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Creativity and Development Counterpoints Oxford
University Press 1st Edition R. Keith Sawyer Digital
Instant Download
Author(s): R. Keith Sawyer, Vera John-Steiner, Seana Moran, Robert J.
Sternberg, David Henry Feldman, Howard Ga
ISBN(s): 9780195186345, 0195186346
Edition: 1
File Details: PDF, 1.12 MB
Year: 2003
Language: english
 Creativity and
Development

R. KEITH SAWYER, et al.

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

CREATIVITY AND DEVELOPMENT
 COUNTERPOINTS: Cognition, Memory, and Language
 : Marc Marschark
Rochester Institute of Technology
National Technical Institute for the Deaf
 
Martin Conway Margaret Jean Intons-Peterson
University of Bristol Indiana University

Giovanni Flores d’Arcais Douglas L. Nelson

Max-Planck Institute and University of South Florida
University of Padua
Robert S. Siegler
Carnegie Mellon University

STRETCHING THE IMAGINATION

Representation and Transformation in Mental Imagery
C. Cornoldi, R. Logie, M. Brandimonte, G. Kaufmann, D. Reisberg

MODELS OF VISUOSPATIAL COGNITION

M. de Vega, M. J. Intons-Peterson, P. N. Johnson-Laird, M. Denis, M. Marschark

WORKING MEMORY AND HUMAN COGNITION

J. T. E. Richardson, R. W. Engle, L. Hasher, R. H. Logie, E. R. Stoltzfus, R. T. Zacks

RELATIONS OF LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT

The View from Sign Language and Deaf Children
M. Marschark, P. Siple, D. Lillo-Martin, R. Campbell, V. Everhart

GENDER DIFFERENCES IN HUMAN COGNITION

P. J. Caplan, M. Crawford, J. S. Hyde, J. T. E. Richardson

FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT

A. Katz, C. Cacciari, R. W. Gibbs, M. Turner
COGNITION AND EMOTION
E. Eich, J. F. Kihlstrom, G. H. Bower, J. P. Forgas, P. M. Niedenthal

BECOMING A WORD LEARNER

A Debate on Lexical Acquisition
R. M. Golinkoff, K. Hirsh–Pasek, L. Bloom, L. B. Smith,
A. L. Woodward, N. Akhtar, M. Tomasello, and G. J. Hollich

MEMORY FOR ACTION

A Distinct Form of Episodic Memory?
H. D. Zimmer, R. Cohen, M. J. Guynn, J. Engelkamp, R. Kormi-Nouri, M. A. Foley

CREATIVITY AND DEVELOPMENT

R. K. Sawyer, V. John-Steiner, S. Moran, R. J. Sternberg,
D. H. Feldman, J. Nakamura, M. Csikszentmihalyi
CREATIVITY AND
DEVELOPMENT

R. KEITH SAWYER
VERA JOHN-STEINER
SEANA MORAN
ROBERT J. STERNBERG
DAVID HENRY FELDMAN
JEANNE NAKAMURA
MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI

3
2003
 3
Oxford New York
Auckland Bangkok Buenos Aires Cape Town Chennai
Dar es Salaam Delhi Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kolkata
Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Mumbai Nairobi
São Paulo Shanghai Taipei Tokyo Toronto

Copyright © 2003 by Oxford University Press, Inc.

Published by Oxford University Press, Inc.
198 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016
www.oup.com
Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise,
without the prior permission of Oxford University Press.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Creativity and development / R. Keith Sawyer . . . [et al.].
p. cm. — (Counterpoints)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-19-514899-1; ISBN 0-19-514900-9 (pbk.)
1. Creative thinking. 2. Creative ability. 3. Developmental psychology.
I. Sawyer, R. Keith (Robert Keith) II. Counterpoints (Oxford University Press)
BF408.C7545 2003
153.3'5—dc21 2002151878

1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Printed in the United States of America
on acid-free paper
 To Howard E. Gruber

Piaget, working with children, found that the growth of their ideas is a
process spread over years. Now that we are learning about adult creative
work in this new way, we can compare two radically different develop-
ment processes that have some important points in common. Each will
illuminate the other.
—HEG
This page intentionally left blank
 Contents

Authors ix

Introduction 3
.  

1. Emergence in Creativity and Development 12

.  

2. Creativity in the Making: Vygotsky's Contemporary Contribution to the

Dialectic of Development and Creativity 61
  and  -

3. The Development of Creativity as a Decision-Making Process 91

 . 

4. The Creation of Multiple Intelligences Theory: A Study in High-

Level Thinking 139
  , with the collaboration of  

5. Creativity in Later Life 186

  and  

6. Key Issues in Creativity and Development 217

Prepared by all authors

Index 243
This page intentionally left blank
 Authors

R. K S is Associate Professor of Education at Washington Uni-

versity in St. Louis. His research focuses on improvisational creativity, every-
day conversation, and emergence in collaborating groups. He is the author of
more than 30 articles and of four books related to creativity and development,
including Pretend play as improvisation (1997) and Group creativity (2003).

V J-S is Regent’s Professor of Education at the University

of New Mexico. She is a scholar of developmental psychology, linguistics, and
creativity, and an influential editor and interpreter of Russian psychologist Lev
Vygotsky. She is the author of Notebooks of the mind (1985) and Creative col-
laboration (2000).

S M has worked with Professor John-Steiner for several years.
She is currently an advanced doctoral student working with Professor Howard
Gardner at Harvard University, focusing on the development of commitment in
domain-transforming creative work.

R J. S is IBM Professor of Psychology and Education at

Yale University. He is one of the most widely published psychologists in the
world, and his research interests span a range of topics. He is perhaps best
known for his studies of intelligence and creativity; his books on creativity in-
clude Developing creativity in students (1996) and The creativity conundrum
(2002). He is the editor of Handbook of creativity (1999).

D H F is Professor of the Eliot-Pearson Department of

Child Development at Tufts University. Author or editor of eight books and
many articles, Dr. Feldman is an expert on cognitive development, developmen-
tal theory, and creativity. His 1986 book on child prodigies (with Lynn Gold-
smith), Nature’s gambit, earned Dr. Feldman the Distinguished Scholar of the
Year award from the National Association for Gifted Children. He is coauthor of
the 1994 book Changing the world: A framework for the study of creativity.

J N is Research Director of the Quality of Life Research

Center at Claremont Graduate University. Her research and writing examine

ix
x AUTHORS

engagement and other aspects of positive experience, creativity, and the social
context of good work in the professions, focusing on mentoring and appren-
ticeship. She is coauthor of Engaged youth (2001).

M C is C. S. and D. J. Davidson Professor of Psy-

chology and Management at Claremont Graduate University. The author or ed-
itor of many books and hundreds of scientific articles, Dr. Csikszentmihalyi is
the author of Flow: The psychology of optimal experience (1990) and Creativ-
ity: Flow and the psychology of discovery and invention (1996). Dr. Csikszent-
mihalyi has also published extensively on his research with talent, creativity,
and success in adolescence and in adults.
CREATIVITY AND DEVELOPMENT
This page intentionally left blank
 Introduction

R. Keith Sawyer

This book is an exploration of the connections between creativity and develop-

ment. These connections are rarely studied, because the fields of creativity re-
search and developmental psychology have proceeded independently—con-
ducted by different scholars and in different paradigms. Creativity research is
typically conducted on adults, often by personality or social psychologists; in
the Creativity Research Journal, there is rarely anything about children or de-
velopment. Developmental psychologists likewise rarely study creativity in de-
velopment; for example, at the biggest recent academic conferences on child
development—the 1999 and 2001 Society for Research in Child Development
(SRCD) meetings—there were only a handful of papers related to creativity.
Even though there has been no sustained attempt to bring theories of creativ-
ity and development together, there have nonetheless been many implicit and
hidden connections between them. By identifying these connections, we intend
this book to be of interest to both creativity researchers and developmental psy-
chologists. Creativity researchers will learn that the much larger field of devel-
opmental psychology offers a body of theory and methodology that can be used
in the study of creativity. At the same time, developmental researchers will be
exposed to the tradition of research in creativity and will gain new perspectives
on some long-standing issues in developmental psychology.
I begin this introduction by reviewing some commonly noted connections
between creativity and development. I then distinguish our approach in this vol-
ume by noting that our unifying focus is process and the dynamics of the emer-
gence of novelty over time. This focus leads to three themes; I discuss each of
these and then briefly describe how each chapter speaks to those themes.
Throughout recorded history, scholars have noted similarities between artis-
tic creativity and children. These similarities have led many scholars to suggest

3
4 CREATIVITY AND DEVELOPMENT

that artistic activity and children’s play are related and perhaps somehow tap
into the same inner source. In the centuries prior to the modern era, this inner
source was often conceived of as divine inspiration, and children were thought
to be closer to God. German idealists such as Schiller (1793–1794/1968) asso-
ciated the creative impulse with children’s play, and almost since the beginning
of formal schooling, idealists and romanticists alike have criticized overly
structured classroom schooling for squashing children’s natural creative ability.
Many twentieth-century psychologists have also observed parallels between
creativity and children’s play. For example, Freud thought the artist was like a
child at play: “He creates a world of his own, or, rather, re-arranges the things of
his world in a new way which pleases him” (Freud, 1907/1989, p. 437). For
Freud, fantasy worlds are created by both the child and the artist from the same
motivating impulse: the desire to satisfy an unfulfilled wish (p. 439).
The belief that children are more creative than adults has taken on the status
of an unexamined cultural myth. Are children really more creative? We examine
this belief in chapter 6, and we conclude that the question cannot be answered
except within a more subtle and sophisticated view of creativity, a view that is
elaborated here in chapters 1 through 5.
A second way to study the connection between development and creativity
is to study the development of creativity (Feldman, 1999). For example, in the
1970s, there were several studies suggesting that children who engaged in
more pretend play scored higher on measures of divergent thinking (Dansky,
1980; Hutt & Bhavnani, 1976; Johnson, 1976; Li, 1978). Although the experi-
mental evidence is equivocal (Pellegrini, 1992, p. 25), many scholars nonethe-
less believe that pretend play is an early childhood precursor to creativity
(Russ, 1996; Sawyer, 1997; Singer & Singer, 1990; Smolucha, 1992). In a re-
cent cross-cultural study of play, Haight (1999) compared caregiver-child pre-
tend play in China and in the United States and found that pretend play in the
two countries is different, and that the style of play corresponds to the type of
creativity that each culture emphasizes. Chinese culture values structures and
cultural frameworks, whereas U.S. culture values individual novelty and di-
vergent thinking (pp. 143–144). Corresponding to this opposition, Chinese
caregivers initiate pretend play as a way of teaching good behavior, especially
of teaching routine interactions; U.S. caregivers initiate play particularly in the
improvisational negotiation of interpersonal interactions (p. 141). These find-
ings suggest that children may be socialized into culturally valued styles of
creativity at a young age.
Similarly, a long tradition of research has studied the development of artistic
ability in children and the role of the arts in education. Much of this research has
been conducted by educational researchers, who are interested in determining
the best way to integrate arts education into the curriculum. These researchers
argue that early education in the arts can contribute unique developmental ben-
 INTRODUCTION 5

efits to children—general skills related to creativity such as higher level think-

ing, analytic ability, problem solving, reflexive thinking, and self-regulation
(Eisner, 1998).

A FOCUS ON PROCESS
Clearly, we are not the first to note that there are connections between creativity
and development. However, observations like the above remain at a relatively
broad-brush level; the substantive theoretical connections between develop-
mental theory and creativity theory have barely been explored. The key insight
driving this volume is that development and creativity are both processes. From
the early twentieth century to the present, both creativity and development have
been conceived of as processes of emergence in complex systems; this focus is
shared among approaches ranging from Piagetian developmental theory to
Csikszentmihalyi’s systems model of creativity.
The process approach is a second wave in creativity research that developed
only in the 1980s. The first wave of creativity research, from the 1950s through
the 1970s, was heavily influenced by personality psychology, and focused on
developing psychometric instruments and identifying the component traits of
creativity in different domains. By the 1970s, the personality approach was
largely thought to have reached its limit. One of the primary motivations of this
research was to develop metrics that could identify exceptional creative talent in
childhood, to select individuals that would be more likely to succeed in occupa-
tions demanding creativity; however, this research program was disappointed
when longitudinal studies found few consistent relationships between measures
of children’s personality traits and creative success in adult life. Long before the
renewed interest in creativity in the 1950s and 1960s, the Terman studies—
which identified high-IQ children in the 1920s and tracked their development
into adulthood—likewise proved something of a disappointment, because al-
though a high percentage of subjects became successful professionals and scien-
tists, few of them manifested exceptional creative performance in adult life.
In the 1970s and 1980s, a second wave of creativity researchers responded to
these disappointments by arguing for a shift in focus from personality to
process. This shift was inspired by the ascendance of cognitive psychology,
which, in the 1970s, led psychology as a discipline away from a focus on per-
sonality and individual differences toward a focus on those mental processes
that underlie not only exceptional ability, but also everyday problem-solving
and decision-making skills. The coauthors of this volume are some of the most
influential figures in this shift to the process approach.
Piagetian theory and method spread throughout U.S. developmental psy-
chology in the 1960s and 1970s. Piagetian theory was also fundamentally con-
6 CREATIVITY AND DEVELOPMENT

cerned with developmental processes—the microgenetic details of how the in-

teraction between a child’s schema and the environment could drive the emer-
gence of schemas characteristic of the next stage of development. Although Pi-
aget’s model has been increasingly criticized in the 1980s and 1990s, these
criticisms are themselves couched in the language of developmental process,
and Piaget’s legacy is that contemporary developmental psychology is now
centrally concerned with processes.
Thus, during the same time periods, creativity theory and developmental the-
ory became fundamentally concerned with process. No doubt there were many
common influences and hidden cross-fertilization. However, developmental
theorists are rarely familiar with theories of the creative process proposed by
creativity researchers, and creativity theorists are rarely familiar with the latest
theories about developmental process. This mutual neglect is hard to explain,
because there are many substantive connections between theories of the creativ-
ity process and theories of developmental process. For example, the core insight
of constructivism—a long-established developmental paradigm associated
with both Piaget and Vygotsky—is that development is a process in which chil-
dren participate in the creation of their own knowledge. Likewise, much of cre-
ativity theory has been based on staged models that are fundamentally develop-
mental. Piaget (1971) himself noted parallels between the processes of
creativity and development: “The real problem is how to explain novelties. I
think that novelties, i.e., creations, constantly intervene in development” (p.
192). Piaget claimed that his theory of development was a theory of genetic
epistemology and, as such, applied both to individual development and to the
historical development of scientific fields (see chapter 1).
In the chapters in this volume, prominent scholars explore these theoretical
connections between creativity and development. The chapters explore both the
nature of creative processes in development and the developmental nature of
creative processes. All of the authors are established in both developmental psy-
chology and creativity research. Because there has been so little work address-
ing both topics, it would be nearly impossible to write a comprehensive volume
that covered every potential connection. Rather, the authors each draw on their
decades of research and focus on distinct but complementary approaches to
these topics.
The uniquely collaborative nature of Oxford’s Counterpoints series allowed
the authors to engage in a dialogue, addressing the key issues and potential ben-
efits of making connections between creativity and development. In chapters 1
through 5, the authors apply their own well-known perspectives to explore con-
nections between creativity and development. Then, in chapter 6, the authors
come together to participate in a dialogue inspired by the key themes running
through all of the chapters.
 INTRODUCTION 7

THEMES OF THIS VOLUME

This book is based on the observation that both creativity and development are
processes that occur in complex systems, in which later stages or changes
emerge from the prior state of the system. This processual or dynamical per-
spective is the central focus of these chapters. This central focus then gave rise
to three related themes.
First, studies of process have always been balanced by a complementary
focus on the stable end points of process. In development, the end point of a de-
velopmental process is the next stage of development, and ultimately, an adult
level of ability. In creativity, the end point of the process is the created product.
Prior to the shift in both disciplines to a focus on process, both disciplines were
more concerned with the end points of the process—consider the focus on stages
and the ages of stage transition in Piagetian psychology, and consider the focus
on properties of created products in creativity research. A focus on process still
requires a consideration of the end points of the process, but now, the focus is on
how the end point emerges from the process, typically by using detailed micro-
genetic studies of how the process unfolds from moment to moment.
Second, studies of both creative and developmental processes have focused
on the dialectic interrelation between individual processes and social processes.
Since the early 1980s, both sociocultural developmental psychology and so-
cially oriented theories of creativity have increasingly studied both the individ-
ual and the social. Scholars of both development and creativity have increas-
ingly emphasized that the individual must be considered to be an integral part of
a complex social system, and that the relative contribution of individual and so-
cial context can only be fully understood by analyzing the processual dynamic
whereby individuals interact. This sociocultural approach is opposed to a more
static conception in which individual and context are both characterized by
fixed variables and the relation is studied via statistical significance (Rogoff,
1998).
Third, the process perspective emphasizes the role of mediating artifacts in
the process. This is manifest in the concern with domains and domain specificity
in both creativity and development, because domains are complex symbol sys-
tems composed of mediating artifacts. Feldman (1974, 1980) and Gardner
(1983) emphasized that development must be studied within its cognitive do-
main, and Csikszentmihalyi (1988) emphasized that creativity always occurs
within a domain. John-Steiner’s 1985 Notebooks of the Mind revealed the im-
portant role played by mediating symbols in creativity. Both Piaget and Vygot-
sky were centrally concerned with the contribution of mediating physical arti-
facts in development. Studies of developmental and creative process both
consider the role played by mediating artifacts, whether physical objects (paint-
8 CREATIVITY AND DEVELOPMENT

brushes, canvas, laboratory equipment) or symbol systems (the languages and

conventions of poetry or music).

CHAPTER SUMMARIES

The first (Sawyer’s) chapter provides a broad overview for the volume, and we
chose to order the next four chapters from early life to later life, starting with
Moran and John-Steiner’s Vygotskian perspective on the social dynamics of
creativity (chapter 2) and ending with Nakamura and Csikszentmihalyi’s focus
on creativity in later life (chapter 5). In between, Sternberg’s chapter empha-
sizes school-age children (chapter 3), and Feldman’s chapter is a hybrid, focus-
ing on the creative development of Howard Gardner’s multiple intelligence
theory at the same time that it applies that theory to children (chapter 4). In com-
bination, the chapters provide a broad set of perspectives on our three themes.
Sawyer’s chapter begins the volume by reviewing the history of creativity
research and developmental psychology, focusing on their common emphasis
on process and dynamics. He introduces the concept of emergence as a way of
identifying commonalities in the processual approaches essential to both cre-
ativity theory and developmental theory. Sawyer shows that emergentist think-
ing has been influential since the foundation of developmental psychology in
the late nineteenth century, and he traces the influence of emergentism in both
creativity theory and developmental theory. To demonstrate emergent process
in social settings, Sawyer presents an example of an improvisational theater di-
alogue from his own research (Sawyer, 2003). His chapter focuses on the first
two themes of this volume, process-product and social-individual relations.
Sawyer’s chapter briefly reviews emergentist elements in Vygotsky’s writ-
ings, and Moran and John-Steiner further draw on Vygotsky’s writings to con-
trast person-centered and social approaches to the study of creativity. Their
chapter focuses on the second and third themes of this book: the social-individ-
ual relation and the mediation of material and symbolic artifacts. Their Vygot-
skian approach is fundamentally developmental and considers both individual
creativity and the social dimension of creativity. Like Piaget, Vygotsky empha-
sized the role of material objects in development, for example, arguing that ob-
jects used in play act as pivots that drive the development of symbolic thought.
Vygotsky’s theory is often considered to be a more socially oriented variant of
constructivism than Piaget’s, because in Vygotskian theory, the child co-con-
structs knowledge through socially situated action.
Sternberg’s contribution explicitly turns to development in educational con-
texts. In educational theory and practice, both creativity and development are
central concerns, and his chapter focuses on our first theme, the relation be-
tween process and end point. For educators, the goal is an end point—a student
 INTRODUCTION 9

who has mastered the intended abilities. Yet contemporary educational theory is
based on the constructivist insight that children create their own knowledge. In
this framework, educators must be centrally concerned with creative processes,
because they cannot simply teach students knowledge but rather must create the
environmental conditions that will enable children to construct their own
knowledge. Sternberg draws on his propulsion and investment theories of cre-
ativity to propose practical recommendations for teachers interested in encour-
aging the development of students’ creativity.
Feldman’s chapter focuses on both childhood development and on later life
processes by engaging in a case study of Gardner’s multiple intelligence (MI)
theory. Feldman focuses on the creative process that led to Gardner’s creation of
MI theory. Because this represents more than a decade of activity, this case study
provides Feldman with an opportunity to examine the extended process that led
to the development of a creative product. Feldman’s discussion emphasizes the
first two themes of this book: the creative process that leads to the creative prod-
uct and the role of social interaction. This case study provides an excellent
demonstration that creativity is at heart a developmental process; many signifi-
cant creative innovations occur over long periods of an adult’s life span and often
correspond to significant developmental changes in the creator. At the same
time, MI theory itself deeply integrates both developmental psychology and cre-
ativity concerns; the intelligences correspond to cognitive domains, and (in a
number of publications) Gardner has emphasized that both creativity and child
development must be considered within the context of the domain of activity.
Like Feldman, Nakamura and Csikszentmihalyi focus on the development
of adult creativity and examine creativity and development in later life. How
does aging affect creativity—not only negatively, but also positively? As they
write, “Every biography of a creative person tries to explain the achievements
of its subject in light of a more or less implicit dynamic theory of life-span de-
velopment. The interest, curiosity, and enduring engagement of the artist or sci-
entist are seen to follow from a series of meaningfully connected experiences
stretching from childhood to maturity and old age.” This discussion draws on
Csikszentmihalyi’s systems perspective and considers not only the psychology
of the creative individual, but also the role of the cultural domain and of the so-
cial community, or field. Thus, this chapter emphasizes our second theme, the
interaction of the social and the individual. The authors are particularly con-
cerned with a broad life-span perspective: What sorts of personality traits are as-
sociated with sustained and continued creativity across a long life span? What
sorts of people continue to create into old age?
As with all Counterpoints volumes, we conclude with a discussion that al-
lows each author to engage the others, with the goal of drawing out common
themes and divergences found in research on creativity and development. Our
discussion centers on three questions:
10 CREATIVITY AND DEVELOPMENT

Does society suppress children’s natural creativity?

How can we balance social context and individual psychological process in
creativity research?
Are there different domains in development and in creativity?

Our responses to these questions further explore the three themes of process
and product, social context, and mediation. We are all enthusiastic about the po-
tential importance of the issues discussed, and we hope that this volume proves
to be only the first step in an increasing cross-fertilization of research in creativ-
ity and development.

REFERENCES

Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1988). Society, culture, and person: A systems view of creativity.

In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), The nature of creativity (pp. 325–339). New York: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Dansky, J. L. (1980). Make-believe: A mediator of the relationship between play and as-
sociative fluency. Child Development, 51, 576–579.
Eisner, E. W. (1998). The kind of school we need. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann.
Feldman, D. H. (1974). Universal to unique. In S. Rosner & L. E. Abt (Eds.), Essays in
creativity (pp. 45–85). Croton-on-Hudson, NY: North River Press.
Feldman, D. H. (1980). Beyond universals in cognitive development. Norwood, NJ:
Ablex.
Feldman, D. H. (1999). The development of creativity. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), Hand-
book of creativity (pp. 169–186). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Freud, S. (1989). Creative writers and day-dreaming. In P. Gay (Ed.), The Freud reader
(pp. 436–443). New York: Norton. (Original work published 1907)
Gardner, H. (1983). Frames of mind: The theory of multiple intelligences. New York:
Basic Books.
Haight, W. L. (1999). The pragmatics of caregiver-child pretending at home: Under-
standing culturally specific socialization practices. In A. Göncü (Ed.), Children’s en-
gagement in the world: Sociocultural perspectives (pp. 128–147). New York: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Hutt, C., & Bhavnani, R. (1976). Predictions from play. In J. S. Bruner, A. Jolly, & K.
Sylva (Eds.), Play: Its role in development and evolution (pp. 216–219). New York:
Penguin.
John-Steiner, V. (1985). Notebooks of the mind: Explorations of thinking. Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Press.
Johnson, J. E. (1976). Relations of divergent thinking and intelligence test scores with
social and nonsocial make-believe play of preschool children. Child Development,
47, 1200–1203.
Li, A. K. F. (1978). Effects of play on novel responses in kindergarten children. Alberta
Journal of Educational Research, 24(1), 31–36.
 INTRODUCTION 11

Pellegrini, A. D. (1992). Rough-and-tumble play and social problem solving flexibility.

Creativity Research Journal, 5, 13–26.
Piaget, J. (1971). Comment on Beilin’s paper. In D. R. Green, M. P. Ford, & G. B.
Flamer (Eds.), Measurement and Piaget (pp. 192–194). New York: McGraw-Hill.
Rogoff, B. (1998). Cognition as a collaborative process. In D. Kuhn & R. S. Siegler
(Eds.), Handbook of child psychology: Volume 2. Cognition, perception, and lan-
guage (5th ed., pp. 679–744). New York: Wiley.
Russ, S. W. (1996). Development of creative processes in children. In M. A. Runco
(Ed.), Creativity from childhood through adulthood: The developmental issues (pp.
31–42). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Sawyer, R. K. (1997). Pretend play as improvisation: Conversation in the preschool
classroom. Norwood, NJ: Erlbaum.
Sawyer, R. K. (2003). Improvised dialogues: Emergence and creativity in conversation.
Westport, CT: Greenwood.
Schiller, F. (1968). On the aesthetic education of man, in a series of letters (E. M.
Wilkinson & L. A. Willoughby, Eds. and Trans.). Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press.
(Original work published as Über die aesthetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer
Reihe von Briefen, 1793–1794)
Singer, D. G., & Singer, J. L. (1990). The house of make-believe: Play and the develop-
ing imagination. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Smolucha, F. C. (1992). The relevance of Vygotsky’s theory of creative imagination for
contemporary research on play. Creativity Research Journal, 5(1), 69–76.
 CHAPTER ONE

Emergence in Creativity
and Development

R. Keith Sawyer

In this chapter, I introduce our volume’s focus on process in creativity and de-
velopment. I explore parallels between the creative process of the artist or sci-
entist and the developmental process that children undergo as they age and ma-
ture. For example, the core insight of constructivism—a long-established
developmental paradigm associated with both Piaget and Vygotsky—is that
children participate in the creation of their own knowledge. Likewise, much of
creativity theory has been based on stage models that are fundamentally devel-
opmental. In many cases, these parallels lead to very similar theoretical issues
being addressed in both fields but being studied and resolved in somewhat dif-
ferent ways. In this chapter, I review the history of theoretical development in
creativity research and developmental psychology, and I demonstrate that the
two fields share many concepts and theoretical frameworks. I show how each
field could benefit from incorporating aspects of the other field’s theoretical
frameworks, and I identify several common issues facing contemporary re-
searchers in both areas.
I first noticed these parallels soon after I began to teach three related courses
at Washington University in St. Louis: educational psychology, play and devel-
opment, and the psychology of creativity. Often, I taught two of these courses in
the same semester. I found myself teaching Piaget’s stage theory of develop-
ment to a class on Monday and then analyzing stage theories of the creative
process on Tuesday. It began to seem increasingly obvious that Piaget’s con-
structivist theory of development was fundamentally a theory of creativity.
Later, as I began a more thorough examination of Piaget’s thought, I discovered
that Piaget (1971a) himself had noted these parallels: “The real problem is how

12
 EMERGENCE IN CREATIVITY AND DEVELOPMENT 13

to explain novelties. I think that novelties, i.e., creations, constantly intervene in

development” (p. 192). In fact, Piaget always claimed that his theory of devel-
opment was a theory of “genetic epistemology” and, as such, applied both to in-
dividual development and to the historical development of scientific fields. In
his three-volume 1950 work, Introduction à l’épistémologie génétique (never
translated into English, although see Piaget, 1970/1972), Piaget analyzed the
development of mathematics (Volume 1), physics (Volume 2), and biology
(Volume 3) using his developmental concepts of equilibration, abstraction, gen-
eralization, accommodation and assimilation (see Messerly, 1996, chapter 3).1
My exploration of these parallels is guided by my empirical studies of the
improvisational creativity of verbal performance (Sawyer, 1997, 2003). In
about 1998, these studies led me to an exploration of the long history of the the-
oretical concept of emergence. In the early twentieth century, philosophers de-
fined emergence as the creation of something new that was unpredictable, even
given a full and complete knowledge of the world prior to its emergence. The
concept was originally developed to address issues in the theory of biological
evolution. At the same time that I studied this philosophical tradition, I began to
explore emergentist thinking in developmental psychology (Sawyer, 2002a)
and in creativity research (Sawyer, 1999). In this chapter, my guiding theme is
that both development and creativity are emergent processes and that dominant
theories in both areas have been deeply influenced by emergentist thinking in
philosophy and biology.
The first U.S. psychologist to elaborate Piaget’s parallel between creative in-
sight and developmental transitions was David Henry Feldman (1974), who
noted that “Piagetian stage-to-stage advance and creative accomplishments
share certain common attributes” (p. 57). The crucial assumption of Piaget’s
theory of intellectual development is that new schemas are constructed by the
child and that these schemas are not simply continuous accumulations of new
knowledge, but represent complete reorganizations of thought. Piaget acknowl-
edged that he had no good explanation for how these reorganizations occur, re-
ferring to it as “the great mystery of the stages” (1971b, p. 9) and noting that
“the crux of my problem . . . is to try and explain how novelties are possible and
how they are formed” (1971a, p. 194). In his seminal 1974 study of Darwin’s
creative process, Gruber explored the relation between Piagetian universal
thought structures and Darwin’s highly original ones, and he suggested that
Darwin’s thought structures were transformed through a Piagetian construc-
tivist process (cf. Feldman, 1980; also see the end of this chapter).
In this chapter, I show that these parallels are merely the most recent mani-
festation of over a century of theoretical parallels. Theories of both creativity
and development have strong emergentist foundations and thus have their ori-
gins in nineteenth-century thought. I identify these emergentist foundations and
show how they have influenced theories of creativity and development.
14 CREATIVITY AND DEVELOPMENT

EMERGENCE

The concept of emergence is a unifying thread underlying both creativity theory

and developmental theory. Theories of emergence have influenced psychologi-
cal theory since the beginning of the field in the late nineteenth century (Sawyer,
2002a). Emergentism in psychology has its roots in nineteenth-century organi-
cism: the theory that the organism is different from the sum of its parts and that
it depends on the structural arrangement of the parts. Social organicism—the
notion that society formed an integrated unity similar in some sense to that of
living organisms—can be traced to classical social philosophy, but the publica-
tion of Darwin’s account of evolution gave new energy to social organismic the-
ories (see Giddens, 1970, p. 172). In the nineteenth century, organicism was
prominent in German social philosophy; influential advocates included Schäffle
and Lilienfeld. These theories influenced German psychologists including
Wundt and the early gestaltists.
The nineteenth century was characterized by a preoccupation with evo-
lution, and organicist metaphors almost always incorporated evolutionary
themes. Evolutionary and organicist thinking were strong influences on psy-
chology’s founders. For example, many neurological theories proposed that the
nervous system was composed of different levels that represented different lev-
els of evolutionary development. Ernst Haeckel’s famous “biogenetic law”
stated that “ontogeny is the short and rapid repetition of phylogeny” (cited in
Sulloway, 1979, p. 199), thus suggesting that the development of a child reca-
pitulates the history of the species. Such ideas would later be explicitly invoked
by Freud, Piaget, and Werner.
Theories of emergence and evolution were the focus of an influential group
of British philosophers and evolutionary biologists just after World War I, a
group that has been called the “British emergentists” (McLaughlin, 1992). In-
fluential figures from this period include Broad (1925), Morgan (1923), and
Whitehead (1926). The philosopher Broad (1925) defined emergentism in
terms of irreducibility and nondeducibility: “The characteristic behavior of the
whole could not, even in theory, be deduced from the most complete knowledge
of the behavior of its components, taken separately or in other combinations”
(p. 59). In spite of irreducibility, emergentists were materialists, holding that
only physical matter existed and thus rejecting the vitalist belief in a nonmater-
ial life-giving substance. Because they were materialists, they held that emer-
gent properties must supervene on microlevel properties. The supervenience
account of emergentism requires that the behavior of the whole be determined
by the nature and arrangement of its components. Even so, the emergentists re-
jected mechanistic theories which held that the behavior of the whole “could, in
theory at least, be deduced from a sufficient knowledge of how the components
behave in isolation or in other wholes of a simpler kind” (Broad, 1925, p. 59).
 EMERGENCE IN CREATIVITY AND DEVELOPMENT 15

The emergentism of both Broad and Morgan involved several related claims
(Kim, 1992; Teller, 1992):

• There are basic, nonemergent entities and properties, and these are mate-
rial entities and their properties.
• Emergence is a process that occurs through time.
• When aggregates of basic entities attain a certain level of structural com-
plexity, properties of the aggregate emerge. New stuff does not emerge;
rather, it is properties of the higher level entities that emerges.
• What emerges are new levels of reality, corresponding to evolutionary or
historical stages. In Morgan’s account of “emergent evolution,” the stages
are matter, life, and mind. Other emergentists proposed more detailed sys-
tems of levels.
• Because these properties are properties of complex organizations of mat-
ter, they emerge only when the appropriate lower level material conditions
are present.
• What emerges is novel; it did not exist before the process of emergence.
• What emerges is unpredictable, and could not have been known analyti-
cally before it emerged.
• Emergent properties are irreducible to properties of their lower level parts,
even though they are determined by those parts.

Although first given explicit expression in the 1920s, these ideas derive from
a current in nineteenth-century thought that has been called evolutionary his-
toricism (Kitcher, 1992, p. 214). Nineteenth-century social and biological ex-
planations were largely historical: A phenomenon was to be explained by offer-
ing an account of its development from earlier conditions (Kitcher, 1992, p. 66).
Evolutionary historicism combined Hegel’s dialectic theory of history, Dar-
win’s evolutionary theory, and subsequent organicist metaphors. Hegel’s model
influenced the developmental psychologies of Freud, Werner, and Piaget; all
three of these developmental theories incorporate the Hegelian idea that each
stage of development bears within it the tensions and contradictions that propel
development to the next stage (Brent, 1978). Evolutionary thought influenced
the founding figures in developmental psychology, including Baldwin, Piaget,
Werner, and Vygotsky (Morss, 1990; Siegler, 1996, pp. 22–26). Stage theories
were also prominent in sociology, to a large extent independent of Darwin’s
work; Comte’s theory of successive stages in historical development preceded
Darwin (Comte, 1830–1842/1854), and Spencer’s social evolutionary theory of
stages was contemporary with Darwin.2
Morgan’s final book, The Emergence of Novelty (1933), emphasized the im-
portance of novelty in emergent evolution and in other developmental
processes. For Morgan, emergent novelty “is some new pattern of relatedness.
16 CREATIVITY AND DEVELOPMENT

In a sense, the ‘items’ of stuff are not new; and yet, in a sense, at each stage of
substantial advance, the ‘units’ of stuff are new” (p. 33). Not only things are
new, but also the laws that apply at the emergent stage: “There are, at successive
stages of advance, new games in play, each with new rules of the game” (p. 39);
knowing the lower level rules isn’t enough to predict the higher level rules. Not
only developmental stages but also the creative products of art and science are
“instances of original novelty as emergent” (p. 103). Like Morgan, other 1920s
thinkers argued that individual creative insights were emergent. In Mc-
Dougall’s 1929 account, the “creative synthesis” of individual minds was the
only true emergence, because physical emergence always has the potential to be
reductively explained with the progress of science (p. 122).
Because these thinkers drew on the same nineteenth-century influences as
the founders of developmental psychology, they made observations associated
today with figures such as Freud and Piaget. For example, Morgan (1933)
claimed that thought proceeds in stages that are characterized by their distinc-
tive mental structures: “In the recurrent development of each individual mind,
there is, I believe, advance through new modes of organization to further nov-
elty in organization” (p. 79). In other words, each stage of mental development
emerges from the prior, and this process of emergence always involves a re-
structuring that is novel. Consequently, Morgan proposed a stage theory of de-
velopment (p. 80), from sentient (before birth) to perceptive (0 to 36 months), to
reflective (36 months onward). He referred to the study of cognitive develop-
ment as both “mental evolution” and “genetic psychology” (p. 157), with ge-
netic having the same emergentist connotations as Piaget’s phrase genetic epis-
temology; in both cases, the term means that structures at each developmental
stage emerge from interaction between the organism and its environment at the
prior stage (p. 165).
The nineteenth-century notion that development proceeds in stages, and that
each stage emerged from the prior stage, was second nature to both Freud and
Piaget. Staged developmental concepts formed the backbone of Piaget’s theory
of cognitive development and of Freud’s theory of affective development. At
roughly the same time, writers on creativity such as Poincaré, Wallas, and
Hadamard were proposing stage theories of the creative process. In develop-
mental theory, the stages proceed over childhood, with each stage lasting sev-
eral years; in creativity theory, the stages culminate in the production of a single
creative work or creative thought. Thus, the latter stages were markedly shorter,
lasting only a few months or even, in some cases, a few days.
Through the 1930s, the ideas of the British emergentists had a wide-ranging
impact in psychology and the social sciences and were explicitly acknowledged
as influences by theorists as diverse as Wolfgang Köhler, George Herbert Mead,
and Talcott Parsons. Piaget never referenced these philosophers, and I am not
claiming that Piaget read Morgan or even that Morgan was the first to notice the
 EMERGENCE IN CREATIVITY AND DEVELOPMENT 17

connections between creativity and development that have often been attributed
to Piaget. Rather, my claim is that both Morgan and Piaget were working on is-
sues that naturally presented themselves in the context of nineteenth-century
evolutionary historicism, that these issues centered on the topic of emergence,
and that the same themes were part of the intellectual background of early cre-
ativity theorists.
A theory of development or creativity as emergent is an intermediate position
between two potential alternative explanations. First, one could explain the final
state of the system by arguing that it is predetermined by the initial state of the
system. In evolutionary biology, this position was known as preformationism,
and this term was also frequently used in early twentieth-century developmental
psychology; Piaget frequently used it in criticizing this view, which today corre-
sponds to an overly simplistic conception of innatism (as criticized by Elman,
Bates, Johnson, Karmiloff-Smith, & Parisi, 1996). In contrast, in emergentism,
each stage emerges from activity and process at the prior stage and thus is a re-
sult of organism-environment interaction. Without this interaction, there would
be no development. Thus, emergentism rejects a preformationist position that
holds that the final state of the mature organism is present in the newborn.3
A second alternative to emergentism represents the empiricist pole; it ex-
plains development by arguing that the final state of the system is determined by
the environment of the organism. Such a stance was common in sociology and
in the radical empiricism of behaviorist psychology. Instead, emergentism
holds that an explanation of the final state of the system requires an examination
of the step-by-step interaction between organism and environment as it passes
from stage to stage, because the state of the organism changes at each stage.
Thus, the environment is not directly imposed on or internalized by the organ-
ism; rather, development results from a constructivist process of organism-en-
vironment interaction.

EMERGENCE IN COLLABORATING GROUPS

I originally began to study emergence theory as a way of helping me to under-

stand collaborative group processes. In a series of studies, I have documented
that collaborating groups have the key characteristics of emergence (Sawyer,
1997, 2001, 2003). I call this form of social group emergence “collaborative
emergence.” In collaborative emergence, novelty is a collective process. To
demonstrate, here is a transcript of an improvised theater performance taken
from a 1993 performance by Off-Off-Campus, a Chicago theater group. This is
the first few seconds of dialogue from a scene that the actors knew should last
about five minutes. The audience was asked to suggest a proverb, and the sug-
gestion given was “Don’t look a gift horse in the mouth.”
18 CREATIVITY AND DEVELOPMENT

Lights up. Dave is at stage right, Ellen at stage left. Dave begins gesturing to his right,
talking to himself.

11 Dave All the little glass figurines in my

menagerie,
The store of my dreams.
Hundreds of thousands everywhere! Turns around to admire.
12 Ellen Slowly walks toward Dave.
13 Dave Turns and notices Ellen.
Yes, can I help you?
14 Ellen Um, I’m looking for uh, uh, Ellen is looking down like
a present? a child, with her fingers in
her mouth.
15 Dave A gift?
16 Ellen Yeah.
17 Dave I have a little donkey? Dave mimes the action of
handing Ellen a donkey
from the shelf.
18 Ellen Ah, that’s . . . I was looking for
something a little bit bigger . . .
19 Dave Oh. Returns item to shelf.
10 Ellen It’s for my dad.

By Turn 10, elements of the dramatic frame are starting to emerge. We know
that Dave is a storekeeper, and Ellen is a young girl. We know that Ellen is buy-
ing a present for her dad and, because she is so young, probably needs help from
the storekeeper. These dramatic elements have emerged from the creative con-
tributions of both actors. Although each actor’s incremental contributions to the
frame can be identified, none of these turns fully determines the subsequent dia-
logue, and the emergent dramatic frame is not chosen, intended, or imposed by
either of the actors.
It’s important to emphasize that this emergent process cannot be reduced to
actors’ intentions in individual turns, because in many cases an actor cannot
know the meaning of his or her own turn until the other actors have responded.
In Turn 2, when Ellen walks toward Dave, her action has many potential mean-
ings; for example, she could be a coworker, arriving late to work. Her action
does not carry the meaning of a customer entering the store until after Dave’s
query in Turn 3. In improvised dialogues, many actions do not receive their full
meaning until after the act has occurred; the complete meaning of a turn is de-
pendent on the flow of the subsequent dialogue. This sort of retrospective inter-
pretation is quite common in improvised dialogue, and it is one reason that the
frame is analytically irreducible to the intentions or actions of participants in in-
dividual turns of dialogue (Sawyer, 2001b, 2003).
 EMERGENCE IN CREATIVITY AND DEVELOPMENT 19

In each turn of dialogue, an actor proposes a new elaboration to the frame.

But not all proposals are accepted; the other actors may decide they don’t like
the proposed change, they may attribute an unexpected meaning to it, or they
may choose to modify it or elaborate it further. Only after the other actors have
responded can we know whether or not an actor’s proposal will become a part of
the frame.
In improvisation as in everyday conversation, speakers proceed with the as-
sumption that all turns of dialogue must be consistent with the frame. After Turn
4, because Ellen is now a young child and a customer, she cannot suddenly begin
to act as a coworker; likewise, she cannot act as if she had a prior relationship with
Dave, because his query in Turn 3 makes it clear that they have not met before. As
the dialogue proceeds and the frame progressively emerges, each actor is increas-
ingly constrained by the requirement to maintain coherence with the frame.
As the dialogue continues beyond Turn 10, we learn that Ellen is buying her
dad a present because he has not been feeling well; in fact, he has been exhibit-
ing psychotic behaviors. A third actor then enters the scene, enacting the charac-
ter of Ellen’s psychotic dad, and his condition is cured through some clever
actions by the storekeeper. These dramatic elements—the characters, motiva-
tions, relationships, and plot trajectory—emerge from the collective interaction
and creative contributions of all three actors.
The social process of creativity is analogous to collaborative improvisation;
in both an improvised dialogue and a scientific discipline, creativity emerges
from a complex interactional and social process (Sawyer, 1995). In the systems
model—outlined by Csikszentmihalyi (1988b) and Gardner (1993)—the cre-
ative individual completes a creative product and then attempts to disseminate it
to the broader community, or field. For example, a scientist may submit a manu-
script to a journal to be considered for publication. The editors of the journal
may decide to reject the manuscript, or they may send it to two or three scholars
for peer review. This review process could also result in the rejection of the arti-
cle. If the article—the individual’s creative product—is rejected by this group
of “gatekeeper” individuals, then it will never enter the domain, the shared body
of accepted scientific knowledge.
Thus, in a sense, all creativity is an emergent process that involves a social
group of individuals engaged in complex, unpredictable interactions (Sawyer,
1999). The systems model proposes that the analysis of creativity requires not
only a psychological focus on the creative individual, but also a consideration of
the social system. It is the entire system that creates, not the individual alone.
Therefore an explanation of an improvisational performance requires a social
level of analysis, a microinteractional analog of what occurs in the field of the
systems model.
Many creativity researchers have observed that scientific insights often
occur in collaborating groups (Csikszentmihalyi & Sawyer, 1995; John-Steiner,
20 CREATIVITY AND DEVELOPMENT

2000). Ludwig Fleck (1935/1979), one of the earliest scholars of the history of
science, was perhaps the first to comment on this socially emergent process: “A
stimulating conversation between two persons” can result in the emergence of a
“thought structure that belongs to neither of them alone” (p. 44). Based on this
analogy, Fleck compared scientific work to “a soccer match, a conversation, or
the playing of an orchestra,” in that the result is not a summation of the partici-
pants’ work but is “the coming into existence of a special form” (p. 99). These
collaborative insights result from a social process of emergence.

THEORIES OF THE CREATIVE PROCESS

I have defined emergence, provided an example of collaborative emergence,

and claimed that emergence is a key theoretical thread linking twentieth-cen-
tury conceptions of creativity and development. I introduced this connection
and demonstrated its plausibility by briefly discussing what Morgan and Piaget
had to say about these connections.
To further elaborate these connections between creativity and development,
I now delve more deeply into theories of both creativity and development. In
this section, I discuss twentieth-century theories of creativity, and in the subse-
quent section, twentieth-century theories of development.
Creativity is notoriously difficult to define. Theorists have debated what the
term means, and empirical researchers have employed different operationaliza-
tions of the term. For my purposes, I hold to a broad conception of creativity that
has been widespread among creativity researchers since the 1970s: Creativity is
“a socially recognized achievement in which there are novel products” (Barron
& Harrington, 1981, p. 442). First of all, a creative idea or work must be novel.
Yet novelty is not enough, because a novel idea may be ridiculous or nonsensi-
cal; many dreams are novel but rarely have any impact on the world after break-
fast. In addition to novelty, to be creative an idea must be appropriate, recog-
nized as socially valuable in some way to some community.
In the 1950s and 1960s, psychological studies of creators focused on their
personalities and roughly fell under the aegis of personality or trait psychology.
For example, creative individuals were found to be active, curious, and uncon-
ventional (Barron & Harrington, 1981). Beginning in the 1970s, the cognitive
revolution began to influence creativity studies, with experimental methods
being used to identify the internal cognitive processes associated with creativ-
ity, and with computer models that simulate the creative process (see chapters 5
to 9 in Sternberg, 1988). However, the individualistic trait conception of cre-
ativity tended to emphasize the generation of novelty and to neglect the appro-
priateness criterion. Feldman’s 1974 article was an influential early argument
for a focus on process rather than traits; he noted that the process approach is
 EMERGENCE IN CREATIVITY AND DEVELOPMENT 21

less individualistic than the trait approach, because it involves both individual
and situation, organism and environment.
There are two substantive analogies between emergence theory and contem-
porary theories of the psychology of creativity (Sawyer, 1999). First, emer-
gence theory of the 1920s was primarily an evolutionary theory, and many of
the most influential contemporary theories of creativity are based on an evolu-
tionary metaphor. The evolutionary approach to creativity is usually traced to
Campbell (1960), who proposed that creativity was subject to the same three-
stage process as evolution: blind variation, selective retention, and preservation
and reproduction. Csikszentmihalyi followed Campbell in arguing that creativ-
ity was not a property of an individual, but a function of both the individual and
the selective environment. Csikszentmihalyi’s influential systems model
(1988b) is also based on evolutionary metaphors, and includes three compo-
nents analogous to Campbell’s: the creative individual, who generates a novel
product; the field, a social system of individuals in a discipline, that evaluates
novel products and selects some of them according to established criteria; and a
domain, an external body of work whose stable physical traits allow it to serve
the function of preservation across time.
There is a second substantive comparison between emergence theory and the
contemporary psychology of creativity: A creative insight is hypothesized to
emerge from the subconscious mind of the creator. Morgan (1933) viewed
emergence as “new modes of relatedness” that arise from a system of smaller,
interacting entities; today, a novel creative insight is often considered to be a
new configuration of mental elements, none of which are individually novel.
The mathematician Henri Poincaré (1913/1982) described the emergence of an
insight in a widely quoted passage: “One evening, contrary to my custom, I
drank black coffee and could not sleep. Ideas rose in crowds; I felt them collide
until pairs interlocked, so to speak, making a stable combination. By the next
morning, I had established the existence of a class of Fuchsian functions” (p.
387). A contemporary example of such a theory is Simonton’s cognitive model
(1988), which proposes that the individual first internalizes mental elements—
facts, theories, images, and information from the creative domain—and that
these are stored in the brain; during a subconscious creative process, these men-
tal elements combine into chance configurations, and although many of these
novel configurations never make it into consciousness, some of them are stable
enough to emerge and cause the subjective sensation of having an insight.
In sum, the contemporary conception of the creative process corresponds
quite closely to concepts of emergence:

• Creativity is theorized as a process through time, rather than a static trait of

individuals or of certain creative products.
• The creative product is novel.
22 CREATIVITY AND DEVELOPMENT

• The creative product emerges from the combination of lower level ele-
ments, in combination in a complex system. In other words, no new sub-
stance is created, only combinations of elements in complex systems.

In the following sections, I elaborate on some specific emergentist aspects of

contemporary creativity theory.

The Stages of the Creative Process

The mind being prepared beforehand with the principles most likely
for the purpose . . . incubates in patient thought over the problem, try-
ing and rejecting, until at last the proper elements come together in the
view, and fall into their places in a fitting combination.
 , The Senses and the Intellect

In addition to the previously noted broad parallels between current conceptions

of creativity and the history of emergentist thought, there is a more specific par-
allel. Throughout the history of creativity theory, creativity has been thought of
as a staged process. Many contemporary creativity researchers attribute the in-
sight that creativity proceeds in stages to Henri Poincaré (1913/1982) or Joseph
Wallas (1926). In developing their stage theories, both of these theorists attrib-
uted the original description of the stages to the physiologist Hermann von
Helmholtz. Yet, as the epigraph indicates, such ideas were widespread in the
nineteenth century, well before Helmholtz.4 In an address delivered near the end
of his life in 1891, Helmholtz reflected on his own creative work and identified
the same three stages that Bain proposed: an initial investigation, a period of
rest, and then the emergence of the sudden, unexpected solution (Helmholtz,
1971, p. 474).
An influential elaboration of these ideas was presented by Poincaré in a talk
before the Société de Psychologie in Paris. Hadamard—whom Poincaré nur-
tured, and who in 1912 was elected to the Academy of Sciences to succeed Poin-
caré—was present at the talk. He later built on the work of Poincaré and others
to elaborate the stages and the role of the unconscious (in a book published in
English in 1945, after he had emigrated to the United States). Based on an intro-
spective analysis of his own mathematical insights, Poincaré (1913/1982) pro-
posed that the creative process must begin with “a period of conscious work,”
which should then be followed by a rest period where the mind is focused on
other activities. It is during this rest period that one receives “the appearance of
sudden illumination,” and this illumination is the result of “long, unconscious
prior work” that was taking place during the rest period (p. 389) The illumina-
tion does not appear fully formed, but must be verified and elaborated by a sub-
sequent period of conscious work.
 EMERGENCE IN CREATIVITY AND DEVELOPMENT 23

Graham Wallas (1926), drawing on both Helmholtz and Poincaré, coined the
names for the four stages that are in most widespread use today: preparation, in-
cubation, illumination, and verification (p. 80). Preparation is the initial phase
of preliminary work: collecting data and information, searching for related
ideas, listening to suggestions. Incubation is a term for the frequently-observed
delay between preparation and the moment of illumination; Wallas presumed
that, during this period, the prepared material did not just sit in the mind pas-
sively but underwent some sort of internal elaboration and organization. Illumi-
nation is the subjective experience of having the idea, the moment of insight. By
verification, Wallas meant both evaluation of the worth of the insight, and elab-
oration of its complete form (p. 81). The insight must be evaluated and verified
by the conscious mind; not all insights are good ideas, and some of them don’t
pan out. Shortly after Wallas’s book appeared, Catherine Patrick (e.g., 1937)
conducted several studies of creative individuals and found broad evidence for
these four stages.
A few stage theories are somewhat independent of this tradition; these tend
to originate in practical studies of business creativity and innovation. For exam-
ple, Joseph Rossman (1931/1964, p. 57) conducted a questionnaire study of 710
inventors and identified seven stages: (1) observation of a need or difficulty;
(2) analysis of the need; (3) a survey of all available information; (4) a formula-
tion of all objective solutions; (5) a critical analysis of these solutions, identify-
ing advantages and disadvantages; (6) the insight or invention; and (7) experi-
mentation to test the invention, and perfection of the final product. Rossman
referred to the moment of insight of the invention in emergentist terms; it is
“greater than the sum of the parts that have entered into it” (p. 61). But Ross-
man’s stages place most of the creative work in conscious stages; particularly,
Stages 4 and 5 seem to correspond to the configuration-and-selection aspect of
Poincaré’s unconscious. This shift in emphasis to conscious process is probably
due to the fact that invention is more like problem solving than the more prob-
lem-finding types of creative insights; problem finding is likely to require
longer incubation periods and a more significant role for the unconscious (Csik-
szentmihalyi & Sawyer, 1995).

The Unconscious Incubation Stage

In these stage models, the incubation stage is both the least understood and the
most essential. The incubation stage is usually associated with the unconscious,
or what is sometimes referred to as the preconscious or fringe consciousness (to
reflect the fact that it is often just below the surface of awareness).5 In incuba-
tion, elements are hypothesized to combine, and certain combinations are
hypothesized to emerge into consciousness. Yet, the exact nature of these
24 CREATIVITY AND DEVELOPMENT

processes remains unknown. How do elements combine, and which combina-

tions make it into conscious awareness?
One persistent explanation is that the combinations are random. Wallas
(1926) ridiculed Poincaré’s idea that the process of association could be di-
rected by sensibility or beauty (pp. 75–78). Campbell (1960) argued that the
process is blind or trial-and-error; the creative individual “just happened to be
standing where lightning struck” (p. 390). Simonton’s theory of chance config-
urations is explicitly grounded in Campbell’s model. Scientific innovations
arise when mental elements are combined through “chance permutations,” al-
though these may not be completely random (Simonton, 1988, pp. 6–8; also see
Gruber, 1988).
Other theorists believe that incubation is directed in some way. Poincaré
(1913/1982) was the first to claim that the subconscious mind does not ran-
domly generate combinations but only generates combinations “which have to
some extent the characteristics of useful combinations” (p. 386; also see pp.
390–391). Poincaré argued that this unconscious work is directed, with a sense
of the domain of work (pp. 389–394); the unconscious possesses “esthetic sen-
sibility” (p. 392). Poincaré noted that anyone could make new combinations
from known entities, but the combinations that resulted would be “infinite in
number and most of them absolutely without interest” (p. 386). In the mind of
the inventor, “the sterile combinations do not even present themselves” (p.
386); rather, an “unconscious machine” generates good combinations because
the conscious work of preparation has “mobilized” certain elements (p. 389).
The combinations that become conscious are those that seem “beautiful” to the
conscious mind (p. 391). If verification determines that an insight is false, “had
it been true, [it] would have gratified our natural feeling for mathematical ele-
gance” (p. 392).
Hadamard (1945) agreed with Poincaré: The ideas that emerge are those that
are beautiful and that appeal to the creator’s “emotional sensibility” (p. 31). The
unconscious not only generates all of the combinations, but also has to select
those that satisfy our sense of beauty. The conscious mind must still verify, be-
cause sometimes beautiful ideas are wrong (p. 57). Using Wallas’s term,
Hadamard suggested that the fringe-consciousness is “at the service of full con-
sciousness” (p. 81) and can be called on when necessary.
Several psychoanalytic theorists have likewise proposed that the creative un-
conscious is guided by the conscious mind. Arieti (1976) studied the contribu-
tions of primary process (unconscious) and secondary process thinking to cre-
ativity, in what he called a “tertiary process.” Rothenberg (1979) proposed that
the combinations were “active, directed forms of cognition in which the creator
intentionally and in distinct ways brings particular types of elements together”
(p. 11); the elements are “integrated” rather than being “merely added or com-
bined” (p. 12).
 EMERGENCE IN CREATIVITY AND DEVELOPMENT 25

Cognitive psychologists have also argued that some criteria must be applied
at the ideation stage. For example, Johnson-Laird (1987) argued on algorithmic
grounds that constraints must be applied at the ideation stage; otherwise, the
search space of ideas resulting from the ideation stage will be too large. Both
Johnson-Laird and Sawyer (2002b) used the example of jazz improvisation in
making this argument. Jazz improvisation is a real-time creative task; evalua-
tion and ideation must proceed in parallel, because there is no opportunity for
revision or selection during a live performance. Johnson-Laird referred to
staged models with a constrained variation stage as “neo-Lamarckian” to con-
trast them with the random variation of Campbell’s neo-Darwinian model.
Many researchers have noted that the unconscious process can be facilitated
by taking time off from the problem. Wallas (1926) noted that incubation can be
made to occur by either working on another problem, or by retreating from cre-
ative activity altogether (p. 86), for example by engaging in physical exercise
(p. 89). This allows the mind to engage in a form of parallel processing;
Hadamard (1945) noted that “the unconscious has the important property of
being manifold; several and probably many things can and do occur in it simul-
taneously” (p. 23). This parallelism contrasts with the conscious mind, which
can only focus on one thing at a time (also see Csikszentmihalyi & Sawyer,
1995). This multiplicity allows the unconscious to make many combinations si-
multaneously and in parallel.
There is one important alternative to the dominant combination-of-mental-
elements approach to incubation. This is Wertheimer’s (1945) gestalt theory of
“productive thinking.” For Wertheimer, the creative process involves a trans-
formation from one whole situation (S1 in his notation) to another (S2).
Wertheimer accounted for the motivation of the transformation in terms of ho-
listic systemic properties of S1: “S1 contains structural strains and stresses that
are resolved in S2,” and he argued that the transformation springs directly from
these structural troubles (p. 193). Structural features determine the transforma-
tion, not the goals of the individual (p. 196). These conceptual structures always
tend to move toward “objectively better or adequate structure” (p. 198). Insights
cannot be analyzed as elements combining, but rather must be analyzed as
transformations in complex structures.
Piaget was one of the first to identify the key problem with gestaltism:
Gestalts are irreducible and thus must always spring to mind as a totality. They
cannot be analyzed in terms of the empirical origins of the elements that con-
tribute to them. Gestalts are ahistorical; they are not thought of as the product of
past interactions with an environment. A Piagetian schema, on the other hand, is
dynamic and is always continuous with the prior schemas from which it
emerged: “The schema is therefore a gestalt which has a history” (Piaget,
1936/1952b, p. 384). Schemas are elastic structures and continually modify
themselves, whereas gestalt forms are static (cf. Flavell, 1963, pp. 72–75). Un-
26 CREATIVITY AND DEVELOPMENT

like gestalts, schemas “do not replace each other, but . . . are integrated into one
another. The simplest ones become incorporated into later, more complex ones”
(Piaget, 1971b, p. 7). As I discuss below, Piaget’s theory of schema emergence
has interesting similarities to element combination theories of unconscious
incubation.

The Nature of the Creative Insight

In stage theories, the creative insight emerges from unconscious incubation.

The creator experiences this emergence as an “Aha!” or “Eureka!” moment. As
I showed previously, most creativity theories describe the mental process that
leads up to this moment in terms familiar from emergence theory; the insight is
a higher level holistic combination, configuration, or system of lower level ele-
ments, units, or ideas.
How do creative insights emerge from the incubation process? How do com-
binations form at all? Most serious contenders are variations of associationism,
as first suggested by Bain. Bain (1855/1977) argued that creative novelty was
“constructive association” and that the construction of “new combinations” (p.
573) is a form of “associating force” because “the new combinations grow out
of elements already in the possession of the mind” (p. 572). Most creativity the-
ories have proposed that a creative insight results in the mind of a creator when
a set of more basic elements, none of them novel, is brought together to form a
more complex cognitive structure. Like Morgan’s account of emergence, no
new substance is created; rather, novelty is a new mode of relatedness, a combi-
nation of elements into complex systems.
Subjective reports from creative individuals provide some support for these
theories of creativity. Creativity researchers have long been familiar with the
first-person accounts of scientists such as Poincaré and Kekulé. Einstein wrote
in a letter to Hadamard that the “psychical entities which seem to serve as ele-
ments in thought are certain signs and more or less clear images which can be
combined. . . . This combinatory play seems to be the essential feature in pro-
ductive thought” (as cited in Hadamard, 1945, p. 142). Both Einstein and Poin-
caré referred to this process as associative. Wallas’s (1926) theory of the associ-
ations that occur in the incubation stage is taken directly from early British
associationism (e.g., see Wallas, pp. 61–65). The illumination is the “culmina-
tion of a successful train of association” (p. 94). As partial evidence for this
claim, Wallas noted that some creators have a premonition that the insight is
about to come; he called it “intimation” (p. 97).
One of the earliest modern statements of this theory of creativity was made
by the psychologist Sarnoff Mednick (1962), who defined creative thinking to
be “the forming of associative elements into new combinations.” This associa-
 EMERGENCE IN CREATIVITY AND DEVELOPMENT 27

tionist theory of creativity was based in the history of British associationist def-
initions from Locke to Bain (Mednick, 1962, p. 221). Mednick elaborated
on associationism by proposing three distinct mechanisms of association:
serendipity, similarity, and mediation. He identified several mental variables
that contribute to the likelihood of creativity, including the organization of an
individual’s associative hierarchy, or what in the cognitive era of the 1970s
would be called the “semantic network,” the strength and structure of associa-
tions invoked by a given concept; the number of associations the individual has
to the relevant elements of the problem; the individual’s cognitive style (con-
crete vs. conceptual, visual vs. verbal); and the ways that individuals select the
creative combination. For example, Mednick proposed that in problem-solving
creativity, the selection criteria join the associative elements, whereas in prob-
lem-finding creativity, the task of selection also involves identifying relevant
criteria (p. 225). Mednick contrasted his associative theory with theories that re-
quired connections based on “elaborate rules of logic, concept formation, or
problem solving” (p. 227). He developed a psychometric test based on his the-
ory and used the test to support several of his theoretical claims (Mednick &
Mednick, 1965).
Many contemporary theories, including Rothenberg’s and Simonton’s, pro-
pose that creative insights result from combinations of mental elements; yet it is
often unclear whether or not these models are associationist, because the details
of the combinatory mechanism are rarely theorized. For example, Rothenberg’s
(1979) concept of “homospatial process” is one in which “discrete entities are
fused and superimposed” while they “continue to interact and relate to one an-
other” (p. 365). His theory is short on exactly how the distinct components in-
teract with each other and join together in combination to form emergent
wholes; instead, he simply observed that they are occupying the same space.
The theory provided insufficient detail to determine how it was similar to or dif-
ferent from any other associationist theory. The same lack of detail character-
izes Simonton’s (1988) chance configurations. A complete theory of this
process should include (a) a theory of the internal structure of preconscious cog-
nition; (b) a structural theory of what mental elements and combinations are,
and how elements combine; (c) a theory of what, if anything, motivates that pre-
conscious process—of what elements come together in what protocombina-
tions, and why.
Associationism provides another account of how the incubation stage might
be guided, supporting arguments such as those of Poincaré (1913/1982, p. 393)
and others that the ideation stage is not independent of evaluation. Mednick
(1962) argued that the ideas generated are not unrelated, but instead reflect as-
sociative patterns. If incubation is not random, then the ideation stage is not
completely independent of evaluation; this prefigured arguments such as those
28 CREATIVITY AND DEVELOPMENT

of Runco (1993) that evaluation processes must take place during divergent
thought, beyond conscious awareness. Even if it is psychologically meaningful
to distinguish ideation from evaluation, there is no compelling reason to insist
that they cannot occur in parallel. Both types of thought may be constant, ongo-
ing components of the creative mind.

Critiques of Stage Theories

For almost as long as there have been stage theories of creativity, there have
been critics of stage theories. I have even found a textbook that criticized the
stage conception (Lowenfeld & Brittain, 1987, p. 76). These critics accept that
the researcher can identify distinct aspects of creative thought but argue that
they occur in parallel rather than in series. This is a difference in emphasis rather
than a diametric opposition; even Wallas (1926) noted that “in the daily stream
of thought, these four different stages constantly overlap each other” (p. 81) and
that when exploring a problem, “the mind may be unconsciously incubating on
one aspect of it, while it is consciously employed in preparing for or verifying
another aspect” (p. 82). Yet ultimately, Wallas felt that these four stages could
“generally be distinguished from each other” (p. 82).
Vinacke’s (1952) critique of stage theories (pp. 243–251), directed at
Patrick and Rossman, was inspired by Wertheimer’s holistic thinking; he pro-
posed that, rather than looking for distinct stages, “it would be better to con-
ceive of creative thinking in more holistic terms, a total pattern of behavior in
which various processes overlap and interweave between the occurrence of the
original stimulus and the formation of the final product” (p. 248). He recon-
ceived the stages as “parallel processes” and argued that “it is necessary to con-
ceive of creative thinking in terms of dynamic, interplaying activities rather
than as more or less discrete stages” (p. 249). He noted that in many creative
fields, especially fine art, there is a series of insights beginning with the first
draft or sketch and continuing until the work is completed. He argued that in-
cubation does not occur in a particular stage but operates to varying degrees
throughout the creative process. For example, poems and plays do not emerge
suddenly or completely but are gradually developed through a process of many
incubations and insights.
The psychoanalytic theories of both Arieti and Rothenberg echoed Vinacke’s
criticism. Arieti (1976) noted that “complex works that can be divided into
parts” involve a series of insights, with incubation occurring throughout the cre-
ative process. He concluded that the distinct phases exist only as abstractions (p.
18). Rothenberg (1979) argued that creation is not found in a single moment of
insight but is “a long series of circumstances . . . often interrupted, recon-
structed, and repeated” (p. 131). He criticized stage theories, arguing that “the
temporal distinction made between inspiration and elaboration in the creative
 EMERGENCE IN CREATIVITY AND DEVELOPMENT 29

process is an incorrect one; these phases or functions alternate—sometimes ex-

tremely rapidly—from start to finish” (p. 346).
Guilford’s (1967) “structure-of-intellect” model proposed a multifactor con-
ception of intelligence based on five operations. From the most basic to the
least, the operations are cognition, memory, divergent production, convergent
production, and evaluation. Guilford was critical of staged conceptions such as
Rossman’s, arguing that all five operations proceed in parallel during the cre-
ative process, with “evaluation all along the way” (p. 329), although he ac-
knowledged that there are probably higher levels of evaluative processes to-
ward the end of the creative process.
Howard Gruber (1988) also criticized stage theories of creativity (pp.
47–49). He argued that each creative individual is likely to be unique and there-
fore that there are not likely to be general stages of creativity that apply univer-
sally. As evidence for his claim, Gruber (1974) appealed to his study of Dar-
win’s creative process: “Darwin’s achievement was realized not in a golden
moment of insight but in the slower process of constructing an original point of
view” (p. xiv). This criticism echoed those of Arieti and Rothenberg. Gruber ap-
plied Piagetian notions of schema transformation to Darwin’s development of
the theory of natural selection over a 2-year period, to argue that Darwin’s the-
ory could not simply be an isolated, sudden insight. For example, the principle
of natural selection was well-known before Darwin; Darwin’s creativity was
not in the insight of natural selection but in his development of a conceptual
schema within which natural selection could be perceived as an evolutionary
force, whereas prior statements had conceived of it as a conservative force
(Gruber, 1974, p. 7).
Although Gruber argued that Darwin’s creative process was not staged, Gru-
ber’s application of Piagetian concepts seems to imply a staged conception of
Darwin’s creative process, because Piaget’s theory is a stage theory. Gruber re-
solved this apparent contradiction by taking the somewhat unconventional po-
sition that Piaget’s theory was not a stage theory (Gruber & Vonèche, 1977).
This raises the question of what would count as a stage theory for Gruber. Gru-
ber was probably reacting to comments by Piaget to the effect that the details of
his stages were not as important as the fundamental processes of assimilation
and accommodation (e.g., Piaget, 1945/1962, p. 291). Nonetheless, Piaget al-
ways insisted that development occurred in stages.
To further explore these conflicting accounts of the creative process, it is in-
structive to turn to developmental theory. Many developmental theories are
based on stage conceptions, and there has been a great deal of theory surround-
ing the nature of stages, the number of stages, and how transitions between
stages occur. Throughout the history of developmental psychology, these theo-
ries have been influenced by nineteenth-century emergentist and evolutionary
theory.
Exploring the Variety of Random
Documents with Different Content
 A supposed cross between Pottawattamie and the Duke Cherry,
originating with Theodore Williams, Nebraska. Tree vigorous,
productive; fruit larger than Wild Goose, of nearly the same form;
cavity narrow, deep; suture a line; bright red; flesh yellow, firm, mild
subacid; clingstone; mid-season. Waugh states that this variety
resembles a Wild Goose crossed with an Americana and that he is
unable to detect any cherry characters.
Duke of Devonshire. Domestica. Mentioned in Lond. Hort. Soc.
Cat. 146. 1831.
Duke of Edinburgh. Domestica. 1. Jour. Hort. 21:216. 1869. 2.
Flor. & Pom. 7:193. 1871. 3. Hogg Fruit Man. 698. 1884. 4.
Mathieu Nom. Pom. 428. 1889. Duc d’Edinbourg 4.
A variety raised by a Mr. Dry, Hayes, Middlesex, England. Fruit
large, roundish-obovate; suture shallow; skin thin, light purple; flesh
reddish-yellow, juicy, richly flavored; freestone; good culinary plum.
Dumberline. Domestica. 1. Lond. Hort. Soc. Cat. 146. 1831.
A variety under test in the London Horticultural Society Gardens in
1831.
Dummer. Domestica. 1. Hogg Fruit Man. 698. 1884.
Raised in 1837 by a Mr. Dummer at Canterbury, England. Fruit
large, red; like Red Magnum Bonum.
Dumiron. Domestica. 1. Cal. Nurs. Co. Cat. 11. 1897.
Imported from Transon Bros., Orleans, France, by the late John
Rock of California; not introduced.
Dunkelblaue Kaiserin. Domestica. Mentioned in Mathieu Nom.
Pom. 428. 1889.
Violette Kaiserin incor.
Dunlap. Hortulana. 1. Cornell Sta. Bul. 38:79. 1892. 2. Wis. Sta.
Bul. 63:36. 1897. 3. Waugh Plum Cult. 185. 1901.
Dunlap No. 2 3. Dunlap’s No. 2 2.
 Originated and introduced by J. P. Dunlap of Nebraska. Fruit large,
oval; cavity shallow; suture a line; surface smooth, glossy, bright
red; dots many; bloom thin; flesh yellow, soft, juicy, sweet, rich;
good; clingstone; mid-season; reported in the catalog of the
American Pomological Society for 1899.
Dunlap No. 1. Americana. 1. Wis. Sta. Bul. 63:36. 1897. 2. Ibid.
87:13. 1900. 3. Waugh Plum Cult. 148. 1901.
Dunlap 2. Dunlap (No. 1) 3. Dunlap’s No. 1 1.
Another variety produced by J. P. Dunlap of Nebraska. Fruit
medium in size, oblong; suture a line; greenish-yellow covered with
dull purplish-red; bloom heavy; flesh tender, juicy, rich, sweet;
freestone.
Dunlop Nut. Americana. 1. Can. Exp. Farms Rpt. 305. 1893.
A hardy variety tested at the Experimental Farm at Ottawa.
Dunmore. Domestica. 1. Mag. Hort. 9:163. 1843. 2. Downing Fr.
Trees Am. 380. 1857. 3. Hogg Fr. Man. 359. 1866. 4. Mathieu
Nom. Pom. 428. 1889.
Dunmore 4.
Fruit medium in size, oval; skin thick, greenish-yellow becoming
golden; stem half an inch long; flesh yellow, tender, juicy, sweet;
good; freestone; late.
Durazen Zwetsche. Domestica? 1. Mathieu Nom. Pom. 428. 1889.
Reference taken by Mathieu from the Pomologische Monatshefte
2. 1882.
Eagle. Angustifolia varians. 1. Kerr Cat. 1902-3. 2. Ohio Sta. Bul.
162:254, 255. 1905.
Originated in Texas; tree low, spreading; fruit of medium size,
round; suture slight; skin light red; flesh yellow; good; stone
clinging; early.
Early. Domestica. 1. Am. Pom. Soc. Rpt. 61. 1887.
 Skorospielka 1.
From Russia.
Early Amber. Domestica. 1. Forsyth Treat. Fr. Trees 21. 1803. 2.
Floy-Lindley Guide Orch. Gard. 297. 1846.
Fruit small, roundish-oblong, pale greenish-yellow with crimson
specks; flesh greenish-yellow, juicy; stone clinging; early.
Early Apricot. Domestica. 1. Prince Pom. Man. 2:70. 1832. 2. Mas
Pom. Gen. 2:21. 1873. 3. Mathieu Nom. Pom. 430. 1889.
Abricotée Hâtive 1, 3. Abricotée Hâtive 2. Abricote Hâtif 1.
Abricotée Précoce 3. Early Apricot Plum 1. Frühe Aprikosenpflaume
2. Frühe Aprikosenpflaume 3. Oberdiecks Frühe Aprikosenpflaume 2,
3.
The fruit of Early Apricot is small, roundish; suture shallow; cavity
distinct; pale red, darker in the sun; dots small, numerous; flesh
yellowish-green, slightly juicy, firm; quality fair; clingstone; season
early.
Early Blue. Domestica. 1. Ont. Fr. Growers Assoc. 87. 1896. 2. Am.
Pom. Soc. Rpt. 52. 1897.
A Domestica of American origin. Fruit the size of Lombard; very
early.
Early Blue. Domestica. 1. Miller Gard. Dict. 2. 1807. 2. Downing Fr.
Trees Am. 899. 1869. 3. Mas Pom. Gen. 2:13. 1873. 4. Hogg
Fruit Man. 698. 1884.
Azure Hâtive 3. Azure Hâtive 2, 4. Black Perdrigon 2, 4. Blue Gage
3, 4. Blue Gage 1, 2. Cooper’s Blue Gage 2, 4. Early Blue 3. Little
Blue Gage 2.
An old European variety; rejected by the American Pomological
Society in 1858. Fruit of medium size, roundish, dark purple; flesh
greenish-yellow, juicy; flavor brisk and rich; freestone; early.
Early Cherry. Cerasifera ×? 1. Kerr Cat. 21. 1897.
 From California; fruit small, round, red; clingstone; early.
Early Cluster. Species? 1. Mathieu Nom. Pom. 428. 1889. 2. Guide
Prat. 163, 355. 1895.
Mentioned in the preceding references.
Early Cross. Domestica. 1. Downing Fr. Trees Am. 380. 1857.
Originated with a Mr. Cross, Salem, Massachusetts. Tree vigorous,
productive; fruit below medium, roundish, reddish-purple; bloom
thick; flesh greenish-yellow, juicy, sweet; clingstone; early.
Early Favorite. Domestica. 1. Downing Fr. Trees Am. 314. 1845. 2.
Elliott Fr. Book 419. 1854. 3. Downing Fr. Trees Am. 395.
1857. 4. Mas Le Verger 6:11. 1866-73. 5. Mathieu Nom. Pom.
447. 1889. 6. Guide Prat. 152, 356. 1895. 7. Rev. Hort. 548,
Pl. 1909.
Early Favorite 4, 5, 6. Early Favourite 6. Early Favourite 4. Favorite
Hâtive 7. Favorite Précoce 4, 5, 7. Favorite Précoce 6. Favorite
Précoce de Rivers 5, 6. Précoce de Rivers 5. Prune Early Favorite 7.
Rivers Early 5, 6. Rivers Early Favorite 5. River’s Early Favourite 5, 6.
River’s Early Favourite 3. River’s Early No. 1 1. River’s Early No. 1 2.
Rivers Früh Pflaume 5. Rivers Frühpflaume 6. River’s No. 1 3, 5.
A seedling of Précoce de Tours raised by Thomas Rivers,
Sawbridgeworth, England, about 1834. Tree vigorous, productive;
fruit small, roundish-oval; suture shallow; bluish-black; dots russet;
flesh greenish-yellow, juicy, sweet; good; freestone; very early.
Mentioned in the catalog of the American Pomological Society from
1852 to 1891.
Early Genesee. Domestica. 1. Gen. Farmer 9:232. 1848.
Originated in Brighton, Monroe County, New York. Fruit of medium
size, long-ovate, golden-yellow; very early.
Early Golden Drop. Domestica. 1. Wickson Cal. Fruits 352. 1891.
2. Cal. Nur. Cat. 1898.
Early Golden 2.
 “Small, bright yellow, sugary and rich; pit free; ripens early.”
Early Honey. Angustifolia varians. 1. Cornell Sta. Bul. 38:79. 1892.
2. Waugh Plum Cult. 195. 1901.
From Grayson County, Texas.
Early Mirabelle. Insititia. 1. Hogg Fruit Man. 360, 376. 1866. 2.
Mas Le Verger 6:1. 1866-73. 3. Oberdieck Deut. Obst. Sort.
410. 1881. 4. Guide Prat. 152, 360. 1895.
Frühe von Bergthold 3. Mirabelle Précoce 1. Mirabelle Précoce 4,
5. Précoce de Bergthold 1, 2. Mirabelle de Berthold 4. Précoce de
Bergthold 4.
Thought to be of English origin; first noted by Hogg. Resembles
the Mirabelle very closely, with which it is confused. Tree medium in
vigor, very productive; shoots downy; fruit small, nearly round;
suture indistinct; skin pale yellow, specked with red on the sunny
side; flesh yellowish, sweet, juicy, agreeably aromatic; freestone;
early.
Early Minnesota. Americana. 1. Wis. Sta. Bul. 63:36. 1897. 2. S.
Dak. Sta. Bul. 93:17. 1905.
Found wild by Joseph Wood of Windom, Minnesota. Tree low,
spreading, hardy, very productive; fruit small, round, yellowish-red;
flesh sweet, juicy; stone free; very early.
Early Normandy. Domestica. 1. Horticulturist 30:256. 1875. 2. Le
Bon Jard. 340. 1882.
Normande précoce 2.
Noted in the Horticulturist as originating in France. Tree vigorous;
fruit as large as a Reine Claude, purple on the sunny side, light
flesh-colored on the shady side; bloom light; flesh greenish, fine and
melting, juicy, sweet; good; early.
Early Pale. Species? Letter from Burbank.
Originated with Luther Burbank and sold to Judge S. F. Lieb in
1897.
Early Pear. Domestica. 1. Parkinson Par. Ter. 577 fig. 1629. 2. Rea
Flora 209. 1676.
Prunum Pyrinum praecox 1.
An early strain of White Pear.
Early Perdrigon. Domestica. 1. Lond. Hort. Soc. Cat. 151. 1831. 2.
Prince Pom. Man. 2:65. 1832. 3. Poiteau Pom. Franc. 1. 1846.
4. Hogg Fruit Man. 375. 1866. 5. Downing Fr. Trees Am. 936.
1869. 6. Mas Le Verger 6:147. 1866-73. 7. Mathieu Nom.
Pom. 431. 1889. 8. Guide Prat. 153, 361. 1895.
Früher Perdrigon 7. Früher Violetter Perdrigon 7. Moyeu de
Bourgogne ?7, 8. Perdrigon hâtif 1. Perdrigon hâtif 2, 7, 8. Perdrigon
hâtive 2. Perdrigon Violet Hâtif 4, 5, 6, 7, 8. Prune Perdrigon hâtif 3.
Prunus Calvellana 3.
There are two plums known under this name. Both are small, oval,
purplish and are covered with a thick bloom. One, however, which
seems to have been earliest known, is sweet, rich and of very good
quality, ripening about the middle of August. The second variety was
named by Calvel. It is vastly inferior in quality to the first and ripens
in July. Neither variety is well known in America.
Early Red. Angustifolia varians. 1. Am. Pom. Soc. Rpt. 160, 162.
1881. 2. Cornell Sta. Bul. 80:62. 1892. 3. Waugh Plum Cult.
195. 1901.
Grown by G. Onderdonk of Mission Valley, Victoria County, Texas;
introduced by the originator in 1879. Fruit small, roundish; cavity
large; suture lacking; red; dots few, white; skin thin; flesh soft,
yellow, sprightly; quality fair; clingstone; early.
Early Red. Domestica. 1. Am. Pom. Soc. Rpt. 61. 1887. 2. Ia. Hort.
Soc. Rpt. 86. 1890. 3. Can. Exp. Farm. Bul. 43:33. 1903. 4.
Budd-Hansen Am. Hort. Man. 310. 1903.
Early Red Russian 3. Early Red Russian No. 3 3. Krasnaya
Skorospielkaya 1. Mixed Arab 2, 3. No. 3 2.
 Early Red was imported by J. L. Budd from Dr. Regel, St.
Petersburg, Russia, in the winter of 1881-82. The following season it
was disseminated with a mixed lot of varieties, all of which became
badly confused. Fruit large, oval; cavity small; suture shallow; dark
red; bloom thick; dots white; flesh firm, meaty; quality fair;
clingstone; early.
Early Royal of Nikita. Domestica. 1. Downing Fr. Trees Am. 380.
1857. 2. Mas Pom. Gen. 2:25 fig. 13. 1873. 3. Mathieu Nom.
Pom. 429, 430, 441, 449. 1889.
Early Royal of Nikita 3. Frühe Königspflaume Pflaume von Nikita 3.
Frühe Nikitaer Königspflaume 3. Nikitaner Frühe Königspflaume 2.
Nikitaer Frühe Königspflaume 3. Nikita’s Frühe Königs Pflaume 3.
Royale Hâtive de Nikita 3. Royal Hâtive de Nikita 3. Royale Hâtive de
Nikita 2.
According to Mas this variety originated in Nikita, Crimea. Fruit
small, roundish, reddish-purple; bloom thick; flesh yellow, sweet,
juicy; good; semi-clinging; early.
Early St. John. Domestica. 1. Downing Fr. Trees Am. 912. 1869.
Prune de St. Jean 1. St. Jean 1. St. John 1.
Tree vigorous; fruit medium in size, roundish-oblong, reddish-
purple; flesh green, sweet, sprightly; freestone; mid-season.
Early Transparent Gage. Domestica. 1. Jour. Hort. N. S. 17:286.
1869. 2. Hogg Fruit Man. 722. 1884. 3. Guide Prat. 153, 364.
1895. 4. Rivers Cat. 34. 1898. 5. Bartrum Pears and Plums
63. 1902.
Early Apricot 3. Early Transparent 4. Early Transparent Gage 2, 3.
New Transparent Gage 1. Reine-Claude Diaphane Hâtive 3. Rivers’
Early Apricot 2. Rivers’ Early Transparent Gage 5.
This seedling of Transparent Gage was raised by Thomas Rivers,
Sawbridgeworth, England, in 1866. Tree hardy, productive, compact;
branchlets pubescent; fruit medium in size, roundish-oblate; suture
shallow; stem slender; yellowish-green, mottled with crimson; flesh
greenish-yellow, firm, juicy; quality high; freestone; early.
Early Yellow Gage. Domestica. 1. Downing Fr. Trees Am. App.
2:156. 1876.
Originated with Asahel Foote, Williamstown, Massachusetts. Tree
vigorous, upright, productive; fruit of medium size, roundish-oval;
suture shallow; cavity small; stem slender; pale yellow; bloom thin;
flesh greenish-yellow, rather coarse, juicy, sweet; semi-clinging;
early.
Early Yellow Prune. Domestica. 1. Horticulturist 8:536. 1853. 2.
Am. Pom. Soc. Rpt. 86. 1854.
Originated in Bedford County, Pennsylvania. Tree vigorous, prolific;
fruit medium, oval; skin yellow; very good; stone free.
Eason. Domestica. 1. Parkinson Par. Ter. 578. 1629.
Described by Parkinson as “small, red and well tasted.”
Eberly. Domestica. 1. Am. Pom. Soc. Rpt. 135. 1905.
Eberly’s Plum 1.
A seedling brought to notice by W. V. Eberly of the California
Nursery Company. Fruit large, oval; cavity small; yellow, occasionally
slightly russeted; dots numerous, silvery; flesh yellowish,
translucent; sweet, rich; good; stone long, flat, free; late.
Ebon. Cerasifera ×? 1. Kerr Cat. 16. 1899.
Described by Kerr in 1899. Tree upright, with distinct foliage. Fruit
medium in size, round to round-oblong, very dark red; flesh red;
clingstone.
Ecully. Domestica. 1. Cat. Cong. Pom. France 364. 1887. 2. Guide
Prat. 153, 364. 1895. 3. Can. Exp. Farms Rpt. 433. 1905.
Reine-Claude d’Ecully 1, 2, 3.
A chance seedling grown by M. Luizet, at Ecully-les-Lyon, France;
first fruited in 1866. Tree vigorous, very productive; fruit large,
roundish; suture deep; halves unequal; cavity deep and rather wide;
stem medium in length; skin yellow, slightly tinged with red; flesh
yellowish, fine, rather firm, juicy, sweet, Reine Claude aroma; good;
stone nearly free; mid-season.
Eddie. Species? Letter from J. W. Kerr.
Originated by Theodore Williams of Benson, Nebraska.
Edith. Americana. 1. Ia. Sta. Bul. 46:269. 1900.
A seedling of Iowa Beauty grown by E. L. Hayden, Oakville, Iowa,
about 1895. Tree upright, vigorous; fruit medium in size, globular;
suture indistinct; dark red; dots numerous; bloom thick; good; stone
of medium size; mid-season.
Edle Early. Domestica. 1. Oberdieck Deut. Obst. Sort. 411. 1881.
2. Mathieu Nom. Pom. 428. 1889.
Edle Frühpflaume 1, 2. Noble Précoce 2.
Found in a garden in Brunswick, Germany. Tree large, productive;
fruit small, oval; suture a line; brownish-red, with gold-colored dots;
flesh golden-yellow, tender, juicy, sweet; freestone; early.
Edouard Seneclauze. Domestica. 1. Hogg Fruit Man. 361. 1866.
Fruit very small, obovate, golden-yellow; flesh sweet, richly
flavored; freestone; early.
Eggles. Triflora × Hortulana. 1. Vt. Sta. An. Rpt. 14:271. 1901.
Sent out by A. L. Bruce, Texas. Fruit large, round; suture
indistinct; bright red; dots many, minute, yellow; flesh yellow; stone
oval, compressed, clinging; poor.
Eldora. Americana. 1. Ia. Hort. Soc. Rpt. 333. 1894. 2. Waugh Plum
Cult. 148. 1901.
A seedling raised by Judge Samuel Miller of Missouri. Tree rapid in
growth; fruit medium to large.
Eldorado. Americana. 1. Ia. Sta. Bul. 46:269. 1900. 2. Ill. Hort.
Soc. Rpt. 135. 1903. 3. Ibid. 426. 1905.
 A seedling grown by H. A. Terry of Crescent, Iowa, who introduced
it in 1899. Fruit small, round; suture lacking; yellow overlaid with
red; dots small, grayish; bloom thin; skin thick; flesh firm, yellow,
subacid; clingstone; late.
Eldridge. Americana. 1. Am. Pom. Soc. Cat. 42. 1883.
A variety from Wisconsin listed for eight years by the American
Pomological Society.
Elfrey. Domestica. 1. Coxe Cult. Fr. Trees 234. 1817. 2. Prince Pom.
Man. 2:98. 1832. 3. Horticulturist 7:403. 1852. 4. Mathieu
Nom. Pom. 429. 1889.
Elfrey’s Prune 2. Elfreth’s Prune 2. Elfry’s Plum 4.
Of unknown origin; quite widely disseminated and highly
recommended in the South about fifty years ago. Tree vigorous; fruit
medium in size, oval, blue; flesh greenish, firm, rich, slightly dry;
mid-season.
Elisabeth Pflaume. Domestica. Mentioned in Mathieu Nom. Pom.
429. 1889.
Elisabeth d’Elsner. Elsner’s Elisabeth Pflaume.
Ella. Domestica. 1. Can. Exp. Farm Bul. 2d Ser. 3:52. 1900.
A seedling of the Peach plum grown at the British Columbia
Experimental Station; not introduced; closely resembles the parent.
Ellis. Munsoniana × Hortulana. 1. Cornell Sta. Bul. 38:79. 1892. 2.
Waugh Plum Cult. 231. 1901.
Ellis is said to be a cross between Wild Goose and Golden Beauty,
and to have originated in northern Texas; introduced by T. L. Ellis.
Fruit large, round; skin very thin, red; good; semi-clinging.
Ellwood. Domestica. 1. Col., O., Hort. Soc. Rpt. 31. 1892. 2. Ohio
Sta. Bul. 162:254, 255. 1905.
Elwood 1.
 Introduced by Augustine and Company, Normal, Illinois; very
similar to Lombard if not identical with it.
Elmore. Domestica. 1. Gard. & For. 7:243. 1894.
An early variety from Shasta, Sacramento County, California.
Elsner Grüne Zwetsche. Domestica. Mentioned in Mathieu Nom.
Pom. 429. 1889.
Elsner’s Von Gronow Grüne Zwetsche. Prune Celeste.
Elton. Domestica. 1. Lond. Hort. Soc. Cat. 147. 1831.
Grown on the grounds of the London Horticultural Society.
Emerald. Domestica. 1. Can. Hort. 12:265. 1889. 2. Am. Pom. Soc.
Rpt. 101. 1891. 3. Smith Cat. 35. 1898. 4. Can. Hort. 22:340.
1899.
Early Green 1, 2, 4.
Originated with Warren Holton, Hamilton, Ontario; supposedly a
seedling of Reine Claude. It was first called Early Green but was
introduced by E. D. Smith of Winona, Ontario, under the name
Emerald. Tree hardy and productive; fruit large, roundish; stem
slender; suture medium deep; yellowish-green; very good; stone
free, smooth; very early.
Emerald. Triflora × Americana. 1. Ia. Sta. Bul. 46:270. 1900. 2.
Waugh Plum Cult. 209. 1901. 3. Budd-Hansen Am. Hort. Man.
296. 1903. 4. Ia. Sta. Bul. 114:133. 1910.
Burwood 4.
Emerald came from a cross between Brittlewood and Burbank
made by Theodore Williams, Benson, Nebraska, in 1895. Tree
resembles an Early Richmond cherry, hardy, productive; buds
conspicuous; fruit large, roundish, yellow marbled with coppery-red;
flesh yellowish, tender, fibrous, juicy, mild subacid; good.
Emerald Drop. Domestica. 1. Downing Fr. Trees Am. 275. 1845. 2.
Ibid. 913. 1869. 3. Mas Le Verger 6:125. 1866-73.
 Goutte Emeraude 3.
Emerald Drop is a seedling of Washington grown sometime
previous to 1845 by A. J. Downing, Newburgh, New York. Tree
moderately vigorous, productive; fruit of medium size, oval; cavity
small; suture distinct, sides unequal; yellowish-green; flesh greenish-
yellow, juicy; good; clingstone; mid-season.
Emerson. Angustifolia varians. 1. Kan. Sta. Bul. 101:131. 1901. 2.
Cornell Sta. Bul. 38:63. 1892. 3. Waugh Plum Cult. 195.
1901.
Emerson’s Early 3.
Found wild in northern Texas; introduced by A. L. Bruce. Fruit
small, round to oval, bright red, with many white dots; flesh yellow,
soft; stone rough, clinging; early.
Emerson. Americana. 1. Minn. Hort. Soc. Rpt. 127. 1890.
Originated near Dubuque, Iowa. Tree productive; fruit large,
roundish, red, thickly dotted with small gray spots; flesh firm;
valuable for preserving.
Emerson Yellow. Angustifolia varians. 1. Kerr Cat. 20. 1897. 2.
Waugh Plum Cult. 195. 1901.
A seedling of the Emerson from Texas. Fruit of medium size,
round, yellow; inferior.
Emigrant. Domestica. 1. Am. Pom. Soc. Rpt. 126. 1889. 2. Am.
Pom. Soc. Cat. 25. 1897.
A seedling of Lombard. Fruit large, oval, purple; quality fair; mid-
season.
Emily May. Domestica. 1. Ia. Sta. Bul. 46:269. 1900.
A large attractive plum of the Pond type grown by Lillian A. Trotter,
Owen Sound, Ontario, Canada. Fruit large, oval; suture well marked;
clear light yellow; bloom thin; flesh firm, juicy, delicate; good; stone
small, rough, free.
Emma. Americana. 1. Ia. Sta. Bul. 46:269. 1900. 2. Terry Cat.
1900.
Grown by H. A. Terry, Crescent, Iowa, in 1896. Fruit medium in
size, almost round; skin thin, reddish color; good; stone large,
clinging.
Engle. Domestica. 1. Mich Sta. Bul. 129:32, 33. 1896. 2. Ibid.
187:77, 78. 1901. 3. Budd-Hansen Am. Hort. Man. 311.
1903.
Fruit below medium size, roundish-oval; suture obscure; skin
yellow; flesh firm, yellow, flavor rich; very good; very early.
Empereur. Domestica. 1. Mas Le Verger 6:63. 1866-73. 2. Mathieu
Nom. Pom. 429. 1889.
Empereur de Mas 2.
Grown by M. Mas, France, from a seed of Golden Drop sown in
1850; reported in 1861 under the name Empereur. Fruit large,
obovate; suture indistinct; skin tender, purple, streaked with deeper
purple; flesh clear yellow, melting, juicy, sweet; stone small,
clinging; early.
Emperor of Japan. Domestica. 1. Mathieu Nom. Pom. 429. 1889.
Empereur du Japan 1. Emperor of Japan 1. Kaiser Von Japan 1.
Mathieu found reference to it in Pomologische Monatshefte 134.
1882 and Obst-Garten 322. 1882.
Esjum Erik. Domestica. 1. U. S. Dept. Agr. Pom. Bul. 10:21. 1901.
Esjum Erik is an Old World variety imported by the United States
Department of Agriculture in 1900. As tested at this Station it
appears to be of little value for New York growers. Tree vigorous,
unproductive; fruit small, obovate, necked; cavity nearly lacking;
suture a line; purplish-black; bloom thick; dots inconspicuous; flesh
greenish-yellow, juicy, firm, sweetish, mild; quality not high; stone
small, oval, dark colored, clinging; mid-season.
Essex Bullace. Insititia. 1. Lond. Hort. Soc. Cat. 144. 1831. 2.
Hogg Fruit Man. 689. 1884. 3. Rivers Cat. 37. 1909.
New Large Bullace 1, 3. New Large Bullace 2.
Tree vigorous, very productive; fruit large, roundish, greenish-
yellow; flesh juicy; late.
Esslinger Fruhzwetsche. Domestica. 1. Mathieu Nom. Pom. 429.
1889. 2. Lucas Vollst. Hand. Obst. 473. 1894. Quetsche
Précoce d’Esslingen 1.
Tree vigorous; an early and abundant bearer; fruit of medium size,
bluish-black; bloom light; valuable for dessert and drying.
Esther. Hortulana mineri. 1. Ia. Hort. Soc. Rpt. 287. 1887. 2.
Cornell Sta. Bul. 38:79. 1892. 3. Terry Cat. 1900. 4. Waugh
Plum Cult. 173. 1901.
A seedling of Miner, grown by H. A. Terry, Crescent, Iowa; first
fruited in 1885. Fruit medium in size, round-oval; suture a line; dark
red; dots numerous; bloom thin; flesh yellow; good; stone oval,
clinging; late.
Etopa. Prunus besseyi × Triflora. Cir. S. Dak. Exp. Sta. 1910.
Introduced in 1908 by the originator, N. E. Hansen of the South
Dakota Experiment Station. It is a cross of Occident with Prunus
besseyi in which the dark purplish flesh of the male parent is
conspicuous.
Etta. Americana. 1. Kerr Cat. 1900. 2. Terry Cat. 1900. 3. Wis. Sta.
Bul. 85:13. 1901.
A seedling first fruited in 1895 by H. A. Terry, Iowa. Fruit large,
nearly round; suture distinct; skin yellow, striped and splashed with
red; flesh sweet, rich; good; stone oval, free; mid-season.
Eureka. Nigra. 1. Ia. Sta. Bul. 46:270. 1900.
Grown in 1896 by Theodore Williams, Benson, Nebraska, from
seed of Cheney. Tree upright, vigorous, unproductive; fruit large;
roundish, yellowish-red to purple; flesh firm, juicy; good; clingstone;
very early.
Eureka. Munsoniana. 1. Am. Jour. Hort. 5:148. 1869.
Similar to Wild Goose.
Eva. Nigra. 1. Can. Exp. Farms Rpt. 426. 1900.
From Manitoba; tested at the Indian Head Experimental Farm,
Northwest Territory, Canada. Fruit small, red; excellent; mid-season.
Evelyn. Domestica. 1. Ont. Fr. Gr. Assoc. Rpt. 73. 1894. 2. Can.
Exp. Farms Rpt. 137. 1894.
A seedling grown in the neighborhood of Owen’s Sound, Canada;
of local reputation.
Excelsior Damson. Insititia. 1. Green River Cat. 1899.
A freestone introduced in 1892 by the Green River Nursery
Company and described in their catalog as being a particularly fine
strain of the Damson.
Fairchild. Americana. 1. Ia. Sta. Bul. 46:271. 1900. 2. Waugh Plum
Cult. 148. 1901.
A seedling of De Soto supposed to have been fertilized by a wild
plum; grown by J. H. Fairchild, Iowa, in 1894 and offered for sale in
1899 by Snyder and Son, Center Point, Iowa. Fruit above medium,
roundish-oval, yellowish-red with whitish dots; flesh yellow, firm,
juicy; quality fair; mid-season.
Fancy. Munsoniana. 1. Ia. Sta. Bul. 46:271. 1900.
From a sprout of Wild Goose, originating with John Brown,
Oakville, Louisa County, Iowa, in 1885. Tree vigorous, very prolific;
fruit large, oblong, yellow with shading of red; bloom thin; flesh
sweet, juicy; good; stone small, clinging; mid-season.
Fanning. Munsoniana. 1. Waugh Plum Cult. 185. 1901.
A chance seedling found in the yard of a Mr. Fanning, Rockdale,
Texas. Fruit medium in size, round-oval, bright red; dots numerous;
flesh yellow; quality fair; stone oval, clinging; mid-season.
Fawn. Munsoniana. 1. Waugh Plum Cult. 231. 1901.
A variety first grown by David Miller of Camp Hill, Cumberland
County, Pennsylvania. Fruit of medium size, roundish; suture a line;
bright red; dots numerous, large, yellow, giving a dappled or fawn
color; bloom very thin; flesh yellow; quality fair; stone oval, clinging.
Femmonzi. Species? 1. Coates Cat. 1910-11.
A variety first grown by Frank Femmons of Ahwahnee, California,
and introduced by the Leonard Coates Nursery Company, Morganhill,
California, in the fall of 1910. Said to be large and handsome.
Field Marshall. Domestica. 1. Kenrick Am. Orch. 257. 1832. 2.
Downing Fr. Trees Am. 293. 1845. 3. Elliott Fr. Book 426.
1854.
Corse’s Field Marshall 1, 2. Corse’s Field Marshal 3.
A seedling raised by Henry Corse of Montreal, Canada. Fruit large,
oval, bright purplish-red; cavity shallow; flesh greenish-yellow, juicy,
subacid; stone long, pointed, clinging.
Figue Grosse Rouge. Domestica. 1. Lond. Hort. Soc. Cat. 147.
1831.
Wilmots Early 1.
Fruit large, obovate; purple; freestone; quality medium; mid-
season.
Fin de Siecle. Nigra. 1. Can. Exp. Farms Rpt. 426. 1900.
A seedling raised at Indian Head Experimental Farm, Northwest
Territory, Canada. Tree productive; fruit large; red; flavor fair; early.
Fine Bonte. Domestica. 1. Downing Fr. Trees Am. 913. 1869. 2.
Mas Le Verger 6:35. 1866-73. 3. Mathieu Nom. Pom. 429.
1889.
Feine und Gute 3. Fine Bonte 3.
Originated in the nurseries of Simon Louis, Moselle, France. Fruit
small, irregularly ovate; suture indistinct; purple; bloom thin; stem
very short, thick; flesh greenish yellow; very good; stone small, free;
very early.
Fine Early Plum. Domestica. Mentioned in Forsyth Treat Fr. Trees
21. 1803.
Firba Konigspflaume. Domestica. Mentioned in Mathieu Nom.
Pom. 429. 1889.
Firbas Frühe Schuttenhoferin. Domestica. 1. Mathieu Nom. Pom.
429. 1889.
Mathieu found mention of it in Wiener Garten-Zeitung 287. 1884.
First. Species? 1. Burbank Cat. 1899. 2. Ibid. 1901. 3. Ga. Sta. Bul.
68:36. 1905.
No. 31,288 1.
According to the originator, Luther Burbank, this variety is one of
the second generation of a combination cross of Hawkeye, Hammer,
Milton, Wyant, Wayland and Burbank. It was introduced in 1899
under the breeding number 31,288, but grafting wood was not
offered for sale until 1900. This is probably one of the earliest plums,
ripening in California about three weeks before Red June. Fruit
medium in size, roundish; stem short, slender; yellow with faint
blush; flesh yellow, sweet, juicy; earliest.
First Best. Species? 1. Childs Cat. 136. 1910.
 First Best was grown by R. D. Hoyt of Clearwater, Florida, in 1894
from seed marked “Hill Plum” received from W. Gollen of Saharanfur,
India. The tree first fruited in 1904 and was introduced in the spring
of 1910 by John Lewis Childs, Floral Park, New York, who states that
it is an unusually early, yellow variety.
First Sweet. Nigra? 1. Can. Exp. Farms Rpt. 426. 1900.
A seedling raised at the Experimental Farm, Northwest Territory,
Canada. Tree productive; fruit of medium size; skin red, thin; flavor
excellent; early.
Fitzroy. Americana. 1. Can. Exp. Farms Rpt. 119. 1904.
A seedling of Rollingstone grown at the Central Experimental
Farm, Canada. Fruit above medium, roundish, slightly heart-shaped;
suture a line; skin yellow washed with red; dots many; bloom
moderate; flesh pale yellow, juicy, sweet; good; stone nearly free;
cracks when ripe.
Flora Plena. Americana 1. Kerr Cat. 1894-97.
J. W. Kerr, the introducer, found this plum in the yard of a friend in
York County, Pennsylvania, it having been brought from Iowa. Tree
dwarf; blooms profusely with beautiful pure white, very double
flowers; no fruit.
Flushing Bulleis. Domestica. 1. Parkinson Par. Ter. 576. 1629.
Noted by Parkinson as a variety producing fruit in clusters like a
bunch of grapes.
Foote. Insititia. 1. Mich. Sta. Sp. Bul. 35:21. 1906.
Fruit small, roundish-oblong; skin black; flesh rather dry, greenish-
yellow; stone small, oval, clinging; mid-season.
Foote. Domestica. 1. Horticulturist 20:324. 1865. 2. Downing Fr.
Trees Am. 913. 1869. 3. Mas Pom. Gen. 2:77. 1873.
Foote’s Early Orleans 3. Foote’s Early Orleans 1, 2, 3. Monsieur
Hâtif de Foote 3.
 A seedling of Wilmot’s Early Orleans raised in 1852 by Asahel
Foote of Williamstown, Massachusetts. Tree large and vigorous; fruit
of medium size, roundish-oval; suture absent; very black; flesh
greenish, juicy; good; stone oval, flattened, clinging; very early.
Foote Golden Gage. Domestica. 1. Downing Fr. Trees Am. 914.
1869.
Raised by Asahel Foote, Williamstown, Massachusetts. Tree very
vigorous; shoots slightly downy; fruit large, nearly round; suture
shallow; stalk slender; cavity small; skin golden-yellow, obscurely
splashed with green and tinged with red; flesh yellow, juicy, sweet,
slightly vinous; very good; stone slightly adherent; mid-season.
Forest Rose Improved. Hortulana mineri. 1. Ohio Sta. Bul.
113:154. 1899.
An improved strain of Forest Rose somewhat larger than the
original.
Forewattamie. Hortulana mineri × Munsoniana. 1. Vt. Sta. Bul.
67:11. 1898. 2. Kerr Cat. 1900.
A cross between Forest Garden and Pottawattamie grown by
Theodore Williams, Benson, Nebraska. J. W. Kerr, after testing it,
states that it disclosed no special merits; fruit below medium, oval,
dull red; flesh watery; poor.
Formosa. Triflora ×? 1. Fancher Creek Nur. Cat. 7. 1907-8. 2.
Fancher Creek Nur. Cat., Burbank’s Late Introductions. fig.
1909.
Wickson Challenge 1.
Grown by Luther Burbank, who states that it is of mixed
parentage, including probably from fifteen to eighteen varieties. Tree
very vigorous and productive; fruit large, oval to slightly cordate;
suture very prominent; cavity medium; rich yellow with light bloom
turning to clear red at maturity; flesh pale yellow, firm, sweet, rich,
apricot flavor; good; stone semi-clinging; mid-season.
Forward Damask. Domestica. Mentioned in Quintinye Com. Gard.
70. 1699.
Frankfort Peach. Domestica. 1. Koch Deut. Obst. 572. 1876. 2.
Downing Fr. Trees Am. 3rd App. 180. 1881. 3. Mathieu Nom.
Pom. 430. 1889.
Francfort Peach 3. Frankfurter Pfirschen Zwetsche 3. Kuchen
Pflaume 3. Quetsche de Francfort 3. Quetsche-Pêche de Francfort 3.
Tree spreading, productive; fruit of medium size, oval,
compressed; suture shallow; cavity small; black; bloom thick; flesh
yellow, coarse, juicy, sweet, good; stone oval, thin, free; mid-
season.
Franklin. Triflora ×? 1. Vt. Sta. An. Rpt. 12:223. 1899. 2. Waugh
Plum Cult. 210, 211 fig. 1901.
Originated with A. L. Bruce, Texas, from Abundance crossed with
an unknown variety. Fruit of medium size, oblate; suture a line;
bright crimson over yellow; dots numerous; bloom thin; flesh yellow;
good; clingstone.
Fraser. Domestica. 1. Am. Gard. 22:606. 1901. 2. Gard. Chron.
30:120. 1901.
Fraser’s Early Yellow 1.
Raised in the nursery of John Fraser, Woodford, England, about
1895. Tree small; fruit very small, oval; skin bright yellow; flesh soft;
flavor poor; freestone; valuable because of its earliness.
Freeman. Munsoniana. 1. Ia. Hort. Soc. Rpt. 276. 1893. 2. Wis.
Sta. Bul. 87:13. 1901.
Freeman’s Favorite 1.
Originated in 1885 with H. A. Terry, Crescent, Iowa, from seed of
Wild Goose. Tree vigorous, fairly productive; fruit above medium,
roundish-oblong; suture distinct; bright crimson, numerous dots on
the lower half; flesh very tender, sprightly; good; clingstone; early.
Freestone. Species? 1. Ill. Hort. Soc. Rpt. 424. 1905.
 An inferior native variety; fruit small; clingstone; mid-season.
Freestone. Americana. 1. Terry Cat. 1900.
A seedling grown by H. A. Terry from seed of Harrison. Fruit large,
pale yellow becoming light red at full maturity; good; stone semi-
clinging.
Freestone Goose. Munsoniana. 1. Stark Cat. 29. 1910.
Originated by Theodore Williams, Benson, Nebraska, and
introduced by Stark Brothers, Louisiana, Missouri, in 1910. The fruit
is said to be larger and darker colored than the Wild Goose.
Freestone Quetsche. Domestica. 1. Mich. Sta. Bul. 152:209.
1898.
Imported by the Department of Agriculture and noted as vigorous.
Friedheim Damascene. Species? Mentioned in Mathieu Nom. Pom.
430. 1889.
Friedheim’s Rote Früh Damascene. Damas Rouge de Friedheim.
Fritze Herrnpflaume. Domestica. Mentioned in Mathieu Nom.
Pom. 430. 1889.
Frostproof. Cerasifera. 1. Vt. Sta. An. Rpt. 13:369. 1900. 2.
Waugh Plum Cult. 231. 1901.
Grown and introduced by J. H. G. Jenkins, Spring Garden,
Missouri, about 1896. Fruit small, spherical; suture a fine line; dark
crimson; dots minute; bloom thin; flesh yellow; good; clingstone;
very early; blossoms resistant to frosts.
Frühe Englische Zwetsche. Domestica. Listed in Mathieu Nom.
Pom. 430. 1889.
Frühe Gelbe Reine Claude. Domestica. Mentioned in Mathieu
Nom. Pom. 430. 1889.
Frühe Gelbe Kaiser Pflaume.
Frühe Grüne Zwetsche. Domestica. 1. Oberdieck Deut. Obst.
Sort. 445. 1881. 2. Mathieu Nom. Pom. 430. 1889.
Bischtin Erik 2. Herr Pflaume 2.
A German variety said to be suitable for moist soils.
Frühe Leipziger Damascene. Species? 1. Mathieu Nom. Pom.
430. 1889.
Damas de Leipsick 1. Fondante Noire 1.
Mathieu suggests that this may possibly be identical with Précoce
de Tours.
Fuller. Species? 1. Wis. Sta. Bul. 63:37. 1897.
Fuller’s Egg 1.
Reported by B. A. Matthews, Knoxville, Iowa, as a large, oval
plum.
Fulton. Domestica. 1. Downing Fr. Trees Am. 382. 1857. 2.
Cultivator 5:373. 1857.
A variety of uncertain origin found at Johnstown, Fulton County,
New York. Tree vigorous and productive; fruit of medium size, oval;
suture distinct; bright yellow; juicy; good; late and hangs to the tree
well.
Funk. Triflora ×? 1. Munson Cat. 8. 1902. 2. Tex. Dept. Agr. Rpt.
12:102. 1910.
Funk’s Early 2.
An accidental cross of Abundance raised by J. M. Funk, Grayson
County, Texas. Tree vigorous, upright, prolific; fruit medium, heart-
shaped, bright red; clingstone; very early.
Fürst Damson. Insititia. 1. Hogg Fruit Man. 361. 1866. 2. Downing
Fr. Trees Am. 913. 1869. 3. Waugh Plum Cult. 127, 129. 1901.
4. Can. Exp. Farm Bul. 2d Ser. 3:51. 1900.
 Eugene Fürst 1, 2. Eugen Fürst 3. Fürst’s Damson 4. Quetsche
Précoce de Fürst 2. Sweet Damson 1, 2.
This plum is frequently confused with the Furst. The origin of the
name and variety is unknown. According to Waugh, it is a German
variety introduced in America about sixty years ago. Foliage
Damson-like; fruit small, pear-shaped, with a neck; cavity shallow,
abrupt; stem slender; suture obsolete; apex slightly pointed; skin
tough, purplish-black; flesh greenish-yellow, juicy, slightly acid;
quality fair to good; stone nearly free.
Gabriel Combes. Domestica. 1. Rev. Hort. 332, Pl. 1895.
Prune Reine-Claude Gabriel Combes 1.
Of French origin, probably a seedling of the Reine Claude; first
mentioned in 1895. Tree vigorous, productive; fruit spheroidal-ovoid,
large, purple; cavity very small; suture slight; apex pointed; flesh
amber-yellow, fine, juicy, sweet, aromatic, excellent; stone small,
free; ripens after Reine Claude.
Galbraith. Domestica. 1. Horticulturist 8:536. 1853. 2. Downing Fr.
Trees Am. 382. 1857.
Said to have originated with a Mr. Galbraith near Boalsburg,
Pennsylvania. Tree straggling; fruit of medium size, oval, purple;
flesh tender, juicy; good; clingstone; early.
Gale. Americana. 1. Kerr Cat. 1897-1900. 2. Wis. Sta. Bul. 63:37.
1897. 3. Waugh Plum Cult. 149. 1901.
Gale Seedling 2. Gale Seedling 3. Gale’s No. 3 1.
Introduced about 1890 by I. Gale & Son, Waukesha, Wisconsin.
Tree overbears; fruit below medium, roundish, compressed; suture
distinct; apex slightly truncate; dull red; skin thin; flesh yellow, soft;
quality fair; stone thick, rounded, nearly free; very early.
Galena. Americana. 1. Wis. Sta. Bul. 63:37. 1897. 2. Waugh Plum
Cult. 149. 1901.
 Introduced by Charles Luedloff, Cologne, Minnesota. Fruit large,
oval; yellow ground covered with red.
Galopin. Domestica. 1. Guide Prat. 160, 367. 1895. 2. Waugh Plum
Cult. 102. 1901.
Violette de Galopin 2. Violette Galopin 1.
A European variety. Tree poor; fruit of medium size, roundish;
cavity shallow; stem short, thick; suture shallow; blue; many
conspicuous dots; flesh yellow; quality medium; stone of medium
size, oval, slightly necked, nearly free.
Garden King. Americana. 1. Ia. Sta. Bul. 46:273. 1900. 2. Waugh
Plum Cult. 149. 1901.
Found wild in 1853; in 1861 it was put under cultivation by Judge
Elias Topliff of De Soto, Wisconsin, and subsequently turned over to
A. R. Prescott, Postville, Iowa, who introduced it in 1896. Tree
vigorous, productive; fruit medium, oval, scarlet; flesh sweet, juicy;
freestone.
Garfield. Hortulana. 1. Cornell Sta. Bul. 38:48, 86. 1892. 2. Waugh
Plum Cult. 179. 1901. 3. Ohio Sta. Bul. 162:254, 255. 1905.
Reported to have been found wild in Ohio; introduced by Leo
Welz, Wilmington, Ohio, in 1887. Tree unproductive, lacking in
hardiness; fruit small, oval; stem slender; cavity shallow; suture a
line; bright red; bloomless; flesh yellow, juicy, acid; quality fair;
stone small, long-oval, pointed, clinging; late.
Garlick. Domestica. 1. Lond. Hort. Soc. Cat. 147. 1831. 2. Mag.
Hort. 9:164. 1843.
Garlick’s Early 1, 2.
Fruit small, obovate, purple; good; freestone; obsolete.
Garnet. Triflora × Cerasifera. 1. U. S. D. A. Rpt. Pom. 45. 1895. 2.
Waugh Plum Cult. 211. 1901.
Found by J. L. Breece, Fayetteville, North Carolina, under a Kelsey
tree which was probably pollinated from a Pissardi growing near, the
foliage showing the reddish color of the Pissardi; first fruited in
1892. Fruit large, roundish-oval, dark garnet-red with minute russet
dots; cavity small; suture indistinct; skin thin and bitter; flesh yellow
with a tinge of red; flavor mild; stone medium, oval, clinging; more
valuable as an ornamental than for its fruit.
Gates. Americana. 1. Wis. Sta. Bul. 63:38. 1897.
Originated at Owatonna, Minnesota. Fruit medium in size,
flattened; suture distinct; very dull red; dots numerous, yellow; skin
thick; flesh yellow; quality fair; stone distinctly margined; late.
Gaunt. Domestica. 1. Parkinson Par. Ter. 576, 577 fig. 1629. 2. Rea
Flora 208. 1676.
Described in 1629 by Parkinson as “large, reddish, waterish, late.”
Gaviota. Triflora × Americana. 1. Fancher Creek Nur. Cat. 1907. 2.
Fancher Creek Nur. Cat., Burbank’s Late Introductions. fig.
1909.
Rice Seed 1.
Originated with Luther Burbank about 1900; probably contains
admixtures of other species than the ones mentioned above. Tree
vigorous, productive, late blooming; fruit very large, oval; suture
shallow; cavity medium; dark red over yellow ground; flesh yellow,
firm, sweet, aromatic; good; stone extremely small; mid-season.
Gaylord. Americana. 1. U. S. D. A. Rpt. 441. 1889. 2. Wis. Sta. Bul.
63:24, 38 fig. 1897. 3. Ia. Sta. Bul. 46:273. 1900.
Found growing wild by David Hardman, Nora Springs, Iowa, in
1854; introduced by Edson Gaylord of the same place about 1890.
Tree vigorous with a tendency to overbear; fruit of medium size,
oval; cavity small; stem short; suture a line; apex slightly pointed;
dull red over yellow; bloom thin; dots numerous, minute; skin thick,
bitter; flesh yellow, melting; good; stone large, oval, flat, semi-
clinging; mid-season.
Gaylord Gold. Americana. 1. Ia. Sta. Bul. 46:273. 1900.
 Found wild in Rock Grove, Iowa, about 1870 by John Henry, Nora
Springs, Iowa; cions subsequently distributed by Edson Gaylord.
Fruit of medium size, golden yellow; good; stone small, free; mid-
season.
Gelbe Damascener Pflaume. Species? 1. Mathieu Nom. Pom.
431. 1889.
Reference taken by Mathieu from Obst-Garten 315. 1883.
Gelbe Jerusalempflaume. Species? 1. Mathieu Nom. Pom. 431.
1889.
Jaune de Jerusalem 1. Prune de Jerusalem 1.
A variety of doubtful merit and different from Yellow Jerusalem.
Gelbe Kirschpflaume. Cerasifera. Mentioned in Mathieu Nom.
Pom. 432. 1889.
Cerisette Blanche. Myrobalan Jaune. Prunus Cerasifera
Zanthocarpa. Serdali Irek.
Gelbe Spatzwetsche. Species? Listed in Mathieu Nom. Pom. 432.
1889.
Reitzensteiner Gelbe Zwetsche incor. Quetsche Jaune Tardive.
Gem. Domestica. 1. Downing Fr. Trees Am. 915. 1869.
Originated near Albany, New York. Fruit small, round; suture and
cavity shallow; mottled with purple; flesh yellow, juicy, sweet;
clingstone.
Gem. Americana. 1. Meneray Cat.
The Gem 1.
A seedling of Lottie grown by H. A. Terry; introduced by P. W.
Meneray, Council Bluffs, Iowa. Fruit of medium size, oblong, red and
yellow, with whitish bloom; good; freestone.
Gemeiner Gelbe Spilling. Species? Mentioned in Mathieu Nom.
Pom. 432. 1889.
 Bauern Pflaume. Gelber Bidling. Krieke. Prunus Lutea. Spelge.
Spilge. Spindel Pflaume.
Gentleman. Domestica. 1. Mas Pom. Gen. 2:41. 1873.
Probably of American origin as it was sent by Downing to M. Mas,
but was not described by the American author. Tree vigorous,
productive; fruit medium, oval; suture indistinct; skin thick, intense
purple; bloom abundant; stem short; flesh yellowish, juicy, vinous;
good; freestone; early.
Georgia. Triflora ×? 1. Cornell Sta. Bul. 175:153. 1899. 2. Waugh
Plum Cult. 212. 1901.
Normand No. 20 1, 2.
One of the several seedlings sent out by J. L. Normand, Marksville,
Louisiana. Named by L. H. Bailey in 1899. Fruit small, oval, greenish-
yellow covered with bright red; flesh yellow, watery, fibrous, sweet;
stone large, strongly clinging; fruit drops while green; worthless.
Gerishes Seedling. Domestica. Mentioned in Johnson Cat.
Early Bradshaw.
Gersepflaume. Species? 1. Mathieu Nom. Pom. 431. 1889.
Reference taken by Mathieu from Wiener Garten-Zeitung 287.
1884.
Ghiston. Domestica. 1. Downing Fr. Trees Am. 276. 1845. 2. Am.
Pom. Soc. Cat. 222, 244. 1858.
Ghiston’s Early 1, 2.
Fruit large, oval, yellow; bloom thin; flesh yellow; quality poor;
freestone; season early; rejected by the American Pomological
Society in 1858.
Gibson. Domestica. 1. Horticulturist 25:319. 1870.
Gibson’s Seedling.
 A seedling from W. L. Gibson of Elmira, New York. Tree vigorous,
productive; fruit of medium size, deep amber color; bloom slight;
skin thick, very astringent; flesh sweet, juicy, mild; good.
Gill. Domestica. 1. Ohio Sta. Bul. 94:58. 1909.
Introduced by S. R. Gill, Port Clinton, Ohio, who received it in 1882
from a nursery with Golden Drop trees. Tree vigorous, spreading and
productive; fruit medium in size, round, reddish-purple; bloom light;
flesh firm, sweet, rich; good; mid-season; excellent for canning.
Gisborne. Domestica. 1. Lond. Hort. Soc. Cat. 147. 1831. 2.
Horticulturist 10:16. 1855. 3. Mas Pom. Gen.. 2:49. 1873. 4.
Mathieu Nom. Pom. 432. 1889.
De Gisborne 3. Gisborne’s 1. Gisborne’s 3. Gisborne’s Early 2.
Gisborne’s Early 2, 4. Gisborne’s Zwetsche 3. Gisbornes Zwetsche 4.
Ovalrunde Spreckel Pflaume 4. Paterson’s 1, 4.
Tree vigorous, productive; fruit of medium size, oval; suture
indistinct; skin golden-yellow, dotted with cherry-red on the sunny
side, with pale bloom; flesh bright yellow, juicy, sweet; stone large,
oval, free; mid-season.
Glaister. Domestica. 1. Wickson Cal. Fruits 358. 1891.
A variety from California introduced by Leonard Coates of Napa,
California. Fruit very similar to Yellow Egg, but two weeks earlier.
Gloire d’Epinay. Domestica. 1. Rev. Hort. 444. 1898. 2. Ibid. 86.
1899.
A sucker from a chance seedling found about 1850 by M. Donon
of Epinay, France; named and presented to the National Society of
Horticulture in 1898 by M. Gorion. Fruit above medium size,
roundish-oval; suture shallow; deep blue; similar to Monsieur, but is
later and ripens over a period of nearly two months.
Gloire de Louveciennes. Insititia. 1. Rev. Hort. 650. 1900. 2. Ibid.
476, fig. 1901.
Mirabelle Gloire de Louveciennes 1, 2.
 Noted in the Revue Horticole as a Mirabelle introduced in 1900 by
M. Lecointe. Fruit similar to Mirabelle de Nancy in shape and form,
but larger; skin citron-yellow, dotted and shaded with red on the
sunny side; flesh firm, very sweet, like the Apricot in flavor.
Gloria. Americana mollis. 1. Can. Exp. Farms Rpt. 119. 1904.
A seedling of Wolf; fruit large, oval; cavity narrow; suture a line;
bright red or yellow mottled with red; dots few; bloom light; skin
thick, tough; flesh yellow, juicy, sweet; good; stone large, nearly
free; variety promising.
Gloucestershire Violet. Domestica. 1. Jour. Hort. 17:285. 1888.
Minsterworth 1. Prince 1.
A very old variety first known as Prince; it is grown largely on the
banks of the Severn, England, where it is propagated from seed or
from root-suckers. Fruit small, oval, with slight tendency to a neck;
suture distinct; dark mahogany; bloom thin; flesh greenish, tender,
sweet, pleasant; stone small; free.
Glow. Maritima × Subcordata × Americana × Nigra. 1. Burbank
Cat. 14. 1911.
From crosses of the species named Burbank grew this variety. Tree
of medium size; branches slender and drooping. Fruit large, round,
crimson, dotted with yellow; flesh orange color, rich; good;
freestone; late.
G. No. 4. Domestica. 1. N. Y. Sta. Rpt. 9:347. 1890. 2. Mich. Sta.
Bul. 177:42, 43. 1899.
G. No. 44 Jones (unpublished).
In 1890, Herbert A. Jones, Himrods, New York, sent this variety to
a few experiment stations for testing. Fruit of medium size,
roundish; suture very shallow; cavity medium deep; stem slender;
skin thin; dark purple; bloom thick; dots numerous, sometimes
irregular, russet; flesh greenish-yellow, juicy, firm, sourish; poor;
clingstone; mid-season; variety not worth propagating.
Goff. Americana. 1. Meneray Cat.
Prof. Goff 1.
A seedling of Hawkeye grown by H. A. Terry; introduced by F. W.
Meneray, Council Bluffs, Iowa. Fruit large, red over yellow; good;
clingstone.
Gold. Americana. 1. Kerr Cat. 1894. 2. Ia. Sta. Bul. 46:273. 1900.
3. Terry Cat. 1900.
Golden 3.
A variety from H. A. Terry not to be confused with the Golden of
Burbank (Gold of Stark Brothers). Fruit of medium size, roundish;
cavity shallow, small; orange-yellow and red; bloom thin; skin rather
thick, astringent; flesh yellow, firm, meaty, subacid; good;
clingstone.
Gold Coin. Americana. 1. Terry Cat. 1900.
An unknown variety mentioned by H. A. Terry, Crescent, Iowa, as
the parent of Coinage.
Gold Colored. Americana. 1. Wis. Sta. Bul. 63:39. 1897. 2. Waugh
Plum Cult. 150. 1901.
From Edson Gaylord, Gaylord, Iowa. Fruit of medium size, bright
yellow; stone small, free.
Golden Cluster. Domestica. 1. Montreal Hort. Soc. Rpt. 93. 1885.
A seedling from Henry Corse of Montreal. Tree slow in growth,
with long internodes; fruit of medium size, egg-shaped; hanging in
dense clusters by firmly adherent stems; gold, tinged with brown;
flesh firm, pleasant; ripening season long.
Golden Gage. Domestica. N. Y. Sta. Rpt. 12:611. 1893.
Golden Gage is a seedling of Golden Drop grown by J. T.
Macomber, Grand Isle, Vermont. Fruit small, oval; cavity shallow;
suture a line; apex round; skin thin; pale yellow with red specks;
bloom thin; dots small; flesh yellow, very sweet; good; stone oval,
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