Marcus Knaup

Unity of Body and Soul

or
Mind-Brain-Being?
Towards a Paradigm Shift
in Modern Concepts of Personhood

ABHANDLUNGEN ZUR PHILOSOPHIE

Abhandlungen zur Philosophie
Marcus Knaup

Unity of Body and Soul

or Mind-Brain-Being?
Towards a Paradigm Shift
in Modern Concepts of Personhood

J. B. Metzler Verlag
About the author
Dr. Marcus Knaup is researcher at the FernUniverität Hagen in Germany.

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Contents

List of Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IX
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XI

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Part 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

A. Dualism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

1. Descartes and the modern man. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

1.1 Father of the lived body-soul debate: René Descartes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.2 Descartes on the threshold of the modern age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.3 Descartes and scholasticism – »Where Descartes has doubts,
the Middle Ages are at their wits’ end!« – . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.4 In search of certainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.5 Cartesian (methodical) doubt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.6 How doubt is not having the last word . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.7 Res cogitans and res extensa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.8 Made in the image of a machine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.9 About fellow human beings and animals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.10 The passions of the soul . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.11 Descartes and free will . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.12 Descartes and his followers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
1.12.1 The first highlight: From Cartesian understandings of
nonphysicality to the ghost in the machine: Gilbert Ryle
and the lived body-soul problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
1.12.2 The second highlight: Mere brains in a vat? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
1.12.3 The third highlight: John Eccles, Karl R. Popper and
Antonio Damasio about Descartes and dualism . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Appreciation and criticism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

B. Monistic Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

I. The substance monism of Spinoza. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

2. Spinoza’s parallelism and the one divine substance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.1 Psychophysical parallelism as a response to Descartes . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.2 Mos geometricus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
VI       Contents

2.3 Indispensable vocabulary: Causa sui, substance, attribute, modus . 66

2.4 Spinoza and the one divine substance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.5 Spinoza’s world of the imperative and the question of freedom . . . . 72
2.6 Causa sui and the problem of lived body-soul unity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Appreciation and criticism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

II. Mental monism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

3. George Berkeley: Esse est percipi et percipere . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

3.1 Berkeley on human perception and reality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Appreciation and criticism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

III. Material monism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

4. Processes of the soul: symptoms of the body machine – Julien Offray

de La Mettrie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
5. Behaviorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
6. Identity theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
A digression: Anomalous monism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
7. Epiphenomenalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
8. The emergence theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
9. Supervenience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
10. Eliminative materialism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
11. Of computers and men: Functionalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
Critique and outlook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138

C. Hylemorphism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
12. Aristotle and hylemorphism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
12.1 In search of a soothing midrange in the concert of physicalists
and dualists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
12.2 De Anima: What Aristotle has to say about lived body and soul . . . 144
12.3 In the footsteps of Aristotle: Hylemorphism’s counterproposal to
physicalism and dualism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
Conclusion of Part 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164

Part 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
A. Man and his brain. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
1. The human brain: An extraordinary organ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
1.1 Ecce cerebrum! . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
1.2 What do brain researchers know today? An expedition through
the neuron jungle. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
1.3 A journey through the history of brain research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
 Contents       VII

1.4 I can see what you see. Is mindreading possible? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193

1.5 Brain injury and its consequences for human experience and
behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
2. Philosophy and brain research. A complicated relationship? . . . . . . . . . . . 203
2.1 Brain research: The fourth narcissistic affront? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
2.2 Quo vadis brain research? The Manifest of Brain Researchers . . . . . 208
2.3 The premises and limits of brain research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
2.4 The necessity for a multitude of perspectives: The relationship
between philosophy and the neurosciences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223

B. The rediscovery of the lived body (Leib) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225

Preliminary Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
3. I am where my lived body is . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
3.1 The lived body and the physical body (Leib and Körper) . . . . . . . . . . 227
3.2 My lived body is always »here« . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
3.3 My lived body is a moving body . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
3.4 The phenomenon of expression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
4. You are where your lived body is. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
4.1 Empathy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
4.2 The lived body of the other as the carrier of free movement and
orientation center of the spatial world . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240
4.3 The lived bodies of others and the phenomenon of expression:
The human gaze . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
4.4 Empathy and mirror neurons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249

C. Paths to consciousness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251

5. Brain research and the question of consciousness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
5.1 Consciousness: A mysterious phenomenon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
5.2 F. Crick and C. Koch in search of neural correlates for conscious
manifestations of life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
5.3 Consciousness as the result of the human brain. Gerhard Roth
about human consciousness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264
5.4 Phenomenal experiencing as a challenge for brain research.
The works of Ramachandran and Hirstein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270
5.5 The conscious organism: Antonio Damasio about an astonishing
phenomenon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275
5.6 From brain research to a new culture of consciousness: The theses
of Thomas Metzinger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277
Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286
VIII       Contents

D. Lived body and soul or mind and brain? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289

6. The mind-brain paradigm as a threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289
6.1 Downsizing man to a mind-brain being . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289
6.2 The world as a construct of the brain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292
6.3 Of linguistic confusion and philosophical fallacies in the mind-
brain paradigm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295
6.3.1 Referential fallacy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300
6.3.2 The fallacy of localization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301
6.3.3 The mereological fallacy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302
6.4 Lived body-soul unity or mind and brain? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304
6.5 Man the incarnate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308
6.5.1 The origins of mankind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308
6.5.2 Brain death = soulless? On the problematic definition of
brain death in the mind-brain paradigm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314
Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327

E. Brain research and the question of human freedom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329

7. Threatened liberty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329
7.1 Preliminary remarks and problem definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329
7.2 The question of freedom as a multi-layered affair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332
7.3 How to see the current free-will debate in a wider context . . . . . . . . 334
7.4 About the »able to choose« freedom and the »able to act«
freedom. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 338
8. The Libet experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339
8.1 Mind Time. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339
8.2 The experiments of Benjamin Libet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343
8.3 One-sided interpretations of the Libet Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 348
8.4 Are other interpretations possible? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357
9. Can we do what we want? Or do we want what has been determined? . 362
9.1 Our brain circuitry determines us! W. Singer’s position . . . . . . . . . . . 362
9.2 Compatibilism versus incompatibilism? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 369
9.3 Searle’s gap theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371
9.4 Michael Pauen: Freedom and determinism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 376
9.5 Determination and the indeterminate nature of quantum physics . 383
9.6 Why the determinism thesis does not allow real dialogue . . . . . . . . . 384
10. The freedom of man . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 388
10.1 Man in action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 388
10.2 Freedom needs commitment: A thought experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . 396
10.3 Our freedom as conditional freedom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 398
10.4 In all freedom: A brief conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 402
Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 405

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 409
List of Abbreviations

AI Artificial Intelligence
AMP Edith Stein: Der Aufbau der menschlichen Person. Vorlesung zur
philosophischen Anthropologie
An. Aristotle: De Anima
Art. Article
Ax axioma (Spinoza)
BOLD Blood Oxygenation Level Dependent Mechanism
BP Bereitschaftspotential
Cf. confert (lat.), compare
Cor. corollarium (Spinoza)
Def. definitio (Spinoza)
Dem. demonstratio (Spinoza)
Disc. Descartes: Discours de la méthode
Ed./Eds. Editor(s)
EN Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics
EPh Edith Stein: Einführung in die Philosophie
EES Edith Stein: Endliches und ewiges Sein. Versuch eines Aufstiegs zum
Sinn des Seins
et al et alii
f./ff. following
Hist. an. Aristotle: Historia animalium
Hz Hertz
LBP Lateralisiertes Bereitschaftspotential
LRP Lateralized Readiness Potential
Med. Descartes: Meditationes de prima philosophia, Meditations on First
Philosophy
Met. Aristotle: Metaphysics
ms millisecond
NCC Neural Correlates of Consciousness
PA Edith Stein: Potenz und Akt. Studien zu einer Philosophie des Seins
Part. an. Aristotle: De partibus animalium
PE Edith Stein: Zum Problem der Einfühlung
Phys. Aristotle: Physics
Pol. Aristotle: Politics
Princ. Descartes: Principia Philosophiae
Prop. propositio (Spinoza)
PS Descartes: Les Passions de l’âme, The Passions of the Soul
RP Readiness Potential
X       List of Abbreviations

Schol. scholium (Spinoza)

TH Descartes: Traité de l’ homme, Treatise on Man
WP Edith Stein: Welt und Person Beitrag zum christlichen
Wahrheitsstreben
Acknowledgements

In the summer semester of 2011, the original version of this text was accepted as the
inaugural dissertation in fulfillment of the Ph. D. requirements at the Philosophical
Faculty, Albert Ludwigs University in Freiburg i. Br. The dissertation was complet-
ed under the supervision of Professor Regine Kather (Freiburg i. Br.) whose direc-
tion led me to choose this topic. I owe her much gratitude for her untiring support
and expert guidance during my doctoral studies. Gratitude is also due to Professor
Markus Enders (Freiburg i. Br.) and Professor Friedrich A. Uehlein (Freiburg i. Br.)
who acted as second and third examiners. In 2012, this study was published by the
Karl Alber Verlag under the title of »Leib und Seele oder mind and brain? Zu einem
Paradigmenwechsel im Menschenbild der Moderne.« Since 2013, the text has been
available in a student edition, which has since been reissued.
I am now very pleased to present this study in English. I want to thank Dr. Karin
Paasche for translating it. She has also translated all quotations unless noted oth-
erwise. Thanks are also due to the publishers for their trust, confidence and initia-
tive. I also thank my present department head, Professor Thomas Sören ­Hoffmann
(Hagen), whose academic support has been invaluable. This text, as well as the
­German original, is dedicated in love and gratitude to my parents, Wolfgang and
Magdalena Knaup.
Marcus Knaup
Hagen, Summer of 2018
Introduction

»... old or young teased me with a question.

For example: no one’s found out, ever,
What makes body and soul fit together:
Stick tight, as if there’ll be no separation,
Yet always cause each other irritation.«1

Allow me to begin with a request: Imagine you are sitting at a desk, and this book is
open in front of you. You think about its title and try to predict what kind of reading
may be expecting you. As you can’t read it all in one sitting, you wonder how much
time you’ll need to read it and how you will fit this into your timetable. As you reflect
about this, the book falls off the desk and hits your little toe. I assume you may feel
some pain. What you feel now is qualitatively different from what you experienced
a few moments ago. It is your pain, not my pain. You now intend to get up and take
a few steps in the room to make sure all is well with your little toe. So far so good.
In this initial meditation, we have encountered several mental manifestations of
life: We have thought about something, planned and organized an activity, experi-
enced a sensation, did something on purpose. We could of course add to this list.
We take it for granted every day that we can make decisions. What happens around
us does not leave us untouched. We notice things; we can observe, perceive and
understand. When our life is not running as smoothly as we would like or when we
are faced with a calamity, we can be sad or afraid. Yet we can also be grateful. We
can experience life from the perspective of hope and nurture a wish we would like
to come true. We can be happy and feel like hugging the whole world. Of course we
can also be terribly angry or even furious at ourselves and at those around us. ­People
can pray or laugh about a good joke. It all includes hunger and thirst, culinary de-
lights during a delicious dinner, listening to our favorite music or meditating over
an impressive painting. All these experiences, events and attributes will be discussed
in this text under the Terminus technicus mentale that expresses mental, spiritual
or even mental-spiritual manifestations of life. Everything of which you and I are
aware (such as thinking about my dissertation or about the experience of pain), is a
mental manifestation of life. Yet this is not to say that we must be aware of all mental
manifestations of life.
What is extremely interesting is the connection between these rather typical men-
tal manifestations of life and their material course of development: How, for exam-
ple, does your feeling, thinking and experiencing as you read this text fit together

1 Goethe, J. W.: Faust II, 6892–6896.

2       Introduction

with your corporeal performance.2 What can we say about the relationship between
the mental and the physical? Thiat is the body and soul problem.
Similarly, just as in a Russian Matryoshka doll several figures appear all at once,
several questions are connected with this problem: What can be said from an onto-
logical view about the mental and the physical? Do mental manifestations of life need
corporeal conditions? Do they possibly require adequate corporeal conditions? Can
we still speak of the »soul« in this day and age, and what exactly do we mean when
we speak of the lived body (»Leib«)? I call these questions the ontological sub-problem
of the lived body and soul problem.
Can our mental manifestations of life achieve anything in our world? Perhaps
change something? What is the relationship between your intention to get away from
the desk, put the text aside for a moment, take a few steps, and actually walk through
the room? Or between your intention to study the text and your actually reading it?
Can we presume that what we want and how we act are truly free decisions? Or are
both prescribed by our brain and completely determined by it? I suggest calling this
question the freedom theory sub-problem of the lived body and soul problem.
Through which medium do we actually gain access to our environment? How
can we relate to other persons? How successful are we in focusing on something?
Does the thought that Aristotle lived in Greece almost 2400 years ago become
comprehensible solely through cerebral processes? Who or what allows us to relate
to this philosopher from antiquity? A certain area in our cerebrum? Is this thought
aligned with specific processes in our brain? I call this topic area the problem of
intentionality.
In the last analysis, what actually guarantees that we remain identical to our-
selves? Our brain? Or is it a soul after all? How do we want to understand ourselves
and other people? It is Nobel laureate Francis Crick’s »Astonishing Hypothesis« that

»You, your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your sense of per-
sonal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behavior of a vast assembly of
nerve cells and their associated molecules. As Lewis Carroll’s Alice might have phrased
it: ›You’re nothing but a pack of neurons‹. So far removed is his hypothesis from the
imagination of most people that it can be truly called astonishing.«3

The French neurobiologist Jean-Pierre Changeux makes similar claims in his book
which has the telling title L’ homme neuronal [Neuronal Man]. Here he claims that
the observations and reflections of modern brain research not only force us to con-
sider the inner behavioral mechanisms, but to adopt a determinist position towards
these mechanisms. Changeux claims that theoretically there is nothing to prevent us

2 In the study at hand I will speak of »corporeal,« [German: physisch] or rather, »corporeal
prerequisites and conditions« when fundamentally I am referring to the material compo-
nents of these living creatures. With regard to a physical [German: physikalisch] approach,
I am by contrast referring to a discussion about the accumulation and reaction of physi-
cal-chemical particles and the rules which govern them.
3 Crick, F.: The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the Soul. New York 1995, p. 3.
 Introduction       3

from describing human behavior as neuronal activity. He holds the opinion that it is
high time for neuronal human beings to manifest themselves.4
The question is whether – like Crick and Changeux – we want to understand
ourselves as mind-brain creatures, or whether we would rather see ourselves as lived
body-soul entities, as living organisms? Which of the two paradigms quoted here are
really viable? I call this topic area the problem of personal identity.
As the above examples demonstrate, the lived body-soul problem arises through
the experience we can all have ourselves. It is a central subject, a leitmotif throughout
the history of philosophy.5 When we read the introductory chapters of many doc-
toral theses, we keep reading sentences such as this: What is of importance here is,
for one reason or another, especially relevant in the present moment. It has always
piqued the interest of human beings and awakened their thirst for knowledge. There
is often the indication that one or other aspect of the topic being discussed should
finally be brought into the scientific limelight and should be reflected upon in new
and exciting ways.6 I definitely do not want to depart from traditional approaches in
my introductory chapter. It seems to me that all the above statements also apply to
my own dissertation topic. Considering the remarkable progress made in the neuro­
sciences, medicine (e. g. organ transplantation) and research regarding artificial in-
telligence, the topic under discussion here seems to be more critical than ever before,
with enormous consequences for areas such as ethics and jurisprudence. This topic
is constantly feature in the press, and the flood of publications in the sciences and in
popular science is hardly manageable.
It is not surprising that when we are concerned with issues regarding human be-
ings, their relationships with each other and with their environment, this is indeed
an »ancient« topic that has been discussed since time immemorial. The body-soul
problem is a perennial subject, one of the really »great« problems of philosophy. I
will therefore not be presumptuous and regard my own thoughts as the final word in
this matter. My main concern is to identify problem horizons, to explore the scope
and limits of certain theories, and to look for approaches that lead further.

4 Changeux, J.-P.: Der neuronale Mensch. Wie die Seele funktioniert – die Entdeckungen der
neuen Gehirnforschung. Reinbek bei Hamburg 1984, p. 161.
5 Introductions that can be recommended: Seifert, J.: Leib und Seele. Ein Beitrag zur philos-
ophischen Anthropologie. Salzburg 1973; Seifert, J.: Das Leib-Seele-Problem und die gegen-
wärtige philosophische Diskussion. Eine systematisch-kritische Analyse. Darmstadt 21989;
Heckmann, H.-D.: Mentales Leben und materielle Welt. Eine philosophische Studie zum
Leib-Seele-Problem. Berlin/New York 1994; Zoglauer, T.: Geist und Gehirn. Das Leib-Seele-
Problem in der aktuellen Diskussion. Göttingen 1998; Goller, H.: Das Rätsel von Körper und
Geist. Eine philosophische Deutung. Darmstadt 2003; Bieri, P. (Eds.): Analytische Philosophie
des Geistes. Weinheim/Basel 42007; Teichert, D.: Einführung in die Philosophie des Geistes.
Darmstadt 2006; Hermanni, F./Buchheim, T. (Eds.): Das Leib-Seele-Problem. Antwortver-
suche aus medizinisch-naturwissenschaftlicher, philosophischer und theologischer Sicht. Mu-
nich 2006; Searle, J.: Mind. A Brief Introduction. Oxford 2004; Beckermann, A.: Analytische
Einführung in die Philosophie des Geistes. Berlin/New York 32008; Brüntrup, G.: Das Leib-
Seele-Problem. Eine Einführung. Stuttgart 32008.
6 Cf. e. g. Kläden, T.: Mit Leib und Seele ... Die mind-brain-Debatte in der Philosophie des
Geistes und die anima-forma-corporis-Lehre des Thomas von Aquin. Regensburg 2005,
pp. 15 f.; Hartmann, D.: Philosophische Grundlagen der Psychologie. Darmstadt 1998, p. 1.
4       Introduction

Whiles this topic is presently discussed with great enthusiasm, there is little
thinking outside the box. For example, certain thinking patterns are accepted un-
questioningly. They include the assumption that the lived body-soul problem can be
approached either dualistically or physicalistically. Regarding the complex of sub-
jects around the issue of freedom, the only alternative offered is that we are either
absolutely free or totally pre-determined. Such ingrained thought-processes are an
incentive to re-examine and throw a light on aspects of this fascinating topic which
have been paid little attention so far.
My study is to be developed in two sections. In the first section, we will dis-
cuss relevant attempts in philosophical history and at present to interpret the lived
body-soul problem. There will be a problem-based discussion of the most important
points of view, debates, and lines of argument. Promising and less advisable sugges-
tions will be differentiated.
Initially, the objectives of dualism will be discussed. How can a dualist position
be defined? What was at stake for René Descartes, the father of the modern dualist
solution to the lived body-soul problem? What influence does Descartes and his
followers still exert today? Subsequently, monistic positions are presented and crit-
ically discussed. I start with Spinoza’s concept of a divine substance out of which
a psycho-physical parallelism emanates as a response to the Cartesian suggestion
concerning the mental monism espoused by George Berkeley, and I continue to
the now prevalent material monism, i. e. to modern physicalism. Here, I make the
connection between the mechanical-materialistic thought process of La Mettrie and
the modern conception of behaviorism, identity theories (with a side note regarding
anomalous monism), epiphenomenalism, emergence, and supervenience theories,
eliminativism, and functionalism. It is neither possible nor desirable to grapple with
all positions prevalent today. The strengths and weaknesses of the various approach-
es must be explored. Are there other paths besides the dualist and the physicalist? Is
it possible to conceive of a counter-proposal? What could it be like? Is Aristotelian
hyle­morphism suited to indicate a possible way? How does hylemorphism determine
the relationship between mental manifestations of life and physical requirements?
Does the theory developed by Aristotle also offer a feasible and viable solution for
the twenty-first century?
Against this background, the second section of the present study will be shedding
light on the initial questions of modern neuroscience7 and of phenomenology. In
the year 2000, the Decade of the Brain came to an end. In Presidential Proclamation
6158 of July 17, 1990, President George Bush Sr. had called for it in the name of the
U. S. Congress, »to enhance public awareness of the benefits to be derived from brain
research«8. He thus introduced his government’s support for the neurosciences. In
Germany, a similar idea was pursued when the following ten years were declared

7 The designation »neuroscientist« is an umbrella term for various scientific sectors (physiol-
ogy, anatomy etc.) which have taken it upon themselves to research our neural system. For
stylistic reasons I will speak interchangeably about »brain research« and about the »neuro-
sciences.« The concepts mean the same.
8 Presidential Proclamation No. 6158 of 17 July 1990. http://www.loc.gov/loc/brain (Re-
trieved: 28 Nov. 2007).
 Introduction       5

to be a Decade of the Brain. Surely, both proclamations stressed the importance of

brain research at this time. Many people are touched and deeply moved when they
are given an insight into the organ housed inside our skull. For example, modern
imaging techniques can identify which parts of the brain are involved in reading this
introductory chapter.
In a first step, I come to terms with questions of the human brain. What role did
earlier generations of researchers attribute to this organ? What do we know today
about the structure, function, and significance of this organ? Can mental manifes-
tations of life such as thoughts even be observed with modern processes, and what
influence does brain damage have on the experience and behavior of human beings?
The American neuroscientist Vilayanur Ramachandran calls neuroscience a water-
shed moment in the history of humanity9 and expects that in the next few years (in
the »golden age of neurology«10) our understanding of humans will change drasti-
cally. Klaus-Jürgen Grün speaks of a paradigm shift away from the lived body-soul
paradigm to one that is concerned with the brain.11 Can we expect neurobiology to
present us with a solution to the lived body-soul problem?12 What are the epistemo-
logical and methodological premises which define brain research, and where are
their limitations?
Quite a few authors hold the opinion that the cerebrum alone is responsible for
our own experience of ourselves, and that the body is merely a vehicle, or is no more
than the tool of this super organ. In the present study, I call such notions mind-brain
paradigm. In the light of such understandings, it is advisable to take up and examine
the perception of the body as it is experienced. Here the phenomenological work of
philosophers such as Edith Stein may provide an insight into the relevance of our
own corporeality as well as into the significance of someone else’s lived body.
Our consciousness can be understood as an especially fascinating representation
of our mental manifestations of life. For a long time, the scientific study of this phe-
nomenon has not been especially important to neuroscientists and was not consid-

9 Cf. Ramachandran, V.: A Brief Tour Of Human Consciousness. From Impostor Poodles to
Purple Numbers. New York 2004, p. 2.
10 Ibid., p. xiii.
11 Cf. Grün, K.-J.: Die Welt ist ein Hirnphänomen. In: UniReport der Johann-Wolfgang Goethe
Universität Frankfurt a. M. No. 5. 18 Oct. 2004.
12 In the context of this study we will encounter very different understandings of the lived
body-soul problem. Several authors believe this is a purely scientific issue which can only be
discussed within the framework of a scientific debate. There is also the idea that we are here
concerned with an artificial issue which has arisen as a result of an inadmissible confusion
of ideas. It is thus an issue which will disappear through right thinking.
Instead of speaking of the lived body-soul problem Peter Janich refers to the G-G-Problem.
(Janich, P.: Der Streit der Welt- und Menschenbilder in der Hirnforschung. In: Sturma, D.
(Ed.): Philosophie und Neurowissenschaften. Frankfurt a. M. 2006, p. 76. Here he hopes to
escape the chicken-and-egg problem – i. e. whether the brain or the spirit was first and what
in the final analysis has greater meaning for our humanity. According to Janich the letter
»G« [for Geist and Gehirn in German] can represent both the mind and the brain. And this
is why, according to him, the concepts »mind-brain-problem« or the »brain-mind-prob-
lem« should both be acceptable (cf. ibid., p. 83). Given such terminology, the human living)
body is nowhere to be seen. And the impression is created that the brain and the spirit are
the essence of our humanity. I will thus use the term »lived body.«
6       Introduction

ered conducive to promoting their career. Only a relatively small number of authors
have published anything at all on this topic. This has changed significantly. We even
read sometimes, as Thomas Nagel said, that the key question regarding the lived
body-soul problem would be much less interesting if it were not for topics concerned
with consciousness.13 Today, a group of distinguished scientists who assume that
conscious manifestations of life can be understood totally through brain processes
are opposed by other scientists who lay great stress on the observation that a person’s
consciousness cannot be directly observed by a third person such as a scientist in a
laboratory. What do brain researchers today really know, and what might they know
in days to come? What has been pre-programmed, and what are the actual insights?
The next step in this study is a critical discussion of one of the mind-brain par-
adigm interpretations connected to brain research data. Here, I will respond to er-
roneous conclusions in the argumentation as well as to ethical consequences of the
mind-brain paradigm for understanding the beginning of human life and the ques-
tion whether brain death can be equated with the personal death of an individual.
In a concluding chapter I will deal with the topic of brain research and free will.
Many neuroscientists and neurophilosophers announce the end of freedom of per-
sonal volition as an act of free will [Wollenkönnen] and of our personal responsibility.
Do we perhaps merely desire what has been determined and prescribed for us? Are
we determined through our brain or is it still appropriate to speak of freedom today?
Can we find a suitable middle ground between accepting that we are totally deter-
mined and that we have absolute freedom?
There are two more comments I would like to get off my chest: Many observations
in this study have roots in philosophical tradition. One reason for this is that current
debates seem to imply that the wheel must be re-invented. The result is that there is
regression to a place behind extremely fruitful and ground-breaking insights from
the history of philosophy. A further comment concerns the risk I have taken in not
adhering to only one single aspect of the lived body-soul problem such as the under-
standing of the »soul« in the work of one specific author, or the current debate con-
cerning the freedom of will. I am not concerned about presenting the exegesis of a
specific problem that interests only individual specialists. What I consider important
is in view of modern challenges to pay heed to the concerns of good philosophy: not
to lose sight of »the whole« while struggling to achieve an appropriate interpretation
of the human being.

»In the sciences it is very worthwhile to seek out and then develop a partial truth already
possessed by the Ancients.«14

One of the tasks of philosophy is to examine matters closely, to get to the bottom of
all things, to define boundaries, and as Goethe said, to seek out and develop the truth
which the people of the distant past already possessed. In the first book of De Anima,
Aristotle used a similar formulation: »We must take with us for comparison the theo-

13 Quoted by: Metzinger, T.: Einleitung: Das Problem des Bewusstseins. In: Metzinger, T. (Ed.):
Bewusstsein. Beiträge aus der Gegenwartsphilosophie. Paderborn 52005, p. 48.
14 Goethe, J. W.: Maxims and Reflections. Penguin Classics. London. 1998, p. 17.
 Introduction       7

ries expounded by our predecessors, in order that we may adopt those which stated,
and be on our guard against any which are unsatisfactory«15. In this first section, the
most significant approaches to the lived body-soul problem will be presented, their
specific characteristics, outlines and weaknesses discussed.

15 An. I, 2, 403b.
Part 1
A. Dualism
»It is certain that I am entirely and truly distinct
from my body, and may exist without it.«1

Those who call themselves dualists or are called dualists by others are probably
convinced that the mental exists and cannot merely be reduced to corporeal devel-
opments. First of all, dualists would probably let us know that we can clearly differ-
entiate between mental manifestations of life and physical processes. Not everyone
agrees. Monists and hylemorphists see it differently. But more about this later. Here,
we will first take a closer look at dualism. In a conversation with dualists, we would
very soon discover their conviction that we are more than material that can be phys-
icalized. Their response to our question what exactly they mean would be that cor-
poreal entities and mental manifestations of life are radically different, that the rift
between them cannot be argued away.
The most well known and most powerful dualist solution suggested is substance
dualism. Proponents of this position are perfectly convinced that the spiritual di-
mension is not dependent on a corporeal level. We can also say: Let the corporeal be
neither necessary nor sufficient for our mental manifestations of life. You and I are
assembled of both body and mind. The father of this view is the French philosopher
René Descartes.

1 Descartes, R.: Med. VI, 9.

12       A. Dualism

1. Descartes and the modern man

Descartes’ Lehre machte viel Spektakel

und gilt auch heut noch als Orakel:
Natur und Geist erkläre sie,
die Zwei-Substanzentheorie
verleihe Überzeugungskraft
Natur- und Geisteswissenschaft!2

Descarte’s teaching was a spectacle

And is still considered an oracle;
Nature and mind it wants us to see
As the Two Substances Theory.
It promises persuasive properties
To natural science and the humanities!

1.1 Father of the lived body-soul debate: René Descartes

»Bene qui latuit, bene vixit«3

Surely, René Descartes plays a significant role in the debate about the lived body-soul
problem, and that is why I begin with him. His basic assumptions, his assessment of
how to deal with questions and problems, his view of human beings and their world,
his way of thinking and of getting to the bottom of things, have never quite gone out
of fashion and flourish to this day. Descartes casts a long shadow.4
There were and still are innumerable and very divergent interpretations in the
scientific literature about who »Cartesius« really was and what his goals were. In the
17th century, the Cartesian approach to the lived body-soul problem was particularly
debated: Is it viable and what are its weaknesses? How can we improve on Descartes?

2 Geldsetzer, L.: Die Philosophenwelt in Versen vorgestellt. Stuttgart 1995, p. 92.

3 Descartes’ Epitaph.
4 Literature about Descartes: Röd, W.: Descartes. Die Genese des cartesianischen Rationalis-
mus. Munich 1982; Glucksmann, A.: Die cartesianische Revolution. Von der Herkunft Frank-
reichs aus dem Geist der Philosophie. Reinbek bei Hamburg 1989; Holz, H. H.: Descartes.
Frankfurt/New York 1994; Cassirer, E.: Descartes. Lehre – Persönlichkeit – Wirkung. Ham-
burg 1995; Baker, G./Morris, K. J.: Descartes’ Dualism. London/New York 1996; Perler, D.:
René Descartes. Munich 1998 ; Rodis-Lewis, G.: Le développement de la pensée de Descartes.
Paris 1997; Prechtl, P.: Descartes zur Einführung. Hamburg 2000; Koyré, A.: Descartes und
die Scholastik. In: Stein, E.: Übersetzungen V. Freiburg/Basel/Vienna 2005; Poser, H.: René
Descartes. Eine Einführung. Stuttgart 2003; Engelen, E.-M.: Descartes. Leipzig 2005; Ben-
nett, M. R./Hacker, P. M. S.: Philosophical Foundations Of Neuroscience. Malden/Oxford
10
2010, pp. 25–30.
A useful text as introduction to dualist concepts: Lowe, E. J.: Dualism. In: McLaughlin, B. P./
Beckermann, A./Walter, S. (Eds.): The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford
2009, pp. 66–84.
 1. Descartes and the modern man       13

A century later there was special interest in what differentiated this French aristocrat
from the medieval philosophers and theologians: What new possibilities did Des-
cartes point out? What new doors did he open? What did he see with completely dif-
ferent eyes than his predecessors? There was consensus in the 18th century that a new
chapter in the history of philosophy had begun with Descartes. Especially studied
at that time was Descartes’ contribution to our ability to recognize. Today’s interest
in Descartes stands on the shoulders of these earlier works and interpretations. The
approach to Descartes is not always gentle. Some thinkers see him as the »source of
modern nihilism«.5 John Searle regards Descartes as »the greatest single catastrophe
in the history of philosophy in the last four centuries«.6 He says that Descartes has
left us with more problems than solutions and that his answers to the lived body-soul
problem were not convincing, not even deserving the mark of adequate.7 According
to Daniel Dennett, Descartes and dualism should be crushed in a Holy War.8 By
contrast, the French philosopher André Glucksmann, inspired by Michel Foucault’s
»biting anti-Cartesianism,«9 thinks that »we are only truthful in our province when
we encounter the one who introduced the rigor of true philosophizing into French
literature and thus opened to the people of France the possibility of the philosophical
existence Descartes designated as ›bon sens‹10 – the sanity of an orderly mind« and
so, he could proclaim, »Descartes c’est la France!«11 With a twinkle in his eyes, Edwin
McCann describes Descartes’ work as »extremely influential«12, thus hitting the nail
quite well on the head.
Edmund Husserl and other proponents of phenomenological philosophy see in
Descartes’ philosophy the first pointer in the direction of phenomenology. Husserl
admires Descartes as »the greatest thinker of France«13 and recommends the Medi-
tationes as required literature. He praises the way Descartes approaches problems but
is not blind to his weak points. He speaks of the basic perversity to seriously regard
human beings and animals as dual realities; »as an association of two realities which
in their sense of reality should be equated.«14

5 Cf. Glucksmann, A.: Die cartesianische Revolution. Von der Herkunft Frankreichs aus dem
Geist der Philosophie. Hamburg 1989, p. 61.
6 Searle, J.: Mind. A Brief Introduction. Oxford 2004, pp. 13 ff.
7 Ibid., p. 33.
8 Cf. Dennett, D.: Consciousness Explained. Harmondsworth 1993, p. 37.
9 Glucksmann, A.: Die cartesianische Revolution. Von der Herkunft Frankreichs aus dem Geist
der Philosophie. Hamburg 1989, p. 23.
10 Ibid., p. 23.
11 Thus the title of the French original edition: Glucksmann, A.: Descartes c’est la France. Paris
1987.
Cf. also: Glucksmann, A.: Die cartesianische Revolution. Von der Herkunft Frankreichs aus
dem Geist der Philosophie. Hamburg 1989, p. 70.
12 McCann, E.: History: Philosophy of mind in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In:
Guttenplan, S. (Ed.): A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford 102005, p. 338.
13 Husserl, E.: Cartesianische Meditationen. Eine Einleitung in die Phänomenologie. Hamburg
1995, p. 3.
14 Husserl, E.: Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänome-
nologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie. Hamburg 1992, p. 222.
14       A. Dualism

Husserl’s student Edith Stein writes in her Einführung in die Philosophie [Intro-
duction to Philosophy] that the clearest and the most precise perception in which
something appears to us could prove to be a dream or a hallucination. »Thus, if
philosophy is to be a domain of absolutely certain knowledge, we not only have to
eliminate the results of the individual sciences, we must also place in parenthesis all
experiential knowledge.« Stein points out that in his famous meditation on doubt,
Descartes had already recognized that if we are able to doubt everything we know by
way of natural experience and through the sciences, then doubt itself undoubtedly
remains. »Thus, not only doubt remains but also the perception whose reliability
is doubted endures as the recognition of the doubting subject. Similarly, thus each
experience itself as well as the whole domain of consciousness.«15
Yet Stein also points out that Descartes had only opened our view for this re-
search area, that only Husserl had seen this as an independent area of consciousness
research. He was the one to uncover Descartes’ »cogito« as a field for intrinsic de-
scription and recognized that it presented a separate field of scientific activity.16 She
meant phenomenology.
Today, there is lively discussion about what Descartes wanted to prove with his
doctrine of the soul, and what influence his thinking still has on the science and
philosophy of our time. What did Descartes really want? To shed some light on
these questions, it is best to take a look at the time of Descartes first. We are at the
threshold of the modern age.

1.2 Descartes on the threshold of the modern age

»Several years have now elapsed since I first

became aware that I had accepted, even from
my youth, many false opinions for true, and
that consequently what I afterward based on
such principles was highly doubtful; and from
that time I was convinced of the necessity of
undertaking once in my life to rid myself of
all the opinions I had adopted, and of com-
mencing anew the work of building from the
foundation.«17

The term »modern age« is used for the basic ideological attitude which emerged
between 1500 and 1650, following the Middle Ages.18 The coming of a new era does

15 Stein, E.: EPh., pp. 16 f.

16 Cf. ibid., p. 17.
17 Descartes, R.: Med. I, 1.
18 Regarding the approach to the modern age: Guardini, R.: Das Ende der Neuzeit. Ein Versuch
zur Orientierung. Würzburg 1950; Blumenberg, H.: Die Legitimität der Neuzeit. Frankfurt
a. M. 1966; Friedell, E.: Kulturgeschichte der Neuzeit. Die Krisis der europäischen Seele von
der schwarzen Pest bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg. Munich 142001; Holz, H. H.: Descartes. Frank-
furt a. M. 1994, pp. 16–53; Prechtl, P.: Descartes zur Einführung. Hamburg 22004, pp. 11–28.
 1. Descartes and the modern man       15

not mean that everything is suddenly new and different. There are overlaps here and
there which caused Blumenberg to speak of an epochal threshold:19

»For much of the Middle Ages and the modern age, history was synchronous. Increas-
ingly, the supposedly founding documents of the modern age turn out to be a mere
interface of historical developments whose source goes far back to the past. The image
of the founders succumbed to the erosion of historical diligence which always traces the
roots of presumed revolutions back to an evolution.«20

Without claiming to be exhaustive, I want to name a few characteristics of the mod-

ern age:
Surely, a guiding concept for understanding that epoch is the word »discoveries.«
With great passion, things are made known that were unknown before. Seeking and
finding the new, that is important. Think of Columbus, for example, and his adven-
turous travels which finally took him to America. According to legend, he tried and
tried to make an egg stand on end. He finally succeeded in both. Egon Friedell, in
his Kulturgeschichte der Neuzeit, calls Columbus an experimenter, who tried a new
course. When he reached America, he could prove his success, the genius of his ac-
tions.21 In the new age, a special fascination seems to take hold for discovering and
trying out, not only to find new continents or how to make an egg stand on end, but
also consequential inventions such as the printing press, the compass and firearms.
Whether is was the natural sciences, religious creeds or politics – nothing was simply
tolerated the way it was. The role of respected persons, professionals, government
officials and authorities – that had been taken for granted – was suddenly being
challenged. Was it really correct what the elders were teaching? Shouldn’t this or
that be judged differently? Certainly the modern age is not a quiet era: The Refor-
mation brings about religious disintegration of Europe’s religious solidarity. There
is fragmentation into different denominations but little unity in faith. It is accepted
that parties and groups are agitated and meet each other in hostility. The hegemony
of Europe is at stake. Contrasts in the Hapsburg/French alliance lead to armed con-
flict. Descartes himself lives and philosophizes at a time when the Thirty-Years War
(1618–1648) brings discord and strife. It is not only the French philosopher who asks
whether there is anything on which we can depend or whether everything should
simply be swept away.
Inseparably connected with the concept of the modern age are the measures
undertaken by the natural sciences. Their successes are considerable. Much is re-
searched, much is newly evaluated. Remarkable in this age is the contribution made
by the mathematical method. As Jonas points out, the modern natural sciences orig-
inated in the decision to force nature to reveal her truth. This was to occur through
active intervention into the object being discovered. This intervention is called »ex-

19 Cf. Blumenberg, H.: Die Legitimität der Neuzeit. Frankfurt a. M. 1966, pp. 436 f., quoted by
Holz, H. H.: Descartes. Frankfurt a. M. 1994, p. 16.
20 Ibid., pp. 436 f.
21 Cf. Friedell, E.: Kulturgeschichte der Neuzeit. Die Krisis der europäischen Seele von der
schwarzen Pest bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg. Munich 142001, p. 251.
16       A. Dualism

periment.«22 Jonas addresses the surging prestige accorded to experimental research

in the modern age. What is important is to focus on aspects which are generally
replicable. Unimportant is who conducts the experiment, what the experimenter
thinks, believes and feels.
It is known that technical resources are becoming increasingly effective and pow-
erful. They reveal perspectives nobody could have ever anticipated. The wealth of
our senses could not only be supported, but extended. The focal point of all interest
becomes all that can be measured, calculated, and compared. The question of quality
is being thrust aside. How members of a church congregation experience the scent
of incense on a Sunday can be no more quantified than questions regarding meaning
and value. For example, if the question should arise: »What is the color red?« The an-
swer concerns only wavelengths and not what is being experienced or what meaning
has been assigned to this color: the color of love, of jurisdiction, a warning signal for
danger, the color of the martyrs and of the Holy Spirit.
One discipline seems to have been chosen for a special status among all the other
sciences, namely physics. This is the science that teaches the others how to work ac-
curately and empirically. The belief that everything can be measured almost becomes
a matter of fact. »This also affects and changes the intellectual and emotional rela-
tionships among people and with nature. Nature became the ›other‹ and was mer-
cilessly subjected by the sovereignty of humans«23 Everything that was encountered
was pigeon-holed or placed in different drawers either physically-quantitatively or
personally-qualitatively. For example, how to deal with the phenomenon of warmth?
The first drawer contains the question of how particles move. What warmth means
for you or for me (for example sitting around an open fire), is not under considera-
tion. That belongs in another drawer. As Thomas Fuchs documents so well: An ugly
chasm has opened between us and our environment. As he points out, it is precisely
the phenomenon of warmth that is related to the relationship between our lived body
and our environment, to the air or to the sun. If this is not the case, all these relation-
ships which transmit to us the quality of everything, are cut back and reinterpreted
as inner-psychological states.

»Then truly there is only the movement of particles, light waves, chemical reactions.
Cleansing the world of all subjective anthropomorphic parts encourages the creation of
a skeleton of nature which then allows itself to be more easily dissected, manipulated
and controlled technically.«24

Today the mind-brain project of some neuroscientists and philosophers has as its
goal to get a firm grip of what human beings experience as a measurable constella-
tion in the cerebrum. A mind-brain image of the human being is a successor to the
manner in which nature is dealt with in the modern age. It is an image from which

22 Cf. Jonas, H.: Technik, Medizin und Ethik. Praxis des Prinzips Verantwortung. Frankfurt
a. M. 1987, p. 98.
23 Hösle, V.: Philosophie der ökologischen Krise. Moskauer Vorträge. Munich 1994, p. 55.
24 Fuchs, T.: Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan. Eine phänomenologisch-ökologische Konzep-
tion. Stuttgart 2008, p. 19.
 1. Descartes and the modern man       17

the quality of meaning has been removed. The natural sciences with which Descartes
grew up as a young man was trying to get a grip on nature and to control it. It seemed
important to soar above nature. Whoever wants to be part of the spirit of the age can
no longer understand that there is a purpose in nature. We no longer talk about that!
Descartes himself was a passionate natural scientist.25 His observations concern-
ing the planetary system were not without consequences. Today, his contributions
to optics are still recognized. Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker appreciated that while
Descartes was not the first to discover the law of refraction, he discovered and jus-
tified it independently.26 As Weizsäcker points out, the mathematical experiment
in which Descartes used glass balls filled with water to determine the optical beam
path in raindrops and thus discovered how rainbows are formed, is a masterpiece of
physical analysis.27
There is good reason why Cartesius is called the »innovator of philosophy« and
regarded as the father of the modern age. Nevertheless, in some points, he also re-
mains rooted in medieval thought.

1.3 Descartes and scholasticism – »Where Descartes has doubts,

the Middle Ages are at their wits’ end!« –

»Is Descartes an accidental St. Thomas?«28

Most philosophers regard it as common sense that Descartes is the typical author
of the modern age. I share that opinion as it is exactly the Cartesian understand-
ing of the lived body and the soul which differs fundamentally from the medieval
»anima forma corporis« perspective. The road Descartes took was very new. Let
us, for example, consider his famous doubt. Koyré rightly points out that the lan-
guage of Descartes is often more vague than scholastic conceptuality.29 Descartes
did not published many of his books in Latin, surely to set himself apart himself
from other authors, but this also allowed him to broaden the circle of his readers.30
Glucksmann aptly points out that when Descartes doubted, the Middle Ages were
at their wits’ end!31 It is fitting that Descartes makes no secret of the fact that he
will have no »dialogue with the dead.« This can be seen as a clear blow against

25 According to Dominik Perler it is inappropriate to speak of a scientific and a metaphysical

phase in the life of Descartes. Cf. Perler, D.: René Descartes. Munich 1998, p. 21.
26 Weizsäcker, C. F. von: Große Physiker. Von Aristoteles bis Werner Heisenberg. Wiesbaden
2004, p. 125.
27 Ibid., p. 125.
28 Ibid., p. 91.
29 Cf. Koyré, A.: Descartes und die Scholastik. In: Stein, E.: Übersetzungen V. Freiburg/Basel/
Vienna 2005, p. 19.
30 Cf. Descartes, R.: Disc. VI, 11.
31 Cf. Glucksmann, A.: Die cartesianische Revolution. Von der Herkunft Frankreichs aus dem
Geist der Philosophie. Hamburg 1989, p. 91.
18       A. Dualism

the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition.32 John Haldane is right on track when he

points out that Descartes, »rejected many aspects of traditional Aristotelian psy-
chology and introduced new ways of thinking.«33 Samuel Guttenplan similarly sees
in Descartes’ philosophy a »radical break« with Aristotelian-Thomistic philoso-
phy.34 Hacker and Bennett likewise speak of a »profound upheaval in European
thought.«35
Yet the common interface where Descartes and scholasticism meet should not be
overlooked. Descartes appropriates several important scholastic ideas.36 Here, Ben-
net and Hacker offer this quote: »that the soul or mind is incorporeal, that it can
exist independently of the body, and that it is immortal«37. This is most likely why
Glucksmann refers to the Meditationes as the Summa Theologiae which no longer
succeeds.38 In their work, Gordon Baker and Katherine J. Morris highlight »the per-
sistence of traditional concepts and doctrines in Descartes’ philosophical system.«39
Husserl’s student, Alexander Koyré, whose work Essai sur l’ idee de Dieu et les
preuves de son existence chez Descartes was translated into German in 1922 by Hed-
wig Conrad-Martius and Edith Stein and in 1923 was published by the Cohen pub-
lishing house under the programmatic title, Descartes und die Scholastik [Descartes
and Scholasticism]. It deals with the scholastic element of Descartes’ teachings. Koy-
ré calls to our attention that not all links to early and late scholasticism have been cut,
which is something Descartes himself prefers to conceal. Koyré reminds us that »it
is not always easy to determine the sources of Descartes’ inspiration, or to separate
the foreign elements which are incorporated in his teaching. Descartes himself not
only gives us no information regarding this issue, his works also contain no direct
indication of sources he used. Also he never openly specifies which ideas he has as-
similated. Descartes, in fact, does all he can to erase and disguise all traces.«40
Koyré points out that several figures of thought and lines of argumentation em-
ployed by Descartes were already employed by various medieval thinkers. It is cer-
tain that Descartes knew the writings of these authors. He studied them and built
on them and then thought in new ways, farther than they had. In my opinion, Koyré

32 Franz Schupp speaks of Descartes’ »aversion« to scholastic philosophy. He assumes that

this already began in his time in La Flèche (Schupp, F.: Geschichte der Philosophie im Über-
blick. Vol. 3. Neuzeit. Hamburg 2003, p. 110).
33 Haldane, J.: History: Medieval and Renaissance philosophy of mind. In: Guttenplan, S. (Ed.):
A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford 102005, p. 334.
34 McCann, E.: History: Philosophy of mind in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In:
Guttenplan, S. (Ed.): A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford 102005, p. 338.
35 Bennett, M. R./Hacker, P. M. S.: Philosophical Foundations Of Neuroscience. Malden/Oxford
10
2010, p. 25.
36 Cf. Koyré, A.: Descartes und die Scholastik. In: Stein, E.: Übersetzungen V. Freiburg/Basel/
Vienna 2005, p. 9.
37 Bennett, M. R./Hacker, P. M. S.: Philosophical Foundations Of Neuroscience. Malden/Oxford
10
2010, p. 25.
38 Glucksmann, A.: Die cartesianische Revolution. Von der Herkunft Frankreichs aus dem Geist
der Philosophie. Hamburg 1989, p. 91.
39 Baker, G./Morris, K. J.: Descartes’ Dualism. London/New York 1996, p. 194.
40 Cf. Koyré, A.: Descartes und die Scholastik. In: Stein, E.: Übersetzungen V. Freiburg/Basel/
Vienna 2005, p. 10.
 1. Descartes and the modern man       19

is not quite correct when he equates Descartes’ understanding of God with that of
traditional Christian theology.41 According to Descartes, the understanding of God
can be approached geometrically (more geometrico). It is not a contradiction for him
to imagine God in mathematical terms.42 When Descartes lectures about God, he
is primarily concerned with supporting his own thought processes. He is not really
thinking of a divine counterpart to whom we can pray.

1.4 In search of certainty

»I had always a most earnest desire to know

how to distinguish the true from the false, in
order that I might be able clearly to discrim-
inate the right path in life, and proceed in it
with confidence.«43

What is irrefutably certain? What is unshakable and cannot simply be cast away? Or
is there possibly nothing in this world that is completely reliable? Descartes focuses
on these questions. He does not expect the sciences of his day to applaud or assist
him; he holds the hardly modest opinion that all his scientific colleagues pay hom-
age to an erroneous methodological approach. Science longing for innovations is
waiting for him and he is the one to provide these fresh original approaches, these
new methods.
Descartes stresses again and again that when it is (not only, but also) a matter of
progress in science, we cannot avoid using our own reason. What others have said is
all very well but, according to Descartes, it does not really help us to think further.
On the contrary, it may even make everything much more complicated:

»For since God has endowed each of us with some light of reason by which to distin-
guish truth from error, I could not have believed that I ought for a single moment rest
satisfied with the opinions of another, unless I had resolved to exercise my own judg-
ment in examining these whenever I should be duly qualified for the task.«44

Descartes pulls the syllogistic modus operandi of the scholastics to pieces. He argues
that what we know already is merely repackaged in a more or less attractive manner
and offered anew. There finally had to be an end to such a »deceptive package.«45

41 Cf. ibid., pp. 16, 17, 18, 52 etc.

42 »Recurring to the examination of the idea of a Perfect Being, I found that the existence of
the Being was comprised in the idea in the same way that the equality of its three angles
to two right angles is comprised in the idea of a triangle, or as in the idea of a sphere, the
equidistance of all points on its surface from the center, or even still more clearly; and that
consequently it is at least as certain that God, who is this Perfect Being, is, or exists, as any
demonstration of geometry can be.« (Descartes, R.: Disc. IV, 5).
43 Descartes, R.: Disc. I, 14.
44 Descartes, R.: Disc. III, 5.
45 Cf. Descartes, R.: Disc. II, 6, cf. ibid. VI, 6.
20       A. Dualism

Descartes is equally impatient with those who hope to discover any »occult« facts.
Those he finds very suspicious. He would rather research what is truly evident.
But how can he best succeed in such a search? How should he proceed? These
questions are of great concern to Descartes. What is important, he thinks, is that
something new is brought to light. It should not only be warmed up. Furthermore,
we should not begin with just any hidden occult matters, but with what is certain,
what is evident.46 What is not so obvious should be attempted at a later stage. First
and foremost, start with that which is evident. When Descartes speaks of what is
»evident« he means that we should no longer refer to reports or observations and
thoughts of others. We cannot be very wrong when something proves to be »clare et
distincte.« It is wise to subdivide the problem, with which we have to grapple, into
smaller problem areas. We should first wrestle with what is not too complicated to
solve. After we have come to grips with such a beginning, we can move from the
straight-forward issues to the more complex. Thus, everything is done step by step.
To be quite certain that nothing is omitted it is useful to keep order and create an
overview.

1.5 Cartesian (methodical) doubt

»Not that in this I [...] may doubt, and seek

nothing beyond uncertainty itself.«47

Within Cartesian writings, the work Discours de la méthode plays a special role, not
only because it is the first writing Descartes presented to the public, and because
it remains a work that can be easily read today. In Discours, Descartes wished to
provide information concerning what it means for you and me to be human beings.
What resulted was Descartes’ sharp separation between body and mind; between
physical processes and mental manifestations of life; and the categorization of a hu-
man being as a substance that thinks. But let us look at these one by one.
Most commentators share the opinion that the fourth chapter of Discours is espe-
cially interesting and important. The reason is that it is there where Descartes dives
into the ocean of doubt.48 For Descartes, doubt is more than merely critically illumi-
nating something. For Dominik Perler it is important to point out that doubt is just
any crisis of purpose and creativity.49 Thus, Poser points out:

46 Cf. Descartes, R.: Disc. II, 7–10.

47 Descartes, R.: Disc. III, 6.
48 Cf. Gabriel, G.: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnistheorie von Descartes bis Wittgenstein. Pad-
erborn 1993, pp. 29–38; Perler, D.: René Descartes. Munich 1998, pp. 74–83; Poser, H.: René
Descartes. Eine Einführung. Stuttgart 2003, pp. 53–111.
49 Cf. Perler, D.: René Descartes. Munich 1998, p. 68.
 1. Descartes and the modern man       21

»Methodological doubt must be structured in such a manner that it captures everything

and, in that sense, is universal and radical [...]. »Yet the goal of methodological doubt is
not some kind of agnosticism, an admission of total inability to gain knowledge. Quite
the contrary, the goal of methodological doubt is to find the basic reason, the founda-
tion on which the building of certain knowledge can be indisputably erected once and
for all.«50

Descartes wants to comprehend what counts, what is certain. He wishes to identify

about which can be no doubt, that which defies all doubt. Is it possible to find such a
firm foundation? Descartes tries, and doubt is close at hand. What Descartes has in
mind finds expression in the Meditationes:

»[I] am constrained at last to avow that there is nothing of all that I formerly believed to
be true of which it is impossible to doubt, and that not through thoughtlessness or lev-
ity, but from cogent and maturely considered reasons; so that henceforward, if I desire
to discover anything certain, I ought not the less carefully to refrain from assenting to
those same opinions than to what might be shown to be manifestly false.«51

Doubt is not the result of rashness or recklessness. It is the result of well-founded

reasons. Doubt relates to very different facets of human life and does not remain
constant. As Perler points out, doubt becomes ever more incisive and gains ever
more traction.52
Descartes poses the question whether that which we know and can conceive of
through our senses can ever be totally certain. Or is it appropriate to doubt here as
well? Yes, here, too, we can doubt! Descartes gives us an example: We can watch
the sun very clearly. We should not, however, allow ourselves to assume that it is
only as large as it appears to us.53 Descartes is not asking us to constantly question
everything we perceive with our senses. He does say however, that it can deceive us
tremendously and is therefore worthless as a source of certainty in knowledge.54 Des-
cartes’ motto is: Do not trust anyone who has ever deceived you.55 When we attempt
to establish what is truly certain, the insights we gain through our senses (whether
through our eyes, mouth or ears) must be eliminated. These insights can be doubted,
they all must be abandoned.
Doubt must be even more passionate. Descartes casts himself ever deeper into the
ocean of doubt. He takes neither life boat nor life jacket. He asks whether in the per-
ception of material objects, which cannot be thought, if we can find the possibility of
certainty. This too is not the case Descartes tells us. Doubt does not end here either.
We can never be certain of the properties that comprise these objects. Indeed – and
it could be that these objects do not even exist. Descartes’ voice-over sounds like this:

50 Poser, H.: René Descartes. Eine Einführung. Stuttgart 2003, pp. 53 f.

51 Descartes, R.: Med. I, 10.
52 Cf. Perler, D.: René Descartes. Munich 1998, pp. 74 ff.
53 Cf. Descartes, R.: Disc. IV, 8 and Descartes, R.: Med. II, 2.
54 Cf. also Poser, H.: René Descartes. Eine Einführung. Stuttgart 2003, p. 55.
55 Cf. Descartes, R.: Med. I, 3.
22       A. Dualism

»And finally, when I considered that the very same thoughts (presentations) which we
experience when awake may also be experienced when we are asleep, while there is at
that time not one of them true, I supposed that all the objects (presentations) that had
ever entered into my mind when awake, had in them no more truth than the illusions
of my dreams.«56

When we are in the »Land of Dreams« we usually think that we are awake. This also
occupies Descartes and raises the question whether we can be certain of ever being
awake. How do we know everything is not merely a daydream? A kind of private
cinema? »For how do we know that the thoughts which occur in dreaming are false
rather than those other which we experience when awake, since the former are often
not less vivid and distinct than the latter?«57 Doubt expands further: Even the notion
that this is our body is caught up in billows of doubt. So, Descartes asked himself
whether our own body could perhaps in reality be no more than a presumption,
meaning a product of our fantasy.
And this is not enough. Again and again, we all make big and small mistakes,
and therefore, Descartes does not recognize even logical thinking as a safety net for
undeniable knowledge:

»And because some men err in reasoning, and fall into paralogisms, even on the sim-
plest matters of Geometry, I, convinced that I was as open to error as any other, rejected
as false all the reasonings I had hitherto taken for demonstrations.«58

In his Discours, he draws a line here and leaves it at that. In his Meditationes, he is
even more aggressive in the way he approaches the subject: How do I even know
for certain that a square has four sides? Could it not be that there are more and I
am wrong even in this matter? And is 2 + 3 = 5 an incontrovertible fact? In all life
situations? Especially when we remember that I may be awake, sitting at my desk or
dreaming during the night in my bed? Here Descartes introduces the figure of the
genius malignus. He speculates whether we have been called into existence by an
extremely powerful being who is motivated solely by the desire to deceive us and to
whisper in our ears that a square has four sides. The genius malignus: the intelligent
deceiver, who merely fools us about that of which we am otherwise confident. This
is not a far-fetched figure.59 Instead, it illustrates how passionately Descartes doubts:
»How, then, do I know that he [the genius malignus] has not arranged that there
should be neither earth nor sky nor any extended thing, nor figure nor magnitude
nor place, providing at the same time, however, [...] the persuasion that these do not
exist otherwise than as I perceive them?«60 Descartes is truly merciless in his doubt-
ing. Even regarding the earth, heaven, his own desk, and the book that is on it, some
doubt could be recorded:

56 Descartes, R.: Disc. IV, 1.

57 Descartes, R.: Disc. IV, 7.
58 Descartes, R.: Disc. V, 1.
59 Poser, H.: René Descartes. Eine Einführung. Stuttgart 2003, p. 57.
60 Descartes, R.: Med. I, 9.
 1. Descartes and the modern man       23

»I will suppose that the sky, the air, the earth, colors, figures, sounds, and all external
things, are nothing better than the illusions of dreams, by means of which this being has
laid snares for my credulity; I will consider myself as without hands, eyes, flesh, blood, or
any of the senses, and as falsely believing that I am possessed of these.«61

1.6 How doubt is not having the last word

»I will continue always in this track until I

shall find something that is certain, or at least,
if I can do nothing more, until I shall know
with certainty that there is nothing certain.«62

Much of Descartes’ thinking has fallen victim to doubt. Much had no chance in the
whirlpool of doubt. This makes the questions even more important: What is not
carried away by doubt, and how do we leave the whirlpool? Not to drown in the
ocean of doubt, Descartes must find a sandbar on which to stand that will keep him
from drowning. From this island, all further discovery tours can begin, everything
else can be undertaken. In this image, doubt is not only the dangerous storm, but
it is also the boat in which Descartes sails to the safety of this island. The journey is
not easy. Thunderous waves engulf much as Descartes heads for the self-assurance
that only his own doubting, i. e. the thinking »I«, can grant him. Rescue is in sight.
He can no longer drown. If we can think, we exists. This assumption defies all doubt.
No current, no whirlpool is strong enough to wash away this certainty. Descartes
believes that he has finally found a fundamentum inconcussum: something that can-
not be swept away by doubt and that can be considered totally certain. He thinks,
if I have the suspicion that I am being deceived, then it is I and not someone else
who has this suspicion. This becomes tangible in the often-cited formula63 found
in the Discours: »Je pense, donc je suis.«64 Descartes is convinced: It is truly more
than just wishful thinking to understand something with total certainty. There is
something that is more secure than all the authorities of this world, than all book
learning.
Descartes is sailing across the indisputability of his own thinking, via the assur-
ance that he does indeed exist, to the island of certain awareness. By »thought«,
Descartes means mental manifestations of life accompanied by consciousness, such
as doubt and memory. Unconscious manifestations of life, i. e. processes taking place
in our organism without us being aware of them are distinctly excluded.

61 Descartes, R.: Med. I, 12.

62 Descartes, R.: Med. II, 1.
63 Regarding the problem of the first principle and the discussion as to whether the »ergo«
is a judgement, a sentence or an ending cf. Röd, W.: Zum Problem des premier principe in
Descartes’ Metaphysik. In: Kant-Studien 51. 1959/1960, pp. 176 ff.; Röd, W.: Descartes. Die
Genese des cartesianischen Rationalismus. Munich 1995, pp. 81 ff.; Perler, D.: René Descartes.
Munich 1998, pp. 44–168.
64 Descartes, R.: Disc. IV, 1.
24       A. Dualism

In his Meditationes (2nd Meditation), Descartes reaches the sandbank of safety

with the help of the genius malignus:

»But there is I know not what being, who is possessed at once of the highest power and
the deepest cunning, who is constantly employing all his ingenuity in deceiving me.
Doubtless, then, I exist, since I am deceived; and, let him deceive me as he may, he can
never bring it about that I am nothing, so long as I shall be conscious that I am some-
thing. So that it must, in fine, be maintained, all things being maturely and carefully
considered, that this proposition (pronunciatum) I am, I exist, is necessarily true each
time it is expressed by me, or conceived in my mind.«65

How does Descartes arrive at the sandbank of safety in Discours? Doubt has after
all taken hold of everything. The waves of doubt shake everything and finally cover
everything. Doubt increases. It knocks without intermission. Glucksmann tells us
that doubt encircles and burns.

»Its vehemence covers the secret of its unbelievable expansion. It saps its own driving
force and its motives. It brackets the circumstances which gave rise to this doubt and
put the leading perceptions in quotes. It neither allows itself to be thrust aside by any
event nor moved by any mere target.«66

It is the doubt that reaches the ground. This is not cheap doubt, but a really radical
doubt that runs rampant and grabs whatever it can. Nothing escapes. It is also not
possible to hold on to an anchor to free ourselves from this doubt. Doubting is defi-
nitely associated with risks. Yet Descartes concludes in Discours that if we believe
everything can be destroyed in the whirlpool of doubt, then the one who is possessed
by this doubt must at least in fact exist:

»I supposed that all the objects (presentations) that had ever entered into my mind
when awake, had in them no more truth than the illusions of my dreams. But immedi-
ately upon this I observed that, whilst I thus wished to think that all was false, it was
absolutely necessary that I, who thus thought, should be somewhat; and as I observed
that this truth, I think, hence I am, was so certain and of such evidence, that no ground
of doubt, however extravagant, could be alleged by the Sceptics capable of shaking it, I
concluded that I might, without scruple, accept it as the first principle of the Philosophy
of which I was in search.«67

We shall see that a thinker such as Spinoza takes a different route than Descartes.
He does not cross the ocean of doubt. We see, however, that Descartes at any rate is
determined to search for an »island of awareness«, for something safe in the raging
waves of doubt, to find what can be considered as being certain. He is guided by

65 Descartes, R.: Med. II, 3.

66 Glucksmann, A.: Die cartesianische Revolution. Von der Herkunft Frankreichs aus dem Geist
der Philosophie. Hamburg 1989, p. 96.
67 Descartes, R.: Disc. IV, 1.
 1. Descartes and the modern man       25

the experience that much he has assumed to be certain or that one has acquired
from others is not really as »watertight« and certain as one had assumed. Much
is thrown overboard when doubt is fierce enough. Wolfgang Röd points out that
various skeptical judgments and ideas might have affected Descartes. Yet, his me-
thodical doubt differs radically from skepticism. »Descartes attempted to conquer
skepticism as it was incompatible with the theoretical and practical rationalism to
which he felt committed.«68 Descartes experiences not only the roaring waves of
doubt, he shapes doubt itself into the lifeboat with which he stays the course, which
is beyond all doubt. He must be totally certain that he himself exists when he thinks
and doubts. Descartes is satisfied, he now knows what for him is totally certain and
can be counted as incontrovertible:

»In the next place, I attentively examined what I was, and as I observed that I could
suppose that I had no body, and that there was no world nor any place in which I might
be; but that I could not therefore suppose that I was not; and that, on the contrary,
from the very circumstance that I thought to doubt of the truth of other things, it most
clearly and certainly followed that I was; while, on the other hand, if I had only ceased
to think, although all the other objects which I had ever imagined had been in reality
existent, I would have had no reason to believe that I existed; I thence concluded that
I was a substance whose whole essence or nature consists only in thinking, and which,
that it may exist, has need of no place, nor is dependent on any material thing; so that
»I,« that is to say, the mind by which I am what I am, is wholly distinct from the body,
and is even more easily known that the latter, and is such, that although the latter were
not, it would still continue to be all that it is.«69

Descartes also does not hesitate to doubt the presence of the corporeal. Does he
really have a lived body? A brain? His hands and eyes could also be a delusion. Only
his thoughts cannot be engulfed by the ocean of doubt. They are what make him who
he is: »Thinking is another attribute of the soul; and here I discover what properly
belongs to myself. This alone is inseparable from me.«70

1.7 Res cogitans and res extensa

»I here entered, in conclusion, upon the sub-

ject of the soul at considerable length, be-
cause it is of the greatest moment.«71

The »cogito« has given Descartes an answer to his question about what can truly be
certain. After surviving the waves of doubt, he is now able to step on to a sandbank
in the ocean. He does, however, recognize clearly that this sandbank does not offer

68 Röd, W.: Descartes. Die Genese des cartesianischen Rationalismus. Munich 1995, p. 53.
69 Descartes, R.: Disc. IV, 2.
70 Descartes, R.: Med. II, 6.
71 Descartes, R.: Disc. V, 12.
26       A. Dualism

him much space either to live or to move. Everything outside the cogito-sandbank is
still liable to sink into the ocean of doubt.
Descartes now asks: What exactly can be said about this »I« that is now beyond all
doubt, and which can no longer drown in the ocean of doubt?72 His answer is brief,
but extremely conclusive: Sum res cogitans.73 Descartes sees himself as a substance
whose essence is that he can think. He understands himself as »res!«74 He writes:

»For when I think that a stone is a substance, or a thing capable of existing of itself,
and that I am likewise a substance, although I conceive that I am a thinking and non-­
extended thing, and that the stone, on the contrary, is extended and unconscious, there
being thus the greatest diversity between the two concepts, yet these two ideas seem
to have this in common that they both represent substances.«75

As we shall see, it is Spinoza who takes offence at these words. Descartes believes he
is on the right path to understanding himself as a thinking res. This is also how he
understands the »soul.«76 This has no longer anything to do with entelechy, i. e. with
the perspective of the »anima forma corporis.« We will return to this later.
According to Descartes, if I cannot even claim without a doubt that I am seated
at this desk with head, hand, and leg, and that I exist as a corporeal being, conscious
mental manifestations of life (e. g. my thinking, remembering, lesson planning) also
cannot be attributed to the physical. Even if there were no physical processes, the
conscious mental manifestations of life would remain the same. It is totally impossi-
ble that these would be relying on a body! In other words, from now on the physical
is unnecessary for our mental manifestations of life, i. e. for what Descartes calls the
spirit: »I know that nothing of all that I can embrace in imagination belongs to the
knowledge which I have of myself, and that there is need to recall with the utmost
care the mind from this mode of thinking, that it may be able to know its own nature
with perfect distinctness.«77 Descartes reasons that this is how it has to be: body and
mind. The physical and mental manifestations of life must be fundamentally differ-
ent from each other. They differ by nature.
We see that Descartes presumes there are two entirely different kinds of sub-
stances: the res cogitans and the res extensa. Hence, he believes, he has explained
everything both well and exhaustively.78 He further expounds that the two substanc-
es distinguish themselves by their specific characteristics. Expansion characterizes
the res extensa. The salient feature of the res cogitans is the little word »cogitare,«

72 Cf. Descartes, R.: Med. II, 7.

73 Cf. Descartes, R.: Med. II, 8.
74 Descartes, R.: Med. II, 6.
75 Descartes, R.: Med. III, 21.
76 »Unlike Aristotle, he conceived of the soul not as the principle of life, but as the principle
of thought or consciousness« (Bennett, M. R./Hacker, P. M. S.: Philosophical Foundations Of
Neuroscience. Malden/Oxford 102010, p. 26).
77 Descartes, R.: Med. II, 6.
78 »The concept of substance dualism is only appropriate if we remember that this term refers
exclusively to those substances created by God.« (Teichert, D.: Einführung in die Philosophie
des Geistes. Darmstadt 2006, p. 38).
 1. Descartes and the modern man       27

»think,« »penser.« It is essential to recognize that Descartes is concerned with more

than a linguistic differentiation between the two. He takes it for granted that there
is a fundamental disparity, a deep trench that separates them. What does that mean
for you or for me? The answer is that the human being he presents to us is a coalition
of both substances: »Descartes intimated that a human being is not an individual
substance, but a composite entity.«79 Because a person’s mental life »could by no
means be deduced from the power of matter,«80 the res extensa is hereafter neither
the necessary nor the adequate prerequisite for my spiritual life. According to the
French aristocrat Descartes, if we can keep apart the res cogitans and the res extensa,
this can only be because they are also entirely different. A clearly manageable sand-
bank, to once again use the very pertinent image I have taken over from Jaspers,81 has
indeed been taken by storm. But we cannot call it a stretch of land where anything
can flourish: the res cogitans is entirely on its own. Moreover, a retaining wall must
still be built to secure the insights gained. This is where God enters the equation: He
is to assume the tasks of securing the retaining wall and of safeguarding what does
not belong to the cogito-sandbar:

»[T]he idea of a complete and independent being, that is to say of God, occurs to my
mind with so much clearness and distinctness, and from the fact alone that this idea
is found in me, or that I who possess it exist, the conclusions that God exists, and that
my own existence, each moment of its continuance, is absolutely dependent upon him,
are so manifest, as to lead me to believe it impossible that the human mind can know
anything with more clearness and certitude.«82

I will not enlarge here upon either the commonalities or the special features of this
thought compared with other arguments in the philosophical-theological tradition
pointing to the existence of God (e. g. Anselm’s ontological argument).83 Instead, I
will now incorporate the understanding of beings made in the image of the machine
which seems to be even more important to Descartes than the image of human be-
ings made in the image and likeness of God.

79 Bennett, M. R./Hacker, P. M. S.: Philosophical Foundations Of Neuroscience. Malden/Oxford

2010, p. 26.
10

80 Descartes, R.: Disc. V, 12.

81 Cf. Jaspers, K.: Descartes und die Philosophie. Berlin 1956, p. 18.
82 Descartes, R.: Med. IV, 1.
83 Cf. Poser, H.: René Descartes. Eine Einführung. Stuttgart 2003, pp. 75–111; Prechtl, P.: Des-
cartes zur Einführung. Hamburg 2000, pp. 86–94; Koyré, A.: Descartes und die Scholastik. In:
Stein, E.: Übersetzungen V. Freiburg/Basel/Vienna 2005.
28       A. Dualism

1.8 Made in the image of a machine

»But what is a man? Shall I say a rational

animal? Assuredly not.«84

We have seen that Descartes clearly differentiates between the res cogitans and the res
extensa. Even though these two substances have very little in common, what unites
them is that they both depend on the divine substance. According to Descartes, the
bodily substance and the spirit or the thinking substance can be understood under
one common concept as being created as these are objects which only need God’s
help for their existence.85 Insofar as material bodies can be distinguished by means
of their extensio, for Descartes, these different bodily realities can be classified as
purely mechanical matters. Under these auspices, the manifestations of life of hu-
man organisms are likewise seen from a mechanistic perspective. Descartes deems it
appropriate to juxtapose human organism and machines (»comme une machine«86).
In his Discours, Descartes affirms that our lived body is a machine, »made by the
hands of God, which is incomparably better arranged, and adequate to movements
more admirable than is any machine of human invention.«87 In his other works, he
reaches a similar conclusion.88 Allow me now to quote a passage from the Traité de
l’Homme [Treatise on Man], where he very clearly states how he wishes this simili-
tude to be understood. He writes that he supposes,

»that the body is nothing else but a statue or earthen machine, that God has willed to
form entire, in order to make it as similar to us as is possible. Thus he not only would
have given it the external color and shape of our members, but also he put in the inte-
rior all the parts which are required to make it walk, eat, respire, and that it imitate, in
the end, all of our functions which can be imagined to proceed from matter alone, and
depend only on the disposition of the organs. We see clocks, artificial fountains, mills,
and other similar machines, which, being only made by men, nevertheless do not lack
the force to move themselves in several diverse means. And it seems to me that I could
not imagine as many kinds of movements in the latter as I suppose to be made by the
hand of God, nor attribute to him only so much craftsmanship as we could think of. Now
I will not stop to describe to you the bones, nerves, muscles, veins, arteries, stomach,
liver, spleen, heart and brain, nor all the other diverse parts of which this statue must be
comprised. I assume these to be entirely similar to the parts of our body which bear the
same name, and that could be shown to us by some learned anatomist.«89

What Descartes states here he already put in writing prior to his Meditationes. Des-
cartes makes no secret of the fact that in his opinion bodily actions are nothing

84 Descartes, R.: Med. II, 5.

85 Descartes, R.: Princ. I, 52.
86 Descartes, R.: Disc. V, 9.
87 Descartes, R.: Disc. V, 9.
88 Descartes, R.: Med. II, 5.
89 Descartes, R.: TH, p. 44.
 1. Descartes and the modern man       29

but mechanical processes. He tries to explain this point to his readers by means of
the »hypothetical human being.« The word »hypothetical« can actually be omitted
as this portrayal is consistent with normal mortals such as you and I.90 The func-
tions of our organism can be wonderfully discussed when we think of clockwork
processes.91 In this way, we can also dispose of the notion that the soul permeates
living beings. This is what Descartes means when he says manifestations of life
originate from matter. Conscious mental manifestations of life are severed from
the living organism. This does not concern the living unity of the human being.
Descartes thus quite effortlessly »reduces our organs to an arena for mechanical
processes.«92
For Descartes, your body and mine are purely material res, i. e. objects, things.
Is this true? Only matter? Together with our corporeality, Cartesius loses sight of
everything that makes our life colorful, all that makes us into living beings. Descartes
is not at all concerned with what constitutes or belongs to an organism. He concedes
that we need a body for better or worse to accomplish certain things. But he regards
this organism for nothing more than a mute body machine that discloses nothing
about the person. As Rotschuh says, »Descartes has stripped matter of all its qualities
and substantial forms and has reduced its behavior to movement and form of the
smallest particles.«93
Gordon Baker and Katherine J. Morris, however, defend Descartes’ clockwork
comparison:

»In speaking of clocks, Descartes had in mind instruments that were magnificent in
appearance and practically miraculous in their sophistication and accuracy. They were
objects of respect (as the clock in Salisbury Cathedral still is).«94

In my opinion, Hans Blumenberg hits the mark when he points out that by portray-
ing humans in the image of a machine, this profoundly alters the relationship with
other human beings and with the environment. He writes:

»Man puts what he ›can do‹ (or ›could do‹) in place of the unknown, supposedly un-
knowable product of the divine potentia absoluta. For Descartes, however, the highest
quintessence of what man ›can do‹ is the machine. As a purposeful structure put to-
gether entirely from insight, the machine now becomes a counter concept to ›nature‹,
which the modern age strictly forbids itself from interpreting teleologically.«95

90 Cf. ibid., p. 135.

91 Cf. ibid., pp. 136, 142.
In his Discours, he writes: »The mechanism of the corporeal machine is executed with the
same effectiveness as when ›a clock composed only of wheels and weights can count the
hours and measure time more exactly than we with all our skill‹« (Descartes, R.: Disc. V, 6).
92 Rotschuh, K. E.: Einführung: Die Rolle der Physiologie im Denken von Descartes. In: Des-
cartes, R.: TH. Heidelberg 1969, p. 14.
93 Ibid., p. 14.
94 Baker, G./Morris, K. J.: Descartes’ Dualism. London/New York 1996, p. 93.
95 Blumenberg, H. : Paradigms for a Metaphorology. New York 2011, p. 68.
30       A. Dualism

As human beings are living organisms, we can in my opinion not simply classify
them as machines or equate them with these. A watch, an apparatus, a machine
simply functions. After all, a machine is indifferent to whether the book in front of
you falls on its toe or not. It feels nothing, i. e. it is neither aware nor does it experi-
ence anything. When Descartes makes the comparison with a clockwork or other
complex apparatus, he emphasizes that the human being is to be understood as a
»res« that is t be understood as an object. A human being ceases to be an »object
of respect.« A machine does not have to be accorded any respect. When it does not
function as smoothly as we wish, we can easily beat it with a hammer or throw it
into a corner. We can willfully or deliberately break it down into its components,
and once we have done this, we have risen above this machine, we have proven our
superiority.96
This is also how Descartes understands the work of physicians. He said that a
good physician is someone who can maintain the human machine and can even
discard parts of it. Given this logic, it is self-evident that somatic illnesses must be
sharply distinguished from mental illness. According to Damasio, Descartes shares
responsibility for the approach taken by medicine – away from the organic spirit-in-
the-body approach. »How annoyed Aristotle would have been with Descartes, had
he known him!«97

1.9 About fellow human beings and animals

»I readily discover that there is nothing more

easily or clearly apprehended than my own
mind.«98

Thanks to methodical doubt, Descartes knows: Yes, I truly exist! But is there any-
thing else that exists outside my personal island? Inevitably the problem arises: What
about other human beings? »In so far as there is a world of bodies or minds external
to Descartes’ own, this is something that requires argument.«99
When Descartes sits in a sidewalk café and sees people ordering a cup of coffee or
merely walking by, he assumes, as he records in his second meditation, that these are
human beings. »I see them, [...] and yet what do I see from the window beyond hats
and cloaks that might cover artificial machines, whose motions might be determined
by springs?«100 Descartes’ questions whether it is possible that the foreign bodies
passing his table at the sidewalk café may in fact be ingeniously built machines with-

96 »Descartes had made the fundamental contribution of opening up all animal activity to
mechanical analysis – i. e. to what became physiology and neuroscience« (Bennett, M. R./
Hacker, P. M. S.: Philosophical Foundations Of Neuroscience. Malden/Oxford 102010, p. 30).
97 Damasio, A.: Descartes’ Error. Emotion, Reason, And The Human Brain. London 1994,
p. 251.
98 Descartes, R.: Med. II, 16.
99 Avramides, A.: Other Minds. In: McLaughlin, B. P./Beckermann, A./Walter, S. (Eds.): The
Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford 2009, p. 729.
100 Descartes, R.: Med. II, 13.
 1. Descartes and the modern man       31

out manifestations of life. He can be certain of only one thing, that he is alive himself.
But what about the others for whom there is no room on his cogito-sandbar? And
what of the other furry and feathered creatures he can also observe from his chair at
the sidewalk café?101
Descartes responds by saying that the sparrow he hears chirping or the dog being
taken for a walk on a leash cannot claim ownership of a res cogitans. This is the major
difference between him and them. He attempts to legitimize this claim by saying that
human beings can speak. He writes as follows:

»For it is highly deserving of remark, that there are no men so dull and stupid, not even
idiots, as to be incapable of joining together different words, and thereby constructing
a declaration by which to make their thoughts understood; and that on the other hand,
there is no other animal, however perfect or happily circumstanced which can do the
like.«102

Descartes tells us that he can put into words what he sees on the street. He can thus
let others participate in the experience.103 He can tell others that he sees a sparrow
and a dog. He can share the thoughts that come to him in these moments and those
who walk past him while he sits in the street café can do this as well. Therefore,
Cartesius supposes that we are naturally not dealing with machines without men-
tal capacities. While he cannot identify with the friendly servers at the street café
and with his neighbors at the next table, he does connect with them. Just as he is
a human being, so those seated at the tables around him must be human beings as
well and capable of interacting with each other through the medium of language. It
cannot all be just a mirage. He emphasizes that it cannot be merely a grand illusion,
no grandiose deception. That would be extremely annoying and would indicate a
lack of perfection on this globe. And precisely that would not be consistent with his
image of God. Could there be a God who would play such games? Descartes rejects
such a thought.Instead, he envisages a God who ensures that everything outside his
»cogito-sandbank« is truly there, and that human beings are truly human beings and
not machines.104
Let us return to the feathered guests or the furred four-legged guests at the side-
walk café. It is apparent that Descartes distinguishes sharply between human nature
and non-human nature.105 I have already drawn your attention to the shift in the
understanding of nature apparent in the modern age. We can now elaborate on this.
The love of creation we find in Francis of Assisi or in Bonaventure, who saw in all
creation the footprints of the creator, and who responded with a hymn of praise, is
not to be found in the philosophy of Descartes, who writes nothing about being em-
bedded in nature. Instead, he speaks of controlling nature. »Life has withdrawn from

101 Cf. Perler, D.: René Descartes. Munich 1998, pp. 220–231; Perler, D.: Descartes über Fremd­
psychisches. In: Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 77 (1995), pp. 42–62.
102 Descartes, R.: Disc. V, 11.
103 Cf. Perler, D.: René Descartes. Munich 1998, pp. 222 f.
104 Descartes, R.: Med. IV, 7.
105 Cf. Hösle, V.: Philosophie der ökologischen Krise. Moskauer Vorträge. Munich 1994, p. 48.
32       A. Dualism

nature and is now totally concentrated on the human being.«106 Cassirer hit the nail
on the head: »As far as Descartes is concerned, plants and animals are no more than
soul-less devices.107 They are mere things.« At best, he compares the dog running
past his table at the sidewalk café to a clockwork mechanism. Descartes claims that
nature very obviously functions within this animal and its organs just as the wheels
and springs from which a clock is made, and the latter can consequently measure
time and hours more accurately than we humans can, despite all our intelligence.108
There are modern commentators such as Dominik Perler,109 who go to great lengths
defending the position taken by Descartes. Gordon Baker and Katherine J. Morris
claim: »He compared animals with certain mechanisms that were expressly chosen
because they were then the objects of admiration and wonder.«110 It seems to me
that those who rush to the defense of Descartes, have missed something extremely
important. We cannot simply ignore that the followers of Descartes have dismissed
animals as being no more than »bêtes machines,« Aristotle, for example, emphasizes
that animals are living and feeling organisms and not merely automats. Descartes is
even thought that when he kicks the dog running past him at the sidewalk café, it will
feel no pain. He believes we can deal with animals as we do with a piece of clockwork:
We can carry them with us, but we can also dispose of them or even dismember
them.111 The consequences of the mechanistic interpretation of living beings, as ad-
vocated by Descartes and later by La Mettrie, are apparent in a report on the usual
approach taken at the well-known Port-Royal. The report tells us:

»There was hardly anyone who did not speak of an automaton. [...] The blows they dealt
to the dogs were inflicted with great indifference and those who pitied these creatures
as if they truly experienced pain were made fun of. They said the animals were no more
than clock mechanisms. As the whole body had no feelings whatsoever, their cries when
they were beaten was merely the noise made when a small spring was touched. So, as
to observe their blood circulation, which was an important part of their discussion, they
even nailed the four paws of the poor animals to wooden planks and dissected them
while they were still alive.«112

106 Cassirer, E.: Descartes. Lehre – Persönlichkeit – Wirkung. Hamburg 1995, p. 246.
107 Cf. Descartes, R.: Disc. V, 11 f.
108 Descartes, R.: Disc. V, 11.
109 Cf. Perler, D.: René Descartes. Munich 1998, pp. 227, 258.
110 Baker, G./Morris, K. J.: Descartes’ Dualism. London/New York 1996, p. 94.
111 Cf. Hösle, V.: Philosophie der ökologischen Krise. Moskauer Vorträge. Munich 1994, p. 55.
112 Quoted by: Fischer, K.: Drei Grundirrtümer der Maschinentheorie des Bewusstseins. In:
Köhler, W. R./Mutschler, H.-D. (Eds.): Ist der Geist berechenbar? Philosophische Reflexionen.
Darmstadt 2003, pp. 33–57, here p. 33.
 1. Descartes and the modern man       33

1.10 The passions of the soul

»To understand the soul’s passions we must

distinguish its functions from the body’s.«113

In his treatise, Passions de l’âme, Descartes wishes to throw light on the whole range
of topics concerned with human emotions. This is an important matter. He believes
that »to come to know about our passions« as we can read in the second article of
his Passions de l’âme, »there’s no better approach than to examine the difference
between the soul and the body, so as to learn which of the two is responsible for each
of the things we do.«
To avoid any misunderstanding among his readers, Descartes tells them on the
first few pages that when he uses the word »soul« he is not thinking of either a prin-
ciple of life or one of entelechy. Descartes resolutely distances himself from that. He
has something different in mind and wants to put an end to the idea that the soul is
where the lived body is. He wants to end the »anima forma corporis.« For Descartes,
this means the following:

»Death never occurs due to the absence of the soul, but only because some of the most
important parts of the body perish. And let us recognize that the body of a living hu-
man differs from the body of a dead human just as a watch or other automaton (i. e. a
self-moving machine), when it is wound up, contains within itself the physical source of
the movements for which it is designed, just as everything else needed for its operation
differs from the same watch or machine when it is broken and the source of its move-
ment has stopped working.«114

I have quoted this passage at length because it occurs to me that the distinction
made here between a living and a dead human body is especially authoritative today
when human beings are reduced to their mind and brain, and it is assumed that in
the context of today’s definition of brain death, humans are considered dead »when
some of the body*s most important parts have perished.« In Part 2, I will expand on
these issues in the segment called Brain death = soul-less? of the chapter I call Lived
body and soul or mind and brain?
What Descartes tells us about the »passions« (»Affekte«)115 could very well be pre-
sented within the mode of operation of physics (the »leading science«). Descartes ap-
plies himself to enumerating so-called passive and active psychological phenomena
(actions et passions). While Descartes includes acts of the will in active phenomena
of the soul, he interprets the passions as »perceptions, sensations or commotions of

113 Descartes, R.: PS. Art. 2.

114 Descartes, R.: PS. Art. 6.
115 With regard to Descartes’ »Doctrine of the passions« (Affektenlehre): Cassirer, E.: Des-
cartes. Lehre – Persönlichkeit – Wirkung. Hamburg 1995, pp. 237 ff.); Caton, H.: The Origin
of Subjectivity. An Essay on Descartes. New Haven/London 1973, p. 191 ff; Engelen, E.-M.:
Descartes. Leipzig 2005, p. 28 f.; Poser, H.: René Descartes. Eine Einführung. Stuttgart 2003,
pp. 140–148; Gueroult, M.: Descartes selon l’ ordre des raisons. Vol. II. Paris 1953, pp. 208 ff.
34       A. Dualism

the soul which we relate particularly to the soul.«116 Descartes clarifies for himself the
mechanisms that ensure the smooth running of the body machine. For this purpose,
he espouses the idea that there are life spirits (esprit animaux, spiritus animales).117 In
his work Traité de l’ homme, we can read the following:

»As for those particles of the blood which penetrate up to the brain, they function not
only to nourish it and enter its substance, but more primarily to produce there a certain
very fine wind, or rather a very lively and pure flame, that we call the animal spirits
[spiritus animales].«118

He explains further:

»We must understand that the arteries which bring this flame from the heart, after
being divided into an infinity of small branches and composing the fine tissues which
are extended like tapestries at the base of the ventricles of the brain, are reassembled
around a specific little gland situated near the middle of the brain substance [the pineal
gland], just at the entrance of its ventricles.«119

Descartes has a serious problem: How can what he calls »the soul,« i. e. the »res
cogitans«, actually achieve anything within the sanctuary of the body machine? Is
it possible or not? Where is a possible bridge between these two sides of the great
divide? He deals with this in various places in his work According to Descartes, brain
research is concerned with a part of the brain that will become known as the epi­
physis, the pineal gland. This, he claims, is the bridge connecting the two sides of the
great divide. It is here – and nowhere else – that res cogitans and the body machine
touch each other. Scientifically, he says, this is the most reasonable place to declare
the epiphysis as the »headquarters of the soul« (le principal siége de l’ âme)120 where
something extraordinarily amazing occurs: The life spirits (here Descartes refers to
small particles in the blood) operate together. The consequence is obvious: Thanks
to this »brain bridge« the res cogitans becomes aware of the situation in which the
other side of the great divide, the body machine finds itself.121 Furthermore, in this
way the res cogitans can send instructions to the machinery.122 A classical passage in
this regard is definitely the 31st Article of the Passions of the Soul where he records
the following:

116 Descartes, R.: PS. Art. 27.

117 Descartes, R.: PS. Art. 10, 26 f.
118 Descartes, R.: TH, p. 54.
119 Descartes, R.: TH, pp. 54 f.
120 Descartes, R.: PS. Art. 32, 34, cf. Descartes, R.: TH, pp. 57, 71, 112–123.
121 Descartes is of the opinion that the life spirits assume an important role in the body ma-
chine: »Our body’s machine is so constructed that changes in the movements of the spirits
can affect which pores in the brain are more open and which less. Conversely, when an
action of the sensory nerves opens one of those pores a tiny bit more or less than usual, this
affects how the spirits move and directs them into the muscles that control how the body is
usually moved when such an action occurs.« (Descartes, R.: PS. Art. 16).
122 Cf. Descartes, R.: PS. Art. 43.
 1. Descartes and the modern man       35

»But having searched this business carefully, methinks I have plainly found out that part
of the body wherein the soul directly exercises her function is not a jot of the heart, nor
yet all the brain, but only the most interior part of it, which is a certain very small kernel
[the pineal gland] situated in the middle of the substance of it and so hung on the top of
the conduit by which the spirits of its anterior cavities have communication with those
of the posterior, whose least motions in it cause the course of the spirits very much to
change, and reciprocally, the least alteration befalling the course of the spirits cause the
motions of the kernel very much to alter.«

In this passage, Descartes places particular emphasis on the pineal gland. He is firm-
ly convinced that this gland is a bridge which guarantees that both substances stay in
contact with each other. He tries to support this conviction by pointing out that the
epiphysis is unpaired and also differs from other regions of the brain in other ways:
»It was because it is located between the two hemispheres of the brain and is not it-
self bifurcated.«123 A modern brain researcher would point out to Descartes that the
hormone melatonin is produced there, and that the epiphysis is important for our
sleeping and waking rhythms. But for Cartesius there can be only one conclusion:
This is where the res cogitans and the body machine interact.124
The question regarding interaction still occupies the minds of the scientific com-
munity. In the Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, Jaegwon Kim calls the Carte-
sian theory of interaction the »most commonsensical and plausible of the doctrines
that make up Descartes’s theory of mind.«125 William D. Hart speaks of the »most
difficult problem confronting dualism.«126 In my opinion, Tobias Kläden gets to the
heart of the matter.

»It remains questionable whether the spirit even needs such a complex brain. Either the
enormous brain apparatus is superfluous because its amazing accomplishments occur
within the soul’s area of operation, or there is nothing left for the soul to do as all is
being affected by the brain. It is further not clear why my soul only influences my body,
or rather on my brain and not on other brains. This should, given the latter’s assumed
enormity, not be precluded.«127

Yet, our body is not indifferent when we are happy about something, or when we
are angry with a friend. Yet Descartes is blind in this respect. He is really unable to
demonstrate that these manifestations of life actually do influence the whole lived
body. Here, the divide between res cogitans and res extensa is just too great.

123 Bennett, M. R./Hacker, P. M. S.: Philosophical Foundations Of Neuroscience. Malden/Oxford

10
2010, p. 28.
124 Cf. Descartes, R.: PS. Art. 32, 34.
125 Kim, J.: Mental Causation. In: McLaughlin, B. P./Beckermann, A./Walter, S. (Eds.): The Ox-
ford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford 2009, pp. 29–52, here p. 29.
126 Hart, W. D.: Dualism. In: Guttenplan, S. (Ed.): A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind.
Oxford 102005, pp. 265–269, here p. 267.
127 Kläden, T.: Mit Leib und Seele ... Die mind-brain-Debatte in der Philosophie des Geistes und
die anima-forma-corporis-Lehre des Thomas von Aquin. Regensburg 2005, p. 207.
36       A. Dualism

1.11 Descartes and free will

»I see only one thing in us that could entitle us

to esteem ourselves, namely the exercise of our
free will and our command of our volitions«128

Is it right to characterize our will as being »free?« And in this context: Does our will
play any role in the material world (i. e. in the realm of the res extensa)? Is there any
potential of influence? These questions challenge Descartes. He is not willing to shirk
a response. He present his answer by saying that there are different kinds of volition-
al acts. These would include expressions of the res cogitans which are not aimed at
anything physical, nor do they exert any influence here, and this means: »As when
we will to love God or in any way to apply our mind to some object that isn’t mate-
rial.«129 Then he speaks of the expressions of the res cogitans which do in fact affect
the body machine. According to Descartes, when you wish to get up from behind
your desk and take a few steps, the res cogitans impacts the life spirits via the bridge
of the pineal gland, and thus ensures your forward movement in the room. Descartes
writes: »When we will to walk or move our body in some other way, this volition
brings it about that the gland drives the spirits to the muscles that bring about this
effect.«130 Descartes believes that these processes are totally under the command of
the res cogitans. Thus, the body machine has no more than an indirect effect on how
we decide: Get up and walk a few steps or not.131
Descartes continues to adhere to the mundane attitude that we can come to free
decisions and that our actions are decided freely. It is exactly what elevates human
beings and makes them masters of themselves.132 We cannot simply deny that we
have free will. Without free will, we would be nothing but slaves without any volition
of our own. However, what is important is to be our own master. In the opinion of
Descartes, we are when we make abundant use of our free will. It is an essential part
of being human, allowing us to say either A or B. It is therefore totally within our
free will to choose whether we to get up from behind our desk or not. According to
Descartes, neither the pineal gland nor any other area of the brain determines the
choices we make.133
This is not all Descartes has to say about free will. If we look carefully at this
matter, we arrive at the conclusion that free will cannot be bound or determined by
anything or anybody. Descartes can and will not imagine that free will has bounda-
ries, that it is limited. Otherwise it would no longer be free will. But how is Descartes
trying to ensure this? Through an excursion explaining that our will can accomplish
countless things. According to Descartes, we would be incapable of naming all pos-
sible subjects. Descartes tries to convince his readers that this demonstrates that our

128 Descartes, R.: PS. Art. 152.

129 Descartes, R.: PS. Art. 18.
130 Descartes, R.: PS. Art. 43.
131 Descartes, R.: PS. Art. 41.
132 Descartes, R.: PS. Art. 152.
133 Descartes, R.: Med. IV, 8.
 1. Descartes and the modern man       37

will is bound by no conditions.134 Anything we I wish to implement, we can accom-

plish by applying clever motives. It is here that it becomes clear that the res cogitans
is free, whereas in the realm of the res extensa, matters are very strictly regulated:

»For, to the possession of freedom, it is not necessary that I be alike indifferent toward
each of two contraries; but, on the contrary, the more I am inclined toward the one,
whether because I clearly know that in it there is the reason of truth and goodness, or
because God thus internally disposes my thought, the more freely do I choose and em-
brace it; and assuredly Divine grace and natural knowledge, very far from diminishing
liberty, rather augment and fortify it.«135

1.12 Descartes and his followers

»I am glad, by the way, to take this opportunity

of requesting posterity never to believe on
hearsay that anything has proceeded from me
which has not been published by myself.«136

We need to be no experts in the history of philosophy to realize that the obvious

disregard and even contempt for the corporeal is part of the unpleasant legacy given
us by Cartesian dualism that tells us: The island of the thinking »I« is of prime im-
portance. Since Descartes, it is everything but child’s play to bring together the lived
body and the soul, the spirit, and the material. The separation of the res cogitans and
the res extensa has led to an estrangement from the organism’s living processes. The
question how res extensa and res cogitans can be put together again obsessed both
Spinoza and occasionalism.137

134 See also my chapter: Brain Research and the Liberty of the Human Person.
135 Descartes, R.: Med. IV, 8.
136 Descartes, R.: Disc. VI, 6.
137 With his philosophy, Descartes raises the question as to how the various substances can
affect each other. His followers need to find an answer to this question. Louis de la Forge,
Arnauld Geulincx and Nicolas Malebranche try to do exactly that. In the history of phi-
losophy, their thinking is known as occasionalism. They exclude the possibility that the
body machine and the thinking spirit can affect each other. They thus reject Descartes. The
pineal gland theory is no longer relevant. It is instead important to consider the enormous
significance one should assign to the role of God. We have enough occasion to observe
the function of our bodies (occasio). Their response to what the body and the spirit are is
that they are God’s causae occasionales. This means that God must continually intervene
in this world. This is what the occasionalists take for granted. God affects a certain mental
manifestation of our lifestyle. To clarify: let us imagine that while you were reading the
introduction to this work, the book fell on your toe and you were in pain because of it.
Occasionalists would not regard this as a bodily response to nerve irritation but to God’s
direct intervention in your life. They would say that if you now decided to respond, e. g. by
cooling your toe, that here, too God is directly responsible (concursus dei). Thus, God has
brought about the collision between book and toe, as well as the experience of pain. Your
understandable wish to alleviate the pain – move a little, cool with water – would be under-
stood by occasinalists as a pseudo-cause.
38       A. Dualism

Cartesius was of the opinion that whatever can be expanded can also be expressed
mathematically. This point of view had many consequences. All bodies now fell into
the realm of natural sciences. This corporeality no longer had anything to do with
qualitative experiences. As Hans Jonas points out, this legacy also had consequences
for philosophy: It was now consigned to the humanities, and philosophers did not
seem too disappointed that in terms of nature, they would now only play a second
fiddle. This distinct divide is apparent even in today’s academic circles. Jonas’s note
that philosophy and metaphysics should actually stand above this split is also impor-
tant.138 He says that it is not unproblematic when philosophers lose sight of the whole
and allow themselves to be appropriated by either side:

»Materialism inherited dualism’s legacy and didn’t realize that this legacy brought with
it a responsibility it could never hope to redeem. This responsibility involved, at least
theoretically, coming up with a response to those phenomena which were previously
expunged from dualism’s missing half. This became the task assigned to a materialism,
which had established itself as a self-sufficient Monism. Logically materialism contin-
ues to presuppose a transcendental dualism as only by placing dualism’s »other world«
into the background can it afford to ignore the evidence of the spirit in its own area of
influence, and interpret reality within the categories of pure matter.«139

The Cartesian legacy of a rift between the res cogitans and the res extensa is evi-
dent today in the differentiation of one (mind or brain-body) or two (mind and
brain-body) more or less ontologically independent division of entities. Basicalls,
the physicalist theories initially approve the division and then rush to one of the
sides inherited from Descartes, consequently reducing or eliminating the other side.
Thus we can say that materialistic monism represents a slimmed variant of Cartesian
thinking.
Let us put it another way: Descartes is the testator not only of dualist but also of
physicalist models. Both Jonas and Searle observe that because of the great divide
that has been drawn between mental manifestations of life and the body, the route
has been predefined for many authors to concentrate on the mechanization and
physicalization of the body, as authors such as Jonas and Searle have observed.140
Daniel Dennet is attracted to the idea that we should subsequently turn to the other
side of the divide and advance the study of the mechanization and physicalization

The God of the occasionalists is rather strange. He alone affects all that makes human free-
dom a hollow concept (Cf. also: Beckermann, A.: Analytische Einführung in die Philosophie
des Geistes. Berlin/New York 32008, pp. 43–49).
138 Cf. Jonas, H.: Philosophie. Rückschau und Vorschau am Ende des Jahrhunderts. Frankfurt
a. M. 1993, p. 24.
139 Jonas, H.: Das Prinzip Leben. Ansätze zu einer philosophischen Biologie. Frankfurt a. M.
1997, pp. 223 f.
140 Cf. also: ibid., pp. 37–39; Searle, J.: The Rediscovery of The Mind. Cambridge/London 1992,
p. 28; Kläden, T.: Mit Leib und Seele ... Die mind-brain-Debate in der Philosophie des Geistes
und die anima-forma-corporis-Lehre des Thomas von Aquin. Regensburg 2005, p. 311.
 1. Descartes and the modern man       39

of the spirit.141 Whoever thinks within these categories disregards the living organ-
ism in its lived body-soul unity. It is an attempt to seize upon its life contexts and
to objectify these. It also seems that no one asks anymore whether there might be a
peaceful solution beyond the dualist and physicalist battlegrounds. As David Braine
reminds us:

»[F]or materialism to get going at all in its main contemporary form it is an absolute
condition that we should have established a dualist pattern of analysis of what goes
on in human life. That is, before mental states and events can be identified with brain-
states or events, or regarded as ›realized in the brain‹, these mental states and events
have to be conceived in a way which makes them purely ›inner‹, logically segregated
from the ›outer world‹ and the ›outer man‹ with his behavior in the way which is charac-
teristic of dualism. But it is precisely this dualist analysis which is open to philosophical
objection.«142

Today’s dualist position is very similar to the way of thinking and the approach
exemplified by Descartes. For example, the »great divide« mentality: It seems to
be customary to first of all establish to which side a manifestation of life should
be assigned. There seem to be clear guidelines. What exists spatially and publicly
belongs to the body side. What is not spatial but private is assigned to the oth-
er side of the divide. In the current discussion, Richard Swinburne143 and Uwe

141 Cf. Dennett, D.: Sweet Dreams. Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness. Cam-
bridge/London 2006, pp. 5 f.
142 Braine, D.: The Human Person: Animal and Spirit. Notre Dame 1992, p. 23. Quoted by:
Kläden, T.: Mit Leib und Seele ... Die mind-brain-Debate in der Philosophie des Geistes und
die anima-forma-corporis-Lehre des Thomas von Aquin. Regensburg 2005, pp. 311 f.
143 Richard Swinburne supports a dualism of substances. Similar to Descartes, he is convinced
that human beings are a combination of two substances: on the one hand the body, on
the other hand, the soul. This is why Swinburne claims that we are the same tomorrow as
we are today: »A man’s body is to which his physical properties belong. If a man weighs
ten stone then his body weighs ten stone. A man’s soul is that to which the (pure) mental
properties of a man belong. If a man imagines a cat, the dualist will say ›his soul imagines
a cat‹« (Swinburne, R.: The Evolution of the Soul. Oxford 21997, p. 145). Swinburne shares
Descartes’ view that our mental and spiritual life can exist without our body (Swinburne,
R.: Wodurch ich ich bin – Eine Verteidigung des Substanzdualismus. In: Niederbacher, B./
Runggaldier, E. (Eds.): Die menschliche Seele. Brauchen wir den Dualismus? Frankfurt/
Paris/Ebikon/Lancaster/New Brunswick 2006, pp. 41–59). According to Swinburne, sub-
stance dualism means the human soul is understood as being totally separated from the
body. So even today one can say that the death of a person does not mean thw end of the
soul: »Just as I continue to exist wholly and completely if you cut off my hair, so, the dualists
hold, it is possible that I continue to exist if you destroy my body. The soul, by contrast, is
the necessary core which must continue if I am to continue« (Swinburne, R.: The Evolution
of the Soul. Oxford 21997, p. 146).
Josef Quitterer is critical of Swinburne. He questions Swinburne’s position that physical
identity is not necessary for a personal diachronic identity. (Quitterer, J.: Ich bin keine geis-
tige Substanz. In: Niederbacher, B./Runggaldier, E. (Eds.): Die menschliche Seele. Brauchen
wir den Dualismus? Frankfurt/Paris/Ebikon/Lancaster/New Brunswick 2006, pp. 61–74;
Quitterer, J.: Was leistet der Seelenbegriff zur Überwindung physikalistischer Deutungen per-
40       A. Dualism

Meixner144 try to defend a dualist point of view versus materialistic theories. The
point of contact between these two thinkers is that they want to make it very clear
to their readers that physical processes belong to another side of the divide than
mental manifestations of life.
To this day, Descartes’ thoughts are an important point of reference for the phil-
osophical debate, even when it means that Cartesius serves as a »warning example«,
or as Dominik Perler formulates it so nicely, as a »philosophical anti-hero« or »card-
board dummy to be shot down.«145 At this point, I want to introduce some important

sonaler Identität?. In: Knaup, M./Müller, T./Spät, P. (Eds.): Post-Physikalismus. Freiburg/

Munich 2011, pp. 216–233).
A discussion of Swinburne’s theories cf. also: Beckermann, A.: Analytische Einführung in
die Philosophie des Geistes. Berlin/New York 32008, pp. 37–42; Strobach, N./Jansen, L.: Die
Unzulänglichkeit von Richard Swinburnes Versuch, die Existenz einer Seele modallogisch zu
beweisen. In: Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 53 (1999), pp. 268–277.
144 Uwe Meixner sees even modern concepts of materialism as being dependant on Cartesian
philosophy. He believes a materialist is a one-sided dualist (Meixner, U.: Die Aktualität
Husserls für die moderne Philosophie des Geistes. In: Meixner, U./Newen, A. (Eds.): Seele,
Denken, Bewusstsein. Zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Geistes. Berlin/New York 2003,
pp. 309 and 363). However, Meixner does not want to see the lived body-soul problem as
the fruits of Cartesian dualism. Instead, he regards it as a product of objectivism which
is similar (in its historical form) to both dualism and physicalism (ibid., p. 319). Meixner
explains objectivism as the perspective whereby nature, the objective world and thus espe-
cially the physical world primarily represents the ontological. According to an objectivist
understanding, the so-called subjective is itself entirely objective and is thus to be revealed
in this subjectivity by the sciences (ibid., p. 315 f.).
In Das Elend des Physikalismus in der Philosophie des Geistes, Meixner refers to the dif-
ferentiation made by some philosophers between a reductive and a non-reductive phys-
icalism. Here the first variation presupposes that all mental occurrences are physical.
According to Meixner important philosophical reasons and phenomena within the life
world would contradict such an approach. Consequently, the assertion that science chal-
lenges physicalism counts as an example of one of the most blatant examples of met-
aphysical dogmatism. Meixner focuses on the representatives of non-reductive physi-
calism who assume that their version of physicalism is more plausible than a reductive
physicalism and therefore came to the conclusion there are mental occurrences which
are not physical. Meixner argues there is then only one alternative: either become hon-
est (i. e. reductive) physicalists (which the above reasons would speak against) or honestly
espouse dualism, the attractiveness of which he highlights. (Meixner, U.: Das Elend des
Physikalismus in der Philosophie des Geistes. In: Knaup, M./Müller, T./Spät, P. (Eds.):
Post-Physikalismus. Freiburg/Munich 2011, pp. 25–59). Regarding the choice between
dualism and physicalism, Meixner is convinced that dualism presents the better option.
In The Indispensability of the Soul Meixner emphasizes that the supposition that the human
being has a soul is indispensable when it comes to the Christian belief in the resurrection.
He searches for the continuity which ensures that the person is the same in this world and
in the next. His only answer is that there is a soul. It is after all obvious that the body disin-
tegrates. For purposes of description or explanation the presupposition of the existence of
a soul is indispensable. There are thus very good reasons to speak of a soul. (Meixner, U.:
The Indispensability of the Soul. In: Niederbacher, B./Runggaldier, E. (Eds.): Die menschli-
che Seele. Brauchen wir den Dualismus? Frankfurt/Paris/Ebikon/Lancaster/New Brunswick
2006, pp. 19–40).
145 Cf. Perler, D.: Abkehr vom Mythos. Descartes in der gegenwärtigen Diskussion. In: Zeitschrift
für philosophische Forschung 51 (1997), pp. 285 f.
 1. Descartes and the modern man       41

positions and authors. They include Gilbert Ryle with his myth of the Cartesian
ghost in the machine; and Hilary Putnam who presents a new edition of Cartesian
doubt. Then I will introduce John Eccles, Karl Popper and Antonio Damasio’s delib-
erations about Cartesian dualism.

1.12.1 The first highlight: From Cartesian understandings of non-

physicality to the ghost in the machine: Gilbert Ryle and the
lived body-soul problem
»Man need not be degraded to a machine by
being denied to be a ghost in a machine. He
might, after all, be a sort of animal, namely, a
higher mammal. There has yet to be ventured
the hazardous leap to the hypothesis that
perhaps he is a man.«146

These lines were penned by Gilbert Ryle. World War II had just ended when Ryle
began to attack Cartesian dualism of body and mind. What Ryle said and wrote
created quite a stir within the philosophy of mind, and I therefore want to briefly
address his point of view. In his 1949 essay, The Concept of mind,147 which is now
considered a modern classic, and »his best known and most important work,«148
Ryle directs biting criticism against authors who assume that the mental and spiritual
has a chance of influencing the body. In his opinion, that is impossible. His motto
is »absolutely no interaction between soul and mind«. We do not need a modern
pineal gland theory! His recommendation is as follows: We should no longer speak
of mental manifestations of life. According to Ryle, these do not exist. What does not

146 Ryle, G.: The Concept of Mind. London/New York 2009, p. 301.
147 Ryle, G.: The Concept of Mind. (London 1949) London/New York 2009.
For this: Beckermann, A.: Analytische Einführung in die Philosophie des Geistes. Berlin/New
York 32008, pp. 75–98; Hastedt, H.: Das Leib-Seele-Problem. Zwischen Naturwissenschaft des
Geistes und kultureller Eindimensionalität. Frankfurt a. M. 21989, pp. 98–106; Kemmerling,
A.: Gilbert Ryle: Können und Wissen. In: Speck, J.: Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen.
Göttingen 1975, pp. 127–167; Lyons, W.: Gilbert Ryle. An Introduction to His Philosophy.
Brighton 1980; Oesterreich, P. L.: Person und Handlungsstil. Eine rhetorische Metakritik zu
Gilbert Ryles ›The Concept of Mind‹. Essen 1987; Mertens, K.: Metapher und Kategorienfeh­
ler in Ryles Philosophie des Geistes. In: Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie 21. (1996),
pp. 175–200; Perler, D.: Abkehr vom Mythos. Descartes in der gegenwärtigen Diskussion. In:
Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 51 (1997), pp. 285–308; Pauen, M.: Grundprobleme
der Philosophie des Geistes. Eine Einführung. Frankfurt a. M. 32001, pp. 79–90; Quitterer, J.:
Unser Selbst im Spannungsfeld von Alltagsintuition und Wissenschaft. In: Rager, G./Quit-
terer, J./Runggaldier, E.: Unser Selbst. Identität im Wandel der neuronalen Prozesse. Pader-
born/Munich/Vienna/Zurich 22003, pp. 61–142, esp. pp. 65–74; Teichert, D.: Einführung in
die Philosophie des Geistes. Darmstadt 2006, pp. 57–64.
148 Thus Julia Tanney in her article about Ryle in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ryle/ (retrieved 01 Oct. 2010).
Peter L. Oesterreich speaks of an epoch-making work (Oesterreich, P. L.: Person und Hand-
lungsstil. Eine rhetorische Metakritik zu Gilbert Ryles ›The Concept of Mind‹. Essen 1987,
p. 20).
42       A. Dualism

exist obviously cannot set anything in motion. Ryle’s goal is to present a »theory of
mind.« His plan looks like this:

»This book offers what may with reservations be described as a theory of the mind. But
it does not give new information about minds. [...] The philosophical arguments which
constitute this book are intended not to increase what we know about minds, but to
rectify the logical geography of the knowledge which we already possess.«149

Ryle says that a philosopher’s primary task by far is to detect distortions of language
and concept and move them out of the way. Since some people have a problem with
logic, there is much confusion. Ryle illustrates what he means by presenting simple
statements from the everyday life.150 He is after all convinced that the scientific-ac-
ademic exchange is only one of many opportunities we have when we wish to ex-
change information with each other. »The topic regarding the human spirit will be
discussed in the context of general philosophical and academic questions.«151
Ryle pursues an extremely demanding, not to say pretentious concern: He wants
his readers to believe that all that has until now been thought and written about the
lived body-soul problem is totally misleading.152 He claims there is no option but to
oppose Descartes whose substance dualism has caused much confusion and strife,
and that philosophy had taken a wrong turn. Ryle claims to know the correct path.
For Cartesian thought he offers the daring term, »Cartesian myth«. He says that he
is surprised himself how tough and resistant that myth is. We should therefore even
speak of a doctrine with official character:

»A myth is, of course, not a fairy story. It is the presentation of facts belonging to one
category in the idioms appropriate to another. To explode a myth is accordingly not to
deny the facts but to re-allocate them.«153

This sentence demonstrates very well what the focus of Ryle’s project is: A rebel-
lion against the Cartesian myth (»demolish the Cartesian dualist dogma«154) and
a reorganization of ideas about the lived body and the soul. Oesterreich says that
Ryle, to describe his own philosophical role, resorts to the typical logos versus myth
opposition. He stylizes himself as the myth-critical Enlightenment philosopher and

149 Ryle, G.: The Concept of Mind. London/New York 2009, p. viii.
150 Peter L. Oesterreich therefore also speaks of his »persuasive Strategie« (Oesterreich, P. L.:
Philosophen als politische Lehrer. Beispiele öffentlichen Vernunftgebrauchs. Darmstadt 1994,
p. 31).
151 Ibid., p. 31.
152 »Ryle tells us in his Autobiographical Sketch (1970) that his main interest was in the met-
aphilosophical question: ›what constitutes a philosophical problem and what is the way to
solve it?‹ Questions specifically to do with the mind were not in the forefront of his thinking
when he embarked on The Concept of Mind« (Guttenplan, S.: Ryle. In: Guttenplan, S. (Ed.):
A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford 102005, p. 541).
153 Ryle, G.: The Concept of Mind. London/New York 2009, p. x.
154 Lyons, W.: Gilbert Ryle. An Introduction to His Philosophy. Brighton 1980, p. 44.
 1. Descartes and the modern man       43

his opponents as disciples of the Cartesian myth.155 For Ryle, myth is the epitome of
a position that erroneously lays claim to validity. Logos aims to correct, to de-my-
thologize this stance.156 Julia Tanney writes:

»A philosopher of Ryle’s ilk is interested in the informal logic of the employment of

expressions; the nature of the logical force that expressions have as components
of theories and as pivots of concrete arguments. That is why, he says, in our discus-
sions we argue with expressions and about those expressions in one and the same
breath.«157

Ryle also explains to his readers what belongs to the »official teaching« (»official
doctrine, orthodox doctrine« as he calls it). He here addresses what I have called the
mentality of the great divide, where the spirit neatly belongs on the one side which is
regarded as spatial and which we can approach through introspection. The body, for
which he also names a list of typical features (spatiality, observability, subordinate to
physical laws), belongs to the other side of the great divide. For Rye, the Cartesian
view is a thorn in his side: that there should be a bridge connecting the two oppo-
sites, and that there is an interchange between them.158
How is it possible to speak of such an interchange when Descartes so brutally
differentiates between the two sides of the great divide? Ryle would like to show
why certain manners of application of the concepts of spiritual ability and spiritual
processes are a violation of the rules of logic. He believes that the perception that one
(the bodily) side of the great divide is visible to everyone, while the other side (the
spiritual) is only visible to oneself is no longer tenable. He calls such views obsolete.
Otherwise we should open our eyes and watch the behavior of humans; then we
would find different answers. Since Descartes uses his views as a point of departure,
his problem is that he does not know whether the bodies he meets are in fact hu-
mans. For Ryle, it is absurd to sit at a sidewalk café and wonder whether the server
and the bypassers are really human. We will still see that we might agree with Ryle so
far, from an Aristotelian point of view. Yet the consequences differ. Ryle’s accusation
is that the friends of Descartes’ causal bridge relationship between trench side M
and trench side B cannot be replicated. But his criticism does not end there. Fol-
lowers of the orthodox line, Ryle says, let the spirit mutate to become a ghost in the
machine:

»I shall often speak of it [the official doctrine, M. K.], with deliberate abusiveness, as
›the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine‹. I hope to prove that it is entirely false, and
false not in detail but in principle. It is not merely an assemblage of particular mistakes.
It is one big mistake and a mistake of a special kind. It is, namely, a category-mistake. It

155 Oesterreich, P. L.: Philosophen als politische Lehrer. Beispiele öffentlichen Vernunftgebrauchs.
Darmstadt 1994, p. 32.
156 Cf. Oesterreich, P. L.: Person und Handlungsstil. Eine rhetorische Metakritik zu Gilbert Ryles
›The Concept of Mind‹. Essen 1987, p. 25.
157 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ryle/ (consulted on 01 Oct. 2010).
158 Cf. Ryle, G.: The Concept of Mind. London/New York 2009, p. 8.
44       A. Dualism

represents the facts of mental life as if they belonged to one logical type or category [...]
when they actually belong to another.«159

This is a central passage in his book. Here we have an important term for under-
standing Ryle’s philosophy. He says repeatedly that categories are not being taken
seriously.160 What does he actually mean by this?
Ryle warns us to use language carefully and with caution. It calls it especially
important to remember that not all concepts can be used in all situations because
that causes much to be lopsided and wrong. He explains: When I say something
is »sweet,« I could mean my dessert or fruit. However, we would find the terms
»stringent« or »not stringent« in an academic context, for example when evaluating
a dissertation. No matter how brilliant, informative or sometimes even humorous
it may be, a dissertation can never be »sweet«, and dessert can of course never be
»stringent.« According to Ryle, it is therefore clear that the two terms cannot simply
be interchanged. Why not? The answer is clear: »stringent« and »sweet« belong to
different categories.161 Should you claim that this dissertation by Marcus Knaup is
»sweet« you would, according to Ryle, have fallen into the trap of committing a
categorical error. To Ryle, that is the worst mistake anyone could make. This dis-
sertation can be stringent or not stringent, but it can never be sweet! The same is
true, of course, when someone calls a dessert is stringent. That person has also not
understood the seriousness of this categorical error. Perhaps we should say that this
person has »not yet« understood the error. Ryle, after all, is determined to ensure
that there is clarity. He »tells us that the way to expose categorical mistakes is to at-
tempt reductio ad absurdum arguments, for, if they are successful, we have exposed
a concept that has been assigned to a logical type or category to which it does not
belong.«162 Let us try to clarify this in another manner. I imagine I visit the game of
SC Freiburg in the Badenova stadium with a guest. The chanting of the fans rings
out when Freiburg scores the first goal. However, the spectator who is cheering next
to me believes that through a greater fighting spirit he can improve on the commit-
ment of the football players on the lawn. This person should, according to Ryle, not
only have saved the money he spent on his ticket, but by committing a categorical
mistake, he has maneuvered himself to the offside.
We cannot talk about the two sides (M for mind and B for body) of the great di-
vide in an equal manner. Ryle accuses dualists of doing just that because they do not
realize that body and mind belong to completely different categories, yet they create
the impression that there is a bridge that connects the two. Peter L. Oesterreich sug-
gests that »a categorical mix-up is indicative of a faulty subsumption of the particular

159 Ibid., p. 6.
160 Cf. ibid., pp. 8–12.
161 Ansgar Beckermann gets precisely to the heart of the matter when he explains that »Ryle’s
understanding of a category error means that when two expressions a and b belong to the
same category when a in all contexts in which a is meaningful can be replaced by b without
any absurdity ensuing, and vice versa. A category error occurs when expression a is treated
as if it belongs to category A when in reality it belongs to category B.« (Beckermann, A.:
Analytische Einführung in die Philosophie des Geistes. Berlin/New York 32008, p. 78).
162 Lyons, W.: Gilbert Ryle. An Introduction to His Philosophy. Brighton 1980, p. 45.
 1. Descartes and the modern man       45

(facts of the spiritual life) under the categorically general (concepts of philosophical
theories of the spirit).«163 Thus, whoever is on the lookout for side M is not different
from the one who says a doctoral dissertation is »sweet« or the football fan who has
the laughter of the spectators on his side:

»The book focuses on the ›type-errors‹ or ›category mistakes‹ which philosophers of

mind are prone to make when they consider the logical form of ›mental conduct verbs‹,
especially if they use as their starting-point the ›Janus-faced account of human life‹
suggested by a Cartesian conception of the mind.«164

Ryle’s Cartesian legacy assumes the precipitous dividing line between the two sides,
M and B, and then informs his readers that they no longer need to search for the
mind (M). He contends that mental manifestations of life (e. g., our decisions, our
thinking, our hopes, that the »right« football club wins) are reallocated to an interior
domain, which nevertheless causes a response in the realm of the body, is an inex-
cusable error in reasoning, a categorical error. Ryle naturally suggests a correction:

»The hallowed contrast between Mind and Matter will be dissipated [...] The belief that
there is a polar opposition between Mind and Matter is the belief that they are terms
of the same logical type.«165

This sentence shows what Ryle’s main concern is: According to him, we should not
pretend that the two sides, M and B, can be allocated to the same logical class. When
we take no note of this information, we are heading for numerous problems which
have caused many a philosopher to ponder. The time for the great divide between
mind and body has expired.
Ryle’s magic word is »disposition.« It demonstrates what happens when the circum-
stances are adequate: »He tells us that a disposition is an ability, tendency, liability or
proneness to act or react, or fail to act or react, in a certain way in certain circumstanc-
es.«166 In this way, Ryle hopes to shake off the tiresome question concerning the nature
of influence between the two sides of the great divide. A small example to explain this
thought can be found in the sweet (not stringent) dessert. If I pour a pack of Jell-O
into a pot of hot water, the Jell-O will mix with the water. Here we are not only given
a delicious (sweet) dessert, but we have a sample of what Ryle means by disposition.
But we are not only able to speak in this way about a sweet Jell-O pudding. We can
also speak in this way about you or me. »Humans possess not only simple but also
higher grade disposition characteristics, which stand out because they can develop
endless numbers of actualizations.«167 Here is an example, the statement: »Marcus

163 Oesterreich, P. L.: Person und Handlungsstil. Eine rhetorische Metakritik zu Gilbert Ryles
›The Concept of Mind‹. Essen 1987, p. 52.
164 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ryle/ (retrieved 01 Oct. 2010).
165 Ryle, G.: The Concept of Mind. London/New York 2009, p. 12.
166 Lyons, W.: Gilbert Ryle. An Introduction to His Philosophy. Brighton 1980, p. 46.
167 Oesterreich, P. L.: Person und Handlungsstil. Eine rhetorische Metakritik zu Gilbert Ryles
›The Concept of Mind‹. Essen 1987, p. 78.
46       A. Dualism

likes Woody Allen films.« This, according to Ryle, could be a disposition, and Marcus
will soon charge into the nearest cinema. The sentence, »Marcus is eager to learn,«
taken as a disposition means he will not merely walk past the University of Frei-
burg but will actually attend his doctoral supervisor’s lecture. Everyone who has
eyes could observe how Marcus behaves. Using the disposition concept beautifully
demonstrates what Marcus does.168 »Ryle suggests that the mind comprises patterns
of behavior – that it can be reductively identified with behavior – and that to think
otherwise about it is precisely to categorize it wrongly.«169 While his arch enemy
Descartes had spoken of acts of the will, Ryle holds the opinion that such a concept
can no longer be found in our daily communication and therefore, he is only too
pleased to drop him:

»No one ever says such things as that at 10 a. m. he was occupied in willing this or that,
or that he performed five quick and easy volitions and two slow and difficult volitions
between midday and lunch-time. An accused person may admit or deny that he did
something, or that he did it on purpose, but he never admits or denies having willed. Nor
do the judge and jury require to be satisfied by evidence, which in the nature of the case
could never be adduced, that a volition preceded the pulling of the trigger.«170

And what happens when Marcus prefers to watch a Woody-Allen film instead of at-
tending a lecture? Surely we can observe this, but can his fellow-students who waited
for him in vain, hold him accountable? I think it would not be too smart to delete
mental manifestations of life (such as taking responsibility) and attribute them to the
realm of dispositions. According to Ansgar Beckermann, what is problematic is the
understanding that »mental explanations are not causal explanations, and can there-
fore never be in conflict with causal explanations – e. g. those given by physiology
with regard to our actions.«171 Ryle’s solution for the lived body-soul problem is not
particularly watertight as it does not do justice to the mental manifestations of life
that I mentioned in the opening chapter, which begins with planning the literature
to be read and continues to the point where pain is felt when the book falls on the
toe. Dieter Teichert’s criticism of the concept of the disposition is one I gladly adopt
when he says that Ryle’s utilization of the disposition concept is that it is not at all
clear which observations are both necessary and adequate to attribute the concept
of disposition.172
What constitutes our manifestations of life cannot be explained merely with dis-
positions. Let us assume you complain that your toe hurts because this book has

168 Cf. Kemmerling, A.: Gilbert Ryle: Können und Wissen. In: Speck, J.: Grundprobleme der
großen Philosophen. Göttingen 1975, pp. 127–167, esp. p. 147; Macdonald, C.: Introspection.
In: McLaughlin, B. P./Beckermann, A./Walter, S. (Eds.): The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy
of Mind. Oxford 2009, pp. 741–766, here pp. 745 f.
169 Guttenplan, S.: Ryle. In: Guttenplan, S. (Ed.): A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Ox-
ford 102005, p. 542.
170 Ryle, G.: The Concept of Mind. London/New York 2009, p. 81.
171 Beckermann, A.: Analytische Einführung in die Philosophie des Geistes. Berlin/New York
3
2008, p. 92.
172 Teichert, D.: Einführung in die Philosophie des Geistes. Berlin/New York 32008, p. 63.
 1. Descartes and the modern man       47

fallen on it. You are talking of the pain itself and not the disposition, and you will
not cancel going to the movie or attending the lecture. Ryle himself warns against the
dangers inherent in minimization. Here, Dieter Teichert sees the difference in com-
parison with the behavioristic philosophers.173 It is the behaviorism propagated by
the psychology of his time that Ryle found problematic and criticized. I will discuss
this in some detail below. That Ryle nevertheless belongs to the logical behaviorists
can be substantiated in my opinion by the fact that for him, mental manifestations of
life are nothing other than behavioral dispositions.174 Julia Tenney writes: »In contem-
porary philosophy of mind, Ryle is credited with having established an important
connection between mental predicates and behavior; but many of his successors [...]
thought he misconstrued the nature of that connection.«175 It is a pity that Ryle, who
was after all chair of the Aristotelian Society in 1945, did not try to really understand
Cartesian philosophical thought. If he had, he might indeed have bridged the divide
between bodily and mental manifestations of life.

1.12.2 The second highlight: Mere brains in a vat?

»Perhaps [...] the universe just happens to
consist of automatic machinery tending a vat
full of brains and nervous systems.«176

We have already discussed Cartesian doubt at length. In his 1981 Reason, Truth and
History,177 Hilary Putnam ventures out onto the ocean of doubt in his own way. A
thought experiment he conducted is of interest.178 He asks us to imagine an evil sci-

173 Cf. ibid., p. 58.

174 In the meantime, there is only one standard interpretation, and that is to regard Ryle as a
»softer version« of this theory. Beckermann points out that we have missed one or another
point if we regard Ryle solely as a representative of logical behaviorism. Beckermann, A.:
Analytische Einführung in die Philosophie des Geistes. Berlin/New York 32008, p. 76.
Guttenplan points out that Ryle’s project is different than the radical behaviorism espoused
by Skinner and Watson. However, that Ryle is to be counted among the behaviorists is obvi-
ous as far as he is concerned: »[T]here is a kind of behaviorism which treats the mind, not as
a fiction, but as itself consisting in, or definable in terms of, behavior« (Guttenplan, S.: Ryle.
In: Guttenplan, S. (Ed.): A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford 102005, p. 542).
Cf. further my discussion in this section regarding the behaviorist doctrine and Ryle’s in-
clusion in the philosophy of behaviorism.
175 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ryle/ (Retrieved: 01 Oct. 2010).
176 Putnam, H.: Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge 1981, p. 6.
177 Putnam, H.: Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge 1981.
See also: Eberhardt, J.: Gehirne in Tanks – Warum die skeptische Frage offen bleibt. In:
Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 58 (2004), pp. 559–571; Müller, O. L.: Hilary Put-
nam und der Abschied vom Skeptizismus oder Warum die Welt keine Computersimulation
ist. Wirklichkeit ohne Illusionen. Vol. 1. Paderborn 2003; Müller, O. L.: Metaphysik und se-
mantische Stabilität oder Was es heißt, nach höheren Wirklichkeiten zu fragen. Wirklichkeit
ohne Illusionen. Vol. 2. Paderborn 2003; Wright, C.: On Putnam’s proof that we are not
brains in a vat. In: Clark, P./Hale, B. (Eds.): Reading Putnam. Cambridge 1994, pp. 216–241.
178 In the philosophy of mind, thought experiments are frequently presented in order to exem-
plify certain consequences of a specific theory. This frequently leads to mistrust from the
48       A. Dualism

entist who one night opens a man’s skull and removes his brain in a manner similar
to how the heart or kidneys are removed before a transplant. He places the brain in
a vat containing a nutrient liquid that keeps it alive. The liquid has a temperature
in which the brain does not die. Since we have all seen science-fiction movies, we
can follow Putnam’s thoughts. A tiresome and messy process ensures that thanks
to modern technology, the afferent nerve, the fiber that comes from the sensory
organs, as well as the efferent nerve that carries impulses to and from the muscles,
are connected to an enormous computer. This computer is not just any machine,
but a super-computer into which data concerning trees, jobs, animals, families, and
everything else about our world has been programmed. (To further go along with
this, we must disregard the question whether even the world’s fastest computer would
find such a task impossible, and whether the amount of data would soon grow out
of bound.)179 Putnam explains his thoughts as follows: The brains are to function ac-
cording to the same rules as brains do in the real world.180 With the assistance of the
computer, all kinds of sensual stimuli are administered. »The appearance of hands,
arms, a face, legs, and feet, and all the rest result from computer simulation.«181 Thus,
Putnam introduces his readers to a scenario where a computer connected to a brain
makes it believe in a non-existent reality. The brains are still swimming quietly in
the vat and the simulation super-computer processes as quickly and as fabulously
as we hardly dare to imagine. Of course, this is not enough. The brain connected
to the super-computer does not notice the computer and the evil scientist. To the
brain everything runs normally. Thus, when the impression is created of seeing an
elk standing on a green meadow, which we know is not true in reality, the brains
connected to the computer think they actually see an elk. According to Putnam, the
impression is created that once a brain is hooked up, it has the impression of seeing
the elk and begins talking about it (although in this thought experiment the very act
of speaking becomes highly problematic as speaking depends on a bodily reality).
Since when can a brain speak?182 In reality, we are not at all concerned either with

side of the sciences. (e. g. B.: Prinz, W.: Philosophie nervt. Eine Polemik. In: Spät, P. (Ed.):
Zur Zukunft der Philosophie des Geistes. Paderborn 2008, p. 243). Daniel Cohnitz (Cohnitz,
D.: Science (of) Fiction. Zur Zukunft des Gedankenexperiments in der Philosophie des Geistes.
In: Spät, P. (Ed.): Zur Zukunft der Philosophie des Geistes. Paderborn 2008, pp. 189–208)
discuss the purpose and implications of such thought experiments. As these would assume
important functions within the methodology of a modern philosophy of the mind, he con-
tinues to justify their presence in further discussions. Thought experiments illustrate the
internal coherence and structure of theories and could sharpen our understanding. I can
only support this point of view and will therefore present additional thought experiments
in the course of this work (e. g. »Mary,« »Chinese Room«).
179 Cf. also: Eberhardt, J.: Gehirne in Tanks – Warum die skeptische Frage offen bleibt. In:
Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 58 (2004), p. 560 f.; Müller, O. L.: Wirklichkeit ohne
Illusionen oder Der Abschied vom Skeptizismus. In: Humboldt-Spektrum 3 (2005), p. 1.
180 Putnam, H.: Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge 1981, p. 12.
181 Müller, O. L.: Hilary Putnam und der Abschied vom Skeptizismus oder Warum die Welt keine
Computersimulation ist. Wirklichkeit ohne Illusionen. Vol. 1. Paderborn 2003, p. x.
182 With regard to the very obvious category error, please refer to my chapter, Lived body and
soul or mind and brain? in Part 2.
 1. Descartes and the modern man       49

an elk or with a meadow filled with flowers, and the cerebrum continues to swim in
the solution in the vat which the evil scientist manipulates to his heart’s content, and

»by varying the program, the evil scientist can cause the victim to ›experience‹ (or hal-
lucinate) any situation or environment the scientist wishes. He can also obliterate the
memory of the brain operation, so that the victim will seem to himself to have always
been in this environment. It can even seem to the victim that he is sitting and reading
these very words about the amusing but quite absurd supposition that there is an evil
scientist who removes people’s brains from their bodies and places them in a vat of
nutrients which keep the brains alive.«183

The background for this thought experiment is the question whether what we see
really exists. Or is everything merely a deception? A kind of private cinema? A day-
dream? Could not everything around us be drowned in waves of doubt? Are we
being deceived? If so, by whom? A couple of centuries later, the Cartesian genius
malignus has obviously changed professions and is now an evil scientist in a secret
laboratory where with the help of extraordinary supercomputers he is able to please
philosophers by conducting simulation experiments. Are you or I perhaps only a
brain in a vat? Is the desk at which you sit, on which this book is lying open, are
these people, this elk, this meadow really here? Or is everything merely a computer
trick? What makes you so sure that all around you really exists? These questions are
giving Putnam a headache. He finally becomes convinced that we are not brains in
a vat. His thought experiment »cannot possibly be true.«184 He concludes that this is
simply »incoherent,«185 contradictory, a contradiction in terms. The assumption that
you and I are a brain in a vat, cannot be sustained: »If we can consider whether it is
true or false then it is not true.«186
According to Putnam, when I say the word »elk« I mean a real elk. In the language
of the vat, »elk« does not refer to a real elk. There is no causal relationship between
me and a real elk. My language is not that of the vat world. If we were in a vat, we
would be speaking the slang of the vat world. Thus, you and I are not merely floating
in a nutrient solution. If we were merely brains in a vat, then what we see, what we
write and read about, would not simulate a real elk and a real meadow in bloom,
brains and people. Instead, it would refer to what bits and bytes are making us be-
lieve. Imagine you believe you are seeing an elk on a meadow, then your thoughts
are not related to a real elk on a real meadow, but to an artificial elk on an artificial
meadow, i. e. to the computer program in the background. The brains in the vat
world do not »think« of a graceful elk of flesh and blood when the thought occurs:
There is an elk in the hall. Thus, when the claim is made we are brains in a vat, the
little word »vat« would mean a »vat world«:

183 Putnam, H.: Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge 1981, p. 6.

184 Ibid., p. 7.
185 Ibid., p. 7.
186 Ibid., p. 8.
50       A. Dualism

»It follows that if their ›possible world‹ is really the actual one, and we are really the
brains in a vat, then what we now mean by ›we are brains in a vat‹ is that we are brains
in a vat in the image or something of that kind (if we mean anything at all).«187

Putnam continues:

»But part of the hypothesis that we are brains in a vat is that we aren’t brains in a vat
in the image (i. e. what we are ›hallucinating‹ isn’t that we are brains in a vat). So, if we
are brains in a vat, then the sentence ›We are brains in a vat‹ says something false (if it
says anything). In short, if we are brains in a vat, then ›we are brains in a vat‹ is false. So
it is (necessarily) false.«188

In other words, for us to think of a proud elk on a meadow in bloom, we must,

according to Putnam, have had something to do with elks and meadows. In this
context, Putnam brings the word »intentionality« into the discussion. After sug-
gesting this solution, no neuroscientist, no matter how clever and mean, could
fill our thoughts with elk assumptions if there were not a real elk on a meadow in
bloom.
Olaf L. Müller praises Putnam’s thoughts as especially shrewd and innovative.189
He says that Putnam has succeeded in defeating a serious illness: Cartesian skep-
ticism. This illness manifests itself such that we cannot rule out that we are only
dreaming everything, or that we are being duped by an evil scientist. He wonders
how Putnam’s thoughts were to develop further if, for example, no elks existed.
Would this be the end of Putnam’s thought experiment just because my language
no longer differentiates itself from the language of the vat world since it does not
refer to anything specific? He asks if it would possibly be better to use the word
»brain« instead of the term »elk.« Müller concludes that if there were no brains then
it would be impossible that there is a brain in the vat. »Putnam’s results thus remain
unchallenged.«190 Müller makes another attempt to defend Putnam: he asks what the
result would be if the brain (!) were merely repeating Putnam’s thoughts verbatim, if
it were doing no more than retelling the thought experiment. Thus, he supposes that
the brain of Putnam’s experiment has come to the following conclusion: »I am not
a brain in the vat.« It then concludes – translated into our language – that it is not a
bit brain in a bit tank. That conclusion would be correct because it really is not a bit
brain in a bit vat but – quasi on a higher level and therefore less problematic – just
a brain in a vat.191
Joachim Eberhardt is more critical. He points out that Putnam is proceeding from
two linguistic philosophical premises: On the one hand that the word »elk« really
does refer to an »elk« in our language, and on the other hand that the language in the

187 Ibid., p. 15.

188 Ibid., p. 15.
189 Cf. Müller, O. L.: Wirklichkeit ohne Illusionen oder Der Abschied vom Skeptizismus. In: Hum-
boldt-Spektrum 3 (2005), p. 5.
190 Ibid., p. 4.
191 Ibid., p. 5.
 1. Descartes and the modern man       51

vat world does not contain the word »elk.« According to Eberhardt, Putnam’s theory
of meaning is incomplete because »the role of metaphorical, figurative, and fictional
references and ways of speaking is not considered, yet is as immensely important in
normal speech as it is in philosophical argumentation.«192 Eberhardt himself remains
uncertain whether he may only be a brain in a vat.
What I find nauseating is Putnam’s simple assumption that a cerebrum can with-
out any further ado be likened to the complete living human organism, and that this
is supposed to represent our whole life. It seems strange when Putnam writes that the
brain »experiences« something.193 What exactly is the medium of experience here?
Putnam’s thoughts are extremely problematic in that his own corporeality does not
seem to interest him much. With that, he follows in the footsteps of Descartes. He
also reported grave doubts whether his own lived body actually existed. Putnam’s
thought experiment must thus be allocated to the mind-brain lived paradigm, since
he assumes that mind and brain can exist without the lived body and its relationship
with other humans, elks and the world around us. It is interesting that Putnam him-
self is very critical about such speculations when he reflects on functionalism. At
this point, I end my deliberations about the second highlight of Descartes’ children
and grandchildren:

»It is perfectly imaginable that other people should be mere ›dummies‹ controlled re-
motely by some intelligence I know nothing of. But I do not grant that this hypothesis
should be ›in the field‹. For a hypothesis to be in the field, it is not enough for it to rep-
resent a possibility that we can imagine; it must meet two further conditions. It must
be elaborated, [...] and, secondly, it must not be too silly to consider. This hypothesis, the
demon hypothesis, has obviously never been elaborated in any detail at all, and it is too
silly to consider.«194

1.12.3 The third highlight: John Eccles, Karl R. Popper and Antonio

Damasio about Descartes and dualism
»It isn’t bad-mannered to laugh when we
hear someone else’s teasing; indeed it may be
churlish not to laugh.«195

Prominent poster boys for 20th century dualism are the philosopher Karl R. Popper
and John Eccles, who won the Nobel Prize for his research in brain physiology. Both
describe themselves as dualists in their co-authored book, The Self and Its Brain.196
Both authors who are not willing to distance themselves from the interdependency

192 Eberhardt, J.: Gehirne in Tanks – Warum die skeptische Frage offen bleibt. In: Zeitschrift für
philosophische Forschung 58 (2004), p. 569.
193 Cf. Putnam, H.: Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge 1981, pp. 5 ff.
194 Putnam, H.: Mind, Language and Reality. Philosophical Papers. Vol. 2. Cambridge 1975,
pp. 359 f.
195 Descartes, R.: PS. III, 181.
196 Popper, K. R./Eccles, J. C.: The Self and Its Brain: An Argument for Interactionism. Munich/
Zurich 2002.
52       A. Dualism

hypothesis.197 They are determined to explain this hypothesis and make it »suitable
for the future«. As their point of departure, they assume a fundamental contrast be-
tween lived body and soul. We have already met this idea: On the one side is the soul
and on the other the lived body. Both are connected. There is interaction: a bridge.
Eccles is of the opinion that mind-body dualism should be reshaped and in the
light of modern brain research transformed to become a mind-brain dualism.198 As
­Howard Robinson says correctly, both authors set themselves apart from the »main-
stream philosophers.«199 Yet, what we have cited here indicates a point of contact
between the materialistic philosophers and the promoters of dualism such as Eccles
and Popper: A determined orientation towards the cerebrum, and forgetting human
corporeality. This also becomes clear in another passage where Eccles answers the
question as to what guarantees our personal identity: There are two »acceptable«
possibilities: brain or mind.200 Eccles says that materialists must follow the first route
while he and Popper both regard the »mind« as the »vehicle for self-experienced
uniqueness«.201 Here too, we are missing any dimension of human corporeality, the
perspective of the organism and its manifestations of life.
Eccles and Popper definitely have much sympathy for Descartes’ relentless search
for the place where soul and body meet and interact with each other. While they
disregard the epiphysis, they do not think that searching for the bridge connection is
wrong.202 Today, science has advanced beyond where it was at the time of Descartes.

Cf. also: Seifert, J.: Das Leib-Seele-Problem und die gegenwärtige philosophische Diskussion.
Eine systematisch-kritische Analyse. Darmstadt 21989, pp. 180–207; Baum, W./González,
K. E.: Karl R. Popper. Berlin 1994; Breidbach, O.: Die Materialisierung des Ichs. Zur
Geschichte der Hirnforschung im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt a. M. 1997, pp. 318–
323 and 331–336; Zoglauer, T.: Geist und Gehirn. Das Leib-Seele-Problem in der aktuellen
Dis­kussion. Göttingen 1998, pp. 56–66; Keuth, H.: Die Philosophie Karl Poppers. Tübingen
2000; Düweke, P.: Kleine Geschichte der Hirnforschung. Von Descartes bis Eccles. Munich
2001, pp. 166–174; Goller, H.: Das Rätsel von Körper und Geist. Eine philosophische Deutung.
Darmstadt 2003, pp. 90–99; Russ, H. G.: Karl Raimund Popper. In: Volpi, F. (Ed.): Großes
Werklexikon der Philosophie. Vol. 2. Stuttgart 2004, pp. 1210–1216; Brüntrup, G.: Das Leib-
Seele-Problem. Eine Einführung. Stuttgart 32008, pp. 45 f., 50 f., 62 f.; Bennett, M. R./Hacker,
P. M. S.: Philosophical Foundations Of Neuroscience. Malden/Oxford 102010, pp. 49–57.
197 In his collection of essays, Alle Menschen sind Philosophen, Popper writes that in many
respects he sees himself as a Cartesian dualist even when he prefers to describe himself as a
pluralist. He believes in neither of Descartes’ two substances. »Matter is no final ›substance‹
with the inherent characteristic of expansion. Instead, it consists of complex structures con-
cerning the composition where we know a great deal, including a partial explanation of its
expansion – i. e. it takes up space, or is extended thanks to the electrical repulsion between
the particles.« (Popper, K.: Alle Menschen sind Philosophen. Munich 2005, p. 80).
198 Cf. Eccles, J. C.: Die Psyche des Menschen. Gifford Lectures 1978–1979 Universität Edin-
burgh. Munich/Basel 1985, p. 217.
199 Robinson, H.: Dualism. In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/dualism/ (retrieved 09 June 2008).
200 Cf. Eccles, J. C.: Die Psyche des Menschen. Gifford Lectures 1978–1979 Universität Edin-
burgh. Munich/Basel 1985, p. 223.
201 Cf. ibid., p. 223.
202 In several of his lectures, Popper claimed that »Descartes’ assumption that the human soul
is located in the pineal gland is not as absurd as it is often presented to be, and that in con-
sidering the results that Sperry obtained using partitioned brain hemispheres, it is possible
 1. Descartes and the modern man       53

Scientists argue that modern brain research would basically welcome the project.
(It should be noted that modern physicalists also appeal to the authority of brain
research to argue the contrary.) Eccles also reveals where this bridge should be. In his
opinion, the supplementary motoric area is the bridge. They want to honor Descartes
by giving the pineal gland a new coat of paint and name another cerebral structure
where interaction is to take place.203 Hastedt therefore speaks of a »resurrection« of
the old Cartesian doctrine.204 As with their testator, these heirs do not consider the
possibility that the body is permeated by the soul. There is no interweaving of lived
body and soul, of physical processes and mental manifestations of life. There is only
a parallel and successive existence. Lüdmann writes:

»When we examine the assumptions of dualism under temporal aspects we can con-
clude that we are here dealing with a succession of the two phenomena [physical pro-
cesses and mental manifestations of life]. This results from the acceptance of two enti-
ties which should be clearly separated. In other words, this amounts to a non-identity of
the mental and physical occurrence: when the one affects the other, the latter can only
be viewed as a consecutive occurrence.«205

For Eccles and Popper, the question regarding the relationship between the lived
body and the soul is the most difficult and profound. It is the central problem of
modern metaphysics;206 It is of the utmost importance.207 That the two scientists see
their theory as a research program208 and most assuredly not as a perfect solution
speaks in their favor. Scientists have the important task of enhancing our knowledge
concerning the lived body and the soul. The more we can learn, the more knowledge
we can gain, the better! Even in the face of glowing scientific successes, those two
refuse to promise a seamless answer to our initial questions.209 Popper calls his per-
spective of the lived body-soul problem »Descartes’ problem.«210 Popper explains:

to locate the soul in the speech center in the brain’s left hemisphere.« Popper reports that
Eccles recently communicated that this assumption is supported to some extent by Sperry’s
later experiments. »According to this, the right side of the brain can be described as that of
a very intelligent animal, whereas the left side of the brain appears to be specifically human
and aware of itself.« (Popper, K.: Alle Menschen sind Philosophen. Munich 2005, p. 81).
203 See also: Bennett, M. R./Hacker, P. M. S.: Philosophical Foundations Of Neuroscience.
Malden/Oxford 102010, p. 54.
204 Cf. Hastedt, H.: Das Leib-Seele-Problem. Zwischen Naturwissenschaft des Geistes und kultur-
eller Eindimensionalität. Frankfurt a. M. 21989, p. 188.
205 Lüdmann, M.: Schizophrenie im Angesicht des Leib-Seele-Problems: Eine Erörterung und Be-
wertung der bestehenden Lösungsansätze anhand auditiver Halluzinationen. In: Journal für
Philosophie und Psychiatrie 2 (2009). http://www.jfpp.org/jfpp-1–2009–04.html (retrieved
01 Oct. 2010).
206 Popper, K.: Alle Menschen sind Philosophen. Munich 2005, p. 109.
207 Ibid., p. 109.
208 Ibid., p. 86.
209 Ibid., p. 86.
210 Popper, K.: Objektive Erkenntnis. Ein evolutionärer Entwurf. Hamburg 1998, p. 241.
54       A. Dualism

»How it is possible that states of consciousness – acts of will, feelings, expectations –

can influence and direct the physical movement of our limbs? How it is possible that the
physical states of an organism influence its mental states?«211

(Of course, the latter reflection is not as important in the context of this work.)
Popper and Eccles212 are not speaking of two very distant sides of a trench but of
two totally different worlds: First of all, there is World No. 1. It includes physical re-
alities (trees, elks, stones, desks, chairs, and also the cerebrum). World No. 2 contains
conscious mental manifestations of life.213 Desires, pain, fears, hopes, intentions, as
well as thoughts and perceptual experiences are all »citizens of this world«. These
two philosophers take it completely for granted that World No. 1 and World No. 2
are completely dissimilar: Thus, the great divide between the res cogitans and the res
extensa is given a new name. What remains the same is the Cartesian assumption
that bridges are linking World No. 1 and World No. 2, and that there is a lively inter-
change between them. That mental manifestations of life are being violently hacked
off from human corporeality is apparently presenting no great problem for these two
scientists. Other than their testator Descartes, however, they assume there must also
be a World No. 3. This is a world of »culture in all its manifestations«,214 the world
of spoken (written or printed) language such as telling stories, inventing myths and
theories, theoretical problems, mistakes and arguments.215 They see World No. 3 as
the world of objective thought content, of cultural products, of abstract meanings.
For example, in the Gifford Lectures, Eccles characterizes World No. 3 as »humani-
ty’s cultural inheritance«216 or the »product of cultural evolution«.217 Thus, what has
been written between the covers of this book is residing in World No. 3. This is how
Popper and Eccles explain it: In the sense that a publication like the dissertation in
front of you consists of paper, a pretty cardboard cover and printer’s ink, it belongs to
World No. 1. In the sense of its specialized knowledge, its considerations, its thought
experiments and its pleas and suggestions, it belongs to World No. 3 – even when
it has not yet not been read and studied by students and professors. Russ explains:

211 Ibid., p. 241.

212 Popper and Eccles seem to want to circumnavigate the exact ontological status of the
worlds. Brüntrup comments that »the autonomy of the individual worlds definitely borders
on the ontological autonomy of a substance as understood in classical philosophy.« (Brün-
trup, G.: Das Leib-Seele-Problem. Eine Einführung. Stuttgart 32008, p. 51).
Bennett and Hacker raise fundamental questions regarding the assumption that there are 3
worlds: »The conception is confused, since although we distinguish material objects from
mental states, and both from propositions or theorems, these do not collectively constitute
›worlds‹ in any sense whatsoever« (Bennett, M. R./Hacker, P. M. S.: Philosophical Founda-
tions Of Neuroscience. Malden/Oxford 102010, p. 50).
213 Cf. Breidbach, O.: Die Materialisierung des Ichs. Zur Geschichte der Hirnforschung im 19.
und 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt a. M. 1997, p. 333.
214 Cf. Eccles, J. C.: Die Psyche des Menschen. Gifford Lectures 1978–1979 Universität Edin-
burgh. Munich/Basel 1985, p. 16.
215 Cf. Popper, K.: Alle Menschen sind Philosophen. Munich 2005, p. 82.
216 Cf. Eccles, J. C.: Die Psyche des Menschen. Gifford Lectures 1978–1979 Universität Edin-
burgh. Munich/Basel 1985, p. 158.
217 Ibid., p. 158.
 1. Descartes and the modern man       55

»World No. 3 objects such as theories [also dissertations, M. K.] can be criticized by
means of other World No. 3 objects. In this way, our actions are guided by our theories.
But we are not obligated to submit to these theories but may discuss them critically,
and are then free to accept or rejected them after some consideration. This also applies
to standards.«218

Popper and Eccles believe their approach differs from materialistic approaches in
that the latter assert there is only World No. 1. For Popper, this solution is too simple
for dealing with the lived body-soul problem

»by denying the existence of the human spirit and human self-consciousness, i. e.
those things which I count among the most remarkable and amazing in the universe.
The other equally simple way out is Berkely’s and Mach’s immaterialism: the thesis that
only sensations exist, and that matter is nothing but a ›construction‹ made of sensa-
tions«.219

This is a clear criticism of the basic assumption of materialistic theories which claim
that cerebral processes are necessary and suffice for our mental manifestations of
life.220 As far as I know, Popper and Eccles do not indicate that there is any obvious
point of contact between materialists and themselves: The abrupt separation of men-
tal and physical entities into World No. 1 and World No. 2 can no longer be taken
seriously as the manifestations of life of a living organism.
Their own elaborations and suggestions belong, just as the work in front of you,
to World No. 3. The same can be said of other scientific assumptions, whether true
or not. Among the »citizens« of World No. 3 are also the prime numbers, the host of
natural numbers as well as all technical equipment, sculptures and paintings.

»I plead that we can accept reality – or as we may call it – the autonomy of World No. 3,
and at the same time admit that it has been created by human beings. We can even
agree that World No. 3 is a human creation and at the same time claim that it exceeds
humans in a very real way. This world transcends its creator.«221

Popper continues:

»Although World No. 3 is a human creation, I understand it to be superhuman in the

sense that its content consists of possible rather than real thought objects. It is also
superhuman in the sense that only a finite number of objects from a potential infinity

218 Russ, H. G.: Karl Raimund Popper. In: Volpi, F. (Ed.): Großes Werklexikon der Philosophie.
Vol. 2. Stuttgart 2004, p. 1214.
219 Popper, K.: Alle Menschen sind Philosophen. Munich 2005, pp. 82 f.; cf. Popper, K.: A Note
on Berkeley as Precursor of Mach. In: The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 1953,
pp. 26–36.
220 Cf. Eccles, J. C.: Die Psyche des Menschen. Gifford Lectures 1978–1979 Universität Edin-
burgh. Munich/Basel 1985, p. 20.
221 Popper, K.: Objektive Erkenntnis. Ein evolutionärer Entwurf. Hamburg 1998, pp. 164 f.
56       A. Dualism

can ever really become thought objects. But we must not understand these objects as
the thoughts of a consciousness.«222

Have you ever asked yourself what the difference is between you and an amoeba?
Popper and Eccles suggest the following: »You and I are consciously concerned with
correcting errors, and this concerns World No. 3 which is accessible only to Homo
sapiens.« Popper’s and Eccles’ suggested solution of the (lived body-soul problem is
based on strengthening World No. 3 and the notion of an emerging evolution. Franz
von Kutschera characterizes World No. 3 of Popper and Eccles as »the objectively
intellectual and spiritual.«223 Something like pain he calls »subjectively spiritual«.
Other than for instance Spinoza or representatives of epiphenomenalism who as-
sume cohesion in the physical trench as opposed to our mental manifestations of
life, Popper and Eccles are taking the view that World No. 1 is open vis-à-vis World
No. 3 while World No. 2 plays the role of mediator.224 Other than Ryle, they hold
on to the idea of interaction which exists between Worlds No. 2 and No. 3. In this
context, they emphasize that certain mental manifestations of life could not have
taken place without World No. 3.225 The entire platform of their theory includes the
possibility that World No. 2 can emerge from World No. 1, or rather that World No. 3
can originate from World No. 2.226
Authors who walk in Descartes’ footsteps and support dualism, face the same
question as Descartes, how a connection is possible between the two sides of the
great divide (body on the one side, and spiritual/intellectual processes on the other
side) is possible. Ryle attempted to avoid this question through his concept of dis-
position. When Popper and Eccles as well as Descartes, abandon the idea of mutual
transformation and entelechy, they are confronted with the question how World
No. 2 might influence World No. 1. Just like Descartes, Popper and Eccles disregard
the thought of anima forma corporis. That is why they say that the spirit-soul »has
no direct access to the body.«227 Causal interaction, Eccles and Popper claim, takes
place via the cerebrum. »Naturally, interchange between World No. 1 and World

222 Ibid., p. 165.

223 Cf. Kutschera, F. von: Jenseits des Materialismus. Paderborn 2003, p. 16; Kutschera, F. von:
Philosophie des Geistes. Paderborn 2009, p. 16.
224 »The three worlds are connected in such a way that the first two and the last two can interact
with rach other. World 2, the world of subjective or personal experiences, thus interacts
with each of the two other worlds. Worlds 1 and 3 are unable to affect each other except
through the intervention of world 2, the world of subjective or personal experiences.« Pop-
per tells us that he regards it as extremely important that the relationship between the three
worlds is described and explained in this manner, in the understanding that world 2 is
the mediator between worlds 1 and 3. Popper claims that while this point of view is sel-
dom voiced, he nevertheless is of the opinion that it is predetermined by the theory of the
three worlds. (Popper, K.: Objektive Erkenntnis. Ein evolutionärer Entwurf. Hamburg 1998,
p. 160).
225 Cf. Popper, K.: Alle Menschen sind Philosophen. Munich 2005, p. 127.
226 Cf. also: Hastedt, H.: Das Leib-Seele-Problem. Zwischen Naturwissenschaft des Geistes und
kultureller Eindimensionalität. Frankfurt a. M. 21989, pp. 181 ff.
227 Eccles, J. C.: Die Psyche des Menschen. Gifford Lectures 1978–1979 Universität Edinburgh.
Munich/Basel 1985, p. 15.
 1. Descartes and the modern man       57

No. 2 can only take place in the brain, and in that respect, we must say that Descartes
was our predecessor. If we do not wish to modify the possibility of neuronal events,
we must contend that our spirit is only able via the brain to achieve something in the
region of the body.« They summon effects of quantum mechanics to explain to their
readers how this works. They tell us that the spirit stands in a dynamic and active
relationship with the brain, and without a doubt takes up a position of superiority.228
In that respect, Mike Lüdman criticizes that empiricism offers no evidence in this
regard. On the whole, interactionist dualism does not seem very convincing.229 Er-
nst Florey has a similar comment: »It is inevitable that the nature of this interaction
has remained unfathomable. The fact that this puzzle has proven to be unsolvable
has called into question the whole concept of scientifically justifiable dualist world
views thanks to the fact that the puzzle has proven to be unsolvable.«230 We shall see
whether physicalism can offer better answers, or rather whether we can leave this
problem behind us by making a possible counterproposal.
At the same time, Popper and Eccles emphasize the possibility of a direct under-
standing of the subject matter of World No. 3 by World No. 2.231 It is very revealing
that bodily functions or rather brain processes as a necessary precondition for our
mental manifestations of life are not of interest here.

»It is true that the brain participates in interactions between World No. 2 and World
No. 3 and in this way, it interacts with World No. 1. But in the event that there is a great
deal of creative activity involving both World No. 2 and World No. 3, World No. 1 is not
necessarily involved, or participates only as epiphenomenon of World No. 2.«232

Popper and Eccles cannot really explain why our body, from which we are unable to
separate ourselves, or rather, our cerebrum, is not an essential participant in many of
our manifestations of life. They are also unable to explain convincingly why dualism
should be the most beneficial solution as they believe.233
To this day, Descartes’ thought exercises influence people’s thinking. Portu-
guese-American brain researcher Antonio Damasio has a completely different no-
tion of Descartes’ dualism of lived body and soul. In the »abyss which separates
body and mind«,234 he claims to recognize Descartes’ greatest blunder. In his book,

228 Ibid., p. 649.

229 Lüdmann, M.: Schizophrenie im Angesicht des Leib-Seele-Problems: Eine Erörterung und Be-
wertung der bestehenden Lösungsansätze anhand auditiver Halluzinationen. In: Journal für
Philosophie und Psychiatrie 2 (2009). http://www.jfpp.org/jfpp-1–2009-04.html (retrieved
01 Oct. 2010).
230 Florey, E.: Das Gehirn und seine Wirklichkeit. Kognitive Neurobiologie und ihre philosophis-
chen Konsequenzen. http://www.spektrumverlag.de/artikel/822685 (retrieved 05. Novem-
ber 2006).
231 Popper, K. R./Eccles, J. C.: Das Ich und sein Gehirn. Munich/Zurich 2002, p. 647.
232 Cf. also: Düweke, P.: Kleine Geschichte der Hirnforschung. Von Descartes bis Eccles. Munich
2001, p. 174.
233 Cf. also: Düweke, P.: Kleine Geschichte der Hirnforschung. Von Descartes bis Eccles. Munich
2001, p. 174.
234 Damasio, A.: Descartes’ Error. Emotion, Reason, And The Human Brain. London 1994,
p. 250.
58       A. Dualism

Descartes’ Error, he recounts numerous observations on people with brain damage.

He says they demonstrate that body and mind belong together more closely than
dualists would like to admit. »Various variations of the Cartesian error blind us to
the roots of the human spirit in a biologically complex but vulnerable, finite and
unique organism«.235
Damasio emphasizes the living interaction between the cerebrum and the body
and regards Descartes’ split between body and mind as nonsense, as an »untenable
myth«236 (and there is that word again!). The connection between the brain and the
body is apparent in the reference to the sensory and motoric nerve fibers. Damasio
stresses the importance of the lived body in helping us understand inner organismic
and outer organismic processes. This is a dimension that is, for example, missing
in the stories about brains in a vat. Damasio speaks of a truly embodied mind,237 to
clarify how closely our body and our brain belong together. He also writes about the
spirit-filled body238 to highlight that without our body we are unable to experience
reality. He quite correctly recognizes Cartesianism as positive for its »respect and
wonder in the presence of the human spirit«.239 I will be short in this analysis here
since I will l return to Damasio’s ideas later in this study.

235 Cf. ibid., p. 251.

236 Cf. ibid., esp. pp. 247–252.
237 Cf. ibid., p. 252.
238 Cf. ibid., pp. 158 f.
239 Damasio, A.: Looking for Spinoza. Joy, Sorrow and the Feeling Brain. London 2004, p. 189.
 1. Descartes and the modern man       59

Appreciation and criticism

Descartes lehrte uns »ziemlich dreist, nur

denkende Substanz sei Geist
und ausgedehnt sei die Natur – sie zeigt vom
Denken keine Spur –,
so dass die Welt sich teilt im ganzen in diese
zweierlei Substanzen.
Obwohl der Geist nicht ausgedehnt, Descartes
ihn im Gehirn nur wähnt
und meint, er spüre Leibbewegung an seiner
Hypophyse Regung
und treibe auch den Körper an durch dieses
selbige Organ.
Das war, so heißt’ s als Terminus, direkt In-
fluxus physicus.
Dann sei, was keine Seele hat, nur selbstbe-
wegter Automat.«240

Let me now provide a short and sweet appreciation of the Cartesian thinking I have
been writing about. We have seen how much value Descartes placed on doubt. He
thought that everything could be deception. The waves of doubt did not even stop
him from considering the possibility that his own body was just a grandiose bluff.
This is a very disastrous supposition since the followers of Descartes have either
totally forgotten the lived body or are regarding it as merely a mechanical object.
For Descartes, body and soul are in no way coextensive. The lived body has noth-
ing to do with the soul. When he speaks of »soul,« his meaning is the same as that of
thought. He calls it res cogitans, a thinking res. This also clarifies that this soul is not
to be regarded as a principle of life, form and movement. The res cogitans is not the
entelechy of a living organism. Descartes saw fit to banish the soul from the body. He
thought that the res cogitans can send instructions to the body machine via the cere-
brum. To him, what you and I can experience became an occurrence to be physically
deciphered. What characterizes the lived body was banished into the jurisdiction of
mind and brain. According to the Cartesian Credo, the identity of the human being
can only be tied to conscious mental manifestations of life. The physical represents
neither a necessary nor an adequate precondition for such a manifestation. Thus,
those who understand themselves as dualists find themselves on rocky ground when
asked to honestly answer the question what my body has to do with me.
How it is possible to imagine a living relationship between a bodiless spirit and a
body machine is not neatly solved. What constitutes organismic life is not covered
by substance dualism. The strict separation between the thinking and the extended
being claimed by Descartes is phenomenologically untenable, as we can agree with
Hans Jonas who tells us that »not only the factual and causal imprisonment of soul

240 Geldsetzer, L.: Die Philosophenwelt in Versen vorgestellt. Stuttgart 1995, pp. 91 f.
60       A. Dualism

in body, but even more the content of the life of the soul itself [...] is opposed to the
notion that body and soul can be disentangled and even makes unimaginable [...]
any bodiless existence of the soul.«241 I will deal with this more in the later chapters.
Descartes’ absolutization of the human spirit can be seen, as Vittorio Hösle noted,
as a denigration of God, of nature, and of our human interpersonal togetherness.242
A deprecation of God is evident in the fact that God is granted only the obligation of
guaranteeing the certainty of awareness. Descartes’ God primarily has to guarantee
that there is anything beyond the cogito island. Qualities and quantities are removed
from nature. Descartes advises that we should rise above nature. Humans should no
longer be embedded in nature, but confront nature and control it. Hösle is correct
in pointing out that this approach also has consequences for our dealings with other
humans. It is totally overlooked that we live in relationships with others. And that
begins when someone is sitting across from me in a sidewalk café.

241 Jonas, H.: Geist, Natur und Schöpfung. Kosmologischer Befund und kosmogonische Ver-
mutung. In: Dürr, H.-P./Zimmerli, W. C. (Eds.): Geist und Natur. Über den Widerspruch
zwischen naturwissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis und philosophischer Welterfahrung. Bern/
Munich/Vienna 21989, p. 64. Engl. Trans.: https://books.google.co.ke/books?id=TH2K
Xo2fHysC&pg=PA165&lpg=PA165&dq=jonas,+matter+mind+and+creation&source
=bl&ots=JwSxZhZxUq&sig=Ya10LDGjJOt3UQe-YkKLfrOhj1g&hl=en&sa=X&redir_
esc=y#v=snippet&q=%22all%20being%22&f=false p. 171.
242 Cf. Hösle, V.: Philosophie der ökologischen Krise. Moskauer Vorträge. Munich 1994, p. 53.
B. Monistic Concepts

»Die Lehren der Systemerbauer

sie blieben Muster auf die Dauer,
von der Geschichte gut verwaltet,
wie man sein Weltbild ausgestaltet.«1

As we have seen, the dualists are firmly convinced that there are two classes of
completely independent entities which constitute our reality – the material and the
spiritual-mental – but there is also the doctrine that only a single kind of entity ex-
ists. This we can call monism. Monism can appear in very different guises: as mental
(or idealistic) monism, as materialistic monism (physicalism) and – as with Spino-
za – the monism of the one divine substance. In this chapter, I will deal with these
different varieties of monism. I will begin with Spinoza’s solution of the lived body-
soul problem.

1 Geldsetzer, L.: Die Philosophenwelt in Versen vorgestellt. Stuttgart 1995, p. 98.

I. The substance monism of Spinoza

»Was alle als Problem behandelt, das hat

Spinoza zum Prinzip verwandelt,
und dies Prinzip bei ihm nun heißt: Es gibt
nicht [die Substanzen von Körper und Geist]
Was man so nennt sind beides nur zwei [At-
tribute der göttlichen] Natur.«2

2. Spinoza’s parallelism and the one divine substance

2.1 Psychophysical parallelism as a response to Descartes

»Geist und Körper sind verwoben

in Gottes Wesen aufgehoben.«3

In the preceding chapter we have seen that one of the difficulties associated with
Cartesian dualism is how to synchronize the relationship between the bodiless spir-
it-soul and mechanistic matter. This problem had been presented to philosophers
thanks to the great divide created between the res cogitans and the res extensa. The
Cartesian recommendation that it is possible for the two to influence each other is
as contentious today as it was then. Some authors such as Popper and Eccles believe
this is entirely possible, while Ryle vehemently rejects it. Critics of the first hour
secured their arguments with an excursion into classical mechanics. The question
was asked: Don’t we have to be able to assign a bodily cause to everything that is a
bodily development? Is it therefore still contemporary and scientifically satisfactory
to talk about causes which are characterized by not being corporeal? The burning
question arose: What counter proposal is possible that is better in solving the lived
body-soul problem.
Baruch Bento Despinoza (Latinized: Benedictus de Spinoza)4, and then also Gott­
fried Wilhelm Leibniz attempted to identify such a counter proposal. Their solution

2 Ibid., pp. 95 f.
3 Ibid., p. 96.
4 Biographical works: Dunin-Borkowski, S.: Spinoza. 4 volumes. Münster 1933 ff.; Freuden-
thal, J.: Spinoza. Sein Leben und seine Lehre. Stuttgart 1904 (21927).
Spinoza’s Philosphy: Jonas, H.: Spinoza and the Theory of Organism. In: Jonas, H.: Or-
ganismus und Freiheit. Philosophie des Lebens und Ethik der Lebenswissenschaften (Kri-
 2. Spinoza’s parallelism and the one divine substance       63

was psychophysical parallelism. This theory can circumvent many Cartesian pitfalls.
As an attempt of interpreting the lived body-soul problem, it endeavors to take into
account mental manifestations of life such as physical accomplishments. Proponents
of this position refuse to consider that our mental manifestations of life are deter-
mined or even co-determined by bodily principles. Parallelists differ from dualists
like Cartesius and believe it to be correct that physical events and spiritual-mental
manifestations of life can have no reciprocal influence. There is no bridge! The an-
swer a parallelist would give us is that the two sides of the great divide are not open
to each other, but that they fit together perfectly, that they are sufficiently matched to
each other and run parallel to each other, as the name of the theory implies.
How can we image such a scenario? Leibniz tries to give his readers some idea
with the picture of two clocks that tick precisely in unison as they tell the time. They
are totally coordinated: When one clock strikes the hours, the other does the same;
when the hands of one clock move, the hands of the other clock do the same. This
happens morning, noon and night. However, Leibniz warns us, we should not imply
that the two clocks can either influence each other or that they are regularly synchro-
nized by a careful clockmaker. If we think so, Leibniz tells us, we don’t understood
that a better answer is required. Now. Leibniz asks what would happen if there were
a crafty clockmaker who from the beginning had equipped both clocks with special
punctuality so that subsequent work intervention from him or a relationship be-
tween the clocks is no longer necessary. With that, Leibniz feels he has discovered the
solution. The explanation is Prästabilierte Harmonie (prestabilized harmony): Both
clocks will always, now and forever, tell the exact same time and chime in unison.
Spinoza, about whom we will hear more in this section, is of a similar opinion. When
Leibniz speaks of two clocks that run parallel, he implies that there is a spiritual and
a physical realm that are perfectly synchronized. It should be noted however, that
the former is characterized by varying spiritual processes which can influence each
other but are unable to affect other areas subject to scientific laws. Spinoza’s psycho-
physical parallelism is a monism of the one divine substance.5

tische Gesamtausgabe Vol. I/1). Freiburg/Berlin/Vienna 2010, pp. 571–591; Hampe, M./
Schnepf, R. (Eds.): Klassiker Auslegen. Baruch de Spinoza. Ethik in geometrischer Ordnung
dargestellt. Berlin 2006; Kather, R.: Was ist Leben? Philosophische Positionen und Pers-
pektiven. Darmstadt 2003, pp. 54–62; Jaspers, K.: Die großen Philosophen. Munich 72004,
pp. 752–897; Röd, W.: Benedictus de Spinoza. Eine Einführung. Stuttgart 2002; Hammacher,
K./Reimers-Tovote, I./Walther, M.: Zur Aktualität der Ethik Spinozas. Medizin – Psychi-
atrie – Ökonomie – Recht – Religion. Spinoza in der Geschichte der philosophischen Ethik.
Würzburg 2000; Hammacher, K. (Ed.): Spinoza und die moderne Wissenschaft. Würzburg
1998; Bartuschat, W.: Baruch de Spinoza. Munich 1996; Della Rocca, M.: Representation and
the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza. Oxford 1996; Harris, E. E.: The Substance of Spinoza.
New Jersey 1995; Seidel, H.: Spinoza zur Einführung. Hamburg 1994; Kather, R.: Der Begriff
der Causa sui bei Spinoza und Whitehead. In: Philosophisches Jahrbuch. 101. Jahrgang. Frei-
burg/Munich 1994, pp. 55–75; Deleuze, G.: Spinoza und das Problem des Ausdrucks in der
Philosophie. Munich 1993; Bartuschat, W.: Spinozas Theorie des Menschen. Hamburg 1992;
Deleuze, G.: Spinoza. Praktische Philosophie. Berlin 1988; Kauz, F.: Substanz und Welt bei
Spinoza und Leibniz. Freiburg/Munich 1972.
5 The text used here: Spinoza, B.: Complete works with Translations by Samuel Shirley.
Indiana­p olis 2002.
64       B. Monistic Concepts

Hans Jonas characterizes Spinoza’s philosophy as »one of the boldest ventures in

the history of metaphysics.«6 In Spinoza, he finds the great corrector of Descartes’
thinking.7 Karl Jaspers once quite correctly described Spinoza as, »the metaphy-
sician who with traditional and Cartesian concepts expresses a philosophical faith;
he is original in the metaphysical mood which he alone possessed among the phi-
losophers of his time. Of the philosophers of his century, he alone has followers
today.«8 Vittorio Hösle sees in Spinoza the first philosophical genius »who attempts
to overcome Descartes’ subjectivity through a philosophy closer to the attitude of
the ancient world than to that of Descartes.«9 Moreover, according to Hösle, there
is no earlier text regarding the will to establish a philosophical system [Willen zum
System] that can be compared with »Ethica.«10 While in the chapter about Descartes
we have highlighted methodical doubt as a distinctive feature of modern philosophy,
we can at this point pick up Hösle’s reference and can understand the will to establish
a system as a further distinguishing characteristic of modern philosophy.
Spinoza is convinced that alternative responses need to be found to those iden-
tified by Descartes regarding the lived body-soul problem and philosophical reflec-
tions about God. In the previous chapter, we have seen that Descartes dives into the
ocean of doubt until he finally arrives on the sandbank of the thinking »I.« All else is
secured by the assumption that God exists. Spinoza is unable to go that route. »Ac-
cording to him, the approach itself is incorrect in that human beings are its point of
departure and the divine is the destination.«11 The search for the absolute must go
in a totally different direction. The departure point must be different from the one
taken by Descartes.
»The causality due the first principle needs to be one of world-immanence. Only
in this manner will the principle of a finite being belonging to this world be ration-
ally comprehensible.«12 The »cogito« cannot be the point of departure. But where?
Spinoza answers: »At the point of absolute!« Setting off on that route, we can come
to grips with the lived body-soul problem. All that Spinoza thinks and writes is to
proceed from the divine, and is maneuvered back towards it again.13

6 Jonas, H.: Spinoza and the Theory of Organism. In: Jonas, H.: Organismus und Freiheit. Phi-
losophie des Lebens und Ethik der Lebenswissenschaften (Kritische Gesamtausgabe Vol. I/1).
Freiburg/Berlin/Vienna 2010, p. 573.
7 Jonas, H.: Materie, Geist und Schöpfung. Frankfurt a. M. 1988, p. 46.
8 Jaspers, K.: Einführung in die Philosophie. Munich 221999, p. 123.
Eng. Trans: https://archive.org/stream/waytowisdomintro00jasp/waytowisdomintro00
jasp_djvu.txt p. 185
9 Hösle, V.: Philosophiegeschichte und objektiver Idealismus. Munich 1996, p. 21.
10 Ibid., p. 21.
11 Cf. Bartuschat, W.: Baruch de Spinoza. Munich 1996, p. 34.
12 Ibid., p. 35.
13 Spinoza had an intimate knowledge of texts by Maimonides, Gersonides, Crescas, Ebreos
und Herreras.
Cf. Schupp, F.: Geschichte der Philosophie im Überblick. Vol. 3. Hamburg 2003, p. 168; Levy,
Z.: Über die Einflüsse jüdischer Philosophen auf Spinozas kurzen Traktat und die Ethik.
In: Hammacher, K./Reimers-Tovote, I./Walther, M.: Zur Aktualität der Ethik Spinozas.
Medizin/Psychiatrie – Ökonomie – Recht – Religion. Spinoza in der Geschichte der philoso-
phischen Ethik. Würzburg 2000, pp. 403–418.
 2. Spinoza’s parallelism and the one divine substance       65

2.2 Mos geometricus

»Vielmehr war es sein Bestreben,

der Logik alle Ehr zu geben.
Kein andrer tat sich so befleißen,
streng syllogistisch zu beweisen,
was mit beachtenswertem Mut
er Satz für Satz hier kund uns tut.«14

How can conclusive and convincing solutions be developed? This question troubles
not only Descartes but also Spinoza. What is not one hundred percent certain cannot
be a real guideline. What can certitudo guarantee? Spinoza thinks that mathematics
and optics15 are a good starting point for such questions. Spinoza’s ideal on which he
aligns his thinking and his work is the geometric method. Spinoza interpreters such as
Wolfgang Bartuschat point out that reference to this principle was not an original cre-
ation of Spinoza’s. What was characteristic of him though was the way he dealt with
the subject and how he suspected it could be useful for all realms of matter and life.16
Spinoza was especially enthusiastic about Euclidean geometry.17 Euclid appeals to
Spinoza because he presents definitions, quotes postulates and axioms. This greatly
impresses Spinoza. He adopts it as his guiding principle and begins to suggest defi-
nitions. He makes a point of formulating postulates, axioms, and theorems. In this
way, he hopes to circumnavigate any possible confusion. He believes that if this has
been achieved, we can then turn to other matters. The precondition here is that there

Leibniz already noted how important the Kabbalah was for Spinoza. In the Theodicée he
writes: »For the Hebrew Kabbalists Malcuth or the Kingdom, the last Sephiroth, meant that
God reigns irresistably yet gently and without force, and in such a manner that human be-
ings believe they are following their own will, while they are fulfilling the will of God. This
teaching is full of goodness. But Spinoza who had entered deeply into the Kabbalah of the
author of nations, and who in Tractatus Politicus, Ch. 2, section 6 said that persons who un-
derstood freedom as they do reality are building their own kingdom within the Kingdom of
God, brought all these ideas to a head. For him, the Kingdom of God was nothing but a ne-
cessity, a blind necessity (as it was for Straton), through which all flows out of the nature of
God, without God having any real choice, and without the choice of human beings freeing
Him from that necessity.« (Leibniz, G. W.: Versuche in der Theodicée über die Güte Gottes,
die Freiheit des Menschen und den Ursprung des Übels. In: Leibniz, G. W.: Philosophische
Werke in vier Bänden. In der Zusammenstellung von Ernst Cassirer. Übersetzt und mit An-
merkungen versehen von Artur Buchenau. Hamburg 1996. Vol. 4. 3 Part N. 372, p. 357).
I believe it is incorrect to say that Spinoza’s philosophy was mystical. Mysticism after all
refers to an experience of »union« with the Godhead. Jaspers is however right when he
speaks of a certain analogy to mysticism in which union with the Godhead occurs through
thinking itself. (Jaspers, K.: Die großen Philosophen. Munich 72004, p. 789).
14 Geldsetzer, L.: Die Philosophenwelt in Versen vorgestellt. Stuttgart 1995, p. 95.
15 Schupp thus understands Spinoza’s occupation as a lens grinder especially in relation to
his scientific concern, and less with regard to his need to secure a livelihood. Spinoza lived
frugally, occasionally receiving financial help from friends. (Schupp, F.: Geschichte der Phi-
losophie im Überblick. Vol. 3. Hamburg 2003, p. 160).
16 Cf. Bartuschat, W.: Baruch de Spinoza. Munich 1996, p. 51; Coreth, E.: Gott im philoso­
phischen Denken. Stuttgart 2001, p. 149.
17 Cf. Bartuschat, W.: Baruch de Spinoza. Munich 1996, p. 50.
66       B. Monistic Concepts

is »a strong parallel between thinking and being. What is existentially first must also
be what is first recognized. What follows from being must also be inferable from
our thinking in principles.«18 What resonates with this thought is the hardly trivial
expectation that we should merely work convincingly – mathematically-logically –
and than we can gain access to the whole world. Wolfgang Röd is correct when
he says Spinoza deals with metaphysical statements as if they were mathematical
formulae.19

2.3 Indispensable vocabulary: Causa sui, substance, attribute,

modus

»What God from outside would propel his world,

The universe around his finger twirled!
He rightly is the earth’s deep-centered motion,
Nature and He in mutual devotion,
So that what lives and moves and is in Him
Will never find His strength and spirit dim.«20

Inevitably, our first step must be to deal more closely with the terminology Spinoza
uses. We might even have to fight our way through this terminology in order to un-
derstand him properly. Let us now translate and clarify some of these essential terms.
Spinoza gave each individual part of his Ethica a name. What first catches the
reader’s eye is »De Deo.« Spinoza is not satisfied with mere words, he takes things se-
riously and starts with the essential. This is where his journey begins. For him, it is a
matter of course to begin with the essential or as he says, with the Causa sui. By that,
Spinoza means »that whose essence includes existence; or that whose nature can only
be conceived as existing.«21 Spinoza is here referring to nothing less than the divine.
He calls the causa sui »the unavoidable source of being and knowledge of all things –
even when knowledge of the causa sui which comes not through argumentation but
only through intuition is chronologically also last«.22 The concept of causa sui recurs
every now and then in philosophical tradition, when human autonomy is explained

18 Coreth, E.: Gott im philosophischen Denken. Stuttgart 2001, p. 149.

19 Cf. also: Röd, W.: Benedictus de Spinoza. Eine Einführung. Stuttgart 2002, p. 348; Röd,
W.: Der Weg der Philosophie. Von den Anfängen bis ins 20. Jahrhundert. Vol. II. 17. bis
20. Jahrhundert. Munich 1996, p. 51.
20 From the poem: Gott, Gemüt und Welt by Goethe. Cf. Goethe, J. W. von: Sämtliche Ge­dichte.
Frankfurt a. M./Leipzig 2007, p. 299. Berliner Ausgabe. Poetische Werke. Berlin 1960 ff.,
pp. 423–431.
Engl. Transl.: Schweitzer, A.: »Goethe: His personality and his work.« Albert Schweitzer’s
address given at the Goethe Bicentennial Convocation and Music Festival in Aspen, Colorado,
July 6 and 8, 1949. http://tennesseeplayers.org/great-words/goethe-his-personality-and.
html. (Consulted on 24 April, 2016).
21 Spinoza, B.: Ethics I, Def. 1.
22 Kather, R.: Der Begriff der Causa sui bei Spinoza und Whitehead. In: Philosophisches Jahr-
buch. 101. Jahrgang. Freiburg/Munich 1994, p. 56.
 2. Spinoza’s parallelism and the one divine substance       67

and when something is being said about the divine.23 We also come across this con-
cept in modern philosophical works.24 Right at the beginning of his Ethica, Spinoza
makes it clear that he has considered the writings of other thinkers and knows their
point of view. Concerning himself, he feels it is good to begin with the time-honored
thought of the divine doctrine: the ontological argument used by Anselm. He deals
with this concept as Descartes had done before him. Spinoza wants to underline that
the causa sui is not merely a soothing product of the imagination. On the contrary! It
is impossible that the causa sui does not exist. Spinoza’s teachers had pointed out that
this is already inherent in the concept itself.25 It is totally unthinkable that anything
else gave rise to the causa sui, or that we could even identify anything that is a pre-
requisite for the existence of the causa sui. Regarding you and me, Spinoza reflects,
the cause is not to be understood »in terms of limited, causal-mechanical effects, but
in the sense of the source of being and the source of knowledge.«26
When Spinoza explains essential terms that help us to understand his thinking,
we see clearly that he has Descartes in mind. He is having an intellectual fight with
the French aristocrat, and this philosophical struggle includes that he is setting dif-
ferent accents. The terms are changing their meaning. Especially noteworthy is what
he says about the term »substance.« After all, Spinoza was not the first to speak of
substance. He did not invent the word but understands it in a new way, differently
from Cartesius, for example. The term now becomes central tune for all his further
statements. Let us remember the previous chapter: Descartes had spoken of the eter-
nal substance – both divine and that found in our world, the res cogitans and the res
extensa. He told his readers not to ignore the deviations between finite substances
and God. This was too half-hearted for Spinoza. This is not how he wants to speak of
substance. For him, it is high time to emphasize that this term refers to what needs
no preconditions. It is the basis for everything (sub-stare). In the Dutch language
which is that of Spinoza, calls it Zelfstandigkeit. Now Spinoza understands what the
essence of the term substance actually is,27 namely »what is the substance in itself,

»Causa sui:« cf. also: Hadot, P.: Causa sui. In: Ritter, J. (Ed.): Historisches Wörterbuch der
Philosophie. Vol. 1. Basel 1971, p. 976.
23 Cf. Coreth, E.: Gott im philosophischen Denken. Stuttgart 2001, p. 150.
24 Alfred North Whitehead in his 1925 book, Science and the Modern World and in his main
work, Process and Reality (completed in 1929) deliberately uses the term »causa sui.« Cf.
Whitehead, A. N.: Prozess und Realität. Entwurf einer Kosmologie. Frankfurt a. M. 21984,
pp. 406 f.
Regarding Whitehead’s connection and modification of »causa sui« cf. Kather, R.: Der Be-
griff der Causa sui bei Spinoza und Whitehead. In: Philosophisches Jahrbuch. 101. Jahrgang.
Freiburg/Munich 1994, pp. 55–75.
25 Cf. Schneiders, W.: Sub specie aeternitatis. Spinozas absoluter Standpunkt. In: Heinekamp,
A. (Ed.): Theoria cum Praxi. Zum Verhältnis von Theorie und Praxis im 17. und 18. Jahrhun-
dert. Akten des II. internationalen Leibnizkongresses. Hannover 1977. Vol. 2. Wiesbaden
1981, pp. 170–188.
26 Kather, R.: Der Begriff der Causa sui bei Spinoza und Whitehead. In: Philosophisches Jahr-
buch. 101. Jahrgang. Freiburg/Munich 1994, p. 56.
27 Seidel points out that often in the Spinoza exegesis, reference is made to the similarities be-
tween Spinoza’s understanding of substance and eleatic philosophy’s concept of being. Ac-
cording to Seidel, in eleatic thinking, the true »being« is understood as being at rest within
68       B. Monistic Concepts

and is explained by itself« i. e. »what cannot be conceived through another thing

must be conceived through itself.«28 Spinoza held it against Descartes that he did not
regard res cogitans and res extensa for substances, and that he was off the mark in that
respect. Should Descartes have asked why Spinoza thought so, Spinoza would have
answered that res extensa cannot be understood through itself (per se concipitur). He
also held that it must be obvious to everyone that it is finite and it would therefore be
completely absurd to give it the dignity of being a substance. To Spinoza, res cogitans
and Res extensa are not substances. That Descartes thinks differently clearly indicates
that the time for the Cartesian dualism of substance is over. Spinoza concludes that if
we truly reflect, we can come to only one conclusion: There is one substance: »[T]he
oneness of substance also excludes plurality of number: the infinity, being non-par-
titive, leaves no room for the existence of finite substances.«29
However, our definition of terms is not yet complete. Another crucial term we
must include on our list of concepts, if we want to understand Spinoza’s thinking, is
the word »attribute.« When Spinoza uses this term, he refers to »what the intellect
perceives of substance as constituting its essence.«30 Attributes express the divine
being. Spinoza argues that the divine substance includes not only a large number,
but a countless, infinite number of attributes.31 As Bartuschat formulates it so well,
substance is »attributively articulated.«32 Seidel writes that »whatever gives expres-
sion to being and contains in itself no negation belongs to the nature of the absolutely
infinite. However, the determination of an attribute already encompasses a negation.
Definitio est negatio!«33 This raises the following question: What attributes can we
actually identify? Spinoza says that we should only be concerned with and can only
comprehend two of these countless attributes, namely »cogitatio« and »extensio« –
thinking and extension. Röd tells us:

»Since the attributes constitute the essence of the substance, there must be an exact
correspondence between each of their sequences. Spinoza’s metaphysical construction
not only boils down to a continuous parallelism of extensio and cogitation, but to what
Spinoza assumed were other innumerable attributes not accessible to us, together with
their sequences.«34

Where then do bodies belong? This is an important question for the lived body-soul
problem. Spinoza suggests that we speak of modi by which he means »the affections

itself. Spinoza, however, understood substance as causa sui, and thus also as the essence of
the being of all things:
Seidel, H.: Spinoza zur Einführung. Hamburg 1992, p. 40.
28 Spinoza, B.: Ethics I, Def. 3, Cf. Ax. 1–2.
29 Jonas, H.: Spinoza and the Theory of Organism. In: Jonas, H.: Organismus und Freiheit. Phi-
losophie des Lebens und Ethik der Lebenswissenschaften (Kritische Gesamtausgabe Vol. I/1).
Freiburg/Berlin/Vienna 2010, p. 574.
30 Spinoza, B.: Ethics I, Def. 4.
31 Spinoza, B.: Ethics I, Def. 6.
32 Bartuschat, W.: Spinozas Theorie des Menschen. Hamburg 1992, p. 37.
33 Seidel, H.: Spinoza zur Einführung. Hamburg 1994, p. 42.
34 Röd, W.: Benedictus de Spinoza. Eine Einführung. Stuttgart 2002, p. 142.
 2. Spinoza’s parallelism and the one divine substance       69

of substance, which is what is in something else and is conceived through some-

thing else.«35 He means that your desk or a human body are affections of the una
substantia. Substance and modus cannot be juxtaposed in our list of terms, they
mean two different things. The distance between the divine and the respective finite
modi is not denied. A desk, for example, came into being through something else.
We can specify requirements and name causes. It is even possible that we have built
the desk ourselves. Concerning you and me, there is no doubt that we are not our
own reason for being. The desk and human beings, Spinoza tells us, are inherent in
the substantia. Both are temporal and finite: The desk was built some day; man has
a beginning and an end. All of this does not apply to substance. There is yet another
enormous difference which Spinoza clearly addresses: unlike substance, the nature
of a modus has nothing to do with whether it actually exists. We cannot conclude
from the nature of a desk that it in fact really exists. By contrast (according to the
ontological argument), the concept of Causa sui implies that this is not merely a
product of the imagination: »Now any mode of universal substance, whether simple
or complex, whether brief or enduring, is an individual [...], and is this in all of the
attributes if in any one of them.«36

2.4 Spinoza and the one divine substance

»All being, in its essence and at every moment, is both together: extension and thought,
matter and mind, nature and its own idea. Both of these are only two sides of the same
coin – the eternal, absolute substance – that expresses itself in both of them equally.«37

The cornerstone of Spinoza’s thinking is the una substantia. This divine cornerstone
has no other foundation, it is the foundation (sub-stare) as such, as it is neither gener-
ated nor supported by anything else.38 Spinoza’s question is relevant precisely within
the framework of the lived body-soul problem, which is concerned about the inter-
action of various substances. Spinoza does not seek a bridge that spans the two sides
of the great divide, but within the individual areas there can most definitely be an
effect. How can we explain this? Of course, there must be points of contact and com-
monalities.39 Spinoza, saying that it is not very prudent to cling to the notion that
there is a lively exchange between the two sides of the great divide, between mind
and body, since the two do not even share the same attribute. Descartes also does

35 Spinoza, B.: Ethics I, Def. 5.

36 Jonas, H.: Spinoza and the Theory of Organism. In: Jonas, H.: Organismus und Freiheit. Phi-
losophie des Lebens und Ethik der Lebenswissenschaften (Kritische Gesamtausgabe Vol. I/1).
Freiburg/Berlin/Vienna 2010, p. 577.
37 Jonas, H.: Matter, Mind, and Creation. In: Jonas, H.: Mortality and Morality. A Search for the
Good after Auschwitz. Illinois 1996, p. 185.
38 Spinoza, B.: Ethics I, Prop. 6.
39 »The parallel between being and thinking does not allow us to differentiate between formal
equality (the determination of several things) and real sameness (of an identical thing).«
(Coreth, E.: Gott im philosophischen Denken. Stuttgart 2001, p. 151).
70       B. Monistic Concepts

not seem to have understood that it is part of substance to be »in se.«40 Why should
res cogitans and res extensa be substances? Spinoza affirms that they are not because
»God does not create the substances, extension and thought: God is a thinking and
extended being«, as Helmut Seidel nicely explains Spinoza’s concern.41 Descartes had
also disregarded the »per se concipitur«.42 All this, Spinoza tells us, indicates major
errors in reasoning.
What would happen, Spinoza asks, if a substance were limited by another sub-
stance with the same attribute? Spinoza’s answer is already contained in the little
word »limited.« Such a substance would have a beginning and an end. Where is the
problem? We would have to grapple with the question where this substance comes
from and who is responsible for it. What was prior to the una substantia? Was the
substance generated by another substance? According to Spinoza, these are com-
pletely absurd questions. Since this cannot be according to him, there is only the one
substance which is divine and is called causa sui.43 A problem »that the underlying
substance itself has no nature [...] or has a mysterious nature, are not problems for
Spinoza, since he identifies the underlying substance as God.«44
Having said that much about the infinite substance, Spinoza also reflects about the
entities that have a beginning and an end. He directly deals with this complex of sub-
jects with the second definition he introduces in the Ethica, where he explains that fi-
nite substances are »limited by another thing of the same nature.«45 You and I, Spinoza
would tell us, are limited by other humans. This is just an aspect of our being human.
We may twist and turn as much as we want, we cannot change anything about that. All
bodies we see around us are finite: the desk you are sitting at, the book lying on that
desk, your own body. We may find a larger desk or a bigger book, he argues.46 That is
clear. The question remains: What about thinking? No, says Spinoza human thinking
also has its limits. For example, other people may think better, faster, farther or more
intelligently than we. That, too, is plausible.47 For example, if we wonder how to say
something new about an »ancient thinker« such as Spinoza, we will experience definite
limitations due to the formulations and the mindset of others. Spinoza says that quin-
tessentially our bodies and our thinking are finite. Naturally, they are not substances!
What has a beginning and an end (the desk, this book, the human body) Spinoza
tells us, must be a modus of the una substantia. The desk, this book, and our body
are in a very special relationship to the causa sui.48 According to Spinoza, brains, pro-

40 Spinoza, B.: Ethics I, Def. 3.

41 Seidel, H.: Spinoza zur Einführung. Hamburg 1994, p. 44.
42 Spinoza, B.: Ethics I, Def. 3.
43 Spinoza, B.: Ethics, Prop. 14.
44 McCann, E.: History: Philosophy of mind in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In:
Guttenplan, S. (Ed.): A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford 102005, p. 342.
45 Spinoza, B.: Ethics I Def. 2.
46 Spinoza, B.: Ethics I Def. 2.
47 »Whatever the nature of the cause I may recognize, it is always the consequence of other
causes which again have another cause as their condition, and so on. Whichever term I
choose, it is always determined by other terms which in turn are determined by other con-
cepts, and so forth.« (Seidel, H.: Spinoza zur Einführung. Hamburg 1994, p. 39).
48 Spinoza, B.: Ethics II, Def. 1.
 2. Spinoza’s parallelism and the one divine substance       71

fessors, doctoral students, organisms (in short: all finite entities) are not substantial.
Since Spinoza says that only the causa sui is substance, many interpreters of Spinoza’s
philosophy have tried to label it as substance monism.49 With that label, Spinoza tries
to demonstrate that every human being is a lived body-soul unity.50 In essence, Spi-
noza adds, the causa sui unfolds in each of us in the realms of extension and thought.
Spinoza would never agree with the hypothesis that finite modi and divine sub-
stance are one and the same, and can thus be equated. Jaspers points out that Spinoza
recognizes that the divine substance consists of an infinite number of attributes, yet
emphasizes that only cogitatio and extensio manifest themselves in our world.51 The
causa sui is thus always more and larger than we. Spinoza differentiates between
natura naturans and natura naturata.52 Seen from this perspective as well, Spinoza is
unable to simply blend and equate God and world.53 In this context, the suggestion
made by Jaspers and Kather that Spinoza’s philosophy should be characterized as
panentheism is appropriate.54 Spinoza himself formulates it as follows: »Quicquid
est, in Deo est. – Whatever is, is in God.«55 Spinoza’s first thought revolves around
the causa sui and they conclude with God’s love, the amor Dei intellectualis. That is
why Jaspers says: »He is in search of nothing other than authentic thought and life,
which for him means being in God.«56 Spinoza, however, has different views than

49 There are several interpretations as to how substance monism should be understood. With
the abundance of interpretations available, we also have a profusion of reservations con-
cerning Spinoza’s approach. Robert Schnepf has collected several attempts at interpreta-
tion. He writes that there are times when »substance monism is interpreted as neo-Platonic
emanation philosophy where everything finite flows from the one substance (e. g. Wolf-
son 1958); or as philosophy of expression where individual power and strength quantums
which give expression to an extensive potentia comprising the substance (e. g. Deleuze 1968
or Bove 1996); or again as a philosophy of absolute intelligibility of all being from which
all is derived, or rather designed from the nature of God (e. g. Gueroult 1968 or Math-
eron 2006); or finally as field ontology as understood in modern physics (e. g. Bennett 1984
or Rohs 1996).« (Schnepf, R.: Die eine Substanz und die endlichen Dinge. In: Hampe, M./
Schnepf, R. (Eds.): Klassiker Auslegen. Baruch de Spinoza. Ethik in geometrischer Ordnung
dargestellt. Berlin 2006, p. 37 f.).
50 Spinoza, B.: Ethics II, prop. 13, schol.
51 Cf. Jaspers, K.: Einführung in die Philosophie. Munich 221999, pp. 763, 766, 776, 867, 868.
52 »Before I go any further I wish to explain at this point what we must understand by »natura
naturans« [creating nature] and »natura naturata« [created nature]. [...] I consider that it
is already clear from what has gone before that by »natura naturans« we must understand
what is in itself and is conceived through itself; that is, the attributes of substance that ex-
press eternal and infinite essence; [...] God insofar as He is considered a free cause. By »nat-
ura naturata« I understand all that follows from the necessity of God’s nature, that is from
the necessity of each of God’s attributes; or all the modes of God’s attributes considered as
things which are in God and can neither be nor be conceived without God.« (Spinoza, B.:
Ethics I, Prop. 29).
53 Spinoza’s understanding of the concept »nature.« Cf. Moreau, J.: Individuum und Natur bei
Spinoza und Leibniz. In: Heinekamp, A. (Ed.): Theoria cum Praxi. Zum Verhältnis von The-
orie und Praxis im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert. Akten des II. internationalen Leibnizkongresses.
Hannover 1977. Vol. 2. Wiesbaden 1981, pp. 130–137.
54 Cf. Kather, R.: Der Begriff der Causa sui bei Spinoza und Whitehead. In: Philosophisches
Jahrbuch. 101. Jahrgang. Freiburg/Munich 1994, p. 57.
55 Spinoza, B.: Ethics I, Prop. 15 (My emphasis).
56 Jaspers, K.: Die großen Philosophen. Munich 72004, pp. 755 f.
72       B. Monistic Concepts

Jews, Christians and Muslims about God as the creator. There must not be any litur-
gical implementation either.57 According to Spinoza, what the deity does occurs ac-
cording to a kind of natural law. A Jaspers says, Spinoza’s God is a logical something
that is, however, imagined by means which transcend finite logic.58

2.5 Spinoza’s world of the imperative and the question of free-

dom

»At this point our readers will no doubt find

themselves in some difficulty
and will think of many things that will give
them pause.«59

Spinoza notes that humans, desks, and other modi necessarily originate from the
una substantia. He calls this as undeniable as the fact that the angles of a triangle do
not add up to 90 or 360 degrees, they can only add up to 180 degrees.60 This con-
clusion, which once again demonstrates what it means to take on something »more
geometrico,« raises the question what this means, for example, regarding our being
free. Here too, we can go with Jaspers’ interpretation, who said aptly that Spinoza
»both denies and asserts freedom«.61 What does he mean? On the one hand, there
is no freedom insofar as all processes in this world are as necessary as the causa sui
within which they are inherent. Human manifestations of life do not occupy any
special position. Jaspers means that Spinoza’s idea of freedom places emphasis on the
fact that our ability to accept and work within the parameters of this necessity is in
fact freedom.62 In the chapter on freedom which follows, we will meet similar ideas
in that some contemporary authors try to reconcile freedom and determination.
Spinoza himself would probably try to convince these authors that inadequate ideas
rob us of our freedom.63 What about an increase in freedom? Here, Spinoza would
also have an answer ready: Those who use reason and are aware of its necessity, will
attain more and more spheres of freedom.64

57 Spinoza, B.: Ethics V, Prop. 17 cor.

58 Jaspers, K.: Die großen Philosophen. Munich 72004, p. 767.
59 Spinoza, B.: Ethics II, Prop. 11 schol.
60 Spinoza, B.: Ethics I, Prop. 17 schol.
61 Cf. Jaspers, K.: Die großen Philosophen. Munich 72004, p. 811.
62 Jaspers here interprets Spinoza as follows: »We should differentiate between the necessity
of the external compulsion causing something to occur, and the necessity of an occurrence
as the result of our internal nature. Where the action occurs only and alone as a response to
our own inner nature, necessity is at the same time complete freedom.« (Ibid., p. 812).
63 Spinoza, B.: Ethics II, Def. 3.
An adequate idea refers to the substance, an inadequate idea refers to the modi.
Spinoza’s concept of the »idea«: Deleuze, G.: Spinoza. Praktische Philosophie. Berlin 1988,
pp. 105–109; Röd, W.: Benedictus de Spinoza. Eine Einführung. Stuttgart 2002, pp. 199 ff.
64 Regarding the way to greater freedom. Wetlesen, J.: The Sage and the way. Spinoza’s Ethics
of Freedom. Assen 1979.
 2. Spinoza’s parallelism and the one divine substance       73

2.6 Causa sui and the problem of lived body-soul unity

»Praeter Deum nulla dari, neque concipi

potest substantia.«65

Spinoza sees very clearly that human beings have mental manifestations of life: They
can think, plan, deliberate and have ideas.66 He asks the question we have asked in
the introductory chapter: What is the relationship between these mental manifesta-
tions of life and our physical processes?
As mentioned above, Spinoza seeks different answers than Descartes. He regards
the pineal gland theory as a bad joke. He aggressively attacks Cartesian dualism,
accusing it to fail due to its own ambitions to approach everything clare et distincte.
Is the theory itself to be clare et distincte? Spinoza says that those who pose this ques-
tion can’t be serious. He also finds other suggestions unconvincing, and he is aware
of the fact that what he proposes concerning the causa sui and what the occasional-
ists contribute to the deity does not really fit together. There are enormous differenc-
es which cannot simply be ignored. There must be no false harmony. What about the
possibility of accepting half the legacy of the French philosopher, taking the side of
the res extensa and supporting a materialistic monism? Spinoza does not even want
to think of such a possibility since what is at stake is the unity of the human being,
and he resists the reduction of mental manifestations of life to the physical side of the
great divide. Spinoza realizes that he must clarify this unity considering the causa sui.
The causa sui, Spinoza says, is the reason why the organization of bodies is the
same as organizing thought. Causa sui is the reason, Spinoza tells us, that the order
of the body is the same as the order of thought. After all, both are attributes of the
una substantia.67 Jonas rightly calls this thought the »Magna Charta« of his psy-
chophysical parallelism.68 Seen from that perspective, Spinoza’s understanding of
parallelism implies that bodily impulses and mental processes are equally important.
Through the causa sui, body and mind are carefully and adequately synchronized:
»The affections of the body, that is the images of things, are arranged and connected
in the body in exactly the same way as thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged
and connected in the mind.«69 The best response to the lived body-soul problem
is thus a psychophysical parallelism anchored within the causa sui.70 Jonas writes:

65 Spinoza, B.: Ethics I, Prop. 14.

66 Spinoza, B.: Ethics II, Ax. 2.
67 Spinoza, B.: Ethics II, Prop. 13.
68 Cf. Jonas, H.: Spinoza and the Theory of Organism. In: Jonas, H.: Organismus und Frei-
heit. Philosophie des Lebens und Ethik der Lebenswissenschaften (Kritische Gesamtausgabe
Vol. I/1). Freiburg/Berlin/Vienna 2010, p. 586.
69 Spinoza, B.: Ethics V, Prop. 1 (My emphasis).
70 Deleuze points out that the concept of »parallelism« does not come from Spinoza but from
Leibniz. Yet even though Spinoza himself does not use this concept specifically, it char-
acterizes his work well. »Through his rigorous parallelism Spinoza rejects every analogy,
every eminence, every form of placing one sequence above the other, and every ideal effect
which presupposes a preceding eminence: just as the attribute thinking cannot claim to be
superior to the attribute expansion, so the soul is not superior to the body.« (Deleuze, G.:
Spinoza und das Problem des Ausdrucks in der Philosophie. Munich 1993, p. 97).
74       B. Monistic Concepts

»Each occurrence (mode) as viewed under the attribute of extension is at the same time,
and equivalently, an occurrence viewed under the attribute of thought or conscious-
ness, and vice versa. The two sides are strictly complementary aspects of one and the
same reality which of necessity unfolds itself in all its attributes at once.«71

Spinoza thus explains that your mental manifestations of life and your physical pro-
cesses are exactly synchronized. Mental manifestations of life are the unfolding of
the causa sui under the auspices of the attribute of the cogitatio, while the physical
processes of the causa sui can be brought to the fore under the auspices of the exten-
sio attributes. Seidel confirms that »human beings do not belong to two opposing
substances, they are not citizens of two worlds.«72 Each development, no matter how
small, even every body, Spinoza writes, coincides with an idea and vice versa. »This
is a concretization of the parallelism of the attributes with regard to the aspects of
the mental and the bodily, which remain unseparated and linked within the human
being, because the human spirit derives its reality only as the idea of his body which
represents him.«73
The questions whether the lived body may be non-existent and we may merely
be the victims of a grand illusion, or whether we may be nothing but brains in a vat,
are totally bizarre as far as Spinoza is concerned. What he wants to make abundantly
clear is that we are bodily structures and we therefore explore our surroundings
in a bodily manner. We live as lived bodies. His argument is relevant: Our lived
body is not apathetic to what occurs around it. It is not uninvolved. Changes affect
us bodily. Spinoza also argues that it is precisely by observing our own lived body
that we can better understand ourselves. We cannot merely focus on one side of the
great divide. As far as Spinoza is concerned, there can be no corporeality without
mental manifestations of life. »Recognizing the individual parts that belong to the
whole and the relationship of the parts to each other must always remain inade-
quate as long as the components together are not related to the whole.«74 Human
beings are reduced neither to super brains concerned with producing more or less
intelligent thoughts, nor to spiritual beings who have nothing to do with their own
bodies.
According to the principles of parallelism, bodily and spiritual processes take
place in parallel.75 In this sense, parallel means that it is impossible for one area
to affect the other: »The body cannot determine the mind to think, nor can the
mind determine the body to motion or rest, or to anything else (if there is any-

It is not self-evident that Spinoza’s philosophy can be described as psychophysical paral-

lelism (Psychophysischen Parallelismus). Cf. also: Harris, E. E.: The Substance of Spinoza.
New Jersey 1995, pp. 57, 62; Bartuschat, W.: Spinozas Theorie des Menschen. Hamburg 1992,
p. 283.
71 Jonas, H.: Spinoza and the Theory of Organism. In: Jonas, H.: Organismus und Freiheit. Phi-
losophie des Lebens und Ethik der Lebenswissenschaften (Kritische Gesamtausgabe Vol. I/1).
Freiburg/Berlin/Vienna 2010, p. 575.
72 Seidel, H.: Spinoza zur Einführung. Hamburg 1994, p. 52.
73 Bartuschat, W.: Baruch de Spinoza. Munich 1996, p. 85.
74 Seidel, H.: Spinoza zur Einführung. Hamburg 1994, p. 53.
75 Spinoza, B.: Ethics I, Prop. 3, also Ethics III, Prop. 2.
 2. Spinoza’s parallelism and the one divine substance       75

thing else).«76 The concept of parallelism is designed to emphasize that physical

and mental processes have no access to each other: Neither side of the great divide
flows over into the other side. There is no bridge to connect the two sides. However,
Spinoza takes the understanding of parallelism further. Thus, when we think deeply
about this chapter, physical processes are also set in motion. Obviously then even
the smallest physical adjustment brings about a similar response in the domain
of mental manifestations of life. The rivers on either side of the great divide run
parallel to each other. However, according to Spinoza, our conviction that it would
be good to get up and leave our desk, and stretch our legs, initiates no response.
Mental manifestations of life are unable to impact our body: after all, everything is
supposed to happen in parallel! A weakness in the argument is apparent here: As
far as physical and mental processes should occur strictly parallel to each other,
parallelism cannot cope with the phenomenon that our lived body gives expression
to anything concerning our well-being, and that our mental manifestations, goals,
and intentions can be read by observing our lived body. Jaspers remarks that it is
absurd for us to try and explain in corporeal terms what we understand as meaning
but what must become physically visible to become reality. Jaspers says that Spinoza
would answer that all understanding of meaning is only an explanation in the aspect
of the spirit, not of the body.77
We must give Spinoza credit for being truly concerned in doing justice to our or-
gasmic unity, to our lived body-soul unity. He is determined to favor neither side of
the great divide. Both are important in considering the question concerning human
beings. He believes that by speaking of parallel rivers on each side of the rift he is able
to do more justice to the unity of human beings than Descartes did. Today, Spinoza
would say that we cannot be researched from A to Z even with the most sophisticated
technology. He believes that our understanding of our bodies (including the brain)
remains inadequate.

»With this he has brought human awareness into a relationship with what may be
recognized in the corporeal world. A simply structured body is not capable of much in re-
lationship to what is outside it. Many relationships remain inaccessible and the idea of
this body is correspondingly poor regarding the relationships it can form. Only the idea
of that body which from within itself stands in relationship with many other bodies, and
is thus able to take many impressions up into itself, has an internal relationship to many
other ideas. We can thus say that the one who is such an idea is able to perceive much,
and can in this way likewise have many ideas, i. e. the idea of much.«78

Among the advantages of psychophysical parallelism is that contrary to Descartes,

who is oblivious of the lived body, Spinoza understands us as existing corporeally in
the midst of relationships with the world, as Regine Kather tells us.79 These living re-

76 Spinoza, B.: Ethics III, Prop. 2.

77 Cf. Jaspers, K.: Die großen Philosophen. Munich 72004, p. 797.
78 Bartuschat, W.: Spinozas Theorie des Menschen. Hamburg 1992, pp. 313 f.
79 Kather, R.: Was ist Leben? Philosophische Positionen und Perspektiven. Darmstadt 2003,
p. 56.
76       B. Monistic Concepts

lationships include those with other humana as well as with nature itself. Jonas calls
this »openness to the world.«80 Jonas stresses that Spinoza would understand being
alive not merely as something that is exclusively physical in nature. All organisms
not only have extension, but also cogitation. Spinoza’s similarity to hylemorphism is
seen in his arrangement of human beings within a chain of the living, since all or-
ganisms are modi of the one divine substance: »Spinoza was no longer compelled to
view those complex material entities we call organisms as the products of mechanical
design.«81 Spinoza would therefore also regard the question absurd whether a dog
that is being beaten has any feelings.82
Thinking and planning has something to do with our feelings as well. So crucial
was this thought for Spinoza that he presented a separate doctrine for it. He neither
praised nor discredited our emotional life. His focus is a more careful penetration
and a deeper understanding of our feelings.83 Spinoza said that all our buoyant joy,
our passionate enthusiasm, but also our paralyzing fear and our self-destructive envy
are part of our values and actions! While this all sounds modern and flawless, we
must remember that Spinoza was fascinated by the view that we are capable of han-
dling our feelings quite mathematically.84
According to Spinoza, it is not good for us to be fixated on inadequate ideas. It
is much better and more fulfilling (and therefore also more conducive to freedom!)
when life is filled with adequate ideas. A sensible way of life, being rational, is much
more conducive to moving forward. All organisms, Spinoza tells, us strive to pre-
serve themselves (conatus in suo esse perseverare).85 Kather points out that »striving
for self-preservation first attains its purpose when we remember that human beings
are comprised of body and mind. An inanimate body would have no interest in its
being; The bodiless mind however would not be threatened in its existence.«86

80 Jonas, H.: Spinoza and the Theory of Organism. In: Jonas, H.: Organismus und Freiheit. Phi-
losophie des Lebens und Ethik der Lebenswissenschaften (Kritische Gesamtausgabe Vol. I/1).
Freiburg/Berlin/Vienna 2010, p. 590.
81 Ibid., p. 576.
82 Spinoza, B.: Ethics IV, Prop. 37, schol. 1.
It is especially in the following passages that Spinoza reflects on the relationship between
human beings and animals: Ethics IV, Prop. 37 schol. and Ethics IV, Ax. 26.
Cf. also: Soller, A. K.: Das Verhältnis des Menschen zum Tier nach Spinoza. Zur Ethik der
ökologischen Beziehungen. In: Hammacher, K./Reimers-Tovote, I./Walther, M.: Zur Aktuali­
tät der Ethik Spinozas. Medizin/Psychiatrie – Ökonomie – Recht – Religion. Spinoza in der
Geschichte der philosophischen Ethik. Würzburg 2000, p. 109.
83 Cf. Seidel, H.: Spinoza zur Einführung. Hamburg 1994, p. 60.
84 Spinoza, B.: Ethics III, Def. 3.
85 According to Bartuschat, the entire Ethics can be read in light of the endeavor that »it un-
folds the conditions within which the ambition is realized that makes it possible for indi-
viduals to attain their true self.« (Bartuschat, W.: Spinozas Theorie des Menschen. Hamburg
1992, p. IX f.).
Cf. also: Blumenberg, H.: Selbsterhaltung und Beharrung. Zur Konstitution der neuzeitlichen
Rationalität. In: Ebeling, H.: (Ed.): Subjektivität und Selbsterhaltung. Beiträge zur Diagnose
der Moderne. Frankfurt a. M. 1976, pp. 144–207.
86 Kather, R.: Was ist Leben? Philosophische Positionen und Perspektiven. Darmstadt 2003,
p. 55.
 2. Spinoza’s parallelism and the one divine substance       77

I have already mentioned that Spinoza’s thinking begins with the causa sui and
goes back to it. Were we to ask Spinoza about the goal of human endeavors, we would
he would reply: »Summum Mentis bonum est Dei cognitio, et summa mentis virtus
Deum cognoscere.«87
To refer to Spinoza, to follow his thoughts and to develop them, was not particu-
larly conducive to one’s scientific career in the 18th-century. After all, Spinoza had
managed to accumulate a fair number of opponents through his thinking and his
conduct. However, I cannot dwell on this here88. Damasio formulates: »Spinoza’s
opinion was an island of contradiction in a sea of conformity.«89 Looking around
in the philosophical marketplace today, the situation has changed. Quite a few pub-
lications contain a lobby for Spinoza and his way of thinking.90 There are authors
who cite points of contact between their own reflections and Spinoza’s thoughts. Yet,
other authors’ sense of alienation concerning Spinoza’s reference to working with
the mos geometricus indicates that such appreciation does not mean that Spinoza is
merely being imitated. Some modern authors are annoyed by Spinoza’s remark that
he was working according to mos geometricus.
In some scientific essays from the discipline of the philosophy of mind, the ques-
tion is currently asked whether Spinoza may be regarded as a pioneer of identity
theory.91 Since I will still discuss identity theory in the present study, I will not elab-
orate much at this point except to say that it is true to say that Spinoza, like modern
identity theorists, addresses the question how the body and the mind interact and
exchange information. His vision differs in that his parallelism is rooted in the one
divine substance while he tries to do justice to the unity of man. That is also why
he would resist any reference to a diminution of the human being to just mind and
brain. While, according to Spinoza, mental manifestations of life cannot be reduced
to a cerebrum, modern identity theorists are, as we shall see, of a different opinion.
In his book, Descartes’ Error, the internationally respected neurologist Antonio
Damasio is extremely critical of Descartes and his followers. He also dedicated a

87 Spinoza, B.: Ethics, IV, Prop. 28.

88 Cf. Bartuschat, W.: Baruch de Spinoza. Munich 1996, pp. 177 ff.; Seidel, H.: Spinoza zur Ein-
führung. Hamburg 1994, pp. 123 ff.
89 Damasio, A.: Looking for Spinoza. Joy, Sorrow and the Feeling Brain. London 2004, p. 12.
90 Gottfried Seebass for example emphasizes the greater advantages of Spinoza’s monism in
comparison to both dualist and physicalist stances. Seebass, G.: Der Traum des physikalis-
tischen Monismus. Wissenschaftstheoretische und methodenkritische Überlegungen zur
neurowissenschaftlichen Behandlung von Bewusstseinsphänomenen. In: Holderegger, A./
Sitter-Liver, B./Hess, C. W./Rager, G. (Eds.): Hirnforschung und Menschenbild. Beiträge zur
interdisziplinären Verständigung. Fribourg 2007, pp. 55–74, esp. pp. 69 f.
Eva Ruhnau is convinced that in light of modern brain research, Spinoza’s Ethica is increas-
ingly relevant today: Ruhnau, E.: Kausalität und Bedeutung. Hirnphysiologische Grundlagen
menschlichen Zeiterlebens. In: Hammacher, K. (Ed.): Spinoza und die moderne Wissenschaft.
Würzburg 1998, p. 226.
91 Cf. Pauen, M.: Vorläufer der Identitätstheorie? Über das Verhältnis Spinozas zu neueren Var-
ianten des Monismus. In: Studia Spinozana 14 (1998), pp. 34–55; Pauen, M.: Spinoza und die
Identitätstheorie. In: Hampe, M./Schnepf, R. (Eds.): Klassiker Auslegen. Baruch de Spinoza.
Ethik in geometrischer Ordnung dargestellt. Berlin 2006, pp. 81–100.
78       B. Monistic Concepts

monograph to Spinoza.92 It is Spinoza’s thinking that fascinates him, and for which
he professes intellectual passion. Damasio judges Spinoza’s analysis to be funda-
mental for any reflection about human emotions and feelings.93 He emphasizes that
Spinoza dealt with topics that are equally important to him in his scientific work. The
most important of these is the lived body-soul problem, and the question about the
nature of emotions and feelings.94 Damasio says that this 17th century philosopher
has revealed ways that even today can be called upon to propose solutions to difficult
problems.95 He reiterates that there are a number of contact points between what Spi-
noza writes concerning emotions and feelings, and what is being contributed today
in the area of neuroscientific insights.96 Damasio praises Spinoza:

»... for understanding instincts, motivation, emotions, and feelings – a totality which he
called affects or passions – as a central aspect of human nature. Joy and sorrow are two
important concepts in his attempt to understand human beings, and to make sugges-
tions as to how these humans could better organize their lives.«97

Damasio is fascinated by Spinoza’s thoughts that the body is the object of the idea
which constitutes the human mind. The mind is the idea of the body, and the mind rec-
ognizes itself when the body is in a position to understand the affections of the body.98
In many neuroscientific works, Cartesian dualism of body and spirit has merely
been relocated.99 Damasio deplores that in numerous current concepts of the lived
body-soul problem, the brain and the mind are on one side, and the body (without
the brain) on the other. There should be re-thinking. Damasio is concerned with the
organismic whole of the living being, which I believe can be expressed much more
effectively by Aristotelian hylemorphism than with Spinoza’s parallelism (which
still has to be demonstrated), as the latter, for example, must remain silent vis-à-vis
everyday phenomena, and that emotions (which are so important for Damasio in his
work) find expression in corporeality.
Damasio leaves no doubt that our cerebral structures are a necessary prerequi-
site for our mental manifestations of life.100 This requires the cooperation of many
regions of the brain. »It occurs when the mere accumulation of details which affect
the body condition in the regions represented attain a critical value.«101 Here Dama-
sio differs from Spinoza who had emphasized that body and mind are adequately
synchronized (through the causa sui). In this instance the body is not a necessary

92 Damasio, A.: Looking for Spinoza. Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain. Orlando 2003. Dama-
sio, A.: Descartes’ Error: emotion, reason and the human brain. New York 1994.
93 Cf. Damasio, A.: Looking for Spinoza. Joy, Sorrow and the Feeling Brain. London 2004, p. 8.
94 Cf. ibid., p. 11.
95 Cf. ibid., p. 11.
96 Cf. ibid., p. 14.
97 Cf. ibid., p. 8.
98 Cf. ibid., pp. 217 f.
99 Cf. ibid., p. 189.
100 Cf. ibid., p. 206.
101 Cf. ibid., p. 208.
 2. Spinoza’s parallelism and the one divine substance       79

requirement for us experiencing mental manifestations of life. This too could be a

reason to hope that one day Damasio will write a book about Aristotle.
For Damasio, the advantage in the substance monism of Spinoza’s philosophy
is that it can be so profitably expressed that the body and mental manifestations
of life are inseparable. Spinoza’s underlying metaphysical assumptions are quietly
ignored. That is why there is a difference between Spinoza and Damasio speaking
of »the nature of man.« Damasio deplores the fact that Spinoza’s understanding of
body and mind has not received due attention, neither in Spinoza research nor in
the empirical sciences. That seems rather exaggerated when we take modern Spinoza
research into account.102 Damasio appreciates that in Spinoza’s philosophy, human
reason and emotions are interconnected in a credible and forward-looking manner.
It appeals to Damasio that Spinoza’s philosophy not only »emphasizes the positive
effects of joy while rejecting sadness and fear, but also determinedly strives for the
one and overcomes the other two.«103 Damasio finds it very positive that Spinoza
affirms life, and utilizes the emotions and feelings as tools to strengthen and invig-
orate life.104 He regards as problematic that Spinoza’s solution seems to function best
in isolated self-centeredness and without any proximity to others.105 This criticism,
which he also characterizes as rather impractical asceticism, makes little sense and
is a contradiction of what has been said in connection with Jonas and Kather, that
unlike Descartes, Spinoza can think of human beings in relationship to the world.

Appreciation and criticism

»For here there is no beginning and end, no

success and failure, no better and worse,
and, all the more so, no good and evil. What
appears to be such appears so only from the
standpoint of the particular. The whole, the
psychophysical voice is always in the state of
perfection.«106

We have seen that parallelism is Spinoza’s response to the lived body-soul problem.
For him, bodies are modi of the una substantia under the attribute of »extension«,
and mental manifestations of life are modi of the divine substance under the attrib-
ute of cogitatio. For Spinoza, thought and extension are attributes of the one infinite
substantia that is named causa sui. This identifies an important argument as to why
there is a strict parallelism between thinking and extension, between the two sides

102 Cf. ibid., p. 217.

103 Cf. ibid., p. 275.
104 Cf. ibid., p. 273–277.
105 Cf. ibid., p. 273–277.
106 Jonas, H.: Matter, Mind, and Creation. In: Jonas, H.: Mortality and Morality. A Search for the
Good after Auschwitz. Illinois 1996, p. 185.
80       B. Monistic Concepts

of the great divide. Spinoza’s parallelism is rooted in the monism of the one divine
substance.
Spinoza is not concerned whether he may actually have no body. He would rather
leave such speculations to others from whom he likes to distance himself. He also
has nothing in common with suggestions that mental manifestations of life should
be explained away, or rather reduced to states of the brain. Spinoza takes the unity of
the human being seriously. Therefore, a reductionist initiative is out of the question.
Should someone like Spinoza support a psychophysical parallelism, he would not
do justice to the phenomenon that the lived body can give expression to our goals,
expectations, and also our feelings. This would seem to go against such a theory. It
similarly becomes difficult to say something about our human freedom insofar as
this is affirming o are willingly achieve something in this world.
Please remember my introduction, my mentioning a copy of this book falling on
your little toe, and you suffering some pain as a result pain. You will probably come
to the conclusion that the encounter between your toe and the book is related to your
pain. A parallelist would not really explain this since he would separate one physical
side of a trench with its own causalities from the other side of the trench with its
mental manifestations of life. There would be no connecting routes between the two.
While parallelism has determined to leave Cartesianism behind, it still tolerates
some of its fundamental prerequisites such as tearing apart mental manifestations of
life and physical processes that are now (in the dimension of the modi) to run parallel
to each other. Yet, considering the unity of the organism and our living processes,
this is not really a plausible approach.107 Nevertheless, parallelism is not an ad-hoc
response to Cartesian dualism, as Ansgar Beckerman alleges.108 Such a point of view
circumvents problems into which Cartesianism has moved itself. Today, problems
arise when Spinoza’s parallelism is no longer rooted in the causa sui. How else can
we account for a strict parallelism except by means of the one divine substance? A
further argument is given to us by modern neuroscience, which claims that synapses,
nerve cells, and whole areas of our cerebrum can be transformed structurally and
functionally through learning processes (for example when we memorize a poem),
and through other environmental situations. Such arguments cannot be understood
from the perspective of psychophysical parallelism.

107 In Bieri’s criticism of parallelism, it seems to go unnoticed when he states that because of
his pain he can explain his thoughts about seeing a doctor and his wish to visit a doctor.
He contends, however, that the pain itself can no longer be completely explained by means
of other mental phenomena. The explanation must draw on phenomena within his body.
(Bieri, P.: Generelle Einführung. In: Bieri, P. (Ed.): Analytische Philosophie des Geistes. Wein-
heim/Basel 42007, p. 7).
108 Cf. Beckermann, A.: Das Leib-Seele-Problem. Eine Einführung in die Philosophie des Geistes.
Paderborn 2008, p. 40.
II. Mental monism

»All things that exist do so only in the mind

[...] that is, they are purely notional.«109

Another monistic variety is mental monism. Proponents of this theory assume that
all that exists is completely spiritual. Advocates of this theory do not find the the-
ory plausible that there are independent material entities (i. e. sides of the dividing
trench). George Berkeley is a classic proponent of this mindset. The influence of
mental monism on the current philosophy of mind is minimal. Yet, the reflections of
at least one modern-day physicist fall within the scope of this hypothesis. Hans-Peter
Dürr argues that we can delete the word matter as in his opinion it do not exist. We
could well ask: What does exist? Nothing but relational structures, as Dürr proclaims.
We could of course also claim that mind exists. But as Dürr says, »The mind is fun-
damental. He even goes as far as to claim that there is no such thing as matter. All
is spirit.«110

109 Berkeley, G.: The Principles of Human Knowledge. § 34, p. 19. http://www.earlymoderntexts.
com/assets/pdfs/berkeley1710.pdf
110 Quoted by: Dürr, H.-P./Meyer-Abich, K. M./Mutschler, H.-D./Pannenberg, W./Wuketits, F.:
Gott, der Mensch und die Wissenschaft. Augsburg 1997, p. 138.
82       B. Monistic Concepts

3. George Berkeley: Esse est percipi et percipere

»Was uns ein Sinn vor Augen stellt,
dies und nichts andres ist die Welt!
Weshalb auch die Erfahrung findet:
Ohn’ Perzeption die Welt verschwindet.
Es gilt der Satz für uns auf Erden:
Sein, das heißt Wahrgenommenwerden.«111

3.1 Berkeley on human perception and reality

»I do not argue against the existence of any

one thing that we can apprehend, either by
sense or reflection. [...] The only thing whose
existence I deny, is what philosophers call
matter or corporeal substance.«112

George Berkeley,113 theologian, philosopher and Bishop of Cloyne, born in Ireland

at the end of the 17th century, published his major work when he was only in his
mid-twenties. A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge set the tone
for the doctrine of mental monism. Berkeley exegete Arend Kulenkampff wrote:
»Berkeley was a thinker of extraordinary versatility and a brilliant stylist. Yet as a phi-
losopher, he was misunderstood.«114 The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy counts
Berkeley among the »great philosophers of the early modern period.«115 It continues:
»He was a brilliant critic of his predecessors, particularly Descartes, Malebranche,
and Locke.« What makes him so special? Is his approach really so brilliant or just
as much of a dead end as the Cartesian way turned out to be? Berkeley presents his
theory after long and conscientious research. He writes in his introduction that he

111 Geldsetzer, L.: Die Philosophenwelt in Versen vorgestellt. Stuttgart 1995, p. 114.
112 Berkeley, G.: The Principles of Human Knowledge. § 35, p. 19.
113 See also: Kulenkampff, A.: George Berkeley. In: Hoerster, N. (Ed.): Klassiker des philoso-
phischen Denkens. Vol.1. Munich 31985; Kulenkampff, A.: George Berkeley. Munich 1987;
Kulenkampff, A.: Berkeleys Gottesbeweis aus der Empirie. In: Jung, M./Moxter, M./Schmidt,
T. M. (Ed.): Religionsphilosophie. Historische Positionen und systematische Reflexionen.
Würzburg 2000, pp. 87–99; Kulenkampff, A.: George Berkeley. In: Volpi, F. (Ed.): Großes
Werklexikon der Philosophie. Vol. 1. Stuttgart 2004, pp. 170–174; Kreimendahl, L.: Nach-
wort. In: Berkeley, G.: Eine Abhandlung über die Prinzipien der menschlichen Erkenntnis.
Worin die Hauptursachen der Irrtümer und Schwierigkeiten in den Wissenschaften zusam-
men mit den Gründen des Skeptizismus, des Atheismus und der Irreligion untersucht werden.
Stuttgart 2005, pp. 155–191; Robinson, H.: The physical World and the Nature of Thought.
In: McLaughlin, B. P./Beckermann, A./Walter, S. (Eds.): The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy
of Mind. Oxford 2009, pp. 198 ff.
114 Kulenkampff, A.: George Berkeley. In: Volpi, F. (Ed.): Großes Werklexikon der Philosophie.
Vol. 1. Stuttgart 2004, p. 170.
115 Downing, L.: Berkeley. In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/berkeley/ (retrieved 02. August 2010).
 3. George Berkeley: Esse est percipi et percipere       83

is under no illusion that in his work there are passages where his thinking reaches
heights that could lead to him being accused of »highly absurd consequences«. Sev-
eral modern philosophical writers come to mind when Berkeley muses about how
significant philosophical concerns, as for example our lived body-soul problem, are
primarily connected to our use of language: »We need only draw aside the curtain of
words, to behold the fairest tree of knowledge.«116 He writes that philosophers have
only themselves to thank for many of their problems:

»I’m inclined to think that most if not all of the difficulties that have in the past puzzled
and deceived philosophers and blocked the way to knowledge are entirely of our own
making. We have first raised a dust, and then we complain that we can’t see.«117

It may be true that philosophers raise a lot of dust, yet that does not mean that their
questions are »dusty« and that it would suffice to answer them by swiping their ques-
tions away by changing the terminology.
Of course, Berkeley, in The Principles of Human Knowledge, also addresses the
work of other thinkers. Thus, as mentioned, he criticizes the work of John Locke.118
In his essay, Concerning Human Understanding (II,8), Locke had called visual, acous-
tic and gustatory qualities secondary. The word »secondary« was meant to convey
the idea that these qualities belong to us, i. e. to humans, and are motivated by them.
Yes, we already suspect what we shall hear: The »subjective« qualities are quickly
confronted »objectively.« What can be mathematically understood is to be objective.
Locke also had several of those qualities in mind: extension, strength and movement
are all called »primary qualities.« Locke believes that for now they have nothing to
do with you and me as observers. They are detached from our spiritual/mental man-
ifestations of life. Berkeley views this differently. He feels the need to counter, and he
wonders whether we can really place secondary qualities into human beings and pri-
mary qualities into the structures with which human beings identify. His definitive
answer is that we cannot. Since in his opinion, that argument leads nowhere, there
must be a better way. Berkeley’s suggestion: Let us imagine you perceive this page
from the book. Surely it will become yours in a mental and spiritual manner. There is
no other way. It would be a safe assumption that it doesn’t matter whether anything
has a primary or secondary characteristic for us. Berkeley thus turns his back on the
notion that we can separate neatly between primary and secondary qualities.119 As
Edith Stein accurately points out, there can be no objection against criticism of the
doctrine of secondary qualities insofar as we wish to claim that there is a different
objectivity value assigned to the one or the other quality.120

»If we wish to conclude that because the colorblind person sees objects in a way differ-
ent to the ›normal‹ person, colors being subjective appearances without any objective

116 Berkeley, G.: The Principles of Human Knowledge.§ 24, p. 10.

117 Ibid., Introduction § 3, p. 1.
118 Ibid., §§ 9–15, pp. 2–6.
119 Cf. ibid., § 10.
120 Stein, E.: EPh., p. 56.
84       B. Monistic Concepts

meaning, then we will also need to conclude that the short-sighted person sees objects
in different dimensions to the far-sighted or ›normal‹ person, and we must come to the
conclusion that size too is not an objective representation. There is similarly an argu-
ment against the separation of qualities when we remember the point made by Berke-
ley that expansion cannot occur without sensory qualities. Both are dependent on each
other. When we remove the sensory quality, we delete the entire object.«121

According to Berkeley, what can be said for taste and color, applies also to expansion
and stability. Berkeley’s way of proceeding is that he simply interprets both expan-
sion and stability, and taste and color as spiritual-mental manifestations of life. »Ar-
guments against physical realism based on the nature of thought are [...] murky,«122
Robinson claims. This point of view is indeed »strange« or rather »murky« since as
for example the book open in front of you, the desk at which you are seated and the
house in which you live are merely present as contents in the mind. Berkeley is very
sure of himself when he claims that the being of the book and the desk on which it
lies exists in it being perceived: »for unthinking things to exist is to be perceived.«123
Berkeley’s much-cited catchy phrase – »esse est percipi«124 – with which he gets to
the heart of the matter is both famous and notorious. Thus, »being is to be perceived
or if not perceived then able to be perceived. And that is equivalent to being having
been perceived or having been able to have been perceived.«125 The phrase esse est
percipi is the key to everything and is not only valid in relationship to our everyday
experiences, but also pertains to which can be designated as being corporal. Mental
manifestations of life (e. g. when you think of this piece of writing or of your desk)
and the being (of book and desk) coincide. According to Kulenkampff, the principle
esse est percipi only has unrestricted validity if »it relates to all mind-spirit beings,
including God.«126
Regarding our question concerning the lived body-soul problem, Berkeley would
tell us that there is nothing other than spirit: »The only substances are spirits.«127
Under another sign, he is as radical one or the other proponent of modern physicalist
positions. There can truly be only one side of a trench! For Berkeley, the »correct«
side is the spirit. Berkeley flees from any suggestion that there is anything like matter
without there being anyone »in whose spiritual life it is embedded«.128 In contrast to
Descartes, he suggests that there are no thinking substances. In contrast to Spinoza,
the term substance is not reserved only for divinity. Kulenkampff reminds us that
according to Berkeley »physical objects are sensory perceptions which have been

121 Ibid., p. 56.

122 Robinson, H.: The physical World and the Nature of Thought. In: McLaughlin, B. P./Becker-
mann, A./Walter, S. (Ed.): The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford 2009, p. 198.
123 Berkeley, G.: The Principles of Human Knowledge. § 3, p. 11.
124 Ibid. § 3, p. 37.
125 Kulenkampff, A.: George Berkeley. In: Hoerster, N. (Ed.): Klassiker des philosophischen Den-
kens. Vol. 1. Munich 3198, p. 333.
126 Kulenkampff, A.: George Berkeley. In: Volpi, F. (Ed.): Großes Werklexikon der Philosophie.
Vol. 1. Stuttgart 2004, p. 173.
127 Berkeley, G.: The Principles of Human Knowledge. § 7.
128 Ibid., § 6, p. 38.
 3. George Berkeley: Esse est percipi et percipere       85

cemented together through the power of imagination.«129 But is there no connection

between bodies (e. g. the open book in front of you) and ideas (the perception of this
book)? In section 18, he responds to our question that, »we aren’t compelled to sup-
pose that there are external bodies as causes of our ideas. Those ideas are sometimes
so they could be always produced without help from our bodies yet falling into the
patterns that they do in fact exhibit.« The physical is thus neither a necessary nor
an adequate prerequisite for the spiritual life of human beings. Only the spirit is
fundamentally ontological, whereas the physical is designed only to be in this spirit.
Berkeley himself knows that »people aren’t all equally quick in getting a grasp on
topics such as this.«130
When Berkeley writes about ideas, he does not mean the same as when he speaks
of the spirit problem.131 He explains that ideas cannot possibly be beyond the mind
which is aware of them.132 The term of spirit is understood as an intangible, indivis-
ible, simple, active and perceiving being. Berkeley sometimes speaks of spirit and
sometimes of mind. He does not really differentiate. In Section 2 of his work, Berke-
ley writes: »These words don’t refer to any one of my ideas, but rather to something
entirely distinct from them, something in which they exist, or by which they are
perceived. Those two are equivalent, because the existence of an idea consists in its
being perceived.«133
How can you and I actually illustrate that this table at which we are presently
sitting, and this book you are reading really exist? This question concerns Berkeley.
He attempts to offer a patent formula by referring to his Esse est percipi-principal:

»The table that I am writing on exists, that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my
study I would still say that it existed, meaning that if I were in my study I would perceive
it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it.«134

According to Berkeley, the book open in front of is are like all other objects without
mental manifestations of life. They cannot exist outside of what perceives them. I
suggest that we take up Berkeley’s thoughts that all exists only in the mind. Now
we can ask what the difference is between the table that I am presently sitting and
working at, which I can see and feel, and the table I encounter in my dreams (perhaps
when I have had too many distractions during the day and have not done enough
work at my desk on my dissertation), and the table which I can imagine not, in this
very moment. Berkeley is aware of such questions.135 He has an answer ready for

129 Kulenkampff, A.: Berkeleys Gottesbeweis aus der Empirie. In: Jung, M./Moxter, M./Schmidt,
T. M. (Eds.): Religionsphilosophie. Historische Positionen und systematische Reflexionen.
Würzburg 2000, p. 91.
130 Berkeley, G.: The Principles of Human Knowledge. § 34.
131 Cf. ibid., § 27 and 139.
132 Cf. ibid., § 3.
133 Ibid., Introduction § 2.
134 Ibid. § 3, p. 11.
135 Cf. Kreimendahl, L.: Nachwort. In: Berkeley, G.: Eine Abhandlung über die Prinzipien der
menschlichen Erkenntnis. Worin die Hauptursachen der Irrtümer und Schwierigkeiten in den
Wissenschaften zusammen mit den Gründen des Skeptizismus, des Atheismus und der Irreli-
86       B. Monistic Concepts

us. He claims that in his opinion that when the desk is seen or touched this occurs
identically in all spirits (and with this he means in yours and in mine and in that of all
people). Berkeley definitely does not want to be misunderstood. So, in section 48, he
writes: »Whenever I say that bodies [in this case our table, M. K.] have no existence
outside ›the mind‹, I refer not to this or that particular mind but to all minds what-
soever.« Berkeley would argue that the table of which I dream at night – perhaps be-
cause I have not studied enough, only appears in my mind. And the table which I can
picture in my mind?136 That too, according to him, is merely present in my mind.137
The sixty-four dollar question now is how Berkeley explains that the concept of
the table which can be seen and even felt is found in all minds. Berkeley argues that
it cannot be otherwise, since perceptions have an effect upon perceptions. According
to Berkely, the desk at which you are sitting cannot by itself awaken any perception.
Only if the desk itself had any perception could it contribute to the development of
any perception. We can imagine what will follow: the perception that you and I have
of the desk must have something to do with a mind.138 At this point, Berkeley brings
the thinking mind per se, i. e. God, into play. In the context of Berkeley’s project,
God has the task of ensuring that all minds in fact also agree with regard to ideas.
Kreimendahl writes as follows:

»Berkely interprets as a law of nature the rules according to which God brings about
our sensory impressions. The consequence of this is that there can be no more talk of a
causal connection between two events: God is the only cause of our ideas. Every sensory
stimulus is thus endowed with the authority of proving the existence of God. There are
thus two classes of ideas: those which are self-generated, and those which emanate
from God. The last Berkeley calls ›real objects;‹ the first he characterizes as ›images
of objects.‹ Yet both are ideas that only exist in the mind and beyond that have no
being.«139

That you and I can regard the desk in the same way is, according to Berkeley, because
God is the same today, tomorrow and every day. Berkeley’s mental monism cannot
manage without reference to God. Coreth reminds us that »in his own way, Berkeley
places God and his unique action in the center of philosophical thinking.«140 Berke-
ley’s God takes responsibility for the desk you and I see, or rather that the desk is
not lost in »no man’s land« when you and I have finished our work, close the door
behind us and leave the room in which the desk stands. The image of God encoun-

gion untersucht werden. Stuttgart 2005, pp. 173, 176; Störig, H. J.: Kleine Weltgeschichte der
Philosophie. Stuttgart/Berlin/Cologne 161993, pp. 353–355.
136 Cf. Hamlyn, D. W.: Imagination. In: Guttenplan, S. (Ed.): A Companion to the Philosophy of
Mind. Oxford 102005, pp. 361–366.
137 Berkeley, G.: The Principles of Human Knowledge. § 48.
138 Cf. Berkeley, G.: The Principles of Human Knowledge. § 6.
139 Kreimendahl, L.: Nachwort. In: Berkeley, G.: Eine Abhandlung über die Prinzipien der
mensch­lichen Erkenntnis. Worin die Hauptursachen der Irrtümer und Schwierigkeiten in den
Wissenschaften zusammen mit den Gründen des Skeptizismus, des Atheismus und der Irreli-
gion untersucht werden. Stuttgart 2005, p. 182.
140 Coreth, E.: Gott im philosophischen Denken. Stuttgart 2001, p. 170.
 3. George Berkeley: Esse est percipi et percipere       87

tered here reminds us of the occasionalists (assistentia supernaturalis), with whose

suggestions he is also concerned141 in an attempt to bring together the res cogitans
and the res extensa, and according to whom it is inconceivable not to acknowledge
the side of the great divide where the bodies are found. Emmerich Coreth writes that
it is »hardly surprising that the already elderly Malebranche died of a stroke shortly
after an intense discussion with Berkeley.«142
What does Berkeley’s mental monism say about the question whether we are free?
In his Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, he unfortunately keeps
a low profile on that subject. But in another publication (Alciphron: or, the Minute
Philosopher) he writes that it is part of man’s firm treasure of convictions to be free.
Breidert writes:

»He does not know where it will lead when he assumes spiritual objects are corporeal;
or when he takes real and material objects and refines them to become general, ab-
stract concepts; or when he takes simple and individual objects, and with metaphysical
craftsmanship subdivides them into diverse pieces. But when he accepts things as they
are and when he asks simple uneducated persons whether they are free in a particular
action, they will immediately agree and on the basis of this agreement, and because of
what he himself feels inside himself, he will immediately believe them«.143

How does Berkeley solve the problem that had occupied Descartes, specifically
whether people he encountered on the street were possibly machines wearing hats,
or whether they were indeed human beings? Berkeley argues in a similar manner in
that he judges others by his own standards, i. e. with a conclusion by analogy.144 Anita
Avramides summarizes the argument extremely well:

»(i) I know that I have a mind; (ii) I observe that my mind is the antecedent condition
for my behavior; (iii) I observe behavior in the bodies of others similar to what I know
in my own case to be the result of mental antecedents; I conclude, by analogy that this
behavior in others is the result of the existence of other minds.«145

Very similar to Descartes, it is God who must safeguard all these reflections. That
we can empathize with others is as unimportant for Berkeley as it is for the teacher
from France.

141 Cf. Berkeley, G.: The Principles of Human Knowledge. § 53.

142 Coreth, E.: Gott im philosophischen Denken. Stuttgart 2001, p. 169.
143 Breidert, W.: Wahrnehmung und Wirklichkeit. In: Speck, J. (Ed.): Grundprobleme der großen
Philosophen. Philosophie der Neuzeit. Vol. 1. Göttingen 21986, p. 233.
144 Cf. Berkeley, G.: The Principles of Human Knowledge. § 148.
145 Avramides, A.: Other Minds. In: McLaughlin, B. P./Beckermann, A./Walter, S. (Eds.): The
Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford 2009, pp. 727–740, here p. 731.
88       B. Monistic Concepts

Appreciation and criticism

»The tendency, in his own time and later,

to see Berkeley as almost insanely perverse,
almost scandalous, if brilliant, was due to the
unacceptability of his conclusion that matter
does not really exist (except as a construction
from sensations).«146

Berkeley’s mental monism, which acknowledges only the spirit as substance and
wants to proclaim as erroneous the acceptance of matter independent of the spirit,
is an extreme approach which is as counter-intuitive as some materialistic-monistic
solutions that have been suggested as a response to the questions we posed at the
beginning. Berkeley very obviously also has a theological-religious philosophical
goal in that he holds the opinion that he can utilize it to counteract skepticism147 and
atheism.148 In section 156, for example, he says: »The first place in our studies should
be given to the consideration of God and of our duty.« In the light of that statement
it is unclear to me how the thoughts of the Bishop are coming to terms with Jesus
having taken a human lived body, that he had a countenance like us, suffered phys-
ically on Good Friday and finally at Easter physically (not only in the mind of his
disciples) arose from the dead.
Berkeley believed the world to be a phenomenon of our mental manifestations of
life. In the course of this thesis, we will meet approaches which maintain that we and
the world around us emanate from our cerebrum. These approaches are not really
all that dissimilar (except with regard to the speculative rationale). Berkeley does
not really have to think deeply about the manner in which mental manifestations
of life belong to the living organism and what meaning should be accorded the cor-
poreality of human beings. What I have said in the Introduction to this dissertation
does not constitute a profound task for Berkeley, as we are here assuming that there
are brains, bodies, physical entities, matter, etc. It is not difficult to refute Berkeley’s
mental monism in the light of experience.149 We can agree with Edith Stein that this
mental monism is based on a »disregard of the phenomenal differences between
perceptual data and material quality; between immanent and transcendental being;
between perception and what has been perceived. These are differences which have
been clearly demonstrated and cannot be refuted by any theory.«150

146 Putnam, H.: Reason Truth and History. New York. 1981, p. 60.
147 Cf. Berkeley, G.: The Principles of Human Knowledge. §§86–91.
148 Cf. ibid. §§ 92–96; and § 156.
149 Stein, E.: EPh., p. 70.
150 Ibid., p. 70.
III. Material monism

»Materialism is so attractive because it creates

a picture of reality that is simple, unified
and able to be completed. This picture is
recognizable in a reality which allows itself
to be perceived ever more precisely and ever
more comprehensively through the exact
methods of physics in which all phenomena
can be explained consistently and uniformly.«151

All interpretation attempts can be characterized with the heading of materialism

or materialistic in which the main tenor is dominant that everything that exists is
nothing but physical reality. I refer to physicalism and physicalistic in the same sense.
Accordingly, in the ontological sense, there is only one side to the great divide: the
material side. The mission of physicalists is to interpret all phenomena using the
methods of physics and to totally explain them in the way that is customary in phys-
ics. Thus, the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy defines physicalism as »the thesis
[...] that whatever exists or occurs is ultimately constituted out of physical entities
[and] can be completely described in the vocabulary of physics.«152
The present section comprises assumptions about the lived body-soul problem
whose fundamental perception of being is physicalistic. It means that some advo-
cates of these suggestions would probably concede that there are spiritual/mental
manifestations of life (such as philosophical considerations, thoughts concerning
physicalism and wishes of the relevant information sources). However, as skilled
advocates, they would shift all observations towards the physical processes, which
they would say is the manner in which they had revealed themselves, or rather, the
manner in which they could be completely defined. They would argue that the side
of the trench on which corporeal manifestations are present is completely sufficient
to explain everything else. While Berkeley’s mental monism does not want to deny
the existence of material realities that he places »in the mind,« it is assumed here

151 Kutschera, F. von: Jenseits des Materialismus. Paderborn 2003, p. 22.

152 Audi, R.: The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. Cambridge 22001, p. 706.
Cf. Knaup, M./Müller, T./Spät, P. (Eds.): Post-Physikalismus. Freiburg/Munich 2011;
Kutschera, F. von: Philosophie des Geistes. Paderborn 2009, pp. 135–170; Nagel, T.:
Physikalismus. In: Bieri, P. (Ed.): Analytische Philosophie des Geistes. Weinheim/Basel
4
2007, pp. 56–72, esp. p. 56; Kutschera, F. von: Jenseits des Materialismus. Paderborn 2003,
pp. 11–37; Chalmers, D. J.: The Conscious Mind. In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford
1996, p. 124.
90       B. Monistic Concepts

that we can speak of spiritual/mental manifestations of life, but that these can be
sufficiently explained by means of the physical preconditions present on that side of
the great divide. As was the case with Berkeley, only one side of the Cartesian legacy
is being appropriated.
Over the last few years it has become customary in the philosophy of the mind
to differentiate between the so-called non-reductive physicalism and the reductive
physicalism.153 Like other physicalists, representatives of non-reductive physicalism
assume that the world in which we live is causally closed. Spinoza could also sup-
port this point of view. He could agree as well that every physical occurrence must
have a physical cause. it is one of the foundations of physicalism that our mental
manifestations of life of course do not ontologically represent an independent sec-
tor. They belong to the side of the material bodies. Yet interestingly, representatives
of non-reductive physicalism attach great importance to not reducing our mental
manifestations in this manner. We encounter such reassurances again and again. It
is said that while it is true that there are sufficient physical preconditions for mental
manifestations of life, this does not mean that through physical entities we control
the general key to explaining mental manifestations of life. Lynne Rudder Baker has
nothing but praise for such an approach:

»Non-reductive materialism is the most promising metaphysical view for understand-

ing the world as we encounter it – the world filled with ordinary objects like people and
artifacts and works of art. Non-reductive materialism alone offers a metaphysics that
takes ordinary objects and their interactions at face value and makes them intelligible;
and it alone respects a common-sense conception of reality in the context of broadly
scientific outlook.«154

In this chapter, one of the questions we explore is whether such an approach can
even be coherent expressed; i. e. whether speaking of non-reductive physicalist sug-
gestions regarding the lived body-soul problem is even convincing. After all, one of
the mottos of physicalism is that mental manifestations of life must be completely
eradicated or reduced to physical realities.155
Let us now look more closely at the representatives of reductive physicalism. These
tell us again and again that all in principle, spiritual-mental manifestations of life can
be shown to be physical. They even go so far as to say that other scientific disciplines
such as biology and chemistry can be reduced to physics.156 Michael Esfeld writes

153 Cf. Brüntrup, G.: Das Leib-Seele-Problem. Eine Einführung. Stuttgart 32008, pp. 65–132;
Bieri, P. (Ed.): Analytische Philosophie des Geistes. Weinheim/Basel 42007, pp. 31–135.
154 Baker, L. R.: Non-reductive materialism. In: McLaughlin, B. P./Beckermann, A./Walter,
S. (Eds.): The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford 2009, pp. 109–127, here
pp. 125 f.
155 Cf. Beckermann, A.: Analytische Einführung in die Philosophie des Geistes. Berlin/New York
3
2008, p. 204.
156 This perception is not only controversial within the field of philosophy. With sufficient data
from quantum mechanics, critics ask how the mooing of a calf can be explained.
 B. Monistic Concepts       91

that »everything is nothing but a physical system.«157 Esfeld transforms physics into
a worldview: He implies – almost as if it were a matter of fact – that everything that
exists can be unraveled by applying the laws of physics. The worldview of physical-
ism, cloaked in the mantle of science and apparently referring to highly regarded and
praised experiments, is often difficult to detect. Esfeld is convinced that what exists
(or what does not exist) is determined by physicalism. According to Esfeld’s theory,
physical changes can only come from physical causes, and for mental manifestations
of life demand there are sufficient physical conditions.158 In that sense, the protag-
onists of reductive physicalism deal with the question other dualist authors have
struggled with: What about mental causation? The usual answer is that it can’t be
anything but the physical, since all facts can be adequately accounted for with physics
(and this also includes the intention to do something and the plan to deal with this
chapter). Physicalists such as Esfeld often rely on the principle of cosmic evolution:
»Everything that exists in the world beyond events of fundamental physical charac-
teristics has come into being from events of fundamental physical characteristics.«159
Is that statement truly as convincing as it seems? After all, we could argue with the
same justification that material has always had to show an aptitude for mental mani-
festations of life before life can develop, which means that the physicalists’ presumed
understanding of material is lopsided.
It seems to be typical for physicalists to be pleased that today’s neuroscientific
data material has made the pendulum swing in the direction of physicalism. They
insist that nothing could be more obvious, especially since dualism is facing so many
difficulties. Some representatives of physicalism assume, as Esfeld does, that what we
experience is identical to what occurs inside our brain.160 Whether this can be justi-
fied in view of neuroscientific data will be discussed in section two. Physicalism itself
is not a natural science like physics; it is a philosophical-metaphysical hypothesis
concerned with what exists in reality, or rather what can be said to exist.
In the concert of today’s philosophy of mind, the sound of physicalists is especial-
ly prominent. What they present is regarded as the leading edge. In terms of num-
bers, the physicalists are predominant. Yet, we should remember that the loudest
are not necessarily in the right. We often hear that there is no way around physical-
ism. Jaegwon Kim formulates: »There seems no credible alternative to physicalism
as a general worldview. Physicalism is not the whole truth, but it is the truth near
enough.«161 Below, I first present the thoughts of Julien Offray de La Mettrie who in
the 18th century supported material monism and who shares many of the convictions
held by today’s physicalists. Then I will perform a leap into the 20th and 21st century
to discuss the physicalist theories of today.

157 Esfeld, M.: Mentale Verursachung und die neue Reduktionismus-Debatte in der Philosophie
des Geistes. In: Spät, P. (Ed.): Zur Zukunft der Philosophie des Geistes. Paderborn 2008, p. 25.
158 Cf. Esfeld, M.: Mentale Verursachung und die neue Reduktionismus-Debatte in der Philoso-
phie des Geistes. In: Spät, P. (Ed.): Zur Zukunft der Philosophie des Geistes. Paderborn 2008,
p. 27.
159 Ibid., p. 29.
160 Cf. ibid., p. 28.
161 Kim, J.: The mind-body problem at century’s turn. In: Leiter, B. (Ed.): The Future for Philoso-
phy. New York 2004, p. 146.
92       B. Monistic Concepts

4. Processes of the soul: symptoms of the body

machine – Julien Offray de La Mettrie

»In einer Welt, in der man nur noch lebt,

damit man täglich robotten geht,
ist die größte Aufregung, die es noch gibt,
das allabendliche Fernsehbild.
Jeder Mensch lebt wie ein Uhrwerk,
wie ein Computer programmiert.
Es gibt keinen, der sich dagegen wehrt,
nur ein paar Jugendliche sind frustriert.«162

In Martin Walser’s (2004) philosophical novel Der Augenblick der Liebe, (The Mo-
ment of Love) the actual protagonist is the 18th century philosopher Julien Offray
de La Mettrie. He becomes the intellectual companion of a relationship between
Gottlieb Zürn, known to Walser readers from his other novels, and Beate Gutbrod,
who is forty years younger. When journalists asked Walser why he let La Mettrie
play such a prominent role, he pointed to La Mettrie’s view of body and spirit, to
his material monism, which had influenced Walser’s own thinking to a great extent.
In fact, the ideas of this 18th century philosopher still influence our thinking today.
For example, Christof Goddemeier emphasized in the Ärzteblatt what importance
modern medicine accords La Mettrie163 for his claim that material monism is the
optimal way to understand the world.164
One of his writings has the conclusive title L’ homme machine (English Man a
Machine). It is still his best-known work. La Mettrie does not hesitate to tell us on
the first few pages: »For a wise man it is not enough to study nature and the truth;
he must be willing to proclaim it for the benefit of the few who are willing and able

162 Die Toten Hosen: Hier kommt Alex.

163 http://www.aerzteblatt.de/v4/archiv/artikel.asp?src=suche&p=La+Mettrie&id=67145 (re-
trieved 16. August 2010).
164 See also: Baruzzi, A.: Mensch und Maschine. Das Denken sub specie machinae. Munich 1973,
pp. 79–116; Becker, C.: Einleitung. In: La Mettrie, J. O. de: Die Maschine Mensch. Hamburg
1990, pp. VII–XXV; Kather, R.: Was ist Leben? Philosophische Positionen und Perspektiven.
Darmstadt 2003, pp. 62–65; Lange, F. A.: Geschichte des Materialismus und Kritik seiner
Bedeutung in der Gegenwart. Vol. 1. Geschichte des Materialismus bis auf Kant. Waltrop/
Leipzig 2003; Malter, R.: Die mechanistische Deutung des Lebens und ihre Grenzen. Philos-
ophisch-systematische Betrachtungen zum Organismusproblem im Ausgang von La Mettrie.
In: Medizinisch-Historisches Journal 17 (1982). N 4, pp. 299–316; Manicas, P.: Men, Ma-
chines, Materialism, and Morality. In: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 27 (1967),
pp. 238–246; Mödersheim, S.: Julien Offray de La Mettrie. In: Volpi, F.: Großes Werklexikon
der Philosophie. Vol. 2. Stuttgart 2004, p. 874 f.; Tetens, H.: Nachwort. In: La Mettrie, J. O. de:
Der Mensch eine Maschine. Stuttgart 2001, pp. 101–117;
Vartinian, A.: La Mettrie’s ›L’Homme machine‹: A Study of the Origins of an Idea. Princeton
1960.
 4. Processes of the soul: symptoms of the body machine       93

to think.«165 For him, to tell the truth is the equivalent of his dauntless commitment
to material monism. Holm Tetens, for example, praises him for that and calls La
Mettrie’s point of view revolutionary and courageous.166
La Mettrie dedicated this work to the Swiss physiologist and physician Albrecht
von Haller. Even today, his satirical barbs have a certain entertainment value.167 For
example, Haller is being mocked as the »twofold son of Apollo«. The background is
that Haller had accused La Mettrie of having borrowed his thoughts without asking
him, making them his own. Haller was angry that La Mettrie had taken credit for
something that was not his own and which Haller had not even had a chance to
publish himself. La Mettrie was not only quicker but also more aggressive. He forced
Haller to publicly distance himself from La Mettrie and his »scandalous book« which
had caused much hostility.168 This was a very smart move. Obviously, La Mettrie was
not afraid to provoke. Lange writes: »While La Mettrie’s earlier book, Histoire natur-
elle de l’âme ou Traité de l’âme, had been carefully composed gradually surprising
readers with its findings. Now the apex of the work was being addressed up front«.169
To modern readers the title L’ homme machine already indicates the direction the
book will take. The title is the message of the entire work. When we remember our
previous chapter, we hear in this abbreviated credo clear echoes of Descartes’ ideas
about humans made in the image of the machine.170 La Mettrie takes this up and
intensifies the Cartesian statements of which he says they will be the topic of conver-
sation, »as long as there remains the shadow of prejudice or superstition on earth.«171
There is yet another connection if we remember the words of Leibniz, his parallelism
and his metaphor of the clock to explain his view of the lived body-soul problem. La
Mettrie radicalized this and brings it to a head when he claims that all humans live
like clockwork. It is clear that La Mettrie draws a dividing line between his thinking
and that of Leibniz. He does not want to be lumped together with him, and he calls
his answers completely useless. La Mettrie also does not feel that Spinoza’s under-
standing of the causa sui as the one substance is philosophically useful. Similarly, he
doesn’t care for Berkeley’s mental monism. Like Spinoza and Berkeley, he favors a
monistic approach: He emphasizes that there is only one substance in the cosmos,
but he means neither the causa sui nor Berkeley’s »mind.« For La Mettrie there is

165 La Mettrie, J. O. de: Man-Machine, p. 1. Engl. Transl. http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/

assets/pdfs/lamettrie1748.pdf
166 Tetens, H.: Nachwort. In: La Mettrie, J. O. de: Der Mensch eine Maschine. Stuttgart 2001,
p. 109.
167 Cf. also: Oeser, E.: Geschichte der Hirnforschung. Von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart.
Darmstadt 2002, pp. 75–85 and pp. 88 f.
168 Tetens, H.: Nachwort. In: La Mettrie, J. O. de: Der Mensch eine Maschine. Stuttgart 2001,
p. 102.
169 Lange, F. A.: Geschichte des Materialismus und Kritik seiner Bedeutung in der Gegenwart.
Vol. 1. Geschichte des Materialismus bis auf Kant. Waltrop/Leipzig 2003, p. 379.
170 »No one denies that this famous philosopher made many mistakes; but he understood
animal nature, and was the first to demonstrate perfectly [!] that animals were mere ma-
chines.« This great insight compensates for other errors, including his substance dualism
(La Mettrie, J. O. de: Man-Machine, p. 33).
171 Ibid., p. 36.
94       B. Monistic Concepts

no alternative but that everything is centered on the material, and that must be the
point of departure.
La Mettrie makes no great secret of what he thinks of other philosophical ob-
servations regarding the lived body-soul problem: »Good God, what efforts have
been made by some philosophers! And what rubbishy nonsense I have been patient
enough to read on this subject! [the lived body-soul problem, M. K.].«172 He himself
clearly says what he thinks, namely that only »experience and observation«173 will
lead to the goal. It is only necessary to examine the body-machine thoroughly and
thus to experience more than through the superfluous chatter of philosophers: »The
structure of one finger, one ear, one eye [...] proves everything – proves it better than
Descartes and Malebranche do – and none of the other stuff proves anything.«174 He
says that having studied medicine himself, he is particularly competent to comment
on the lived body-soul problem. In his opinion, representatives of other sciences
cannot do this. Theologians are a particular thorn in his flesh. He says that phy-
sicians, »are the only scientists who have the right to speak on this subject. What
could anyone else, especially the theologians, tell us?«175 We will encounter this atti-
tude again in Part 2, where various modern brain researchers insist that the natural
sciences have a claim to exclusivity and maintain that the other sciences have noth-
ing to add about the lived body-soul problem.
La Mettrie regards it as self-evident that the brain is an enormously important or-
gan. As the adherents of the mind-brain paradigm, he searches intensely within the
brain to find mental manifestations of life. »If we want to talk about ›soul‹ at all, it can
only be found here. All the soul’s abilities (depend, M. K.) so much on the specific
organization of the brain and of the whole body that obviously they are nothing but
that very organization themselves.«176 La Mettrie claims that if we are honest, that
what everybody calls the »soul« is in fact only »a sensitive material part of the brain
that we can safely consider as a mainspring of the whole machine.«177 This does not
only sound like materialistic monism, it actually is. In the name of science, La Met-
trie has the audacity to drive away the »soul.« He could succeed by demonstrating
how the soul can be totally reduced to the mass of the brain. This is also a statement
we haven’t heard for the last time in this study.
As we have seen, Cartesius had contributed quite a bit to the idea of man being
like a machine. So what is new in La Mettrie? Descartes says that our body can
be most logically understood as a machine. Through the res cogitans he finds oth-
er words and these do not have the same mechanistic tone. This changes with La
Mettrie. He is not willing to allow any exceptions. He wants to explain everything
mechanistically, even our mental manifestations of life: »Let us then conclude boldly
that man is a machine and that the whole universe contains only one substance, of

172 Ibid., p. 27.

173 Ibid., p. 2.
174 Ibid., p. 19.
175 Ibid., p. 2.
176 Ibid., p. 24.
177 Ibid., p. 26.
 4. Processes of the soul: symptoms of the body machine       95

course with different modifications«178 This statement sums up La Mettrie’s thinking:

Accepting as the truth what materialistic monism proclaims; the aggressive inten-
tion to approach everything mechanistically. He lets no one dissuade him from this
approach. He says himself that his findings are »bold.« In La Mettrie’s work we can
read about »those haughty, vain, self-praising beings who are marked off by their
pride more than by the label ›men‹ – are basically only animals and upright-crawl-
ing machines.«179 Descartes at least had acknowledged that the human machine was
marvelously put together by a divine manufacturer. La Mettrie does not consider
this. What is important to him is that »the body is nothing but a clock.«180 There is
also a clockmaker who keeps it all running smoothly, namely the digestive juices:

»I am not mistaken; the human body is a clock, a huge and complex and finely designed
clock. How well designed? Well, if the cog-wheel that marks the seconds happens to
stop, the one that marks the minutes goes on turning, as does the wheel marking the
quarter-hours; and similarly with the others, when the first ones are halted by rust or
some other cause.«181

These statements, together with what Descartes said about man made in the image
of the machine indicates a clear »new age turning point«: These thoughts would
likely have been out of the question for Plato, Aristotle and the philosophers of the
Middle Ages. They saw nature and man’s relationship with nature very differently.
They believed that if we want to say something about humans, we would find a good
example in nature, and they adapted their thoughts and actions to nature as a model.
They would have found it absurd to take an artificial man-made product such as a
clock or a machine and use it to make a statement about humans and about nature.182
La Mettrie turns such thinking upside down. The new standard gauge for under-
standing and interpreting nature was becoming an artifact. The image of man made
in the image and likeness of a machine was very influential. This problem is also
dealt with in numerous works of literature.183 Especially well known is the confu-

178 Ibid., p. 33.

179 Ibid., p. 29.
180 Ibid., p. 26.
181 Ibid., p. 29.
182 Cf. Merchant, C.: The Death of Nature. Women, Ecology, and the Scientific Revolution. San
Francisco 1980, pp. 192 ff., 216 ff.; Kather, R.: Was ist Leben? Philosophische Positionen und
Perspektiven. Darmstadt 2003, pp. 63 f.
183 Cf. Tabbert, T.: Die erleuchtete Maschine: künstliche Menschen in E. T. A. Hoffmanns »Der
Sandmann«. Hamburg 2006; Tabbert, T.: Frankensteins Schöpfung: künstliche Menschen im
Romanwerk Mary Shelleys. Hamburg 2006; Bauer-Funke, C.: Der automatisierte Körper:
literarische Visionen des künstlichen Menschen vom Mittelalter bis zum 21. Jahrhundert.
Berlin 2005; Febel, G.: Menschenkonstruktionen. Künstliche Menschen in Literatur, Film,
Theater und Kunst des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts. Göttingen 2004; Tabbert, T.: Die Geburt des
Posthumanismus aus dem Geiste der Erlebnis-Gesellschaft: künstliche Menschen in Michel
Houellebecqs Roman »Elementarteilchen«. Hamburg 2004; Völker, K.: Künstliche Menschen:
Dichtungen und Dokumente über Golems, Homunculi, lebende Statuen und Androiden.
Frankfurt a. M. 1994; Daniels, K. (Ed.): Mensch und Maschine. Literarische Dokumente.
Frankfurt a. M./Berlin/Munich 1981.
96       B. Monistic Concepts

sion of love in the story Der Sandmann (The Sandman) by E. T. A. Hoffmann, when
Nathanael falls head over heels in love with Olympia, an automatic doll. In the end
he is totally shocked and disappointed when he discovers that Olympia is only a doll.
We see how alive the understanding of man made in the image of a machine is in
contemporary discussions when we look at what is being said about functionalism.
Holm Tetens is not alone with his opinion that La Mettrie is »an early visionary of
artificial intelligence.«184 He calls La Mettrie’s thinking »the royal road to exploring
soul and mind.«185
According to La Mettrie, all that is alive, all organisms can be described in purely
mechanistic terms. He carefully and with extreme interest he observes everything
that occurs on the material level. He wants to learn everything he can about this hu-
man machine. He does not ask himself whether its life has a purpose and a goal. He
is completely taken up by the idea that we can comprehend human beings’ mental
manifestations of life mechanistically; that this is the key to understanding them. It
is irrelevant whether we are thinking about what has been written here or whether
we decide to walk around the room. Everything can be explained mechanistically.
La Mettrie reasons that it is enough to observe the movement of the muscles, the
impulses of the nerves and the various bodily fluids of the human machine to come
to valid conclusions about its thinking and its movements. Then we would know all
we need to know about mental manifestations of life. In this respect, his theory is
characterized by a certain simplicity: It is enough to concentrate on a certain aspect
of reality to be able to explain all else. La Mettrie tries to substantiate his position
by arguing that humans can, for example, be steered in various directions through
electrical surges and through drugs. (This resembles the modern debate by authors
such as Thomas Metzinger.186) Alcohol and a high fever could also have far reaching
consequences.187 La Mettrie admits that actually we could even get rid of the notion
of the »soul« altogether. Philosophers, medical scientists, and especially he himself
would not need this notion, he said, as »›the soul‹ is an empty term, with no associ-
ated idea; a good mind should use it only to refer to the part of us that thinks.«188 La
Mettrie’s thinking is closely related to that of modern brain researchers as well as to
that of philosophers and theologians who for similar reasons refrain from referring
to the human soul.
Unlike Descartes, Spinoza or Berkeley, La Mettrie dismisses God from his think-
ing. Can the human machine still be held accountable? Is it endowed with freedom?
Gero von Randow, in his book Roboter: Unsere nächsten Verwandten [Robots: Our
Closest Relatives – a title with which La Mettrie would surely have agreed), writes
that La Mettrie, »the first consistent materialist of the modern age, left behind a puz-
zle which still preoccupies philosophers: If human beings are machines, what then

184 Tetens, H.: Nachwort. In: La Mettrie, J. O. de: Der Mensch eine Maschine. Stuttgart 2001,
p. 104.
185 Ibid., p. 112.
186 Cf. also the remarks about Metzinger in the chapter on consciousness in the second section.
187 Cf. La Mettrie, J. O. de: Man-Machine, p. 4. Engl. Trans. http://www.earlymoderntexts.
com/assets/pdfs/lamettrie1748.pdf
188 Ibid., p. 22.
 5. Behaviorism       97

is free will?«189 According to La Mettrie, »Physicians, not judges, should determine

whether a person is truly free when he acts in a certain way«. In the chapter on free-
dom in Part 2 of this study, we will meet contemporary kindred spirits.
At one point, La Mettrie writes that materialists would never treat others badly
based on the premise that they are no more than machines. Von Randow explains
that according to the law of nature granted to all living beings, he would not do to
another what he does not want done to himself. Here we find the well-known golden
rule. Yet La Mettrie owes us an explanation: How can a machine have freedom of
action? That he invokes »the« laws of nature is also a favorite strategy today as we
can see in our chapter on freedom in Part 2 of this study. Like many thinkers of the
modern age, La Mettrie is blind to the limited ability the natural sciences have to
clarify matters when he believes that (in a few years) they will have all the answers to
many of our questions. Even though La Mettrie tried to add observations to support
the accuracy of his viewpoint, these are not enough to prove that the soul is a part of
the brain. Even Tetens admits that it was only natural that his conclusion was slop-
py – to put it mildly. »Consequently, every careful reader will notice the enormous
gaps between the evidence and the radical materialistic conclusions.«190
La Mettrie’s philosophy is a measure of what ontological reductionism stands for:
that every single human manifestation of life can be traced back to the corporeal
and can be deduced causally from it. The perception of a soul is dismissed as being
outdated. All organisms can be explained in their entirety with the methods available
to natural scientists, and nothing of importance would be left unsaid. In modern
varieties of materialistic monism, which I will now discuss, these assumptions are
very much alive.

5. Behaviorism
»Sweetheart, you enjoyed having sex.
What was it like for me?«191

Like Hans Jonas, we are able to build the following bridge from La Mettrie to be-
haviorism: »Both La Mettrie’s L’ homme machine, as well as modern behaviorism are
the legacy of Cartesian dualism stripped of its spiritual side.«192 Behaviorism, which
is after all one of the most authoritative materialist suggestions proposed in the 20th
century, follows in Descartes’ footsteps. An image chosen by Alex Byrne that is al-
ready known to us depicts this close relationship:

189 Randow, G. von: Roboter unsere nächsten Verwandten. Reinbek bei Hamburg 1998, p. 39.
190 Tetens, H.: Nachwort. In: La Mettrie, J. O. de: Der Mensch eine Maschine. Stuttgart 2001,
p. 106.
191 A well-known behaviorist joke.
192 Jonas, H.: Organismus und Freiheit. Ansätze zu einer philosophischen Biologie. In: Jonas, H.:
Organismus und Freiheit. Philosophie des Lebens und Ethik der Lebenswissenschaften (Kri-
tische Gesamtausgabe Vol. I/1). Freiburg/Berlin/Vienna 2010, p. 142.
98       B. Monistic Concepts

»A clock has visible moving exterior parts – the hands. To the behaviorist about clocks, a
clock is simply something with such time-indicating exterior parts. The inner workings
of any clock are entirely irrelevant to its status as a clock, provided they produce (or at
least don’t interfere with) the movements of the hands.«193

The behaviorist is less interested in whether (or how) different clocks are coordinated
with each other or whether there is an ingenious clockmaker. Behaviorists are solely
interested in the behavior of clocks without worrying what moves and drives this
clock. Human organisms are understood in the sense of being created in the image
of the machine. We cannot look inside the clock. We can, however, observe its ap-
peal and behavior: its inputs and outputs as behaviorists like to say. Thus, the answer
to the question about mental manifestations of life is: Nothing but the behavior of
bodies. Thus, George Graham says: »Loosely speaking, behaviorism is an attitude.
Strictly speaking, behaviorism is a doctrine.«194 The focus of behaviorism is the be-
havior of bodies (as mentioned above: why and how the clock ticks and what drives
it is unimportant for behaviorists). That is why this solution is called behaviorism.
Byrne very nicely explains it: »If a philosophical theory of the mind emphasizes
waving or arm movements over silent cogitations and brain events, then it is, to that
extent, behaviorist.«195
Below, I follow the customary differentiation between methodological and logical
behaviorism.196 The term methodological behaviorism refers to a confirmed circle of
psychologists whose project primarily consisted in observing what can be learned
from human behavior: »A behaviorist, so understood, is a psychological theorist
who demands behavioral evidence for any psychological hypothesis. For such a per-
son, there is no knowable difference between two states of mind unless there is a
demonstrable difference in the behavior associated with each state.«197 All this was
spiced with they the somewhat vain aspiration to considerably develop the scien-
tific profile of psychology and finally to make psychology »cool«. Methodological
behaviorists try to interest their readers in all stimuli to which we are exposed. They
also found it important to know how we are responding to this. Their demanding
research program seeks to identify a line of communication between the influx of
stimuli and our external behavior. A small example: The attraction of a good dinner
is measured by bodily responses (such as increased production of saliva, accelerated

193 Byrne, A.: Behaviourism. In: Guttenplan, S. (Ed.): A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind.
Oxford 102005, pp. 132–140, here p. 132.
194 Graham, G.: Behaviorism. In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.
edu/entries/behaviorism/ (retrieved 05. November 2010).
195 Byrne, A.: Behaviourism. In: Guttenplan, S. (Ed.): A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind.
Oxford 102005, p. 133.
196 Cf. Seifert, J.: Das Leib-Seele-Problem und die gegenwärtige philosophische Diskussion. Eine
systematisch-kritische Analyse. Darmstadt 21989, pp. 16 ff., 20 ff., 71 ff.; Teichert, D.: Ein-
führung in die Philosophie des Geistes. Darmstadt 2006, pp. 52–65; Beckermann, A.: Analy­
tische Einführung in die Philosophie des Geistes. Berlin/New York 32008, pp. 63–98; Graham,
G.: Behaviorism. In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/
behaviorism/ (retrieved 05. November 2010).
197 Graham, G.: Behaviorism. In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.
edu/entries/behaviorism/ (retrieved 05. November 2010).
 5. Behaviorism       99

heartbeat). What this dinner means to you is not considered. According to behavio-
rists, feeling hungry and eating would describe the same thing.
So active and assertive was this group of behaviorists that in some cases, the entire
the discipline of psychology was redefined. The motto can be formulated as fol-
lows: Psychology was to become a science of human behavior and should therefore
practically reconstituted. This, they believed, was long overdue. This first branch of
behaviorism was especially concerned with establishing useful guiding principles for
psychologists to explore human behavior more effectively.198 Thus, human behavior
and the resulting behavioral analyses were paramount. »Psychology is the science
of behavior. Psychology is not the science of mind.«199 Only what can be directly
observed has any validity. The guiding principle of a »new psychology« was present-
ed which orients itself according to measureable behavior. The motto »know then
thyself« had become obsolete. Authors who valued introspection were looked down
upon. Their approach could not be subjected to scientific observation which is the
point of the behaviorist joke at the beginning of this section.
It should be possible to describe all processes which have an effect on our organ-
ism by means of scientific measures. The hope was to employ laboratory studies to
verify all influences as well as possible. To experience manifestations of life such as
hunger and thirst, to bring beautiful memories to mind, to think about behaviorism
are inseparable parts of who we are. Can behaviorism do justice to these facets of
our lives? Where mental manifestations of life are concerned, behaviorists become
very flustered as these cannot be measured through observing the behavior of oth-
ers. What about someone who remains as silent as the grave when annoyed about
something? And what about people who do not show that they don’t like the food
we have served them? Or the philosopher who thinks about an intricate question but
his neighbor does not realize how occupied he is? Behavioristic crisis management
programs might include allowing such mental manifestations of life to be ignored.
Yet such a suggestion will not be popular as I am well-aware when I am meditating
on a philosophical problem or when I don’t like the taste of my food and I am an-
noyed, but do not want others to notice. How else could behaviorists deal with this
situation except to declare all references to mental manifestations of life taboo? A
second emergency plan that could be instituted to help the threatened behaviorists
is the admission that it is not completely ignorant to speak and write about men-
tal manifestations of life. Even though we would be told we should conserve our
strength and concentrate on identifying behavioral responses. I believe it is a fact that
the effects of thoughts and sensations, for example, can be observed in our behavior.
(More about this later.) There are, however, talented stage and screen actors who will
play certain behaviors to entertain an amazed audience. All of us who enjoy a play or
a movie know of such instances. The stage Romeo probably does not love his stage
Julia in real life, and he does not really die on stage. Every physician knows examples

198 »Psychological behaviorism is primarily a claim about the correct methodology of a scien-
tific psychology« (Byrne, A.: Behaviourism. In: Guttenplan, S. (Ed.): A Companion to the
Philosophy of Mind. Oxford 102005, p. 133).
199 Graham, G.: Behaviorism. In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.
edu/entries/behaviorism/ (retrieved 05. November 2010).
100       B. Monistic Concepts

of good and poor sham artists who just want to have a certificate for convincing the
boss that they are really ill. Poker players will do their best not to let their opponents
see what they are thinking. If they did they would soon lose the game. Another ex-
ample of behaviorism is one told by Thomas Zoglauer about a lame man who does
not let on that he is suffering pain.200 He tells us that »there is pain without apparent
pain behavior and there is pain behavior when no pain is felt.«201 Health insurance
companies might prefer to claim a patient is completely free of pain, but this would
be inappropriate when the judgment is based on an assumption that there is no pain
just because the patient does not demonstrate the pain. Observing how the hands
of a clock are moving is much less spectacular and has few consequences. As Peter
Bieri points out:

»Methodological behaviorists believed that we can get by with principles that embed a
certain type of behavior into a causal story of external stimuli and earlier responses, and
which can be understood in the context of the conditioning phenomenon. This convic-
tion has been contradicted thanks to the factual workings of empirical psychology.«202

Bieri says that wearing blinders never helps in answering questions about human
beings.
I already mentioned that the army of behaviorists includes yet another unit. This
is the phalanx of logical behaviorists. The interesting word »logical« does not in-
dicate that members of this group are especially intelligent and insightful in their
approach. Instead, it is what a group of like-minded people call themselves who are
primarily made up of philosophers who pay homage to behaviorism. They aggres-
sively accuse Descartes and the dualists of having suggested what is totally illogical.203
Instead they believe that a sentence about our mental manifestations of life can be
completely articulated in physical diction (NB: although most are not physicists!).204
Thus, philosophy becomes translation work. Normally, when we say that we need to
plan for a week to review the manuscript you’re holding in your hands, or even when
we tell you what to expect with regard to what I am presenting, we would be obligat-
ed to transform this into a series of statements concerning actual as well as possible
behavior. Such translation work can be accomplished without omitting anything:

200 Cf. Zoglauer, T.: Geist und Gehirn. Das Leib-Seele-Problem in der aktuellen Diskussion. Göt-
tingen 1998, p. 120; Teichert, D.: Einführung in die Philosophie des Geistes. Darmstadt 2006,
p. 56.
201 Zoglauer, T.: Geist und Gehirn. Das Leib-Seele-Problem in der aktuellen Diskussion. Göttin-
gen 1998, p. 121.
202 Bieri, P.: Einleitung. In: Bieri, P. (Ed.): Analytische Philosophie des Geistes. Weinheim/Basel
4
2007, p. 32.
203 Cf. Ryle, G.: The Concept of Mind. London/New York 2009; Hempel, C. G.: The logical Anal-
ysis of Psychology. In: Block, N. (Ed.): Readings in Philosophy of Psychology. Vol. 1. Cam-
bridge 1980, pp. 14–23.
204 »All psychological statements which are meaningful, that is to say, which are in principle veri­
fiable, are transable into statements which do not involve psychological concepts, but only the
concepts of physics. The statements of psychology are consequently physicalistic statements.
Psychology is an integral part of physics.« (Hempel, C. G.: The logical Analysis of Psychology.
In: Block, N. (Ed.): Readings in Philosophy of Psychology. Vol. 1. Cambridge 1980, p. 18).
 5. Behaviorism       101

»It need not be translatable into statements about presently existing behavior, for a
person might have a pain or a belief that he was not then and there manifesting in
behavior, but then the statement has to be translatable into a set of hypothetical state-
ments about behavior, what the agent would do or would say under such and such
circumstances.«205

Logical behaviorists suppose that what we call mental manifestations of life could
best be explained by the word dispositions.206 This seems familiar. In this atmosphere,
we can often hear war cries against terms such as »soul,« »mind,« or »mental.« We
don’t need them anymore, they tell us. Get rid of them! It is in this context that we
need to understand Ryle’s already explained statements that the spiritual-mental
manifestations of life should be perceived as behavioral dispositions. I have already
pointed out the obstacles such a project encounters. Ryle himself supports a form of
logical behaviorism (as far as human actions can be seen as dispositions) and claims
that the lived body-soul problem is based on an ill-considered approach.
When in true behavioristic manner we dismiss the questions and subjects we have
formulated in our introduction as being »unscientific«, certain facets of the lived
body-soul problem seem to evaporate in thin air. Adjusting the question concerning
our mental manifestations of life and restructuring them as behavioral dispositions
is seen by some of the disciples of logical behaviorism as a plausible way to solve the
lived body-soul problem. Bieri points out that »both behavioristic programs attempt
to avoid the problem that current forms of materialism seek to solve.«207
As mentioned above, behaviorists have employed every possible weapon and have
had enormous success. Even though other thinkers have taken over the arena today,
we continue to encounter their footprints. Skinner’s208 conviction that we are incapa-
ble of guilt reminds us of a mechanistic view of humans. Observations made by Roth
and Singer – to be discussed in Part 2 – remind us of Skinner’s theory. In Skinner’s
standard work, Science and Human Behavior, we can read the following:

»The free inner man who is held responsible for the behavior of the external biological
organism is only a prescientific substitute for the kinds of causes which are discovered

205 Searle, J.: Mind: A Brief Introduction. Oxford 2004, pp. 51 f.

206 Logical behaviorism »says that the very idea of a mental state or condition is the idea of a
behavioral disposition or family of behavioral tendencies, evident in how a person behaves
in one situation rather than another« (Graham, G.: Behaviorism. In: Stanford Encyclope-
dia of Philosophy). http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/behaviorism/ (retrieved 05. November
2010).
207 Bieri, P.: Einleitung. In: Bieri, P. (Ed.): Analytische Philosophie des Geistes. Weinheim/Basel
4
2007, p. 33.
208 Burrhus F. Skinner is convinced that talk of human freedom can be shown to be an illusion.
It is only through social dressage that human behavior can be influenced. Cf. Skinner, B. F.:
Jenseits von Freiheit und Würde. Reinbek 1973; Skinner, B. F.: Wissenschaft und menschliches
Verhalten. Munich 1973, pp. 408 f.
George Graham rightly points out: »He is the behaviorist who has received the most atten-
tion from philosophers, fellow scientists and the public at large« (Graham, G.: Behaviorism.
In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/behaviorism/ (re-
trieved 05. November 2010).
102       B. Monistic Concepts

in the course of a scientific analysis. All these alternative causes lie outside the individ-
ual. The biological substratum itself is determined by prior events in a genetic process.
Other important events are found in the nonsocial environment and in the culture of
the individual in the broadest possible sense. These are the objects which make the
individual behave as he does. For them he is not responsible, and for them it is useless
to praise or blame him. It does not matter that the individual may take it upon himself
to control the variables of which his own behavior is a function or, in a broader sense
to engage in the design of his own culture. He does this only because he is the product
of a culture which generates self-control or cultural design as a mode of behavior. The
environment determines the individual even when he alters the environment.«209

Here, human behavior is nothing but a response to exterior stimuli. Typical too is
the juxtaposition of an alleged »scientific« (i. e. behavioristic) perspective and a
»non-scientific« perspective according to which other people are endowed with
freedom and responsibility. The analogy to present day battle arenas come to mind
insofar as human beings are determined and the space for a free decision-making
process is zero. Here, Roth and Singer would try to improve the supposed deter-
minism through genes and environment by referring to supposed determination
through cerebral structures. Yet the outcome would be the same: We could no longer
speak of our freedom. More about this later.
Does it make sense to explain our behavior appropriately without any reference
to our wishes, plans and fantasies? We could question behaviorists whether our con-
duct is not precisely to be judged as a testimony for mental manifestations of life.
After all, coming to grips with human behavior means to come to grips with the
mental talent of humans. It is also not particularly advisable to observe reactions to
stimuli in complete isolation. It is our whole entire organism that responds to some-
thing, and our actions are more than a mere response to stimuli.210 While those who
endorse logical behaviorism would like to discuss mental manifestations of life away,
Seifert sees in this an audacity211 that cannot be condoned. I would agree with this
as it is not acceptable to lump together mental manifestations of life and behavioral
patterns – they are just not the same. Neither is it acceptable to wish to attempt to
explain everything with the magic concept dispositions. Increasingly, since the mid-
dle of the twentieth century, the weak points of behaviorism have come under fire,
and finally a new arena of conflict regarding the lived body-soul problem has been
opened: Identity theory.

209 Skinner, B. F.: Science and Human Behavior. New York 1953, p. 447.
210 See also the chapter on freedom in Part 2.
211 Seifert, J.: Das Leib-Seele-Problem und die gegenwärtige philosophische Diskussion. Eine
­systematisch-kritische Analyse. Darmstadt 21989, p. 20.
 6. Identity theory       103

6. Identity theory
»Identity is discussed because that is what is
problematical.«212

That the concept »identity theory« contains the word »identity« indicates that the
proponents of this physicalist focus promise that the physical processes of the brain
and mental manifestations of life should be the same.213 Those who see themselves
as identity theorists will declare that our mental manifestations of life are physical.
There are no other possibilities. Thus, the great dividing trench identified by Des-
cartes will be filled up. When we look at it all ontologically, we see the dominance
of monistic thought regarding the lived body-soul problem if we hold on to the
idea that there is only a single substance, but neither the res cogitans nor Spinoza’s
causa sui. Berkeley’s solution does not seem to be attractive either. Identity theorists
answer the question of substance by saying »it can only be the human brain!« They
generously admit that we could speak of mental manifestations of life or of brain
processes. In contrast to members of the behavioristic camp,214 they do not immedi-
ately silence authors who speak about mental manifestations of life. Naturally there
is a big »but«: Never forget that brain processes are mental manifestations of life!215
Identity theorists suggest that the cerebrum is both necessary and adequate for our
spiritual-mental life. In other words: mind = brain.

212 Putnam, H.: Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge 1981, p. 81.
213 Three classical elaborations on identity theory are found in: Place, U. T.: Is Consciousness a
Brain Process? In: British Journal of Psychology. Vol. 47. No. 1 (1956), pp. 44–50; Smart, J. J. C.:
Sensations and Brain Processes. In: Rosenthal, D. M. (Ed.): The Nature of Mind. New York
1991, pp. 169–176; Smart, J. J. C.: Sensation and Brain Processes. In: Philosophical Review 58
(1959), pp. 141–156; Feigl, H.: The ›Mental’ and the ›Physical’. In: Feigl, H./Scriven, M./Max-
well, G. (Eds.): Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Vol. 2. Minneapolis 1958.
Regarding the analysis of identity theory cf. also: Borst, C. (Ed.): The Mind-Brain-Iden-
tity Theory. London 1970; Seifert, J.: Das Leib-Seele-Problem und die gegenwärtige philo­
sophische Diskussion. Eine systematisch-kritische Analyse. Darmstadt 21989, pp. 69 ff., 74 ff.;
Zoglauer, T.: Geist und Gehirn. Das Leib-Seele-Problem in der aktuellen Diskussion. Göt-
tingen 1998, pp. 95–118; Pauen, M./Stephan, A. (Eds.): Phänomenales Bewusstsein. Rück-
kehr der Identitätstheorie? Paderborn 2001; Pauen, M.: Grundprobleme der Philosophie des
Geistes. Eine Einführung. Frankfurt a. M. 32002, pp. 106–122; Goller, H.: Das Rätsel von
Körper und Geist. Eine philosophische Deutung. Darmstadt 2003, pp. 110–119; Teichert, D.:
Einführung in die Philosophie des Geistes. Darmstadt 2006, pp. 66–78; Beckermann, A.: Das
Leib-Seele-Problem. Eine Einführung in die Philosophie des Geistes. Paderborn 2008, pp. 58–
71; Beckermann, A.: Analytische Einführung in die Philosophie des Geistes. Berlin/New York
3
2008, pp. 98–141; Brüntrup, G.: Das Leib-Seele-Problem. Eine Einführung. Stuttgart 32008,
pp. 89 ff., 106 f., 127; Smart, J. J. C.: The Identity Theory of Mind. In: Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mind-identity/ (retrieved 16 Nov. 2010).
214 J. J. C. Smart explains: »Some identity theorists give a behavioristic analysis of mental states,
such as beliefs and desires, but others, sometimes called ›central state materialists‹, say that
mental states are actual brain states« (Smart, J. J. C.: The Identity Theory of Mind. In: Stan-
ford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mind-identity/ (retrieved
16 Nov. 2010).
215 Cf. Place, U.: The Concept of Heed. In: British Journal of Psychology 45 (1954), p. 255.
104       B. Monistic Concepts

Because identity theory regards mental manifestations of life as physical enti-

ties, i. e. as neuronal events, it succeeds on the one hand in adhering to the credo
that there is in the final analysis only the physical essence of being, and, on the
other hand, to the axiom that the physical is not open to mental manifestations of
life. Thus, Esfeld216 claims that »what is mental can only affect something when it is
identical to the physical.«217 »The cause is mental qua physical.«218 As far as Esfeld is
concerned, »we are here dealing with descriptions of two particular characteristics
whose meaning varies, but whose extension is the same.«219 Unfortunately Esfeld
does not clarify whether we can still speak meaningfully of identity when the mean-
ing of characteristics and relations are not the same. Esfeld’s own understanding of
identity theory is concerned with an ontological reductionism, according to which
everything in the world is accessible through physical realities; ontological reduc-
tionism involves epistemological reductionism, according to which it should be possi-
ble in every individual case to reduce a mental description to a physical description.
Readers feel that Esfeld is pulling their leg when he writes that his concern »is not
to eliminate the mental, but to preserve it.«220 If as he says there are ontologically
only physical characteristics, it can hardly be maintained that the mental are being
preserved.221
So, if I manage to get up from my desk and decide to go to the gym, then accord-
ing to identity theorists this can only be ascribed to physical preconditions. There
are, after all, enough physical preconditions for all mental manifestations of life.
When I am careless and sprain my arm working out with my training equipment,
identity theory tells me that the resulting pain is nothing but a physical occurrence
in the body. »These experiences are brain processes, not merely correlated with brain
processes.«222 Is that reassuring?
The proponents of identity theory are convinced of the advantages of their theory
and sharply criticize Cartesian dualism. As far as they are concerned, Descartes had
been wrong and had not seen that what he called mind is nothing but the brain.223

216 Esfeld, M.: Mentale Verursachung und die neue Reduktionismus-Debatte in der Philosophie
des Geistes. In: Spät, P. (Ed.): Zur Zukunft der Philosophie des Geistes. Paderborn 2008, p. 25.
217 Michael Esfeld (ibid., pp. 25–40) picks up the problem of mental causation. Based on con-
siderations of the causal closedness of the physical he presents himself as a representative of
the identity theory. He unfortunately refuses to deal with objections voiced by the philoso-
phy of mind in the last few years with regard to identity theory.
218 Ibid., p. 31.
219 Ibid., p. 32.
220 Ibid., p. 32.
221 It is rather astonishing when Heiner Hastedt in his criticism of the identity theory writes
that »this implies not much more than a basic reference of the spirit to the body.« (Hastedt,
H.: Das Leib-Seele-Problem. Zwischen Naturwissenschaft des Geistes und kultureller Eindi-
mensionalität. Frankfurt a. M. 21989, p. 118). When an identity is postulated it is not mean-
ingful to still speak of a relationship to the body.
222 Smart, J. J. C.: The Identity Theory of Mind. In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mind-identity/ (retrieved 16. November 2010).
223 Cf. Vogeley, K./Newen, A.: Ich denke, was du nicht denkst. In: Könneker, C. (Ed.): Wer erklärt
den Menschen? Hirnforscher, Psychologen und Philosophen im Dialog. Frankfurt a. M. 22007,
pp. 59–74, esp. p. 60 f./Esfeld, M.: Mentale Verursachung und die neue Reduktionismus-De-
 6. Identity theory       105

Neither is there always agreement in the physicalist camp where interaction can
sometimes be quite unfriendly. Smart counts La Mettrie as one of the precursors of
identity theory.224 Identity theorists also prefer not to be associated with the grubby
urchins of logical behaviorism. After all, while they themselves claim to be dealing
with important facts that are empirically watertight, they say that the logical behav-
iorists are concerned primarily with certain magic words, with language games.225
Identity theorists tell us that the facts speak support this view of the lived body-
soul problem.226 It is also clear to them that we can contribute in different ways to the
acquisition of knowledge concerning mind and brain. It is thus correct for them that
from a laboratory perspective an in-depth observation of humans can be observed.
Behaviorists would go along that far. Yet in contrast to the latter, identity theorists
claim that introspection, characterized by Armstrong as a »self-scanning process in
the brain,«227 cannot be completely wrong. Whatever we have just thought about as
we read this remarkable comment is thus identical with our cerebral processes.
It is obvious that such a point of view will not remain unchallenged. One of the
questions posed was formulated as follows: if it is correct to assume that should a
specific brain status be the same as a specific mental manifestation of life, does that
mean that beings living without a cerebrum have absolutely no mental manifesta-
tions of life? And vice versa: Is it possible that there are beings somewhere who expe-
rience mental manifestations of life as we do without having a brain? Would this not
contradict the equation proposed by identity theorists that mind = brain? Members
of the identity theory camp have taken these queries seriously. As a result, various
branches have developed which differ as to what might be the correct message of
the identity theory. There are those who champion »type-type identity theory«, and
those who support a token-token identity theory, where the concept of »type« refers
to abstract general entities while »tokens« involves concrete individual events of a
type of object. Thus, a »token« is an individual, concrete type of general type. Smart
explains this as follows: »The notion ›type‹ and ›token‹ here comes by analogy from
the words ›type‹ and ›token‹. A telegram reading ›love and love and love‹ contains
only two type words but in another sense, as the telegraph clerk would insist, it con-
tains five words (›token words‹).«228 While type-type identity assumes that every type
of mental manifestation of life is the same as a physical state identity, token-token
identity claims that every occurrence of a mental manifestation of life is identical
to a specific type of brain status. Concretely this means that for type-type identity

batte in der Philosophie des Geistes. In: Spät, P. (Ed.): Zur Zukunft der Philosophie des Geistes.
Paderborn 2008, pp. 25 ff.
224 Cf. Smart, J. J. C.: The Identity Theory of Mind. In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mind-identity/ (retrieved 16. November 2010).
225 Cf. Zoglauer, T.: Geist und Gehirn. Das Leib-Seele-Problem in der aktuellen Diskussion. Göt-
tingen 1998, pp. 97 f.
226 Cf. Armstrong, D. M: A Materialist Theory of Mind. London/New York 1993, p. 91; Lewis,
D.: Die Identität von Körper und Geist. Frankfurt a. M. 1989, pp. 21 ff.
227 Armstrong, D. M.: A Materialist Theory of Mind. London/New York 1993, p. 102.
228 Smart, J. J. C.: The Identity Theory of Mind. In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mind-identity/ (retrieved 16 Nov. 2010).
106       B. Monistic Concepts

the brain status for example of »type MK1211« is the same as what we call hope.229
According to the information given by the identity theorist mentioned, I must very
definitely be existing in the brain status »type MK1211.« According to this branch
of identity theory, it is thus obvious that the colleague who does not have the brain
status »type MK 1211« cannot have any hope. This does not really make any sense
now, and it will be discussed in more detail in Part 2.
Token-token identity theory argues differently. According to proponents of this
theory, it is definitely possible that people’s experience of hope at the point in time
t1 is identical with the brain status B1 and at the point in time t2 is identical with the
brain status B2. They are thus able to free themselves somewhat from the stranglehold
into which their identity-theory colleagues have maneuvered themselves and can for
example say that the hope I am presently experiencing is identical with a specific sta-
tus of my cerebrum (MK1211a), whereas my neighbor who is also full of hope expe-
riences this in accordance with an identical status in his brain (MK1211b).230 Mental
manifestations of life can therefore be identical to diverse cerebral conditions. That
is why this branch of identity theory is regarded as having the »weaker claim.«231
Frank Jackson is firmly convinced that we cannot do what hardened physi-
calists do, that is reduce mental manifestations of life to physical processes.232 To

229 David Lewis has quite a few publications regarding the philosophy of mind. In these he un-
equivocally supports a reductive materialism (Cf. e. g. Lewis, D.: Die Reduktion des Geistes.
In: Lewis, D.: Materialismus und Bewusstsein. Frankfurt a. M. 2007, p. 11). Time and again
he has shamelessly dipped into the bag of tricks which belongs to identity theory and has
integrated functionalist observations. According to Lewis, spiritual and mental manifes-
tations of life are exactly the same as conditions of the nervous system (Cf. ibid., p. 11).
In his study, Mad Pain and Martian Pain. In: Philosophical Papers. Vol. 1. Oxford 1983,
pp. 122–132, esp. clearly on p. 124, he presents a version of the type-identity theory. Almost
as a matter of course Lewis declares that an experience of pain and also a person’s hope
and fear are the same as a specific state of the brain. In his studies from 1985–2001 Lewis
increasingly chooses to speak of supervenience.
230 According to type-type identity theory even an extremely well-constructed machine is not
able to produce spiritual-mental manifestations of life as it has neither neurons nor a cer-
ebrum. Here is a difference to functionalism which we will look at more closely in this
chapter.
231 Rosenthal, D. M.: Identity theories. In: Guttenplan, S. (Ed.): A Companion to the Philosophy
of Mind. Oxford 102005, pp. 348–355, here p. 350.
232 Cf. Jackson, F.: What Mary didn’t know. In: Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 83 (1982), pp. 291–
295; Jackson, F.: Epiphenomenal Qualia. In: Philosophical Quarterly. Vol. 32 (1986),
pp. 127–136; Jackson, F.: Epiphänomenale Qualia. In: Heckmann, H.-D./Walter, S. (Ed.):
Qualia. Ausgewählte Beiträge. Paderborn 2001, pp. 123–138.
Cf. Ludlow, P./Nagasawa, Y./Stoljar, D. (Eds.): There’s something about Mary: Essays on
phenomenal consciousness and Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument. Cambridge 2004;
Nida-Rümelin, M.: Was Mary nicht wissen konnte. Phänomenale Zustände als Gegenstand
von Überzeugungen. In: Metzinger, T. (Ed.): Bewusstsein. Beiträge aus der Gegenwartsphi-
losophie. Paderborn 52005, pp. 259–282; Lycan, W. G.: Eine eingeschränkte Verteidigung
phänomenaler Information. In: Metzinger, T. (Ed.): Bewusstsein. Beiträge aus der Gegen-
wartsphilosophie. Paderborn 52005, pp. 283–303; Dennett, D.: Sweet Dreams. Philosophical
Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness. Cambridge/London 2006, pp. 103–129; Lewis, D.:
Was die Erfahrung lehrt. In: Lewis, D.: Materialismus und Bewusstsein. Frankfurt a. M. 2007,
pp. 53–87.
 6. Identity theory       107

demonstrate this, he submitted a well-known thought experiment. I believe that his

thoughts bring us further, and I therefore want to comment on this. According to
Jackson, one of the hooks of ontological reductionism is not to take the quality of ex-
perience seriously at all. This is said to be an indication for the inappropriateness of
the whole project. Let us therefore take a closer look at Jackson’s argument, and im-
agine a young woman. Her name is Mary. Since birth she has lived in a single room
where she has been isolated from the outside world. We can surely imagine that
the course of her daily life is grey-in-grey and that as she has never washed colored
clothes or perhaps even put a red dress with a white blouse in the washing machine,
she has never perceived colors, only black, white and gray objects.233 As a distraction,
she has a black and white monitor in her dark little room through which she studies
everything that science can teach about the brain. She doesn’t just study any old way.
Mary is extremely diligent and in the course of time she becomes a much-recognized
expert. She learns carefully which processes take place in the brain, where these
occur when we use words such as »red« and »green« when we speak of a lush green
meadow or of a bright red rose. She naturally knows about important areas of the
brain and about chemical-physical processes. She knows what happens in our brain
when we red dresses and white blouses. We can also imagine that Mary publishes
highly regarded and often cited scientific papers concerning how color experiences
are processed in our cerebral structures, a subject she knows extremely well. For
the time being, let us not speculate whether there are indeed scientists who live and
work as Mary does, but let us ask the question posed not only by Jackson, whether
the young researcher would experience something fundamentally new, should one
day the gates of her high-security prison were to open and she could experience
the world in all its diversity of colors. What do you think? How would that day be
different than all the »grey« days before? What would be different for Mary? What
would be the consequences regarding the way in which she would now experience
her surroundings; the way she would interact with other people she would now want
to meet and get to know? The inevitable happens. One day Mary finally leaves her
black and white little room and for the first time feels the warmth of the sun’s rays,
sees various birds flying through the sky, and is greeted with a bouquet of flowers.
In the past, she has diligently gathered an enormous amount of knowledge on how
human beings experience and process colors. Now reality sets in. For the first time
in her life, she can see the lush green od a meadow and the glowing red of a rose she
takes from the bouquet. For the first time, she dresses in a crimson dress and applies
matching make up. For the first time, she experiences first-hand and not only by
means of polished scientific papers or via her PC screen the blaze of color in flow-
ers, in the meadow, in ladies’ clothes and in song birds. This very obviously differs
from being able to say what happens to the synapses and the color receptors when
she experienced colors. Jackson’s goal in this story is to point out that Mary has in-
deed experienced something new, something that goes beyond the well-studied facts

233 One could of course point out that if Mary hurts herself with a pair of scissors or a scalpel,
red blood would flow. Even in her black and white high security wing she would feel pain
if she collided with the edge of her desk. She would likewise notice the warmth of the PC
monitor. That is true but should not detract from Jackson’s meaningful story.
108       B. Monistic Concepts

and data. Even her tremendous proficiency is not enough to teach her what it feels
like when the black and white gates of her world are opened. The living experience
does not appear in all those representations – the physical discovery of a color-filled
world, the joy of experiencing multicolored song birds and fine ladies’ clothing and
the interaction with others concerning these wonders. Jackson writes that she had
access to all physical information. Thus, her experiences demonstrated that knowl-
edge goes beyond all she had learned and thatbthe arguments of physicalism are
wrong.234 Even physicalists and the most intelligent neuroscientists such as Mary
are not capable of explaining all there is to experience. Jackson points out that this
would be absurd as not all that is physical can be reduced in this manner. Life has
many other examples.
I am obligated to Patrick Spät for referring me to a »real relative« of Mary. There-
fore I ask the question whether there are in fact scientist who live and work like Mary.
Just like Mary, the recently deceased Knut Nordby concentrated on researching the
question how we experience colors, recognize them, differentiate between them, and
process them. Through his publications and his knowledge, he also became an expert
on the subject. However, here is what happened: While Nordby was not locked up in
a black and white little room, he also had to experience the world as grey and grey.
He had suffered from color blindness (achromatopsy). He could not have experi-
enced a colorful bouquet of flowers or Mary in her new dress as other people who
do not suffer from this condition. Of course, Nordby’s following lines could also have
come from Mary:

»Although I have acquired a thorough theoretical knowledge of the physics of colors

and the physiology of the color receptor mechanisms, nothing of this can help me to
understand the true nature of colors. From the history of art I have also learned about
the meanings often attributed to colors and how colors have been used at different
times, but this too does not give me an understanding of the essential character or
quality of colors.«235

Of course, Jackson is not alone in his criticism of physicalism. Levine236 is not com-
fortable either with this concept and criticizes such projects because they cannot
demonstrate why we feel the way we do when we take delight in the colorful flowers
on our window sill or when we bite into a sweet apple. His criticism: Physical identity
theorists fail because they cannot comment on what I experience or why my experi-
ence is as it is. It is scientifically dishonest (and also fairly blind to »real life«) to claim
that pointing to cerebral processes is enough for understanding everything. Levine
advises against doing this. Something is missing. This is why he likes to speak of an

234 Jackson, F.: Epiphänomenale Qualia. In: Heckmann, H.-D./Walter, S. (Eds.): Qualia. Aus-
gewählte Beiträge. Paderborn 2001, p. 128.
235 Nordby, K.: Vision in a Complete Achromat: A Personal Account. In: Hess, R. F./Sharpe, L. T./
Nordby, K.: Night Vision. Basic, Clinical and Applied Aspects. Cambridge 1990, p. 305.
236 Cf. Levine, J.: Warum der Physikalismus Qualia auslässt. In: Heckmann, H.-D./Walter, S.
(Eds.): Qualia. Ausgewählte Beiträge. Paderborn 2001, pp. 79–105.
 6. Identity theory       109

»open space.«237 If we agree with the mind = brain equation, it remains completely
uncertain where we should place our experience. I would like to add to what Levine
says: What exactly is the medium of our perception? We are not merely »brains in
the world.« Let us remember the introduction to this dissertation where we thought
about this book falling on our little toe. This can be really hurt. If I’m not mistaken,
at such a moment, even a staunch identity theorist would wonder about what is
happening to his own body.238 That is why Esfeld’s words not only sound strange,
they are incorrect: »When for example a certain pain is identical with a certain state
of the brain, then it is possible to reduce the description of this specific pain to a
description of a specific brain state.«239 Representatives of the mind-brain paradigm
such as the identity theorists are not in a position to clarify how and why we expe-
rience something.
What is awkward about the Identity Theory of Mind is that manifestations of life
such as joy, hope, fear and pain belong to the entire organism. Yet it is claimed that
they are therefore the same as a cerebral process. We are unable to get a scientific grip
on our mental manifestations of life if we reduce them to the premise of bodily mani­
festations and/or states of the brain. If we remember that identity theorists lay claim
to empirical verifiability, we must call such an approach dishonest. This will become
clearer in Part 2 of this study. The equations mind = brain or pain = stimulation of
the C-fibers miss something quite fundamental: the dimension of corporeality. When
we speak of the characteristics of mental-spiritual manifestations of life, which brain
states just cannot have (and vice versa!), this clearly argues against identity theory.240
Mind and brain are not identical in all their characteristics. That is why the identity
theory is false.241

237 Cf. ibid., p. 79.

Cf. also: Goller, H.: Das Rätsel von Körper und Geist. Eine philosophische Deutung.
Darmstadt 2003, pp. 116–118.
238 Levine is concerned about more than the causal role of pain: »Indeed, we do feel that the
causal role of pain is crucial to our concept of it, and that discovering the physical mecha-
nism by which this causal role is effected explains an important facet of what there is to be
explained about pain. However, there is more to our concept of pain than its causal role,
there is its qualitative character, how it feels; and what is left unexplained by the discovery
of C fiber firing is why pain should feel the way it does! For there seems to be nothing about
C fiber firing which makes it naturally ›fit‹ the phenomenal properties. Unlike its functional
role, the identification of the qualitative side of pain with C fiber firing (or some property
of C fiber firing) leaves the connection between it and what we identify it with completely
mysterious. One might say, it makes the way pain feels into merely a brute fact.« (Levine, J.:
Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap. In: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (1983),
p. 357.
239 Esfeld, M.: Mentale Verursachung und die neue Reduktionismus-Debatte in der Philosophie
des Geistes. In: Spät, P. (Ed.): Zur Zukunft der Philosophie des Geistes. Paderborn 2008, p. 33.
240 Cf. also: Kutschera, F. von: Das Leibniz-Gesetz. In: Knaup, M./Müller, T./Spät, P. (Eds.):
Post-Physikalismus. Freiburg/Munich 2011, pp. 234–244.
241 Cf. also the discussion in Part 2.
110       B. Monistic Concepts

A digression: Anomalous monism

»Davidson has maintained that one can be

a monist – indeed, a physicalist – about the
fundamental nature of objects and events,
whilst also asserting that there can be no full
Reduction of the mental to the physical.«242

Within the many different varieties of the philosophy of mind, there is the percep-
tion of anomalous monism, that is connected with the name of Donald Davidson.243
The reason I refer to it at this stage is that we are here dealing with an aspect of the
token-token identity theory.244 We can read the following about this theory:

»Anomalous Monism continues to provide an extremely useful framework for exploring

fundamental issues and problems in the philosophy of mind, and has earned a central
place on the rather short list of important positions on the relation between mental and
physical events and properties.«245

In this short digression, I would like to introduce this theory which advertises it-
self as follows: It does not deviate one inch from physicalism yet, at the same time,
advocates for the non-reductionist view of our mental manifestations of life. Is that
possible? I had mentioned at the beginning of this chapter that there are indeed such
creeds within the physicalist camp. Davidson categorically rejects that we can speak
of mental substances as Descartes did, and he calls it absurd. Since this terminology
is full of fairly heavy philosophical-historical ballast, he prefers to speak of events.
He refers to happenings which can be singled out and identified. Davidson now

242 Guttenplan, S.: Anomalous monism. In: Guttenplan, S. (Ed.): A Companion to the Philosophy
of Mind. Oxford 102005, p. 122.
243 Cf. Davidson, D.: Geistige Ereignisse. In: Davidson, D. (Ed.): Handlung und Ereignis. Frank-
furt a. M. 1990, pp. 291 ff.; Davidson, D.: Thinking Causes. In: Heil, J. F./Mele, S. (Ed.): Men-
tal Causation. Oxford 1993, pp. 3–17; Davidson, D.: Mentale Ereignisse. In: Bieri, P. (Ed.):
Analytische Philosophie des Geistes. Weinheim/Basel 42007, pp. 73–90.
Cf. also: Honderich, T.: The Argument for Anomalous Monism. In: Analysis 42 (1982), pp. 59–
64; McLaughlin, B.: Anomalous Monism and the Irreducibility of the Mental. In: LePore, E./
McLaughlin, B. (Eds.): Actions and events. Oxford 1985, pp. 331–368; Lanz, P.: Menschli-
ches Handeln zwischen Kausalität und Rationalität. Frankfurt a. M. 1987; Van Gulick, R.:
Who’s in Charge Here? And Who’s Doing all the Work? In: Heil, J. F./Mele, S. (Eds.): Mental
Causation. Oxford 1993, pp. 233–258; Zoglauer, T.: Geist und Gehirn. Das Leib-Seele-Pro­
blem in der aktuellen Diskussion. Göttingen 1998, pp. 189–197; Pauen, M.: Grundprobleme
der Philosophie des Geistes. Eine Einführung. Frankfurt a. M. 32002, pp. 119–122; Teichert,
D.: Einführung in die Philosophie des Geistes. Darmstadt 2006, pp. 79–85; Beckermann, A.:
Analytische Einführung in die Philosophie des Geistes. Berlin/New York 32008, pp. 181–203;
Brüntrup, G.: Das Leib-Seele-Problem. Eine Einführung. Stuttgart 32008, pp. 83–88.
244 We can speak of a variation of token identity theory: here the identity of general charac-
teristics (type identity) is assumed but a token identity as an identity of individual occur-
rences. Cf. also: Davidson, D.: Handlung und Ereignis. Frankfurt a. M. 1990, pp. 293 ff.
245 Yalowitz, S.: Anomalous Monism. In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/anomalous-monism/ (retrieved 10. November 2010).
 6. Identity theory       111

writes that we can assign a spiritual attribute to the one or other physical entity. In
the physical real, we have the view that our mental manifestations of life are possible
as physical events, yet »anomalous monism rejects the thesis that mental phenomena
can be explained purely physically. An ontological decision is included in anomalous
monism only insofar as it grants the possibility that not all events are mental, and yet
adheres to the belief that all events are physical.«246
On the one hand, anomalous monism wants to continue following physicalist
ideas. On the other hand, it recognizes that physicalism is often inadequate in im-
portant questions. Davidson wants to free himself from this conflict. Anomalous
monism cannot be pigeonholed as being reductionist.247 His thought are as follows:
First, he takes talks about »the interaction principle« whereby »some mental events
causally interact with some physical events.«248 This is a topic that had already both-
ered Descartes as he thought about the theory of influxus physicus! Davidson writes
that wherever there are events thought of as being related as cause and effect, one
could not avoid the »the cause-law principle« whereby »events related as cause and
effect are covered by strict laws.«249 He is not alone in this assumption but supported
by other physicalists. The reason his theory is characterized as anomalous monism
is that »anomalous« contains the Greek word nomos (= a law). The prefix »a« stands
for negative, and what is being negated here is lawfulness (»the anomalism princi-
ple« where »there are no strict laws on the basis of which mental events can predict,
explain, or be predicted or explained by other events.«250 As Davidson points out,
»there are no strict determinist laws to form the basis from which spiritual events can
be predicted or explained.«251 Davidson believes it is impossible to subsume spiritual
events under strict laws.252 He develops his thoughts even further and explains that
he does not believe there are strict determinist causal laws253 which are obligated to
bring together spiritual and physical circumstances. Thus, according to him, »every
causally interacting mental event is token-identical to some physical event.«254 In
this potpourri of colorful suggestions regarding the lived body-soul problem, there
is also an aspect we could call the anomalous dualist solution. Here too we find trac-
es of Descartes. Davidson refers to the father of the lived body-soul problem. This
suggestion is anomalous because even Descartes did not know how to deal with such

246 Davidson, D.: Mentale Ereignisse. In: Bieri, P. (Ed.): Analytische Philosophie des Geistes.
Weinheim/Basel 42007, p. 79.
247 It is at any rate not suitable to call forth the »nothing other than« reflex (Ibid., p. 79).
248 Yalowitz, S.: Anomalous Monism. In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stan
ford.edu/entries/anomalous-monism/ (retrieved 10. November 2010).
249 Ibid.
250 Ibid.
251 Davidson, D.: Handlung und Ereignis. Frankfurt a. M. 1990, p. 293, Cf. Davidson, D.: Men-
tale Ereignisse. In: Bieri, P. (Ed.): Analytische Philosophie des Geistes. Weinheim/Basel 42007,
p. 73.
252 Cf. Zoglauer, T.: Geist und Gehirn. Das Leib-Seele-Problem in der aktuellen Diskussion. Göt-
tingen 1998, p. 191.
253 Cf. Davidson, D.: Mentale Ereignisse. In: Bieri, P. (Ed.): Analytische Philosophie des Geistes.
Weinheim/Basel 42007, p. 81.
254 Yalowitz, S.: Anomalous Monism. In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stan
ford.edu/entries/anomalous-monism/ (retrieved 10. November 2010).
112       B. Monistic Concepts

legality and therefore rejected it. At the same time, he could not accept statements of
identity which had mental predicates and those which had physical predicates. We
have here a dualist and not a monistic point of view. Davidson not only believes that
the pineal gland theory has long become obsolete, he also does not simply name an-
other interactive cerebral structure as for example Popper and Eccles do. According
to Davidson, the thought process which claims that spiritual events affect spiritual
events is skewed. Instead, we should realize that while our mental manifestations of
life do have an effect, this is only because they are physical.255 Esfeld’s argumentation
was very similar. Following the supervenience theory, Davidson assumes that »there
can be no two events which are the same in all physical aspects, yet vary in their
spiritual aspects without however changing physically.«256 Supervenience »does not
provide reducibility by means of either law or definition.«257 (I will discuss this later
in this book.) Ontologically we are here dealing with a monistic suggestion. On the
other hand, Davidson does not wish to be associated with other physicalists and
be labeled as being reductionist. »Davidson thinks that complete knowledge of the
brain and any related neurophysiological systems that support the mind’s activities
would not itself be knowledge of such things as belief, desire, experience and the
rest of the mental.«258 It is revealing to note that when we look at what Davidson
says about events, he states that it is possible to portray an event first in one way and
then in another. We can even include mental expressions. Logical behaviorists can
never accept this. In Part 2, I will attempt to clarify where the difference lies between
events and actions.
Thus, anomalous monism starts from the premise that our mental manifestations
of life cannot be explained with the help of laws that can be applied in physics. What
is being confirmed here is that what we say about mental events cannot be under-
stood within the same anomalous framework as physical events. So imagine that you
would like to take a break after this section. According to Davidson, this wish finds
no »echo« in physics.259
If we regard the whole matter ontologically, then there is no doubt that here we
have a monistic model. There is, however, no wish to move away from mental man-
ifestations of life. The frequent reference to non-reductionism pertains to this issue.
We are dealing with a quintessentially physicalist point of view which does not want
to turn its back on the understanding that there are only physical entities:

255 Cf. Davidson, D.: Mentale Ereignisse. In: Bieri, P. (Ed.): Analytische Philosophie des Geistes.
Weinheim/Basel 42007, p. 75 und Davidson, D.: Thinking Causes. In: Heil, J./Mele, A. (Ed.):
Mental Causation. Oxford 1993, pp. 3–17, esp. p. 13.
Cf. also: Kim, J.: Can Supervenience and ›Non-Strict-Laws’ Save Anomalous Monism? In:
Heil, J./Mele, A. (Eds.): Mental Causation. Oxford 1993, pp. 19–26, esp. p. 20.
256 Davidson, D.: Handlung und Ereignis. Frankfurt a. M. 1990, p. 301, cf. also: Davidson, D.:
Mentale Ereignisse. In: Bieri, P. (Ed.): Analytische Philosophie des Geistes. Weinheim/Basel
4
2007, p. 79.
257 Davidson, D.: Handlung und Ereignis. Frankfurt a. M. 1990, p. 301.
258 Guttenplan, S.: Anomalous monism. In: Guttenplan, S. (Ed.): A Companion to the Philosophy
of Mind. Oxford 102005, p. 122.
259 Cf. Searle, J.: Mind. A Brief Introduction. Oxford 2004, p. 77.
 7. Epiphenomenalism       113

»Insofar as the goal of the argument here is to reserve space for mental activity
within a world that is explained entirely in physicalist terms, this ›anomalous mon-
ism‹ is also unconvincing. For it is superfluous to postulate the existence of a special
sort of property, if ›it does no causal work‹ in a materialistically conceived world, in
which only events can influence esach other. Davidson’s attempt to save the mind
from reduction seems to lead unintentionally to its elimination.«260

7. Epiphenomenalism
Kutschera tells us that »epiphenomenalism is
akin to a polite materialism in that it does not
deny the spiritual but sees it merely as a corol-
lary, a shadow of the physical.«261

Since the 19th century, a position is being discussed that is called epiphenomenal-
ism.262 In the light of the sub-questions concerning the lived body-soul problem
formulated in the introduction, we know that epiphenomenalists are especially in-
terested in the freedom theoretical sub-problem. This also explains what they have
to say concerning ontological questions, i. e. the problem complexes of intentionality
and personal identity. The starting position for epiphenomenalists is that we should
keep physical and a mental manifestations of life apart. They thus recognize and
accept the Cartesian great divide with mental manifestations of life on the one side
and physical entities on the other. They recognize no bridge that crosses the two
sides of the trench and would have any kind of effect. While Spinoza was convinced
that the two areas were sufficiently synchronized, the epiphenomenalists see the sit-

260 Habermas, J.: Das Sprachspiel verantwortlicher Urheberschaft. Probleme der Willensfreiheit.
In: Janich, P. (Ed.): Deutsches Jahrbuch für Philosophie. Vol. 1: Naturalismus und Menschen-
bild. Hamburg 2008, p. 25. Engl. Transl. (by Joel Anderson): http://www.tandfonline.com/
doi/pdf/10.1080/13869790601170128?needAccess=true.
261 Kutschera, F. von: Jenseits des Materialismus. Paderborn 2003, p. 80.
262 Cf. Birnbacher, D.: Epiphenomenalism as a solution to the ontological mind-body prob-
lem. In: Ratio 1(1988), pp. 17–32; Birnbacher, D.: Das ontologische Leib-Seele-Problem
und seine epiphänomenalistische Lösung. In: Bühler, K.-E. (Ed.): Aspekte des Leib-Seele-
Problems. Philosophie, Medizin, Künstliche Intelligenz. Würzburg 1990, pp. 59–79; Bieri,
P.: Trying Out Epiphenomenalism. In: Erkenntnis 36 (1992), pp. 283–309; Birnbacher,
D.: Wie kommt die Welt in den Kopf? Eine Lösung für das Leib-Seele-Problem. In: Rapp,
F. (Ed.): Die konstru­ierte Welt. Theorie als Erzeugungsprinzip. Schriftenreihe der Univer-
sität Dortmund. Vol. 41. Dortmund 1997, pp. 17–35; Zoglauer, T.: Geist und Gehirn. Das
Leib-Seele-Problem in der aktuellen Diskussion. Göttingen 1998, pp. 76–87; Seebass, G.:
Der Traum des physika­listischen Monismus. Wissenschaftstheoretische und methodenkri-
tische Überlegungen zur neurowissenschaftlichen Behandlung von Bewusstseinsphänome-
nen. In: Holderegger, A./Sitter-Liver, B./Hess, C. W./Rager, G. (Eds.): Hirnforschung und
Menschenbild. Beiträge zur interdisziplinären Verständigung. Fribourg 2007, pp. 55–74, esp.
pp. 58–60 and pp. 63–66; Robinson, W.: Epiphenomenalism. In: Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epiphenomenalism/ (retrieved 05. November
2010).
114       B. Monistic Concepts

uation differently. The theory of epiphenomenalism rests on two pillars. The first is
the conviction that we can understand everything physically. Thus, when we want to
speak about a cause of the sub-problem of freedom theory, we must remember that
there are only physical cause-effect relationships. William Robinson puts it this way:

»The central motivation for epiphenomenalism lies in the premise that all physical
events have sufficient causes that lie within the class of physical events. If a mental
event is something other than a physical event, then for it to make any causal contri-
bution of its own in the physical world, would require a violation of physical law.«263

The other pillar on which epiphenomenalism is built, consists of the dualist legacy of
an incalculable variety of mind and brain versions. Unlike the identity theorists, the
epiphenomenalists do not assume that mind and brain are the same. Epiphenome-
nalists do not want to go as far as their physicalist colleagues from the identity theory
camp. They acknowledge that mental manifestations of life do exist and support
this by saying there must be sufficient physical preconditions for it. »Mental events
are caused by physical events in the brain, but have no effect upon any physical
events.«264
The British biologist Thomas H. Huxley (1825–1895) was one of the pioneers of
epiphenomenalism. He believes that enough mental manifestations of life are caused
by physical circumstances. What is strange about his suggestion is that in his opin-
ion, our mental manifestations of life are actually unable to exert any efficacious
power. Gerhard Roth thinks that we should remember that epiphenomenalism »is
an approach that must be taken seriously regarding solving the problem of reduc-
tionism.«265 We are now going to examine this more closely.
Epiphenomenalists also employ the metaphor of the mechanical clock when they
attempt to represent the relationship between the bodily and the mental-spiritual.
According to them, the mental is like the bell in an alarm clock; the body is the
clockwork.266 Much better known is the comparison of mental manifestations of life
with the whistling of a steam locomotive.267 References to the ring tone of an alarm
clock or the smoke coming from the steam locomotive indicate that we are willing
to acknowledge that the presupposition that there are mental manifestations of life
is not wrong. They have been brought about in a mechanistic system, but cannot
accomplish anything retroactively. Zoglauer says very aptly that »the effect is never
bi-directional, but always unidirectional.«268 What is meant here is that mental man-
ifestations of life are so powerless that they are incapable of accomplishing anything

263 Robinson, W.: Epiphenomenalism. In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epiphenomenalism/ (retrieved 05. November 2010).
264 Ibid.
265 Roth, G.: Das Gehirn und seine Wirklichkeit. Kognitive Neurobiologie und ihre philoso­
phischen Konsequenzen. Frankfurt a. M. 1997, p. 293.
266 Huxley, T. H.: On the Hypothesis that Animals are Automata, and its History. In: Huxley,
T. H.: Collected essays. Vol. 1. London 1893, p. 242.
267 Cf. ibid., pp. 199–250, here pp. 239 ff.
268 Zoglauer, T.: Geist und Gehirn. Das Leib-Seele-Problem in der aktuellen Diskussion. Göttin-
gen 1998, p. 76.
 7. Epiphenomenalism       115

either in the brain or indeed in the region of the brains, or even with regard to other
mental manifestations of life. They are »shadows« as Franz von Kutschera formulates
it.269
If were to talk with an epiphenomenalist, he would not try to convert us and not
say that the mental manifestations of life mentioned in the introduction do not exist.
Yet the epiphenomenalist would do everything possible to convince us that mental
manifestations of life are causally irrelevant, and he would tell us that shadows do not
create anything, they do not play any role! If we would ask what he means by that,
we would probably be told that mental manifestations of life occur at random, and
nothing and nobody has any influence over them. It is also possible that he would try
to give us a theological rationale, something not quite unknown among epiphenom-
enalists. Thus, Dietrich explains that mental manifestations of life are a very excellent
gift from God the creator. However, not only can we not return this present, we can
in fact do nothing with it. Dietrich explains that mental manifestations of life have
no causal effect whatsoever.270 If we imagine creation in the manner proposed by
Dietrich, we must delete from our vocabulary concepts such as free and responsible
planning and acting. Epiphenomenalists are firmly convinced that our perceptions
and intentions are totally incapable of causing any transformation. As for Descartes
in his sidewalk cafe, epiphenomenalists should be raising urgent questions regarding
our fellow human beings and fellow creatures. Or, as Robinson writes: »Epiphenom-
enalism implies the (exceedingly implausible) conclusion that we do not know that
others have mental events.«271 Moreover, Walter tells us:

»Among other things, it appears to undermine [...] our conviction that others enjoy a
mental life similar to ours, the application of epistemic norms like justification, warrant,
or reasonableness to processes of belief formation, the distinction between reasons for
an action and the reasons for which it was performed, and our ability to refer to, have
knowledge of, and have memories about mental states.«272

What is disastrous is their view of our qualitative experience, e. g. our experiencing

pain. A physician or counselor called in an emergency situations could say to a an
accident victim: »Your pain has neither effect nor function. The impression you have
that your pain an effect is a deception and, viewed objectively, is false. Your pain, just
like other mental phenomena, is only seated on foundational neuronal processes.«
This scene illustrates how absurd, how epistemologically and ontologically skewed
epiphenomenalism is.
We can be forgiven a little smirk when we read that the same argument is used
to demonstrate the basis of epiphenomenalism as it is used to argue against it. The

269 Cf. Kutschera, F. von: Jenseits des Materialismus. Paderborn 2003, p. 80.
270 Dietrich, R.: Bewusstsein. Näherungslösungen für ein unlösbares Problem. In: Evangelische
Aspekte 3 (2001), pp. 4–11.
271 Robinson, W.: Epiphenomenalism. In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epiphenomenalism/ (retrieved 05. November 2010).
272 Walter, S.: Epiphenomenalism. In: McLaughlin, B. P./Beckermann, A./Walter, S. (Eds.): The
Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford 2009, pp. 85–94, here p. 85.
116       B. Monistic Concepts

proponents claim that in the development of human beings better and better phys-
ical processes have evolved and in this way to improve chances for survival. We
thus do not have to engage in heated discussions about mental manifestations of
life. The contenders conclude that mental manifestations of life exhibit no function
whatsoever.273 The acceptable equation is: suitable brain structure = selection advan-
tage. Mental manifestations of life do not play any role in this equation; they have
absolutely no meaning. The opponents of epiphenomenalism refuse to accept such
a calculation. They point out that mental manifestations of life are part of all living
beings, and such an equation ignores the reality of what it means to be alive. To deny
that our mental manifestations of life are able to affect something is totally false.274
So, we pose questions to epiphenomenalists such as whether we can do without the
shadow play of our mind, or rather our mental manifestations of life seeing they
have no meaning whatsoever. Our life would definitely not look the way it does if
there were no mental manifestations of life. This goes against the attempts of epi-
phenomenalists to convince, and most non-philosophers would shake their heads
in disbelief: »The most powerful reason for rejecting epiphenomenalism is the view
that it is incompatible with knowledge of our own minds – and thus, incompatible
with knowing that epiphenomenalism is true.«275
Edith Stein says in this context that precisely »because we call them accompany-
ing factors we say they are not the same as physical processes but require their own,
separate, field of study.«276 The question is also interesting how epiphenomenalists
know that mental manifestations of life are in fact epiphenomena. Where do they
get this »knowledge?« This too should after all be an epiphenomenon, a shadow that
can affect nothing. Hans Jonas argues in a similar vein when he wishes to point out
that there is a logical contradiction in epiphenomenalism.277 Probably all epiphe-
nomenalists assume their theory should be taken seriously as a good suggestion to
be included in the discussion concerning the body-soul problem. However, here
is the problem: Even the most wonderful argumentative statement is, according to
epiphenomenalists themselves, nothing but shadows accompanying phenomena. The
sticking point is how from systems whose immanent expiry has nothing to do with
meaning and truth,278 an argument can emanate which needs to be discussed. When
epiphenomenalists present arguments for their position, these arguments are also
excellent arguments against their statements. As Jonas so rightly points out, epiphe-

273 Cf. Edelman, G. M.: Das Licht des Geistes. Wie Bewusstsein entsteht. Düsseldorf/Zurich
2004, p. 89.
274 Cf. Searle, J.: Freedom And Neurobiology. Reflections on Free will, Language, and Political
Power. New York 2007, p. 69; Jonas, H.: Das Prinzip Leben. Ansätze zu einer philosophis-
chen Biologie. Frankfurt a. M. 1997, p. 223; Popper, K./Eccles, J. C.: Das Ich und sein Gehirn.
Munich/Zurich 82002, pp. 101 ff.; Roth, G.: Aus Sicht des Gehirns. Frankfurt a. M. 2003,
p. 136; Zoglauer, T.: Geist und Gehirn. Das Leib-Seele-Problem in der aktuellen Diskussion.
Göttingen 1998, pp. 81–84.
275 Robinson, W.: Epiphenomenalism. In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epiphenomenalism/.
276 Stein, E.: EPh, pp. 73 f.
277 Cf. Jonas, H.: Das Prinzip Leben. Ansätze zu einer philosophischen Biologie. Frankfurt a. M.
1997, p. 224.
278 Cf. ibid., p. 224.
 8. The emergence theory       117

nomenalist theory leads to unsatisfactory internal contradictions: »epiphenomenal-

ism proclaims the impotence of any thinking and with that its own inability to be
an independent theory.«279 The presumption which epiphenomenalism makes that
matter is a sufficient condition for mental manifestations of life is presented without
any reference to what this might even mean for our examination of matter.280 Epiphe-
nomenalism is of no help as we continue our quest for the lived body-soul problem.

8. The emergence theory

»In each stage the world which we perceive
comes into being through ›emergence.‹ It
comes into being through the process in
which considerable aggregations of matter
spontaneously develop characteristics which
have no meaning for the simpler units from
which they come.
A cell is not yet a tiger. Nor is a single gold
atom yellow and shiny.«281

Metaphorically speaking, advocates of the emergence theory282 are tightrope walkers.

On the one hand, they hold on to a physicalist way of thinking, but on the other

279 Jonas, H.: Macht oder Ohnmacht der Subjektivität? Das Leib-Seele-Problem im Vorfeld des
Prinzips Verantwortung. Frankfurt a. M. 1987, pp. 62 f.
Critique of Hans Jonas’ understanding of epiphenomenalism cf. also: Seifert, J.: Das Leib-
Seele-Problem und die gegenwärtige philosophische Diskussion. Eine systematisch-kritische
Analyse. Darmstadt 21989, pp. 82–110.
280 Cf. Jonas, H.: Das Prinzip Leben. Ansätze zu einer philosophischen Biologie. Frankfurt a. M.
1997, p. 222.
281 Anderson, P.: Quantentheorie. In: Brockman, J. (Ed.): Die wichtigsten Erfindungen der letz-
ten 2000 Jahre. Berlin 22000, p. 178.
282 Cf. Lewes, G. H.: Problems of Life and Mind. Vol. 2. London 1875; Morgan, C. L: Emergent
Evolution. London 1923; Broad, C. D.: The Mind and Its Place in Nature. London 1925;
Alexander, S.: Space, Time and Deity. London 1927; Jonas, H.: Das Prinzip Verantwortung.
Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation. Frankfurt a. M. 1984, pp. 133–136;
Beckermann, A./Flohr, H./Kim, J. (Eds.): Emergence or Reduction? Essays on the Prospects
of Nonreductive Physicalism. Berlin/New York 1992; Stephan, A.: Emergence – A system-
atic View on its Historical Facets. In: Beckermann, A./Flohr, H./Kim, J. (Eds.): Emergence
or Reduction? Essays on the Prospects of Nonreductive Physicalism. Berlin/New York 1992,
pp. 25–48; McLaughlin, B.: The Rise and Fall of British Emergentism. In: Beckermann, A./
Flohr, H./Kim, J. (Eds.): Emergence or Reduction? Essays on the Prospects of Nonreductive
Physicalism. Berlin/New York 1992, pp. 49–93; Beckermann, A.: Analytische Einführung
in die Philosophie des Geistes. Berlin 1999, pp. 216–227; Beckermann, A.: Analytische Ein-
führung in die Philosophie des Geistes. Berlin/New York 32008, pp. 203–269; Stephan, A.:
Emergenz. Von der Unvorhersagbarkeit zur Selbstorganisation. Dresden 1999; Stephan, A.:
Emergenz in kognitionsfähigen Systemen. In: Pauen, M./Roth, G. (Eds.): Neurowissenschaf-
ten und Philosophie. Eine Einführung. Munich 2001, pp. 123–154; Stephan, A.: Zur Rolle
des Emergenzbegriffs in der Philosophie des Geistes und in der Kognitionswissenschaft. In:
118       B. Monistic Concepts

hand, they want do justice to the phenomenal independence of our mental man-
ifestations of life. They say we cannot simply introduce the thesis that mind is the
same as brain. Emergence theorists tell us that mind is a concept of the schematic
community of brain, that our mental manifestations of life cannot merely be traced
back to physical structures. It also seems that their ambition is to offer a non-reduc-
tive solution.283
The development of this theory indicates that at first, a group of biologists was
wondering how to speak responsibly about the history of human development. One
of them was Lloyd Morgan, who is still well known today. In those scientific cir-
cles, the term emergence seemed to be helpful as an approach to address the arising
questions. When something emerged that was previously unknown, it was called
emergence.

»At the beginning of the 20th century, the term was generally used in connection with
the theory of evolution. Accordingly, emergent characteristics are not predictable on the
basis of already known characteristics. An example of emergence was the genesis of life
from inanimate nature.«284

As Achim Stephan explains, it was increasingly popular to think about emergence

since the early 1990s.285 Since then, many articles have been published on the sub-
ject. The English verb »to emerge«, which gave the theory its name, in this context
means something that develops and appears suddenly. It is important that in all the
writings about this theory, the reference was to emergent properties, and those have
identified the system. Followers of this theory like to point to the novelty of what ap-
pears and what is thus emergent. According to Stephan, this refers to the genesis out
of new constellations. On the other hand, it means that until now no one had spoken
about this reality since none of it was foreseeable.286 Some works about emergentism
differentiate between weak emergence and strong emergence. The former is meant as

Sturma, D. (Ed.): Philosophie und Neurowissenschaften. Frankfurt a. M. 2006, pp. 146–166;

Clayton, P.: Die Frage nach der Freiheit. Biologie, Kultur und die Emergenz des Geistes in
der Welt. Göttingen 2007; Brüntrup, G.: Das Leib-Seele-Problem. Eine Einführung. Stuttgart
3
2008, pp. 67–73; O’Connor, T./Yu Wong, H.: Emergent Properties. In: Stanford Encyclope-
dia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties-emergent/ (retrieved 10. No-
vember 2010).
283 The word emergence can be utilized both ontologically and epistemically. This theory should
be discussed in the context of the chapter on materialism. This is because for most authors
who work in this context and who advocate emergentism, the emergence theory presents
a none-reductive physicalist solution possibility and they understand the emergence idea
epistemologically. Mario Bunge e. g. speaks of an »emergent materialism.« For Bunge mind
is a »collective of functions and activities of certain neural systems« (Bunge, M.: Das Leib-
Seele-Problem. Tübingen 1984, p. 271).
284 Sturma, D.: Philosophie des Geistes. Leipzig 2005, p. 40.
285 Cf. Stephan, A.: Zur Rolle des Emergenzbegriffs in der Philosophie des Geistes und in der Kog-
nitionswissenschaft. In: Sturma, D. (Ed.): Philosophie und Neurowissenschaften. Frankfurt
a. M. 2006, p. 146.
286 Cf. Stephan, A.: Emergente Eigenschaften. In: Krohs, U./Toepfer, G. (Eds.): Philosophie der
Biologie: Eine Einführung. Frankfurt a. M. 2005, pp. 88–105; Stephan, A./Beckermann, A.:
Emergenz. In: Information Philosophie 3 (1994), p. 47.
 8. The emergence theory       119

a suggestion that it is based on systems that will not always remain inexplicable. The
proponents of strong emergence are of a different opinion. They suggest that may not
be possible – not tomorrow and not ever – to decipher the emergent characteristics
exactly.287
Emergentists maintain that when we examine a single cell of our cerebrum, we
cannot yet identify our mental manifestations of life and qualities. The emphasis
is placed on »single cell«, for the proponents of this theory feel that it is evident
that mental manifestations of life »arise« from the very complicated intertwining
of billions of nerve cells. According to emergentists, our mental manifestations of
life come from our brain structure. However, they say as a matter of fact, these do
not have the qualities yet that are typical for our mental manifestations of life. A
certain level of complexity needs to be achieved to bring about the emergence of
mental manifestations of life.288 There is general agreement that the »emergent enti-
ties« are second-order entities. Our mental manifestations of life are not yet present
in the first order, the underlying »fundamental entities.« »Emergent qualities are
something truly new under the sun, but the world’s fundamental dynamics remain
unchanged.«289
When emergentists attach importance to the understanding that the emergent
properties cannot be traced back to the fundamental entities, they try to support
this by saying that otherwise the first order would already indicate exactly what the
nature of the second order would be, but that this is just not possible. »Emergent
properties are systematic features of complex systems which could not be predicted
[...] from the standpoint of a pre-emergent stage.«290 Emergentists reject the pre-
sumption that emergent properties can simply be brought forth from fundamental
entities:

287 Cf. Stephan, A.: Emergenz. Von der Unvorhersagbarkeit zur Selbstorganisation. Dresden
1999, p. 21; Stephan, A.: Emergenz in kognitionsfähigen Systemen. In: Pauen, M./Roth,
G. (Eds.): Neurowissenschaften und Philosophie. Eine Einführung. Munich 2001, p. 127;
Stephan, A.: Zur Rolle des Emergenzbegriffs in der Philosophie des Geistes und in der Kog-
nitionswissenschaft. In: Sturma, D. (Ed.): Philosophie und Neurowissenschaften. Frankfurt
a. M. 2006, p. 148.
Achim Stephan (Stephan, A.: Zur Rolle des Emergenzbegriffs in der Philosophie des Geistes
und in der Kognitionswissenschaft. In: Sturma, D. (Ed.): Philosophie und Neurowissenschaf-
ten. Frankfurt a. M. 2006, pp. 146–166) presents three distinctive characteristics regard-
ing a weak emergentism. These are the assertion of a physical monism, the assumption
of systemic factors, and thirdly the conviction of synchronous determinacy. A diachronic
emergentism is then characterized by the distinctive mark of newness (ibid., p. 147). When
what is supposed to be emerging cannot be reduced to a physical level, we speak of a strong
emergentism.
288 »In the integration of the elements into a new system, we do not encounter something
which already existed in a hidden manner. We are here dealing with something that de-
velops even though one cannot necessarily deduce this in an examination of the simple
elements.« (Wuketits, F.: Zustand und Bewusstsein. Hamburg 1985, p. 98).
289 O’Connor, T./Yu Wong, H.: Emergent Properties. In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties-emergent/ (retrieved 10. November 2010).
290 Ibid.
120       B. Monistic Concepts

»Emergent properties and laws are systematic features of complex systems governed
by true, law-like generalizations within a special science that is irreducible to funda-
mental physical theory for conceptual reasons.«291

It is customary in the literature to illustrate the principle of the emergence theory

with the following example: While identity theorists often try to establish the appar-
ent identity of mind and brain by pointing out that water and the chemical formula
H2O are also the same, emergence theorists point to the chemical composition of a
water molecule to explain what they mean.

»The task of physics is to investigate the fundamental properties of the elementary con-
stituents of nature and the laws that characterize them, whilst the task of the special
sciences is to elucidate the properties had by complex material substances and the laws
governing their characteristics behavior and interactions.«292

Every junior high school student knows that a water molecule consists of two hy-
drogen atoms and one oxygen atom, as the formula H2O indicates. The oxygen atom
is in the center of the molecule. The hydrogen atoms and the oxygen atoms are each
brought together in a single bond. We can even tell the bond angle that combines
the two: it is exactly 104.45°. Emergentists now point out that H2O can come into
being (»emerge«) thanks to two gases (hydrogen and oxygen). In the language of
emergentists this is expressed as follows: The liquid nature cannot be identified yet in
the initial (gaseous) state; this can only be done when the two gases react with each
other in an explosion (which not only students find impressive). The emergentists
say that the liquid nature is a factor that cannot be reduced to the prerequisites of the
initial state or that it is simply the same. After all, both gases involved have originally
nothing to do with this peculiarity. In that sense, the liquid state of the water in a
drinking glass is now characterized as »emergent.« Stephan tells us that »the world
around us is full of characteristics that occur only on the system level and not on
the plane of system components.«293 I would call to mind the van der Waals forces,
which we keep encountering, for example, in connection with alkanes and even in
connection with geckos that are using these forces to cling to walls. They inform us
how certain molecules form compounds.294 This suggests that we should question
such references.295
Ontologically speaking, the emergence theory falls within the spectrum of phys-
icalist theories, as priority is obviously placed on the fundamental entities. The in-

291 Ibid.
292 Ibid.
293 Stephan, A.: Zur Rolle des Emergenzbegriffs in der Philosophie des Geistes und in der Kog-
nitionswissenschaft. In: Sturma, D. (Ed.): Philosophie und Neurowissenschaften. Frankfurt
a. M. 2006, p. 150.
294 Cf. Parsegian, V. A.: Van der Waals Forces. A Handbook for Biologists, Chemists, Engineers,
and Physicists. Cambridge 2006.
295 Cf. Spät, P.: Gradueller Panpsychismus: Ein Lösungsvorschlag zum Leib-Seele-Problem. In:
Theologie und Philosophie 3 (2010), pp. 341–378.
 8. The emergence theory       121

teresting question is how the emergent circumstances can be causally active.296 Go-
dehard Brüntrup discusses this, and it is helpful to follow his ideas here. According
to Brüntrup, a possible way to deal with this complex of problems would be to let
some mental manifestations of life influence others. In addition, it would be possible
to have the mental implement the physical. Let us look at the first possibility with
Brüntrup: A mental phenomenon, let us call it M1, is to affect another mental phe-
nomenon called M2. Let us now remember the definition statement of the emergence
theory, that thee mental emerges from the physical basis plane on which it depends
completely. As far as emergentists are concerned, the physical (together with its char-
acteristics) is enough to indicate that there is something like mental manifestations
of life. Considering that an adequate physical basis for M2 needs to be established, we
need to ask what exactly could be the cause of M2. We can of course, with Brüning,
choose not to mention the effect M1 has on M2. It is after all a sufficient physical
precondition that M2 exists at all. A physicalist who is loyal to the party line could re-
spond that to speak of physicalism implies that the acceptance of physicalist causality
is sufficient. The causal forces which are assigned to the emergent plane are in the
final instance nothing but what clearly belongs to the physical basis. Consequently,
the emergent plane is without effect. If in fact the emergent characteristics are in
reality to develop a causal effect from within themselves, there remains the question
how this is to be aligned with the foundations of physicalism. So, we can once again
agree with Brüntrup: If we assume that out of the fundamental entities, i. e. from the
physical base, the causal force of the emergent mental level develops, this suggestion
of a solution can truly be called non-reductionist.297
If we now assume that the magnetic attraction is an emergent reality, »the behav-
ior of the atoms and molecules of a compass needle would at least in some instances
be determined by forces which do not arise from out of the basic laws of physics.«298
As we have learned, the emergent characteristics cannot be deciphered from those
of the first order. Beckermann thus concludes that a consequence would be that »the
basic laws of physics are (therefore, M. K.) full of gaps.«299 How can that be possible?
Can a physicalist admit that? In other words: How can physicalsts admit that there
is something convincingly and qualitatively new? This is why critics say sarcastically
that this theory reminds them of Aladdin, the oriental tale that tells the story of a
genie in the bottle who continuously reappears while Aladdin the protagonist does
not quite know why a »spirit« should emerge from the »bottle system.«300
In our exploration of epiphenomenalism, we have followed Edith Stein who said
that calling a phenomenon epiphenomenal does not absolve us from continuing the

296 Cf. also: Brüntrup, G.: Das Leib-Seele-Problem. Eine Einführung. Stuttgart 32008, pp. 67–74.
297 Cf. ibid., pp. 67–74.
298 Beckermann, A.: Analytische Einführung in die Philosophie des Geistes. Berlin 22001, p. 243.
299 Ibid., p. 245.
300 Gerhard Roth understands emergence theory as mysticism. He tells us that »emergence
theoretical materialism is thus either a triviality as all characteristics are emerging; or a
mysticism which makes the emergence of the mind something puzzlingly non-physical.«
(Roth, G.: Das Gehirn und seine Wirklichkeit. Frankfurt a. M. 1997, p. 292 f). Cf. also:
Roth, G.: Gehirne, Gründe und Ursachen. In: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 5 (2005),
pp. 702 f.
122       B. Monistic Concepts

debate. A similar objection can be formulated in this case: Calling a phenomenon

»emergent« does not justify us to interpret its meaning by the appearance of new
qualities. Emergentists remain silent as to why quantity should at some stage become
quality. Does this really happen? For what reason? We could of course argue that
the source plane cannot be understood in purely quantitative terms, that there is no
trench between fundamental entities and emergent properties. But that would imply
a position beyond dualism and physicalism.
What you and I feel and experience (»emergent properties«) is said to originate
in our cerebral structures. This illustrates that here, too, the focus is placed on mind
and brain and that the dimension of corporeality, without which we are incapable of
sensual feeling and experiencing, is being blocked out. Thomas Fuchs sees this as a
clear deficiency in the approach taken by emergence theorists, especially regarding
their personal understanding of humans at the intersection of mutually regulating
interior and exterior systems.301 In this regard, Christine Zunke points to another
important aspect. She tells us;

»the higher level of complexity is not measured quantitatively at the level of complex-
ity. Instead, the complexity must be allocated subsequently to the new quality as its
cause. It only becomes a »higher complexity« in that the mind, the spirit is an already
recognized quality which is then presented (not explained) as being brought about by
means of the complexity of the brain and, in this way, would qualify as being a »higher«
complexity.«302

Hans Jonas puts his finger on it when he says that in the final instance, we cannot
understand why we even experience and understand something qualitatively. In light
of my chapter on Aristotle, which will follow below, I agree that emergence theory
should say:

»The evolving antecedent must be credited with a positive potentiality for the novel
mode (not totally novel, indeed, by this view) whose time would come. That coming
must be understood as actualization, as »telos,« as fulfillment of a movement tending
toward it. In short, only in connection with a generally »Aristotelian« ontology is the
theory of emergence logically tenable. But this is precisely what the theory wished to
avoid: the substructure was to be spared the need of being interpreted with a view to
the superstructure; there was to be no need to import categories of explanation from
the latter into the former; the newly apparent causality of the one was not to be seen as
foreshadowed in the other and aiming at this appearance. [...] However, that leads [...] to
the dead end of the absolute leap and of the impotence of the mind.«303

301 Cf. Fuchs, T.: Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan. Eine phänomenologisch-ökologische
Konzeption. Stuttgart 2008, p. 261.
302 Zunke, C.: Kritik der Hirnforschung. Neurophysiologie und Willensfreiheit. Berlin 2008,
p. 198.
303 Jonas, H.: The Imperative of Responibility. In search of an Ethics for the Technological Age.
Chicago 1984, p. 69.
 9. Supervenience       123

9. Supervenience
»Many physicalists looked for a way of
characterizing the primacy and priority of the
physical that is free from reductionist
implications.«304

The so-called supervenience theorists are marching to a similar beat as the emer-
gence theorists.305 Their baggage also includes the assumption that mental manifes-
tations of life depend asymmetrically on the physical. To them physical entities give
rise to mental manifestations of life.
The word supervenience comes from the Latin verb supervenire which can be
translated as »add to« or »appear.« In English, there is the verb supervene. The Latin
»nomen est omen« applies to this theory. It is not quite clear how the term »su-
pervenience« became a philosophical concept. The first generation of authors who
thought about the emergence theory spoke alternately of emergence and of superven-
ience, and they did not differentiate much between the two.

»It is also frequently claimed that the term ›supervene‹ was first used in its contem-
porary philosophical sense by R. M. Hare, who used it to characterize a relationship be-
tween moral properties and natural properties. Unlike Morgan, Hare used the term in
essentially the current philosophical sense, but he claims that he was not the first to
do so. He claims that the term was so used in Oxford in the 1940s, though he does not
recall by whom, or in what context.«306

In present discussions, it is especially Donald Davidson, whom we have already cited

in another context, and Jaegwon Kim, who determine the route of this theory and
have coined the term supervenience. In his Mental events, Davidson (1970) writes:

»Mental characteristics are in some sense dependent, or supervenient, on physical char-

acteristics. Such supervenience might be taken to mean that there cannot be two events

304 Kim, J.: Supervenience. In: Guttenplan, S. (Ed.): A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind.
Oxford 102005, p. 578.
305 Cf. Kim, J.: Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays. Cambridge/New York
1993; Savellos, E. E. (Ed.): Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge 1995; Zoglauer, T.: Geist
und Gehirn. Das Leib-Seele-Problem in der aktuellen Diskussion. Göttingen 1998, pp. 214–
222; Kim, J.: Supervenience. In: Guttenplan, S. (Ed.): A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind.
Oxford 102005, pp. 575–583; Schumacher, R.: Die prinzipielle Unterbestimmtheit der Hirn-
forschung im Hinblick auf die Gestaltung schulischen Lernens. In: Sturma, D.: Philosophie und
Neurowissenschaften. Frankfurt a. M. 2006, pp. 167–186; Brüntrup, G.: Das Leib-Seele-Prob-
lem. Eine Einführung. Stuttgart 32008, pp. 74–82; Beckermann, A.: Analytische Einführung
in die Philosophie des Geistes. Berlin/New York 32008, pp. 203–269; Kutschera, F. von:
Philosophie des Geistes. Paderborn 2009, esp. pp. 140–146 and pp. 165–169; McLaughlin,
B./Bennett, K.: Supervenience. In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.
edu/entries/supervenience/ (retrieved 10. November 2010).
306 McLaughlin, B./Bennett, K.: Supervenience. In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/supervenience/ (retrieved 10. November 2010).
124       B. Monistic Concepts

alike in all physical respects but differing in some mental respect, or that an object can-
not alter in some physical respect.«307

Jaegwon Kim names three cornerstones that define the field of supervenience the-
ory: Covariance, dependence/determination, and non-reducibility. Covariance
means: »If two things are indiscernible in base properties, they must be indiscernible
in supervenient properties.«308 The second cornerstone in this triad is dependence/
determination: What is supervenient must be »determined« by the subvenient ba-
sis. Non-reducibility is to mean: »Property covariation and dependence involved in
supervenience can obtain even if supervenient properties are not reducible to their
base properties.«309
The word supervenience is to tell us something about the relationship between our
mental manifestations of life and our physical performance. It is not a relationship
between equals. This becomes apparent when we see that for supervenience theorists
the physical realm is ontologically fundamental. It is the ontological which shows the
way. It is the »subvenient basis« from which a direct connection leads to our mental
manifestations of life and which appear to originate in the subvenient base. This is
where we call it supervenire! There are, of course, several different ways and road
signs on this route, but the common path seems to be the presupposition that if there
is a change in the mental manifestations of life, there must also be one in the physical
arena. But the opposite does not apply. Thus, only when there is an alteration in the
physical processes can there also be a change in the mental manifestations of life. As
Kim points out: »No two things (organisms, events) could differ in mental respect
unless they differed in some physical respect – that is, indiscernibility with respect
to physical properties entails indiscernibility with respect to mental properties.«310
Supervenience theorists see this as a very promising way for something to occur on
the physical plane without any transformation in the mental manifestations of life.
When we consider the theory from the point of view of our mental manifestations
of life, supervenience theorists point to a clearly defined way which proclaims that
nothing happens on the level of the supervenient without a transformation on the
subvenient physical basis.311 »Any change in a mental property ›p‹ of a particular
event ›e‹ will be accompanied by a change in the physical properties of ›e‹.«312 Super-
venience theorists attach great importance to the understanding that mental mani-
festations of life can be brought about through totally disparate means.
Supervenience theorists are also of the opinion that we cannot agree with all phys-
icalists regarding the most appropriate road for physicalism. They themselves take
the path along which we hear again and again that mental manifestations of life
cannot be minimized and reduced to the mere physical. The subvenient basis cannot

307 Quoted by: Kim, J.: Supervenience. In: Guttenplan, S. (Ed.): A Companion to the Philosophy
of Mind. Oxford 102005, p. 576.
308 Ibid., p. 576.
309 Ibid., p. 576.
310 Ibid., p. 577.
311 Cf. Davidson, D.: Handlung und Ereignis. Frankfurt a. M. 1990, p. 301.
312 Davidson, D.: Thinking Causes. In: Heil, J./Mele, A. (Ed.): Mental Causation. Oxford 1993,
p. 7.
 9. Supervenience       125

even be interlaced by some principle of movement. Its roads are clearly separated
even though they are in contact with each other. When adherents of the superven-
ience theory write that the supervenient (trench) area may affect something causally,
they realize that on the road they advocate this is only possible if the subvenient
physical (trench) sector does not remain inactive.313 Here it is clear that the direction
of mental manifestations of life is completely pre-determined by physical processes.
As Kim writes: »The mental character of a thing is wholly determined by its physical
nature.«314 Supervenience theorists are less emphatic than emergentists that the oc-
curring circumstances are completely new and unexpected.315 This is understandable
if we remember the third coordinate: »determinism.« The physical basis itself is suf-
ficient that human beings have spiritual-mental manifestations of life.316 In the final
analysis, our mental manifestations of life are completely determined by the subveni-
ent physical base. Brüntrup tells us that »the physical determines everything that is
mental. The physical is all there is. The mental is after all only the physical.«317 The
term »non-reducibility« here refers to what Brüntrup points out, that in epistemic
consideration our mental manifestations of life cannot be ascribed to the physical
trench area. Ontologically this is very different. Here the claim is that there is noth-
ing but the physical. While adherents of the supervenience theory and emergentists
travel along similar paths, the direction taken by supervenience theorists can also
be reductive. This does not go down well with these authors whose ambition it is to
present a non-reductive physicalist alternative. We can only conclude as Kim does:
»Mind-Body-supervenience, therefore, does not state a solution to the mind-body
problem; rather it states the problem itself.«318

313 Jaegwon Kim sees as his main question how spiritual-mental entities can be accommodated
in a physicalist world (Kim, J.: Philosophie des Geistes. Vienna/New York 1998, p. 10). Is
there still space for these? In his opinion, what is mental can achieve something causally
in the realm of physicalism when a reduction of mental manifestations of life to physical
characteristics can be carried out. Kim is convinced that mental manifestations of life are
only in a position to bring about other mental manifestations of life when physical occur-
rences occur. When these conditions are met and mental manifestations of life are reduced
to physical realities, then mental manifestations of life can effect physical occurrences.
Cf. Kim, J.: Downward causation, emergentism and nonreductive physicalism. In: Becker-
mann, A./Flohr, H./Kim, J. (Ed.): Emergence or Reduction? Essays on the Prospects of nonre-
ductive Physicalism. Berlin/New York 1992, pp. 119–138.
314 Kim, J.: Supervenience. In: Guttenplan, S. (Ed.): A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind.
Oxford 102005, p. 575.
315 Cf. Brüntrup, G.: Das Leib-Seele-Problem. Eine Einführung. Stuttgart 32008, p. 77.
316 Cf. Lewis, D.: Die Reduktion des Geistes. In: Lewis, D.: Materialismus und Bewusstsein.
Frankfurt a. M. 2007, p. 15.
317 Brüntrup, G.: Das Leib-Seele-Problem. Eine Einführung. Stuttgart 32008, p. 82.
318 Kim, J.: Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays. Cambridge/New York 1993,
pp. 167 f.
126       B. Monistic Concepts

10. Eliminative materialism
»Dass man an so was [wie mentale Lebens­
äußerungen] nicht glauben kann,
daran glaubt er genauso fest
wie an den Backenzahn,
der ihm weh tut, und daran,
dass heute Donnerstag ist;
ja sogar, dass sein Ich sein Ich ist,
glaubt er inständig und daran,
dass Staub zu Staub wird.«319

This poem by Hans Magnus Enzensberger addresses what the followers of elimina-
tive materialism, also called eliminativism, believe: The existence of a soul and all
mental manifestations of life are vehemently denied. »I cannot believe in something
like that!« eliminativists say. They see their primary task in declaring that terms such
as »believe,« »mean,« »think,« i. e. expressions which refer to mental manifestations
of life, are a sinister linguistic confusion and should be eliminated as soon as possi-
ble. Eliminativists strongly believe this.
As a theory of the philosophy of mind, eliminativism made its appearance on the
stage of theories of philosophy of the mind in the middle of the previous century.
At that time, questions were common which dealt mostly with the meaning and
implications of the identity of mind and brain.320 Thus, as not to adopt the same
role as that claimed by the identity theory and not to share their departure from the
philosophical stage, eliminative materialism had to »develop this theory without any
recourse to existent terminology.«321
Adherents of the eliminative materialism theory showed much confidence in
brain research which enjoyed much success. It would not be long before it showed
that most suppositions about our mental manifestations of life proved to be outmod-
ed and simply wrong! The principle that there are thoughts, perceptions, opinions,
and desires could be eliminated once and for all. If we remember the physicalist
suggestions we have looked at so far, there was constant talk about reducing men-
tal manifestations of life. Here, now was a diligent search for the appropriate brain
structures. Eliminativists are looking for something else: »radical suggestions.«322
They want to eradicate, exterminate, eliminate! To them, mind, spiritual manifes-

319 Enzensberger, H. M.: Gedicht »Der Zweifler«. In: Enzensberger, H. M.: Rebus. Gedichte.
Frankfurt a. M. 2009, p. 42.
320 Cf. also Keil, G.: Kritik des Naturalismus. Berlin/New York 1993, p. 68.
Rorty thus speaks of identity theory’s »disappearance version« (Rorty, R.: Mind-Body Iden-
tity, Privacy and Categories. In: Rosenthal, D. M. (Ed.): Materialism and the Mind-Body
Problem. New Jersey 1971, pp. 174–199, here p. 176).
321 Feyerabend, P.: Mental Events and the Brain. In: Journal of Philosophy 60 (1963), p. 295 f.,
here p. 295.
322 Bennett, M. R./Hacker, P. M. S.: Philosophical Foundations Of Neuroscience. Malden/Oxford
10
2010, p. 366.
 10. Eliminative materialism       127

tations of life, do not exist. They make a radical choice for the corporeal side of the
Cartesian trench and claim that the other side does not exist:

»Like dualists, eliminative materialists insist that ordinary mental states can not in any
way be reduced to or identified with neurological events or processes. However, unlike
dualists, eliminativists claim there is nothing more to the mind than what occurs in the
brain. The reason mental states are irreducible is not because they are non-physical;
rather, it is because mental states, as described by common-sense psychology, do not
really exist.«323

We should not speak of mental manifestations of life as there is nothing but matter. In
order to secure this viewpoint, it is important to bring the laws of nature into play. As
far as I know, there is no natural law that has physical components itself. Something
has obviously gone very wrong here.324
According to eliminativists, we speak of mental manifestations of life (e. g. a
toothache or pain in the little toe, but also the conviction of what day of the week
it is today and our intentions for further plans) to explain what we are doing. And
it is precisely what they no longer regard as necessary. In comparison with other
thought models, they especially like to use the term »pre-scientific biases.« They
claim to know it all better, that their answers are far superior to others. In time, no-
tions about our mental manifestations of life can be eradicated in favor of physicalist
views, or more precisely, neuroscientific statements (eliminativists regard these two
as being the same).325 Gert Keil writes: »From an eliminative perspective what is
to be replaced cannot even be expressed in the language of the new theory. Their
supremacy can thus only be claimed by means of the inability to interpret accorded
the forerunner.«326 Eliminativists even go so far as to claim that ordinary everyday
suppositions do not have a shadow of meaning. Their slogan is »Eradicate! Extermi-
nate! Eliminate!« Eliminativists keep writing that just as witches used to be hunted,
now the soul and mental manifestations of life must be attacked. It took us quite a
while before we realized that there are no witches, they say. The same must be said
of the soul, the freedom of human beings and their mental manifestations of life.327
These terms should be hounded and chased like witches until some day there will

323 Ramsey, W.: Eliminative Materialism. In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/materialism-eliminative/ (retrieved 05. November 2010).
324 Cf. the chapter on freedom inPart 2 regarding the concept of natural law.
325 Cf. Zoglauer, T.: Geist und Gehirn. Das Leib-Seele-Problem in der aktuellen Diskussion. Göt-
tingen 1998, pp. 119–129; Quitterer, J.: Probleme einer ontologisch radikalen Theorienrevision
im Eliminativen Materialismus. In: Nida-Rümelin, J. (Ed.): Perspectives of Analytic Philoso­
phy. Berlin 1999, pp. 543–550; Goller, H.: Das Rätsel von Körper und Geist. Eine philoso­
phische Deutung. Darmstadt 2003, pp. 119–124; Beckermann, A.: Analytische Einführung
in die Philosophie des Geistes. Berlin/New York 32008, pp. 269–290; Bennett, M. R./Hacker,
P. M. S.: Philosophical Foundations Of Neuroscience. Malden/Oxford 102010, pp. 366–377.
326 Keil, G.: Kritik des Naturalismus. Berlin/New York 1993, p. 3.
327 Cf. Rorty, R.: Mind-Body Identity, Privacy and Categories. In: Rosenthal, D. M. (Ed.): Mate-
rialism and the Mind-Body Problem. New Jersey 1971, pp. 174–199.
128       B. Monistic Concepts

be an enlightenment and a realization that they do not exist at all. To initiate their
witch-hunt, eliminativists like to refer to brain research.328
In Part 2, I will try to clarify why that source of legitimization for an eliminativist
world view is of no use. Zoglauer points out that the proposed process of extermi-
nation by the self-appointed enlightenment philosophers must be understood in
an ontological, linguistic and explanatory sense.329 Their call for extermination and
elimination looks mainly like this:330 »What in the darkness of primeval times was
called ›x‹ is for those of us who are scientifically learned nothing but ›y‹!« Now mind
can replace ›x‹ and brain can replace ›y‹«
. Time-honored interpretations of meaning have become dusty and old-fash-
ioned. They are no longer needed. We should say that any talk of mind has finally
eliminated.331 The future belongs to brain interpreters. Rorty tells us in this context:
»What we have called sensations are nothing but brain processes.« and he continues:
»the elimination of the referential use of questionable expressions – [e. g., sensations,
pain, fears etc., M. K.] from our language would not lessen our ability to describe
and to predict.«332
Thus, all statements concerning mental manifestations of life we have made so
far can be dropped without any disadvantage.333 They are of no use to modern ed-
ucated people! If things turn out as eliminativists dream, soon we will no longer
believe that it is worthwhile to deal with the lived body-soul problem. Instead, only
cerebral structures will be active in a kind of »philosophically curious behavior«.
Eliminativists truly believe, to quote Enzensberger, that there is no belief, that there
are no convictions, no intentions. It is as Franz von Kutschera points out, »a hardly
believable prophecy«.334
Assuming that eliminative materialism is right, it would be inconsequential I had
thought of suitable examples before writing this chapter. Wherever we see reasons
and arguments, we would be completely on the wrong track. This would not only
apply to the present text, but also to the work of those who want to spread elimina-
tivism. Supposing eliminativists are right and there is no meaning, no sense, no truth

328 Here the limitations of scientific method are not being considered. I will discuss these in Part
2. What is at stake here is that the prerequisites for scientific work are forgotten. This too
will become clearer in Part 2 where the point of departure is that science finds its source in
the questioning by human beings.
329 Cf. Zoglauer, T.: Geist und Gehirn. Das Leib-Seele-Problem in der aktuellen Diskussion. Göt-
tingen 1998, p. 26.
330 Cf. Rorty, R.: Leib-Seele-Identität, Privatheit und Kategorien. In: Bieri, P. (Ed.): Analytische
Philosophie des Geistes. Weinheim/Basel 42007, pp. 93–120.
331 »Eliminative Materialism is thus a prognosis regarding future scientific developments and
changes which will occur in our language. At first glance, this seems implausible as it is
unlikely that we will lose our interest in psychological phenomena, and in contrast to the
concepts and theories of neurology and physics, those of psychology will be tailored to this
phenomenon.« (Kutschera, F. von: Jenseits des Materialismus. Paderborn 2003, p. 36).
332 Rorty, R.: Leib-Seele-Identität, Privatheit und Kategorien. In: Bieri, P. (Ed.): Analytische Phi-
losophie des Geistes. Weinheim/Basel 42007, p. 99.
333 Ibid., p. 104.
334 Kutschera, F. von: Jenseits des Materialismus. Paderborn 2003, p. 37.
 10. Eliminative materialism       129

content, and no intentionality, then what eliminativists themselves think, say and
proclaim in scientific journals and lectures would also be totally without meaning.
Even if mental manifestations of life cannot easily be reduced to brain structures,
we cannot simply theorize that mental manifestations of life do not exist. The exter-
mination of mental manifestations of life is definitely not a convincing suggestion
since after all we can experience them. Importantly there is an enormous difference
whether we explain something by means of physics or experience it ourselves. Im-
agine we are participating in a wine-tasting evening. Instead of a »fruity« Pinot gris
or an »earthy« red wine, we are offered something else. The vintner, an eliminativ-
ist who is obviously not very business-minded, is completely convinced that physi-
cal wine formulas are more than satisfactory for a wine tasting. After all, he argues
against the local vintners association, it is unimportant that the aroma of the wine
only unfolds slowly to provide us with pleasure. He tells us that we can participate in
the wine tasting session without actually smelling or tasting the wine. So he gives us a
wine menu with an impressive number of formulas: »In the olden days people tasted
the wine itself. But what in the prescientific age was called ›tipsy from wine-tasting‹
is now being replaced by physical formulas informing us what would happen to our
taste receptors if a real bottle of wine were to be opened! Those who agree with this
vintner that a list of wine formulas is enough may indeed call themselves eliminative
materialist, but those who think that it is not that easy and who realize that a physical
explanation clearly differs from a true experience, should first of all turn their backs
on eliminativist materialism and then book a holiday in the Kaiserstuhl wine region
and go to a real wine-tasting.
We could also turn this argument around. A very serious consequence of elimi-
nativism would be that every attempt at explaining social and society relationships
would no longer have any meaning, that they would only be worthless pseudo expla-
nations. Eliminativists hope that physical hope that soon physical justifications will
soon take over. Zahavi clearly illustrates the point:

»Of course, World War II, as a political, cultural, social, and economic phenomenon,
cannot be reduced to or explained by the principles of neurophysiology. Eliminativism,
however, arrives at the conclusion that the Second World War as a political, cultural,
social, and economic phenomenon did not really happen.«335

It is grotesque and contradictory wanting to eliminate all mental manifestations of

life. It is not a serious option.336 As Searle tells us, it becomes crazy when I say I had
never experienced thirst or desire, that I never felt pain, that I have no real convic-
tions or that my beliefs and desires play no role in my actions.337

335 Zahavi, D.: Phänomenologie für Einsteiger. Paderborn 2007, p. 30.

336 Bennett, M. R./Hacker, P. M. S.: Philosophical Foundations Of Neuroscience. Malden/Oxford
10
2010, p. 377.
337 Searle, J.: The Rediscovery of The Mind. Cambridge/London 1992, p. 48.
130       B. Monistic Concepts

11. Of computers and men: Functionalism

»Functionalism [...] holds that we are analo-
gous to computers, and that our
psychological states are simply our ›functional
states’, that is, they are the
states that would figure in an ideal descrip-
tion of our ›program‹.«338

In the philosophy of mind, functionalism is one of the most popular theories and
thus probably also one of the most influential. William G. Lycan even speaks of the
»reigning paradigm in philosophy of mind.«339 Functionalism appeared with the goal
to present better answers to the lived body-soul problem than identity theory was
capable of.340 Hilary Putnam, who was the first to suggest the attempt of an explana-
tion by functionalism, writes:

»On the functionalist view there is indeed an identity here, but [representatives of iden-
tity theory were M. K.] looking at the wrong sort of brain property to figure as the other
term in the identity. According to the functionalist, the brain has properties which are
in a sense not physical.«341

When Putnam speaks of the nonphysical properties of the brain, he means that prop-
erties are assumed which allow themselves to be perceived without a discussion of
the material structure of the brain. To illustrate this, Putnam refers to the model of
a computing machine:

»If it seems strange that a system which is physical should have properties which are
not physical, consider a computing machine. A computing machine has many physical
properties. It has a certain weight, for example; it has a certain number of circuit chips,
or whatever. It has economic properties, such as having a certain price; and it also has
functional properties, such as having a certain program. Now this last kind of property
is non-physical in the sense that it can be realized by a system quite apart from what its,
as it were, metaphysical or ontological composition might be. A disembodied spirit might
exhibit a certain program, a brain might exhibit a certain program, a machine might ex-
hibit a certain program and the functional organization of these three, the disembodied

338 Putnam, H.: Putnam. In: Guttenplan, S. (Ed.): A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind.
Oxford 102005, p. 507.
339 Lycan, W. G.: Functionalism. In: Guttenplan, S. (Ed.): A Companion to the Philosophy of
Mind. Oxford 102005, pp. 317–323, here p. 322.
340 Cf. Block, N.: Troubles with Functionalism. In: Block, N. (Ed.): Readings in the Philosophy of
Psychology. Cambridge 1980, pp. 268–305.
341 Putnam, H.: Reason, Truth And History. Cambridge 1998, p. 78.
In an encyclopedia article about himself Hilary Putnam outlines the genesis of functional-
ism: Putnam, H.: Putnam. In: Guttenplan, S. (Ed.): A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind.
Oxford 102005, pp. 507–513.
 11. Of computers and men: Functionalism       131

spirit, the brain, the machine, could be exactly the same even though their matter, their
stuff, is totally different.«342

This quote is very conclusive as it tells us what functionalism means. He explains

the theory with the following key terms from the last sentence in the above quote:
disembodied spirit, brain, machine, program, totally different stuff. This is followed by
a critique of functionalism.
Let me begin with the first two terms: disembodied spirit and brain. A standpoint
is functionalistic when it is based on the assumption that brain conditions become
mind conditions when they take over a certain type of function for the whole sys-
tem. In other words: Mental manifestations of life, according to the functionalists,
are functional conditions of our cerebrum. Today, functionalism appears in various
guises.343 Some varieties of functionalism expect a token identity between the physical
and the functional level, but most functionalist approaches assume that a difference
in type identity can be made between the functional and the physical levels. Simply
explained, it means that ontologically it implies that the functional level is not auton-
omous. According to Shoemaker, all functionalistic versions agree with the simple
intuition,

»that every mental state is a ›functional state‹, i. e. a state which is definable in terms
of its relations (primarily its causal relations) to sensory inputs, behavioral outputs, and
(especially) other functional states. A mental state is individuated, and constituted as
being the particular state it is, by its place in a complex causal network of states.«344

When functionalists say or write anything about the brain, they are mainly con-
cerned with its functional characteristics. While the supervenience theorists had
underlined that the same mental manifestation of life can be caused by two different
physical relationships, functionalists emphasize the thought that with regard to our
mental manifestations of life we can at best say something about the causal role,
which they attribute to the whole system. The brain – and this seems extremely fa-
miliar – can be characterized as a symbol processing machine. This explains in whose
footsteps the functionalists walk. There is much talk of input and output relation-

342 Putnam, H.: Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge 1981, pp. 78 f.
343 Thus e. g. G. Brüntrup differentiates between a »weak« and a »strongly reductive function-
alism.« The first is recognizable through a three-fold schema: Mental – functional – physi-
cal. This type of functionalism reduces the mental to the functional. An ontologically inde-
pendent functional level as Brüntrup understands it does not exist (Brüntrup, G.: Zur Kritik
des Funktionalismus. In: Köhler, W. R./Mutschler, H.-D. (Eds.): Ist der Geist berechenbar?
Philosophische Reflexionen. Darmstadt 2003, pp. 58–76).
Block, Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson as well as the study by Janet Levin give an overview
of the various versions of a funcionalistic interpretation in modern day philosophy. Block,
N.: What is Functionalism? In: Block, N. (Ed.): Readings in Philosophy of Psychology. Cam-
bridge 1980, pp. 171–184; Braddon-Mitchell, D./Jackson, F. (Eds.): The Philosophy of Mind
and Cognition. Oxford 1996; Levin, J.: Functionalism. In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philoso-
phy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/functionalism/ (retrieved 05. November 2010).
344 Shoemaker, S.: Personal Identity: A Materialist’s Account. In: Shoemaker, S./Swinburne, R.
(Eds.): Personal Identity. Oxford 1987, p. 92.
132       B. Monistic Concepts

ships.345 Some authors even go so far as to assume that it is enough to determine the
functional form of the cerebrum, then to feed it into a PC and in this way to artifi-
cially manufacture spiritual-mental manifestations of life. Disembodied spirit: We
can exist without a body if we want to survive in the world of the functionalists.346
The following example demonstrates what is meant by input and output relation-
ships that are important in functionalism. Let us look at the sentence: »Marcus is
firmly convinced that it is snowing.« A functionalist will interpret the sentence to say
that something is happening inside Marcus. It would also be clear to him that there is
this or that cause for it. Marcus may have done research on the Internet, and his need
not to feel cold when he leaves his comfortable warm study has the consequence of
handling a snow situation. He will put on a lined winter coat and a beret to have
something protecting him against the cold. Generally speaking, functionalists say
that mental manifestations of life are functional states. Janet Levine writes:

»Functionalism is the doctrine that what makes something a thought, desire, pain (or
any other type of mental state) depends not on its internal constitution, but solely on its
function, or the role it plays, in the cognitive system of which it is a part. More precisely,
functionalist theories take the identity of a mental state to be determined by its causal
relations to sensory stimulations, other mental states, and behavior.«347

Understandably, the word »function« appears often when functionalists talk about
the lived body-soul problem. This established several reference points: Advocates of
the functionalist doctrine mean the relationship with external stimuli, to external
behavior and other mental manifestations of life. We have seen above that authors
who support behaviorism are very interested in input and output data. Functionalists
are as well, yet in addition they also bring causal roles into play.348 In the language of
functionalists, the fact that Marcus dresses appropriately to meet the snowy weather
would be regarded as output. However, there is also an input: the Internet research
that led him to put on the coat and the beret. Let’s continue with this scenario and
imagine Marcus slipping on the frozen walk, hurting himself. A functionalist would
regard this pain as a functional occurrence.349 The ankle, sprained in the fall, would

345 »Functionalism says that mental states are constituted by their causal relations to each other
and to sensory inputs and behavioural outputs« (Block, N.: Functionalism. In: Guttenplan,
S. (Ed.): A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford 102005, pp. 323–332, here p. 323).
346 Cf. also: Dennett, D.: Sweet Dreams. Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness.
Cambridge/London 2006, p. 18.
347 Levin, J.: Functionalism. In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/functionalism/ (retrieved 05. November 2010).
348 »Like behaviorism, functionalism takes mental states out of the realm of the ›private‹ or
subjective, and gives them status as entities open to scientific investigation. But, in contrast
to behaviorism, functionalism’s characterization of mental states in terms of their roles in
the production of behavior grants them the causal efficacy that common sense takes them
to have« (Levin, J.: Functionalism. In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stan-
ford.edu/entries/functionalism/ (retrieved 05. November 2010).
349 Cf. also: Block, N.: Are absent Qualia Impossible? In: Philosophical Review 89 (1980),
pp. 257–274, Putnam, H.: Die Natur mentaler Zustände. In: Bieri, P. (Ed.): Analytische Phi-
losophie des Geistes. Weinheim/Basel 42007, pp. 127 f., 134.
 11. Of computers and men: Functionalism       133

be regarded as the input. We quickly learn that his complaining and perhaps even a
little tear in the corner of his eye would be the output. According to functionalists,
what is pain can be captured by this causal role. »We know what the experience of
pain is, when we know what external stimuli on the body and which internal pro-
cesses in the body have caused the pain, and what kind of behavior is triggered by
feeling pain.«350
The next two concepts of our guideline according to which functionalism can be
understood, are machine and program. Putnam writes:

»According to functionalism, the behavior of, say, a computing machine is not explained
by physics and chemistry of the computing machine. It is explained by the machine’s
program. [...] But that does not make the program a physical or chemical property of the
machine; it is an abstract property of the machine.«351

Somewhere else he writes: »Functionalism views us as automata.«352 Descartes as

well as La Mettrie already confronted us with the idea that man can be understood
as a machine. The technical modernization of the 20th century resulted in numerous
authors depicting the cerebrum as a computer. A specific mental-spiritual action is to
the »brain box« what a program is to the computer. In other words: Mental-spiritual
manifestations of life are nothing but the processes of a »computing machine.«353
The fact that in the 21st century, reference to calculators and computers is especially
meaningful to many authors is probably connected with the fact that in our part of
the world, most households have access to a computer, which has even arrived in the
bedrooms of many children. Computers are becoming ever better, faster and cheap-
er, and occupy a firm place in our daily lives. Why shouldn’t they possess mental
capabilities as well? Haugeland’s statement is very informative:

»This is not science fiction, but real science based on a theoretical conception as pro-
found as it is daring: We are basically computers ourselves. [...] In principle, thinking is
the same as what computers do.«354

350 Kutschera, F. von: Philosophie des Geistes. Paderborn. 2009, p. 148, cf. also: Beckermann,
A.: Analytische Einführung in die Philosophie des Geistes. Berlin/New York 32008, p. 142 and
Goller, H.: Das Rätsel von Körper und Geist. Eine philosophische Deutung. Darmstadt 2003,
pp. 126 f.
351 Putnam, H.: Mind, Language and Reality. Vol. 2. Cambridge 1975, p. xiii.
352 Putnam, H.: Putnam. In: Guttenplan, S. (Ed.): A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind.
Oxford 102005, p. 507.
353 Cf. also: Johnson-Laird, P.: Der Computer im Kopf. Formen und Verfahren der Erkenntnis.
Munich 1996; Johnson-Laird, P.: Mental Models, Towards a Cognitive Science of Language,
Inference and Consciousness. Cambridge 1983; Draaisma, D.: Die Metaphern-Maschine.
Darmstadt 1999; Lüer, G.: Simulationsmodelle für den menschlichen Geist: Kann man die
psychischen Tätigkeiten nachahmen? In: Elsner, N./Lüer, G. (Eds.): Das Gehirn und sein
Geist. Göttingen 2000, pp. 205–222; Sturma, D.: Ersetzbarkeit des Menschen? Robotik und
menschliche Lebensform. In: Jahrbuch für Wissenschaft und Ethik 9 (2004), pp. 141–162.
354 Haugeland, J.: Artificial Intelligence. The very idea. Cambridge 1985, p. 2. Quoted by: Fi­
scher, K.: Drei Grundirrtümer der Maschinentheorie des Bewusstseins. In: Köhler, W. R./
134       B. Monistic Concepts

What resonates in this claim is the idea that human mental-spiritual manifestations
of life can be calculated and described with the help of diverse programs.355 We can
do the same with computer processes, and in principle, they are said to be the same
as our mental manifestations of life.
The next key term in our guideline is: totally different stuff. Functionalism claims
that what is crucial for mental processes is not the physical features, but that a spe-
cific program can be played back. According to Putnam, this program is not to be
a »physical or chemical property« of the machine. Functionalism is totally uncon-
cerned with the question whether we are dealing with an organism at all. Comput-
ers or robots can exhibit mental manifestations of life if there is a corresponding
»abstract property of the machine«, i. e. if the corresponding functional links exist.
However, surprisingly, these theorists who put forward such theses overlook that
not a single component of a computer has even the slightest number of functions
comprising a living organism.
Gierer writes:

»On the one hand, the brain achieves decentralization. On the other hand, it integrates
in a different way than modern computers. In the nervous system, information is often
worked through in various sectors, and there is a selective linkage of processes that all
belong together. For example, seeing and hearing together with perception is coupled
with corresponding effects and (in human beings) especially with memories and ex-
pectations.«356

While a computer or a robot must be guided by a certain program, organisms de-

velop on their own. No computer has any development dynamics typical of all living
beings. The programs we use daily on our PCs are placed on our computers by pro-
fessionals. No computer is able to reproduce or create little computer programs to
become the future computer generation.
In the light of our key term, »completely different stuff,« Benjamin Libet devel-
oped an interesting logical argument. If we call the one computer System A, and a
human being System B, we will find that System A and System B are very different
regarding their material consistency. Now let us imagine there is a characteristic ›x‹,
which is found in both systems A and B. ›X‹ is thus the common denominator for
systems A and B. But according to Libet, this common denominator does not mean
by long shot that there has to be another characteristic, perhaps called ›y‹, that is
common to both. Libet sees the same logical error hidden in a similar claim, that
every nerve cell in our cerebrum can be replaced by a silicon chip and all functions

Mutschler, H.-D. (Eds.): Ist der Geist berechenbar? Philosophische Reflexionen. Darmstadt
2003, pp. 33–57, here p. 33.
355 Cf. Scheutz, M.: Zur Geschichte der Berechnungsthese. In: Köhler, W. R./Mutschler, H.-D.
(Eds.): Ist der Geist berechenbar? Philosophische Reflexionen. Darmstadt 2003, pp. 13–32,
esp. p. 22.
356 Gierer, A.: Im Spiegel der Natur erkennen wir uns selbst. Wissenschaft und Menschenbild.
Hamburg 1998, p. 99. Reference is also made to Wolfgang Lenzen: Lenzen, W.: Schatten
über den Geist – eine kritische Rezension der Bücher von Roger Penrose. In: Kognitionswis-
senschaft 6 (1997), pp. 35–46, esp. pp. 45 f.
 11. Of computers and men: Functionalism       135

ascribed to our brain can be substituted by an extremely powerful chip. In such a

scenario, if we could do this for the whole brain, he argues, we would have an instru-
ment which could perform functions which could not be differentiated from those
of the original cerebrum.357 What is being neglected here according to Libet is that
in the comparison between the original cerebrum and the powerful magical chip,
we are dealing with two entirely different systems. The giant chip has no relationship
to a lived body and to life itself. The brain, on the other hand, is structurally and
functionally different from systems consisting of silicon chips.358
With the last example, we have now reached the point at which we criticize func-
tionalism. John Searle, who considers the computer theory of the mind as physical-
ism’s »most sophisticated formulation«359, endorses the idea that not even the best
computer in the world is able to understand the meaning of its own program. Searle
points out that the computer does not understand how and why something happens.
It has no intentional talent. It has no awareness of symbols. While we can ask the
question for the meaning of everything, the computer cannot. Furthermore, the PC
is totally lost without its user who turns it on or off. Searle smugly asks functionalists
who the »computer user« would be if our brain were nothing but a PC.360
A staple in the philosophy of mind is the Chinese Room Argument developed by
Searle.361 The strategy of his argument is »to appeal to one’s first person experiences
in testing any theory of the mind.«362 Searle does not seem to comprehend how
we can transfer our relationship with computers and computer programs to us as
human beings. According to Searle, this is impossible as there are major differences
which cannot be argued away. The computer with which I have written this work
functions according to certain rules of syntax. It has this in common with all com-
puters in the world. My PC has no idea about the meaning of what I am typing while
you as my reader can understand it very well. We have an awareness of symbols. You
and I do not merely follow any specific rules: We can differentiate between sense and
nonsense and can interact with each other about significant matters. Let us now try
to follow Searle’s thought process. Imagine you are in a locked room, and this room

357 Cf. Libet, B.: Mind Time. The Temporal Factor in Consciousness. Cambridge/London 2004,
p. 213.
358 Cf. ibid., p. 213.
359 Searle, J.: Mind. A Brief Introduction. Oxford 2004, p. 49.
360 Cf. Searle, J.: Mind, Language And Society. New York 1999.
361 Cf. Searle, J.: The Rediscovery of The Mind. Cambridge/London 1992, p. 45, 200, 210; Searle,
J.: Geist, Gehirn, Programm. In: Zimmerli, W. C./Wolf, S. (Eds.): Künstliche Intelligenz. Phi-
losophische Probleme. Stuttgart 1994, pp. 232–265; Searle, J.: Mind. A Brief Introduction. Ox-
ford 2004, pp. 88–91.
Searle knows of about 100 objections in the English language alone against his thought pro-
cess. Cf. Searle, J.: Geist, Gehirn, Programm. In: Zimmerli, W. C./Wolf, S. (Eds.): Künstliche
Intelligenz. Philosophische Probleme. Stuttgart 1994, pp. 240 ff.
Cf. Brüntrup, G.: Das Leib-Seele-Problem. Eine Einführung. Stuttgart 32008, pp. 97 ff.;
Goller, H.: Das Rätsel von Körper und Geist. Eine philosophische Deutung. Darmstadt 2003,
pp. 131–133; Preston, J./Bishop, M. (Eds.): Views into the Chinese room: New essay on Searle
and artificial intelligence. Oxford 2002/Zoglauer, T.: Geist und Gehirn. Das Leib-Seele-Pro­
blem in der aktuellen Diskussion. Göttingen 1998, pp. 152–164.
362 Searle, J.: Mind. A Brief Introduction. Oxford 2004, p. 90.
136       B. Monistic Concepts

is not completely empty. There are a few baskets filled to the brim with Chinese let-
ters. Now imagine you cannot even say »duck, sweet and sour« in Chinese, but you
have with you a book of rules written in your mother tongue. It is supposed to guide
you in knowing what to do with all those Chinese characters. Naturally do not know
what these letters are and what meaning they have because you did not take a crash
course in Chinese. Now you see a small mail slot through which other Chinese sym-
bols are being pushed. What do they mean? What should you do? You don’t know
but you file through your book of rules to learn what to do in this situation, i. e. what
to do with those many letters, which should you return through the letterbox! Of
course you don’t know that the people who have handed you the letters in the Chi-
nese Room understand them as »questions« and believe that the sorted and returned
letters are your »answers.« You work with amazing speed and accuracy. Searle says
you are acting like a computer: i. e. that like a computer you know you are incapable
of intellectually understanding what you are doing as the letters pass through your
hands. His suggestion is that a computer does everything, tenaciously acting accord-
ing to fixed rules. It works. Let us imagine that after a certain time you are able to
work quite well with the Chinese symbols in the baskets in your room. As you gain
practice, you reach for the correct containers and return the correct symbols. But,
so says Searle, you still do not understand Chinese. You do not even know what the
symbols represent. Let us quickly think back: Descartes argued in a similar fashion
when he wondered whether the person opposite him in the street café was a real
person or an automaton, or rather wondered how to draw the line between an animal
and a human being. Nevertheless, Searle is not a dualist. I will deal with this more
in Part 2. Let us return to the Chinese Room. You are working quickly and precisely
with the Chinese characters, but the meaning of the whole book remains a mystery
to you. It is the same with your computer. You have gathered together the characters
from the baskets with amazing speed, but you have no idea that the characters have
meaning. In the ideal case, the computer does what you want. To achieve this, your
computer (just like you in the Chinese Room) consults a book of rules. You do not
need much imagination to think what might happen if you had to answer the ques-
tions in English. Where would happen if there were changes? On the outside, no one
would notice that anything is different than before since you do you job quickly and
accurately. You can be depended upon! And yet there is a major difference. You do
not understand a single word of Chinese (no matter how many questions you are be-
ing asked in Chinese). However, when questions are handed to you in English, your
mother tongue, you comprehend what passes through your hands. You know what
is involved. According to Searle, it is totally out of place to equate mental manifes-
tations of life with any computer program – not even with the best in the world – as
computer programs function in syntax, and this is not the same as insight into sense
and meaning.363 We can also say it this way: You and I can comprehend sense and
nonsense, can differentiate and name them. Our PC cannot do any of that.
Functionalism can be criticized that it does not consider all the issues which make
up our living experience. Putnam should at least be commended in that he found this

363 Cf. Searle, J.: The Mystery of Consciousness. New York 1997, pp. 11 f.
 11. Of computers and men: Functionalism       137

flaw in the doctrine of functionalism: »The theory has difficulty with the qualitative
character of sensations.«364 In contrast to a behaviorist, a functionalist has difficulty
in finding an explanation when a person is not in pain after suffering a bad accident.
He could relate this to mental manifestations of life such as the will to remain »cool«
in this situation. He could, however, not comprehend the dimension of the pain
experience. This deficit is so grave that we should not look to functionalism for a
profitable suggestion or solution regarding the lived body-soul problem.
Authors who argue in a similar vain point to Thomas Nagel’s now well-known es-
say, What is it like to be a bat?365 I do not want to deprive you of the following excerpt:

»If physicalism is to be defended, the phenomenological features must themselves be

given a physical account. But when we examine their subjective character it seems that
such a result is impossible. The reason is that every subjective phenomenon is essen-
tially connected with a single point of view, and it seems inevitable that an objective,
physical theory will abandon that point of view.«366

Using a bat as an example, Nagel brings this ideas to a head: We are to assume with
Nagel that we will somehow feel like being this organism. And in a very special
way, the bat will experience what it is like to depend on echolocation. According to
Kathleen Akins,367 it is definitely possible for us to know what it is like to be a bat.
Imaginatively, she gives us the following example: For the blind, the white cane is an
orientation aid. Obstacles and uneven ground can be recognized more easily. Akins
wants to give a person two such white canes. It is useful to beat these two sticks
against each other. As can be imagined, there will be a noise and it is easier with the
help of this noise to find the way in a space with one or two obstacles. Akins calls
this a fitting analogy to Nagel’s portrayal of a bat. But is that really correct? Unfor-
tunately not. Nagel is not concerned with re-enacting what Microchiroptera, i. e.
bats, do night after night, or what it would be like for us to be a kind of »batman« or
»batwoman.« Nagel is interested in finding out what it is like for the small bat to be a
bat, and that is something very different. We cannot approach this by noisily banging
white canes against each other.368 But let us nevertheless imagine we knew all the
physical matters concerning bats, starting from the nature of the flying membrane on
their wings, to the vibrisses (i. e. the small sensing hairs), and the tragus (eminence

364 Putnam, H.: Reason, Truth And History. Cambridge 1998, p. 79.
365 Cf. Nagel, T.: What is it like to be a bat? In: Nagel, T.: Mortal questions. Cambridge 1979,
pp. 165–180.
366 Cf. ibid., p. 167.
367 Cf. Akins, K.: What’s it like to be Boring and Myopic? In: Dahlbohm, B. (Ed.): Dennett and
his critics. Oxford (et al.) 1993, pp. 124–160.
368 »It will not help to try to imagine that one has webbing on one’s arms, which enables one to
fly around at dusk and dawn catching insects in one’s mouth; that one has very poor vision,
and perceives the surrounding world by a system of reflected high-frequency sound signals;
and that one spends the day hanging upside down by one’s feet in an attic. Insofar as I can
imagine this (which is not very far), it tells me only what it would be like for me to behave
as a bat behaves. But that is not the question. I want to know what it is like for a bat to be a
bat.« (Nagel, T.: What is it like to be a bat? In: Nagel, T.: Mortal questions. Cambridge 1979,
pp. 165–180, here p. 169).
138       B. Monistic Concepts

of the ear) which serves to optimize echolocation, and finally, to the structure of a
bat brain. Do all these facts give us the information we need to know what it is like
to be a microchiroptera, a bat? According to Nagel, they are by far not enough! They
are missing something very essential: the lively experience in which the small ani-
mal participates. It is precisely what we with all our ambitious physical and factual
knowledge, and with our valuable neurobiological insights, are unable to capture. It
is a weak point of functionalism that it is unable to do enough justice to the living
experience.369
In conclusion, we can learn what the character of Daniel 25.5 says in Michel
Houellebecq’s science fiction novel, The Possibility of an Island: His perception is of
the human brain as a computer and the mind as a program

»with flexible networks, which should prove to be absolutely useless. In the human
mind, there are after all no algorithmic processes of non-verifiable sentences which can
nevertheless be clearly recognized as being true: similar to the existence suggested by
Gödel in the 1930s.«370

Critique and outlook

»To know and note the living, you’ll find it

Best to first dispense with the spirit:
Then with the pieces in your hand,
Ah! You’ve only lost the spiritual bond.«371

In this present chapter, we have read and tested representative materialistic ideas
from La Mettrie’s machine thinking all the way to 21st century computer func-
tionalism. We have seen that for physicalists there are various ways of dealing with
spiritual-mental manifestations of life. One strategy was to assume that the propo-
nents have lost their connection with the present, and that scientific progress will
therefore be necessary to convert the eternally backward and to eradicate all men-
tal manifestations of life. But there are other methods. Another physicalist interest
group claims that when the ontological sub-question regarding the lived body-soul
problem is posed, we can only reply that there is nothing but the physical. However,
this is not a refusal to understand mental manifestations of life as irreducible. What
we call mental manifestations of life cannot be ignored, argued away, or eradicated.
This group therefore calls itself the non-reductive physicalists. Certain proponents
of reductive physicalism would acknowledge that it is at least not wrong to speak
of mental manifestations of life. They would, however, point out that these can be
traced back to physical entities without any disadvantages worth mentioning. The

369 F. Jackson’s argument already referred to in the discussion of identity theory could also be
used against functionalism.
370 Houellebecq, M.: Die Möglichkeit einer Insel. Cologne 2005, p. 221.
371 Goethe, J. W.: Faust I, Verse 1936–1939. Engl. Transl.: http://www.iowagrandmaster.org/
Books%20in%20pdf/Faust.pdf
 11. Of computers and men: Functionalism       139

motto is: eliminate, reduce, or simply pretend not to reduce. The common denom-
inator in all these different approaches is wanting to find necessary and sufficient
physical prerequisites for mental manifestations of life.
Arguments for and against physicalism were discussed in this chapter. In this
way, it became clear that physicalist suggestions pertaining to the lived body-soul
problem neglect some important dimensions of our being alive. Think for example
of our intentional talent or even of our living experience which belongs to us as lived
body-soul organisms, to which I drew attention with some pretty thought experi-
ments. The physicalist project cannot be the right answer to the questions posed.
Physicalism is very much in fashion right now, but it not only fails to listen to im-
portant arguments, it also overlooks numerous phenomena. Questions about God,
of values, and goals are beyond the horizon of physicalists.
The thoughts presented here contradicting physicalist explanation attempts
show that it does not lead anywhere to assume necessary and sufficiently physical
prerequi­sites which – come what may – lead to mental manifestations of life. Dual-
ism was no more helpful in that the necessary physical foundations for our mental
manifestations of life were unable to incorporate our mental manifestations of life,
and placed a deep trench between physical processes and mental manifestations of
life. Neither dualism nor physicalism have a convincing answer to the questions we
posed at the beginning. There were other suggestions that also failed to really sat-
isfy. Let us remember briefly: Berkeley’s mental monism reduces human beings to
pure creatures of the mind and forgets everything that constitutes our corporeality.
Spinoza’s suggestions were unable either to answer questions about our freedom, or
to do justice to the fact that mental manifestations of life can be observed in living
organisms. It all proves that it is appropriate to keep looking for a counterproposal.
C. Hylemorphism

»A philosophical investigation does not aim to

save or apologize for a text.
On the contrary: it intends to better under-
stand nature and human beings.«1

12. Aristotle and hylemorphism

»Neither Aristotle’s questions nor his argu-
ments are so closely connected with the con-
cepts of the Greek world that they cannot be
appropriated in other cultural epochs.«2

A much-cited explanation about the nature of the lived body-soul problem comes
from Peter Bieri who is known to many non-philosophers, mainly for his impres-
sive novels which he writes under the pseudonym of Pascal Mercier. With razor
sharpness, Bieri differentiates between metabolic processes and action potentials in
the cerebrum on the one hand and mental manifestations of life such as opinions,
plans, difficult thinking exercises or perceptions on the other hand.3 According to
Bieri, we could compile a list of physical phenomena on one side and mental phe-
nomena on the other.4 Bieri says: »Every phenomenon is either mental or physical,
and there is no mental phenomenon that can ever become physical or the other
way around.«5 In his opinion, this very radical differentiation between physical
functions and mental manifestations of life is altogether »innocuous« and »not par-
ticularly problematic.«6 Bieri describes what it means to him: »The meaning of

1 Höffe, O.: Aristoteles. Munich 21999, p. 304.

For this chapter cf.: Knaup, M.: Jenseits von Physikalismus und Dualismus! Der Hylemor-
phismus als wirkliche Alternative in einem aktuellen Streit. In: Knaup, M./Müller, T./Spät, P.
(Eds.): Post-Physikalismus. Freiburg/Munich 2011, pp. 189–215.
2 Höffe, O.: Aristoteles: Ethik und Politik. In: Buchheim, T./Flashar, H./King, R. (Eds.): Kann
man heute noch etwas anfangen mit Aristoteles? Darmstadt 2003, p. 125.
3 Cf. Bieri, P.: Generelle Einführung. In: Bieri, P.: Analytische Philosophie des Geistes. Wein-
heim/Basel 42007, p. 2.
4 Cf. ibid., p. 2.
5 Ibid., p. 3.
6 Ibid., p. 2.
142       C. Hylemorphism

›mental‹ is to regard it in contrast to ›physical‹.«7 »Contrast« is the important key

term. To illustrate this, he suggests to compare the difference with light and dark or
loud and quiet.8 When we go through life with open eyes, we can see for ourselves
that there is not only »bright daylight«, but also the »dark of the night«. It is similar
in the world of sound. Opera lovers and those of us who like to sing (though perhaps
only in the shower) know that there are not only fortissimo and pianissimo, but also
the soothing gradation of pianoforte.
Bieri insists there is a deep divide between mental manifestations of life and phys-
ical processes. We can also say he accepts the Cartesian legacy. The defining question
is what how we want to position ourselves regarding this divide. Do we wish to
maintain the divide and decide to adopt a dualist position, or do we wish to place
ourselves on one side of the divide, claiming that we can level it, and that this side
is sufficient to explore everything else? Do we thus want to commit ourselves to
physicalism?9
What about a position that regards clinging to such trench warfare as lazy and
not particularly true to life? As a concept where the key term »contrast« is no longer
important since the unified whole of the living organism is what counts? Surely you,
too, have known situations where you started to dance with enthusiasm (when your
favorite sports team won) and broke out in a song of jubilation. We cannot just clas-
sify such manifestations of life bureaucratically as either »purely physical« or »purely
mental.« They are not just connected with something inside you, but quite concretely
with you as a living whole. It is precisely this whole that must be considered and
can most adequately be expressed by means of Aristotelian hylemorphism, which is
neither dualist nor physicalist.

12.1 In search of a soothing midrange in the concert of physical-

ists and dualists

Aristoteles will nicht »der Ideen Schau [...]

betreiben;
er will die Welt der Wirklichkeit beschreiben:
wie alles aus der bloßen Möglichkeit
zur Wirklichkeit gelangt und sich befreit,
wie Steine, Pflanze, Tier, bis zum Gestirn,
dazwischen noch das menschliche Gehirn,
in einer ungeheuren Weltbewegung
sich fortentwickeln in gewalt’ger Regung.«10

Our discussions on dualism and physicalism have shown that these positions are un-
tenable at close look. Of course, a welcome change in the dualist approaches was that

7 Ibid., p. 3.
8 Cf. ibid., p. 3.
9 Cf. ibid., p. 5.
10 Weischedel, W.: Auch eine Philosophiegeschichte. Darmstadt 1975, pp. 14 f.
 12. Aristotle and hylemorphism       143

they were not fit to eliminate or reduce mental manifestations of life. Let us brief-
ly remember: It is apparently typical for a dualist approach to the lived body-soul
problem to draw a well-guarded border line between physical functions and mental
manifestations of life. The two sides of the great divide are to remain independent of
each other, to create an »exclusive contrast«. In other words (and that idea occurred
to me when reading Michael-Thomas Liske)11: A dualist would not admit that our
mental manifestations of life have necessary and sufficient physical preconditions.
That is known to be different in the physicalist camp. There we hear voices telling
us that our mental life can be reduced, for example to the level of brain physiology,
and that it is the inevitable result of sufficient physical prerequisites. The last chapter
has shown that this is not a convincing approach, and certainly not one that leads us
further in our search to assume there are sufficient physical conditions for all mental
manifestations of life. The dialogue with dualism ha shown that it is not a convincing
approach to ignore the necessary physical basis for our mental manifestations of
life. For that reason, it is important to look for an alternative (»to start looking for a
credible middle path.«12
What does our counterproposal (»the middle path«) have to remember? What
demands do we make with such a position? Not to be end up in dualist straits, it must
acknowledge the necessary physical preconditions for our mental manifestations of
life. Physicalist theories can be circumnavigated if such a theory is not satisfied that
there are sufficient physical grounds from which – come what may – mental mani-
festations of life can result.13 Between the Scylla and Charybdis of physicalism and
dualism, new ways of thinking must be developed.

11 Liske, M.-T.: Lässt sich eine aristotelische Zwischenposition zwischen Dualismus und
Physikalismus konzipieren? In: Niederbacher, B./Runggaldier, E. (Eds.): Die menschliche
Seele. Brauchen wir den Dualismus? Frankfurt/Paris/Ebikon/Lancaster/New Brunswick
2006, p. 199.
12 Burnyeat, M. F.: Is An Aristotelian Philosophy Of Mind Still Credible? A Draft. In: Nussbaum,
M. C./Oksenberg Rorty, A. (Eds.): Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima. Oxford 1992, p. 16.
13 Regarding the concept of Aristotle’s alternative position: Liske, M.-T.: Lässt sich eine aristo­
telische Zwischenposition zwischen Dualismus und Physikalismus konzipieren? In: Nieder­
bacher, B./Runggaldier, E. (Eds.): Die menschliche Seele. Brauchen wir den Dualismus?
Frankfurt/Paris/Ebikon/Lancaster/New Brunswick 2006, pp. 197–220; Liske, M.-T.: Aristo-
teles’ Philosophie des Geistes: Weder Materialismus noch Dualismus. In: Meixner, U./Newen,
A. (Eds.): Seele, Denken, Bewusstsein. Zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Geistes. Berlin/
New York 2003, pp. 20–56; Runggaldier, E.: The Aristotelian Alternative to Functionalism
and Dualism. In: Niederbacher, B./Runggaldier, E. (Eds.): Die menschliche Seele. Brauchen
wir den Dualismus? Frankfurt/Paris/Ebikon/Lancaster/New Brunswick 2006, pp. 221–248
and Sorabji, R.: Body and Soul in Aristotle. In: Durrant, M. (Ed.): Aristotle’s De Anima in
focus. London/New York 1993, pp. 162–196.
With regard to Aristotle’s concept of the soul cf. also: Bennett, M. R./Hacker, P. M. S.: Phil-
osophical Foundations Of Neuroscience. Malden/Oxford 102010, pp. 11–19; Nussbaum,
M. C./Oksenberg Rorty, A. (Eds.): Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima. Oxford 1992; Durrant,
M. (Ed.): Aristotle’s De Anima in focus. London/New York 1993 and Picht, G.: Aristoteles’
»De Anima«. Stuttgart 1987.
With regard to the almost inexhaustible research regarding Aristotle’s biography, I refer
specifically to the following authors: Chroust, A. H.: Aristotle – New Light in His Life and on
Some of His Lost Works. Vol. 1. London 1973; Barnes, J.: Aristoteles. Eine Einführung. Stutt-
144       C. Hylemorphism

12.2 
De Anima: What Aristotle has to say about lived body and
soul

»And so Aristotle claims the world

Is a single dynamic process.
Its entelechy is constantly manifested
Through the original genius of nature.«14

»To attain any sure belief on the subject is hedged with difficulties on every side.«15
Aristotle already made no secret about it. To speak of the »soul« is often enough
ridiculed by scientists, psychologists, theologians and philosophers. There are philo­
sophical reference books which have no entry for the terms »soul« and »spirit.«16
Even many standard introductions to psychology dispense do without the term of
soul. Francis Crick even regards any mention of the human soul as an »aggressive
faith«17 and in the final analysis as »unnecessary.«18 As far as he is concerned, the
»fairy tales of the past«19 are obsolete. We will learn more about his neuroscientific
works in Part 2. For now, it is enough to know that he regards the term soul is a big
mistake, an »illusion.«
According to Aristotle, dealing with the term »soul« is anything but irrelevant. In
his opinion, it is no less than one of most worthy objects of knowledge (epistêmê).
When Aristotle talks of the »soul,« he means nothing mysterious, dark or inexpli-
cable. He does not target what we would find in a modern bookstore under the
category of »Alternative Lifestyle/Esoteric/Transcendental.« He is most definitely
not concerned with a »ghost in a body machine« or something we could capture
in neuronal networks. Aristotle is concerned with the aliveness of the organism. He
means nothing trivial: »The study of Aristotle’s conception of the soul [...] helps us
to identify more clearly some of our preconceptions concerning both the mental and
the physical.«20
Aristotle is concerned with more than entrenched definitions and linguistic sub-
tleties. He observes. And he wants to describe what he examines. »In the course of
his exploration, he continually points to unresolved difficulties. He continually ques-
tions his own methodology; he nowhere makes the claim to having attained a final
and invincible final result.«21 His understanding of how science functions, and how
nature can be explored definitely varies from how natural scientists work today. By

gart 1992; Pieper, A.: Aristoteles. Munich 1995; Höffe, O.: Aristoteles. Munich 21999; Rapp,
C.: Aristoteles zur Einführung. Hamburg 2001.
14 Weischedel, W.: Auch eine Philosophiegeschichte. Darmstadt 1975, p. 15.
15 An. I 1, 402a.
16 Cf. Klaus, G./Buhr, M.: Philosophisches Wörterbuch. Leipzig 1966.
17 Cf. Crick, F.: The Astonishing Hypothesis. The Scientific Search For The Soul. Glasgow 1994,
p. 4.
18 Ibid., p. 321.
19 Ibid., p. 319.
20 Frede, M.: On Aristotle’s Conception Of The Soul. In: Nussbaum, M. C./Oksenberg Rorty, A.
(Eds.): Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima. Oxford 1992, p. 93.
21 Picht, G.: Aristoteles’ »De Anima«. Stuttgart 1987, p. 192.
 12. Aristotle and hylemorphism       145

that I do not mean that he naturally had no access to the technology, machinery, and
high-powered computers available today. No, I mean something else. For Aristotle, it
was quite natural not simply to disregard the qualitative dimensions of reality, but to
take them seriously. In the previous chapter, we have seen how problematic it is to re-
gard qualitative realities of our aliveness as being unimportant or to categorize them
as nothing but physical entities. Aristotle is concerned with the issues themselves.
He tells philosophers to look very closely if they want to contribute anything to the
nature of things. He notes that the spiritual is never without any physical functions.
Aristotle would probably agree neither with Berkeley nor with Descartes. But there
is more. He believes that the spiritual can be expressed in material processes. This,
again, differentiates him from Spinoza, Cartesius and the physicalist approaches. In
the 20th century, the phenomenological movement has picked up on these important
ideas and pointed out that the spiritual manifests itself in the lived body, that the
lived body is the medium of expression. I will relate to this in Part 2, in the chapter
called Rediscovering the lived body. When I talk about myself or meet other people,
I assume that I am dealing with a lived body-soul unit and not with a physicalizable
biomass or a coalition of substances C (cerebrum) and B (body), even though we
might even be able to assign a location for soul-substance in the cerebrum. It is this
unity that concerns both Aristotle and hylemorphism.
Aristotle dedicated a whole book to the topic of the soul. It is called Peri psychês in
Greek, De Anima in Latin and On the soul in English. Many educated people have al-
ready commented on this book: in antiquity Theophrast, Alexander of Aphrodisias,
Themistius, Simplicius and Philoponus, just to name a few. Thomas of Aquinas pre-
sented a truly marvelous commentary: »From this time on, Aristotle’s de Anima was
continually discussed within the philosophical traditions of Europe. Meanwhile, in
the Arab world, the treatise was also available, and was the subject of much dis-
cussion [...].«22 In the light of this wealth of reception history, it should perhaps be
pointed out that Aristotle’s works are not texts we should worship in humility. If we
did that, he would be unable to communicate with us who live today, and what he
said would not reach us. Georg Picht pointed out: »Only when we are capable of
discovering and identifying Aristotle in ourselves, i. e. in those concepts and images
that define our behavior, do we understand what the texts are telling us.«23
In De Anima, Aristotle undertakes to deal with what it means to be alive. He
asks, for instance, what the principles are for that. Can we give reasons? He wants

22 Nussbaum, M. C.: Introduction. In: Nussbaum, M. C./Oksenberg Rorty, A. (Eds.): Essays on

Aristotle’s De Anima. Oxford 1992, p. 4.
Often in the Middle Ages Christian philosophers did not use his name. They spoke only
of »the Philosopher« and celebrated him as »praecursor Christi in naturalibus.« Yet Abû
l-Walîd ibn Ruschd (Averroes, died 1198) is convinced that Koran literature encourages
one to engage in studying philosophy (cf. e. g. Sura 59 Verse 2, Sura 7 Verse 185, Sura 16
Verse 125) and Aristotle could help one to think fruitfully about the relationship between
reason and revelation. He is the author of several commentaries on Aristotle. (cf. Rudolph,
U.: Islamische Philosophie. Von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart. Munich 2004, pp. 70–76;
Gätje, H.: Studien zur Überlieferung der aristotelischen Psychologie im Islam. Heidelberg
1971, pp. 63–68).
23 Picht, G.: Aristoteles’ »De Anima«. Stuttgart 1987, p. 31.
146       C. Hylemorphism

to account for these principles and reasons. Höffe writes that In De Anima there is a
»metaphysics of what is alive,«24 since it is here that the philosophical foundations
of the entire biological science are explored. Aristotle’s major concern about ques-
tions relating to humans is how we live in a living environment and interact with it.
Humans are not merely facing this living environment to quantify and control it, but
they are integrated into the chain of living beings. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty gets to
the heart of the matter:

»The scope of De Anima is much broader than that of either contemporary philosophy
of mind or contemporary philosophical psychology. It is a metaphysical inquiry into the
ontology of psuchē and of nous; it is philosophical psychology, a general analysis of the
activities of psuchē, it is philosophical bio-psychology, an investigation of the teleologi-
cally organized functions that are common to living bodies.«25

At the beginning of the first book of De Anima, Aristotle addresses two extreme
positions to which then as now much attention was paid. There is, first of all, the
school of thought which scrutinizes the soul and the mental life of humans without
a glance at the lived body. On the other hand, there is the position which no longer
cares to speak about the soul and assumes that there are sufficient physical prere­
quisites for our mental manifestations of life.26 It is enlightening what Aristotle says
about anger in An. I 1, 403a30. He envisages that the physikos, or what we may now
call the natural scientist, enquires and researches what can be discovered about the
physical. This is, after all, part of the scientist’s line of work. We do not actually have
to mention that this is very important and none of us would want to do without it.
However, by far such an approach does not tell us everything about anger. Nothing
is said so far about why someone is angry, and how such a phenomenon finds ex-
pression. Nothing is said about the living network of relationships between humans,
about insults or contempt. In this respect, as Aristotle did, as Aristotle notes, we can
also understand anger »as the appetite of returning pain for pain.« We should not
disregard this view and take it seriously as well.
Aristotle critically looks at various suggestions made respecting the lived body-
soul problem. He does not think much of answers that isolate the soul from the body,
regarding them as a harmony or as purely corporeal. This is out of the question for
him. He also cannot regard the soul as a numerical ratio or as a number that moves
itself. Aristotle cannot comprehend such ideas and feels that it is »absurd« that there
are thinkers who have clever thoughts about the human soul and about mental man-
ifestations of life while »trying to explain what is the nature of the soul, without [...]
adding further details.«27 When Aristotle talks about the soul, he can do so only
when only he also talks about the animate lived body. For him, the lived body and

24 Höffe, O.: Aristoteles. Munich 21999, p. 141.

25 Oksenberg Rorty, A.: De Anima: Its Agenda And Its Recent Interpreters. In: Nussbaum,
M. C./Oksenberg Rorty, A. (Eds.): Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima. Oxford 1992, p. 7.
26 An. I 1, 403a27-b19.
27 An. I 3, 407b.
 12. Aristotle and hylemorphism       147

the soul belong together. He shakes his head about people who think that the lived
body is only a prison for the soul.
Two terms are important to Aristotle in illustrating that the various manifesta-
tions of life belong to living organisms, to a lived body-soul unity: form and matter.
His perception is called hylemorphism. This refers to a position assuming that phys-
ical processes (hylê = matter), and the form-giving powers of the soul (morphê =
form) belong together and complement each other. When Aristotle says »matter,« he
means what underlies everything. He characterizes it as having the capability of be-
coming this and that (dynamis). Form refers to what structures, organizes, pervades
and shapes matter. The hylemorphistic understanding is that forma ensures that
what is already given is realized. Aristotle characterizes forma as being the actuality
and the reality of what is. And what about matter? He answers that matter is what
is possible. It also means that what is possible is open to composition, structuring,
pervasion: »Matter is or actuality [entelechy].«28 Against this background, matter
and form cannot be torn asunder in all beings with whom we have contact every
day.29 We cannot dig a trench to position matter on one side and form on the other.
What can we say about form? Aristotle says that form pervades matter. We can
also say that form organizes matter. Where we find matter, we will also find forming
power. Matter and forming power cannot be separated from each other. Aristotle is
especially concerned to stress that forma is what turns matter into what it is, in our
case into a living human organism. Every living being (whether dog, cat, mouse, or
human) is assigned a body, or rather a lived body (sôma) as its matter, as well as a
form. It is essential to know that Aristotle understands soul as the form of the lived
body.30 »So, the phrase ›to have a soul‹ does not signify a relation of possession be-
tween an agent and an entity, as does ›to have a car‹. Furthermore, the soul does not
stand to the body as the brain does, for it is not a part of the body.«31 We should not
understand form in the sense of a cake mold which, as every child knows, exists even
when no delicious cake is being baked. Furthermore, we can measure the form that
way. Yet this is precisely not what the Aristotelian concept applies. Aristotle tells us
that »form is not something that exists in and of itself, and then secondarily partic-
ipates in some way of other. Instead the form is the principal moment within being.
Form does not approach natural things from the outside, so to speak extraneously.
Instead, form is what determines the reality of natural things.«32 Matter is more
than extension, more than res extensa. It is always pervaded by a forming principle
and by being pervaded it is what it is. It is not easy to communicate what Aristotle is
saying in today’s use of language. It is, interesting, however, is that in some biological
publications we find the term »organized« matter. Therefore, one suggestion could
be to interpret what Aristotle meant as »organization« or even as »information.« This

28 An. II 1, 412a.
29 Refer to these basic concepts in Aristotelian philosophy in Books VII–IX of the Metaphys-
ics.
30 An. II 1, 412a.
31 Bennett, M. R./Hacker, P. M. S.: Philosophical Foundations Of Neuroscience. Malden/Oxford
10
2010, p. 14.
32 Jacobi, K.: Aristoteles. In: Hoerster, N. (Ed.): Klassiker des philosophischen Denkens. Vol. 1.
Munich 31985, pp. 78 f.
148       C. Hylemorphism

is indeed obvious to call it that, and yet we must be cautious not to simply confuse
the human soul with our genetic sequences. If we did that, we would have incurred
the problem that the soul would be material and an adequate requirement for our
mental manifestations of life.
When Aristotle speaks of the soul he means what makes a living being (such as
you and me) into what it is. He does not lay in wait believing he will track down the
soul in some corner of the brain. This is what pleasantly differentiates hylemorphism
from other suggested solutions. Aristotle always has the dimension of corporeality
in sight. There can be no living being without a lived body. The matter of our body is
not adequate, it does not suffice either for being alive or for mental manifestations of
life. There must be »more.« This is what Aristotle targets when he says that a living
being »qua« soul is what it is. This is how he formulates it: »The soul is that whereby
we live and perceive and think in the primary sense; so that the soul would be the
notion or form, and not the matter or substrate.«33 Hence the rightness of the view
that the soul cannot be without a body.34 At the same time, he says that we cannot
simply say that your soul and your lived body are one and the same. The form, the
soul, the anima (as it is called in Latin), is not that what underlies all else, i. e. matter.
Yet, matter is formed and without this forming principal we could neither perceive,
nor live. Aristotle says that we are a lived body-soul unity. Humans are thus more
than soul, more than manifestations of life, and more than the matter of their bod-
ies or a certain organ. Human beings are not mind-brain beings. Humans are not
congruent with the forma, and the latter is, according to Aristotelian understanding,
not a thinking entity. The difference between our lived body and the desk at which
we sit and the computer running in the background is that our lived body is alive.
That is a very definite characteristic. Our lived body as something filled with life is
very different from what – like our desk or the computer – is not filled with life. Our
lived body is »soul-endowed« (German: beseelt) meaning that it is pervaded with a
soul. It is now clear that the soul is not the same as a pure spirit, and this difference
is »at hand« or evident when we look at our hands, which form an inseparable unit
with our bodies. Aristotle tells us that: »The soul is the cause [aitia] and first princi-
ple [archê] of the lived body.«35 What he means, of course, is that we cannot deduce
either what is alive or mental manifestations of life from material processes, that
these processes are not sufficient for us to be alive. Aristotle would not understand
how it could be possible to detach life from living, i. e. from the consummation of
our lives.36
We cannot characterize as living beings all that only appears to be a living being
without being alive. There are many examples such as crash test dummies that share
one or the other commonality with us (it is not for nothing that it is placed on our
behalf in a car that is being crashed into a wall), but they are still being dummies

33 An. II 2, 414a12 f.
34 An. II 2, 413a.
35 An. II 4, 415b8.
36 Cf. Liske, M.-T.: Aristoteles’ Philosophie des Geistes: Weder Materialismus noch Dualismus.
In: Meixner, U./Newen, A. (Ed.): Seele, Denken, Bewusstsein. Zur Geschichte der Philosophie
des Geistes. Berlin/New York 2003, p. 26.
 12. Aristotle and hylemorphism       149

and cannot be called living beings. Living organisms exhibit life processes, and that
is where the dummy fails the test. Weand all other living organisms display certain
manifestations of life. The being of living beings, Aristotle tells us definitively, is in
their life itself.37 He suggests that the soul should be understood as the actualizing
principle. What does that mean? A dead body is no longer animated (»beseelt«) i. e.
permeated with a soul. Yet what applies to our lived body is that it has in it the
principle of life and therefore shows manifestations of life, and as Aristotle says, it is
permeated with the soul. If we wanted to know the difference between a living and a
dead body, Aristotle would point to the permeation – or lack of permeation – of the
soul. It is the soul that gives life.38
A living organism does not merely appear to be slightly different from a corpse.
A corpse lacks something essential: the principle of life, or as Aristotle says, its soul.
This soul is no appendage. This forma does not come floating down from heaven
to be somehow added to the body. While our desk, for example, is simply »there,«
things are very different for living beings: Their being is a dynamic life process. We
can also say they strive to stay alive. As Aristotle says, the basic distinguishing char-
acteristic of living beings is that they carry in themselves the principle of striving and
of movement: you too constantly move. It is an auto-mobility. They are not being
moved from the outside. Aristotle distinguishes various methods by which living
beings move: »But the word living is used in many senses, and we say that a thing
lives if any one of the following is present in it – mind, sensation, movement or rest
in space, besides the movement implied in nutrition and decay or growth.«39 Or-
ganisms cease to be alive when their striving, i. e. their integration processes, come
to an end, when what Aristotle lists here is no longer present. When the soul is ab-
sent, there are no more manifestations of life. The body collapses and decays when
the soul departs the body. The soul seems rather to hold the body together; at any
rate, when the soul is gone the body dissolves into air and decays.«40 Whoever has
touched or seen a corpse knows that a dead body is missing the essential – it is no
longer alive. Manifestations of life are absent. There is no metabolism, no laughter,
no fever, no healing of wounds, no movement. The corpse smells differently than the
body, feels differently. Decay sets in. What has held it together is no longer present.
As Aristotle tells us, an organism receives structure and duration from the soul, the
form that creates unity. The following words by Antonio Damasio seem to confirm
this Aristotelian perspective:

37 »On the surface the phenomenon of life in every living creature presents itself in a number
of diverse manifestations of life. But this does not exhaust life. Behind the surface of the
phenomenon we find the basic nature which grants to the individual manifestations of life
and life functions specific fundamental features and shapes the individual activities of the
parts of a certain type of life.« (Runggaldier, E.: Deutung menschlicher Grunderfahrung im
Hinblick auf unser Selbst. In: Rager, G./Quitterer, J./Runggaldier, E.: Unser Selbst. Identität
im Wandel der neuronalen Prozesse. Paderborn/Munich/Zurich 22003, p. 218.
38 Cf. also: Hübner, J.: Die aristotelische Konzeption der Seele als Aktivität in De Anima II 1. In:
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie (81) 1999, pp. 11 ff.
39 An. II 2, 413a, 31 ff.
40 An. I 5, 411b8–10.
150       C. Hylemorphism

»No component remains the same for very long, and most of the cells and tissues that
constitute our bodies today are not the same we owned when we entered college. What
remains the same, in good part, are the construction plan for our organism structure
and the set points for the operation of its parts. Call it the spirit of the form and the
spirit of the function.«41

It is advisable to speak of the soul in the Aristotelian sense. When we do, we can live
with the reality that, on the one hand, we are constantly changing, and, on the other
hand that we live with the basic everyday conviction that we are still the same person
we were yesterday. Our soul continues to pervade our organism even then when
certain mental abilities are no longer present.42
Aristotle understands the soul as the lived body’s first entelechy, which he ex-
plains by using the example of the human eye:

»If the eye were a living creature, its soul would be its vision, for this is the substance
in the sense of formula of the eye. But the eye is the matter of vision, and if vision fails
there is no eye, except in an equivocal sense, as for instance a stone or painted eye. Now
we must apply what we have found true of the part to the whole living being. For the
same relation must hold good of the whole of sensation of the whole sentient body
qua sentient as obtains between their respective parts. What has the capacity to live is
not the body which hast lost its soul, but what possesses its soul; so seed and fruit are
potentially bodies of this kind.«43

This example is really very conclusive. Aristotle suggests that we imagine the eye to
be a living being. Sight, which is typical for the eye, would thus be the soul. With-
out its ability to see it would be rather erroneous to continue speaking of it as an
eye. Aristotle continues that the eye is the »matter of sight.« This means that we
need a functional body organism to complete the processes associated with it. Ar-
istotle describes what is necessary for the manifestation of life leading to sight. In
Aristotle’s language, this is the hylê, i. e. the matter that has been structured and
organized. Without the eye, there is no sight. In Antonio Damasio’s words: Human
sight »depends on several specific neural regions located along pathways from the
retina to the cerebral hemispheres. When one of these regions is removed, vision
is disturbed.«44 Damasio wants to emphasize that sight would be impossible if the
necessary physical basis were partly or wholly absent. Aristotle demonstrates that the
process of sight is a manifestation of life where the process of seeing and the sight of
an object belong together. The two cannot be separated since we are dealing with the
manifestations of life of a lived body-soul organism. Aristotle takes the physiological

41 Damasio, A.: The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Conscious-
ness. London 1999, p. 144.
42 Cf. Quitterer, J.: Was leistet der Seelenbegriff zur Überwindung physikalistischer Deutungen
personaler Identität? In: Knaup, M./Müller, T./Spät, P. (Eds.): Post-Physikalismus. Freiburg/
Munich 2011, pp. 216–233.
43 An. II 1,412b10 ff.
44 Damasio, A.: Looking For Spinoza. London 2003, p. 189.
 12. Aristotle and hylemorphism       151

processes about which Damasio would be able to tell us quite a bit into account as
material prerequisites for mental manifestations of life. It is important to remember
that unlike in physicalist perceptions, matter (hylê) is not judged to be sufficient to
enable our manifestations of life to occur. It is clear that our lived bodies are extreme-
ly important if there are any manifestations of life. The principle that supports this
understanding is anima, the soul.45 It is in this context that Aristotle speaks of the
first entelechy.
The Greek term entelechy refers to that which realizes or makes actual what is
otherwise merely potential, to the realization of what is possible. In the example
of the eye, the entelechy is sight. Eyesight can be regarded as the eye’s fulfillment.
When an eye is portrayed in a painting, even by a master like Rembrandt, we are
not really dealing with an eye. This also applies to a glass eye. In each case, vision is
absent. What Aristotle has said about the eye, he transfers to the whole organism:
»As the pupil and sight make up an eye, so [...] the soul and the body make up a living
being.«46 When Aristotle says that the soul is the body’s first entelechy, he wants to
demonstrate that we are dealing with the aliveness of the organism.47 The soul is thus
the fundamental prerequisite for our life processes.
In An. II 1, 412a1-b9, Aristotle differentiates between two means of fulfillment.
He suggests comparing the soul to acquired knowledge. This is not the same as a con-
crete handling of this knowledge. Regarding ignorance, the former already implies a
fulfillment. Imagine I have completed vocational training, but for some reason I am
unable to practice that particular trade. What I know cannot be actualized, cannot be
practiced. Naturally the occupational knowledge I have acquired during my training
was a fulfillment of that knowledge. We are, after all, not dealing with an »object,«
with something that can simply be locked out. With reference to the second fulfill-
ment, the focus is on the tangible practice of the potentiality of the knowledge that
can be applied at any time. The natural body’s animation, the soul that enables this
body to be alive, is similar to what happens with knowledge that has been gained.
Thus, the forma of the first entelechy, the first completion of the body, is pervaded by
the soul. Referring to the example of the eye, eyesight becomes the first fulfillment
of the eyeball. What we now see – the text in front of us – is the second entelechy.
According to Aristotle, this can be transferred to the organism. The soul is the first
entelechy of the lived body, the basic precondition that we are even alive. Without
this there is no manifestation of life at all. In this context, it becomes clear what is
meant by the body’s second entelechy. Here, it is the living development and practice
of these manifestations of life. The soul is »the first actuality of a natural body poten-
tially possessing life; and such will be any body which possesses organs.«48 Aristotle
now says that it is obvious that the soul can never be an independent substance (as

45 A. Oksenberg Rorty’s understanding of the Aristotelian position as »psycho-physicalism«

is thus not acceptable: Oksenberg Rorty, A.: De Anima: Its Agenda And Its Recent Inter-
preters. In: Nussbaum, M. C./Oksenberg Rorty, A. (Eds.): Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima.
Oxford 1992, p. 13.
46 An. II 1, 413a.
47 Cf. also: Hübner, J.: Die aristotelische Konzeption der Seele als Aktivität in De Anima II 1. In:
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie (81) 1999, pp. 1–32.
48 An. II 1, 412b.
152       C. Hylemorphism

substance dualism would have it) or even a mere ornament or a characteristic.49 »No
duality exists when what is total being, the dynamei on, as natural body is totally ac-
tualized reality, totally animated (soul-endowed) lived body.«50 However, we cannot
claim that the lived body and the soul are the same.51
We should not overlook that the anima is not the soul of just any body. As Aristotle
shows us, the body is equipped in a very characteristic manner. It is organically
formed and is not a body-machine. In contrast to other bodies, the organic body is
the lived body. The familiar reference to hardware and software is not particularly
suitable for explaining the lived body-soul unity. We are know that any number
of different programs can be installed on the same electromechanical terminal of
a computer system. Yet the soul cannot be simply exchanged or renewed, should
another opportunity arise. The soul is always the form of a matter while the matter
is always in form. »The complete form is not what can be detached from matter. In-
stead, it is matter that has been formed in a specific manner.«52 The lived body-soul
unity, the intertwining of form and matter is maintained throughout our life. A PC
cannot be aware of its processes and is in no position to have any specific point of
view. Furthermore, what is typical for this program is not found in the hardware.
Spiritual competencies do not float around somewhere in a vacuum. As Aristotle
notes, they pervade our organs.

»The equipping of individual parts of organisms which enables them to fulfill a particu-
lar function did not happen randomly. Instead they were formed for a specific purpose.
The concept of the organism implies therefore that the body is a whole in which the
individual partial functions work together meaningfully. They are coordinated in such
a manner that they are able only to fulfill their specific functions in the interplay be-
tween all the organs. As form- and function-unities living beings are not divisible into
individual elements.«53

Aristotle does not believe that matter is adequate for generating mental manifesta-
tions of life. Yet he criticizes not only that physicalist point of view. He also clearly
acknowledges that there must be physical preconditions for our mental manifesta-
tions of life.54

49 An. II 2, 414a14 ff.; Cf. An. I 1, 403a3 ff.

50 Elm, R.: Aristoteles: Dynamis und Energeia. Zum Problem des Vollzugs des Seienden. In:
Speck, J. (Ed.): Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen. Philosophie des Altertums und des
Mittelalters. Göttingen 52001, p. 104.
51 An. II 2, 414a20 f.
52 Elm, R.: Aristoteles: Dynamis und Energeia. Zum Problem des Vollzugs des Seienden. In:
Speck, J. (Ed.): Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen. Philosophie des Altertums und des
Mittelalters. Göttingen 52001, p. 100.
53 Kather, R.: Was ist Leben? Philosophische Positionen und Perspektiven. Darmstadt 2003,
p. 25.
54 »As fulfilment the spiritual life is already as concept dependent on a material base which
is to be completed. It is not just any foundation but one which as the carrier of matter is
equipped for the relevant activities: dynamis can be understood as enabling precondition
or negative prerequisite (conditio sine qua non).« (Liske, M.-T.: Aristoteles’ Philosophie des
 12. Aristotle and hylemorphism       153

Aristotle is not only contemplating the reality of the human being permeated with
a soul. After all, he is also concerned with the relationship between humans and their
environment. After what we now know about the soul, it is in fact likely that Aristotle
includes animals and plants being animated with a soul. He does not hesitate to
criticize authors who are concerned only whether human beings are animated. Here
he can find very clear words. It is a matter of course for him that he should expand
his view to other living beings. Klaus Jacobi writes: »What is really amazing is the
wealth of empirical materials that Aristotle collected from the most diverse areas
then described, and explained it. This ranged from meteorology to zoology.«55 None
other than Darwin was very impressed by Aristotle and described him as »one of the
greatest, if not the greatest observer that ever lived.«56
Aristotelian thinking attaches great importance to the scala naturae where Aristotle
had classified all living creatures into a scale of being according to their spiritual
complexity. At the bottom of the ladder are the lifeless entities with which we are
clearly also connected. In ascending order, the scale goes through the plant and
animal kingdoms until reaching humans. All organisms have striking peculiarities
which according to Aristotle are related to their various spiritual capabilities.

»The domain of what is endowed with a soul, of what is alive, is a sub-domain of nature.
And this again is a sub-domain of being. At the same time their purpose, which accord-
ing to Aristotle determines the things of nature, is very clear: plants, animals and hu-
man beings carry the principle of their processes which determine them in themselves.
They are differentiated from each nother according to the manner of the processes spe-
cific to them (growth; nutrition; geographic movement triggered through perception of
beneficial, agreeable or of harmful or even dangerous objects of occurrences; self-con-
trol; thinking, reflection). Nature is especially apparent in what is alive. Thus, Aristotle
accords to the soul a cardinal and plausible revelatory function.«57

When some living beings are higher on the scala naturae than others, when their
spiritual possibilities are more comprehensive, this does not imply that the spiritual
capabilities of the less complex organisms are absent.58 Thus, every is endowed with
a soul. But this does not mean that every organism on this planet has all possible
spiritual capabilities at is command. As Jacobi points out, »having a soul does not

Geistes: Weder Materialismus noch Dualismus. In: Meixner, U./Newen, A. (Eds.): Seele, Den-
ken, Bewusstsein. Zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Geistes. Berlin/New York 2003, p. 28).
55 Jacobi, K.: Aristoteles. In: Hoerster, N. (Ed.): Klassiker des philosophischen Denkens. Volume
1. Munich 31985, p. 54.
56 Quote according to: Höffe, O.: Aristoteles. Munich 21999, p. 132.
57 Jacobi, K.: Aristoteles. In: Hoerster, N. (Ed.): Klassiker des philosophischen Denkens. Vol. 1.
Munich 31985, p. 64.
58 Cf. also: Happ, H.: Die Scala naturae und die Schichtung des Seelischen bei Aristoteles. In:
Stiehl, R./Stier, H. E.: Beiträge zur Alten Geschichte und deren Nachleben. Festschrift für
Franz Altheim zum 6.10.1968. Vol. 1. Berlin 1969, pp. 220–244, esp. p. 231.
Regarding the Scala naturae see also: Solmsen, F.: Antecedents of Aristotle’s Psychology and
Scale of Beinigs. In: American Journal of Philology 76 (1955), pp. 148–164; Lovejoy, A.: Die
große Kette der Wesen. Geschichte eines Gedankens. Frankfurt a. M. 21993.
154       C. Hylemorphism

mean the same for all living beings. Some kinds of living beings have characteristics
that other beings do not have even though they too have a soul.«59
The nutritive soul, i. e. the soul of the plant (threptikê psychê, anima vegetativa)
provides the specific differentia specifica of (living) organisms compared with what
has no soul. It is the essential difference. For Aristotle it is unimaginable that even
the form of a less complex organism has nothing to do with the matter, leaves it
untouched. Instead, this form permeates and forms it. Aristotle believes that What
truly is as we encounter it in certain individual objects is one in itself, each this
(definite concrete) being (tode ti).60 It is the manifestations of life that point to a
clear difference of living organisms to what is not alive. Characteristics of the anima
vegetativa include the ability to self-reproduce and to have metabolism for the pur-
pose of operation. According to Aristotle, plants strive for preservation of the self
and of the species. The Aristotelian assumption that a plant is endowed with a soul
while it strives to survive can be demonstrated with a remarkable modern-day ex-
ample: In the 1980s, there was a very unfortunate dying of kudus in South Africa.61
African farmers had brought these animals into a large game enclosure to meet the
great demand for meat and to earn some extra money. Soon the farmers were facing
a puzzling situation. It was not a question of water shortage, parasites or animal
diesease. The farmers consulted Wouter van Houven, a well-known biologist. His
conclusion: The animals had been poisoned. However, not by some animal torturers
who were jealous of the farmers who profited from their labor, but it was because a
fence had been built. The staple food for the kudus included acacia leaves, and they
were now unable to wander far afield and feed off many different kinds of trees. The
animals had no choice but to keep feeding from the same kinds of trees. On the other
hand, the very survival of some trees was threatened. Scientific research showed that
the tannin content of the tree stands which were radically fed upon was now four
times as high as normal. In addition, the plants released ethylene gas which the wind
quickly carried to other acacias, also to those outside the game enclosure that had
been spared the kudu grazing, but were now likewise induced to begin producing
poison.
It obviously is part of the behavior of acacia trees to register the attack by plant
eaters and to prevent the harmful effects. For that reason, it is still not far-fetched to
assume teleological behavior. While acacia trees do not have brains as we do, they
are still no machines. Just like stones, desks and computers, they are incapable of
what Aristotle means by threptikê psyche.62 In present debates about functionalism,

59 Jacobi, K.: Aristoteles. In: Hoerster, N. (Ed.): Klassiker des philosophischen Denkens. Vol. 1.
Munich 31985, p. 69.
60 Cf. Elm, R.: Aristoteles: Dynamis und Energeia. Zum Problem des Vollzugs des Seienden. In:
Speck, J. (Ed.): Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen. Philosophie des Altertums und des
Mittelalters. Göttingen 52001, p. 99.
61 Cf. also: Spät, P.: Zur Würde des Lebendigen. In: Knaup, M./Müller, T./Spät, P.: Post-Physika­
lismus. Freiburg/Munich 2011, pp. 352–378.
62 The acacia’s biochemical processes described here would be characterized as being caused
by matter. That the acacia tree is in fact an acacia tree and develops as such he succinctly
calls form. Aristotle is of the opinion that it does not suffice to speak of a living being such
as our acacia tree only from the perspective of exterior or even the mechanical causes with
 12. Aristotle and hylemorphism       155

it has often been suggested that the span between organisms and robots/computers is
slowly but surely being leveled off. We have seen how important the idea of machines
in the image of man has been throughout history. Yet not even the most advanced ro-
bot/computer can feed itself or procreate, which an acacia can do very well63 A veg-

which the tree is confronted. And matter alone is not a sufficient explanation. He would
admit that certain exterior preconditions are required for the acacia to develop. But this
would not be the manner in which to understand either the specific for or the direction of
the development. Reference to the climate or the quality of the soil is similarly no unequivo-
cal explanation that from a seed a tree will eventually evolve. Aristotle’s designation for the
inner driving force which brings about transformation and inertia is that it is the »effective
cause.« According to this the causa finalis of the tree is that one day it will be in full bloom.
When Aristotle thus speaks of cause (aitia) he means it in a much wider sense than is the
case in modern thinking or in the current discussion. Aristotle assumes that being carries its
goal immanently in itself. What the acacia tree will be one day is – according to Aristotle –
already present in the acacia seed. If we understand the development of the acacia tree as
the unfolding of the possibilities already contained in the seed, then it is appropriate to give
expression to this concept even in the 21st century.
63 In the 1970s, Putnam surprisingly wrote: »I was pleasantly surprised to find that my view
was substantially the same as Aristotle’s, although stated a bit more precisely with the aid
of the vocabulary of contemporary scientific methodology« (Putnam, H.: Mind, Language
and Reality. Cambridge 1975, p. XIV).
It has become almost fashionable to some interpreters to point to an apparent relationship
between Aristotle and today’s functionalists and to discuss this with great fervor. Gert Keil
says aptly that »by defining the human being as an »animal rationale« functionalism be-
comes almost acceptable, except that then the relationship between »genus proximum« and
»differentia specifica« is reversed. If in Aristotle’s philosophy human beings are the rational
ones amongst the animals, then according to functionalism human beings are the animals
amongst the rational beings, i. e. those beings whose mental conditions are in contingent
manner implemented in biological ›wetware‹.« (Keil, G.: Kritik des Naturalismus. Berlin/
New York 1993, p. 332).
Beyond this one must remember that for functionalists everything revolves around in- and
outputs. The question regarding the specific what of an object is not of particular interest.
Which is why Roman Dilcher is emphatic that in functionalism functional equivalence
takes the place of personality characteristics. It is unmistakably evident in the character-
istic »whatever it may be« (Dilcher, R.: Lockungen des Aristotelismus. Zum Streit um die
Aktualität der aristotelischen Seelenlehre. In: Philosophische Rundschau. Eine Zeitschrift für
philosophische Kritik. Vol. 47 (2000), p. 26). What I find problematic in a functionalist in-
terpretation of Aristotle is that there is no longer the innovative explosive force of a coun-
terproposal to dualism and physicalism. Unlike functionalism, hylemorphism does not
present a physicalist theory. In matter, Aristotle does not perceive sufficient prerequisites
for your and my mental manifestations of life. Yes, we can go along with the Aristotelian
perceptions of form and matter. When Aristotle uses the concept form he refers to some-
thing completely different to what the functionalists want to convince us of in their use
of the technical concept function. Unlike Putnam, Aristotle would not say that matter to
which the form belongs is irrelevant. Aristotle would instead emphasize that it constitutes
the being of the form itself. This is a view point Putnam would not be able to support.
The concept of entelechy is foreign to convinced functionalists who would not let it pass
their lips. While a functionalist’s theory revolves around mind and brain, hylemorphism
observes the whole organism together with its manifestations of life – thus the unity of
matter and form. Cf. also: Stenfeld, E.: Ancient Greek Psychology and the Modern Mind-
Body Debate. Aarhus 1987; Shields, C.: The first Functionalist. In: Smith, J. C. (Ed.): Histor-
ical Foundations of Cognitive Science. Dordrecht/Boston/London 1990, pp. 19–34; Cohen,
156       C. Hylemorphism

etative function of the soul is part of every living organism. Hans Jonas suggests that
we could continue Aristotle’s reflections about the soul of plants by connecting them
to their ability to affect substance exchange based on environmental circumstances.

»This first appearance of the principle of freedom in its naked and elementary ob-
ject-form signifies the Being’s breakthrough into an unlimited realm of possibilities ex-
tending into the farthest reaches of subjective life and subsumed in its entirety under
the rubric of ›freedom.‹«64

As Aristotle has pointed out, animals are endowed with more than the abilities of the
anima vegetative. We are speaking of the anima sensitive here. In Aristotle’s opinion,
these are giving animals perception (aisthêsis), locomotion and endeavor (orexis).65
Animals can move in space in a goal-directed manner, they are capable of seek-
ing out what is pleasant and of avoiding threatening constellations. Aristotle says
that higher-order animals experience pleasure and pain. In the second book of De
anima, he writes: »Where sensation is, there is also pain and pleasure, and where
these are there must also be desire.«66 In their desire we see Ariadne’s thread of
freedom, which is present in all living beings. Plants and animals are connected
with each other. Aristotle assumes that there is a seamless transition between them.
In another of his works, he points out that bats are transitional forms between land
animals and birds.67 We know today that apes, with whom we share genetic simi-
larities, were seen by Aristotle as a transitional form between humans and four-leg-
ged mammals.68 This sounds surprisingly modern. What Aristotle understands as
a higher form of mental manifestation of life, Darwin sees as an evolutionary later
form. The concept of degrees of kinship which even today in the 21st century causes
conflict between fundamentalists of various religions and evolution biologists was
completely unproblematic for Aristotle. Speaking of a Scala naturae meant assuming
kinship between animals and humans and to allow humans to be embedded in a
living environment.
According to Aristotle, animals have their own being purpose of being, while
Descartes was interested mainly in their benefit for humans. Wolf Singer, with whose
work we will deal more in Part 2, writes that »we claim to be endowed with a soul

S. M.: Hylemorphism and Functionalism. In: Nussbaum, M. C./Rorty, A. O. (Eds.): Essays

in Aristotle’s »De anima«. Oxford 1992, pp. 57–74; Burnyeat: Is an Aristotelian Philosophy
of Mind Still Credible? A Draft. In: Nussbaum, M. C./Rorty, A. O. (Eds): Essays in Aristotle’s
»De anima«. Oxford 1992, pp. 15–26; Nussbaum, M. C./Putnam, H.: Changing Aristotle’s
Mind. In: Nussbaum, M. C./Oksenberg Rorty, A. O. (Eds): Essays in Aristotle’s »De anima«.
Oxford 1992, pp. 27–56; Putnam, H.: Aristotle’s Mind and the Contemporary Mind. In:
Sfendoni-Mentzou, D.: Aristotle and Contemporary Science. Vol. 1. New York 2000, pp. 7–28;
Perler, D.: War Aristoteles ein Funktionalist? In: Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung. 50
(1996), pp. 341–363; Granger, H.: Aristotle’s Idea of the Soul. Dordrecht 1996.
64 Jonas, H.: Evolution and Freedom. In: Jonas, H.: Mortality And Morality. A Search for the
Good after Auschwitz. Illinois 1996, p. 61.
65 Cf. An. II 2, 413b; An. III 7, 431a9–14.
66 An. II 2, 413b.
67 Part. an. IV 13, 697.
68 Hist. an. II 8–9, 502a16-b26.
 12. Aristotle and hylemorphism       157

and to be in command of a unique spiritual dimension. Then why, he asks, do we

deny chimpanzees the same gift even though they are like us in so many ways?«69
Aristotle would most definitely accept the view that apes, too, are filled with a soul.
This would in no way detract from the dignity and superiority of human beings.
Neither Aristotle nor we have heard of apes who, can write a doctoral dissertations
or of kudus who engage in poetry. Yet, when we say that these animals are endowed
with souls, this also means that they are not simply interchangeable. They are neither
objects nor machines, but living beings with their own unique experience. Like hu-
mans, they are living organisms. The Aristotelian doctrine of the soul can thus also
be read as a critique of meat consumption and animal experimentation, especially
since higher-order animals experience pain and pleasure more intensely. In 2005,
Animal Protection Act of the Swiss Confederation ruled that regarding animal pro-
tection made it illegal to cause unjustified pain, suffering, or injury to an animal, to
cause it fear or in any other way to disregard its dignity.70
Human beings still have access to other dimensions of reality than animals and
plants. Thus, according to Aristotle, humans are capable of living a good life.71 For
Aristotle, being able to lead a good life does not mean having an especially large sum
of money in the bank to afford as many things as possible. He refers to something
else: to live a qualitatively successful life. In this instance, it is not advisable to cling to
extremes. That, according to Aristotle, will never turn out well. It is always better to
focus on the middle path and to ask: How can I live my life reasonably? What is it that
makes what I do good and true? What should I consider even beyond the boundaries
and limitations of my own life? Those are extremely important questions for him.
But it is also clear that human beings share perception and desires, metabolism,
and reproduction with other organisms.72 This it what »grounds« us as humans.
According to Aristotle, higher abilities of the soul cannot exist in separation from
the lower forms. However, there are indeed lower abilities of the soul which do not
have access to higher ones, as mentioned above: no ape can write a doctoral thesis in
philosophy. In the course of these reflections, Aristotle can, on the one hand, present
in detail the specificum of Homo sapiens. On the other hand, and on the other hand
clearly state the unifying bond between different organisms. The human soul is the
forma of the entire human organism and as such, according to hylemorphic under-
standing, the principle of all our manifestations of life: those which we experience
consciously and those of which we only become aware with some delay or not at all
(such as metabolism).
The noûs is to be what is specifically human, what sets us apart from animals and
plants. Yet it is not quite easy to understand what Aristotle means by noûs. It does
not become easier when, in this context, he speaks of an element that is bound to

69 Singer, W.: Verschaltungen legen uns fest: Wir sollten aufhören, von Freiheit zu sprechen. In:
Geyer, C. (Ed.): Hirnforschung und Willensfreiheit. Zur Deutung der neuesten Experimente.
Frankfurt a. M. 2004, p. 38.
70 TschG 2005, Art. 4, Abs. 2. http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/ff/2006/327.pdf (retrieved 12 June
2010).
71 Part. an. II. 10, 656a5 ff.
72 An. II 4, 415a.
158       C. Hylemorphism

the body and is thus perishable, and an impersonal bodiless, divine, and therefore
imperishable element.73 Like our mental manifestations of life such as sight, percep-
tion and imagination, our thought processes have organic structures and processes
as a necessary precondition. From modern imaging techniques, which I will discuss
in more detail in Part 2, we know that it is equally unrealistic to derive the truth of
this knowledge as it is to reconstruct the structure of the cerebrum. Thus, the truth
of the claim that 1+1 = 2 is not influenced by the brain’s physiological consistency.
It is identical in all human beings, fat or thin, young or old, big or small. The claim
that 1+1 = 2 remains true. The ability to comprehend what is true is what Aristotle
calls noûs. »Today, we would still have to join with Aristotle and say that this ability
is housed in no bodily organ.«74 Perhaps these other words of Thomas Nagel are
more familiar, when he says that »while others can open our skulls and examine
their interior life, they cannot open our spirit and look into it, at least not in the same
manner.«75 Thanks to the impressive data gathered by brain researchers, we know
which processes take place in the brain when we see or experience something. »But
the realization, the recognition of what occurs in the interaction of these responses,
the reality of what has been observed can again not be explained.«76 The ability to
recognize authenticity (e. g. a mathematical equation) is what Aristotle calls the noûs.
A hylemorphic point of view does justice to the awareness that our thoughts, our
ability to evaluate, assess, and decide cannot occur without our cerebral processes.
We need these; they are necessary. Aristotle tells us that we as human beings are able
to allow ourselves to be directed by our reason. We can enquire concerning reasons
and direct ourselves according to what is good and true. This is what I would like to
discuss in greater detail in the chapter on freedom.
There is something greater than human beings. For Aristotle it is the divine.77 He
believes that when we broach the question of being as being, we also need to address
the question of the divine. It would be foolish to try to avoid this aspect. Physicalist
concepts have little time for questions concerning God, goals and meaning. Aristot-
le, by contrast, attaches great importance to the realization that in determining the
nature of the being, we cannot avoid discovering the principles and highest causes of
being. This consideration is extremely meaningful for Aristotle. If it is true, he tells
himself, that each movement needs something that is moving (kinoun),78 there must
be a prime mover (proton), which does not move itself, only others. This is the divin-

73 An. II 4, 413b24–29 und An. III 5, 430a22–25.

74 Picht, G.: Aristoteles’ »De Anima«. Stuttgart 1987, p. 372.
75 Nagel, T.: Was bedeutet das alles? Eine ganz kurze Einführung in die Philosophie. Stuttgart
1990, p. 27.
76 Picht, G.: Aristoteles’ »De Anima«. Stuttgart 1987, p. 373.
77 »Greeks experience the most important break between those entities who are not able to
comprehend the eternal, and those who are in a position to do so. We are here speak-
ing about the horizontal incision of a vertical hierarchy. Descartes [...] on the other hand
experiences a vertical incision between the res extensa and the res cogitans as the central
ontological difference. He abandons the traditional idea of a scala naturae.« (Hösle, V.: Phi-
losophiegeschichte und objektiver Idealismus. Munich 1996, p. 22).
78 Phys. 7, 241a4 f.; b24; Cf. 242a13 f. (amongst others).
 12. Aristotle and hylemorphism       159

ity Aristotle calls proton kinoun akineton.79 An original immobile entity that moves
others! Aristotle tells us that it is characteristic of human beings that they want to
preserve not only themselves but that thy can imagine something nobler than them-
selves. Human beings have the talent to orient themselves to what is true and good.

12.3 In the footsteps of Aristotle: Hylemorphism’s counterpro-

posal to physicalism and dualism

»The question as to whether Aristotle still

presents innovation potential is not
decided only by his writings, but through the
innovative strength of his readers.«80

Hylemorphism promotes the idea that all our mental manifestations of life (from the
planning of this text to the point where it is read and reflected upon) belong to a lived
body-soul organism, and must therefore be understood in relationship to the whole-
ness of all living beings (you and I!). We quickly see from the previous chapters that
this distinguishes Aristotle from the physicalists as well as from dualist approaches.
Aristotle believes it is important that we have an organic body, a lived body, for ex-
ample, to read and discuss this text – an indication of our mental manifestations of
life. However, this Leibkörper, this lived physical body, and especially any particular
organ such as the encephalon, the appendix or the spleen, is not responsible alone
for our mental manifestations of life. In contrast to dualist approaches found in the
colorful arena of the philosophy of mind, hylemorphism states very clearly that we
really need physical processes for our mental manifestations of life.81 Against this
background it would be totally unimaginable to regard only the mental manifesta-
tions of life of some cogito island as real. Without a lived body we are unable to see,
hear or think and even unable to live. The German expression »wie er leibt und lebt«
(as he lives and breathes) connects the lived body (Leib) to life itself (Leben). In con-
trast to physicalist solutions, it is suggested that a material basis (such as our eyeballs)
alone is not enough to ensure our capability for mental manifestations of life (such
as sight and the ability to read this page). Yet, without this basis nothing is possible
either. As Aristotle tells us, it is necessary. Thus, our goal comes within reach. We
are able to circumnavigate Scylla and Charybdis (dualism and physicalism). A real
strength of the Aristotelian approach is that mental manifestations of life cannot be
situated anywhere beyond physical processes, that there is no deep trench. Without
the body there are no manifestations of life. Mental manifestations of life (remember
our discussion of entelechy!) cannot be reduced to the physical basis, but are clearly

79 Met. 12, 1073a27.

80 Höffe, O.: Aristoteles. Munich 21999, p. 304.
81 Cf. also: Liske, M.-T.: Lässt sich eine aristotelische Zwischenposition zwischen Dualismus
und Physikalismus konzipieren? In: Niederbacher, B./Runggaldier, E. (Ed.): Die mensch­liche
Seele. Brauchen wir den Dualismus? Frankfurt/Paris/Ebikon/Lancaster/New Brunswick
2006, p. 218.
160       C. Hylemorphism

reaching beyond. The physical and the mental are very clearly not torn asunder. We
thus experience that our manifestations of life (whether we sing in the shower or
feel pain when this book falls on our toes) have uniformity and belong to a unified
organism. »Hylemorphism, like no other theory in the history of thought, is in a
position to imagine the unity of man without neglecting the difference between the
two ontological dimensions [...] mind and matter.«82
Hylemorphism presents a real alternative to physicalist and dualist conceptions.83
In the words of Edmund Runggaldier: »Aristotelian philosophy and ontology opens

82 Scherer, G.: Das Leib-Seele-Problem in seiner Relevanz für die individuelle Eschatologie. In:
Dexinger, F. (Ed.): Tod, Hoffnung, Jenseits. Dimensionen und Konsequenzen biblisch verank-
erter Eschatologie. Ein Symposion. Freiburg/Basel/Vienna 1983, p. 64.
83 Thorsten Streubel in his book Gehirn und Ich [My Brain and I] (Streubel, T.: Gehirn und
Ich. Plädoyer für einen Paradigmenwechsel. Frankfurt a. M. 2008) begins with the promis-
ing question as to whether Aristotle’s teaching on the soul is an alternative to Descartes’
thinking. (ibid., pp. 11–32). The idea of the Entelechy at first glance seems to him to have
undermined the problems of current solution strategies. Careful examination of these ideas
however, shows that the Aristotelian ideas are not a true alternative to a Cartesian substance
dualism and even support the latter. Streubel states that the Aristotelian understanding of
the soul is much more comprehensive than the Cartesian understanding of the res cogitans
which does not include the vegetative and sensorimotor areas but limits itself to the noetic
functions (ibid., p. 18). In contrast to the Cartesian understanding of the res extensa which
incorporates what is common to all bodies, the Aristotelian understanding of the form
reveals the differences between different types of bodies – for example between living and
dead bodies, or between living and artificial bodies (ibid., p. 26). Streubel rightly sees that
for Aristotle, in contrast to Descartes, perception and thinking are not possible without the
lived body (ibid., p. 18). And Aristotle’s understanding of the form is placed conceptually in
opposition to the material. But the material and the form are only realizable within the unity
of a concrete being (ibid., p. 20). Streubel further sees that the soul according to Aristotle’s
understanding of her functions, the soul cannot develop without the influence of the en-
vironment of the lived body. He tells us that without nutrition the ability to feel oneself
cannot be realized. And without sensory impressions nothing can be perceived. Finally
without perceptions nothing that can be thought can be recognized. »The lived body is only
able to activate and continue to realize and maintain its spiritual potential on the basis of
its openness to its environment.« (ibid., p. 22) In the light of these insights Streubel’s ques-
tion is puzzling: as to whether Cartesian dualism is related to Aristotle’s thinking and one
can therefore understand hylemorphism as pre-Cartesian dualism. In the context of this
formulation of the problem Descartes too is characterized as being hylemorphist. Streubel
claims that even Descartes »would understand the spirit as being the completion of the
body insofar as without the spirit the human body would lack what which is uniquely hu-
man. In the light of this insight Descartes too is a hylemorphist who nevertheless does not
have to renounce dualism.« (ibid., p. 30) It is however, rather absurd to characterize Des-
cartes as a hylemorphist. Streubel also misses the point when he characterizes the concept
of hylemorphism as a »hidden dualism.« (ibid., p. 30) It is clear that for Streubel, Aristotle’s
understanding of the soul presents no alternative to Descartes. As far as he is concerned,
the similarities outweigh the differences. Merely the emphases have to be placed differently
(ibid., p. 33). Aristotle is as little able to clarify the relationship between the body and the
soul and the manner in which they interact as is the Cartesian tradition. Streubel affirms
that »his hylemorphism could not repeal the duality of body and spirit.« (ibid., p. 46) This
statement shows quite clearly that Streubel has not understood what hylê and morphê really
mean. Consequently, he can also not understand hylemorphism as an alternative to dualist
and physicalist models.
 12. Aristotle and hylemorphism       161

the way to alternative approach to the mind-body problem and avoids the extremes
of physicalism and dualism. It allows for a conception of ourselves compatible with
the assumptions of diachronic personal identity, indexicality and agent causality.«84
Runggaldier85 also supports an Aristotelian intermediate position and points out
that physicalist and dualist share an understanding of the body that has its origin
in physics. Aristotle is not primarily concerned with measureable and quantifiable
bodies, but with the lived body.
When Aristotle sees the soul as »the first actuality of a natural body potentially
possessing life,«86 he does not refer to something which has no relationship to the
body, virtually picking it out of thin air. He does not mean a brain product but re-
fers to the »basic activities of the lived body«. Of course, I have conceptually distin-
guished soul and lived body in this chapter. It should therefore be emphasize once
again that anima – as the principle of life – remains connected to a specific body
throughout the entire life of a human.87 According to hylemorphic understanding,
what constitutes our organism has its source and base (aitia kai arche) in the soul’s
all-encompassing presence [Durchseelung]. In many discussions today, it is enough
to pay attention to material prerequisites when talking about organisms, but this
leaves out many facets. Aristotle’s horizon reaches beyond this. Let us remember
what was said about the form principle: »Aristotle thinks that it is true of natural
objects and their behavior in general that they cannot be fully understood in terms of
material constituents and their properties, but have to be explained in terms of their
essence or nature.«88 It is not enough just to mention material and causal reasons as
physicalists do. As Aristotle notes in his writings about the soul, there is also a cause
for form, effect and goal.89
As we have seen, form is not something that somehow just appears from the ma-
terial. Form is not the genie in the bottle from Arabian Nights. Hylemorphism insists
that form permeates the material: form and material are always intertwined. The
form is the form of the material and the material is always permeated by the form. As
mentioned above, it is the form, the basis and the cause of the organism that makes
a living organism into a living organism. As such, form does not emerge as soon as
the body has attained a specific organizational level. It should also be clear that, for

84 Runggaldier, E.: The Aristotelian Alternative to Functionalism and Dualism. In: Nieder-
bacher, B./Runggaldier, E. (Eds.): Die menschliche Seele. Brauchen wir den Dualismus?
Frankfurt/Paris/Ebikon/Lancaster/New Brunswick 2006, p. 221.
85 Ibid, pp. 221–248.
86 An. II 1, 412b5–6.
87 »Even if the soul always belonged to one specific lived body, i. e. if in all her functions the
body were always involved, it would be possible to draw abstract conclusions and speak
of psychic implementations themselves. One would however, have to be aware that one is
dealing with an abstraction. The abstract form must not be converted into a substance that
has an independent existence. Nor must the abstraction of the material lead to the judg-
ment that here there is form different to the form of the material.« (Jacobi, K.: Aristoteles. In:
Hoerster, N. (Ed.): Klassiker des philosophischen Denkens. Vol. 1. Munich 31985, pp. 92 f.).
88 Frede, M.: On Aristotle’s Conception Of The Soul. In: Nussbaum, M. C./Oksenberg Rorty, A.
(Eds.): Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima. Oxford 1992, p. 94.
89 An. II 4, 415b8–20.
162       C. Hylemorphism

Aristotle, the soul is not a more or less cute decoration of bodies, a characteristic. The
soul is the entelechy of living organisms.
Aristotle quite distinctly answers the question whether the soul and the body are
one in the negative:

»So one need no more to ask whether body and soul are one than whether the wax and
the impression it receives are one, or in general whether the matter of each thing is the
same as that of which it is the matter; for admitting that the terms unity and being are
used in many senses, the paramount sense is that of actuality.«90

Aristotle says that it is serious error in reasoning to say that the soul and the body
are identical. Instead, he says that the concrete wholeness of the living organism in
its lived body-soul unity is what is important. Aristotle would have no patience with
anyone who believes that mental manifestations of life are the same as brain-pro-
cesses.91 As Sorabji writes, »Aristotle’s use of the matter/form distinction in his psy-
chology has been called a strain, a misfit and an obfuscation. But it has the merit of
steering us away from the idea that mental states may be identical with, or may be
simply, physiological processes.«92 Neither are the lived body and the soul two sub-
stances as Descartes and his follower Richard Swinburne would have us believe.93
Aristotle is concerned with the concrete human such as Marcus in his lived body-soul
unity.

90 An. II 1, 412b6 ff.

91 In the 1950s Feigl believed that Aristotle was a forerunner of identity theory (see also: Feigl,
H.: The ›Mental’ and the ›Physical’. In: Feigl, H./Scriven, M./Maxwell, G. (Ed.): Minnesota
Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Vol. 2. Minneapolis 1958 und Matson, W. I.: Why Isn’t
the Mind-Body Problem Ancient? In: Feyerabend, P. K./Maxwell, H. (Eds.): Mind, Matter,
and the Method. Essays in Philosophy and Science in Honor of Herbert Feigl. Minneapolis
1966, pp. 92–102, Cf. also Shields, C.: Some Recent Approaches to Aristotle’s De anima. In:
Hamlyn, D. W.: Aristotle: De anima. Books II and III. Translation with Notes. Oxford 1993,
pp. 162 f.). What is being ignored here is that, for Aristotle, bodily and soul processes are
not the same. The material is not the form and the form is not the material, but the material
stands within the form. In this sense, Aristotle views the material and the form as being nei-
ther necessary nor sufficient for each other. It is thus necessary to reject the understanding
of Günther Patzig, according to whom we could without too much effort create a connec-
tion between Aristotle and modern monistic theories, especially with the identity theory
and functionalism (Patzig, G.: Leib und Seele – das aristotelische Paradigma. In: Elsner, N./
Lüer, G. (Eds.): Das Gehirn und sein Geist. Göttingen 2000, pp. 9–27, esp. pp. 9 and 25 f.).
92 Sorabji, R.: Body and Soul in Aristotle. In: Durrant, M. (Ed.): Aristotle’s De Anima in focus.
London/New York 1993, p. 176).
93 Insofar as the soul is entelechy and the body processes (and the cerebrum is amongst these)
have always been possible by means of the soul (cf. An. I 4, 408b14–15), the problem of
causal interaction does not present itself for hylemorphism as it did for Descartes or for
physicalists.
Cf. also the following regarding the differentiation between hylemorphism and property
dualism: Liske, M.-T.: Lässt sich eine aristotelische Zwischenposition zwischen Dualismus
und Physikalismus konzipieren? In: Niederbacher, B./Runggaldier, E. (Eds.): Die mensch­liche
Seele. Brauchen wir den Dualismus? Frankfurt/Paris/Ebikon/Lancaster/New Brunswick
2006, pp. 214 ff.
 12. Aristotle and hylemorphism       163

Aristotle would flinch if he had to talk only about inputs and outputs in refer-
ence to us or to other organisms. He would say that our mental manifestations of
life cannot be understood if we just talk of bodies that behave in a certain way, that
we are more than the behavior of our bodies. We must look at the whole human
when we consider something as important as the question about the lived body-soul
problem, and not only about the cerebrum or about the soul.94 »It is better not to
say that the soul pities, or learns, or thinks, but to say rather that the soul is the in-
strument whereby man does these things.«95 Our brain belongs to a lived body-soul
whole, a living organism. And that is of course intertwined with our environment.
For example, our metabolism (which already belongs to the anima vegetativa), or
a pleasant discussion with a friend to whom Aristotle pays special attention when
he says about each of us that we are zoon logon echon96 and zoon politikon.97 These
two characterizations are to indicate how exactly our aliveness looks. To Aristotle,
we are not lonely cogito islands who first must wonder whether others exists or not:
Humans are always connected with other humans. It is only through this realization
that we can fully develop our ability to communicate linguistically, or to penetrate
something rationally.
Thus, Aristotle understands man as a lived body-soul unity: We are more than
mind and brain. We are living organisms. I find it interesting that in this context,
Antonio Damasio laments »the noticeable absence of a notion of organism in cog-
nitive science and neuroscience. The mind remained linked to the brain in a some-
what equivocal relationship, and the brain remained consistently separated from the
body rather than being seen as part of a complex living organism.«98 Hylemorphism
meets the requirement of what Damasio calls a neuroscientifically and philosophi-
cally responsible position:

»The comprehensive understanding of the human mind requires an organismic per-

spective; that not only must the mind move from a nonphysical cogitum to the realm of
biological tissue, but it must also be related to a whole organism possessed of integrat-
ed body proper and brain and fully interactive with a physical and social environment.«99

The Aristotelian understanding of the soul as entelechy and (life) principle of the
organism can be made fruitful today if we speak about the relationship between the
lived body and mental manifestations of life. This always allows us to look at the
entire organism.

94 An. I 4, 408b.
95 An. I 4, 408b.
96 Pol. I, 2; 1153 a 9.
97 Pol. I, 2; 1153 a 2.
98 Damasio, A.: The Feeling of What Happens. Body and Emotion in the Making of Conscious-
ness. London 1999, p. 40.
99 Damasio, A.: Descartes’ Error. Emotion, Reason, And The Human Brain. New York 2005,
p. 252.
164       C. Hylemorphism

Conclusion

»Those are right in their view who maintain

that the soul cannot exist without the body,
but is not itself in any sense a body. It is not a
body, it is associated with a body, and there-
fore resides in a body, and in a body of a
particular kind.«100

Hylemorphism does justice to the reality that we see ourselves as a lived body-soul
unity and not as two substances added to each other, and not as mere physicalizable
objects. For that we also do not have to suppose that physical processes and mental
manifestations of life are parallel. We can draw the conclusion that hylemorphism is
a suggestion that goes beyond dualism and physicalism. There is more than loud and
quiet, light and dark. There is also a soothing midrange. It is therefore unnecessary to
join the chorus of physicalists and dualists.

Conclusion of Part 1

»We have now stated the truth; nevertheless

let us recapitulate and state it more clearly.«101

In Part 1, we have looked at a variety of approaches to the lived body-soul problem

and have dealt with the often stubborn debates. We have also examined the strengths
and the weaknesses of the various approaches. Aristotle’s solution proved to be the
most viable, one that makes it possible to avoid the dead ends of dualist and physi-
calist suggestions. Part 1 establishes the background for the discussions that follow.
Let us conclude with Aristotle: »The theories of the soul handed down by our prede-
cessors have been sufficiently discussed; now let us start afresh.«102

100 An. II 2, 414a19 ff.

101 Met. VII, 101035b.
102 An. II, 1412a.
Part 2

»If we knew all that occurs within the brain as

it pursues its activity,
If we were able to see through to the finest
detail all chemical, electrical etc. processes –
what would be the use?
All waves and vibrations, all that is electric
and mechanical
Is still no state of mind, no conception.«1

1 Griesinger, W.: Die Pathologie und Therapie der psychischen Krankheiten für Ärzte und Stu­
dierende. Stuttgart 21861, p. 6.
A. Man and his brain

»Some people, amongst them brain research-

ers, are of the opinion our brain is the most
complicated system in the universe. But then:
who knows the universe?«1

1. The human brain: An extraordinary organ

1.1 Ecce cerebrum!

»Despite all pending issues, one thing has

become apparent in brain research, and that
is the fact that the human brain is the organic
system that in its complexity and dynamism
far surpasses all other systems in the uni-
verse. That is the source both of our pride and
of our misery.«2

Our thirst for knowledge about the human brain seems to be still unquenched. It
is not too far-fetched to assume that this is because brain research affects all of us.
The brain is a part of our organism that plays an important role in our thoughts and
actions, an organ that is involved in reading this page. Without a brain, I could not
have written these words. In their work on various topics, neuroscientists keep re-
turning to issues that are »closer to life« and »of more practical use« than for example
articles by chemists filled with detailed experiments and sprinkled with formulas.
There might also be a connection with the genre of horror novels dealing with the
exploration of the cerebrum.
Christine Zunke wrote that because of its special nature, the »brain as an object
of research is subject to the projection of theories about social conditions. These
projected theories cannot be separated from scientific facts. Consequently, as society
evolves the definition of the role ascribed to the brain is also transformed.«3

1 Roth, G.: Aus Sicht des Gehirns. Frankfurt a. M. 2003, p. 9.

2 Oeser, E.: Geschichte der Hirnforschung. Von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart. Darmstadt 2002,
p. 12.
3 Zunke, C.: Kritik der Hirnforschung. Neurophysiologie und Willensfreiheit. Berlin 2008,
p. 10.
168       A. Man and his brain

Probably many neuroscientists come to public attention because they no longer

merely »stew in their own scientific juice«, but are able to express themselves in a
manner which the general public can understand. It is also much faster to scan the
Internet for relevant neuroscientific articles and for papers with popular scientific
relevance than it is searching for philosophical treatises. If we take neuroscientific
publications which target a population that reads very widely, examine them more
closely and make a list of similarities and differences, we find that the similarities list
is clearly longer. We do not find this in other branches of science. Why not? Christine
Zunke provides a plausible answer:

»The solutions presented are neither of neurological material nor of plausible premises.
Instead, they present the structures that either reveal the prejudice of the scientists
developing them, or an empirically presented and therefore generally known societal
reality. Their popularity is possibly due to the resulting theories coinciding with the un-
derstanding of many members of the public, and thus seem intuitively plausible.«4

This present chapter called Man and his Brain is divided into two parts. In the first,
the human brain will be the center of attention as we explore its structure, its manner
of functioning, its exploration in the past and in the present. In a second step we
shed light on the relationship between brain research and philosophy. In subsequent
sections, we will ask what brain researchers really know today, as we dare to join an
expedition into the neuronal jungle (1.2). We then take a walk through the history of
brain research (1.3). There, we will discover that scientists who use certain concepts
today (such as those dealing with the location of the soul, with mental manifestations
of life in the brain and with contradictions of freedom) do so because they already
have a another career behind them and are not really as new and innovative as is
usually presumed. In a next step, we wonder whether it is possible to read other
people’s mind (1.4) and what consequences brain damage can have for a person’s
experience and behavior (1.5).

1.2 What do brain researchers know today? An expedition

through the neuron jungle

»The living brain is an extraordinarily dynamic

Organ.«5

It is generally known that in the neurosciences, tremendous advances have been

made in understanding the human brain. With increasing rapidity, we are presented
with more and more insights into our brains. And yet, the amount of what we do not
know is enormous. We can hear »sciemus«, but also a careful »ignorabimus«. Con-

4 Ibid., p. 13.
5 Koch, C.: Kintopp der Sinne. In: Könneker, C. (Ed.): Wer erklärt den Menschen? Hirnfor-
scher, Psychologen und Philosophen im Dialog. Frankfurt a. M. 22007, p. 36.
 1. The human brain: An extraordinary organ       169

sidering all that is happening in the neural field (and especially why), we certainly
have no satisfying explanation that would answer all our questions.
Let us begin our expedition with the nervous system (systema nervosum). This
term refers to the organ system of the higher animals (which include human be-
ings as the animal rationale) that absorbs, assimilates and processes environmental
and intraorganic stimuli, an essential characteristic of living organisms. Damasio
explains that »nerves transmit impulses from the brain to the body, and from the
body to the brain. The brain and the body are also linked chemically, through mat-
ter such as hormones which circulate in the bloodstream.«6 Our human nervous
system is divided into the central nervous system (CNS) and the peripheral nervous
system (PNS), which are functionally very closely interconnected. The PNS includes
the cranial nerves, spinal nerves (nerves in the spinal cord) and our intra-mural
nervous system. The PNS transmits peripheral stimuli to the CNS. Thus, the PNS
has a specific transmission function. The task of the CNS is to assist the organism to
deal with impulses originating from within the organism and from the outside, to
regulate them, to process them and to integrate them into the organismic whole. It
helps us to coordinate our motoric capabilities.7
It does not take us very far (and not only with the question of who we are) just to
study the brain. This is already apparent when we remember that it forms the CNS
in conjunction with the spinal cord. In our expedition through the neuron jungle,
we will discover that our encephalon comprises various areas. We recognize a typical
stratification of these areas and how it creates a distinctive structure. At the same
time, as if according to a wonderfully planned organizational plan, they are joined
together and formed. Today, we know about areas of the brain which must perform
their tasks with perfection if, for example, we want to see and hear. They are an essen-
tial prerequisite for you if you want to see this page and hear the hum of your com-
puter in the background. Seeing and hearing are manifestations of life in which our
brain is involved as it actively and dynamically interacts with our entire organism.

It is customary to distinguish six different regions of the human cerebrum:

1. The medulla oblongata,
2. The cerebellum,
3. The mesencephalon,
4. The diencephalon,
5. The telencephalon and
6. The pons.

A few figures and comparisons are of interest: The brain mass of men is 1350 g, that
of women 1220 g, or about 2% of their body mass. By comparison, a chimpanzee’s
or gorilla’s cerebrum weighs about 500 g, i. e. slightly more than a pound of but-

6 Cf. Damasio, A.: The Feeling of What Happens. Body And Emotions in the Making of Con-
sciousness. London 1999, p. 325.
7 This is thematized more comprehensively in: Weis, S./Thaller, R./Villringer, A./Wenger,
E.: Das Gehirn des Menschen. Morphologie, Kernspintomographie und 3 D-Computerrekon-
struktion. Göttingen/Toronto/Zurich 1992, pp. 7 ff.
170       A. Man and his brain

Fig. 1: This figure shows a longitudinal section of the human brain. Source: back cover of:
Gegenfurtner, K. R.: Gehirn und Wahrnehmung. Frankfurt a. M. 2003. Permission to reproduce
was granted by the publishing house of S. Fischer.

ter, while the net weight of the human brain equals about 2–1/2 pounds of butter.
About 20% of our blood flows through our brain, which needs 20% of the oxygen
we breathe in and take in with our meals – i. e. the glucose that is provided by our
metabolism.8 Brain researchers point out that the different brain mass in females
and males has nothing to do with the fact that women and men respond and decide
differently – or even park their cars differently. Some animal brains are considerably
larger than those of Homo sapiens. For example, elephants brains weigh a remarkable
5 kg. In sperm whales and orcas, the encephalon can weigh even more, sometimes
between 8 and 10 kg.9 That would be like approximately 16 to 20 pounds of butter.
This shows that the human brain is a »light weight!« by comparison. Obviously, the
complexity of certain mental manifestations of life does not depend on brain size.
Neither is it useful to know the ratio of brain mass to body mass. We can realize that
when we think of the grey giants of Africa and Asia. After all, the elephant brain is
only 0.2% of the animal’s body mass, while our cerebrum is about 2% of our body
mass. Susan Greenfield tells us about a few sprightly little mammals: In shrews (So-
ricidae), the brain is about 3.33% of the body mass. Thus, size and body weight ratio
are not enough to explain certain human manifestations of life.10

8 Cf. Gassen, H. G.: Das Gehirn. Darmstadt 2008, p. 96.

9 Cf. Dicke, U./Roth, G.: Evolution der Intelligenzen. In: Gehirn & Geist 3 (2008), pp. 58–65.
10 Cf. Greenfield, S. A.: Reiseführer Gehirn. Heidelberg/Berlin 2003, p. 29; Changeux, J.-P.: Der
neuronale Mensch. Wie die Seele funktioniert – die Entdeckungen der neuen Gehirnforschung.
Reinbek bei Hamburg 1984, p. 88; Dicke, U./Roth, G.: Evolution der Intelligenzen. In: Gehirn
& Geist 3 (2008), pp. 58–65.
 1. The human brain: An extraordinary organ       171

Fig. 2: A sagittal section of the human skull. Source: schlake, h.-p./roosen, k.: Der Hirntod als
der Tod des Menschen. Würzburg 22001, p. 18. Permission to reproduce granted by the two
authors and by the Deutsche Stiftung Organtransplantation.

A truly important role is played by the organizational form of the pre-frontal and the
orbito-frontal cortex11 that allow us to master certain life processes which neither the
largest land mammals nor the little shrews are able to do. What is important is the
interaction, or as neuroscientists also call it, the »wiring« of the nerve cells.12

»The neocortex of the human brain contains only a few more nerve cells than that found
in whales, dolphins and elephants. In comparison, however, the distance between the
neurons is clearly shorter and the axonal networking is faster.«13

Under normal circumstances we cannot see our brain since it lies hidden inside
our skull. We feel nothing of its working processes. In comparison, we can feel our

11 Cf. Roth, G.: Aus Sicht des Gehirns. Frankfurt a. M. 2003, pp. 63–66.
12 Cf. Singer, W.: Vom Gehirn zum Bewusstsein. In: Elsner, N./Lüer, G. (Eds.): Das Gehirn und
sein Geist. Göttingen 2000, p. 192.
13 Dicke, U./Roth, G.: Evolution der Intelligenzen. In: Gehirn & Geist 3 (2008), p. 63.
172       A. Man and his brain

heart beating fast. Especially conspicuous is the extraordinary diversification of our

cerebrum. It therefore has an impressively large surface. The thickness of the cerebral
cortex is given as about 5 mm in the literature. The cerebrum is embedded in our
organism and not, as Hans Günter Gassen would have us believe, an »independent
being that merely uses the rest of the body as a supply unit.«14 In this context, we
should remember Aristotle’s understanding of life: Mental manifestations of life do
not occur in a »brain in a vat« – i. e. in a disembodied organ – but belong to the living
organism which is responsible for the metabolism on which every brain substance
depends. »The brain would cease to exist without the body, it needs the body as its
basic point of reference.«15 What occurs in our heads is a sign of living developmen-
tal processes of the human organism. The work processes of the nerve cells are a facet
of our aliveness and important for the entire lived body-soul organism to which our
encephalon belongs. As Thomas Fuchs points out, this includes mediating processes
regarding our relationship with others and with our environment.

»The needs of the organism – nutrition, water, recreation, sleep, procreation – are ex-
perienced as lack and drive, and must be converted by means of goal-oriented activities
supported by emotions. Constant feedback within the organism makes this possible.«16

Fuchs also tells us that our brain is an organ »that reciprocally converts elementary
and complex system statuses, and thus makes possible the organism’s integral op-
tions for perception and action.«17 Fuchs stresses that we are not mindless »fetchers
and gofors« for our brain. He also emphasizes that what we experience and perceive
is not merely a figment of our imagination. He speaks of, »an overestimation of the
brain as a god-like creator of mental life.« He continues:

»When the brain is relieved of its role as creator of the world, with which it is no
doubt over-extended, it loses its mythological powers [...] [it] turns into a still fasci-
nating yet far more modest mediator of human experience, action and interaction.
[...] The brain is not a creator, but a relational organ: it is embedded in the meaningful
interactions of a living being with its environment. It mediates and enables these inter-
active processes, but it is in turn also continuously formed and restructured by them.
The mind may be regarded as a continuous process of relating to the environment

14 Gassen, H. G.: Das Gehirn. Darmstadt 2008, p. 26.

15 Rager, G.: Neuronale Korrelate von Bewusstsein und Selbst. In: Rager, G./Quitterer, J./
Runggaldier, E.: Unser Selbst. Identität im Wandel der neuronalen Prozesse. Paderborn/
Munich/Vienna/Zurich 22003, p. 49; cf. Fuchs, T.: Kosmos im Kopf? Neurowissenschaften
und Menschenbild. In: Zeitschrift für medizinische Ethik 1 (2006), pp. 3–14, esp. pp. 3, 9, 13.
16 Fuchs, T.: Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan. Eine phänomenologisch-ökologische Konzep-
tion. Stuttgart 2008, p. 134, cf. also: Damasio, A.: Ich fühle also bin ich. Die Entschlüsselung
des Bewusstseins. Berlin 62006, p. 387.
17 Fuchs, T.: Kosmos im Kopf? Neurowissenschaften und Menschenbild. In: Zeitschrift für
medizinische Ethik 1 (2006), p. 3, cf. also: Fuchs, T.: Lebendiger Geist. Wider den Dualismus
von ›Mentalem‹ und ›Physischem‹. In: Knaup, M./Müller, T./Spät, P. (Eds.): Post-Physikalis-
mus. Freiburg/Munich 2011, pp. 145–164.
 1. The human brain: An extraordinary organ       173

which is constantly transformed into the more stable structures of neural networks
and dispositions.«18

It is extremely important for our organism that our brain finds a connection between
what we perceive and our actions. A necessary requirement for such different man-
ifestations of life as seeing, hearing, feeling or experiencing pain is that our organs
(eyes, ears, skin, brain) are in constant living interaction with each other; They be-
long to a unified whole. Our brain is truly a »survival organ«19 as Hans Lenk tells us.
However, does that not apply to our other organs? Who would want to be without
the heartbeat? Or without the kidneys, the intestines or the lungs? All these organs
belong to the living organism, a lived body-soul unity. According to Thomas Fuchs,
it would be rather absurd to speak of the bloodstream or the air we breathe merely
as »input« for an output made for an organ that can be identified.20 We cannot refer
to the different areas of our cerebrum a »miniature brains.« They are all part of a
living whole.21 In our expedition through the neuronal jungle, we should also know
that these areas are not isolated. They are in constantly dynamic interchange with
each other.
There is something we have in common with other organisms that have a brain:
Our cerebrum is composed of cells. These are no »dead building blocks«, but filled
with life. Many cells are able to generate and transmit electric signals. We call them
nerve-cells or neurons. Apart from these cells specialized in transmitting stimuli,
the brain also has so-called glial cells (the Greek word glia means glue). Today we
know that these are important for the neurons and also have a support function.
They ensure the mutual electric isolation of the neurons. Recent research suggests
that they also participate in material and fluid transport in the brain. This gives them
an important supply function. As brain researchers tell us, they are also important
for maintaining homeostasis in our brains. Yet according to Gerhard Roth, it is not
yet certain what their role is in neuronal excitation.22 Every neuron is tremendously
complex.23 There are 1011 neurons in the human encephalon, a gigantic number
which amazes us when we write it, but amazement is a wonderful starting point for
philosophy. Furthermore, every neuron has a breath-taking 104 contact points. The
sum of glial cells is even approximately ten times greater than the number of nerve
cells. G. Rager points out that to have an idea of the activities of neurons in the net-
work, simpler structural models are used to calculate these activities.24 To give us

18 Fuchs, T.: Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan. Eine phänomenologisch-ökologische Konzep-

tion. Stuttgart 2008, p. 9. Engl. Transl.: https://www.klinikum.uni-heidelberg.de/
fileadmin/zpm/psychatrie/fuchs/The_Brain_-_A_Mediating_Organ.pdf pp. 197 f.
19 Lenk, H.: Kleine Philosophie des Gehirns. Darmstadt 2001, pp. 6, 21.
20 Fuchs, T.: Leib, Raum, Person. Entwurf einer phänomenologischen Anthropologie. Stuttgart
2000, p. 148.
21 Cf. Greenfield, S. A.: Reiseführer Gehirn. Heidelberg/Berlin 2003, p. 50.
22 Cf. Roth, G.: Aus Sicht des Gehirns. Frankfurt a. M. 2003, p. 12.
23 Cf. also: Rager, G.: Bewusstsein und Hirnforschung: Befunde und Theorien. In: Quitterer, J./
Runggaldier, E. (Eds.): Der neue Naturalismus. Stuttgart 1999, pp. 77–103.
24 Rager, G.: Neuronale Korrelate von Bewusstsein und Selbst. In: Rager, G.: Die Person. Wege
zu ihrem Verständnis. Fribourg 2006, p. 134.
174       A. Man and his brain

a rough idea about the dizzying number of brain cells, Susan Greenfield compares
it to the Amazon jungle where 100 billion trees grow in an area of 4,300,000 square
kilometers. Greenfield suggests that the number of leaves in the Amazon jungle can
be compared with the number of nerve connections.25 Frank Rösler also points to
the complexity of our brain:

»A scientific observer who wishes to understand the state of the brain at a point in
time t and wishes to predict the point in time of t + 1 would have to register the activ-
ity of 1011 neurons (100000000000), and would have to know the transitional rules by
means of which the next neuron state can be extrapolated. This, again, demands an
exact knowledge of the state of all the 1015 synapses involved which could transmit the
influence the neurons have on each other.«26

Researchers have discovered that smaller brains have a noticeably higher number of
nerve cells than glia cells. According to Gerhard Roth, this is because larger cerebral
structures also have a higher need for care, and thus need more glial cells.27
The nerve cells in our brain are not found in random confusion; they are organ-
ized. The matter is structured. I mentioned above that various anatomical character-
istics can be differentiated in different areas. These take over diverse functions for
our organism. In our expedition through the neuron jungle we also need to say a
little more about the nerve cells. Each nerve cell has a cell body, also known as a soma
or a perikaryon which in turn has a nucleus. The cell body whose size is approximate-
ly one forty-thousandth of a millimeter (i. e. 0.000025 mm) is the metabolism center
of the cell (cellula). If we look closer, we notice that numerous branches exit the
soma. Scientists refer to these as axons (from the Greek axōn = axis) and dendrites
(from the Greek dendron =r tree). The dendrites of one nerve cell receive impulses
from the other neurons. It is amazing how this happens. The impulses are passed on
from the tip of one soma to another until they are passed on to a neighboring nerve
cell.28 The axons ensure that our nerve cells are in constant lively interaction with
each other. To be exact, not every nerve cell has an axon. Yet, here impulses are also
transmitted, and this occurs via the cytoplasmic extensions of the nerve cells, the
dendrites. No nerve cell is exactly like any other.
How is it possible for frequency pulses to move from one place to the other?
Gassen, Roth and Damasio explain. The electrical impulses are passed on to the syn-
aptic end-feet. These impulses are called action potentials or spikes. Measurements

25 Cf. Greenfield, S. A.: Reiseführer Gehirn. Heidelberg/Berlin 2003, p. 105.

26 Rösler, F.: Grenzen der Erkenntnis. Individualität und Plastizität des menschlichen Gehirns
machen eine genaue Vorhersage des Verhaltens einzelner Personen prinzipiell unmöglich. In:
Könneker, C. (Ed.): Wer erklärt den Menschen? Hirnforscher, Psychologen und Philosophen
im Dialog. Frankfurt a. M. 22007, p. 85.
27 Cf. Roth, G.: Aus Sicht des Gehirns. Frankfurt a. M. 2003, p. 12; Dicke, U./Roth, G.: Evolu-
tion der Intelligenzen. In: Gehirn & Geist 3 (2008), p. 63.
28 In neuroscientific literature, we here speak of »Information.« What is meant here is the
charge displacement in the axon and the movement of transmitter substances. I will explore
these expressions in the chapter lived body and Soul or mind and brain?.
 1. The human brain: An extraordinary organ       175

confirm that they have an amplitude of approximately 100 Millivolt (mV). The action
potential at the axon hillock occurs within 100 milliseconds (ms).29
The nerve cells do not exist in unconnected confusion. There are contact points
between them, and these are the synapses. »Nerve cells thus do not represent a
­system that is merged as is for example the case with arteries and veins. Instead,
each cell is an individual.«30 Brain researchers tell us that most synapses are found
on the dendrites. But some are in the soma:

»Synapses can be strong or weak. Synaptic strength determines whether or not, and
how easily, impulses continue to travel into the next neuron. In an excitatory neuron, a
strong synapse facilitates impulse travel, while a weak synapse impedes or blocks it. On
the average each neuron forms about 1.000 synapses.«31

Gerhard Roth explains that a transmission of excitation occurs on the synapses.

Dendrite activity is introduced across the so-called synaptic cleft. This is extremely
important because now messengers are exposed which are important for the cells’
interplay in our organism. Neuroscientists have called these neurotransmitters or
transmitters.32 According to Roth, these transmitters overcome the synaptic cleft.
Contact is created with the cell membrane of the next cell. Here, electric excitation
takes place. The transfer of stimuli occurs both via spikes as via the exposure of the
neurotransmitter, transmitter substances.
»The effect of the transmitters does not depend only on their chemical nature. It
also depends on the nature of the cell membrane of the downstream cell. According
to this, a transmitter’s effect can be either stimulating or inhibiting – depending on
the conditions.«33
Our cerebrum is a plastic organ. It is in a constant process of transformation (e. g.
through environmental circumstances or when we learn something new about our
brain) and yet it remains the same organ. »Through neuronal plasticity, the develop-
ment of synaptic structures especially in childhood, the brain evolves into an organ
that belongs to its environment complementarily like a key in a lock.«34 Here, Fuchs
refers to the fact that our brain does not remain untouched by life situations and
environmental conditions. When we chat with each other and exchange ideas, this

29 Cf. Gassen, H. G.: Das Gehirn. Darmstadt 2008, p. 51.

30 Ibid., p. 50.
31 Damasio, A.: The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Conscious-
ness. London 1999, p. 330.
32 Cf. Roth, G.: Die neurobiologischen Grundlagen von Geist und Bewusstsein. In: Pauen, M./
Roth, G. (Eds.): Neurowissenschaften und Philosophie. Eine Einführung. Munich 2001,
p. 166.
33 Ibid., p. 166.
With regard to stimulus trnsmission in the brain cf. Gassen, H. G.: Das Gehirn. Darmstadt
2008, pp. 51–56; Gegenfurtner, K. R.: Gehirn und Wahrnehmung. Frankfurt a. M. 2003,
pp. 15–20.
34 Fuchs, T.: Kosmos im Kopf? Neurowissenschaften und Menschenbild. In: Zeitschrift für
medizinische Ethik 1 (2006), pp. 3–14, here p. 9.
176       A. Man and his brain

is reflected here.35 We can say that our cerebrum is in a constant forming process. As
Fuchs has pointed out, »our brain does not enter this world as a finished appliance
ready to explore it. Instead, our brain forms itself in and through the world.«36 The
cerebral microstructure of your brain is different after you have read this text than
it was before.
Our cerebrum is also determined by the fact that new synaptic contacts can be
established. As far as we know, this is still very well possible as we get older. Thus
adults can still learn what adolescents have missed in school. Unused connections
are capped again.37 Since you and I are not subject to exactly the same relationship
with the environment or with other people, our neuronal contacts in our cerebrum
also differ. This alone demonstrates that we are all unique and special.
In their studies, Roth and Kandel show that the brain stem, the hypothalamus
and parts of the amygdala are needed for the organism to maintain certain vegetative
processes.38 For us to be able to observe anything, we rely on the smooth interaction
between the mesencephalon and thalamus even though all these areas are in and of
themselves unable to observe and conclude. For us to move safely from point A to
point B, certain parts of the mesencephalon, the mesencephalon, the medulla ob-
longata, and the spinal cord must be operationally ready. Our mental manifestations
of life, such as language, depend on the associative cortex of the neocortex.39 If the
associative cerebral cortex were a living being, its soul would be linguistic ability.
The associative cerebral cortex is the matter of linguistic ability. With reference to
Aristotle, we can say that linguistic ability is the fulfillment of the associative cere-

35 Cf. Singer, W.: Selbsterfahrung und neurobiologische Fremdbeschreibung. Zwei konfliktträch-

tige Erkenntnisquellen. In: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie. 52 (2004), pp. 235–255, esp.
p. 249; Singer, W./Ricard, M.: Hirnforschung und Meditation. Frankfurt a. M. 2008, p. 87;
Fuchs, T.: Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan. Eine phänomenologisch-ökologische Konzep-
tion. Stuttgart 2008, pp. 153 ff.; Rager, G.: Neuronale Korrelate von Bewusstsein und Selbst.
In: Rager, G./Quitterer, J./Runggaldier, E.: Unser Selbst. Identität im Wandel der neuronalen
Prozesse. Paderborn/Munich/Vienna/Zurich 22003, p. 25; Kempermann, G.: Plastizität. In:
Honnefelder, L./Schmidt, M. C. (Eds.): Naturalismus als Paradigma. Wie weit reicht die
naturwissenschaftliche Erklärung des Menschen? Berlin 2007, pp. 181–183.
36 Fuchs, T.: Kosmos im Kopf? Neurowissenschaften und Menschenbild. In: Zeitschrift für
medizinische Ethik 1 (2006), p. 9.
37 »A large number of the neurons formed as surplus die in the later embryonic stages and in
the first months after birth as they are not utilized. Only those neurons activated through
constant contact with the environment are selected and preserved. Similarly, during early
childhood nearly twice as many synapses are formed than are utilized in the final instance.
Throughout our lives the microstructure remains changeable regarding synapse sensitivity
and neuronal switching patterns. These are regulated through changes in gene expression,
in signal transmission and receptor density. Dendrites are similarly still able to develop or
retreat. Even the new formation of neurons in the adult hippocampus has been observed.«
(Fuchs, T.: Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan. Eine phänomenologisch-ökologische Konzep-
tion. Stuttgart 2008, p. 154).
38 Cf. also: Kandel, E. R./Schwarz, J. H./Jessell, T. M.: Principles of neural sciences. New York
3
1991, pp. 275 f. and Roth, G.: Aus Sicht des Gehirns. Frankfurt a. M. 2003, pp. 25–29.
39 The associative cerebral cortex is also a necessary prerequisite for our ability to plan actions.
Cf. Roth, G.: Wie das Gehirn die Seele macht. Vortrag auf dem 51. Lindauer Psychotherapie-
wochen. http://www.lptw.de/archiv/vortrag/2001/roth.pdf (retrieved 15. September 2008),
pp. 4 f.
 1. The human brain: An extraordinary organ       177

bral cortex. The individual neuron groups and linguistic ability form the associative
cerebral cortex; soul and body form the organism, a part of which is the associative
cerebral cortex.
The limbic system (we might translate limbus as »hem« or »seam«) lies like a
»hem« around the brain stem and plays a role in our emotions. Included here are
the hypothalamus, the amygdala, the mesolimbic system, the insular, cingulate, and
orbitofrontal cortex as well as the hippocampus. These brain areas are an important
prerequisite for conscious mental manifestations of life to take place. Yet they are
not aware of anything. Thomas Fuchs points out »that brain research undoubtedly
assigns spiritual processes to this central organ the brain.« This is, however, not the
only place as our spirit constantly transcends the limitations of brain and body.40
This statement by Thomas Fuchs, a physician, is in line with Aristotle’s view and the
assumption that there are physical requirements for mental manifestations of life.
Günter Rager has made a convincing suggestion for how we may imagine the soul as
the base form of the body. This could take place

»through the soul’s continuous chemical and neuronal control of the interior milieu.
Its effects would extend to the molecular level, would regulate the activity of the intes-
tines and the musculoskeletal system, so as to situate the organism in its environment.
Through the numerous reentry loops all brain activity would potentially work together
in all regions of the brain.«41

1.3 A journey through the history of brain research

»A constructive dialogue, i. e. a dialogue in which

the quality of the individual statements made
by the science of brain research can be assessed,
can only occur with and within this discipline if
we know its traditional teachings.«42

At this point we will make the more than courageous effort to undertake a journey
through the history of brain research.43 We must limit our discussions to the most

40 Fuchs, T.: Kosmos im Kopf? Neurowissenschaften und Menschenbild. In: Zeitschrift für
medizinische Ethik 1 (2006), pp. 3–14, here p. 8.
41 Rager, G.: Die Person. Wege zu ihrem Verständnis. Fribourg/Vienna 2006, p. 160.
42 Breidbach, O.: Die Materialisierung des Ichs. Zur Geschichte der Hirnforschung im 19. und
20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt a. M. 1997, p. 12.
43 Cf. also more detailed representations: Changeux, J.-P.: Der neuronale Mensch. Wie die Seele
funktioniert – die Entdeckungen der neuen Gehirnforschung. Reinbek bei Hamburg 1984,
Finger, S.: Origins of Neuroscience. Oxford 1994; Florey, E.: Geist – Seele – Gehirn. Eine
kurze Ideengeschichte der Hirnforschung. In: Roth, G./Prinz, W. (Eds.): Kopf-Arbeit. Gehirn-
funktionen und kognitive Leistungen. Heidelberg 1996, pp. 37–86; Pauen, M.: Was ist der
Mensch? Die Entdeckung der Natur des Geistes. Munich 2007; Scheerer, E.: Einmal Kopf,
zweimal Kognition: Geschichte und Gegenwart eines Problems. In: Roth, G./Prinz, W. (Eds.):
Kopf-Arbeit. Gehirnfunktionen und kognitive Leistungen. Heidelberg 1996; Breidbach, O.:
Die Materialisierung des Ichs. Zur Geschichte der Hirnforschung im 19. und 20. Jahrhun-
178       A. Man and his brain

important research personalities and their evaluation. While Thomas Metzinger is

right that in the last ten years we have probably discovered more about the struc-
ture and functioning of the cerebrum than in the last three hundred years,44, today’s
brain research did not just fall from the sky. A glance at the tradition of this disci-
pline shows that a number of questions, problems and suggestions can be located
in a much broader network of relationships. The journey into the history of brain
research may present us with fruitful ideas regarding the lived body-soul problem. It
may also lead us into dead-ends streets and frightening shadow sides that are seldom
mentioned when we want to praise the brilliant successes and the special relevance
of the neuroscientific community. Our journey through history will show that the
claim we often hear today – that neuroscientists now more or less understand the
relationship between the cerebrum and mental manifestations of life – is not an
invention of today’s scientists.45 Quite a few other statements which we can read or
hear today have their high points and low points behind them. Our look at history
can help us to better assess and perhaps even understand the ambitions displayed by
several modern representatives of this discipline. Our journey through the history
of brain research will take us to 10 principal stations.

Station 1: From the ancestors of modern neuroscientists:

Questions about the brain did not originate in the 21st century. There have been devel-
opments, successes and a history of errors.

Some researchers have shown that the word »brain« was found for the first time
in the Edwin Smith Papyrus scrolls. Experts date these texts, which today can be
admired in the New York Academy of Medicine, to the time around 1700 B. C. Some
archaeologists interpret that the described circumstances go back even father – to
the time between 2500 and 3000 B. C. The 48 medical case histories in the so-called
»Book of Woundedness« include 27 portrayals of brain damage.46 There are reports

dert. Frankfurt a. M. 1997; Hagner, M.: Homo cerebralis – Der Wandel vom Seelenorgan
zum Gehirn. Frankfurt a. M. 2000; Elsner, N.: Die Suche nach dem Ort der Seele. In: Els-
ner, N./Lüer, G. (Eds.): Das Gehirn und sein Geist. Göttingen 2000, pp. 29–52; Breidbach,
O.: Hirn und Bewusstsein. Überlegungen zu einer Geschichte der Neurowissenschaften. In:
Pauen, M./Roth, G. (Eds.): Neurowissenschaften und Philosophie. Eine Einführung. Munich
2001, pp. 11–58; Düweke, P.: Kleine Geschichte der Hirnforschung. Von Descartes bis Eccles.
Munich 2001; Oeser, E.: Geschichte der Hirnforschung. Von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart.
Darmstadt 2002; Hagner, M.: Geniale Gehirne. Zur Geschichte der Elitegehirnforschung.
Munich 2007; Bennett, M. R./Hacker, P. M. S.: Philosophical Foundations Of Neuroscience.
Malden/Oxford 102010; Illing, R.-B.: Stationen der Gehirnforschung durch die Jahrtausende.
http://www.robert-illing.de/ (retrieved 12 June 2010).
44 Cf. Metzinger, T.: Auf der Suche nach einem neuen Bild des Menschen. Die Zukunft des Sub-
jekts und die Rolle der Geisteswissenschaften. In: Spät, P. (Ed.): Zur Zukunft der Philosophie
des Geistes. Paderborn 2008, p. 228.
45 Thus e. g. the physiologist from Göttingen, Max Verworn (1863–1921). Cf. Elsner, N.: Die
Suche nach dem Ort der Seele. In: Elsner, N./Lüer, G. (Eds.): Das Gehirn und sein Geist.
Göttingen 2000, p. 48.
46 Cf. http://www.touregypt.net/edwinsmithsurgical.htm (retrieved 22 Febr. 2008), Jäncke, L.:
Hirnforschung: bildgebende Verfahren. Zur Grenze zwischen Naturwissenschaft und philoso-
phischer Spekulation. In: Holderegger, A./Sitter-Liver, B./Hess, C. W./Rager, G. (Eds.): Hirn-
 1. The human brain: An extraordinary organ       179

on cephalagia (headache) and some therapeutic possibilities for it. In his book, Neu-
ronal Man, J.-P. Changeux points especially to Cases 6, 8 and 22. In Case 6 it is
described that when the skullcap was removed, folds could be seen that resembled
those of melting copper.47 This report already gave a fairly exact portrayal of the
brain’s folds and convolutions. Equally sensational is that disabilities in movement
and language were already related to brain damage. Case 8 draws attention to the
fact that an illness »in the skull« leads to motoric dysfunction (e. g. of the eyes).
In Case 22, we read that »when you examine someone whose temple is depressed,
that person will not answer your questions because he can no longer speak.«48 Ob-
viously, the Egyptians knew that the brain was of far-reaching consequence for the
human organism. Their cultural advancement and achievements were also evident
in their medical knowledge. 5000 years ago, they already performed neurosurgical
interventions in the cerebrum. Yet, the Egyptians considered the heart, this hollow
muscular organ, as the major human organ, and that is why it (and not the brain)
was embalmed.

Station 2: Brain research prior to questions about the relationship between the
encephalon and mental manifestations of life: Profitable ideas and the danger of dead-
lock.

In antiquity, it wasn’t only the Egyptians who were exceptionally knowledgeable

about brain research. Alkmaeon of Croton was an outstanding researcher. About 500
B. C. he knew that manifestations of life such as hearing, sight and smell were closely
linked to the cerebrum. He was even able to demonstrate that the brain and the eyes
were in contact with each other via nerve paths.49

»He was the first to develop an argument for the immortality of the soul. He used a
political metaphor to define health and disease: The equality (isonomia) of the oppos-
ing powers which make up the body (e. g., the wet, the dry, the hot, the cold, the sweet,

forschung und Menschenbild. Beiträge zur interdisziplinären Verständigung. Fribourg 2007,

pp. 121 and 469; Westendorf, W.: Papyrus Edwin Smith. Ein medizinisches Lehrbuch aus
dem alten Ägypten. Wund- und Unfallchirurgie, Zaubersprüche gegen Seuchen, verschiedene
Rezepte. Bern/Stuttgart 1966.
47 Cf. Changeux, J.-P.: Der neuronale Mensch. Wie die Seele funktioniert – die Entdeckungen der
neuen Gehirnforschung. Reinbek bei Hamburg 1984, p. 13.
48 Ibid., p. 14.
49 He describes the nerve fibers and speaks of poroi, i. e. hollow canals, pipes. He tells us that
»all these channels originate from the same place and have the same root (in the brain), and
are connected in the innermost parts of the forehead. After they have separated themselves
in a forked manner from oeach othet, they reach the eyeballs where the eyebrows extend in
transverse directions. There they turn around and because the lap of the skin takes up nat-
ural moisture they fill out the spheres which are protected through the top of the eyelids.«
(Quoted by: Oeser, E.: Geschichte der Hirnforschung. Von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart.
Darmstadt 2002, p. 19). Regarding brain research in antiquity cf. also: Finger, S.: Origins of
Neuroscience. Oxford 1994; Oeser, E.: Gehirn, Bewusstsein und Erkenntnis. Darmstadt 1988,
pp. 1 ff.
180       A. Man and his brain

the bitter etc.) preserve health, whereas the monarchy of any one of them produces
disease.«50

He finally arrived at the conclusion that the brain »permits the perception of hearing,
sight, smell. These then lead to memory and presentation, and when these, in turn,
have come to rest they give rise to knowledge.«51 The works of this versatile thinker
have influenced Hippocrates and Aristotle among others. Similar to Alkmaeon, Dio-
genes of Apollonia (about 499–428 B. C.) assessed the situation. Patricia Curd sum-
marizes his approach: »Humans and animals live by breathing air, and are governed
by it – in them air is both soul and intelligence.«52 The air was understood to be so
important that it was said to be the connecting medium between the encephalon and
the respective sensory organs. This might sound strange or even bizarre to modern
ears, yet I believe that something very important was recognized here, namely that
no organ, not even the encephalon, is an isolated entity. According to Diogenes, the
human soul cannot be found in any specific region of the brain.53 Democritus (460–
371) intensively studied the Nervus opticus (i. e. the connection between the back of
the brain and the eyes). He actively pursued the question how it is possible that a
sensory impression finds its way from our eyeballs to the cerebrum, a question that
is being discussed in a different context today – as I will demonstrate in the chapter
on consciousness, through the works of Ramachandran and Hirstein. According
to Democritus, the importance of the encephalon cannot be overrated. He tells us
that »the brain watches over the highest extremities as a watchman, a citadel of the
body entrusted with the task of standing guard.«54 Hippocrates (about 460–370),
whose name and work is known to every medical professional, carefully examined
skull wounds and dedicated himself especially to patients suffering from seizures,
i. e. epilepsy (from the Greek epilepsis = attack). Probably Hippocrates had not even
dreamed of what are routine diagnostic procedures today. He also could not know
that all this is connected to a paroxysmal synchronistic discharge of neuronal groups.
Yet he examined patients very carefully and reached the following conclusion:

»They know ahead of time that they will have a seizure and flee from other people. If
their home is nearby, they go home. Otherwise they go to a lonely place where as few
people as possible can see them fall down. There they conceal themselves. They do this

50 Huffmann, C.: Alcmaeon. In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/

entries/alcmaeon/ (retrieved 12 Sept. 2009).
51 Quoted by: Oeser, E.: Geschichte der Hirnforschung. Von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart.
Darmstadt 2002, p. 19.
52 Curd, P.: Presocratic Philosophy. In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stan
ford.edu/entries/presocratics/ (retrieved 12 Sept. 2009).
53 Cf. Oeser, E.: Geschichte der Hirnforschung. Von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart. Darmstadt
2002, p. 21.
54 Quoted by Changeux, J.-P.: Der neuronale Mensch. Wie die Seele funktioniert – die Entdeck-
ungen der neuen Gehirnforschung. Reinbek bei Hamburg 1984, p. 15.
Changeux recognizes the importance of Democritus for brain research in that he as-
signs individual mental abilities to various areas in the body. His understanding of »soul
anatomes,« which are spread across the entire body, can be seen as an indication of the
concept of nerve activity.
 1. The human brain: An extraordinary organ       181

because they are ashamed of their suffering, not as is generally believed, because they
are afraid of the godhead.«55

Hippocrates tells us that we must depend on a healthy and performance-oriented

encephalon is crucial if we want to think about the subjects discussed here, if we want
to hear the doorbell or enjoy the smell of coffee coming from the kitchen. Our cer-
ebral accomplishments include the ability to differentiate between good and evil, to
discriminate between the pleasant and the unpleasant. Hippocrates believes the brain
has »the greatest power« in us, although his assumption that it is a gland was of course
incorrect.56 Yet he was aware that there are two sides to the brain. He also discovered
other important facts. For example, he knew that when one half of the brain is injured,
the opposite side of the organism is especially affected.57 Aristotle saw the cerebrum
as something like a cooling assembly for our organism. He had discovered that the
temperature of the brain is not as high as that of the surrounding body. Changeaux
acknowledged: »Aristotle discovered [...] that in contrast to the heart, the exposed
brain does not respond to mechanical stimuli.«58 Bennett und Hacker write: »His
fundamental conceptions of animate life are indispensable to an understanding of the
reasoning of the early scientists.«59 This is of course true. Furthermore, the statements
made by Aristotle concerning the organism and mental-spiritual manifestations of life
(as emphasized for example by the statements of Damasio) are of great significance
for modern brain research. Here, we should definitely mention the name of Galen, a
physician to gladiators (129–199). He was a true specialist in his field, probably be-
cause he organized numerous experiments which he implemented successfully.60 He
studied in Alexandria and practiced in Rome. He is said to have written 500 treatises,
and today we still have access to 83 of them. He was looking for mental manifestations
of life in a specific place within the cerebral structures. The mental manifestations of
life named in the introduction to the present study (from listening to favorite music
to praying) are, according to Galen, most likely located there. He thought that the
special shape of the whorls of the cortex in four-legged animals with long ears, such
as donkeys, was an indication that we need not look for mental manifestations of
human life in those places. His supposition had many consequences: In his opinion,
the spiritus animalis (pneuma psychikon) emanates from the spiritus vitalis (pneuma
zootikon) i. e. our breathing. He said that all this occurs in our brain ventricles, and
he was sure of that since he said it was well-documented scientifically. His hypothesis
was that the spiritus vitalis is generated by the spiritus naturalis. He also had an expla-
nation for that, saying that it is the result of occurrences in our liver. In the chapter on

55 Quoted by: Gassen, H. G.: Das Gehirn. Darmstadt 2008, p. 18.

56 Cf. Elsner, N./Lüer, G.: Einführung. In: Elsner, N./Lüer, G. (Eds.): Das Gehirn und sein Geist.
Göttingen 2000, p. 7.
57 Cf. Changeux, J.-P.: Der neuronale Mensch. Wie die Seele funktioniert – die Entdeckungen der
neuen Gehirnforschung. Reinbek bei Hamburg 1984, p. 15.
58 Ibid., p. 16.
59 Bennett, M. R./Hacker, P. M. S.: Philosophical Foundations Of Neuroscience. Malden/Oxford
10
2010, p. 12.
60 Cf. Changeux, J.-P.: Der neuronale Mensch. Wie die Seele funktioniert – die Entdeckungen der
neuen Gehirnforschung. Reinbek bei Hamburg 1984, p. 17.
182       A. Man and his brain

Descartes, we heard about the notion of life spirits. This is where that assumption had
its roots. Galen had also already thought about the pineal gland. In his opinion, we
were dealing with a valve that plays a role in how our thoughts manifest themselves:

»Galen discussed the pineal gland in the eighth book of his anatomical work On the
usefulness of the parts of the body. He explained that it owes its name (Greek: kônarion,
Latin: glandula pinealis) to its resemblance in shape and size to the nuts found in the
cones of the stone pine (Greek: kônos, Latin: pinus pinea). He called it a gland because
of its appearance and said that it has the same function as all other glands of the body,
namely to serve as a support for blood vessels.«61

Medieval scholars in Europe as well as the Arabic interpreters of Aristotle (such

as Avicenna, who was a physician himself), largely appropriated Galens’ ideas and
modified them:

»Although Galen was the supreme medical authority until the seventeenth century, his
views were often extended or modified. An early example of this phenomenon is the
addition of a ventricular localization theory of psychological faculties to Galen’s account
of the brain. The first theory of this type that we know of was presented by Posidonius
of Byzantium (end of the fourth century AD), who said that imagination is due to the
forepart of the brain, reason to the middle ventricle, and memory to the hind part of
the brain [...]. A few decades later, Nemesius of Emesa (ca. 400 AD) was more specif-
ic and maintained that the anterior ventricle is the organ of imagination, the middle
ventricle the organ of reason, and the posterior ventricle the organ of memory [...]. The
latter theory was almost universally adopted until the middle of the sixteenth century,
although there were numerous variants. The most important variant was due to Avicen-
na (980–1037 AD), who devised it by projecting the psychological distinctions found in
Aristotle’s On the soul onto the ventricular system of the brain.«62

Station 3: About new beginnings and the struggle for interpretational sovereignty in
brain research.

The name of Leonardo da Vinci (1452–1519) remains a household word in many

sectors of society. Leonardo was a multi-gifted person, not only as a painter, sculptor,
architect and engineer, but also as an anatomist who is said to have dissected more
than thirty corpses. With his ability to draw ventricles, he helped in the advancement
of science in the 15th century. He was confident that the medulla, the spinal cord,
originated in the cerebral structures of the head. He documented for posterity how
to perform a brain ventricle analysis:

61 Lokhorst, G.-J.: Descartes and the Pineal Gland. In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pineal-gland/ (retrieved 12 Oct. 2010).
Cf. also: Bennett, M. R./Hacker, P. M. S.: Philosophical Foundations Of Neuroscience.
Malden/Oxford 102010, pp. 19–21, 23, 30, 34 f.
62 Ibid.
 1. The human brain: An extraordinary organ       183

»Two vents should be made in the horns of the large ventricle. The molten wax should
be introduced by drilling a hole in the memoria. Through this hole, the three brain ven-
tricles should be filled. As soon as the wax has hardened, the brain should be taken out.
You will then be able to see the exact shape of the three ventricles. Be careful, however,
to remember to insert small pipes into the vents so that the air can escape and make
room for the ventricles.«63

In the 16th century, the Flemish researcher Andreas Vesalius (1514–1564), who was
given the honorary title, »Father of modern anatomy,« took a new approach. He con-
ducted his anatomical research in Padua. He observed and analyzed precisely where
the ventricles are located and how they are structured. He wrote that the pineal gland
looks like a pine cone. He prepared many brain sections. Bennet and Hacker write
about him: »He was skeptical about the idea that psychological functions originate
in the ventricles.«64
His assumption was that the convolutions of the brain played an important role
for our mental and spiritual manifestations of life. Vesalius »rejected all ventricular
localization theories and all theories according to which the choroid plexus, pineal
gland, or vermis of the cerebellum can regulate the flow of spirits in the ventricles
of the brain.«65 Vesalius’ criticism of Galen was seen by his Parisian teacher Jacobus
Sylvius (1478–1555) as a betrayal. It seems that the struggle for interpretational dom-
inance is not new in the neuroscientific discipline.

Station 4: New terms for new discoveries. Or: We stand on the shoulders of others

Some neuroanatomical advances could be documented, for example by Giulio Ce-

sare Aranzio (1530–1589), who in 1564 was the first to write about the »hippocam-
pus«. Another name for a brain region still well known today is the pons (the bridge).
This term was coined by Constanzo Varolio (1543–1575). Let us therefore remember
that modern research is indebted for its terms, words and ideas to a scientific com-
munity that discussed these matters with each other, rejected some findings and set
new benchmarks. I will discuss these thoughts further in this study.

Station 5: Brain research and the question: Lived body and soul or mind and brain?

Let us make the acquaintance of another 16th century research personality: Jean Fer-
nel (1506–1588). According to him, the brain is the leading organ in our nervous
system. For example, we need an active cerebrum to read this text or hear when
someone turns a page. In contrast to Descartes, Fernel supports an organismic per-

63 Quoted by: Oeser, E.: Geschichte der Hirnforschung. Von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart.
Darmstadt 2002, p. 43. Cf. also: Bennett, M. R./Hacker, P. M. S.: Philosophical Foundations
Of Neuroscience. Malden/Oxford 102010, p. 23; Kupper, D.: Leonardo da Vinci. Reinbek bei
Hamburg 2007.
64 Bennett, M. R./Hacker, P. M. S.: Philosophical Foundations Of Neuroscience. Malden/Oxford
10
2010, p. 23.
65 Lokhorst, G.-J.: Descartes and the Pineal Gland. In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pineal-gland/ (retrieved 12 Oct. 2010).
184       A. Man and his brain

spective. He definitively wants to hold fast to the idea that the soul pervades the
living being. In his Universa medicina, Fernel writes: »The achievements of the body
do not emanate from their own initiative, nor from that of the body ... The reason for
the body’s achievements is the soul.«66 Fernel seems to have understood that we can
very well combine the observations of entelechy with brain research.67 It is extremely
interesting to see what has been said in the name of science to explain the cerebrum.
Weinhold used the image of man the machine to tell his students that the cerebrum
can be understood as a battery.68 »A battery?« William B. Carpenter (1813–1885)
muses, and he suggests we would have to understand the body as a complete factory
and the nervous system as a well-functioning telephone system.69 It is evident that
these researchers had the talent to »marry« their ideas to the spirit of the times in
which they lived. However, they soon found themselves to be »widowers«.
There is also an intellectual connection between Descartes and his contemporary,
Thomas Willis (1621–1675). They were both engaged in searching for a switch to
connect the influxus physicus. According to Willis, the cortex was the most likely
location.70 Regarding the pineal gland he wrote: »We can scarce believe this to be the
seat of the Soul, or its chief Faculties to arise from it; because Animals, which seem
to be almost quite destitute of Imagination, Memory, and other superior Powers of
the Soul, have this Glandula or Kernel large and fair enough.«71 In our discussion
of Popper and Eccles, we saw that some modern authors are also walking in those
footsteps. Willis argued that in terms of unconscious mental manifestations of life,
the cerebellum is a factor that has to be taken seriously:

66 Fernel, J.: Universa medicina. Liber V, Capitel 1. Quoted by: Beckermann, A.: Das Leib-
Seele-Problem. Eine Einführung in die Philosophie des Geistes. Paderborn 2008, p. 15.
67 »Like Aristotle, Fernel holds that plants and animals have a soul (anima), or principle of life.
Possession of a rational soul (i. e. a soul that includes the powers of the intellect and will) is
distinctive of man. Unlike Aristotle, but like Aquinas, Fernel conceived of the rational soul
of man [...] as separable from the body, and as immortal« (Bennett, M. R./Hacker, P. M. S.:
Philosophical Foundations Of Neuroscience. Malden/Oxford 102010, p. 24).
68 In order to prove his theory that the cerebrum is a battery, »he bored an opening into the
back of a little cat’s head and with a spoon inserted into this opening he removed the cere-
brum and the cerebellum. Then he destroyed the spinal marrow. Thereupon the animal lost
all life, all use of its senses as well as the movement of the voluntary muscles and eventually
all pulsation. When Weinhold then filled both cavities with an amalgam filling of zinc and
silver life returned to the animal so that it lifted its head, opened its eyes, stared ahead and
attempted to crawl. It collapsed a few times until it finally made a great effort to get up,
jumped around and then collapsed exhausted. During this time, the beating of the animals
heart and the pulsation as well as the blood circulation were noticeably livelier. The animal’s
body temperature had returned to normal.« (Oeser, E.: Geschichte der Hirnforschung. Von
der Antike bis zur Gegenwart. Darmstadt 2002, p. 100 f.).
69 Cf. Breidbach, O.: Die Materialisierung des Ichs. Zur Geschichte der Hirnforschung im 19.
und 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt a. M. 1997, p. 161; Hagner, M.: Homo cerebralis – Der Wan-
del vom Seelenorgan zum Gehirn. Frankfurt a. M. 2000, p. 17.
70 Cf. Bennett, M. R./Hacker, P. M. S.: Philosophical Foundations Of Neuroscience. Malden/Ox-
ford 102010, p. 30. f.; Oeser, E.: Geschichte der Hirnforschung. Von der Antike bis zur Gegen-
wart. Darmstadt 2002, pp. 58–69.
71 Lokhorst, G.-J.: Descartes and the Pineal Gland. In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pineal-gland/ (retrieved 12 Oct. 2010).
 1. The human brain: An extraordinary organ       185

»All spontaneous movements are planned within the brain i. e. the movements we
know and want. The spirit that resides in the cerebellum quietly and almost unnoticed
carries out the task given it by nature without us knowing or being concerned about
it.«72

Medicine favored Willis insofar as it enabled him to demonstrate that the cerebral
cortex, the Cortex cerebri covers the sub-cortical areas. »With the participation of
Christopher Wren (the architect who designed Saint Paul’s Cathedral) who did the
drawings, he produced the best images of the brain we have ever seen to date.«73

Station 6: The brain: Creator of the universe or an amazing creation?

For the Danish anatomist and later Bishop Niels Stensen (1638–1686), who discov-
ered the excretory duct of the parotid gland, the encephalon was a true masterpiece
of God’s creation: »A wonderful organ which points to the wonderful creator.« To-
day, the brain is often regarded as the creator of our world, creator mundi, which I will
discuss in the chapter Lived body and soul or mind and brain?. Stensen pointed out
that »Descartes’ basic anatomical assumptions were wrong because the pineal gland
is not suspended in the middle of the ventricles and is not surrounded by arteries but
by veins.«74 Stensen, who was beatified in 1988, commented on the hypotheses re-
garding our sensory perception, which were hotly discussed in his time. He said that
concepts such as »animal-like spirits in their smallest parts or as blood vapor or nerve
sap are all perceptions that are used by many but are no more than words without
meaning.«75 Erhard Oeser praises Stensen in particular for having clearly recognized
the complexity of our brain. He calls Stenson’s suggestion »groundbreaking« that the
failure of brain functions should let us draw conclusions about normal functions.76
We will meet with this idea again in section 1.5, in my chapter on brain damage.
Franz Joseph Gall, whose work we will look at below, also refers to Stensen’s work.77

Station 7: Brain research in the conflict area between justified hopes and daring
prophecies: Localization projects and the question of the organism.

Luigi Galvani (1737–1798) successfully demonstrated that the speculation about

nimble life spirits is not really tenable. His main subject was the electrical stimulation
of nerves. He informed his colleagues that electrical current flows through nerves and

72 Willis, T.: Cerebri anatome: cui accessit nervorum descriptio et usus. London 1664, p. 111.
Quoted by: Greenfield, S. A.: Reiseführer Gehirn. Heidelberg/Berlin 2003, p. 58.
73 Changeux, J.-P.: Der neuronale Mensch. Wie die Seele funktioniert – die Entdeckungen der
neuen Gehirnforschung. Reinbek bei Hamburg 1984, p. 23.
74 Lokhorst, G.-J.: Descartes and the Pineal Gland. In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pineal-gland/ (retrieved 12 Oct. 2010).
75 Quoted by: Gassen, H. G.: Das Gehirn. Darmstadt 2008, p. 23.
76 Cf. Oeser, E.: Geschichte der Hirnforschung. Von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart. Darmstadt
2002, pp. 69 f., 72, 80.
77 Cf. Breidbach, O.: Die Materialisierung des Ichs. Zur Geschichte der Hirnforschung im 19.
und 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt a. M. 1997, p. 66.
186       A. Man and his brain

muscles.78 Breidbach writes: »We know today that Galvani [...] only provided proof
of animal electricity in 1794 and that he did not himself recognize the relevance of
his discovery.«79 His name has been perpetuated through the term »galvanism«, and
we remember him for his experiments with frogs which were later imitated by gen-
erations of l students. Changeux and other modern authors have regarded Galvani’s
book, De viribus electricitatis in motu musculari commentaries as a »scientific revolu-
tion«80 The following comments demonstrate how many exaggerated hopes and wish-
es have been connected with neuroscientific research. The author of Frankenstein,
Mary Shelly, referred to Galvani’s experiments when she said that »galvanism has
shown that a corpse can perhaps be brought to life again. Then, perhaps, the matching
parts can also be processed, brought together, and given back the warmth of life.«81
As we have already heard in Part 1, some current authors contemplate whether it is
possible to save a person’s identity on a computer chip. Occasionally, brain research
is to ensure a better life and even grant eternal life and salvation. Like many modern
neuroscientists and neurophilosophers,82 Charles Bonnet (1720–1793) was in favor
of a mind-brain image of humans. He was convinced that the problem of personal
identity can only be linked to the cerebrum. He neglected the lived body-soul unity
in favor of encephalocentrism. »When the soul of a Huron inherits the brain of a
Montesquieu, the Montesquieu would continue to be creative.«83
The venturesome speculations of Samuel Thomas Soemmering (1755–1830) were
similarly encephalocentric. That his name appears in most representations of the
history of brain research is probably due to the fact that he dedicated his work about
the organ of the soul (Über das Organ der Seele) to Immanuel Kant, who tore apart
Soemmering’s claim that the encephalon is where the soul is located.
The natural scientist and theologian Emanuel Swedenborg (1688–1772) believed
that the various areas of the brain are also responsible for different functions. His

78 Cf. Bennett, M. R./Hacker, P. M. S.: Philosophical Foundations Of Neuroscience. Malden/Ox-

ford 102010, p. 35; Oeser, E.: Geschichte der Hirnforschung. Von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart.
Darmstadt 2002, pp. 93 f.; Breidbach, O.: Die Materialisierung des Ichs. Zur Geschichte der
Hirnforschung im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt a. M. 1997, pp. 52 ff.
79 Breidbach, O.: Die Materialisierung des Ichs. Zur Geschichte der Hirnforschung im 19. und
20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt a. M. 1997, p. 52.
80 Changeux, J.-P.: Der neuronale Mensch. Wie die Seele funktioniert – die Entdeckungen der
neuen Gehirnforschung. Reinbek bei Hamburg 1984, p. 44.
81 Quoted by: Oeser, E.: Geschichte der Hirnforschung. Von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart.
Darmstadt 2002, p. 101.
82 Neurophilosophers are convinced that only the neurosciences are in a position to present an
appropriate answer to the body-soul problem. Their fundamental belief is that we should no
longer understand ourselves as free active persons: being human can be reduced to mind and
brain. According to them, mental manifestations of life should be eradicated and words such
as »think,« »believe,« »suppose« (mental vocabulary) should be replaced by neuroscientific
vocabulary. There are times when neurophilosophers epistemically continue to adhere to
mental manifestations of life. They, however, reduce these ontologically to physical realities.
This approach became familiar to us in the Part 1 where physicalism was discussed. Here, we
see that eliminative materialism comes under the guise of »neurophilosophy«.
83 Quoted by: Oeser, E.: Geschichte der Hirnforschung. Von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart.
Darmstadt 2002, p. 265.
 1. The human brain: An extraordinary organ       187

work only became known considerably later. Just as today some neuroscientists keep
making the headlines, so did Franz Joseph Gall (1758–1828). Gall said it was possible
to identify diverse mental manifestations of life on the surface of the brain. In the
spirit of the mind-brain paradigm, he assumed that all mental manifestations of life
are located in the cerebrum, and that the shape and the dimension of the area of the
brain tell us something about a person’s personality, strengths and weaknesses.84
Johann Kaspar Spurzheim (1776–1832) quickly realized that we could gain a great
deal of publicity with such thoughts, and he proceeded to make phrenology more
widely accessible. Phrenologists promised that the state of the skull made it possi-
ble to discover scientifically substantiated knowledge about another person’s mental
manifestations of life. Another phrenologist, George Combe (1788–1858) examined
the skulls of two indigenous Americans and came to rather questionable results.
Breidbach points out that the discrimination of non-Europeans was supported in
the name of the neurosciences. According to Olaf Breidbach, phrenology created
thought patterns which were predisposed towards developments regarding racist
theories independent of further internal neuroscientific assessments.85 In any event,
general fascination with phrenology was enormous. All stayed up to date in their
concern with this subject. Anyone who didn’t just want to »listen to their heart«,
consulted phrenologists when they chose their spouses. Stefan Zweig’s The Royal
Game, which he wrote during his exile in Brazil between 1938 and 1941, again high-
lights the effect of Gall’s phrenology:

»In the olden days of physiognomic passion, Gall might have dissected the brains of
these chess masters to determine whether such chess geniuses had any special convo-
lutions in the grey mass of their brains, whether there was a chess muscle or a chess
cusp not present in other skulls.«86

Yet the works of Gall did not only meet either with applause and with the sym-
pathy of his colleagues. After the French physiologist Marie Jean Pierre Flourens
(1794–1867) had examined many people who showed a restriction in their cerebral
processes, he did his best to promote another view. In his opinion »we can remove a
large part of cerebral lobes without losing any of their functions ... The cerebral lobes
contributes contribute to the complete and integrated function.«87 Today, Flourens
is especially well known for his holistic views.88 But that, too, as can be imagined,

84 Cf. Oehler-Klein, S.: Die Schädellehre Franz Joseph Galls in Literatur und Kritik des
19. Jahrhunderts. Stuttgart/New York 1990; Oeser, E.: Geschichte der Hirnforschung. Von der
Antike bis zur Gegenwart. Darmstadt 2002, pp. 110–130; Düweke, P.: Kleine Geschichte der
Hirnforschung. Von Descartes bis Eccles. Munich 2001, pp. 42–57; Breidbach, O.: Die Mate-
rialisierung des Ichs. Zur Geschichte der Hirnforschung im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt
a. M. 1997, pp. 73–81.
85 Ibid., p. 88.
86 Zweig, S.: Schachnovelle. Tübingen 602009, p. 23.
87 Changeux, J.-P.: Der neuronale Mensch. Wie die Seele funktioniert – die Entdeckungen der
neuen Gehirnforschung. Reinbek bei Hamburg 1984, p. 29.
88 Cf. Bennett, M. R./Hacker, P. M. S.: Philosophical Foundations Of Neuroscience. Malden/Ox-
ford 102010, pp. 38 f.
188       A. Man and his brain

did not only meet with agreement. Olaf Breidbach suggested: »With this, Flourens
blocked every forward development of the localization theory up into the 1860s.«89
What we can learn here is that first of all, brain research is not an infallible project,
that secondly it is not free of controversy and thirdly it is not a unitary enterprise,
often full of controversial views. Often different groups were formed which defended
their own perspectives and guiding principles against each other.
Paul Broca (1824–1890)90 and Carl Wernicke (1848–1904) also made a name
for themselves. Both could state convincingly that our speech and the perception of
speech require certain regions of the brain. More about this later. As groundbreaking
as their results were, their relationship with corporeality was rather strange. They
said it was »a machine that possesses the devices to receive sensory stimuli designed
to carry out movement, but which itself in its relationship to the brain constitutes a
part of the external world.«91 The English physiologist David Ferrier (1843–1928) is
convinced that our will is the result of cell physiological events, a theory still often
heard today. Obviously many modern convictions are not all that young.92
In the German-language sector, for example, Kurt Goldstein (1878–1965) dis-
tances himself from localizational plans. He finds it particularly important to ob-
serve phenomena very carefully and to describe them. His main question was for-
mulated by Votsmeier: »What meaning or rather function does a symptom have for
the human organism as a whole? How does a symptom (a) help the survival of the
organism, and (b) ensure the optimal manifestation of the person’s individual na-
ture?«93 According to Goldstein, we must see that in a case of brain lesions, not only
one organ, but the whole living organism is afflicted. The living being is then trying
to regain the lost balance in such situations.94 He said that organisms are designed
for self-preservation and self-realization:

»The possibility of asserting ourselves while maintaining our own unique responsibility
is linked to the manner in which the organism interacts with the environment. This
interaction needs to occur in such a manner that each change occasioned by environ-
mental stimuli will rebalance itself within a certain time so that the organism can re-

89 Breidbach, O.: Hirn und Bewusstsein – Überlegungen zu einer Geschichte der Neurowissen-
schaften. In: Pauen, M./Roth, G. (Eds.): Neurowissenschaften und Philosophie. Eine Ein-
führung. Munich 2001, p. 30.
90 Cf. Düweke, P.: Kleine Geschichte der Hirnforschung. Von Descartes bis Eccles. Munich 2001,
pp. 58–72.
91 Wernicke, C.: Grundriß der Psychiatrie in klinischen Vorlesungen. Leipzig 1900, pp. 37 f.
Quoted by: Fuchs, T.: Leib, Raum, Person. Entwurf einer phänomenologischen Anthropolo-
gie. Stuttgart 2000, p. 39. Cf. also: Oeser, E.: Geschichte der Hirnforschung. Von der Antike bis
zur Gegenwart. Darmstadt 2002, pp. 160–165.
92 Cf. Breidbach, O.: Die Materialisierung des Ichs. Zur Geschichte der Hirnforschung im 19.
und 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt a. M. 1997, pp. 253 ff.
93 Votsmeier, A.: Gestalttherapie und die ›organismische Theorie‹. Der Einfluss Kurt Goldsteins.
In: Gestalttherapie 1 (1995), pp. 2–16, here p. 5.
94 Cf. Jäncke, L.: Hirnforschung: bildgebende Verfahren. Zur Grenze zwischen Naturwissen-
schaft und philosophischer Spekulation. In: Holderegger, A./Sitter-Liver, B./Hess, C. W./
Rager, G. (Eds.): Hirnforschung und Menschenbild. Beiträge zur interdisziplinären Verstän-
digung. Fribourg 2007, pp. 123 f.
 1. The human brain: An extraordinary organ       189

main in line with its own being within the ›medium‹ condition of excitement adequate
to itself.«95

Donald O. Hebb (1904–1985) also believes we should think holistically. In his re-
search, he is also studied how mental manifestations of life such as learning processes
can transform the cerebrum.96

Station 8: Brain research and the projection of societal structures onto the brain.

Among others, the work of Paul Flechsig demonstrates that socio-political concepts
are continuously projected onto the brain: »In the development of our spirit and its
persistent traits we can clearly recognize the architecture of our brain.«97 We could
subdivide the cerebrum in the sense of a monarchical society. »It is not the republic,
but the monarchy that is reflected in the organization of the soul organ« Flechsig tells
us.98 This ideological concept was revised by later researchers.

Station 9: Brain research and the scramble for the super-brain.

Looking around in the book market today, we often come across recipe collections
and guidelines showing how we can better »serve« and »use« our brain.99 Just as we
can upgrade computers, we can apparently refresh brains and help our brain cells a
bit to perform.100 The brain is not to be excluded from the motto, »citius, altius, for-
tius«. Nintendo, the games manufacturer, advertises that you can »Train your brain
in minutes a day. We’re all mobile today, and life is faster. The more important is to
have a fit head that is able to play along«.101 Manufacturers of baby food emphasize
that their products promote brain development. The dream of being particularly
blessed with a super-brain is not new. A glance at Oskar Vogt (1870–1959) and his
wife Cécile (1875–1962) demonstrates this. The couple were given the special task
by the Kremlin to demonstrate to the world that Lenin’s head held an above average
cerebrum which helped to promote Communism.102

95 Quoted by Votsmeier, A.: Gestalttherapie und die ›organismische Theorie‹. Der Einfluss Kurt
Goldsteins. In: Gestalttherapie 1 (1995), p. 8.
96 Cf. Breidbach, O.: Die Materialisierung des Ichs. Zur Geschichte der Hirnforschung im 19.
und 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt a. M. 1997, pp. 23–26, 33 ff., 362 f., 366 u. a.
97 Quoted by Oeser, E.: Geschichte der Hirnforschung. Von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart.
Darmstadt 2002, p. 207.
98 Quoted by Breidbach, O.: Die Materialisierung des Ichs. Zur Geschichte der Hirnforschung
im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt a. M. 1997, p. 224.
99 Cf. e. g. Hüther, G.: Bedienungsanleitung für ein menschliches Gehirn. Göttingen 2001;
Spitzer, M.: Das Gehirn – eine Gebrauchsanweisung. Reinbek bei Hamburg.
100 Cf. Stafford, T./Webb, M.: Mind Hacks. Beijing 2005.
101 Cf. the adevertising text of »Dr. Kawashima’ s Brain Training«. Nintendo DS. 2007.
102 Cf. Düweke, P.: Kleine Geschichte der Hirnforschung. Von Descartes bis Eccles. Munich 2001,
pp. 114–128; Elsner, N.: Die Suche nach dem Ort der Seele. In: Elsner, N./Lüer, G. (Eds.): Das
Gehirn und sein Geist. Göttingen 2000, p. 46.
190       A. Man and his brain

Station 10: Brain research and the advance of technology

The success story of brain research is primarily due to technical innovations in the
last two centuries. For example, new methods of dying nerve cells had momentous
consequences. With his wax plate technology, Wilhelm His (1831–1904) invented
three-dimensional imaging of embryos. »The approach taken by His was very suc-
cessful in that the extremely complex structure of the adult brain could be reduced to
simple embryo-size.«103 It is also important to mention the developmental leap that
resulted from of electron microscopy. New research paths were opened; the relation-
ship and the understanding of the brain changed. As Oeser wrote:

»The realization that the complete brain with its functionally differentiated areas is
made up of individual active elements which change and develop provides the brain
with a dynamic process character that could no longer be reconciled with the under-
standing of the brain as a mechanical apparatus.«104

Of consequence for our century are also the works of Otto Creutzfeld (1927–1992).
The German neurologist, who also trained Wolf Singer, tells us that it is wise to think
of the organization of the cerebral cortex as forming parallel loops. In his opinion,
these guarantee inner-organismic responses as well as the relationship between the
organism and its environment.105
The following statement made by some psychologists is very apt: »The latest im-
pulses in brain research are less due to developmental leaps in theory development
but thanks to important technical developments.«106 Among these technical innova-
tions is the invention by Hans Berger of the electroencephalograph (EEG).107 Other
important imaging processes that have enriched research during the last century108

103 Rager, G.: Neuronale Korrelate von Bewusstsein und Selbst. In: Rager, G./Quitterer, J./Rung-
galdier, E.: Unser Selbst. Identität im Wandel der neuronalen Prozesse. Paderborn/Munich/
Vienna/Zurich 22003, p. 18.
104 Oeser, E.: Geschichte der Hirnforschung. Von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart. Darmstadt 2002,
p. 212.
105 Cf. Elsner, N.: Die Suche nach dem Ort der Seele. In: Elsner, N./Lüer, G. (Eds.): Das Gehirn
und sein Geist. Göttingen 2000, p. 47.
106 Psychologie im 21. Jahrhundert. Eine Standortbestimmung. In: Gehirn & Geist 7/8 (2005), p. 60.
107 The EEG is part and parcel of a modern neurologist’s toolkit. The word electroencephalog-
raphy contains the two Greek words enkephalos (brain) and graphein (to write). What is
being written down are the changes in tension as well as the electrical brain currents. This
is made possible by hooking a human being’s head up to cables.
It is claimed that the advantage of this method of treatment is that through it is best uti-
lized with people who are unable to communicate with others linguistically. The spectrum
here goes from small children to people who are unconscious. The EEG is, for example,
used to determine the depth of anesthesia. It is also used to determine whether brain death
has taken place or not. Cf. Zschocke, S.: Klinische Elektroenzephalographie. Berlin 2002;
Zumsteg, D./Hungerbühler, H./Wieser, H.-G.: Atlas of Adult Electroencephalography. Bad
Honnef 2004; Schleim, S.: Gedankenlesen: Pionierarbeit der Hirnforschung. Hannover 2008,
pp. 39–67.
108 For an informative outline regarding 20th century brain research cf. Breidbach, O.: Hirn
und Bewusstsein – Überlegungen zu einer Geschichte der Neurowissenschaften. In: Pauen,
 1. The human brain: An extraordinary organ       191

are computer tomography (CT)109, magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)110, positron

emission tomography (PET)111 and functional magnetic resonance tomography
(fMRT, fMRI)112.

M./Roth, G. (Eds.): Neurowissenschaften und Philosophie. Eine Einführung. Munich 2001,

pp. 37 ff.
109 In this process many X-rays are taken, e. g., of the cerebrum. Then a three-dimensional
image can be generated. Here, experts speak of an approach that creates a cross section.
The two researchers with whom this process is associated, Allan M. Cormack (1924–1998)
and Godfrey Hounsfield, were awarded the Nobel Prize. CT-scans are well-liked as because
of them fairly precise evidence is available. The enormous exposure to radiation, said to
be a thousand times higher than is the case with regular X-ray scans, remains problem-
atic. Cf. Frahm, J.: Zur materiellen Organisation des Denkens: Magnetresonanz-Tomogra-
phie des Gehirns. In: Elsner, N./Lüer, G. (Eds.): Das Gehirn und sein Geist. Göttingen 2000,
pp. 53–70; Jäncke, L.: Methoden der Bildgebung in der Psychologie und den kognitiven Neu-
rowissenschaften. Stuttgart 2005; Grillenberger, A./Fritsch, E.: Computertomographie. Eine
Einführung in ein modernes bildgebendes Verfahren. Vienna 2006; Kalender, W.: Computer-
tomographie. Grundlagen, Gerätetechnologie, Bildqualität, Anwendungen. Erlangen 22006;
Gassen, H. G.: Das Gehirn. Darmstadt 2008, pp. 80–86.
110 Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MR and MRI) is a further imaging process that has enabled
medicine and research to advance during the 20th century. It serves to depict tissue and
organ structures. Here, one makes use of magnetic fields and radio waves. With the help
of radio waves the molecules in our organism are moved. Researchers have discovered that
then a small energy impulse is released. A computer measures and digitalizes this. This
process can only be initiated when the test person/patient is placed in a tube. During the ex-
amination process, several receiving coils are attached to the person being examined. These
make it possible for signals to be registered. Per computer sectional views are generated.
The human organism is not confronted with harmful rays during this process.
Cf. Abrahams, P. H./Belli, A./Hemingway, A. P./Hourikan, M. D./Weir, J.: Die Anatomie des
Menschen in der bildgebenden Diagnostik. Röntgentechnik, Magnetresonanz-, Computerto-
mographie, Angiographie und Sonographie. Munich 1993; Jäncke, L.: Methoden der Bildge-
bung in der Psychologie und den kognitiven Neurowissenschaften. Stuttgart 2005; Weishaupt,
D./Köchli, V. D./Marincek, B./Froehlich, J. M./Nanz, D.: Wie funktioniert MRI? Eine Ein-
führung in Physik und Funktionsweise der Magnetresonanzbildgebung. Berlin 52006.
111 It is thanks to Michel Ter-Pogossian and Michael E. Phelps that, since the 1970s, a fur-
ther imaging method of examination is available. With the Positron Emission Tomography
(PET) emits a slightly radioactive material (»Tracer«) that spreads through our organism.
Radionuclides, which emit positrons, play a key role in this method of examination. When
two photons meet a positron, an electron sends them in opposite directions. Now it be-
comes important to find out the location of the destructive rays. Several detectors are em-
ployed. The important question is to what extent the tracer substance was able to spread
through the tissues. In this way, several sectional views are generated. Gassen tells us that
»PET is extraordinarily flexible because radionuclides when used in biological are spread
extensively and they can, for example, therefore be incorporated into interesting molecules
such as into medication. In addition, special pharmaceuticals can be utilized which either
because of metabolic response or because of their composition target the region to be ex-
amined and are converted. Thus, PET can be utilized for a wide spectrum of neurochemical
and physiological processes.« (Gassen, H. G.: Das Gehirn. Darmstadt 2008, p. 83). The radi-
oactive nature of the tracer substances is criticized by certain experts.
112 The imaging processes are being improved constantly. The letters fMRT or fMRI represent
the reformation of the magnetic resonance imaging system: the functional magnetic res-
onance tomography. The purpose of this process is to identify metabolic processes. In this
way, one can for example show which area of our cerebrum is especially active when we are
thinking about something, are remembering of acting. Hans Gassen writes that »the inno-
192       A. Man and his brain

As living organisms, we engage in metabolism. And of course, metabolic process-

es also take place in our brain (such as glucose and oxygen consumption). The above
mentioned technologies make these processes visible, and allow us, for example,
to diagnose illnesses such as depression and cancer. The imaging processes allow
assumptions regarding the necessary prerequisites for certain mental manifestations
of life. There is also a certain optimism that with all these methods, mental manifes-
tations of life can be captured and quantified.113

vative idea of the fMRT was to create images on the basis of hemoglobin chemistry. Hemo-
globin appears in two forms: either in the form of oxygen-filled oxyhemoglobin, or after the
hemoglobin has been discharged as deoxyhemoglobin. Each possesses different magnetic
characteristics so they can be differentiated with regard to amount and locality. In this way,
by means of the fMRT, one measures changes which occur in the oxygen content of the
blood when locally restricted areas in the brain need more oxygen for their metabolism.«
(Gassen, H. G.: Das Gehirn. Darmstadt 2008, p. 84). This process is utilized to measure the
level of the blood flow at different times. This constantly changes. What is important is the
Blood Oxygenation Level Dependent Mechanismus (BOLD) as from here statements can be
made regarding the involvement of a specific region of the brain.
Generally, a very short pre-scan utilizing only a small amount of solvent is performed. Fol-
lowing this is a phase in which a much higher amount of solvent is utilized (3D MRT-Scan).
The examination continues in a further phase, when metabolic deviations are measured
(MRT-Scan). During this phase, the person is asked to perform a small task – e. g., to twid-
dle one or more fingers. A short pause is instituted and the process is repeated several times.
Finally, the differences which are visible in color in the various activity phases are assessed.
The advantages of the fMRT are obvious. The first is surely that no tracer substance needs
to be ingested. The resolution is furthermore much better than with PET-images. Today,
this method of examination is combined with other methods to achieve even better results
(cf. Michel, C. M./Seeck, M./Landis, T.: Spatiotemporal Dynamics of Human Cognition. In:
News of Physiological Sciences 14 (1999), pp. 206–214).
Jens Frahm points out that there are a few technical problems connected with this process.
There might be errors in the image when a signal is deleted or distorted: Frahm, J.: Zur ma-
teriellen Organisation des Denkens: Magnetresonanz-Tomographie des Gehirns. In: Elsner,
N./Lüer, G. (Eds.): Das Gehirn und sein Geist. Göttingen 2000, p. 66.
Winfried Löffler points to the medical-ethical aspects of PET and fMRT. Many people find
it difficult to deal either with the small space within which an fMRT examination takes
place, or that during a PET a radioactive tracer substance has to be ingested. »The exposure
to higher fields similarly presents certain health risks which need to be assessed with regard
to the value to both the patient and to the research. An ethical consequence of imaging pro-
cesses is the accidental diagnosis of existing sickness and anomalies that are to be expected
because of the higher level of solvent as well as because in purely experimental scenarios
this can be expected more often. Besides questions regarding the security of data are those
concerning the right of the person being tested not to be troubled by an unwished-for
diagnosis which has consequences for follow-up medical care.« (Löffler, W.: Neurowissen-
schaften und Ethik: Was müssen wir neu (be-)denken? In: Zeitschrift für medizinische Ethik
1 (2006), p. 82).
113 Cf. Oeser, E.: Gehirn, Bewusstsein und Erkenntnis. Darmstadt 1988, p. 21.
Cf. the following with regard to the often scanty interpretation of results of imaging studies:
Synofzik, M.: Interventionen zwischen Gehirn und Geist: Eine ethische Analyse der neuen
Möglichkeiten der Neurowissenschaften. In: Fortschritte Neurologie Psychiatrie 73 (2005),
pp. 596–604.
 1. The human brain: An extraordinary organ       193

1.4 I can see what you see. Is mindreading possible?

»Die Gedanken sind frei, wer kann sie erraten?

Sie fliehen vorbei wie nächtliche Schatten.
Kein Mensch kann sie wissen, kein Jäger er-
schießen
mit Pulver und Blei: Die Gedanken sind
frei!«114

Not only the disciples of the dubious mentalist Uri Geller are telling us that mind­
reading is possible. This question is being addressed even in the ivory towers of some
universities as well as in some research laboratories. Is it true what the old folk song
says, that we cannot read a person’s thoughts as we can read a book? Or is it that
thanks to technological advances they are accessible in a brain scan? Is such a project
condemned to fail even before it has begun? Authors who tend to distance them-
selves from this question are pointing out that cerebral structures can very well be
subjected to careful examination (as a necessary requirement for us to have mental
manifestations of life such as thoughts). That is the daily work of brain researchers.
But you cannot determine what exactly you were thinking about while reading these
lines, i. e. you cannot investigate the content of your thoughts. No one can know ...
We read the following in the New York Times:

»Soon we will need no jury, no hordes of detectives and witnesses, no prosecution, no

counter-suit, and no defense. The state will simply take all suspects and subject them
to scrutiny with scientific instruments. Since these instruments cannot be instigated
to make mistakes or perjure themselves, their evidence will be enough for determining
who is guilty or not guilty.«115

Admittedly, that article is not all that current. It was published in 1911 when the
pros and cons of lie detectors were debated in American society. Where are we to-
day? Imagine the German Federal Intelligence Service has been told about an im-
pending terror attack, and a high alert is declared for the country. There is police
everywhere. The Minister for the Interior is the man of the hour. The situation is
dramatic. If it is true what the informant says, the number of victims could probably
be in the three-digit range. There are also indications that extremists have captured
some planes, and among their targets is the Bundestag in Berlin. Trains are to be
hijacked and blown up. Christmas markets, churches and public squares are to be
targeted by the terrorists. There is more. There are highly secret statements about
an attempted assassination of the Federal Chancellor. Let us imagine further that to
fend off such a worst-case scenario, police at German airports, where parcel bombs
from abroad have already been discovered, apparently confirming the reliability of
the informer messages, a brand-new method is available that is to help with the

114 German Folk song.

115 Cf. Markowitsch, H. J./Siefer, W.: Tatort Gehirn. Auf der Suche nach dem Ursprung des Ver-
brechens. Frankfurt a. M. 2007, p. 93.
194       A. Man and his brain

investigation: a mindreading machine that allows the representatives of democracy

to see what is happening in the minds of the arrested suspects and what they are
thinking. Potential terrorists can be screened. Not in the form of »lightly shadows«
as in the folksong, but in all clarity. The police would know whether the suspects they
are facing have already seen the instructions for the act of terror, or the photo images
from training camps for terrorists have fortunately come into the hands of capable
investigators, even prior to the interrogation of suspects.
Is all of that only science fiction? Playing with our fear? In the land of appar-
ently unlimited opportunities, such possibilities are already being discussed with
very much enthusiasm. One of the chief participants in the discussion is Lawrence
Farwell, who time and again has been advocating the so-called brain fingerprinting,
which is already being praised as a super weapon for fighting terrorism.116 Farwell
declares that his technology

»...is based on the principle that the brain is central to all human acts. In a terrorist act,
there may or may not be peripheral evidence such as fingerprints or DNA, but the brain
of the perpetrator is always there, planning, executing, and recording the crime. The ter-
rorist has knowledge of organizations, training and plans that an innocent person does
not have. Until the invention of brain fingerprinting testing, there was no scientific way
to detect this fundamental difference. Brain fingerprinting tests provide an accurate,
economical and timely solution to the central problem in the fight against terrorism. It
is now possible to determine scientifically whether or not a person has terrorist training
and knowledge of terrorist activities.«117

Farwell’s goal is to draw attention to electric developments which occur in the cer-
ebrum and, according to his theory, are in unison with the stimuli presented and
can thus be recorded by experts. He is speaking of the so-called P300 component in
our cerebral processes. From that, we could read what a person such as a potential
terrorist has observed and experienced. The mindreading machine can be employed
when terror suspects are questioned and refuse to cooperate. Do they really know
nothing, as they claim? Or do they have knowledge of horrible terrorist plans against
Germany as the informant has reported? Have they already heard the details the
police are talking about? Have they already seen the photos that the police are put-
ting in their hands? Farwell is convinced: »By testing for specific information, brain
fingerprinting technology can accurately distinguish between a trained terrorist and
an innocent person who may have knowledge of certain locations, people and events
for legitimate reasons.«118 For the terrorists, to step into the trap, only the necessary
stimuli – pictures, audio-materials, other secret information – need to be present-
ed.119 We could thus search in the cerebrum for the truth about certain suspicions,

116 »American anti-terror activists are determined to utilize technology that till now has only
minimally improved security and is subject to errors of judgment.« (ibid., p. 92).
117 http://www.brainwavescience.com/counterterrorism.php (retrieved 11. September 2010).
118 Ibid.
119 »Brain Fingerprinting testing cannot be used for general, non-specific testing, something
for which no reliable facts exist against which to compare the subject’s answer. For exam-
 1. The human brain: An extraordinary organ       195

ideas, statements, and last but not least about terrorist plans. Screening would be
enough. Farwell raves:

»A new era in security and intelligence gathering has begun. Now, terrorists and those
supporting terrorism can be identified quickly and accurately. No longer should any
terrorist be able to evade justice for lack of evidence. And there is no reason why an in-
nocent individual should be falsely imprisoned or convicted of terrorist activity. A Brain
Fingerprinting test can determine with an extremely high degree of accuracy those who
are involved with terrorist activity and those who are not.«120

Yet the validity of this method is being questioned. J. For example, Peter Rosenfeld
disagrees with Farwell’s thoughts.121 He writes:

»It is likely that an individual in the act of committing a serious crime – from murder to
bank robbery to terror bombing – would be in such an excited or anxious state so as to
render his/her attention to details of the crime scene close to inoperable. Also, a high
proportion of crime in the U. S. is committed under the influence of drugs or alcohol,
both of which are known to play havoc with memory.«122

Rosenfeld reminds us that it is part of our being alive that the content of our memory
is not »fixed.« When enough water has flown under the bridge, our memory could
be totally different than before.123 One of his objections is that we would merely
concentrate very hard and think of something we experienced passionately (such as
having been slapped or making love) to nullify the P300-test.124 The potential terror-
ist would simply have to have an especially emotional constellation in mind, such as

ple, a general question like ›Are you a terrorist?‹ is not something that can be addressed by
Brain Fingerprinting technology. However, the recognition of specific information from
terrorist training or of individuals at a training camp can be detected« (ibid.).
120 Ibid.
121 Cf. e. g. Rosenfeld, J. P.: ›Brain Fingerprinting‹: A critical Analysis. http://groups.psych.
northwestern.edu/rosenfeld/documents/BFCRITREPRINT.pdf (retrieved 11. September
2010).
122 Ibid.
123 Cf. also: Metzinger, T.: Gedankenleser im Kreuzverhör. In: Könneker, C. (Ed.): Wer erklärt
den Menschen? Hirnforscher, Psychologen und Philosophen im Dialog. Frankfurt a. M. 22007,
pp. 238–245, esp. p. 241. Further studies on this topic: Langleben, D. D./Loughead, J. W./
Bilker, W. B./Ruparel, K./Childress, A. R./Busch, S. I.: Telling truth from lie in individual
subjects with fast event-related fMRI. In: Human Brain Mapping 26 (2005), pp. 262–272;
Mohamed, F. B./Faro, S. H./Gordon, N. J./Platek, S. M./Ahmad, H./Williams, J. M.: Brain
mapping of deception and truth telling about an ecologically valid situation: functional MR
imaging and polygraph investigation-initial experience. In: Radiology 238 (2006), pp. 679–
688; Tag, B.: Neurowissenschaft und Strafrecht. In: Holderegger, A./Sitter-Liver, B./Hess,
C. W./Rager, G. (Eds.): Hirnforschung und Menschenbild. Beiträge zur interdisziplinären
Verständigung. Fribourg 2007, pp. 349–366; Schleim, S.: Gedankenlesen: Pionierarbeit der
Hirnforschung. Hannover 2008.
124 Cf. Metzinger, T.: Gedankenleser im Kreuzverhör. In: Könneker, C. (Ed.): Wer erklärt den
Menschen? Hirnforscher, Psychologen und Philosophen im Dialog. Frankfurt a. M. 22007,
p. 241; Schleim, S.: Gedankenlesen: Pionierarbeit der Hirnforschung. Hannover 2008, p. 35.
196       A. Man and his brain

the police officer slapping his face very hard or him having sex with the female police
officer, and the success of the mindreading machine would turn to failure. In two out
of three cases, there might actually be success, Rosenfeld tells us. But there are other
concerns.125 A suspected top terrorist might respond with a P300-wave when he sees
a black bullet-proof limousine, not because it belongs to the German Chancellor,
but because he is actually a car salesman who in his free time has opened a small
museum and in his spare time opened a small museum for just such cars. Errone-
ous interpretations are not impossible. »For example, what would happen if during
the scanning someone is pondering whether to lie or to tell the truth and he finally
decides against one or the other?«126 Peter Rosenfeld has succeeded in showing that
it is absolutely possible to influence P300 signals (such as when we are very concen-
trated, thinking of something, and we employ certain strategies of which the police
obviously know nothing), and this then remains that way for a longer phase of their
lives – which is one of the reasons why Rosenfeld responds to Farwell’s promises
with more than a question mark.
Jane Campbell Moriarty criticizes: »That recognition [...] may arise in a variety
of ways – some quite innocent.« She also says that it is not really correctly recorded
what exactly constitutes memory »which does not record and recall information like
a video recorder.«127 Karla Schneider points out in her dissertation that Farwell’s idea
has never been tested independently, but that there are only twenty tests he conduct-
ed himself.128 Also, we should not overlook that Farwell measures brain wave curves
and not the truth. It is actually obvious that there might be one or more other errors
in his interpretations. To put it quite bluntly: Even with a machine like Farwell’s that
can read thoughts, or with any other of the various imaging processes employed
today, it is not possible to see what a suspected terrorist or any one of us can see.
The various colored images show metabolic processes in the cerebrum. We can, of
course, provide validated statements – and that is already a great deal – whether a
person or can see something, but, we cannot do so about what the person sees and
especially not what value that has for us quite personally or to what life history it is
connected. Henning Scheich, one of the signatories of the Brain Researcher Manifest,
which I will discuss below, writes that »even when a test person gives very differ-
ent information in a tomography, his brain often shows similar reaction patterns. It
is therefore fairly impossible to determine what information was registered on the
brain image.«129 It is a similar situation as in lie detectors in certain TV programs that

125 Cf. ibid., p. 241.

126 Markowitsch, H. J./Siefer, W.: Tatort Gehirn. Auf der Suche nach dem Ursprung des Verbre-
chens. Frankfurt a. M. 2007, p. 91.
127 Campbell Moriarty, J.: Visions Of Deception: Neuroimages And The Search For Truth. In: 42
Akron Law Review 739 (2009), pp. 739–761, here p. 752.
128 »In the only historically known case (Harrington vs. State of Iowa), in which this process
was actually implemented, the court rejected the forensic validity of ›Brain Fingerprinting.‹
The accused was nevertheless acquitted. He was not based on the P300 analysis as Farwell
maintains on his homepage.« (Schneider, K.: Der Einsatz bildgebender Verfahren im Straf-
prozess. Cologne 2010, p. 47).
129 Scheich, H.: Gedankenkontrolle. In: Könneker, C. (Ed.): Wer erklärt den Menschen? Hirnfor-
scher, Psychologen und Philosophen im Dialog. Frankfurt a. M. 22007, p. 190.
 1. The human brain: An extraordinary organ       197

are becoming more and more popular on German private TV channels. Whether
we are skirting the truth or telling downright lies, whether we are especially agitated
because of other situations, cannot be determined from the curves that have been
measured.
The fact that a major effort is being made to read the content of people’s thoughts
has to do with the conviction of the mind-brain paradigm, according to which our
mental manifestations of life can simply be ascribed to the encephalon, that they are
perhaps even identical with these, and in that case can be captured by something like
screening. Employing the latest technologies, we try to capture what occurs in the
living encounter between human beings.130 This cannot succeed since there is mote
to humans than what occurs in their cerebrum. There is no way tot avoid continuing
with brain research, and that is good. But with Aristotle, we should remember that
the noûs, our ability to recognize that something is true, is not bound to a specific
organ. We cannot detect truth in the brain. It is an error to confuse things of which
we are convinced (such as how helpful a mindreading machine would be) with cer-
ebral requirements.131

1.5 Brain injury and its consequences for human experience and

behavior

»And sickness unsettles the brain, and

­fantastic strange dreams are hatched.«132

Oliver Sacks, the neuropsychologist who has become well known through his de-
tailed and warm-hearted descriptions of people who have suffered brain damage
and are no longer considered »normal,« writes as follows in his book, The Man who
Mistook His Wife for a Hat:

»Neurology’s favorite word is ›deficit,‹ denoting an impairment or incapacity of neuro-

logical function: loss of speech, loss of language, loss of memory, loss of vision, loss of
dexterity, [...] and myriad other lacks and losses of specific functions (or faculties).«133

130 In this connection Thomas Fuchs observes that »in the same vein one could of course make
an X-Ray of the »Mona Lisa« and in this manner attempt to analyze the painting.« (Fuchs,
T.: Neuromythologien. Mutmaßungen über die Bewegkräfte der Hirnforschung. In: Scheide-
wege. Jahresschrift für skeptisches Denken. 36 (2006), p. 193).
131 In this context, Dominik Perler discusses an interesting thought-experiment. Here we im-
agine a twin earth on which twin earthlings live. While one earthling and the one living
on the twin earth may have the same brain state, the contents of this conviction may differ
radically. Perler thus concludes that the state of our brain does not determine the content of
our convictions. Perler, D.: Ist Geist im Gehirn? Skeptische Bemerkungen aus philosophischer
Sicht. In: Holderegger, A./Sitter-Liver, B./Hess, C. W./Rager, G. (Ed.): Hirnforschung und
Menschenbild. Beiträge zur interdisziplinären Verständigung. Fribourg 2007, pp. 75–89, esp.
pp. 82–86.
132 Schiller, F.: Die Räuber, Act 5: Sc. 1.
133 Sacks, O.: The Man Who Mistook His Wife For A Hat: And Other Clinical Tales. New York
1998, p. 3.
198       A. Man and his brain

Various injuries to the human cerebrum, for example resulting from with tumor
conditions, accidents, infectious diseases, genetic imperfections, or also metabolic
disorders, can produce such »deficits« and significantly affect a person’s life. That the
memory is impaired, that language and perception no longer function as before, can
all be due to brain injuries.134 We have already looked at the Edwin Smith Papyrus
scrolls and the brain injuries that are portrayed there. There have been brain injuries
in all ages. We only have to think of mankind’s innumerable wars. Physicians and
researchers have examined these injuries closely and have thus learned a great deal
about which task a certain area of the brain takes over.135
It is important to describe brain injuries and symptoms of disorders very accurate-
ly. Ramachandran and Hurstein explain the so-called »Charles Bonnet syndrome«:

»Patients with this disorder typically have damage to the retina, to the optic nerve, optic
radiations, or sometimes even toarea17, producing blindness in either a large portion
or in the entire visual field. But remarkably, instead of seeing nothing, they experience
vivid visual hallucinations. Typically these are ›formed‹ hallucinations rather than ab-
stract patterns; i. e. the patients claim to see little circus animals, or Lilliputian beings
walking around.«136

To put it bluntly, thanks to modern imaging processes we no longer have to wait

until we have become corpses before physicians are able to carefully analyze the our
brain injuries. Injuries sustained by the motor, sensory, and associative areas of the
cortex, of the basal ganglia, of the diencephalon, and of the brain stem are recognized
today as essential factors that cause certain illness. Staining methods and generally
also specific antibodies are employed to learn more about damage done to the nerve
cells, the axons, and the dendrites.137
In the section on the History of brain research, we already encountered the name
of Paul Broca, the French psychiatrist who discovered what is crucial for posterity.
His patients, who were suffering from injury to the left side of the cerebral cortex, in
the frontal lobe of the brain, could no longer communicate linguistically.138 Since that

134 Cf. Hell, D.: Sind psychische Störungen ausschließlich Hirnkrankheiten? In: Rager, G.: Ich und
mein Gehirn. Persönliches Erleben, verantwortliches Handeln und objektive Wissenschaft.
Freiburg/Munich 2000, pp. 139–160, here p. 139.
135 Cf. Oeser, E.: Geschichte der Hirnforschung. Von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart. Darmstadt
2002, p. 13.
136 Ramachandran, V./Hirstein, W.: Three Laws of Qualia. What Neurology Tells Us about the
Biological Functions of Consciousness, Qualia and the Self. In: Journal of Consciousness Stud-
ies. 4 (1997), p. 440.
137 Cf. Volk, B.: Störungen höherer Hirnleistungen aus der Sicht des Neuropathologen. In: Rager,
G. (Ed.): Ich und mein Gehirn. Persönliches Erleben, verantwortliches Handeln und objektive
Wissenschaft. Freiburg/Munich 2000, pp. 91–137, here p. 93.
138 »Broca-Aphasiacs [Aphasia is a speech disorder, M. K.] have tremendous articulation pro­
blems and therefore use strongly shortened and grammatically simplified sentences. Con-
tent words (verbs and nouns) are seldom declined, and prepositions articles are almost
never used. They have problems repeating words. The latest findings indicate that Bro-
ca-Aphasiacs not only have disruptions in speech production but find it difficult to pro-
cess grammatical information. It is, therefore, assumed that the central problem for Bro-
 1. The human brain: An extraordinary organ       199

time, a great deal of importance has been attributed to the cortical fields 44 and 45 on
the left side which enable us to speak. We can also once again call this a necessary re-
quirement. In this context, neuroscientists also speak of the »motor speech center«.
I already briefly mentioned the German psychiatrist Wernicke, who is usually
named together with Broca, since these two made similar groundbreaking discover-
ies. Wernicke notes that when there is a left-hand lesion in the cortical areas in the
upper rear temporal lobe, patients suffer from a massive reduction in their speech
intelligibility. They mangle their words and babble syllables that are not understood
correctly. A Wernicke aphasiac has enormous deficits on the phonetic-phonological
level. The affected cortical areas have been called the »sensoric speech center.« Ac-
cording to what we know today, these speech centers are in contact with each other
(Fasciculus arcuatus). If they have sustained an injury of the fasciculus arcuatus, they
can only communicate minimally. They are able to produce sounds and can certainly
understand what is being said. It is a special challenge for them to produce sentences
or even to reproduce individual words.139 Global aphasiacs are unable to read as we
can. They are unable to speak and probably do not comprehend a single word:

»In patients with global aphasia, the damage destroys a large sector of the left cerebral
hemisphere but does not destroy it completely. Patients with global aphasia have dam-
age to both famous language areas, Broca’s and Wernicke’s, in the frontal and tempo-
ral lobe of the left hemisphere; they usually have extensive damage to regions of the
frontal, parietal and temporal cortices in between Broca’s and Wernicke’s areas, and
damage to a vast amount of white matter underneath these cortices and even to gray
matter in the basal ganglia of the left hemisphere.«140

It is interesting that Damasio, who examined numerous patients with such disorders,
points out that, »while it is out of the question to maintain a normal conversation
with a global aphasic, it is possible to communicate, richly and humanly, if only you
have the patience to accommodate to the limited and improvised vocabulary of non-
linguistic signs the patient may develop.«141 In my chapter on Rediscovering the lived
body, I will try to address from a phenomenological point of view why it is possible
what Damasio described.142

ca-Aphasiacs is syntax processing, something which has an effect both on the production as
well as on the understanding of language.« (Herrmann, C./Fiebach, C.: Gehirn und Sprache.
Frankfurt a. M. 2004, p. 102).
139 With regard to language processing cf. also: Friederici, A. D.: Sprache und Gehirn: Zur Neu-
robiologie der Sprachverarbeitung. In: Elsner, N./Lüer, G. (Eds.): Das Gehirn und sein Geist.
Göttingen 2000, pp. 71–85; Herrmann, C./Fiebach, C.: Gehirn und Sprache. Frankfurt a. M.
2004.
140 Damasio, A.: The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Conscious-
ness. London 1999, p. 110.
141 Ibid., p. 109.
142 Brain injuries definitely result in malfunctions but this does not take away from the dignity
of human persons as spiritual beings as Thomas Metzinger claims. (Metzinger, T.: Der Preis
der Selbsterkenntnis. Beschert uns die Hirnforschung mit einem neuen, naturalistischen Men-
schenbild auch das Ende der Religion? In: Könneker, C. (Ed.): Wer erklärt den Menschen?
Hirnforscher, Psychologen und Philosophen im Dialog. Frankfurt a. M. 22007, p. 264).
200       A. Man and his brain

Despite brain injury (to be exact: an injury to both hemispheres of the occipital
lobes) patients who have gone partially blind are better able to orient themselves
than persons who have never been able to see at all in their lives. Brain researchers
call this »blind sight.«143 Interestingly, blind-sighted people are perfectly able to con-
vey coherent messages about things which they themselves say they cannot see. They
are, after all, blind and yet they perceive far more than they themselves suspect: »The
parietal cortices, the superior colliculi, and the thalamus are just a few of the struc-
tures presumably involved in these processes.«144 Damasio continues: »Although the
early sensory cortices and the topographically organized representations they form
are necessary for images to occur in consciousness, they do not, however, appear to
be sufficient.«145
During my own time in »alternate service«, I met a woman who continual-
ly claimed that during the night someone had amputated her leg and had secretly
stitched on a »foreign« leg. She claimed we could not see any scars or seams as the
foreign leg had been stitched on perfectly. The woman could move her »foreign« leg
but claimed that it was not she but someone else who was doing this. The reason
she finally gave was that it was actually not her leg. At first, I used reasonable argu-
ments trying to convince her that no such secret operation had taken place. I soon
realized that I would not succeed. Later, a friend of mine, a brain researcher gave me
an explanation for this behavior. Patients like this woman, who believe the leg does
not belong to them, have suffered a division – a cut-through – of the sensory nerves
which run through the muscles. The result is that such a restriction can result in the
sensory-motoric feedback loops being thrown out of sync. The woman could move
her »foreign« leg backwards and forwards, but was not conscious of the movement.
This is why she insisted that the leg was most definitely not hers, and this is why it
was playing tricks on her and not obeying her!
In patients with a clearly discernible impairment in motivational capability (pseu-
do depression), left-sided lesions in the upper lateral frontal lobe have been observed.
Patients with lesions in the center-line frontal lobe area suffer from a reduction in
their emotional capabilities.146
A case that is still discussed much today is the terrible accident suffered by Phi-
neas Gage (1823–1861). As foreman of the Rutland and Burlington Railroad, he was

143 Cf. Weiskrantz, L.: Blindsight: A Case Study and Its Implications. Oxford 1986; Bennett,
M. R./Hacker, P. M. S.: Philosophical Foundations Of Neuroscience. Malden/Oxford 102010,
pp. 393 ff.; Libet, B.: Mind Time. The Temporal Factor in Consciousness. Cambridge/London
2004, pp. 15, 81, 117 ff., 197; Sturma, D.: Ausdruck von Freiheit. Über Neurowissenschaften
und die menschliche Lebensform. In: Sturma, D. (Ed.): Philosophie und Neurowissenschaften.
Frankfurt a. M. 2006, p. 188 f.; Ramachandran, V./Blakeslee, S.: Phantoms In The Brain. New
York 1998.
144 Damasio, A.: Descartes’ Error. Emotion, Reason, And The Human Brain. New York 1994,
p. 99.
145 Ibid., p. 99.
146 Cf. Hell, D.: Sind psychische Störungen ausschließlich Hirnkrankheiten? In: Rager, G. (Ed.):
Ich und mein Gehirn. Persönliches Erleben, verantwortliches Handeln und objektive Wissen-
schaft. Freiburg/Munich 2000, p. 140.
 1. The human brain: An extraordinary organ       201

working in Vermont in 1848 where he was responsible for rock blasting.147 In a mo-
ment of carelessness, an early explosion changed his life. Everything occurred so
suddenly that Gage was unable to protect himself. An iron rod 3 cm thick and more
than 1 m long flew through his left cheek, pierced the base of the skull and the front
part of his brain. At a tremendous speed, the iron rod exited the top of the skull.
Smeared with blood and brain tissue, it was flung another 30 meters. Gage did not
die in the accident, but did lose consciousness for a short while. His colleagues were
dumbfounded when, after a short while, Gage spoke to them and even climbed some
stairs. They believed their colleague had been lucky in the midst of his misfortune.
The head wound became infected and for two weeks the physicians were not sure
whether their patient would survive. To the joy of family and physicians, the twenty-
five-year-old survived. The time he needed to recuperate was a mere two months,
when therapy was discontinued. Gage’s future seemed assured again. The strong
young man could speak, hear and feel. While he was blind in his left eye, he could see
with his right eye. He was almost »back to normal.« Almost! Now massive changes
in his mood and personality alarmed the people around him:

»These new personality traits contrasted sharply with the ›temperate habits‹ and ›con-
siderable energy of character‹ Phineas Gage was known to have possessed before the
accident. He had had ›a well-balanced mind and was looked upon by those who knew
him as a shrewd business man, very energetic and persistent in executing all his plans
of action.‹«148

Before his terrible accident, Gage had been an excellent organizer who could make
rational decision. After the accident, his colleagues no longer knew whether he was
able to plan ahead or to structure his future. Much had changed. He no longer ad-
hered to social conventions and, more often than not, transgressed them. In the
places where he worked, such as on horse farms, he was prone to quit in a capri-
cious mood, or he was fired because of poor discipline.149 Gage developed epileptic
seizures150, and he died twelve years after his accident.151 The story of Gage’s illness
allows us to presume that certain areas of the brain are indispensable for mental
manifestations of life such as planning for the future, decision-making, and the
shouldering of responsibility. Of course we can say that they are necessary for that
purpose.
Phineas Gage’s story and the other cases mentioned here show how brain research
is conducted: Various stories of illnesses related to brain injury are collected. Par-

147 Cf. Damasio, A.: Descartes’ Error. Emotion, Reason, And The Human Brain. London 1994,
pp. 3–33.
148 Ibid., p. 8.
149 Ibid., p. 9.
150 Cf. ibid., p. 10.
151 The skull was later dug up and is today to be found in the anatomical museum of Harvard
University. Here, Hanna Damasio and her colleagues examined it and x-rays were taken.
Cf. also: Damasio, H./Grabowski, T./Frank, R./Galaburda, A. M./Damasio, A.: The Return
of Phineas Gage: Clues About the Brain from the Skull of a Famous Patient. In: Science 264
(1994), pp. 1102–1105.
202       A. Man and his brain

allels are compared, and scientists can come to conclusions concerning the actual
function of the brain area in its relationship to the whole organism. According to
Jens Frahn,

»We should adopt the approach that in our mental manifestations of life lesion research
can only capture certain elements of a very complex network. Research into memory,
learning, and consciousness points to open questions regarding the direct connection to
or bond between cortical activity in brain areas which are separated from each other.«152

That a certain behavior can be made impossible points to the fact that the cerebral
area concerned is necessary for the corresponding mental manifestation of life. That
Gage repeatedly transgressed against certain societal norms does not justify the as-
sumption that the ability Gage had (or had lost) in terms of his interaction with
other people is to be reduced to the neuronal processes found in a small white-gray
organ.153 Our language does not live either in the Broca area or in the Wernicke
area. Also, depression is not merely some area in the frontal lobe. Ethics and morals
do not »reside« in the orbitofrontal cortex.154 Our cerebrum is not our character, as
Susan Greenfield suggests.155 While the cerebrum belongs to us as human beings,
it does not constitute our personhood.156 What is important in this context is that

152 Frahm, J.: Zur materiellen Organisation des Denkens: Magnetresonanz-Tomographie des Ge-
hirns. In: Elsner, N./Lüer, G. (Ed.): Das Gehirn und sein Geist. Göttingen 2000, p. 60.
153 Cf. Falkenburg, B.: Was heißt es, determiniert zu sein? Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen
Erklärung. In: Sturma, D.: Philosophie und Neurowissenschaften. Frankfurt a. M. 2006, p. 68.
154 Thus e. g.: Roth, G.: Wie das Gehirn die Seele macht. Vortrag auf dem 51. Lindauer Psycho-
therapiewochen. http://www.lptw.de/archiv/vortrag/2001/roth.pdf (retrieved 15. Septem-
ber 2008), p. 9.
155 Cf. Greenfield, S. A.: Reiseführer Gehirn. Heidelberg/Berlin 2003, p. 35.
156 When we speak of the person we are not referring to an object that can be measured. We are
also not referring to our brain. Like Spaemann we refer to somebody different in being from
all else with which we are familiar
(Cf. Spaemann, R.: Personen. Versuche über den Unterschied zwischen ›etwas‹ und ›jemand‹.
Stuttgart 21998).
Qualitative experience and giftedness similarly belong to our understanding of person-
hood (Cf. also Kather, R.: Person. Die Begründung menschlicher Identität. Darmstadt 2007,
pp. 124 ff.). Interestingly, in our language, there is no ability to name our personhood which
we can adopt or even rid ourselves of. According to Spaemann: though persons have abilities
and are capable of certain manifestations of life, they are carriers of characteristics and man-
ifestations of life which only they as persons possess and some which they share with other
living beings. We speak of ourselves and of other human beings as persons and such persons
are living human beings. »There is no such thing as being separated from the human being
something which is evident in certain states of consciousness.« (Spaemann, R.: Personen.
Versuche über den Unterschied zwischen ›etwas‹ und ›jemand‹. Stuttgart 21998, p. 78). The
term person does not refer to what we understand by soul, the first we already saw in Part 1,
refers to the entelechy and forming principle. The term »soul« can also be seen in conjunc-
tion with plants and animals. It embraces the whole being of the human, not merely the soul
itself. Living human persons in in their lived body-soul wholeness are persons.
Our personhood implies that we belong to ourselves and can stand back from ourselves.
As free spiritual persons, we can stay within ourselves and come out of ourselves. Persons are
able to turn towards others. In the next chapter, I discuss that we do this as bodily beings.
 2. Philosophy and brain research. A complicated relationship?       203

even after brain injuries the structures which have not been injured can take over the
functions of the affected areas. This has been observed especially regarding language
and orientation functions.157 Thus, Sacks points out that the loss of a neurological
function should not be regarded only as a loss. The organism always attempts to
restore, replace or balance and compensate, regardless of how strange the means to
this end may be.158

2. Philosophy and brain research.

A complicated relationship?

»A philosopher and a brain researcher quarrel

about the importance of their relative dis-
ciplines. ›Philosophy – that is as if we were
walking through the dark with eyes bound
looking for a black cat which is not even there‹
the brain researcher mocks.
Whereupon the philosopher responds: ›Brain
research – that is as if we were walking
through the dark with eyes bound, looking for
a black cat and suddenly yelling: I found it!«159

At present, we can often have the impression that in many cases there is really no
love lost between brain researchers and philosophers. We argue in public about the
validity of interpretations. Arguments about socio-political context – and thus also

This makes clear that our (living) bodies belongs to our personhood. This is ignored when
consciousness, self-consciousness, memory and planning for the future are defined as con-
stituting our manifestations of life.
Though brain impairment has tremendous consequences for the life and thinking of hu-
man beings, this does not mean that our brain determines our personhood. The person
as lived body-soul continues to exist up till death. The personality of the ten-year-old, the
thirty-year-old and (hopefully one day) the eighty-year-old Marcus Knaup may be different
in some ways. But it is the same person. A variety of positive as well as negative factors in-
fluence the personality. This is why we cannot say that the brain determines the personality,
the character.
157 Especially in children’s brains the task of the injured area can be taken over by neighboring
areas with different specializations.
Cf. also: Scheich, H.: Gedankenkontrolle. In: Könneker, C. (Ed.): Wer erklärt den Menschen?
Hirnforscher, Psychologen und Philosophen im Dialog. Frankfurt a. M. 22007, p. 191; Paulus,
W.: Neuroplastizität bei neurologischen Erkrankungen. In: Elsner, N./Lüer, G. (Eds.): Das
Gehirn und sein Geist. Göttingen 2000, pp. 123–130.
158 Cf. Sacks, O.: Der Mann, der seine Frau mit einem Hut verwechselte. Reinbek bei Hamburg
30
2009, p. 21.
159 Esfeld, M./Herzog, M.: Wenn der Geist Kopf steht. In: Könneker, C. (Ed.): Wer erklärt den
Menschen? Hirnforscher, Psychologen und Philosophen im Dialog. Frankfurt a. M. 22007,
p. 179.
204       A. Man and his brain

about financial allocations – rarely make the relationship less tense. It is truly a del-
icate relationship.
Below, we want to look more closely at the relationship between philosophy and
brain research. We first ask whether brain research is indeed a narcissistic affront
(2.1) and then deal with the so-called Manifest of Brain Researchers (2.2). Light is
also to be shed on the methodological and epistemological premises of brain re-
search, as well as on its limits (2.3). The discussion will show that the relationship
between philosophy and the neurosciences does not have to be as complicated and
can be more relaxed than is often the case (2.4).

2.1 Brain research: The fourth narcissistic affront?

»Is this, the final demystification of human

beings, scientifically sustainable?
Are such conclusions not merely the result
of a pre-existing picture of the human being
taken as a basis for research?«160

We sometimes forget that especially among scientists, explanations become glori-

fications, and myths can flourish.161 I now want to address an example that is cited
again and again under this topic. It is the lecture by Sigmund Freud162 about the
narcissistic affronts to humanity which he said had endangered our view of man.
The first humiliation was linked to the name of Copernicus. Confusion was said
to have followed when mankind had to admit not to be in the center of the universe
they started to get into trouble. Freud said that the second affront was due the fault of
Charles Darwin, who wrote that humans had passed through a long history of evo-
lution. Darwin’s The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection was published in
1859. In 1871 appeared the sequel, The Origin of Man. Both provided a large amount
of material for socio-scientific discussion. Since then, it has been widely known that
Darwin was the founder of modern evolutionary thinking. With all scientific hu-
mility, Freud associated his own name and his project of psychoanalysis with the
third affront. He aimed at convincing us that our conscious manifestations of life are

160 Könneker, C.: Wer erklärt den Menschen? Warum die Neurowissenschaften heute en vogue
sind – und wir den Dialog über sie dringend brauchen. In: Könneker, C. (Ed.): Wer erklärt
den Menschen? Hirnforscher, Psychologen und Philosophen im Dialog. Frankfurt a. M. 22007,
p. 15.
161 Exposing various neuro myths: Fuchs, T.: Neuromythologien. Mutmaßungen über die Beweg­
kräfte der Hirnforschung. In: Scheidewege. Jahresschrift für skeptisches Denken. 36 (2006),
pp. 184–202.
162 Cf. also: Freud, S.: 18. Vorlesung zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse. In: Freud, S.: Gesam­
melte Werke XI. Frankfurt a. M. 1999, p. 294 f.; Freud, S.: Eine Schwierigkeit der Psychoan-
alyse. In: Freud, S.: Gesammelte Werke XII. Frankfurt a. M. 1999, pp. 7–9; Freud, S.: Die
Widerstände gegen die Psychoanalyse. In: Freud, S.: Gesammelte Werke XIV. Frankfurt a. M.
1999, p. 109.
 2. Philosophy and brain research. A complicated relationship?        205

actually only a small part of all our manifestations of life. We know his statement:
The ego is not master in its own house.
When we examine current research discussions, we quickly discover that Freud’s
idea concerning those appalling affronts is again and again being conjured out of
the scientific box of tricks. The following is bound to happen: Someone agrees with
Freud and even wants to outdo him by claiming that his thoughts included the
most brutal of all former affronts. The »neuro-affront« is then added to become the
»fourth affront«.163
Metzinger tells us that »many people believe that today we are moving towards
one of the greatest scientific revolutions in human history. This revolution will only
occur when the degree of cross-linking in research clearly transcends all disciplinary
borders.«164 For Gerhard Roth, it is quite natural to see a gruesome humiliation and
disappointing degradation of the human race in what brain research brings to light.
He says that speaking about human beings presupposes two basic convictions: »1.
The ego as the subject of spiritual and emotional conditions is the core of human
nature and the carrier of human dignity. 2. The ego is the agent of action.«165 The
immense explosive power of brain research is consists of demonstrating that neither
sentence reflects the truth. We can also say it this way: In his opinion, the explosive
power of his own work is to make clear that we think we are still in the dark about
understanding the nature of man. Roth goes even further and claims that brain re-
search has long helped Homo sapiens to forfeit its uniqueness within the animal
world.166 His conclusion: The opinion that humans are above all other living beings

163 Cf. Metzinger, T.: Einleitung: Das Problem des Bewusstseins. In: Metzinger, T. (Ed.): Bewusst-
sein. Beiträge aus der Gegenwartsphilosophie. Paderborn 52005, pp. 16 f., cf. also: Metzinger,
T.: Auf der Suche nach einem neuen Bild des Menschen. Die Zukunft des Subjekts und die
Rolle der Geisteswissenschaften. In: Spät, P. (Ed.): Zur Zukunft der Philosophie des Geistes.
Paderborn 2008, pp. 225–236, esp. pp. 233 f.; Churchland, P.: Die Neurobiologie des Be-
wusstseins. Was können wir von ihr lernen? In: Metzinger, T. (Ed.): Bewusstsein. Beiträge aus
der Gegenwartsphilosophie. Paderborn 52005, p. 470; Linden, W.: Und seh, dass wir nichts
wissen können? Erkenntnisprobleme der Hirnforschung. In: Linden, W./Fleissner, A. (Eds.):
Geist, Seele und Gehirn. Entwurf eines gemeinsamen Menschenbildes von Neurobiologen und
Geisteswissenschaftlern. Münster 2005, p. 26; Löffler, W.: Neurowissenschaften und Ethik:
Was müssen wir neu (be-)denken? In: Zeitschrift für medizinische Ethik 1 (2006), p. 80; Kön-
neker, C.: Wer erklärt den Menschen? In: Könneker, C. (Ed.): Wer erklärt den Menschen?
Hirnforscher, Psychologen und Philosophen im Dialog. Frankfurt a. M. 22007, p. 15; Wils, J.-
P.: Wie bedroht ist die Handlungsfreiheit wirklich? In: Holderegger, A./Sitter-Liver, B./Hess,
C. W./Rager, G. (Eds.): Hirnforschung und Menschenbild. Beiträge zur interdisziplinären
Verständigung. Fribourg 2007, p. 247; Tag, B.: Neurowissenschaft und Strafrecht. In: Hol-
deregger, A./Sitter-Liver, B./Hess, C. W./Rager, G. (Eds.): Hirnforschung und Menschenbild.
Beiträge zur interdisziplinären Verständigung. Fribourg 2007, pp. 351 f.
164 Metzinger, T.: Einleitung: Das Problem des Bewusstseins. In: Metzinger, T. (Ed.): Bewusst-
sein. Beiträge aus der Gegenwartsphilosophie. Paderborn 52005, pp. 16 f., Cf. also Metzinger,
T.: Auf der Suche nach einem neuen Bild des Menschen. Die Zukunft des Subjekts und die
Rolle der Geisteswissenschaften. In: Spät, P. (Ed.): Zur Zukunft der Philosophie des Geistes.
Paderborn 2008, pp. 225–236, esp. pp. 233 f.
165 Roth, G.: Fühlen, Denken, Handeln. Wie das Gehirn unser Verhalten steuert. Frankfurt a. M.
2001, p. 325.
166 Cf. Roth, G.: Aus Sicht des Gehirns. Frankfurt a. M. 2003, p. 206.
206       A. Man and his brain

because of their spirit, their consciousness, their reasoning, their ethics and their free
will should finally be scrapped.167 »Viva la revolution!«
Vilayanur Ramachandran’s statements are of a very similar nature. In an inter-
view with the journal Gehirn und Geist, he said:

»The history of science is a lesson in humility. Since Copernicus, human beings are no
longer at the center of the universe. Since Darwin, they are no longer the head of crea-
tion. Brain research today very certainly provides significant evidence that we have also
systematically overestimated the role of the ego.«168

According to Roth, since brain research is not concerned with the universe or with
foreign continents, but with human beings, with mind and brain, we are facing »the
greatest revolution«169. But are the opinions of Roth, Ramachandran and others, who
speak so glibly of affronts, really tenable? Who is affected by all this abuse? You and
I who are to realize in all our freedom that we are not free at all? Or a cerebrum
that is being told it will decide everything? All this Freudian mystification forgets
that back in the 15th century, Nicholas Cusanus, in the second chapter of his work
De docta ignorantia used philosophical an theological arguments to prove that our
earth is moving and is not the center of the universe. Regine Kather emphasizes that
with this insight, he placed himself far beyond the scientifically founded cosmology
of Copernicus, Galileo and Kepler.170 What is new in western cosmology is that the
universe has been stripped of all its hubs. Kather points out:

»When Cusanus spoke of the relative movement of all heavenly bodies, it was not dis-
similar to Einstein’s theory of relativity. Yet contrary to Freud’s belief, neither Cusanos
nor at a later stage Bruno or even Einstein experienced the decentration of the earth as
a plunge into nothingness or as narcissistic affront. Why should mankind, whose spatial
center shifts, also lose its spiritual center? And why should the infinity of the universe
prove the futility of human existence?«171

Regine Kather therefore arrives at the conclusion that »the arguments of Cusanus
and Bruno [...] still provide an essential impulse for orientation in an infinite uni-
verse.«172 It is inappropriate to speak of an affront by Copernicus. Michael Pauen173

167 Cf. Roth, G.: Aus Sicht des Gehirns. Frankfurt a. M. 2003, p. 7.
168 Ramachandran, V.: Das Ich im Schneckenhaus. In: Gehirn & Geist 3 (2003), p. 69.
169 Ramachandran, V./Blakeslee, S.: Phantoms in The Brain. Probing the Mysteries of the Human
Mind. New York 1998, p. xvi.
170 Kather, R.: »Gott ist der Kreis, dessen Mittelpunkt überall ist ...« Von der Dezentrierung der
Erde und der Unendlichkeit des Universums bei Nikolaus von Kues und Giordano Bruno. In:
Peitz, H.-H. (Ed.): Der vervielfachte Christus. Außerirdisches Leben und christliche Heils-
geschichte. Stuttgart 2004, p. 18.
171 Ibid., p. 18.
172 Ibid., p. 18.
173 Pauen, M.: Keine Kränkung, keine Krise. Warum die Neurowissenschaften unser Selbstver-
ständnis nicht revidieren. In: Holderegger, A./Sitter-Liver, B./Hess, C. W./Rager, G. (Eds.):
Hirnforschung und Menschenbild. Beiträge zur interdisziplinären Verständigung. Fribourg
 2. Philosophy and brain research. A complicated relationship?        207

also rejects the contention of a severe affront. As far as he is concerned, the insights
of Copernicus led to an ennobling of the earth. Thanks to Copernicus, our globe has
been elevated to the status of a planet. Pauen refers to Galileo, who wanted to show
that the luster of the earth »outshines that of the moon«. He criticizes Freudian my­
stification which completely ignores the picture of our world before the Middle Ages
into account. Galileo and Copernicus themselves did not understand their discover-
ies as affronts. Pope John Paul II emphasized that Galileo, as a »sincere believer [...]
was more farsighted [M:K:] than his theological opponents«, and that it was precisely
through Galileo and Copernicus that a reflection became possible »how the Biblical
sciences are to be understood, an endeavor that would later bear rich fruit for mod-
ern exegetical work.«174 Pope John Paul II continued that the example of Galileo and
Copernicus shows »that those who wish to consider the richness of reality, necessar-
ily need a multitude of models [...] each of which make it possible to bring to light
various aspects of reality within each area.«175 This already gives us an idea of what
I intend to demonstrate in the section called Program for a multitude of perspectives.
Pauen’s objection to the claim of Darwin’s alleged affronts is that Darwin’s teach-
ing has led to a deeper perception of our mental manifestations of life.176 With Dar-
win, we can understand better who we are than without Darwin! In his opinion,
nothing has changed in that there is in fact a difference between humans, animals
and stones. Only the explanation models for the differences have changed. »If the
natural sciences lead us to a better understanding of the relevant differences, then
there is no longer any reason to suggest that these sciences are fundamentally in
conflict with our image of man.«177 Pauen continues: »In any event, we have at least
retained so much self-esteem and dignity that the prognosis of their loss still elicits
heated discussions.«178
The fact that the first three affronts were actually no affronts does not mean that
brain research could still be an affront. Whoever reads brain research data through
the lenses of a physicalist, and determinist will have no alternative but to see them
as a humiliation of mankind. In Part 1, I could show that physicalism is not the only
possibility to understand humans. We would be justified to speak of a »neuronal
affront« if brain research were truly able to furnish ultimate proof that there is no
freedom, that we are nothing but mind, and that our mental manifestations of life
should either be totally eliminated or reduced to cerebral structures. In the closing
chapter of the present study, I try to show that brain research is in no way refuting the
understanding of human freedom. Authors such as Damasio, Fuchs, and Rager – to

2007, pp. 41–53; Pauen, M.: Was ist der Mensch? Die Entdeckung der Natur des Geistes.
Munich 2007, pp. 9, 15, 19, 30 ff.
174 German L’Osservatore Romano, 13. November1992, p. 9 f.
175 Ibid., p. 9.
176 Pauen, M.: Keine Kränkung, keine Krise. Warum die Neurowissenschaften unser Selbstver-
ständnis nicht revidieren. In: Holderegger, A./Sitter-Liver, B./Hess, C. W./Rager, G. (Eds.):
Hirnforschung und Menschenbild. Beiträge zur interdisziplinären Verständigung. Fribourg
2007, p. 43; Pauen, M.: Was ist der Mensch? Die Entdeckung der Natur des Geistes. Munich
2007, pp. 10 f., 16, 35 ff.
177 Ibid., p. 11.
178 Ibid., pp. 9 f.
208       A. Man and his brain

name just a few – demonstrate that the data of brain research can also be interpreted
very differently from the way of authors who subscribe to the mind-brain paradigm.
It is not the data themselves but the theories behind them which lead to a specific
point of view. Thus, only when the course is set in error from the start (physicalism,
a determinist picture of the world) will brain research become the fourth affront.179

2.2 Quo vadis brain research? The Manifest of Brain Researchers

»If there is any cause for worry, it comes not

from a lack of progress but rather from the
torrent of new facts that neuroscience is de-
livering and the threat that they may engulf
the ability to think clearly.«180

In the Fall of 2004 eleven brain researchers from Germany managed to attract
a great deal of attention. In the journal Gehirn und Geist they presented a co-
authored text which they called Manifest über die Gegenwart und Zukunft der
Hirnforschung.181 [»The Manifest – Eleven neuroscientists on the present situa-
tion and the future of brain research«]. Since then, the subject of this Manifest has
been much discussed on the Internet and in print media. Among the signatories –
who do not seem to be lacking in self-confidence since after all, they claim to
speak for an entire scientific discipline – we find Christof Koch, Gerhard Roth,
Henning Scheich and Wolf Singer. They are among the protagonists of the present
debate between neuroscientists and philosophers. For that reason, I will discuss
their work in detail in this section. Surely, the text created a certain expectation
among an astonished readership since it was presented as a Manifest. A manifest is
a document that cannot be ignored. Yet, as Hubert Markl has commented, we are
allowed to register our doubt whether it really was a manifestation, i. e. a real revela-

179 A retrospective glance at the history of brain research shows that the hypothesis that we are
determinate and that mind and brain can be seen as one and the same is not as avant-garde
as is often claimed but is re-presented despite important philosophical statements. Another
positive thesis could counter the claim regarding the evil insult to human beings. Brain re-
search is a scientific branch which benefits us. It can help us find explanations as a response
to questions which concern and move us. It should amaze us that we human beings have
been gifted with such a remarkable organ as our brain. Asking questions and doing research
relates to our deepest dignity.
180 Damasio, A.: Descartes’ Error. Emotion, Reason, And The Human Brain. New York 1994,
p. 258.
181 Gehirn & Geist 6 (2004), pp. 30–33.
Cf. Markl, H.: Das Menschenbild als Palimpsest. Die Vorstellung von uns selbst entwerfen wir
unaufhörlich neu. In: Gehirn & Geist 7 (2004), pp. 40–41; Töpfer, F./Huber, L./Synofzik, M.:
Ein neues Menschenbild? Bemerkungen zum »Manifest elf führender Neurowissenschaftler«.
In: Zeitschrift für medizinische Ethik. 1 (2006), pp. 71–79; Wetzel, M.: Sokratischer Dialog
über Hirnforschung. Würzburg 2007; Janich, P.: Kein neues Menschenbild. Zur Sprache der
Hirnforschung. Frankfurt a. M. 2009, pp. 102–114.
 2. Philosophy and brain research. A complicated relationship?        209

tion.182 Does the number »eleven« allude the number of apostles at the Last Supper
and the revelation they received there?183 Or is the reference to a soccer team that
consists of eleven different players who nevertheless fight for a common cause?184
Frank Töpfer, Lara Huber, and Matthias Synofzik are quick to point out that the
authors of the Manifest have their roots in various branches of brain research and
are using the number eleven to emphasize the representative nature of the text.185
The title Manifest also indicates that the authors see themselves as the leaders of a
neurobiological party who wish to inform the public about what is now possible
thanks to brain research, and what achievements can be expected in the next few
years and decades.
Let us look a bit closer at the text. The preliminary thoughts are already inter-
esting and significant. The authors, who are the signatories to the Manifest, say that
research into the cerebrum usually consists of three different stages that need to be
thought of separately. The first or highest stage is said to be the one concerned with
the activity of the larger areas of the brain such as the tasks of exploring the various
sections of the cerebral cortex or the amygdala. In the intermediate level, it is decided
what exactly occurs in the nerve cell groups. The lower level is responsible for what
eventually occurs inside the nerve cells and the molecules. So far so good. Thanks
to technical methods such as PET, fMRT and EEG, the upper of the named levels
has been analyzed quite well. Innovative processes also allow a quite satisfactory
overview of the lower level:

»We now know a great deal more about the configuration of the nerve cell membrane
with receptors and ion channels. We also know about the way they work, the function
of the neurotransmitters, the neuropeptides and the neurohormones as well as the pro-
cess of intra-cellular signal processes or the formation and continuation of neuronal
stimulation. We can analyze whatever occurs in a single neuron with high spatial and
temporal resolution, and also simulate this this in computer models.«186

An where has it been possible so far to celebrate progress and success? The signato-
ries agree completely on how to answer this question: On the upper and on the lower
level! And nowhere else! That is an honest admission that there is a great deal of terra
incognita on the intermediate level. It is »frightening how little we know« about what
is going on in the smaller and larger cell groups. Unmistakably, there is said to be an
»enormous knowledge gap«.«187
Thanks to imaging techniques, mental manifestations of life can be easily locat-
ed in cerebral structures. However, the signatories feel, as brain researchers they
especially should not only know where something is happening, but how. In that

182 Cf. Markl, H.: Das Menschenbild als Palimpsest. Die Vorstellung von uns selbst entwerfen wir
unaufhörlich neu. In: Gehirn & Geist 7 (2004), p. 40.
183 Ibid., p. 40.
184 Cf. Wetzel, M.: Sokratischer Dialog über Hirnforschung. Würzburg 2007, p. 8.
185 Cf. Töpfer, F./Huber, L./Synofzik, M.: Ein neues Menschenbild? Bemerkungen zum »Manifest
elf führender Neurowissenschaftler«. In: Zeitschrift für medizinische Ethik. 1 (2006), pp. 71 f.
186 Gehirn & Geist 6 (2004), p. 31.
187 Ibid., p. 31.
210       A. Man and his brain

connection, the signatories of the Manifest have recourse to an already very familiar
comparison. They tell us that »it is as if we tried to understand the manner in which
a computer functions by measuring the power consumption while it completes vari-
ous tasks.«188 The next statement sounds measured, thoughtful and restrained:

»We do not even have any rudimentary understanding of the rules according to which
the brain works; how it maps the world so that immediate perception and earlier expe-
rience merge; how internal activity is experienced as its action and how it plans future
initiatives. It is also not clear at all how we can research this with the modern means
available. In this respect we are so to speak still at the hunter-gatherer stage.«189

This statement informs readers about what the brain is said to accomplish: It creates
(day in, day out) the world and its people; it experiences its own actions and plans
what needs to be done. It is a very busy super organ. With all that, the well-known
neuroscientists tell us, the brain adheres to strict rules. Yet, against the background
of our present discussions regarding the structure of the brain and the manner in
which the brain functions, its embedding in a living organism and its interrelation
with the world around it, the statements of the Manifest are also open to criticism
from the point of view of neurobiology. Does the cerebrum experience anything?
Does it plan, does it know rules? Is it aware of its alleged special role? In the chapter
entitled »The lived body and soul or mind and brain«, I will discuss philosophical mis-
interpretations which are apparent not only in the Manifest, but in extraordinarily
many neuroscientific and neurophilosophical publications.190
Following the cited introductory statement, the signatories responsible for the
Manifest confirm that they have discovered that »in the human brain neuronal pro-
cesses and consciously experienced spiritual-psychic conditions are extremely close-
ly related.«191 What do they actually mean by »in the brain?« Can mental manifes-
tations of life be found in the brain? What is meant by »extremely closely related«?
It does not become any clearer when it is subsequently explained that mental man-
ifestations of life »accompany certain neuronal processes in specific brain areas.«192
This formulation is such (without calling it »fuzzy«) that it could be endorsed by the
representatives of various representatives of physicalist suggestions, by parallelists,
hylemorphists and even of dualists. But that is not enough. The Manifest signatories
uphold the hypothesis that all manifestations of life can be completely understood if
we observe what is happening physically and chemically:

»Even though we do not yet know the exact details, we can assume that all these pro-
cesses can be described by means of physico-chemical occurrences. The research in this

188 Ibid., p. 33.

189 Ibid., p. 33.
190 This also applies to the formulation found in the Manifest that nerve cells communicate
with each other (ibid., p. 31) or rather speak to each other (ibid., p. 33) in the language of
circuits and information of the brain (ibid., p. 34).
191 Gehirn & Geist 6 (2004), p. 33.
192 Ibid., p. 33.
 2. Philosophy and brain research. A complicated relationship?        211

area is to be conducted in the coming years and decades by brain researchers. Spirit
and consciousness – however strangely we may experience them, they thus integrate
themselves as natural events and do not transcend nature. Spirit and consciousness
have not fallen from the sky, but have taken shape, gradually, within the evolution of
the nervous system.«193

In light of such statements, we may wonder as careful readers: Have we missed some-
thing? In the introduction, the signatories clearly said that all investigations were
still at the hunter-gatherer level. The Manifest leaves no doubt about that, does not
limit it by means of interpretation. Yet now, when the pages are turned, we find with
lightning speed that we can look back at the »good old days« of the hunter-gatherers.
Now we are told that we much, much more. Is it all a wonderful revelation? Especial-
ly since the authors are apparently so sure that they know what the neurosciences
will bring to light in the future.194 Michael Hagner comes to the conclusion that
the signatories have apparently lost the overview in the wide spectrum of humble
modesty and facing a lack of knowledge about the cerebral mechanisms and their
exuberant futuristic promises. He thinks it was »not an industrial accident« part of
a tradition which he calls the proleptic structure of the neurosciences. Hagner writes:

»During the last two hundred years, brain researchers made big far-reaching promises
when new instruments and technologies made new intervention possibilities available.
For a while, these promises were concrete co-determiners of their work. Later, there was
always disillusionment which in turn led to new humility. At the moment, the cognitive
neurosciences are still in the ascendancy. But, this state of affairs may not last.«195

In the light of the grandiose declarations found in the Manifest, we don’t even have
to waste time researching and finally discovering anything. It isn’t worth the trouble.
Right from the beginning, without knowing the exact details, it is evident that mental
manifestations of life can be described in detail with physico-chemical processes. We
may well be permitted to ask how such a preposterous thesis can be formulated when
it is correct that we know so »alarmingly little«.
Statements about how we make decisions and how our sensations »can be ex-
plained fundamentally by physicochemical processes« are clearly articles of faith in
a reductionist strategy that has been adopted. This is a primary tenor in the Mani-
fest, and evidently, if the signatories had their way, this would apply to all the other
neurosciences as well. After all, they claim to speak on behalf of brain research as

193 Ibid., p. 33. Regarding the statement that spirit and brain did not fall from heaven cf.
Dawkins, R.: Der Gotteswahn. Berlin 2007, p. 46.
194 The scientists are represented by the biologist Hubert Markl in his criticism of the Manifest.
Markl, H.: Das Menschenbild als Palimpsest. Die Vorstellung von uns selbst entwerfen wir
unaufhörlich neu. In: Gehirn & Geist 7 (2004), pp. 40–41.
Especially psychologists who fear that their science is being threatened are critical: Psycho­
logie im 21. Jahrhundert. Eine Standortbestimmung. In: Gehirn & Geist 7/8 (2005). Gehirn
& Geist 6 (2004), pp. 56–60.
195 Hagner, M.: Der Geist bei der Arbeit. Historische Untersuchungen zur Hirnforschung. Göttin-
gen 2006, p. 11.
212       A. Man and his brain

such. Yet, we must remember the story of the wine-tasting session told in Part 1 or
the attempt to understand what a bat experiences, to appreciate that arguments such
as the impossibility of physicalizing everything are not considered at all. Something
very important is lost if we merely interchange various neuroscientific, i. e. physical
concepts.196 If we remember these important subjects from Part 1, we realize that the
text of the Manifest has one or more weak points. What about the question how we
can reasonably uphold the assumption that our living experience naturally retains
its greatness and charisma when at the same time we fly under the flags of reduc-
tionism.197 Have we been missing something again? Forgot to hear a revelation? The
insinuation that everything is totally ascertainable physico-chemically, at the very
least overlooks what has been established in Part 1, namely that this is not a way to
understand a living human being. And something else: A Manifest should focus on
the future and motivate people to act in a certain way. A manifest is supposed to
be a directive.198 May we assume that the signatories will also accept other types of
explanations such as those in reference to reason, and purposeful targeted action?
And how does this fit into the fundamental belief in reductionism?
Probably to hide such weak points, the signatories of the Manifest rapidly refocus
on the direction of the document. Allegedly there is agreement that it has been pos-
sible to get to the heart of questions concerned with our conscious mental manifesta-
tions of life as well as those concerned with our will. There is, however, still an answer
that is pending: »There are plausible guesses as to the codes with which individual or
some nerve cells communicate with each other (perhaps they use several codes simul-
taneously).«199 At least these »guesses« are »plausible« and the »guesses« or »hunches«
in question are not hard facts. Moreover, the use of the term »codes« suggests
that neuroscientists will soon »crack« what transpires on the neuronal level.200

196 Cf. also: Töpfer, F./Huber, L./Synofzik, M.: Ein neues Menschenbild? Bemerkungen zum
»Manifest elf führender Neurowissenschaftler«. In: Zeitschrift für medizinische Ethik. 1
(2006), p. 73; Wetzel, M.: Sokratischer Dialog über Hirnforschung. Würzburg 2007.
197 Cf. Gehirn & Geist 6 (2004), p. 37.
198 Cf. Janich, P.: Kein neues Menschenbild. Zur Sprache der Hirnforschung. Frankfurt a. M.
2009, p. 103.
199 Gehirn & Geist 6 (2004), p. 31.
200 Wolf Singer likewise refers to the little word »code.« He tells us that »each of us is con-
cerned with a different question. Some want to understand what happens within indi-
vidual cells, others are interested in the manner in which the brain organizes language.
We all have a common goal which we summarize in the manifest, i. e. that we all wish
to decode the neuronal code.« (Singer, W.: Großartige Gehirne. In: http://www.spiegel.de/
spiegel/0,1518,druck-323627,00.html (retrieved 12 Oct. 2005)). Singer creates the impres-
sion that the neuronal code will soon be cracked. He tells us »we have the instruments to
explain in their entirety the functioning of nerve cells. It is only a matter of time. We also
have the methods to determine on the macro-level which brain structures are responsible
for specific activities. But neither the one nor the other method will enlighten us what the
neuronal code is, or how specific activities emanate from the communication between the
nerve cells. The neuronal code is encoded in dialogues taking place between the nerve cells.
Many thousands of neurons participate in the coding of specific cognitive content. They
coordinate specific movements. Intuitively this incredibly complex, dynamic code which
functions abstractly is not accessible to us.«
 2. Philosophy and brain research. A complicated relationship?        213

»As a result of their efforts, neuroscientists will have grasped the basic secrets of the
brain.«201
The fatal flaw of the Manifest is that it claims that all that remains is for the authors
and their neuroscientific co-workers to overcome a few remaining technical barriers.
They claim that all they will know within the next ten years about the exact relation-
ship between mind and brain depends primarily on the development of new research
methods.202 Consequently, all questions regarding the lived body-soul problem can
be solved with faster and more efficient computers, measuring devices, and imag-
ing procedures. There is no word about the prerequisites and conditions of person-
al competences. There is nothing about ethical boundaries. Nothing is said about
the possibility that scientific research might come up against its limits. »The only
mental and spiritual reality seems to be what is present under the skull of a few
individuals.«203
The authors of the Manifest doggedly speculate that it is time to create a new im-
age of human beings. We hear the old revolutionary song that old perspectives have
served their purpose. They are willing to reveal several facets, confirming that it is
not possible to bypass the cerebrum since our brain is on the point of recognizing
itself.204 Man is understood as a mind-brain being. It is therefore not surprising that
concepts such as organism, lived body and being alive are nowhere to be found in
the Manifest. The data of brain researchers are assessed through very specific lenses
as the dualist suggestion (»the separation of body and mind) is being opposed.«205
What then is the counter suggestion to dualism advocated by physicalism authors
such as Roth and Singer? We are already convinced that this does not help us find an
answer to our questions.
Another striking passage in the Manifest is when the authors emphatically rec-
ommend that mental manifestations of life should be categorized in such a way that
they »rest« completely on biological processes.206 This passage is striking because we
must ask what exactly it is they want to tell us. Unfortunately, they remain silent,
and nothing is revealed, although precisely that would be worth knowing. Let us
imagine two possibilities. Possibility A would be a clear commitment to physicalism
if indeed the reference would be clearly to physical preconditions. Possibility B could
point to a necessary requirement. In fact, this passage could even be read in terms
of Aristotelian hylemorphism. Did the authors think of such a suggestion? It seems

(Singer, W.: Das Gehirn ist ein wunderbares Organ. Wie im Kopf aus dem Zusammenspiel
von hundert Milliarden Nervenzellen ein Bild von der Welt und von uns selbst entsteht: Ein
Gespräch mit Wolf Singer. In: FAZ (No. 276). 25. November 2004, p. 40).
201 Gehirn & Geist 6 (2004), p. 36.
202 Ibid., p. 34.
203 Kettner, M.: Was macht Gründe zu guten Gründen? In: Janich, P. (Ed.): Deutsches Jahrbuch
für Philosophie. Vol. 1: Naturalismus und Menschenbild. Hamburg 2008, p. 257.
204 Cf. Gehirn & Geist 6 (2004), p. 37.
205 Ibid., p. 37.
206 Cf. ibid., p. 36.
214       A. Man and his brain

rather improbable. We can only hope that the supporters of option A will one day
recognize their error.207
The Manifest does not hesitate to praise the benefits of brain research. In an al-
most prophetic tone, they proclaim that brain research is the research of the future
and will also include the cure of diseases. At least, much hope is raised Alzheimer,
Parkinson and depression. Who in the world would not want that? The following
sentence is also of interest: »The expected advances in brain research will increas-
ingly put us in a position to take the necessary steps to counter psychological abnor-
malities and aberrations and also to predict behavioral dispositions.«208 Is it possible
that soon we will understand psychological illnesses only as mind-brain-problems?
Or is it not preferable to take into consideration the entire human being as well as
the environment? Are the neurosciences also responsible for such questions?209 Is
this a behavioristic endeavor to make psychology more »scientific« through bet-
ter research into the cerebrum, and thus to make it more viable for the future?
We are denied access to the secret as to which counter measures the authors
have in mind.
The signatories leave readers with the impression that they are qualified to speak
for their entire discipline. This seems to be taken for granted in the context of a
»Neurobiological Party« which publishes a Manifest. Unfortunately, they pay no at-
tention to the fact that quite a few representatives of their discipline discourage such
statements. Neither are the thoughts and objections, the questions and suggestions
of philosophers taken seriously at all. On the contrary! The freedom-theory problem
associated with the lived body-soul problem is quite clearly said to be the domain
of the neurosciences – »the great questions of the neurosciences.«210 With Hubert
Markl, we can say that »the Manifest gives us more to ponder than it actually ex-
presses.«211

207 Cf. also Töpfer, F./Huber, L./Synofzik, M.: Ein neues Menschenbild? Bemerkungen zum
»Manifest elf führender Neurowissenschaftler«. In: Zeitschrift für medizinische Ethik. 1
(2006), pp. 72, 74, 77.
208 Gehirn & Geist 6 (2004), p. 36.
209 The manifest Psychologie im 21. Jahrhundert emphasizes: Psychology and brain research
are analyzed on different levels. They can therefore not be in competition with each other.
(Gehirn & Geist 7/8 (2005), p. 59).
210 Gehirn & Geist 6 (2004), p. 34.
211 Markl, H.: Das Menschenbild als Palimpsest. Die Vorstellung von uns selbst entwerfen wir
unaufhörlich neu. In: Gehirn & Geist 7 (2004), p. 41.
 2. Philosophy and brain research. A complicated relationship?        215

2.3 The premises and limits of brain research

»It soon becomes apparent that an adequate

analysis of the basic tenets of
the modern neurosciences can only then be
achieved
when the methodological framework and the
statements of this science
can be reconstructed.«212

What importance does the brain have for our entire organism? The work of neuro-
scientists begins with this and similar questions. To obtain a good answer leading
further, scientists cannot simply quote »raw« data. Instead, they must agree with
colleagues in their discipline what needs to be clarified and discussed, and where to
begin. This already shows that from the start, certain parameters must be adhered
to and an area must be outlined that can and should be researched. Not everyone
does and examines everything. Thus, for example, it is the responsibility of physio­
logists to assess more carefully the reception of signals and their usefulness for our
organism. What exactly occurs biochemically is the question chemists must ask,
But there are other research questions. How does medication affect our nervous
system? This is the key question assigned to neuropharmacologists. Morphologists
dedicate themselves to other specialties such as questions concerning the structure
of nerve cells. Neurogenesis focuses on the creation of neurons from stem cells.
Every area contributes in its own way to the research of the cerebrum. If we look
again at the discussions in »History of brain research«, we find that at the begin-
ning, when the Edwin Smith Papyrus scrolls were composed, i. e. at the time of
Alkmaion or Galen, all these sub-disciplines which are now concerned with brain
research, and which cluster around the umbrella concept of the »neurosciences«,
did not exist. They appeared at a later stage to illuminate specific facets within the
discipline.
Our journey into the history of brain research made clear that the neurosciences
have come a long way and have not simply »fallen from the sky«. Their sources are
the questioning and searching undertaken by real people. In order to answer questions
of the kind referred to in the introduction, generations of researchers have devised
multiple strategies and have improved these as necessary. When we call brain re-
search an »objective« science today, we should not forget that it is rooted in this
questioning exchange between people.213

212 Breidbach, O.: Die Materialisierung des Ichs. Zur Geschichte der Hirnforschung im 19. und
20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt a. M. 1997, p. 407.
213 See also: Schockenhoff, E.: Theologie der Freiheit. Freiburg/Basel/Vienna 2007, p. 72; Za-
borowski, H.: Herausforderungen der Freiheit. In: Communio 2 (2008), p. 140; Husserl, E.:
Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. Eine
Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie. Hamburg 1992, p. 70; Janich, P.: Natur-
wissenschaft vom Menschen versus Philosophie. In: Janich, P. (Ed.): Deutsches Jahrbuch für
Philosophie. Vol. 1: Naturalismus und Menschenbild. Hamburg 2008, pp. 30–51, esp. p. 41.
216       A. Man and his brain

Even the most promising of neuroscientific projects cannot be completed with-

out input from researchers interested in Homo sapiens and our cerebrum. These re-
searchers ask questions and wonder under which aspect something must be looked
at more closely. Planning and organizing follows from the research questions, from
the intentionality as decisions are made concerning the experiments to be employed,
what is technically and financially possible. Part of the neuroscientist’s daily routine
includes working with data and »separating the wheat from the chaff« and then to
pass these data on to others – e. g. in scientific papers. What is communicated to us
is also influenced by the principles and views of the scientific community. What we
call »brain research« is not possible without people who are interested in specific
questions and see answers.214
Whoever is active in the neurosciences will soon realize that people in these disci-
plines are not a phalanx of infallible scientists who cannot be questioned and whose
answers are always correct. It is especially in neuroscientific publications where we
discover a large number of unproven ideas. Some statements found there are indeed
more or less valid assumptions, and yet these are mostly ignored. Our survey of the
history of the discipline has shown that the statements made are not free of errors
and exaggerations. Even the declarations made by neuroscientific high achievers are
subject to certain conditions. We can also say that their radius is not unlimited. There
is no brain theory that can provide an answer to everything.215
In the neuroscientific discipline, it is important to approach research according
to a much-promising plan and not to rush into it blindly. A goal-oriented approach
must be taken to certain questions and problems. Even some suggestions by Des-
cartes can be helpful for the methodological approach. For example, we could begin
by dealing with a simpler problem, and then proceed to a more difficult one to keep
order and create overviews. The work done by neuroscientists must be separated
from the personal opinions and preferences of the scientist concerned.
Brain researchers are not concerned with the opinion which some unknown phi-
losopher from a suburb of Dortmund has thought to have had at one time. Their
concentration is focused on the fact that people can be aware of certain issues at all. It
is well known that laboratory tests are employed when someone wants to test either
the knowledge already gathered or suspected to be true. As Hesse tells us,

»The goal is inter-subjectively recognized knowledge related to the regulated occur-

rence of events, conditions and characteristics which can be carried over to comparable

214 According to Janich, »the direction of the methodically naïve assessment of human beings
as research objects should be expanded to include the opposite direction and see human
beings as subjects, as authors, and bearers of the sciences.« (Janich, P.: Naturwissenschaft
vom Menschen versus Philosophie. In: Janich, P. (Ed.): Deutsches Jahrbuch für Philosophie.
Vol. 1: Naturalismus und Menschenbild. Hamburg 2008, p. 49).
215 Other levels of the scala naturae reflect the reality that not everything can be explained
with the help of neurobiology. Today, we know that the nervous system of a nematode
(Caenorhabditis elegans) contains not more and not less than 302 nerve cells. This claim is
exact. There are many books about the nervous system of this tiny creature. Yet, this intense
research gives little indication as to how we should understand the manifestations of life of
the nematode.
 2. Philosophy and brain research. A complicated relationship?        217

constellations from cases that have already been explored. This makes recognition and
prediction possible.«216

At the beginning of Part 2, we introduced individual technological achievements

with which neuroscientists perform their work. In that connection, I pointed out
that it is important to measure something not just once, but several times in succes-
sion. There is a good reason for that: Imagine a test subject is shown the picture of
an animal. The test subject thinks of his own pet, or of the neighbor’s dog, or of the
neighbor’s child who enjoys playing with this dog. All these factors would be part of
the equation when measuring the activation. To minimize these side effects, various
pictures of animals or other images will be presented.
Neuroscientists are concerned with what can be tested at any time. It is never
about one specific moment. There is much in our lives that is not accessible to a pro-
fessional or with the possibilities of even the most diligent neuroscientist. This can
be demonstrated with an everyday situation: Imagine that you are eating a pizza for
the first time in your life. Since it was delicious, you visit the pizzeria for the second
time. Since your brain is a dynamic organ, it is now in a different state than it was
during your first visit. The effect of the pizza has left its mark, but this effect cannot be
experimentally measured before your first visit to the pizzeria. Ethical concerns (e. g.
whether it is ethically responsible to eat tuna fish pizza when overfishing threatens
our oceans) cannot be answered with the neuroscientific methods available at the
moment. As is already apparent in the Manifest, the question asked by neurosci-
entific research is how something occurs. Are there rules and laws? What are they?
­Questions regarding meaning and importance are not considered. My own qualita-
tive understanding when I visit a pizzeria and enjoy eating a pizza is totally ignored
in neuroscientific projects, and so is my pleasure of being with my dining compan-
ion. Experienced qualities cannot not be captured, e. g. what it feels like when we
eat this pizza. Questions regarding varying mental manifestations of life cannot be
answered merely from the perspective of science – no matter how reputable it may
be. It is after all I who is looking forward to dinner, who feels the pleasant ambience,
who enjoys the pizza. So, if we wish to pursue the questions posed at the beginning,
it is important to pay heed to our own experience, as well as to our living relationship
with other people. The perspective of experience cannot simply be translated by a
neuroscientist into universally valid statements carved in stone.217

216 Hesse, H.: Was können wir wissen? Zu Voraussetzungen, Struktur und Grenzen der natur-
wissenschaftlichen Erforschung von Bewusstseinsphänomenen. In: Herrmann, C. S./Pauen,
M./Rieger, J. W./Schicktanz, S. (Eds.): Bewusstsein. Philosophie, Neurowissenschaften, Ethik.
Munich 2005, p. 169.
217 When I say: I want to love, honor, and respect you all the days of my life, then this has a
different meaning than when a young philosopher promises a pretty woman called Anna
Bolika that he will love, honor, and respect her. The living love relationship, the butterflies
in the stomach, the promise to be faithful to each other does not appear in a third project.
What neuroscientists say about love, is not simply the same as the »fiery« commitment of
an experience and vice versa. The experience perspective will similarly evolve once one of
the partners discovers that the other or they themselves are suffering from a serious illness.
In medical circles, numerous medical tales are known in which the medical prospects have
218       A. Man and his brain

Colorful presentations of imaging resources do not speak for themselves, they

have to be translated or interpreted.218 Thus, during an fMRI, special attention is
paid to the flow of blood and the consumption of oxygen in the area of the cerebrum
(BOLD). On this basis, we can then say something about neuronal processes. Ex-
perts tell us that the scanner’s »time of repetition« is every two seconds. Photogra-
phers would call the result a snapshot of our brain. Stephan Schleim points out that
during the activation of half a million to about three million neurons per measuring
unit one single average is generated.219
Since the sum of nerve cells, in addition to their connections, is so incredibly
large (who is able to count the trees and leaves of the Amazon jungle captured in one
view? – to follow the image used by Susan Greenfield), neuroscientists fall back on
pattern and model representations. Since everyone and thus every cerebrum is dif-
ferent, it becomes impossible to avoid using certain templates.220 Certain aspects that
do not fit into the template are excluded. Yet, Edith Stein reminds us that »what es-
capes the mesh of the mathematic formula net is not the less ›real‹.«221 Even the most
impressive technology available to neuroscientists cannot be used for all areas and
situations in our lives.222 Fruit and vegetable merchants have measuring instruments
and measuring units which are far less exact than those of a neuroscientist. They after
all do not need them for their work. Whoever wishes to buy a kilo of asparagus in a
farmers’ market does not need a microscale. The asparagus does not first have to be
put through a CT device. There are contexts where these measuring instruments are
useful. In other contexts, using them would be totally wrong.
When neuroscientists present their raw data, they still contain a plethora of issues
that are not what scientists are looking for, but that are also collected. These things
are then filtered out; the raw data are sorted out. Stephan Schleim points out that
from the original signal to the formulation of a scientific paper about brain activity is
a fairly long and often tedious road which leads past several steps before it has been
processed. »The quality and the significance of the data is limited by the deduction of
apparently irrelevant activation.«223 Thomas Fuchs reminds us that we are here deal-
ing with »the visualization of statistical calculations, i. e. with complex constructs.«224
The many brightly colored images let us forget that mental manifestations of life are
found in organisms which are alive and which stand in lively interaction with other

changed thanks to the patients will to live because of the love the other partner has shown.
In this way, many very serious illnesses have been overcome.
218 In the neurosciences, there is reference to the fact that it is dangerous to only to pay at-
tention to specially active areas. Cf.: http://mod.iig.uni-freiburg.de/cms/fileadmin/publi
kationen/online-publikationen/med.Bild.Objektivitaet.pdf (retrieved 10 Oct. 2008).
219 Cf. Schleim, S.: Gedankenlesen. Pionierarbeit der Hirnforschung. Hannover 2008, p. 49.
220 Cf. also Roth, G.: Aus Sicht des Gehirns. Frankfurt a. M. 2003, p. 201.
221 Stein, E.: EPh, p. 62.
222 Cf. Husserl, E.: Formale und transzendentale Logik. Den Haag 1974, p. 284.
223 Schleim, S.: Gedankenlesen. Pionierarbeit der Hirnforschung. Hannover 2008, p. 55.
224 Fuchs, T.: Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan. Eine phänomenologisch-ökologische Konzep-
tion. Stuttgart 2008, p. 73.
 2. Philosophy and brain research. A complicated relationship?        219

and with their environment. In this sense, »imaging technology freezes the stream
of consciousness and isolates it from its contexts.«225
Time and again we read that with the necessary dedication and even better in-
struments than is already available, no questions about man will remain unanswered.
The fact that the source of neurosciences is found in the living exchange between
humans is forgotten. At the same time, it is promised that it is possible to understand
man from the current of neurosciences. It should be noted that the spring is not the
same as the current of a river. As Günter Rager remarks quite correctly:

»This is similar to the fantastic stories of Baron Münchhausen, who falls into a swamp
and then attempts to pull himself out by his own hair. It is an old philosophical insight
that we can no longer question either the horizon from which our thinking originates,
or the absolute ground from which we have emanated. It is a fundamental impossibility
to reify or to grasp them. We have already overstepped all individual disciplines if we
want to make the horizon from whose environs one thinks and questions the subject
of a discussion. In philosophy, likewise, this horizon never appears as object, but always
only as prerequisite of knowledge possibilities.«226

According to Rager, man’s mental giftedness is the requirement that enables us to

research our wonderful cerebrum, and that is why it is not possible to make this
giftedness completely comprehensible by means of neurosciences.227 Thomas Fuchs
emphasizes: »Neuroscientific work and research is definitely not something that has
›come out of nowhere‹. We cannot approach all these issues without requirements.
Neurobiology cannot extract even a single bit of meaning from its subject, the brain,
without first having gained the insight by means of inter-subjective communica-
tive understanding and then attributed this to its subject.«228 The thought that the
current of the neurosciences springs from human beings who seek and question,
invariably indicates that we are in a relationship with other humana and with our
environment.229 It is vitally important to envisage the assumptions and the range of
neuroscientific endeavors.

225 Ibid., p. 74.

226 Rager, G.: Das Leib-Seele-Problem. Begegnung von Hirnforschung und Philosophie. In: Rager,
G.: Die Person. Wege zu ihrem Verständnis. Fribourg 2006, p. 27.
227 Cf. ibid., p. 27; Rager, G.: Das Bewusstsein und seine neurobiologische Erklärung. In: Rager,
G.: Die Person. Wege zu ihrem Verständnis. Fribourg 2006, p. 54.
228 Fuchs, T.: Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan. Eine phänomenologisch-ökologische Konzep-
tion. Stuttgart 2008, p. 288.
Jürgen Habermas has similar insights. He says that »for the observer the objectivity of the
world constitutes itself with the inter subjectivity of a possible understanding of what can
be grasped of an inner worldly occurrence. The inter-subjective assessment of subjective
evidence makes possible the objectification of nature. Thus, the process of communica-
tion cannot be totally relegated to the object side, i. e. cannot be totally described as an
inner-worldly determinate occurrence and in this way be overtaken by objectification.«
(Habermas, J.: Freiheit und Determinismus. In: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 52
(2004), p. 883).
229 In neuroscientific and neurophilosophical publications, the second-person perspective is
ignored. Insofar as these scientists are cognizant of the range of their own research, this is
220       A. Man and his brain

2.4 The necessity for a multitude of perspectives:

The relationship between philosophy and the neurosciences

»Wo kämen wir hin mit unsern kleinen Gehir-

nen, wenn alle an alles dächten?«230

In the Manifest of Brain Researchers, the signatories confirm how important it is

for neuroscientists and scholars in the humanities to sit at the same table and con-
centrate on exchanging ideas about certain issues. Apart from the fact that philo­
sophers, who should actually be outside of this unfortunate split between natural
sciences and humanities, what is being said here has little meaning and is no more
than half-hearted lip service.231 The reason for this unfortunate situation is that the
assembled neuroscientists grandiosely declare that their strategies are the general
key to the solution of our questions concerning the lived body-soul problem. Any
mutual discourse that now takes place can be at cross-purposes or fall silent before
it really begins. But it isn’t necessarily so.232
It is well known that there are several ways in which we can come to grips with
statements made by philosophers and neuroscientists. One of these, adopted by
many authors today is to suppose that as philosophical and neuroscientific state-
ments in effect amount to the same thing, we should look only at one side of the coin.
Philosophers who adopt this approach are thus of the opinion that what is being de-
veloped in the neurosciences can be minimized, i. e. reduced, to philosophical results
and objections. The opposite is also true: members of the neuroscientific discipline
claim that their »hard facts« speak for themselves; philosophy is only for aesthetes
and what the latter laboriously formulate is of no consequence with regard to what
neuroscientists already regard as known and dealt with. This attempt at muzzling
each other by disregarding the other side’s capacities, qualifications, and charac-
teristics as well the typical manner in which everyone approaches the issues is not
conducive to an honest dialogue.
There are also authors who do not tire to point out how far apart philosophy and
the neurosciences are. In their opinion, the two disciplines are totally disparate. They
can never come together: it is a case of »either-or.« Instead of talking to each other
and that way learning something about the other and about issues not yet seen, we

not a big problem. It becomes difficult when they claim to have definitive revelations and
therefore relationships no longer belong to us as living »human beings. Coreth reminds us
that human beings only attain spiritual awareness, thinking and judgment regarding moral
values and actions, i. e. to human spiritual-moral self-realization within community. Hu-
man beings must be approached, invited and trained.« (Coreth, E.: Metaphysik als Aufgabe.
In: Coreth, E. (Ed.): Aufgaben der Philosophie. Innsbruck 1958, p. 82).
230 Excerpt from the poem: Arbeitsteilung by Hans Magnus Enzensberger: Enzensberger,
H. M.: Leichter als Luft. Moralische Gedichte. Frankfurt a. M. 1999, p. 22.
231 Cf. Gehirn & Geist 6 (2004), p. 37.
232 Regarding the relationship between the individual sciences: Muck, O.: Methodologie und
Metaphysik. In: Coreth, E. (Ed.): Aufgaben der Philosophie. Innsbruck 1958, pp. 99–157;
Rager, G.: Bewusstsein und Person in Wissenschaft und Lebenswelt. In: Rager, G.: Die Person.
Wege zu ihrem Verständnis. Fribourg 2006, pp. 83–100.
 2. Philosophy and brain research. A complicated relationship?        221

should emphasize our own strengths and give prominence to contrasts. We search
for the »mote in the other’s eye« but ignore the »plank« blocking our own horizon
and preventing us from being enriched by what the other sees. Authors who adopt
this model deny that the other side is even capable of discriminatory judgment re-
garding the questions being posed.233 All the while, we cling to the belief that our
own insights are more than sufficient. This model is unwelcome since it stifles all
honest dialogue.
There are other possibilities how philosophers and neuroscientists can deal with
each other. For example, they could ignore each other. We can close our eyes or
look only at ourselves. Philosophers would not care what neuroscientists have to

233 Time and again, one hears that philosophy is not important for the neurosciences. Christof
Koch is convinced that only the neurosciences can find an answer questions concerned
with the lived body-soul problem (e. g., the sub problem concerned with the theory of free-
dom or the problem concerned with personal identity) (Koch, C.: Die Zukunft der Hirn-
forschung. Das Bewusstsein steht vor seiner Enthüllung. In: Geyer, C. (Ed.): Hirnforschung
und Willensfreiheit. Zur Deutung der neuesten Experimente. Frankfurt a. M. 2004, pp. 229–
234). Gerhard Roth blames philosophy alone for communication disturbances, which are
characterized by »lack of knowledge regarding problem consciousness, conceptual systems,
methodical-practical approaches, and especially the discussion and knowledge bases in the
natural sciences.« (Roth, G.: Gehirn oder Geist? In: Die Zeit. 17. Febr. 1995. Quoted by:
Beckermann, A.: Es bleibt schwierig. Zur Zukunft der Zusammenarbeit von Philosophie des
Geistes und empirischen Wissenschaften. In: Spät, P. (Ed.): Zur Zukunft der Philosophie des
Geistes. Paderborn 2008, p. 249).
In an article with the provoking title »philosophy is annoying,« Wolfgang Prinz (Prinz, W.:
Philosophie nervt. Eine Polemik. In: Spät, P. (Ed.): Zur Zukunft der Philosophie des Geistes.
Paderborn 2008, pp. 237–247) laments especially the differences between a philosophi-
cal and a neuroscientific world view. There is an irreconcilable contradiction between a
neuroscientific and a philosophical approach to reality. Philosophical work goes nowhere,
especially not »when I measure it according to the goals of my own work.« Philosophy is
annoying because her thematic and theoretical program is diametrically opposed to that
of the modern neurosciences (ibid., p. 238). A fruitful dialogue is not possible when the
appropriateness of a philosophical approach is denied, and there is only a competitive re-
lationship between philosophers and nature scientists (»ignore or annoy«: ibid., p. 247).
In his reply to Prinz’s assertions, Ansgar Beckermann (Beckermann, A.: Es bleibt schwierig.
Zur Zukunft der Zusammenarbeit von Philosophie des Geistes und empirischen Wissenschaf-
ten. In: Spät, P. (Ed.): Zur Zukunft der Philosophie des Geistes. Paderborn 2008, pp. 249–261)
points to the important task that philosophy of mind has to help eliminate lack of clarity, to
take a closer look at the basic concepts, and so to play an important role in taking a closer
look at the basic concepts as problems are framed and solution strategies are sought. In
contrast to Prinz, he emphasizes that a dialogue between philosophers and neuroscien-
tists could bring fruitful insights. What is problematic about Beckerman’s statement is that
he differentiates between two kinds of philosophy: those who are skeptical towards the
empirical sciences in principal (something Beckermann himself rejects) and the empirical
sciences as followed by open-minded philosophers (ibid., p. 260). As far as he is concerned,
the latter can only be naturalistically disposed. This is why the cooperation between phi-
losophers and neuroscientists that he extols finally results in a »naturalistic image of the
human being.« (ibid., p. 261). Beckermann overlooks that there are indeed philosophers
who take neuroscientific facts seriously and who are concerned with establishing a fruitful
dialogue with modern brain research, but who on principle reject naturalism.
222       A. Man and his brain

contribute to the lived body-soul problem, and vice versa. Since authors who adopt
this model, would live and talk at cross purposes, this is not a recommended path.234
The model that leads somewhere is the idea of a diversity of perspectives. In that
scenario, neuroscientific and philosophical statements are not merely the same, i. e.
they can be adapted to each other, thus making true dialogue impossible. Various
approaches are welcomed. Here, for example, a philosopher or a neuroscientist can
be defined according to a biological perspective as a vertebrate that belongs to the
species of primates and a colleague in the hominid family, i. e. one of the great apes.
Such a perspective acknowledges man’s animal-like qualities and that there are de-
grees of kinship within the scala naturae. This was something Aristotle already wrote
about. He did not ignore other perspectives, and he also described man as zóon
lógon échon. Let us remember what he said in An.I 1, 403a30 about anger: The ap-
proach taken by the physikos is welcomed. It is important. Yet, Aristotle also pointed
out that it does not suffice to do no more than adopt the perspective of the natural
scientist who here ignores phenomenological facets which are equally meaningful.
Similar to the physikos Aristotle had in mind, modern brain research regards only
a section of reality. Or, as Aristotle said in MET. IV 1, 1003a: it delimits a section of
what exists and examines only a section of what is according to parameters which
apply to it. Neuroscientists stake out their area of research. They care about questions
concerning the nervous system, and especially about our encephalon. They are able
to achieve much through efficient work. Yet, they take no note of what is outside the
area they have staked out. We have already seen this when some brain researchers
claim that they alone have the right and are in a position to contribute constructively
to the lived body-soul problem. Neuroscientists provide us with information con-
cerning the necessary cerebral prerequisites as for instance how we, the readers of
this text, are reflecting and exchanging ideas. Here, we see that our cerebral processes
are not sufficient to describe our mental manifestations of life.
While neuroscientists gather facts, philosophers ask what is meant when we speak
of »freedom« or even of the »lived body.« Their questions are concerned with the
nature of what exists. For example, they ask what exactly a living being is, what ex-
actly constitutes being alive. In the 21st century, we have many »currents of science«,
all of which originate from humans who ask question.Here, too, Aristotle gives us
valuable advice in as much as he believed that this clarification is embedded in the
»original philosophy« of metaphysics. Its task is to pose and keep alive the question
about the whole.235 »Its task is to speculatively formulate and coordinate category
schemes which cross over individual disciplines and establish coherence between
various modes of experience.«236

234 Cf. Muck, O.: Methodologie und Metaphysik. In: Coreth, E. (Ed.): Aufgaben der Philosophie.
Innsbruck 1958, p. 105.
235 I am unable to expand on this at the moment. For greater insight cf. Schmidinger, H.: Met-
aphysik. Ein Grundkurs. Stuttgart/Berlin/Cologne 2000.
236 Kather, R.: Ordnungen der Wirklichkeit. Die Kritik der philosophischen Kosmologie am
mecha­nistischen Paradigma. Würzburg 1998, p. 393.
»We are concerned with metaphysics insofar as here the most general principles or ideas
which can be generally applied are developed. These principles serve as an interpretation of
various experiences. These principles are general insofar as they have a character that tran-
 2. Philosophy and brain research. A complicated relationship?        223

In addition, philosophers can help to identify and point out dangerous traps. It
can be quite profitable if philosophers regularly ask whether what is being presented
makes any sense. Or is it nonsense? Is it correct what is being said about man? Is it
consistent and sustainable what is being lectured about freedom or determinism?
Are there any opposite proposals or is this the one prescribed way? Does what is
being said about the »soul« hold up to scrutiny? Could there perhaps be an error
in reasoning? Can the way animals are treated or such and such experiments with
human beings be justified? What are the consequences for the beginning and end
of a human life when we look at issues in a certain manner? How can we find our
way in the Babylonian confusion of languages? An important aspect of philosoph-
ical questioning and research is the meaning and validity of linguistic terms in all
their forms, methods and structures, of conceptualization and theory formation,
of an empirical or an a priori status of results. In short, philosophical questioning
includes the scientific and epistemological tools of scientific discussion.237 There can
be no successful neuroscientific research concerning the question about man and his
brains without input from philosophy.

Conclusion

»Any book that has as its main topic the brain

is only as good as the ›aptitude‹ of its author’s
brain and as the present level of the sciences
at the time of its composition allows.«238

Until now, we have tried in this chapter to come to terms with the structure and the
functioning of our brain, and we have seen that the brain is a plastic organ embedded
in the human organism. A look at the history of brain research has shown that in-
terest in this fascinating organ goes back very far, and that many questions and ideas
being discussed today are themselves »ancient history«. This applies, for example, to
the search for the soul and for mental manifestations of life (such as thinking, being
afraid) in the cerebrum. In this context, we have also seen that the history of brain
research has not been a total »success story«, but prone with errors and dead-ends.
And that is still the case today. Within the scope of the debate about the relationship
between philosophy and brain research, the question was raised whether brain re-
search is a narcissistic affront and how the signatories of the Manifest see the future
of brain research. We have looked at questions such as: What are the fundamental

scends the disciplines and individual observations. This character is basic for an adequate
representation of reality. Thus, the manner and choice of these principles decides how real-
ity is defined. These principles are neither independent reality as they are for Plato; nor are
they a priori regulative ideas as for Kant; nor mere concepts as understood by empiricism.«
(ibid., p. 393).
237 Janich, P.: Naturwissenschaft vom Menschen versus Philosophie. In: Janich, P. (Ed.): Deutsches
Jahrbuch für Philosophie. Vol. 1: Naturalismus und Menschenbild. Hamburg 2008, pp. 34 f.
238 Changeux, J.-P.: Der neuronale Mensch. Wie die Seele funktioniert – die Entdeckungen der
neuen Gehirnforschung. Reinbek bei Hamburg 1984, p. 343.
224       A. Man and his brain

and methodological premises of brain research? We have looked for the source of
the sciences and discussed the limits of neuroscientific observation. Finally, we have
pleaded for a model that would reflect a diversity of perspectives, where various
perspectives have a right to exist side by side. Metaphysics has the task of ensur-
ing categorical schemes encompassing the various perspectives. The next step is to
look more closely at our lived body in which our brain is embedded. Subsequently,
representative neuroscientific theories about consciousness are to be presented and
examined with regard to their basic philosophical assumptions.
B. The rediscovery of the lived body (Leib)

»The form of the human body is not merely of

tangible quality,
it is a momentous figure that expresses the
spiritual nature of man.«1

Preliminary Remarks

»The body of which our senses make us aware

tells us of is spiritual content.
And when we take our own experience as
a guide, we do not find our body as foreign,
separated from us with which we communi-
cate from the outside as if it were something
other.«2

Thanks to the constant drum beat of the mind-brain paradigm, which wants to re-
duce us to mind and brain, and thanks to the siren sounds of mechanistic thinking
telling us we are nothing but exchangeable body pieces making us function like a
machine, our corporeality has been increasingly sidelined. This is all the more sur-
prising when we remember that we are corporeal beings who do everything as cor-
poreal beings. Our manifestations of life are impossible without our lived body. It is
therefore of special concern to me that after my chapter called Man and his brain and
before my chapter called Paths to consciousness I should talk about our corporeality
and to argue against a mind-brain paradigm.3

1 Stein, E.: AMP, p. 115.

2 Ibid., p. 98.
3 The following are interesting introductions to phenomenology: Merleau-Ponty, M.:
Vorwort. In: Merleau-Ponty, M.: Phänomenologie der Wahrnehmung. Berlin 1966, esp.
pp. 3–18; Waldenfels, B.: Der Spielraum des Verhaltens. Frankfurt a. M. 1980, esp. pp. 11–75;
Spiegelberg, H.: The Phenomenological Movement. Den Haag 31982; Husserl, E.: Die Krisis
der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung
in die phänomenologische Philosophie. Hamburg 1992; Waldenfels, B.: Einführung in die
Phänomenologie. Munich 1992; Husserl, E.: Cartesianische Meditationen. Eine Einleitung
in die Phänomenologie. Hamburg 1995; Böhme, G.: Leibsein als Aufgabe. Leibphilosophie in
pragmatischer Hinsicht. Baden-Baden 2003; Stein, E.: Einführung in die Philosophie. Frei-
burg/Basel/Vienna 2004; Fellmann, F.: Phänomenologie zur Einführung. Hamburg 2006;
Zahavi, D.: Phänomenologie für Einsteiger. Paderborn 2007.
226       B. The rediscovery of the lived body (Leib)

As I developed this chapter, I found dealing with the works of Edith Stein espe-
cially helpful. Stein has provided an impressive phenomenology of the lived body, to
which unfortunately researchers have paid little attention so far.4 She was also very
familiar with Aristotelian philosophy. It is appropriate to follow in her footsteps as
we inquire about the lived body.
The present chapter is divided into two closely related sections. The first section
is headed: I am where my lived body is. The first question I ask is: What differentiates
the lived body from a material body (3.1)? Subsequently I discuss the »presence«
of our own lived body (3.2). The next section deals with our own lived body as the
carrier of free movement and a medium for exploring the world (3.3). The first sec-
tion ends with some notes on the phenomenon of expression (3.4). The second part
of this chapter is entitled You are where the lived body is. The title already indicates
that this section focuses on the lived body of others. As we take into consideration
the question of how the lived body of another is presented to us, we first examine
the idea of empathy – identifying with the other (4.1). Subsequently, the lived body
of the other as carrier of free movement and center of orientation in a three-dimen-
sional world is addressed (4.2). That the lived body of the other is also the carrier
of the phenomenon of expression is dealt with in the next section. The human look
becomes an example to demonstrate that the qualitative characteristics of the lived
body are also found in the lived body of the other. The phenomenological analysis
of the look is augmented with reference to two studies in the area of infant research
(4.3). The fourth and final section examines the possibility of empathy through mir-
ror neurons (4.4).

Hermann Schmitz takes the experience of his own lived body as the point of departure to
demonstrate that corporeality belongs to each of us. Cf. Schmitz, H.: Phänomenologie der
Leiblichkeit. In: Petzold, H. (Ed.): Leiblichkeit. Philosophische, gesellschaftliche und thera-
peutische Perspektiven. Paderborn 1985, pp. 71–106; Schmitz, H.: Leib und Gefühl. Materi-
alien zu einer philosophischen Therapeutik. Paderborn 1989.
A good presentation of various 20th century works on the phenomenology of the blood
can be found in: Fuchs, T.: Leib, Raum, Person. Entwurf einer phänomenologischen Anthro-
pologie. Stuttgart 2000, pp. 43–85. The phenomenological movement is largely unknown in
analytic philosophy. Uwe Meixner has therefore written an introduction to the philosophy
of Husserl. This introduction is not only well-worth reading, it is directed at the representa-
tives of analytical philosophy: Meixner, U.: Die Aktualität Husserls für die moderne Philoso-
phie des Geistes. In: Meixner, U./Newen, A. (Ed.): Seele, Denken, Bewusstsein. Zur Geschichte
der Philosophie des Geistes. Berlin/New York 2003, pp. 308–388.
4 Cf. also: Knaup, M.: Personalität und Leiblichkeit als Voraussetzung für zugelassenes Anders-
sein. Nachdenken in den Spuren Edith Steins. In: Gerl-Falkovitz, H.-B./Kaufmann, R./Sepp,
H. R.: Europa und seine Anderen. Emmanuel Lévinas – Edith Stein – Jósef Tischner. Dresden
2010, pp. 97–117; Knaup, M.: Das Verständnis der Person bei Edith Stein. Philosophische
Anthropologie im Horizont von Phänomenologie und klassischer Metaphysik. In: Enders, M.
(Ed.): Jahrbuch für Religionsphilosophie. Vol. 6. Frankfurt a. M. 2007, pp. 123–157.
 3. I am where my lived body is       227

3. I am where my lived body is

»What affects my lived body affects me
­ xactly in the same place where this lived
e
body is affected. I am present in all parts of
my lived body, wherever I sense something is
happening now.«5

3.1 The lived body and the physical body (Leib and Körper)

»What differentiates the lived body from the

mere body is that it is permeated with a soul.
Where there is a lived body, you will also find
a soul. The reverse is also true: where there
is a soul, you will also find a lived body. A
material thing without a soul is just body, not
lived body. It is not a lived body that is alive. A
spiritual being without a physical body is just
spirit and not a soul.«6

The German language has two separate words: Leib (for the lived body) and Körper
(for the physical body).7 In the present study, we use »lived body« for the German
Leib and simply »body« or physical body for the German Körper. In German, the
word Leib (lived body) is older than that the word Körper (body) whose growth in
popularity is primarily related to the spread of Cartesian and materialistic think-
ing.8 In the 20th century, the challenge was met to rethink the advantages of the
term lived body and to advocate it for a living corporeality in contrast to a Cartesian
materialistic body concept. Thus, the Aristotelian concern that the Leib should always
be understood as a lived body endowed with a soul (German: beseelt) was adopted
as an innovation.
It was primarily the phenomenologically schooled and working philosophers who
contributed to the rediscovery of the lived body. Edith Stein, a student of Husserl,
differentiates between Leib and Körper (the lived body and the body). Her under-
standing of the lived body is a body formed and permeated by the soul. She says that
a bodily construct without this principle of formation cannot be called a lived body.
Certainly Aristotle would agree. Stein speaks of a dual nature of the lived body. She
means on the one hand that the soul forms the lived body and we can therefore expe-

5 Stein, E.: EES, p. 313.

6 Ibid., p. 313.
7 In French Merleau-Ponty differentiates between the corps vivant, phénoménal, fonctionnel
and the corps objectif, i. e. physical. The former refers to the lived body insofar as this is the
means of discovering the world. The second characterizes the body’s physicality. For Mer-
leau-Ponty, it is clear that one cannot separate the lived body and the body.
8 Cf. Böhme, G.: Leibsein als Aufgabe. Leibphilosophie in pragmatischer Hinsicht. Baden-
Baden 2003, p. 12.
228       B. The rediscovery of the lived body (Leib)

rience this, our body. On the other hand, she recognizes that we are also dealing with
a »mere« body (Körper). According to Stein, this dual nature corresponds to the dual
nature of the soul, insofar as the soul’s life is both an external material creation and an
internal movement. »The soul experiences nothing which does not come to it through
the lived body, or which does not mutually affect both the lived body and the soul.
Conversely, there is nothing which does not in some way have an effect on the body.«9
Stein leaves no doubt that the human lived body is naturally a material body, a
»spatial self-defined and self-enclosed object of three-dimensional expanse.«10 It is
thus also inherent to physicality that it can be measured and (which may not always
be so pleasant) placed on a scale. However, that is not all Stein means by what she
calls the Leibkörper.

»Every Leibkörper has been assigned a specific subject to which the diversity of its oc-
currence is however not unlimited. In contrast to all other subjects, the Leibkörper can
on principal not reveal all its characteristics to this subject. »This constraint in the per-
ceptibility of the Leibkörper is related to the fact that the subject cannot freely modify
its position to the body (as it can towards every other body and as all other subjects can
to this body).«11

I can feel what happens to my lived body, and more: I can experience my lived body.
My living body belongs to me as a person »whose external shape it represents and
who is placed in the external world into which it can intervene creatively.«12
It seems to me that it is right to speak of external perception and perception of the
lived body. However, the external perception does not grasp everything: I can see
neither my own back nor my ear lobes.

»Once I tried to contemplate my body from the outside [...] and found it to be a very
strange object. A real thing, a body whose motivated series of appearance had strange
gaps, which, more obstinate than the Moon, was hiding its back side from me, and
fooled me by asking me to look at it from different sides, and as soon as I did, it was
hiding those sides as well.«13

9 Stein, E.: EES, p. 360.

10 Cf. Stein, E.: EPh, p. 114.
11 Cf. Stein, E.: EPh, p. 114.
12 Stein, E.: WP, p. 172.
13 Cf. Stein, E.: PE, p. 57.
In EES, Stein claims: »The head and the whole lived body can be understood as a phy­
sical body-object that I can perceive with my external senses. But in this cognition, I am
strangely restricted in a manner unlike that experienced in the presence of any other physi-
cal body. I have no real freedom of movement in relation to this physical body of mine and
it is precisely because I cannot extricate myself from this physical body that I cannot view
it from all sides. However, as I am able to observe my lived body from the inside, I am not
dependent on external perception alone. That is why the lived body is not simply a physical
body: It is »my« lived body in a manner unlike anything else external is »mine.« I reside
within this lived body as in the innate dwelling place into which I have been born. Conse-
quently, I sense what occurs in and is done to this lived body. It is in this cognition that I am
able to perceive and understand this lived body of mine.« (EES, p. 312 f.).
 3. I am where my lived body is       229

Edith Stein then says that when we speak of the »body,« she means what can be
seen from the outside, for example by herself. Looking at it, however, she is not at
all certain that this body actually belongs to her. »My body is not merely a body like
other bodies in the world.« For example, since it is alive, since it has a soul, it can be
differentiated from things like the desk or the computer. It is the lived body. »What
happens to the lived body is experienced, is felt.«14
The body can be perceived from the outside. Neuroscientists who discuss the data
created with imaging techniques are primarily concerned with the body or parts of
the body.15 The body can be X-rayed and placed in a CT scanner. It can be weighed.
»Lived body«, however, refers to something else. When I speak of perceiving the
lived body, I mean I can experience that my lived body belongs to me and I belong
to it. I can feel and perceive being alive. My lived body is not a dead piece of equip-
ment.16
Therefore, I live my lived body. Imagine it is summer and I am sunbathing. A
stone, a sun-shade or a lounge chair can also be warmed by the sun’s rays. Yet by
contrast, I can experience being tickled by the sun’s rays, and I can enjoy that. Of
course, can also feel when I have been in the sun too long and am suffering a sun-
burn. When I reach for the sunscreen lotion, I move and feel my hand. My hand feels
a real sunscreen tube, not an illusion. Thus, Edith Stein argues: »The lived body is a
feeling body not only because it feels external stimuli, but also because it feels itself.
It is quintessentially a feeling lived body that continually senses and experiences, not
only superficially or only when it is beset by external stimuli.«17
The felt and experienced lived body cannot be dismembered into individual piec-
es as, for instance, is the case with a machine. New energy and weariness, to name
just two examples, are experienced by the lived body as a whole, not only by my
hand, my leg, or my brain.18 When I am hungry or thirsty, or when this book falls on
my toe and I experience pain, then I experience bodily sensations as my sensations. I
always experience myself as a living whole. We can call the lived body a feeling body
while feeling is something that jointly characterizes both the lived body and the soul.
The fact that we can experience something is due to us having a lived body.19 »What

14 Stein, E.: EES, p. 315.

15 Bermes points out that here we are shown that the objective sciences are unable to ade-
quately describe the lived body as an object. At the same time, we see that they are not in a
position to comprehend the phenomenon of the concrete by means of the scientific notion
of subject matter. This means they are incapable of explaining either the perceiving subject
or the world that is being observed. (Bermes, C.: Maurice Merleau-Ponty zur Einführung.
Hamburg 22004, p. 73).
16 Cf. Böhme, G.: Leibsein als Aufgabe. Leibphilosophie in pragmatischer Hinsicht. Baden-
Baden 2003, pp. 12 f.
17 Stein, E.: AMP, p. 46.
18 Cf. Schmitz, H.: Phänomenologie der Leiblichkeit. In: Petzold, H. (Ed.): Leiblichkeit. Philo­
sophische, gesellschaftliche und therapeutische Perspektiven. Paderborn 1985, p. 79; Schmitz,
H.: Der unerschöpfliche Gegenstand. Grundzüge der Philosophie. Bonn 21995, pp. 117 ff.;
Stein, E.: AMP, pp. 122 f.
19 »Being refreshed and being exhausted are not only states of the lived body. They are simul-
taneously ›I,‹ they are an experience of the self, an awareness of life as the ego experiences
it. At the same time these are experienced through the lived body, are radiated through this
230       B. The rediscovery of the lived body (Leib)

intensifies intimacy of the connection between the subjective sensation and the per-
ception of the lived body is the fact that the lived body is the experiencing body and
these sensations are experienced by the lived body.«20
For a scientific research project to be conducted, the lived body must be reduced
to a bodily object. In the previous chapter I mentioned how important it is for exam-
ple to treat certain body parts such as our cerebrum according to specific templates.
However, we should remember that as far as the neurosciences are concerned, it is
not possible to reproduce a neuronal situation on a one-to-one basis. According to
Fuchs: »If we do that, the lived body [...]slips away into its lived functions and expe-
riences. You can only research and determine the organismic prerequisites of these
functions, not the seeing, hearing, movement of the lived body itself.«21
From the perspective of the perception of the lived body, neuroscientific statements
need to be provided with question marks here and there. It is entirely possible that
neuroscientists will scoff at what we develop in the context of what Edith Stein has
written about experiencing the lived body.22 We could ask what the purpose of all
this is. The answer is that a great deal depends on that we are not able to catego-
rize the lived body-soul unit as a thing among other things.23 In this sense, Gernot
Böhme reminds us: »Criticism which the notion of the lived body allows is also
always criticism of the alienation, the instrumentalization and the manipulation of
man.«24
Our lived body and our manifestations of life are also able to remind us that as a
person made of flesh and blood, I have limits, and not everything is in my power. My
lived body can also become estranged, for example when I am ill. Its familiarity can
be lost. As Edith Stein points out: »When the body is neglected or treated incorrectly,
the corporeal functions are disrupted and there is the definite danger that, as a result
of this malfunction, the inner life-processes are disturbed. The lived body pushes
its way into the foreground in a most disconcerting way when there is something
amiss. In such a situation, there is the very real danger that it pulls the subject into it-
self.«25In the short story, The dancer and her lived body (Die Tänzerin und der Leib)
written by Alfred Döblin in 1910, we are presented with an extremely vivid and com-
prehensible instance of alienation from the own corporeality. The central character,

lived body. They are not localized in any particular place but completely fill the lived body.«
(Stein, E.: EPh, p. 120).
20 Stein, E.: PE, p. 60.
21 Fuchs, T.: Leib, Raum, Person. Entwurf einer phänomenologischen Anthropologie. Stuttgart
2000, pp. 88 f.
22 Cf. also Böhme, G.: Leibsein als Aufgabe. Leibphilosophie in pragmatischer Hinsicht. Baden-
Baden 2003, p. 13.
23 »There where rational subjects rob themselves of their own corporeal experiences, their
sensual perceptions and their sense of values of worth by declaring that these are no more
than epiphenomenal neuronal switching circuits, or tools of egotistically blind gene sub-
stances, they are threatened by a creeping emptying of the world of all that speaks to them
through the senses, moves them emotionally and touches them personally.« (Fuchs, T.: Leib,
Raum, Person. Entwurf einer phänomenologischen Anthropologie. Stuttgart 2000, p. 18 f.).
24 Böhme, G.: Leibsein als Aufgabe. Leibphilosophie in pragmatischer Hinsicht. Baden-Baden
2003, p. 13.
25 Stein, E.: WP, p. 176, cf. also Stein, E.: AMP, p. 89.
 3. I am where my lived body is       231

a dancer, ignores her serious illness and increasingly alienates herself from her lived
body. She despises it because of its weakness and because of the obstacles and limits
with which it crosses her plans. »She could have spat at her suffering lived body. She
scoffed at it bitterly. She was disgusted by the corrupt flesh to which she was bound.
In quiet fear, she opened her eyes as she looked at her limbs which were withdraw-
ing from her.«26 Because of her illness the dancer did not feel at home in her lived
body. Consequently, »she locked up her body and laid it in chains.«27 The lived body
which is initially portrayed as a »home« becomes the despised enemy committed to
medical care. »Out of hatred against this slothful animal (das träge Tier)«28 – her
body – the dancer finally takes her own life in the presence of her physician.
But, it is not only illness – as in Döblin’s remarkable story – which can cause us
to become estranged from our lived body. It is also possible that in the context of
today’s common beauty cult a lived body is turned into an object (of fashion), and in
this way we forfeit our intimate relationship with our lived body as we »restore« and
»style« it as is usually done with inanimate objects.29 What makes our lived body
most special and also particularly endearing is covered up, corrected, or even com-
pletely cut off. Then, the lived body is no longer itself if it is allowed to proliferate.
Instead, it is alienated from itself.30
In the last chapter, I indicate among other things that freedom also presents us
with a task and is always closely connected with responsibility. It is appropriate here
to pick up on a thought expressed by Gernot Böhme and to also understand corpore-
ality as task and responsibility insofar as it is important to rediscover the perception of
the lived body.31 As a person, I have a relationship with my bodily processes. There
are many ways in which I can express the reality that I am not indifferent to my
lived body. As Stein said, »man into whose hands the lived body is given also bears
responsibility for it.«32
Every now and then, we find in the literature statements by philosophers who
say: I am my lived body. This statement is not all that accurate. To experience myself
as living person and to experience my lived body are not simply the same. Stein il-
lustrates this with the example that we can travel to other times and places in spirit,
emphasizing that we are not identical with our lived body. The lived body belongs
to our being a person:

26 Döblin, A.: Die Tänzerin und der Leib. In: Döblin, A.: Die Ermordung einer Butterblume und
andere Erzählungen. Munich 32007, p. 19.
27 Ibid., p. 20.
28 Ibid., p. 22.
29 Cf. Ammicht-Quinn, R.: Körper – Religion – Sexualität. Theologische Reflexionen zur Ethik
der Geschlechter. Mainz 1999, p. 114.
30 Cf. Stein, E.: WP, p. 175.
31 Böhme points out that »genetic engineering threatens to confront us with our genetic data
as a kind of fate. Medical technology rules over our bodies until the day we die in the Inten-
sive Care Unit. The current images of beauty let us worry about our bodily appearance and
this even leads to cosmetic surgery. These are the challenges which give us an indication as
to the extent of the concern regarding our own (living) bodies. With that our concern for
our (living) bodies becomes a moral issue.« (Böhme, G.: Leibsein als Aufgabe. Leibphiloso-
phie in pragmatischer Hinsicht. Baden-Baden 2003, p. 77).
32 Stein, E.: WP, p. 176.
232       B. The rediscovery of the lived body (Leib)

»I am not my body. Instead, I have a body over which I have authority. I can also say I am
in my lived body. In my thoughts, I can distance myself from it and contemplate it as
from the outside. In reality, however, I am bound to my lived body. [...] I cannot identify
any one point within my body where ›I‹ am located. There was a time when we did try
to identify the location of the ›I‹. Yet, even though at a certain point in the anatomy of
the brain there were a specific spot which when destroyed the consciousness of the
self would disappear and the complete personal-spiritual structure would fade away,
we could still not say that at this specific point the ›I‹ is located. The ›I‹ is no brain cell.
Instead it has a spiritual and intellectual significance only accessible by experiencing
our self.«33

This clearly indicates how important it is to enrich the scientific-objective view by

adding the perspective of the experienced lived body.

3.2 My lived body is always »here«

»All perception is perceived from a specific

point of view.
Perceiving subjects are placed at point zero in
their orientation.
Spread out around them is the spatial
world.«34

The primary characteristic of my lived body is that it is always »here« for me. An
example: When I play handball, as a fairly experienced handball player I can grasp
the ball with my hand and then throw it to one of my five team mates, or into the
opposing net. When I prepare to catch the ball my team mate is passing to me, I do
not first have to ponder where I might have placed my hand and then look for it like
a detective. Such a search is unnecessary since my hand belongs to me, is a living part
of my entire lived body-soul organism. As Edith Stein points out, »this connection,
this belonging to me could never be established through external perception.«35
The ball and the hand are not given to me in the same manner. Edith Stein observes
that »the distance between the parts of my lived body and me cannot be compared
to the distance between foreign bodies and me.«36
My lived body in its entirety is situated at or »in the zero point of the orientation
within the spatial world (»im Nullpunkt der Orientierung der räumlichen Welt«).«37
That this perception comes from a »zero point of orientation« is founded – according

33 Stein, E.: AMP, p. 84.

34 Stein, E.: EPh, p. 65.
35 Stein, E.: PE, p. 58.
36 Stein, E.: PE, p. 58.
37 Ibid., p. 74.
 3. I am where my lived body is       233

to Stein – in the bodily state of being.38 My lived body is always »here,« whereas all
other objects are always »there.«39 No matter how tightly I close my eyes, I can lose
a ball but my lived body will always stay here with me.
Stein says that my lived body is fashioned in a two-fold manner – as an experi-
encing lived body (leibwahrgenommener Leib) which can be apprehended, and as an
externally observable body present in the external world, and it is also experienced
in this dual reality as itself. Consequently, it is assigned its own space in the outside,
part of which it fills.40

3.3 My lived body is a moving body

»With every step I take forward a new piece of

this world is made accessible,
or the old shows itself from a new perspec-
tive. And I always take my lived body with
me.«41

In all its manifestations of life, my lived body is engaged in a lively exchange with the
environment. When I breathe or touch something, I can only do so because I have a
lived body. It is my lived body through which I can see and hear. My lived body gives
me access to the world around me. To Stein, the lived body is thus the medium of
world exploration. »Through its organs, the lived body provides me with the external
impressions that make it possible for me to impact this three-dimensional world in
dual capacity as a freely moving instrument of the will and as a body connected to
the external world.«42 Peter Hanke describes this very accurately in The Absence:
a Fairy Tale:

[The Old Man says:] »The footpath begins here. From here, we will walk, not drive. Tread
the earth. Not hold on to anything. Sway of our own volition. Drive and be driven only
in an emergency. I have never been at places to which I was driven. Only when I walk
can I spin with the apples in the tree. A head will grow only on the shoulders of those
who walk, only those who walk will experience the balls on their feet. Only the walkers
experience the wind on their bodies. Only the walkers comprehend the tallest tree – the
silence! Only the walkers catch up with themselves and regain their senses. Only what
the walkers think is of value. We will walk. There will be walking!

38 Stein emphasizes: »As long as I am given only one zero point and my body is within this
zero point, there is the possibility that my zero point will shift when my body does. There
is also the possibility of a shift in my imagination, which then clashes with the actual zero
point and the corresponding orientation – this being the possibility of empathy. There is,
however, no possibility that I can freely glance at myself as on another body.« (ibid., p. 81).
39 Ibid., p. 57.
40 Ibid., p. 57.
41 Ibid., p. 63.
42 Stein, E.: Eph, p. 102.
234       B. The rediscovery of the lived body (Leib)

And you are not to walk as most people do, who show that they only walk under duress
and accidentally. Walking is the freest of games. Let us go, away from here! The blessing
of the place is the blessing of the walk.«43

It is clear in the above passage that I experience the world with my lived body. The
old man stresses the wonder and significance of his own movement. He wants to be
driven »only in an emergency«. He says he has never been at the places to which was
driven. An exaggeration? Probably not because the point is to differentiate between
the phenomenon of moving yourself and being moved. Handke’s Old Man seems to
deny that there is anything like »being move while alive«. This is the very question
Edith Stein discusses. She writes:

»When I travel through a landscape on a train or I let myself be pushed on the skating
rink, I feel that the movement (other than own movement) happens only in a shift of
the spatial environment and could just as well be understood as the movement of the
landscape as the movement of my own physical body. That is why there are these opti-
cal illusions: trees and telegraph poles flying by, just as the simulated movement when
the props are being moved on stage.«44

Such being moved along is indifferent, mechanical. We could even call it »not alive«.
Stein says: »Every live movement seems to be personal mobility.«45 My lived body
is characterized by its own mobility. If I move my right leg, and then my left leg, fol-
lowing the instruction of Handke’s »Old Man«, I perceive personal mobility in my
lived body. I am also given an externally visible awareness of body movement. The
fact that I am aware of my own mobility is precisely the specialty of the lived body’s
movement in contrast to a bodily movement that I can only observe.

»Just as the part of the body that has been observed by the lived body and what has
been observed from the outside are one and the same, so the identifying juxtaposition
occurs between the movement of the lived body and the movement of the physical
body. Thus, the moving lived body becomes the physical body that is being moved. This
perception of ›I am moving‹ will continue also to be seen in the movement of a part of
the body. The movement of the body, which is not seen in the experience of my moving,
shall likewise be registered and experienced.«46

I am unable to experience the movements of my own self merely in external con-

templation. Here, the manner in which the movement of another body occurs also
remains hidden. Stein stresses that it is not possible to predict when the movement
of the other objects and of my own body part ways if we insist on clinging to our

43 Handke, P.: Die Abwesenheit. Ein Märchen. Frankfurt a. M. 1987, pp. 115–117.
44 Cf. Stein, E.: PE, p. 84.
45 Cf. ibid., p. 84.
46 Ibid., p. 62.
 3. I am where my lived body is       235

fictive perception that our body is constituted merely in external perception and not
as lived body.47
My goal-directed lived body can head for a specific place. The living movement,
the act of walking to which Handke’s »Old Man« summons us is the motion of the
self. Hikers experience their own movement and thus recognize themselves and take
note of what they encounter. As the Old Man says, it is only by walking that spaces
open and interspaces dance before us. As Stein says of herself: when she moves, the
picture of her surroundings shifts.48 The lived body »is never separable from the
circumstances of its spatial exterior surroundings.«49 On the one hand, we realize
that thanks to our living bodies we are able to perceive our environment. At the same
time, it is the lived body that determines this perception.
Through my personal mobility, I experience the world around me. Yet how I per-
ceive this world depends on the movements of my lived body.50 The walkers Hand-
ke describes are bodily rooted in the world. They discover the trees and the paths,
the surrounding reality, through bodily movement. »I see with the movement of my
eyes, which are situated in a head that turns, which is connected to a body which for
its part is able to move within space. A stationary perspective is thus a borderline
case of this moving perspective.«51 My ability to move is thus crucial to my ability
to perceive my environment.52 Experiencing something or somebody always oc-
curs from my bodily point of view. When I see a fruit tree in the garden I can move
towards it slowly or quickly, I can walk around it, touch it, and hug it. Through my
lived body I experience the tree as reality, not as a myth. Only in walking do I spin
with the apples in the tree. I experience this as live movement, as »I move,« not as »I
am moved« or »I am being driven.«
The Handke text draws attention to the fact that through the personal mobility
made possible by my lived body I can unlock the secrets of the world around me,
the world to which I belong. Hikers who walk experience themselves and sense
their environment (the footpath, the trees) in the actual movement of their phys-
ical body. Only those who walk experience the balls of their feet. Only those who
walk experience the wind on their bodies. It is only those who walk whose ears
comprehend the tallest tree – the silence! Handke’s Old Man and Edith Stein share
the conviction that movements are not given to us as mere mechanical actions.53
It is of course extremely simple to determine mathematically where the walkers are
situated. Such information would not specify how the hiking tour is experienced,
that and how the trail and all they encounter is being experienced. The relationship I

47 Ibid., p. 57.
48 Cf. ibid., p. 62.
49 Ibid., p. 79.
50 Cf. ibid., p. 62.
51 Zahavi, D.: Phänomenologie für Einsteiger. Paderborn 2007, p. 59; cf. also Gibson, J. J.: The
Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Hillsdale/New York 1979, pp. 53 and 205.
52 Cf. also: Husserl, E.: Analysen zur passiven Synthesis. Den Haag 1966, p. 299; Husserl, E.: Die
Konstitution der geistigen Welt. Hamburg 1984, p. 44; Fuchs, T.: Leib, Raum, Person. Entwurf
einer phänomenologischen Anthropologie. Stuttgart 2000.
53 Stein, E.: PE, p. 83.
236       B. The rediscovery of the lived body (Leib)

have with the world around me is interwoven with my corporeality. Stein maintains
that the spatial orientation can never be completely separated from the freedom of
movement.54
The hiker’s trail can be experienced as being long and difficult. As a corporeal
person, I understand the world and am touched by it. I do not experience it as a
mind-brain worry figure. No matter how brilliant an essay on architecture may be,
it will not be enough to help readers understand what a gothic cathedral is. When I
introduce visitors to the cathedral in Freiburg, we first walk around the old dignified
church building. This gives them a sense of its size. of course, the tour also includes
a look at the paintings of saints typical for the Middle Ages, at the vivid colors of
the church windows, and also smelling the incense, the flowers, and the candles. In
this tour, the lived body is anything but a silent witness. Thomas Fuchs formulated:
»space only opens itself to a being which in its corporeality possesses an expansive
structure, which in drive and desire is determined to attain something and reaches
beyond itself.«55 Through my body, I am connected to my environment and can
move within my surroundings.

3.4 The phenomenon of expression

»Mental-spiritual being and life develop in my

lived body and speak through the body.«56

Through the medium of my lived body, I can express mental manifestations of

life – both consciously and unconsciously: in my movements, my mimicry and my
gestures. But also using the spoken word. When I speak, this happens through the
medium of my lived body. This suggests an interesting comparison. A word has a
necessary material requirement. We can find meaning in a word the word. It is the
same with our lived body. Here, too, we encounter meaning, we learn what gives
this lived body cohesion, what constitutes the lived body. In short: the spiritual [das
Seelische].57
In the fourth chapter of James Joyce’s Ulysses, we are faced with a very graphic
description telling us that coming to terms with the written word also concerns us in
their in our lived body-soul unity. The passage deals with Leopold Bloom who reads
the newspaper while sitting on the toilet:
»Quietly he read, restraining himself, the first column and, yielding but resisting,
began the second. Midway, his last resistance yielding, he allowed his bowels to ease
themselves quietly as he read, reading still patiently, that slight constipation of yes-
terday quite gone. Hope it’s not too big to bring on piles again. No, just right. Ah!
Costive. One tabloid of Cascara sagrada. Life might be so. It did not move or touch

54 Cf. ibid., p. 85.

55 Fuchs, T.: Leib, Raum, Person. Entwurf einer phänomenologischen Anthropologie. Stuttgart
2000, p. 120.
56 Stein, E.: AMP, p. 89.
57 Cf. also Merleau-Ponty, M.: Phänomenologie der Wahrnehmung. Berlin 1966, p. 217.
 3. I am where my lived body is       237

him but it was something quick and neat. Print anything now. Silly season. He read
on, seated calm above his own rising smell. Neat certainly. Matcham often thinks
of the masterstroke by which he won the laughing witch who now. Begins and ends
morally. Hand in hand. Smart. He glanced back through what he had read and, while
feeling his water flow quietly, he envied kindly Mr. Beaufoy who had written it and
received payment of three pounds, thirteen and six.«58
The passage cited above, which describes a visit to the toilet, is not indecent or
unfit for a philosophical work such as this. It illustrates very nicely that our entire
lived body is involved when we read. Everything is connected, the way Bloom moves
and then sits still again, suppresses his urge and finally yields, how he holds the news-
paper in his hands and lets his eyes move over the printers’ ink while he muses about
all that is being printed. Bloom is browsing through the newspaper. It is not only one
of his organs, but his lived body or also his soul.
There are bodily manifestations when I read a masterful novel or an exciting
newspaper article. A mental action »is of the lived body and soul, and must manifest
itself in the corporeal material sphere.«59 Pleasure and anxiety, to name two mental
manifestations of life, can document themselves in my body, can express themselves
in it. I can feel these manifestations of life. They belong to me, to my living whole. So
before we move to the second part of this chapter, let me quote Edith Stein:

»In contrast to the physical body, the lived body is the carrier of sensations. It finds itself
at the zero-point of orientation within the spatial world. It can move freely within itself
and is made up of movable organs. It is the expanse within which experiences that
belong to the ›I‹, instruments of its will, are manifested.«60

I am where my lived body is.

58 Joyce, J.: Ulysses. Frankfurt a. M. 1975, p. 97. English: http://www.geoffwilkins.net/wiki/

Ulysses.pdf. p. 60.
59 Stein, E.: AMP, p. 105.
60 Cf. Stein, E.: PE, p. 74.
238       B. The rediscovery of the lived body (Leib)

4. You are where your lived body is

The lived body is »the mirror of the Soul
on which her whole inner life is depicted,
and this is the medium through which
she enters the Kingdom of Visibility.«61

4.1 Empathy

»The world in which I live is not only a world

filled with physical bodies. Not only I live in
this world. It is also inhabited by other experi-
encing feeling subjects, and I am aware of this
experiencing.«62

We have seen what makes our own lived body so special and what difference is
between the lived body and the mere body. The question arises how we experience
the other’s lived body and how we know anything about other people. How do we
know when we are sitting at a sidewalk café that those across from us are not merely
machines wearing hats?
Empathy [Einfühlung] makes it possible for me to experience what the person
across from me is experiencing. Imagine for a moment, the hand of a fellow student
is resting on the table of a sidewalk café. My hand reaches out to hers. I virtually be-
come her hand and assume her position. Thus it become possible to experience what
she feels.63 Yet while we are at the café and I try to empathize with the young wom-
an, her hand remains her hand. There is a difference between what she experiences
and with what I empathize.64 Stein says that the experience of this fellow student,
just as all experience of others, is not originally mine.65 She experiences something
other than what I experience.
The other lived body has »conoriginarity« because the lived body to which it refers
is also the perceived body and because it is originary for the other ego and not for
me. As far as my own perception of my lived body is concerned, it is originary for me.

61 Stein, E.: WP, p. 179.

62 Stein, E.: PE, p. 12.
63 Cf. ibid., p. 75.
64 Stein is clear that »empathy as visualization is a primary experience, a present reality. What
brings this experience to mind however is not a past or future »Impression« of one’s own.
Instead, it is a present original stirring of the life of another. This stirring of another’s life
stands in no continuous relationship with my experience. The two can never be congruent.
I place myself within the experienced body as if I were the center of its life. In doing so, I
practically implement an impulse of the kind that it can – experienced practically from
within – trigger a movement which when perceived in conjunction with the external move-
ment can be made congruent with the latter.« (Stein, E.: EPh, p. 152).
65 Cf. Stein, E.: PE, p. 19.
 4. You are where your lived body is       239

»The perception of the lived body of the other person does not originate with me (it has
conoriginarity). It is originally from the lived body of the other ego and not from mine.
Yet my perception of my own living body however originates in myself.«66
»These perceptions are present in curious ways in the external awareness of our physi-
cal body where what is perceived and what is not perceived can be together even there.
In like manner, the other person’s sensory fields are available to me and the other’s lived
body can be observed as such.«67

Together with Edith Stein, we can therefore declare that with regard to empathy we
are here dealing with a non-originating experience, which nevertheless proclaims
the presence of an originating experience.68 The person participating in the process
of empathy (»ego«) and the person with whom we are empathizing (the student
at my table) are separate from each other.69 Even when I am with her, we are not
»one.«70 It is not the same whether Person A or Person B experiences something.
Edith Stein says: »It is completely unknown what makes my lived body mine and the
other belong to another. My lived body’s reality continues to remain totally unfath-
omable, and that of the stranger remains essentially foreign to me.71 I am together
with the other person. However, as I am not ›one‹ with this person, we are able to say
that the other person’s otherness is recognized and affirmed.«72

»So, the possibility of sensory empathy is guaranteed when we understand our own
lived body as physical body, and our own physical body as a lived body in the merging of
external and lived body perceptions. It is also guaranteed through the possible spatial
change of position of this physical body. Finally, it is guaranteed through the possibility
of a modification of its tangible qualities taking place within the imagination that yet
adheres to its type.«73

66 Ibid., p. 79.
67 Ibid., pp. 74 f.
68 Cf. ibid., pp. 24 f.
69 Cf. ibid., p. 20.
70 Cf. ibid., p. 22.
71 Ibid., p. 27.
72 »One cannot speak of oneness until the same individual feeling lives in all and that the
›we‹ is experienced as subject. This oneness, however, does not involve the obliteration of
individual subjects. ›I‹ and ›you‹ and ›he‹ are maintained in the ›we.‹ Not an ›I‹ but a ›we‹ is
the subject of the sense of oneness. It is not through the sense of oneness, that we learn of
others, but through empathy.« (ibid., p. 29).
73 Ibid., p. 76.
240       B. The rediscovery of the lived body (Leib)

4.2 The lived body of the other as the carrier of free movement

and orientation center of the spatial world

»Human beings in their movements, actions

in their talking, writing etc. are not merely
connections, linking together of an object
called the soul with another called a lived
body.
As a lived body the lived body is a lived body
permeated by a soul.
Each movement of this lived body is soul-
filled, coming and going, sitting and standing,
walking and dancing etc.«74

We have already talked much about our own lived body as a carrier of free move-
ment. Let us now take a look at the other lived body. Let us imagine a fellow student
passes me in a car. I can see how the fellow student is moved. The situation would be
different if the student would stand up, stand up in the car or would stop the car and
run towards me. His lived body would move and approach me. Stein points out that
on the one hand I could follow his movements externally, but I could also empathize
and follow it emotionally:

»I see a movement of the type I am able to perform; I understand it as my own move-

ment; I follow the tendency to the point of fulfillment of the co-perception of my own
movement in that I emotionally participate, and I finally accomplish objectivation in
that I understand this as the movement of another individual who faces me.«75

Stein thus draws the conclusion that this body naturally must be a lived body to make
it possible for me to feel empathy wit his live movement.76 My lived body has always
been a lived body with others. On the one hand, my lived body is my bridge to the
other; on the other hand, this lived body makes me assailable, vulnerable. What we
have said about my lived body as a medium of free movement also applies to the
lived body of the other. It is quite possible that a fellow student, a friend, is able to
adopt certain movements which I will never master and practice. It is for example
quite unlikely that I will ever become a high-performance athlete like my friend. I
am and will remain a philosopher who is not all that athletically inclined. Yet, when
I move, this good friend will recognize me thanks to the way in which I move.
The lived body of the other constitutes an orientation center in our common en-
vironment. This is why Stein writes:

»In experiencing the other person as perceived lived body I can place myself within that
body empathetically; I gain a new picture of the spatial world and a new orientational

74 Husserl, E.: Die Konstitution der geistigen Welt. Hamburg 1984, p. 71.
75 Stein, E.: PE, p. 85.
76 Ibid., p. 85.
 4. You are where your lived body is       241

zero point. It is not as if I relocate my own zero point, rather I retain my own distinct zero
point and my ›distinct‹ orientation while I gain the other empathetically and non-dis-
tinctly.«77

The other sees the room differently than I do. We can also say he has his own point
of view, his own orientational zero point. Through the lived body of others I become
aware of my own limitations. On the one hand, this includes the important insight
that my own point of view is just one spatial point among many others.78 On the
other hand, in the development of my own lived body my experience of this lived
body is generally limited to the present state. [...] »It is therefore understandable that
we realize developments first in others.«79 Through the experience of the other’s lived
body certain dimensions of my own humanity are opened up.
As embodied beings, we are able to enter into a relationship with each other and
with objects. In this manner, we become more familiar with our own lived bodies,
and this is why Regine Kather draws attention to the development of infants. She
writes: »Only when babies kick and can reach for objects do they develop a feel for
the range of movements available to them and the strength and extent of their own
bodies. It is true both literally and figuratively that by comprehending objects they
learn to comprehend themselves.«80
Our ability to move as well as our life contexts which are given with our corpore-
ality, blossom in the living relationship with others. When we are still in the crib, we
are not yet able to walk, hike or jump. We must learn it all – slowly and laboriously.
We would not be able to do this on our own. This is an example that shows that in-
teraction with others is indispensable. This is why Böhme, for example, says our lived
body is always an indication of others.81 Our lived body needs others and makes
contact with them possible.
We first have to acquire many movements. We are able to incorporate movements.
What we do or perceive leaves its mark on us. I was able to observe these marks in
a woman with Alzheimer’s who had been bedridden for years. She lived in abject
mental derangement and was no longer capable of conscious thought. She no longer
knew who she was and who her children were, but her lived body still knew how to
make the sign of the cross, a sign she had assimilated as a young girl.82

77 Ibid., p. 79.
78 Cf. ibid., p. 80.
79 Stein, E.: EPh, p. 155.
80 Kather, R.: Person. Die Begründung menschlicher Identität. Darmstadt 2007, p. 157.
81 Cf. Böhme, G.: Leibsein als Aufgabe. Leibphilosophie in pragmatischer Hinsicht. Baden-
Baden 2003, pp. 261 ff.
82 Dekkers describes how our movements are wonderfully coordinated to our environment:
»The lived body possesses its own knowledge of the world, which implies the existence of a
›tacit knowledge‹, a silent knowledge that functions without conscious control. On a sub-
conscious level, my body provides me with a lot of information about the world« (Dekkers,
W. J. M.: Autonomy and the Lived Body in Cases of Severe Dementia. In: Purtilo, R. B./
Ten Have, H. (Eds.): Ethical Foundations of Palliative Care for Alzheimer Disease. Baltimore/
London 2004, p. 122).
242       B. The rediscovery of the lived body (Leib)

4.3 The lived bodies of others and the phenomenon of expres-

sion: The human gaze

»The external appearance not only gives ex-

pression to the interior life, it also corresponds
to that life in the sense that the external and
the internal exhibit commonalities and seem
›to fit‹ so that the external becomes the pic-
ture of the internal.«83

As we examine the significance of the human gaze, I want to clarify that the qual-
itative characteristics of the lived body also show in the lived body of the other,
expressing a lived body-spirit dimension. First of all, it seems necessary to differen-
tiate between man’s gaze and man’s eyes. They are by no means the same. There may
indeed be a more or less mathematically discernable difference between our own
eyeballs and those of others. On the other hand, a person’s gaze may fall on anoth-
er or »undress« the other observing any respect whatsoever. For example, when a
young man and a young woman meet, they may flirt by through their gaze. At the
same time, a physician in the eye clinic will closely examine his patients’ eyes with a
refractometer. Our gaze is an expression of our manifestations of life within the per-
spective of the lived body, and it cannot be measured even sophisticated instruments.
My gaze can express my searching, my helplessness, and my desires. My gaze can
be erotic, but it can also destroy the person the person facing me.84 There is the kind
of gaze that liberates and benefits and lights up our love. Edith Stein is convinced
that our gaze reflects our spirituality. »I also see the degree of his alertness or stress.
In the steadiness of his gaze I see the steadiness of his spiritual direction, and in the
unsteady wandering of his gaze I see his unsteady wavering from one to the other.«85
She continues: »I also see the whole scale of emotions, rage, pleasure and sorrow; I
see pride and kindness and generosity, and I also see the ›quite personal‹ manner in
which this person is kind and loving or dismissive.«86 The human gaze can carelessly
register things around us, but »when my gaze falls on a person, I will generally not
remain indifferent.«87 We can also »hide« our gaze and turn our lived body into a
mask.88 »Of course, as human beings, we are inclined to be open to others, and we
have to ›lock ourselves‹ to be uncommunicative for the moment or permanently.«89

83 Stein, E.: EPh, p. 161.

84 Cf. Schmitz, H.: Leib und Gefühl. Materialien zu einer philosophischen Therapeutik. Pa­
derborn 1989, p. 54.
85 Cf. Stein, E.: EPh, pp. 158 f.
86 Cf. ibid., p. 159.
87 Stein, E.: AMP, p. 112.
88 Cf. Stein, E.: EPh, p. 143.
A good actor in the theatre or on television must even have the ability to fool people. In this
scenario, my corporeal expression does not reflect my manifestations of life, or may reflect
them only partially.
89 Stein, E.: AMP, pp. 112 f.
 4. You are where your lived body is       243

According to Stein, it is our gaze that can say »ego«. Our gaze can make it possible
to meet others, but also to show our rejection.

»I look into another person’s eyes and the gaze from this person’s eyes answers me. This
glance allows me to penetrate their inner being or it pushes me away. Other persons are
Lords of their own souls and can both open and close the gates to their inner selves. They
are able to come out of themselves and be received. Whenever two people look at each
other, the one ›I‹ meets the other ›I‹. This meeting can occur outside erected barriers,
or can be a coming-together in the innermost being where an ›I‹ becomes a ›you.‹ A
person’s gaze speaks and when a sovereign, alert being looks back at me we know this
to be the glance of a free and spiritual being, different from all other natural beings.«90

Through their lived bodies, persons reveal something about their manifestations
of life, their intentions. Thus people have access to the intentions, to the panorama
of the other’s manifestations of life. We don’t first have to ponder long and hard
whether the other person is indeed a human being. Their corporeal expression gives
us clues about their nature. »His expression points to something he expresses and to
what he is himself.«91 In the encounter with other people, our corporeal expression
is of crucial importance, and not our bone density, our liver count, or the size of our
brains. Our corporeal expression gives us an opportunity to meet and accept each
other. »All interaction between people is based on the corporeal expression of their
innermost life. (Here, ›expression‹ is to be understood in the widest sense including
spoken as well as all other deliberate or involuntary expressions.)«92
My life experiences leave their marks not only in cerebral structures. My lived
body carries the benchmarks of my life history. It is there they can be discovered
and read in my scars and in the wrinkles that come with age. My lived body is an
icon which reveals something about my life. Stein says: »My lived body is the human
body, and my soul is a human soul, but this means a personal lived body and a per-
sonal soul. A personal lived body is one in which my ego resides and which can be
fashioned through my own free action.«93

90 Ibid., p. 78.
91 Fuchs, T.: Leib, Raum, Person. Entwurf einer phänomenologischen Anthropologie. Stuttgart
2000, p. 195.
92 Stein, E.: EES, p. 350.
93 Stein, E.: AMP, p. 84.
Only a person can say »I.« »The I itself is an individual, no matter the bond to a material
lived body and without consideration of species which separates it qualitatively from oth-
ers. The separateness from all else lies in an individual’s being and is understood in the
consciousness of one’s self, which is unmistakably different from any other consciousness:
only an »I« can say »I« of itself and so own itself that it is able to say ›I‹.« (Stein, E.: PA,
p. 86). Stein insists that the beginning of a conscious experience of myself does not coincide
with the inception of human existence.
There where the soul-endowed lived body is found, there also is the »ego.« It is bound to the
bodily existence of human beings. Edith Stein thus tells us that the »ego« lives within the
lived body and the soul. (Cf. Stein, E.: EES, pp. 318, 363, 370). The »ego« is, however, not
synonymous with either the soul or the lived body. If we, for example, think of metabolic
occurrences, we soon see that lived body-soul occurrences are not merely experiences of
244       B. The rediscovery of the lived body (Leib)

My mental manifestations of life can be read in my gaze, in my corporeality. They

impact, they end »in an expression by imprinting themselves in my lived body.«94 It
is possible to discover special content of expression in the gaze of a person. Brain re-
searchers such as that Vilayanur Ramachandran, speak of the human gaze but don’t
say that the lived body can express something spiritual:
»A spontaneous smile is produced by the basal ganglia, clusters of cells found be-
tween the brain’s higher cortex (where thinking and planning take place) and the ev-
olutionarily older thalamus. When you encounter a friendly face, the visual message
from that face eventually reaches the brain’s emotional center or limbic system and
is subsequently relayed to the basal ganglia which orchestrate the sequences of facial
muscle activity needed for producing a natural smile. When this circuit is activated,
your smile is genuine. The entire cascade of events, once set in motion, happens in a
fraction of a second without the thinking parts of your cortex ever being involved.«95
Today every high school student taking a senior biology course knows what hap-
pens in optics, in converging lenses. It is also clear that in contrast to bees (Api-
formes) we cannot see UV light, no matter how hard we try. As far as we know today,
our ability to see lies at a wave length of approximately 380 nm to 780 nm. Today,
we know a great deal about what occurs in eyes and in optic tracts.96 My eyesight
has phenomenal qualities. In the next chapter we will, in addition to other issues,
examine how some brain researchers try to understand this phenomenal quality
neuroscientifically. Yet, how I »instantly fall in love« with someone at first (or sec-
ond?) sight, when I am touched by a gaze, no neuroscientific study has been able to
tell me.97
To avoid any misunderstanding, I should point out again that a functioning eye
is a prerequisite for expressing anything with the eyes (remember the example of
the eye in De Anima). As the lived body and the soul are inseparable, our spiritual
life can express itself in corporeal realities. In the corporeal encounter, I perceive a
soul-endowed body, a lived body. The soul permeates the lived body and is perceived
in it.98 »Phenomenologically the soul [...] is what reveals itself in the non-reified face,
in its expression.«99 The soul as entelechy as formative principle does not hide in
some corner of the brain but expresses itself in the shape of our lived body.
Edith Stein emphasizes that the lived body and its spiritual expression belong
together as a unit: »Both the expression and what is being expressed constitute a

my self. The ego cannot be located in the brain. It is present in every part of the lived body-
soul unity where it experiences what is alive (ibid., p. 318).
94 Cf. Stein, E.: EPh, p. 122.
95 Ramachandran, V./Blakeslee, S.: Phantoms in The Brain. Probing the Mysteries of the Human
Mind. New York 1998, p. 13; cf. Singer, W.: Vom Gehirn zum Bewusstsein. In: Elsner, N./
Lüer, G. (Eds.): Das Gehirn und sein Geist. Göttingen 2000, p. 194.
96 Cf. Rager, G.: Neuronale Korrelate von Bewusstsein und Selbst. In: Rager, G.: Die Person.
Wege zu ihrem Verständnis. Fribourg 2006, p. 135; Rager, G.: Neuronale Korrelate von Be-
wusstsein und Selbst. In: Rager, G./Quitterer, J./Runggaldier, E.: Unser Selbst. Identität im
Wandel der neuronalen Prozesse. Paderborn/Munich/Vienna/Zurich 22003, pp. 26 f.
97 Cf. also: Scheler, M.: Über Scham und Schamgefühl. In: Scheler, M.: Gesammelte Werke.
Vol. 10. Bern/Munich 1957, pp. 67–154, esp. p. 78.
98 Cf. Stein, E.: EPh, p. 159.
99 Lévinas, E.: Gott, der Tod und die Zeit. Vienna 1996, p. 21.
 4. You are where your lived body is       245

living unity which can only be separated abstractly. It is not as if the one were merely
external. The external is filled with a soul. The other is not merely internal but the
innermost being made visible.«100 The ability for corporeal expression is rooted in
the hylê and in the morphê. This is why physicalists, dualists and parallelists cannot
do justice to this phenomenon.
The lived body can express conscious and subconscious manifestations of life.
Dekkers writes:

»The body interprets not only itself but also everything in the outside world with which
it is confronted via the senses. The content of these bodily interpretations of the world
does not necessarily need to be known by the person. The human body may be consid-
ered the author of a text (of bodily signs), but also the reader of the text that is consti-
tuted by what is happening in the outside world.«101

In some phases of life, for example when persons suffering from Alzheimer’s can no
longer decide what they want to tell others, the phenomenon of corporeal expression
also remains intact. The faces of bedridden patients suffering from dementia show
their joy when someone touches their hand or perhaps when they hear a certain kind
of music on the radio. Dekkers calls certain movements by such patients »bodily
defense movements.«102 he means that they tell us something about these persons
and their manifestations of life. Stein explains this as follows:

»The soul expresses itself in the lived body through which the soul itself and its inner-
most life is able to appear and manifest itself. What sees the light of day by means of
the corporeal expression is the innermost being in yet another sense: it is not merely
the sensing of what the lived body experiences externally; nor is it only the response to
what is outside. Instead, it is an expression of the innermost sensitivity.«103

These phenomenological reflections are supported by numerous empirical observa-

tions. Again and again, developmental psychologists point out how important eye
contact is between infants and their mothers. It is surprising that shortly after their
birth, babies can respond to and even imitate the glances of those around them.104 As
mentioned above, thanks to our lived body we are always connected with others. Dan

100 Stein, E.: EPh, p. 122.

101 Dekkers, W. J. M.: Autonomy and the Lived Body in Cases of Severe Dementia. In: Purtilo,
R. B./Ten Have, H. (Eds.): Ethical Foundations of Palliative Care for Alzheimer Disease. Bal-
timore/London 2004, p. 123.
102 Ibid., p. 119. Thanks for the reference to Dekkers’ works is due to Regine Kather.
103 Stein, E.: AMP, p. 47.
104 Cf. Meltzoff, A. N./Decety, J.: What imitation tells us about social cognition. In: Frith, C. D./
Wolpert, D. M. (Eds.): The neuroscience of social interaction. Decoding, imitating, and in-
fluencing the actions of others. Oxford 2004, pp. 109–130, here p. 110; Herpetz-Dahlmann,
B./Resch, F./Schulte, Markwort, M./Warnke, A.: Entwicklungspsychiatrie. Biopsychologische
Grundlagen und die Entwicklung psychischer Störungen. Stuttgart 22007, pp. 197 ff.; Melfsen,
S. S.: Sozial ängstliche Kinder: Untersuchungen zum mimischen Ausdrucksverhalten und zur
Emotionserkennung. Marburg 1999, pp. 43 ff.
246       B. The rediscovery of the lived body (Leib)

Zahavi reports about an extremely interesting study with 6 to 12 week-old infants

who could see their mothers on a TV screen. The mother was in another room.105 her
glance was transmitted to their children via a life-sized video image. Such, they were
»connected« and stayed in »eye contact« of each other. Now, various possibilities of
video transmissions were played. During a live transmission everything proceeded
smoothly. There were no noteworthy behavioral responses. However, when shortly
afterwards the infants were presented with a recorded video clip which contained
the same expressions of motherly love and affection as the previous »live« one, the
children immediately sensed that something was not quite right. It was only the gaze
of the mother out of the »canned video.« They clearly and very audibly expressed
their discomfort. As Stein said: »the glance, the expression, the facial features por-
tray the meaning they express.«106 Zahavi refers to other studies with infants aged 12
months. Here, the children were to know from their mother’s expression what they
were allowed to do and what not. In the so-called Visual Cliff Experiment, mother
and child were separated by a table top. With the help of plastics and modern com-
puter technology, an apparent abyss, a »visual cliff,« was projected onto this table
top. This optical illusion thus separated mother and child. It really seemed as if there
were »tremendous danger« between them. There was only one »bridge« – eye contact
between mother and child. Interestingly, once the child registered the considerable
difference in height, it immediately took up eye contact with the mother, and in that
way tried to find out what was to be done. In this context, developmental psycholo-
gists speak of social referencing. When the eyes of the mother appeared happy and
encouraging, telling the child »nothing will happen to you!« most infants very easily
crawled back across the »abyss.« There was a completely different response when the
mother had a mistrustful and anxious look on her face telling the child: »Be careful!«
In that case, the infants refused to cross the »source of danger.« Eye contact as the
means of communication between mother and child is extremely important. »We
first get to know and understand the nature of an expression in the face of the other
person.«107 As Zahavi ascertained, through their living bodies, small children can
already communicate with other people. They associate other people’s expressions
with themselves and even allow these to guide them in their actions.

105 Cf. Zahavi, D.: Phänomenologie und Kognitionswissenschaft: Möglichkeiten und Risiken. In:
Lohmar, D./Fonfara, D. (Eds.): Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven der Phänomenologie. Neue
Felder der Kooperation: Cognitive Science, Neurowissenschaften, Psychologie, Soziologie, Poli-
tikwissenschaft und Religionswissenschaft. Dordrecht 2006, p. 300.
106 Stein, E.: EPh, p. 159.
107 Ibid., p. 163.
 4. You are where your lived body is       247

4.4 Empathy and mirror neurons

»The phenomenon remains q phenomenon.

It is wonderful if we are able to explain it, but
the explanation neither adds to nor subtracts
from it.«108

We have already a bit about nerve cells. This current section is concerned with so-
called mirror neurons which in the mid 1990s were discovered to exist in the premo-
tor cortex of Macaques monkeys (Area F5109). Scientists observed that these nerve
cells are extremely in these monkeys when they are watching what the keeper is
doing (such as taking nuts into his hand). Reactions took place in their brains which
were the same as if they had grabbed the treats themselves. Since that time, much
research has been done and published about mirror neurons.110 It is now generally
assumed that mirror neurons are also active in the human brain. However, it seems
that they are not quite as highly specialized as in the case of those furry relatives.111
When we become aware of something that takes place in other people, nearly the
same action potential is triggered in us as if we were active ourselves.112 Joachim
Bauer points out that the mirroring process takes place concurrently, involuntarily
and without us thinking about it.113 We now learn from modern neuroscientists that
mirror neurons are located on the island which is of extreme importance for our
emotional life, in the premotor cortex, and in the secondary somatosensory cortex.114
An often-heard assumption says that mirror neurons are also active when we
follow a scene in a movie, and the images are making us feel scared (such as when an
especially clever murder is bound to be committed with the help of a tarantula115).

108 Stein, E.: PE, p. 61.

109 Cf. Gallese, V.: The Roots of Empathy: The Shared Manifold Hypothesis and the Neural Basis
of Intersubjectivity. In: Psychopathology 36 (2003), p. 173.
110 Cf. Gallese, V./Goldman, A.: Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of mind reading. In:
Trends in Cognitive Science 12 (1998), pp. 493–501; Gallese, V.: The ›shared manifold’ hy-
pothesis. From mirror neurons to empathy. In: Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (2001),
pp. 33–50; Rizzolatti, G./Fogassi, L./Gallese, V.: Neurophysiological mechanisms underlying
the understanding and imitation of action. In: Nature Neuroscience 2 (2001), pp. 661–670;
Gallese, V.: The Roots of Empathy: The Shared Manifold Hypothesis and the Neural Basis of
Intersubjectivity. In: Psychopathology 36 (2003), pp. 171–180; Bauer, J.: Warum ich fühle, was
Du fühlst. Intuitive Kommunikation und das Geheimnis der Spiegelneurone. Hamburg 102005.
111 Cf. also: Rizzolatti, G./Sinigaglia, C.: Empathie und Spiegelneurone. Die biologische Basis des
Mitgefühls. Frankfurt a. M. 2008, p. 131.
112 Mirror neurons also become active when we take action or when we imagine an action. The
activity is especially strong when a specific movement is being imitated.
113 Bauer, J.: Warum ich fühle, was Du fühlst. Intuitive Kommunikation und das Geheimnis der
Spiegelneurone. Hamburg 102005, p. 26.
114 Cf. Rizzolatti, G. et al.: The Mirror System in Humans. In: Staminov, M./Gallese, V. (Eds.):
Mirror Neurons and the Evolution of Brain and Language. Amsterdam 2003, pp. 37–59.
115 The visitors to the cinema must, however, first know that this type of spider presents a
threat to their (living) bodies and so to their life. Thus, when we speak of the activity of
mirror neurons, we should see that these are a part of the lived body-soul organism which is
in a relationship to its environment. Mirror neurons are embedded within a framework of
248       B. The rediscovery of the lived body (Leib)

These mirror neurons are also active when laughter becomes contagious or when we
yawn because others are yawning.116

»Not only observation, but every awareness of something that is happening to others
can cause the observer’s mirror neurons to ignite. [...] They also give off sparks when the
test person is asked to imagine the relevant action. They, however, flare up most signifi-
cantly when a person is asked to simultaneously imitate the action being observed.«117

The Italian research scientist Vittorio Gallese, who is known well beyond his home
country, believes that with mirror neurons we have discovered the key to the whole
complexity concerning the subject of empathy.118 What we discussed above about
empathizing with a student and reaching out to touch her hand, or about the em-
pathy experienced when meeting the communicative look of the other person, can
thus be explained by means of neuroscience. It becomes clear that when we exam-
ine these studies and the reflections of Edith Stein, that these two are not that far
apart.119 Stein would surely be very enthusiastic about the scientific work of Gallese
and would agree with him that we need mirror neurons to empathize with others.
Yet she would also remind us of the significance of the lived body-soul unity and
not the importance of just the one single organ. She would also remind us that we
cannot minimize our relationships to mere cerebral functions. Consequently, in a
conversation with Gallese, Stein would emphasize the importance of acknowledging
the wholeness of the lived body as a prerequisite for any experience of empathy, and
so she would emphasize that these cerebral structures are by no means enough to
account for our empathetic encounters with other.120
I want to refer to an idea by Thomas Fuchs, who speaks of a resonance system and
understands mirror neurons as a necessary prerequisite for the encounter between liv-
ing bodies. Mirror neurons are, as he points out, part of a lived body-soul whole, a liv-
ing organism. He rightly warns against the premature interpretation of mirror neurons
as a substrate of human inter-subjectivity. The mere awareness of another’s motivation
is in no way related to a real understanding of the other person as intentional actor.

»To experience others as similar beings presupposes a complex understanding of one-

self as an intentional being with a will; a being who sets goals. This is an achievement
which cannot be understood purely on the level of brain functions being subordinated
to target movements.«121

meaning and action. Cf. Bauer, J.: Warum ich fühle, was Du fühlst. Intuitive Kommunikation
und das Geheimnis der Spiegelneurone. Hamburg 22005, p. 31).
116 Cf. ibid., pp. 7, 13 and 57 ff.
117 Ibid., pp. 24 f.
118 Cf. Gallese, V.: The Roots of Empathy: The Shared Manifold Hypothesis and the Neural Basis
of Intersubjectivity. In: Psychopathology 36 (2003), pp. 171–180.
119 Cf. ibid., pp. 175 ff.; cf. also: Rizzolatti, G./Sinigaglia, C.: Empathie und Spiegelneurone. Die
biologische Basis des Mitgefühls. Frankfurt a. M. 2008, p. 136.
120 Cf. Stein, E.: PE, p. 15.
121 Fuchs, T.: Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan. Eine phänomenologisch-ökologische Konzep-
tion. Stuttgart 2008, p. 197.
 4. You are where your lived body is       249

And Edith Stein writes that although she feels at one with others whose feelings be-
come the motifs of her own desires, she still knows that she does not possess the oth-
ers. Their own circumstances and their existence are the pre-existing conditions.122
As human beings, we all depend on our lived body’s encounter with others. It is
not brains that meet each other and not mirror neurons either, but beings with lived
body-souls. Without the living relationships which people have with others, mirror
neurons also disappear again.123

Conclusion

»Where the inner life is missing, there is also

no lived body.«124

Let us briefly summarize some results of this chapter. Our life in the here and now is
totally impossible without our lived body. Thanks to our lived body, we are in a vital
and life-sustaining relationship with the world around us. Our lived body is »always
here,« it is the zero point of our orientation. Because we can move, dance, jump and
hike, we are able to experience our surroundings without first having to search for
our lived body. At the same time, we cannot only contemplate our lived body from
the outside or scrutinize it in the mirror, we can also feel and experience it. Based on
Stein, we have called this »awareness of the lived body« (Leibwahrnehmung). This is
a dimension where all the thinking of dualists and physicalists fails. Our lived body
is alive, soul-embodied. Our mental manifestations of life (moving, feeling, laughing,
pleasure and fear) arise from our body.
The physical human body is a body that surely has a lot in common with other
bodies. However, the lived body is always ours: It belongs to me or to you. We also
concluded that we are where our lived body is. Our corporeality allows us to meet
others. It allows us to acknowledge that others are beings in their own right. Even
deeply felt empathy does not make them a part of ourselves. It is in our lived bodies
that our intellectual spiritual being, permeated and formed by this lived body, finds
expression. Where the lived body is, the soul is found. The present chapter has made
it clear that it serves no purpose to understand the lived body merely as a fascinating
creation from the laboratory perspective. We have seen how absurd it is to try and
reduce us to no more than mind and brain. We are alive. Our integrity is based on
our lived body-soul wholeness.
The thoughts developed here can be read as confirmation of the chapter on
­hylemorphism in Part 1. Hylemorphism and phenomenology do justice to each of
us, and know that the lived body and the physical body, or the lived body and the
soul, are not simply the same. These thoughts do not turn the forma into a more or
less valuable piece of jewelry which we could get rid of. Its completion is visible in

122 Cf. Stein, E.: PE, p. 135.

123 Cf. Bauer, J.: Warum ich fühle, was Du fühlst. Intuitive Kommunikation und das Geheimnis
der Spiegelneurone. Hamburg 22005, pp. 57, 60, 70 and 118 f.
124 Stein, E.: WP, p. 172.
250       B. The rediscovery of the lived body (Leib)

the completion of the lived body. The lived body is not without the soul and the soul
is not without the lived body. The complete Leibkörper is filled with the soul. Hyle­
morphism and phenomenology are aware of the physical basic preconditions of our
mental manifestations of life (we just need remember the »eye-examples«) without
needing to shrink you and me into what occurs – or does not occur – in our cerebral
structures. If Hylemorphism and phenomenology work together, we will have dis-
covered a viable answer to the challenges of mind-brain thinking, and an important
contribution will have been made to the rediscovery of the lived body. Having gained
these tools, let us now turn to the subject of consciousness.
C. Paths to consciousness

»Consciousness is a subject on which much

has been written
but about which little is known.«1

5. Brain research and the question of consciousness

»I am certain that consciousness is different
from the brain
Or is a subtle part of the brain.«2

5.1 Consciousness: A mysterious phenomenon

»Nor would the fullest objective description of

the brain, down to its minutest structures and
most delicate ways of functioning, provide
any clue of the existence of consciousness, if
we did not know about it through our own
inner experience.«3

The question regarding conscious mental manifestations of life is the discussion with
something which we know very well. Yet, we find it extremely difficult to understand
consciousness. William James once said: »We know so long as no one asks to define
it.«4 Christof Koch is more optimistic: »Consciousness [...] appears as mysterious
to 21st-century scholars as when humans first started to wonder about their minds

1 Sutherland, N. S.: The International Dictionary of Psychology. New York 1989. Quoted by:
Ramachandran, V./Hirstein, W.: Three Laws of Qualia. What Neurology Tells Us about the
Biological Functions of Consciousness, Qualia and the Self. In: Journal of Consciousness Stud-
ies. 4 (1997), p. 429.
2 Leibniz, G. W.: Schriften zur Logik und zur philosophischen Grundlegung von Mathematik
und Naturwissenschaft. Philosophische Schriften. Vol. 4. Darmstadt 1992, p. 63.
3 Jonas, H.: Mind, Matter, and Creation. In: Jonas, H.: Mortality and Morality. A Search for the
Good after Auschwitz. Illinois 1996, p. 169.
4 James, W.: Principles of psychology. New York 1890, p. 225.
252       C. Paths to consciousness

several millennia ago. Nevertheless, scientists today are better positioned than ever
to investigate the physical basis of consciousness.«5
What exactly do we mean when we speak of consciousness? When a physician re-
ceives an emergency call, he will immediately ask whether the patient is »conscious.«
He might hear that the latter has »lost consciousness« or »is conscious.« Someone
who has recently been separated from a beloved partner might experience the pain
of separation »quite consciously.« We also often hear the following statements: »she
is very conscious of what she is doing« or »he consciously broke the rules« or »she
consciously calculated the effects of a negative outcome«, »he only became conscious
later of his shock at the new situation« or »that remark was made unconsciously.«
These examples should suffice. What is being addressed here is the difference be-
tween conscious and unconscious mental manifestations of life (the question asked
by the physician); the awareness of what is or is not (e. g. environment or problems),
awareness of our own condition (such as a broken heart). As these examples show,
consciousness is a basic experience, a basic phenomenon of all humans. Making it
the subject of this chapter, we stress that it is something very typical for humans.
We are able to think consciously about what consciousness is, and to write about it.
Consciousness is part of who we are as living beings with a lived body-soul. Not all,
but very many manifestations of life occur consciously.6 When we say an organism
is »conscious,« we imply on the most elementary level that »it must feel like some-
thing to be that organism.«7 In our consciousness, we become aware of our own
experience. That may well be the reason why authors such as Edith Stein and Antonio
Damasio use »to step into the light« as a meaningful metaphor for consciousness.8
Today neuroscientists and philosophers discuss approaches to consciousness.9
Thomas Metzinger, philosopher and expert regarding this topic, is among those
who consider the question concerning consciousness as »the final great mystery per

5 Koch, C.: The Quest for Consciousness. A Neurobiological Approach. Englewood/Colorado

2004, p. 19.
6 »All of our conscious life is not synonymous with »my being« – it is similar to a surface that
has been exposed to light that yet remains above a dark depth which makes itself known by
means of this surface.« (Stein, E.: EES, p. 311).
7 Nagel, T.: What is it like to be a bat? In: Nagel, T.: Mortal Questions. Cambridge 1979,
pp. 165–180, here p. 166.
8 Cf. Stein, E.: Eph, p. 85; Stein, E.: EES, p. 311 and Damasio, A.: The Feeling of What Happens:
Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness. London 1999, pp. 3 ff.
9 Cf. especially: Chalmers, D.: The Conscious Mind. In Search of a Fundamental Theory.
Oxford/New York 1996; Pauen, M.: Das Rätsel des Bewusstseins. Eine Erklärungsstrategie.
Paderborn 1999; Newen, A./Vogeley, K. (Eds.): Selbst und Gehirn. Menschliches Selbstbe-
wusstsein und seine neurobiologischen Grundlagen. Paderborn 2000; Rager, G./Holderegger,
A. (Eds.): Bewusstsein und Person. Neurobiologie, Philosophie und Theologie im Gespräch.
Fribourg 2000; Hofmann, F.: Natur und Begriff des Bewusstseins. Paderborn 2002; Rager,
G./Quitterer, J./Runggaldier, E.: Unser Selbst. Identität im Wandel der neuronalen Pro­
zesse. Paderborn/Munich/Vienna/Zurich 22003; Herrmann, C. S./Pauen, M./Rieger, J. W./
Schicktanz, S. (Eds.): Bewusstsein. Philosophie, Neurowissenschaften, Ethik. Munich 2005;
Metzinger, T. (Ed.): Bewusstsein. Beiträge aus der Gegenwartsphilosophie. Paderborn 52005.
Thomas Metzinger and David Chalmers have compiled a very extensive overview of the
literature concerned with consciousness: Cf. Metzinger, T. (Ed.): Bewusstsein. Beiträge aus
der Gegenwartsphilosophie. Paderborn 52005, pp. 731–842; Metzinger,T.: Bibliographie
 5. Brain research and the question of consciousness       253

se«.10 According to Metzinger, the challenge we face is that even when we examine
the topic more closely, it is not quite clear what exactly constitutes the mysterious-
ness of what we call consciousness. Nor do we know what the key might be to solve
this mystery.11 This is a truly fascinating topic, and Metzinger reminds us that it is
concerned with who we are. He tells us that we are here dealing with the problem of
self-knowledge and self-awareness.12 This concerns us all, not only philosophy or
individual disciplines.13 Metzinger himself mentions certain characteristics, which
in numerous discussions we connect with the understanding of »consciousness.«14
One characteristic of consciousness is that it must be transparent. It means that we
as conscious living beings understand our experience as being translucent. A further
characteristic of conscious manifestations of life is that they should have a certain
perspective. This means that conscious manifestations of life belong to us. Our neigh-
bor experiences everything from a different perspective. Conscious subject matter
is given directly and exists now. It is therefore another characteristic that conscious
mental manifestations of life occur in the present.
Many authors active in this field see a philosophical-neuroscientific challenge in
the question whether consciousness can even be represented, researched and de-
scribed neuroscientifically. Once brain researchers learn more about manifestations
of life such as seeing and thinking, can we then say that the question will be answered
as to what consciousness really is? Will the mystery finally have been resolved? One
of the items found on the »list of especially important questions« on the subject of
consciousness is the one that asks about the phenomenal richness of our experience.
Is it realistic to hope for a neuroscientific theory that not only presents a good an-
swer, but a universal explanation that leaves nothing out?15 At least the two brain

(http://www.philosophie.uni-mainz.de/metzinger/publikationen/ConsciousnessBib.
pdf)/ as well as the bibliography which includes more than 18,000 titles: Chalmers, D.:
Mindpapers (http://consc.net/mindpapers/) (retrieved 12 June 2009).
I would like to thank Günter Rager for the important leads and suggestions incorporated
into this chapter. The following works were of special importance: Rager, G.: Hirnforschung
und die Frage nach dem Ich. In: Rager, G. (Ed.): Ich und mein Gehirn. Persönliches Erleben,
verantwortliches Handeln und objektive Wissenschaft. Freiburg/Munich 2000, pp. 13–51;
Rager, G.: Neuronale Korrelate von Bewusstsein und Selbst. In: Rager, G./Quitterer, J./Rung-
galdier, E.: Unser Selbst. Identität im Wandel der neuronalen Prozesse. Paderborn/Munich/
Vienna/Zurich 22003, pp. 15–59; Rager, B.: Bewusstsein und Person in Wissenschaft und
Le­benswelt. In: Rager, G./Holderegger, A. (Ed.): Bewusstsein und Person. Neurobiologie,
Philosophie und Theologie im Gespräch. Fribourg 2000, pp. 9–26, esp. 16–21; Rager, G.: Die
Person. Wege zu ihrem Verständnis. Fribourg 2006.
10 Metzinger, T.: Einleitung: Das Problem des Bewusstseins. In: Metzinger, T. (Ed.): Bewusst-
sein. Beiträge aus der Gegenwartsphilosophie. Paderborn 52005, p. 15.
11 Cf. ibid., p. 15.
12 Cf. ibid., p. 15.
13 Ibid., p. 15.
14 Cf. ibid., pp. 15–51.
15 Chalmers differentiates between the difficult and the simple problems in consciousness re-
search (Cf. Chalmers, D.: Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness. In: Journal of Con-
sciousness Studies 2 (1995), pp. 200–219, cf. Chalmers, D.: The Conscious Mind. In Search
of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford/New York 1996). He includes the following amongst the
simple questions: speech understanding; awareness as well as learning and memory (cf.
254       C. Paths to consciousness

researchers, Ramachandran and Hirstein, try to present such an explanation. Like

them, many brain researchers assume that, on the level of physical reality, each con-
scious manifestation of life has »a causally sufficient condition, especially that of
the central nervous system.«16 Thanks to imaging techniques with which we have
become familiar, we now know of regions of the brain involved in a special way when
we do something consciously. Many neuroscientists believe that they must look there
for conscious manifestations of life. Several authors assume that consciousness is
the product of cerebral occurrences. Among them Gerhard Roth. But there are also
authors who distance themselves from this terminology and instead speak of corre-
lations between brain and consciousness. Christof Koch and Francis Crick belong to
that group. According to them, the key term neural correlates of consciousness (NCC)
refers to all that occurs in our cerebrum at the time of a conscious experience. In or-
der to shed light on the question of conscious mental manifestations of life, Antonio
Damasio considers the living organism.
There seems to be some agreement, however, that consciousness must has a pur-
pose. Various authors point out that it provides living beings with a better chance
to survive.17 Usually there is also the suggestion that consciousness is especially
important when we want to learn something new.
I will now discuss five consciousness theories; four are neuroscientific and one is
neurophilosophical. The (doubtlessly subjective) selection by Crick and Koch (5.2),
Roth (5.3), Ramachandran and Hirstein (5.4), as well as Damasio (5.5), was made
because internationally recognized scientists should be heard whose thoughts are
discussed in current debates by brain researchers and philosophers, and who can be
regarded as being relatively representative in the neuroscientific project of exploring
the issue of consciousness. At the end we will discuss the thoughts of the neurophi-
losopher Thomas Metzinger (5.6) who has presented numerous widely noted pub-
lications concerning the problem of consciousness, and who regards himself as the
content of a transparent self model.

ibid., p. 200). Much can be achieved through methods employed by the natural sciences.
The keyword »phenomenal consciousness« is as far as Chalmers is concerned the »hard
problem« of consciousness. Even if we knew exactly what is happening in the brain, we
would still not have a universal answer to the understanding of consciousness.
16 Strasser, P.: Mein Gehirn und ich. Ein Dialog. In: Lederhilger, S. J. (Ed.): Seele, wo bist du?
Hirnforschung und Menschenbild. 5. Ökumenische Sommerakademie Kremsmünster 2003.
Frankfurt a. M. 2004, p. 53; cf. Rager, G.: Das Bewusstsein und seine neurobiologische
Erklärung. In: Theologie und Philosophie 74 (1999), pp. 183–203, Birnbacher, D.: Künstliches
Bewusstsein. In: Metzinger, T. (Ed.): Bewusstsein. Beiträge aus der Gegenwartsphilosophie.
Paderborn 52005, p. 725.
17 Cf. Baars, B. J.: In the Theatre of Consciousness. Global Workspace Theory. A Rigorous Sci-
entific Theory of Consciousness. In: Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1997), pp. 292–309;
Roth, G.: Das Gehirn und seine Wirklichkeit. Kognitive Neurobiologie und ihre philoso­
phischen Konsequenzen. Frankfurt a. M. 1994; Merikle, P./Joordens, S./Stolz, J.: Measuring
the relative magnitude of unconscious influences. In: Consciousness and Cognition 4 (1995),
pp. 422–439.
 5. Brain research and the question of consciousness       255

5.2 F. Crick and C. Koch in search of neural correlates for conscious

manifestations of life

»We would simply like to see what the cause

of consciousness is. We’d like to have a de-
scription of it in scientific terms, but what
the description is you can’t tell in advance.
I remember someone being asked at his in-
augural lecture – what is the next important
step? And he said, ›Well if I knew that, I’d take
it.‹«18

Nobel laureate Francis Crick and his colleague Christof Koch, who are both signato-
ries of the Manifest, presented a much-noted neuroscientific consciousness theory.
Ramachandran praised the work of Crick and Koch, and said that their theory elec-
trified the entire scientific community and motivated many researchers.19 Accord-
ing to Crick and Koch, the »consciousness research project« presents a challenge
since consciousness cannot be easily explained using the usual terms. The question
of consciousness is clearly an empirical problem.20 As natural scientists, they see
their task in finding clarity. The two researchers believe that it must be possible to
solve the consciousness problem: »Just because one particular scholar is unable to
understand how consciousness might arise does not mean that it must be beyond all
human comprehension.«21 It is their goal to find the peculiarities of brain activity
while we are conscious as opposed to the unconscious manifestations of life. »The
fundamental question at the heart of the mind-body problem is what is the relation
between the conscious mind and the electro-chemical interactions in the body that give
rise to it«22
The idea of finding brain activities that coincide with conscious manifestations
of life was already discussed in the section concerning Franz Josef Gall, who tried
to correlate the various cerebral areas with mental manifestations of life. There has
been much water under the bridge since then. Regarding questions of correlation,
today’s scientific community seems to have zeroed in on specific areas (such as the
recognition of faces) while almost neglecting other facets of our being alive.
Crick and Koch also dedicate themselves to such a special area. Their work is
primarily concerned with research of visual systems. They are especially interested
in why we sometimes see something and sometimes we don’t, and where in the

18 Crick, F.: You’re just a pack of neurons. In: Blackmore, S.: Conversations on Consciousness.
Oxford 2005, pp. 68–78, here p. 78.
19 Cf. Ramachandran, V./Blakeslee, S.: Phantoms in The Brain. Probing the Mysteries of the
Human Mind. New York 1998, p. 234.
20 Cf. Koch, C.: Why does pain hurt?.In: Blackmore, S.: Conversations on Consciousness. Ox-
ford 2005, pp. 125–136, here p. 130; Koch, C.: The Quest for Consciousness. A Neurobiologi-
cal Approach. Englewood/Colorado 2004, pp. 11–16.
21 Koch, C.: The Quest for Consciousness. A Neurobiological Approach. Englewood/Colorado
2004, p. 6.
22 Ibid., pp. 1 f.
256       C. Paths to consciousness

cerebrum the difference lies?23 The two suspect that always when we experience
something consciously (e. g. when this book hits your toe, when you see your neigh-
bor in the street or when you hear your favorite music), »we believe that there’s a
coalition of neurons which are firing together, and this firing is more or less at the
same time, and probably above some threshold. When you’re seeing a particular
scene, as Edelman and Tononi are fond of pointing out, that is only one of an im-
mense number of scenes you might possibly see.«24 Crick and Koch assume that
the neuronal correlates actually refer to a very manageable number of nerve cells:
»It’s a subset: a relatively small number of neurons. We wouldn’t like to say what
percentage it is, but one percent, ten percent, or some numbers like that.«25 Crick
and Koch’s concern is that it is an manageable coalition of neurons, which are in
action. In such an event, this coalition then can be considered a neuronal correlate
for conscious mental manifestations of life. They reject the assumption that the whole
brain participates. Their thesis is that, »because of the nature of the brain, and the
fact that one neuron connects to so many others, this must mean that there’s a large
number of neurons which have been associated. They can become conscious if the
NCC [i. e. the neuronal correlates for consciousness] shifts.«26
Crick and Koch have cooperated in their research for almost 20 years. They tried
to express their main concern in Towards a neurobiological theory of consciousness,
which they co-authored.27 In this publication, they explain their attempts at ex-
plaining mental manifestations of life as (»a program for research rather than a de-
tailed model«28).29 Crick and Koch explain that they are not primarily concerned

23 Cf. Koch, C.: Why does pain hurt?. In: Blackmore, S.: Conversations on Consciousness. Ox-
ford 2005, pp. 125–136, here pp. 125 f.
24 Crick, F.: You’re just a pack of neurons. In: Blackmore, S.: Conversations on Consciousness.
Oxford 2005, pp. 68–78, here p. 72.
25 Ibid., p. 72.
26 Ibid., p. 73.
Cf. also Koch, C.: The Quest for Consciousness. A Neurobiological Approach. Englewood/
Colorado 2004, pp. 87–115.
27 Crick, F./Koch, C.: Towards a neurobiological theory of consciousness. In: Seminars in Neuro-
science 2 (1990), pp. 263–275.
28 Ibid., p. 273.
29 In his book The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the Soul Crick voices the
suspicion that should the problem of conscious mental manifestations of life be solved,
the explanation concerning the freedom of will would also be easier to solve. The two are
closely connected. He believes the question of the freedom of will exerted by Homo Sapiens
to be outdated. (Crick, F.: The Astonishing Hypothesis. The Scientific Search For The Soul.
Glasgow 1994, p. 265). In the discussion with the Argentinian cell biologist Luis Rinaldi,
Crick at the end of the 1980s came to adopt three assumptions concerning freedom of will.
The first was that a part of the cerebrum was concerned with making action plans for the
future. The planning as to how the literature for this work is to be mastered is the task of
the brain. The plans made by the super brain do not, however, all have to be carried out and
can be retrieved at a moment’s notice. This means that you and I have to be aware of these
plans. Crick further believes that human beings are only aware of the »decisions« (!) and
not of the calculations which the relevant part of the cerebrum has carried out. The third
assumption is that the substance of a decision, but definitely not the calculation which has
led to this decision, can be retrieved at a moment’s notice. Such a machine, he tells us, will
then have the impression of itself that it possesses freedom of will. That is, of course, if this
 5. Brain research and the question of consciousness       257

in presenting a definitive, ultimate, quasi dogmatic clarification of an important

problem. They said that based on what is practically known, this is still a long way
off,30 and that more appropriate is the suggestion of a rough idea of conscious men-
tal manifestations of life which as many people as possible could support:

»Everyone has a rough idea of what is meant by consciousness. We feel that it is bet-
ter to avoid a precise definition of consciousness because of the dangers of premature
definition. Until we understand the problem much better, any attempt at a formal defi-
nition is likely to be either misleading or overly restrictive, or both.«31

After clarifying this, Crick and Koch proceed to provide their readers with important
basic ideas of their scientific work. But what are these? First: Not all manifestations
of life and therefore not everything that happens in our head becomes conscious. In
the next section, we will see that this is also very important for Gerhard Roth. Sec-
ond: They are convinced that we must discover the correct docking point and from
there, in a zipper-like effect, all other questions we have about our consciousness can
be solved. Is it really that simple? Both scientists believe that by intuition the basic
mechanism for discovering conscious mental manifestations of life can be unlocked,
that it is the task of natural science to discover it. They want to concentrate on this
in their own work. Their hope for their dedicated project is: »If we understand the
mechanisms for one aspect, we will have gone most of the way to understanding
them all.«32 Crick and Koch assume that working with the visual system is espe-
cially fruitful in searching for the »mechanism for one aspect.«33 They point out
that we are very visual beings, that we can therefore expect much information about
conscious manifestations of life. They also feel that while the visual system is highly
structured, it is possible to control it without much effort. It is thus as if this system

machine is able to personify its conduct, in other words has a picture of itself (ibid., p. 266).
He further notes that the reason for the decision must be sharply delineated. It can at the
same time be deterministic and chaotic, i. e. a very small fluctuation can have a major effect
on the end result. The unpredictability of the result will create the impression that the will
is »free.« Obviously conscious activities can also have an influence on the decision-making
process (ibid., p. 266). Crick is convinced that the human will is located in or near to the
anterior sulcus cingula. It does, however, not exclude the participation of other areas in the
forebrain (ibid., p. 268). These comments of mine regarding the localized and mereological
misapprehensions as well as with regard to freedom of human will are a definite criticism
of this approach.
30 Cf. Crick, F./Koch, C.: Towards a neurobiological theory of consciousness. In: Seminars in
Neuroscience 2 (1990), p. 264.
31 Ibid., p. 264.
32 Ibid., p. 264; cf. Crick, F.: The Astonishing Hypothesis. The Scientific Search For The Soul.
Glasgow 1994, pp. 19 f.
33 »Visual awareness is a favorable form of consciousness to study neurobiologically.« (Crick,
F./Koch, C.: Towards a neurobiological theory of consciousness. In: Seminars in Neuroscience
2 (1990), p. 263, Cf. p. 267).
Cf. also: Koch, C.: The Quest for Consciousness. A Neurobiological Approach. Englewood/
Colorado 2004, pp. 14, 69–86, 133–152.
258       C. Paths to consciousness

were just made for experimental access.34 They say that the very obvious advantages
of the visual system speak for themselves: »Unlike language, it is fairly similar in man
and higher primates.«35
Let us now look at the basic aspects of their consciousness theory. How can hu-
man be consciously active? What is important? Especially: What is the task of the
cerebrum in this process? Crick and Koch leave us in no doubt that short-term mem-
ory plays an enormously important role in our conscious mental manifestations of
life.36 They therefore explore these first, but make their thesis more precise. They
claim that there are two differently constituted characteristics. On the one hand,
they refer to (»a very fast form«):37 »iconic memory.«38 On the other hand, a much
more laid-back functioning »working memory.«39 In this context they state:

»Iconic memory is similar to a sensory input buffer, storing information mainly at a

pre-categorical level, i. e. in terms of simple visual primitives such as orientation or
movement, although it may also involve more complex features, such as familiar words.
It has a very large capacity but decays very quickly, perhaps in half a second or less.«40

This obviously leads to the following questions: What is the role of the »working
memory?« Where exactly are the differences between this and graphic conscious-
ness? Is it possible to identify this? How does this manifest itself in daily life? Crick
and Koch respond as follows:

»Working memory, in contrast, may last for seconds; it seems to have a rather limited
capacity (a figure often quoted is seven items), is different for different modalities and
seems to use a much more abstract representation (post-categorical memory). It can be
prolonged by rehearsal, as when we rehearse a telephone number. We suspect that it is
this form of memory that is strongly activated in the binding process.«41

These are the first steps in understanding their consciousness theory. Crick and Koch
suggest that conscious manifestations of life can be understood as integration attain-
ment of parallel occurrences in the cerebrum. As I already mentioned above, it is a
zipper effect, a basic mechanism »or perhaps a few such mechanisms«42 according
to which the nerve cells involved can be arranged. In this context, they also shred the

34 Cf. Crick, F.: The Astonishing Hypothesis. The Scientific Search For The Soul. Glasgow 1994,
p. 22, 259.
35 Crick, F./Koch, C.: Towards a neurobiological theory of consciousness. In: Seminars in Neuro-
science 2 (1990), p. 267.
36 Ibid., pp. 265, 269.
37 Ibid., p. 263.
38 Ibid., p. 263.
39 Ibid., p. 269.
40 Ibid., p. 269.
41 Ibid., p. 269.
Cf. also: Koch, C.: The Quest for Consciousness. A Neurobiological Approach. Englewood/
Colorado 2004, pp. 187–204.
42 Crick, F./Koch, C.: Towards a neurobiological theory of consciousness. In: Seminars in Neuro-
science 2 (1990), p. 264.
 5. Brain research and the question of consciousness       259

idea they regard as absurd, that every possible living being or thing we can meet on
any day has its own special neuron: i. e. a neuron for my neighbor xy; a neuron for
my grandmother; a neuron for the book open in front of you and the desk as well as
for the house in which I live: »There cannot be a single neuron, often referred to as
a grandmother cell for each one. The combinational possibilities for representing so
many objects at all different values of depth, motion, color, orientation and spatial
location are simply too staggering.«43 If that is not an option, what option is there?
Crick and Koch refer to a collection of nerve cells, which is extremely active when
it is necessary to recognize the face of another person (of my neighbor xy or my
grandmother), or a book in the library, or a house. Crick and Koch hypothesize that
when we meet our grandmother or neighbor xy on the street, this is represented44
through »a set of neurons.«
When we examine the consciousness theory of Crick and Koch, we should not
overlook that we are coming in contact with a large dose of philosophical assump-
tions. These two scientists are strongly influenced by Locke’s empiricism. Yet, we
won’t find an indication of this under »risks and side effects« on the insert of their
package. We know the techniques available in neuroscience and how they function,
and we may well ask: Have these truly discloses for them that a »set of neurons«
represents this or that? You see where I am heading: Has what they offer the reader
as empirically tangible facts (and they are after all of the opinion that we can only
solve the lived body-soul problem in this manner) really been achieved in various
experiments, or is it rather a mirror of the manner in which under a certain sign they
wish to interpret us and all of reality?
When we meet neighbor xy in the stairway, we do not observe some »shreds of
perception«. We see him in front of us as a unit. This is, of course, also true when
we meet another person or read the page of this book, which we do not see as a wild
mixture of letter. Crick and Koch tell us that our cerebrum is responsible for this.
The active participation of the nerve cells involved must of course be arranged.45
Thy call this complex of problems the »bonding problem,« which is »how different
aspects of a single visual object are bound together.«46 Sensory information (such

43 Ibid., p. 268.
44 Cf. ibid., pp. 268 f.
45 »Because any object will have different characteristics (form, color, motion, etc.) that are
processed in several different visual areas, it is reasonable to assume that seeing any one
object often involves neurons in many different visual areas. The problem of how these
neurons temporarily become active as a unit is often described as ›the binding problem.‹
As an object seen is often also herad, smelled or felt, this binding must also occur across
different sensory modalities.« (Crick, F.: The Astonishing Hypothesis. The Scientific Search
For The Soul. Glasgow 1994, p. 208).
46 Crick, F./Koch, C.: Are we aware of neural activity in primary visual cortex. In: Nature 375
(1995), p. 121.
»Our experience of perceptual unity thus suggests that the brain in some way binds to-
gether, in a mutually coherent way, all those neurons actively responding to different as-
pects of a perceived object. In other words, if you are currently paying attention to a friend
discussing some point with you, neurons in area MT that respond to the motion of his face,
neurons in area V4 that respond to its hue, neurons in auditory cortex that respond to the
words coming from his face and possibly the memory traces associated with recognition of
260       C. Paths to consciousness

as about our grandmother and the friendly neighbor) are subsequently reduced to
their basic ingredients. Something coherent is then presented to us, which makes
us ask how the process of reassembling the pieces occurs? According to Crick and
Koch, this follows a voting process of the spikes, i. e. the action potential of this group
of neurons. The two scientist friends say that there are oscillations in the range of
40 Hz.47 »These oscillations do not themselves encode additional information, ex-
cept in so far as they join together some of the existing information into a coherent
percept.«48 After the spikes’ successful synchronization process, all is placed in the
working memory and becomes available to the person concerned.49 Then, we are
able to become aware of our grandmother, our neighbor, and the pages in front of us.
Crick and Koch are inspired to solve a question such as this: Imagine in the street
in front of your home, you see an elderly lady in a red dress rush to the left and a
university professor in a blue suit sprint to the right. These activities do not occur in
succession but as so often in life, simultaneously. Crick and Koch ask the question:
Since different regions of the visual cortex are involved in the observation of color,
movement and form, why is the result not a perceptual mishmash of the various
colors? That is obviously not the case, since it is clear that the elderly lady is wearing
a red dress and the professor is wearing a blue suit. Neither do the figures of the lady
and the gentleman blend. Crick and Koch say the fact that you observe the professor
who is in a hurry, take note of his hasty movements and the color of his suit has
to do with oscillations which occur in phase. Other oscillations are responsible for
you observing that the lady is wearing a smart red dress. Crick and Koch regard the
»function« of consciousness »to make a summary of everything around me that’s
currently relevant and to send that summary over to the planning stages to make the
next decision« about what steps to take next.50

the face all have to be ›bound‹ together, to carry a common label identifying them as neu-
rons that jointly generate the perception of that specific face« (Crick, F./Koch, C.: Towards
a neurobiological theory of consciousness. In: Seminars in Neuroscience 2 (1990), p. 269).
Cf. also: Singer, W.: Vom Gehirn zum Bewusstsein. In: Elsner, N./Lüer, G. (Eds.): Das Gehirn
und sein Geist. Göttingen 2000, pp. 194 ff.
47 Cf. Crick, F./Koch, C.: Towards a neurobiological theory of consciousness. In: Seminars in
Neuroscience 2 (1990), pp. 270 ff.; cf. also: Koch, C.: The Quest for Consciousness. A Neu-
robiological Approach. Englewood/Colorado 2004, pp. 167–171; Engel, A. K.: Neuronale
Synchronisation und Bewusstsein – Hypothesen, Experimente, Vorbehalte. In: Rager, G./
Holderegger, A. (Eds.): Bewusstsein und Person. Neurobiologie, Philosophie und Theologie
im Gespräch. Fribourg 2000, pp. 27–52.
48 Crick, F./Koch, C.: Towards a neurobiological theory of consciousness. In: Seminars in Neuro-
science 2 (1990), p. 272.
49 Cf. ibid., p. 274.
50 Koch, C.: Why does pain hurt?. In: Blackmore, S.: Conversations on Consciousness. Oxford
2005, pp. 125–136, here p. 133; cf. Koch, C.: The Quest for Consciousness. A Neurobiological
Approach. Englewood/Colorado 2004, p. 305.
Crick and Koch emphasize »that a language system (of the type found in humans) is not
essential for consciousness. That is, one can have the key features of consciousness without
language« (Crick, F./Koch, C.: Towards a neurobiological theory of consciousness. In: Semi-
nars in Neuroscience 2 (1990), p. 264.
Christof Koch does not hesitate to affirm that cats, dogs and monkeys possess conscious-
ness. He tells us that »[m]onkeys don’t have the same richness of consciousness as you
 5. Brain research and the question of consciousness       261

In a correspondence with Koch, Daniel Dennett criticizes that the »Crick-Koch

program was sort of delusional; there wasn’t any NCC because there wasn’t funda-
mentally any real conscious sensation.«51 In response to the claim that there was
no real conscious sensation concerning the reality of pain, Koch pointed out (in my
opinion correctly) that »you can’t just say you’re linguistically confused because at
that point the pain is the most annoying thing that there is.«52 Searle calls the search
for neural correlates »the building block approach«.

»What these guys try to do is to find the neural correlate of individual conscious phe-
nomena; and the idea is that if you could find even one building block – such as what it
is that causes me to experience red – then you could crack open the whole system.«53

Searle regards the search for neural correlates as erroneous and emphasizes that, for
him, the key question is not what the characteristics of consciousness really are, but
what the difference is between a »conscious« and a »subconscious« brain.54 It seems
to me that Searle’s criticism does not really come to grips with Crick and Koch’s ap-
proach. It is, after all, also their declared goal to discover the difference between brain
activities in the conscious state as opposed to what occurs in a subconscious state.
We should realize that looking for correlates is preceded by a number of prelimi-
nary decisions and preconditions, and not least the fact that we already have a certain
notion what consciousness is. The explanation with the help of correlates depends
on »how the correlate to neural processes is conceived, which conscious phenomena
or also which aspects of conscious phenomena a neurobiological theory targets.«55
When neuroscientists such as Crick and Koch speak about NCCs there is the basic
premise that manifestations of life are involved and that these can be classified, and
for which there are neuroscientific templates. What happens to conscious mental
manifestations of life which do not fit into such a template? They are not fit to be
candidates for such a research program. Despite all the fascination concerning the

and I do; they don’t know about death, and Macintosh, and representative democracy, but
they feel and see, and their brain is very similar to ours.« (Koch, C.: Why does pain hurt?.
In: Blackmore, S.: Conversations on Consciousness. Oxford 2005, pp. 125–136, here p. 134).
Yet, Koch tells us, one cannot claim that every animal possesses consciousness. As nema-
todes, Caenorhabditis elegans, do not exhibit sufficient differentiated behavior, one may
question whether their manifestations of life occur consciously (ibid., p. 135). The ques-
tion regarding the consciousness of animals can also be approached by means of analogies
(ibid., p. 136; cf. also: Koch, C.: The Quest for Consciousness. A Neurobiological Approach.
Englewood/Colorado 2004, pp. 12 f., 325 f.).
51 Koch, C.: Why does pain hurt?. In: Blackmore, S.: Conversations on Consciousness. Oxford
2005, pp. 125–136, here p. 133.
52 Ibid., p. 133; cf. Koch, C.: The Quest for Consciousness. A Neurobiological Approach. Engle-
wood/Colorado 2004, pp. 213, 262 f., 300.
53 Searle, J.: I don’t understand a word of Chinese. In: Blackmore, S.: Conversations on Con-
sciousness. Oxford 2005, pp. 198–212, here p. 200 f.
54 Cf. ibid., p. 201.
55 Reuter, G.: Einleitung: Einige Spielarten des Naturalismus. In: Becker, A./Mehr, C./
Nau, H. H./Reuter, G./Stegmüller, D. (Eds.): Gene, Meme und Gehirne. Geist und Ge-
sellschaft als Natur. Frankfurt a. M. 2003, p. 44.
262       C. Paths to consciousness

work on NCCs, we should be careful not to suppose that conscious mental manifes-
tations of life are nothing but cerebral actions. When we recall Part 1 of this study,
we can say that the discovery of correlates should not be a neuroscientific recipe for
reductionism.
Do the knowledgeable discussions concerning 40 Hz oscillations actually say
why and how we perceive things? To really observe the movements of elderly ladies
and quick professors, we need more than such oscillations. If we keep in mind the
conclusions reached in the last chapter, we must question whether in the search for
NCCs, humans in their lived body-soul unity are indeed sufficiently in focus. As
Damasio tells us: »The idea that subjective experiences are not objectively accessible
is nonsense.«56
Let us assume that all conscious mental manifestations of life have their own
neuronal correlate. Let us assume a philosopher and a neuroscientist who generally
do not get on with each other were at least both willing to participate in a research
project to be conducted by Christof Koch, who at the end would be able to proclaim
the good news that an NCC for both their conflicts had been found. Would Koch
already have picked up the controversy between the two? No, he would not have.
The answer is negative because the two opponents play no real role here, and what
they become so terribly excited about is more than just brain activity. We can also
remember the statements made in the chapter called Man and his brain. Let us recall
the exploration of brain injuries and the remarks made. We have heard that in such
situations it is possible that other regions take over the function for the organism.
Precisely, this reality should not be overlooked as it would affect every search for
NCCs. Let us imagine Koch would indeed have been lucky enough to discover an
NCC for the quarreling of the philosopher who never avoided a discussion with a
brain researcher. In his present life situation, after a serious accident, it could be that
precisely this area of the brain has a completely different purpose within the whole
organism. Hence, we have to remember that there cannot be sufficient NCCs for
conscious mental manifestations of life.57
In this case too, it is important to keep in mind that the organism is embedded in
the environment. For humans, their being in relationship with other humans is also
important. Imagine being fortunate enough to be allowed to listen to a well-known
German-American violinist improvising on stage in Freiburg. He plays motifs from
various music styles: classical, sacral music, jazz and modern pop. He plays the music
of Johann Sebastian Bach as well as that of Michael Jackson. He is successful in his
attempt to entertain a fascinated audience. We have never heard anything like that
before. We may like this person, believe that he is a gifted musician who creatively
produced the most beautiful sounds on his million-dollar Stradivari. Next to us in
the audience is a friend, a natural scientist, who is equally fascinated with what he
hears. At intermission we have an idea we immediately follow up on. We tell the mu-

56 Damasio, A.: The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Conscious-
ness. London 1999, p. 309.
57 »Physicalism asserts that [...] the NCC for the percept of purple is the percept. Nothing else
is needed« (Koch, C.: The Quest for Consciousness. A Neurobiological Approach. Englewood/
Colorado 2004, p. 18).
 5. Brain research and the question of consciousness       263

sician about the modern imaging techniques we have at hand. We invite him to par-
ticipate in an investigation in the friend’s laboratory. He quickly agrees to participate
in an experiment. The question is whether we are searching for a neural correlate for
his ability to entertain us, or whether we want to find one relative to his special gift of
his creative violin style. We will not be able to choose. His music is largely dependent
on the musical notes outside the musician’s brain, whether what is being played is
judged to be creative or monotonous. Even when an NCC could be identified for my
thoughts concerning the beautiful sounds of the violinist, it would not mean that the
NCC and what I am thinking about are in fact the same.
Crick and Koch are concerned about more than conscious neuroscientific man-
ifestations of life.58 On the one hand, they say that no neuroscientific theory can
explain conscious mental manifestations of life.59 On the other hand, they adhere
faithfully to their understanding of a »reductionist« point of view:

»What is the relationship between ›awareness‹, in particular visual awareness, and neu-
ronal activity in the nervous system? Within a larger context, this question is sometimes
known as the ›mind-body‹ problem, and has been asked since antiquity. In recent years,
we have been trying to understand this relationship from a neuronal, reductionist point
of view.«60

They write that in the course of the last two thousand years, philosophers have pre-
sented so little regarding the problem of consciousness that they would be better to
keep silent now. We »should not pay too much attention to their discussions and
suggestions.«61
Both scientists vehemently deny that we are able to think about the question of
consciousness in different ways, that various facets can be highlighted and many
perspectives can contribute what is valuable: »Experience has shown that logical
argumentation and introspection [...] are simply not powerful enough to crack this
problem [the problem of consciousness, M. K.].«62 They speak contemptuously of
»armchair methods.«63 For Crick and Koch, it is thus clear: »We believe that the
problem of consciousness can, in the long run, be solved only by explanations at the

58 Cf. Crick, F.: The Astonishing Hypothesis. The Scientific Search For The Soul. Glasgow 1994,
pp. 8 f.
Cf. also: Bennett, M. R./Hacker, P. M. S.: Philosophical Foundations Of Neuroscience.
Malden/Oxford 102010, pp. 388–393.
59 »No neural theory of consciousness will explain everything about consciousness« (Crick,
F./Koch, C.: Towards a neurobiological theory of consciousness. In: Seminars in Neuroscience
2 (1990), p. 264).
60 Crick, F./Koch, C.: Are we aware of neural activity in primary visual cortex. In: Nature 375
(1995), p. 121.
61 Crick, F.: You’re just a pack of neurons. In: Blackmore, S.: Conversations on Consciousness.
Oxford 2005, pp. 68–78, here p. 74; Koch, C.: Why does pain hurt?. In: Blackmore, S.: Con-
versations on Consciousness. Oxford 2005. pp. 125–136, here p. 129; Koch, C.: The Quest for
Consciousness. A Neurobiological Approach. Englewood/Colorado 2004, p. 317.
62 Koch, C.: The Quest for Consciousness. A Neurobiological Approach. Englewood/Colorado
2004, p. 316.
63 Ibid., p. 316.
264       C. Paths to consciousness

neural level.«64 The word »only« is conclusive because its use once again places the
»reductionist point of view« at center stage. They believe that this approach is un-
shakeable, and this is why they confirm that brain processes are »necessary and suf-
ficient« for conscious mental manifestations of life.65 Bennett and Hacker comment
appropriately: »It is surprising that Crick should find his materialist hypothesis ›as-
tonishing.‹ [...] So, if it is astonishing, that is certainly not because of its novelty.«66

5.3 Consciousness as the result of the human brain. Gerhard Roth

about human consciousness

»From a neurobiological perspective conscious-

ness is the state of special neuronal activity
which consists primarily in the placing of corti-
cal networks for the purpose of mastering new,
more complex, more perceptive, more cognitive
emotional and motoric tasks.«67

Gerhard Roth regards the question of what constitutes our consciousness as his life-
long subject. He said that philosophy offers no truly satisfying answers for his ques-
tions and that the work of neuroscientists is much more promising. Crick and Koch
had also seen it that way.
Roth’s point of departure is that there must be a close relationship between con-
scious mental manifestations of life and our cerebral structures. This is not new, but
has developed in the course of evolution.68 Roth points out that »on the basis of
known relationship structures we are able today to come to conclusion regarding
the evolution of spirit, consciousness, and cognition of animals living today.«69 Still,
the question concerning consciousness cannot be easily answered »as it does not in

64 Crick, F./Koch, C.: Towards a neurobiological theory of consciousness. In: Seminars in Neuro-
science 2 (1990), p. 263.
65 Cf. Koch, C.: The Quest for Consciousness. A Neurobiological Approach. Englewood/Colo-
rado 2004, p. 19.
66 Bennett, M. R./Hacker, P. M. S.: Philosophical Foundations Of Neuroscience. Malden/Oxford
10
2010, p. 355.
67 Roth, G.: Die neurobiologischen Grundlagen von Geist und Bewusstsein. In: Pauen, M./
Roth, G. (Eds.): Neurowissenschaften und Philosophie. Eine Einführung. Munich 2001, p. 204.
68 Cf. Roth, G.: Die Evolution von Geist und Bewusstsein. In: Elsner, N./Lüer, G. (Eds.): Das
Gehirn und sein Geist. Göttingen 2000, p. 167.
69 Ibid., p. 167.
According to Roth, all vertebrate and possibly all invertebrate creatures with large brains
(e. g., cuttlefish) are able to pay attention and have an expanded memory. There is a great
difference in the behavior of fish, amphibians and reptiles when contrasted to mammals.
It is thus not clear whether these can be associated with consciousness or not. But, Roth
speaks of the supposition that we are here dealing with simple forms of conscious life (cf.
ibid., p. 174). It is difficult to imagine that human beings require consciousness for a num-
ber of skills which animals without consciousness can accomplish. One should thus assume
that in the process of evolution there are several leaps in cognitive achievement (cf. ibid.,
p. 175).
 5. Brain research and the question of consciousness       265

any way meet the criteria of what is otherwise present in nature.«70 Philosophers
constantly claim that conscious mental manifestations of life defy a gapless neuro-
biological decoding. Roth thus wishes to dedicate himself to exploring the question
whether »brain research is able to define consciousness; how it comes into being in
the brain and what role consciousness plays in cognition.«71
Roth portrays various kinds of brain injury which lead him to formulate the hy-
pothesis that consciousness per se does not exist. He claims that only people without
a clue could say otherwise. He suggests that consciousness is to be understood as a
bundle of multicolored processes and states of being which are experienced directly
and about which we can talk with contemporaries.72 He says that this approach
stands to reason and promotes neuroscientific research. Roth does not say: This is
not a purely empirical diagnosis. Considering what Roth believes, it is interesting
to see what philosophy has to offer regarding the question of consciousness, that
his bundle theory in fact resonates with the philosophy of Hume. We do not have to
discuss here that there are perhaps more relevant sources.
As Roth points out, much of what we do day in and day out are conscious acts.
He is primarily concerned with manifestations of life such as thinking, remember-
ing, and also with the certainty of knowing we are the origin of our own actions.
Roth’s neuroscientific approach points to the importance of separating the actual
consciousness (Aktualbewusstsein) from the background consciousness (Hinter-
grundbewusstsein).73 What is at stake here? Let us first look at the term Aktualbe-
wusstsein, or actual consciousness. What is meant, as the term »actual« suggests, are
the processes that are characterized by a special presence. According to Roth, actual
consciousness includes manifestations of life which can be unequally intense. The
manifestations of life that Roth includes here are conscious remembering and think-
ing. In many texts, Roth focuses in a very detailed manner on a typical manifestation
of actual consciousness: attentiveness. There are many situations in our lives when it
is important to do something very attentively. To be attentive means to be able to per-
ceive something in a goal-directed manner. There are many sensory influences and
even thoughts on which we have to turn our attention. This does not mean that the
brain is not aware of what we do not accomplish with special thoughtfulness and at-
tention. There is, however, little that we do that is only slightly conscious or perhaps
not conscious at all. »We cannot become aware of something without simultaneously
experiencing it consciously,« Roth tells us.74 It is possible that attentiveness results

70 Roth, G.: Aus Sicht des Gehirns. Frankfurt a. M. 2003, p. 126.

71 Roth, G.: Das Gehirn und seine Wirklichkeit. Kognitive Neurobiologie und ihre philoso­
phischen Konsequenzen. Frankfurt a. M. 1997, p. 213.
72 Cf. Roth, G.: Aus Sicht des Gehirns. Frankfurt a. M. 2003, pp. 126 f. and Roth, G.: Fühlen,
Denken, Handeln. Wie das Gehirn unser Verhalten steuert. Frankfurt a. M. 2001, p. 325.
73 »Both the actual consciousness (Aktualbewusstsein) and the background consciousness
(Hintergrundbewusstsein) together are part of the characteristic stream of our conscious-
ness, which is only interrupted during phases of deep sleep and unconsciousness.« (Roth,
G.: Fühlen, Denken, Handeln. Wie das Gehirn unser Verhalten steuert. Frankfurt a. M. 2001.
74 Roth, G.: Persönlichkeit, Entscheidung und Verhalten. Warum es so schwierig ist, sich und
andere zu ändern. Stuttgart 52009, p. 77; cf. Roth, G.: Fühlen, Denken, Handeln. Wie das
Gehirn unser Verhalten steuert. Frankfurt a. M. 2001, p. 206.
266       C. Paths to consciousness

from an unusual or unforeseeable occurrence: Careful, you must pay attention here!
It is, however, also possible that attentiveness is guided from »inside.«75 The question
here is, of course, who or what turns their attention to something. The person? The
neuron group? A special area within the cerebrum? More about this later. For now,
it should be noted that attentiveness is no neuroscientific invention. Authors such as
Descartes, Berkeley, Leibniz, Locke, William James, and Husserl, to name just a few,
have worked on this topic. Christopher Mole writes:

»Attention is also a topic of philosophical interest because of its apparent relations to

a number of other philosophically puzzling phenomena. There are empirical and theo-
retical considerations suggesting that attention is closely related to consciousness. It is
controversial, however, whether the relationship of consciousness to attention is one
of necessity, or sufficiency (or both or neither). There are also considerations linking
attention to demonstrative reference, to the development of an understanding of other
minds, and to the exercise of the will.«76

The term of background consciousness contains the word background which ex-
presses quite well that facet of the conscious life: Roth does not intend to devalue
this kind of consciousness. There is much in our everyday life that is not experienced
consciously, much remains constrained. But, it is precisely what is important for us
to be able to accomplish other conscious manifestations of life. For example, when
we think about Roth’s theory or remember the previous chapter, then background
consciousness is crucial to make all this present to us. Roth explains that »we speak
of background consciousness because we are generally not explicitly aware of these
states of consciousness and are concentrating on the content of the actual conscious-
ness.«77 Roth writes, that the very fact that we are awake is the prerequisite for the
content of our consciousness.78
Roth assigns preeminent significance to our »working memory« as a conscious
mental manifestation of life. Crick and Koch had already spoken of the special task
of the »working memory.« In this context, Roth points especially to the fact that
the working memory is capable of accessing processes that are important for our
actions as well as for achievements of memory, but that we usually take no note of
them.79

75 Roth, G.: Aus Sicht des Gehirns. Frankfurt a. M. 2003, p. 127.

76 Cf. Mole, C.: Attention. In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/attention/ (retrieved 12 June 2010).
77 Roth, G.: Persönlichkeit, Entscheidung und Verhalten. Warum es so schwierig ist, sich und
andere zu ändern. Stuttgart 52009, p. 77.
78 Cf. Roth, G.: Die Evolution von Geist und Bewusstsein. In: Elsner, N./Lüer, G. (Eds.): Das Ge-
hirn und sein Geist. Göttingen 2000, p. 168, Roth, G.: Die neurobiologischen Grundlagen von
Geist und Bewusstsein. In: Pauen, M./Roth, G. (Eds.): Neurowissenschaften und Philosophie.
Eine Einführung. Munich 2001, pp. 156 f.; Roth, G.: Das Gehirn und seine Wirklichkeit. Kog-
nitive Neurobiologie und ihre philosophischen Konsequenzen. Frankfurt a. M. 1997, p. 214.
79 Cf. Roth, G.: Die Evolution von Geist und Bewusstsein. In: Elsner, N./Lüer, G. (Eds.): Das
Gehirn und sein Geist. Göttingen 2000, p. 168.
 5. Brain research and the question of consciousness       267

Roth tells us that when we want to accomplish something new, or at least some-
thing innovative, we depend on our consciousness. Yet, there is also much that oc-
curs unconsciously at the same time. There is a good reason for this: the processing
of »information« (Roth is here referring to nerve impulses) is more rapidly and more
effectively accomplished with simpler significances – e. g. physical characteristics.80
What is processed unconsciously cannot be described.81 Neither he nor we are able
to do this. Our cerebrum has to accomplish much if we are even to have conscious
mental manifestations of life. This is why he claims that consciousness is an expensive
state of being in metabolic-physiological regard.82
n a paper on the neurobiological bases of consciousness, Roth characterizes con-
sciousness as the end result of the very complex interaction of many brain centers.83
This suggests that many regions of the brain have to be involved for us to be con-
scious. The activities of the associative cerebral cortex, the six-layered neocortex or
isocortex are indispensable for conscious manifestations of life.84 Beside the asso-
ciative cortex, there are still other important cerebral structures that are important
for our conscious life. That we are here dealing with a decisive region of the brain is
apparent in its designation as the »place of consciousness,«85 or »the seat of con-
sciousness.«86 Not to be misunderstood, he immediately confirms that this area is
no singular »producer«87 of our conscious mental manifestations of life. There are,
after all, still other areas to consider, also subcortical areas of the cerebrum whose
activity itself is unconscious, six-layered isocorticals, sensory, and motoric areas of
the cerebral cortex as well as the complete cortex (three to five-layered areas of the
cortex, the hippocampus, cingulate entorhinal and insular cortex). In the lateral hy-
pothalamus, the ventral tegmental area and the dorsal and ventral basal ganglia, he
identifies important centers of the brain so that we have an overview of the conscious
mental manifestations of life.88 Roth finally explains to his readers that conscious

80 Cf. Roth, G.: Die neurobiologischen Grundlagen von Geist und Bewusstsein. In: Pauen, M./
Roth, G. (Eds.): Neurowissenschaften und Philosophie. Eine Einführung. Munich 2001,
p. 164.
81 Cf. ibid., pp. 163 f.
82 Roth, G.: Aus Sicht des Gehirns. Frankfurt a. M. 2003, p. 130.
83 Cf. Roth, G.: Die neurobiologischen Grundlagen von Geist und Bewusstsein. In: Pauen, M./
Roth, G. (Eds.): Neurowissenschaften und Philosophie. Eine Einführung. Munich 2001,
p. 195.
84 Cf. Roth, G.: Das Gehirn und seine Wirklichkeit. Kognitive Neurobiologie und ihre philoso-
phischen Konsequenzen. Frankfurt a. M. 1997; Roth, G.: Das Gehirn und seine Wirklichkeit.
Frankfurt a. M. 21996; Roth, G.: Fühlen, Denken, Handeln. Wie das Gehirn unser Verhalten
steuert. Frankfurt a. M. 2001.
85 Roth, G.: Das Gehirn und seine Wirklichkeit. Kognitive Neurobiologie und ihre philoso­
phischen Konsequenzen. Frankfurt a. M. 1997, p. 219; Roth, G.: Fühlen, Denken, Handeln.
Wie das Gehirn unser Verhalten steuert. Frankfurt a. M. 2001, p. 221.
86 Roth, G.: Persönlichkeit, Entscheidung und Verhalten. Warum es so schwierig ist, sich und
andere zu ändern. Stuttgart 52009, p. 81; Roth, G.: Fühlen, Denken, Handeln. Wie das Gehirn
unser Verhalten steuert. Frankfurt a. M. 2001, pp. 224, 237.
87 Ibid., p. 81; Roth, G.: Das Gehirn und seine Wirklichkeit. Kognitive Neurobiologie und ihre
philosophischen Konsequenzen. Frankfurt a. M. 1997, pp. 219 and 228.
88 In greater detail cf. Roth, G.: Die Evolution von Geist und Bewusstsein. In: Elsner, N./Lüer,
G. (Eds.): Das Gehirn und sein Geist. Göttingen 2000, pp. 170 ff.
268       C. Paths to consciousness

mental manifestations of life primarily come into being »where cortical and limbic
system, cognition and emotion penetrate.« This is at least true for »higher« forms of
consciousness, such as ego perception and autobiographical thinking.«89 If the usu-
al cortical activities are constrained – e. g. through lack of air or sugar deficiency – we
lose our consciousness; we become »unconscious.«

Roth writes: »Consciousness can be global or focal. Injury to both sides of the brain, in
the area of the formation reticularis, generally lead to global unconsciousness, that is
to a coma. Lesions in the area of the associative cortical areas, on the other hand, can
lead to focal losses of consciousness. So, the ability of conscious seeing and hearing can
be selectively restricted. Yet, patients are awake and fully aware of their activities and
experiences.«90

When Roth writes about the subject of consciousness, he especially enjoys talking
about all that is unconscious. He includes very different manifestations of life. He
begins with what was conscious in the past and in the light of suitable constellations
can become conscious again via so-called preconscious processes (which can be-
come conscious if the associative cerebral cortex is in action) up to the processes that
occur beyond the associative cerebral cortex.91 Again and again, Roth emphasizes
that we do not become aware of most processes on a molecular and cellular level.
Consequently, questions regarding the unconscious are even more interesting to him
than questions about consciousness.92 It should also be noted that many factors of
which we are never conscious can well be a part of our actions.93 When and how
does something become conscious?

89 Roth, G.: Die neurobiologischen Grundlagen von Geist und Bewusstsein. In: Pauen, M./
Roth, G. (Eds.): Neurowissenschaften und Philosophie. Eine Einführung. Munich 2001 p. 199.
90 Roth, G.: Das Gehirn und seine Wirklichkeit. Kognitive Neurobiologie und ihre philoso­
phischen Konsequenzen. Frankfurt a. M. 1997, p. 214.
91 Cf. Roth, G.: Wie das Gehirn die Seele macht. Vortrag auf dem 51. Lindauer Psychotherapie-
wochen. http://www.lptw.de/archiv/vortrag/2001/roth.pdf (retrieved 15. September 2008),
p. 5; Roth, G.: Persönlichkeit, Entscheidung und Verhalten. Warum es so schwierig ist, sich
und andere zu ändern. Stuttgart 52009, p. 78 f.; Roth, G.: Fühlen, Denken, Handeln. Wie das
Gehirn unser Verhalten steuert. Frankfurt a. M. 2001, p. 227.
92 Cf. Roth, G.: Persönlichkeit, Entscheidung und Verhalten. Warum es so schwierig ist, sich und
andere zu ändern. Stuttgart 52009, p. 76.
93 Cf. Roth, G.: Die neurobiologischen Grundlagen von Geist und Bewusstsein. In: Pauen, M./
Roth, G. (Eds.): Neurowissenschaften und Philosophie. Eine Einführung. Munich 2001,
p. 160.
Wolf Singer, too, emphasizes that we are far from being conscious of all the processes in
our brains. He is of the opinion and advocates for the thesis that only neuronal patterns of
excitement of the cerebral cortex lead to conscious perceptions and emotions. According
to Singer, this too occurs only then »when they show a critical amount of coherence, order,
synchronization and are able to sustain this state for a sufficient amount of time.« (Singer,
W.: Über Bewusstsein und unsere Grenzen. Ein neurobiologischer Erklärungsversuch. In:
Becker, A./Mehr, C./Nau, H. H./Reuter, G./Stegmüller, D. (Eds.): Gene, Meme und Gehirne.
Geist und Gesellschaft als Natur. Frankfurt a. M. 2003, p. 294). He concludes that the reason
the blood pressure level and the level of the blood sugar do not reach consciousness is that
these processes occur without participation of the cerebral cortex.
 5. Brain research and the question of consciousness       269

Roth explains: »After processing centers outside the cerebral cortex and in the primary
and secondary sensory areas of the cortex have unconsciously pre-processed the per-
ceptual ›raw materials,‹ they send this information to the associative areas. There they
meet the content of the declarative memory. From this primary information and the in-
termingled memory content, the associative areas then form a sensible and useful state
and across retroactive tracks in the primary and secondary areas create the perceptual
details that belong there.«94

Roth believes his statement to be self-evident, that our conscious experiences »corre-
spond« to certain activities in parts of the cerebral cortex.95 Nonetheless, we cannot
consider the »mind-brain problem« to have been solved. This statement reveals quite
a bit about Roth’s image of man and shows that the living organism where conscious-
ness occurs is not in his focus.96
Roth writes that we are actually still totally in the dark and have no knowledge
of what occurs »during the interplay of millions and billions of nerve cells when
conscious experience comes into being.«97 Roth does not stop at this modest igno-
ramus-model. In a publication addressing mainly philosophers he says that it is not
really a problem to air completely the relationship between neuronal activities and
mental manifestations of life.98 The reason for this apparent growth in knowledge
follows immediately. He tells us that consciousness is irrefutably a macro-physical
process, otherwise it would not be ascertainable with current neurobiological regis-
tration methods.99 There are, after all, sufficient preconditions for conscious mental
manifestations of life. This is where Roth very clearly gets carried away – as we can
say with regard to what we discussed in Part 1.100

As lived body-soul beings, we are capable of observing our conscious mental manifesta-
tions of life. We can relate to them, have an opinion and test them. We can give our life a
certain direction. We can consciously decide that it is better not to neglect contact with out
friends even when we are working hard to complete our doctoral dissertation. We can re-
solve to take part in sport in the future and to give up smoking. As spiritual beings, we have
the possibility to come to grips with our mental manifestations of life, which theoretically
will lead to greater conditional freedom.
94 Roth, G.: Aus Sicht des Gehirns. Frankfurt a. M. 2003, pp. 132 f.
95 Ibid., p. 133.
96 Cf. ibid., p. 135. Cf. also: Roth, G.: Fühlen, Denken, Handeln. Wie das Gehirn unser Ver­
halten steuert. Frankfurt a. M. 2003, pp. 241–255.
97 Roth, G.: Aus Sicht des Gehirns. Frankfurt a. M. 2003, p. 135.
98 Roth, G.: Worüber Hirnforscher reden dürfen. In: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie.
Vol. 52. Berlin 2004, p. 233.
99 Cf. Roth, G.: Fühlen, Denken, Handeln. Wie das Gehirn unser Verhalten steuert. Frankfurt
a. M. 2001, p. 245, Cf. ibid., p. 218.
100 Cf. Roth, G.: Aus Sicht des Gehirns. Frankfurt a. M. 2003, p. 136; Roth, G.: Fühlen, Denken,
Handeln. Wie das Gehirn unser Verhalten steuert. Frankfurt a. M. 2001, p. 245; Roth, G.: Das
Gehirn und seine Wirklichkeit. Kognitive Neurobiologie und ihre philosophischen Konsequen-
zen. Frankfurt a. M. 1994, pp. 273 f.
270       C. Paths to consciousness

5.4 Phenomenal experiencing as a challenge for brain research.

The works of Ramachandran and Hirstein

»In neurology they said: ›Don’t ask the patient

what he’s experiencing because you’ll be
misled,‹ and that of course threw the baby out
with the bathwater.
But I think that in this generation I have done
a lot to try and revive that approach of good
old-fashioned nineteenth-century neurology –
because I was untrammeled by fashion.«101

»What is new, what that cannot be grasped, is consciousness. I will now claim what
I truly believe, which is that, not only given the current status quo, consciousness
cannot be explained from its material terms. Everybody will freely admit this. Yet
because of its very nature it will never be explainable. What possible relationship is
there on the one hand between certain movements of certain atoms in my brain; and
on the other hand the facts which for me are original, not further definable and not
to be denied: I feel pain, feel joy, I taste something that is sweet, smell the scent of
roses, hear the sound of the organ, see red, and the simultaneously present certainty
that this is who I am. It can definitely not be understood how the interaction of the
atoms works together so that consciousness can come to be.«102
In this excerpt from the talk given by Emil Du Bois-Reymond in 1872, which
is still well-known today, the physiologist from Berlin and co-founder of modern
electrophysiology tells us that we will not be able to measure neuroscientifically what
consciousness is in its entirety. Ignorabimus! Two brain researchers, Vilayanur Ra-
machandran103 and William Hirstein, approach this problem area much more op-
timistically. The steady advance in the neurosciences is an indication of »good days
for mind-body materialists«104 and a hint that the last word has not yet been spoken
regarding this question: »Many of us were brought up with the belief that God knows

101 Ramachandran, V.: You’re part of Shiva’s dance; not a little soul that’s going to be extin-
guished. In: Blackmore, S.: Conversations on Consciousness. Oxford 2005, pp. 186–197, here
p. 193.
102 Du Bois-Reymond, E.: Über die Grenzen der Naturerkenntnis. In der zweiten allgemeinen
Sitzung der 45. Versammlung Deutscher Naturforscher und Ärzte zu Leipzig am 14. August
1872 gehaltener Vortrag. In: Du Bois-Reymond, E. (Ed.): Reden von Emil Du Bois-Reymond
in zwei Bänden. Vol. 2. Leipzig 1912, p. 458.
103 Amongst other topics, Ramachandran has till now worked on optical illusions; phantom
pain in amputated limbs; denial syndromes in patients with brain injuries, as well as the
question as to how the body is »represented« in the brain. He was given special recognition
for his work on temporal lobe epilepsy as well as his statements regarding a »God-module«
responsible for religious sensations. (e. g.: Ramachandran, V./Blakeslee, S.: Phantoms in The
Brain. Probing the Mysteries of the Human Mind. New York 1998, pp. 174–198).
104 Hirstein, W.: Mindmelding: Connected Brains and the Problem of Consciousness. In: Mens
Sana Monographs. Vol 6 (1). Jan-Dec 2008, pp. 110–130, here p. 110.
 5. Brain research and the question of consciousness       271

everything that happens in our minds. [...] It seems at least conceivable that I could
experience your consciousness.«105
Ramachandran and Hirstein are not satisfied with being unable to explain entirely
neurobiologically what we experience qualitatively. They believe it must be possible
to discover what the other experiences when they see a bright red apple, and to
smell or eat the delicious fruit. After all, neuroscientists have had other considera-
ble successes. They would formulate their guiding question as follows: How can we
scientifically encode what we call our qualitative experience? Or, to put it another
way: Is there a relevant neuroscientific approach to the question how it feels when
we see a red apple?106
A by no means small ambition of Ramachandran and Hirstein is to ensure that
there is a revelation of the consciousness problem that once and for all will »solve
the problem of consciousness.«107 They are confident of their mission when they
write that we should see and explain everything in reductionist terms.108 When they
speak of the neurosciences, they unfortunately understand this as a synonym for
a reductionist view of the world. It has cost philosophers from Aristotle to Searle
much time and effort to keep apart the »mind« apart from the »body,« illusion from
reality. This has led to no results, and this is why there should be an end to the »end-
less number of debates.«109 There must be a »fresh approach,«110 which can soon be
crowned with success. As far as they are concerned, it is high time to understand the
lived body-soul problem and with that the question concerning conscious mental
manifestations of life as a purely scientific task.111 This we can regard as their »pri-
mary goal.«112 To regard the lived body-soul problem as a medical issue, »provides

105 Ibid., p. 114.

106 Cf. Ramachandran, V./Blakeslee, S.: Phantoms in The Brain. Probing the Mysteries of the Hu-
man Mind. New York 1998, p. 229; Ramachandran, V./Hirstein, W.: Three Laws of Qualia.
What Neurology Tells Us about the Biological Functions of Consciousness, Qualia and the Self.
In: Journal of Consciousness Studies. 4 (1997), pp. 429–457.
107 Ramachandran, V./Hirstein, W.: Three Laws of Qualia. What Neurology Tells Us about the
Biological Functions of Consciousness, Qualia and the Self. In: Journal of Consciousness Stud-
ies. 4 (1997), p. 430.
108 In his book, A Brief Tour of Human Consciousness, Ramachandran likewise champions the
reductionist point of view. All human feelings, plans, thoughts, preferences, feelings of love
as well as religious convictions are nothing other than a product of the human brain: Cf.
Ramachandran, V.: A Brief Tour Of Human Consciousness. From Impostor Poodles to Purple
Numbers. New York 2004, pp. 3 and 57.
In Phantoms in the Brain. Probing the Mysteries of the Human Mind Ramachandran char-
acterizes reductionism as the most successful strategy in science (Ramachandran, V./
Blakeslee, S.: Phantoms In The Brain. New York 1998, p. 234). We are here not only talking
about a specific methodological approach but about an ontological view of the world.
109 Ramachandran, V./Hirstein, W.: Three Laws of Qualia. What Neurology Tells Us about the
Biological Functions of Consciousness, Qualia and the Self. In: Journal of Consciousness
­Studies. 4 (1997), p. 429.
110 Ibid., p. 429.
111 »Our focus is on showing the form a scientific theory of consciousness might take, some-
thing which is independent of the truth of all of the more detailed claims and suggestions
we will make« (ibid., p. 429).
112 Ibid., p. 429.
272       C. Paths to consciousness

a context in which the ethical issues involved can be understood, including severe
violations of mental privacy.«113 We already heard something similar when we dis-
cussed La Mettrie. The two researchers need not start at the zero point. They can
easily build on the work of neuroscientists such as Crick and Koch.114
An enormously important strategy for these two researchers is to identify a loca-
tion for conscious mental manifestations of live. They seem to take it for granted that
there must be such a »seat of consciousness« where conscious mental manifestations
of life can be traced: »It is ironic that people have often thought that the seat of con-
sciousness is the frontal lobes, because nothing dramatic happens to consciousness
if you damage the frontal lobes. We suggest instead that most of the action is in the
temporal lobes.«115 The two researchers define the temporal lobes as the »main play-
er[s] in generating conscious experience.«116 When we hear the sound of an organ,
see the red of an apple and taste something that is sweet, this qualitative experience
is »based [...] in the temporal lobes.«117 Moreover, they write:

»What if we imagine connecting person A’s temporal lobes to person B’s prefrontal
lobes? Could this be done in a way that would produce a coherent conscious state for
B? Could this produce a case where one person, B, has direct access for another person’s,
A’s, perceptual representations?«118

In this context, let us remember from Part I the statements made by Knut Nordby,
the color researcher who himself suffered from colorblindness.119 Hirstein and Ra-
machandran similarly attempt to grapple with the question how a colorblind per-
son can understand how somebody with »normal« color perception perceives color.
They want to replace the »ignorabimus« by Du Bois Reymond, with »sciemus!« A
colorblind person like Nordby could »become very interested in this curious phe-
nomenon we call color; they look at objects and describe them as red or green or
blue, but the objects often all look like shades of gray.«120 The colorblind person
could of course understand the red of an apple better if he had a spectrometer and
discovered that light emanates from the apple at wave lengths of 600 Nanometer.
Hirstein and Ramachandran point out that, however well the suggestion is meant,
it does not help the colorblind person to grasp how persons with normal sight feel

113 Hirstein, W.: Mindmelding: Connected Brains and the Problem of Consciousness. In: Mens
Sana Monographs. Vol 6 (1). Jan-Dec 2008, p. 127.
114 Cf. Ramachandran, V./Hirstein, W.: Three Laws of Qualia. What Neurology Tells Us about
the Biological Functions of Consciousness, Qualia and the Self. In: Journal of Consciousness
Studies. 4 (1997), pp. 430, 450.
115 Ibid., p. 450.
116 Ibid., p. 451.
117 Ibid., p. 450.
118 Hirstein, W.: Mindmelding: Connected Brains and the Problem of Consciousness. In: Mens
Sana Monographs. Vol 6 (1). Jan-Dec 2008, p. 122.
119 Cf. Nordby, K.: Vision in a Complete Achromat: A Personal Account. In: Hess, R. F./Sharpe,
L. T./Nordby, K.: Night Vision. Basic, Clinical and Applied Aspects. Cambridge 1990, p. 305.
120 Ramachandran, V./Hirstein, W.: Three Laws of Qualia. What Neurology Tells Us about the
Biological Functions of Consciousness, Qualia and the Self. In: Journal of Consciousness
­Studies. 4 (1997), p. 431.
 5. Brain research and the question of consciousness       273

when they see a red apple. Nothing has been gained. He has »no idea what color this
might correspond to, or indeed what people mean when they say ›color.‹«121 He
does, after all, not see the apple as the person with ›normal‹ sight does – but sees it
with other eyes. For these two researchers, this means that as a colorblind person
he cannot participate in his friend’s experiences. They wish to change this state of
affairs. We get more by understanding it as a problem of translation.122 That we chat
and exchange experiences is normally a barrier for what we do not experience what
others experience: »This barrier [...] emerges when there is a translation.«123 As with
any translation, something is lost. The experience itself is lost in translation.«124 The
decisive question is thus whether we can overcome this barrier.125 Perhaps bridge it?
»To bridge« – Ramachandran and Hirstein believe that this sounds like a good
solution. This situation can in fact be solved as only the eyeball of the colorblind
person is not in a position to capture wavelengths in such a manner as happens
normally, but the cerebral preconditions to see color are present. Their suggestion
is that a »cable of neurons«126 should be created from nerve cells which are present
in area V4 crucial for the perception of color. It is possible to link various compo-
nents in other areas. A cable of neurons can achieve the same. We may suspect that
La Mettrie and Descartes would have been delighted with this perception of the
mechanistic view of human beings. Hirstein and Ramachandran have a very clear
view how all this is possible: »The connection has to bypass your eyes, since you
don’t have the right cone cells, and go straight to the neurons in your brain without
an intermediate translation.«127 Their idea is that the V4 of the person who can see
the apple can be connected by means of the cable of neurons.128 Ramachandran and
Hirstein are excited at the possibility that the colorblind person will thus be able to
»skip the translation,«129 and yet be in the fortunate position to experience exactly
what the friend with »normal« sight experiences when the apple is seen. Thanks to
the cable of neurons, the colorblind person could call out full of joy: »Oh my God,
I see what you mean.«130 All of this means the ringing in of a new era.131 They wax
lyrical that it will soon be possible »for a person to directly experience the conscious
states of another.«132

121 Ibid., p. 431.

122 Cf. ibid., p. 433.
123 Ibid., p. 432.
124 Ibid., p. 432.
125 Cf. ibid., p. 432.
126 Ibid., p. 432.
127 Ibid., p. 432.
128 Cf. Ramachandran, V./Blakeslee, S.: Phantoms in The Brain. Probing the Mysteries of the
Human Mind. New York 1998, p. 233.
129 Ramachandran, V./Hirstein, W.: Three Laws of Qualia. What Neurology Tells Us about the
Biological Functions of Consciousness, Qualia and the Self. In: Journal of Consciousness
­Studies. 4 (1997), p. 432.
130 Ibid., p. 432.
131 Cf. ibid., p. 430.
132 Hirstein, W.: Mindmelding: Connected Brains and the Problem of Consciousness. In: Mens
Sana Monographs. Vol 6 (1). Jan-Dec 2008, p. 110.
274       C. Paths to consciousness

Modern brain research assumes that we do not only possess a visual area, the
visual cortex, and the optic area, but beyond that another thirty areas that are located
in the anterior part of the cerebrum and are needed for sight. The areas themselves
see nothing. Ramachandran describes injuries to the V4, the color area, and to MT,
the visual movement area. He finally arrives at the conclusion that even though the
anatomy of these thirty ›visual‹ areas at first seems confusing, they are subject to a
superordinate organizational plan.133 There is no reason for this organizational plan.
But, what is the reason for this organization? The Aristotelian doctrine of the soul
is quite compatible with these observations, and with the perspective of the soul as
the formative principle would be able to provide a real reason for the organization
of the various areas. Let us remember the discussion about the entelechy thought
pictured in the example of the eye in De anima, or even the argument of our com-
municative gaze in the previous chapter. This could be very enriching here. Howev-
er, for Ramachandran, there seems to be only the option of alternative dualism or
(material) monism. In his book, he makes a number of statements concerning the
lived body-soul problem, none of which he could have gained through experiments,
even though he risks his reputation as a neuroscientist. He rejects dualist theories,
saying that in the universe »we cannot differentiate between ›mental‹ and ›materi-
al‹ substance. Both are the same.«134 Hirstein writes: »Conscious states are physical
states.«135 The objections to the identity theory formulated in Part 1 counters the
point of view that mind and matter are the same.
Hirstein and Ramachandran have made it their goal to answer our questions re-
garding conscious manifestations of life once and for all. They need to let us ask
them whether they are concerned with brain scans and questionnaires or with living
(human) beings where consciousness is part of their live manifestations. Could it
be that they are brushing past the subject of conscious manifestations of life, that
they have gathered a great deal of material regarding the manner in which eyes and
sight areas function, but are blind to the qualitative characteristics of the human
gaze? It is unlikely that how I feel when I walk across the market and see and smell
a red apple can be transferred one-on-one to others. As Stein points out, »I can only
behold and name quality. I can neither calculate it nor make it accessible.«136 It is
not my brain that sees and tastes the red apple. There is a German proverb which
says that while the red apple attracts our senses, it often has a worm in its center. The
»worm« that spoils everything is called physicalism and reductionism in the name
of the neurosciences. »Malo mala, mala mala!« (»When the apple tree is rotten, the
apples are too!«)

133 Cf. Ramachandran, V.: A Brief Tour Of Human Consciousness. From Impostor Poodles to
Purple Numbers. New York 2004, p. 26, cf. also Ramachandran, V./Blakeslee, S.: Phantoms
in The Brain. Probing the Mysteries of the Human Mind. New York 1998, p. 8.
134 Ibid., p. 45.
135 Hirstein, W.: Mindmelding: Connected Brains and the Problem of Consciousness. In: Mens
Sana Monographs. Vol 6 (1). Jan-Dec 2008, p. 127.
136 Stein, E.: Eph, p. 57.
 5. Brain research and the question of consciousness       275

5.5 The conscious organism:

Antonio Damasio about an astonishing phenomenon

»Brains are a part of living organisms that

interact with biological, physical and social
environments.«137

This statement, which can be read as a criticism of Ramachandran and Hirstein,

was made by Antonio Damasio. In his opinion, in the question of consciousness,
»our striving for understanding and our appetite for wonderment which according
to Aristotle are our unmistakable human characteristics, can be exercised to our
heart’s content.«138 It is of course possible that the perspective of our own experi-
ence can at times be distorted, but this should not lead to the conclusion that we
should approach the phenomenon of conscious mental manifestations of life only
from the scientific external perspective: »The study of human consciousness requires
both internal and external views.«139 For Damasio, the perspective of experience
is a mystery as well as a precondition that cannot be sidestepped when we want
to explore conscious mental manifestations of life. After all, Ramachandran and
­Hirstein understood the perspective of experience as something that can be bridged
by means of neuronal cables. Damasio vehemently rejects such conclusions. He also
points out that it is rather questionable when in the exploration of consciousness we
concentrate on a single sensory modality such as sight, yet do not include the entire
core consciousness. Damasio emphasizes that conscious mental manifestations of
life presuppose »that the brain is part of a whole organism with which it interacts
continuously.«140 Damasio regards brain structures, which can be found deep within
the interior of our cerebrum, as necessary for our conscious mental manifestations
of life. The living organism continuously interacts with its environment. Damasio
stresses that our organism does not remain untouched when we either do or perceive
something in our environment.
It is important to differentiate between our conscious mental manifestations of
life. Thus, Damasio speaks of our so-called core consciousness, which »provides the
organism with a sense of self about one moment – now – and about one place –
here.« Here, he thus refers to our elementary awareness of life: »Core consciousness
does not illuminate the future and the only past it lets us vaguely glimpse at is what
occurred in the instant just before.«141 Core consciousness is a reality which goes
through no transformations during our life and stands in no relationship of depend-

137 Damasio, A.: The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Conscious-
ness. London 1999, p. 322.
138 Ibid., p. 4.
139 Ibid., p. 82.
Cf. Parvizi, J./Damasio, A.: Consciousness and the Brainstem. In: Cognition 79 (2001),
pp. 135–160, esp. p. 136.
140 Damasio, A.: The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Conscious-
ness. London 1999, p. 85.
141 Ibid., p. 16.
276       C. Paths to consciousness

ency with our thinking, our speech or our memory.142 It is also does not depend on
our working memory, which is needed for extended consciousness.143 According
to Damasio, it requires only short term memory and is connected to our emotions.
The nature of core consciousness is the thought of the self, the feeling of the self, as
an individual being that is concerned with the recognition of self-existence and the
existence of others.144
Beyond this, there are further occurrences of conscious mental manifestations
of life. These are far more complex. Damasio speaks of an extended consciousness.
This is not static, but develops throughout our lifetime. We are able to differentiate
between various levels of organization.145 Damasio’s theory is that it gives us access
to what we have already experienced and to the future: »In extended consciousness
both the past and the anticipated future are sensed along with the here and now in a
sweeping vista as far-ranging as that of an epic novel.«146 It is thanks to the extended
consciousness that organisms (we can also say: we) have access to a wide »knowledge
horizon.«147 Damasio also explores what might negatively impact these manifesta-
tions of life. Thus, it can be that the extended consciousness is dimmed while the core
consciousness uninterruptedly continues to do its duty on behalf of the organism.
According to Damasio, this changes when the elementary forms of our conscious-
ness can no longer be regarded as being intact. Then, even the higher forms of our
conscious mental manifestation of life are affected.
A central concern of Damasio is to highlight again and again that conscious men-
tal manifestations of life belong to a living organism. They are a form of our being
alive. Life and conscious mental manifestations of life are intertwined.148 Damasio
thus argues against the view that propagates a mind-brain image of man. He points
out again and again that even the most wonderful cerebral structure is part of a
larger living organism. He assumes that the vegetative centers of the brain stem play
an important role in fashioning the relationship between cerebral structures and the
organism as a whole. He also never attempts to seek conscious manifestations of life
in one or other area of the brain. After all, consciousness is not a characteristic of
the brain. Instead, the cerebrum is a necessary prerequisite for our conscious mental
manifestations of life and so, Damasio ascribes a prominent role to our corporeality.
He takes seriously our experience of our bodies and in this way is different from oth-
er scientists. The experience of our corporeality, of our lived body is part and parcel
of our being alive even when we hardly notice it.149 Every human has a lived body
and is thus more than mind and brain. No one has two or even more lived bodies.150

142 Cf. ibid., pp. 112 f.

143 Cf. ibid., pp. 112 f.
144 Ibid., p. 127.
145 Cf. ibid., pp. 16 f.
146 Ibid., p. 17.
147 Cf. ibid., p. 198.
148 Cf. ibid., p. 23.
149 Cf. Damasio, A.: Descartes’ Error. Emotion, Reason, And The Human Brain. London 1994,
p. 152.
150 Cf. Damasio, A.: The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Con-
sciousness. London 1999, p. 142.
 5. Brain research and the question of consciousness       277

Whoever wishes to make pronouncements concerning mental manifestations of life

must not forget the lived body. According to Damasio, our lived body remains our
point of reference. It is from this vantage point of the lived body that we perceive and
assess specific situations.151
Since we have the talent of consciousness, we can learn what happens inside us:
»the hunger and the thirst, the sexuality, the tears, the laughter, the highs and the
lows, the flow of images we call thought, the feelings, the words, the stories, the
convictions, the music and the poetry, the happiness and the ecstasy.«152 Damasio
continues:

»At its simplest and most basic level, consciousness lets us recognize an irresistible urge
to stay alive and develop a concern for the self. At its most complex and elaborate lev-
el, consciousness helps us develop a concern for other selves and improve the art of
life.«153

5.6 From brain research to a new culture of consciousness:

The theses of Thomas Metzinger

»I am the substance of a transparent

self-model.«154

Having discussed neuroscientific consciousness theories, we now need to talk about

a neurophilosophical consciousness theory. Thomas Metzinger believes that the
question regarding conscious mental manifestations of life is »a special issue.«155
In his opinion, consciousness matters are everything but clear as far as conscious-
ness is concerned.156 Metzinger regards this as a »hot topic,« since consciousness is
apparently contrasted with physical, biological, and chemical conditions which we
can only know from a distant outside perspective.157 To many people access to our
conscious manifestations of life seems to be possible both externally and internally.
The problem is that the relationship between external and internal is not clear. »We
must know what it is that makes my own conscious state what it is, how I appropriate
it as a conscious self.«158 Metzinger understands a personal experience perspective
as »a very specific kind of representational structure, a way in which brains depict
the world as a centered world, as a world that’s centered around a self, and which

151 Cf. ibid., pp. 145 f.

152 Ibid., p. 5.
153 Ibid., p. 5.
154 Cf. Metzinger, T.: I am the content of a transparent self model. In: Blackmore, S.: Conversa-
tions on Consciousness. Oxford 2005, pp. 149–159.
155 Metzinger, T.: Einleitung: Das Problem des Bewusstseins. In: Metzinger, T. (Ed.): Bewusst-
sein. Beiträge aus der Gegenwartsphilosophie. Paderborn 52005, p. 25.
156 Ibid., p. 20.
157 Cf. Metzinger, T.: I am the content of a transparent self model. In: Blackmore, S.: Conversa-
tions on Consciousness. Oxford 2005, pp. 149–159, here p. 149.
158 Ibid., p. 150.
278       C. Paths to consciousness

has proved to be adaptive, biologically successful.«159 In this context, he rejects the

explanation gap of the relationship between what we experience consciously and the
processes which occur in our brain. Yet, he does believe that an intelligibility gap is
possible. He means that a scientifically satisfying consciousness theory is not neces-
sarily intuitively intelligible.160
Metzinger reminds us that the question concerning conscious manifestations of
life is in fact a whole bundle of problems. He wonders about the components of
these bundles: whether and by what means they are linked, whether there really is
one bundle of problems.161 He describes the current situation as follows: »There is
still no unified theoretical background against which a science of consciousness could
develop.«162
Metzinger explains that we have the impression that phenomenal circumstances
are very near and familiar to us. To leave no doubt about it, he says that in his opin-
ion, without phenomenal consciousness we would not be humans but zombies. Who
would like to say of themselves that they are zombies? And who would want to be a
zombie? It seems obvious to him that we should first draw a line between phenome-
nal circumstances on the one hand and physicalist, chemical, biological and neuro-
biological circumstances on the other. This approach is already very familiar to us,
and we have seen that it leads nowhere. Nevertheless, he continues and says that our
experience is transparent, perspective and present.163 For Metzinger, the question of
phenomenal consciousness is one of the most difficult problems.164 He calls it the
crucial pivot point of the lived body-soul problem.165 He himself is convinced that
our we can only understand our qualitative experience through neuronal develop-
ment processes.
Metzinger says that thanks to our ever-increasing knowledge about the cerebrum,
it is becoming ever more obvious that we must rethink such terms as »person,« »free
will« and »responsibility.« He says that outdated concepts must be replaced by con-
temporary concepts. As far as he is concerned, brain research is headed for the »final
breakdown of the metaphysical image of humans with their double nature as bodily
and spiritual beings.«166 The new image of human beings167 – Metzinger speaks of

159 Ibid., p. 151.

160 Cf. ibid., p. 151.
161 Cf. Metzinger, T.: Einleitung: Das Problem des Bewusstseins. In: Metzinger, T. (Ed.): Bewusst-
sein. Beiträge aus der Gegenwartsphilosophie. Paderborn 52005, p. 20.
162 Ibid., p. 20.
163 Cf. ibid., p. 25.
164 Cf. ibid., p. 115.
165 Cf. ibid., p. 179.
166 Metzinger, T.: Der Preis der Selbsterkenntnis. Beschert uns die Hirnforschung mit einem
neuen, naturalistischen Menschenbild auch das Ende der Religion? In: Könneker, C. (Ed.):
Wer erklärt den Menschen? Hirnforscher, Psychologen und Philosophen im Dialog. Frankfurt
a. M. 22007, pp. 265 f.
167 Cf. Metzinger, T.: Einleitung: Das Problem des Bewusstseins. In: Metzinger, T. (Ed.): Bewusst-
sein. Beiträge aus der Gegenwartsphilosophie. Paderborn 52005, pp. 21 f.; Metzinger, T.: Auf
der Suche nach einem neuen Bild des Menschen. Die Zukunft des Subjekts und die Rolle der
Geisteswissenschaften. In: Spät, P. (Ed.): Zur Zukunft der Philosophie des Geistes. Paderborn
 5. Brain research and the question of consciousness       279

a »neuroscientific human image«168 – would have far-reaching technological, sci-

entific, and especially socio-cultural consequences not be underestimated.169 He is
dealing with no less than the mind-brain image of human beings. Brains, not living
human beings are »general problem solvers.«170
Metzinger calls it unavoidable that we must have a dialogue with each other about
the variety of materialistic monism that should take precedence. We know from our
discussions in Part 1 that there is no agreement in the physicalist camp. According
to Metzinger, the neurosciences do not only mean what would be true, a challenge to
our image of man, but a radical overthrow, a revolution of how we regard ourselves
and other humans.171 I draw attention again to the discussion about the question
whether brain research is an affront or not. According to Metzinger, modern philos-
ophy has only few examples of poorly developed and ideologically motivated forms
of reductionism. »It has long been evident that a primitive scientism that attempts
to level the subtle structure and depth of our consciousness space through the intro-
duction of a new materialist jargon, avoids the real issues.«172 To those who argue
that there are non-reducible dimensions of our humanity, Metzinger replies that
they should follow the trend of empirical knowledge and become knowledgeable
about the facts.173 He calls all that has been said about the boundaries of our insight
and the non-reducibility of certain human characteristics a sign of incompetence.174
According to Metzinger, the results of empirical research suggest that in the clas-
sical-philosophical sense there is no soul. Something which remains over time and
guarantees a person’s self cannot be found in the brain.175 But who told Metzinger

2008, pp. 225–236, esp. p. 233; Metzinger, T.: Der Preis der Selbsterkenntnis. In: Gehirn &
Geist 7–8 (2006), pp. 42–49.
168 Metzinger, T.: Der Riss im Selbstmodell. In: Die Zeit (Nr. 34). 16. August 2007. Cf. also:
http://www.zeit.de/2007/34/M-Seele-Interview (retrieved 16. Oktober 2007).
169 Cf. Metzinger, T.: Von der Hirnforschung zur Bewusstseinskultur. In: NZZ (Nr. 64). 18
March. 1998, p. 79; Metzinger, T.: Einleitung: Das Problem des Bewusstseins. In: Metzinger,
T. (Ed.): Bewusstsein. Beiträge aus der Gegenwartsphilosophie. Paderborn 52005, p. 15.
170 Metzinger, T.: Subjekt und Selbstmodell. Die Perspektivität phänomenalen Bewusstseins vor
dem Hintergrund einer naturalistischen Theorie mentaler Repräsentation. Paderborn 21999,
p. 243.
171 Cf. ibid.; Metzinger, T.: Einleitung: Das Problem des Bewusstseins. In: Metzinger, T. (Ed.):
Bewusstsein. Beiträge aus der Gegenwartsphilosophie. Paderborn 52005, p. 15; Metzinger, T./
Singer, W.: Frontalangriff auf Selbstverständnis und Menschenwürde. In: Könneker, C. (Ed.):
Wer erklärt den Menschen? Hirnforscher, Psychologen und Philosophen im Dialog. Frankfurt
a. M. 22007, pp. 207–215.
172 Metzinger, T.: Einleitung: Das Problem des Bewusstseins. In: Metzinger, T. (Ed.): Bewusst-
sein. Beiträge aus der Gegenwartsphilosophie. Paderborn 52005, p. 18.
173 Cf. Metzinger, T.: Auf der Suche nach einem neuen Bild des Menschen. Die Zukunft des Sub-
jekts und die Rolle der Geisteswissenschaften. In: Spät, P. (Ed.): Zur Zukunft der Philosophie
des Geistes. Paderborn 2008, p. 228.
174 There is the suspicion that Metzinger wishes to appropriate the claim of all-encompassing
knowledge to himself. In the same essay, he, in a sweeping blow, accuses »the« members
of the humane disciplines that they are not in a position to synthesize the large amount of
information into an image of human beings, nor are they able to take note of data collected
by the natural sciences, both of which would be useful for future developments. In his bib-
liography, eleven of the twelve titles refer to his own works (Ibid., p. 236).
175 Cf. Metzinger, T.: Der Riss im Selbstmodell. In: Die Zeit (Nr. 34). 16. August 2007.
280       C. Paths to consciousness

that he should find the soul in the brain? Surely an intelligent person like Metzinger
should know that this naive statement does not argue against the existence of a
soul. According to the Aristotelian view, the soul is not a substance and cannot be
empirically discovered in the brain. Instead, it is entelechy – the form of the body.
Before Metzinger throws any concept of the soul overboard, he should remember
that hylemorphism, for example, is scientifically compatible with the data of natural
sciences.176
As far as Metzinger is concerned, the soul is no guarantee that we are the same
tomorrow as we are today. He points to his own suggestion, the assumption of a
mental self-model:177

»We are mental self-models of information processing bio-systems and center a critical
portion of our internal representations of the world. If we cannot be calculated we do
not exist.«178

Thus, in line with the idea of man the machine, Metzinger claims that we don’t
exist if we can’t be calculated. Is this the promised progress in contrast to outdated
concepts? Metzinger’s concern is creating sufficient conditions for mental manifes-
tations of life, which would include, for example, tasting a drop of wine or noticing
that there is too much salt in the soup. Metzinger assumes that we can find correlates
for all conscious mental manifestations of life.179 Here, the conclusion we reached
in our discussion of Crick and Koch applies: finding a »correlate« is no universal
weapon to handle a phenomenon. It is no justification to conduct neuroscientific
physicalist signs. According to Metzinger, all that is part of human consciousness is
to be understood as the content of a transparent human self-model which he chooses
to perceive as a neurocomputational weapon, as a specific data structure which the
brain can activate from time to time, for example upon waking up in the morning
when it is important to coordinate sensory perceptions and motoric behavior. »The
ego machine just turns on its phenomenal self, and that is the moment when you
come to.«180

176 According to Metzinger, philosophers have till now mainly emphasized the difference be-
tween human beings and animals, and have concluded that only human beings possess dig-
nity and a soul, whereas animals are bestial raw and possess lower instincts by which they
are driven (Metzinger, T.: Beweislast für Fleischfresser. In: Könneker, C. (Ed.): Wer erklärt
den Menschen? Hirnforscher, Psychologen und Philosophen im Dialog. Frankfurt a. M. 22007,
p. 252), which, in the light of Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition is doubtlessly abbreviated
and erroneous.
177 For a discussion on subjectivity and self model as understood by Metzinger, cf. also: Quit-
terer, J.: Unser Selbst im Spannungsfeld von Alltagsintuition und Wissenschaft. In: Rager, G./
Quitterer, J./Runggaldier, E.: Unser Selbst. Identität im Wandel der neuronalen Prozesse. Pa-
derborn/Munich/Vienna/Zurich 22003, pp. 116–129.
178 Metzinger, T.: Subjekt und Selbstmodell. Die Perspektivität phänomenalen Bewusstseins vor
dem Hintergrund einer naturalistischen Theorie mentaler Repräsentation. Paderborn 21999,
p. 284.
179 Cf. Metzinger, T.: Der Riss im Selbstmodell. In: Die Zeit (Nr. 34). 16 Aug. 2007.
180 Metzinger, T.: I am the content of a transparent self model. In: Blackmore, S.: Conversations
on Consciousness. Oxford 2005, pp. 149–159, here p. 153.
 5. Brain research and the question of consciousness       281

Thus, the brain busily brings forth models of our body, our surroundings, of hous-
es and trees. Our total consciousness, all that defines us as human beings is thus
staged by our cerebrum. That is where Metzinger creates the name for his sugges-
tion: self-model. Metzinger has, after all, said that it is time to re-define the concept
of personhood. He is not willing to avoid this task. In order to understand what is
meant by the concept of »person,« he suggests we imagine a pilot sitting in a flight
simulator. He does not even have the slightest indication that he is in a simulator. As
everything looks so real, the pilot believes all he is experiencing is real. However, he
experiences only what the flight simulator allows him to experience. For Metzinger,
the difference is that the brain is not being used by a pilot who has »temporarily«
entered the simulator. That, he feels, would be too Cartesian.181 Instead, the brain
functions like a »total flight simulator,« which he calls »a self-modeling plane that
has always flown without a pilot and which generates a complex picture of itself in its
flight simulator.«182 Concretely, this means that »human brains simultaneously sim-
ulate the pilot.«183 Our conscious mental manifestations of life – and with that also
what he has said about consciousness – are a sublime pretense of the cerebrum. His
suggestion is that we understand personhood in the sense of a pilot, yet that pilot,
that person, does not exist. »It is, after all, the brain that activates the pilot each time
it needs this pilot as a representational tool to watch over the activities of the whole
system and to image these. When at any point in time the system no longer needs a
functional active self-model, it is simply turned off.«184
Metzinger regards the experiential perspective (he calls it the perspective of the
first person) as a representational phenomenon and the unity of self-consciousness
for fiction:

»The ›perspective of the first person‹ is only a representational phenomenon which does
not correspond with anything present in the objective structure of the world. We are
not mysteriously identical with a specific intra-worldly person and this person’s point of
view. In this sense, we do not possess an identity at all. Internally we are a more or less
strongly correlated conglomeration of physical and psychological characteristics which
move through time. The unity of self-consciousness is mere representational fiction.«185

How does Metzinger know that this is the way to solve the problem of personal
identity? That all is no more than simulation? What else does he, who speaks of »sim-
ulation«, really know about this phenomenon that allows him to say that? According
to his own testimony, he is also no more than a simulation.

181 Cf. Metzinger, T.: Subjekt und Selbstmodell. Die Perspektivität phänomenalen Bewusstseins
vor dem Hintergrund einer naturalistischen Theorie mentaler Repräsentation. Paderborn
2
1999, p. 243.
182 Ibid., p. 243.
183 Ibid., p. 243. (Italics in the original).
184 Ibid., pp. 243 f.
185 Metzinger, T.: Niemand sein. Kann man eine naturalistische Perspektive auf die Subjektivität
des mentalen einnehmen? In: Krämer, S. (Ed.): Bewusstsein. Philosophische Beiträge. Frank-
furt a. M. 1996, p. 151.
282       C. Paths to consciousness

According to Metzinger, brain research also causes the exitus of religions. This is
a fairly daring thesis, one with others have been very wrong who predicted that reli-
gions were in their death struggle. According to Metzinger, we should remember that
we are »biological ego-machines without immortal souls.«186 Man can only be called
a radically mortal being.187 In time, he believes, we will discover that there is no life
after death, and we will say with Woody Allen that »there is no prize to be won for
great acting achievements.«188 For Metzinger, radical mortality is an »open wound
in our self-model.«189 Man is a radically mortal being of »a totally intra-worldly or-
igin.«190 Brain research would sever man from any »divine root.«191 Metzinger sees
himself as the messenger of the »good news«192 found in a gospel, and he mixes
scientific facts with facts that cannot be inferred from his fundamental conviction
that there is no God when he claims that there is nobody whom we can despise or

186 Metzinger, T.: Der Preis der Selbsterkenntnis. Beschert uns die Hirnforschung mit einem
neuen, naturalistischen Menschenbild auch das Ende der Religion? In: Könneker, C. (Ed.):
Wer erklärt den Menschen? Hirnforscher, Psychologen und Philosophen im Dialog. Frankfurt
a. M. 22007, p. 266.
187 Cf. ibid., p. 264.
According to Metzinger, all who believe in a life after death are alienated from science. He
tells us: »Whoever encounters scientific advances in knowledge with an open mind can
soon no longer believe there is something like a personal life after death.« (Metzinger, T./
Singer, W.: Frontalangriff auf Selbstverständnis und Menschenwürde. In: Könneker, C. (Ed.):
Wer erklärt den Menschen? Hirnforscher, Psychologen und Philosophen im Dialog. Frankfurt
a. M. 22007, p. 208).
Francis Crick, likewise, becomes a preacher: Crick, F.: Dr. Crick’s Sunday Morning Service.
In: Crick, F.: The Astonishing Hypothesis. The Scientific Search For The Soul. Glasgow 1994,
pp. 255–263. His friend C. Koch is more objective: Koch, C.: The Quest for Consciousness. A
Neurobiological Approach. Englewood/Colorado 2004, p. 327.
188 Metzinger, T.: Der Preis der Selbsterkenntnis. Beschert uns die Hirnforschung mit einem
neuen, naturalistischen Menschenbild auch das Ende der Religion? In: Könneker, C. (Ed.):
Wer erklärt den Menschen? Hirnforscher, Psychologen und Philosophen im Dialog. Frankfurt
a. M. 22007, p. 265.
Woody Allen famously said that he did not believe in a life after death but would never-
theless take along a change of underwear. (Quoted by: Lüke, U.: Für- und Wi(e)der Worte.
Anstößige Gedanken im Kirchenjahr. Paderborn 2005, p. 56). Woody Allen, screenwriter,
director and actor, beloved for his very special humor, is addresses honestly the fact that
having no religious faith is also not always easy, and that even such a person can experience
a crisis of faith. Regarding the person and humor of Woody Allen cf. Hösle, V.: Woody Al-
len. Versuch über das Komische. Munich 2005.
189 Metzinger, T.: Der Preis der Selbsterkenntnis. Beschert uns die Hirnforschung mit einem
neuen, naturalistischen Menschenbild auch das Ende der Religion? In: Könneker, C. (Ed.):
Wer erklärt den Menschen? Hirnforscher, Psychologen und Philosophen im Dialog. Frankfurt
a. M. 22007, pp. 267 f.
190 Metzinger, T.: Unterwegs zu einem neuen Menschenbild. In: Könneker, C. (Ed.): Wer erklärt
den Menschen? Hirnforscher, Psychologen und Philosophen im Dialog. Frankfurt a. M. 22007,
p. 221.
191 Ibid., p. 221.
192 Metzinger, T.: Der Preis der Selbsterkenntnis. Beschert uns die Hirnforschung mit einem
neuen, naturalistischen Menschenbild auch das Ende der Religion? In: Könneker, C. (Ed.):
Wer erklärt den Menschen? Hirnforscher, Psychologen und Philosophen im Dialog. Frankfurt
a. M. 22007, p. 273.
 5. Brain research and the question of consciousness       283

against whom we can rebel.193 He believes that this »collapse of the Christian view
of man« is surely bound to happen.194 Obviously, Metzinger does not want to admit
that it is not the task of neuroscientists to use brain data to make pronouncements
about the existence or non-existence of God. At least Christof Koch has realized that
in contrast to Metzinger, when he says: »With the end of life, consciousness ceases,
for without brain, there is no mind. Still, these irrevocable facts do not exclude some
beliefs about the soul, resurrection, and God.«195
Metzinger says that the achievements in the neurosciences show us the way to
a new view of mental manifestations of life, consciousness and personhood.196 He
welcomes that this theory can finally be safeguarded by means of an empirical foun-
dation.197 With this, he says, it is revealed that we have a clear superiority in compar-
ison to metaphysical models.198 He seems to totally ignore that scientific facts also
have to be interpreted and that (pre-)philosophical fundamental convictions play a
role: We only have to think of the understanding of a concept such as »representa-
tion.« It is also clear that explicitly metaphysical concepts can include empirical data.
As Metzinger himself cannot totally do without metaphysical assumptions – some-
thing he does not admit – it is inappropriate to make sweeping statements about
»metaphysical ideologies«199 whose time has expired.
Metzinger tells us that the upheaval caused by the neurosciences and the cognitive
sciences is more powerful than other scientific innovations of the past, and that they
provide valuable improvements in the fields of medicine, the philosophy of mind
and other disciplines. Yet there are not only positive developments. We now have
must deal with risks and side effects unheard of before, such as military applications
of artificial intelligence research.200 It is obvious that developments take place at
lightning speed, often without reflection or political guidance. Metzinger asks what
it would mean if we no longer believed in the existence of a soul. He suspects there
would be some cultural side-effects about we can predict little at present.201 He says
that on the one hand, the success story of the neurosciences means that we are es-

193 Cf. ibid., p. 270.

194 Metzinger, T.: Neurobics für Anfänger. In: Könneker, C. (Ed.): Wer erklärt den Menschen?
Hirnforscher, Psychologen und Philosophen im Dialog. Frankfurt a. M. 22007, p. 263, Cf.
also: Metzinger, T.: I am the content of a transparent self model. In: Blackmore, S.: Conversa-
tions on Consciousness. Oxford 2005, pp. 149–159, here p. 156.
195 Koch, C.: The Quest for Consciousness. A Neurobiological Approach. Englewood/Colorado
2004, p. 327.
196 Cf. Metzinger, T.: Einleitung: Das Problem des Bewusstseins. In: Metzinger, T. (Ed.): Bewusst-
sein. Beiträge aus der Gegenwartsphilosophie. Paderborn 52005, p. 16; Metzinger, T.: Von der
Hirnforschung zur Bewusstseinskultur. In: NZZ (Nr. 64). 18 March. 1998, p. 79.
197 Cf. Metzinger, T.: Einleitung: Das Problem des Bewusstseins. In: Metzinger, T. (Ed.): Bewusst-
sein. Beiträge aus der Gegenwartsphilosophie. Paderborn 52005, p. 16.
198 Cf. Metzinger, T.: Von der Hirnforschung zur Bewusstseinskultur. In: NZZ (Nr. 64). 18 March.
1998, p. 79.
199 Metzinger, T.: Auf der Suche nach einem neuen Bild des Menschen. Die Zukunft des Subjekts
und die Rolle der Geisteswissenschaften. In: Spät, P. (Ed.): Zur Zukunft der Philosophie des
Geistes. Paderborn 2008, p. 227.
200 Cf. ibid., p. 226.
201 Cf. Metzinger, T.: I am the content of a transparent self model. In: Blackmore, S.: Conversa-
tions on Consciousness. Oxford 2005, pp. 149–159, here p. 157.
284       C. Paths to consciousness

tranged from ourselves (»the emotional price«). On the other hand, there would be
unwanted side-effects with regard to our co-existence with other human beings, i. e.
with other brains and their simulation (»the sociocultural price«).202 According to
Metzinger, it is economically necessary not to allow the aggregate to explode. He
definitely does not want the neuroscientific revolution to be followed by »clumsy
vulgar materialism.«203
»The advanced medical neurotechnologies and information technologies of the
future will in many cases be consciousness technologies. It is therefore of the utmost
importance for us all to think about what kinds of consciousness states are at all
interesting and desirable.«204
He says that consciousness is increasingly becoming available to technology. Subjec-
tive experience can now be influenced and manipulated more accurately. In many
areas, this is a »beneficial development.«205 Metzinger thus feels it is appropriate to
search for an acceptable way to a sustainable consciousness ethics and culture.
He imagines a dialogue about which manifestations of life can be regarded as good
and desirable and which cannot.206 »We are dealing with the cultural embedding of
our scientific knowledge progress and our changing vision of ourselves. Phenomenal

202 Cf. Metzinger, T.: Der Preis der Selbsterkenntnis. Beschert uns die Hirnforschung mit einem
neuen, naturalistischen Menschenbild auch das Ende der Religion? In: Könneker, C. (Ed.):
Wer erklärt den Menschen? Hirnforscher, Psychologen und Philosophen im Dialog. Frankfurt
a. M. 22007, p. 264 f.; Metzinger, T.: Auf der Suche nach einem neuen Bild des Menschen. Die
Zukunft des Subjekts und die Rolle der Geisteswissenschaften. In: Spät, P. (Ed.): Zur Zukunft
der Philosophie des Geistes. Paderborn 2008, p. 231.
203 Cf. Metzinger, T.: I am the content of a transparent self model. In: Blackmore, S.: Conversa-
tions on Consciousness. Oxford 2005, pp. 149–159, here p. 157.
204 Cf. Metzinger, T.: Von der Hirnforschung zur Bewusstseinskultur. In: NZZ (Nr. 64). 18
March. 1998, p. 79.
In this context, Metzinger is also able to imagine a cultural integration which can be trig-
gered through an LSD state of consciousness. It is time that parents, teachers, and the state
admit how beautiful the states of mind can be that are triggered by illegal drugs. He com-
pares mystical experiences to experiences which are triggered by hallucinogenic drugs. I
do not wish to deny that the states of mind of both experiences may feel the same, but
Metzinger overlooks that the content of these experiences is very different. In the face of the
massive problems, which develop in our society thanks to illegal drugs, his suggestion to
introduce an LSD license so that young people can follow in the steps of Meister Eckhart is
more than questionable. It seems to me that, to follow in the footsteps of Meister Eckhart, it
is more advisable to grapple with his writings and to deepen one’s prayer life. Real mystical
experiences cannot be created. Theologically speaking, they are the result of grace. They are
not replicable on a one-to-one basis. This is why they cannot be empirically verified. Paying
attention to a person such as Meister Eckhart shows that higher and qualitatively different
forms of consciousness are possible. Most neuroscientists and neurophilosophers have little
knowledge of these. Cf. Metzinger, T.: Intelligente Drogenpolitik für die Zukunft. In: Kön-
neker, C. (Ed.): Wer erklärt den Menschen? Hirnforscher, Psychologen und Philosophen im
Dialog. Frankfurt a. M. 22007, pp. 229–237.
205 Metzinger, T.: Auf der Suche nach einem neuen Bild des Menschen. Die Zukunft des Subjekts
und die Rolle der Geisteswissenschaften. In: Spät, P. (Ed.): Zur Zukunft der Philosophie des
Geistes. Paderborn 2008, p. 231.
206 Cf. Metzinger, T.: Neurobics für Anfänger. In: Könneker, C. (Ed.): Wer erklärt den Menschen?
Hirnforscher, Psychologen und Philosophen im Dialog. Frankfurt a. M. 22007, p. 260.
 5. Brain research and the question of consciousness       285

consciousness is therefore also a social and cultural issue.«207 For Metzinger, this
means:

»We need empirical consciousness research. We also need a serious philosophy of con-
sciousness, and we need a critical consciousness culture that makes possible a rational
implementation of the new insights and action possibilities on the level of social coex-
istence.«208

When Metzinger asks which states of consciousness we want to show the coming
generation and which not, this is more than a violation of good taste.209 According to
which guideline are we to decide which state of consciousness is desirable and which
is not? Will it be determined by a flight simulator? If so, which one? We also need to
ask: Who wants to do without the poetry of Paul Celan, the paintings of Vincent van
Gogh or the philosophical/religious thought of Romano Guardini if it so happens
that in the context of Metzinger’s project a melancholy state of consciousness would
be placed on the list of manifestations of life that need to be abolished?210
Metzinger is convinced that a »rational consciousness culture« has nothing to do
with religion or with a specific political vision, but that – as he tells us with a certain
enlightens us with a certain passion for enlightenment – the responsibility for taking
one’s own life lies in the encouragement of individuals.211 The goal of consciousness
culture and ethics is »to fill up the ethical and anthropological vacuum,«212 which
has resulted from the collapse of the Christian image of man. In his introduction to
his well-known anthology on the subject of consciousness, he writes that in any case
»it is clear that a serious theory of consciousness must give account for the phenom-
enological richness, color and diversity of our manifestations of life.«213 Measured
by this statement, we must say that his self-model theory does not do justice to man’s
status as a lived body-soul being. He overlooks the relationships of humans which
are the result of corporeality, and he reduces them in the sense of the mind-brain
paradigm to nothing but a brain simulation. As Metzinger himself said: »None of
the current materialistic theories can be regarded as satisfying solutions to these
problems.«214 That also applies to his own approach.

207 Metzinger, T.: Einleitung: Künstliches Bewusstsein. In: Metzinger, T. (Ed.): Bewusstsein. Bei­
träge aus der Gegenwartsphilosophie. Paderborn 52005, p. 687.
208 Ibid., p. 687.
209 Cf. Metzinger, T.: Neurobics für Anfänger. In: Könneker, C. (Ed.): Wer erklärt den Menschen?
Hirnforscher, Psychologen und Philosophen im Dialog. Frankfurt a. M. 22007, p. 262.
210 Cf. also: Schockenhoff, E.: Das wäre die Abschaffung des Menschen. Fordert die Hirn-
forschung den Glauben heraus? In: Könneker, C. (Ed.): Wer erklärt den Menschen? Hirnfor-
scher, Psychologen und Philosophen im Dialog. Frankfurt a. M. 22007, p. 281.
211 Cf. Metzinger, T.: Neurobics für Anfänger. In: Könneker, C. (Ed.): Wer erklärt den Menschen?
Hirnforscher, Psychologen und Philosophen im Dialog. Frankfurt a. M. 22007, p. 263.
212 Ibid., p. 263.
213 Metzinger, T. (Ed.): Bewusstsein. Beiträge aus der Gegenwartsphilosophie. Paderborn 52005,
p. 18 (Metzinger speaks of »interior life,« not of »life processes.«)
214 Metzinger, T.: Neurobics für Anfänger. In: Könneker, C. (Ed.): Wer erklärt den Menschen?
Hirnforscher, Psychologen und Philosophen im Dialog. Frankfurt a. M. 22007, p. 19.
286       C. Paths to consciousness

Conclusion

»In no way are all consciousness activities

such as perception, thinking or action based
solely on the neuronal activation of the neo-
cortex. They are based also on the continuous
vital and affective regulation process which
includes the whole organism and its current
state.«215

Man is a living being gifted with consciousness. If we think hard about the results
of this chapter and remember what has been said before and wonder what the next
chapter might contain, we are doing all that in a state of consciousness. We are not
aware of what exactly is happening at this moment at the synapses and in certain
brain areas.
Many manifestations of life take place unconsciously in our organism. All life
long, all is never accessible in the same brightness. Some is »bright and clear«, some
is more »in the shade« but can still be illuminated through attention. In brain re-
search, we value the indication that we only become aware of certain manifestations
of life when we have scaled a certain level of enlightenment. Only then can certain
things »come to light«. We should always remember that these manifestations of life
already belong to us before.
Yet, when conscious mental manifestations of life are being discussed, the ques-
tion as to the appropriate approach is often explosive. The thought of the lived body
(Leibkörper) could be helpful. Based on our physical nature, it is possible to approach
this issue from an external perspective. But this cannot capture everything: our lived
body experience, the experience perspective also belongs to us and also needs to
be taken into account. It is therefore gratifying to hear Antonio Damasio come to
the honest conclusion within the neuroscientific community that until now brain
research has not been known for understanding our perceptions of our lived bodies
and our living experience. It is not a matter of trying to discover mistakes made by
brain research. Inventories, such as that by Damasio can help to identify more clearly
what is really possible and also what is unattainable from a neuroscientific external
perspective. It allows for even more efficient work and may avoid one or more disap-
pointments. Possibly these findings can place the focus on approaches to conscious
mental manifestations of life that are part of our daily lives. For example, when we
empathize with other people and thus learn to understand how they are.
At the beginning of Part 2 we spoke of science and its origin in people asking
questions. These thoughts are important and should not be ignored in the present
discussion concerning the interesting subject of consciousness. There is a very real
danger that the neurosciences, as a movement that has originated in its source, will
be turned into a completely disconnected river. If we think that it is enough to un-
derstand man as the source of the movement we will very soon come to grief. We are

215 Fuchs, T.: Leib und Lebenswelt. Neue philosophisch-psychiatrische Essays. Baden-Baden
2008, p. 360.
 5. Brain research and the question of consciousness       287

able to draft clever hypotheses and carry out revealing experiments because we have
a talent for consciousness. Without our conscious mental manifestations of life, nei-
ther philosophical headaches nor neuroscientific projects would be possible. Even
the solutions expressed here originate with researching and questioning scientists.
For this chapter, I have selected representative neuroscientific consciousness the-
ories. When we look at these more closely, we realize that goals, values, and purposes
have out of place here. Hence no neurobiological consciousness theory can reason-
ably claim to present an explanation that leaves no questions open. Furthermore,
none of these theories examine the conscious life experiences of unique people or of
people who seem to us completely exceptional, for example mystics, whom we do not
meet in laboratory experiments.216
We have seen that some authors speak in fairly derogatory terms about philo-
sophical achievements concerning the subject of consciousness. Not only Roth, but
also Crick and Hirstein prefer to place their trust in the empirical sciences. I would
thus remind you of what we said about perspective diversity, and that it is important
to query various perspectives and acknowledge the role of metaphysics to create
order. The often heard claim that the neurosciences can answer questions about our
conscious mental manifestations of life, and show us the way to consciousness can
be countered with the fact we met in this chapter, that the researchers concerned
approach this topic in many different ways, set different focuses, present different
data and interpretations. There is obviously no scientific consensus within the neu-
roscientific community concerning our conscious mental manifestations of life.
It is awkward when what is physically – cerebrally – necessary is blended with
sufficient conditions.217 We cannot fathom and objectify our conscious experience
in its totality. In Part 1, we read some convincing arguments in this regard (e. g.
Mary, Chinese Room, Levine). Neuroscientists cannot explain where exactly certain
developmental phases occur and which areas are especially active when we see or
taste a red apple. What they do have to tell us is impressive. Yet, the question remains
unanswered: What does this enjoyment of an apple really feel like? It cannot be an-
swered with neuron-cable theories. The authentic experience of another person is
not authentic to me. We are after all not the same people. Not the »cable of neurons,«
but the lived body of the other is my bridge to the other.
With regard to our thoughts in the chapter on hylemorphism and in that on The
rediscovery of the lived body, let us remember the following: To perform conscious
manifestations of life, such as feeling with our fingers, seeing, moving, etc., we de-
pend on our lived body. Even if we possess the most efficient cerebrum, this alone
does not enable us to make contact with other citizens of the earth. Brains are not
enough to produce conscious mental manifestations of life. Conscious as well as
unconscious manifestations of life belong to a lived body-soul unit.

216 Cf. also: Rager, G.: Die Person. Wege zu ihrem Verständnis. Fribourg 2006, pp. 97–100.
217 Cf. also: ibid., pp. 137–139.
D. Lived body and soul or mind and brain?

»Was da unaufhörlich tickt

und feuert, das soll ich sein?
Woher denn. Es ist nur
diese graue Masse da drinnen.«1

6. The mind-brain paradigm as a threat

»We all must take control of our own
brain!«2

6.1 Downsizing man to a mind-brain being

»Now I always hold my own brain in my hands

and constantly must investigate what possi-
bilities I have.«3

Entering the word »brains« in an Internet search engine (in German), one of the
first results is a reference to Gottfried Benn’s 1916 narrative novel called Gehirne
(Brains). Rightly so, because this is a truly readable book to this day, and concerning
the question of »lived body and soul or mind and brain?« it is of amazing relevance.
Benn’s novel begins as follows:
Rönne, a young physician, who used to perform many autopsies, is on a train trip
through southern Germany. In the past few months, he has remained inactive. For
two years, he had been employed at a pathological institute. This means that he had
handled about 2000 corpses without given it much thought, and that had exhausted
him in a strange and unexplained manner.4

1 Enzensberger, H. M.: Poem »Unter der Hirnschale«. In: Enzensberger, H. M.: Rebus. Ge­
dichte. Frankfurt a. M. 2009, p. 16.
2 Thus Ansgar Beckermann in conversation with Henning Scheich: Beckermann, A./
Scheich, H.: Jeder muss sein Gehirn selbst in die Hand nehmen. Ein Gespräch über Neuropro-
thesen, Manifeste, Menschenbilder mit dem Neurobiologen Henning Scheich und dem Philoso­
phen Ansgar Beckermann. In: Könneker, C. (Ed.): Wer erklärt den Menschen? Hirnforscher,
Psychologen und Philosophen im Dialog. Frankfurt a. M. 22007, pp. 98–107, here p. 107.
3 Benn, G.: Gehirne. In: Benn, G.: Gehirne. Stuttgart 2004, p. 8.
4 Ibid., p. 3.
290       D. Lived body and soul or mind and brain?

We soon learn what the problem is. Dr. Rönne, who had earned his living at the
pathological institute until now, was asked to substitute for a time for the head physi-
cian in a mental hospital. The novel begins with Rönne’s train trip to the clinic, and it
then tells about his life at the clinic. It is not a pleasurable trip. The fist two sentences
explain that he is under stress and struggling with a serious life situation. His own
routine as a physician becomes a great challenge for Rönne. For him, everything is
now revolving around brain structures and cerebral processes.5 The name of the
novel already indicates that this is the central subject. According to Rönne, the gray
mass inside the skull behaves according to »its own rules«.6 He takes it for granted
that every cerebrum also has its own history, its own very personal »destiny«.7 The
reader is not surprised to find Rönne attending the slaughter of an animal and that
he shows great enthusiasm and much interest in it. He physically assists, taking hold
of what turns up on the butcher’s table. What constitutes the processes of life must be
lodged inside the brain mash oozing from between the skull bones.8 As the novel
develops, Rönne comes to the conclusion that he himself and all his manifestations
of life are owed to cerebral activity »dissipating from behind the temples«.9 Rönne
believes he is being carried by the cortex. Sexuality, vivacity, personality, his very
being as a man – is it all just to be brain?.10 It is a disastrous equation which is not
without consequences. He loses contact with the world around him and becomes
a recluse. He quickly loses the familiar relationship with his own lived body as he
only regards himself as a mind-brain being. Everything below his skull becomes a
»foreign attachment«.11
Benn further developed the defining role of the cerebrum in Die Insel (The Island),
which also belongs to the Rönne complex.12 He says that the assumption that there

5 Benn himself writes that in the light of his tortuous suffering Rönne wants to know how the
ego comes into being, what ego really means. (Benn, G.: Prosa und Autobiographie. Frank-
furt a. M. 2006, p. 366). According to Benn Rönne experiences his existence as a »wound«
(ibid., p. 368).
6 Cf. Benn, G.: Gehirne. In: Benn, G.: Gehirne. Stuttgart 2004, p. 7.
7 Cf. ibid., p. 7.
8 In his essay Medizinische Psychologie Benn speaks about this and refers to the doctrinal
statements of Gall and Wundt which were in vogue at the time and who we already meat in
Part 1. (Benn, G.: Gesammelte Werke. Vol. 8. Autobiographische Schriften. Wiesbaden 1968,
pp. 2059–2064).
9 Benn, G.: Gehirne. In: Benn, G.: Gehirne. Stuttgart 2004, p. 8.
10 Cf. ibid., p. 8.
11 Helmut Lethen summarizes this very well when he says that the »unity of the person«
seems to be disintegrating. (Lethen, H.: Der Sound der Väter. Gottfried Benn und seine Zeit.
Berlin 22006, p. 35). And Jürgen Flackert says pointedly that »Rönne has disintegrated into
pure functions which reflect his inner destruction as well as his broken relationship to re-
ality. Thus his hands have become objects which are independent of him.« (Flackert, J.:
Nachwort. In: Benn, G.: Gehirne. Stuttgart 2004, pp. 56 f.).
12 Verena Halbe’s Inaugural Dissertation presents a very insightful interpretation of the
Rönne-tale, especially the novel Gehirne: Halbe, V.: Zyklische Dichtung im Expressionis-
mus: Gottfried Benns Gehirne und Ernst Stadlers Der Aufbruch. Exemplarische Untersuch-
ung einer charakteristischen Kompositionsform der literarischen Moderne. Siegen 1999, esp.
pp. 109–240.
 6. The mind-brain paradigm as a threat       291

is a soul, which Descartes could still handle, has been retired by something much,
much better: the brain, the super organ per se.

»While Cartesius still thought that the pineal gland was the seat of the soul because
it has an exterior that looks like the finger of God: yellowish, elongated, mild and yet
threatening, brain physiologists had discovered that puncturing the brain causes a flow
of sugar into the urine, the appearance of indigo and a correlative flow of saliva.«13

In the Rönne scenario called Ithaka, Benn writes: »He only feels the brain. That this
brain lies, like a braid, in his skull.« It makes him nauseous and is always ready to act.
»Yellow, yellow, brain, brain.«14
In the light of the halo surrounding the cerebrum, there is no longer an awareness
that something essential for life has been submerged into a dark zone. This is the
living, i. e. the lived body filled with a soul, the organismic whole. With this, Rönne
becomes a typical follower of the mind-brain paradigm, and he can be compared
with many modern authors who believe that brain is sufficient for our manifesta-
tions of life and who wish to make other people happy with the statement that what
constitutes our humanity is the sum of our brain processes.
In the present chapter, we will take a closer look at the mind-brain paradigm.
First, we will look at the statements made by Gerhard Roth, where the brain is highly
stylized to become the person who constructs our world (6.2). This is followed by a
section where the linguistic conventions of these authors that follow the mind-brain
paradigm is explored. Here, we will see how corporeality has disappeared, and what
bizarre understandings of the soul are brought into the discussion (6.3). In this con-
text, several fallacies are presented as they are found in the work of many neurophi-
losophers and brain researchers: The referential fallacy (6.3.1), the localizing fallacy
(6.3.2), and the mereological fallacy (6.3.3). We then discuss the question whether
we should understand ourselves as mind-brain-beings, or as lived body-soul units,
and what consequences are associated with these different paradigms (6.4). As the
question lived body and soul or mind and brain? is especially relevant in relation to
the beginning and the end of human life, this chapter also includes a discussion
about the beginning of human life (6.5.1). Following that question, we will explore
whether the definition of brain death that is typical for the mind-brain paradigm can
be overcome (6.5.2).

http://deposit.ddb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?idn=959963405&dok_var=d1&dok_ext=pdf&file-
name=959963405.pdf (Retrieved 22 June 2009).
13 Benn, G.: Die Insel. In: Benn, G.: Gehirne. Stuttgart 2004, p. 27.
14 Quoted by: Lethen, H.: Der Sound der Väter. Gottfried Benn und seine Zeit. Berlin 22006,
p. 49.
292       D. Lived body and soul or mind and brain?

6.2 The world as a construct of the brain

»When we declare that the reality we experi-

ence is a virtual construct,
then we deprive ourselves of the basis of our
autonomy.«15

Gerhard Roth not only presented internationally noted works about the state of con-
sciousness, which I referred to in the previous chapter, but he can also be regarded as
a modern colleague and fellow sufferer of Benn’s Dr. Rönne. According to Roth, the
brain not only participates in the occurrence of conscious mental manifestations of
life, it also allows him and his surroundings to escape from within the cerebral struc-
tures. We learned that Metzinger spoke of a flight simulator. Roth does not, but he
wants to demonstrate that »the brain constructs the world.«16 This co-signatory of
the Manifest is especially interested in the question where the creator of everything,
the wonderful »draughtsman« of it all, resides. He offers the following solution:

»The perceived phenomenal world, the reality, is a construct of the brain. It is, howev-
er, decisive that the draughtsman does not appear in this world. [...] The brain of the
draughtsman is part of the reality of the world that is independent of consciousness and
is therefore the real brain ... For us reality is not accessible in terms of our experience. As
we are the end result of the construction process, we in fact are ourselves the construc-
tion, we do not experience how the brain constructs the content of our perceptions:
how it activates the memory and brings forth feelings...« All this results, Roth tells us,
in »the ›fundamental‹ difference between thought and substance is a construct of the
brain.« The fact that what we perceive and experience belongs to what he calls Wirklich-
keit (actuality) and not to what he understands as Realität has important consequences
for all we do, and also for science. »All that concerns scientists, i. e. also brains, is part of
the phenomenal world. The brains being examined by neurobiologists can thus not be
identical with those brains which generate the phenomenal world. These real brains are
as inaccessible as all reality.«17

The title of the book from which I took the above quotation in is called Schnitts-
telle Gehirn (Interface Brain). According to Roth, the brain is the interface between
Realität and Wirklichkeit. »As part of the Realität independent of consciousness, it

15 Fuchs, T.: Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan. Eine phänomenologisch-ökologische Konzep-

tion. Stuttgart 2008, p. 49.
16 Roth, G.: Aus Sicht des Gehirns. Frankfurt a. M. 2003, p. 36. Cf. also: Roth, G.: Das Ge-
hirn und seine Wirklichkeit. Frankfurt a. M. 1994, p. 293; Roth, G.: Das konstruktive Gehirn.
Neurobiologische Grundlagen von Wahrnehmung und Erkenntnis. In: Schmidt, S. J. (Ed.):
Kognition und Gesellschaft. Frankfurt a. M. 1992, pp. 277–336.
The following authors use similar formulations: Crick, F.: The Astonishing Hypothesis. The
Scientific Search For The Soul. Glasgow 1994, pp. 13 ff. and 266; Metzinger, T.: Subjekt und
Selbstmodell. Paderborn 21999, p. 243.
17 Roth, G.: Schnittstelle Gehirn, Interface Brain. Bern 1996, pp. 53 ff.
 6. The mind-brain paradigm as a threat       293

develops the Wirklichkeit.«18 The cerebrum is, after all, the »interface between many
individual Wirklichkeiten.«19 To clarify the point, he differentiates between a »phe-
nomenal brain« and an »actual« brain. He admits himself that this sounds »quite
odd«.20 For him, this is an important step as in his perception, the source of the
phenomenal sphere of life is the real brain. And it, Roth claims, is what we all regard
as our reality, our Wirklichkeit (actuality). This is not all. Roth says that the real brain,
as the creator of all, is not located in actuality (Wirklichkeit), but in Realität. Roth’s
reasoning: What is in Realität is not accessible to us. He says that »Realität gives
rise to Wirklichkeit, but Realität does not exist in Wirklichkeit.«21 As a co-author
of the Manifest, he emphasizes that the real brain is not present in our phenomenal
world, no matter how intensive and goal-oriented the search may be. Nevertheless,
he speaks of what this actual cerebrum makes and does, what it generates and con-
structs. He says that all we perceive around us including ourselves is nothing but the
result of this construction process, i. e. that we are constructs.
To ensure that he is interpreted correctly, Roth confirms that all that we are able
to perceive belongs to Wirklichkeit, not Realität. This is the case, for example, with
the open book and the desk in front of you. Yet he says that there are plenty of ac-
tualities (Wirklichkeiten) since every real brain is busy generating its own actuality.
The actual brain is extremely busy creating its own Wirklichkeit. That you and I see
the same desk and read the same book is not given by a divine spirit, as in Berkeley’s
mental monism. Roth says that we do not all live in the same actuality.22 At this
point, readers will begin to wonder in astonishment as Roth goes into detail about
Realität and the real brain while on the same page, he expands on his idea that in
fact we are unable to access the actual brain. How can that be? Where did Roth find
this confidential knowledge?
According to Roth, the consequences are as follows: That mental manifestations
of life are not the same as the body is an insinuation, a brain-construct.23 It is actu-
ally impossible for us »to understand mental and neuronal processes as a unity.«24
Could it be that Roth has lost sight of our lived body-soul unity? Our manifestations
of life are a unity and belong to our living whole.
Let us for a moment take Roth (or his real brain) at his word. If every real brain
works hard to generate its own actuality, that is also the end of truth. We can be really
amazed by this: How can this far-out theory be right that truth does not exist?25 It

18 Ibid., p. 61.
19 Ibid., p. 61.
20 Cf. ibid., p. 57.
21 Roth, G.: Das konstruktive Gehirn. Neurobiologische Grundlagen von Wahrnehmung und
Erkenntnis. In: Schmidt, S. J. (Ed.): Kognition und Gesellschaft. Frankfurt a. M. 1992, p. 321.
22 Cf. Roth, G.: Das Gehirn und seine Wirklichkeit. Frankfurt a. M. 1994, pp. 329 f.
Roth believes that Kant’s theories support his epistemology. Christine Zunke, however,
showed in her doctoral thesis that Roth did not understand some basic features of Kant’s
philosophy. Cf. Zunke, C.: Kritik der Hirnforschung. Neurophysiologie und Willensfreiheit.
Berlin 2008, pp. 133–142.
23 Roth, G.: Schnittstelle Gehirn, Interface Brain. Bern 1996, p. 57.
24 Ibid., p. 57.
25 Cf. Zunke, C.: Kritik der Hirnforschung. Neurophysiologie und Willensfreiheit. Berlin 2008,
pp. 133–142.
294       D. Lived body and soul or mind and brain?

is apparent how the cerebrum is overloaded with tasks and characterizations. Should
we expect the cerebrum to be the entity to be explored, the personality of the re-
searcher and – as the crowning glory of it all – also the creator of everything? This
view makes Roth a typical disciple of the mind-brain paradigm.

Beckermann writes: »Roth’s observations lead to statements concerning what occurs in

the brain. But which brain is he talking about? Is he speaking about the brain that exists
in Wirklichkeit?« Then, as Wirklichkeit does not agree with Realität these statements are
worthless. Or, are we speaking about the actual brain? How then does Roth access his
information – if of course he is right and we have no access to Realität.«26

Especially in view of the more recent neuroscientific findings, we can sharply criti-
cize the role into which the brain is being pressed, and that it is almost totally sep-
arated from the living connection with the corporeal. It also seems problematic to
me how the assumption that Wirklichkeit is the result of the real brain, including our
conscious mental manifestations of life, and should fit Roth’s own statement which
I have discussed in the chapter on consciousness, that conscious mental manifes-
tations of life are in the final analysis nothing but physical processes. Let us assume
Roth’s assertions are correct, that we and everything around us are nothing but brain
constructs. He also couldn’t claim a special role for his own presentations.
It is also worth looking at what Roth’s brain-construct theory would mean for our
social interaction. He writes: »An inevitable consequence resulting from the differ-
entiation of Realität and Wirklichkeit is the fact that not only the things and events I
perceive are a construct, but also the human beings with whom I interact.«27 Let us
imagine a romantic declaration of love addressed to his wife: »You, Sweetheart, are
a nice brain construct. In reality, such a declaration of love would be meaningless28
because Roth is firmly convinced that

»Meanings cannot be transferred at all but must be produced (constructed) in every in-
dividual brain. The result of the generation of meanings not only depends on the acous-
tic and grammatical-syntactic analysis. It also depends on which meanings are already
apparent in the semantic language memory and are available during the process of
meaning generation. A further consequence is that communication between two or
more people is not a direct exchange of information. Instead, it is a stimulus to bringing
about reciprocal conscious or unconscious meaning constructs.«29

26 Beckermann, A.: Es bleibt schwierig. Zur Zukunft der Zusammenarbeit von Philosophie des
Geistes und empirischen Wissenschaften. In: Spät, P. (Ed.): Zur Zukunft der Philosophie des
Geistes. Paderborn 2008, pp. 257 f.
27 Roth, G.: Schnittstelle Gehirn, Interface Brain. Bern 1996, p. 58.
28 »Letters, words and sentences as an arrangement of printer’s ink have absolutely no mean-
ing.« (ibid., p. 59).
29 Roth, G.: Persönlichkeit, Entscheidung und Verhalten. Warum es so schwierig ist, sich und
andere zu ändern. Stuttgart 52009, p. 269.
 6. The mind-brain paradigm as a threat       295

Those who – like Roth – want to unmask our world as a construct of the cerebrum
are overlooking that in our corporeality we depend on others from the beginning.
In the words of Zahavi:

»It is only when I realize that others experience the same objects as I do, can I experi-
ence these objects to be truly objective. [...] What can in principle not be experienced
by others can also not be seen as being transcendent and objective. My experience of
objectivity is mediated by means of the actuality of my experiences of another subject
that is transcendent to me; i. e. through my experiences of a foreign subject that like-
wise experiences the world.«30

In his encephalocentric view, Roth fails to see the living and soul-endowed lived
body. The Old Man in Handke’s fairy tale, and Edith Stein would probably invite him
not only to think, but to move in body to learn more not only about his surround-
ings, but also about himself.

6.3 Of linguistic confusion and philosophical fallacies in the

mind-brain paradigm

»Du musst wissen

wir wohnen in Babylon
Worte auseinandergewachsen.«31

A closer look at some neuroscientific or neurophilosophical publications tells us

that they are often based on a fairly insecure empirical foundation, although that is
precisely what they want to give the reader. In addition, we encounter much »Baby-
lonian confusion of language«. As in the Biblical story of Babylon, we are facing lin-
guistic confusion, and in addition the authors’ exaggerated opinion of themselves –
such as the wish that nothing should be unachievable. We hear much scientific and
vernacular vocabulary while the authors talk much against each other and at cross
purposes. It is important to read them critically. Peter Janich, who has dedicated an
interesting book to this problem area, says that brain researchers write with »a peren-
nial underestimation of the risks, unexplained reference to experience, experiment,
insight, reflexivity, proof etc., unrecognized philosophical mortgages.«32 He says
that reasonable dialogue should distance itself from deceptions and non-sustainable
prophecies. What is being discussed must be comprehensible to other people.33 We
are, after all, not dealing with special knowledge just for some secret circles.

30 Zahavi, D.: Phänomenologie für Einsteiger. Paderborn 2007, p. 83.

31 Ausländer, R.: Gedicht »Lehmbrot«. In: Ausländer, R.: Wir wohnen in Babylon. Gedichte.
Frankfurt a. M. 22001, p. 8.
32 Janich, P.: Kein neues Menschenbild. Zur Sprache der Hirnforschung. Frankfurt a. M. 2009,
p. 16.
33 Cf. ibid., pp. 21 f.
296       D. Lived body and soul or mind and brain?

Numerous authors use the language belonging to the field of control and regu-
lation. From nerve cells to examples with flight simulators or considerations about
real brains. We already encountered this in the Manifest. The super organ behind
our eyes and between our ears is to control and regulate our lives. As Janich notes,
the fact that we can again and again hear these terms in the Babylonian language
muddle is interesting because it introduces a target orientation which these authors
are assuming to lead them to the depth of the ocean.34
In several works about the lived body-soul problem, we find frequent references
to our daily cultivation of contact with others. Ramachandran for example speaks
of information-filled news.35 Gerhard Roth speaks of information generation and
information processing.36 In Christof Koch’s work we read: »Whenever informa-
tion is represented in the NCC, you are conscious of it.«37 This kind of terminology
shows the transformation of transmitter substances. Generally, when we speak of
»news« or »information,« we refer to people who exchange ideas: for example that
xy has presented another new book about the lived body-soul problem. Peter Janich
reminds us that »news and information can only be understood when the author
and recipient communicate with each other, i. e. in the back and forth of speaker and
listener, of whether they have understood each other and whether they acknowledge
the validity of the news concerned.«38 According to Janich, one of the flaws in many
neurophilosophical and neuroscientific texts is that their authors forget that »they
put descriptions of neuronal processes in a relationship with linguistic or cognitive
personal achievements.«39
Often, in the mind-brain songs, the clefs and notations which significantly deter-
mine the key of the tune are seldom mentioned. What exactly is being »represent-
ed«? Or why is the only alternative dualism versus physicalism? Recurring motifs
in these revolutionary songs, words such as »freedom« or »person«, are often taken
out of context and used in a manner that is extremely annoying in comparison with
how we usually talk.

»They generally present a simplified anthropomorphized description of neuronal pro-

cesses, or situations that in no way represent what we usually understand by those
terms. The change in meaning that occurs through the operational redefinition of a

34 Cf. ibid., pp. 63–65.

35 Cf. Ramachandran, V./Blakeslee, S.: Phantoms in The Brain. Probing the Mysteries of the
Human Mind. New York 1998, pp. 231 f.
36 Cf. Roth, G.: Das Gehirn und seine Wirklichkeit. Kognitive Neurobiologie und ihre philoso-
phischen Konsequenzen. Frankfurt a. M. 1997, pp. 98 ff.
37 Koch, C.: The Quest for consciousness. A Neurobiological Approach. Englewood 2004, p. 16.
Cf. e. g. Singer, W.: Über Bewusstsein und unsere Grenzen. Ein neurobiologischer
Erklärungsversuch. In: Becker, A./Mehr, C./Nau, H. H./Reuter, G./Stegmüller, D. (Eds.):
Gene, Meme und Gehirne. Geist und Gesellschaft als Natur. Frankfurt a. M. 2003, p. 290.
38 Janich, P.: Kein neues Menschenbild. Zur Sprache der Hirnforschung. Frankfurt a. M. 2009,
p. 70 f.
39 Ibid., p. 74.
 6. The mind-brain paradigm as a threat       297

subject being explored goes unnoticed because a corresponding change in the concepts
used does not take place.«40

Another problem in many neuroscientific texts is that something is rejected with

brute force of which the authors are not even clear what it means or of which they
have a distorted understanding. Thus, Gerhard Roth, one of the authors of the Man-
ifest, wonders how the brain creates the soul.41We can even acquire a DVD of this
work. The main character is neither a phenomenal nor a real brain, but Gerhard
Roth in person. I should also include the book mentioned in my introduction, pub-
lished in 1983, by the French neurobiologist Jean-Pierre Changeux under the title
of L’  homme Neuronal.42 Even the title leads us to expect that we are dealing with
a work that has a radically reductionist focus. The author leaves no doubt as to his
intention. He writes, for example, that »from now on we no longer need to contend
with the ›spirit‹. It is enough that we are neuronal beings.«43
Quite a few authors reject the idea of a soul primarily because they think of it in
terms of Cartesian philosophy. We find an example of such a Babylonian linguistic
confusion in the work of Dietrich Dörner. In an essay Man muss wissen, wonach
man sucht [We must know what we are looking for], he writes that »The question is
not whether neurons constitute the soul, but how they do it.«44 Does Dörner really
know what he is looking for? What does he mean by »soul?« In another essay, he
speaks of the »soul from the retort which today refers to the soul in the computer,
the soul as a machine and in the machine.«45 He understands man as a machine.46
The circuitry of this machine is the »soul.«47 The fact that in the same essay he tries
to support his thoughts about language and thinking by referring to De Anima III48
indicates that he has not studied Aristotle enough. This suspicion is confirmed when
we read his book, Bauplan für eine Seele [Blueprint for a soul]. He has no problem
talking about the »life of robot’s soul«,49 or referring to rational soul processes in
a computer,50 or claiming that »soul as a machine is possible«.51 Aristotle is the

40 Synofzik, M./Wiesing, U.: Eine Frage der Haltung. Die Geist-Gehirn-Frage und ihre Transfor-
mation. In: Zeitschrift für medizinische Ethik 1 (2006), p. 37.
41 Roth, G.: Wie das Gehirn die Seele macht. Vortrag auf dem 51. Lindauer Psychotherapie-
wochen. http://www.lptw.de/archiv/vortrag/2001/roth.pdf (retrieved 15. September 2008).
42 Changeux, J.-P.: Der neuronale Mensch. Wie die Seele funktioniert – die Entdeckungen der
der neuen Gehirnforschung. Reinbek bei Hamburg 1984.
43 Ibid., p. 216.
44 Dörner, D.: Man muss wissen, wonach man sucht. In: Könneker, C. (Ed.): Wer erklärt den
Menschen? Hirnforscher, Psychologen und Philosophen im Dialog. Frankfurt a. M. 22007,
p. 92.
45 Dörner, D.: Seelen aus der Retorte? In: Becker, A./Mehr, C./Nau, H. H./Reuter, G./
Stegmüller, D. (Eds.): Gene, Meme und Gehirne. Geist und Gesellschaft als Natur. Frankfurt
a. M. 2003, p. 264.
46 Cf. ibid., pp. 264, 277.
47 Cf. ibid., p. 277.
48 Cf. ibid., p. 273.
49 Dörner, D.: Bauplan für eine Seele. Reinbek bei Hamburg 22008, p. 11.
50 Ibid., p. 14.
51 Ibid., p. 19.
298       D. Lived body and soul or mind and brain?

author mentioned most often in this book of 800 pages.52 Dörner uses him to sup-
port his thoughts, telling us that even in antiquity, Aristotle expressed this opinion
in his booklet, De Anima.53 Dörner quotes Aristotle’s statements that the soul is the
cause and principle of the living body. Yet, at the same time, he discusses the question
whether a refrigerator is alive,54 which for him, obviously means »a very simple
linkage between sensors and motors«.55 In his chapter, Die Bausteine des Geistes
[The building stones of the mind-spirit], he quickly locates love, hate, despair, hope
and consciousness in the brain where a neuron is regarded as a calculator56 »that
brings forth the soul«.57 What can we say? It might be best to quote Dörner once
more:

»The counter clerk is mentally more flexible, is a regular universal genius compared to
a system giving timetable information, or than some other such ›expert system‹.« No
wonder that many people no longer read AI as »artificial intelligence« but as »artificial
idiot.«58

Daniel Dennett wrote:

»For a long time it has been attempted to imagine that the obvious differences between
man and animal as well as between man and sticks and stones, must be grounded in
›some extra thing‹ – a soul – installed somehow in the bodily headquarters.«59

In what headquarters of the body is this »soul thing« to be installed, and where not?
In the Aristotelian view, the idea is totally absurd that only some headquarters of the
body are soul-endowed and some not. The strict separation of bodily and psycholog-
ical processes is foreign to Aristotelian philosophy. The soul is not a »thing,« nothing
physical, but the entelechy of the living organism. Dennett’s suspicion that the »soul
is a curious fossil relict of the desire to regards ourselves as absolute,«60 seems to be
rather skewed. To speak of a soul in the Aristotelian sense also means to assume this
life principle also in plants and in animals: »Soul« is what is common to all that lives.
As we have seen, the perception of a chain of all that is alive includes the perception
that plants, animals and human beings differ from each other.
In their studies, Damasio and Rager point out that the growing knowledge about
the meaning of our cerebral structures has often led to the assumption that we can
localize a personal decision-making entity in the corners of our brain. They call

52 Cf. ibid., pp. 20, 25, 28, 33, 258, 272, 323, 478, 510, 609, 712, 734, 736, 808 f.
53 Ibid., p. 20, similar: p. 809.
54 Ibid., pp. 33–47.
55 Cf. ibid., p. 47.
56 Cf. ibid., pp. 61 f., p. 71.
57 Ibid., p. 88.
58 Ibid., p. 12.
59 Dennett, D.: Sweet Dreams. Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness. Cam-
bridge/London 2006, p. 3.
60 Dennett, D.: You have to give up your intuitions about consciousness. In: Blackmore, S.: Con-
versations on Consciousness. Oxford 2005, pp. 79–91, here p. 82.
 6. The mind-brain paradigm as a threat       299

this idea the Homunculus solution. They are not speaking of a Homunculus in the
sense of Goethe’s Faust II, but of imagining a little man sitting behind our temples,
looking at the world through our eyes. Crick and Koch comment: »The hypothesis
of the Homunculus is very much out of fashion these days, but this is, after all, how
everyone thinks of themselves.«61
According to leading neuroscientists, our brain has no central administration in
the sense of a Homunculus.62 Rager and Damasio point out that whoever rejects
the Homunculus theory also avoids an endless regress. After all, Homunculus 1 must
contain an even smaller Homunculus 2 which comprises Homunculus 3, and so
forth.63 From a hylemorphistic point of view, we can agree with these neuroscien-
tists who regard the Homunculus doctrine as insufficient. Francis Crick thinks that
it is not always easy to avoid the idea of a Homunculus.64 Yet, he tells us:

»The mental picture most of us have is that somewhere in our brain is a small man or a
small woman who is aware of what is happening. Many people do indeed believe this
and, in time, there will be an explanation for this as well. Our surprising hypothesis,
however, says that this is not the case. It says that this all the activity of the neurons.«65

61 Crick, F./Koch, C.: A framework for consciousness. In: Nature Neuroscience. Vol. 6. No. 2
(2003), p. 120.
In many places, Crick and Koch reject the idea of a Homunculus (Cf. e. g.: Koch, C.: The
Quest for Consciousness. A Neurobiological Approach. Englewood/Colorado 2004, pp. 33 f.,
298 f., 324 f., 335). They do, however, speak of a non-conscious Homunculus: »Indeed, Fran-
cis and I believe that somewhere in the confines of the frontal lobe are neuronal networks
that act to all intents and purposes like a homunculus. This is a nonconscious homunculus
who receives massive sensory input from the back of the cortex (olfaction is an exception
to this rule), makes decisions, and feeds these to the relevant motor stages. Crudely put, the
homunculus ›looks at‹ the back of the cortex; neuroanatomically this means that it receives
a strong, driving projection from there into its input layer [...] while the connections in
the reverse direction look quite different« (ibid., p. 298, Cf. also pp. 299, 304, 324 und 341;
cf. also Crick, F./Koch, C.: The Unconscious Homunculus. With commentaries by multiple
authors. In: Neuro-Psychoanalysis 2 (2000), pp. 3–59).
62 Cf. also: Keil, G.: Homunkulismus in den Kognitionswissenschaften. In: Köhler, W. R./
Mutschler, H.-D.: Ist der Geist berechenbar? Philosophische Reflexionen. Darmstadt 2003,
pp. 77–112; Damasio, A.: Descartes’ Error. Emotion, Reason, And The Human Brain. Lon-
don 1994, pp. 94 ff.; Kinsbourne, M.: Models of consciousness. In: Gazzaniga, M. S. (Ed.): The
cognitive neurosciences. Cambridge 1994. pp. 1321–1329; Singer, W.: Vom Gehirn zum Be-
wusstsein. In: Elsner, N./Lüer, G. (Eds.): Das Gehirn und sein Geist. Göttingen 2000, p. 194;
Singer, W.: Verschaltungen legen uns fest: Wir sollten aufhören, von Freiheit zu sprechen. In:
Geyer, C. (Ed.): Hirnforschung und Willensfreiheit. Zur Deutung der neuesten Experimente.
Frankfurt a. M. 2004, p. 43.
63 Cf. Damasio, A.: The somatic marker hypothesis and the possible function of the prefontal cor-
tex. In: Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society. B. 351. London 1996, p. 227; Dama-
sio, A.: The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness.
London 1999, pp. 189–192; Rager, G.: Hirnforschung und die Frage nach dem Ich. In: Rager,
G. (Ed.): Ich und mein Gehirn. Persönliches Erleben, verantwortliches Handeln und objektive
Wissenschaft. Freiburg/Munich 2000, p. 23; Rager, G.: Die Person. Wege zu ihrem Verständ-
nis. Fribourg 2006, pp. 102–107.
64 Cf. Crick, F.: The Astonishing Hypothesis. The Scientific Search For The Soul. Glasgow 1994,
p. 24 f., 258.
65 Ibid., p. 44.
300       D. Lived body and soul or mind and brain?

The fact that there is no Homunculus does not mean that we are mind-brain beings,
or that the processes in our cerebrum are sufficient for our manifestations of life.66
In the current discussion, there are a number of linguistic confusions. It is thus
important to address any lack of clarity. We must not take it lightly as Wolfgang Prinz
has done: »Everyone knows that the lab jargon of everyday research is full of termi-
nological errors.«67 We might quite easily excuse the »sloppiness of lab jargon«.68
But what if this sloppiness determines how to express the distinctive image of man?
Below, we will look more closely at some terminological errors. They are manifesta-
tions of the mind-brain paradigm that have lost sight of the living human being, and
which are giving one small organ a role it does not in fact deserve.

6.3.1 Referential fallacy
»Aus euern Schatten, Schlaf und Haar,
muss ich mein Hirn besteigen,
alle Windungen,
das letzte Zwiegespräch.«69

The first fallacy I want to address here is the so-called referential fallacy. It means
that in many publications about the lived body-soul problem, the difference is disre-
garded between a sign for something (evidence) and the meaning of something (ref-
erence).70 Authors who fall into this trap are – without batting an eyelid – equating
physical reality with physicalist meaning. In the light of our discussions, for example
about corporeality, this must be rejected as an error. What we experience as corpo-
real living beings cannot simply be replaced by models and snazzy brain scans. Such
an error does not result from technical glitches, but from insufficient thinking. Our
organismic life processes are not what can be displayed with colorful picture! How-
ever, this completely escapes the authors who claim that in the foreseeable future
we will have proof that conscious mental manifestations of life are nothing but data
which can be physicalized. Dieter Sturma comments:

»The referential fallacy is based on the fact that experiences and the manner in which
information regarding the physical processes that underlie these experiences are ac-
cessed are confused with each other. Holding on to the difference between mental
states of mind, such as color perceptions, or states of anxiety, and the accompanying
identifiable bodily process is, however, not a return to dualist positions.«71

66 Cf. Damasio, A.: The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Con-
sciousness. London 1999, pp. 189 ff.
67 Prinz, W.: Philosophie nervt. Eine Polemik. In: Spät, P. (Ed.): Zur Zukunft der Philosophie des
Geistes. Paderborn 2008, p. 246.
68 Ibid., p. 246.
69 Benn, G.: Gedicht »Ikarus«. In: Benn, G.: Gedichte. Frankfurt a. M. 2006, p. 110.
70 Cf. Sturma, D.: Ausdruck von Freiheit. Über Neurowissenschaften und die menschliche Le­
bensform. In: Sturma, D. (Ed.): Philosophie und Neurowissenschaften. Frankfurt a. M. 2006,
pp. 194–196; Sturma, D.: Philosophie des Geistes. Leipzig 2005, pp. 28 f.
71 Sturma, D.: Philosophie des Geistes. Leipzig 2005, p. 28.
 6. The mind-brain paradigm as a threat       301

Mental manifestations of life occur in the lived body of man. Our thoughts in Part 1
and the discussions in the chapter entitled The rediscovery of the lived body suggest
that the identity of the cerebral process and mental manifestations of life should be
rejected. What occurs in our heads and what we experience belongs to us as alive or
lived body-soul unities.

6.3.2 The fallacy of localization

»Das wahre Leben, hier,
mein Lieber, findet es statt!
Spürst du es nicht in deinem Bauch?«72

We will now discuss will another terminological error to be called the fallacy of lo-
calization.73 In the beginning of Part 2, I said that for example I need the Broca area
to formulate this text and turn it into a computer document. However, it would be a
huge error to claim that my language could be acquired by means of the Broca area.
Another example: Many thinkers before us have explored the phenomenon of hu-
man fear. Modern neuroscientists contribute to our knowledge by telling us that we
need an intact amygdala and other brain structures to experience fear.74 Yet, the fear
we feel does not hide somewhere in the cerebrum! My whole body experiences what
it means to be afraid. Thomas Fuchs points out that we must take into account the
economic situation (the financial crisis, the Euro crisis), our social value system, the
realistic or less realistic possibilities of further professional development, and many
other factors to understand what causes us to be afraid. Therefore, not only cere-
bral developments, but our whole life (in the truest sense of the word): our social,
political, cultural, and religious surroundings need to be taken into account. Fuchs
understands fear as »an integral manifestation of life in which the total organism is
focused evaluatively and motivatingly on specific environmental situations.«75 It
is amazing that there are neuroscientists and neurophilosophers who write where
they believe fear resides in the brain, looking for it in the gyri of the brain. Fear is a
phenomenon that affects the (lived) body-soul personal unit and that can discharge
itself – as mentioned above – in the corporeal expression, i. e. it is given to me in my
perception of my lived body.76 Authors who make such an error of localization are
mixing up the necessary and the sufficient physical preconditions.

72 Enzensberger, H. M.: Gedicht »Ist was?«. In: Enzensberger, H. M.: Rebus. Gedichte. Frank-
furt a. M. 2009, p. 79.
73 Regarding localized and mereological fallacies cf. also: Fuchs, T.: Das Gehirn – ein Bezie-
hungsorgan. Eine phänomenologisch-ökologische Konzeption. Stuttgart 2008, pp. 65–77.
74 Cf. also: Hell, D.: Sind psychische Störungen ausschließlich Hirnkrankheiten? In: Rager, G.
(Ed.): Ich und mein Gehirn. Persönliches Erleben, verantwortliches Handeln und objektive
Wissenschaft. Freiburg/Munich 2000, p. 144; Damasio, A.: Descartes’ Error. Emotion, Rea-
son, And The Human Brain. London 1994; Le Doux, J.: The emotional brain. New York 1996.
75 Fuchs, T.: Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan. Eine phänomenologisch-ökologische Konzep-
tion. Stuttgart 2008, p. 140.
76 Gerhard Roth does not even consider this aspect. He does not focus at all either on the
whole organism or on the dimension of corporeality. His only question is whether feelings
302       D. Lived body and soul or mind and brain?

6.3.3 The mereological fallacy

»It is better not to say that the soul pities, or
learns, or thinks, but to say rather that the
soul is the instrument whereby man does
these things.«77

One of Gerhard Roth’s many publications is entitled: Aus Sicht des Gehirns78 [From
the brain’s point of view]. The unbiased reader who finds this in a bookstore could
think that the author of the Manifest wants to say that the cerebrum can even see
something (such as the price of the book) or has a certain opinion (e. g. that the book
is overpriced). Roth believes that we only have to gather more information about the
cerebrum to totally grasp the nature of man. In describing his research project, he
says that he was motivated to explain to readers »what our brain really does, that it
perceives, thinks, imagines, experiences.«79
It is easy to find similar passages. There is also a very revealing text by Wolf Singer:
»Brains create amazing things: they compose, they have deep feelings. From them
comes everything that makes up our cultural world.«80 In another passage, he de-
clares: »All knowledge which the brain has at its command resides in the function-
al architecture of a specific interconnection of the many billions of nerve cells.«81
Singer explains that we merely have a small insight into the mental manifestations
of life of which we are conscious. No more and no less. Matters are different in our
cerebrum insofar as all the processes associate themselves with those of which we

originate in the brain and if they do, then how? (Cf. Roth, G.: Wie das Gehirn die Seele
macht. Vortrag auf dem 51. Lindauer Psychotherapiewochen. http://www.lptw.de/archiv/
vortrag/2001/roth.pdf (retrieved 15. September 2008), pp. 5–10).
In the 4th chapter of his book Persönlichkeit, Entscheidung und Verhalten Roth emphasizes
that the personality is firmly established in the brain, and in a wider context in the periph-
eral nervous system. (Roth, G.: Persönlichkeit, Entscheidung und Verhalten. Warum es so
schwierig ist, sich und andere zu ändern. Stuttgart 52009, p. 88). In the 6th chapter, he asks
where reason (ibid., pp. 138–141) and where feelings (ibid., pp. 141–166) are located. Roth
believes one could identify the orbito frontal cortex as the location of morals, ethics and
conscience (ibid., p. 140). Roth does not need free spiritual persons who have feelings, who
decide based on specific reasons and who orient themselves according to moral standards.
In line with the mind-brain paradigm, the cerebrum takes over these roles.
77 An. I, 4, 408b13–15.
78 Roth, G.: Aus Sicht des Gehirns. Frankfurt a. M. 2003.
79 Roth, G.: Kognition: Die Entstehung von Bedeutung im Gehirn. In: Krohn, W./Küppers, G.
(Eds.): Emergenz: Die Entstehung von Ordnung, Organisation und Bedeutung. Frankfurt
a. M. 1992, p. 128, Cf. also Kanitscheider, B.: Auf der Suche nach dem Sinn. Frankfurt a. M.
1995, pp. 68 f.
80 Singer, W.: Großartige Gehirne. In: http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/0,1518,druck-323627,00.
html (retrieved 12. Oktober 2005).
81 Singer, W.: Keiner kann anders als er ist. In: FAZ. 08. Januar 2004, p. 33, cf. also Singer, W.:
Entscheidungsgrundlagen. In: Linden, W./Fleissner, A. (Eds.): Geist, Seele, Gehirn. Entwurf
eines gemeinsamen Menschenbildes von Neurobiologen und Geisteswissenschaftlern. Mün-
ster 2005, p. 71.
 6. The mind-brain paradigm as a threat       303

are not aware. Singer, like Dr. Rönne, understands himself as the creator of his brain
substance. If we believe Singer, we are not talking to each other; it is our brains.82
In an essay with the astonishing title Ich bin mein Gehirn. Nichts spricht gegen den
materialistischen Monismus83 [I am my brain. Nothing speaks against materialistic
monism] Holk Cruse promotes the typical mind-brain paradigm and says that he is
who he is thanks to his brain box. His revelation is that the creator mundi is called
brain! Venite adoremus! What we experience is quickly declared to be a creation of
the cerebrum. Thus, the dimension of the experienced lived body is of course totally
excluded.

»The data that the sensory organs deliver to the brain are nearly always ambiguous.
This is apparent in certain optical illusions, but also applies to every perceptual process.
To still have a decision-making basis, the brain must decide on one of these interpreta-
tions. The mechanism that is employed in the process utilizes inherited or learned rules
and chooses from many possible interpretations the one that best fits these rules.«84

Cruse lets the brain slip into the role of decision maker. We do not plan what to do
in our spare time. According to Cruse, our brain decides. You did not decide to read
this dissertation. It was a decision made by your cerebrum. »But the system weighs
the arguments and comes to a decision.«85 It is truly amazing what this small organ
is supposed to be able to do! It apparently even »knows« what is »true« and what is
»wrong.«
Roth, Singer, and Cruse are not the only culprits. There are numerous instances
where the cerebrum is given powers supported by manifestations of life (making
decisions, reading, thinking, philosophizing), as if this organ were a complete organ-
ism. This is a serious misconception (a mereological fallacy).86 The problem is that
a part (meros) of us (i. e. the brain) cannot be exchanged for someone else (another
lived body-soul unit).87 Whom can we blame for this error if our exchange is a dia-
logue between brains, and the brain has come up with the idea? In other words, who
pockets the income for the sold books and the lectures? Also the brain?
Through all the statements named here, agreement with the mind-brain image of
man is to be achieved. The mereological fallacy does not take the corporeality of man
seriously and reduces us to a shrunken mind-brain being. Due to these prevalent

82 Cf. ibid., p. 73, Singer, W.: Über Bewusstsein und unsere Grenzen. Ein neurobiologischer
Erklärungsversuch. In: Becker, A./Mehr, C./Nau, H. H./Reuter, G./Stegmüller, D. (Eds.):
Gene, Meme und Gehirne. Geist und Gesellschaft als Natur. Frankfurt a. M. 2003, p. 296.
83 Cruse, H.: Ich bin mein Gehirn. Nichts spricht gegen den materialistischen Monismus. In:
Geyer, C. (Ed.): Hirnforschung und Willensfreiheit. Zur Deutung der neuesten Experimente.
Frankfurt a. M. 2004, pp. 223–228.
84 Ibid., pp. 223 f.
85 Ibid., p. 224.
86 Bennett, M. R./Hacker, P. M. S.: Philosophical Foundations Of Neuroscience. Malden/Oxford
10
2010, pp. 68 ff.
Hacker and Bennett see the driving force behind the problems identified in a failed attempt
to escape from dualism. (Cf. ibid., p. 68).
87 Cf. ibid., p. 83.
304       D. Lived body and soul or mind and brain?

fallacies, it is advisable to call to mind the hylemorphistic thoughts together with

the discussion in the chapter on the Rediscovery of the lived body. We can rightly say
that it is the alive lived body unit of a person which motivates the brain to think. But
we must remember that it is not the lived body, not any coalition of neurons, not
the cerebrum nor the soul that thinks about something. We allow our »grey matter«
to work when we, for example, think about the lived body-soul problem and about
terminological errors. With Thomas Fuchs, we can draw a rough outline of what
modern brain research should look like. It would be neither dualist nor materialistic
and would take leave of a mind-brain view of the world. Fuchs tells us:

»Brain research that behaves neither materialistically nor dualistally would understand
the brain as the organ of a living being. It would be an organ that is indissolubly embed-
ded in systemic relationships to the world around it; that is constituted socially and his-
torically and that through its ability to translate links us to the world. Thus, it becomes
the basis of the conscious mind. [...] It is neither the mind nor the brain, but the whole
human being who thinks, feels and acts.«88

6.4 Lived body-soul unity or mind and brain?

»When modern neuroscientists declare that

the old lived body-soul problem has been
solved, then that is because they have not
understood it.«89

In the mind-brain paradigm, as the name indicates, everything revolves around

»mind« and »brain.« The focus is on questions such as this: Can »mind« be consti-
tuted from »brain?« Is there anything at all beyond »brain?« Are »mind« and »brain«
the same or not? Authors who are associated with the mind-brain paradigm proceed
from the view that man is a shrunken brain-mind being. Some followers of this para-
digm claim that, according to this paradigm, cerebral structures and processes make
up our complete humanity.
On the mind-brain paradigm stage, the brain plays the lead role. Accordingly,
it is to simulate and construct everything. The cerebrum makes an appearance not
only because of its histrionic-illusionistic characteristics and actions, but actually
directs the play and is believed to be responsible for all decisions and actions. We
have already read of some examples where perceptions super-elevate the brain in this
manner. Such an encephalocentric vision, in love with the brain, is blind to the or-
ganismic unity of living beings. »Human beings are nothing but mind-brain beings«,
but this ignores the fact that such nothing-but statements have nothing to do with
openness for scientific precision.

88 Fuchs, T.: Kosmos im Kopf? Neurowissenschaften und Menschenbild. In: Zeitschrift für
medizinische Ethik 1 (2006), p. 13.
89 Zunke, C.: Kritik der Hirnforschung. Neurophysiologie und Willensfreiheit. Berlin 2008,
p. 32.
 6. The mind-brain paradigm as a threat       305

The oblivion of Cartesianism and materialistic monism regarding the lived body
has contributed much to the vision of humans as mind-brain beings. Today, this
image is promoted with reference to the neurosciences, which apparently promotes
their abbreviated representation of humans. This goes well both with a physicalist
and a dualist fundamental conviction insofar as the stark classification into a short-
ened material side of the trench (brain) and a bodiless side of the trench (mind) that
is still alive in the mind-brain paradigm, and which is either affirmed or an attempt
is made to incorporate it into the physicalist.
We are more than mind and brain! When we breathe, laugh, dance, jump, move,
meet each other, we experience ourselves as lived body-soul units! We participate
in numerous contacts and relationships that are not merely an insinuation or the
creation of our brains. The observations regarding the rediscovery of the lived body
and hylemorphism do justice to this. What has been achieved can also be called the
lived body-soul paradigm.90
The study of neuroscientific works as well as our thoughts in our own philosoph-
ical works, suggest that mind and brain belong to a lived body-soul unity of person-
hood. Mental manifestations of life are our own manifestations of life. They belong to
us or to our organism. It goes without saying that we need our brain in order to live
as we do. But, surely we need much more than healthy and efficient brain areas. As
we can say with Aristotle – and as for example Antonio Damasio, Thomas Fuchs, and
Günter Rager continually emphasize in contemporary discussions – that the organ
inside our skull belongs to a living organism that constantly interacts with its environ-
ment. The soul-endowed lived body takes care of our metabolism. As Edith Stein says,
this lived body makes it possible for us to come together with others, and to move into
our world. This aspect is seldom explored when the cerebrum is in the spotlight and
our corporeality into the darkness of marginalization. We ourselves and our mani-
festations of life cannot be scaled down to what occurs in our brain. Wanting to see
man as having been shrunken down to mind-brain beings means to deny the value of
the soul-endowed lived body, and with that to deny the value of human aliveness.91
As absurd as it is, the mind-brain paradigm is becoming ever more popular. Its
followers are very active and dedicated, for example, when they applaud that our cer-
ebrum relieves us of our thinking and of our freedom. This is not sustainable for em-
pirical and philosophical reasons. I will deal with this later, in the final chapter of this
study. The rapture for this paradigm can be seen not least in the fact that meanwhile
introductions into the lived mind-body problem bear the title of »mind and brain«,
as if the living, lived body-soul organism did not exist at all. In the meantime, the
mind-brain paradigm seems to have conquered the »rule of rationality.«92 Scientific
applause and financial support can only be expected for what can be incorporated

90 It is clear that no dualism is referred to here.

91 Cf. also: Fuchs, T.: Kosmos im Kopf? Neurowissenschaften und Menschenbild. In: Zeitschrift
für medizinische Ethik. 1 (2006), p. 5 und Fuchs, T.: Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan. Eine
phänomenologisch-ökologische Konzeption. Stuttgart 2008, pp. 16 f.
92 Cf. Meixner, U.: Die Aktualität Husserls für die moderne Philosophie des Geistes. In: Meixner,
U./Newen, A. (Eds.): Seele, Denken, Bewusstsein. Zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Geistes.
Berlin/New York 2003, p. 311.
306       D. Lived body and soul or mind and brain?

into this paradigm. To be (neuro-)scientifically »up to date,« many contemporary

colleagues regard themselves as lackeys of the encephalon, but no longer as persons
able to express themselves as soul-endowed lived bodies.93
The inappropriate overestimation of the brain in the context of the mind-brain
paradigm forces us to deal differently with each other: For some educators, for ex-
ample, it is very important that the educational projects and the pedagogical ob-
servations do justice to the brain. They are less concerned with what the students
experience than with what is happening in the region of the synapses. Is it too old
fashioned to be student-oriented or child-oriented? Is that a way to do justice to our
children? Do we even notice how a child experiences and suffers stress before a math
test mathematics in its lived body?94
The »mind and brain« paradigm in itself comprises a ghastly imbalance in the
case of certain illnesses, when instead of the considering our whole being (and those
close to us), only one tiny excerpt is taken into account.95 Thomas Fuchs points out
that medical treatment that concentrates – for instance pharmacologically – only
on the cerebrum, cannot alone lead to recovery.96 With Fuchs, we can say that it
is decisive to meet humans in the spirit of the lived body-soul paradigm in all their
organismic wholeness. In this context, statements made by Ludolf von Krehl in the
1930s can be considered to be both modern and pointing the way:

»The manner in which an illness develops always depends on the totality of all that has
occurred in this person’s life and is occurring. The person treating such a patient will
only understand all the symptoms shown and all other occurrences when these are
correlated, and their causal relationship to each other, or to a superordinate process, is
brought into being.«97

93 Many relationships between human beings are impoverished when they no longer include
the corporeal. We only have to think of the various »social networks« on the Internet (e. g.
Facebook), or the popular computer game »second life« Cf. Virilio, P.: Die Eroberung des
Körpers: vom Übermenschen zum überreizten Menschen. Frankfurt a. M. 1996; Fuchs, T.:
Leibliche und virtuelle Realität. In: Scheidewege. Jahresschrift für skeptisches Denken 27
(1997), pp. 182–203; Roessler, S.: Identity Switch in Cyberspace. Eine Form der Selbstinszenie­
rung. Frankfurt a. M. 2006; Wendel, S.: Die Fetischisierung des »schönen« Körpers. Kritische
Bemerkungen zu gegenwärtigen Körperpraxen. In: Internationale Katholische Zeitschrift
Communio 37 (2008), pp. 335–345.
94 Cf. Schumacher, R.: Die prinzipielle Unterbestimmtheit der Hirnforschung im Hinblick auf
die Gestaltung schulischen Lernens. In: Sturma, D.: Philosophie und Neurowissenschaften.
Frankfurt a. M. 2006, pp. 167–186.
95 Gerhard Roth’s statements make this very clear. When he speaks about psychological
illnesses, he thinks only of brain disorders and never of the relationship of persons to their
fellow human beings and to the world around them. He tells us that the goal of all psycho-
therapy must be alter the psyche of the patient by alleviating the malfunctioning of the
subcortical limbic networks. (Roth, G.: Wie das Gehirn die Seele macht. Vortrag auf dem 51.
Lindauer Psychotherapiewochen.
http://www.lptw.de/archiv/vortrag/2001/roth.pdf (retrieved 15. September 2008), p. 14.
96 Cf. Fuchs, T.: Kosmos im Kopf? Neurowissenschaften und Menschenbild. In: Zeitschrift für
medizinische Ethik. 1 (2006), p. 5.
97 Quoted by: Hildebrandt, M.: Konturen eines holistischen Krankheitskonzepts in der klini­
schen Praxis. In: Honnefelder, L./Schmidt, M. C. (Eds.): Naturalismus als Paradigma. Wie
 6. The mind-brain paradigm as a threat       307

Medical care that is subservient to the lived body-soul paradigm is concerned about
the living human being, not about brain waves or liver function readings. Hastedt
confirms what has already become clear in the chapter on Descartes, that »the sharp
differentiation between mental and bodily illnesses should be regarded as a relic of
an unsustainable dualism.«98 It is not the body machine or the cerebrum that is ill
or enjoys good health. It is you and I who may fall ill, an event that may change not
only our lives but also the lives of those who are dear to us. As Hastedt has told us,
»medical care that explains illnesses only in relation to disease-causing sicknesses
within the body is short-changing the patient and themselves.«99
In the following two sections, I would like to discuss in more detail two ethical
consequences when the organismic wholeness is reduced to a shrunken mind-brain
being without a lived body. If certain mind abilities or brain structures cannot, or
cannot yet, or can no longer be distinguished, the protection status and the right to
life of these human beings is eroded.

weit reicht die naturwissenschaftliche Erklärung des Menschen? Berlin 2007, pp. 268–277,
here p. 270.
98 Hastedt, H.: Das Leib-Seele-Problem. Zwischen Naturwissenschaft des Geistes und kultureller
Eindimensionalität. Frankfurt a. M. 21989, p. 314.
99 Ibid., p. 311.
308       D. Lived body and soul or mind and brain?

6.5 Man the incarnate

»People’s corporeal existence has a temporal

form. Their lives do not begin only when they
self-consciousness and autonomy have de-
veloped, when they have attained corporeal
sovereignty.
We only do justice to people’s corporeal exist-
ence when we acknowledge their lives in their
totality; when we acknowledge in the unborn
as well as in the frail bodies at the end of life
the dignity of the human person.«100

6.5.1 The origins of mankind

»Human persons are not to be regarded as
only a sensitive physical organism until the
time of birth. Their individual biography does
not begin only at birth or even during the
development of I-consciousness which begins
round about the second year after birth.«101

When we think of birth and death, we readily realize that each of us is a lived body-
soul unit. We are born with a lived body, and some day we must die in our corpore-
ality. Every birthday indicates that life is a gift we owe to others. The terms life, love
and lived body are (not only linguistically) related. We should never cease standing
in awe of the fact, that the physical love between the lived bodies of a man and a
woman can produce new life.
In modern western society, the beginning of a human life is not always under an
auspicious star. In politics and at the pub, people discuss the question: When do we
actually become a human being? Was there a phase in which we were not human?
Some authors who participate in these debates are using the term »becoming fully
human.« They believe it is obvious that life only begins when certain mental talents
become available and when children are competent to speak about themselves and
deliberate about their future. Is this really clear and apparent? We would find very
soon that embryos and infants would be excluded from being »fully human« or
complete persons. It means that their life does not have to be protected in every
case. An abortion, or even sexual abuse of infants leading to death would be »no big
problem«? We discover that it is indeed problematic when we realize that a child in
the neonatal ward of a hospital, or even an embryo, has a lived body that is alive and a
human face like ours. The look on the face of an infant shows its innermost soul-en-
dowed life. Let us remember discussing the corporeal communication between

100 Fuchs, T.: Leib und Lebenswelt. Neue philosophisch-psychiatrische Essays. Baden-Baden
2008, pp. 117 f.
101 Kather, R.: Person. Die Begründung menschlicher Identität. Darmstadt 2007, p. 137.
 6. The mind-brain paradigm as a threat       309

mother and child. These authors totally ignore the lived body of an embryo. They
think to be authorized to create a guideline defining which mental manifestations of
life must be apparent before a human being is »fully human.« Did these authors not
also live through these human life phases when certain skills were only inside them
in potential form? The following question should be asked as well: Is it not correct
that when these authors go to bed at night or – something we wish no one – should
they fall into a coma, they too are – according to their own definition – no longer
»fully« human while certain mental manifestations of life are not being utilized?
Another group of authors seems to have realized that this landmark is not help-
ful. Nevertheless, they are still looking for another (apparently better), namely the
development of the cerebrum which will is said to provide a watertight argument.
Their motto is: »A person becomes »fully human« when certain brain structures are
formed.« Some authors remind us of brain death in this context – a topic we will still
discuss – and claim that when important brain structures are missing or their activi-
ty has ceased, we are no longer dealing with a human being! This is pure mind-brain
thinking! The followers of this approach are ignorant of the fact that the embryo is
definitely alive even before cerebral structures are formed. I would say with Dama-
sio: »Life and the life urge inside the life boundary that circumscribes an organism
precede the appearance of nervous systems, of brains.«102 With Damasio, we can
point out that we are here dealing with an organismic whole. Thomas Fuchs makes
us aware that our cerebrum is never »complete.« It continues to develop throughout
our lives. We are not static beings. We are living, dynamic persons, and this is why
such demarcations really make no sense.103 Günter Rager’s reference is also impor-
tant here.104 He argues that a synaptogenesis is a continuous development, whereby
the emphasis is on the word »continuous«. There is no such thing as a sudden somer-
sault in the development of a human being. Yet that is precisely what the bio-ethicist
Bernhard Irrgang suggests when he speaks of a »pre-embryo.«105 Through the use of
the prefix »pre,« he wishes to convince his readers that there is a phase in which we
are not yet dealing with a »real« living human being, and that there is a stage when
a »leap,« a »somersault« is taken toward the state of a human being. Irrgang seems
unconcerned that, before this »somersault,« everything is allowed from an »ethical
perspective.« Rager is of a different opinion, and points to the »aliveness« of the em-
bryo. According to Rager, we are dealing with a living wholeness, a living unit. It is
precisely what allows the development of cerebral structures, and much more.
This reference to a living unit is extremely important, especially from a natural
sciences perspective. We should be reasonable enough to realize we are dealing with

102 Damasio, A.: The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Conscious-
ness. London 1999, p. 139.
103 Cf. Fuchs, T.: Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan. Eine phänomenologisch-ökologische
Konzeption. Stuttgart 2008, p. 181.
104 Cf. Rager, G.: Zur Ontologie der Embryonalentwicklung von B. Smith und B. Brogaard: Kom-
mentar und Kritik aus embryologischer Sicht. In: Honnefelder, L./Schmidt, M. C. (Eds.):
Naturalismus als Paradigma. Wie weit reicht die naturwissenschaftliche Erklärung des Men-
schen? Berlin 2007, pp. 205–208; Rager, G.: Der Status des Embryos. In: Rager, G.: Die Per-
son. Wege zu ihrem Verständnis. Fribourg 2006, pp. 185–249.
105 Irrgang, B.: Einführung in die Bioethik. Munich 2005, p. 69.
310       D. Lived body and soul or mind and brain?

a fusion of nuclear cells forming a new living human being.106 What is coming into
being is not merely biological »wetware« but, as Rager emphasizes, a new biological
unit. Rager says it can be called new in the sense that the genetic material of mother
and father have united. In a similar vein, Vollmert states that molecular biological
research has shown that the biological nature of a living being is determined by the
nucleotide sequence of its DNS chain. A living being that possesses a DNS sequence
specific to humans is a human being no matter in what stage of its embryonic growth
process it may be – i. e. from the first moment of its fertilization, the first cell is al-
ready a human being.107
Very important: Rager’s and Vollmert’s observation applies irrespective of the
question whether man has originated from the sexual union of a man and a woman,
IVF or cloning. When the nuclear cells unite, a remarkable development begins that
did not exist before. »Contrary to the description of the embryo as a mere cluster of
cells [...] is the finding that cells already begin to specialize and to assume particular
functions in the blastomere stage.«108
It is extremely strange when Bernhard Irrgang, in Bioethik, asks whether a zy-
gote is »a human in the anthropological sense«109 (a telling formulation that already
reveals his interests) and speculates that a »human soul, subjectivity and the like«
[...] probably develop in rudimentary form only during pregnancy if not even af-

106 B. Smith and B. Brogaard (Smith, B./Brogaard, B.: Ontologie des Embryos: Wann beginnt
menschliches Leben? In: Honnefelder, L./Schmidt, M. C. (Eds.): Naturalismus als Paradigma.
Wie weit reicht die naturwissenschaftliche Erklärung des Menschen? Berlin 2007, pp. 196–
204) are of the opinion that this assumption also has traps insofar as up to the maturation
of the primitive streak twins can still develop. This is why up, to this point, one cannot speak
of a human individual. Therefore, these two authors date the beginning of a human life to
the time when the axis formation and gastrulation are complete (ibid., p. 200 f.), and as is
important to them, the formation of twins is no longer a possibility. »While the precursor is
human life, it is only when gastrulation is complete that we are dealing with a human indi-
vidual.« (ibid., p. 200). G. Rager (Rager, G.: Zur Ontologie der Embryonalentwicklung von B.
Smith und B. Brogaard: Kommentar und Kritik aus embryologischer Sicht. Honnefelder, L./
Schmidt, M. C. (Eds.) in Naturalismus als Paradigma. Wie weit reicht die naturwissenschaft-
liche Erklärung des Menschen? Berlin 2007, pp. 205–208) is not happy with these statements,
and points out that from its inception a zygote should be understood as being a living unity
of a fertilized egg cell and the zona pellucida. This is not merely a part of the mother (ibid.,
p. 205). That grastrulation is even possible has its origins in the embryo itself. With regard
to the question, which is important for Smith and Brogaard concerning the formation of
twins, Rager suggests that this can be understood as a kind of sprouting from the first (ibid.,
p. 207).
107 Vollmert, B.: Das Molekül und das Leben. Vom makromolekularen Ursprung des Lebens und
der Arten. Reinbek bei Hamburg 1985, p. 177.
108 Rager, G.: Biologische Fakten und personales Denken. In: Putallaz, F.-X./Schumacher, B. N.
(Eds.): Der Mensch und die Person. Darmstadt 2008, p. 65.
Günter Rager states that »the works of Antczak and Van Blerkom with immunofluorescence
and with confocal laser-scanning microscopy show that the regulatory protein STAT3 and
leptin are already diametrically allocated after the first cell division. This result indicates
that individual cells already emerge during the blastomeric stage and already begin to spe-
cialize for specific functions in the service of the system as a whole.« (ibid., p. 66).
109 Irrgang, B.: Einführung in die Bioethik. Munich 2005, p. 20.
 6. The mind-brain paradigm as a threat       311

ter birth.«110 Irrgang says that the beginning of physical life does not coincide with
the beginning of the human body.111 Irrgang thus differentiates between the human
body and the lived body,112 whereby physicality is given from the moment of fusion
between egg and sperm up to the moment when the body disintegrates in the grave,
and lived corporeality comes into being when subjectivity develops and ends with
brain death.113 »We can only speak of a lived body when subjectivity has developed.
Initially, only a human body develops.«114 Thus the lived body and the physical body
are not only differentiated, but torn apart.
For Irrgang, the source of all corporeality is development of the brain.115 Here,
»corporeality« is »a dangerous wolf dressed in the sheep’s clothes of bioethics,« and
it legitimizes the mind-brain picture of the human being. The brain is not under-
stood as being embedded in the organism as a whole, but is understood as the very
seat of corporeality.116 According to Irrgang, cerebral processes are the essence of
personhood. Our cerebral processes are of course not excluded. Irrgang tells us that
the humanly-personal and bodily constituted life develops after the 25th week of
pregnancy.117 The bodily reality is thus not seen as the essential basis within which
the brain structures are even able to develop. Lived body thus depends on brain.118
The formation of the brain is sufficient for important mental manifestations of life –
such as subjectivity. We cannot yet attribute subjectivity to the unborn human: it is
not yet the author of an action. Thus, Irrgang claims that subjectivity understood
in this way is also the indicator of whether a living human being is entitled to legal
protection. Embryos as »pre-personal human physicality«119 only have a right to a
considerably downgraded measure of inviolability. With that, he claims, an apparent
ethical benchmark has been discovered for research on embryos,120 and if that is
followed, the killing of embryos is found to be acceptable.
According to Irrgang, stem cell research needs embryos as »raw material.« This
also seems to be the leading motif: Irrgang knows that if embryos were accorded
dignity, »consuming embryo research would be considered bad«.121 The following
statement made by Irrgang should be evaluated with the same argument: »Only
when embryos and fetuses are not accorded human dignity up to a certain point in

110 Ibid., p. 21.

111 Cf. ibid., p. 38.
112 Cf. ibid., pp. 41, 60.
113 Cf. ibid., p. 45.
Subjective vulnerability is a precondition for human corporeality. Vulnerability, in turn,
presupposes human-corporeal sentience. It is from here, that a parallel to brain death is
deduced. (ibid., p. 61).
114 Ibid., p. 46.
115 Cf. ibid., p. 45.
116 Cf. ibid., p. 45.
117 Cf. ibid., p. 66.
118 Cf. ibid., p. 45.
119 Ibid., p. 46.
120 Irrgang says that »even research on persons capable of giving consent is a problem.« He
is, however, not consistent in his arguments when he later claims that research on human
beings incapable of giving their consent is likewise problematic (Ibid., p. 83).
121 Cf. ibid., p. 52.
312       D. Lived body and soul or mind and brain?

time can provisions permitting abortion within the first three months of pregnancy
be justified.«122 The »value« of an embryo created for research purposes has to be
appraised differently than one that has been fertilized in the womb.123 This argument
in which Irrgang separates a life worth living from a life not worth living, reminds
us of Nazi rhetoric in Germany: »Without a doubt, the life of some humans is less
valuable, since it is less worth saving than others.«124 In the case of an embryo or also
an infant whose mind and brain have not yet fully developed, and where we cannot
yet speak of personality in the full sense of the word, »certain acts of omission are
still possible.«125 Thus, according to Irrgang, when a certain »demand« exists (e. g.
for research purposes), there are certain human beings who can be killed, especially
then when some specific faculties with which we assist other mortals as a matter of
course have not yet fully evolved. Irrgang claims that »the almost limitless right to
reproductive self-determination includes the right to select embryos or fetuses and
so also includes eugenic tendencies.«126 This reminds us of a 1943 statement by C. S.
Lewis, which in the light of Irrgang’s theories has lost none of its relevance:

»The process which, if not checked, will abolish Man goes on apace among Commu-
nists and Democrats no less than among Fascists. The methods may (at first) differ in
brutality. But many a mild-eyed scientist in pince-nez, many a popular dramatist, many
an amateur philosopher in our midst, means in the long run just the same as the Nazi
rulers of Germany.«127

Irrgang disregards that even unicellular organisms constitute a living whole. This
whole is organized, structured, or – as we may of course also say – formed. It is the
forma that holds everything together.128 Irrgang’s statements about the zygote are
more than questionable from a biological as well as a philosophical perspective. His
assumption that the spirit/soul is only added in the course of time, is not feasible and
collapses fairly soon: in that life phase a forming principle can already be identified.
As Günter Rager correctly points out:

»Already in the zygote, and in the following blastomeric stages, we see an exchange
of molecules between the individual and the environment. The unity of zygotes and
blastomeres is, however, guaranteed through the targeted control of the metabolism
that takes place in the protected space of the Zona pellucida. Thus, on the one side, we
have materiality that allocates a certain space and designates boundaries to individuals,
which anchors these individuals within space and time and gives them their individu-

122 Ibid., p. 151.

123 Ibid., p. 50.
124 Ibid., p. 47.
125 Ibid., p. 161.
126 Ibid., p. 151.
127 Lewis, C. S.: The Abolition of Man. New York 2005, p. 74.
128 This Aristotelian thought is well taken up by: Oduncu, F. S.: Moralischer Status von Embry-
onen. In: Düwell, M./Steigleder, K. (Eds.): Bioethik. Frankfurt a. M. 2003, pp. 213–220, esp.
pp. 215 f.
 6. The mind-brain paradigm as a threat       313

ality. On the other hand, we have a form which does not only guarantee the survival of
the zygotes, but also their unity and further development.«129

In the sense of Aristotle’s philosophy, the life of man can be described as a »devel-
opmental process.«130 »It begins as an embryo t the moment when life stirs in the
fertilized egg cell and growth is evidenced in progressive structures.«131 This means
that it is inappropriate to speak of an emerging or nascent human life.132 Or, as Edith
Stein writes: »(Human beings) are not first a plant, then an animal, then a human
being.«133 What she means is that the development is typically human. Today, this
can be fully supported. From the beginning, our genetic make-up is fully present.134
Entelechy, form, is present from the beginning. They is not added at a later date. Just
like you or I, or a professor who is concerned with bioethical questions, an omnipo-
tent cell with a double set of chromosomes is also a member of the human family. It
is thus absurd to link the protection of an embryo to the question where an embryo
is located (in the researcher’s laboratory or in the womb).135 Of course it is obvious
that the life contexts and faculties of an embryo are different from ours. This cannot
be denied. It is, however, important to recognize that these contexts and faculties
already exist in the fetus and will only reach maturity later.136 The living body »with
its boundaries and its possibilities of regulation is the guarantor of the identity and
survival of the biological individual.«137 Without exception, every embryo is a lived
body-spirit unity, a living wholeness of form and matter. This is independent of the
future profession; the social competence; intelligence; the religious view or other
ideology. There are fatal consequences when we reduce humans to the mind-brain
paradigm; i. e. to the existence or non-existence of brain-structures and mind-facul-
ties. It is important to remember the re-formulation of the Hippocratic Oath at the

129 Rager, G.: Die Person. Wege zu ihrem Verständnis. Fribourg/Vienna 2006, pp. 159 f.
130 Stein, E.: AMP, p. 130.
131 Ibid., p. 130.
132 Cf. Irrgang, B.: Einführung in die Bioethik. Munich 2005, p. 121.
133 Stein, E.: AMP, p. 132.
134 Cf. also: Spaemann, R.: Seelen. In: Hermanni, F./Buchheim, T. (Eds.): Das Leib-Seele-Pro­
blem. Antwortversuche aus medizinisch-naturwissenschaftlicher, philosophischer und theolo-
gischer Sicht. Munich 2006, pp. 71–83.
135 Out of the corporeal love of a man and a women new life can emerge. There are today a
number of techniques that attempt to separate the corporeal union from the conception of
offspring. Something else should take the place of the act of love. These supposed examples
of progress too are part of the mind-brain paradigm that attempts to write off the corpore-
ality of human beings, and in that way control them so that outside the lived body of a man
and a woman actions of third persons take place.
136 Stein points out that what I am now is the kernel of what I am not currently but will become
one day in the future. »What I currently am I was already in the past but not then currently.
My present being contains the possibility to future relevant being and presupposes a possi-
bility in my earlier being. My present being is current and potential being; simultaneously
reality and possibility; and insofar as it really is, it is the realization of a possibility that
already existed earlier.« (Stein, E.: EES, p. 43).
137 Rager, G.: Neuronale Korrelate von Bewusstsein und Selbst. In: Rager, G./Quitterer, J./Rung-
galdier, E.: Unser Selbst. Identität im Wandel der neuronalen Prozesse. Paderborn/Munich/
Vienna/Zurich 22003, p. 37.
314       D. Lived body and soul or mind and brain?

World Medical Association in 1948 in Geneva: »The life of the human person would
be maintained with deepest reverence from the moment of conception.«

6.5.2 Brain death = soulless? On the problematic definition of brain

death in the mind-brain paradigm
»When a brain death diagnosis is given, no-
body need be afraid that they are really brain
dead. Yet it is a completely different question
whether brain death means they are indeed
dead.«138

In the course of the mind-brain paradigm and the associated one-sided glorification
of the human brain, a new concept developed in the 20th century as to when a sub-
ject of Homo sapiens is actually dead. The new thing was that brain death was sup-
posed to be the death of the entire human being while breathing and heart function
could still be maintained.139
How did matters come to this point? As we know, there were many new medi-
cal regulations in connection with technical developments. These included that at
the end of the 1950s it became possible to place people on respirators and to keep
them breathing for an extended time.140 This was a great advancement, but soon,
some negative effects also became apparent. Influential researchers such as Mollaret
and Goulon in France arrived at the conclusion that there could be situations when
thanks to the new technology, a person’s breathing could be maintained and the
heart could continue to beat while no cerebral manifestations of life could be deter-
mined. The technical term was »coma depassé« which soon became a common med-
ical term. What is important for our question is that these people were not regarded
as dead under any circumstances.141 They were patients.

138 Linke, D. B.: Hirnverpflanzung. Die erste Unsterblichkeit auf Erden. Reinbek bei Hamburg
1993, p. 124.
139 Cf. also: Jonas, H.: Technik, Medizin und Ethik. Zur Praxis des Prinzips Verantwortung.
Frankfurt a. M. 1987, pp. 219–241; Seifert, J.: Das Leib-Seele-Problem und die gegenwärtige
philosophische Diskussion. Eine systematisch-kritische Analyse. Darmstadt 21989, pp. 235–
255; Hoff, J./In Der Schmitten, J. (Eds.): Wann ist der Mensch tot? Organverpflanzung und
»Hirntod«-Kriterium. Reinbek bei Hamburg 1994; Brudermüller, G./Seelmann, K. (Eds.):
Organtransplantation. Würzburg 2000; Schlich, T./Wiesemann, C. (Eds.): Hirntod. Zur Kul-
turgeschichte der Todesfeststellung. Frankfurt a. M. 2001; Schumacher, B. N.: Zur Definition
des menschlichen Todes. In: Putallaz, F.-X./Schumacher, B. N. (Eds.): Der Mensch und die
Person. Darmstadt 2008, pp. 51–61.
140 Cf. Schellong, S. M.: Die künstliche Beatmung und die Entstehung des Hirntodkonzepts.
In: Schlich, T./Wiesemann, C. (Eds.): Hirntod. Zur Kulturgeschichte der Todesfeststellung.
Frankfurt a. M. 2001, pp. 187–208.
141 Cf. Brudermüller, G./Seelmann, K. (Eds.): Organtransplantation. Würzburg 2000, p. 294;
Hoff, J./In Der Schmitten, J.: Kritik der »Hirntod«-Konzeption. Plädoyer für ein menschen-
würdiges Todeskriterium. In: Hoff, J./In Der Schmitten, J. (Eds.): Wann ist der Mensch tot?
Organverpflanzung und »Hirntod«-Kriterium. Reinbek bei Hamburg 1994, p. 155.
 6. The mind-brain paradigm as a threat       315

»With the spread of heart-lung-resuscitation and the introduction of cardiac massage

in 1960, the number of patients who had suffered brief circulatory arrest and apnea
continued to live with irreversibly damaged brains, in the state of »Coma depassé.«142

A »solution« had to be found. In the late summer of 1968 some things did change.
A committee of the Harvard Medical School in the USA (which in addition to physi-
cians also consisted of legal experts, ethicists and theologians) revised the definition
of coma depassé: These patients were no longer considered comatose but dead.143
This was, as Hoff and Schmitten point out, a really »decisive step.«144 Being alive
was reduced to what is possible or not in the cerebrum. To ensure that brain death
could be identified in the hospitals, it was agreed that there must be no processes in
the cerebrum that could be recognized by physicians (a flat electroencephalogram).
This was not the only criterion. There should also be no more spontaneous breath-
ing and reflexes.145 We should not overlook the revolutionary effect: Being human
would end when brain processes could no longer be diagnosed. The death of one
part of us (meros), namely the brain, should be the same as the death of the whole
human organism.146 Once this diagnosis had been made, life-sustaining measures
did not have to be continued. Clarity seemed to have been achieved: »At that time,
physicians were hesitant to turn off artificial respiration when a patient was irre-
versibly comatose. They were of the opinion that by turning off the respirator, thus
indirectly inducing immediate death, they would be guilty of active killing.«147 Hoff
and Schmitten wrote:
»The introduction of a criterion for death did not come about on the basis of a
serious discussion of the philosophical and ideological premises. [...] but it was the
result of a pragmatic decision taken in the interests of medical progress.«148
Hans Jonas, who was one of the first to express his concern about this innovation,
makes the farsighted point that this strategic approach opened a way for serving the

142 Ibid., p. 155.

143 Lately the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Chirurgie (Kommission für Reanimation und Organ-
transplantation der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Chirurgie 1968) and other professional
bodies in Germany have taken a comparable approach. Cf. Wiesemann, C.: Notwendigkeit
und Kontingenz. Zur Geschichte der ersten Hirntod-Definition der Deutschen Gesellschaft für
Chirurgie von 1968. In: Schlich, T./Wiesemann, C. (Eds.): Hirntod. Zur Kulturgeschichte der
Todesfeststellung. Frankfurt a. M. 2001, pp. 209–235.
144 Hoff, J./In Der Schmitten, J.: Kritik der »Hirntod«-Konzeption. Plädoyer für ein menschen-
würdiges Todeskriterium. In: Hoff, J./In Der Schmitten, J. (Eds.): Wann ist der Mensch tot?
Organverpflanzung und »Hirntod«-Kriterium. Reinbek bei Hamburg 1994, p. 157.
145 Cf. Jonas, H.: Technik, Medizin und Ethik. Zur Praxis des Prinzips Verantwortung. Frankfurt
a. M. 1987, p. 220; Hoff, J./In Der Schmitten, J.: Kritik der »Hirntod«-Konzeption. Plädoyer
für ein menschenwürdiges Todeskriterium. In: Hoff, J./In Der Schmitten, J. (Eds.): Wann ist
der Mensch tot? Organverpflanzung und »Hirntod«-Kriterium. Reinbek bei Hamburg 1994,
pp. 157 f.
146 Cf. Jonas, H.: Technik, Medizin und Ethik. Zur Praxis des Prinzips Verantwortung. Frankfurt
a. M. 1987, p. 220.
147 Hoff, J./In Der Schmitten, J.: Kritik der »Hirntod«-Konzeption. Plädoyer für ein menschen-
würdiges Todeskriterium. In: Hoff, J./In Der Schmitten, J. (Eds.): Wann ist der Mensch tot?
Organverpflanzung und »Hirntod«-Kriterium. Reinbek bei Hamburg 1994, p. 158.
148 Ibid., p. 153.
316       D. Lived body and soul or mind and brain?

interests of transplantation medicine.149 In the previous section, I had mentioned

that in terms of embryo research, Irrgang had used the term »human raw material«.
Here is a similar case: the availability of many (»fresh and living«) organs. Authors
who welcome the concept of brain death are trying to reassure us and are playing
down the connection between these two concepts, or they totally deny that there
is a connection. They argue that the original decision was not dictated by outside
interests but by reasonable medical considerations (»for the benefit of patients«).
Jonas argues:

»What was really at stake was to bring forward the moment of death which did not
only mean having permission to turn off the respirator, but also to be allowed to use
this and other life support systems, and so to keep the body in a state which would in
earlier times have been defined as life, but according to a more modern definition is no
more than an illusion. Now what was once known as vivisection meant that one could
access organs and tissues under the most ideal conditions.«150

Even Peter Singer, who has initiated a very controversial discussion concerning ques-
tions about the protection of human life, writes:

»The change in our conception of death that excluded these human beings [the brain
dead M. K.] from the moral community was among the first in a series of dramatic
changes in our view of life and death.«151

Authors with diverse views, such as Hans Jonas and Peter Singer, agree that the new
definition of death was the result of an agreement which said that patients should
now be called brain dead. As mentioned, this opened new possibilities for trans-
plantation medicine.152 According to Jonas, another reason was to lower the emo-
tional and financial cost involved in the care of irreversibly comatose patients. No
investment in time or money is needed for the dead!153 If we wait until all life pro-
cesses have ended, an organ such as the heart, can no longer be transplanted. In the
report by the Harvard Committee, published in 1968 in the Journal of the American
Medical Association, we read that »obsolete criteria for the definition of death can

149 Cf. Jonas, H.: Technik, Medizin und Ethik. Zur Praxis des Prinzips Verantwortung. Frankfurt
a. M. 1987, pp. 220, 224.
150 Cf. ibid., p. 221.
151 Singer, P.: Is the Sanctity of Life Ethic Terminally Ill?. In: Bioethics 9 (1995), pp. 327–342, here
p. 308. Cf. Rethinking Life and Death. The Collapse of Our Traditional Ethics. New York 1996,
p. 22.
152 Matters are slightly different with regard to living donor transplantations for example of
kidneys which is the most frequent form as there is a pair of kidneys. Because of its ability
to regenerate, the liver is also used in living donor transplantations where a part can be
transplanted. In my opinion, the radius should be limited to the family. This would ensure
the freewill nature of the donation and limit abuse, for example, regarding organ trafficking
in poorer countries. At no time should the life and the health of the donor be in danger.
153 Cf. Jonas, H.: Technik, Medizin und Ethik. Zur Praxis des Prinzips Verantwortung. Frankfurt
a. M. 1987, p. 224.
 6. The mind-brain paradigm as a threat       317

lead to controversy in obtaining organs for transplantation.«154 According to Peter

Singer, »the redefinition of death in terms of brain death went through so smoothly
because it did not harm the brain-dead patients and it benefitted everyone else.«155
The first statement is to be challenged. To bring about the real death of a person can
be glossed over as »causing injury«. In the point, I completely agree with Singer:
»Defining such people as dead was a convenient way around the problems of with-
drawing treatment from them.«156
In the chapter on Descartes, I had talked about the wish of people, particularly
articulated since the beginning of the modern age, to declare themselves lord and
masters over life and death. By advancing the time of death, we succeed even more
in this effort. Physicians prepare checklists and decide when someone is no longer
a patient, but a corpse. This fits the image of man the machine according to which
old and defective parts can be discarded and at best replaced by others which still
function. Hoff and Schmitten: »Declaring a person dead, whose warm blood still
pulses through his veins, remains a prerogative reserved for our progressive age.«157
In the past, the German Medical Association presented several statements about
brain death. A 1993 publication assumed that brain death is giving a definite sign
that death has indeed occurred. It referred in particular to the loss of control caused
by the impairment of the cerebrum. Accordingly, our organism is considered dead
when »the individual function of its organs and systems as well as their interactions
are »irrevocably no longer encapsulated in the superordinate unity of the living being
in its functional unity, and can no longer be controlled by it.«158 The concern of the
German Medical Association was that practicing physicians should be given secu-
rity with a list of characteristics and criteria that would assist them in determining
brain death. Four years later, in 1997, this concern became reality.159 The Medical
Association very clearly stated that it is imperative to determine that the follow-
ing are not responsible for the termination of cerebral processes: neuromuscular
blockades, intoxication, hypothermia, circulatory shock, an endocrinal or metabolic
coma. Physicians were to take note of these. It is made clear that a person who is
brain dead is not only »slightly« dead. The whole person must have died. Brain death
is »an irreversible termination of the total function of the cerebrum, the cerebellum
and the brain stem«.160

154 Quoted by: Singer, P.: Rethinking Life and Death. The Collapse of Our Traditional Ethics.
New York 1996, p. 25.
155 Singer, P.: Rethinking Life and Death. The Collapse of Our Traditional Ethics. New York 1996,
p. 32.
156 Ibid., p. 32.
157 Hoff, J./In Der Schmitten, J.: Kritik der »Hirntod«-Konzeption. Plädoyer für ein menschen-
würdiges Todeskriterium. In: Hoff, J./In Der Schmitten, J. (Eds.): Wann ist der Mensch tot?
Organverpflanzung und »Hirntod«-Kriterium. Reinbek bei Hamburg 1994, p. 154.
158 Deutsches Ärzteblatt 90, Ausgabe 44 (1993). Quoted by: Unnewehr, M.: Totes Herz, totes
Hirn, toter Mensch. Medizinische Aspekte des Todes. In: Una Sancta. Zeitschrift für ökume-
nische Begegnung 3 (2006), p. 194.
159 Cf. http://www.bundesaerztekammer.de/page.asp?his=0.7.45.3252 (retrieved 04 March
2008), http://www.bundesaerztekammer.de/downloads/Hirntodpdf.pdf (retrieved 04
March 2008), Deutsches Ärzteblatt 95, Heft 30, 24 July 1998, pp. 53–60.
160 Cf. ibid., p. 53.
318       D. Lived body and soul or mind and brain?

In Germany, the question regarding the definition of brain death and the possi-
bilities presented to transplantation medicine were discussed extensively. There was
agreement that political regulations were needed. Was it not essential to have abso-
lute answers to such an important question? In the summer of 1997, Horst Seehofer,
then Federal Minister of Health, in developing a Transplantation Act, pointed out
that it is important not to criminalize physicians who issue a certificate of death in
the wake of brain death and that it was therefore necessary to agree on the legal defi-
nition of the time of death.161 If people declared brain dead were actually only dying
patients, it would be easy to actually eviscerate these people and to harvest their
organs. He also feared that many people would under such circumstances hardly be
willing to agree on organ donation for their relatives or themselves and to carry a
card authorizing such an organ donation.162

»It was a practice that was both scientific and scientifically attractive, which forced a
decision regarding the definition of brain death, and this raises the suspicion that the
true nature of death was falsified and redefined in favor of this practice.«163

In the winter of 1997, the regulations currently in force became law. The German
Bundestag, in agreement with the Bundesrat, passed the Act concerning the Do-
nation, Harvesting and Transfer of Organs (Transplantationsgesetz-TPG),164 regu-
lating the removal of organs from the brain dead165 as well as of from patients still
alive. The TPG prohibits the removal of organs for business purposes. No one is
permitted to profit from the organs of other human beings. The act has detailed
regulations and conditions for the harvesting of organs in Germany. However,
the TPG also could not avoid defining what is meant by »brain death.« When is
a person brain dead? According to the TPG, brain death is »the final irreversible
termination of the total function of the cerebrum, the cerebellum, and the brain
stem.166 Peter Singer has made the following statement with which I want to
agree:

161 Cf. Bauer, A. W.: Wo bleibt die Würde des Menschen? Hirntodkonzept und Organspende aus
ethischer Sicht. In: Universitas. November 2007. pp. 1150–1162, esp. pp. 1152–1154; Sch-
neider, W.: Vom schlechten Sterben und dem guten Tod – Die Neuordnung des Todes in der
politischen Debatte um Hirntod und Organtransplantation. In: Schlich, T./Wiesemann, C.
(Eds.): Hirntod. Zur Kulturgeschichte der Todesfeststellung. Frankfurt a. M. 2001, pp. 279–
317.
Seehofer’s speech can be found at: http://www.med.uni-hd.de/igm/g47/bauershf.htm (re-
trieved 03 March 2008).
162 Cf. Bauer, A. W.: Wo bleibt die Würde des Menschen? Hirntodkonzept und Organspende aus
ethischer Sicht. In: Universitas. November 2007, p. 1154.
163 Seifert, J.: Das Leib-Seele-Problem und die gegenwärtige philosophische Diskussion. Eine
­systematisch-kritische Analyse. Darmstadt 21989, p. 239.
164 The TPG came into effect on 1 Dec. 1997.
165 § 3 par. 1 Clause 1 no. 2 TPG (= German Transplantation Act).
166 § 3 Par. 2 Clause 1 Number 2 TPG (= German Transplantation Act).
 6. The mind-brain paradigm as a threat       319

»The consequences of the redefinition of death were so evidently desirable that it met
with scarcely any opposition, and was accepted almost universally. Nevertheless, it was
unsound from the start. Solving problems by redefinition rarely works, and this case
was no exception.«167

The brain death criterion is now taken for granted in many areas of society. The
new ideas and redefinitions did not even stop at the German Bishops’ Conference,168
which does not seem to notice that being human is used within the mind-brain
paradigm and equated with brain function. This is the only reason why the bish-
ops can speak of brain death as the »disintegration of the life of the total human
being.«169 It is also found acceptable to harvest organs once brain death has set
in.170 This approach is spiced with reference to the Christian love of neighbor. The
bishops wrongly refer to the Catechism of the Catholic Church, which refers to trans-
plantations from living donors but emphasizes that it is ethically unacceptable to
directly cause a person’s disability or death when it serves to delay the death of
others.171
Many followers of the brain death criterion rarely mention that there is no uni-
form definition worldwide as to what is meant by brain death. The literature points
to assumptions which speak of three hundred different definitions.172 This is truly
not a small number. It is therefore entirely possible you or one of your relatives may
be declared dead in one of the hospitals of this world, while other physicians may
well be convinced to still have a patient in their care who deserves medical care and
a pension.
In this context, I would like to call attention to another aspect: According to sta-
tistics, about one in a thousand infants born in Germany suffers from anencephaly.
These infants (there are more girls than boys) have a severe impairment or atrophy
of the diencephalon (interbrain), of the cerebellum and of the mesencephalon. In
addition, there has been no proper development of the meninges, the cerebrum and
of the bony skull. It is obvious that this has tremendous consequences if we remem-

167 Singer, P.: Rethinking Life and Death. The Collapse of Our Traditional Ethics. New York 1996,
p. 51.
168 Cf. Deutsche Bischofskonferenz: Katholischer Erwachsenenkatechismus. Vol. 2. Leben aus
dem Glauben. Freiburg/Basel/Vienna 1995, pp. 314–316.
169 Cf. ibid., p. 316.
170 A similar definition is found in Gott ist ein Freund des Lebens, [God is the friend of life],
the joint declaration of the Council of Evangelical Churches in Germany and the German
Bishops’ Conference. It states that as with the death of the entire brain the control of the
lived body-soul unit has ended, brain death obviously also involves the death of the human
person: Kirchenamt Der Evangelischen Kirche In Deutschland/Sekretariat Der Deutschen
Bischofskonferenz: Gott ist ein Freund des Lebens. Trier 1989, p. 104.
171 Catechism of the Catholic Church. Chapter 2296. http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG
0015/_INDEX.HTM
172 Cf. Balkenohl, M.: Der Hirntod – Zur Problematik einer neuen Todesdefinition. In: Theologi­
sches. Katholische Monatsschrift. Jahrgang 37. Nr. 1/2 (2007), p. 54.
In Europe regulations regarding the definition of brain death are very different. A tabulated
overview is found in Schlake, H,-P./Roosen, K.: Der Hirntod als der Tod des Menschen.
Würzburg 22001, p. 61.
320       D. Lived body and soul or mind and brain?

ber our discussion about brain lesions. Physicians point out that the brain stem of
such infants can apparently only fulfill its service to the total organism in a very
limited manner.173 Some authors emphasize that this is a »primitive form of life.«174
For them, it means that such infants cannot under any circumstances be regarded
as »meaningful human life« in the true sense of the word.175 That is clear. However,
Peter Singer states: »Both anencephalics and cortically dead infants may move their
limbs, cough, sneeze, cry, and even appear to smile – all, however, without having
any consciousness.«176 Singer argues that these children are not dead, but because
the presence of conscious mental manifestation of life is denied them – something he
believes is constitutive for human personhood – he suggests the following:

»Instead of changing the definition of death so as to declare legally dead anencephalic

infants and infants whose cortexes had been destroyed, it would be better to make it
lawful to remove organs from living, precisely defined and indubitably diagnosed anen-
cephalic infants or infants whose cortexes had been destroyed.«177

The honesty and consequences inherent in this thought of Singer are truly fright-
ening. Instead of adapting definitions to suit the situation, he suggests that organ
removal from living children should be allowed, as their mental abilities and neu-
ronal structures are not completely developed in the full sense of the word. In his
opinion, the easiest means of attaining the desired goal is to be allowed to remove
these children’s organs.178 He puts the brain on the throne of the »seat of conscious-
ness.«179 Similarly, in Jeff McMahan’s statements concerning anencephalic infants,
the characteristic reduction of the human person to mind and brain all too obviously
reflects the mind-brain paradigm. He writes that as we are primarily mind beings,
a newborn infant born with anencephaly is fundamentally different: »It is no more
than an organism – a permanently vacant human organism.«180
Thus, anencephalic infants are »only« organisms? We can only marvel at such
profound insights. Quite obviously, the fact that these organisms are alive is being
ignored. That these organisms are seen as being »permanently vacant« is an indica-
tion of the skewed assessment that all manifestations of life in the organisms flow

173 Cf. Beller, F. K./Czaia, K.: Hirnleben und Hirntod – erklärt am Beispiel des anencephalen
Feten. Medizinische Materialien 17. Bochum 1988; Schlake, H.-P./Roosen, K.: Der Hirntod
als der Tod des Menschen. Würzburg 22001, pp. 73–75.
Anencephalic infants breathe independently (in contrast to those who are brain dead),
their temperature is regulated as is their cardiac cycle. They can suck and swallow and
respond to pain stimuli.
174 Schlake, H,-P./Roosen, K.: Der Hirntod als der Tod des Menschen. Würzburg 22001, p. 74.
175 Ibid., p. 74.
176 Singer, P.: Rethinking Life and Death. The Collapse of Our Traditional Ethics. New York 1996,
p. 40.
177 Ibid., p. 52.
178 Cf. ibid., p. 47.
179 Ibid., p. 39.
180 McMahan, J.: The Ethics of Killing. Problems at the Margins of Life. Oxford 2002, p. 451.
Quoted by: Schumacher, B. N.: Zur Definition des menschlichen Todes. In: Putallaz, F.-X./
Schumacher, B. N. (Eds.): Der Mensch und die Person. Darmstadt 2008, pp. 54 f.
 6. The mind-brain paradigm as a threat       321

from the brain; that the essence of a human person is found in the mind and brain.
In discussing Rager’s work, I pointed out that the lived body-soul unity first evolves
in the course of the embryonic development of brain structures. While it is true that
heart, lungs, and brain are not present right from the beginning, something alive is
nevertheless already present from which all the rest will evolve. It is scientifically not
tenable to say that aliveness only begins then when cerebral functions are present.
This fact is not apparent to those who in the line of hylemorphism speak of a soul-en-
dowed organism, and of a unifying entelechial principle of the entire organism.
An extremely important question concerns the criteria regarding the concept of
brain death. Do they fall overboard when we examine them more closely? Or do
they withstand a critical examination? There are countries in which medical person-
nel – there is always more than one physician involved – are asked to do an EEG and
determine whether there is a flat line.181 Vollmann comments:

»in the case of certain skull deformities or injuries, contradictory neurovascular and
neurophysiological findings were repeatedly reported (e. g. cerebral residual circulation
upon EEG flat line, or otherwise patchy EEG activity with cerebral circulation). Other
authors report hormonal activity in the pituitary gland, which had been established
not only by means of hormonal evidence in the peripheral blood, but also through the
reaction of the pituitary gland’s frontal lobe to hormonal stimulation tests.«182

It is not permissible to declare that someone is dead, even when the main purpose
is to optimize the life possibilities of other very ill patients. This is sometimes over-
looked, for example, when – to advertise organ donor cards – some especially sad
family stories are told. One story told be Wellendorf illustrates the extent to which
people will go when the possibility of a donated organ looms, even when no one is
entitled to it:

»One of my female patients dreamed that she attacked a naked man, and with big
teeth greedily bit into his chest and ate his heart and lungs. When she woke up, she
was ashamed and irritated. Yet, she realized that there was a connection with her daily
life. She, like other patients, was obsessed with the intense wish that someone else
might die for them and leave them their organs. It seems that there are times that the
distress, the fear of death, drives these patients to wishing another human being would
die so they themselves can live. When there is black ice or snow on the roads they listen
intently whether they can hear the sirens of an ambulance or the sound of a landing
helicopter. They long for this kind of weather, and they are ashamed as soon as they
become conscious of their feelings.«183

181 Isoelectric lines occur after certain kinds of poisoning. When brain death is declared, poi-
soning must thus be excluded as a cause of death.
182 Vollmann, J.: Das Hirntodkriterium heute. Begriffsklärung und medizinethische Kontro-
versen. In: Schlich, T./Wiesemann, C. (Eds.): Hirntod. Zur Kulturgeschichte der Todesfest-
stellung. Frankfurt a. M. 2001, p. 50.
183 Wellendorf, E.: Der Zweck heiligt die Mittel? Erfahrungen aus der Arbeit mit Organem­
pfängern. In: Hoff, J./In Der Schmitten, J. (Eds.): Wann ist der Mensch tot? Organverpflan-
zung und »Hirntod«-Kriterium. Reinbek bei Hamburg 1994, p. 390.
322       D. Lived body and soul or mind and brain?

Is the equation brain dead = soul-less correct? Heinz Angstwurm tries to support his
thoughts about brain death by claiming that without brain processes there can be no
activity of the soul.184 The physician and theologian Stephan Patt comes to a similar
conclusion.185 Patt speaks of our spiritual soul that ensures that there is a dynamic
and organic unity between brain, senses, and body. According to Angstwurm, this
unity is totally dependent on the brain. He links the status of what it means to be hu-
man to the intact state of the brain. When the brain, which Patt understands as being
the superordinate inceptor and the seat of all thinking and feeling,186 no longer func-
tions, the entire human organism has lost its integral superordinate (lived) body-soul
unity.187 For Patt, being brain dead means also being soul-less.188 This point of view
does not, however, apply to the soul as the principle of life and as the formative prin-
ciple of the lived body. To answer the question whether the equation brain-dead =
soul-less is indeed correct, we will look at the life processes of people who have been
declared dead. In the context of this discussion, Detlef B. Linke has called attention
to the fact that in the event of brain death, at least 97% of the organism is still alive.189
It is thus ridiculous even mathematically to declare such an organism dead. The
organism has not yet collapsed and still exhibits a number of manifestations of life,
is permeated with the principle of life. Regarding Patt and Angstwurm, it should
be noted that we are still dealing with a unity of lived body-soul. Quite concretely,
this means that the brain dead we are dying human beings and not objects. In many
cases, organismic functions in the brain dead continue not only for a few hours,
but for many weeks. In contrast to corpses, these lived bodies show no sign of rigor
mortis, cold or stiffness. It is important to note what is still present: for example, the
metabolism that belongs to the aliveness of the organism. Patients who have been
declared dead are still processing food and producing excretions. Their heart is still
beating, and their injuries can still heal. Their body temperature can rise again. In
the sun, their skin can develop a holiday tan. None of these phenomena have ever
been observed after death.
Brain-dead men can still have an erection, and under certain conditions they
would still be in a position to father children.190 In the age of Viagra, it seems strange
that physicians who themselves might be suffering from erectile dysfunction, can

184 Cf. Angstwurm, H.: Der Hirntod als sicheres Todeszeichen. In: Düwell, M./Steigleder, K.
(Eds.): Bioethik. Eine Einführung. Frankfurt a. M. 2003, p. 296.
185 Patt, S.: Zu viele Fragezeichen. In: Lebensforum 91 (2009), pp. 26–29.
186 Cf. ibid., p. 26.
187 Cf. ibid., p. 28.
188 »Necessary criteria for the development of brain death are an uncontrollable and progres-
sive cerebral swelling with subsequent increase of intercranial pressure beyond the value of
systolic blood pressure. This intercranial pressure causes the total blockage of brain circu-
lation, and this, in turn, leads to the death of the brain. Brain death is thus chronologically
located at the end of the dying process and not in the middle.« (ibid., p. 27).
189 Cf. Linke, D. B.: Hirnverpflanzung. Die erste Unsterblichkeit auf Erden. Hamburg 1993,
p. 120.
190 Cf. Hoff, J./In Der Schmitten, J. (Eds.): Kritik der ›Hirntod‹-Konzeption. Plädoyer für ein
menschenwürdiges Todeskriterium. Reinbek bei Hamburg 1994. In: Hoff, J./In Der Schmit-
ten, J. (Eds.): Wann ist der Mensch tot? Organverpflanzung und Hirntodkriterium. Reinbek
bei Hamburg 1994, p. 204.
 6. The mind-brain paradigm as a threat       323

declare patients to be dead who may well have less difficulties to beget children than
the physicians themselves. In contrast to many women who cannot carry a child to
full term, this is not impossible for a woman who has been declared brain dead.191 To
save the child of such a woman, the physicians involved in their treatment speak of
a »brain dead living womb.«192 Of course, defenders of the brain death concept also
have to take a position referring to such cases.193 Schlake and Roosen advise against
a »metaphysical glorification of simple vital processes«194. According to them, this is
merely a »manifestation of residual life forms,« which are being realized »on the level
of primitive vegetative residual functions.«195 In both these instances, the notion of
vital (life) processes and life forms are mentioned. It is precisely these terms that
indicate that we are dealing with living beings and not with corpses.
Quite often people who are considered brain dead will lift their arms or make
walking movements. Followers of the brain death concept declare that this phenom-
enon only takes place »at the level of bone marrow, nerves and muscles.«196 Are
these not manifestations of life? Why are they not supposed to be life functions?
There is another aspect we should consider regarding the brain dead: it is utter non-
sense to claim that someone can be alive and dead at the same time.197 No one who
isn’t dead should be declared dead with the acrobatics of definition. It is clear that,

191 Cf. Schneider, H.: Die Erlanger Rettungsaktion. Eine achtseitige Dokumentation von Pro
Conscientia e. V. vom Schutze des menschlichen Lebens und für das ungeborene Kind. Hei-
delberg 1993; Schlake, H,-P./Roosen, K.: Der Hirntod als der Tod des Menschen. Würzburg
2
2001, pp. 82–85.
192 Jonas, H.: Brief an Hans-Bernhard Wuermeling. In: Hoff, J./In Der Schmitten, J. (Eds.):
Wann ist der Mensch tot? Organverpflanzung und Hirntodkriterium. Reinbek bei Hamburg
1994, p. 25.
193 According to the German Medical Association this pregnancy can be classified as an ex-
pression of autonomous placenta function.
194 Schlake, H.-P./Roosen, K.: Der Hirntod als der Tod des Menschen, Würzburg 22001, p. 85.
195 Ibid., p. 85, Cf. in this context Thorsten Streubel’s bizarre interpretation of Aristotle: Streu-
bel, T.: Gehirn und Ich. Plädoyer für einen Paradigmenwechsel. Frankfurt a. M. 2008, p. 17.
196 Cf. Schlake, H,-P./Roosen, K.: Der Hirntod als der Tod des Menschen. Würzburg 22001, p. 65.
197 This might sound simple, but is definitely not to be taken for granted. Markus Unnewehr
tells us that »only dead human bodies which have suffered brain death are kept ›alive‹ for
the sake of organ donation.« (Unnewehr, M.: Totes Herz, totes Hirn, toter Mensch. Medi­
zinische Aspekte des Todes. In: Una Sancta. Zeitschrift für ökumenische Begegnung 3 (2006),
p. 197).
Hans-Peter Schlake and Klaus Roosen similarly say that »for the person concerned, the
death of the brain inaugurates the very last phase of life. Yet, through measures taken in in-
tensive care the activities of the heart and of the circulation are made possible well beyond
the moment of death and the dying of the remainder of the body is delayed.« (Schlake, H,-
P./Roosen, K.: Der Hirntod als der Tod des Menschen. Würzburg 22001, p. 15).
In the work of Erhard Oeser, we read that »braindead persons who have been artificially
reanimated through technical means, and to whom these conditions apply, present a real
challenge to the general understanding of life and death in this incomprehensible and un-
canny yet real living corpse.« (Oeser, E.: Geschichte der Hirnforschung. Von der Antike bis
zur Gegenwart. Darmstadt 2002, p. 262). He explains the reasons for his statement by saying
that »the highest degree of vitality of the organs of the body is given when the braindead
person is reanimated and the »living corpse« thus becomes an organ bank for as long as it
remains plugged into the heart-lung machine.« (Ibid., p. 263).
324       D. Lived body and soul or mind and brain?

even according to Peter Singer, »the brain dead are not really dead.«198 As Jonas tells
us, »the truth does not care about our definitions.«199
According to Michael Quante,200 when an organism loses its ability to integrate,
this is accompanied by the breakdown of the brain as a whole.201 »The irreversible
breakdown of the brain as a whole is the end of the time when this organ took over
the integration function and thus the death of the human organism.«202 Apart from
the fact that it would be interesting to know what was responsible for the integration
of an organism before the brain allegedly took over,203 Quante acknowledges min-
imal brain processes before the integration process when he thinks of brain death.
In this context, some neurobiologists emphasize that all organs contribute to the
maintenance to the entire organism, saying that there is no significant hierarchy of
organs, and that the cerebrum is thus not the authority that decides everything for
the maintenance of our life processes.204 When kidneys fail, no one speaks of kidney
death or the death of a beloved fellow human being. Why this special role for the
brain? An organism is only dead when the entire organism has collapsed.
Hoff and In der Schmitten write:

»Proponents of the brain death criterion continue to claim that, regarding the remain-
ing functions of the brain-dead organism, we are merely concerned with the activities
of subsystems of an irrecoverable whole. Yet, the rather complex organization of these
functions can only be maintained on the level of the complete organism through the
interaction of the remaining subsystems. This interaction is not in need of a central
intermediary.«205

Supporters of the brain death criterion such as Hans-Peter Schlake and Klaus Roos-
en proceed from the basic assumption that the »personality of a person, the individ-
ual unmistakable whole of this person’s human existence, is bound to consciousness
and thus to the brain.«206 What about the subconscious processes of which, as we
heard in the previous chapter, represent the major part of our manifestations of life?

198 Singer, P.: Rethinking Life and Death. The Collapse of Our Traditional Ethics. New York 1996,
p. 35.
199 Jonas, H.: Brief an Hans-Bernhard Wuermeling. In: Hoff, J./In Der Schmitten, J. (Eds.):
Wann ist der Mensch tot? Organverpflanzung und Hirntodkriterium. Reinbek bei Hamburg
1994, p. 23.
200 Cf. Quante, M.: Personales Leben und menschlicher Tod. Personale Identität als Prinzip der
biomedizinischen Ethik. Frankfurt a. M. 2002.
201 Cf. ibid., p. 148.
202 Ibid., p. 132.
203 Cf. ibid., p. 153.
204 Cf. also: Roth, G./Dicke, U.: Das Hirntodproblem aus der Sicht der Hirnforschung. In: Hoff,
J./In Der Schmiten, J. (Eds.): Wann ist der Mensch tot? Organverpflanzung und »Hirn-
tod«-Kriterium. Reinbek bei Hamburg 1994, pp. 51–59; Roth, G.: Aus Sicht des Gehirns.
Frankfurt a. M. 2003, pp. 192 f.
205 Hoff, J./In Der Schmitten, J.: Kritik der »Hirntod«-Konzeption. Plädoyer für ein menschen-
würdiges Todeskriterium. In: Hoff, J./In Der Schmitten, J. (Eds.): Wann ist der Mensch tot?
Organverpflanzung und »Hirntod«-Kriterium. Reinbek bei Hamburg 1994, p. 185.
206 Schlake, H,-P./Roosen, K.: Der Hirntod als der Tod des Menschen. Würzburg 22001, p. 77.
 6. The mind-brain paradigm as a threat       325

Do they not also belong to us as personal living beings? In the light of these numer-
ous manifestations of life, is it right to claim that conscious processes constitute the
entire person? Is it a scientific fact that we should be equated with our conscious
mental manifestations of life?
Most authors who welcome the concept of brain death locate mental manifesta-
tions of life in the cerebrum or claim that brain processes and mental manifestations
of life are one and the same. Other authors say that the brain dead are without a soul,
since they are missing the essential of man. These statements show a careless igno-
rance of the lived body. The manifestations of life the »brain dead« can still perform
cannot be explained without a »dynamic auto-organization and integration of the
whole living organism« and differ from the mere »dynamic auto-organization and
integration of the entire living organism207 and differ from the mere existence of a
stone or a planet. We definitely must assume that those who have been declared dead
are still alive. Their organism still has shape, structure and continuity. We can also
speak of entelechy, i. e. of a life principle. The meaning of hylemorphism is apparent
precisely in these important bioethical questions. In the chapter on re-discovering the
lived body, we concluded that in the meeting between people it is not the brain or the
consciousness that is in the foreground, but the lived body. It is our lived body that
makes it possible for us to meet each other. This can also be linked to the question at
hand. I meet even irreversibly comatose persons in the shape of their lived bodies.
When I take hold of the hand of such a person, it definitely feels very different from
the hand of corpse in the coffin. For as long as not all vital functions have been dis-
tinguished, we are still dealing with a lived body that we must respect.
Hans Jonas presents us with the following situation: Let us assume the brain dead
have to serve as objects for certain experiments for years and perhaps decades, or
junior medical students would be permitted to perform their first operations on
them. This would be an attractive proposition because we would have the benefits
of a living donor without the disadvantages imposed by this person’s rights and
interests.208 Young students would have the advantage of amputating in vivo with-
out being afraid of making mistakes.209 Can that be desirable? Jonas then reminds
continues:

»All patients must be certain that their physicians do not become their executioners,
and that there is no definition that will ever allow them to become hangmen. The pa-
tients’ right to this security is absolute, and equally absolute is their right to their own
lived bodies with all their organs. Absolute recognition of this right does not breach
other’s right, because nobody has a right to another person’s lived body. To speak of
another religious spirit, when a person passes away, such a person should be protected
by piety and protected against exploitation.«210

207 Seifert, J.: Das Leib-Seele-Problem und die gegenwärtige philosophische Diskussion. Eine
­systematisch-kritische Analyse. Darmstadt 21989, p. 242.
208 Cf. Jonas, H.: Technik, Medizin und Ethik. Zur Praxis des Prinzips Verantwortung. Frankfurt
a. M. 1987, p. 232.
209 Cf. ibid., p. 232.
210 Ibid., p. 223.
326       D. Lived body and soul or mind and brain?

When humans are declared to be brain-dead, the dying process has begun. Dying
is part of our life. That sounds ambivalent. On the one hand, this statement incudes
the simple fact that we all must die some day, also the proponents of the brain death
concept. On the other hand, it means that the dying person does not yet belong to
the community of those who have already died, and death is more than one of our
organs in our organism being unable to function.211 Thus, Johannes Hoff and Jürgen
in der Schmitten speak of »a humane understanding of death.«212 The question as
to the time when a person is dead must not be decided according to opportunistic
benchmarks. We can say a person has died when all his organism’s life processes
have ceased. That is when the organism no longer has entelechy, no longer possesses
a soul. Even with the support of computers and imaging techniques, the exact mo-
ment cannot be predicted. According to Jonas, this lack of clarity is »the final state of
unknowing the boundary between life and death. Here, the assumption of life should
be given priority and the temptation should be resisted to pragmatically claim that
the person is dead.«213

211 Josef Seifert names three important ontic and epistemological aspects of death, which are
overlooked in the definition of brain death. »It fails to recognize the objective ontic struc-
ture of death. Instead, it identifies death which cannot be directly empirically determined
with the irreversible collapse of brain function. [...] It further forgets that we do not know
anything about the chronological coinciding of brain death with real death. It does not
remember that ontic death can neither be measured directly nor can it be perceived. [...]
Finally, this definition does not recognize the strong reasons which speak against such a
chronological coinciding or brain death with real ontological death.« (Seifert, J.: Das Leib-
Seele-Problem und die gegenwärtige philosophische Diskussion. Eine systematisch-kritische
Analyse. Darmstadt 21989, p. 246).
212 Hoff, J./In Der Schmitten, J.: Kritik der »Hirntod«-Konzeption. Plädoyer für ein menschen-
würdiges Todeskriterium. In: Hoff, J./In Der Schmitten, J. (Eds.): Wann ist der Mensch tot?
Organverpflanzung und »Hirntod«-Kriterium. Reinbek bei Hamburg 1994, p. 199.
213 Jonas, H.: Brief an Hans-Bernhard Wuermeling. In: Hoff, J./In Der Schmitten, J. (Eds.):
Wann ist der Mensch tot? Organverpflanzung und Hirntodkriterium. Reinbek bei Hamburg
1994, pp. 24 f.
Jonas suggests the determination of characterstics such as: brain death plus heart death
plus any other indication (Jonas, H.: Technik, Medizin und Ethik. Zur Praxis des Prinzips
Verantwortung. Frankfurt a. M. 1987, p. 222, cf. also p. 233)
»One can only speak of the death of an organism as a whole when all vital functions have
ceased on the level of the organism as a whole.« (Hoff, J./In Der Schmitten, J.: Kritik der
»Hirntod«-Konzeption. Plädoyer für ein menschenwürdiges Todeskriterium. In: Hoff, J./In
Der Schmitten, J. (Eds.): Wann ist der Mensch tot? Organverpflanzung und »Hirntod«-Krit-
erium. Reinbek bei Hamburg 1994, p. 222).
 6. The mind-brain paradigm as a threat       327

Conclusion

»By this I recognize a most learned lord!

What you can’t feel lies miles abroad,
What you can’t grasp, you think, is done with
too.
What you don’t count on can’t be true,
What you can’t weigh won’t weigh, of old,
What you don’t coin: that can’t be gold.«214

In the present chapter, we confronted two decisive thought patterns about the un-
derstanding of man within the present discussion involving brain research, neuro-
philosophy, and philosophy of mind, and we scrutinized these with regard to their
consequences. In the mind-brain paradigm, the brain is regarded as what consti-
tutes our being human and alive. The brain is sometimes even expected to bring
forth the world in which we live. The dialogue with such a position is how we began
this chapter this chapter. We looked closely at the Babylonian linguistic confusion
which appears in these discussions.Then, various misapprehensions, typical for the
mind-brain paradigm, became the center of our discussions. The terminological er-
rors, which are found so frequently in the current debate, indicate that a very pecu-
liar view of the brain has emerged that has little to do with any facts of the natural
­sciences. An immense problem of the mind-brain paradigm is found in the fact
authors have lost sight of the living organismic whole. There is an assumption that
it is sufficient to carefully research and analyze neuronal processes to understand
mental manifestations of life, to discover who we are. This topic was discussed based
on the beginnings of human existence and the definition of brain death. Regarding
the question of lived body and soul or mind and brain? and against the background
of a hylemorphistic philosophy and the suggested lived body phenomenology, a case
was made for a personal understanding of human beings as a living unity of lived
body and soul. A mind-brain model has a multitude of negative consequences (e. g.
with regard to social interaction or the protection of life). An effort must therefore
be made to overcome this paradigm.

214 Goethe, J. W.: Faust II, 4917–4922.

E. Brain research and the question of
human freedom

»Whenever you so wish, at any moment,

You can discover that your will is free.«1

7. Threatened liberty
»He created humanity at the beginning, and
left it to the power of its own choice.«2

7.1 Preliminary remarks and problem definition

»Be careful, however, that the exercise of your

rights does not become a stumbling block to
the weak.«3

In the last chapter of this study, the main focus is to be on the freedom of human be-
ings against the background of neuroscientific research. The question what the word
freedom means is not new. Many clever thoughts on the subject have been presented
throughout the history of philosophy, which does not mean, however, that Impor-
tant traditional arguments have always been taken seriously and used fruitfully in
current debates. It is definitely an extremely important question because it demands
that we take a position in terms of who we are and who we want to be.4

1 Schiller, F.: Maria Stuart. 2. Act, Scene II, 3.

2 Jesus Sirach 15,14.
3 1 Cor 8,9.
4 As introduction to the topic: Jaspers, K.: Existenzerhellung. Philosophie II. Berlin/Göttingen/
Heidelberg 41973, esp. pp. 163–200; Coreth, E.: Vom Sinn der Freiheit. Innsbruck/Vienna
1985; Nagel, T.: Willensfreiheit. In: Nagel, T.: Was bedeutet das alles? Eine ganz kurze Ein-
führung in die Philosophie. Stuttgart 1990, pp. 41–50; Walter, H.: Die Freiheit des Determin-
isten. Chaos und Neurophilosophie. In: Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 50 (1996),
pp. 364–385; Walter, H.: Neurophilosophie der Willensfreiheit. Von libertarischen Illusionen
zum Konzept natürlicher Autonomie. Paderborn (et al.) 1998; Goller, H.: Fiktive Freiheit?
Die Willensfreiheit aus der Sicht der Hirnforschung. In: Herder Korrespondenz 55 (2001),
pp. 418–422; Geyer, C. (Ed.): Hirnforschung und Willensfreiheit. Zur Deutung der neuesten
330       E. Brain research and the question of human freedom

In modern philosophy, according to Vittorio Hösle, three factors can be identified

which have especially contributed to drawing attention to the topic of determinism
and freedom.5 He calls the first factor the theological factor, meaning that we regard
the world as a unit in which man lives – based on faith in one omnipotent and om-
niscient God – imagined as vouched for and guaranteed only through one consistent
causality. As the second factor he regards contemporary science and the assumption
that mechanical principles can be applied everywhere. As another factor he sees the
new role of the »ego« which sees itself confronted by an (apparently) determinist na-
ture. He tells us that »it is precisely this cruel irony that the »ego« sees itself overtaken
in its rule over nature that gives this problem its main meaning and that explains the
often irrational irritability with which it is being discussed.«6
Thanks to the advances made in the neurosciences, the exchange of opinions
concerning a possible determination of Homo sapiens has received new input. In
particular, the present debate concerns the question whether our actions are deter-
mined or not and whether it is somehow possible to find definite proof of this. Can
we call humans »free?« Or are we mistaken, and is the word »freedom« regard, and
the word »freedom« an empty promise and a »useful fiction«,7 an impressive idea,
but in the end no more than a figment of our imagination? Does it exist or not? And
if we in fact are endowed with the gift of freedom, is it the freedom which Ferdinand
Hucho8 means, for example, a phenomenon that we can grasp and totally under-
stand through scientific projects, possibly when neuroscientists are ambitiously at

Experimente. Frankfurt a. M. 2004; Hermanni, F./Koslowski, P. (Eds.): Der freie und der un-
freie Wille. Philosophische und theologische Perspektiven. Munich 2004; Lüke, U.: Zur Frei-
heit determiniert – zur Determination befreit? In: Stimmen der Zeit 222 (2004), pp. 610–622;
Pauen, M.: Illusion Freiheit? Mögliche und unmögliche Konsequenzen der Hirnforschung.
Frankfurt a. M. 2004; Rosenberger, M.: Die Freiheit fühlen. Theologische Anmerkungen
zum Determinismus. In: Lederhilger, S.: Seele, wo bist du? Hirnforschung und Menschen-
bild. Frankfurt a. M. 2004, pp. 69–91; Schockenhoff, E.: Beruht die Willensfreiheit auf einer
Illusion? Hirnforschung und Ethik im Dialog. In: Vorträge der Aeneas-Silvius-Stiftung an
der Universität Basel. 2004; Searle, J.: Freedom And Neurobiology. Reflections on Free will,
Language, and Political Power. New York 2007; Linke, D. B.: Die Freiheit und das Gehirn.
Eine neurophilosophische Ethik. Munich 2005; Nida-Rümelin, J.: Aufsätze zur Willensfrei-
heit. Stuttgart 2005; Pauen, M.: Willensfreiheit. http://www.philosophieverstaendlich.de/
freiheit/aktuell/libet.html (retrieved 6. August 2006); Köchy, K./Stederoth, D. (Eds.): Wil-
lensfreiheit als interdisziplinäres Problem. Freiburg i. Br./Munich 2006; Seebass, G.: Hand-
lung und Freiheit. Philosophische Aufsätze. Tübingen 2006; Boeddinghaus, J.: Wer entschei-
det: Mein Gehirn oder Ich? Die Möglichkeit der freien Entscheidung bei Augustinus und in
den Neurowissenschaften. Freiburg i. Br. 2007; Schockenhoff, E.: Theologie der Freiheit. Frei-
burg/Basel/Vienna 2007; Zaborowski, H.: Herausforderungen der Freiheit. In: Communio 2
(2008), pp. 131–154; Zunke, C.: Kritik der Hirnforschung. Neurophysiologie und Willensfrei-
heit. Berlin 2008.
5 Cf. Hösle, V.: Philosophiegeschichte und objektiver Idealismus. Munich 1996, p. 23.
6 Ibid., p. 23.
7 Cf. Herrmann, T.: Willensfreiheit – eine nützliche Fiktion? In: Cranach, M./Foppa, K. (Eds.):
Freiheit des Entscheidens und Handelns. Ein Problem der nomologischen Psychologie. Frank-
furt a. M. 1996, pp. 56–69.
8 Cf. Hucho, F.: Das Elend mit dem Reduktionismus. Die molekulare Ebene des Problems der
Willensfreiheit. In: Köchy, K./Stederoth, D. (Eds.): Willensfreiheit als interdisziplinäres Pro­
blem. Freiburg/Munich 2006, p. 50.
 7. Threatened liberty       331

work? Are the reasoning strategies correct that are used by »freedom skeptics« and
»friends of determinism«? Are their explanation attempts useful and convincing?
And very importantly: What is the significance of those neuroscientific experiments,
which are discussed everywhere with apparent interest and commitment (and which
we should therefore be discussing here as well)? Where can we search for freedom?
And if we should indeed be free, what is the extent of our freedom? Can we who
live in the 21st century really (scientifically) claim that we can take responsibility for
something, or should we remove that word from our vocabulary and »blame« our
brain for everything?9 These are a lot of questions showing that we still have much
to do in this final chapter.
In the Manifest of Brain Researchers, we are told bluntly that the neuroscientific
profession has the necessary competence to answer the entire bundle of questions
posed here. (This is a subtle but distinct confirmation of into what discipline these
issues actually belong, and who is authorized to comment on that.) Not only are the
signatories of the Manifest publicly known for saying that what happens in a person’s
skull determines that person completely, but they are also in demand as speakers at
congresses and conferences and for interviews in the press and on TV. Again and
again, they join the chorus chanting that there is no such thing as freedom. The
brain does everything. We are predetermined beings. The position they take begs the
question why we should even do this research project which should prove that all
is determined. Is this done voluntarily? Or is this determined as well? Couldn’t we
instead commit ourselves to other topics, working groups and major projects? Those
who love freedom may well wonder if they wait patiently whether they too will be
presented with a task that can prove that there is no other possibility than to take up
this project and reach a similar conclusion.
We all know questions such as these: »Why did you do this?« »Why did you not
visit me?« »Wouldn’t have been possible for you to help me when I was in need?«
Admittedly, all these questions sound a little accusing, but in every case someone is
blaming someone else. In all these questions, we hear that we are dealing with an-
other person who is free, who can be held responsible for what has or has not been
done. Try to remember the answers you last gave in response to such questions. I
suspect your response was similar to mine. When somebody asks me to give a reason
for my behavior – e. g. why I didn’t visit them for a cup of coffee – I assume that I

9 The following works provide insight into the topics concerned with ethics and criminal law:
Schockenhoff, E.: Wer oder was handelt? Überlegungen zum Dialog zwischen Neurobiologie
und Ethik. In: Rager, G. (Ed.): Ich und mein Gehirn. Persönliches Erleben, verantwortliches
Handeln und objektive Wissenschaft. Freiburg/Munich 2000, pp. 239–287; Burkhart, B./
Merkel, R.: Reparaturanstalt für verletzte Normen. In: Könneker, C. (Ed.): Wer erklärt den
Menschen? Hirnforscher, Psychologen und Philosophen im Dialog. Frankfurt a. M. 22007,
pp. 158–164; Schockenhoff, E.: Theologie der Freiheit. Freiburg/Basel/Vienna 2007; Merkel,
R.: Handlungsfreiheit, Willensfreiheit und strafrechtliche Schuld. In: Holderegger, A./
Sitter-Liver, B./Hess, C. W./Rager, G. (Eds.): Hirnforschung und Menschenbild. Beiträge zur
interdisziplinären Verständigung. Fribourg 2007, pp. 317–348; Tag, B.: Neurowissenschaft
und Strafrecht. In: Holderegger, A./Sitter-Liver, B./Hess, C. W./Rager, G. (Eds.): Hirn-
forschung und Menschenbild. Beiträge zur interdisziplinären Verständigung. Fribourg 2007,
pp. 349–366.
332       E. Brain research and the question of human freedom

could have acted differently from the way in which I did act – I preferred to read a
book. This also applies to the more difficult questioner who could otherwise have
decided not to ask the question. In this vein, Aristotle writes that where we have the
freedom to act, we are also free not to act.10 Our daily lives prove that Aristotle is
right – and not only when we think about refusing the invitation to come for a cup
of coffee. But, could it be that in the light of neuroscientific experiments, a change
of course is necessary? What determines our actions? What can we say about our
decisions? Does the cerebrum determine what our next action should be – e. g. to
continue reading, to skip a few pages or to take a rest? How does our will actually
achieve something and bring it about? Is it even possible for the will to do so? In the
present chapter I will try to throw some light on the matter.

7.2 The question of freedom as a multi-layered affair

»The contracts have been signed.

We laugh a lot.
Have something sweet for dessert.
Freedom. Freedom.«

The above is a free translation of the well-known German song, Freiheit [Freedom]
by Marius Müller Westernhagen. It seems to appeal to the attitude and taste of many
fellow citizens The second verse tells us in sober tones that freedom is all that is
missing. The song ends with the call that all who dream of freedom should not forget
to celebrate. They should dance on graves. Freedom. Freedom. It is all that counts.
The last line is repeated, that freedom is all that counts. Freedom, we see here, is a
basic concept, an underlying melody in our thinking and in the manner in which we
deal with each other. It is clear that freedom has varying facets. We speak of freedom
of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of opinion, freedom of movement. When
these freedoms are not provided in country, we could congregate in the streets and
squares of a large city and sing the song of Westernhagen and demand – possibly by
endangering our lives – that something be changed about the present situation and
that these forms of freedom be granted.11 We can also imagine a young doctoral

10 Aristotle: EN 1113b6.
11 The Nazi regime, Stalinist Russia, Maoist China are all examples of countries in which this
freedom obtains a zero. »It is the ambition of totalitarian regimes to manage all human
activities and to leave nothing to individual choice.« (Kołakowski, L.: Mini-Traktate über
Maxi-Themen. Leipzig 22001, p. 74 f.).
Leszek Kołakowski points out that especially the proponents of socialism believe that in the
legal sense freedom is both unimportant and negligible if the other needs, e. g., the provi-
sion of foodstuffs are not met. »It is true that hunger is a more urgent feeling than the lack
of political freedoms. When these freedoms exist, however, then the hungry unemployed
have a far better chance to change their lot. Then, they are able to unite in the struggle to
change their fate. They can unite in their fight for their interests and their claiming of rights
insofar as they feel hard done by.« (ibid., p. 77). According to Kolakowski, it is irresponsible
to confuse freedom with various goods. »It is after all possible to imagine a concentration
camp in which there is no hunger. But, it would be risky to claim that this concentration
 7. Threatened liberty       333

student marching in front of research laboratories carrying placards demanding free

will, loudly shouting for it. Such an action would be met with surprise and confusion.
We would soon question the mental health of such a person. We therefore see that
freedom of will is somewhat different from the other freedoms named here.
It seems to be part of our humanity that we sing the Song of Freedom. When we
enter the term »Freiheit« (freedom) in the Google search engine, we find more than
47 million entries. In English, the term »freedom« occurs about 645 million times.
Again and again, we can experience what it means to be free. For example, then when
we know we have done something correctly. If I am honest with myself, I know that
whatever action I have taken cannot be separated from other basic realities in my
life. Generally, when we speak of freedom, we refer to »a freedom from« or »freedom
of« something. History books tell us that the GDR was not free from spying. In the
news, we hear again and again that certain countries are not free from corruption.
In a hospital, a physician will be happy when a patient is finally free of fever and on
the way to recovery. According to Robert Spaemann, what restricts people – spying,
corruption, fever – must be recognized as a real possibility so that being free of it can
be accepted. »This restriction must either have been previously present, must appear
to be a threat, must be perceived as a reality in other people’s lives, i. e. others with
whose reality we can compare the non-impairment.«12
It is also possible that we use the concept »free« or »freedom« in various life
situations which, at first glance, do not have many contact points.13 An example
often used in the history of philosophy is that of a prisoner, a person who has been
locked up and who cannot take a single step outside his prison world.14 We would
not hesitate to say that such a person is not free. Many restrictions limit him. Yet, if
we imagine the faces of Edith Stein, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Nikolaus Groß, François
Xavier Nguyên Van Thuan, Alois Andritzki, Maximilian Kolbe, or Nelson Mande-
la, it becomes clear that being locked up in prison, being deprived of so many life
opportunities that we take for granted in our daily lives, helplessness with regard
to external forces does not necessarily mean that we have been dispossessed of all
freedom in this life situation. It was precisely there where the above named became
people of freedom.

camp ensures that those in it are guaranteed certain freedoms whereas a liberal state order
guarantees others.« (ibid., p. 77).
Political freedom is characterized by legal laws that exist in the interplay of freedom and
authority. Jaspers emphasizes that both belong together. It is precisely this interplay that can
be derailed when authority becomes violent and freedom is confused with arbitrariness.
»The individual who has no authority and thus becomes capricious does not know what
is needed. Authority without freedom lets violence turn into terror.« (Jaspers, K.: Freiheit
und Autorität. In: Jaspers, K.: Das Wagnis der Freiheit. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Philosophie.
Munich/Zurich 1996, p. 149).
12 Spaemann, R.: Personen. Versuch über den Unterschied zwischen »etwas« und »jemand«.
Stuttgart 21998, p. 209.
13 Regarding the lingistic ambivalence of freedom terminology: Schockenhoff, E.: Theologie
der Freiheit. Freiburg/Basel/Vienna 2007, pp. 12 f.; Schockenhoff, E.: Beruht die Willens-
freiheit auf einer Illusion? Hirnforschung und Ethik im Dialog. In: Vorträge der Aeneas-Silvi-
us-Stiftung an der Universität Basel. 2004, pp. 5–11.
14 Cf. ibid., p. 5.
334       E. Brain research and the question of human freedom

While I was doing my doctorate, I was introduced to a woman who was convinced
that her behavior was guided by foreign powers. She was diagnosed as suffering from
schizophrenia and committed to a geronto-psychiatric institution. She was subject
to internal compulsions that had a massive effect on her life, and on the life of her
immediate neighbors. This woman can definitely not be characterized as being free,
since she was in no position either to question rationally what motivated her or how
she should orient her life.
Without a doubt, there can always be a temptation to take leave of our freedom.
For example, when due to provocative behavior, possibly also the lack of my oppo-
site’s lack of education, my willingness to engage in an honest dialogue fades, and
since I know I will not be able to make progress by intellectual means, I try to enforce
my arguments violently. We should not underestimate the price we pay in such a
case. As I violate another person’s freedom, my own freedom vanishes as well.15
The multi-layered nature of the debate concerning the topic of »freedom« should
not be underestimated.

7.3 How to see the current free-will debate in a wider context

»The idea of free decisions and the idea of

responsibility or our own actions
are very closely connected with each other.«16

No one would deny that in modern western societies there are obviously more exten-
sive freedom areas than were available to the generations before us.17 For example, in
the past, it could not be taken for granted that people could work in the occupation
they wanted. The work world has changed drastically. Not long ago it was completely
unthinkable that a woman should serve in the military, and it is only since the early
20th century that a university career has been possible for women. People did not

15 Cf. Jaspers, K.: Über Gefahren und Chancen der Freiheit. In: Jaspers, K.: Das Wagnis der
Freiheit. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Philosophie. Munich/Zurich 1996, p. 130 f.
16 Bieri, P.: Das Handwerk der Freiheit. Über die Entdeckung des freien Willens. Munich/
Vienna 42005, p. 21.
17 Cf. Habermas, J.: Die Moderne – ein unvollendetes Projekt. In: Habermas, J.: Kleine politische
Schriften. Frankfurt a. M. 1981, pp. 444–464; Schockenhoff, E.: Theologie der Freiheit. Frei-
burg/Basel/Vienna 2007, pp. 17–23.
In this context, Michael Pauen presents an interesting thought. He makes the point that
»if we were truly not able to deal appropriately with freedom and responsibility, then in-
stitutions and societies which grant individuals only a small amount of freedom and re-
sponsibility would be more successful than societies that are more generous in this respect.
The former would minimize the errors that would result given the greater responsibility
given to individuals in a free society.« (Pauen, M.: Was ist der Mensch? Die Entdeckung
der Natur des Geistes. Munich 2007, p. 162). He finally arrives at the conclusion that the
development of western society during the last decades and centuries has shown that the
latitude granted by freedom has resulted in success. »It would therefore be strange« Pauen
tells us »when one of the central preconditions of this strategy should prove to be totally
erroneous.« (ibid., p. 162).
 7. Threatened liberty       335

always have an opportunity to learn to read and write. Many questions and deci-
sions were often determined by birth and family circumstances. Sometimes this also
applied to the choice of a marriage partner. In 21st century Germany, things are very
different. Today’s population is faced with the task of making their own life choices.
For people like us, not everything but an extremely large choice is available including
things people before us could not even dream of. It is precisely this situation that
shows how important it is to have a sensible approach to our own life or – as Edith
Stein said: to »self-education.«18 It is possible that some of our contemporaries so
concentrated on »setting the course« that they lose sight of the bigger picture.
For most people, their daily lives look different in the 21st century that in earlier
times: telephone, television and the Internet are now constantly bombarding us with
information. We must »filter,« separate the wheat from the chaff. Newly-won tech-
nical possibilities can help us to penetrating new areas of freedom, but they can also
greatly restrict our freedom. For example, a smart phone lets us call for help in an
emergency, but we can also use it to control partners and friends. It really does not
give us greater freedom to telephone a friend while waiting in line at a supermarket
counter but not to pay the slightest attention to the people around us. That is why in
discussions about our freedom, we often hear the terms insecurity of freedom, pres-
sure of freedom or challenge of freedom.19 »This means that theoretically we experi-
ence ever more possibilities to organize our lives, while on the other hand, more and
more responsibility is demanded of us, whether we want it or not.«20 In the words
of a famous quote of George Bernard Shaw: »Liberty means responsibility. That is
why most men dread it.«
Even in the Bible we read of intimidation and insecurity in the face of freedom.
The people of Israel »murmured« during the exodus from Egypt as they became
skeptical about their newfound freedom: »And the whole congregation of the children
of Israel murmured against Moses and Aaron in the wilderness: And the children
of Israel said unto them, Would to God we had died by the hand of the Lord in the
land of Egypt, when we sat by the flesh pots, and when we did eat bread to the full;
for ye have brought us forth into this wilderness, to kill this whole assembly with
hunger.«21
It was a freedom that provoked, challenged and motivated, a freedom that is was
not perceived as beneficial (as opening future opportunities), but a a burden and as
unpleasant (»it was better in Egypt«).

18 Stein, E.: AMP, p. 16.

19 Cf. Zaborowski, H.: Herausforderungen der Freiheit. In: Communio 2 (2008), pp. 131–154;
Walter, H./Goschke, T.: Autonomie und Selbstkontrolle. Bausteine für eine naturalistische
Konzeption von Willensfreiheit. In: Köchy, K./Stederoth, D. (Eds.): Willensfreiheit als inter-
disziplinäres Problem. Freiburg/Munich 2006, pp. 103–142, esp. pp. 103–105; Hermenau,
F.: Impuls und Reflexion. Adorno über Willensfreiheit. In: Köchy, K./Stederoth, D. (Eds.):
Willensfreiheit als interdisziplinäres Problem. Freiburg/Munich 2006, pp. 347–358.
20 Walter, H./Goschke, T.: Autonomie und Selbstkontrolle. Bausteine für eine naturalistische
Konzeption von Willensfreiheit. In: Köchy, K./Stederoth, D. (Eds.): Willensfreiheit als inter­
disziplinäres Problem. Freiburg/Munich 2006, p. 104.
21 Cf. Ex 16, 1–36.
336       E. Brain research and the question of human freedom

In the summer of 1990, following the new freedom many people had fought for
and won in Czechoslovakia, Václaw Havel famously spoke of »The fear of freedom«,
a freedom experienced as an unwelcome and disagreeable challenge. Joachim Gauck,
who was appointed to oversee the dismantling of East German State Security Service
(STASI) and who in 2010 became President of the Federal Republic of Germany,
formulated: »Freedom is strenuous and difficult. Freedom requires that we make
decisions, that we choose. This is not easy for everyone, and for some it seems im-
possible. We may win, but we may also fail.«22 Gauck addressed the possibility of
failure and that many people do not know how to handle the gift of freedom. They
experience freedom as excessively demanding. Gauck pointed out that »every step
in the direction of a self-directed life is threatened by new insecurities. Every newly
gained freedom appears to be an unbearable burden. Freedom can be a source of
suffering.«23
Karl Jaspers, one of the great »freedom thinkers« of our time, observed with great
insight that there are people who experience »freedom as violence in which they par-
ticipate while suffering it and passing it on.«24 In that sense, it is not implausible that
the modern tendency to be bewitched by freedom’s swan song is related to the wish
to have nothing more to do with freedom’s provocative, demanding and challenging
nature.25 In such a scenario, the impotence preached by some neuroscientists is
constructive and brings joy. It means that we no longer need to take responsibility
for our actions. It is, after all, a fact that modern brain research gives us the same
message. »We can read it in black and white in the paper! Everything will be OK. The
good news is: I am not free! So stop talking about freedom!«
Perhaps some people argue against freedom because they experience it as un-
pleasant and very difficult. We can formulate it this way: Better to dissociate our-
selves from freedom than to say yes to life and to take responsibility for it. Holger
Zaborowski correctly pointed out that such an attitude – a mantra-like denial of
freedom – can be understood as a crisis of guilt about something that has been con-
firmed by sociologists and psychologists. Zaborowski writes:

»In the event that freedom is a given, the sense of guilt and responsibility can, at best, be
repressed. It is then that it makes itself known as repressed consciousness. If, however,
there is no freedom, if freedom is in fact an illusion, then it is not necessary to repress

22 http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article7922299/Freiheit-ist-anstrengend-denn-
man-muss-waehlen.html (retrieved 10 June 2010).
23 http://www.welt.de/politik/article3622396/Warum-nur-lieben-wir-unsere-Freiheit-nicht.
html (retrieved 10 June 2010).
24 Cf. Jaspers, K.: Über Gefahren und Chancen der Freiheit. In: Jaspers, K.: Das Wagnis der
Freiheit. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Philosophie. Munich/Zurich 1996, p. 128.
25 Jaspers, Sartre, and also Zaborowski, have gone to great lengths to portray the retreat into
un-freedom that is being explored here as a response to the imposition of freedom. Cf.
Sartre, J.-P.: Das Sein und das Nichts. Versuch einer phänomenologischen Ontologie. Ham-
burg 1962, pp. 84 and 699; Jaspers, K.: Existenzerhellung. Philosophie II. Berlin/Göttingen/
Heidelberg 41973, pp. 183–186; cf. also Jaspers, K.: Über Gefahren und Chancen der Freiheit.
In: Jaspers, K.: Das Wagnis der Freiheit. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Philosophie. Munich/Zu-
rich 1996, p. 128; Zaborowski, H.: Herausforderungen der Freiheit. In: Communio 2 (2008),
pp. 131–154.
 7. Threatened liberty       337

our sense of guilt, because then our sense of guilt, our bad conscience, as well as our
taking responsibility for our own actions, is likewise as much of an illusion as freedom
is.«26

Zaborowski also points to another aspect: In the presence of others, we are never
one thousand percent certain of what they are thinking, saying or doing. Testing
and calculating reaches a very definite limit in our interaction with others. If we
deny freedom to the other person, we still don’t know what the other person is
thinking, saying, or doing. We can, however, view and categorize the other person
very differently:

»With this the actions of the other person at least become predictable and controllable.
They lose the fear-creating quality which they have for as long as they are generated
from within their own freedom. If the other person has no freedom, then all actions are
scientifically re-constructible generalities. They are no longer an expression of a scien-
tifically definable special characteristic.«27

In this modern age, we face numerous questions and possibilities. Yet, freedom for
adults is not simply random, as Schockenhoff notes:

»The ability to attain moral self-determination does not develop at the same pace as
external freedom. As a consequence, many forfeit the freedoms guaranteed them by
the state and turn their personal freedom over to anonymous institutions (trendsetters,
spin doctors, societal role expectations).«28

Mutually hostile twins are heard again and again in modern discussions:29 We as-
sume that freedom does exist, but that it has nothing to do with others or with limits
and conditions. This twin regards freedom as unrestricted, absolute and nothing else,
that there is no other way to discuss this. The other twin proclaims that what we call
freedom is no more than wishful thinking, that there is no freedom! We are deter-
mined! These twins continuously quarrel and claim that only their own position is
valid. We will still have to debate the question whether question we need to ask is
whether there is an alternative and what it might look like.

26 Zaborowski, H.: Herausforderungen der Freiheit. In: Communio 2 (2008), p. 144.

27 Ibid., p. 145.
28 Schockenhoff, E.: Beruht die Willensfreiheit auf einer Illusion? Hirnforschung und Ethik im
Dialog. In: Vorträge der Aeneas-Silvius-Stiftung an der Universität Basel. 2004, p. 10.
29 Cf. also Zaborowski, H.: Herausforderungen der Freiheit. In: Communio 2 (2008), p. 133.
338       E. Brain research and the question of human freedom

7.4 About the »able to choose« freedom and the »able to act«

freedom

»I sit here very quietly. There are two practical

possibilities to consider. Now I
have made the choice, made the decision: I
throw my head back and jump up briskly.«30

A look at the history of philosophy shows that philosophers have always talked of
freedom of action as well as of freedom of the will. We should consider what is meant
here. Let us look first at freedom of action. In a few words, we can say that we speak
of "able to act" freedom [Tunkönnen]. I can do something, I am able to bring about, to
really accomplish something. For example, I can intend to write a dissertation about
the lived body-soul problem. My freedom to act would be expressed when I sit at my
desk and begin to write a few pages.
Yet, we all realize again and again that there are limits to what we can do. I cannot
put everything I know about this topic or what I have learned about this topic into
this one thesis. I also do not have unlimited time to put it all on paper. Of course,
certain conditions are necessary to enable me to actually accomplish anything. For
example, it is helpful to have the relevant literature handy or to have Internet access.
If I had a contagious disease, it would prevent me from leaving my bed, and I would
not be able to concentrate on this topic and to write about it.
Due to their position and due to their social and religious status, the German
Chancellor or the Pope have very different ways in which to act than a doctoral phi-
losophy student does. What is possible for me these days was not always possible and
may develop differently in the future. I remember my 18th birthday when I realized
very concretely that my scope of action had widened. I was allowed to take the test
for my drivers’ license, to donate blood, and to become politically active. That was a
lot, even though I still couldn’t become German Chancellor or drive a locomotive.
But there is more to life than the budding of youth. I know many elderly people
needing nursing care whose possibilities to act are not great. We can say quite gen-
erally: There are a several life situations in which the radius for our freedom of doing
something varies. We have the freedom to act, but, as Schockenhoff emphasizes, it
does not cover the entire scope of freedom.31
Our second term is called the »able to choose« freedom [Wollenkönnen]. It con-
cerns the exploration of whether our intention to act can be called free: When I
stand at the crossroads of life asking myself which way to go, Route A or B, when
either route is theoretically available (e. g. to write a doctoral dissertation or to do
something else).32 My »able to choose« freedom is expressed when I am truly able

30 Stein, E.: PE, p. 72.

31 Cf. Schockenhoff, E.: Theologie der Freiheit. Freiburg/Basel/Vienna 2007, p. 109.
32 Spaemann tells us: »Whoever attributes freedom of will to human beings indicates that
human beings are themselves the cause of their acting-in-this-manner-and-not differently.
Such action is not merely the result of antecedent conditions, which because they occurred
in the past are beyond our influence. These actions imply that human beings take respon-
 8. The Libet experiments       339

to choose Route A, and if this is not imposed upon me from the outside or by my
cerebrum.
Considering the advances made in the neurosciences, we are today facing the
question whether it is possible to act differently and who should be called the origi-
nator of the action: the alive lived body/soul-endowed person or the mind and brain?
We hope for a helpful answer by looking at various experiments.

8. The Libet experiments

»When the great innovation appears it will
seem to be confusing and strange.
This innovation will not be properly under-
stood by the person who discovered it. For
others it will be a puzzle. Any idea that at first
does not seem odd is hopeless.«33

8.1 Mind Time

»The question regarding freedom of will is at

the root of our perception
concerning the nature of human beings.«34

What can we say concerning the interaction between preparing a motoric ac-
tion, our conscious purpose of doing something and the actual implementation?
This question is addressed by the research program and lifework of Benjamin Li-
bet, who conducted numerous experiments trying to answer it. He published
his work in the 1980s, and it is still being discussed today in connection with
the subject of freedom.35 Damasio, for example, calls Libet’s work groundbreak-

sibility for who they are insofar as who they are is determined by their own actions, and by
specific decisions to act and are simultaneously decisions concerning the kind of persons
they wish to be.« (Spaemann, R.: Personen. Versuch über den Unterschied zwischen »etwas«
und »jemand«. Stuttgart 21998, p. 209).
33 Niels Bohr. Quoted by: Libet, B.: Mind Time. The Temporal Factor in Consciousness. Cam-
bridge/London 2004, p. 181.
34 Libet, B.: Mind Time. The Temporal Factor in Consciousness. Cambridge/London 2004,
p. 140.
35 Cf. Libet, B./Wright, E. W./Gleason, C. A.: Readiness-potentials preceding unrestricted ›spon-
taneous‹ vs. pre-planned voluntary acts. In: Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysi­
ology 54 (1982), pp. 322–335; Libet, B./Gleason, C. A./Wright, E. W./Pearl, K.: Time of con-
scious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential). In: Brain
106 (1983), pp. 623–642; Libet, B.: Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious
will in voluntary action. In: Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1985), pp. 529–566; Libet, B.:
The timing of a subjective experience. In: Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (1989), pp. 183–
185; Libet, B.: Neurophysiology of consciousness. Boston 1993; Libet, B.: Do we have free
340       E. Brain research and the question of human freedom

ing.36 He is not alone in believing that Libet is an exceptional figure and a pioneer
of his profession. In 2003, Libet was awarded the Virtual Nobel Prize in Psychology.
Libet describes himself as an »experimental« neurophysiologist, saying that such
a researcher is recognized by his properly conducted experiments verifiable all.37
Libet is critical of colleagues who neither plan nor conduct their experiments as he
does.38 As far as he is concerned, the battle lines are clearly drawn. His book, Mind
Time, provides impressive insight into forty years of experimental research.
According to Libet, »our subjective inner life is what really matters to us as hu-
man beings. [...] We do know that the physical brain is essential to and intimately
involved in the manifestations of our conscious, subjective experience.«39 People’s
subjective experience cannot simply »debated away«. Libet emphasizes that neuro-
scientists should take this fact seriously.40 Yet taking it seriously is not the same as
the assumption that we can put arrive at a complete neurobiological classification.
Such an undertaking is senseless and bound to fail. The knowledge of cerebral struc-
tures and functions is not enough to understand our mental manifestations of life.41
Exploring the »timing« of our conscious inner life is both interesting and leading to
new insights.
A special research interest of Libet is the question of how we are able to receive
stimuli, to process them and of course to become aware of them. He looked for the
answer by exposing the sensory cortex to electrical stimulation.42 Crick summariz-
es this undertaking very well:

»For clinical reasons, the neurosurgeon probed the exposed surface of the somatosen-
sory and related cortices with an electrode that sent pulses of current into the underly-
ing gray matter. Libet recorded the minimal current intensity, I min, below which no sen-
sation or feeling was produced, no matter how long the electrical stimulus was applied.
The nature of the sensations, as reported spontaneously by the patients, varied with
the site of the electrode and included tingling, pins and needles, prickling, vibrations,
feelings of warmth and cold, touch, movement, and pressure.«43

will? In: Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (1999), pp. 47–57; Libet, B.: The timing of mental
events: Libet’s experimental findings and their implications. In: Consciousness and Cognition
11 (2002), pp. 291–299.
36 Damasio, A.: The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Conscious-
ness. London 1999, p. 127.
37 »If a proposal or hypothesis cannot be tested in a way that could potentially falsify the
proposal then the proposer can offer any view without the possibility of its being contra-
dicted.« (Libet, B.: Mind Time. The Temporal Factor in Consciousness. Cambridge/London
2004, p. 3)
38 Cf. ibid., p. 189.
39 Ibid., p. 2.
40 Cf. ibid., pp. 5 and 18.
41 Libet himself supports an emergentist approach (Cf. ibid., pp. 203, 214). In this context a
fictitious dialog with René Descartes is well worth reading (Cf. ibid., pp. 185–198).
42 Cf. Libet, B.: Electrical stimulation of cortex in human subjects and conscious sensory aspects.
In: Iggo, A. (Ed.): Handbook of Sensory Psychology. Berlin 1973, pp. 743–790.
43 Koch, C.: The Quest for Consciousness. A Neurobiological Approach. Englewood/Colorado
2004, p. 262.
 8. The Libet experiments       341

Libet himself wrote about his approach: »Our intracranial physiological observa-
tions were directly related to reports of conscious experiences by awake human sub-
jects.«44 In his trials, Libet discovered that especially the duration of the repeated
stimuli was a very important factor for participants to become aware of what was
happening. If the stimulation was too brief, participants were not even aware of
the intervention on their cerebrum. Liber says that the »rated frequency and in-
tensity of the stimulation was less important.«45 »The brain needs a relatively long
period of appropriate activations, up to about half a second, to elicit awareness of
the event!«46 The participants could not tell Libet and his team anything when the
stimulation was under 500 ms:

»The durations of similar activations may itself be the basis [of consciousness M. K.].
That is when the duration of repetitive similar activations of appropriate neurons reach-
es a certain value, and then the phenomenon of awareness emerges.«47

According to Libet, there has to be an activation of at least 0.5 seconds on the cere-
brum (i. e. an electrical stimulation) for us even to notice. We do not become aware
of what is of shorter duration, no matter how hard we try. The defining threshold
thus seems to be at 0.5 seconds of stimulation. From these findings, Libet formulates
his scientific hypothesis. His time-on theory says:

»When these brain activities are of shorter duration than is necessary for consciousness
they can still be part of an unconscious mental function. An unconscious function can
simply be transformed into a conscious one by increasing the time-on duration and so
increasing the appropriate brain activities.«

Libet’s time-on theory tells us that our experience trails behind the processes in our
surroundings. In his own words: »We are not conscious of the actual moment of
the present. We are always a little late« as what we become conscious of has already
occurred half a second earlier.48 Libet suggests what the reason could be. The time
of the experience, he says is »back-dated.« In this way, we are given the opportunity
to believe we are experiencing something at the time it is happening. According to
Libet, we are not aware of this slight delay and the consequent back-dating, and that,
too, is of interest. His time-on theory is based on the well-founded assumption that all
our conscious mental manifestations of life (such as our thinking about Libet and his
theory) first occur unconsciously.49 According to this, a process then takes place,

44 Libet, B.: Mind Time. The Temporal Factor in Consciousness. Cambridge/London 2004, p. 4,
cf. ibid., p. 59.
45 Cf. ibid., pp. 58 f.
46 Ibid., p. 33.
47 Ibid., pp. 58 f.
48 Ibid., p. 70.
49 »(1) After a delayed achievement of neural adequacy for awareness, there is an automatic
subjective referral of the experience backwards in time, to approximately the delivery time
of the stimulus. (2) The initial cortical response (primary evoked potential at S1 cortex), to
the fast specific (lemniscal) projection sensory message, serves as the timing signal for this
342       E. Brain research and the question of human freedom

a dynamic development from awareness to the manifestation of life! We should not

overlook: Even unconscious manifestations of life belong to our organism. They do
not belong to another person, and definitely not to an object. In short, what is un-
conscious is our manifestation of life as well, it belongs to us as living beings. What
do these thoughts mean concretely? What does Libet have to say?
He spells out what his time-on theory means for all kinds of daily questions:
Many situations in which we have to be especially swift comprise many unconscious
processes.50 For example, when a musical instrument is played, it would be impos-
sible for a pianist to be conscious of the movement of every one of his fingers.51
The same is true of professional tennis players, who have to react to a ball com-
ing towards them at a speed of 160 km per hour in a curved trajectory. Libet tells
us, »These players report being aware of the serving motion of the opponent, but
they are not immediately aware of the ball’s location when hitting the return ball.«52
In the light of the discussion in the chapter on the re-discovery of the lived body,
we can now say that these professional tennis players have incorporated the move-
ments.
Libet accentuates (as we have already heard in Roth’s discussions of conscious-
ness), that conscious processes are not as fast as unconscious processes. In relation
to our metabolism, they are rather »costly« as Roth would put it. What is the role of
the time-on requirement? Libet presumes there is a kind of »filter« function, so that
our conscious occurrences are not overwhelmed.53 It is neither possible nor even
desirable that we become aware of everything that occurs around us. Now let us
look at the famous/infamous experiments, which are seen to provoke the question
concerning our »able to choose« freedom.
Libet was able to refer to the work of the German scientists Kornhuber and
Deecke.54 These researchers from the University of Freiburg had already discovered
something very important in the 1960s: that the EEG is of great help. They conducted
many measurements of human brain waves, which they compared and evaluated.
What did not go unnoticed was that 800 ms before a person even began to make a
movement (e. g. bending the wrist or the finger), a distinct potential change occurred
in the cerebrum. It means that something is happening in the brain before we have
even begun a movement. There is a certain time lapse. How to categorize this very
exciting observation that soon became known far beyond the research laboratory?
The two researchers explained that the results of their measurements indicated that
something is happening in the motoric cortex on a neuronal level, and that this is
related to the movements of the person. When people move (even if it is only one

backward referral. The experience would thus be subjectively antedated and would appear
to the subject to occur without the substantial neural delay required for its production«
(Quoted by: Bennett, M. R./Hacker, P. M. S.: Philosophical Foundations Of Neuroscience.
Malden/Oxford 102010, p. 124).
50 Cf. Libet, B.: Mind Time. The Temporal Factor in Consciousness. Cambridge/London 2004,
p. 109.
51 Ibid., p. 109.
52 Ibid., p. 110.
53 Cf. ibid., p. 115.
54 Cf. ibid., p. 124.
 8. The Libet experiments       343

finger), the neurons are involved. Something like that cannot occur without the brain
participating, which is why researchers can also measure brain signals. This neuronal
recasting is a condition necessary for every movement we make. It is called the read-
iness potential (RP).
Libet says that Kornhuber and Deecke did not consider the question of when
the conscious will to act occurs in contrast to the readiness potential: »The long at
which the RP precedes the voluntary act, made me think intuitively, that there might
be a discrepancy between the onset of brain activity and the time of the conscious
intention to perform the voluntary act.«55

8.2 The experiments of Benjamin Libet

»What does this mean? First the process lead-

ing to a voluntary act is initiated by the brain
unconsciously, well before the conscious will to
act appears. In other words before these per-
sons are aware that they are ready to act.«56

These are the questions Libet wanted to answer in his experiments. In Mind Time, he
describes his experimental design in much detail. Part of it was to let a participant
sit in front of a disc. This disc looked similar to a clock face divided by lines into
equal sectors. He used a cathode ray oscilloscope to bring a spot of light onto the
outer part of the disc of his »special clock.« The light point circled the disc similar
to the hand of a clock, but much faster. At only 2.56 seconds the spot of light rotated
about twenty-five times as fast as a second hand. The lines marked on the face of the
disc were equal to a time segment of 43 ms. »The subjects were seated 2.3 m from
the oscilloscope. For each trial, the subjects fixed their gaze on the center of the
oscilloscope’s face.«57
Now Libet asked the subject to look at the oscilloscope’s face and at »any random
point in time«58 to perform a free »able to want« act. Here, Libet was thinking of
accomplishing a fairly simple act, e. g. to lift a finger. Libet explains that the subjects
were asked not to plan ahead of time how they would act. The act should occur of its
own accord.59 It goes without saying that during the tests electrodes were attached
to the scalp of the participants. After all, Libet was interested in what was happening
in the brain, and that should be measured and evaluated. The subjects were asked
that whenever they felt the impulse to lift their fingers, to take note of the exact place
where they saw the point of light and to report this to the person doing the test.
Everyone’s active (and honest) participation was thus very important.

55 Ibid., p. 125.
56 Ibid., p. 136.
57 Ibid., p. 126.
58 Ibid., p. 126.
59 Ibid., p. 126.
344       E. Brain research and the question of human freedom

With these experiments, Libet wanted to examine whether the conscious will of a
person enters the head before or after the process. What mattered was the »timing«
of the conscious will. This was a dynamite question, as Libet well knew. He wrote:
»Testing this question only required that the point in time when the action occurred
was for the participant to choose freely.«60 The answer Libet finally presented to
the public was that 550 ms before the act of will there is a very obvious neuronal
readiness potential (RP). However, we know nothing about this, not even rudimen-
tally. Libet says that the wish to act only becomes apparent to the person about 150
to 200 ms before the action takes place. This is also true for us. This was probably
by far Libet’s most important result. For Libet, the conclusion was apparent: The
process of our will (for example to relax and place our legs on the desk) is preced-
ed by unconscious manifestations of life.61 He explains: »We clearly found that the
initiation of the preparation, which is to culminate in a free voluntary movement,
arises unconsciously in the brain, preceding the conscious awareness of wanting or
intending to ›act now‹ by about 400 ms or more.«62 The unconscious manifestations
of life are followed by an awareness, an impulse, to lift the finger (or to put the legs
on the desk). The question whether all that was present visually (observing the disc,
looking for the spot of light, etc.) narrows the validity of the experiment in that a
certain time is required for that as well was never asked in these experiments. In the
1990s, Libet’s study was tested by other research teams who reached the conclusion
that the road taken by Libet leads to new insights, and that it is by and large correct.63

60 Ibid., pp. 129 f.

61 Cf. ibid., pp. 123 f.
62 Ibid., p. 141.
63 Especially important in this context are the works of Joaquim Brasil-Neto und Alvaro Pas-
cual-Leone (Cf. Brasil-Neto, J. P./Pascual-Leone, A./Valls-Solé, J./Cohen, L. G./Hallett, M.:
Focal transcranial magnetic stimulation and response bias in a forced-choice task. In: Journal
of Neurology, Neurosurgery and Psychiatry 55 (1992), pp. 964–966). They explored »the dif-
ferential effects of focal magnetic stimulation of motor and prefrontal areas on response
bias in a forced-choice task, with emphasis on the relation between response time, hand
preference, and specific sites of transcranial stimulation« (ibid., p. 964). The structure of the
experiment conducted by these scientists was designed in such a way that the participants
were exposed to a magnetic stimulation of the motoric cortex. This was not all. They were
given a small task: e. g., lifting the right forefinger, or the one on the other hand. »Single
magnetic stimuli were delivered to the prefrontal or motor area, and in the control situa-
tion, away from the head. Magnetic stimulation affected hand preference only when it was
delivered to the motor area« (ibid., p. 964). The team of neurobiologists came to the conclu-
sion that there seems to be conspicuous precedence given to allow the contralateral finger –
the one lying opposite the one being stimulated – to move. »With stimulation of this area,
subjects more often chose the hand contralateral to the site stimulated with response times
that were mainly less than 200 ms. With longer response times (between 200 and 1100 ms),
magnetic stimulation had no effect on hand preference regardless of the site stimulated«
(ibid., p. 964). There were of course several repetitions of the experiment described here
(there was a total of three men and one woman who participated in the experiment). At the
conclusion of the experiment, the participants said they had decided of their own volition
to have made the decision regarding finger on the right or the left hand. They said this even
though they knew that the magnetic stimulation played a fairly important role – one that
was more important than they would have liked. The research team then came to the con-
clusion: »It is possible to influence endogenous processes of movement preparation exter-
 8. The Libet experiments       345

This all means that according to Libet, when we want something, this is preceded
by an RP of which we are not aware, and this does not only happen in a laboratory
situation. It constantly happens in our heads, in our brains. For example, when we
want to leave our desk, there is first of all an RP. This inevitably leads to questions:
What does this mean for the »able to choose« freedom [Wollenkönnen]? Is it only
a belated comment? And what do these statements mean in terms of our thoughts
about our actions? This is what interests Libet. His results are also baffling in this
respect. Together with his team, he was able to demonstrate experimentally that

nally without disrupting the conscious perception of volition« (ibid., p. 964). How should
this be evaluated? What should our approach be? My suggestion is that day in and day out
we experience that various factors influence our volition to will and act of our own free will
[Wollenkönnen and Tunkönnen]. There are any number of »influencing factors.« It has not
been disproved that you or I are the authors of our actions. It has not been proved that mind
and brain organize everything for us.
We should also mention the tests conducted by Daniel Wegner and Thalia Wheatley which
Libet likewise mentions (Cf. Wegner, D. M./Wheatley, T.: Apparent Mental Causation. In:
American Psychologist 54 (1999), pp. 480–492). Thomas Metzinger is full of praise for these
two researchers, who, he says »have succeeded with the help of an ingenious experiment
have discovered the necessary and sufficient prerequisites for the experience of the con-
scious will.« (Metzinger, T.: Der Ego Tunnel. Eine neue Philosophie des Selbst: Von der Hirn-
forschung zur Bewusstseinsethik. Berlin 2009, p. 181). What was important to them? Before
these scientists began using test subjects in a research laboratory, they defined a trio of
characteristics they felt had to be given so that people like you and I would be convinced
that we were the authors of our actions. In the report on their experiments, they wrote: »The
experience of willing an act arises from interpreting one’s thought as the cause of the act.
Conscious will is thus experienced as a function of the priority, consistency, and exclusivity
of the thought about the action. The thought must occur before the action, be consistent
with the action, and not be accompanied by other causes« (Wegner, D. M./Wheatley, T.:
Apparent Mental Causation. In: American Psychologist 54 (1999), p. 480). The first of the
criteria named was: The conscious decision to get an action going cannot coincide with
this action (be this the lifting of a finger or walking around your office). It must be chrono-
logically displaced. The second criteria that these scientists decided on said that a person’s
action and the conscious decision taken must be assessed consistently. This touchstone
they name the criterion of »consistency.« Last, but not least, other consciously noted causes
should not be considered as being the trigger (exclusivity). The trio wished to be the trigger
in their own experiment structure. »An experiment illustrating the role of priority found
that people can arrive at the mistaken belief that they have intentionally caused an action
that in fact they were forced to perform when they are simply led to think about the action
just before its occurrence.« (ibid., p. 480).
Wegner and Wheatley’s research project meant that the trio of criteria were to be evoked
through a computer game. Is this possible? Wegner and Wheatley claim that it is. We should
also know that the participating test persons were not told that they had no opportunity
to interfere with the game. (Cf. ibid., p. 487 f.). On the computer screen, they were shown
pictures of dinosaurs, cars, swans and many other objects. Next to the test person sat an
accomplice of the research leader. Both are given headphones. Then the following occurred:
»the test person did not know that the partner could hear neither the words nor the music.
Instead they were given instruction by the research leader to make certain movements.
During four of the twenty experiments the accomplice was told to hold the mouse on a cer-
tain object which was different every time). These forced stops had to be made within the
prescribed music interval and at different points in time, and after the test person had heard
the word – e. g. »swan« – on their headphones.« (Metzinger, T.: Der Ego Tunnel. Eine neue
Philosophie des Selbst: Von der Hirnforschung zur Bewusstseinsethik. Berlin 2009, p. 182).
346       E. Brain research and the question of human freedom

150 ms before a motoric action is initiated, we are aware of what we really want and
what not. While 150 ms is not that long, he believes it is completely long enough for
us to influence the process of our will.64 To Libet, this influence also means being
able to stop the process, for example, when it would be against certain norms and
conventions to go ahead or if it were in blatant contrast either to our opinions or to
our entire personality. No RP could tell us what to do or not to do, especially not
when we are totally reluctant to do it. It means that the will processes which start
off unconsciously and only become conscious at a later point in time can be blocked.
Circumstances can also change, as Libet says, who now introduces the beautiful
Latin word »veto.«65 Exactly this opportunity to block something is available to us
exactly 100 to 200 ms before the expected time of action.66 Our chance to veto, to

The test persons joined in the game and took it for granted that their honest participation
would influence the further development of the game. They experienced a relationship be-
tween their purpose and thoughts and the game situation. They were convinced it was they
who had been playing and had determined the course of the game. Wegner and Wheatley
knew the reason for this was that they had prepared their experiment very well and had
adhered to the trio criteria. And in this way, Wegner and Wheatley wish to show us that we
do not have much freedom after all. There is no freedom of volition! Everyday life was the
same as that they experienced in front of their computer screen. »The experience of will is
like magic. [...] The magician creates the illusion by managing events so that the apparent
causal sequence is far more conspicuous than the real one. The experience of conscious will
is a comparable illusion produced by the perception of an apparent causal sequence relating
one’s conscious thought to one’s action. In reality, this may not be the causal mechanisms
at all. [...] Believing that our conscious thoughts cause our actions is an error based on
the illusory experience of will – much like believing that a rabbit has indeed popped out
of an empty hat« (Wegner, D. M./Wheatley, T.: Apparent Mental Causation. In: American
Psychologist 54 (1999), p. 489 f.).
The conclusions reached by the two scientists are truly amazing. They have managed to
deceive the participant – there were no exceptions – when with the help of a computer they
performed the »magic trick.« But that they now claim that they have also given definitive
proof that we are not free is totally unacceptable. Falling victim to a trick does not mean we
have no freedom of volition [Wollenkönnen], that our freedom is nothing but lazy magic.
Henrik Walter says, in his criticism, that »whether an effect anticipated prior to an action
agrees with an event occurring after the action is in most cases a valid indicator whether
the event was brought about by me, through my actions or was caused through something
else. Thus, the comparison between the anticipated effect of an action and the effect that
actually occurs is a highly adaptive mechanism, which would hardly have evolved if erro-
neous effects had constantly been generated.« (Quoted by: Kröber, H.-L.: Falsche Schlussfol-
gerungen. In: Könneker, C. (Ed.): Wer erklärt den Menschen? Hirnforscher, Psychologen und
Philosophen im Dialog. Frankfurt a. M. 22007, p. 156).
Benjamin Libet criticizes Daniel Wegner that he at no point in his work mentions the role
played by the veto as Libet has highlighted and the fact that this presents a potential causal
role for the conscious will. This role would be the control of the willed action which even-
tually occurs even then when the process of the will is unconsciously introduced before
the will kicks in. (Libet, B.: Mind Time. The Temporal Factor in Consciousness. Cambridge/
London 2004, pp. 144, 152, 156).
64 Cf. ibid., p. 137.
65 Ibid., p. 137.
66 »The conscious will (W) does appear 150 msec before the motor act, even though it follows
the onset of the cerebral action (RP) by at least 400 msec. that allows it to, potentially, to
affect or control the final outcome of the volitional process. [...] The conscious will could
 8. The Libet experiments       347

register a personal objection, is available to us before our motoric movement. Ac-

cordingly, an impulse can still be suppressed. Concretely, this means that we do not
have to accept everything that emerging within us. Libet and his team confirm that
we can say »No! – I will not lift my finger and I will not put my legs on the desk!«
We can, of course, just as consciously say »Yes!« and turn the impulse into a deed.
Here, Libet is concerned with more than whether we lift our fingers or put our legs
on the desk. He is concerned about a fundamental principle, about our freedom. In
one sentence, he summarizes his suggestion regarding our freedom of will when he
tells us that »conscious free will does not initiate our freely voluntary acts. However,
it can control the outcome by either suppressing and stopping the act or allowing (or
dissolving) the act67 The veto possibility is empirically well supported and is thus
beyond any doubt.68 Libet writes:

»What we are sure of is the ability of the conscious will to block or »veto« the free-will
process, and prevent the performance of any motor act. In other words, conscious free
will might control the outcome of an unconsciously initiated process.«69

»Block,« »suppress«, »prevent« and »control« are the verbs with which he describes
the veto role of the free will (he also likes to speak of a »control function«70). This
veto is also said to be in conformity with commonly held religious and ethical direc-
tions and rules for life.71 Libet confirms that we are in a position to deny and reject
a wish that would go against one of the Ten Commandments. Nothing and nobody
forces us a to commit adultery or not to let God be uppermost in our lives – no RP
and no brain. Libet confirms that this is where we see that we are endowed with a
free will and that we can do (or not do) what is in our power. We are not simply at the
mercy of mindless powers or subject to our brains. He writes with special emphasis:
»I can say categorically that there is nothing in neuroscience or in modern physics
that compels us to accept the theories of determinism and reductionism.«72 Clear
words. Nothing that he says can be misunderstood or misinterpreted. Libet himself
knows that our assumption of freedom is under constant threat. He identifies the
weaknesses of determinist answers and confronts them explicitly. This is often ig-
nored by his readers. Libet’s response to the question of freedom or determinism?
Freedom of course! Libet differs totally from some authors who interpret and often

decide to allow the volitional process to go to completion, resulting in the motor act itself.
Or the conscious will could block or ›veto‹ the process so that no motor act occurs.« (Ibid.,
p. 137 f.)
Cf. Libet, B.: Timing of Conscious Experience. Reply to the 2002 Commentaries on Libet’s
Findings. In: Consciousness and Cognition 12 (2003), pp. 321 ff.; Libet, B.: The Neural
Time-Factor in Perception, Volition and Free Will. In: Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 97
(1992), pp. 255–272, esp. p. 269.
67 Libet, B.: Mind Time. The Temporal Factor in Consciousness. Cambridge/London 2004, 139.
68 Ibid., pp. 137 ff.
69 Ibid., p. 145.
70 Cf. ibid., pp. 145 ff.
71 Cf. ibid., p. 191.
72 Ibid., p. 216.
348       E. Brain research and the question of human freedom

wear out Libet’s data. He says: »This determinist materialist view is a belief system;
it is not a scientific theory that has been verified by direct tests«73 – not even by his
own. Whoever reads and quotes him should read correctly and not misinterpret:
»Theories are supposed to explain observations, not do away with them or distort
them unless there are good reasons to do so.«74 Let those who have ears listen! Libet
is addressing those who characterize free will as a figment of the imagination and
who make the accusation that free will cannot be empirically explained.75 »Who
has proven that there is no freedom? Where is the laboratory where it was done?
With what experiments?« He himself offers no proof of neuro-determination. Other
neuroscientists, Libet tells us, offer no such proof either.« Freedom is not just some
icing on the cake. He is adamant: »It is foolish to give up the image of ourselves as
having some freedom of action and of not being predetermined robots on the basis
of an unproven theory of determinism.«76
It is also important to note that Libet’s test subjects decided for themselves wheth-
er they wanted to participate in the experiments or not. Why do this? What’s the
purpose? Do I have any personal advantages? Expect any personal advantage? They
questioned whether Does it possibly help the advance of science? Can I trust the
instructions of the researchers and follow his instructions? Of course, everything
the participants did during the experiments had something to do with these ini-
tial questions. That is why we can say with Rager: »The preparation of the activity
as expressed in the RP was our preparation of the activity, based on the preceding
decision to bend the wrist at some point in time.«77 No RP dictates what we are to
do. Knowing this, it would be gross negligence to regard the readiness potential as
adequate for our actions.78

8.3 One-sided interpretations of the Libet Experiments

»Many scientists and philosophers seem not

to realize that their rigid view that
determinism is valid is based on faith. They
really don’t have an answer.«79

The experiments conducted by Libet are still being discussed today. In many works
I have seen, they are addressed quite briefly and very one-sidedly. William Robinson

73 Ibid., p. 5.
74 Ibid., p. 155.
75 Cf. ibid., p. 156.
76 Ibid., p. 156.
77 Rager, G.: Neuronale Korrelate von Bewusstsein und Selbst. In: Rager, G.: Die Person. Wege
zu ihrem Verständnis. Fribourg 2006, p. 143.
78 Cf. also: Bennett, M. R./Hacker, P. M. S.: Philosophical Foundations Of Neuroscience.
Malden/Oxford 102010, pp. 228–231.
79 Libet, B.: Mind Time. The Temporal Factor in Consciousness. Cambridge/London 2004, p. 6.
 8. The Libet experiments       349

makes the point: »Interpretation of Libet’s results is extremely controversial.«80 He

writes further:

»Some philosophers have, however, noted that if Libet’s own claims are accepted, then
some of our actions are initiated prior to our conscious intention to perform them. If
this is correct, then at least in some cases our intuitive judgments that our conscious
intentions are causing our movements must be illusory.«81

As we have seen, Libet himself would never have dreamed to offer experiments as
clear-cut proof that there is no such thing as an »able to choose« freedom of and that
we are very wrong to believe that we are free. However, many interpreters make pre-
cisely that point: they use the Libet experiments to support their determinist views.
They say that od course we are not the initiators of our actions, and that this has been
clear at least since Libet.
According to Vilayanur Ramachandran, the Libet-experiments suggest that our
brain is in reality in command and that our »free will« is a retroactive rationalization:
»Like King Canute, who thought he could control the tides« because he believed to
be the ruler of the world.«82
To him, free will is an illusion as it is not able to bring about the neuronal process-
es.83 On the other hand, he assumes that the delay in our experiencing freedom has
a certain function produced by evolution:

»The subjective sensation of willing is delayed deliberately to coincide not with the
onset of the brain commands but with the actual execution of the command by your
finger. And this in turn is important because it means that the subjective sensations
which accompany brain events must have an evolutionary purpose. For if that were
not the case, if they merely accompanied brain events, as so many philosophers be-
lieve (this is called epiphenomenalism) – in other words, if the subjective sensation of
willing is like a shadow that accompanies us as we move but is not causal in making us
move – then why would evolution bother delaying the signal so that it coincides with
our movement?«84

Dennett sees it differently. He says that this delay has no purpose and happens due
to the inevitable blurring of neuronal events in space time:

»Since there is no ›cinema screen‹ in the brain being watched by a little person (Homun-
culus) in real time, there’s no reason to expect a precise synchrony between one’s sense
of volition and the neural cascades that generate the corresponding movements. This

80 Robinson, W.: Epiphenomenalism. In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epiphenomenalism/ (retrieved 05. November 2010).
81 Ibid.
82 Ramachandran, V.: A Brief Tour of Human Consciousness. New York 2004, p. 87.
83 Cf. ibid., p. 89.
84 Ibid., pp. 88 f.
350       E. Brain research and the question of human freedom

view has been eloquently championed by the American philosopher Dan Dennett and
it has the advantage of parsimony.«85

Ramachandran may not see any logic in the idea that the neuronal events concerned
can be blurred over time. He is instead interested in discovering how it can happen
that these constant errors in judgment regarding the synchronicity of brain events,
and the sense of volition occur: »If it is really just ›error‹ you might expect to feel the
willing at random points of time clustered around the brain events.«86
Opinions like these referring to Libet are fairly common: »There is experimental
evidence that we come to be conscious of our decisions only after those decisions
have been formed [...]; so consciousness cannot play a role in determining what we
decide even when our decisions are conscious.«87 But would Libet have seen it that
way – that there conscious mental manifestations of life are not playing any role?
In German-speaking countries, it is especially Gerhard Roth who relies heavily
on the Libet experiments as well as on the work of Patrick Haggard and Manfred
Eimer to legitimize his point of view that we are not free.88 He does not deal kindly
with those who defend the idea of freedom. He is not always kind to defenders of
the freedom of will. He accuses them of »simply denying the relevance of empirical
evidence.«89 Libet, too, would be affected by the lump-sum judgment that he has
overlooked (or denied) scientific facts that say we are not free. What would he say
about this? He would probably draw Roth’s attention to the fact that there is no
empirical legitimization either for the hypothesis that we are not free and that we
do not generate our actions. It is unlikely that Roth would listen. After all, he has an
opportunity to read about it. At any rate, he interprets Libet’s experiments as follows:

»When the time of decision preceded the readiness potential (without being visible
in the EEG), then freedom of will is closer to being proven empirically. If the decision
occurred at the same time as the beginning of the RP, then nothing would happen as
we could expect that the immaterial free will would be able to affect brain processes
instantaneously without any delay. If, however, the decision followed the beginning of
the readiness potential then serious doubts would be justified whether there is indeed
free will which causes mental processes but has not itself been caused.«90

85 Ibid., p. 145.
86 Ibid., p. 145.
87 Rosenthal, D. M.: Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness. In: McLaughlin, B. P./Beck-
ermann, A./Walter, S. (Eds.): The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford 2009,
pp. 239–252, here p. 246.
88 Cf. Roth, G.: Aus Sicht des Gehirns. Frankfurt a. M. 2003, p. 178; Roth, G./Grün, K.-J.: Das
Gehirn und seine Freiheit. Göttingen 2006; Roth, G.: Das Zusammenwirken bewusst und
unbewusst arbeitender Hirngebiete bei der Steuerung von Willenshandlungen. In: Köchy, K./
Stederoth, D. (Eds.): Willensfreiheit als interdisziplinäres Problem. Freiburg/Munich 2006,
pp. 17–38.
89 Cf. Roth, G.: Wir sind determiniert. Die Hirnforschung befreit von Illusionen. In: Geyer, C.
(Ed.): Hirnforschung und Willensfreiheit. Zur Deutung der neuesten Experimente. Frankfurt
a. M. 2004, pp. 218–222, here p. 220.
90 Roth, G.: Fühlen, Denken, Handeln. Wie das Gehirn unser Verhalten steuert. Frankfurt a. M.
2001, p. 438.
 8. The Libet experiments       351

Roth addresses several possibilities:

1. Free will precedes the readiness potential.
2. Free will and RP are simultaneous.
3. RP precedes the feeling of initiating the action.
Roth says that the Libet experiments demonstrate that only the third alternative is
correct. First, an RP is established, and only then we think that our actions have any-
thing to do with us. Roth admits that this impression of the origin of action is indeed
prevalent. However, in the same breath, he emphasizes that this is in no way linked
to the possibility that something can be causally accomplished.91 The will does not
cause the occurrence of the RP and also does not precede it. This, he believes, is the
only way in which the Libet experiments should be understood. On the contrary:
the RP appear first. We should never ignore that.92 Roth arrives at the following
conclusion: Our will can achieve nothing since our RP comes long before our will to
act. According to Roth, we can of course also champion the bizarre notion that the
will can move into the past – and so precede the RP. But, such an approach cannot
be taken seriously in a scientific way.
In the sense of the mind-brain paradigm, he says that the brain determines what
we do. The brain, he says, has »the ability to determine the implementation of actions
from within its own inner impulse.«93 We are not even aware of this reality which
we cannot change. All we are able to do is to be aware at some point of this decision
which the brain has taken from us and to ascribe it to ourselves.94 It is precisely
what we constantly do. He tries to convince his readers that the preceding readiness
potential is a »decision« of the cerebrum.95 In his opinion, it not only prepares the
(cerebral) preconditions for movement, but indicates that the brain has decided it
should be carried out in a particular manner. In Bennett and Hacker, we can read
the following about such interpretations:

»The fact that the neurons in the supplementary motor cortex fire 350 ms before the
feeling is allegedly apprehended does not show that the brain ›unconsciously decided‹
to move before the agent did. It merely shows that the neuronal processes that activate
the muscles began before the time at which the agent reported a ›feeling of desire‹ or
›feeling an urge to move‹ to have occurred.«96

91 Cf. Roth, G.: Aus Sicht des Gehirns. Frankfurt a. M. 2003, pp. 166, 178; Roth, G.: Worüber
dürfen Hirnforscher reden – und in welcher Weise? In: Geyer, C. (Ed.): Hirnforschung und
Willensfreiheit. Zur Deutung der neuesten Experimente. Frankfurt a. M. 2004, pp. 66–85,
here p. 75.
92 Cf. Roth, G.: Das Zusammenwirken bewusst und unbewusst arbeitender Hirngebiete bei der
Steuerung von Willenshandlungen. In: Köchy, K./Stederoth, D. (Eds.): Willensfreiheit als in-
terdisziplinäres Problem. Freiburg/Munich 2006, p. 23.
93 Roth, G.: Das Gehirn und seine Wirklichkeit. Kognitive Neurobiologie und ihre philoso­
phischen Konsequenzen. Frankfurt a. M. 1997, p. 310.
94 Cf. Roth, G.: Aus Sicht des Gehirns. Frankfurt a. M. 2003, p. 178.
95 Cf. Roth, G.: Das Gehirn und seine Wirklichkeit. Kognitive Neurobiologie und ihre philoso-
phischen Konsequenzen. Frankfurt a. M. 1997, p. 307.
96 Bennett, M. R./Hacker, P. M. S.: Philosophical Foundations Of Neuroscience. Malden/Oxford
10
2010, p. 230.
352       E. Brain research and the question of human freedom

The two scientists, Eimer and Haggard, have thoroughly addressed the Libet ex-
periments and organized their own series of experiments which are comparable to
those of Libet.97 Very generally, we can say that their findings have pointed in the

97 Cf. also: Keller, I./Heckhausen, H.: Readiness Potentials Preceding Spontaneous Motor Acts:
Voluntary vs. Involuntary Control. In: Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology
76 (1990), pp. 351–361; Haggard, P./Eimer, M.: On the relation between brain potentials
and the awareness of voluntary movements. In: Experimental Brain Research 126 (1999),
pp. 128–133; Trevena, J. A./Miller, J.: Cortical Movement Preparation before and after a Con-
scious Decision to Move. In: Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2002), pp. 162–190; Libet, B.:
Mind Time. The Temporal Factor in Consciousness. Cambridge/London 2004, pp. 135 ff.;
Metzinger, T.: Der Ego Tunnel. Eine neue Philosophie des Selbst: Von der Hirnforschung zur
Bewusstseinsethik. Berlin 2009, p. 184.
In the experiments conducted by Haggard and Eimer, not only the readiness potential on
the parting of the hair was determined. It was further ascertained what the readiness po-
tential is in the lateral premotor areas of the cortex. The technical term here is lateralized
readiness potential (German: LBP: lateralisiertes Bereitschaftspotential). (Eimer, M.: The
lateralized readiness potential as on-line measure of selective response activation. In: Behavior
Research Methods, Instruments & Computers 30 (1998), pp. 146–156). This lateral readi-
ness potential Libet tells us concerning the experiments conducted by Haggard and Eimer,
showed starting times which were closer to the -550 msec that Libet and his research team
had observed during their readiness potential measurements. »Haggard and Eimer also di-
vided the LRP trials into a group with the earlier onsets and one with the later onsets«(Libet,
B.: Mind Time. The Temporal Factor in Consciousness. Cambridge/London 2004, p. 135).
Haggard and Eimer arrived at the conclusion that readiness potential occurs before people
believe that it is they and they alone who are responsible for their actions. The lateralized
readiness potential is unconscious and precedes conscious mental manifestations of life
such as our acts of will. There is a definite causal relationship. They further pointed out that
the readiness potential measured on the parting of the hair could have no causal relation-
ship to a conscious act of will. (ibid., p. 135).
Metzinger, for his part, points out that Haggard indicates that consciousness of one’s own
intentions and consciousness of movement must be differentiated as concepts. He suspects,
however, that they are derived from the same state of processing in the motoric path. He
continues by pointing out that it seems that our access to the constant and current mo-
toric information processing occurring in the brain is extremely limited. Consciousness
is always limited to a narrow window of pre-motoric activity, to only the interim stage in
a much longer process. »If Haggard is correct, then the feeling of agency, the conscious
experience of being someone who is acting right now, results from the process in which the
consciousness of the intention is connected to an inner representation of one’s own current
body movement.« (Metzinger, T.: Der Ego Tunnel. Eine neue Philosophie des Selbst: Von der
Hirnforschung zur Bewusstseinsethik. Berlin 2009, p. 184).
The theory that lateralized readiness potential (LRP) and human volition are causally
linked to each other has been accepted by the research world without any criticism. It is
argued that two of eight test persons reported something extraordinary: Their response to
the question when they had decided of their own volition was long before the LRP. How is
this possible? Did something go wrong? And how can an occurrence take place when there
is as yet no cause? It has not yet been clarified what the role of the RP and/or the LRP is with
regard to our volition (cf. also: Herrmann, C. S./Pauen, M./Min, B. K./Busch, N. A./Rieger,
J. W.: Eine neue Interpretation von Libets Experimenten aus der Analyse einer Wahlreaktions­
aufgabe. In: Herrmann, C. S./Pauen, M./Rieger, J. W./Schicktanz, S. (Eds.): Bewusstsein.
Philosophie, Neurowissenschaften, Ethik. Munich 2005, p. 124 f.)
There have been critical inquiries concerning the design of the experiments. These did not
indicate when a participant had made a de facto decision to perform one of the options.
»Strictly speaking, the decision came in two parts. The one was a choice between two ac-
 8. The Libet experiments       353

same direction as those of Libet and his team. In his work, which carries the rather
expressive subtitle, Wie das Gehirn das Verhalten steuert [How the brain controls
behavior], Roth interpreted it as follows:

»There can now no longer be any doubt that the decision to implement a specific pre-
scribed or freely chosen movement occurs several hundred milliseconds after the be-
ginning of the lateralized Readiness potential and thereby clearly follows an earlier or
a later onset of this potential. [...] We must now presume that the feeling of wanting
to do something now – the fiat! of volitions psychologists, the pull of the will – only
develops a short while after the onset of the lateralized readiness potential. It builds
up long before the decision made by the will. This act of the will actually occurs after
the brain has already decided which movement it wishes to implement. Only when the
readiness potential – especially the lateralized one – has attained minimum strength
and the cortical neurons have been sufficiently activated does consciousness come into
play – whereby it has already been decided that this will occur.«98

When we decide to do something, this is always subsequent. Before that, quite a bit
happens in the limbic system.99 We can agree with that aspect in that numerous
processes take place in our cerebral structures even before we become active. How-
ever, we can also express much doubt when Roth claims that our behavior is deter-
mined on a one-to-one basis and we are incapable of acting differently than what
our brain wants. In his statements about the subject of consciousness, Roth talked
of areas which he believes are indispensable for conscious mental manifestations
of life. With regard to questions about our freedom of human, he is concerned that
beings are only concerned with the fact that a decision is »made for us« in areas that
have little to do with closely conscious mental manifestations of life. Here, he says,
it is decided that we will definitely do this or that, and that we have no other chance.
Roth writes that »since we are only aware of only processes which take place in the
cerebral cortex, a significant number of our action control comes from parts of the
brain never accessible to our conscious mind.«100 This statement is important to Roth
as he wants to show that when we act, unconscious mental manifestations of life are
much more important than has generally been assumed. He this wants to underline
our impotence and the superiority of the cerebrum. He says that what we regard as

tion alternatives. The other was the decision to implement the chosen action at a specific
point in time. It is conceivable that the participants made a decision regarding the choice
of the two alternatives and only implemented the chosen action at the time specified by
Haggard and Eimer.« (Pauen, M.: Willensfreiheit, Neurowissenschaften und die Philosophie.
In: Herrmann, C. S./Pauen, M./Rieger, J. W./Schicktanz, S. (Eds.): Bewusstsein. Philosophie,
Neurowissenschaften, Ethik. Munich 2005, p. 75).
98 Roth, G.: Fühlen, Denken, Handeln. Wie das Gehirn unser Verhalten steuert. Frankfurt a. M.
2001, pp. 441 ff.
99 Cf. Roth, G.: Worüber dürfen Hirnforscher reden – und in welcher Weise? In: Geyer, C. (Ed.):
Hirnforschung und Willensfreiheit. Zur Deutung der neuesten Experimente. Frankfurt a. M.
2004, pp. 75 f.
100 Roth, G.: Das Gehirn und seine Wirklichkeit. Kognitive Neurobiologie und ihre philoso­
phischen Konsequenzen. Frankfurt a. M. 1997, p. 306.
354       E. Brain research and the question of human freedom

a free decision has already been decided before we are aware of it,101 and that exactly
speaking, everything is being decided for us, that the brain takes care of everything
for us: our decisions, our actions. He says that his statements prove that there is no
»able to choose« freedom and no »able to do« freedom. Our will is impotent, »it is
merely a corollary to our actions.«102 Even when we want to take a deep breath and
not to continue reading, this will alone cannot affect anything.
Again and again he claims that he is on the right track with his interpretation of
the Libet experiments. Whoever sees it differently has not understood the situation.
Roth also claims there »can be no reasonable doubt that even regarding the more
sophisticated processes taking place in our brain, our behavior is deterministically
managed.«103 He certainly cannot claim to be supported in this by Libet’s work. Is
he glossing this over by claiming there can be »no doubt« that his point of view is
correct while accusing those who contradict of having no clue with regard to this
matter? Here, Benjamin Libet would certainly not be on the same page. As we have
seen, he regarded determinism as a very ugly ideology and stressed that his (!) exper-
iments cannot be used as legitimation that everything that occurs in the cerebrum is
determinist in nature. That there are readiness potentials in our heads does not offer
sufficient empirical proof to support neuro-determinism.104
Roth is aware of the strong appeal of being the originator of an action. Has he
also succumbed to this »illusion?« This brain researcher from Germany claims that
this experience does not prove that we are gifted with freedom.105 Another ques-
tion: Is this experience a convincing argument (let alone proof) that everything hap-
pens deterministically? He wants to secure his hypothesis by referring to patients in
whom certain brain areas were stimulated during a brain operation and assumed
various functions. Similar to the participants in the Libet experiments, these people
presumed they were the originators of their movement processes.106 This is where
Roth has definitely crossed the line: Our »able to choose« freedom is not unhinged
because certain organs can be stimulated or we can be technically manipulated.
Roth claims that our actions cannot be understood from the perspective of
the lived body-soul unit, but from an interlinking of conscious and unconscious
mind-processes.107 He also presents an answer how in his opinion the feeling arises
that we have planned and willed an event. Certain processes must occur for us in the
supplementary motoric cortex (SMA, pre-SMA) for us to believe we have planned

101 Cf. ibid., p. 307.

102 Cf. ibid., p. 308.
103 Roth, G.: Fühlen, Denken, Handeln. Wie das Gehirn unser Verhalten steuert. Frankfurt a. M.
2001, p. 447.
104 »The difficult questions in which proof of the veracity of determinsm could be found and
what its relationship is to the area specific, is not considered at all.« (Keil, G.: Naturgesetze,
Handlungsvermögen und Anderskönnen. In: Janich, P. (Ed.): Deutsches Jahrbuch für Philoso­
phie. Vol. 1: Naturalismus und Menschenbild. Hamburg 2008, p. 162).
105 Cf. Roth, G.: Das Zusammenwirken bewusst und unbewusst arbeitender Hirngebiete bei der
Steuerung von Willenshandlungen. In: Köchy, K./Stederoth, D. (Eds.): Willensfreiheit als in-
terdisziplinäres Problem. Freiburg/Munich 2006, p. 18.
106 Cf. ibid., p. 18.
107 Cf. ibid., p. 25.
 8. The Libet experiments       355

and willed something.108 Without these processes, there can be no sense of fiat! The
»able to choose« freedom is a trick played on us by the brain. As Roth writes, un-
concerned about philosophical counter arguments, the acting person – you and I for
example – can be replaced by brain. which he believes is sufficient to account for
mental manifestations of life such as thoughts and decisions. He also explains how
the personal impression of individual freedom and the claim of determinism can be
combined:

»The causally experienced relationship between a free act of the will and the action is,
on the one hand, the result of complicated neuronal attribution mechanisms. On the
other hand, it is the result of experiencing consecutive events and an everyday psycho-
logical urge to explain and legitimize.«109

We see here that Roth speaks of neuronal attribution mechanisms, and that we are
subject to an urge to legitimize. How does he come to the conclusion that a neuronal
event should be interpreted as »attribution?« In reality, he probably means that when
we think we are the originators of an action, we appropriate something that actually
originates in the limbic system.110 He means that we are mistaken when we are un-
der the impression that we decide to get up in the morning, to have a shower, and fi-
nally to read the text in front of us, that all this was determined by our limbic system.
Roth assures us that although we believe that we have made the decisions ourselves,
we haven’t in fact done so. This is why Roth ascribes such importance to the limbic
system.111 At this point, Roth’s words and description are especially impressive since
it is here, this German researcher tells us, we make our decisions.112 Not only made
for or against reading this dissertation. The important role the limbic system is play-
ing becomes clear when Roth tells us that it is the limbic system that decides whether
and to what extent the results from these mind games are transformed into practice.
»The cognitive system has an advisory role. The decision-making area listens to the
advice, but decides unilaterally what will be put into practice.«113
Thus, according to Roth, the limbic system decides what must be done. It is not
dependent on reasons or arguments or what he calls a brain trust. Only the limbic

108 Cf. ibid., p. 25.

According to Roth, the wish to act originates in the rear parietal cortex. »This intention
is then conducted to the pre-SMA, to the SMA, and to the premotoric cortex which plans
the broadly defined sequence of movements, and finally to the motoric cortex which de-
termines the finely tuned movement. This is apparently where the will becomes the deed.«
(Roth, G.: Aus Sicht des Gehirns. Frankfurt a. M. 2003, p. 173).
109 Roth, G.: Wir sind determiniert. Die Hirnforschung befreit von Illusionen. In: Geyer, C. (Ed.):
Hirnforschung und Willensfreiheit. Zur Deutung der neuesten Experimente. Frankfurt a. M.
2004, p. 219.
Eine ähnliche Argumentation findet sich in: Roth, G.: Fühlen, Denken, Handeln. Wie das
Gehirn unser Verhalten steuert. Frankfurt a. M. 2001, pp. 245 ff.
110 Cf. ibid., p. 215.
111 Cf. Roth, G.: Aus Sicht des Gehirns. Frankfurt a. M. 2003, pp. 145–150.
112 Cf. ibid., p. 181.
113 Roth, G.: Fühlen, Denken, Handeln. Wie das Gehirn unser Verhalten steuert. Frankfurt a. M.
2001, p. 448.
356       E. Brain research and the question of human freedom

system acts, and it does so on its own as the actual decision-making authority. Hans
Lenk points out that when Roth is speaking about the brain, he uses a Homunculus
language.114 Ulrich Lüke comments that Roth uses »an exterritorialization of the
limbic system regarding the integral unity of the brain. Through transference to ego-
less processes, there is an anonymization of decisions. Yet, conversely, the ego could
not exist at all without this ego-less system.«115
In the light of the mind-brain paradigm, Roth proclaims without much concern
that »origination of personal actions« is a major error and that, without doubt, the
cerebrum takes over the planning of our actions (that is also then when we were
thinking about the time frame in which we were going to read this text). He also
names the inevitable consequence: The responsibility for our actions remains only
with the cerebrum and nowhere else. The only conclusion that can be drawn is that
nobody »is morally responsible for what the brain decides to do.«116 I really wonder
whether Roth would continue to think this if he caught his wife in the act of adul-
tery with another man. According to his arguments, she is not responsible for her
extra-marital sexual adventure. I also hope that Gerhard Roth would not be angry
with me because of this rather aggressive thought about his wife’s intimate life. After
all, when I present such an example, I am determined to act as a critic of determin-
ism. Since he believes that everything is brain-determinated, no one can be become
guilty. This is why Roth would also like to see the German justice system turned
upside down.117 Roth’s point of view also means that we can no longer speak of
guilt or responsibility that human beings were murdered in the most brutal manner
in German concentration camps, or when old people are attacked on the street and
kicked to death. Which neurons force are forcing us to build concentration camps
or to cheat on our partner?
Some critics have pointed out that Roth’s commitment to neuro-determinism
makes his own scientific effort appear in a strange light as he does not only turn this
into something physical, but also only lets it proceed as it does in fact proceed. Other
scientific thoughts and explanations, other theories and approaches are discarded
right from the start. He eliminates all other scientific considerations and explana-
tions, other ways and means. If Roth were right, the much lauded freedom of science
would be passé. His own publications would not be the sum of free research, rational
thought and clever assessment, but unavoidable reality imposed by the brain. Why
then does he want to persuade us to accept the alleged determinateness? Shouldn’t
he assume that his readers have the freedom to be convinced by his arguments in

114 Cf. Lenk, H.: Kleine Philosophie des Gehirns. Darmstadt 2001, p. 128.
115 Lüke, U.: Das Säugetier von Gottes Gnaden. Evolution, Bewusstsein, Freiheit. Freiburg/Basel/
Vienna 2006, p. 232.
Körtner says equally forcefully that it is significant that Roth speaks of the brain or the
limbic system as entity. »He also does not abandon the concept of action which in con-
trast to natural processes presupposes intentionality. Surreptitiously thus the brain [...] or
the limbic system becomes a quasi-personal subject of action.« (Körtner, U. H. J.: »Lasset
uns Menschen machen«. Christliche Anthropologie im biotechnologischen Zeitalter. Munich
2005, p. 98 f.).
116 Roth, G.: Aus Sicht des Gehirns. Frankfurt a. M. 2003, p. 180.
117 Cf. ibid., p. 181.
 8. The Libet experiments       357

his own books? Libet saw such inconsistencies of the determinist view of brain and
world more clearly than those who are happily referring to him.

8.4 Are other interpretations possible?

»My conclusion about free will, one genuinely

free in the non-determined sense,
is that its existence is an at least as good, if
not a better scientific option than is
its denial by natural law determinist theory.«118

Within the neuroscientific community, there is everything but consensus about read-
ing from the Libet data that we are not free.119 The question of how we can explain the
presence of the readiness potential has a large place value in the discussions of the
Libet experiments. What does it actually mean that there are readiness potentials in
our brain? How can this be interpreted in a meaningful manner? Does this indeed
point to brain determination or is such an interpretation totally inappropriate? Can
readiness potentials be reconciled with the fact that we are free? Is it possible that a
readiness potential developed because the participants were told ahead of time that
they would be asked to lift a finger?
In the light of these questions, some interpreters are quick to point out that read-
iness potentials might well be present in our cerebral structures, but that they are
part of a larger whole, namely a living organism from which they cannot be simply
be cut off. Concretely, this means that the RP and the decision-making process of a
living person must be looked at together.120 They say that when we make decisions,

118 Libet, B.: Mind Time. The Temporal Factor in Consciousness. Cambridge/London 2004,
p. 156.
119 Cf. Gomes, G.: The Timing of Conscious Experience. A critical Review and reinterpretation of
Libet’s research. In: Consciousness and Cognition 7 (1998), pp. 559–595; Gomes, G.: Volition
and the readiness potential. In: Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (1999), pp. 59–66; Gomes,
G.: The interpretation of Libet’s results on the timing of conscious events: a commentary. In:
Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2002), pp. 221–230; Beckermann, A.: Free Will in a Nat-
ural Order of the World. In: Nimtz, C./Beckermann, A. (Eds.): Philosophie und/als Wissen-
schaft. Paderborn 2005, pp. 111–126; Nida-Rümelin, J.: Aufsätze zur Willensfreiheit. Stutt-
gart 2005; Nida-Rümelin, M.: Zur philosophischen Interpretation der Libet-Experimente. In:
Holderegger, A./Sitter-Liver, B./Hess, C. W./Rager, G. (Eds.): Hirnforschung und Menschen-
bild. Beiträge zur interdisziplinären Verständigung. Fribourg 2007, pp. 91–120; Rösler, F.:
Neuronale Korrelate der Handlungsausführung. Zur Validität der Experimente von Libet. In:
Köchy, K./Stederoth, D. (Eds.): Willensfreiheit als interdisziplinäres Problem. Freiburg/Mu-
nich 2006, pp. 165–190.
120 Cf. also: Fuchs, T.: Personale Freiheit – verkörperte Freiheit. In: Fuchs, T./Schwarzkopf, G.
(Eds.): Verantwortlichkeit – nur eine Illusion? Schriften des Marsilius-Kollegs. Heidelberg
2010, pp. 43–59; Gomes, G.: The Timing of Conscious Experience. A critical Review and re-
interpretation of Libet’s Research. In: Consciousness and Cognition 7 (1998), pp. 559–595;
Gomes, G.: The interpretation of Libet’s results on the timing of conscious events: a commen-
tary. In: Consciousness and Cognition. 11 (2002). pp. 221–230; Joordens, P./Eimer, M.: On
the relation between brain potentials and the awareness of voluntary movements. In: Exper-
358       E. Brain research and the question of human freedom

we need certain physical parameters, which are evident in the RP. What we want is
not completely separated from our physical processes. It would be unwise to claim
there are no physical preconditions for our wanting and planning. Especially the
great-rift mentality addressed in Part 1 and the associated question whether and how
one side can interact with the other, seems to be very much alive in the debates about
our being free.121 Also a mental manifestation of life such as our decision-making
of course belongs to a living Leibkörper, and we should not create a new rift between
our mental manifestations of life on the one hand and physical processes on the oth-
er. Based on Aristotle we may say that our physical processes (i. e. also our readiness
potentials) are always formed already. Fuchs says that »decisions first and foremost
belong to a life process.«122 He explains:

»People are not made up of minds and bodies. They are primarily living beings, i. e. a
lived body-soul unity. In this respect, their decisions are also life processes in which
conscious and unconscious, corporeal, affective and cognitive components interact with
each other. So, if we want to know the reason why people act the way they do, we
should not seek this in a disembodied ›ego‹ or in a pure act of the will or even in the
brain. A reason is to be found only in persons themselves with all their spiritual, mental
and bodily conditions. It is found in persons as embodied subjectivity.«123

Remembering the thoughts of Hans Jonas, all manifestations of life – conscious and
unconscious – can be interpreted as expressions of freedom. This applies even to the
example of our metabolism (and there are several metabolic processes in our brain)
where we encounter something that is not present in inanimate reality. It would
thus be no argument for our lack of freedom that a manifestation of life is at first
unconscious.
Lüder Deecke, one of the discoverers of the readiness potential, is also extremely
disappointed with the above interpretations of the Libet experiments.124 He says that
we are well able to perform »self-initiated activities, i. e. to perform movements ac-

imental Brain Research 126 (1999), pp. 128–133; Rosenthal, D. M.: The Timing of conscious
States. In: Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2002), pp. 215–220.
Not all authors who reject the one-sided interpretation of the Libet-experiments share this
assumption. Thus, for example, Martine Nida-Rümelin who is of the opinion that it is most
inappropriate to understand the RP as an unconscious mental event that only reaches the
person’s consciousness after some delay. Cf. Nida-Rümelin, M.: Zur philosophischen In-
terpretation der Libet-Experimente. In: Holderegger, A./Sitter-Liver, B./Hess, C. W./Rager,
G. (Eds.): Hirnforschung und Menschenbild. Beiträge zur interdisziplinären Verständigung.
Fribourg 2007, pp. 91–120.
121 Cf. also: Bennett, M. R./Hacker, P. M. S.: Philosophical Foundations Of Neuroscience.
Malden/Oxford 102010, p. 235.
122 Fuchs, T.: Personale Freiheit – verkörperte Freiheit. In: Fuchs, T./Schwarzkopf, G. (Eds.): Ver­
antwortlichkeit – nur eine Illusion? Schriften des Marsilius-Kollegs. Heidelberg 2010, p. 43.
123 Ibid., pp. 43 f.
124 Cf. Deecke, L.: Freies Wollen und Handeln aus dem Urgrund der Seele. In: Peschl, M. F. (Ed.):
Die Rolle der Seele in der Kognitions- und Neurowissenschaft. Auf der Suche nach dem Sub-
strat der Seele. Würzburg 2005, pp. 63–108.
 8. The Libet experiments       359

cording to our own free will.125 He says that we are capable of forming our »fate.«126
The spirit of the time (zeitgeist) when the RP was discovered was not well disposed
to the idea of freedom. According to Deecke, our freedom is not coupled with our
consciousness at all cost. »Conscious experience also belongs to our freedom, and it
prepares the ground that allows us to decide freely.«127 Yet we should not overrate
consciousness since after all, most manifestations of life are unconscious. Conscious-
ness is not the only sign of freedom.128 The fact that most processes of our organism
occur on a unconscious level is not unusual and does not narrow our freedom. On
the contrary, it ensures that other (»higher«) functions can be performed.129 The
assumptions of determinism are contradictory and arrive at the wrong conclusions
with regard to the Libet experiments.130 Roth’s interpretation is »not viable.«131 »The
repetition of stereotypical simple movements is definitely not suited to answer ques-
tions regarding the freedom of will!«132
In the debates about the interpretation of the Libet experiments, some »cosmetic
errors« are also pointed out. For example, the circumstance that the participants
approached the experiments with a certain attitude. They had a certain idea of what
would happen to them. It is also pointed out that the number of participants was
fairly small.133 Critics of the one-sided interpretation of the Libet experiments also
point out that the situation in the laboratory is fundamentally different from that in
»real life« where we must constantly make decisions and look for alternative actions.
It is also indicated that conscious mental manifestations of life (for example the ex-
perience of being free) cannot simply be reduced to organic structures, and that this
is in danger of being ignored in some of the interpretations.
Christoph S. Herrmann and colleagues were also motivated to determine the exact
consequences of the RP discovery in the cerebrum. Their very interesting suggestion
is that this is an indication for the fact that persons are anticipating something with
more or less suspense.134 That team of researchers conducted several experiments in
which the exploration of the readiness potential was coupled to a simple task requir-
ing an elective response. Participants had to press one of two buttons either with the
right or with the left index finger. Which button to choose depended on geometric
figures of some similarity which they were offered in 1 to 1.5 second intervals. As
with the Libet experiments, a restructuring could be detected in the participants’

125 Cf. ibid., p. 72.

126 Cf. ibid., p. 79.
127 Ibid., p. 97.
128 Cf. ibid., p. 97.
129 Cf. ibid., p. 100.
130 Cf. ibid., p. 76.
131 Ibid., p. 98.
132 Ibid., p. 98.
133 Cf. Nida-Rümelin, M.: Human Agency and Neurophysiological Data. In: Ernst, G./Nieber-
gall, K.-G. (Eds.): Philosophie der Wissenschaft – Wissenschaft der Philosophie. Festschrift für
C. Ulises Moulines zum 60. Geburtstag. Paderborn 2006, pp. 205–232.
134 Cf. Herrmann, C. S./Pauen, M./Min, B. K./Busch, N. A./Rieger, J. W.: Eine neue Interpreta-
tion von Libets Experimenten aus der Analyse einer Wahlreaktionsaufgabe. In: Herrmann,
C. S./Pauen, M./Rieger, J. W./Schicktanz, S. (Eds.): Bewusstsein. Philosophie, Neurowissen-
schaften, Ethik. Munich 2005, pp. 120–134.
360       E. Brain research and the question of human freedom

brains before they began any action. This was not really new. What was surprising
was that an RP could already be detected before the researchers had presented the
participants with the different images.135 What was even more astounding was that
this occurred before the participants could even guess which button they should
press! What does that tell us? Herrmann and his colleagues come to the plausible
conclusion that the Libet experiments do not answer the question whether we could
also could act differently or not – something Roth and also Ramachandran thought
had been explained. Their summary shows more: As the researchers emphasize, an
RP does not order what action must be taken. There is no RP which determines that
you must take a walk around the room before beginning to read the next section of
this text. Of course, Herrmann and his colleagues say, the participants could have
assumed that it was expected of them to do something soon. After all, they knew
what would happen in the experiment and suspected that it would happen soon, and
for that reason there were RPs in their brain,136 that the readiness potentials showed
that the test person was in a sense ready for action. The participants expected soon
to be active. The Libet experiments could not prove that we are not free. This was
interpreted as a wrongful curtailment of the Libet data, that no RP can decide any-
thing, and that no RP thinks of anything, that no RP can decide whether button A
or button B should be pressed.
Some critics see a weakness of the experiments in the fact that for the experiments
to be flawless and therefore successful and with as little interruption as possible, it
would be necessary that the participants strictly followed the rules and bent or lifted
their fingers when expected or when given the opportunity. After all, it was a fairly
simple movement. I believe an even bigger problem was that it had not been taken
intro account from the start that the fingers could also have remained still without
being moved at all. What would have happened had the participants not moved their
fingers or had moved their middle finger?137 It was not important in the experiments
whether something would be set in motion, but the timing of the RP and its motoric
implementation. If the only indication of success had been that the participants com-
pleted the instructions the team gave them, the thesis cannot be seriously defended
that freedom has nothing to do with us.138 We are speaking of »technical limitations
of experiments« and that »the quality of the evidence is poor.«139

135 Cf. ibid., p. 128.

136 Cf. ibid., pp. 126, 128, 130.
137 Cf. Bridgeman, B.: Free will and the function of consciousness. In: Behavioral and Brain
Sciences 8 (1985), p. 540.
138 Cf. Pauen, M.: Keine Kränkung, keine Krise. Warum die Neurowissenschaften unser Selbst­
verständnis nicht revidieren. In: Holderegger, A./Sitter-Liver, B./Hess, C. W./Rager, G.
(Eds.): Hirnforschung und Menschenbild. Beiträge zur interdisziplinären Verständigung. Fri-
bourg 2007, p. 50; Herrmann, C. S./Pauen, M./Min, B. K./Busch, N. A./Rieger, J. W.: Eine
neue Interpretation von Libets Experimenten aus der Analyse einer Wahlreaktionsaufgabe.
In: Herrmann, C. S./Pauen, M./Rieger, J. W./Schicktanz, S. (Eds.): Bewusstsein. Philosophie,
Neurowissenschaften, Ethik. Munich 2005, p. 123.
139 Gomes, G.: Problems in the Timing of Conscious Experience. In: Consciousness and Cogni-
tion 11 (2002), pp. 191–197, here p. 194.
 8. The Libet experiments       361

Some authors who oppose the unjustified appropriation of the Libet experiments
support the idea that the participants documented their freedom in several respects:
First of all, they had to decide whether they would be available as test persons. That
decision might have been influenced by several possibilities. It is conceivable that
some may have been ambitious and wanted to make this small contribution to scien-
tific progress. Possibly there was a financial motivation or the possibility of cooperat-
ing with the team leader who would get to know the participant better, which might
in turn help the student (most participants were students) in an exam to be given by
the professor. What should not be overlooked is the fact that all participants had to
get involved with the experiment –after all, it is not every day that cables are attached
to your scalp. Finally, the participants had to be prepared to exactly follow the in-
structions of the team leader. Many commentators indicated that what happened in
the laboratory belongs to this wider context.
Eberhard Schockenhoff is annoyed that the discussions about the Libet experi-
ments included some rather bizarre understandings of the »able to choose« freedom
and the »able to do« freedom. He criticizes that Libet’s experiments brutally simpli-
fied decision-making situations, and that therefore we could actually not speak of a
real decision. Schockenhoff finds fault with the view of man as a random generator of
motoric acts, which erupt from within us and which can turn out either this way or
that, and that no rational reasons, thoughts, or considerations can be recognized.140
Schockenhoff asks: Who decides that a free decision can never be as expected or
as predicted? To Schockenhoff it is especially important that we must consider the
question for some time as to what direction we want our lives to take.141 Again and
again in our lives, we face the task to develop a future that is meaningful for us. What
am I to do after I have my doctorate. If I’m on a diet, will I be able to lose weight and
to keep it down? Can I imagine starting a family? Would a religious profession be an
option for me? Schockenhoff emphasizes that such life decisions are not the focus of
the Libet experiments.

140 Schockenhoff, E.: Beruht die Willensfreiheit auf einer Illusion? Hirnforschung und Ethik im
Dialog. Vorträge der Aeneas-Silvius-Stiftung an der Universität Basel. 2004, p. 24.
141 Cf. ibid., p. 25.
362       E. Brain research and the question of human freedom

9. Can we do what we want? Or do we want what has

been determined?

»Strictly speaking we can neither prove nor

disprove the presence of freedom of will
merely by observing behavior.«142

9.1 Our brain circuitry determines us! W. Singer’s position

»What is left when we get rid of the utopian

idea that we can plan our own future?«143

Wolf Singer, co-signatory of the Manifest, is one of Germany’s most influential brain
researchers. He is even a member of the Pontifical Academy of Sciences. He shares
Roth’s conviction that human brain research can only be interpreted in determinist
terms. His opinions about the topic of freedom of will are gratefully discussed in
various media. To many, he is the »Denker des Denkens« (thinker of thought), as a
well-known German weekly once called him.144 His work on oscillation frequencies
in nerve cells is highly regarded.145
Like Roth, Singer admits that we normally believe to be free. He says: »We speak
of free will, and we apparently all know what it means.«146 But what does Singer
mean when he talks about »free will«? In his opinion, we definitely believe that we
are gifted with intentionality who can implement our decisions. We refer to others
and convince ourselves of the fable »that we are able to intervene actively in world
events.«147 Singer argues that we separate such intentional acts from unintentional
manifestations of life.148 When we think we have implemented something inten-
tionally, this has a different quality for us than something whose implementation
we have merely have to rubber-stamp. He says that according to neuroscientific re-
search, such an approach is long outdated and should therefore be revised as soon
as possible. Singer believes he knows how to do this. As far as he is concerned, the
question is not whether we are free, but why we experience this. What we would call
a free decision is undeniably »a retroactive justification of a changes in situations

142 Roth, G.: Aus Sicht des Gehirns. Frankfurt a. M. 2003, p. 169.
143 Singer, W.: Conditio humana aus neurobiologischer Perspektive. In: Peschl, M. F. (Ed.): Die
Rolle der Seele in der Kognitions- und Neurowissenschaft. Auf der Suche nach dem Substrat
der Seele. Würzburg 2005, p. 60.
144 Cf. http://www.zeit.de/2005/11/P-Singer (retrieved 29 June 2010).
145 Cf. Bennett, M. R./Hacker, P. M. S.: Philosophical Foundations Of Neuroscience. Malden/­
Oxford 102010, pp. 54, 141.
146 Cf. Singer, W.: Conditio humana aus neurobiologischer Perspektive. In: Peschl, M. F. (Ed.):
Die Rolle der Seele in der Kognitions- und Neurowissenschaft. Auf der Suche nach dem Sub-
strat der Seele. Würzburg 2005, p. 41.
147 Ibid., p. 42.
148 Cf. ibid., p. 55.
 9. Can we do what we want? Or do we want what has been determined?       363

which would have occurred anyway, but whose actual cause we generally cannot
grasp in its entirety.«149 We have already encountered this talk about a »retroactive
justification« from his comrade-in-arms Roth, who »ticks« the same as Singer, or
rather as his neurons do, which are determined in the same way, if we are to believe
him. Everything would have happened the way it did in facto. There is no chance of
doing anything differently or to utilize other possibilities. We are at the mercy of our
neuronal processes. They determine us. Singer does not doubt that our »neuronal
processes« are »determinist«.150 He relates this suspicion to manifestations of life
which we believe to be free according to our understanding and our experience, and
those on which we say we have no influence. In no uncertain terms, he says that we
perceive our thoughts and our will to be free [...] but this is incompatible with the
determinist laws which rule our material world.151
Singer likes to present himself as pioneer of a determinist world view. Everything –
as in the above quotation – is being arranged by determinist laws. There is no room
for human freedom. Not quite modestly, Singer says that the work of neuroscientists
has heralded the end of free will. In this context, he speaks of the ability of neuro-
biologists to reach a consensus on the subject,152 yet he does not mention that not
all members of his profession draw the same conclusion, and that several of his col-
leagues believe that a universal determinism is completely erroneous.
As we said above, Singer does not want to deprive us of the illusion that we are
free. But he calls the experience a delusion, as a popular strategy that helps us to keep
certain phenomena away from us.153 As a brain researcher, he has can offer better
answers. Singer is perfectly aware of the explosive and provocative nature of his state-
ments. In this context, he speaks of irreconcilable conflicts154 between the statement
he allegedly developed in the laboratory that there is no such thing as freedom, and
the experience that we are responsible for what we do.
He believes that his view that mental life experiences can be attributed to brain
structures needs no further explanation. It seems he neither knows nor regards
as relevant the important arguments we mentioned in Part 1. Again and again,

149 Singer, W.: Vom Gehirn zum Bewusstsein. In: Elsner, N./Lüer, G. (Eds.): Das Gehirn und sein
Geist. Göttingen 2000, pp. 189–204, here p. 203.
150 Singer, W./Wingert, L.: Wer deutet die Welt? Ein Streitgespräch zwischen dem Philosophen
Lutz Wingert und dem Hirnforscher Wolf Singer über den freien Willen, das moderne Men-
schenbild und das gestörte Verhältnis zwischen Geistes- und Naturwissenschaften. In: Singer,
W.: Ein neues Menschenbild? Gespräche über Hirnforschung. Frankfurt a. M. 2003, p. 20.
151 Cf. Singer, W.: Conditio humana aus neurobiologischer Perspektive. In: Peschl, M. F. (Ed.):
Die Rolle der Seele in der Kognitions- und Neurowissenschaft. Auf der Suche nach dem Sub-
strat der Seele. Würzburg 2005, p. 44.
152 Cf. Singer, W.: Das Ende des freien Willens? In: Singer, W.: Ein neues Menschenbild?
Gespräche über Hirnforschung. Frankfurt a. M. 2003, p. 32.
153 Cf. Singer, W.: Verschaltungen legen uns fest: Wir sollten aufhören, von Freiheit zu sprechen.
In: Geyer, C. (Ed.): Hirnforschung und Willensfreiheit. Zur Deutung der neuesten Experi-
mente. Frankfurt a. M. 2004, p. 38.
154 Singer, W./Wingert, L.: Wer deutet die Welt? Ein Streitgespräch zwischen dem Philosophen
Lutz Wingert und dem Hirnforscher Wolf Singer über den freien Willen, das moderne Men-
schenbild und das gestörte Verhältnis zwischen Geistes- und Naturwissenschaften. In: Singer,
W.: Ein neues Menschenbild? Gespräche über Hirnforschung. Frankfurt a. M. 2003, p. 12.
364       E. Brain research and the question of human freedom

he says that our brain determines all our actions and behaviors. Singer portrays
our cerebrum as being a very well organized (!), linked and complicated system in
which all the processes run in a synchronized manner. »Synchronous« is the key
term that allows him to reject the notion of a »command center«, which he says he
could not discover in the course of his neuroscientific work.155 With this, he wants
to emphasize that under no circumstances are we responsible agents of our actions.
We encountered a similar argument in the previous chapter where we discussed the
Homunculus fallacy. The natural philosopher Hans-Dieter Mutschler nevertheless
invites us to imagine a central control point in the brain. He asks whether this
would not be the ultimate evidence that there is an originator of action. Mutschler
is certain that the answer is negative. That we cannot locate a »headquarters« for
our actions in the cerebrum does not contradict the reality that we in our lived
body-soul unity are the originators of our actions. According to Mutschler, it would
be equally foolish to speak of a computer with a personality only because there is
a central processor that helps the machine to run.156 Mutschler uses a little experi-
ment to explain his ideas, which I want use here. There is a small radio on my desk.
It has a very specific purpose. I scroll through the stations to relax a little during a
break from my work or to listen to the news. If I use the correct tools and open the
radio carefully, I may very well look for its purpose, but I will be unlikely to discover
and understand it. As Mutschler says, there is no need for any hierarchy of parts
allowing us to speak of a unity of purpose. The similarity between the radio and our
brain is that neither the »interior nature« of the radio nor that of the brain tells us
anything of a hierarchical order. But just because we cannot discover any hierarchi-
cal structures is no proof that there is no unity of purpose. Mutschler’s discovery
applies to my little radio as well as to the organ inside my skull. With regard to us
human beings, this unity of purpose must be called personal. Mutschler is therefore
right to conclude:

»Whoever wishes to make the absence of something plausible must first make its pos-
sible presence plausible. Thus, we are not surprised that there are no lions in Antarctica
but that we find them in Namibia. The absence of freedom in the brain can be just as
much taken for granted as the absence of lions at temperature around -40«157

Let us look once again at how Singer tries to prove that our brain is supposed to be
deterministically wired through and through. He argues that if we admit that con-
scious mental manifestations of life (such as our considerations) and the origin of
actions are based on neuronal processes, a neuronal determinism must be at work
just as it is case of our unconscious processes. He writes: »The assessment process

155 Cf. Singer, W.: Verschaltungen legen uns fest: Wir sollten aufhören, von Freiheit zu sprechen.
In: Geyer, C. (Ed.): Hirnforschung und Willensfreiheit. Zur Deutung der neuesten Experi-
mente. Frankfurt a. M. 2004, p. 43; Singer, W.: Entscheidungsgrundlagen. In: Linden, W./
Fleissner, A. (Eds.): Geist, Seele und Gehirn. Entwurf eines gemeinsamen Menschenbildes von
Neurobiologen und Geisteswissenschaftlern. Münster 2005, p. 75.
156 Cf. Mutschler, H.-D.: Ist der Mensch eine neurokybernetisch programmierte Maschine? In:
Katechetische Blätter 5/2002, p. 339.
157 Ibid., p. 339.
 9. Can we do what we want? Or do we want what has been determined?       365

itself is naturally based on neuronal processes and thus follows determinist natural
laws.«158 Singer’s way of expressing himself reminds us of the Manifest, of which
Singer was a signatory. He says that determinist natural laws determine what occurs
in our heads and how we act, even as we are now reading these lines. He calls this »a
compelling insight.«159 We should remember that he refers to the concept of deter-
minist natural laws, as I will return to this later. I We need to be cautious: The fact
that neuronal processes are necessary in our brain so that we can for example plan
and organize actions (such as reading this text) does not mean that our processes of
thinking and organizing of xy are neuronally fixed.
In the light of these determinist natural laws in our cerebrum, which are ap-
parently super-powerful, we are supposed to be in no position to act differently
from the way in which we do or have done. In this connection, our responsibility
for ourselves and for others is also discarded. Singer assures us: »The assumption
that we are responsible for what we do because we could have done it differently is
not feasible from a neurobiological perspective.«160 He explains this: »Persons did
what they did because in the decisive moment they could not have acted differently,
otherwise they would have done so.«161 To my mind, Singer is taking the easy way
out. Let us assume that a member of his audience is disgusted with what he said
and slapped his face after one of his lectures. Singer would have to assume that this
freedom lover had no choice but to act as he did. In simple terms: The manner in
which an action ends gives us an indication that it has occurred deterministically.
Is that reasonable? Does he not overlook the fact that as living beings, we could
be able to direct our actions? Would it not be possible for the indignant member
of his audience to express his protest in another way? These are not unimportant
questions. It is rather amusing that Singer himself uses such words as »could« and
»would«. »Could« does not mean the same as »must« and presupposes that there
are different ways in which we can act. These are subject to our decisions. For ex-
ample, the member of the audience had the choice of slapping his face or arguing
with him. According to Singer, a murderer only has the misfortune of having a
brain with a lower tolerance level for killing than others. It is obvious that we can-
not speak of responsibility. The same applies to the member of Singer’s audience,
whose neuronal processes determine him to silence Singer with a slap in the face.
Since Singer does not wish to face a »determined murderer«, he suggests it is the
duty of governments to provide training and therapy programs. It is interesting
that determined people can be placed in therapy, and a more tolerable situation

158 Singer, W.: Verschaltungen legen uns fest: Wir sollten aufhören, von Freiheit zu sprechen. In:
Geyer, C. (Ed.): Hirnforschung und Willensfreiheit. Zur Deutung der neuesten Experimente.
Frankfurt a. M. 2004, p. 52.
159 Ibid., p. 58.
160 Singer, W./Wingert, L.: Wer deutet die Welt? Ein Streitgespräch zwischen dem Philosophen
Lutz Wingert und dem Hirnforscher Wolf Singer über den freien Willen, das moderne Men-
schenbild und das gestörte Verhältnis zwischen Geistes- und Naturwissenschaften. In: Singer,
W.: Ein neues Menschenbild? Gespräche über Hirnforschung. Frankfurt a. M. 2003, p. 20.
161 Singer, W.: Verschaltungen legen uns fest: Wir sollten aufhören, von Freiheit zu sprechen. In:
Geyer, C. (Ed.): Hirnforschung und Willensfreiheit. Zur Deutung der neuesten Experimente.
Frankfurt a. M. 2004, p. 64.
366       E. Brain research and the question of human freedom

can be created for them and those around them. Unfortunately, we do not find
answers as we read Singer’s writings. How can we correlate this with the certainty
that everything is determinate? Is his suggestion not a real stumbling block for his
own ideas on neuro-determinism?162
Singer starts with the statement that conscious and unconscious manifestations
of life are deterministically defined. This basic assumption is evident throughout his
work. It makes no difference whether the audience member at Singer’s lecture has
thought about his actions or not. In either case, Singer would consider him to be
determinate. After all, since determinist laws control the cerebrum, both conscious
and unconscious manifestations of life are determined, and the neuronal processes
present in conscious manifestations of life would not distance themselves from those
of which we are not aware. Singer says:

»In both cases the decisions and actions are prepared through neuronal processes. The
only difference is that in one case the focus is on the motives and these are brought to
consciousness, in the other this is not the case. But, in both cases, decision-making is
based on neuronal processes and therefore follows determinist natural laws.«163

Singer also supports his determinism thesis by referring to the process of evolution,
to early childhood learning processes and environmental influences:

»Evolutionary adaptations which as genetic specifications define the basic function of

our brain; early childhood influences of which we know that they are able to perma-
nently change the fine structure of neuronal interconnections, and thereby have a direct
influence on the functional processes in the brain; and finally, the learning processes
which accompany us throughout our lives and likewise lead to changes in the functional
architecture of the nerve network, even then when the structural changes only occur on
the sub-microscopic and molecular level.«164

Singer says that his neuroscientific activities have taught him that freedom must
be understood as a brain construct. This is apparently the typical manner in which
supporters of the mind-brain paradigm see the world. From the moment of birth,
children are continually confronted with the injunction to do or not to do certain
things. In this way, they quite naturally acknowledge their participation in an action

162 Cf. ibid., p. 63; Singer, W.: Hoffnung für Querschnittsgelähmte. In: Singer, W.: Ein neues
Menschenbild? Gespräche über Hirnforschung. Frankfurt a. M. 2003, p. 50 f.; Singer, W.: Das
falsche Rot der Rose. In: Singer, W.: Ein neues Menschenbild? Gespräche über Hirnforschung.
Frankfurt a. M. 2003, p. 65; Singer, W.: Entscheidungsgrundlagen. In: Linden, W./Fleissner,
A. (Eds.): Geist, Seele, Gehirn. Entwurf eines gemeinsamen Menschenbildes von Neurobio­
logen und Geisteswissenschaftlern. Münster 2005, p. 80. Cf. also: Roth, G.: Das Problem der
Willensfreiheit. Die empirischen Befunde. In: Information Philosophie 5 (2004), p. 20; Roth,
G.: Aus Sicht des Gehirns. Frankfurt a. M. 2003, pp. 166 ff.
163 Singer, W.: Conditio humana aus neurobiologischer Perspektive. In: Peschl, M. F. (Ed.): Die
Rolle der Seele in der Kognitions- und Neurowissenschaft. Auf der Suche nach dem Substrat
der Seele. Würzburg 2005, p. 55.
164 Ibid., p. 57.
 9. Can we do what we want? Or do we want what has been determined?       367

and assume responsibility.165 This is also how we were led to believe we are free. We
have been told often enough and we have followed the example of others. Yet, the
neurosciences say they can show that the assumption of our freedom is erroneous.
He says:

»Small children learn a great deal in a short time and apply what they have learned. Yet,
when they are asked how they know something, they are seldom able to answer. Chil-
dren believe that what they have learned has always been a part of them. This could be
the reason that later, when we begin to think about ourselves, the content of our early
learning appears not to have been caused, but seems to have been there always and
thereby gains this strange transcendent connotation.«166

It is true that did not yet know in the cradle what we would be capable of later, for
example to think about the lived body-soul problem and the topic of freedom. As
many things, we must also learn how to use freedom. This can be both stressful and
challenging, a life-long task. I that an argument against freedom? In other words,
does this grumbling against our being free perhaps have its roots in the fact that it is
not always easy to come to terms with our freedom? We should also ask the question
whether Singer’s allusion to the dimension of our interaction with others does not
point to the reality that we are after all more than mind and brain.167 We are not
lonely brains, but living unities who thanks to our corporeality are also interested
in others.
Singer is firmly convinced that increased knowledge about what is happening in
our brain (is such a gain in neuroscientific knowledge also determinate?) inevitably
leads to a paradigm change, and with this he is referring to our mind-brain image
of humans.168 It is according to this paradigm that he can declare that the brain
explains itself. He tells us that »the self-explaining brain employs its own cognitive

165 Cf. ibid., p. 54; Singer, W.: Verschaltungen legen uns fest: Wir sollten aufhören, von Frei-
heit zu sprechen. In: Geyer, C. (Ed.): Hirnforschung und Willensfreiheit. Zur Deutung der
neuesten Experimente. Frankfurt a. M. 2004, p. 50 f.; Singer, W.: Unser Gehirn: ein Produkt
der Erziehung. In: Singer, W.: Ein neues Menschenbild? Gespräche über Hirnforschung.
Frankfurt a. M. 2003, pp. 97–109; Singer, W: In der Bildung gilt: Je früher, desto besser! In:
Singer, W.: Ein neues Menschenbild? Gespräche über Hirnforschung. Frankfurt a. M. 2003,
pp. 110–119.
As we are here speaking of cultural constructs, neurobiological explanations are not di-
rectly possible. Singer, W.: Vom Gehirn zum Bewusstsein. In: Elsner, N./Lüer, G. (Eds.): Das
Gehirn und sein Geist. Göttingen 2000, pp. 189–204, esp. pp. 191 and 201 ff.
166 Singer, W.: Conditio humana aus neurobiologischer Perspektive. In: Peschl, M. F. (Ed.): Die
Rolle der Seele in der Kognitions- und Neurowissenschaft. Auf der Suche nach dem Substrat
der Seele. Würzburg 2005, p. 55.
167 Cf. Geyer, C.: Hirn als Paralleluniversum. Wolf Singer und Gerhard Roth verteidigen ihre
Neuro-These. In: Geyer, C. (Ed.): Hirnforschung und Willensfreiheit. Zur Deutung der neu-
esten Experimente. Frankfurt a. M. 2004, p. 90 f.
168 Cf. Singer, W.: Wahrnehmen ist das Verifizieren von vorausgeträumten Hypothesen. In:
Singer, W.: Ein neues Menschenbild? Gespräche über Hirnforschung. Frankfurt a. M. 2003,
p. 74.
368       E. Brain research and the question of human freedom

tools in order to understand itself.«169 He does not lose a single word about the living
organism. Instead, he affirms a mind-brain reduced being. The obvious terminolog-
ical errors and the neglect of the lived body-soul unity of the human organism are a
serious problem in Singer’s thinking. His thoughts have no content other than his
cerebrum-determined assertions. They are not the well-considered ideas we would
expect from a neuroscientist.
I refer to and agree with the criticism of Ulrich Lüke who points out some con-
tradictions in Singer’s explanations of determinism. Singer’s basic assumption is that
conscious and unconscious mental manifestations of life proceed in the same man-
ner, and for him that means deterministically. Lüke criticizes that Singer is of the
opinion that all neuronal processes proceed equally, and he takes it for granted that
we can become aware of some manifestations of life, but not of others, yet that at no
point does he consider understanding consciousness as an artifact. Lüke argues that
if it is true that conscious and unconscious manifestations of life are subject to the
same neuronal processes, this co-signatory of the Manifest has to ask himself why
free and unfree decisions do not develop from this. Lüke also writes:

»If what Singer calls neuronal determinism can lead to what is conscious and uncon-
scious, then given the sameness of the neurophysiological processes on which the ar-
gument is based, it is not clear why it is inevitable that only the same consequences can
follow – i. e. that all, the conscious and the unconscious, is determinate.«170

It is truly amazing how Singer can claim that our neuronal connectivity determines
us, yet he cautions his readers no longer to speak of freedom.171 This appeal definite-
ly does not go with neurodeterminism. I would therefore suggest that we take Singer
seriously when he urges us to continue searching and to decide and act according to
the best of our ability. He assures us »that our knowledge that what is knowable is
limited will protect us from following those who offer simple solutions and pretend
that they know«.172

169 Singer, W.: Conditio humana aus neurobiologischer Perspektive. In: Peschl, M. F. (Ed.): Die
Rolle der Seele in der Kognitions- und Neurowissenschaft. Auf der Suche nach dem Substrat
der Seele. Würzburg 2005, p. 41. Similar: Singer, W.: Der Beobachter im Gehirn. Essays zur
Hirnforschung. Frankfurt a. M. 2002, p. 61.
170 Lüke, U.: Das Säugetier von Gottes Gnaden. Evolution, Bewusstsein, Freiheit. Freiburg/Basel/
Vienna 2006, p. 227.
171 Cf. Singer, W.: Verschaltungen legen uns fest: Wir sollten aufhören, von Freiheit zu sprechen.
In: Geyer, C. (Ed.): Hirnforschung und Willensfreiheit. Zur Deutung der neuesten Experi-
mente. Frankfurt a. M. 2004, pp. 30–65.
172 Cf. Singer, W.: Der Beobachter im Gehirn. Essays zur Hirnforschung. Frankfurt a. M. 2002,
p. 199.
 9. Can we do what we want? Or do we want what has been determined?       369

9.2 Compatibilism versus incompatibilism?

»When we concede someone has the freedom

to make decisions, we develop a moral sense
of resentment and indignation, and we find
fault with their actions. When we change
our judgment and say such a person has no
freedom, such perceptions no longer make
sense.«173

In philosophical discussions it is quite customary to differentiate between compati-

bilist and incompatibilist suggestions concerning the problem of freedom. In favor
of incompatibilism, the following argument is put forward:174 A basic premise of this
thought is that it is not within the scope of my possibilities to change either what was
before my birth or the laws of nature. In these cases, my hands are tied. This premise
is accompanied by the assumption that all my actions (e. g. composing a symphony
or writing a doctoral thesis) follow inevitably from earlier events and natural laws if
the explanation is correct that everything happens deterministically. Based on these
two initial premises, we then reach the conclusion that as a human I cannot be con-
sidered the originator of my actions if determinist laws of nature allow no room for
an open future and strictly determine everything.
Authors who classify their own thinking as incompatibilist think that the assump-
tion we are free and the belief that everything is defined deterministically cannot be
reconciled with each other. It is easy to see that this basic understanding can lead to
two different attitudes. On the one hand, there can be praise for determinism which
claims there is no freedom, that freedom is a fallacy.175 The »anathema sit« is said by
those who think otherwise. The other group consists of those who want nothing to
do with determinism and see it as an aberration; they hold on to free will.
In the literature, this latter group is contrasted with a number of authors called
compatibilists or who would define their own work as compatibilist. The terminus
technicus »compatibilism« refers to a theory which on the one hand wants to adhere

173 Bieri, P.: Das Handwerk der Freiheit. Über die Entdeckung des freien Willens. Munich/
Vienna 42005, p. 21.
174 Cf. Keil, G.: Naturgesetze, Handlungsvermögen und Anderskönnen. In: Janich, P. (Ed.):
Deutsches Jahrbuch für Philosophie. Vol. 1: Naturalismus und Menschenbild. Hamburg 2008,
p. 157; Keil, G.: Willensfreiheit. Berlin/New York 2007, p. 83; Van Inwagen, P.: An Essay on
Free Will. Oxford 1983, pp. 16, 56; Vihvelin, K.: Arguments for Incompatibilism. In: Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-arguments/
(retrieved 05 June 2010); Clarke, R.: Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free
will. In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibi-
lism-theories/ (retrieved 05 June 2010); McKenna, M.: Compatibilism. In: Stanford Encyclope-
dia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/ (retrieved 05 June 2010).
175 The following argument is fairly frequent: »1. If a person acts of her own free will, then
she could have done otherwise. 2. If determinism is true, no one can do otherwise than
one actually does. 3. Therefore, if determinism is true, no one acts of her own free will«
(McKenna, M.: Compatibilism. In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stan-
ford.edu/entries/compatibilism/ (retrieved 05 June 2010).
370       E. Brain research and the question of human freedom

to a credo of a full-blown determinism, but on the other hand also wants to believe in
our free will. same time wish to believe in our free will. Compatibilists are convinced
that this is possible. Sentences such as the following are common: »Compatibilism
offers a solution to the free will problem.«176 Some compatibilists claim that it is not
an insurmountable obstacle to believe that mental manifestations of life are not de-
terminate, but that this does not apply to our cerebral processes.177 There are other
voices from the camp of the compatibilists who have a slightly different approach and
claim that determinism is part of our freedom whether we want it or not.178 Inside
the compatibilist community are those who do not really see the sense in wondering
about the value or otherwise of determinism, that determinism is in any event not
the big bogeyman when we contemplate freedom: »It seems that in the compatibilist
view we can have our cake and eat it too.«179
Numerous authors who see themselves as compatibilists avoid the question
whether we could act differently or not.180 Some authors twist and turn the question
in such a way that a situation in which, due their brain processes, they have come to
a different assessment, this would also have resulted in different actions, and that this
would not be heresy for the determinist credo.
It is quite obvious that there is a great deal of controversy whether compatibi-
lism or incompatibiism is correct. It is apparent that the various communities of
compatibilists and incompatibilists are certainly not in agreement. There are many
cases where widely differing ideological groups are congregated under the same
roof, although they do not have much in common. Philosophers with very different
approaches are marked with the label of compatibilist, even then other points of
contact are not all very close.181 As Eberhard Schockenhoff criticizes, their different
focuses, peculiarities and the often rather big differences between these thinkers

176 Ibid.
177 Cf. Lenzen, W.: Searles verpatzte Lösung des Freiheitsproblems. In: Facta Philosophica 7
(2005), pp. 35–68.
178 »Nobody can prove determinism. But, it is certain that we presume its existence in all our
practical modes of behavior.« (Schlick, M.: Wann ist der Mensch verantwortlich? In: Schlick,
M.: Fragen der Ethik. Vienna 1930, p. 168. Quoted by: Keil, G.: Naturgesetze, Handlungsver-
mögen und Anderskönnen. In: Janich, P. (Ed.): Deutsches Jahrbuch für Philosophie. Vol. 1:
Naturalismus und Menschenbild. Hamburg 2008, p. 158).
179 Searle, J.: Mind. A Brief Introduction. Oxford 2004, p. 220
180 Frank Hofmann (Hofmann, F.: Willensfreiheit und der Preis für den Kompatibilismus. In:
Spät, P. (Ed.): Zur Zukunft der Philosophie des Geistes. Paderborn 2008, pp. 163–187) high-
lights the difficulties associated with compatibilistic concepts of freedom (Bieri, Becker-
mann, Grundmann, Tugendhat, Pauen). These appear to be reconcilable with general un-
derstandings of determinism and are often taken as weapons to defend challenges from the
neurosciences. Yet, Hofmann does not want his observations to be seen as contradicting
compatibilism. They are to be understood as stimuli which will help improve compatibilist
positions. Freedom of will is, after all, not possible without determinism (ibid., p. 164).
Compatibilist freedom theories face the dilemma that they have to let go of one of two
hypotheses: What proclaims self-determination, or what says it is possible to decide differ-
ently.
181 Cf. Merkel, R.: Handlungsfreiheit, Willensfreiheit und strafrechtliche Schuld. In: Holderegger,
A./Sitter-Liver, B./Hess, C. W./Rager, G. (Eds.): Hirnforschung und Menschenbild. Beiträge
zur interdisziplinären Verständigung. Fribourg 2007, pp. 322 ff.
 9. Can we do what we want? Or do we want what has been determined?       371

are often disregarded. He therefore believes that the talk about compatibilist and
incompatibilist blueprints is not very helpful and can even be misleading. He says:

»The bringing together of freedom theories which originate in different proveniences

to make up a single philosophical historical mainstream understanding of free-
dom-thought avoids the question whether the remaining understandings of freedom,
which are understood in conjunction with a totally determinate universe, can still be
characterized as freedom. In any event, the resultant weak understanding of compati-
bilist freedom theories is very different from what we understand by this concept in our
pre-reflective understanding of ourselves.«182

In the next section, we will explore the freedom theories of John Searle and Michael
Pauen. While Searle sees freedom and determinism as mutually exclusive, Pauen
adheres to compatibilist understandings. In the section following this discussion,
the question is asked whether in the light of quantum physical indeterminacy it
makes any sense to even speak of a rigid determinism. The section after that, Deter-
minism as a discourse killer, examines the reference to the laws of nature which both
incompatibilists and compatibilists make again and again to justify the determinism
theory.

9.3 Searle’s gap theory

»I think that another reason why many

philoso­phers accept compatibilism is that
they are not really very much interested in the
problem of free will, as I have defined it.«183

John R. Searle believes it is a »scandal« that the debate about the »able to choose«
freedom [Wollenkönnen] will not stop and keeps occupying our thinking.184 For
many problems that seem to be hopeless, the crux of the matter is that we have a large
number of precepts to which we continue to cling; on the other hand, we bring with
us a veritable treasure of guidelines of which we are also convinced and to which we
similarly want to hang on. The latter, however, are not quite in sync with the former,
or – as Searle says – our beliefs are »inconsistent.« When we transfer this to the prob-
lem of free will, it means that we experience ourselves as free beings. We are under
the impression that in our lives there are many different possibilities to accomplish
something in this or that way (working or being lazy?). We are convinced of this,
but there is also the assumption that the course of the world is deterministically de-

182 Cf. Schockenhoff, E.: Theologie der Freiheit. Freiburg/Basel/Vienna 2007, p. 68.
183 Searle, J.: Mind. A Brief Introduction. Oxford 2004, p. 222
184 Searle, J.: Freedom And Neurobiology. Reflections on Free will, Language, and Political Power.
New York 2007, p. 37.
372       E. Brain research and the question of human freedom

fined.185 How does this fit together? As »mere illusions«?186 Searle does not want to
reject as heresy that we only have the impression of being free.187 His declared goal
is to take freedom of will seriously.188 He says that there could be much speculation
that there is no such thing as freedom of will. There are philosophers, neurophilo­
sophers or neuroscientists who are fully engaged in this endeavor.189 The conviction
that freedom is part of who we are, Searle emphasizes, cannot simply be abandoned.
He says: »We cannot think away our own free will.«190 We cannot hide free will in a
drawer and wait to see what happens.
With regard to the discussion about the lived body-soul problem, Searle attaches
great importance to the understanding that conscious mental manifestations of life
should best be seen as system characteristics of our cerebrum. According to Searle,
there is a brain level and a higher system level (mind level), on which conscious
manifestations of life, e. g. our thinking about the future and our decision-making,
are located: »The features of the system level are caused by the behavior of the micro
level elements, and are implemented in the system composed of the micro level ele-
ments.«191 Searle calls his understanding of the lived body-soul problem biological
naturalism.192 By this he means that his point of departure is that the processes on
the mind level definitely result from sufficient physical requirements. At the same
time, Searle also says that from an ontological point of view, a conscious mental
manipulation of life cannot merely be reduced to physical prerequisites.193 In Part
1, we already heard about some of his arguments which are being discussed in the
philosophy of mind. What was important to him was to accentuate the perspective of
experience as a counter weight to the scientific outsider view.194 According to Searle,
mental manifestations of life are not the recipients of causal powers which »must be
something extra, something ›over and above‹ neuronal behavior.«195 This is certainly
also being criticized. Bennett and Hacker regard the opinion that our mental man-
ifestations are a »feature of the brain«, as Searle asserts, as »grievous.« They write:

185 Cf. ibid., p. 38 f.; cf. Searle, J.: Mind. A Brief Introduction. Oxford 2004, pp. 216 f.
186 Searle, J.: Mind. A Brief Introduction. Oxford 2004, p. 218 f.
187 Cf. ibid., p. 218 f.; Searle, J.: Freedom And Neurobiology. Reflections on Free will, Language,
and Political Power. New York 2007, p. 38.
188 Cf. Searle, J.: Freedom And Neurobiology. Reflections on Free will, Language, and Political
Power. New York 2007, p. 38.
189 »Searle’s work is widely read by cognitive neuroscientists. It is admired for its lucidity and
forceful arguments« (Bennett, M. R./Hacker, P. M. S.: Philosophical Foundations Of Neuro-
science. Malden/Oxford 102010, p. 436).
190 Cf. Searle, J.: Mind. A Brief Introduction. Oxford 2004, p. 230.
191 Searle, J.: Freedom And Neurobiology. Reflections on Free will, Language, and Political Power.
New York 2007, p. 59.
192 Cf. Searle, J.: The Rediscovery of The Mind. Cambridge/London 1992, p. 1.
193 Cf. Searle, J.: Freedom And Neurobiology. Reflections on Free will, Language, and Political
Power. New York 2007, p. 50.
194 Cf. ibid., p. 49 f.; cf. also Searle, J.: The Rediscovery of The Mind. Cambridge/London 1992,
pp. 111 ff.
195 Searle, J.: Freedom And Neurobiology. Reflections on Free will, Language, and Political Power.
New York 2007, p. 50.
 9. Can we do what we want? Or do we want what has been determined?       373

»Brains are no more conscious than they can go for walks or climb trees, even though
it is true that an animal cannot go for walks or climb trees unless its brain functions
appropriately. It is animals, including human beings, that are conscious or unconscious,
that lose and later regain consciousness, and that may become conscious of this or that
if their attention is caught and held by some feature of their environment.«196

Searle is convinced that with regard to the debate concerning the freedom of will,
there is no way that we can avoid facing the problem and then getting rid of various
»philosophical confusions,«197 so that we can finally get a grip on the remaining
problem which primarily refers to the manner in which the brain functions.198 Even
someone who denies the existence of free will is exerting free will. Searle provides
the following amusing example that perfectly captures the seriousness of the situa-
tion: People are sitting in a restaurant where they are given the choice of veal or pork
(unfortunately Searle fails to consider vegetarians). Nob one would have the idea of
refusing to exercise their free will by claiming they are determinists. He adds:

»I you say to the waiter: ›Look, I’m a determinist – che serà, serà, I’ll just have to wait and
see what I order,‹ that refusal to exercise free will is only intelligible to you as one of your
actions if you regard it as an exercise of your free will.«199

For Searle there is no question that it is necessary to first learn more about the hu-
man brain before we can formulate an appropriate answer to the question regarding
our free will.200 In his work, Freedom and Neurobiology, he even speaks of a »charac-
teristic of the brain« (which in my opinion is also ›grievous‹) that freedom of the will
does not remain merely a beautiful concept, but becomes a reality.201 In this sense, he
sees representatives of the neurosciences as having special responsibility. »It is a fac-
tual empirical question, not to be settled by philosophical argument alone, whether
or not our actions are all psychologically determined.«202 He himself introduces a
philosophical argument into the discussion, which is known as the argument of the
gap.203 The name of his argument indicates that there must be a blank space in the
otherwise firmly structured network of cause and effect. He says that when we make
a decision upon which to act, there is a gap between the cause of the phenomenon
that takes the form of reason for decisions and actions and the actual occurrence of

196 Bennett, M. R./Hacker, P. M. S.: Philosophical Foundations Of Neuroscience. Malden/Oxford

10
2010, pp. 444 f.
197 Searle, J.: Freedom And Neurobiology. Reflections on Free will, Language, and Political Power.
New York 2007, p. 41.
198 Cf. ibid., p. 41.
199 Ibid., p. 43.
200 Cf. Searle, J.: Mind. A Brief Introduction. Oxford 2004, p. 215.
201 Cf. Searle, J.: Freedom And Neurobiology. Reflections on Free will, Language, and Political
Power. New York 2007, pp. 58 f.
202 Searle, J.: Mind. A Brief Introduction. Oxford 2004, p. 225.
203 Searle, J.: Freedom And Neurobiology. Reflections on Free will, Language, and Political Power.
New York 2007, pp. 41 ff.; cf. Searle, J.: Mind. A Brief Introduction. Oxford 2004, pp. 216 ff.
374       E. Brain research and the question of human freedom

the decision or action.204 Thus, before we implement an action, or rather before we

decide how we will act, there is a phase called a »gap.« In the view of this American
philosopher, we can continue to say quite calmly that our actions are free because
there are such »gaps«. In Searle’s own words:

»If we probe more deeply we can see that the gap can be divided into different sorts
of segments. There is a gap between the reasons for the decision and the making of
the decision. There is a gap between the decision and the onset of the action. In typical
cases of deliberating and acting, there is, in short, a gap, or a series of gaps, between
the causes of each stage in the processes of deliberating, deciding and acting, and the
subsequent stages. Such, when I am trying to learn German or to swim the English
Channel, there is a gap between the onset of the action and its continuation to comple-
tion [...] The gap as I have described it is a feature of our conscious, voluntary activities.
At each stage, the conscious states are not experienced as sufficient to compel the next
conscious state.«205

According to Searle, there are gaps between different mental manifestations of life.
»The gap is between one conscious state and the next, not between conscious states
and bodily movements or between physical stimuli and conscious states.«206 In this
way, he believes he is able to ascertain that we are free.
Searle does not search for gaps in the cerebrum.207 He illustrates what he means
with the famous, mythological example of »the Judgment of Paris.«208 The son of
Hecuba and the Trojan king, Pram, is faced with a tricky task: »Confronted with
three beautiful goddesses, Hera, Aphrodite and Pallas Athena, Paris was required
to deliberate and reach a decision as to which one should receive the golden apple
inscribed ›For the fairest.‹« This was not an easy choice for the unfortunate Paris, as
his decision depended on his choice of the gift (i. e. the bribe) each of the goddesses
offers him. Each goddess does her utmost to persuade Paris to choose her. Should
he decide in favor of becoming ruler of Europe and Asia, or instead choose a Trojan
victory over the Greeks? Or is it best for him to choose possessing the most beautiful
woman in the world? After much deliberation, Paris decided to accept Aphrodite’s
bribe and accepted as his wife the most beautiful woman in the world. That the other
goddesses were deeply disappointed and that, according to Homer, this led to the
destruction of Troy is not important here, even though it may be comforting that
goddesses are no easier to deal with than »normal« women. What is important is that
Paris’s decision was neither spontaneous nor ill-considered. He did not let someone
else make the decision for him. It was not a random decision. Too much was at
stake for him not to think matters through thoroughly. Searle is very clear about his

204 Searle, J.: Mind. A Brief Introduction. Oxford 2004, p. 217

205 Searle, J.: Freedom And Neurobiology. Reflections on Free will, Language, and Political Power.
New York 2007, p. 43.
206 Ibid., p. 43.
207 Cf. ibid., p. 42.
208 Ibid., p. 60.
 9. Can we do what we want? Or do we want what has been determined?       375

opinion that Paris »was operating in the gap.«209 Paris thus made a free decision: »He
consciously felt that a range of choices was open to him, and his decision was not
forced by lust, rage or obsession. He came to a free decision after deliberation.«210
The decision Paris made – and this is important to Searle – was not predetermined.
Neither the goddesses nor events of the past determined Paris’s decision. If they
had, Searle would see the opportunity slip away to continue to characterize Paris’s
decision as being free. What, according to Searle, had to be fulfilled so that the de-
cision could truly be regarded as being free? The answer is clear: The decision can
only have been be taken in the gap, i. e. before Paris gave expression to his decision.
In this he succeeded, and Searle says: »What goes for Paris goes for us all. If the state
of his brain at t1 is not causally sufficient to determine the subsequent states of his
brain up to t2, given certain assumptions about consciousness that I need to make
clear, he does have free will.«211 Paris’s decision can thus be considered free as it was
determined neither by what went before nor by what would be.
An argument that is used again and again to contradict Searle is that freedom is
somehow left floating in a vacuum. Detlef B. Linke thinks that strangely enough,
Searle’s reasons fall into the abyss of a consciousness gap. Searle does not see this as
a disruption of freedom, but states that this is the proof of this freedom.212 While
Searle’s thoughts have some value, Linke tells us they are contrary to »all concerns
of freedom«. He says Searle wants to be affiliated with a brain theory that proves
there are gaps in determinism.213 »The conscious experience of the gap gives us the
conviction of human freedom.«214 Martin Seel comments that he had never sus-
pected there were gaps and that such a hypothesis would be necessary to speak of
freedom.215 The existence of a gap would mean that »there is an abyss between our
reasons and our decisions, which makes it impossible for us and for others to un-
derstand why we act in a certain way and not otherwise.«216 Seel criticizes the gap
theory and says that by removing the one thought that speculatively concludes the
statement from the causality which underlies it, this then also takes away this the-
ory’s ability to be an effective definition of thinking and action. »Whoever departs
from causality, departs from the effectiveness of reasons and thus departs from the
reality of freedom. Whoever departs from nature simultaneously leaves the domain
of the mind.«217

209 Cf. ibid., p. 60

210 Ibid., p. 60
211 Ibid., p. 61.
212 Cf. Linke, D. B.: Die Freiheit und das Gehirn. Eine neurophilosophische Ethik. Munich 2005,
p. 55.
213 Cf. ibid., p. 55.
214 Searle, J.: Freedom And Neurobiology. Reflections on Free will, Language, and Political Power.
New York 2007, p. 43.
215 Cf. Seel, M.: Freiheit als Skandal. Können wir, wie wir wollen? Oder wollen wir, was wir müs-
sen? Die Philosophie streitet mit der Hirnforschung. In: Die Zeit (Nr. 51). 09 Dec. 2004.
http://www.zeit.de/2004/51_lit/ST-Neurologie (retrieved 29 May 2010).
216 Ibid.
217 Seel, M.: Die Fähigkeit zu überlegen. http://www.goethe.de/ins/sg/sin/ges/phi/de869634.
htm (retrieved 12. Febr. 2007).
376       E. Brain research and the question of human freedom

One frequent criticism of Searle, which seems reasonable to me, is that it is fairly
inexplicable how his primary line of argumentation that mental manifestations of
life cannot be shrunken to physical structures without themselves losing something,
agrees with the assumption that there are sufficient cerebral preconditions for these.
There is also the following: »According to Searle, the brain is a machine, a biological
machine, and it can think.«218 This is a rather bizarre concept. Searle is very inter-
ested in the human brain, but he shows little interest in the lived body as a whole.219

9.4 Michael Pauen: Freedom and determinism

»The expectation that the suspension of

determination leads to an increase of freedom
disappears when we aply this freedom to a
concrete action process.«220

While Searle regards freedom and determination as irreconcilable, Michael Pauen

takes another route. He has good reason to presume that both belong together.221
One of Pauen’s key statements is: »Our thoughts may be determined, but that doesn’t
mean by a long shot that they are forced.« If Pauen were to meet Searle personally he

218 Bennett, M. R./Hacker, P. M. S.: Philosophical Foundations Of Neuroscience. Malden/Oxford

10
2010, p. 445.
219 Cf. also: Knaup, M.: John Searles Buch »Geist«. In: Theologie und Glaube 1 (2007), pp. 113 f.
220 Pauen, M.: Illusion Freiheit? Mögliche und unmögliche Konsequenzen der Hirnforschung.
Frankfurt a. M. 2006, p. 163.
221 »When freedom can be translated into self-determination, then even a determined action
can be free. On condition this action is determined by the person performing the action
and not through any external factors. Furthermore: Suspending determination would ob-
viously not lead to greater self-determination. It would on the contrary increase the possi-
bility for a random action which would contradict the demand for authorship.« (Pauen, M.:
Keine Kränkung, keine Krise. Warum die Neurowissenschaften unser Selbstverständnis nicht
revidieren. In: Holderegger, A./Sitter-Liver, B./Hess, C. W./Rager, G. (Eds.): Hirnforschung
und Menschenbild. Beiträge zur interdisziplinären Verständigung. Fribourg 2007, p. 44 f.).
Cf. also: Pauen, M.: Illusion Freiheit? Mögliche und unmögliche Konsequenzen der Hirn-
forschung. Frankfurt a. M. 2006, esp. pp. 54–58 and pp. 162–184; Pauen, M.: Was ist der
Mensch? Die Entdeckung der Natur des Geistes. Munich 2007, pp. 161–209.
Peter Bieri (Bieri, P.: Das Handwerk der Freiheit. Über die Entdeckung des freien Willens.
Munich/Vienna 42005, p. 80) and Ansgar Beckermann see the relationship between free-
dom and determination in a similar manner. Beckermann’s standpoint is that human be-
ings are biologically completely determinate. Yet, there is nothing to hinder us from seeing
ourselves as free beings. According to Beckermann, the similarity between the concepts
suggest that these findings are not completely irrelevant. (Beckermann, A.: Schließt biolo-
gische Determination Freiheit aus? In: Hermanni, F./Koslowski, P. (Eds.): Der freie und der
unfreie Wille. Philosophische und theologische Perspektiven. Munich 2004, p. 19. Cf. Beck-
ermann, A.: Neuronale Determiniertheit und Freiheit. In: Köchy, K./Stederoth, D. (Eds.):
Willensfreiheit als interdisziplinäres Problem. Freiburg/Munich 2006, pp. 289–304). We are
unfortunately not able to further explore the various nuances of these conceptions of free-
dom. What they have in common is that now the freedom of volition [Wollenkönnen] exists
and must find an echo in the person’s self-definition.
 9. Can we do what we want? Or do we want what has been determined?       377

would probably say to him: »If an action can only be free to the extent that it is not
determinate, the neurosciences also prove that as far as they reveal the determination
of human action, these actions are not free.«222 Pauen’s statements are a compatibil-
istic suggestion as to how we may think about freedom.
In the first sentence in one of Pauen’s many books about freedom of will, he
asks his readers to imagine being really free to act.223 Inevitably, the question arises
what Pauen exactly means when he speaks of a truly free act. What is such an act,
and what is it not? Pauen says that all the polemics about the subject of free will
were based on certain standards indicating what freedom is actually supposed to
be. He feels that the task of the philosopher is to examine these standards critically
and deal with them. Pauen calls this justifying the criteria.224 He says it is first of
all important to agree which guidelines indicate that a person can be called free.
Pauen says philosophers must turn »diffuse and incoherent« reference points into a
coherent conception of freedom225 Only then can we say more about the importance
of empirical data. For Pauen, it is self-evident that philosophers must take note of
this. It is even a commitment for all who are working on the lived body-soul prob-
lem. He regards everything else in the context of our subject as »speculation«226with
which thinkers would be ill-advised. He has little patience with philosophers who are
unwilling to deal with the neurosciences, ignore them and close their eyes to them
and live only in their philosophical ivory towers without grasping what valuable ma-
terial neuroscientists can contribute. Precisely for that reason we should also not ig-
nore this: Neuroscientists cannot prove that we are supposed to be without freedom.

»Of course, the philosophical criteria of freedom cannot be contradicted by means of

empirical results, not even when it becomes apparent human beings only seldom fulfil
these criteria or not at all. Yet, philosophers should still be interested in ascertaining
whether, and if yes under what conditions human beings are able to act freely.«227

For Pauen, the question of freedom is extremely complex.228 That is true, and according
to Pauen, that is why it is not at all easy to say which standards must actually be met for
an action to be defined as »free.« Empirical work, he believes, can help in formulating
an answer. When he deals with the »able to choose« freedom [Wollenkönnen], he does
not actually answer the question whether our world is determined or not.229 Among

222 Pauen, M.: Illusion Freiheit? Mögliche und unmögliche Konsequenzen der Hirnforschung.
Frankfurt a. M. 2004, pp. 11 f.
223 Cf. ibid., p. 7.
224 Cf. ibid., p. 13.
225 Cf. ibid., p. 14.
226 Cf. ibid., p. 12.
227 Pauen, M.: Willensfreiheit, Neurowissenschaften und die Philosophie. In: Herrmann, C. S./
Pauen, M./Rieger, J. W./Schicktanz, S. (Eds.): Bewusstsein. Philosophie, Neurowissenschaf-
ten, Ethik. Munich 2005, p. 56.
228 Cf. Pauen, M.: Illusion Freiheit? Mögliche und unmögliche Konsequenzen der Hirnforschung.
Frankfurt a. M. 2004, p. 13.
229 Cf. ibid., pp. 12, 31; Pauen, M.: Willensfreiheit, Neurowissenschaften und die Philosophie.
In: Herrmann, C. S./Pauen, M./Rieger, J. W./Schicktanz, S. (Eds.): Bewusstsein. Philosophie,
Neurowissenschaften, Ethik. Munich 2005, pp. 69 f.
378       E. Brain research and the question of human freedom

compatibilist, he therefore belongs to those who are prepared to elegantly detour this
volatile topic. He is more interested in telling us that he does not think it completely
wrong to simultaneously speak of freedom and determination. He has no problem
calling us free while our world can be determinist.230 Even if everything around us is
determinist, this would not absolve us from our responsibility.
To speak of a »truly free action«, the following principles must be met according
to Pauen: It should first of all not be achieved »coincidentally« since coincidence
is fundamentally different than freedom. They are like fire and water and cannot
be reconciled at all. When something happens coincidentally, it has nothing to do
with freedom. Coincidence is neither just nor unjust: it merely come upon us. When
something is coincidental, it has to do with no one. We can’t hold anyone responsible
for it. Even with the greatest effort, we cannot find an originator. However, when we
speak of a free action, everything looks different. It does not simply come out of thin
air, but from an acting person, i. e. from us when we are acting. For that precise rea-
son, a free action is different than the toss of a coin.231 Pauen indicates that we natu-
rally hold each other responsible (remember the example of the invitation/refusal to
have a cup of coffee!). We can only do that if actions do not happen coincidentally232
Another »negative intuition« to Pauen’s concept of freedom is the assumption that to
be regarded as free, what we do must not have been forced upon us.233 What occurs
due to external coercion cannot be free. Let us remember: What Pauen calls freedom
must have nothing to do with coincidence or coercion.
Based on Pauen’s considerations about what freedom is not, he proceeds to the
pillars of his freedom concept. Without these, there can be no »truly free action«.
What are these two pillars? Pauen says that a free action must be fully subject to the
principle of autonomy234. He goes back to the principle that when we want to regard
our action as free, it must not be based on coercion. This is the first of Pauen’s two pil-
lars on which Pauen’s freedom theory rests. Now it is our turn as actors.235 In Pauen’s
terminology, the second pillar of his theory is the originator principle for the action.
Pauen says that a truly free action is neither coincidental nor coerced, but has its or-
igin in us taking action, when we know how we are acting and understand it exactly.

230 Cf. Pauen, M.: Illusion Freiheit? Mögliche und unmögliche Konsequenzen der Hirnforschung.
Frankfurt a. M. 2004, p. 25.
231 Cf. ibid., p. 17.
232 Cf. Pauen, M.: Willensfreiheit, Neurowissenschaften und die Philosophie. In: Herrmann,
C. S./Pauen, M./Rieger, J. W./Schicktanz, S. (Eds.): Bewusstsein. Philosophie, Neurowissen-
schaften, Ethik. Munich 2005, p. 57.
233 Cf. Beckermann, A.: Schließt biologische Determination Freiheit aus? In: Hermanni, F./
Koslowski, P. (Eds.): Der freie und der unfreie Wille. Philosophische und theologische Pers-
pektiven. Munich 2004, p. 21.
234 Cf. Pauen, M.: Illusion Freiheit? Mögliche und unmögliche Konsequenzen der Hirnforschung.
Frankfurt a. M. 2006, pp. 60 ff.
235 Cf. Pauen, M.: Von Fledermäusen und der Freiheit des Willens. In: Könneker, C. (Ed.): Wer
erklärt den Menschen? Hirnforscher, Psychologen und Philosophen im Dialog. Frankfurt
a. M. 22007, p. 150 f.; Pauen, M.: Illusion Freiheit? Mögliche und unmögliche Konsequenzen
der Hirnforschung. Frankfurt a. M. 2006, p. 15.
 9. Can we do what we want? Or do we want what has been determined?       379

After Pauen has erected these pillars he advises that we translate freedom as
self-determination.236 He expects several advantages. A truly free action is not deter-
mined by other factors, persons, coercion or coincidence, but by the acting persons
themselves. His suggested translation can kill two birds with one stone, satisfying the
autonomy principle as well as the originator principle. The focus is on the individuals
who determine the action themselves. Without commitment, such an action cannot
be self-determined; it is indeterminate.237 He regards the term »indeterminate« as
more appropriate and broader than »determined by others« which could imply that
it refers to a person who just floats with the tide. In that case, the action would not be
determined by others, but would also show no real measure of freedom. The question
of whether we can do something »this way or that way« also has a viable way in that it
is part of the freedom of action to be determined by another person whose choice de-
termines the nature of action. It is, therefore, correct to say that it is our own respon-
sibility whether we do something or not.238 This is Pauen’s compatibilist response to
the question whether we can decide to follow alternative action possibilities.
Pauen now turns to another thought, that of personal preferences.239 What does
he mean by this? What is part of the acting persons: e. g. their convictions and value
systems, their wishes, ideals and plans. According to Pauen, we are different because
we have varying preferences which make us into individuals. The concept of personal
preferences is very important as it explains why persons in a certain life situation
decide differently today than for example a few weeks or months later. We may have
a preference for x and thus determine our day is accordingly.

»A person’s history could be totally determined through genetic or social circumstanc-

es. What is decisive is whether such persons have consciously owned the preferences
which have developed in the course of their history and take these as the basis for their
actions.«240

236 Cf. Pauen, M.: Willensfreiheit, Neurowissenschaften und die Philosophie. In: Herrmann,
C. S./Pauen, M./Rieger, J. W./Schicktanz, S. (Eds.): Bewusstsein. Philosophie, Neurowissen-
schaften, Ethik. Munich 2005, p. 57; Pauen, M.: Was ist der Mensch? Die Entdeckung der
Natur des Geistes. Munich 2007, pp. 13, 166–168; Pauen, M.: Illusion Freiheit. Mögliche und
unmögliche Konsequenzen der Hirnforschung. Frankfurt a. M. 2004, pp. 15, 64 f.; Pauen, M.:
Hätte Gott anders handeln können? Alternative Möglichkeiten in einer determinierten Welt.
In: Köchy, K./Stederoth, D. (Eds.): Willensfreiheit als interdisziplinäres Problem. Freiburg/
Munich 2006, p. 376.
237 Cf. Pauen, M.: Willensfreiheit, Neurowissenschaften und die Philosophie. In: Herrmann,
C. S./Pauen, M./Rieger, J. W./Schicktanz, S. (Eds.): Bewusstsein. Philosophie, Neurowissen-
schaften, Ethik. Munich 2005, p. 58.
238 Cf. Pauen, M.: Illusion Freiheit? Mögliche und unmögliche Konsequenzen der Hirnforschung.
Frankfurt a. M. 2006, p. 19.
239 Cf. ibid., pp. 67, 75 ff.; Pauen, M.: Was ist der Mensch? Die Entdeckung der Natur des Geistes.
Munich 2007, pp. 169 ff.; Pauen, M.: Hätte Gott anders handeln können? Alternative Mög­
lichkeiten in einer determinierten Welt. In: Köchy, K./Stederoth, D. (Eds.): Willensfreiheit als
interdisziplinäres Problem. Freiburg/Munich 2006, p. 377.
240 Kather, R.: M. Pauen: Illusion Freiheit? http://www.forum-grenzfragen.de/printable/
aktuelles/m-pauen-illusion-freiheit.php (retrieved 09. August 2010).
380       E. Brain research and the question of human freedom

Can someone actually drop preference x in favor of preference y? Of course, says

Pauen.241 Person P acts in complete freedom at time t when a decision is made for A
and not for B, and A is P’s personal preference. To return to the Searle’s example: The
choice made by Paris would be truly free if it corresponded to his preference. Searle,
however, would immediately say that being determined by his preferences does not
make Paris free. Pauen says that persons must be in a position to act according to
their preferences.242 Regine Kather comments as follows on Pauen’s concept of per-
sonal preferences:

»No matter how these personal preferences have come into being, whether they have
a biological basis or have developed because of education and social surroundings, they
can be consciously experienced and owned. All persons are thus made up of a bundle of
characteristics with which they identify on account of their consciousness. Kather tells
us that Pauen does not believe there is an invariant kernel in any human being that, first
of all, synthesizes and integrates these characteristics and wishes. Pauen argues that
even a radical change in personal preferences brought about by external circumstances,
through manipulation or accidents does not result in a change of the same person, but
leads to another person.«243

Should Paris have been hit by lightning and what once made him into a nice and
loveable person would have been radically swept away, he would now no longer be
Paris 1 but Paris 2 (provided that he survived the accident).
For Pauen, a »truly free action« is one which is defined in a very special way, and
that is where Pauen differs from thinkers like Seare. Pauen also does not have to
assume a gap in the network of cause and effect. He is instead concerned that those
who are able to implement their actions according to their preferences are acting in
freedom. Like Searle, Pauen would think that Paris’s free choice had nothing to do
either with coincidence or with coercion. Paris would have acted in freedom if he
had let himself be guided by his preferences and had either affirmed or negated them.
Pauen says that »the most reasonable criterion is probably people’s ability to decide
effectively against one of the preferences.«244 To remain with our example, Paris had
a preference for particularly beautiful women throughout his life and less for honor
and political power. Here, Pauen believes that he also has an answer to the question

241 Cf. Pauen, M.: Illusion Freiheit? Mögliche und unmögliche Konsequenzen der Hirnforschung.
Frankfurt a. M. 2006, p. 82; Pauen, M.: Willensfreiheit, Neurowissenschaften und die Philoso­
phie. In: Herrmann, C. S./Pauen, M./Rieger, J. W./Schicktanz, S. (Eds.): Bewusstsein. Philos-
ophie, Neurowissenschaften, Ethik. Munich 2005, p. 59.
242 Cf. Pauen, M.: Illusion Freiheit? Mögliche und unmögliche Konsequenzen der Hirnforschung.
Frankfurt a. M. 2006, p. 68.
243 Kather, R.: M. Pauen: Illusion Freiheit? http://www.forum-grenzfragen.de/printable/
aktuelles/m-pauen-illusion-freiheit.php (retrieved 09. August 2010).
244 Cf. Pauen, M.: Keine Kränkung, keine Krise. Warum die Neurowissenschaften unser Selbst­
verständnis nicht revidieren. In: Holderegger, A./Sitter-Liver, B./Hess, C. W./Rager, G.
(Eds.): Hirnforschung und Menschenbild. Beiträge zur interdisziplinären Verständigung. Fri-
bourg 2007, p. 45.
 9. Can we do what we want? Or do we want what has been determined?       381

of determinism when he assumes that the concept of personal preferences can be rec-
onciled with the acceptance of a determined world.
For Pauen, freedom and determination are not mortal enemies. They neither fight
nor exclude each other, since Pauen claims that every action must be determined
if it is to be truly free. Such a suggestion would surely raise Searle’s blood pressure
as he expresses his anger. Pauen would respond by telling him that if an action is
not determined, it also cannot be free. That is clear as in such a case it would not
have been determined by preferences.245 He takes this idea a step further and says
that if the cerebral processes and the personal preferences had nothing to do with
each other, the respective act of the will could be anything, but not free. Pauen does
not see this »having something to do with each other« as a necessary prerequisite,
but rather as one that is adequate. Brain processes and personal preferences, Pauen
concludes, must be identical if we wish to speak of a self-determined action. »If
it turns out that mental processes are neuronal processes, even if it becomes evi-
dent that acts of the will are determined neuronal processes, this would not mean
that these acts of the will are not free.«246 The objections regarding reflections of
identity theory named in Part 1 do not need to be repeated here, but they are also
relevant.
With respect to the mind-brain paradigm, Pauen explains what it means to him
in the last analysis when we act. Strangely, he here no longer speaks of persons, but
of busy neurons which are to be sufficient for our actions:

»if the action can be ascribed to those higher-level neuronal processes that also give
rise to our conscious decisions, thoughts and emotions, then we would be directing the
action. If these processes were not present then the corresponding wishes, convictions
and needs would not exist.«247

A negative intuition in Pauen’s process to his concept of freedom was the conviction
that to be free, we must under no circumstances be subject to external coercion. In
this connection, want us to remember the people mentioned at the beginning of this
chapter, who were subject to terrible external coercion while in prison, but who con-
tinued to radiate inner peace and great freedom. Do these people not demonstrate
that Pauen’s view is flawed in this respect? We can criticize his view that reasons are
in the end brain processes.
Schockenhoff writes:

»When the causal chains of the natural world and the influence of internal factors are
in the univocal use of concepts ascribed to the same determining power, then the pos-
sible exceptionality of determination through reasons for action as opposed to a causal

245 Pauen, M.: Willensfreiheit, Neurowissenschaften und die Philosophie. In: Herrmann, C. S./
Pauen, M./Rieger, J. W./Schicktanz, S. (Eds.): Bewusstsein. Philosophie, Neurowissenschaf-
ten, Ethik. Munich 2005, p. 60.
246 Ibid., p. 61.
247 Pauen, M.: Illusion Freiheit? Mögliche und unmögliche Konsequenzen der Hirnforschung.
Frankfurt a. M. 2006, p. 98.
382       E. Brain research and the question of human freedom

determination through natural efficient causes is already excluded because of these

definitional preliminary decisions.«248

Pauen no longer goes to the trouble to differentiate between the specific in human
actions as opposed to occurrences. This dismisses an extremely important dimension
of our freedom, as I will show in greater detail below. Pauen says: »Of course actions
are occurrences, and of course, different actions are different occurrences.«249 Ac-
cording to Pauen, we are actually characters in a determined world theater. It is of
rather little effect that we can also influence our environment which influences us
and with which we are in living interaction.
Kather argues:

»With Pauen ethical principles which were supposed to determine actions are univer-
sally valid. As a result, they are in fact independent of our own preferences and can even
be opposed to them. It is not clear how in Pauen’s understanding of self-directed actions
determined through preferences persons can distance themselves from them in an act
of self-reflection and be critical towards them. The motive to give up certain preferences
is only possible through the presence of more potent preferences.«250

From an Aristotelian perspective, Pauen’s claim that the specific dignity of human
beings and their special capabilities would not allow the mechanisms which control
non-human nature to be operative251 is not viable. Pauen believes that the assump-
tion of the presence of an immaterial soul is anachronistic in the current lived body-
soul (!) debate. He tells us that the notion of a soul should gradually be replaced
by scientific explanations.252 He is of the opinion that to assume there is a soul is a
»loveable bit of fiction«.253 As far as he is concerned, advances in brain research and
in biology inevitably lead us to finally abandon the idea of a soul.254 The assumption
»that the soul is of divine origin and its differentiation from the body and the rest of
nature should be abandoned when traditional understandings are replaced by a sci-
entific theory and the whole human being becomes part of nature.«255 He continues:

248 Schockenhoff, E.: Theologie der Freiheit. Freiburg/Basel/Vienna 2007, p. 69.

»An offer of reconciliation between determinism and freedom which ignores questions
concerned with the power and might of thought gives one the impression that no more
than a hollow peace is sought.« (Seel, M.: Freiheit als Skandal. Können wir, wie wir wollen?
Oder wollen wir, was wir müssen? Die Philosophie streitet mit der Hirnforschung. In: Die Zeit
(Nr. 51). 09 Dec. 2004). http://www.zeit.de/2004/51_lit/ST-Neurologie (retrieved 29 May
2010).
249 Cf. Pauen, M.: Illusion Freiheit? Mögliche und unmögliche Konsequenzen der Hirnforschung.
Frankfurt a. M. 2006, p. 130.
250 Kather, R.: M. Pauen: Illusion Freiheit? http://www.forum-grenzfragen.de/printable/
aktuelles/m-pauen-illusion-freiheit.php (retrieved 09. August 2010).
251 Cf. Pauen, M.: Was ist der Mensch? Die Entdeckung der Natur des Geistes. Munich 2007, p. 8.
252 Cf. ibid., p. 40.
253 Cf. ibid., p. 41.
254 Cf. ibid., pp. 10 f., 29, 234 f.
255 Ibid., p. 46.
 9. Can we do what we want? Or do we want what has been determined?       383

»The model of the brain as a complex neuronal system presents a plausible explanation
of the cognitive capabilities of the human mind. These developments so constrict any
space that may be left for the soul that the image of an immaterial soul substance is
finally abandoned in the context of scientific theories.«256

Similarly incomprehensible is Pauen’s assumption that it is totally impossible for the

soul to separate itself from a body when the brain is a constitutive component of the
human being.257 Pauen calls his thoughts a »minimal concept.« He says that other
(stronger) models do not take one of the two pillars seriously. The theory of the con-
ditional nature of human freedom, which will be discussed later, is indeed a stronger
model since it is compatible with the principles named by Pauen but does not cling
to determinism and also acknowledges that we can also to begin something new.
Accordingly, mental manifestations of life are not identical with neuronal processes.

9.5 Determination and the indeterminate nature of quantum

physics

»Quantum mechanics forces us to deal with

probabilities, rather than with certainties of
events. And, in chaos theory, a random event
may shift the behavior of a whole system in a
way that was not predictable.«258

In the light of quantum mechanics and chaos theory, blind faith in an iron determin-
ism can no longer be as self-evident and unquestioned as has might have been the
case before. This faith has suffered unmistakable scratches and cracks. A concerted
effort in favor of consistent determinism seems definitely disconcerting when quan-
tum physicists tell us that particles in the subatomic region are still unspecified. This
news has a philosophical dimension that should not be underestimated: A constitu-
ent part of the credo of classical physics has now become obsolete, namely that the
manner in which everything happens has always been quite clear. For example, we
now read: »The processes in the microcosm are based on initial conditions which are
unknown – not only for technical reasons, but because they do not exist in sharp-
ly discernable form. There are certainly also amplifier effects that can expand this
uncertainty into the macroscopic world.«259 The following question appears on the
horizon: Does this open a gap for our »able to choose« freedom [Wollenkönnen] to
slip into our world? At least, this argument has been offered and allows us to say

256 Ibid., p. 97.

257 Cf. Pauen, M.: Mein Gehirn und ich. Vorsicht vor Denkfallen der Leib-Seele-Debatte! In:
Könneker, C. (Ed.): Wer erklärt den Menschen? Hirnforscher, Psychologen und Philosophen
im Dialog. Frankfurt a. M. 22007, p. 186.
258 Libet, B.: Mind Time. The Temporal Factor in Consciousness. Cambridge/London 2004,
p. 152.
259 Bischof, N.: Das Paradox des Jetzt. In: Psychologische Rundschau 1 (2005), pp. 36–42, here
p. 39.
384       E. Brain research and the question of human freedom

something more profound about us being free. In the works of Pascual Jordan, we
can read that we can defend our »able to choose« freedom against all who doubt our
freedom and against the determinists.260 In the contemporary works of Robert Kane,
we find a certain mental kinship: He thinks and argues in a similar vain.261 But does
this really help us with the question about our freedom?
It is not surprising that such statements have led to furor and controversy. Some
neurobiologists claim that the indeterminate nature of quantum physics can be ig-
nored when we talk about the cerebrum. Other natural scientists are irritated and
formulate critical arguments, saying that it is not legitimate to underestimate these
phenomena. They argue that the indeterminate nature of quantum physics contra-
dicts rigid determinism. It does, and that is why we should not ignore it. But is the
»able to choose« freedom irrevocably demonstrated with the pontifical authority of
modern physics? Quite soberly, we must say »no«. We cannot simply lump together
the indeterminate nature of quantum physics with our freedom.262 Subsequent to
Pauen and Searle, we can say that when we speak of free action, we speak of more
than indeterminacy. When I plan to write a chapter about freedom and determina-
tion in my dissertation, I do not want these lines to appear on the page incidentally.
No, I have a purpose and can find several good reasons for what I am doing. The in-
determinate nature of quantum physics does not help our »able to choose« freedom.
And neither can today’s physics prove that we are not free.

9.6 Why the determinism thesis does not allow real dialogue

»The assumption that a determinist nature of

the physically observable world can account
for subjective conscious functions and events
is a speculative belief, not a scientifically prov-
en proposition.«263

In current discussions, non-determinist suggestions are usually mentioned in less

spectacular form than positions taken by those who think it is their calling to pro-
mote the validity of determinism. We may agree with Robert Spaemann and say

260 Cf. Jordan, P.: Der Naturwissenschaftler vor der religiösen Frage. Abbruch einer Mauer. Ol­
denburg/ Hamburg 1963.
261 Cf. Kane, R.: The Significance of Free Will. Oxford 1996; Kane, R.: Two Kinds of Incompati-
bilism. In: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 1 (1989), pp. 219–254.
»As one struggles to sort out and prioritize one’s own values, the possible outcomes are
not merely undetermined, but also indeterminate: at each stage of the struggle, the possible
outcomes have no specific objective probability of occurring. This indeterminacy, Kane
believes, is essential to freedom of will« (O’Connor, T.: Free will. In: Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/ (retrieved 10. November 2010).
262 Cf. Searle, J.: Mind. A Brief Introduction. Oxford 2004, pp. 24, 230 ff.; Pauen, M.: Illusion
Freiheit? Mögliche und unmögliche Konsequenzen der Hirnforschung. Frankfurt a. M. 2004,
p. 17.
263 Libet, B.: Mind Time. The Temporal Factor in Consciousness. Cambridge/London 2004,
p. 153.
 9. Can we do what we want? Or do we want what has been determined?       385

that what determinists have to tell us is »itself utopian« and can »never be realized«,
something which »strangely is not seriously included in the debate.«264 To quote
Gerhard Kaiser, the assumption that we are all completely determined is a »dis-
course killer and completely absurd.«265 The Polish philosopher Leszek Kołakowski
expressed this with humor in a fictitious birth announcement: »Janek Kowalski was
born in the capital yesterday, and he will be an outstanding composer some day. To
mark this event, the Warsaw Philharmonic will play the Third Symphony tomorrow
which he will compose at the age of 37.266
If the followers of universal determinism are right, all that happens in the world
would be absolutely specified. We could not change a thing because everything is a
foregone conclusion. Whether I compose a symphony at 37 or write a philosophical
text about the subject of freedom has already been sealed since time immemorial.
The assumption that we could go in such and such a direction in our life would be
invalid. How strange and absurd these assumptions are becomes apparent when we
realize that every day we take it for granted not to »be lived« but to actively intervene
in our world, to move something and to get things going. Why else would we support
projects to improve climate protection if not with the motivation to work against
global warming, to improve the future of this planet and to do reduce the negative
consequences as much as possible? Projects in which people are involved whose goal
it is to minimize the consumption of fossil fuels or to decisively lower the emission of
greenhouse gases cannot be reconciled with the determinist dogma that every point
in the course of time has been determined.267
As I mentioned earlier, the theological factor played a certain role in making de-
terminism acceptable. In modern works, there are regular references to »the laws
of nature« according to which everything is supposed to be determined: the brain,
human beings, the course of the world.268 We have already met some examples in
this chapter. Pauen says that freedom presupposes the existence of various action
alternatives. »Yet, precisely that seems to be impossible when action and decision are
determined by determinist laws of nature.«269
In his works, Geert Keil points out that in various publications references to the
laws of nature are short-sighted and often not particularly well-grounded.270 He
argues that the »laws of nature« are not legal regulations, not provisions demanding

264 Cf. Spaemann, R.: Personen. Versuch über den Unterschied zwischen »etwas« und »jemand«.
Stuttgart 21998, p. 223.
265 Cf. Kaiser, G.: Warum noch debattieren? Determinismus als Diskurskiller. In: Geyer, C. (Ed.):
Hirnforschung und Willensfreiheit. Zur Deutung der neuesten Experimente. Frankfurt a. M.
2004, pp. 261–267.
266 Cf. Kołakowski, L.: Mini-Traktate über Maxi-Themen. Leipzig 22001, pp. 72 f.
267 For example, the know-how we need to compose a symphony or to organize an environ-
mental protection project has been stored neither in any specific part or the brain, nor in
the genes. Here an important aspect is what we as lived body-soul organisms are currently
experiencing (»I am a part of a threatened environment which has to be protected!«/»I am
in contact with other human beings who enjoy my music!«).
268 Cf. Roth, G.: Aus Sicht des Gehirns. Frankfurt a. M. 2003, pp. 167 f.
269 Pauen, M.: Was ist der Mensch? Die Entdeckung der Natur des Geistes. Munich 2007, p. 163.
270 Cf. especially: Keil, G.: Naturgesetze, Handlungsvermögen und Anderskönnen. In: Janich,
P. (Ed.): Deutsches Jahrbuch für Philosophie. Vol. 1: Naturalismus und Menschenbild. Ham-
386       E. Brain research and the question of human freedom

to be met and followed. Laws of nature do not comprise an imperative telling us

what to do or not to do. They only help us to describe what happens in the world.271
Keil argues that it is »an untenable assumption« that the laws of nature command
or prescribe what is to happen.272 Let me explain this with two examples. Imagine
an annoying philosopher jumps out of a window, or you even help and give him a
push. Since the window is not on the first, but on the on the thirtieth floor, you can
imagine the outcome, and I do not have to go into details. What I want to point out
is this: The change of the original situation (annoying philosopher standing at the
window) due to a specific development (defenestration) to the final consequence
(violent impact) can easily be understood and explained with the laws of nature.
But which law of nature would determine that the annoying philosopher must jump
from the window or determine that you best get rid of him by pushing him? It would
be cruel to try and legitimize such an enterprise by citing the laws of nature. A law
of nature is not dictatorial. It will be self-evident to everyone that the future with the
annoying philosopher will be different than without him. At any rate, if you want to get
rid of this unpleasant person by pushing him out of the window, you are not going
against the laws of nature. Keil also emphasizes that the fact that there are laws of
nature does not strip you of your freedom, nor does it prove your lack of freedom.
Here is the second example: In a vacuum, light moves at the speed of approxi-
mately 300,000 kilometers per second. A gigantic figure! At least I do not know a
runner who is faster. We would in fact worry about an athlete who tries to achieve
such speed, and at best we would regard him as unreasonable for eagerly pursuing
such a goal.273 But, whether our athlete decides to spend his next vacation in the Do-
minican Republic or on the Island of Sylt does not depend on natural laws, but on his
personal reasons and possibilities (e. g. his fear of flying, the fact that he cannot speak
Spanish, his rather tight budget). He can ponder whether the Dominican Republic
or Sylt should be his holiday destination. Aristotle would remind us that there are
things which are our responsibility (e. g. for our athlete to play sports or finally take a
vacation), and some which are out of our hands and have to do with concepts such
as nature, necessity and coincidence (e. g. the impossibility to win the next marathon
by moving at the speed of light from A to B).274 Therefore, Geert Keil comments
quite rightly that from an Aristotelian point of view the laws of nature reduce the
scope of possible processes, but they do not reduce them to one single process.275 As
Keil explains, the known laws of nature restrict our freedom. We are not able to do

burg 2008, pp. 157–184, esp. p. 165; Keil, G.: Willensfreiheit. Berlin/New York 2007, pp. 28,
118–130.
271 Cf. Keil, G.: Naturgesetze, Handlungsvermögen und Anderskönnen. In: Janich, P. (Ed.):
Deutsches Jahrbuch für Philosophie. Vol. 1: Naturalismus und Menschenbild. Hamburg 2008,
pp. 165, 174.
272 Cf. Keil, G.: Willensfreiheit. Berlin/New York 2007, p. 125.
273 »The most important thing is that we expect nothing impossible from the laws of nature.«
(Ibid., p. 129).
274 Cf. Aristotle: EN 1112a31 ff.
275 Cf. Keil, G.: Naturgesetze, Handlungsvermögen und Anderskönnen. In: Janich, P. (Ed.):
Deutsches Jahrbuch für Philosophie. Vol. 1: Naturalismus und Menschenbild. Hamburg 2008,
p. 177.
 9. Can we do what we want? Or do we want what has been determined?       387

everything. However, it would be foolish to use them as proof that we are not free:
»Everything is possible that is not made impossible by the laws of nature.«276 No law
of nature is broken when the athlete decides to spend his vacation on Sylt. We can
agree with Keil who says that the laws of nature show us the paths within which we
can move and act. For example, the athlete cannot run at the speed of light in the
next Olympic Games. As a being gifted with freedom, I can think about the laws of
nature and try to interpret them. Yet the laws of nature are no proof for the validity
of a determinist world view. »The determinist promise would only be kept if we
would observe motives as independent variables before they motivate (e. g. whether
to holiday in the Dominican Republic or on the Island of Sylt), and we could predict
the result of their interaction.«277 That is exactly what a trued determinist would
have to prove.
Authors who deny the concept of freedom want to understand the cerebrum as a
determinist system.278 How strange, we wonder: The brain of all organs! It does not
exist in an isolated world all on its own. It is embedded in a lived body-soul organism
which interacts with its environment as a living entity. According to Keil, we could be
correct in assuming the existence of brain determinism if the brain were a causally
isolated system. In that case it would be possible for area-specific determinist process
laws – e. g. the way in which brains function – to aptly and completely describe the
behavior of their subject.279 In our discussions about whether the will is determined,
we should not forget that the brain is the organ of a living being which is very defi-
nitely formed by social and cultural conditions.280 Those who love freedom affirm
that the brain is part of our organism and thus an »open system.«
In the course of debates about freedom, we can also hear voices saying that our
mental manifestations of life (such as free decisions to act) are separated from any
terms and conditions or even from influences: by brains, people and the course of
the world. They say that our freedom – if it exists – would be divorced from phys-
ical preconditions; it would be absolute and with no conditions. We should not be
trapped by the assumption of rigid determinism or by a one-sided understanding
of human freedom; we should not be taken in by these quarrelling twins (determin-
ism – absolute freedom). Proponents of complete determinism deny that we are free
and that we can design our own lives our freedom do not see that our freedom also

276 Ibid., p. 177.

277 Cf. Spaemann, R.: Personen. Versuch über den Unterschied zwischen »etwas« und »jemand«.
Stuttgart 21998, pp. 223 f.
278 We could of course expect that at least Roth and Singer know all about the processes which
are determinate. But this is not the case.
279 Cf. Keil, G.: Naturgesetze, Handlungsvermögen und Anderskönnen. In: Janich, P. (Ed.):
Deutsches Jahrbuch für Philosophie. Vol. 1: Naturalismus und Menschenbild. Hamburg 2008,
p. 170.
280 »That changes in behavior simultaneously involve biological changes is also true of the
brain. Nerve cell networks with which we process specific perceptions, for example pain,
strengthen their connectivity when the signal concerned is repeated frequently. When envi-
ronments regularly and over a longer period of time produce signals of a certain kind, then
not only the behavior, but also the accompanying neurobiological event adapts structurally
to this situation.« (Bauer, J.: Warum ich fühle, was Du fühlst. Intuitive Kommunikation und
das Geheimnis der Spiegelneurone. Hamburg 102005, p. 157).
388       E. Brain research and the question of human freedom

has boundaries. Considerations about quantum physics and the laws of nature tell us
that there is both, necessity and coincidence in nature. These are the chords by which
the music of freedom is played.

10. The freedom of man

»To be free of the faith in lack of freedom is to
become truly free.«281

10.1 Man in action

»It is important to recognize an almost uni-

versal experience: that we can act in certain
situations [and have] the experience of inde-
pendent choice and of control of whether and
when to act.«282

As we know, some authors rant against the assumption that we are free. Their motto:
Our actions are nothing but events. They mean that there are solid physical causes
which we should assiduously identify and clearly name, to make our actions com-
pletely understandable. This approach requires that we thinking about what actions
really are, and what distinguishes them from events. We also need to clarify what
reasons and causes are.283
Some works dealing with our freedom point out that to have access to our actions,
we should not confuse the concepts of »cause« and »reason«. In this context it is also
discussed that intentionality is typical for our actions. This group incudes authors
as different as Habermas, Runggaldier, and Schockenhoff. Habermas points out that
the reasons for our actions should not be confused with (experimentally observable)
physical realities.284 Habermas says that reasons are something else. As far as he is
concerned, it is grossly negligent to reduce reasons to »playing the role of retro-

281 Buber, M.: Ich und Du. Stuttgart 2001, p. 56.

282 Libet, B.: Mind Time. The Temporal Factor in Consciousness. Cambridge/London 2004,
p. 154.
283 Cf. also: Runggaldier, E.: Was sind Handlungen? Eine philosophische Auseinandersetzung
mit dem Naturalismus. Stuttgart/Berlin/Cologne 1996; Schockenhoff, E.: Theologie der Frei-
heit. Freiburg/Basel/Vienna 2007.
284 Cf. Habermas, J.: Zwischen Naturalismus und Religion. Philosophische Aufsätze. Frankfurt
a. M. 2005, p. 168; Habermas, J.: Das Sprachspiel verantwortlicher Urheberschaft. Probleme
der Willensfreiheit. In: Janich, P. (Ed.): Deutsches Jahrbuch für Philosophie. Vol. 1: Naturalis-
mus und Menschenbild. Hamburg 2008, pp. 15–29. English: The Language Game of Respon-
sible Agency and the Problem of Free Will. How Can Epistemic Dualism be Reconciled With
Ontological Monism? (Translated by J. Anderson). http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/
10.1080/13869790601170128?needAccess=true&.
 10. The freedom of man       389

spectively rationalizable running commentaries about unconscious neurologically

explicable behavior:«285

»Reasons do not swim like beads of fat on the surface of the soup we call conscious life.
Instead, the processes of judging and acting for the participating subjects are connected
with reasons. If the ›give and take‹ of reasons would be discarded as an epiphenome-
non, not much would remain of the biological functions of the self-understanding of
subjects able to speak and act.«286

Some scientists admit that reasons are not merely beads of grease but can develop an
effect, but only with the caveat that reasons are nothing but empirically describable
causes. »If the reason for action is equated with causes and the causal effect of causes
can only be understood in physicalist terms,« Edmund Runggaldier says, »then the
everyday conviction must be abandoned that reasons with their intentional content
play a certain causal role.«287
Aristotle would have pointed out that it is not enough just to keep the causa ma-
terialis and the causa efficiens in mind, but that reasons only become understandable
when we include the causa finalis and the causa formalis. Eberhard Schockenhoff
has a similar approach. He illustrates the difference between causes and reasons by
asking the question why Socrates did not escape from his prison cell.288 It is well
known that Socrates’ friends and students wanted to persuade him to escape from
prison. Why did they not succeed? The line that his bones and sinews failed to move,
and he therefore stayed in the prison cell does not do justice either to the situation or
to Socrates. Schockenhoff stresses that this answer did not clarify the »why« of the
question. Socrates was convinced that it was better to remain in prison. Escape was
out of the question, and for good reasons. It was important to let judgments stand.
Socrates was afraid that otherwise the laws could become pale and meaningless. He
was determined to follow his inner daimonion. In other words, there were reasons for
Socrates to stay in prison. Schockenhoff points out that he had a specific intention.
When neuroscientists today point to the activities of certain neuronal groups and
want to tell us something about action potential, we have learned something about
Socrates’ bones and sinews, but nothing about his reasons.

285 Habermas, J.: Zwischen Naturalismus und Religion. Philosophische Aufsätze. Frankfurt a. M.
2005, p. 168.
286 Ibid., pp. 168 f.
287 Runggaldier, E.: Was sind Handlungen? Eine philosophische Auseinandersetzung mit dem
Naturalismus. Stuttgart/Berlin/Cologne 1996, p. 142.
288 Cf. Schockenhoff, E.: Wer oder was handelt? Überlegungen zum Dialog zwischen Neurobio­
logie und Ethik. In: Rager, G. (Ed.): Ich und mein Gehirn. Persönliches Erleben, verantwortli-
ches Handeln und objektive Wissenschaft. Freiburg/Munich 2000, pp. 244–247; Schocken-
hoff, E.: Beruht die Willensfreiheit auf einer Illusion? Hirnforschung und Ethik im Dialog. In:
Vorträge der Aeneas-Silvius-Stiftung an der Universität Basel. 2004, pp. 16 f.
Cf. Boeddinghaus, J.: Wer entscheidet: Mein Gehirn oder Ich? Die Möglichkeit der freien
Entscheidung bei Augustinus und in den Neurowissenschaften. Freiburg 2007, p. 49; Rung-
galdier, E.: Was sind Handlungen? Eine philosophische Auseinandersetzung mit dem Natu-
ralismus. Stuttgart/Berlin/Cologne 1996, p. 146.
390       E. Brain research and the question of human freedom

Please imagine the following situation: You are on a couch with friends, watching
a game of your national football team. This game will determine whether the team
will enter the quarter finals of the World Cup. For a moment, your friends were
distracted when they opened a bottle of beer, and now they ask you why the umpire
blew his whistle. Since you are not only interested in the World Cup, but also in
neuroscientific problems, you tell your friends that in the a readiness potential had
developed in the umpire’s brain. Authors such as Kornhuber and Deecke, and also
Libet, could have written wonderful stories about this topic. You explain in detail
which brain areas were involved and what occurs in the synapses. Can you imagine
the faces of your friends? Their question had demanded a different answer than such
a doubtlessly profound lecture. What they want to know is the reason for the whistle
which would not be an ineffective bead of fat or an experimentally distinguishable
material cause. They want to know what will define and influence the further course
of the game, whether this will have consequences for the team entering the quarter
final. Your friends, all of them enthusiastic football fans, would probably have been
satisfied if you had pointed out that a forward from the German team had fouled a
defense player in the box, and that this had resulted in an injury which made a con-
tinuation of play impossible for your player. Naturally the umpire was unwilling to
overlook such an aggressive defense of the goal, and even the current FIFA football
rules would say there had to be consequences for such behavior. The umpire – and
this could be called the reason for his action – told the unfair striker to leave the field.
What will happen now? We can watch this on TV. The forward who committed the
foul approaches his opponent and apologizes by offering to shake hands. He must
then leave the field, and a penalty kick is awarded. The umpire’s whistle, as everyone
can see (and can hear – despite loud chanting by the fans), was not senseless. He had
a reason for it. The referee achieved something: a break and a change in the game.
Let us remember that when your football friends asked why the umpire whistled,
they were not interested in causal or material causes. They wish to know the reasons,
the intention, the predominant purpose of the umpire in halting the game.289 These
two different examples make clear that Socrates’ decision to remain in prison and
the action of the umpire on the football field did not just come out of nowhere. They
were neither incidental nor imposed by others (the friends of Socrates, the football
fans) or through the laws of nature. Both Socrates and the referee were able to give
reasons for their actions.
Undoubtedly not all reasons have the same importance for everyone. That would
be impossible. We are constantly faced with the difficult task to differentiate between
really good and tolerable reasons. Which are stronger, which are weaker? What must
be taken into account in this life situation? What is good and true and what will

289 »An atomistic approach to the question regarding the description of actions and their on-
tological interpretation, which separates actions from the mentioned circumstances, refer-
ences and acting persons, is not sufficient for an adequate understanding of actions. This
is especially apparent in the consideration of symbolic actions. When we do something,
which is symbolic, we do more than move our bodies. We send others a message and com-
mit ourselves to behaving in a certain manner in the future.« (Runggaldier, E.: Was sind
Handlungen? Eine philosophische Auseinandersetzung mit dem Naturalismus. Stuttgart (et
al.) 1996, p. 65).
 10. The freedom of man       391

perhaps lead to ugly consequences in the future? As in our umpire and Socrates
examples, we can form our own reasons and thus find a new direction in our life
(staying in prison, punishing unfair football practices). Reasons give us a means of
orienting ourselves.
What reasons does my opponent have? What is he passionate about? What moves
him? What makes him tick? How does he deal with issues? Of course, we can chat
about these things. Surely Socrates would have been willing to explain his reasons,
and after the game a friendly referee would surely give me the reasons for his actions.
With reference to the chapter on the rediscovery of the lived body, we can say that
through empathy we can become aware of what is happening inside others, what
their purpose is, what their goal is. All that is genuinely and distinctly his. Through
empathy it also becomes mine. In the view of others I can see what my actions mean
to them and how they feel about an action (was Socrates afraid of the poison cup?
Did the referee enjoy the excitement in the football stadium?)
The fact that not all reasons are the same for all of also means that we can confi-
dently deal with reasons. We are able to assess and be critical. We can »rank« reasons,
and we are in a position to follow a higher reason. But, do we always do this? If we
are honest we must admit to the temptation not to seek better and nobler reasons in
all situations. The umpire – perhaps even for a bit of »pocket money« – might have
overlooked the foul, and Socrates might have planned his escape with his friends.
However, these actions would not have been made more free since they would have
acted contrary to what they knew to be good and true. Keil points out something
else:

»What some people believe are the best reasons are not necessarily so, and the people
know that there is this gap. In their thinking, they may have overlooked something im-
portant. That is why it is generally sensible to re-examine a reason that is believed to
be good.«290

We do not merely unreel what we do. What distinguishes us are the reasons which we
allow to be efficacious in our lives. There could have been good reasons for Socrates
to accept the invitation to escape, and better reasons for him to remain in prison.
Reasons can speak for us. When we let them, it becomes clear that our lives will
take the one or the other turn. Socrates may flee with friends or remain in prison.
The referee could punish the unfair action of a player or himself become unfair by
flouting the rules of the football game. Reasonable and justified actions are based on
the knowledge that there are also other ways and possibilities. We are also able to
act differently.
People who believe there are actually no reasons will skate on very brittle ice. If
there are actually no reasons, their own reasons with which they support their posi-
tions are also worth nothing. Like those of Socrates and the referee, our actions are

290 Keil, G.: Willensfreiheit. Berlin/New York 2007, pp. 135 f.

Cf. also: Welte, B.: Determination und Freiheit. In: Welte, B.: Person. Gesammelte Schriften
I/1. Freiburg/Basel/Vienna 2006, pp. 71 f.
392       E. Brain research and the question of human freedom

supported by reasons. This approach rocks the boat of the advocates of a determin-
istic mindset. Rafael Ferber says:

»if determinism is true then this truth cannot be substantiated. The determinist is de-
termined not by reasons but through efficient causes to assume that his opinion is true.
Reasons presuppose freedom. Rational reasons are for the determinist as they are for
the materialist purely efficient causes, which is why the determinist can argue with
rhetorical methods based on his own presuppositions. But he is unable to persuade
with arguments. The proof given by a determinist is equivalent to a burp that he cannot
control.«291

Let me now say something about the difference between events and actions. First I
want to explore whether actions can be performed or even replaced by means of an
extremely exact recording and detailed depiction of body movements. This question
was already suggested when we thought about the referee who put his whistle into
his mouth; and when we thought of Socrates sitting quietly in his prison cell. Let us
look at another example to more clearly delineate what is specific to human actions.
I remember participating in a brain tumor operation at the neurocenter in Frei-
burg during my doctoral studies. I will describe the body movements I could ob-
serve. After the patient was placed in the correct position on the operating table,
some of his hair was shaved off, and the part of his head that would be opened, was
marked with paint. Then, I could observe how a hand previously placed inside a
glove was given a scalpel, grasped it and very precisely cut open the scalp. The same
hand carefully folded the scalp back and fastened it with clamps. I could observe
this hand directly next to me but also on the screen above me. The hand was quite
calm. The thought crossed my mind: »These hands are not doing this for the first
time.« I watched what the hand now prepared to do to the h patient’s head. It laid the
scalpel on a tray that had been prepared, and grasped the saw – the skull still had to
be opened. As impressive as this »quiet hand« was, it did not operate any more than
the scalpel or the saw. The main actor of this brain tumor operation was the senior
surgeon of the neurocenter, who had conducted innumerable similar operations.
Had I concentrated solely on the events connected with the surgeon’s action, I could
have had the idea that the white-gloved hand was the main actor in the OR. However,
when we (the surgeon and we) interact, our attention is drawn to the lived body uni-
ty of the living person who is becoming active. In this case, it was the very pleasant
senior surgeon who was conducting the brain operation. If it were a matter of telling
about events, we would concentrate on the scalpel or the saw. The senior surgeon
obviously did not simply open the patient’s head. He acted for a specific reason: He
wanted to remove the tumor which was situated near Wernicke’s area and the visual
pathway. Throughout the operation, the surgeon continued to explain what he was
doing at each moment, revealing some of his motivation. As a non-medical observer,
I could understand what was happening before my eyes. Actions cannot merely be

291 Ferber, R.: Philosophische Grundbegriffe 2. Munich 2003, p. 185.

 10. The freedom of man       393

explained by recording body actions in minute detail.292 When I describe actions

like those in the OR, the senior surgeon, I describe the concrete person in his lived
body-soul unity. It is different when we are concerned with events. Here, we are often
satisfied to speak of the »quiet hand« or of the saw.
When we are precise, the movement of a hand can be both an event and an action.
How so? It become clear when I say that I move my hand (like the senior physician)
or when I tell you that my hand is moving. When I say that I move my hand, it is also
clear that my hand is moving. Here is the point: The proper motion is mine. Imagine
that my hand – for example by bumping into another hand or by an especially strong
gust of wind – is caused to move. In that case, the proper motion is not mine. We can
understand this as an event which does not carry the same meaning as when we call
something an action. When I try to understand an event, there can be any number
of causes. For example, an impact motion or a gust of wind. When I move my hand
like the senior surgeon during his operation (which I observed in great detail), I
can speak of my action for which I have certain reasons. What is happening is not
happening to me. I have seen what the surgeon is doing, and am now imitating him.
Part of my action is that it is embedded in a specific (life) situation (I have taken part
in the operation); it can also be dated (I am no longer in the neurocenter, but am
sitting at my desk again). Since I once considered whether I should study medicine,
this action (like other actions of mine) also has a certain history.
As beings who begin, we can also make new beginnings with our actions. For
example. we can quite consciously decide to register for a degree in philosophy and
theology and not in medicine. In other words: My choice of subjects was clearly a
preferential choice (prohairesis).293 My further (study) decisions (choice of a seminar,
exam registration) were determined by my choice of the subjects of philosophy and
theology. For example, I could not write a medical exam but studied according to
the rules set by Faculty of Philosophy and Theology. During my studies, I did not
waste my time waiting to see what would happen. My action during my studies was
not without direction: My goal was to study diligently, to explore important questions
and finally to graduate with honors. I was convinced that I could have acted in var-
ious ways: I could have stayed in bed or gone to classes. This can also be formulated
as follows: I could actively pursue my goals regarding my goals I (go to classes) or not
(stay in bed). In terms of my actual goal – to study diligently – the second possibility
can also be classified as an action. Every student and professor knows that it is not a
foregone conclusion that every test will earn the highest mark, which illustrates that
our actions can succeed or end in a way we do not like. They can go wrong – i. e. miss
the target. I have not succeeded with everything I tried. Actions can have a positive
outcome or they can fail.

292 »An action can be seen as having occurred according to physical or psychological regu-
larities, but then can not be viewed as action, but merely as reflex or body movement.«
(Schockenhoff, E.: Theologie der Freiheit. Freiburg/Basel/Vienna 2007, p. 93).
293 »As then the object of choice is something within our power which after deliberation we
desire, choice will be a deliberate desire of things in our power; for we first deliberate, then
select, and finally fix our desire according to the result of our deliberation.«
(Aristotle: EN 1113a10 ff.).
394       E. Brain research and the question of human freedom

As we have learned, when we plan and carry out an action, certain readiness
potentials exist in the brain and in the nerve cells which are important for my ac-
tions. As empirical studies have documented impressively, the fact that the »grey
cells« in our brain become fairly active does not mean that we I are forced to carry
out an action under all circumstances. We can choose to refrain from acting. With
hindsight, we realize that not all plans and ideas could be put into practice in our
lives.294 We cannot seize all opportunities. Our financial possibilities are as limited
as out lifespan.
I can judge my actions, take a stand: Where am I? Is this what I wanted? Does it
match my real goals? I experience what I do. I sense my actions. Bauer says:

»it is, first of all, important to assess which bodily feelings – from pleasant feelings to
paresthesia and even to feelings of pain – are to be expected. On the other hand, most
actions are within an emotional, an affective context.«295

In the context of our thoughts about actions, we should also say something about the
lived body. When we act and refer to something, this occurs through our lived body.
Readiness potentials (RPs) and active brain centers belong to a living organism, be-
long to our lived body, belong to a lived body which is the medium of our actions.
Regarding the chapter, The re-discovery of the lived body, we can say that it is not the
body or individual organs which act, but that it is thanks to our lived body that we
are able to move, act, and achieve something in our surroundings. What I want to
implement, what I hope for or what I attempt to avoid is embodied in my actions.
These mental manifestations of life cannot be separated from my corporeality.296 A
mind-brain view cannot even come close to what is special in our actions because
the corporeal dimension has been dismissed.
Our mental manifestations of life such as our convictions, wishes and intentions
do not float aimlessly in mid air and without direction. They are related to something
specific. Socrates, the umpire and the senior surgeon are concerned about something
quite concrete. They all have goals. Their actions – and our actions – are goal-ori-
ented. We are able to intervene when it is necessary. We are able to change matters.
Kather says that it is also a part of our actions that through goal-controlled changes
in our behavior, the processes of the biosphere which can be derailed thanks to hu-
man goal orientation, can be influenced.297 Concerning the discussion in the pre-
vious section, we can say that through the laws of nature the events connected with
our actions can be explained with the laws of nature.
When we act, we are able to implement our ideas and our intentions. It must be
emphasized that the content of our ideas, plans and intentions is important. Let
us o back to the example of the annoying philosopher who falls from the thirtieth

294 Cf. Bauer, J.: Warum ich fühle, was Du fühlst. Intuitive Kommunikation und das Geheimnis
der Spiegelneurone. Hamburg 102005, p. 160.
295 Ibid., p. 67.
296 Cf. Fuchs, T.: Leib, Raum, Person. Entwurf einer phänomenologischen Anthropologie. Stutt-
gart 2000, pp. 185, 187.
297 Cf. Kather, R.: Person. Die Begründung menschlicher Identität. Darmstadt 2007, p. 129.
 10. The freedom of man       395

floor. Not only people watching mysteries on TV, but our whole legal system would
like to know whether it was murder, manslaughter or criminal negligence. It is not
the same, neither morally nor legally (for example in terms of the jail sentence).
We quickly see that in each of these three scenarios we are looking at a completely
different motivation on which the action was based. Was the annoying philosopher
deliberately pushed out of the window and for base reasons? Was there a violent
fight during which people were overwhelmed with rage? Even though the outcome
was the same (the annoying philosopher died), we still have to examine everything
closely and search for the motive behind the action. Not all actions are the same. The
intention makes all the difference.
And let us assume the annoying philosopher had not even plunged from the win-
dow, that Instead there had been much fighting and quarrelling and perhaps even
injuries. Once our actions have been implemented, they cannot be undone as with a
clock whose hands can be set back. The quarrel and the physical interaction did take
place. Wounds are visible to everyone. When people act, they can become guilty. A
really new beginning is only imaginable when there is an attitude of forgiveness, when
the thought of reparation is not allowed to take over, and every grudge is dismissed.
What happened at the window cannot be undone, but true forgiveness implies re-
lease, renunciation, exoneration. Only then will new, natural, i. e. free interaction
become possible.
Hannah Arendt says:

»It is only through mutual unburdening of oneself and exoneration that human beings
who were endowed with the gift of freedom, when they came into this world, can also
remain free in the world. It is only in the measure in which they are willing to change
the way they view the world and start afresh that they will be in a position to handle a
so immense and immensely dangerous treasure as freedom and new beginnings.«298

In the mind-brain paradigm, we are no longer seen as actors in our lived body-soul
unities. Therefore, actions are no longer connected to us but are to be curtailed to
form causally joined mind-brain events. It is most unsatisfactory that crucial dimen-
sions of our actions no longer appear in the mind-brain paradigm.
As living beings gifted with reason, we are able to fashion our actions according
to what we believe is desirable and good. This could relate to planning to read the
study now before you as well as larger projects such as graduating from university. In
this sense, we can say that we as living human beings in our lived body-soul wholeness
are the »moving principle« of our actions.299 If the way in which you act lies in your
hand, we can call this being »free.« If this is the case, this also includes the chance to

298 Arendt, H.: Vita activa oder Vom tätigen Leben. Munich 62007, p. 306.
Cf. also: Spaemann, R.: Personen. Versuch über den Unterschied zwischen »etwas« und »je-
mand«. Stuttgart 21998, pp. 235–251, esp. pp. 248–251; Spaemann, R.: Glück und Wohlwol-
len. Versuch über Ethik. Stuttgart 21990, p. 248; Peucker, H.: Vergebung und Einfühlung. In:
Lohmar, D./Fonfara, D. (Eds.): Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven der Phänomenologie. Neue
Felder der Kooperation: Cognitive Science, Neurowissenschaften, Psychologie, Soziologie, Poli-
tikwissenschaft und Religionswissenschaft. Dordrecht 2006, pp. 235–246.
299 Cf. Aristotle: EN III 1, 1113b19–21.
396       E. Brain research and the question of human freedom

take another road and decide differently (to study medicine or better philosophy and
theology).300 We make plans for many actions. Remember the example of deciding
whether to holiday in the Dominican Republic or on the Island of Sylt. We can criti-
cally analyze whether it is even in our power to accomplish what we want (to book a
holiday flight or to jog faster than the speed of light).301 In conclusion, we can state
that when we act, there is more involved than corporeally (or even neuroscientifical-
ly) determinable events. We are characterized by the fact that we have intentions and
reasons which we can implement. Actions have to do with living human beings in
their lived body-soul wholeness, not with beings reduced to minds/brains.302

10.2 Freedom needs commitment: A thought experiment

»Whoever denies determinism is at least not

subject to the claim
that anything can happen at any time.«303

The Scottish chess grandmaster Jonathan Rowson once publicly called chess a »cel-
ebration of existential freedom«. What did he mean? Isn’t chess a game subject to
strict rules? How can it signify freedom? By using Ulrich Lükes’ thought experiment,
I want to demonstrate that freedom needs rules and conditions.304

300 Aristotle: EN III 1, 1110a, 17, Cf. EN III 2, 1111a.

Cf. also: Ricœur, P.: Wege der Anerkennung. Erkennen, Wiedererkennen, Anerkanntsein.
Frankfurt a. M. 2006, p. 114.
301 Aristotle: EN III 5, 1112b.
302 Cf. Aristotle: EN III 1, 1109b35–1110a18 und EN V 10, 1135a23–1136a9.
Aristotle distinguishes between praxis and poiêsis (Met. 1025b3–1026a32). When he uses
the term poiêsis (operatio) Aristotle refers to a productive creation. An example would be the
manufacture of a scalpel, or the building of a football stadium. Neither originates in nature.
Regarding our modern world of work, where pragmatic activity is demanded, the list could
be expanded. According to Aristotle, every creator creates for a specific purpose; it is not
purpose per se but is created in relation to another and for another (EN VI 2, 1139b22 ff.).
Thus, while poiêsis is purpose-oriented, the goal of praxis is different where the action is in
itself the purpose (ibid.). Here, we are thus not concerned with a purpose no merely in rela-
tion to another and for another. Aristotle contends that through praxis you and I can become
a great deal better (Cf. also EN VI 5, 1140b6 f.). Of importance, here, is that Aristotle sees the
living person, not the soul, not the encephalon, as the source of action.
(EN III 5,1112b31). Aristotle is confident that human beings can act according to their own
judgment. He therefore understands two aspects. On the one side, is manufacture (build-
ing of a football stadium, the manufacture of a scalpel), and an action that is meaningful
in itself. Acting out of love for your partner is, as far as Aristotle is concerned, a beautiful
example of the second aspect.
(Cf. Elm, R.: Poiêsis. In: Höffe, O. (Ed.): Aristoteles-Lexikon. Stuttgart 2005, pp. 469–471;
Elm, R.: Praxis. In: Höffe, O. (Ed.): Aristoteles-Lexikon. Stuttgart 2005, pp. 487–491; Arendt,
H.: Vita activa oder Vom tätigen Leben. Munich 62007, pp. 213–317, esp. pp. 241–251;
Schockenhoff, E.: Theologie der Freiheit. Freiburg/Basel/Vienna 2007, pp. 96–99).
303 Keil, G.: Willensfreiheit. Berlin/New York 2007, p. 129.
304 Cf. Lüke, U.: Das Säugetier von Gottes Gnaden. Evolution, Bewusstsein, Freiheit. Freiburg/
Basel/Vienna 2006, pp. 234 f.
 10. The freedom of man       397

I invite you to imagine a game of chess, one of the oldest and most popular games
in the world. We know that Aristotle enjoyed playing chess and specifically recom-
mended it as »training« for the spiritual and mental life. A chess board is divided into
64 alternatively black and white squares. When the game begins, 32 of the squares are
occupied with chess pieces – 16 black and 16 white pieces. Major and minor pieces
are distinguished. Major pieces are the King, the Queen and two Rooks. The minor
pieces are two Bishops and two Knights. In addition, each player has eight Pawns.
No more and no less. It is clearly prescribed that a square can only hold one piece
at a time, and that only one piece can be moved at a time. If a figure is already on a
square, a second piece cannot be placed there in addition. However, the first piece
can be attacked and captured and is then removed from the board. The player with
the white pieces always starts the game (»Regina regit colorem«).
It is strictly regulated how each piece can be moved: The Queen, the strongest at-
tack piece, can occupy every square on the board. Pawns on the other hand can only
make limited moves and have few opportunities to capture an opponent’s piece. In
contrast to the Queen and other pieces, they cannot be moved backwards. The King
can move only one square in any direction at a time, and only the Bishop has the
special privilege of being able to jump over another piece.305 If a pawn has not yet
moved, it can move one or two squares forward (provided no other piece occupies
the square) – at the player’s discretion. Pawns have the strictest rules: A Pawn can
only capture a piece on either square diagonally in front of it, but it cannot move to
those squares if they are vacant. It cannot move backwards or sideways. There are
other strict rules and regulations which the players have to follow, and these are
especially important in tournaments. But this certainly does not make the game »un-
free« – on the contrary. Lüke notes that these conditions provide the spatial freedom
needed. The conclusion of a chess duel is not predetermined. Based on the stringent
rules, many different (and very imaginative) variations can be played, such as Live
Chess and – in the age of the Internet – online chess. So-called Blindfold Chess is
popular among professionals where the players do not touch the pieces or see their
positions.
Now imagine we would not abrogate all these (very stringent) rules but give the
game a totally different goal. No longer would it be about attacking the opponent’s
King and rendering him checkmate. Instead, we would have to try and get our own
KIng out of the way as quickly as possible. That would obviously reverse the inten-
tion, but the basic conditions (i. e. the rules) would not change.
In the 1960s there was an episode in the Star Trek series where three-dimensional
chess was played. Lüke’s suggestion goes in the same direction: We should include
the third spatial dimension in a chess game which would be played with cubes in-
stead of squares. Lükes points out that we also have a third spatial dimension in
our cerebrum and that the analogy is thus within a permissible scope. According to
Lüke, the necessary conditions, the strict rules are what constitute the freedom of
the game.
Lüke suggests we also consider the time factor:

305 Except in castling.

398       E. Brain research and the question of human freedom

»If the result is a number of variations by many powers of ten more than there are mo-
ments in my life, to realize at least the most interesting game variations among them, I
have an enormous, perhaps even astronomical dimension of relative freedoms of choice
at my disposal.«306

Lüke uses this beautiful example to demonstrate that we are able to choose freely on
the basis of our predetermined conditions, rules and life variations. In other words,
our freedom is an interplay of rules (conditions) and not of predetermined chess
moves (decisions).307

10.3 Our freedom as conditional freedom

»One can live in true freedom,

And yet not be unattached.«308

I would now like to present a suggestion how we can raise a white flag of peace and
find a sensible position – first of all, in the trench warfare between authors who reject
any suggestion that freedom actually exists and authors who understand freedom as
being completely detached from rules and preconditions (freedom as an absolute),
and secondly in the battle between compatibilist and incompatibilist philosophers. I
think that it does not help us to deny that freedom exists, and that freedom belongs
to us as living human beings (contrary to the camp of freedom deniers and friends
of consistent determinism). I also think that it is part of our freedom that we are not
footloose, but that we are referred to and depend on conditions in our freedom (i. e.
that our freedom is not absolute). The assumption of conditional freedom cannot
be filed in the drawer of compatibilist models since the perception of a consistent
determination was banished, and we therefore no longer have to consider whether
and how freedom and determination belong together. Nevertheless, we also cannot
attach the label of »incompatibilist« to our suggestion: We should not overlook the
abyss between interpreting the laws of nature and considering how our freedom can
be concretely spelled out.

306 Cf. ibid., pp. 235.

307 The mystic Teresa of Avila also thinks about the chess game. In the sixteenth chapter of her
work The Way of Perfection she thinks about the setting of the chess figures and from here
makes a connection to the »heavenly king.« Her thinking is very interesting. The saint sees
being checkmated and checkmating as God’s gift to his human creatures and our surrender
to God. The freedom to which Teresa is here referring has a deeper meaning than being
given permission to do whatever comes to mind. This human liberty is more than lifting a
finger in a laboratory experiment or the decision between button A and button B. Mystics
such as Teresa of Avila indicate that whole new vistas of freedom will open up when human
freedom binds itself to the Divine. This is a perspective which is not even being considered
in the current neuroscientists’ discussion.
Cf. also: Seifert, J.: Schachphilosophie. Ein Buch für Schachspieler, Philosophen und ›normale‹
Leute. Darmstadt 1989, pp. 116 ff.
308 Excerpt from the poem Der wahre Genuss. Cf. Goethe, J. W. von: Sämtliche Gedichte. Frank-
furt a. M./Leipzig 2007, p. 693.
 10. The freedom of man       399

The chess example in the previous section has illustrated quite effectively what
we can experience again and again every day: We truly have a great deal of leeway
in our actions and free movements. Yet, speaking figuratively, there are walls which
do not allow us total unlimited movement. If we pay attention to the world around
us we can give find a lot of examples. A look in a daily newspaper may help. Let us
begin with a glance at the politics and economics section: We find that the scope
of action granted to German soldiers stationed outside the country is limited by
specific conditions. Political parties impose terms and conditions before coalitions
can be being formed. The German Federal Government links state assistance and
discussions about tax cuts or increases to certain conditions. Some political offices
such as that of the German Federal President are subject to conditions such as age
and German citizenship. In our society, there are fixed rules which govern the way
we live together and laws to protect the freedom of citizens. In the features sections
of newspapers, we read about university examination rules or environmental issues.
Our daily life is influenced by numerous cultural, religious and social factors. We
should not forget to scan the birth and death notices. Our lives have a beginning and
an end,. We are born some day, and the day will come when we must take leave of
this world. I have never heard of a new arrival at any maternity ward in the world
who has chosen parents, extended family, name, date of birth and place of birth. I
assume that neither were you asked whether you even wanted to be here. I know I
wasn’t. Neither were we able to pick our body or the size and performance rating
of our cerebrum from a catalogue insert of the paper. Kather says, and we agree:
»Since we are bound to our bodies, we are subject to boundaries. The price paid
for transgression against these boundaries is a lowering of our quality of life and of
our life expectancy. These boundaries are not the result of consensus but rest upon
the relationship of human beings to nature.«309 It obviously matters whether we
are man or woman, since our gender determines much. We are mental beings, but
also beings with urges and as such, as Edith Stein says, »We are unable to fashion
our whole life completely freely.«310 As human beings, we always find ourselves in a
network of conditions from which we cannot completely untangle ourselves. Goethe
said that we can live in true freedom and yet we can’t be unattached. Let us turn this
around: Since we do not our being from ourselves –after all, we are human and not
divine – it would be quite foolish to believe that we are not subject to conditions,
bonds and limits. Our freedom is bounded, conditional.311 In Stein’s words: »All of
nature also means bonding. No creature is unconditionally free. Only the creator is
unconditionally free – because He is of Himself.«312
It is not only in the newspaper where we find it is part of man’s mortality to make
mistakes. Our freedom is a freedom to good and evil. It can be a springboard for
committing ourselves to helping others. It can also lead us astray. To the extent in

309 Kather, R.: Person. Die Begründung menschlicher Identität. Darmstadt 2007, p. 164.
310 Stein, E.: EES, p. 316.
Cf. Merleau-Ponty, M.: Phänomenologie der Wahrnehmung. Berlin 1966, p. 516.
311 Cf. also: Schockenhoff, E.: Theologie der Freiheit. Freiburg/Basel/Vienna 2007; Zaborowski,
H.: Herausforderungen der Freiheit. In: Communio 2 (2008), pp. 131–154.
312 Stein, E.: EES, p. 339.
400       E. Brain research and the question of human freedom

which our lived bodies always show us our boundaries and constantly remind us of
our mortality, a project that tries to establish human freedom beyond all conditions
must be rejected as being reckless and completely inappropriate.
There are countless internal and external factors (earlier I called this setting the
switch) that play a role in our lives and that can make or break us. My decision-mak-
ing and the course of my whole life depend on what I learned from my parents, at
school and at university. We ponder about things, we argue and weigh our argu-
ments, we examine what may happen when we transform our will into action. Our
will matures and grows – also determined by this or that »growth intensifier« or
»growth inhibitor« – and can finally end in action. Our action is not absolute.
All our lives, we have beautiful and pleasant, but also painful and bad experienc-
es. It is this treasure of experiences that defines us: On the one hand, for example
when we when open ourselves unconditionally to certain suggestions, recommen-
dations, incentives, plans, people and developments, we are curious and anxious
to experience what awaits us. On the other hand, this happens also when some
things, ideas, projects and people fill us with suspicion and a good portion of dis-
trust. Aristotle said: »The acts which we implement in a specific direction make
us into the person who we are. We see this in the lives of those who are preparing
for a contest or for business. They do this by tenaciously practicing the necessary
acts.«313 But we may also a abandon old and well-known habits and pursue other
ways.
When we speak of a free man, we do not mean »a hounded person«, who always
does what others tell him and who always pays attention to what others do. To fash-
ion and live our life freely does not mean rejecting all proven patterns of thought
and action like religion and our treasure of traditions. In his Encyclical, Spe salvi,
Benedict XVI formulated this very beautifully:
»Freedom presupposes that in fundamental decisions, every person and every
generation is a new beginning. Naturally, new generations can build on the knowl-
edge and experience of those who went before, and they can draw upon the moral
treasury of the whole of humanity. But they can also reject it, because it can never be
self-evident in the same way as material inventions. The moral treasury of humanity
is not readily at hand like tools that we use; it is present as an appeal to freedom and
a possibility for it.«314
There are obviously a number of basic constants which determine the way we
live and which and limit our freedom. We should pay careful attention that these
basic constants can help us to develop our freedom. We can learn to come to terms
with them. It should be clear by now that we should not confuse freedom with pure
coincidence or with pure arbitrariness. What occurs happens incidentally cannot be
my action. Arbitrariness is completely unreasonable; it is the grotesque back-side of
a freedom that is spurned; it is not concerned with what is good and true. Outer and
inner factors can stifle freedom. Yet, not all external constraints necessarily mean
that we have to lose our freedom. Someone with internal constraints (remember

313 Aristotle: EN III 7, 1114a.

314 Benedict XVI.: Encyclical letter Spe Salvi. http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/
encyclicals/documents/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20071130_spe-salvi.html.
 10. The freedom of man       401

the woman with schizophrenia we mentioned at the beginning of this chapter?) is

no longer able to bring reason to bear in life and action. As we have seen, we are
normally able to lead our lives and to act for certain reasons. Let us remember the
two examples: Socrates and the umpire. »These reasons are motives. They move our
will, they do not force us.«315
Our freedom also means that we can question the results our actions may have
in the future. I can, for example, avoid developing lung cancer in a few years by
stopping to smoke now. And because it is better for my health, I can go on a diet
and lose 25 kg. Well-founded actions impressively document that I have been gifted
with freedom. I am able to act in different ways: I can go on a diet and participate
in sports, or otherwise pay no attention to my eating habits, my fitness and my con-
dition. The decisions I make (to go on a diet) are directed towards a specific goal (a
healthier lifestyle), and yet I can ask whether my decisions are ethically acceptable
(e. g. is it ethical that the cost of my unhealthy lifestyle will one day burden society?).
It is definitely part of our humanity that we are open to values and commit ourselves
to values (e. g. that in the interest of protecting the environment we decide not to fly
to the Dominican Republic). As Joachim Gauck said: »We live our freedom for the
sake of a value, a faith, a goal. Human beings shrivel up when they are not permitted
to live this kind of freedom.«316
Certainly, a necessary precondition for our mental manifestations of life is our
brain, and what happens in my head as I write these lines is characterized – we could
also say: determined – by former cerebral processes. Thomas Fuchs: »Freedom does
not preclude ›neuronal conditionality‹. On the contrary, it is a prerequisite for its
freedom’s possibilities.«317 Even the most sophisticated neuroscientific tools are not
able to capture freedom inside the skull. We are only free in our entire lived body-
soul wholeness.
In the chapter on hylemorphism, in connection with Hans Jonas’s discussion con-
cerning the soul of plants, we suggested that we should see freedom as a common
thread which is present within all living beings. We know that single-cell organisms
are susceptible to stimuli and have their own metabolism. This is something marble
pillars, mountains or computers are not. It is from this »germ of freedom« that high-
er forms of freedom have sprouted. We are characterized as animal rationale, able
to question our own action goals and, if necessary, also to dismiss them to dismiss
them – something in which we may or may not succeed.
It is part of human freedom that we can shape our own life, to give it direction.
We express our freedom through our ability to interact and empathize with others,
to create contact and socialize with others. Freedom can only truly grow and flourish
with human interaction. If I am only concerned about my own freedom, it will soon
shrivel up and die. Pope Benedict XVI said: »The freedom of a human being is the
freedom of a limited being, and therefore is itself limited. We can possess it only as a

315 Stein, E.: EES, p. 340.

316 http://www.welt.de/politik/article3622396/Warum-nur-lieben-wir-unsere-Freiheit-
nicht.html (retrieved 10 June 2010).
317 Fuchs, T.: Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan. Eine phänomenologisch-ökologische Konzep-
tion. Stuttgart 2008, p. 86.
402       E. Brain research and the question of human freedom

shared freedom, in the communion of freedom: only if we live in the right way, with
each nother and for each other, can freedom develop.«318
In our personal and public lives, we continually experience how beneficial it can
be to have the courage of truth. We not only respect those who succeed in this and
who are rooted in truth, we also call such persons truly free. Lüder Deecke, who
discovered RP, said that »a healthy way of life is in the long run a condition for free-
dom, and truth is the basis of freedom. Freedom is a task and a challenge for human
life and culture.«319 In this sense, as Aristotle already realized, freedom is more than
being able to choose between A and B. Our freedom grows in proportion to what we
have recognized as being good and true. We read in the Bible: »The truth will make
you free« (John 8:32). Since 1911, these words (in German) have been displayed in
golden letters above the entrance to the University of Freiburg. They have definitely
been an important impulse for further discussions about human freedom.

10.4 In all freedom: A brief conclusion

»The greatest gift that humanity has received

is free choice. It is true that we are limited in
our use of free choice. But the little free choice
we have is such a great gift and is potentially
worth so much more that for this itself life is
worth living.«320

In this chapter, I have tried to show that as living human beings we have always
been integrated in a network of relationships and conditions. However, we have
seen that we are not at the mercy of this network. We can act creatively, we can
make new connections within this network, we can distance ourselves and take
up new positions. As Goethe said: »We can live in true freedom. And yet not be
unattached«.321
In connection with Zaborowski, I referred to a pair of twins between whom no
love is lost and who often take over the debate about freedom. The one represents
consistent determinism, the other is the one who loses sight of the fact that freedom
is not absolute. As with all extremists, they are one-sided and are really no help at

318 http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/homilies/2005/documents/hf_ben-xvi_
hom_20051208_anniv-vat-council.html (Retrieved 16 Jan. 2017).
Cf. Jaspers, K.: Über Gefahren und Chancen der Freiheit. In: Jaspers, K.: Das Wagnis der
Freiheit. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Philosophie. Munich/Zurich 1996, p. 131, Cf. also pp. 134
and 140.
319 Deecke, L.: Freies Wollen und Handeln aus dem Urgrund der Seele. In: Peschl, M. F. (Ed.):
Die Rolle der Seele in der Kognitions- und Neurowissenschaft. Auf der Suche nach dem Sub-
strat der Seele. Würzburg 2005, p. 76.
320 Thus the novelist Isaac Bashevis Singer. Quoted by: Libet, B.: Mind Time. The Temporal
Factor in Consciousness. Cambridge/London 2004, p. 156.
321 Excerpt from the poem Der wahre Genuss. Cf. Goethe, J. W. von: Sämtliche Gedichte. Frank-
furt a. M./Leipzig 2007, p. 693.
 10. The freedom of man       403

all. They bypass the essence of human freedom, what constitutes our freedom. That
is the reason why I tried to find a viable middle ground. Our freedom has necessary
prerequisites; it is a conditional freedom.
Our freedom includes our capability of running on different tracks. To achieve
this, we continually have to set the switches – together with others. The track of our
life is not a determined one-way line without turnoffs in either direction. We can
look back on stretches we have traveled, and we can take new tracks, new begin-
nings – for example, when we forgive each other. I tried to explain that to be free is
also to be able to say »yes« to life, to shape it, and to handle it with common sense.
That kind of freedom will not only revolve around itself and not end up in a one-way
road.
We have seen that the acceptance of our freedom is constantly under threat and
that the debate about this phenomenon is an extremely many-layered affair. We
have explored how the current discussion about the »able to choose« Freedom and
the »able to act« freedom can be integrated into a larger context, and how compat-
ibilist and incompatibilist suggestions can then be formulated about it. Benjamin
Libet’s research data were discussed in depth, from which we cannot merely con-
clude that our freedom is a simple farce. Libet himself has unequivocally criticized
such interpretations, saying that this is not the way to deal with his research data
or talk about freedom. In this chapter, we have looked critically at some of the ref-
erences to Libet’s experiments. Gerd Kempermann’s comment is very much to the
point: »The natural sciences can say something about the conditions under which
we can experience free will. Without a brain, there is no free will. But that does not
mean that free will can be completely captured and explained biologically.«322 It is
really strange that in the current debate there is the constant assumption, meant
seriously, that when we experience ourselves as free living beings, this is less mean-
ingful than information about this controversial matter that comes from a neu-
roscientific research laboratory. Against this background, let us again remember
the discussion about those who were searching and questioning – we can also say
who were free – and who became our sources of science. Those people, gifted with
freedom, have shouldered and shaped the neuroscientific series of experiments.
They painstakingly searched for explanations, answers and interpretations that will
further our quest. This applies not only to Libet or Haggard and Eimer. Let us put
it quite bluntly: Without the freedom of those diligent neuroscientists there would
be no essays about freedom and determinism now. When they honestly faced the
question of why we act as we do (e. g. to implement a specific series of tests and
ask for research money) and committed their lives to the truth, freedom showed
up in their lives. Jaspers commented very aptly that the evidence of freedom is
not affected through knowledge, but through action. This is, however, not merely
some one-time deed, but an action that takes place every day because individ-

322 Kempermann, G.: Infektion des Geistes. Über philosophische Kategorienfehler. In: Geyer, C.
(Ed.): Hirnforschung und Willensfreiheit. Zur Deutung der neuesten Experimente. Frankfurt
a. M. 2004, p. 236.
404       E. Brain research and the question of human freedom

uals exist who in their interaction with each other become a part of a true, free
community.323
We have been thinking about the reasons which motivate us to act the way we
do. We have also searched for a deeper understanding of our actions. In this effort,
we have been helped by Socrates, a football umpire and a senior brain surgeon. In
this context, we have differentiated between our actions and events. The question
concerning the laws of nature was also of interest. The examples dealing with the
vacation planning (Dominican Republic or the Island of Sylt) and with the annoying
philosopher who was thrown out of a window underlined that retreating behind the
laws of nature is not helpful to make us understand our freedom. Yet, it is thanks
to the laws of nature that very precise explanations of events become possible. We
discussed that we can become active thanks to our lived body which is the medium
for our actions. Considering that a whole group of well-known neuroscientists and
neurophilosophers do not even think about the dimension of our corporeality (since
often only the brain is their focus of interest, and since they do not differentiate
between body and lived body), we must say that something quite elementary is not
being addressed that would help us to gain deeper access to our actions. We also
mentioned that people become involved with issues to which they dedicate them-
selves (e. g. in environmental protection or the freedom of the press) and turn their
concerns into actions. This is certainly not a negligible insight. In the neurosciences,
much time is spent on extremely serious questions and on content that is impor-
tant for our lives. But those are not dealing with values and reasons which cannot
be lumped together with causal and material reasons. This also indicates that the
neuroscientific profession is actually incapable of apprehending what shapes and
determines our actions.
Seen from the perspective of Aristotle, it is appropriate that we emphasize again
that it is the human being as a whole that decides and implements a certain action:
You as brain researcher or I, each in our respective lived body-soul unity, and not
someone shrunk down to a mind-brain entity. There is no deterministically closed
world hiding in our skull. There is a living organ connected with the complete lived
body-soul organism and determined by various factors – for example, the intellectu-
al endeavor to come to grips with the work you are presently reading and discussing
with good friends. The followers of neurobiological determinism again and again
insist on disregarding this reality. Freedom is something which characterizes us as
living human beings. As Lüder Deecke said: Freedom is both a challenge and a task
for us.

323 Cf. Jaspers, K.: Über Gefahren und Chancen der Freiheit. In: Jaspers, K.: Das Wagnis der
Freiheit. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Philosophie. Munich/Zurich 1996, p. 136.
 10. The freedom of man       405

Conclusion

»The finest achievement for a person of

thought is to have fathomed what may be
fathomed, and quietly to revere the unfath-
omable.«324

At the end of the present study, it is now my task to summarize the most important
conclusions, to look back and at the same time venture to look ahead. I have exam-
ined the lived body-soul problem under several aspects. I have looked closely at what
can be said ontologically concerning the mental and the physical, and whether men-
tal manifestations of life have a necessary, perhaps also a sufficient requirement or
condition. I discussed the problem of freedom of will as well as the subjects around
intentionality and personal identity. As I asked in the introductory chapter, do we
want to understand ourselves as living organisms in our lived body-soul entirety or
as mind-brain beings.
In Part 1 of the present study, I showed that hylemorphism can do without the
trench warfare between dualist and physicalist approaches, and that it can point to
a way leading farther. Hylemorphism is not something that should be consigned
to the dumps of the history of philosophy. We are here dealing with a position that
takes into account the organismic entirety, an approach that authors such as Antonio
Damasio, Thomas Fuchs, and Günter Rager currently demand. What turned out to
be important in that discussion was that in the sense of the Aristotelian suggestion,
the lived body and soul, form and matter cannot be torn apart or reduced to con-
form to each other. The idea of entelechy was much supported: Assuming that our
associative cerebral cortex were a living being, its soul would be the power of speech
while we could call the associative cerebral cortex the matter providing the power
of speech and the latter in turn its fulfillment. Just as these two belong together, soul
and body form the organism. The brain is part of the body. The soul is its accom-
plishment.
Our mental manifestations of life belong to a lived body-soul unity, belong to the
vitality, the aliveness of a living being. What speaks for hylemorphism is that it has
been able to overcome the abyss between mental manifestations of life and physical
preconditions, which most authors accept as self-evident. These physical processes
are thus seen as being necessary, not sufficient, for our mental manifestations of life.
In this way, hylemorphism gets tied up neither with dualism nor with physicalism. If
after reading this text and thinking about the material you are a little tired, you now
wish to put a response on paper, this all pertains to a lived body-soul entirety. It is
possible that due to the unity of lived body and soul, the complementarity of hylê and
morphê, our body discloses something about us, namely the medium of expression,
the icon of the living person. This is a dimension which neither dualist, physicalist
and parallelist approaches nor the reflections of mental monism can grasp.

324 Goethe, J. W.: Maximen und Reflexionen. Nr. 1207. Frankfurt a. M. 2003, p. 206.
406       E. Brain research and the question of human freedom

With this thought, we have already arrived at the discussion in Part 2. Here, our
initial questions were explored through the lens of modern brain research and of
phenomenology. We discussed what the meaning of the brain is in relation to our or-
ganism, the approaches taken in the history of brain research, and what the premises
and boundaries of neuroscientific work are. It became clear that there was a fruitful
complementarity between the point of view conceptualized by the Aristotelian doc-
trine of the soul and the research results of the neurosciences.
Our brain is an extremely fascinating part of ourselves and we do not have to be
a fortune-teller to know that further research will certainly reveal more exciting de-
tails. Today we know that our cerebral structures do not remain untouched by what
happens in our environment. Neuroscientists speak of a malleable/plastic organ. Our
mental manifestations of life are capable of altering the structure of our brain. This
happens, for example, if you have discovered something new in the present study.
Our brain, like the rest of our Leibkörper is constantly being formed. Our lives are
not being dictated by a lonely abstract world. Our being human cannot be reduced
to what constitutes our grey matter. Those suggestions and theories about the lived
body-soul problem, which lose sight of our corporeality and are only concerned with
a cerebrum that apparently has no attachment to a lived body, all go wrong. There
is no doubt that our brain is an especially important organ. Our lives would change
drastically if it our brain did not cooperate smoothly. We are more than mind and
brain. Our cerebrum needs – as of course our other organs also do – organismic me-
tabolism, a process founded in our being soul-endowed. The mental manifestations
of life mentioned in the introduction belong to us as a living person unit. It is not my
mind and brain that is the author of the text in front of you, but I. it is not your brain
that has read the work and made it to this point, but you!
With reference to Edith Stein, we worked out that our movements, our access
to the world, and our contact with other human beings is possible thanks to our
corporeality. It is not a gene sequence, our bone density or the size of our brains, but
our lived bodies that counts when we meet other. Our corporeality makes it possible
that we can have empathy with others. As we come into contact with each other in
our bodily form, we no longer need to ask whether the other person is truly human.
When we empathize with others, we also experience ourselves. In the course of these
manifestations of life, mirror neurons have an important role to play. They are by no
means sufficient for us to experience others, but they are clearly important for our
interaction with each other. We also worked out that there is a loss in our perception
of our lived bodies when its reality is rendered in the form of tables, graphs and
neuroscientific data.
We looked extensively at various consciousness theories. Strengths and weakness-
es were identified, and philosophical background assumptions were referred to. Both
conscious and unconscious processes belong to a lived body-soul organism. If we did
not have these manifestations of life, we could not even think about such problems.
We pointed to certain basic decisions, which are usually not referred to. For example,
when we speak of »representations,« when manifestations of life are located in the
brain and certain data are understood from the outset through a specific lens, or
neuroscientific theories are believed to be more significant and closer to reality than
what we experience in our own lived bodies.
 10. The freedom of man       407

As humans, we are able to establish reasons, are able to reflect in which direction
we would like our lives to proceed, and can be on the lookout for what is good and
true, and can adapt our actions accordingly. We belong to an assembly of persons
that naturally has rules. But for us, these rules are not as rigid as they are, for in-
stance, for a computer or for a robot. We are in a position to come to manage these
rules and to ask what their purpose and consequences are. Is this rule sensible? What
is their purpose? What will happen if I don’t obey this rule? When we deal with
these questions and ask them in all honesty, our thoughts can be good or bad, true
or false. We know that our brain plays an important part in this process. However,
the operating procedure in an area of our brain is neither true nor false. Instead, it
is necessary so that we are able to ponder these questions. That we are beings gift-
ed with intention becomes clear when we take note of the clear boundary marker
between us and the fastest and most efficient computer on earth. This insight was
enough reason to bid farewell to the notion of humans being made in the image of
machines. It also gave us cause to remember what we said with regard to Aristotle’s
statement about the soul of a plant (threptikê psychê, anima vegetativa): What an
organism, even one consisting of only one cell, can achieve thanks to its metabolism
cannot be matched by any computer. Here, we had the first glimpse of what we call
freedom: Human freedom was differentiated from absolute freedom and a strict de-
terminism. These quarreling twins did not help us to move on. Instead, we took the
middle road: freedom as conditional freedom. Humans have always been part of a
network of relationships and conditions. This is necessary for them but restricts and
presents boundaries regarding their movement possibilities, their options to act, i. e.
their freedom.
We saw in the last chapter that the neuroscientific experiments, which are dis-
cussed with a great deal of enthusiasm, cannot merely be understood as confirming
that we are not free. They can, on the contrary, be understood in the context of the
idea of a conditioned freedom since for example, there has to be a basic decision –
for which there may be good and less praiseworthy reasons – for participants to join
the series of experiments, and allow cables fixed to their head to be hooked up to
a machine. Critics who protest the over-interpretation of the Libet data, should see
these experiments, in which participants move their fingers, as being very different
from life-changing decisions such as the decision to complete a doctoral degree over
a course of several years, of the decision to follow a specific way of life. We also
explored why some people might find it obvious that we should refer to »the« neu-
rosciences and to take leave of our freedom. We also explored what we understand
by the term »laws of nature« and what these laws can accomplish. Using the example
of an »annoying philosopher,« we came to the conclusion that no laws of nature
prescribe that this person should be sent to his death when he is pushed from the
window. However, the laws of nature assist us in documenting and describing such
an event.
We examined the problems resulting from the mind-brain paradigm. We could
illustrate that for neuroscientific and philosophical reasons it is important to take
corporeality and aliveness seriously. The lived body-soul paradigm (which is how
we named our response to hylemorphism and lived body phenomenology) provides
possibilities for further reflection. What characterizes us as human beings is much
408       E. Brain research and the question of human freedom

more than what happens in our heads. We are neither brains that wander through
life philosophizing nor angelic beings and thus pure spirits. In other words: We are
not reduced to mind-brain beings but are physically in the here and now. As lived
body-soul beings, we change yet remain the same. Our identity is characterized by
our the fact that we are living beings endowed with a soul, a lived body-soul unity.
The encephalocentric perspective characteristic of the mind-brain paradigm must
be rejected. The glorification of this approach, which marginalizes all others, is in-
appropriate and does not do justice either to our brains or to us as human beings.
This is especially true when we realize that life processes (such as in an embryo)
can indeed exist without cerebral structures. The alarming consequences of such an
approach – which glorifies the brain but is blind to phenomena – were addressed
with regard to the beginning of human life and the definition of brain death. The
various neuroscientific experiments and the data at our disposal enrich us and do
not present either a narcissistic insult or a dangerous revolution. In my opinion, the
danger lies elsewhere. During revolutions – a word often used in the rather agitated
debates on the subject – the guillotine is one of the means used to further the ideals
of those who wish to overthrow the government. The mind-brain paradigm threat-
ens to make us all »headless,« or to let us »lose our lived bodies.« As this is truly not
a negligible danger, we should immediately start rethinking.
For all who are interested in the lived body-soul problem, it will also be increas-
ingly important to ask what we have empirical de facto information about; what we
can say that is meaningful; and what we can philosophically justify. We shouldn’t
be afraid of reading authors of antiquity »again«. Those who want to seriously deal
with the lived body-soul problem in the future will not be able to contribute much
without the theory of multiple perspectives which I have recommended, according
to which different views are justified and metaphysics is given the role of conductor.
It is essential to pay attention to thorough neuroscientific reflections, but these have
not all the answers. They only represent one view of the situation.
We have seen that the lived body-soul problem is anything but a simple matter
and that it is subject to many reasoning errors, pitfalls and to Babylonian language
confusion. The lived body-soul problem is more than an exciting topic for a doctoral
thesis or even a nice occupational therapy for scientists with time on their hands. It
has to do with our life, life, and it remains one of the great intellectual tasks, or as
Hans Jonas formulates it, one of the world’s mysteries. I want to close this study with
a beautiful quotation from H. Jonas:

»Of course every attempt to get a grip on the riddle of the universe must end in disre-
pute. But this must ever be risked anew, each time as a different and unique venture,
and mitigated by the consolation that at least by doing so we find ouselves in good
company.«325

325 Jonas, H.: Mind, Matter, and Creation. In: Jonas, H.: Mortality and Morality. A Search for the
Good after Auschwitz. Illinois 1996, p. 194.
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