730 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

*
No. L-78164. July 31, 1987

TERESITA TABLARIN, MA. LUZ CIRIACO, MA NIMFA

B. ROVIRA, EVANGELINA S. LABAO, in their behalf and
in behalf of applicants for admission into the Medical
Colleges during the school year 1987-88 and future years
who have not taken or successfully hurdled the National
Medical Admission Test (NMAT). petitioners, vs THE
HONORABLE JUDGE ANGELINA S. GUTIERREZ,
Presiding Judge of Branch XXXVII of the Regional Trial
Court of the National Capital Judicial Region with seat at
Manila, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY LOURDES
QUISUMBING, in her capacity as Chairman of the
BOARD OF MEDICAL EDUCATION, and THE CENTER
FOR EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT (CEM),
respondents.

scarcely needs
documentation that a court would issue a writ of preliminary
injunction only when the petitioner assailing a

_______________

* EN BANC.

731

VOL. 152, JULY 31, 1987 731

statute or administrative order has made out a case of
unconstitutionality strong enough to overcome, in the mind of the
judge, the presumption of constitutionality, aside from showing a
clear legal right to the remedy sought. The fundamental issue is
of course the constitutionality of the statute or order assailed.

the trial court,

petitioners had made the argument that Section 5 (a) and (f) of
Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, offend against the
constitutional principle which forbids the undue delegation of
legislative power, by failing to establish the necessary standard to
be followed by the delegate, the Board of Medical Education. The
general principle of non-delegation of legislative power, which
both flows from and reinforces the more fundamental rule of the
separation and allocation of powers among the three great
departments of government, must be applied with circumspection
in respect of statutes which like the Medical Act of 1959, deal
with subjects as obviously complex and technical as medical
education and the practice of medicine in our present day world.
Mr. Justice Laurel stressed this point 47 years ago in

"One thing, however, is apparent in the

development of the principle of separation of powers and that is
the the maxim of or
adopted this practice (Delegibus
et Consuetudiniis Anglia edited by G.E. Woodbine, Yale
University Press, 1922, Vol. 2, p. 167) but which is also recognized
in principle in the Roman Law (d. 17.18.3)

giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle

of 'subordinate legislation,' not only in the United States and
England but (People
vs. Rosenthal and Osmena [68 Phil. 318, 1939]. Accordingly,

The standards set for subordinate legislation in

the exercise of rule making authority by an administrative agency
like the Board of Medical Education are necessarily broad and
highly abstract. As explained by then Mr. Justice Fernando in
"The standard may be either expressed or
implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met.
 732

732 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In the Reflector Law, clearly

What is sought to be
attained as in
We believe and so hold that the necessary standards are
set forth in Section 1 of the 1959 Medical Act: "the
standardization and regulation of medical education" and in
Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same Act, the body of the statute itself,
and that these considered together are sufficient compliance with
the requirements of the non-delegation principle. The petitioners
also urge that the NMAT prescribed in MECS Order No. 52, s.
1985, is an "unfair, unreasonable and inequitable requirement,"
which results in a denial of due process. Again, petitioners have
failed to specify just what factors or features of the NMAT render
it "unfair" and "unreasonable" or "inequitable." They appear to
suggest that passing the NMAT is an unnecessary requirement
when added on top of the admission requirements set out in
Section 7 of the Medical Act of 1959, and other admission
requirements established by internal regulations of the various
medical schools, public or private. Petitioners arguments thus
appear to relate to utility and wisdom or desirability of the NMAT
requirement. But constitutionality is essentially a question of
power or authority: this Court has neither commission or
competence to pass upon questions of the desirability or wisdom
or utility of legislation or administrative regulation. Those
questions must be addressed to the political departments of the
government not to the courts.

There is another reason

why the petitioners' arguments must fail: the legislative and
administrative provisions impugned by them constitute, to the
mind of the Court, a valid exercise of the police power of the state.
The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and
non-waivable power and authority of the sovereign to secure and
promote all the important interests and needs—in a word, the
public order—of the general community. An important component
of that public order is the health and physical safety and well
being of the population, the securing of which no one can deny is a
legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation.
Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether
there is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of
passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school
on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the
general community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps
most usefully approached by recalling that the

733

VOL. 152, JULY 31, 1987 733

in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable

method of protecting the health and safety of the public. That the
power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes
the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized
to practice medicine, is also well recognized. Thus, legislation and
administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice
medicine first
have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental
power. Similarly, the

admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a

legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state. What
we have before us in the instant case is closely related:
MECS Order No. 52,
s. 1985, as noted earlier, articulates the rationale of regulation of
this type: the improvement of the professional and technical
quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the
quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical
schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of
admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting
admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the
aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice.
The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high
standards in our professional schools in general, and medical
schools in particular, in the current stage of our social and
economic development, are widely known. We believe that the
government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the
NMAT as a means for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading
the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of
"improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country."
Given the widespread use today of such admission tests in, for
instance, medical schools in the United States of America (the
Medical College Admission Test [MCAT]) and quite probably in
other countries with far more developed educational resources
than our own, and taking into account the f failure or inability of
the petitioners to even attempt to prove otherwise, we are entitled
to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the
ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end,
it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the
potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those
who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or
trauma.

PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the

Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 37.

734

734 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

FELICIANO,

The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of

medicine for the school year 1987-1988. However, the
petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take
the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by
the Board of Medical Education, one of the public
respondents, and administered by the private respondent,
the Center for Educational Measurement (CEM).
On 5 March 1987, the petitioners filed with the Regional
Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, a Petition for
Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction.
The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education,
Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and
the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing
Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended,
and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August
1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of the
NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility
for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications
for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as
scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing
on the petition for issuance of preliminary injunction, the
trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The
NMAT was conducted and administered as previously
scheduled.
Petitioners accordingly filed this Special Civil Action for
Certiorari with this Court to set aside the Order of the
respondent judge denying the petition for issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction.
Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos.
4224 and 5946, known as the "Medical Act of 1959" defines
its basic objectives in the following manner:

"Section 1. This Act provides for and shall govern

(a)
(b) the examination for registration of physicians; and
(c) the super-

735

VOL. 152, JULY 31, 1987 735

Tablarin vs Gutierrez

vision, control and regulation of the practice of medicine in the

Philippines." (Underscoring supplied)

The statute, among other things, created a Board of

Medical Education which is composed of (a) the Secretary
of Education, Culture and Sports or his duly authorized
representative, as Chairman; (b) the Secretary of Health or
his duly authorized representative; (c) the Director of
Higher Education or his duly authorized representative; (d)
the Chairman of the Medical Board or his duly authorized
representative; (e) a representative of the Philippine
Medical Association; (f) the Dean of the College of
Medicine, University of the Philippines; (g) a
representative of the Council of Deans of Philippine
Medical Schools; and (h) a representative of the Association
of Philippine Medical Colleges, as members. The functions
of the Board of Medical Education specified in Section 5 of
the statute include the following:

"(a)

(b) To determine and prescribe requirements for

minimum physical facilities of colleges of medicine,
to wit: buildings, including hospitals, equipment
and supplies, apparatus, instruments, appliances,
laboratories, bed capacity for instruction purposes,
operating and delivery rooms, facilities for out
patient services, and others, used for didactic and
 practical instruction in accordance with modern
trends;
(c) To determine and prescribe the minimum number
and minimum qualifications of teaching personnel,
including studentteachers ratio;
(d) To determine and prescribe the minimum required
curriculum leading to the degree of Doctor of
Medicine;
(e) To authorize the implementation of experimental
medical curriculum in a medical school that has
exceptional faculty and instrumental facilities.
Such an experimental curriculum may prescribe
admission and graduation requirements other than
those prescribed in this Act; Provided, That only
exceptional students shall be enrolled in the
experimental curriculum;
(f)

736

736 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

(g) To select, determine and approve hospitals or some

departments of the hospitals for training which
comply with the minimum specific physical
facilities as provided in subparagraph (b) hereof;
and
(h)

(Italics supplied)

Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for

applicants to medical schools:

who has not been convicted by any court of

competent jurisdiction of any offense involving moral turpitude
and (a) a record of completion of a bachelor's
degree in science or arts; (b)

a certificate of good moral character issued by two

former professors in the college of liberal arts; and (d) birth
certificate. Nothing in this act shall be construed to inhibit any
college of medicine from establishing, in addition to the preceding,
other entrance requirements that may be deemed admissible.
xxx xxx x x x" (Italics supplied)

MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of

Education, Culture and Sports and dated 23 August 1985,
established a uniform admission test called the National
Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as an additional
requirement for issuance a certificate of eligibility for
admission into medical schools of the Philippines,
beginning with the school year 1986-1987. This Order goes
on to state that:

"2.

The cutoff score for the

successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT,
shall be determined every year by the Board of Medical
Education after consultation with the Association of
Philippine Medical Colleges.

737

VOL. 152, JULY 31, 1987 737

Tablarin vs Gutierrez

3. Subject to the prior approval of the Board of Medical

Education,

that will yield

information on other aspects of the applicant's personality
to complement the information derived from the NMAT.
xxx xxx xxx
8.
 (Underscoring supplied)

Pursuant to MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, the private

respondent Center conducted NMATs for entrance to
medical colleges during the school year 1986-1987. In
December 1986 and in April 1987, respondent Center
conducted the NMATs for admission to medical colleges
during the school year 19871988.
Petitioners raise the question of whether or not a writ of
preliminary injunction may be issued to enjoin the
enforcement of Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No.
2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985,
pending resolution of the issue of constitutionality of the
assailed statute and administrative order. We regard this
issue as entirely peripheral in nature. It scarcely needs
documentation that a court would issue a writ of
preliminary injunction only when the petitioner assailing a
statute or administrative order has made out a case of
unconstitutionality strong enough to overcome, in the mind
of the judge, the presumption of constitutionality, aside
from showing a clear legal right to the remedy sought. The
fundamental issue is of course the constitutionality of the
statute or order assailed.
1. The petitioners invoke a number of provisions of the
1987 Constitution which are, in their assertion, violated by
the continued implementation of Section 5 (a) and (f) of
Republic Act 2381, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s.
1985. The provisions invoked read as f ollows:

738

738 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

(a) Article II, Section 11: "The state values the dignity
of every human person and guarantees full respect
of human rights."
(b) Article II, Section 13: "The State recognizes the
vital role of the youth in nation building and shall
promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual,
intellectual and social well being. It shall inculcate
in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and
encourage their involvement in public and civic
affairs."
 (c) Article II, Section 17: "The State shall give priority
to education, science and technology, arts, culture
and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism,
accelerate social progress and to promote total
human liberation and development."
(d) Article XIV, Section 1: "The State shall protect and
promote the right of all citizens to quality education
at all levels and take appropriate steps to make
such education accessible to all."
(e) Article XIV, Section 5 (3): "Every citizen has a right
to select a profession or course of study, subject to
fair, reasonable and equitable admission and
academic requirements."

Article II of the 1987 Constitution sets forth in its second

half certain "State policies" which the government is
enjoined to pursue and promote. The petitioners here have
not seriously undertaken to demonstrate to what extent or
in what manner the statute and the administrative order
they assail collide with the State policies embodied in
Sections 11, 13 and 17. They have not, in other words,
discharged the burden of proof which lies upon them. This
burden is heavy enough where the constitutional provision
invoked is relatively specific, rather than abstract, in
character and cast in behavioral or operational terms. That
burden of proof becomes of necessity heavier where the
constitutional provision invoked is cast, as the second
portion of Article II is cast, in language descriptive of basic
policies, or more precisely, of basic objectives of State policy
and therefore highly generalized in tenor. The petitioners
have not made their case, even a case, and we
are not compelled to speculate and to imagine how the
legislation and regulation impugned as unconstitutional
could possibly offend the constitutional provisions pointed
to by the petitioners.
Turning to Article XIV, Section 1, of the 1987
Constitution, we note that once more petitioners have
failed to demonstrate

739

VOL. 152, JULY 31, 1987 739

that the statute and regulation they assail in fact clash

with that provision. On the contrary we may note—in
anticipation of discussion that the statute and the
regulation which petitioners attack are in fact designed to
promote "quality education" at the level of professional
schools. When one reads Section 1 in relation to Section 5
(3) of Article XIV as one must one cannot but note that the
latter phrase of Section 1 is not to be read with absolute
literalness. The State is not really enjoined to take
appropriate steps to make quality education "accessible to
who might for any number of reasons wish to enroll in a
professional school but rather merely to make such
education accessible to

2. In the trial court, petitioners had made the argument

that Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as
amended, offend against the constitutional principle which
forbids the undue delegation of legislative power, by failing
to establish the necessary standard to be followed by the
delegate, the Board of Medical Education. The general
principle of nondelegation of legislative power, which both
flows from the reinforces the more fundamental rule of the
separation and allocation of powers among the three great
1
departments of government, must be applied with
circumspection in respect of statutes which like the
Medical Act of 1959, deal with subjects as obviously
complex and technical as medical education and the
practice of medicine in our present day world. Mr. Justice
Laurel stressed this point 47 years ago in
vs

"One thing, however, is apparent in the development of the

principle of separation of powers and that is that the maxim of
or
adopted this practice (Delegibus et
Consuetudiniis Anglia edited by G.E. Woodbine, Yale University
Press, 1922, Vol. 2, p. 167) but which is also recognized in
principle in the Roman Law (d.17.18.3)

_______________

1 See People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937) and Pelaez v. Auditor General, 15 SCRA
569 (1965).
2 70 Phil. 221(1940).

740

740 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

 Tablarin vs Gutierrez

giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle

of 'subordinate legislation,' not only in the United States and
England but (People
vs. Rosenthal and Osmena [68 Phil. 318, 1939]. Accordingly,

3
"

The standards set for subordinate legislation in the

exercise of rule making authority by an administrative
agency like the Board of Medical Education are necessarily
broad and highly abstract. As explained by then Mr.
Justice Fernando in

"The standard may be either expressed or implied. If the former,

the non-delegation objection is easily met.

In the Reflector Law, clearly

What is sought to be attained as in
5
"

_______________

3 70 Phil., at 229; underscoring supplied.

4 35 SCRA 481 (1970).
5 35 SCRA, at 497; underscoring supplied. At this point, Mr. Justice
Fernando dropped a useful footnote of the following tenor:

"This Court has considered as sufficient standards, 'public welfare,' Municipality

of Cardona v. Binangonan, 36 Phil. 547 (1917); 'necessary in the interest of law
and order,' Rubi v. Provincial Board, 39 Phil. 660 (1919); 'public interest,' People v.
Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328 (1939); and 'justice and equity and substantial merits of
the case,' International Hardwood v. Pangil Federation of Labor, 70 Phil. 602
(1940)."

101 Phil. 1125 (1957), Mr. Justice J.B. L. Reyes

said:

"It is well established in this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non-
delegable activity that corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless, the
latter may constitutionally delegate authority and promulgate rules and
regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the
reason that the legislature often finds it imprac
 741

VOL. 152, JULY 31, 1987 741

We believe and so hold that the necessary standards are

set forth in Section 1 of the 1959 Medical Act: "the
standardization and regulation of medical education" and
in Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same Act, the body of the
statute itself, and that these considered together are
sufficient compliance with the requirements of the non-
delegation principle.
3. The petitioners also urge that the NMAT prescribed
in MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, is an "unfair, unreasonable
and inequitable requirement," which results in a denial of
due process. Again, petitioners have failed to specify just
what factors or features of the NMAT render it "unfair"
and "unreasonable" or "inequitable." They appear to
suggest that passing the NMAT is an unnecessary
requirement when added on top of the admission
requirements set out in Section 7 of the Medical Act of
1959, and other admission requirements established by
internal regulations of the various medical schools, public
or private. Petitioners arguments thus appear to relate to
utility and wisdom or desirability of the NMAT
requirement. But constitutionality is essentially a question
of power or authority: this Court has neither commission or
competence to pass upon questions of the desirability or
wisdom or utility of legislation or administrative
regulation. Those questions must be addressed to the
political departments of the government not to the courts.
There is another reason why the petitioners' arguments
must fail: the legislative and administrative provisions
impugned by them constitute, to the mind of the Court, a
valid exercise of the police power of the state. The police
power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and
non-waivable power and authority of the sovereign to
secure and promote all the important interests and needs—
in a word, the public

_______________

ticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and provide for the multifarious
and complex situations that may be met in carrying the law into effect.
 (101 Phil., at 1129; underscoring supplied).

742

742 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

6
order—of the general community. An important
component of that public order is the health and physical
safety and well being of the population, the securing of
which no one can deny is a legitimate7
objective of
governmental effort and regulation.
Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is
whether there is some reasonable relation between the
prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for
admission to medical school on the one hand, and the
securing of the health and safety of the general community,
on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully
approached by recalling that the
in all its branches has long been
recognized as a reasonable8
method of protecting the health
and safety of the public. That the power to regulate and
control the practice of medicine includes the power to
regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to
practice medicine, is also well recognized. Thus, legislation
and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to
practice medicine first
have long ago been recognized as valid
9
exercises of governmental power. Similarly, the
establishment of minimum medical educational
requirements—i.e.,
admission
to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a
legitimate
10
exercise of the regulatory authority of the
state. What we have before us in the instant case is
closely related:

_______________

6 E.G., U.S. v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85 (1910); Ermita-Malate Hotel and

Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849 (1967)
and Morfe v. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424 (1968).
7 E.G., Case v. Board of Health, 24 Phil. 256 (1913); People vs. Witte,
146 NE 178 (1925) and Lorenzo v. Director of Health, 50 Phil. 595 (1927).
8 Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 US 442, 98 L.Ed. 829, 74 SCT. 650
(1954); Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners v. Beatty, 220 La. 1,
55 So2d. 761 (1951) and Reisinger v. Com., State Board of Medical
Education and Licensure, et al., 399 A2d 1160 (1979).
 9 Dent v. West Virginia, 129 US 114, 32 L.Ed. 623, 9 SCt. 231 (1889);
State v. Bair, 112 Jowa 466, 84 NW 532 (1900).
10 People v. Love, 298 III 304, 131 NE 809, 16 ALR 703 (1921); Collins
v. Texas, 223 US 288, 56 L.Ed. 439, 32 SCt. 286 (1912).

743

VOL. 152, JULY 31, 1987 743

MECS
Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted earlier, articulates the
rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the
professional and technical quality of the graduates of
medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted
to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading
is sought by selectivity in the process of admission,
selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting
admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the
aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical
practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of
maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in
general, and medical schools in particular, in the current
stage of our social and economic development, are widely
known.
We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe
an admission test like the NMAT as a means for achieving
its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants
into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality
of medical education in the country." Given the widespread
use today of such admission tests in, for instance, medical
schools in the United States of11 America (the Medical
College Admission Test [MCAT]) and quite probably in
other countries with far more developed educational
resources than our own, and taking into account the failure
or inability of the petitioners to even attempt to prove
otherwise, we are entitled to hold that the NMAT is
reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of
legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is
useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the
potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in
those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds
for disease or trauma.
4. Petitioners have contended, finally, that MECS Order
No. 52, s. 1985, is in conflict with the equal protection
clause of the Constitution. More specifically, petitioners
assert that that portion of the MECS Order which provides
that
 based on the
scores on the NMAT, by the
Board of Medical

_______________

11 See, e.g., McDonald v. Hogness, et al., 92 Wash. 431, 598 P. 2d. 707 (1979).

744

744 SUPREME COURT REPORT ANNOTATED

Tablarin vs Gutierrez

Education after consultation with the Association of Philippine

Medical Colleges." (Italics supplied)

infringes the requirements of equal protection. They assert,

in other words, that students seeking admission during a
given school year, e.g., 1987-1988, when subjected to a
different cutoff score than that established for an, e.g.,
earlier school year, are discriminated against and that this
renders the MECS Order "arbitrary and capricious." The
force of this argument is more apparent than real.
Different cutoff scores for different school years may be
dictated by differing conditions obtaining during those
years. Thus, the appropriate cutoff score for a given year
may be a function of such factors as the number of students
who have reached the cutoff score established the
preceding year; the number of places available in medical
schools during the current year; the average score attained
during the current year; the level of difficulty of the test
given during the current year, and so forth. To establish a
permanent and immutable cutoff score regardless of
changes in circumstances from year to year, may well
result in an unreasonable rigidity. The above language in
MECS Order No. 52, far from being arbitrary or capricious,
leaves the Board of Medical Education with the measure of
flexibility needed to meet circumstances as they change.
We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring
certain minimum scores therein as a condition for
admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not
constitute an unconstitutional imposition.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is
DISMISSED and the Order of the respondent trial court
denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
 and
concur.

——o0o——

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