2016g; Lean 2016a; Mainichi
Japan 2015).
From the stated aims of the AIIB and ADB there exist no clear conflict
of interests which should, theoretically, result in fruitful cooperation. The
AIIB’s website states that “The Bank’s foundation is built on the lessons
of experience of existing MDBs [Multilateral Development Banks] and the
private sector. […] AIIB will complement and cooperate with the existing
MDBs to jointly address the daunting infrastructure needs in Asia. The
Bank’s openness and inclusiveness reflect its multilateral nature” (AIIB’s
website).
This pro-cooperation attitude has also been expressed by both banks’
presidents. The ADB’s leader, Takehiko Nakao, said that the “ADB has
been working closely with AIIB throughout its establishment process. We
will further strengthen our cooperation in promoting sustainable growth,
reducing poverty, and combating climate change in the region.” His AIIB
counterpart, Liqun Jin, declared that the “AIIB looks forward to deepening
our already strong relationship and expanding our collaboration as we
seek to address the significant infrastructure financing needs in the
Asia region.” In his words both organization believe that they “are
complementary to each other and we will be working together in the
future” in reality, the optimistic language used for ‘future cooperation’
is a rediscription of the existing, ongoing relationship between the two
(ADB’s website; Xinhua News Agency 2016a; Mainichi Japan 2015).
Even before the AIIB was up and running, the ADB had already
expressed its support for its new multilateral partner. The ADB waited
until the time the Articles of Agreement were ready to be signed and the
deadline for submission of membership applications had passed, before
offering its services. It was well known that the AIIB would be ‘starting
its journey’ with several ADB members, including various EU members,
South Korea, and Australia, on board. ADB President Takehiko Nakao and
AIIB President-Designate Liqun Jin met twice in 2015 to discuss possible
frameworks for cooperation. As a result of these meetings the ADB helped
the AIIB Multilateral Interim Secretariat to create operational policies,
especially those of procurement and environmental and social safeguards.
It is said that the ADB was encouraged to offer its assistance to the AIIB by
the US government, as it was a chance to shape the new institution without
US or Japanese membership. This wise strategy had to be introduced as an
alternative to the failure of US-Japanese diplomatic attempts to suppress
the AIIB’s idea before it achieved international legitimization. So far, this

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new attitude seems to be working well. The ADB offered its expertise
to help the AIIB design better demand driven services to meet the great
need in various sectors of the Asian economies. This sort of arrangement
could build a truly win-win cooperation, with both banks agreeing to
identify projects for possible co-financing, with special attention being
given to the sectors of: transport, energy, telecommunications, rural and
agriculture development, water, urban development, and environmental
protection. On the May 2, 2016, the ADB and the AIIB presidents signed
a memorandum of understanding which creates a legal foundation for
joint financing of projects. The first co-financed investment is “Pakistan’s
M4 highway project, a 64-kilometer stretch of motorway connecting
Shorkot to Khanewal in Punjab Province.” The ADB will play the role of
lead co-financer, responsible for the project’s administration, giving the
organization more opportunity to influence its new counterpart (ADB’s
website; Xinhua News Agency 2016a; AIIB’s website; China Daily 2016;
Lean 2016b).
Despite Chinese dominance and US/Japanese fears behind their
attempts to suppress its birth, the AIIB should not be strictly perceived
as an instrument of Chinese foreign policy. As a multilateral financial
institution, its agenda cannot be restricted to the interests of one country,
as can be seen in bilateral aid agencies. The bank is not limited to the
‘One Belt, One Road’ projects, or even formally bound to this investment
strategy. The first five revealed projects are totally independent from this
initiative (Mainichi Japan 2015; AIIB’s website).
Finally, the profile of the AIIB’s decision-makers should also be
considered. The bank’s top officials, including its president, previously
served as senior executives at: the ADB, World Bank, European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, Korea Development Bank, African
Development Bank, and various national governmental institutions. All
the experience of the senior management officers and their international
contacts suggest that the AIIB, at least within the next couple of years,
should lean towards cooperation with other development agencies,
including the ADB, instead pursuing the costly rivalry (AIIB’s website;
Berwin, Leighton & Paisner 2016).
The arguments presented above show that while some cooperation
between the ADB and the AIIB is possible and even quite probable,
the likelihood of the banks managing to achieve the utopian outcome
of the scenario expressed as ‘Extensive cooperation and coordination’
remains very low. Although confrontation is not expected in the short

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term, we should expect some competition developing over the longer

term. The scenario based on technical dialogue and cooperation looks to
be the most likely outcome.

Table 9. Scenarios’ plausibility test

Scenarios Plausibility
Sino-Japanese full scale rivalry via AIIB-
very unlikely
ADB confrontation
Non-cooperation with some competition likely
Neutral coexistence even
Sub-regional or thematic specialization even
Limited technical dialogue and cooperation very likely
Extensive cooperation and coordination very unlikely
Source: based on author’s estimation.

Conclusions
As the analysis demonstrates the ADB and the AIIB are based on the
same models of management and governance. This involves a tripartite
governing format, both institutions consisting of a board of governors
– board of directors, and a senior management team. The international
character of both banks is represented not only through its board’s
composition, but also through the number and variety of nations holding
shares issued by both institutions. This is also evidenced by the inability
of any single shareholder to impose its unilateral decision to dominate the
whole organization. Lots of Western criticism was focused on the PRC’s
de facto veto power within the AIIB, perhaps ironic when we consider
the existing power of Japan and the US to block almost any decision of
the ADB. Both organizations share a common interest in terms of their
statutory goals and focus areas. The analysis found some significant areas
in which these organizations differ. The most obvious of these would
be: the limited experience of the AIIB. Obvious disparity in financial
capabilities and clear divergence in their member countries. The US and
Japan displayed a clear lack of interest in joining the AIIB, while the BRICS,
and various Middle Eastern countries, were easily persuaded to come on
board. The organizational model shared by both banks could potentially
give rise to some form of natural competition between them. At the same
time, these structural similarities may also allow clearer positive dialogue

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between top decision makers, who will all undoubtedly have extensive
experience in multilateral negotiations, and so effectively will be able to
‘speak the same language’, thereby avoiding more obvious obstacles.
Ultimately, the future of ADB-AIIB relations regarding any strategy
for ongoing collaboration will be determined by their main shareholders.
Only time will tell whether the relationship, now still in its infancy, will
be of a hostile, neutral, or cooperative nature.
Not only is cooperation between the ADB and AIIB possible, but is
in fact an ongoing reality. While clear objectives have been decided upon
to be of mutual benefit to the banks (win-win), it is essential not to forget
the raison d’être of these institutions which should be the improvement
in living standards of the citizens of borrowing nations. For this reason,
every effort to advance cooperation and quality of services to achieve
a truly win-win-win outcome is vital.
While the history of ADB-AIIB relations may be very short, it has
already shown great promise. In spite of their initial anxieties, the ADB
has assisted its new counterpart during its setting up period. Their
relationship being further reinforced by the signing of a memorandum
of understanding that has already produced a joint investment project.
Taking into consideration the fact that they are multilateral organizations,
obviously governed in a different way than bilateral agencies, we can
predict that, out of six logically possible situations, that of the ‘Limited
technical dialogue and cooperation’ is the most plausible. The hyper-
pessimistic, ‘Sino-Japanese full scale rivalry via AIIB–ADB confrontation’
and the ultra-optimistic, ‘Extensive cooperation and coordination’, are
found to be very unlikely, at least for today. Putting idealism aside, we
cannot totally rule out some form of competition between these two
banks, as they follow the interests of their main shareholders, including
regional powers.
Most likely the ADB and the AIIB will engage in technical dialogue and
cooperate on an operational level, however some degree of competition on
a strategic level should also be expected. This would mean acting together
in cases of single projects, maintaining a flow of useful information and
know how, as well as co-hosting international conferences and workshops.
Areas where serious competition will prove problematic are: requests for
financial assistance to nations with membership of both banks, and/or
either bank attempting to wield its influence to promote their different
visions of regional economy or grand geo-economic initiatives.

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Acknowledgments

I would like to thank my friend, Marty Cook, for his patience and
advice, both vital in the writing of this text

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mar/13/white-house-pointedly-asks-uk-to-use-its-voice-as-part-of-chinese-led-bank.
Wildau, G., Mitchell, T., 2016, China’s new Asia development bank will lend in US
dollars, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/762ce968-bcee-11e5-a8c6-deeeb63d6d4b.html.
Xinhua News Agency, 2016a, AIIB, ADB sign MOU on cooperation, http://silkroad.news.
cn/2016/0511/800.shtml.
Xinhua News Agency, 2016b, The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, http://silkroad.
news.cn/2016/0701/3037.shtml.

MATEUSZ SMOLAGA, Ph.D. is a lecturer at the Institute of Political Science

and European Studies, University of Szczecin, where he teaches various courses
in the field of international relations. Since completing his studies at the Institute
of International Relations, University of Warsaw, his research has focused on the
issue of international development, especially activities of emerging donors of
development assistance, and South–South cooperation.

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 http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/8088-758-9.13

Joanna Wardęga
(Jagiellonian University)

Constructing a desired image of China:

Picture of territorial controversies
in Chinese language textbooks

Abstract

China is one of the Asian countries, whose borders are contested by different
actors on the geopolitical stage, who do not agree on the Chinese version of
geography. As China is strengthening its soft power, one of the tools for the
spreading of the Chinese version of the map of Asia are textbooks for teaching
the Chinese language. Since 2004 China has been setting up Confucius Institutes
around the world to spread its language and culture. There are some concerns
and controversies arousing around Confucius Institutes, seen as Chinese
government-backed institutions present on Western universities, and questions
about their role in creating Chinese soft power.
The purpose of this article is to understand one aspect of language education,
that is how the Chinese territory is shown to the students of the Chinese language
in the textbooks that are used in the Confucius Institutes.

Key words: Chinese language textbooks, Confucius Institute, geography, soft

power.

Introduction
Chinese history and geography are continuously re-constructed and
re-memorized based on contemporary social and political needs of the
nation and its elites. Since the end of the 19th century, an evolution of
describing the Chinese nation can be observed, by either integrating or
excluding certain parts, both geographical and ethnic or demographic. Sun
Yat-sen in The Three Principles of the People presented China as having

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territorial aspirations towards Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan, Pescadores

Islands, Burma, Annam (northern part of Vietnam), and territories north of
Amur River. He also showed some sentiments towards the former Imperial
Chinese tributary system territories, including the Ryukyu Islands, Siam
(Thailand), Sulu Archipelago (Philippines), Java, Ceylon, Nepal, and
Bhutan (Sun 1937, pp. 33–35). Another Chinese leader, Mao Zedong in
the interview given to Edgar Snow in 1936, expressed his conviction that
in the future “the Outer Mongolian Republic will automatically become
part of the China Confederation, at their own will. The Mohammedan
and Tibetan peoples, likewise will form autonomy republics attached to
the Chinese federation […] Burma, Indo-China, Korea and Mongolia
are illegally annexed parts of China which must be restored to it” (Snow
1937, p. 102; Yahuda 2000, p. 28). Mao eventually resigned from a broad
idea of a Chinese federation, but some of his territorial ambitions tended
to show up in the later decades.
When it comes to the definition of the Chinese nation, in Mao
Zedong’s China, according to Townsend (1996, pp. 28–29), there were
“four different Chinese Nations”: (1) official one of state nationalism,
nation composed of all People’s Republic of China (PRC) citizens,
including Han and non-Han people; (2) defined by ethnic nationalism
and political reality, PRC’s Han nation; (3) PRC citizens and compatriots
from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan; (4) in the sense of ‘Chineseness’,
including all Chinese around the world, who share a cultural attachment
to China.
Nowadays the Chinese nation is still in the process of reconstructing.
The idea of ​​nation and nationalist attitudes are modified by the Communist
Party of China. This process can be perceived by the constructivists’
approach to nation. Eric Hobsbawm (2008, pp. 263–307) recognized
nations as the constructs of deliberate social engineering. Thus, symbols,
histories, myths, were instruments of social control by the ruling elite.
Depending on the needs of that elite, the political or cultural understanding
of the nation would be used, and particular elements could be accented.
As in the case of many other nations, in China we may find some places,
cities or tourist destinations, without which the describing of the nation
would not be possible, such as Beijing, the Yellow River and the Great Wall.
Some others may be seen controversial, like Tibet, Taiwan, or Xinjiang.
To understand how the Chinese nation and its territory are perceived
nowadays, we can refer to the tools of socialization prepared for its own
people, as well as those addressed to other nations.

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Education is an important aspect of soft power. The importance

of promoting their own language in foreign countries is seen by many
governments as an essential part of creating a desired image of the
nation and the state. China was not the first to promote its culture and
language throughout the world, but followed the popularity of French
as the language of diplomacy in the 17th and 18th centuries, and English
in the 19th and 20th. Meanwhile numerous countries have launched
institutions dedicated to teach language and promote culture: British
Councils, German Goethe Institutes, Spanish Cervantes Institutes,
Japan Foundation, and many more. Since China began gaining more
attention and power on the international stage, Beijing also wanted
to use language as a soft power tool. Nevertheless, Mandarin is not
a widely spoken language, and is perceived by many people as one of
the most difficult languages to learn. Since opening the first Confucius
Institute in 2004, these institutions have been supposed to convince
foreigners that it is possible to learn Chinese, and to offer them that
opportunity, by sending abroad Chinese language teachers and teaching
materials, by offering scholarships to study in China, setting up the
standard Chinese proficiency test, and organizing various cultural and
educational events.
The supreme institution dedicated to the promotion of Chinese
language is the Chinese National Office for Teaching Chinese as a Foreign
Language, abbreviated to Hanban, which is affiliated with the Chinese
Ministry of Education. The official reason for its creation is the development
of China’s economy and exchange with the world, which provided “a sharp
increase in the world’s demands for Chinese learning” (Hanban 2014b).
Hanban is responsible for the Confucius Institutes program, especially for
financing it, training Chinese teachers and organizing the Chinese Bridge
Competition. According to its declaration, Hanban “is committed to
providing Chinese language and cultural teaching resources and services
worldwide” (Hanban 2014a). Hanban “drafts international Chinese
teaching standards and develop and promote Chinese language teaching
materials” (Hanban 2014a).
Publishing and distribution of teaching materials may be perceived
as a part of an intentionally created policy in many different ways. The
discussion of the content of history textbooks may reach far beyond
the borders, as during the Japanese history textbooks content crises in
1982 and 2005 between Japan and China, and Japan and Korea. Processes
of teaching and learning a foreign language include – apart from the

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obvious linguistic elements – also knowledge of the culture, history,

geography, and politics of a given country. A positive image of a nation is
also seen in the materials to teach many languages as foreign, including
Polish (Nowakowska 2013). And it also creates a picture of a country in
the minds of the language learners. The aim of this study was to show
what geographical image of China is presented in textbooks for teaching
the Chinese language. From all of the Chinese geographical and social
diversity, which places were chosen to be most representative, and how
were they described? Another research question, derived from the political
controversy surrounding the Confucius Institutes, was whether, and in
which context, the names of disputed territories appear in textbooks,
in order to promote the image of China, considered appropriate by the
authorities. The main hypothesis of the article is that the textbooks
published in China are presenting the picture of the country, which is
not only positive, but also deliberatively chosen to produce a demanded
vision of China – as modern, but also proud of its history and tradition,
diversified in ethnic and cultural sense, but also unified as one nation.
Another hypothesis of the research is that the more often and earlier
in the process of learning some geographical objects appear, the greater
importance is attached to them.

Literature Review
There have been some articles focused on the Chinese language
textbooks content, but they lack the analysis of aspects other than
linguistic. Cynthia Y. Ning (2001) in the text “Second-language Studies
and College-level Chinese-language Textbooks in the United States”
presented a critical approach to structures and formats of the traditional
textbooks, and focuses on such characteristics as grammar-orientation,
communicative curriculum, and task-based activities. There is also
an article by Wang Min and Wei Dongying (2007) about the Chinese
geography textbooks, but it is focused on sustainable development and
environmental education.
On the other hand, some articles about the whole process of teaching
language by the Confucius Institutes, including non-linguistic, political
aspects, were written by Western scholars, for instance Don Starr (2009)
“Chinese Language Education in Europe: The Confucius Institutes,”
James F. Paradise (2009) “China and International Harmony. The Role

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of Confucius Institutes in Bolstering Beijing’s Soft Power.” None of the

found texts touches the content of the Chinese language textbooks. Thus
the presented research is innovative.
Realizing that this is an initial phase of a wider research project, the
development of research is planned towards the analysis of awareness
and knowledge of Chinese language learners – by studying cognitive
maps, spatial representations of China that are kept within the minds
of Chinese language students, as such research has not been conducted
yet either.

Materials and Metods

In the first phase of the research, which is presented in this article,
the textbooks for adult students of the Chinese language from the very
beginners to the Hanyu Shuiping Kaoshi (HSK) level 3 were taken into
account. The reason for that was that these books may reach the largest
audience, since most of the students cease to learn Chinese before
reaching the HSK3 level of language proficiency. According to the research
conducted in 2016 among Polish learners of Chinese language,1 only 32%
of them were learning Chinese longer than three years, and 29% passed
examination HSK 4 or higher. The database of the textbooks consisted of
over twenty titles. According to results of the abovementioned research,
three-quartersof the Polish learners were using at least one of those
textbooks, mostly the New Practical Chinese Reader, Contemporary
Chinese and Boya Chinese.
The analyzed textbooks were published between 2002 and 2013 by
various publishing houses from the People’s Republic of China. All of
them were approved by Hanban, and promoted by that institution, as they
were sent by the Division of Teaching Resources to Confucius Institutes
abroad as an element of the material support for them.

1 Unpublished research conducted by the Author and Mao Rui, online in June–July
2016, among 423 learners of Chinese language from all major and some minor ed-
ucational institutions teaching Chinese (Warsaw University, Poznan Adam Mickie-
wicz University, Jagiellonian University, Silesia University, Lodz University, Gdansk
University, SWPS University, Catholic University of Lublin, Confucius Institutes in
Krakow, Poznan, Opole, and some language schools), as well as individual learners
and Polish students at Chinese universities.

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Table 1. Database of the textbooks

Name Volumes Publishing house

1 2 3
Boya Chinese 博雅汉语 1, 2 Peking University Press
Chinese for Beginners Beijing Language and
1
初级汉语课本 Culture University Press
Contemporary Chinese
1, 2, 3 Sinolingua
当代中文
Conversational Chinese 301 Beijing Language and
汉语会话301句 Culture University Press
Experiencing Chinese:
Experiencing Culture in Higher Education Press
China 体验汉语 文化篇
Experiencing Chinese:
Living in China Higher Education Press
体验汉语 生活篇
Experiencing Chinese:
Traveling in China Higher Education Press
体验汉语 旅游篇
Threshold, Lower
Beijing Language and
Road to Success 成功的路 Elementary 1, 2,
Culture University Press
Elementary 1, 2
Meeting in China Beijing Language and
Speaking 1, 2
相会在中国 Culture University Press
Modern Chinese Beginner’s Beijing Language and
1, 2
Course 初级汉语课 Culture University Press
Beijing Language and
Great Wall Chinese 1–6
Culture University Press
A Key to Chinese Speech
1 Sinolingua
and Writing
Practical Chinese Reader
1, 2 The Commercial Press
实用汉语课本
New Practical Chinese Beijing Language and
1, 2
Reader 新实用汉语课本 Culture University Press
Living in China – Spoken
Beijing Language and
Chinese for Foreigners
Culture University Press
生活在中国
The World of Chinese Foreign Language Teaching
1, 2
汉语世界 and Research Press
Chinese Conversation for
Beijing Language and
Foreigners 1, 2
Culture University Press
外国人汉语会话课本

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1 2 3
Communicate in Chinese
1–4 科学普及出版社
交际汉语 (phrasebook)
Basic Chinese 基础篇, Daily
Chinese in Hand
Chinese 生活篇, and Travel People’s Education Press
中文在手 (phrasebook)
Chinese 旅游篇

In the first stage of research, which is presented in this article, a total

of 932 units (lessons) were analyzed, in total 40 volumes of textbooks. In
the content of each lesson geographical names were identified. Among all
of the lessons there were 266 lessons including any kind of them. These
names appeared in the new words sections, in the texts, dialogues, and
a few times in the texts in English, presenting additional information
about China and Chinese culture. Besides quantitative analysis, an
analysis of content of the texts was also conducted. The context of the
sentence in which names appeared was also analyzed, for instance:
objective or evaluative description, relation to which sphere: geography of
China, economy, transport, leisure, weather, and cuisine.

Discussion of the results

According to expectations, some of the names were particularly
popular, and those were the locations that may be seen in tourist folders,
creating a kind of showcase of the country. Unbeatable in first place was
taken by the capital city, Beijing. It was mentioned 96 times, that is
in 36%, if we take only texts with geographical names into account, or
in 10% of all lessons. Second place was taken by another famous Chinese
city, namely Shanghai: it appeared 63 times, 24%.
Besides these two metropolises, the Great Wall took third place
(39 times as Changcheng, plus sometimes a particular section of the
Great Wall was mentioned: mostly it was Badaling (8 times), Mutianyu
(2 times), as well as Jinshanling and Simatai (1 time each), altogether
in 15% of the lessons). The Great Wall was described as “one of the
world’s wonders in ancient architecture” (Practical Chinese Reader),
and even – mistakenly – “the only human construction visible from the
moon” (A Key to Chinese Speech and Writing). The Chinese idiom Bu
dao Changcheng fei haohan, meaning “He who has never been to the
Great Wall is not a true man,” was placed in a number of texts. Students

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are taught that climbing the Great Wall should bring great emotions
and experience of a beautiful landscape (Contemporary Chinese, New
Practical Chinese Reader, Living in China).
When it comes to the cities besides Beijing and Shanghai, they were left
far behind. Among the relatively popular there were: Xi’an (10%), Harbin,
Guangzhou (Canton), Hangzhou, Nanjing, Guilin (all of them 6%), and
also Tianjin, Suzhou, and Chongqing (5%). Special Administrative Region
Hong Kong (5% of the lessons) was three times more popular than Macau
(around 2%). Taibei was mentioned in three lessons, that is less than 2%
of the lessons with any geographical name.

Table 2. Names of the Chinese cities mentioned in the textbooks.

Percentage among Percentage among

Name of the city Number of lessons lesson with names all the lessons
(in %) (in %)
1 2 3 4
Beijing 96 36 10
Shanghai 63 24 7
Xi’an 27 10 3
Ha’erbin 17 6 2
Guangzhou 17 6 2
Hangzhou 17 6 2
Nanjing 16 6 2
Guilin 15 6 2
Tianjin 14 5 2
Hong Kong 14 5 2
Suzhou 14 5 2
Chongqing 10 4 1
Kunming 8 3 1
Luoyang 7 3 1
Chengdu 7 3 1
Qingdao 7 3 1
Sanya 6 2 1
Lhasa 5 2 1
Dalian 5 2 1
Lijiang 5 2 1

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1 2 3 4
Shenzhen 4 2 <1
Macau 4 2 <1
Wuhan 4 2 <1
Taibei 3 1 <1
Yangshuo 3 1 <1
Kaifeng 3 1 <1
Xiamen 3 1 <1
Dali 2 1 <1
Lanzhou 2 1 <1
Chengde 2 1 <1
Pingyao 2 1 <1
Source: results of the research.

Content analysis of the texts revealed how those cities were described
with their own special characteristics. The capital city is the most
important and most prestigious place in the whole country, therefore it
must present itself as perfect. Beijing therefore was presented as “country’s
chief political, economic and cultural centre” (Practical Chinese Reader),
“ancient city and cultural centre of China” (A Key to Chinese Speech and
Writing), as a city of long and rich history (Modern Chinese Beginner’s
Course, New Practical Chinese Reader, Road to Success), famous in the
world. Beijing is an ancient city, with many historical objects worth
to be visited (Living in China). Not often a modern face of Beijing was
commented, once: as “becoming a cosmopolitan city as its economy
continues to develop” (New Practical Chinese Reader). Only one critical
aspect was shown, namely that the transportation situation is not great
(Go2China Lessons). A lot of attention was also paid to the weather:
summer were described as hot and dry, and it was recommended to visit
Beijing in autumn.
Not only Beijing, as a main municipality in China, was presented in the
largest number of lessons, but also a significant number of its tourist spots
were showed in them. The Forbidden City, Gugong, ranked fourth among
all of the geographical names. It was mentioned in 29 lessons (11%) as the
most popular tourist destination in Beijing. According to the textbooks,
on the city map we may also find: the Summer Palace Yiheyuan (23 times,
9%, and the 6th name in total), “as the most popular ancient garden”
(Practical Chinese Reader), Tiananmen (22 times, 8%), Temple of Heaven

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Tiantan (17 times, 6%), Fragrant Hills Park Xiang Shan (11 times, 4%),
whose autumn red leaves were praised (Practical Chinese Reader), then also
Beihai lake (10 times, 4%), and Wangfujing street (3%). Occasionally some
other places in Beijing could be found: Quanjude Beijing Duck Restaurant,
hutongs (presenting old Beijing culture and lifestyle), Liulichang Street,
Silk Market, Xizhimen, Qianmen, Zhongnancun, Xidan, Old Summer
Palace Yuanmingyuan, Yonghegong Lama Temple, and the Great Hall
of the People, “which was built in only 10 months” (Practical Chinese
Reader). Tiananmen Square was “regarded as the symbol of new China”
and it was mentioned that “many important state ceremonies and mass
rallies have been held on Tiananmen Square” (Practical Chinese Reader).
On the photos that may be found in the textbooks, the architecture of
China is presented usually with the Temple of Heaven, Forbidden City.
Also, spectacular modern buildings, such as Bird Nest Olympic Stadium,
are shown as the illustration of transformations taking place in Beijing in
the last years.
Shanghai, in contrast to the mostly traditional Beijing, in many texts
was described as China’s biggest city. Also, it was the largest industrial
centre of the country (New Practical Chinese Reader, Road to Success).
Shanghai was presented as the most beautiful international city in China.
It should be underlined that Shanghai may be international, but, according
to the text, it has its own characteristics, very different from European
and American municipalities (Contemporary China). In one of the texts
Shanghai was compared to Beijing, and described as more lively, and
offering more business and trade opportunities, hosting more factories,
and restaurants. Among other sites, Yuyuan garden neighborhood was
praised for its tasty snacks (Conversational Chinese 301). On the other
hand, its streets are narrower, the parks are not as big nor beautiful as
in the capital city, and has much less historical spots (Modern Chinese
Beginner’s Course). The weather in Shanghai is described as a coastal city
in the southern part of China (Road to Success), hot and humid (Great
Wall Chinese).
Most of the names of other Chinese cities and provinces appear in
lessons about weather and transportation, as destinations of the travels
or places from where the characters originate from. Xi’an is presented as
a city of culture, full of historical sites (Road to Success, Hanyu Jiaocheng),
of which one was listed: the Terracotta Army. That would be a right
place to visit for those who would like to learn about China’s history
(Contemporary Chinese). Harbin, on the other hand, is described as the

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winter capital of China, with beautiful winter landscape,ice sculptures,

and ice lanterns in particular (Hanyu Jiaocheng, Great Wall Chinese). The
weather there is described as cold (Boya), but its citizens like to swim in
cold water (Road to Success). In the context of Guangzhou, the Cantonese
dialect was mentioned, but with a note that Mandarin is widely spoken
in a public sphere (Conversational Chinese). Hangzhou is a city, which
“Marco Polo described as the noblest and the finest city in the world,
famous for its lake” (A Key to Chinese Speech and Writing). You may also
find the saying Shang you Tiantang, xia you Su Hang meaning that just
as there is paradise in heaven, there are Suzhou and Hangzhou on earth.
Guilin is praised for its natural landscapes (Conversational Chinese,
Hanyu Jiaocheng, A Key to Chinese Speech and Writing).

Table 3. Chinese provinces by the biggest popularity

Percentage among Percentage among

Name of the city Number of lessons lesson with names all the lessons
(in %) (in %)
1 2 3 4
Sichuan 22 8 2
Yunnan 15 6 2
Guangdong 14 5 2
Xinjiang 11 4 1
Hainan 11 4 1
Xizang 10 4 1
Shandong 10 4 1
Shanxi 10 4 1
Zhejiang 9 3 1
Hunan 8 3 1
Anhui 8 3 1
Fujian 4 2 <1
Dongbei 4 2 <1
Qinghai 4 2 <1
Guizhou 4 2 <1
Shaanxi 4 2 <1
Henan 3 1 <1
Guangxi 3 1 <1
Heilongjiang 3 1 <1
Jiangxi 3 1 <1

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Table 3 cont.

1 2 3 4
Neimengu 3 1 <1
Jiangsu 3 1 <1
Hebei 3 1 <1
Hubei 3 1 <1
Liaoning 3 1 <1
Jilin 3 1 <1
Gansu 2 1 <1
Ningxia 2 1 <1
Source: results of the research.

When it comes to the provinces, obviously not all of them were

represented on the same level. The most widespread name is Sichuan
(22 times, 8%), usually in the context of its famous cuisine, for instance
the hot pot. Then there was Yunnan province (15 times, 6%), with many
ethnic minorities (Hanyu Jiaocheng) and tasty snacks (Conversational
Chinese 301), and Guangdong (14 times, 5%).
The question how the places that are sensitive to the Chinese government
such as Taiwan, Tibet, or Xinjiang, were presented in the textbooks was also
interesting. The Chinese teachers sent by Hanban have to obey the laws of
China and try to avoid being involved in activities contrary to the interests
of China. How often the autonomous regions were presented in the analyzed
textbooks? In fact they were less popular than it was expected: Xinjiang
(11 times) and Tibet (10 times) appeared in a slightly more than 4% of
the units, while Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, and Ningxia were hardly ever
described. Xinjiang was praised as a region where tasty fruits were grown,
and texts about other regions were nonexistent. Taiwan was mentioned in
5 lessons, so around 2% of the lessons (Taibei in 3 lessons), of course never as
the Republic of China, just as one of China’s provinces.
In the analyzed textbooks some of geographical objects, such as rivers
and mountains, were also present. Yangtze River Changjiang (15 times,
6%) was more popular that the Yellow River Huanghe (9 times, 3%).
Yangtze was described as one of the longest in the world, while the Yellow
River valley as “the cradle of the ancient Chinese civilization” (Practical
Chinese Reader). Of among the mountain ranges, Chinese language
students learn mainly about Huang Shan (12 times, 5%) and Tai Shan
(11 times, 4%), and rarely Emei Shan, Wutai Shan or Hua Shan. Mount
Everest was mentioned only three times, much less often than expected.

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Map 1. Provinces of the PRC, Special Administrative Regions and Taiwan according to
the popularity in analyzed textbooks

Source: results of the research.

Among the tourist destinations that were expected to be more popular,

but in reality appeared in less than 1% of the texts, there were the following:
Terracotta Army, Three Gorges, West Lake, Ming Tombs, Hainan island
and Sanya city, Jiuzhaigou Valley, Mogao Caves, Emei Shan, and Shaolin
Temple. One of the reasons why these destinations were not so popular in
the textbooks, may be that their names are difficult to learn or pronounce.
But even if we take a closer look at the data including photos’ content,
additional vocabulary, and introduction about China provided in English,
they were also not that popular.

Conclusions
There are many components used to construct the soft power of
a country. Among them, language education aimed to foreigners may
play an important role and can be used to build up the desired image of

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a nation. Those textbooks are used in the process of learning Chinese by

foreigners, who tend to tie their life or careers with China, so the possibility
of shaping their picture of that country cannot be neglected. How can we
describe this particular soft power tool, a result of the combination of
language education, tourism promotion, and border controversies?
Based on research, it seems that in the first stage of language education
the greatest importance is given to strengthen the interest in ancient
Chinese culture, not the contemporary one. In the second stage the effects
of modernization and economic development are highlighted.
In this context it is not surprising that the most popular architecture
objects in the textbooks were the Great Wall and the Forbidden City.
The importance of the Great Wall for the national pride of the Chinese
people could not be underestimated. Its uniqueness in the world has
been emphasized on many occasions in the context of cultural policy in
China, therefore, such a high position of the Great Wall is not surprising.
The Great Wall appears in the first verses of the national anthem, on the
1 RMB banknote, and also in the name of one of the Chinese textbooks
series. The myth of its visibility from space has been repeated so often,
that many Chinese and foreigners believed it – and as it may be noticed,
this myth was still present in some of the textbooks. The Forbidden City,
now a museum, could be seen as a proof of the richness of Chinese culture,
although most valuable collections were taken to Taiwan in 1949. At the
same time the Forbidden City served as an example of the disastrous
Western influence in China, since after the suppression of the Boxer
Rebellion, European troops plundered the imperial palace. Both of these
historical objects were described as beautiful, making a great impression
on the visitors. They were the evidence of the magnificence of Chinese
history and culture.
It is worth to mention, that for the last decades of constant growth,
China has been building a picture of a country of fast development, that
positively affects not only biggest municipalities of East coast, but also
interior provinces. In the analyzed textbooks, however, presented pictures
of cities and provinces may only strengthen the stereotypes and deepen
divisions. Foreign Chinese language students could learn about the sites
well-known for their history and tradition, like Beijing and Xi’an. Later on,
most modern and developed cities, such as as Shanghai and Guangdong,
were presented.
If some distant provinces were mentioned, they were praised only
for their cuisine, traditional culture of ethnic minorities and nature, not

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 Constructing a desired image of China: Picture of territorial controversies… 229

economic or social development. That could be a sign of still existing

internal, geographical and ethnic essentialism. The description of
minority regions was limited to their characteristics related to ethnicity.
Culture of national minorities in China is often considered interesting as
a kind of colorful folklore, so their representatives are displayed in folk
costumes, and also the local cuisine is appreciated. From the early decades
of the 20th century the Chinese Marxist-Leninists promised material and
cultural progress to minorities that inhabit remote regions, described as
backward and feudal. Even today the problems of minorities having lower
social status than the Han people, and forced to match with the level
of Han culture, were not solved yet. The culture of national minorities
is considered as popular destinations for both local and foreign tourists,
but not having much to offer in comparison to the Chinese high culture,
even if it is in contrary to official multinational policy guidelines. During
the annual meetings of the National People’s Congress, representatives
of national minorities are shown in the media wearing multicolored,
traditional dresses, while members of the Han majority usually wear
Western-type suits or military uniforms. It shows a different approach to
these groups, which is similar with Anthony D. Smith’s (2003, pp. 95–
130) ‘missionary nationalism’ of great empires. The same approach seems
to apply to the picture of distant provinces in the analyzed textbooks.
Contrary to the hypothesis, the names associated with controversy,
such as Tibet, Taiwan, and Xinjiang, were not particularly emphasized in
the analyzed textbooks. The information about the islands in the South
China Sea or Diaoyu/Senkaku islands were nonexistent. Perhaps more
advanced learners would encounter them in the next volumes of the
textbooks. This requires further study.
In short, what image of China can get a learner Chinese from Chinese
textbooks for beginners? China is displayed as a great civilization and
rich culture, the country which is geographically diverse, inhabited by
people with different ethnic, cultural, culinary characteristics. A country
on the road to modernization, which has already beneficed some parts of
the state, but not distant provinces, still being the folklore, multi-cultural
background for more economically developed and enjoying long history
and high culture parts of China.

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 230 Joanna Wardęga

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Textbooks
Boya Chinese 博雅汉语 (Volume 1), Peking University Press, Beijing 2007.
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Chinese for Beginners 初级汉语课本 (Volume 1), Beijing Language and Culture University
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Communicate in Chinese 交际汉语 (Volume 2), 科学普及出版社, Beijing 2009.
Communicate in Chinese 交际汉语 (Volume 3), 科学普及出版社, Beijing 2009.
Communicate in Chinese 交际汉语 (Volume 4), 科学普及出版社, Beijing 2009.
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Contemporary Chinese 当代中文 (Volume 2), Sinolingua 2006.

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Contemporary Chinese 当代中文 (Volume 3), Sinolingua 2006.

Conversational Chinese 301 汉语会话301句 (Volume 1), Beijing Language and Culture
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Conversational Chinese 301 汉语会话301句 (Volume 2), Beijing Language and Culture
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Experiencing Chinese: Experiencing Culture in China 体验汉语 文化篇, Higher Education
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Experiencing Chinese: Living in China 体验汉语 生活篇, Higher Education Press, Beijing
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Experiencing Chinese: Traveling in China 体验汉语 旅游篇, Higher Education Press,
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Great Wall Chinese (Volume 1), Beijing Language and Culture University Press, Beijing
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Great Wall Chinese (Volume 2), Beijing Language and Culture University Press, Beijing
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Great Wall Chinese (Volume 3), Beijing Language and Culture University Press, Beijing
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Great Wall Chinese (Volume 4), Beijing Language and Culture University Press, Beijing
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Great Wall Chinese (Volume 5), Beijing Language and Culture University Press, Beijing
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Great Wall Chinese (Volume 6), Beijing Language and Culture University Press, Beijing
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A Key to Chinese Speech and Writing (Volume 1), Sinolingua, Beijing 2009.
Living in China – Spoken Chinese for Foreigners 生活在中国, Beijing Language and Culture
University Press, Beijing 2004.
Meeting in China 相会在中国 (Speaking 1), Beijing Language and Culture University Press,
Beijing 2005.
Meeting in China 相会在中国 (Speaking 2), Beijing Language and Culture University Press,
Beijing 2005.
Modern Chinese Beginner’s Course 初级汉语课 (Volume 1), Beijing Language and Culture
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Modern Chinese Beginner’s Course 初级汉语课 (Volume 2), Beijing Language and Culture
University Press, Beijing 2008.
New Practical Chinese Reader 新实用汉语课本 (Volume 1), Beijing Language and Culture
University Press, Beijing 2010.
New Practical Chinese Reader 新实用汉语课本 (Volume 2), Beijing Language and Culture
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Road to Success 成功的路 (Threshold), Beijing Language and Culture University Press,
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Beijing 2008.

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The World of Chinese 汉语世界 (Volume 1), Foreign Language Teaching and Research
Press, Beijing 2006.
The World of Chinese 汉语世界 (Volume 2), Foreign Language Teaching and Research
Press, Beijing 2006.

JOANNA WARDĘGA, Ph.D., Assistant Professor at the Institute of Middle

and Far East. She graduated in sociology from Jagiellonian University and studied
Chinese in the universities of Shanghai and Xiamen. She is a Director of Confucius
Institute in Kraków since November 2010. Her research interests include society
transformations, contemporary Chinese culture, Chinese national and social
thought between the 19th and the 21st century, and social and anthropological
issues of tourism development in East Asia. She is the author of recent books:
Chinese nationalism. Rebuilding Nation in People’s Republic of China (2014),
Contemporary Chinese Society (2015).

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