STUDIA TRADITIONIS THEOLOGIAE

Explorations in Early and Medieval Theology

Theology continually engages with its past: the people,

experience, Scriptures, liturgy, learning and customs of
Christians. The past is preserved, rejected, modified; but the
legacy steadily evolves as Christians are never indifferent
to history. Even when engaging the future, theology looks
backwards: the next generation’s training includes inheriting a
canon of Scripture, doctrine, and controversy; while adapting
the past is central in every confrontation with a modernity.

This is the dynamic realm of tradition, and this series’ focus.

Whether examining people, texts, or periods, its volumes
are concerned with how the past evolved in the past, and
the interplay of theology, culture, and tradition.
 STUDIA TRADITIONIS THEOLOGIAE
Explorations in Early and Medieval Theology

38

Series Editor: Thomas O’Loughlin,

Professor of Historical Theology
in the University of Nottingham

EDITORIAL BOARD

Director
Prof. Thomas O’Loughlin

Board Members
Dr Andreas Andreopoulos, Dr Nicholas Baker-Brian, Dr Augustine
Casiday, Dr Mary B. Cunningham, Dr Juliette Day, Prof. Johannes
Hoff, Prof. Paul Middleton, Prof. Simon Oliver, Prof. Andrew Prescott,
Dr Patricia Rumsey, Prof. Jonathan Wooding, Dr Holger Zellentin
The Anthropology of
St Gregory Palamas
The Image of God, the Spiritual Senses, and the Human Body

Alexandros Chouliaras

F
 © 2020, Brepols Publishers n.v., Turnhout, Belgium.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be

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D/2020/0095/119
ISBN 978-2-503-58941-1
eISBN 978-2-503-58942-8
DOI 10.1484/M.STT-EB.5.120114

ISSN 2294-3617
eISSN 2566-0160

Printed in the EU on acid-free paper.

Man, the greater world contained in a lesser, the concurrence
of all things, the recapitulation of God’s creatures, which is
why he was produced last of all, just as we put an epilogue at
the end of speeches; in fact, one could say that this universe
is the composition of the person of the self-subsistent Logos.
St Gregory Palamas, Homily 53, On the Entry of the Theotokos
into the Holy of Holies II, 55.824–27, ΠΣ 6, 579 (ΠΑΕ 11, 330–32),
trans. Veniamin, 439 (modified): Ἄνθρωπος γάρ, ὁ μείζων οὗτος
ἐν μικρῷ κόσμος, ἡ συνδρομὴ τοῦ παντός, ἡ ἀνακεφαλαίωσις
τῶν τοῦ Θεοῦ κτισμάτων, διὸ καὶ παρήχθη πάντων ὕστατος,
ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς ἐν λόγοις τοὺς ἐπιλόγους ποιοῦμεν∙ οἱονεὶ γάρ τι
σύγγραμμα τὸ πᾶν τοῦτο φαίη τις ἂν αὐθυποστάτου Λόγου…

He [i.e. man] is placed in the world like a treasure inside a

large house which is far more valuable than the house con-
taining it, or like an intricate and expensive vessel belonging
to a king kept inside his palace. The palace is made out of
very large stones which are easy to find, whereas the vessel is
decorated with small stones, which are rare and very costly.
Hom. 26, 1.15–19, ΠΣ 6, 294–95 (ΠΑΕ 10, 154), trans.
Veniamin, 206: Καὶ σύνεστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐντεθησαυρισμένος
τῷ κόσμῳ, καθάπερ ἐν οἰκίᾳ μεγάλῃ πολύολβόν τι χρῆμα,
πολλῷ τῷ μέτρῳ τοῦ περιέχοντος ὀλβιώτερον, καὶ οἷον ἐν
βασιλείοις βασιλική τις σκευὴ ποικίλη καὶ πολυτίμητος∙ τὰ
μὲν γὰρ μεγίστοις λίθοις, ἀλλ᾿ εὐώνοις καὶ τοῖς τυχοῦσιν, ἡ δὲ
σμικροῖς ἀλλὰ δυσπορίστοις καὶ πολυτιμήτοις ἐσκεύασται.

But the eyes are blind. One must look with the heart…
Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, Le Petit Prince, 81: ‘Mais les
yeux sont aveugles. Il faut chercher avec le cœur…’
 For my wife, Effrosyni,
and our children, Aglaia, Angelos, Spyridon, and Malamatenia

Ἄγγελον εἰρήνης, πιστὸν ὁδηγόν, φύλακα τῶν ψυχῶν

καὶ τῶν σωμάτων ἡμῶν, παρὰ τοῦ Κυρίου αἰτησώμεθα
Table of Contents

Acknowledgments xiii

Abbreviations xv

Introduction 1
1. Literature Review: the Status Quo of the Present Research 5
2. The Historical and Theological Context: the Emergence of
Hesychast Anthropology During the Fourteenth Century 16
The Information Drawn from the Tomos Regarding the
Anthropological Issues 17
3. The English Translation of νοῦς and αἴσθησις νοερά 21
4. The Notions of the νοῦς (intellect), διάνοια (reasoning), ψυχή
(soul), and καρδία (heart) in the Thought of Palamas 23
a. The Powers of the Soul 24
b. Nous and Dianoia 25
c. The Heart 27
d. Nous: Essence and Activities 28

Part I
The Image of God

Chapter 1. Introduction 35
1. The Background 35
a. The Bible 35
b. The Fathers 35
2. An Overview of Palamas’ Teaching 39
a. Prologue 39
b. Where is the Locus of the Imago Dei? 40
c. The Logos as the Undeviating Image: the Christological
Dimension42
3. Conclusions 47

Chapter 2. Imago Trinitatis: The Trinitarian Reflections in Man 49

1. The Human Intellect and its λόγος 50
2. The ἔρως of the Intellect for its λόγος 54
X ta bl e o f co nt e n t s

3. The Patristic Context 56

a. From the Early Christian Era to St John Damascene 56
b. St Maximos the Confessor 58
c. St Symeon the New Theologian and Niketas Stethatos 61
d. St Gregory of Sinai and Theoleptos of Philadelpheia 68
e. Imago Trinitatis: Why? 72
4. The Presence of St Augustine 72
a. Reviewing the Literature 73
b. Assessment: Augustine and the Notion of Eros 76
c. Why Does Palamas Borrow the Notion of Eros? 78
d. Some Concluding Thoughts 81
5. Conclusions 83
Rezeptionsgeschichte 84

Chapter 3. The Image of God in Man and the Angels 87

Introduction. The Superiority of Man: ‘τῶν ἀσωμάτων ἀγγέλων
μᾶλλον κατ’ εἰκόνα τοῦ Θεοῦ…’ 87
1. The Soul’s ζωοποιὸς δύναμις: The Pneumatological Dimension 87
a. Man: An Initiate (μύστης) of the Intelligible Creation, and of
the Holy Trinity 89
b. Τhe Only Creature Made in the Image of God 90
c. The Patristic Context 91
2. The Faculty of Self-Governance and Man’s Dominion over the
Created World 93
a. The Patristic Context 95
b. Man and the Cosmos 96
c. St John Damascene: A Possible Source? 99
3. The Faculty of Sense Perception (αἰσθητικόν): the Christological-
Incarnational Dimension 102
a. Creation ἐκ μὴ ὄντων (‘Out of Nothing’) 103
b. The Human Person and the Incarnate Word 103
c. Some Concluding Thoughts 104
4. The Superiority of Humans over the Angels due to Participation
in the Eucharist 106
5. Concluding Remarks 112

Chapter 4. The καθ’ ὁμοίωσιν 115

1. The Superiority of the Angels 115
2. Spiritual and Ethical Dimension 116

Conclusion. The Palamite εἰκὼν Θεοῦ: Palamas’ Dynamic of

Thinking of Man as Being in the Image of God 119
 tab le o f co nt e nt s XI

Part II
The Spiritual Senses: Αἴσθησις νοερά

Chapter 5. Contextualising the Palamite Spiritual Senses 129

1. Introduction 129
2. Reviewing the Literature 130
3. Triad 1,3 (Third Question): The Historical and Theological
Context, and the Teaching of Palamas’ Theological Opponents 133
4. The Reaction of Palamas: Human Knowledge and Divine Light 136
a. Palamas on Knowledge, and the State of the Question 136
b. Knowledge and Intellectual Illumination (νοερὸς φωτισμός) 137
c. Is the Divine Light Sensible? Is it Identical to Knowledge? 142
5. Concluding Remarks 143

Chapter 6. Αἴσθησις νοερά (Intellectual Perception) 145

1. Inner or Intellectual Illumination 145
a. Introduction 145
b. The Background 146
c. Why the Term ‘νοερά’ (Intellectual)? 147
d. Why ‘αἴσθησις’ (Perception)? 148
2. Seeing the Divine Light 150
a. The Eyes of the Soul and the Experience of God 150
b. The Coordination of the Physical and the Spiritual Senses 151
c. Ascesis, Detachment, Purification: The Presuppositions of
Seeing the Light 155
d. The Illuminations in the Old and New Testament: Symbolic
or Real? 157
e. The Light of the Transfiguration of Christ 159
f. The Potentiality of Seeing the Divine Light in this Life: a
Christological Dimension 161
3. Concluding Remarks 163

Chapter 7. Vision through Ecstasis and the Role of the Body 165
1. Ecstasis: Surpassing One’s Self 165
a. Vision through Self Transcendence 165
b. Intellectual Perception Superior to ‘Abstraction’ and
‘Negation’ (Apophasis): Theologia and Theoptia 167
c. Apophasis, Theosis, and the Passionate Part of the Soul 170
d. Angels, Humans, and the Vision of the Light 174
e. Cessation (ἀπόπαυσις) of all Ιntellectual Αctivity 175
f. Drawing the Intellect Into the Heart: ‘ἡ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν στροφὴ
καὶ τήρησις’ 179
g. Case study: St Stephen’s vision 180
XII ta bl e o f co nt e n t s

2. The Road from the Soul to the Body 183

a. The Spiritual Dispositions Imprinted (ἐνσημαινομένας) on
the Body 183
b. Participation of the Body in Theosis: Now and in the Age to Come184
c. Moses, St Stephen, and St Mary of Egypt 186
d. A Christological Dimension 187
e. Τhe Transformation of the Body 189
f. The Role of the Heart 192
3. Concluding Remarks: Is the Participation of the Body a ‘Created
Effect of Grace’? An Assessment of some Arguments of Sinkewicz 194

Conclusion. The Palamite αἴσθησις νοερά: Palamas’ Dynamic of

Thinking of Man as a Being which may ‘Taste’ God 199

Epilogue. From the Image of God to the αἴσθησις νοερά 201

Bibliography 203
Ancient and Medieval Authors 203
Modern Authors 208

Index223
Scriptural References 223
Citations from the Fathers and other Ancient Texts 224
Ancient and Modern Authors 230
General Index 234
Acknowledgments

The whole process of writing the current book—which is based on my doctoral

research—, apart from being really delightful, was also very demanding and difficult.
About seven years of systematic and hard work were required. Undoubtedly, it could
not have been completed without the help and support of many beloved persons.
First, I am indebted to my main PhD supervisor, Revd Prof. Andrew Louth.
From the very first moment of our acquaintance, I have been the recipient of his
gentleness and kindness. He transmitted many things to me and a lot of knowledge,
and his help was determinative in the writing of this book. Moreover, I am grateful
to all the members of my examination committee and especially to Revd Prof. John
Behr for his willingness to act as my PhD thesis’ promotor—since Fr Andrew, as
former visiting professor at VU, could not be the formal promotor.
But first and foremost, I would like to express my sincere thanks to my Bishop, His
Eminence Nikolaos, Metropolitan of Mesogaia and Lavreotiki, with whose blessing
and constant support I was able to start and also continue without obstructions my
doctoral studies. It was he himself who first advised me to write on the subject of
anthropology and, moreover, study Palamas.
I owe as well a debt of gratitude towards my parents, Spyros and Aigli, for the
many sacrifices that they undertook in raising me and my brother by offering us
so many things, but also for their constant interest and encouragement during the
writing of my book; likewise my brother, Andreas, as well as all our relatives, for their
unreserved love and solidarity.
It is indispensable that I thank the Holy Synod of the Church of Greece for
granting me a scholarship for the conduct of my PhD project (2012–2016). I am
extremely grateful to my spiritual father, Archimandrite Christodoulos Kogionis,
for his continuous and discerning guidance and aid.
Fr Demetrios Bathrellos was one of the first persons who inspired and encouraged
me to begin my dissertation and write my book. I can with great pleasure and honour
say that he has been for me both a teacher and a fellow traveller, a true spiritual friend
and brother. The contribution of Fr Maximos Constas was also very significant; he
read parts of this work at various stages and generously offered his advice—which
came out of his great experience—, as well as our stimulating conversations. At this
point I could not but also remember my Professors at the School of Theology of the
National and Kapodistrian University of Athens (UoA), since through them I first
came into contact with the wealth and beauty of academic theology.
Fr Michael Bakker’s—the Director of ACOT (Amsterdam Centre for Orthodox
Theology)—help was determinative both at the beginning of the thesis, but also
at the various issues that often appeared. Dr Norman Russell’s help is appreciated
XIV ac k n owl e dg m e n t s

as particularly significant to this work, as he kindly offered not only his important
feedback on my thesis, but also provided genuine support and encouragement to
proceed to the publication of the book. Moreover, it is necessary that I thank my
co-priests, for their understanding and constant help, as well as our parishioners.
Furthermore, I would like to extend my sincerest thanks and appreciation to the
following persons, who either reviewed parts of the current work and offered their
remarks, or helped me through our conversations or in other ways: Metr. Kallistos
Ware, Bishop Alexander Golitzin, Revd Dr Kristian Akselberg, Prof. Alexandros
Alexakis, Dr Dmitry Biriukov, Prof. Paul Blowers, Mr Stavros Bozovitis, Prof. David
Bradshaw, Fr Evangelos Ganas, Mrs Olga-Maria Gkaragkounis-Skondras, Revd
Dr Demetrios Harper, Revd Prof. Archim. Nikolaos Ioannides, Fr Evgenios
Iverites (Dr Nicholas Marinides), Prof. Konstantinos Kornarakis, Fr Chrysostom
Koutloumousianos, Mrs Alexandra Labridou, Revd Prof. Nikolaos Loudovikos,
Dr Basil Lourié, Prof. Joseph Munitiz, Prof. Nonna Papademetriou, Prof. Ioannis
Papadogiannakis, Dr Manolis Papoutsakis, Fr Antonios Pinakoulas, Mr Tikhon
Pino, Prof. Marcus Plested, Prof. Demetrios Raios, Prof. Antonio Rigo, Prof. Joost
van Rossum, Prof. Robert Sinkewicz, Revd Prof. Vasileios Thermos, Prof. Torstein
Theodor Tollefsen, Prof. Alexis Torrance, Dr Angelos Tsakirakis, Fr Apostolos
Tsolakis, Prof. Stavros Yangazoglou. I am also grateful to Mr Vincent DeWeese, who
provided important input regarding the linguistic and grammatical aspects of my
English language usage. Of course, for all possible mistakes or shortcomings in the
book the author is solely responsible.
Additionally, I thank the staff of the following Libraries for their eager service:
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, School of Theology of the UoA, The Gennadius
Library, and the Study-Room of Byzantine and Neo-Hellenic Philology (Philosophical
School of the UoA).
Finally, I am really grateful to Prof. Thomas O’Loughlin, for accepting to publish
this book, and for his sincere interest in this work, that was also conveyed in practice
through his continuous and considerable support during the publication process;
moreover, to the publishing manager of Brepols, Mr Bart Janssens, and his colleagues,
for their excellent professionalism and cooperation.
Last, but not least, it is imperative that I wholeheartedly thank my wife, Efrosyni.
Without her love, patience, tolerance and support, it would have been impossible
for me to complete this project; likewise our children Aglaia, Angelos, Spyridon,
and Malamatenia for the great pleasures that they give us, and for the fact that they
carry the image of God every day in our household. May they forgive me for the
moments that they lacked my presence in favour of my research. My dedicating to
all of them this book, as a humble antidoron, is but a small reflection of my immense
love and gratitude.

Athens, 15 March 2020

Second Sunday of Lent, Feast of St Gregory Palamas
Abbreviations

CCSG Corpus Christianorum (Series Graeca)

Ch. Sinkewicz, R. E. (1988) Saint Gregory Palamas. The One Hundred and Fifty
Chapters [Critical Edition, Translation and Study] (Studies and Texts 83),
Toronto. [for instance, Ch. 56.2–9, 148–50 means: Chapter 56, lines 2–9,
pp. 148–50 in Sinkewicz’s edition]
GNO Gregorii Nysseni Opera
GCS Die Griechischen Christlichen Schriftsteller
JTS Journal of Theological Studies
Kotter Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos, ed. B. Kotter, OSB, 5 vols,
1969–1988, Berlin and New York, PTS 7, 12, 17, 22, 29.
PG Patrologia Græca
PO Patrologia Orientalis
PTS Patristische Texte und Studien, im Auftrag der Patristischen Kommission
der Akademien der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, Heidelberg, München
und der Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur zu Mains, ed.
K. Aland and W. Schneemelcher, 1964-, Berlin and New York.
SC Sources Chrétiennes
SP Studia Patristica
SVTQ St Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly
The Philokalia The Philokalia: The Complete Text, compiled by St Nikodimos of the Holy
Mountain and St Makarios of Corinth, vols 1–4, English trans. G. E. H.
Palmer, P. Sherrard and K. Ware, London, 1979, 1981, 1986 and 1995
respectively [vol. 5 is in preparation].
TLG Thesaurus Linguae Graecae: a Digital Library of Greek Literature (Project
Director: Maria Pantelia)
Tomos Hagioretic Tomos (or Tomos of the Holy Mountain), ed. V. Pseftogas, in ΠΣ
2, 1966 [20102], 567–78 (PG 150, 1225C–36).
Tr. Palamas, Ὑπὲρ τῶν ἱερῶς Ἡσυχαζόντων (Pro hesychastis) [Triads]. We first
refer to Christou’s edition (i.e. in ΠΣ 1, 20103 [19621], Thessaloniki) and
then, in parentheses, to Meyendorff ’s one (19732 [1959], Louvain); e.g. Tr.
1,3,27.22–24, 438 (169.20–22).
Veniamin Saint Gregory Palamas: The Homilies, edited and translated from the
original Greek with an introduction and notes by C. Veniamin [with the
assistance of the Monastery of St John the Baptist, Essex, England], 2009,
Waymart.
XV I a bbr e v i atio ns

ΠΑΕ Γρηγορίου τοῦ Παλαμᾶ Ἅπαντα τὰ Ἔργα, ed. P. K. Christou et al.,

introduction, text, trans. (in modern Greek), commentary
(this edition uses the critical texts, where available), 11 vols,
1981–6, Thessaloniki, Ἕλληνες Πατέρες τῆς Ἐκκλησίας [ΕΠΕ]
51, 54, 61, 63, 87, 88, 120, 121, 72, 76, 79 respectively [the abbreviations ΠΑΕ
and ΠΣ are borrowed from Sinkewicz (2002), 138].
ΠΣ Γρηγορίου τοῦ Παλαμᾶ Συγγράμματα (P. K. Christou et al. [critical edition],
6 vols [the sixth, and last, volume was edited recently, i.e. in 2015], 1962–
2015, Thessaloniki (this is the critical edition of the whole of the Palamite
corpus).
 Introduction

In Greek Mythology, the Sphinx, a feathered monster with the body of a lion and the
head of a woman, was said to guard the entrance towards the ancient city of Thebes. In
order for a person to be allowed to pass, he had to answer the well known Riddle of the
Sphinx: ‘Which creature has one voice and yet becomes four-footed and two-footed
and three-footed?’ If one did not know the answer, then the Sphinx strangled and
devoured him. However, Oedipus found the solution: ‘Man—who crawls on all fours
as a baby, then walks on two feet as an adult, and then uses a walking stick in old age’.
From one point of view, the riddle of the Sphinx has not lost its significance for our
modern society. Our era is perhaps unique in history, for two reasons, both having to
do with the human person. First, man1 has such huge resources of power that he never
had in the past. Second, man encounters such great dangers and problems which, in
past epochs, were unimaginable. Thus, on the one hand, technology grows rapidly and
amazingly, medicine works ‘miracles’, and education, communication and transportation
are easier than ever. On the other hand, it is as if man is not satisfied with his life. Even
nowadays many wars are taking place around the world, a great percentage of the global
population lives in poverty, many people—small children included—die from serious
diseases, the traditional idea of the ‘family’ is confronted by severe challenges, many
young people seem to have no desire for creativity or hope for a better life, psychological
problems and disorders (e.g. depression) have seriously increased.
Before all these dangers and problematic situations, can Christian theology offer
something worthy of the challenge? In my view, it can offer many important things.
In fact, the articulation of a genuine and modern Christian anthropology—i.e.
the teaching of the Church about man, both soul and body, his great value and
potentialities—seems to be the only real and effective resistance to the effort of all
those who try to diminish the importance of the human being so as to control him.
Moreover, the need to clearly and persuasively articulate such an anthropology, capable
of guiding contemporary man correctly, seems nowadays more urgent than ever.2 As
Metropolitan Kallistos Ware has insightfully argued, ‘The master-theme of Orthodox
theology in the twentieth century has been ecclesiology; in the twenty-first century,
the centre of interest is shifting to the doctrine of the human person’.3 Therefore,
anthropology will be a primary focus of theological reflection in our era. In such a

1 In Greek the word anthropos (ἄνθρωπος) refers to both male and female. In this book it is translated
as ‘man’.
2 For an important relevant analysis, see Ware (2012a).
3 See Ware (2012b), 105–21 (at 105).
2 in tro ducti o n

way, it could offer a firm answer to many contemporary problems, personal, political,
religious, bioethical, etc.
For all of these reasons the present book examines some specific points of
St Gregory Palamas’ anthropology. In particular, it focuses on two principal areas:
First, the image of God, namely in what way man images the Holy Trinity, his creator.
Specifically, this book tries to prove why and how man is regarded greater than the
angels, in terms of the imago; and, moreover, why this is due to the human body. In
an era where the notion of the image has such a central place, speaking of the image
of God in man is, undoubtedly, a major anthropological element of very crucial
importance. As Metropolitan Nikolaos of Mesogaia and Lavreotiki has expressed it,
In an era that has sunk man to the level of biological existence…, that recognizes
him only as a machine that is technologized, or as information that is programmed,
or as a social being with profits, rights and commitments, that nullifies every
perspective of his, that flattens his value, …[we] Orthodox recognize man as
being made ‘in the image and likeness of God’ (Gen 1:26), as ‘a living creature
that is being deified [ζῶον θεούμενον]’, as called to become ‘partaker of the divine
nature’ (2 Pet 1:4)4
Second, the current book deals with the spiritual senses, namely the power hidden in
man which renders him capable of knowing divine realities, of meeting God. Specifically,
this book tries to demonstrate that, for Palamas, the human body has a very crucial
place in spiritual perception. As will be shown in Part II, Palamas would not disagree
with the valuable secret that the fox reveals to the Little Prince, towards the end of
the well known novella of Antoine de Saint-Exupéry—if of course such a statement
would be placed in the correct theological context: ‘It is only with the heart that one
can see rightly; what is essential is invisible to the eye’.5 On the contrary, modern
man is a rationalist, and cannot easily accept such a statement.
Ordained metropolitan of Thessaloniki in 1347, recognized as a saint in 1368 and
acknowledged as a major theologian and Father of the Orthodox Church, Gregory
Palamas (c. 1296–1357) produced a rich and highly influential corpus of writings.6
While a monk and ascetic, he was the central figure during the so called hesychast
controversy (c. 1335–1351). The matter at stake was mainly human knowledge of the divine:
whether man is truly able to know God. Palamas was fervently opposed to the extreme
apophaticism of his opponents—which could lead to agnosticism—, and supported

4 Hatzinikolaou (2016).
5 de Saint-Exupéry (1987), 72: ‘on ne voit bien qu’avec le cœur. L’essentiel est invisible pour les yeux’.
6 There exists a huge bibliography on Palamas. As far as his anthropology is concerned, the most
important studies are mentioned in the Literature Review of this book. For Palamas’ biography,
works, and theology in general, see indicatively Meyendorff (1959a). Sinkewicz (2002), 131–82.
Prosopographisches Lexikon der Palaiologenzeit (PLP) 21546. Russell (2019). Mantzaridis (19983)
[cf. the English trans. of a part of this book (on ‘theosis’; with some revisions to the footnotes by the
author) by Sherrard (1984)]. Some important relevant studies are found in Mantzaridis (2000). See
also, more recently, Athanasopoulos (2015). Important information may be also drawn from the work
of the Haghiorite hieromonk Venediktos (2008).
 i nt ro d u ct i o n 3

the reality of this knowledge: man is not only able to know something about God, but
even to be united with him, through the divine uncreated activities (ἐνέργειαι).7 And in
this union the whole person takes part, both soul and body. This is theosis, and it is the
central idea in the mind of Palamas, around which he develops the rest of his theology.

Structure of the Book

The structure of the present book is as follows. Initially, in the Introduction, a review of
the relevant scholarly literature is presented. Moreover, the emergence of the question of
the human person in the context of the hesychast debates is traced, as well as some key
anthropological notions. These sections define the context in which this study moves,
and help the reader better understand the subsequent chapters. In particular, Part I tries
to prove that, according to Palamas, man is greater than the angels, as far as the image of
God is concerned; and, additionally, that this is due to human corporeality. In order to
achieve this aim, it provides an overview of St Gregory’s teaching on the image of God
(ch. 1). Then, it moves on to an analysis of a major issue, namely why man is believed
to bear some reflections of the Holy Trinity in himself (ch. 2). These two chapters
provide the basis for the treatment of our main topic, specifically why man is regarded
as superior to the angels, in terms of the imago Dei (ch. 3). Finally, a brief treatment of
the likeness to God (kath’ omoiosin) is presented (ch. 4), again with reference to the
angels, so that the reader may gain a fuller account of the question; it is shown here that,
concerning the kath’ omoiosin it is the angels that are greater than humans.
Part II follows, which explores a most interesting topic: the Palamite αἴσθησις
νοερά, namely man’s spiritual senses. In particular, it tries to demonstrate that the
body occupies a very central place in spiritual perception: this will be shown in ch.
7. However, in order to reach such an aim, it is necessary that, first, a) the Palamite
teaching about the spiritual senses be contextualised, placed in its historical and
theological context (ch. 5), and b) the αἴσθησις νοερά (intellectual perception) be
analysed (ch. 6), since this is the key notion in understanding Palamas’ teaching on
this topic (i.e. spiritual perception). This means that the main research questions
that are pursued in Part II are the following: Is man able to gain knowledge of God,
according to St Gregory? How is this possible? What is the role of the divine light
and of the ‘eyes of the soul’? What is the place of ‘ecstasis’ and in what sense does
the body have an important role in the activation of the spiritual senses? Finally, the
general conclusions of the current book are presented.

7 There is often a problem in the translation of the word ‘ἐνέργεια’ in English. It is generally
acknowledged that its exact meaning is not perfectly captured by the word ‘energy’, because the latter
may have some other connotations too, that could confuse the reader. For an explanation about why
the term energeia is better rendered as activity, rather than energy, see the Introduction of Tollefsen
(2012), 4 (cf. p. 186). Therefore, in this book the term ‘activity’ (or ‘activities’) is used; through it we
refer to this specific reality that the Greek word ‘ἐνέργεια’ (or: ‘ἐνέργειαι’) refers to. The use of the
word ‘activity’ had been also proposed by Louth (2008), 596 [= Coakley and Stang (eds) (2009),
66]), since in English energy ‘rather suggests a potentiality for activity’, a capacity (what one would
call in Greek δύναμις).
4 in tro ducti o n

Methodology of the Book

In this book we shall engage with the œuvre of St Gregory Palamas, especially with the
following texts: a) The One Hundred and Fifty Chapters; b) the Triads, mainly Triad
1,3 (see, e.g., Part II of the book); c) the Homilies, or Sermons; and d) the Hagioretic
Tome. However, in order for our examination to be as thorough as possible, other
Palamite texts will be referenced as well.
As far as the methodology of the book is concerned, the following should be
mentioned: First, a close reading and examination of the primary sources is attempted.
Namely, first of all the author has tried to carefully read what Palamas himself has
written about the image of God and the spiritual senses, with all the aforementioned
research questions in mind. Second, a deep and careful analysis and interpretation
of those points is carried out. That is, at a second level, we try to understand what
Palamas wants to say, and then express it in our own words. Third, we seek to engage
in dialogue with the secondary literature concerning each of these topics. Some
aspects of modern scholarship are accepted, while others are approached critically.8
Our view will be mainly theological. However, philosophical viewpoints will be also
considered, in so far as they belong to Palamas’ understanding of the human hypostasis
or provide a framework for comprehending his arguments. Finally, through a deep
analysis of all the above, an effort is made to answer the specific research questions
that each chapter and section pose.
Regarding the possible sources of Gregory’s anthropology,9 we intend to trace
them to the Bible and to the basic anthropological texts of patristic literature,
that is in Fathers such as John Damascene,10 Maximos the Confessor, Nemesios
of Emesa (On the Nature Of Man), Dionysiοs the Areopagite, Gregory of Nyssa,
Gregory Nazianzen, Evagrios of Pontus, Macarios, Diadochos of Photiki,11 Niketas
Stethatos, Nikiphoros the Monk, Theoleptos of Philadelpheia, John Climacus and
Isaak of Syria.
The work of Palamas has been thoroughly studied in scholarship, including its
implications for anthropology. Thus, one may wonder: ‘what else could be said
here?’ However, despite the multitude of studies, it could be supported that there
remain many aspects in the teaching of Palamas on man that await thorough study
and analysis. I hope that this fact will become obvious through the present review of
the scholarly literature as well as from the treatment and analysis of the subsequent
chapters.

8 See, e.g., ch. 7.3, where some arguments of R. Sinkewicz are critically assessed.
9 Cf. Christou, ΠΣ 1, 326–35.
10 For instance, as St John argues, humans manifest the divine image more than the angels, because
they give life to the body. This is also supported by Palamas. Cf., e.g., his Chapters 38–39. This whole
subject, as well as the possible influences of Palamas from the Damascene, is examined in ch. 3.
11 For instance, Palamas gives to the body a salient place in spiritual experience. This point of eastern
spirituality may be traced back to Diadochos, Macarios and John of the Ladder. Concerning the
dependence of Palamas on those authors, see mainly ch. 7 of this book.
 i nt ro d u ct i o n 5

1. Literature Review: the Status Quo of the Present

Research

It has been, correctly, stated that ‘One of the most significant contributions made by
Palamas lies in his original and inspired synthesis of the theological anthropology of
the Eastern Fathers’.12 In this section the most important works related to the current
research—namely Palamas’ theological anthropology—are recorded.13 Initially, let
us refer to the critical editions of the Palamite corpus.14 The first critical edition of
Palamas’ major work The Triads or Defence of the Saint Hesychasts (Ὑπὲρ τῶν ἱερῶς
ἡσυχαζόντων / Pro hesychastis) was that of Meyendorff, in 1959.15 In the years to follow
a significant critical effort was realized: the publication in critical editions of the entire
Palamite corpus by Prof. Panagiotis Christou.16 This edition remains the most basic
resource for Palamite studies today.17 However, in spite of their great value, both
editions of Meyendorff and Christou seem to have some shortcomings.18 Moreover,

12 Sinkewicz (1986b), 857.

13 For a thorough review and analysis of the general bibliography regarding Palamas from 1959–1970,
see Stiernon (1972), 231–341. Stiernon divides the works in the following sections: ‘Editions de
textes et traductions, Travaux d’ensemble, Cadre et détails historiques, Points de doctrine, Tradition
patristique, Hésychasme’. For the relevant bibliography until 1959, see Meyendorff (1959a), 15–22,
and for the more recent literature, see Meyendorff (1984), 105–07. Cf. Veniamin, xxxi–xxxiv. For
a very useful review of the research around Palamas in the modern era, see Russell (2012), 7–21.
Cf. Yangazoglou (2012), 23–53. Martzelos (2016). For an interesting general sketching of Palamas’
Rezeptionsgeschichte through the ages, namely from Palamas’ own times to our era, see Plested (2015).
Finally, for a significant recent study on the reception of Palamite theology in modern age, see Russell
(2019). Unfortunately, this work appeared too late for me to incorporate its important findings into
the present book.
14 For an inventory of the manuscript tradition and a list of ancient editions of Gregory’s writings, see
Meyendorff (1959a), 331–39.
15 Défense des saints hésychastes (2nd edition 1973). English trans. (extracts) by Gendle (1983).
16 See ΠΣ (‘Abbreviations’). For the contents of these volumes, see the Bibliography of our book. For
an edition of the texts with a modern Greek facing translation, see ΠΑΕ. Recently has also been made
a convenient edition of the Palamite corpus (Greek prototype with Italian translation) in E. Perrella
et al. (eds) (2003–6) (3 vols; see the Bibliography of the current book for the details of each volume).
This work contains an interesting introduction, which explores not only the theological significance
of Gregory’s work, but also its philosophical and epistemological implementations. Cf. Yangazoglou
(2012), 46.
17 For Palamas’ Homilies, an indispensable work for our research, we refer to the recent critical edition
by Pseftogas, in ΠΣ 6, as well as to ΠΑΕ, vols 9–11. For an older (and rare) edition, see that of
Oikonomos (1861). For the first English translation of the whole corpus of the Homilies, see the
important edition of Veniamin (2009).
18 Concerning Meyendorff ’s edn of the Triads, and for the first three volumes of Christou’s edn,
Sinkewicz (1988), 56 comments that ‘Although these are major works of Palamas, the editors have
not produced critical editions by modern standards… Selection of manuscripts for collation was
somewhat arbitrary. The best manuscripts were chosen, but we are never informed about the factual
bases for such judgements. At times, manuscripts early in date and easily accessible were not included
in collations. No attempt was ever made to establish stemmatic relationships. The principles for
including or excluding variant readings in the apparatus were left for the reader to guess. Finally, the
constitution of the text appears to have been based largely upon the subjective judgement of the
6 in tro ducti o n

in 1988 Robert Sinkewicz produced a critical edition of Palamas’ eminent work The
One Hundred and Fifty Chapters (Κεφάλαια ἑκατὸν πεντήκοντα φυσικὰ καὶ θεολογικά,
ἠθικά τε καὶ πρακτικὰ καὶ καθαρτικὰ τῆς Βαρλααμίτιδος λύμης / Capita physica, theologica,
moralia et practica CL).19 It has been asserted that this is an edition which obeys all
the necessary modern textual rules.20
Now let us refer to the relevant secondary bibliography. First and foremost,
in 1936 Basile Krivochéine wrote a paper on Gregory’s Ascetic and Theological
Teaching.21 Furthermore, in 1938 Fr Dumitru Stăniloae published in Romanian his
important book The Life and Teaching of Saint Gregory Palamas.22 About ten years
later, Archimandrite Cyprien Kern published an article regarding the basic elements
of Palamas’ thought,23 where he devotes some pages to Gregory’s ideas on cosmos
and man (pp. 171–85). Moreover, Kern published in 1950 a monograph on Palamas’
anthropology, in Russian.24 However, as Mantzaridis points out, Kern did not have
access to the greater part of our theologian’s works, including some of the most
important among them.25
The most known recent author to produce an important work based on the
complete writings of Palamas is Fr John Meyendorff. He studied Gregory’s texts
in manuscript form and even published some of them himself. In 1954, he wrote
on the hesychast subject of ‘returning to one’s own self ’26 and in 1959 he published
his very important introductory study on Palamas.27 In this pioneering—and even
today fundamental—study, Meyendorff treats many anthropological issues, such
as the knowledge of God (173–75), knowledge through creation (176–78), image
and likeness (178–79), original sin (179–80), sin and death (181–83), transmission of
death (183–84), the two different anthropologies of Barlaam (platonic-Evagrian) and
the hesychasts (biblical-patristic) (199–201), purification and ‘monological prayer’
(‘prayer of the heart’) (203–06), the participation of the body in prayer (206–07)
and in eternal life (208), the true meaning of the psychophysical method of prayer
(209–10), the role of the heart (211–12), the link between incarnation and anthropology
(213–15), the Christian notion of ‘returning to one’s own self ’ (215), baptismal grace
(217–18), redemption, deification and their link to the sacraments and generally to

editor’. For the brief response of Christou to Sinkewicz’s critique, see ΠΣ 5, 35 n. 11 and for his own
critique to the latter’s edn, see ΠΣ 5, 35–36. For the relevant reviews on these editions, see Sinkewicz
(1988), 56. Additionally, for Christou’s edn, see Stiernon (1972), 233–41.
19 See Ch. (at the ‘Abbreviations’).
20 Lison (1994a), 12 n. 24. Cf. Meyendorff ’s interesting Review in SVTQ 33.2 (1989), 195–96.
21 Krivochéine (1936).
22 Stăniloae (1938). However, he seems to have been working on Palamas from at least the end of 1920s.
Cf., e.g., Toma (2014), 21. For the Neo-Palamite theological contribution of Stăniloae, see Agachi
(2013).
23 Kern (1947).
24 Kern (1950).
25 Mantzaridis (1984), 13. Moreover, as Sinkewicz (1986b), 857 notes about Kern’s monograph, ‘although
it was a noble beginning, is now dated’.
26 Meyendorff (1954), 188–206.
27 Meyendorff (1959a).
 i nt ro d u ct i o n 7

the life of the Church (Ecclesiology) (223–56), the distinction between essence and
activities, and theology’s existential dimension (279–310).
Meyendorff also treated these and similar subjects in another of his books.28
Furthermore, as already mentioned in the beginning of this section, in 1959 he
published the critical edition of one of the most important texts of Palamas, which
contains many anthropological references and implications: the Triads or Defence
of the Holy Hesychasts (Ὑπὲρ τῶν ἱερῶς ἡσυχαζόντων). Another critical edition of this
text was made by Panagiotis Christou in 1962.29
Nevertheless, Meyendorff’s oeuvre has not been left uncriticized. Fr John Romanides
wrote two articles (in 1960–1 and 1963–4) engaging in a strong—and sometimes
acerbic—critique.30 It seems that the critique of Romanides is, in general, correct.
His main points of disagreement are the following: a) Barlaam cannot be classified
as a nominalist, b) Palamas is the correct interpreter of Dionysiοs the Areopagite (the
author of the Corpus Areopagiticum) and not Barlaam,31 c) the ‘debate was neither
over dualistic and monistic anthropologies, nor over the part of man which prays
unceasingly, as Father John [Meyendorff] thinks, but rather over the mode of union
between body and soul’,32 d) ‘Palamas… is identifying the revelatory experiences
of the uncreated light before and after the Incarnation as well as before and after
the formation of the Church as Body of Christ’,33 whereas Meyendorff ‘restricts this
divinization not only to the Incarnation, but also to the sacraments of the Church,
thus excluding from it even the apostles at the time of the Transfiguration on Mount
Tabor’.34 As far as I know, Meyendorff never replied to this criticism. Moreover, as
shown in the following lines of this Review, one can find voices critical of Meyendorff’s
work in recent scholarship as well, without of course scorning his significant and
pioneering contributions.35
To these remarks I would like to add the following. In Meyendorff ’s Introduction
it is obvious that he believes that in the Fathers one may find two different types of
anthropology: one that is based on the intellect, the ‘intellectualist’ account, and

28 Meyendorff (1959b).
29 In ΠΣ 1 (1962 and 20103).
30 Romanides (1960–1) and (1963–4). It should be noted that the latter had worked a lot on Palamas.
Some of his major arguments may be found in Romanides (ed.) (1991), 5–194.
31 In his anthropology Palamas relies heavily on Dionysiοs, mainly on matters regarding theosis. This
will become evident in Part II of this book.
32 Romanides (1963–4), 231. And, it can be argued, over the important place that the body has in the
spiritual life; this will be mainly shown in ch. 7 of the current book.
33 Romanides (1963–4), 245.
34 Romanides (1963–4), 245–46. Regarding the deifying experience of the Apostles during the
Transfiguration, see ch. 6.2.e. About the Illuminations in the Old and New Testament, and whether
they are symbolic or real, see ch. 6.2.d.
35 See indicatively, Golitzin (2002). Louth (2008), 590–98. Louth (2012). Demetracopoulos (1996)
shows that Meyendorff is based on a wrong translation, in order to present one of his key witnesses
for Palamas’ alleged ‘Personalism’ (or ‘Existentialism’). As he states (p. 12) ‘My view is that
Meyendorff ’s interpretation of Palamas’ thought is altogether unjustified and totally misleading’. For
an insightful recent evaluation of Meyendorff ’s Introduction a l’etude de Gregoire Palamas, see Pino
(2017).
8 in tro ducti o n

another that is based on the heart, the more ‘spiritual’ account.36 In the first case
Meyendorff places Evagrios (or even Gregory of Nyssa, Dionysiοs, and Maximos),
whereas in the second one mainly Macarios.37 Hence, he contrasts ‘an “intellectual
mysticism” based on a Neo-Platonist dualist doctrine of man, and the “mysticism of
the heart”, which is more Biblical and, sometimes, Stoic’.38 Moreover, Meyendorff
believes that Palamas belongs to the second line of thought, placing emphasis on
the heart.39
In my view, Meyendorff is correct in arguing that one may find these two different
ways of thinking about the human person. However, the emphasis he places in his
approach is not very accurate, because Palamas draws on both of these approaches
and even combines them. In this book it is shown how he gives proper emphasis to
both the role of the intellect and the heart. Therefore, this sharp contrast does not
accurately reflect Palamas’ mind on the topic.
Besides, as Kallistos Ware argued, there is not in fact any real opposition between
these two ‘anthropologies’.40 It is more correct to argue that both of them express the
same reality, but in different ways.41 In addition, a central hesychast aim is to ‘draw
the intellect into the heart’. For this reason, both approaches are essential to our
effort to understand Palamas, and articulate a comprehensive anthropology.42 Finally,
it seems to me that Meyendorff ’s account is motivated by his reading of Palamas’
strong opposition to the ‘intellectualism’ of Barlaam, something that is, however, true.
In 1959, the great Orthodox theologian Fr Georges Florovsky delivered a lecture in
Thessaloniki about Palamas’ connection to the patristic tradition. There he pointed that
St Gregory was suspected of subversive innovations by his enemies in his own
time. This charge is still maintained against him in the West. In fact, however,
St Gregory was deeply rooted in the tradition. It is not difficult to trace most of
his views and motives back to the Cappadocian Fathers and to St Maximus the
Confessor, who was, by the way, one of the most popular masters of Byzantine
thought and devotion. Indeed, St Gregory was also intimately acquainted with
the writings of Pseudo-Dionysius. He was rooted in the tradition. Yet, in no sense
was his theology just a ‘theology of repetition’. It was a creative extension of ancient
tradition. Its starting point was Life in Christ.43

36 It seems that the first to have argued such an idea in scholarship is Irénée Hausherr (1935).
37 See, e.g., Meyendorff (1959a), 212–13 (= Meyendorff (1974a), 148).
38 Meyendorff (1959a), 211 (= Meyendorff (1974a), 147).
39 Meyendorff supports this opinion in many places in his book, making it as one of his basic arguments.
40 For instance, see Ware (1985), mainly at 158–59.
41 The texts of Macarios are a very representative example, for in them one finds no opposition between
nous and kardia. On the contrary, these two seem to ‘cooperate’, since the former is said to dwell
within the latter. Palamas makes frequent use of this idea, citing Macarios. See, e.g., Tr. 2,2,29. Cf. the
section about some basic anthropological notions in the Introduction of this book, and ch. 7.2.f.
42 Besides, even Meyendorff himself often acknowledges that Palamas integrates in his teaching
elements from both of these approaches. See, e.g., Meyendorff (1959a), 221 or 243–44 (= Meyendorff
(1974a), 155 and 174 respectively).
43 Florovsky (1959–1960), 126 (italics added).
 i nt ro d u ct i o n 9

It is our hope that this book, among other things, will justify the above thoughts of
Florovsky.
In 1963, Georgios Mantzaridis, Professor at the Theological School of the University
of Thessaloniki, published his book, The Teaching of Gregory Palamas on the Deification
of Man.44 As Metropolitan Kallistos Ware has noted, ‘By concentrating upon the single
topic of deification, Professor Mantzaridis supplements Fr John’s [Meyendorff] general
survey in a most illuminating fashion’.45 This book deals with the foundation of the
teaching on man’s deification (15–39), the sacramental and ecclesiological nature of
deification (41–60), its moral aspect (61–85), mystical experience (87–115) and its
consummation (resurrection and the vision of God) (117–25). Mantzaridis depicts
Palamas as an ‘existential’ theologian who endorses a ‘synthetic’ view of the human
person and regards man as an integral unity of the physical and the spiritual. So, ‘the
divine image in man involves his body as well as his soul’.46 Moreover, in this book,
we see how Gregory applies his distinction between essence and activities in his
doctrine of theosis, affirming thus the possibility of direct vision and communion with
God.47 Ten years later, Amphilochios Radović issued his doctoral dissertation on The
Mystery of the Holy Trinity according to St Gregory Palamas, where he mentions some
thoughts about man as an ‘icon’ (‘εἰκών’) of the Holy Trinity, and about purification
as prerequisite of the revelation of the Trinity to man.48
Nevertheless, Palamite theology, apart from ardent supporters, also had its own
opponents. In 1974, a special issue of the French Dominican journal Istina pointed
out the supposed lack of patristic foundation for Palamas’ theology.49 In fact, in
modern scholarship, it was Jugie in 1932 who first portrayed Gregory as an innovator
and distant from the Fathers.50 Yet Lossky51 and Meyendorff52 responded to Jugie
setting Palamas in his patristic context. This time, André de Halleux,53 Barrois54 and
Yannaras55 responded against the Istina accusations. Furthermore, two years later,
Rowan Williams56 found Palamas’ theology problematic and defended Thomas
Aquinas, while Kallistos Ware57 clarified some of Gregory’s opinions and strongly
supported the latter’s teaching.

44 Mantzaridis (1963) (= Mantzaridis (19983), 149–292). English trans. by Sherrard (1984). French trans.
by Monsaingeon and Paramelle (1990), 43–160.
45 Kallistos, ‘Foreword’, in Mantzaridis (1984), 7.
46 Kallistos, ‘Foreword’, in Mantzaridis (1984), 9.
47 Kallistos, ‘Foreword’, in Mantzaridis (1984), 9.
48 Radović (1991), 45–58 and 58–61 respectively.
49 Houdret (1974). Garrigues (1974). Nadal (1974). Le Guillou (1974).
50 Jugie (1932), 1735–1776, mainly at 1750, 1759, 1760, 1764.
51 Lossky (1944).
52 Meyendorff (1959a).
53 de Halleux (1975).
54 Barrois (1975).
55 Yannaras (1975).
56 R. Williams (1977).
57 Ware (1975) and Ware (1977).
10 in tro ducti o n

Additionally, in recent years, Wendebourg—to my view, falsely—regarded

Palamite theology as defective and lacking continuity with that of the Fathers.58 On
the other hand, let us mention here parenthetically, some modern scholars are very
sympathetic towards Gregory, trying, moreover, to establish a convergence between
his teaching and that of Aquinas.59
Palamas’ teaching on the passions and virtues is dealt with in Anestis Kesselopoulos’
important book first published in 1982.60 The main subjects treated are the notion of
passion (‘πάθος’) (23–54), its phenomenology (55–77), repentance and the purification
(79–113), the virtue as the ‘mean’ (‘μεσότης’) of the spiritual life (115–59) and the
notion of the ‘ἔνθεον πάθος’, that is having a communion in the divine life (161–210).
In the same year, Robert Sinkewicz showed that the hesychast controversy was
initially a conflict not over the nature of grace (i.e. created or uncreated), but over
the nature of man’s knowledge of God.61 Moreover, he wrote in 1986 an interesting
paper about the image of God in Palamas’ major work The One Hundred and Fifty
Chapters.62 Apart from outlining the main characteristics of this doctrine, he also
traces Gregory’s possible sources for the psychological triad of ‘intellect, knowledge,
love’ (‘νοῦς, λόγος, ἔρως’) mainly in St Theoleptos of Philadelpheia and St Gregory
of Sinai, but not in Augustine63 or Thomas Aquinas.
Furthermore, as already mentioned at the beginning of this Review, in 1988
Sinkewicz created a critical edition of The One Hundred and Fifty Chapters. In addition
to the excellent edition as well as his translation of the aforementioned original text,
Sinkewicz gives also a very useful commentary on the Chapters. Particularly important
to our survey are his comments on ‘The Divine Nature and its Triadic Image in Man’
(pp. 16–34). A year later George C. Papademetriou wrote a paper on Palamas’ view of
the human body,64 whereas four years later, Kallistos Ware compared the hesychast
Jesus Prayer with two other traditions of prayer (yoga and sufism), by highlighting
more specifically the value attributed to the body in each of these traditions.65
In 1994 the Dominican Jacques Lison published his doctoral dissertation on the
Pneumatology of Palamas.66 Written under the supervision of the Roman Catholic
pro-Palamite theologian Fr André de Halleux,67 it is generally accepted as a balanced
and well-articulated approach to Gregory’s thought.68 It is placed in an ecumenical
perspective and it aims—apart from clarifying Palamas’ teaching—to bring into

58 Wendebourg (1980). Cf. Wendebourg (1982).

59 Marshall (1995). A. N. Williams (1999) (for a brief discussion on this book, see below in the current
Literature Review). Loudovikos (2010c) and Loudovikos (2013).
60 Kesselopoulos (1986).
61 Sinkewicz (1982).
62 Sinkewicz (1986b).
63 The presence of Augustine in Palamas’ imago theology is discussed in ch. 2.4 of this book.
64 Papademetriou (1989).
65 Ware (1993).
66 Lison (1994a).
67 See indicatively Halleux (1973) and Halleux (1975), where, as mentioned above, he counters the
arguments for Palamas’ disconnection from the patristic tradition.
68 For two important reviews see those of Larchet (1994) and Louth (1997).
 i nt ro d u ct i o n 11

close dialogue Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic theology. Additionally, it

possesses none of the scholastic hostility shown toward Palamite theology by certain
western scholars in the twentieth century.69 Moreover, this book deals with many
anthropological issues, such as the Palamite doctrine of participation (133–72),
sacramental life (Baptism, Eucharist) (173–93), the role of ascesis in the life of virtue
and prayer (193–207), union with God, adoption and deification (207–19), the results
of deification by the Spirit (221–70), such as the experience of the Spirit, the vision
of the uncreated light and the participation of the body in grace. Furthermore, Lison
also treats the subject of deification according to St Gregory in a paper of his from
the same year, giving a synoptic account of this teaching.70
The same topic was covered by two other books published three years later, in
1997. Reinhard Flogaus undertook a systematic comparison of theosis in Palamas
and Luther and placed their teaching in an ecumenical perspective.71 On the other
hand, Kyriakos Savvidis stressed the importance of Maximos’ theology of deification
for Palamas and examined the way in which Gregory integrated this teaching into
his own system.72 Flogaus’ book is also very important for yet another reason: he
there publishes for the first time his findings on whether and how Palamas utilised
the works of St Augustine, and specifically the Greek translation of his treatise De
Trinitate by Maximos Planoudes.73 In particular, he presents with documentation
many parallels, not only there,74 but also in two other articles (in 1997 and 1998
respectively).75
In about the same period with Flogaus’ first treatment of the above subject,
in 1997, that is almost simultaneously but independently, John Demetracopoulos,
makes nearly identical discoveries as Flogaus, in his book on Palamas and Augustine.76
So, it is proven that in Palamas’ oeuvre one can find many textual borrowings from
Augustine’s De Trinitate.77 However, it should be noted that Sinkewicz78 and Lison

69 See, for example, the following general remarks from the Conclusion: ‘À partir de là, il nous paraît
opportun de consacrer la présente conclusion générale à verifier une dernière fois dans quelle
mesure la doctrine palamite des énergies incréés est en harmonie avec la tradition théologique et
spirituelle qui inspirait sa systématisation face aux antihésychastes’ (271); ‘Bref, il nous paraît injuste
de reprocher à l’Hesychaste de ne pas avoir toujours suffisament situé les énergies divines dans leur
contexte sotériologique’ (275); ‘La synthèse de notre auteur est authentiquement chrétienne’ (278);
‘La doctrine palamite des énergies incréés nous semble ainsi s’intégrer naturellement dans les grands
thèmes théologiques, sotériologiques, ascétiques et mystiques qui l’avaient suscitée et qu’elle voulait
défendre’ (279).
70 Lison (1994b).
71 Flogaus (1997). See the review of Podskalsky (1998).
72 Savvidis (1997). See the review of Louth (2001b).
73 Planoudes, Αὐγουστίνου Περὶ Τριάδος βιβλία πεντεκαίδεκα ἅπερ ἐκ τῆς Λατίνων διαλέκτου εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα
μετήνεγκε Μάξιμος ὁ Πλανούδης (ed. M. Papathomopoulos et al., 1995).
74 See mainly Flogaus (1997), 98–109, 140, 143–53, 155–57, 238–61.
75 Flogaus (1996) (as Flogaus (2008), 66 n. 12 explains, this article appeared in January 1997). Flogaus
(1998).
76 Demetracopoulos (1997), specifically 13–17, 52–54, 83–94, 115–19, 183–93.
77 Mainly in Palamas’ Chapters, Homily 16 On the Incarnation, Contra Bekkos, and Ad Xenam.
78 Sinkewicz (1988), 18.
12 in tro ducti o n

were very cautious in seeing a direct influence of Augustine on Palamas. Nevertheless,

Lison, in contrast to the former, did not want to exclude the possibility of some
‘indirect’ influence.79
This debate was continued in 1999 and 2000 by Joseph Lössl.80 Drawing heavily
on Flogaus’ articles, he pointed out that ‘Augustine’s influence on the development
of Palamite trinitarian thought should therefore no longer be categorically ruled out,
but seriously taken into account in any further venture to explore this fascinating field
of Byzantine theology’;81 but he believes that, for Flogaus, Palamas is, mistakenly,
an ‘Augustinian’ theologian.82 However, Flogaus renounces such criticism.83 This
whole subject regarding the Presence of St Augustine in the Palamite corpus is
approached in ch. 2.4 of the current book, where a fuller survey of the literature
is also given.
In 1999 Sinkewicz composed a very important paper on Palamas’ apprehension
of the concept of spiritual perception.84 This paper will help us to a great extent in
Part II of this book, regarding Palamas’ doctrine of the spiritual senses;85 however,
it will be argued there that it is not without certain disadvantages and problems.86
In the same year, Anna Williams, in her book The Ground of Union,87 attempted a
comparative study on the issue of deification in Palamas and Aquinas. This is a very
interesting and promising topic, but, as has been noticed, the author does not take
the argument much further, simply concluding that ‘the ground that Aquinas and
Palamas share is vast compared to the points at which they diverge’ (175).88 Moreover,
this conclusion was strongly challenged by Joost van Rossum, a former student of
Meyendorff, who does not find any compatibility between Aquinas and Palamas. He
believes that the God of Thomism is the God of Aristotle, and that, in the end, we have
two different concepts of God.89

79 Lison (1994a), 89. Lison (1997).

80 Lössl (1999). Lössl (2000).
81 Lössl (1999), 82.
82 Lössl (1999), 63, 70–71. It is remarkable that Fr Meyendorff (1959a), 175 had characterised Palamas as
‘l’un des auteurs les plus “augustiniens” de l’Orient chrétien’, regarding his doctrine of grace. Yet Fr
Romanides (1960–1), 196–205 strongly opposed this.
83 Flogaus (2008), 73–74.
84 Sinkewicz (1999).
85 For the relevant literature survey, see ch. 5.2.
86 See ch. 5.2 and the Concluding Remarks of ch. 7.
87 A. Williams (1999).
88 Russel (2012), 17. For a review of Williams’ book, see that of Bradshaw (2000). According to
Bradshaw, in her attempt to reconcile Palamas and Aquinas, Williams does not refer to their differing
attitudes toward the body and the senses, where surely one can find crucial differences. Additionally,
Williams’ ‘idea that [for Palamas] the distinction of ousia and energeia is merely nominal also will not
bear scrutiny’ (587–88). For a much more positive stance towards Williams’ book, a dialogue with its
critics, and an effort to improve and expand some of its points—along with some insightful thoughts
on Aquinas’ deificatio—, see Townsend (2015).
89 van Rossum (2003a).
 i nt ro d u ct i o n 13

Nevertheless, this statement seems a bit exaggerated. Recent scholarship—though

not always90—tends to see some convergence, or at least some similarities, between
Palamas and Aquinas.91 Namely, despite their differences—which are indeed crucial
on specific points—,92one can find common ground. Moreover, van Rossum does
not adequately explain his view that Palamas’ and Aquinas’ ‘different approaches to
the divine transcendence also imply a different anthropology: that of Aquinas can
be characterised as platonic and dualistic (at least within this context), while the
anthropology of Palamas and the hesychasts is holistic: when the human being is
united with God, he becomes himself pneuma’.93
In the meanwhile Stavros Yangazoglou has written an important monograph in
2001 on the conjunction of Christology and Pneumatology in the work of Palamas.94
While not a purely anthropological study, one can find in it very useful points for the
present book, such as the relationship between man and the cosmos (54–60), the
trinitarian image and likeness (66–82), freedom and repentance (83–108), and the
divinization of the humanity (281–304). A year later Sinkewicz writes an excellent
general article on Palamas, which is divided into the following parts: biography,
theology, conclusions and general bibliography.95 Particularly important for our survey
are the sections ‘The Palamite Theological Defence of Hesychast Mystical Experience’
(155–61) and ‘The Problem of Profane Learning and Palamite Anthropology’ (164–71).
In the first section Sinkewicz treats topics such as the nature of divine illumination,
the goal of monastic prayer and the phenomenon of ‘spiritual perception’ (‘νοερὰ
αἴσθησις’), while in the second, he takes up the themes of the value of knowledge,
the image and likeness of God and the rank of man in the cosmic hierarchy. These
points will prove to be of great importance for our book, and will be discussed at
length. Furthermore, it is worth noting that Sinkewicz here recognises, for the first
time, that there are indeed in Palamas’ texts ‘direct citations from Augustine’s De
Trinitate in the Greek trans. by Maximos Planoudes’ (163, 170).96
Fr Alexander Golitzin, in the same year, argued that both Dionysiοs the Areopagite
and Gregory Palamas are ‘within the ascetico-mystical tradition of Eastern Christianity’
(165).97 Through his impressive paper, in his effort to prove this, he initially rejects the

90 For instance, Bradshaw (2004), 267–68 (indicatively) finds many problems in the teaching of
Aquinas, from a theological-philosophical perspective, mainly regarding the essence/activities
distinction. For Bradshaw’s comparative approach between Palamas and Aquinas, see pp. 221–62 of
the aforementioned book.
91 This is a huge subject that cannot be dealt with in this book. Indicatively, see the following studies:
Plested (2013). Divry (2009). Loudovikos (2010c). Loudovikos (2013). Loudovikos (2015). Lévy
(2006). Lévy tries to explore the different ways in which the Byzantine East and the Latin West
approached the relationship between created and uncreated. For a thorough (and, indeed, rather
critical) review, see Larchet (2008).
92 e.g. on the distinction between essence and acitivites, the Filioque, the ancestral/original sin, etc.
93 van Rossum (2003a), 370, with reference to Gregory’s Tr. 2,3,31.
94 Yangazoglou (2001).
95 Sinkewicz (2002).
96 Cf. Flogaus (2008), 73.
97 Golitzin (2002).
14 in tro ducti o n

accusations of some scholars, according to whom Dionysiοs was so much influenced

by the Neo-Platonism that a ‘Christological corrective’ needed to be applied to his
theology by Palamas (and earlier by Maximos the Confessor) rather than Barlaam.
This belief was first expressed by Fr Meyendorff.98 But other scholars also followed,99
among them recently Adolf Ritter.100 Golitzin writes extensively against Ritter’s paper,
based largely on the aforementioned article of Romanides.101 Golitzin shows that in
fact Gregory, and not Barlaam, was the faithful and accurate interpreter of Dionysiοs’
thought, which contains nothing problematic in the first place.102
In 2004 Norman Russell in his excellent book The Doctrine of Deification devoted
some pages to Palamas’ teaching on divinization (304–09) and the dissemination
of hesychast spirituality (309–11).103 Two years later, he traced possible points of
continuity and doctrinal change in Gregory’s doctrine of theosis.104 Here Russell,
after sketching briefly—but substantially—the personalities, politics and the
philosophical methods that appeared during the hesychast controversy, engages with
the theological issues, particularly the theme of ‘participation in God’. He points out
that the latter issues were all related to the correct exegesis of the Transfiguration of
Christ on Mount Tabor (367). After a well-documented analysis of the data, Russell
concludes—correctly in my view—by stressing that Palamas, ‘[b]y approaching
theosis from the new perspective of his particular understanding of hesychasm [he]
succeeded in shaping a philosophical notion of deification which has elements of
both continuity and change… Only a willingness to look at the issues from a different
perspective could have brought them (i.e. his opponents) to an understanding of
what, in all sincerity, they were unable to see’ (378–79). Eventually, ‘[h]is version of
theosis was enshrined in Orthodox teaching as a result of his canonization by the
synod of 1368, but among the intellectuals for whom it was intended it remained −and
still remains− controversial’ (379).
In 2006 Joost van Rossum revisited the theme of the ‘Christological Corrective’.105
He believes that there is indeed a difference between Dionysiοs and Palamas, ‘if not
in essence, then at least in emphasis and language (in the sense of the French word

98 Meyendorff (1957). More recently, Louth (2012) calls in question the adequacy of Meyendorff ’s view,
in a balanced and objective way.
99 For some examples, see Golitzin (2002), 166–67.
100 Ritter (1997).
101 Romanides (1960–1). Romanides (1963–4).
102 Golitzin (2002), 170 argues that Gregory is ‘correcting the mis-reading of the Areopagite which Ritter
(and Meyendorff) effectively share with Barlaam’ and that Meyendorff ’s correctif ‘is not only not
“incontestable”, but that it is an illusion, a scholarly invention’. (167). For some general points about
the influence of Dionysiοs on Palamas and the other participants in the hesychast controversy, see
Louth (2008), 595–98.
103 Russell (2004). See, indicatively, p. 309: ‘…the official canonization of Gregory Palamas, whose
proclamation as a saint enshrined the hesychast doctrine of deification as the Orthodox Church’s
noblest expression of the content and purpose of the spiritual life. This doctrine was to have
enormous influence, especially in the Slavic world’.
104 Russell (2006).
105 van Rossum (2006).
 i nt ro d u ct i o n 15

langage)’ (351) and he traces this difference in the ecclesiology of both theologians
(351–53). Moreover, Flogaus returns to the discussion of Augustine’s influence on
Palamas in 2008, about ten years after his first treatment of the issue, by claiming
that he believes it ‘to be undeniable that Palamas made use of Augustine in various
writings. He did so not only by letting himself be inspired by some Augustinian
arguments, which he incorporated in his own writings, but also by simply exploiting
Augustine’s notions, ideas, and arguments for a different purpose. Finally, in some
cases, he used Augustine’s words in order to support a concept that was the opposite
to what Augustine had originally meant’ (75).106 In his interesting lecture, Flogaus
firstly recounts the relevant academic conversations of the past years (63–74), and,
secondly, he demonstrates the various ways in which Palamas used the writings of
Augustine (75–80).107
David Bradshaw in 2009, in a very interesting article, tried to articulate the notion
of ‘drawing the mind into the heart’ through prayer and what this indicates about the
Eastern Christian understanding of the human person, through a comparative study
of how the intellect and the heart are approached in East and West.108 In 2012 Torstein
Tollefsen published an important book on the notion of Activity and Participation,
both in the Philosophers, such as Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus, and in the Fathers,
such as Sts Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, Dionysiοs, and Maximos.109 He devotes the final
chapter (i.e. ch. 7) to St Gregory Palamas. There one can find, albeit presented in a
very brief and general form, a number of significant anthropological references.110
It is widely accepted that modern scholarship has examined various important
aspects of the works of St Gregory Palamas.111 This is obvious from the current
literature review. However, as far as I know, Palamas’ theological anthropology has
not been the subject of a special monograph, which would take into account the
entire Palamite corpus:112 the aforementioned studies, as have been presented and
discussed by the author in this section, cover only some aspects of this topic, usually
peripherally and partially.

106 Flogaus (2008), 63–80.

107 For a more recent (yet more general) summary of the whole debate and some insightful remarks, see
Louth (2013d).
108 Bradshaw (2009).
109 Tollefsen (2012).
110 Certain problems may be found in Tollefsen’s approach to Palamas. For a brief critical evaluation, see
ch. 5.2 of this book. Here let us only note the following. In his approach to St Gregory (see Tollefsen
(2012), 185–206) Tollefsen almost exclusively refers to some of Palamas’ Chapters and to Tr. 1,2 and
1,3, also providing a few citations from the Homilies. One difficulty that a reader of this chapter faces
is that the author is not very accurate in his citations; for instance, he almost never refers to a specific
critical edition of the Palamite texts, or to the relevant lines and pages. If these were provided, the
potential reader would be certainly assisted better in his effort to understand Palamite theology.
111 However, it should be noted that many Western scholars have focused only on the Triads and the 150
Chapters.
112 As it is well known, there exist many studies specifically written on the anthropological teaching
of other Church Fathers. For instance, about Maximos the Confessor, see the classical study of
Thunberg (19952).
16 in tro ducti o n

Therefore, this book aims to fill this gap. Its primary focus is to illustrate the following
two Palamite contentions. First, that man is to be regarded as superior to the angels,
in terms of the imago Dei. This is due to human corporeality. Second, that the body
has a crucial role in spiritual perception. In order to achieve this aim, the current book
also engages with the following research questions, which seem not to have been fully
examined in the existing scholarship: a) why is man believed to bear some reflections
of the Holy Trinity in himself? b) Is man able to gain knowledge of God? How is
this possible? And what is the role of the divine light and of the ‘eyes of the soul’ in
this process? c) What is the place of ‘ecstasis’? d) How does Palamas understand the
intellect (‘νοῦς’), its essence and activities, in the context of his imago and spiritual
senses theology? Which exactly is the intellect’s role and why does it have such a salient
place? e) How does Gregory approach the heart and the soul? f) What is the place
of the body? g) What is it, finally, to be human according to St Palamas? To this end,
this study explores the sources of Palamas’ anthropology and how he is incorporating
his teaching on the distinction between essence and activities in his anthropology.
In this way, we hope that it will contribute to several areas of research. First of all,
it will be of great importance to the general study of patristic anthropology. It will
show the influence of the classical patristic anthropological views on Palamas, placing
him within his proper theological context. Last but not least, it will try to highlight
his original contributions to the development of the tradition. This will help us better
understand the roots and the inner sense of hesychast theology, which is a fundamental
part of the Eastern Orthodox teaching and life. But, first of all, let us briefly observe
how the question of the human person appears during the hesychast controversy.

2. The Historical and Theological Context: the Emergence

of Hesychast Anthropology During the Fourteenth
Century

In this section we shall try to see how questions regarding anthropology emerged in the
context of the hesychast debates. In particular, we shall focus on the two main issues
that this book is concerned with, namely the spiritual senses and the image of God.
Undoubtedly, important information regarding the historical and theological
context of these topics could be drawn from many points of the Palamite corpus.113
However, here we shall limit our approach to just one crucial document:114 namely
the Hagioretic Tome.115

113 See, e.g., Meyendorff (1959a), 65–153. Christou, ΠΣ 1, 315–54. Christou, ΠΣ 2, 9–42. Sinkewicz
(2002), 131–37, 155–73. Sinkewicz (1980). Sinkewicz (1982). Koutsouris (2016).
114 The historical and theological context of the debate around man’s spiritual senses is also briefly
outlined in ch. 5.3 of this book, there based exclusively in Tr. 1,3.
115 Hagioretic Tomos (or Tomos of the Holy Mountain) [Ἁγιορειτικὸς τόμος ὑπὲρ τῶν ἱερῶς ἡσυχαζόντων διὰ
τοὺς ἐξ ἰδίας ἀπειρίας καὶ τῆς πρὸς τοὺς ἁγίους ἀπειθείας ἀθετοῦντας τὰς τοῦ Πνεύματος μυστικὰς ἐνεργείας
κρεῖττον ἢ λόγος ἐν τοῖς κατὰ πνεῦμα ζῶσιν ἐνεργουμένας καὶ δι’ ἔργων θεωρουμένας, ἀλλ’ οὐ διὰ λόγων
ἀποδεικνυμένας], ed. V. Pseftogas, in ΠΣ 2, 1966 [20102], 567–78 (PG 150, 1225C–36). For a concise
 i nt ro d u ct i o n 17

This text has as its aim to defend, in the form of an official declaration, the
teaching of the hesychasts over against their opponents. It was written by Palamas in
1340, signed by twenty leading monks of Mount Athos, and confirmed by the local
bishop of Hierissos in Chalkidiki, who declared that the whole of Mount Athos
subscribed it. Therefore, as has been noticed, ‘[t]his makes it clear that Palamas is
expressing, not merely his own personal opinion, but the accepted teaching of the
Holy Mountain’.116 The Tome affirms that the divine light is uncreated, and that it is
able to be sensibly perceived by man.

The Information Drawn from the Tomos Regarding the Anthropological

Issues

In the first lines of the Hagioretic Tome, Palamas argues that the doctrines of the
Church, that are now ‘known to all in common and proclaimed openly’, were initially
‘mysteries of the Law of Moses’, and ‘foreseen in Spirit by the Prophets alone’. In the
same way ‘the mysteries of the evangelical life are the good things promised to the
saints in the age to come; these are granted to and foreseen by those deemed worthy
of sight by the Spirit, and to these in measure as a partial foretaste’.117 Here Palamas
wants to argue that the hesychasts play the role that the Prophets occupied in the
Old Testament: to come to knowledge of the mysteries of God and reveal them to
the faithful. Let us note here the emphasis Palamas lays on the role of the Holy Spirit:
man comes to knowledge of God through the activity of the Spirit. As Palamas always
argues, through the divine uncreated activity.
In the Old Testament some people were reluctant to listen to what the Prophets
had to say. For instance, some Jews may have found problematic the teaching of the
Prophets that the Logos and the Spirit are coeternal,118 because one may have had
in mind the biblical phrase that ‘The Lord our God is one Lord’ (Dt 6:4). And so,
from piety, one would have denied the truth. But, Palamas goes on to say, ‘Similarly,
perhaps now too it could happen that a person fails to listen with reverence to the
mysteries of the Spirit known only to those who have attained purification by virtue’.119
It is interesting that Palamas recognizes that there indeed appeared some
objections to the hesychast teaching motivated by piety, namely because it was
regarded by some persons as innovative. Nevertheless, Palamas draws the following
parallelism: as those teachings of the past were finally proved to be correct, despite

presentation and analysis of it, see Christou, ΠΣ 2, 551–53. Vlachos (20073), 305–26. In this last book
one may see the tight connection of Palamas with the spirituality of Mount Athos, throughout his
whole life.
116 The Philokalia, vol. 4, 292.
117 Ἁγιορειτικὸς Τόμος (Tomos of the Holy Mountain or Hagioretic Tome; hereafter Tomos), Prologue.1–8,
ed. Pseftogas, ΠΣ 2, 567, trans. Sinkewicz (2002), 183.
118 This teaching, of course, was not directly exposed in the Old Testament. However, Palamas, following
the tradition of the Fathers, regards it as clearly implied in many points, if the Old Testament is read
through the prism of the New.
119 Tomos, Prologue, ΠΣ 2, 567.8–568.5, trans. Sinkewicz, 183.
18 in tro ducti o n

the objections of some Jews, in the same way the teaching and life of the hesychasts
will be proved to be correct and genuine, despite the opposition to them by some
contemporary Christians.
Let us note here the important role Palamas attributes to the pursuit of the
virtues, ascesis, as a way of knowing God: this is indeed a most central notion in
his thought and teaching.120 Thus, this is why one should trust the hesychasts,
for they ‘have been initiated by experience (πείρᾳ) itself ’, and ‘for the sake of the
evangelical life [they] have not only renounced the acquisition of possessions,
human honour and the evil pleasures of their bodies, but have also confirmed this
renunciation through submission to those with greater maturity in Christ’. Here
Palamas stresses a virtue very crucial for him, that of obedience. Furthermore,
the hesychasts, ‘for having devoted their time to themselves and to God through
stillness and freedom from cares, and by transcending themselves through pure
prayer and, having attained God through a mystical union with him that transcends
the intellect, they have been initiated into the realities that transcend the intellect’.
However, ‘there are others who have been initiated by the respect, faith and love
they show to such persons’.121
Then Palamas mentions three Fathers (Sts Dionysiοs, Maximos, and Macarios)
who refer to the deifying gift (θεοποιὸν δῶρον).122 Here, on the one hand he wants
to introduce the idea of the ‘divine uncreated activities’, and on the other hand the
notion of the ‘uncreated light’, which, according to Macarios, is ‘the nourishment of
the incorporeal beings, the glory of the divine nature, the beauty of the age to come, a
divine and heavenly fire, an ineffable and intellectual light (φῶς ἄρρητον καὶ νοερόν),
a pledge of the Holy Spirit, the sanctifying oil of gladness’.123
But there was a major accusation made against the hesychasts. In particular, sometime
before the summer of 1337, Barlaam accused the hesychast monks of Messalianism.124
In the meanwhile, he had come into contact with some hesychasts who introduced
him to their practices. So, on the basis of what he had heard, or what he had read, he
denounced the hesychast monks to the Standing Synod in Constantinople.125 The
Synod, however, declared his accusations as having no firm basis.126
It should be mentioned that the Messalians (or Euchites, from the Greek Εὐχίται)
were a heretical group that appeared in Mesopotamia in the 370s. In general, they
rejected the sacraments of the Church, and accepted only what they called ‘the pure
prayer of the heart’, through which they considered that union with the Godhead

120 For ascesis as a way of attaining the virtues, see Kesselopoulos (1986), 147–59.
121 Tomos, Prologue, ΠΣ 2, 568.18–569.2, trans. Sinkewicz, 183–84.
122 Tomos, Prologue.3–18, ΠΣ 2, 569.
123 Tomos, Prologue.15–18, ΠΣ 2, 569, trans. Sinkewicz, 184 (modified). For the passage of Macarios, see
Ὁμιλίαι Πνευματικαί [Homiliae Spirituale 50], 12.14 and 17.2, 114 and 167–68 respectively.
124 For a study and evaluation on the sources of Barlaam’s criticism of the hesychasts, see Rigo (1989),
39–103.
125 For a brief approach to this issue, see ch. 5.3 of this book.
126 Sinkewicz (2002), 133.
 i nt ro d u ct i o n 19

was attained. Moreover, they seem to have believed that the essence of God could
be perceived through the bodily senses.127
Palamas of course knew about the accusation of Messalianism from Barlaam and
his followers. This is why Gregory attacks ‘[w]hoever… ranks with the Messalians
and calls ditheists those who say that this deifying grace is uncreated, ingenerate
and a distinct reality’. For Palamas, ‘if indeed there is such a person, let him know
that he stands in opposition to the saints of God and, unless he should repent, casts
himself out of the inheritance of the saved and himself falls away from the one who
alone by nature is God of the saints’.128 Gregory introduces here his basic doctrine of
the essence/activities distinction, and stresses the uncreated character of the divine
activities. If someone rejects this, and uses the accusation of Messalianism, then he
is opposed to God. On the other hand, whoever believes this mystery, ‘and does not
reject out of ignorance what is said openly, but is ignorant of the way of the mystery,
let him not disdain to seek out and learn from those who do know’.129
But Palamas continues by bringing to the fore some very important parameters. He
argues that perfect union with God cannot ‘be attained by imitation and disposition
alone without the deifying grace of the Spirit’, as happens with ‘people of the same
character who are also loved by one another’. Moreover, the grace of God is not ‘a
habit of rational nature which is attained through imitation alone’; on the contrary,
it is ‘a supernatural illumination and an ineffable and divine energy which is invisibly
seen and incomprehensibly conceived by those deemed worthy’. If one denies any
of these, ‘let this man know that he has fallen without knowing it into the deceit of
the Messalians’.130
Through these arguments, Palamas wants to stress the fact that union with God
is not the result of human effort alone, but, mainly, of divine grace. He was aware
of the teaching of Barlaam, that man may attain union with God through human
knowledge.131 In particular, Barlaam ‘insisted that access to God could normatively
come only through careful logical inference from creation and scriptural revelation’.132
But Palamas deems this very dangerous to the spiritual life. And he adds that ‘if
deification takes place by a natural power and is naturally encompassed by the
bounds of nature’, then ‘one who is deified will by all necessity be God by nature’.133

127 About the Messalians, see Fitschen (1998). Stewart (1991). Plested (2004), mainly 16–27, but also
passim. It is worth noting that, as Plested (2004), 27 n. 60 notes, by the time of Palamas ‘the term
Messalian was used as a synonym for Bogomil. It is a characteristic of heresiology to stigmatize
newer heresies with the name of an older heresy…’ As far as the Bogomils are concerned, they were
also a heretical group, which rejected ecclesiastical hierarchy and showed a Manichaean dualism.
They probably firstly appeared in the tenth century. For an important historical study regarding
the relationship between hesycashm and the Bogomils, see Rigo (1989). About the Bogomils, see
Fitschen (1998), 323–33. For an older study, see Obolensky (1948).
128 Tomos, 1, ΠΣ 2, 569.19–570.4, trans. Sinkewicz, 184.
129 Tomos, 1.4–8, ΠΣ 2, 570, trans. Sinkewicz, 184.
130 Tomos, 2.13–21, ΠΣ 2, 570, trans. Sinkewicz, 184.
131 For an analysis of ‘Barlaam’s doctrine of illumination’, see Sinkewicz (1982) (mainly pp. 222–42).
132 Blowers (2016), 303.
133 Tomos, 2.21–24, ΠΣ 2, 570, trans. Sinkewicz, 184.
20 in tro ducti o n

To support his arguments, St Gregory refers to a very crucial passage of

St Maximos, where it is mentioned that ‘the grace of divinization is completely
unconditioned (ἄσχετός ἐστι παντάπασιν), because it finds no faculty or capacity of
any sort within nature that could receive it, for if it did, it would no longer be a grace
but the manifestation of a natural activity latent within the potentiality of nature’. If
the latter were the case, ‘it would rightly be a work of nature, and not a gift of God,
and a person so divinized would be God by nature and would have to be called so
in the proper sense’. And St Maximos wonders: ‘How, then, divinization could make
the divinized person go out of himself (Πῶς δὲ καὶ ἐξίστησιν ἑαυτοῦ τὸν θεούμενον ἡ
θέωσις), I fail to see, if it was something that lay within the bounds of his nature (εἰ
τοῖς ὅροις τῆς φύσεως αὐτὴ περιείληπτο)’.134
Based on St Maximos, Palamas concludes that ‘The grace of deification is therefore
beyond nature, virtue and knowledge, and all such things are infinitely inferior to
it’. And he adds something very crucial: ‘For all virtue and imitation of God on our
part render the person who has acquired them fit for divine union, but grace effects
the ineffable union itself (ἡ δὲ χάρις αὐτὴν τελεσιουργεῖ τὴν ἀπόρρητον ἕνωσιν)’.135
In other words, as it has been put recently by Paul Blowers, ‘deification transforms
human nature but is not naturally acquired’.136
Palamas is also aware of another accusation. The hesychasts were teaching that
the intellect is located in the heart or in the head (or, better, brain; ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ ἢ τῷ
ἐγκεφάλῳ).137 But for their opponents this was a hint of Messalianism.138 However,
Palamas explains that this is not justified. By mentioning that ‘the intellect is located
in the heart or in the head’ one simply declares the fact that ‘the intellect is in the
body because it is joined to it’.139 To support his argument, he refers to Macarios,
who argues that ‘the activity of the intellect is in the heart’.140 Moreover, one should
not take as contradictory the argument of St Gregory of Nyssa, that ‘the intellect is
neither inside nor outside the body, since it is incorporeal’.141 Besides, there is not
any contradiction in saying, on the one hand, ‘that the divine is not in a place’, and on

134 Tomos, 2.2–13, ΠΣ 2, 571. For the passage of St Maximos, and its translation, see Ambiguum 20, 2.15–27,
ed. Constas, 408–10 (PG 91, 1237B): ἡ γὰρ χάρις τῆς θεώσεως ἄσχετος ἐστι παντάπασιν, οὐκ ἔχουσα τὴν
οἱανοῦν δεκτικὴν ἑαυτῆς ἐν τῇ φύσει δύναμιν, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἔτι χάρις ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τῆς κατὰ τὴν φυσικὴν δύναμιν
ἐνεργείας φανέρωσις. Καὶ οὕτω γε πάλιν οὐκ ἔσται παράδοξον τὸ γινόμενον, εἰ κατὰ δεκτικὴν δύναμιν
φύσεως ἡ θέωσις ἦν. Φύσεως γὰρ ἂν εἰκότως ἔργον, ἀλλ’ οὐ Θεοῦ δῶρον ἡ θέωσις ἔσται, καὶ δυνήσεται
καὶ φύσει Θεὸς ὁ τοιοῦτος εἶναι καὶ κυρίως προσαγορεύεσθαι. Οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο καθέστηκεν ἡ κατὰ φύσιν
ἑκάστου τῶν ὄντων δύναμις ἢ φύσεως πρὸς ἐνέργειαν ἀπαράβατος κίνησις…
135 Tomos, 2.13–19, ΠΣ 2, 571, trans. Sinkewicz, 185.
136 Blowers (2016), 305. For the vision of the divine light through ecstasis and the role of the body,
according to Palamas, see ch. 7 of the current book.
137 If we are to translate ἐγκέφαλος as brain here, we must have in mind that there are different
understandings between the ancient and the modern era, as far as the brain is concerned.
138 Tomos, 3.3–5, ΠΣ 2, 572.
139 Tomos, 3.11–13, ΠΣ 2, 572, trans. Sinkewicz, 185.
140 Tomos, 3.7–8, ΠΣ 2, 572, trans. Sinkewicz, 185. In particular Macarios argues that the intellect is found
in the heart. See his Homily 15, 20.283–87, ed. Dörries, 139: ἐκεῖ γάρ ἐστιν ὁ νοῦς… We shall analyse
this crucial passage of Macarios, in ch. 7.2.f.
141 Gregory of Nyssa, Περὶ κατασκευῆς ἀνθρώπου (De opificio hominis), PG 44, 177B.
 i nt ro d u ct i o n 21

the other hand, ‘that the Word of God was once within a virginal and unblemished
womb, since there it was joined beyond rational sense to our constitution out of an
inexpressible love for humanity’.142
But why is Palamas insisting on this point, namely that the intellect is found in
the human brain? As it is known, the intellect is the human faculty through which
man is united with God.143 But in this union the human body also takes part.144 This
is why Palamas regards it important to stress the fact that the νοῦς is ‘located in the
human heart or brain’, meaning in the human body more generally.145 Moreover, as
will be shown in this book, he strongly insists that both the intellect and the body
a) are closely involved in union with God, and b) are connected to the two specific
issues that we shall examine: first, the image of God, namely how man images his
creator, and how it is possible for him to attain the likeness; and, second, the doctrine
of the spiritual senses, that is to say, how man is capable of ‘seeing and tasting’ God.
From this presentation, it is clearly shown that anthropology has a most central
place in the hesychast debates. Perhaps, it would not be false to argue that the matter
at stake was mainly the human person; indeed, man lies at the core of Palamite
theology. But, before going on to analyse the two aforementioned specific points in
the anthropology of Palamas, let us first examine some basic notions in his relevant
teaching. These notions will help us better understand the subsequent analysis
conducted in Parts I and II.

3. The English Translation of νοῦς and αἴσθησις νοερά

In this point, let us make a pause to search for the most adequate translation of the
Palamite νοῦς and αἴσθησις νοερά, two notions that we shall very frequently meet
in this book. In general, when one tries to translate texts of Palamas into English,
he comes face to face with a very difficult situation: how can one translate the word
νοῦς, so as to transmit, in an exact and precise way, what Palamas intends to say? Of
course, this is not a problem faced only in the Palamite texts; it is a general difficulty
that a scholar of the Greek Fathers (and Philosophers) faces. And the complexity
lies exactly in the fact that all the words that have been proposed for translating νοῦς
and its derivatives (such as mind, intellect, intellectual, intellective, intelligent, etc.)
do not have exactly the same meaning as their Greek original.

142 Tomos, 3.14–18, ΠΣ 2, 572, trans. Sinkewicz, 185.

143 For an analysis of the notion of intellect, cf. section 4 of the Introduction.
144 This fact will be analysed below, in the relevant chapter regarding the participation of the body in the
divine realities (ch. 7).
145 Palamas discusses this point also in Tr. 1,2,1.1–12, 393 (75.8–20). [It should be here noted that for
Palamas’ Triads we first refer to ΠΣ 1 and then, in parentheses, to Meyendorff ’s edn; cf. the relevant
note at the Bibliography.] He there explains that the body is not something evil, therefore one should
not be afraid to argue that the nous abides in the body: ‘As for us, we regard it as evil for the intellect
to be [or: be caught up] in material thoughts [or: to dwell on fleshly thoughts], but not for it to be in the
body, since the body is not evil [in itself]’. We quote this passage in the Conclusion of Part I; cf. ch. 7.
22 in tro ducti o n

In particular, nous does not have the meaning of ‘thinking about something’. It means
either the organ of thought (i.e. who or what does the thinking) or the thought itself
(i.e. the content of thought/meaning). However, through the word nous the Fathers
usually refer to this human faculty that is capable of reaching God, of attaining union
with God, ‘knowledge’ of God. For this reason it is regarded as the highest faculty
of the soul. This is why when one translates νοερός as intellectual or intellective, one
is not totally accurate. The same goes for νοητός, if it is translated as intelligible or
something similar.146 Moreover, the real problem with νοερός/νοητός is not so much
an issue of simple translation, as much as the different understandings of how νοῦς
knows, in classical, medieval, and post-Cartesian thought.147 As has been explained,
the words ‘mind’ and ‘intellect’ and their derivatives (intellection, intellectual, etc.)
have quite different overtones from the Greek nous. The most fundamental reason
for this is a cultural one: the Greeks were pre-Cartesian; we are all post-Cartesian.
We say, ‘I think, therefore I am’, that is, thinking is an activity I engage in and there
must therefore be an ‘I’ to engage in it; the Greeks would say, ‘I think, therefore
there is that which I think—ta noeta’. What I think is something going on in
my head; what the Greek thinks, ta noeta, are the objects of thought that (for
example, for Plato) exist in a higher, more real world. This means that nous and
its derivatives have a quite different feel from our words, mind, mental, intellect,
intellection, etc. Our words suggest our reasoning, our thinking; nous, noesis, etc.
suggest an almost intuitive grasp of reality.148
Taking the above clarifications in account, in this book we usually use ‘intellect’ for
νοῦς, ‘intellectual’ for νοερός and ‘intellective’ for νοητός.149 As far as the αἴσθησις νοερά
is concerned, the solution Sinkewicz provides is to translate it as ‘spiritual perception’.
In his effort to support his choice, he mentions two arguments. First, he writes that
‘In Triad 1.3.20 Palamas decided that this power or faculty should be called “spiritual
perception”, just as Solomon called it “a spiritual and divine perception”’.150 Sinkewicz
continues arguing that ‘Palamas appears to be following here the same exegetical
tradition as Origen in Contra Celsum 1.48’. Sinkewicz then refers also to Gregory of
Nyssa, In Canticum canticorum oratio 1.3, and concludes that ‘This interpretation would
justify the translation of the adjective as “spiritual” rather than “intellectual”’. Finally,
he mentions Tr. 1,3,21 where Palamas, indeed, speaks about the αἴσθησιν πνευματικήν.151

146 It should be noted that Palamas seems not to be always consisent in his usage of the words ‘νοερός’
and ‘νοητός’, since sometimes he uses them interchangeably. For instance, in Tr. 1,3,10 he calls the
pledge (ἀρραβών) of the divine light ‘intelligible and intellectual, or better spiritual’ (φῶς νοητὸν καὶ
νοερόν, μᾶλλον δὲ πνευματικόν). See Tr. 1,3,10.22–23, 420 (131.9–10) (about this ἀρραβών, see, e.g., ch.
5.4.c of this book). For another characteristic example, see Tr. 1,3,3.
147 For a very important discussion of the above issues, see Louth (2007), xiv–xvi.
148 Louth (2007), xiv.
149 This seems to be consistent with the preferences of the English translators of The Philokalia, i.e.
Palmer, Sherrard, and Ware.
150 Sinkewicz (1999), 377.
151 Sinkewicz (1999), 377 n. 13. Cf. Tr. 1,3,21.20–23, 431 (155.2–5). The potential influence from Solomon
and Origen on Palamas, regarding αἴσθησις νοερά, will be discussed in ch. 6.1.a,b.
 i nt ro d u ct i o n 23

Two remarks could be made here. First, in Tr. 1,3,20 there is no reference to the
word πνευματική, which would justify the use of ‘spiritual’, but only to words such as
νοεράν and θείαν (divine). Second, in some points of his oeuvre Palamas does indeed
speak about the αἴσθησιν πνευματικήν. Moreover, as will be shown in Part II, Palamas,
very often says that man sees the divine light ‘spiritually’ (πνευματικῶς). This is why,
to my view, Sinkewicz chooses the rendering ‘spiritual perception’; and why, perhaps,
he may be somewhat justified in his choice. In other words, he prefers this rendering,
because we then speak of a ‘spiritual perception’: man ‘senses’ the Divine, and this is
accomplished through his spiritual faculties. However, in the majority of cases, Palamas
speaks about the νοερά (not πνευματική) αἴσθησις. For this reason, it seems to me that
it would be more accurate to render it as ‘intellectual perception’. Undoubtedly, this
translation is not entirely precise. Nevertheless, it avoids the problem of rendering
νοερά as spiritual, since this more accurately translates the term πνευματική.152
But these remarks prompt us to examine, at the outset, some fundamental terms
in the anthropology of Palamas, which have to do with the intellect and the soul.
This examination will help us better understand the analysis that follows in later
parts of this book.

4. The Notions of the νοῦς (intellect), διάνοια (reasoning),

ψυχή (soul), and καρδία (heart) in the Thought of
Palamas

In this section we shall briefly present some key words that Palamas uses in his texts,
central notions to which he often refers in his anthropology. These are the following:
νοῦς (intellect), διάνοια (reasoning), ψυχή (soul), and καρδία (heart).153 It should be
noted that in the Palamite texts these terms are sometimes used interchangeably.154
Thus, this presentation will help us better examine Palamas’ understanding of the
imago Dei and the spiritual senses, which follows in the next chapters.

152 Tollefsen, in his chapter on the ‘Theology of St Gregory Palamas’ (see Tollefsen (2012), 204–05),
refers once to αἴσθησις νοερὰ καὶ θεία, which he translates as ‘intellectual and divine sensation’.
However, it seems to me that ‘perception’ would be a better choice than ‘sensation’, because the latter
is primarily connected with the body. Besides, for Palamas αἴσθησις here refers mainly to the νοῦς,
although, as will be shown, it also permits of important participation by the body. Furthermore,
‘perception’ seems to be a better choice, because it is actually concerned with the way that the outer
world is grasped and perceived by a person, whereas ‘sensation’ is just a feeling.
153 Some very useful remarks considering these notions may be drawn from the ‘Glossary’ of the English
translation of The Philokalia; see it in the end of each of the five published volumes (e.g., The Philokalia,
vol. 1, 357–68). In general, there is a huge bibliography on these terms. Indicatively, see Ware (1985).
Ware (1999). For a recent approach on the intellect, see A. N. Williams (2007). For how ancient
philosophers approached the notions of the soul and body, see Corcilius (2015). Sorabji (1999). For an
analysis of the terms intellect, soul, heart, and reasoning in the Fathers, as well as their differences, see
Larchet (2005), 16–33. Metr. Hierotheos Vlachos (201410), 97–241. About Palamas, more specifically,
see Archimandrite Efrem (2000b). Some useful points may be found in Takarides (2010).
154 Kesselopoulos (1986), 57.
24 in tro ducti o n

a. The Powers of the Soul

First of all, in his second sermon On the Entry of the Theotokos into the Holy of Holies,
St Gregory speaks about the five powers of the soul: αἴσθησις (sensation), φαντασία
(imagination/fantasy), δόξα (opinion), διάνοια (reasoning), and νοῦς (intellect).155
In particular, in section 56 he explains what exactly each power refers to.156 First,
‘Sensation (αἴσθησις) is a non-rational power, capable of knowing and comprehending
perceptible objects when they are present’.157 Obviously, this refers to man’s physical
sense perception.
Second, ‘Imagination has its starting point in sensation [or: in the senses], but
exercises its ability even in the absence of objects which can be perceived by the
senses. It could be perhaps also called intellect (νοῦς), in so far as it can act without
such objects; although, as not existing outside divisible things, it is passive’.158 As
Veniamin comments, ‘St Gregory is pointing out that imagination may be referred
to as mind [i.e. nous], in the sense that the imagination has the ability to operate
on its own, independently, without the stimulus of sensory objects’. However, ‘it
is still necessarily limited to its experience of the created, material world—“things
divisible”’. For this reason ‘it is passive and, unlike the nous proper, incapable of
separate existence’.159
Third, ‘Opinions (δόξα) originating from the imagination are irrational judge-
ments, but not those which come from reasoning (διάνοια); for the ability to form
opinions is natural to both’.160 In other words, if one makes an opinion based only
on his imagination, this opinion is probably non-rational, since it does not derive
from reasoning (dianoia), namely from ‘the discursive or reasoning aspect of the
soul’.161 On the other hand, dianoia ‘is always logical, and comes eventually, by means
of a gradual process, to opinions in accordance with reason’.162 That is, ‘dianoia is
the logical power which completes, through several detailed reflections, the δόξα,
namely opinion’.163

155 Hom. 53, On the Entry of the Theotokos into the Holy of Holies II, 55–56, ΠΣ 6, 579–80 (ΠΑΕ 11, 332–34).
The translation is from the edition of Veniamin, 439–40 (modified). As happens with the translation
of the Chapters by Sinkewicz, in his translation Veniamin renders nous as mind; thus, for reasons of
consistency, I usually modify this rendering by writing ‘intellect’.
156 For the following, see Hom. 53, 56.851–62, ΠΣ 6, 580 (ΠΑΕ 11, 334), trans. Veniamin, 440 (modified).
157 Hom. 53, 56.851–52, ΠΣ 6, 580 (ΠΑΕ 11, 334), trans. Veniamin, 440 (modified): Δύναμις μὲν οὖν ἄλογός
ἐστιν ἡ αἴσθησις, γνωστικὴ καὶ ἀντιληπτικὴ τῶν αἰσθητῶν παρόντων.
158 Hom. 53, 56.852–55, ΠΣ 6, 580 (ΠΑΕ 11, 334), trans. Veniamin, 440 (modified): …φαντασία δὲ ἀπὸ
ταύτης ἔχει τὴν ἀρχήν, ἐνεργεῖ δὲ τὰ ἑαυτῆς καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀπόντων∙ καὶ νοῦς μὲν λέγοιτ’ ἄν, ἧ δίχα
τούτων ἐνεργεῖ, παθητικὸς δ’ ὅμως ὡς οὐκ ἔξω μεριστῶν.
159 Veniamin, 628 n. 898–99.
160 Hom. 53, 56.855–57, ΠΣ 6, 580 (ΠΑΕ 11, 334), trans. Veniamin, 440: Δόξα δὲ ἡ μὲν ἀπὸ φαντασίας
ὁρμωμένη ψῆφος ἄλογός ἐστιν, ἡ δ’ ἀπὸ τῆς διανοίας οὔ∙ πρὸς γὰρ ἀμφότερα πέφυκεν ἡ ἕξις αὕτη.
161 Veniamin, 628 n. 901.
162 Hom. 53, 56.857–58, ΠΣ 6, 580 (ΠΑΕ 11, 334), trans. Veniamin, 440: Διάνοια δὲ λογικὴ μέν ἐστιν αἰεί,
διεξοδικῶς δὲ πρόεισιν εἰς τὴν μετὰ λόγου δόξαν ἀποτελευτῶσα.
163 Efrem (2000b), 770.
 i nt ro d u ct i o n 25

Palamas now makes an interesting clarification: ‘All these mental powers were
formed, and act, by means of the primary organ, man’s natural spirit within the brain’.164
This means that the aforementioned powers need the existence of a healthy human
brain to be exercised. However, this is their great difference from the human intellect:
‘The intellect, by contrast, has no organ, but is an essence complete in itself, able to
operate independently, even though it lowers itself to the level of man’s natural life
which develops through reasoning᾿.165 In other words, the activity of the intellect
should not be constrained to either sensation or reason, because the intellect goes
far beyond reasoning: the nous is the faculty whereby man is united with God. As
Metr. Kallistos expresses it, ‘The nous enables us, not simply to know about God, but
to know God’.166 In general, in the writings of the Fathers one may see this distinction
between intellect (νοῦς) and reason (λόγος-λογική). These are two parallel, but
different, powers of the soul.167
What should be added here is that Palamas follows the Platonic division of the
soul into three parts or powers: the reasoning-irascible-desiring (logistikon, thymikon
and epithymitikon). These powers are cured through Christ’s Incarnation.168 The
logistikon refers to nous, the thymikon to θυμός (anger) and the desiring to ἐπιθυμία
(desire). The irascible and desiring are often called the ‘passionate’ part of the
soul. Moreover, Palamas believes that the logistikon should guide the thymikon and
epithymitikon, namely the passionate part should be subordinated to the intellect.169
On the other hand, as will be shown, Barlaam falsely regarded impassibility (ἀπάθεια)
as the ‘mortification of the passionate part of the soul’. But this was strongly rejected
by Palamas, as distorting the genuine anthropology.170 But let us now examine the
difference between nous and dianoia.

b. Nous and Dianoia

St Gregory makes a very interesting distinction, regarding the potentiality of man

to see the divine realities. In Tr. 2,3,15 in particular, based on St Isaac the Syrian,171
he argues that man has two ‘eyes of the soul’ (δύο ὀφθαλμοὺς κεκτήμεθα ψυχικούς),
namely two ‘seeing powers’. These have to do not with physical seeing, but with
spiritual vision, and are different from one other, in terms of their ‘operation’. With

164 Hom. 53, 56.858–59, ΠΣ 6, 580 (ΠΑΕ 11, 334), trans. Veniamin, 440: Πᾶσαι δ’ αὗται δι’ ὀργάνου πρώτου
συνειστήκασι καὶ ἐνεργοῦσι, τοῦ ψυχικοῦ ἐν ἐγκεφάλῳ πνεύματος.
165 Hom. 53, 56.860–62, ΠΣ 6, 580 (ΠΑΕ 11, 334), trans. Veniamin, 440: Νοῦ δὲ ὄργανον οὐδέν ἐστιν, ἀλλ’
αὐτοτελής ἐστιν οὐσία καὶ καθ’ ἑαυτὴν οὖσα ἐνεργητική, εἰ καὶ πρὸς τὴν κατὰ διάνοιαν ψυχικήν τε καὶ
ἀνελιγμένην ζωὴν ὑποκαταβιβάζει ἑαυτόν.
166 Ware (1985), 163.
167 See Romanides (1991), 145.
168 To nun Xene, 29, ed. Christou, ΠΣ 5, 208. Cf. Kesselopoulos (1986), 57.
169 See, e.g., Tr. 2,2,19. Cf. Kesselopoulos (1986), 60. Palamas attaches to this fact an important reason for
why man is superior to the angels, in terms of the imago Dei, namely the ‘faculty of self-governance’.
See relevantly ch. 3.2 of this book.
170 For an analysis of this issue, see ch. 7.1.c.
171 See Homily 45, ed. Pirard, 540.
26 in tro ducti o n

the first, man is able to contemplate God through created reality. In other words,
thereby man sees the mysteries of God, ‘namely the power of God and His wisdom
and His providence for us, which one may understand through the majesty of His
governance over us’.172 Perhaps here Palamas has in the back of his mind the theology
concerning the divine logoi.173 Through the second eye, ‘we see the glory of his holy
nature, whenever God be contented to introduce us into the spiritual mysteries’.174
Hence, this ‘eye’ refers to spiritual contemplation: this is what we shall examine, in
Part II of this book, as man’s spiritual senses.
Furthermore, as Palamas clarifies some lines below, the first type of seeing refers
to ‘knowledge obtained through the creatures regarding their Creator’,175 namely
knowledge of God through the creation, and the second type to ‘contemplation,
not of the divine nature …but of the glory of His nature’,176 namely participation in
His divine activity, theosis. He concludes this section, ‘Therefore, this is the glory
through which we possess in us and, properly speaking, see God’.177 Consequently,
it could be said that these two ‘eyes’ are respectively the dianoia (reasoning) and
the nous. And, as archimandrite Efrem puts it, the nous is ‘the intellectual activity
in the heart of man through which the divine contemplation is attained, as well
as the empirical (ἐμπειρική) knowledge of God through the uncreated divinizing
(θεοποιῶν) activities of God’.178 But this remark brings to the fore a very crucial
notion for Palamas, that of the ‘heart’.

172 Tr. 2,3,15.12–20, 551 (417.13–23): …ἐν ἐνὶ μὲν γὰρ ὀφθαλμῷ τὰ κεκρυμμένα ἐν ταῖς φύσεσιν ὁρῶμεν, ἤγουν
τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ τὴν σοφίαν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν περὶ ἡμᾶς πρόνοιαν αὐτοῦ τὴν καταλαμβανομένην ἐκ
τῆς μεγαλειότητος τῆς κυβερνήσεως αὐτοῦ εἰς ἡμᾶς.
173 The question whether Palamas uses the teaching about the logoi in his anthropology is briefly
examined in ch. 2.1.
174 Tr. 2,3,15.20–22, 551 (417.23–25): …καὶ ἐν τῷ ἑτέρῳ ὀφθαλμῷ θεωροῦμεν τὴν δόξαν τῆς φύσεως αὐτοῦ
τῆς ἁγίας, ὅτε εἰς τὰ μυστήρια τὰ πνευματικὰ εὐδοκήσει ὁ Θεὸς εἰσάξαι ἡμᾶς.
175 This reminds us of the so-called natural theology, namely that type of theology which seeks in nature
arguments for the existence of God.
176 Tr. 2,3,15, 551.26–552.17 (417.29–419.24): …καὶ ἁπλῶς τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν κτισμάτων προσγινομένην γνῶσιν τοῦ
κτίσαντος αὐτά, τὸ δὲ θεωρίαν οὐ τῆς θείας φύσεως… ἀλλὰ τῆς δόξης τῆς φύσεως αὐτοῦ…
177 Tr. 2,3,15.18–19, 552 (419.24–26): Αὕτη ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡ δόξα, δι’ ἧς κτώμεθα ἐν ἑαυτοῖς καὶ ὁρῶμεν κυρίως
τὸν Θεόν. It seems to me that Meyendorff (1973²), 418 is not correct in translating the first part of this
sentence [‘C’est donc là la gloire par laquelle nous sommes possédés à l’interieur de nous-mêmes et
par laquelle à proprement parler nous voyons Dieu’] as ‘…nous sommes possédés à l’interieur de
nous-mêmes…’ (i.e., ‘through which we are possessed in the interior of ourselves’; I am grateful to
Dr Aigli Siouti for discussing with me this point). Christou (ΠΑΕ 2 [ΕΠΕ 54], 443) gives a much
more accurate rendering.
178 See Efrem (2000b), 771, where he refers to Tr. 1,3,45. This is a very crucial Palamite text, which will be
analysed in ch. 7.1.f of this book.
 i nt ro d u ct i o n 27

c. The Heart

The heart (καρδία) is the spiritual centre of the human person.179 Thus, Palamas
argues that the soul is found in the whole body, but without having a specific place.180
However, it uses as its primary organ the heart.181 St Gregory is very much influenced
by a key text of Macarios, which we shall meet again in Part II, regarding the spiritual
senses: ‘…the heart directs and governs all the other organs of the body. And when
grace pastures the heart, it rules over all the members and the thoughts. For there,
in the heart, the intellect (νοῦς) abides as well as all the thoughts of the soul and all
its hopes. This is how grace penetrates throughout all parts of the body’.182
Based on this, Palamas concludes that ‘our heart is the place of the rational
faculty, the first rational organ of the body’.183 But man’s intellect is often misled by
the physical senses and, thus, guided to sin. For this reason, it is essential that man
gather and return his intellect to his interior, to the heart. As Palamas states, ‘when
we seek to keep watch over and correct the rational power of our soul (λογιστικὸν)
by a rigorous sobriety, with what are we to keep watch, if we do not gather together
our intellect, which has been dissipated abroad by the (physical) senses, and lead it
back again into the interior, to the selfsame heart which is the seat of the thoughts?’184
As Kesselopoulos notes, the intellect is scattered outside when it opens its ‘gate to
the passions’.185 And some lines below Palamas writes: ‘Can you not see, then, how
essential it is that those who have determined to pay attention to themselves in inner

179 As Gendle (1983), 125 n. 24 puts it, the ‘Heart (kardia) in the Greek tradition is not just the physical
organ, or the affections and emotions, but the spiritual centre of man’s being, his inmost self, where
the encounter with God takes place’. The role of the human heart in spiritual perception, according
to Palamas, is examined in ch. 7.2.f of this book. It should be here noted that, in his translation of the
Triads, Gendle renders nous as ‘mind’; however, for consistency in this book, when I cite passages
from this translation, I modify it by writing ‘intellect’ (i.e. for nous).
180 See, e.g., Hom. 19, On the Samaritan Woman, 14.226–29, ΠΣ 6, 234 (ΠΑΕ 9, 563), trans. Veniamin,
159: ‘…the soul does encompass the body with which it was created, and is everywhere within it, not
in spatial terms nor as being contained by the body, but as enclosing and containing it, since it is in
God’s image in this respect as well’ (Ἡ μέντοι ψυχή, συνέχουσα τὸ σῶμα ᾧ καὶ συνεκτίσθη, πανταχοῦ
τοῦ σώματός ἐστιν, οὐχ ὡς ἐν τόπῳ, οὐδ’ ὡς περιεχομένη, ἀλλ’ ὡς συνέχουσά τε καὶ περιέχουσα τὸ σῶμα,
κατ’ εἰκόνα καὶ τοῦτ’ ἔχουσα Θεοῦ).
181 Tr. 1,2,3, 395.17–396.6 (79.18–81.7). Cf. the comment of Christou in ΠΣ 1, 395–96 n. 4.
182 Macarios, Homily 15, 20.283–87, ed. Dörries, 139: ἡ γὰρ καρδία ἡγεμονεύει καὶ βασιλεύει ὅλου τοῦ
σωματικοῦ ὀργάνου, καὶ ἑπὰν κατάσχῃ τὰς νομὰς τῆς καρδίας ἡ χάρις, βασιλεύει ὅλων τῶν μελῶν καί τῶν
λογισμῶν∙ ἐκεῖ γάρ ἐστιν ὁ νοῦς καὶ ὅλοι οἱ λογισμοὶ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ ἡ προσδοκία αὐτῆς, διὸ καὶ διέρχεται
εἰς ὅλα τὰ μέλη τοῦ σώματος (the translation is drawn from Maloney (1992), 116). In Tr. 1,2,3 Palamas
cites this passage with some small differences. He also refers to it in some other points of his texts. Cf.,
e.g., Tr. 1,3,41.16–21, 452 (199.29–201.3).
183 Tr. 1,2,3.8–10, 396 (81.11–13), trans. Gendle, 43: Οὐκοῦν ἡ καρδία ἡμῶν ἐστι τὸ τοῦ λογιστικοῦ ταμεῖον
καὶ πρῶτον σαρκικὸν ὄργανον λογιστικόν.
184 Tr. 1,2,3.10–14, 396 (81.13–17), trans. Gendle, 43 (slightly modified): Τὸ τοίνυν λογιστικὸν ἡμῶν ἐν
ἀκριβεῖ νήψει σπεύδοντες ἐπισκέπτεσθαι καὶ διορθοῦν, τίνι γ’ ἂν ἐπισκεψαίμεθα, εἰ μὴ τὸν ἐκκεχυμένον
διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων νοῦν ἡμῶν ἔξωθεν συναγάγοντες πρὸς τὰ ἐντὸς ἐπαναγάγομεν καὶ πρὸς ταύτην τὴν
καρδίαν, τὸ τῶν λογισμῶν ταμεῖον;
185 Kesselopoulos (1986), 32.
28 in tro ducti o n

quiet should gather together the intellect and enclose it in the body, and especially
in that “body” most interior to the body, which we call the heart?’186 Consequently,
from the above it is shown that Palamas draws a distinction between soul, intellect,
and heart, even this is not always made in a most clear way.187 These observations
lead us to the next section.

d. Nous: Essence and Activities

Another very interesting aspect of St Gregory’s teaching on the nous is how in the
intellect one may find a distinction between essence and activity, like in God: ‘the
essence of the intellect is one thing, its activity another’.188 The activity of the nous
is thought and intuition, and, therefore, is somehow distinct from its essence, yet
not totally separated from it. In Mantzaridis’ own words, ‘it cannot be identified
with the intellectual nature from which it originates; yet neither can it be viewed as
entirely different from it. And although the energy of the intellect is distinct from
its nature, as consequence from cause, it is nevertheless related and united with the
intellectual nature in being its intellectual expression’.189 Obviously, we have here an
example of how the Palamite distinction between essence and activities is applied
to the anthropology.
As shown above, the intellect’s essence is found in the heart. Moreover, it
is ‘immovable’ (ἀμετάβατος), and ‘never abandons itself ’ (τὴν μηδέποτε ἑαυτὴν
ἀπολείπουσαν).190 On the other hand, however, as Fr Efrem clarifies, ‘The activity
of the intellect… goes over [μεταβαίνει]191 and is scattered outside [διαχέεται ἔξω]
through the senses and the thoughts [λογισμῶν]. The ascetic tries to bring this
activity back into its essence, through intellectual [νοερά] prayer, so that the intellect

186 Tr. 1,2,3.19–22, 396 (81.23–26), trans. Gendle, 43 (slightly modified): Ὁρᾷς πῶς ἀναγκαιότατον τοῖς
προῃρημένοις ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ προσέχειν ἑαυτοῖς ἐπανάγειν καὶ ἐμπερικλείειν τῷ σώματι τὸν νοῦν, καὶ μάλιστα
τῷ ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐνδοτάτῳ σώματι, ὃ καρδίαν ὀνομάζομεν;
187 As Ware (1999), 66 writes, regarding the understanding of the soul in the Fathers, ‘First, there is the
notion of the heart as the unifying centre of our personhood, open on the [one] side to the abyss of
our unconscious, open on the other to the abyss of divine grace. Second, there is the understanding
of the nous or intellect as a faculty far higher than the reasoning brain—a visionary power, creative
and self-transcending, that reaches out beyond time into eternity, beyond words into silence’. For
an interesting article, which examines this ‘abyss of our unconscious’ from the standpoint of both
patristic theology, as well as modern psychology, see Bakker (2013). It is worth noting that comparing
the teaching of the Fathers with that of modern psychology, in terms of anthropology, could be
of great benefit to both camps. For a recent approach, see again Bakker (2015). In a similar way,
moreover, it would also be interesting to bring Palamas into dialogue with modern psychology. For a
relevant attempt, see that of Thermos (1998).
188 Tr. 1,2,5.26, 397 (83.27–28), trans. Gendle, 44 (modified): ἄλλο μὲν οὐσία νοῦ, ἄλλο δὲ ἐνέργεια. The
same argument is also found in To the most holy and wise in things divine, Daniel, Metrop. of Ainos
5.11–12, ed. Matsoukas, ΠΣ 2, 378.
189 Mantzaridis (1984), 17.
190 Tr. 2,2,26.24–25, 533 (375.28–30).
191 Cf. Tr. 2,2,26.20–27, 533 (375.24–31).
 i nt ro d u ct i o n 29

return to itself and, then, be united with God’.192 A brief analysis of this situation,
what the hesychasts call ‘drawing the intellect into the heart’, is attempted in ch. 7.1.f
of the current book. This is what Palamas calls, based on St Dionysiοs, the ‘circular’
movement of the intellect, in opposion to the ‘direct’ one; the former is superior to
the latter.193 And, of course, for Palamas this union, namely theosis, is attained only
through participation—both of the intellect and the body—in God’s uncreated
activity. Besides, as will be shown in this book, the human body has an extremely
great value and place in the anthropology of St Gregory.194
Undoubtedly, this assessment of the foregoing key terms is rather brief; many
other points could be highlighted to support and clarify the above. However, it seems
essential—and, perhaps, more fruitful—to examine these notions in the context
of the two central ideas in the anthropology of Palamas that this book studies,
namely the image of God and the spiritual senses. There it will be shown that the
intellect, for instance, is the primary locus of the imago Dei in man, as well as the basic
human faculty in the union between man and God. Therefore, let us now begin the
examination of these two points.

192 Efrem (2000b), 772. Cf. Tr. 1,2,5.16–19, 398 (85.14–17). Tr. 2,2,25.27–30, 532 (373.30–33).
193 See, e.g., Tr. 1,2,5. Cf. Kesselopoulos (1986), 57. Bradshaw (2009).
194 As far as the participation of the body in the divine realities is concerned, see ch. 7 of this book.
Regarding the body’s great value, in terms of the image of God, see ch. 3.
 Part I

The Image of God

 How much greater is the human intellect than the heavens! It is the
image of God, knows God, and alone of everything on earth can, if it
wishes, become God, exalting man’s humble body at the same time.1

In thee, O Father, was preserved unimpaired that which is accord-

ing to God’s image; for thou didst take up the Cross and follow
Christ. By thine actions thou hast taught us to despise the flesh for
it passes away, but to care for the soul which is a thing immortal.
Wherefore thy spirit holy […] rejoices with the angels.2

If our creation in God’s image means that we are to seek God, to

honor him as God (i.e., as the Creator and Lord of all things),
and to thank him as the Author of life and of every good gift,
then we may assume that there is a disposition to do so in every
human life, no matter how little we see of it in a given case.3

This Part analyses and presents the teaching of St Gregory about the image of God
in man. Our main aim is to prove that, according to Palamas, man is greater than the
angels, as far as the image of God is concerned; in addition, to show that this is due
to the human body. To achieve such an aim, first a general sketch of the Christian
theology about the image of God is presented, as well as an overview of Palamas’ own
teaching (ch. 1). Second, a very crucial side of his theology is analysed, namely the
trinitarian reflections in man (ch. 2). These two chapters will provide the basis for
the treatment of our main aim in ch. 3. Finally, in ch. 4 the likeness to God is briefly
approached, so as to give a fuller account of the whole question.
The notion of the ‘image of God’ (kat’ eikona tou Theou or imago Dei) has always
occupied a prominent place in Christian theology.4 It first appeared in the Old

1 St Gregory Palamas, Hom. 26, Delivered at harvest time. Also concerning the spiritual harvest, 2.20–23,
ΠΣ 6, 295 (ΠΑΕ 10, 154) [= Hom. 53, On the Entry into the Holy of Holies II, 56.842–44, ΠΣ 6, 580
(ΠΑΕ 11, 332)], trans. Veniamin, 206: Πόσον οὐρανοῦ κρείττων ὁ ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς, ὃς εἰκών τέ ἐστι
Θεοῦ καὶ Θεὸν οἶδε καὶ μόνος τῶν ἐγκοσμίων Θεός, εἰ βούλεται, γίνεται, συναναφέρων τὸ σῶμα τῆς
ταπεινώσεως; Τhe word Θεός (‘τῶν ἐγκοσμίων Θεός’) is missing from the edition of Christou ΠΑΕ 10,
but exists in ΠΑΕ 11.
2 Common Troparion for a monk (Tone 8; emphasis added).
3 Pannenberg (2004), 227 (emphasis added).
4 On the ‘image of God’ there exists a huge bibliography. Indicatively, see Nellas (1979), 19–45 (=
Nellas (1987), 21–42). Mantzaridis (1984), 15–25. Harrison (2008), 78–92. Louth (2013a), 82–89
(‘Being human—being in the image of God’). Lars Thunberg (19952), 114 n. 140 provides a very
useful—yet a little bit outdated—survey of the literature on the imago Dei. For an interesting recent
attempt to bring the imago Dei in contact with issues and debates of the contemporary society, see
Harrison (2010). Finally, for a very recent edited volume on the interpretation of the image of God in
early Christianity, see Edwards and E. D-Vasilescu (eds) (2016).
 Testament, is found in the New, and the majority of the Church Fathers approach
it, though in different ways. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the image of God
is also very often used in the liturgical texts of the Eastern Orthodox Church.5 In
addition, great figures of the Mediaeval era referred—often to a great extent—to the
imago Dei,6 as well as many modern theologians. Among all those approaches, one
should doubtless pay attention to St Gregory Palamas’ own contribution. This Part
of our book, tries to present his approach and also trace its importance and potential
interest for Christian theology.
Robert Sinkewicz, about 30 years ago, made two important comments about
the image of God, as approached by Palamas in his Chapters. In particular he argued
that ‘One of the most significant contributions made by Palamas lies in his original
and inspired synthesis of the theological anthropology of the Eastern Fathers. The
penetrating character of this synthesis is most evident in his teaching on the divine
image in man’.7 And elsewhere, that ‘Palamas produces not merely a synthesis of the
patristic doctrine [i.e. of the image of God], but a genuine theological development
within the Church’s tradition to meet the needs of the controversy with which the
Church was confronted’.8
But a question now arises: to what extent are these comments correct? Is it true
that Palamas’ imago Dei is indeed that significant? And for what reasons? These are
the main questions that Part I pursues. Moreover, it deals with more specific research
questions, such as the following: where is the locus of the image of God? Why does
Palamas refer to the Trinitarian reflections in man? Last, and most important, do the
angels also have the imago, and, if they do, who bears the image to a greater extent,
humans or angels?
As far as I know, there is no study that thoroughly examines the image of God
according to St Gregory.9 For this reason, Part I traces Palamas’ conception of
man as created in the image of God. In particular we shall try to understand how
Gregory used what he read in the Scripture and the Fathers about this topic, as well
as outlining his own contribution. The truth is that he found in the tradition, and he
read, ideas that he found useful for his own thought; the decoding of his reasoning
will now be our aim. As mentioned already, our main goal is to show how for Palamas
man is greater than the angels, in terms of the image of God. But first we shall briefly
outline some basic points of the imago story.

5 Many references to the imago Dei are found in the Divine Liturgy, Baptism, Wedding, Funeral service,
daily offices of the various commemorated saints, etc. For instance, in the prayer before the Trisagion
Hymn of the Divine Liturgy, the celebrant reads: ‘Holy God, at rest in the holy place, hymned by the
Seraphim with the thrice holy song, glorified by the Cherubim and worshipped by every heavenly
Power, out of non-existence you brought the universe into being and created humankind according
to your image and likeness, adorning it with every gift of your grace…’, trans. Lash (2011), 28 (italics
added).
6 See, for instance, the case of Thomas Aquinas, in Merriell (1990).
7 Sinkewicz (1986b), 857.
8 Sinkewicz (1988), IV.
9 Undoubtedly, there are indeed some very important contributions on this matter, such as the
following: Sinkewicz (1986b). Sinkewicz (1988), 16–34. Wilkins (2003). Hussey (1972).
 Chapter 1

Introduction1

1. The Background

a. The Bible

In the Old Testament the image of God is a very important notion, although not called
upon very often, at least in a direct or evident way.2 Moreover, the notion of the image
has a central place in Greek philosophy: in Plato, the Stoics, and Neoplatonism.3 Thus,
it was a commonplace of ancient philosophy that ‘like is only known by like’.4 A special
emphasis is given to the image of God by Philo, a Hellenistic Jewish philosopher
who lived in Alexandria, who is in the middle of these traditions.5 Furthermore, in
the New Testament the imago Dei acquires a Christological nuance: it mainly refers
not to human beings in general, but to Christ. So, for St Paul, Christ is ‘the Image of
the invisible God’.6 This is a very crucial point, to which we shall return below. But
let us now see how the Fathers approach the imago Dei.

b. The Fathers

For the Church Fathers, man’s being kat’ eikona tou Theou makes it possible for
him to know God, who ontologically is utterly different and therefore unknowable.
Moreover, it seems that much more important for the Greek Fathers is not how to
identify the image, but how the idea of an image provides them with a way of thinking
about God’s relationship to humanity, and vice versa. In other words, through the
imago they find a means to express their conviction that man resembles his Creator

1 The following publication was based on this chapter: Chouliaras (2017–2019).

2 See, mainly, Gen 1:26–27, 5:1–3, 9:6. For the notion of the image, see also Wisdom 7:24–28.
3 There exist some studies on how these trends affected the Fathers in their own construction of the
imago theology. For instance, Merki (1952) has examined Gregory of Nyssa’s conception of the
notions ‘ὁμοίωσις Θεῷ’ (likeness to God) and ‘ἐικὼν Θεοῦ’ (image of God) in comparison to Plato’s
and the Neoplatonists’ comprehension of these subjects.
4 See, for instance, the quotation of Plato’s Timaeus in Aristotle, De Anima, 404b17–8: γινώσκεσθαι
γὰρ τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον, τὰ δὲ πράγματα ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν εἶναι. Cf. Aristotle, De Anima, 405b15: φασὶ γὰρ
γινώσκεσθαι τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ. Aristotle, Ethica Eudemia, 1235a5–9: δοκεῖ γὰρ τοῖς μὲν τὸ ὅμοιον
τῷ ὁμοίῳ εἶναι φίλον, ὅθεν εἴρηται ‘ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὅμοιον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὅμοιον·’ ‘καὶ γὰρ κολοιὸς παρὰ
κολοιόν·’ ‘ἔγνω δὲ φώρ τε φῶρα, καὶ λύκος λύκον’.
5 Nellas (1979), 19 (= Nellas (1987), 21).
6 Col. 1:15: ὅς ἐστιν εἰκὼν τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου. See also 2 Cor 4:4: ‘who [Christ] is the image of God’.
Cf. Nellas (1979), 21–23 (= Nellas (1987), 23–25).
36 cha p te r 1

to a great extent. Consequently, human beings are able to have a firm relationship
with God and be guided to union with Him, to theosis.
Thus, among the Fathers, one can locate a number of different approaches to
the imago Dei.7 Generally speaking, they connect the image with such properties
as rationality, free will (τὸ αὐτεξούσιον), perception, and the ability to attain the
‘likeness’ of God (resemblance or καθ’ ὁμοίωσιν).8 Sometimes they attribute it to
the intellect, to the body and the soul, and so on.9 But some Fathers connect the
image to the person as a whole.10 It is worth noting that this variety of approaches
appears not only from author to author, but often within the treatises of a single
writer.11 However, they usually regard the intellect (νοῦς) as the basic point of the
divine image in man, but in various ways.12
Nevertheless, it has been noticed that in early Christian theology we do find some
attempts to connect the imago Dei with the body, but these efforts entailed the danger
of an anthropomorphic conception of God. This is perhaps the main reason why this
approach was not more prevalent.13 Thus, on the one hand, we have Irenaeus’ claim that
the whole man, body and soul, bears the image of God.14 The same impression is given
by Cyprian and Lactantius.15 On the other hand, the Alexandrian theologians link the
image principally with the soul. With this position we find Cyril of Jerusalem16 and the
entire Western tradition in agreement.17 Furthermore, both Eusebius of Ceasarea and
John Chrysostom claim that the imago is not in the body.18 However, the Cappadocians
do not leave the body out when they consider the image, since they regard it as closely
linked to the soul. But here again one can observe an emphasis on man’s spiritual part.19

7 See, indicatively, Thunberg (19952), 114–18.

8 It should be noted that some Fathers do not distinguish between image and likeness; e.g. Athanasios,
Theophilos, and Cyril (cf. Russell (2009), 77–80).
9 Harrison (2008), 78. Nellas (1979), 20–21 (= Nellas (1987), 22–23). Cf. John Damascene, De duabus
in Christo voluntatibus [On the Two Wills in Christ, or: Against the Monothelites], 30.1–3, ed. Kotter,
22 (PG 95, 168B): Κατὰ πόσους τρόπους λέγεται ‘τὸ κατ’ εἰκόνα’; Κατὰ τὸ λογικὸν καὶ νοερὸν καὶ
αὐτεξούσιον, κατὰ τὸ γεννᾶν τὸν νοῦν λόγον καὶ προβάλλειν πνεῦμα, κατὰ τὸ ἀρχικόν.
10 See, e.g. Epiphanius of Cyprus, Panarion (= Adversus haereses), 70, 3.20–24, ed. Holl, 235 (PG
42, 344B): ἀλλ’ εἶναι μὲν πιστεύειν ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ κατ’ εἰκόνα, ἐν παντὶ δὲ μάλιστα καὶ οὐχ ἁπλῶς <ἔν
τινι μέρει>. ποῦ δέ ἐστιν ἢ ποῦ πεπλήρωται τὸ κατ’ εἰκόνα, αὐτῷ μόνῳ ἔγνωσται τῷ Θεῷ, τῷ κατὰ χάριν
τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δωρησαμένῳ τὸ κατ’ εἰκόνα.
11 For instance, Mantzaridis (1984), 16 mentions Clement of Alexandria and Gregory of Nyssa. Each of
them, in two different works of his, presents two different approaches to the image of God.
12 Harrison (2008), 83.
13 Thunberg (19952), 114–15.
14 On the Anthropology of Irenaeus, see analytically Behr (2000). Steenberg (2008). Steenberg (2009).
15 Thunberg (19952), 115.
16 Catech. 4, 18 (PG 33, 477B).
17 Cf. Thunberg (19952), 115. In this page, n. 147, the following authors are mentioned: Tertullian, Hilary
of Poitiers, Zeno of Verona, Philastrius of Brescia, Ambrose of Milan, and Augustine.
18 Eusebius, Contra Marcellum I, 4, ed. Klostermann, 25. John Chrysostom, Hom. in Gen. 8, 3–4 (PG
53, 72–73). For the teaching of Chrysostom on the imago Dei, see Harrison (2002), 259–79.
19 Thunberg (19952), 116. In the same page, Thunberg, trying to explain the fact that the Cappadocians
relate the body to the imago, argues that by their era the anthropomorphic danger had disappeared.
Nevertheless, it seems that this explanation is not accurate due to the so-called ‘Anthropomorphite
 i nt ro d u ct i o n 37

In particular, in the Alexandrian tradition it seems clear from the beginning that
the imago Dei is connected only to the soul and, specifically, to the intellect (νοῦς).
Additionally, Philo regarded the body simply as the sanctuary of the image. Clement
has the same restrictions and Origen clearly adapts the Philonian position: he claims
that the imago is essentially invisible and he connects it exclusively with the soul.
The body is for him the temple containing the imago. However, one must note that
this is an immensely powerful image, namely the body as a temple containing the
kat’ eikona: it ascribes to the body a high dignity, that of preserving and guarding
the imago. Yet the imago is still not seen as being reflected by the body. Moreover,
Athanasios and Cyril of Alexandria insist on the soul as locus of the divine image.20
This also happens with St Macarios of Egypt (fourth century).21
Let us note here that Philo regarded only the νοῦς, the highest part of the human
soul, as the image of God.22 Origen likewise traces the imago in the intellect, where,
according to him, the pre-existent part of the soul is to be found. Furthermore, Evagrios
also indicates the image not in the body, but in the νοῦς, because of its incorporeality
and its potentiality of becoming a recipient of God.23 It should be here underlined
that Clement sees the νοῦς as the ‘image of the Image’ (εἰκὼν Εἰκόνος).24 The reason
is that the image of God is the Logos. This last sentence is very crucial: it could be
argued that is an extension of the fundamental patristic theology of the image and,
moreover, has a very significant implication, namely that man is logikos.

Man as logikos

It is worth noting that often, for the Fathers, far more important than finding the
image in various qualities is the idea that the Logos is the Image of God, and man, as
logikos, is created kat’ eikona. By ‘logikos’ is suggested something more than ‘rational’;

Controversy’ of the late fourth century. The other interpretation that Thunberg provides, i.e. because
the Cappadocians regard the body closely linked to the soul, is most probably more representative
of the reality. On the Anthropomorphites, see Patterson (2012). Florovsky (1975a), 89–96 and 289.
Florovsky (1975b), 97–129 and 296. Stamoulis (1993). Gould (1992), 549–57.
20 Thunberg (19952), 115.
21 As Plested (2004), 34 notes, Macarios ‘associates the image of God principally with the soul. He
observes: “It was not of Michael and Gabriel, the archangels, that God said, ‘Let us make [man] after
our image and likeness’, but of the intellective essence (νοερὰ οὐσία) of man, that is, his immortal soul”
(ii 15.22). Its dignity is supreme: the entire creation cannot equal the worth of a single soul (i 27.2.6; ii
15.43). The body is in a sense the icon of the soul, the image of the imago Dei (I 18.7.1–3)’.
22 It should be underlined that, strictly speaking, Philo does not belong in the patristic tradition,
because he is not recognized as a Father of the Church; however, he has probably influenced some
Fathers.
23 Thunberg (19952), 115–16. For Evagrios, see Cent. gnost. [Kephalaia Gnostica (Propositions on
Knowledge)] 6.73, ed. Guillaumont, 247, 249. For an English trans. of this Kephalaion, see Ramelli
(2015), 361. For some useful comments on this Kephalaion see, Ramelli (2015), lxxvi–lxxvii and
361–62.
24 Stromateis 5.14.94.5–6, ed. Stählin, 388.14–16: εἰκὼν μὲν γὰρ Θεοῦ λόγος θεῖος καὶ βασιλικός, ἄνθρωπος
ἀπαθής, εἰκὼν δ’ εἰκόνος ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς. Cf. Nellas (1979), 22–23 (= Nellas (1987), 23–25).
38 cha p te r 1

it implies that man is created in the image of the Logos.25 Certainly, this is what
Clement has in mind, when he sees the nous as ‘the image of the Image’, as mentioned
above. More specifically, saying that man is logikos suggests that he participates in the
Logos, who is the image of God. This produces a notion of image which is bound up
with man’s relationship to the Logos.26 Several Fathers are conscious that this further
relates man, as an embodied being, to the Logos who became incarnate. Thus, man
is the image of Christ and it is through this that the body participates in humanity’s
being kat’ eikona tou Theou.27 The theology of the image is essentially relational.28
To sum up, the true image of God is Christ. Hence, strictly speaking, man is
not the image of God, but man is made ‘according to the image of God’. This is
what is written in Genesis (1:26): κατ’ εἰκόνα τοῦ Θεοῦ. Therefore, when one sees
the expression ‘man is the image of God’ in the current book, one should take into
regard that it is used in a conventional way. To be precise, man is the ‘image of the
Image’, as we have already shown.
Palamas seems to follow this line of thought. As will be argued in this chapter,
he also regards the Logos as the Image of God par excellence.29 He contends that the
saints ‘became living icons of Christ and the same as he is, more by grace than by
assimilation’.30 Moreover, one of his arguments about the superiority of man over
the angels, in terms of the imago, is not only based on human corporeality, but also
bears a strong Christological and incarnational nuance.31
From the above it is shown that through St Maximos the Confessor (sixth-seventh
century) we have a relatively fixed tradition surrounding the imago Dei as far as the
locus in which it is most manifest: the nous.32 In the following it will be argued that
Palamas follows this same line of thought and sometimes expands it. Moreover, he
also ascribes a crucial role to the body, in terms of the kat’ eikona, to such an extent
that his different treatments of the theme could sometimes be acknowledged as
original and unique in patristic literature.

25 As Norman Russell (1988), 55 mentions, for Origen all rational beings are logikoi because they
participate in the Logos. See Origen, De Principiis I,3,6, ed. Koetschau, 56.19–57.1. But in another occasion
Origen mentions that only the saint is logikos. See Commentarius in Iohannem II,16.11–18, ed. Preuschen,
73. Cf. St Maximos, Mystagogia, 17, PG 91, 693D–696A: Τίνος ἐστὶ σύμβολον ὁ θεῖος ἀσπασμός. Ὁ δὲ πᾶσι
προσφωνούμενος πνευματικὸς ἀσπασμός, τὴν ἐσομένην πάντων πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐν τῷ καιρῷ τῆς τῶν
μελλόντων ἀρρήτων ἀγαθῶν ἀποκαλύψεως, κατὰ πίστιν τε καὶ ἀγάπην, ὀμόνοιάν τε καὶ ὁμογνωμοσύνην,
καὶ ταυτότητα λογικήν∙ δι᾿ ἣν τὴν πρὸς τὸν Λόγον καὶ Θεὸν οἰκείωσιν οἱ ἄξιοι δέχονται, προτυποῖ καὶ
προδιαγράφει. Λόγου γὰρ σύμβολον τὸ στόμα, καθ᾿ ὃν μάλιστα πᾶσιν ἅπαντες οἱ λόγῳ μετειληφότες, ὡς
λογικοί, καὶ τῷ πρώτῳ καὶ μόνῳ Λόγῳ, καὶ παντὸς αἰτίῳ λόγου συμφύονται (emphasis added).
26 Louth (2013a), 86–87.
27 Cf. Louth (2013a), 87–89.
28 I owe this remark to Fr Andrew Louth.
29 Theophanes, 26, ed. Christou, ΠΣ 2, 252.16–18.27 and 253.1–4 respectively (PG 150, 949AB): …ὁ
ἡμέτερος νοῦς… ἐπεὶ μηδ’ ἀπαράλλακτός ἐστιν εἰκών.
30 Ch. 76.3–4, 170 (= Ch. 111.15–16, 210): καὶ ζῶσαί τινες εἰκόνες Χριστοῦ καὶ ταὐτὸ µᾶλλον αὐτῷ κατὰ
τὴν χάριν ἢ ἀφοµοίωµα. Here Gregory quotes Maximos the Confessor, Amb. 21, 15.24, ed. Constas,
vol. 1, 444: καὶ γενέσθαι ζώσας εἰκόνας Χριστοῦ… (PG 91, 1253D).
31 See ch. 3.3 of this book (the faculty of sense perception, the ‘αἰσθητικόν’).
32 Thunberg (19952), 117.
 i nt ro d u ct i o n 39

2. An Overview of Palamas’ Teaching

a. Prologue

For St Gregory Palamas, man stands at the peak of the created order. He is placed
immediately after God and is superior even to the angels. He was brought forth on
the final day of creation, after all things; all the sensible world was created for his sake.
A crucial reason for this high dignity is his creation in the image of God.33
Gregory regards the creation of man as the crown of the whole creation. God ‘put
himself within His creature through His divine grace, and showed man as a living
being upon earth in His own image and likeness, capable of knowing Him’.34 Thus
we see two initial consequences of the kat’ eikona: man is capable of receiving God
and of knowing God. For Palamas, these both are effected through participation in
the uncreated divine activities.
In the previous lines, a brief history of the imago Dei was offered. In what
follows it is argued that Palamas, along with the majority of the Fathers, utilised
many ways of construing the image without proposing one of them as the only
one. This shows that his main aim is not to provide the perfect solution to the
‘imago problem’, but to see how he can exploit this means—i.e. the image—in his
greater theological project. Maybe this is the reason for why Palamas does not
systematically treat the subject of the image of God; he does not devote a special
treatise to it.35 But rather he offers passing insights on the imago in many places
within his corpus.36
In my opinion, the main concern of Palamas is to articulate his confident belief
that man is able to have a firm and close relationship with his creator. This relationship

33 Ch. 24.1–8, 106: Οὕτω δὴ πρῶτόν τι τῶν ὄντων ἐν τῇ κτίσει παρήχθη καὶ μετὰ τὸ πρῶτον ἕτερον καὶ μετ᾿
αὐτὸ πάλιν ἄλλο καὶ ἐφεξῆς, καὶ μετὰ πάντα ὁ ἄνθρωπος∙ ὃς τιμῆς τῆς παρὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ προμηθείας
τοσαύτης ἠξίωται, ὡς καὶ τὸν αἰσθητὸν τοῦτον ἅπαντα κόσμον πρὸ αὐτοῦ γενέσθαι δι᾿ αὐτόν, καὶ τὴν
τῶν οὐρανῶν βασιλείαν εὐθὺς ἀπὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου δι᾿ αὐτὸν ἑτοιμασθῆναι πρὸ αὐτοῦ, καὶ βουλὴν
περὶ αὐτοῦ προηγήσασθαι, καὶ χειρὶ Θεοῦ καὶ κατ᾿ εἰκόνα πλασθῆναι Θεοῦ… Cf. Sinkewicz (2002),
169–71. For the Capita of Palamas we refer to the critical edition of Sinkewicz (1988). Let us note that
Sinkewicz uses the word ‘mind’ for the Greek word ‘νοῦς’. On the other hand, the editors of the texts
of the Philokalia prefer the word ‘intellect’, which we also utilise. For this reason, we usually modify
the translation of Sinkewicz on this point, writing ‘intellect’ instead of ‘mind’. For a brief yet concise
meaning of the term ‘intellect’ as utilised by the philokalic writers, see The Philokalia, vols 1, 2, 3, 4,
pp. 362, 384, 360, and 432 respectively.
34 Hom. 17, Explaining the Μystery of the Sabbath and of the Lord’s Day, 3.35–38, ΠΣ 6, 205 (ΠΑΕ
9, 488.5–7), trans. Veniamin, 135: …καὶ τὸ μέγιστον, ὅτι καὶ ἑαυτὸν διὰ τῆς αὐτοῦ θείας χάριτος ἐνθεὶς
καὶ κατ’ εἰκόνα καὶ ὁμοίωσιν οἰκείαν, γνωστικὸν ἑαυτοῦ ζῷον ἐπὶ γῆς ἀναδείξας τὸν ἄνθρωπον;
35 As far as I know, in the patristic tradition, at least this of the Greek East, one can discover only rare
occasions, if any, that an ecclesiastical author devotes a whole treatise to the imago Dei.
36 In Palamas’ Chapters one can find many references to the image of God. These are usually reiterations
of other treatments of this subject, found in his other works, mainly his Homilies and Triads. It is
often the case that it is in these treatises—and not in the Chapters—that his meaning is more fully
expressed. Thus, it is necessary that these texts also be seriously considered in order to articulate a
sufficient account of Palamas’ imago Dei.
40 cha p te r 1

is effected through participation in the uncreated divine energeiai, through which,

for our author, man attains theosis and regains the kath’ omoiosin. Gregory regards
the latter, resemblance to God, to be the most important goal for man; the imago is
just the foundation and basis, the basic premise which grants him the opportunity
to continue in his pursuit of this goal. For this reason he strives to interpret the
high—the highest, indeed—place of man in the hierarchy of creation. As a major
way to establish this, he develops his kat’eikona theology.
We could sum up Palamas’ approach—and, indeed, the whole patristic stance
towards the image—in the following way: ‘man is created in the image of God. One
can present many different explanations for this. Because he resembles to God
to such an extent (the kat’eikona), he can attain the kath’ omoiosin, that is union
with God, both in this life and in the life to come’.37 For this reason St Gregory
tries, in many ways, to explain why man resembles God, how he is created kat’
eikona tou Theou. As will be shown below, these ways include a) reflections of the
Trinitarian Persons in man, in particular the Logos and the Holy Spirit; and b)
the superiority of human beings over the angels, as far as the imago is concerned,
which is based in his corporeality, something that proves the great value Gregory
attributes to the human body. In Part I, these ways will be traced, along with their
patristic context.

b. Where is the Locus of the Imago Dei?

But now let us treat a first question that arises: where does Palamas locate the image
of God, i.e. in which part of the human person? Sometimes he seems to attribute it to
the whole person, body and soul. It will be seen that not only does he find reflections
of the Holy Trinity in the human soul, but he also closely relates the imago with the
human body. Nevertheless, it seems to the author of this book that it would not be
unfair to argue that Palamas locates the kat’ eikona only in the human intellect, the
nous.38

37 It seems that the following words of Nonna Verna Harrison (2002), 264–65 apply to Palamas
too: ‘The standard Orthodox understanding of the image of God in the human person is that it
is constitutive of human identity as such and comprises those human faculties that enable us to
practice virtue and enter into communion with God. Accordingly, the likeness is understood as the
actualization of this potential for virtue and communion through our free choice and cooperation
with God. The likeness is thus an intensification and fuller actualization of the image. This position,
though it oversimplifies patristic anthropology, is often regarded as representing a consensus of the
Greek Fathers. John of Damascus summarizes it in his comment on Genesis 1:26: “Intellect and self-
determination manifest what is according to the image, and likeness in virtue to the extent possible
manifests what is according to the likeness”’. For the reference to St John, see his Expositio fidei
2.12.19–21, ed. Kotter, 76. However, it will be shown that Palamas adds his own special nuance to the
imago theology.
38 As Demetracopoulos (1997), 161 n. 252 correctly underlines, ‘for Palamas… the imago clearly refers to
the human soul only and not both to his body’ (the emphasis is from Demetracopoulos).
 i nt ro d u ct i o n 41

As already mentioned, the Church Fathers usually locate the image in the nous,
though in various ways. For Palamas the image of God is placed in the intellect and
not in the body, because the very nature of the intellect is the superior human part:
‘it is not the bodily constitution but the very nature of the intellect [nous] which
possesses this image and nothing in our nature is superior to the intellect. If there
were something superior, that is where the image would be’.39 Elsewhere he exclaims:
‘How much greater is the human intellect [nous] than the heavens! It is the image of
God, knows God, and alone of everything on earth can, if it wishes, become God,
exalting man’s humble body at the same time’.40
Of course, these statements of Palamas do not signify an undervaluation of the
human body. Αs will be shown further on, Gregory firmly connects the imago with
corporeality, attributing great value to the body. Besides, worth noting is the way in
which Palamas connects the intellect with the body in the aforementioned passage:
the nous—in which the image of God is located—carries along with it (συναναφέρων)
the human body in the process of theosis.41
Here we must make a parenthesis. In recent scholarship, it has sometimes been
attempted to show that Palamas locates the image both in the soul and the human
body.42 A basic passage used to justify this is found in a work called Prosopopoiia
(Προσωποποιία), often ascribed to Palamas. In this work, we read the following
dialogue between the soul and the body: ‘I [i.e. the human body] would argue, based
on human physiology, as expressed in the Scripture (cf. Gen 1:26), that man cannot
be said to be only soul or only body, but both together, both having been made in
the image of God, as it is said’.43
This implies that both the soul and the body were created in the image. So, one
could argue that Palamas locates the image both in the soul and the body. However,
it has been definitively proven that this text belongs not to St Gregory,44 but to

39 Ch. 27.1–5, 110 (50.1–4): Τὸ γὰρ κατ᾿ εἰκόνα τοῦτο, οὐχ ἡ τοῦ σώματος ἔχει θέσις, ἀλλ᾿ ἡ τοῦ νοῦ πάντως
φύσις, οὗ μηδὲν κατὰ φύσιν κρεῖττον. Εἰ γὰρ ἦν τι κρεῖττον, ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἂν ὑπῆρχε τὸ κατ᾿ εἰκόνα. Gregory
relates the imago only to the human soul also in his Apod. 2, 8.4–11, ΠΣ 1, 85) and in his Hom. 11, On
the Precious and Life-Giving Cross, 2.10–13, ΠΣ 6, 132 (ΠΑΕ 9, 284.2–4).
40 Hom. 26, Delivered at harvest time. Also concerning the spiritual harvest, 2.20–22, ΠΣ 6, 295 (ΠΑΕ
10, 154) (= Hom. 53, On the Entry into the Holy of Holies II, 56.842–44, ΠΣ 6, 580 [ΠΑΕ 11, 332]), trans.
Veniamin, 206: Πόσον οὐρανοῦ κρείττων ὁ ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς, ὃς εἰκών τέ ἐστι Θεοῦ καὶ Θεὸν οἶδε καὶ
μόνος τῶν ἐγκοσμίων Θεός, εἰ βούλεται, γίνεται, συναναφέρων τὸ σῶμα τῆς ταπεινώσεως; Cf. Christou,
ΠΣ 2, 253 n. 1.
41 This point, about man ‘carrying’ with him the creation towards theosis, and, moreover, the fact that
this is made in order for the image of God to be completed, will be approached in ch. 3.2.b of this
book.
42 Demetracopoulos (1997), 161 and 164 cites some relevant secondary literature.
43 Prosopopoiia, Dialogues on soul and body [Προσωποποιία], PG 150, 1361BC: Ἰσχυρισαίμην γὰρ ἐκ τῆς
γραφικῆς ἀνθρώπου φυσιολογίας ὁρμώμενον, μὴ ἂν ψυχὴν μόνην, μήτε σῶμα μόνον λέγεσθαι ἄνθρωπον,
ἀλλὰ τὸ συναμφότερον, ὃν δὴ καὶ κατ’ εἰκόνα πεποιηκέναι ὁ Θεὸς λέγεται.
44 For the relevant literature, see Demetracopoulos (1997), 162. For why this passage was mistakenly
attributed to Palamas, see Jugie (1932), 1749 and Meyendorff (1959a), 335. Moreover, it is, correctly,
not included in the critical edition of Palamas’ oeuvre made by Christou, nor does Sinkewicz include
it in his chronological catalogue of Gregory’s works (see Sinkewicz (2002), 138–55).
42 cha p te r 1

St Michael Choniates.45 Besides, it has been shown that this excerpt, read carefully
in its broader context, does not really locate the imago in the body.46

c. The Logos as the Undeviating Image: the Christological Dimension

St Gregory regards the Only-begotten Son as the undeviating (or ‘exact’) image of
God the Father (ἡ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἀπαράλλακτος εἰκών),47 and the human being as an
indistinct image (ἀμυδρὰ εἰκών). While man is in the image of God, it is only in an
obscure way.48 Besides, as stated already, in the New Testament the imago Dei has a
mainly Christological meaning.49 But Gregory also presents an interesting argument:
the Son is the image of God the Father, whereas the Holy Spirit is the image of the
Son.50 It is worth noting here that the point about the Spirit being the image of the
Son is not unknown in the Greek fathers.51 In another occasion Palamas identifies the

45 St Michael Choniates (c. 1138–1222) was the last bishop of Byzantine Athens and a very learned
personality, who, apart from his strong Christian faith, had a great fondness towards classical
antiquity. As has been pointed out, he ‘is one of the most fascinating historical individuals because
in him the three cultural pillars of the western world −Greek, Christian, Roman− came together
in a most sincere and humane way as he attempted to resolve their deeper contradictions in a
time of exceptional turmoil’ (Kaldellis, ‘Michael Choniates: a classicist-bishop and his cathedral
(1182–1205 AD)’, in Kaldellis (2009), 156). For him, see Kolovou (1999). Kaldellis, ‘Michael Choniates
and the “Blessed” Greeks’, in Kaldellis (2007), 317–34. Kaldelis (2009), 145–62. For his Letters see the
edition of Kolovou (2001).
46 For an interesting and clever clarification, see again Demetracopoulos (1997), 163. However, we cannot
agree with the—rather indirect—attempt of Demetracopoulos to support that Orthodox theology
holds a disparaging view of the human body. See, e.g., p. 164 (where he writes about Lossky the
following: ‘…in that place, where, based on the two passages of the Προσωποποιία and the Chapters,
he tries to show that “orthodox tradition” ostensibly does not undervalue the body’), but also p. 165.
From my point of view, the patristic teaching, if read correctly, and in its proper context, has many
positive elements that could contribute to our effort to articulate today a genuine and fruiful theology
that will respect and honour the human body; that will elevate it to its genuine rank. In this effort, the
relevant teaching of Palamas could play a pivotal role. See, relevantly, ch. 3 and 7 of this book.
47 Possibly here Gregory is influenced by St John Damascene, who is most likely based on Gregory
Nazianzen. See respectively, John Damascene, Contra imaginum calumniatores orationes tres, III,
18.19–20, ed. Kotter, 127, trans. Louth, 97: ‘The Son is the Father’s image, natural, undeviating…’ (Ἔστι
μὲν ὁ υἱὸς εἰκὼν τοῦ πατρὸς φυσική, ἀπαράλλακτος…), and Gregory Nazianzen, In Theophania (Orat.
38), 13 (PG 36, 325B) [= idem, In sanctum Pascha (Orat. 45), 9 (PG 36, 633B)]. It is very interesting
that this phrase (ἡ γὰρ ἀπαράλλακτος εἰκὼν τοῦ Πατρός) is also found in the first stichiron troparion of
the vespers of the 25th December in the Orthodox Church, namely in the first hymn of the Christmas
vespers. This is a very characteristic case of how the dogmatic theology of the Fathers inspires and
imbues the Church offices.
48 Theophanes, 26, ΠΣ 2, 252.16–18 and 253.1–4. Cf. Sinkewicz (1988), 18 n. 49. Christou, ΠΣ 2, 252 n. 4.
49 For a presentation of Logos-Christ as the archetype of man, according to Palamas, see Yangazoglou
(2001), 77–82.
50 Apod. 1, 35.16–17, ΠΣ 1, 66: τὸν μὲν υἱὸν τοῦ πατρὸς μορφήν τε καὶ εἰκόνα λέγομεν, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα τοῦ υἱοῦ.
Here again Gregory probably relies on the Damascene, De Imaginibus, III, 18, ed. Kotter, 127.23–24.29–
30, trans. Louth, 97: ‘And the Holy Spirit is the image of the Son…’; or on Damascene’s, Expositio fidei
13 (I 13), ed. Kotter, 40.75.
51 Cf. Athanasios of Alexandria, Epistula I ad Serapionem (First Letter to Serapion), 24.27–35, ed. Savvidis,
512 (PG 26, 588BC). For an English translation, see Anatolios (2004), 224.
 i nt ro d u ct i o n 43

imago—and also the likeness—with the ‘breath of life’ (πνοὴ ζωῆς) and the ‘living
soul’ (ζῶσα ψυχή), namely the rationality and eternality of the soul, as well as with
the fact that the soul is full of divine grace.52
Moreover, Palamas considers free will to be the great prerogative of man and the
crucial component of the imago Dei. This was also stressed by Basil the Great, Gregory
of Nyssa, Maximos the Confessor, John Damascene, and other Fathers.53 This view
has great significance for our contemporary society, where one sees a proliferation of
various mechanisms intended to control man’s capacity for free thinking and willing.54
In particular, Gregory argues that God has created man as self-governing, with
control over his actions (αὐτεξούσιον), so that, if he uses his self-ruling power well,
he can walk towards good and not evil.55 As will be analysed below, in the relevant
subsection, this ruling power, if utilised prudently, grants the imago to man more
fully than the angels.56 From the very beginning, God made man in his image and
likeness (Gen 1:26) so that man, looking towards his archetype, i.e. God, would not
deviate from the road of goodness. Moreover, God shows his kindness to man to a
greater extent in comparison to the other creatures. Additionally, through imitation,
God invites man to continually pursue His goodness: exactly due to humanity’s
creation in the imago, through imitation of God he can attain goodness, but not of
course to the same degree as God.57 On another occasion Gregory maintains that
The will to do good and to be as well disposed towards all as we are towards
ourselves is therefore also inborn (ἔμφυτον) in us. We were all made in the image
of Him who is good. Then when sin entered and multiplied, it did not extinguish
our self-love, since it was not at all opposed to that, but it cooled down love for
one another, the crown of the virtues, changed it and rendered it useless. As a
result, He who renews our nature, recalling it to the grace of His own image (ὁ
ἀνακαινίζων ἡμῶν τὴν φύσιν καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς οἰκείας εἰκόνος χάριν ἀνακαλούμενος)
and putting his laws, as the prophets tell us, in our hearts ( Jer 31:33), says, ‘As

52 Apod. 2, 8.5–12, ΠΣ 1, 85: Τί δὲ ἐνεφύσησε; ‘Πνοὴν ζωῆς’. Τί ἐστι ‘πνοὴν ζωῆς’; ‘Ψυχὴν ζῶσαν’. Διδασκέτω
σε Παῦλος· ‘ἐγένετο ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν’ (1 Cor 15:45). Τί δέ ἐστι ζῶσαν; Ἀείζωον,
ἀθάνατον, ταὐτὸν δ’ εἰπεῖν λογικήν· ἡ γὰρ ἀθάνατος λογική· καὶ οὐ τοῦτο μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ κεχαριτωμένην
θείως. Τοιαύτη γὰρ ἡ ὄντως ζῶσα ψυχή. Τοῦτο δὲ τῷ κατ’ εἰκόνα ταὐτόν, εἰ δὲ βούλει καὶ καθ’ ὁμοίωσιν· ὢ
τῆς ζημίας, ἐκ τίνος εἰς τί μετεβάλομεν.
53 Mantzaridis (1984), 20. Thunberg (19952), 118–19.
54 This fact can be seen in political parties, economic institutions, religious movements, etc.
55 Macarios also connects vividly the faculty of will with the imago. See Plested (2004), 34.
56 See ‘The Faculty of Self-Governance and Man’s Dominion over the Created World’ (ch. 3.2).
57 Hom. 36, On Saint Matthew’s Gospel for the eleventh Sunday after Pentecost, 1.1–12, ΠΣ 6, 389–90 (ΠΑΕ
10, 410.1–412.7): Ὁ Θεὸς αὐτεξούσιον πλάττων τὸν ἄνθρωπον μεγάλης αὐτὸν προμηθείας ἠξίωσεν, ὥστε
μὴ πρὸς τὸ κακόν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν νεῦσαι, τῷ αὐτεξουσίῳ καλῶς χρησάμενον. Εὐθὺς οὖν αὐτὸν
ποιῶν, κατ᾿ εἰκόνα τοῦτον ἑαυτοῦ ποιεῖ καὶ ὁμοίωσιν, ὡς ἂν αὐτός τε πρὸς τὸ ἀρχέτυπον ἀγαθὸν βλέπων
μὴ ἐκπίπτῃ τῆς ἀγαθότητος, καὶ ὁ Θεὸς πάλιν πρὸς αὐτόν, ὡς πρὸς οἰκείαν εἰκόνα μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τὰ παρ᾿
αὐτοῦ πάντα γεγονότα, πλουσίαν δικαίως τὴν οἰκείαν χρηστότητα κἀν τοῖς ἑξῆς ἐπιδείξηται. Κἀντεῦθεν
πάλιν ἐκ περιουσίας ἕλκει τοῦτον διὰ μιμήσεως πρὸς τὴν σύμμετρον αὐτῷ καὶ κατάλληλον ἀγαθότητα.
Καὶ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον δυνατὸν κατ᾿ εἰκόνα τοῦ κτίσαντος ἐκ τῆς πρὸς τοῦτον
μιμήσεως, ἀπαραλλάκτως δὲ καὶ ὅσον ἀγαθός ἐστιν ὁ Θεός, καὶ ἄνθρωπόν τινα εἶναι, τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστίν.
44 cha p te r 1

ye would that men should do to you, do ye also to them likewise’ (Mt 7:12 and
Lk 6:31)…58
Therefore, in order to attain the likeness, it is essential that all the virtues, and especially
love, are pursued. To express the need to work for good, and not for evil, Gregory
also employs St Paul’s argument, and writes the following:
‘…as we have borne the image of the earthy, we shall also bear the image of the
heavenly’ (1 Cor 15:48–49) …and laying aside everything to do with the coats of
skins (δερματίνους χιτῶνας)59 in which we were clothed because of the transgression
(Gen 3:21), let us stand on holy ground (cf. Ex 3:5), each one of us marking his
own holy ground through virtue and steadfast inclination towards God.60
Consequently, Palamas states that when man walks on the road of virtues, then he
is moved from the state of the image of God, to that of the likeness.

Τhe Restoration of the Image of God

These remarks lead us to a very significant topic, that of the restoration of the imago.
Palamas often stresses that in the fall, whereas man rejected the resemblance to God
(the καθ’ ὁμοίωσιν), he did not lose the kat’ eikona.61 Nevertheless, the image of God
in man was blackened and the basic task of Christ is to restore it.62 This is a theme
that comes up often in Palamas’ thought: the Logos takes up flesh in order to reveal
the truth, renew the image of God, and guide humanity unto its archetype, namely
God.63 Thus, as hinted above, Christ is ‘He who renews our nature, recalling it to

58 Hom. 45, On the Gospel for the Second Sunday of Luke, 5.81–90, ΠΣ 6, 481 (ΠΑΕ 11, 76.3–13), trans.
Veniamin, 355–56: Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθοποιεῖν ἐθέλειν καὶ πρὸς πάντας διακεῖσθαι καλῶς, ὡς καὶ πρὸς
ἑαυτούς, ἔμφυτον ἡμῖν ἐστίν∙ ἐπεὶ καὶ κατ᾿ εἰκόνα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ γεγόναμεν ἅπαντες, ἀλλ᾿ ἐπεισελθοῦσα
ἡ ἁμαρτία καὶ πληθυνθεῖσα τὴν μὲν εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἑκάστου ἡμῶν ἀγάπην οὐκ ἔσβεσεν, ἅτε μηδὲν
ἐναντιουμένην αὐτῇ, τὴν δὲ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀγάπην, ὡς κεφάλαιον τῶν ἀρετῶν οὖσαν, κατέψυξε καὶ
ἠλλοίωσε καὶ ἠχρείωσεν. Ὅθεν ὁ ἀνακαινίζων ἡμῶν τὴν φύσιν καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς οἰκείας εἰκόνος χάριν
ἀνακαλούμενος, διδοὺς τοὺς αὐτοῦ νόμους κατὰ τὸ προφητικὸν εἰς τὰς καρδίας ἡμῶν, ‘καθὼς θέλετε,
φησίν, ἵνα ποιῶσιν ὑμῖν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, καὶ ὑμεῖς ποιεῖτε αὐτοῖς ὁμοίως’.
59 For an analysis of the theology of the ‘garments of skin’ (δερμάτινοι χιτῶνες), see Nellas (1979), 45–114
(= Nellas (1987), 43–104). Palamas does not seem to visit very often this topic (i.e. the ‘garments
of skin’). However, it is implied in many points of his oeuvre. Yangazoglou (2001), 98–108 gives an
interesting presentation of Palamas’ relevant approaches, placing them in the context of the Saint’s
soteriology. Kesselopoulos (1986), 52 makes just a brief reference to the ‘garments of skin’.
60 Hom. 21, On the Ascension of our Lord and God and Saviour Jesus Christ, 17.219–25, ΠΣ 6, 255 (ΠΑΕ
10, 42), trans. Veniamin, 176: Ὡς οὖν ἐφορέσαμεν τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ χοϊκοῦ, φορέσωμεν καὶ τὴν εἰκόνα
τοῦ ἐπουρανίου… καὶ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς δερματίνους χιτῶνας ἀποθέμενοι σχέσιν, οὓς ἐκ παραβάσεως
ἐνδεδύμεθα, στῶμεν ἐν γῇ ἁγίᾳ, τὴν καθ᾿ ἑαυτὸν ἕκαστος γῆν ἁγίαν δι᾿ ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς ἀκλινοῦς πρὸς
Θεὸν νεύσεως ἀποδείξαντες.
61 Ch. 39.9–10, 126 (57.5–6): …τὸ καθ᾿ ὁμοίωσιν εἶναι θείαν ἀποβαλόντες, τὸ κατ᾿ εἰκόνα οὐκ ἀπωλέσαμεν.
62 Apod. 2, 9, ΠΣ 1, 85.30–86.2: …ὡς ἂν ζωοποιήσας ἀνακαινίσῃ τὴν ἀμαυρωθεῖσαν εἰκόνα.
63 Tr. 1,1,5.7–10, 365 (17.21–24): ‘ὁ πρὸ τῶν αἰώνων ὢν’ καὶ μετ’ αὐτὸν φανεὶς καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ‘ἐλθὼν εἰς τὸν
κόσμον ἵνα μαρτυρήσῃ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ’ καὶ ἀνακαινίσῃ τὸ κατ’ εἰκόνα καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἀρχέτυπον ἐπαναγάγῃ.
 i nt ro d u ct i o n 45

the grace of His own image’.64 Worth noting is that here Palamas sees Christ as the
Image, to whom man should return.
But how could this be achieved? Perhaps through knowledge? For St Gregory
human knowledge and wisdom are not on their own able to restore the image
of God in the soul. He strongly insists on this point, because he believes that his
opponents, in particular Barlaam, argued that man could attain knowledge of God
and assimilation to Him simply through reason and human knowledge. He names
his adversaries ‘iconognosts’ (εἰκονογνῶστες), since they ‘pretend that man receives
the image of God by knowledge, and that this knowledge conforms the soul to
God’.65 Elsewhere Palamas wonders how it is possible for ‘the wisdom of the flesh
to grant the divine image to the soul’: for him this is unthinkable.66 Besides, Adam
possessed ‘natural wisdom’ more than any man who came after him; nevertheless,
he did not keep the image.67
Furthermore, for Palamas, man is made in the image of God moreso than all
other creatures. One great proof of this is the Incarnation, namely the hypostatic
union of the two natures of Christ, divine and human, in the one person of the
Logos. In other words, the fact that human nature was able to be joined to the
divine in one person: ‘Human nature was shown to have been created in the image
of God to a greater extent than the rest of creation and this kinship with God was
such that human nature could be joined to Him in one person’.68 It is worth noting
that, for Gregory, God adorned human nature to such a great extent ‘because
He was going to clothe Himself in it’. Through the Virgin Mary the Logos would
receive flesh and blood to become man.69 ‘Because in His wisdom and love for

64 Hom. 45, On the Gospel for the Second Sunday of Luke, 5.86–88, ΠΣ 6, 481 (ΠΑΕ 11, 76.9–11), trans.
Veniamin, 356: …ὁ ἀνακαινίζων ἡμῶν τὴν φύσιν καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς οἰκείας εἰκόνος χάριν ἀνακαλούμενος.
65 Tr. 1,1,20.6–8, 384 (57.19–21), trans. Gendle, 28: …καὶ τοὺς ‘εἰκονογνώστας’ τούτους, οἵ φασιν ἐκ τῆς
γνώσεως τὸ κατ᾿ εἰκόνα τὸν ἄνθρωπον λαμβάνειν καὶ δι᾿ αὐτῆς κατὰ Θεὸν μορφοῦσθαι τὴν ψυχήν.
Cf. Gendle’s note 31 in p. 120.
66 Tr. 1,1,2.17–19, 362 (11.24–25): Ἡ τοίνυν τῆς σαρκὸς σοφία, πῶς τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ κατ’ εἰκόνα παρέξεται; For
Barlaam’s position towards human knowledge, and the reaction of Palamas, see Sinkewicz (1982).
67 Tr. 1,1,22.9–11, 386 (63.1–4): Τῆς δὲ φυσικῆς σοφίας καὶ τῷ Ἀδὰμ εἴπερ τινὶ τῶν μετ᾿ αὐτὸν περιεῖναι
λέγεται, καίτοι τὸ κατ᾿ εἰκόνα πρώτῳ πάντων μὴ φυλάξαντι.
68 Hom. 16, 18.286–88, ΠΣ 6, 192 (ΠΑΕ 9, 448.15–18), trans. Veniamin, 123 (modified). Veniamin writes
in his translation: ‘Human nature was shown to have been created in the image of God, unlike the rest
of creation’. The original text reads as follows: Γέγονε τοίνυν ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ Υἱὸς ἄνθρωπος… ἵνα δειχθῇ,
πῶς ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσις παρὰ πάντα τὰ κτίσματα κατ’ εἰκόνα ἐκτίσθη Θεοῦ· τοσοῦτον γὰρ ταύτῃ τὸ
συγγενὲς πρὸς Θεόν, ὡς καὶ δύνασθαι συνελθεῖν αὐτῷ πρὸς μίαν ὑπόστασιν… (the emphasis is mine).
So it seems that it would have been better rendered as ‘Human nature was shown to have been created
in the image of God at a greater extent than the rest of creation’.
69 Hom. 26, Delivered at harvest time. Also concerning the spiritual harvest, 3.30–34, ΠΣ 6, 295 (ΠΑΕ
10, 156.1–5), trans. Veniamin, 207. For Palamas’ theology of the Mother of God, see his Homilies 42:
On the Nativity of the Mother of God; 53: On the Entry of the Mother of God into the Holy of Holies; 14:
On the Annunciation; 37: On the Dormition. See also the following studies: Meyendorff, ‘The Mother
of God’, in Meyendorff (1974a), 232–36 (= Meyendorff (1959a), 317–22). Likoudis (2007), 139–58.
Kappes (2014), 69–81 (‘The Palamite Tradition’).
46 cha p te r 1

mankind He was making provision for this, He honoured our nature with many
and varied gifts’.70
Additionally, St Gregory presents two other significant reasons for why God created
man in his image and likeness. First an eschatological71 point: ‘…to enable man at some
time to contain the greatness of God’s kingdom, the blessedness of God’s inheritance
and the perfection of the heavenly Father’s blessing, by which everything visible and
invisible was made’.72 The image and likeness of God, inherent in man, are the factors
that push him towards the pleasure of the divine kingdom, towards Paradise. Moreover,
it is the potentiality of the likeness that renders man capable of participating in the life
of Paradise. The image and likeness both have an intensely eschatological character.73
Second, a Christological reason: as mentioned above, man was created in the
image of God so that one day the taking up of flesh by the Logos could occur. In
particular, in Homily 60, On The Holy Feast of Theophany, Palamas argues that the
whole Old Testament was pointing to the Incarnation.74 Moreover, all creation was
waiting and looking towards the ‘dispensation whereby God became human’ (τὴν
θεανδρικὴν οἰκονομίαν).75 Additionally, man ‘was also brought into being in the
beginning because of Him [i.e. the Logos], being formed according to God’s image, so
that one day he might contain his archetype’.76 This means that man was granted the
imago, so that the Logos could receive human nature. The Son of God is the archetype,
and humanity is made in His image. It seems that Palamas has in mind here the fact
that the Logos is the ‘express image of the Father’77 and humanity’s archetype; as
already mentioned, the Logos is the image, whereas man is created according to the
image (κατ’ εἰκόνα).78 Here Palamas possibly has in mind man as logikos.79

70 Hom. 26, 3.34–35, ΠΣ 6, 295 (ΠΑΕ 10, 156.6–7), trans. Veniamin, 207: Τοῦτο δὴ καὶ προοικονομῶν
σοφῶς ἅμα καὶ φιλανθρώπως, οὕτω πολλαῖς, μᾶλλον δὲ παντοδαπαῖς αὐτὴν ἐτίμησε χάρισιν.
71 On the eschatology of Palamas, see Georgi (2010).
72 Hom. 4, On Christ’s second coming, 12.157–63, ΠΣ 6, 75 (ΠΑΕ 9, 122–24), trans. Veniamin, 28: …ἵνα
δυνηθῇ ποτε χωρῆσαι τὴν μεγαλειότητα τῆς θείας βασιλείας, τὴν μακαριότητα τῆς θείας κληρονομίας,
τὴν τελειότητα τῆς τοῦ ἀνωτάτω πατρὸς εὐλογίας, δι᾿ ἣν πάντα ἐγένετο τὰ ὁρατὰ καὶ τὰ ἀόρατα.
73 Cf. Hom. 4, 12.170–72, ΠΣ 6, 75 (ΠΑΕ 9, 124), trans. Veniamin, 29: ‘“Come”, He Says, “you who made
good use of the earthy, perishable and fleeting world in accordance with my will, and inherit as well
the lasting, heavenly world which is now at hand”’. Palamas very often stresses the indispensability of
conforming our will to God’s one.
74 Hom. 60, 19, ΠΣ 6, 655 (ΠΑΕ 11, 532).
75 Hom. 60, 20.300, ΠΣ 6, 656 (ΠΑΕ 11, 534), trans. Veniamin, 502.
76 Hom. 60, 20.294–95, ΠΣ 6, 655 (ΠΑΕ 11, 532), trans. Veniamin, 502 (slightly modified): Οὐκοῦν καὶ
ἡ ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς παραγωγὴ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου δι’ αὐτόν [i.e. τὸν Υἱόν], κατ’ εἰκόνα πλασθέντος τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἵνα
δυνηθῇ ποτε χωρῆσαι τὸ ἀρχέτυπον… Here Palamas refers to the Son (δι᾿ αὐτόν). This is clear, if one
takes into account the previous paragraph in the relevant text (i.e. par. 19).
77 Cf. Heb 1:3: ὃς ὢν ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης καὶ χαρακτὴρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ.
78 This is what Veniamin, 648 n. 1172 comments based on this point. In fact, Gregory does not clearly
explain his meaning here. But it seems that Veniamin’s interpretation is compatible with Gregory’s
thinking in this point, because, as shown before, Palamas uses this interpretation elsewhere.
Cf. Theophanes, 26.16–18, ΠΣ 2, 252 and 1–4, 253, where the Only-begotten Son is the identical image
of God (ἡ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἀπαράλλακτος εἰκών) and man is an indistinct image (ἀμυδρὰ εἰκών).
79 See above, in our brief presentation of the teaching of the Fathers on the imago Dei (i.e., in ch. 1.1.b),
for what logikos means for them.
 i nt ro d u ct i o n 47

3. Conclusions

So far we have attempted to sketch a general introduction to Palamas’ imago theology.

Gregory uses many of the approaches found in the previous tradition, mainly stressing
the fact that the Logos is the Image of God. But, he also focuses on the Incarnation, and
Christ Incarnate as the Image. At the same time, he tries to bring into focus the role of
man as logikos, and his relationship with Christ, in terms of the image of God. These
points will become clearer through the more systematic examination of Palamas’
imago theology that will follow in the next Part of our book. Now, specifically, two
major elements of his teaching will be depicted, namely why man images the Holy
Trinity, and—what constitutes our main aim—why he is superior to the angels in
virtue of the kat’ eikona. Let us first examine the former.
 Chapter 2

Imago Trinitatis: The Trinitarian Reflections

in Man

In this chapter we shall examine the imago Trinitatis according to Palamas. This
examination will serve as the basis for the later treatment of this Part’s main aim,
namely why man is greater than the angels in terms of the image of God.
But, first of all, what is in fact a ‘Trinitarian reflection in man’? In broad terms
we could say that it is an element or condition in the human person—usually in the
human soul or intellect—that resembles the Holy Trinity. It is a point that permits
us to make an analogy between man and the Trinity. So far it is shown that man is
made in the image of God for many different reasons. Now it will be argued that
there is also another reason: man has the imago because he somehow reflects in his
inner constitution the Holy Trinity.
Recent scholarship has dealt a good deal with Palamas’ Trinitarian reflections in
man.1 Nevertheless, it seems that this subject is not central, but quite peripheral
in Gregory’s theology. Hence, in what follows it is pointed out that it is rarely used
in his corpus and does not receive there an eminent place. Moreover, Palamas’
arguments are expressed in a laconic way making them difficult to fully interpret. In
other words, his opinions are very difficult to understand, because Palamas is very
succinct and does not provide many clues.2 In particular Gregory makes use of
this approach in his Ch. 34–38 and, in a brief form, his Homily 60.3 These points, of
course, correspond only to a very small portion of his oeuvre.
So why, at last, have Gregory’s Trinitarian reflections attracted such a high
degree of interest among modern scholars? The main reason is, perhaps, that the
Trinitarian image theology in Greek thought is rather minor, compared with the

1 For a good basic approach, see Sinkewicz (1988), 16–34. A detailed analysis of Gregory’s thought,
as presented in his Chapters, has been attempted by Wilkins (2003). Cf. also Hussey (1972). Here
we shall not merely reiterate their arguments; we shall rather critically engage with their most basic
points, placing them in the context of Gregory’s kat’ eikona theology, as well as try to offer some new
insights on this whole topic.
2 Of note is that Wilkins’ interpretation, whereas more advanced than Hussey’s one, is—as he himself
confesses (cf. Wilkins (2003), 410)—not entirely sufficient, because it is not very clear what exactly
Palamas wants to express in this text. Cf. our comments in the end of this chapter (in the ‘Concluding
Remarks’).
3 Hom. 60, Delivered on the Holy Feast of Theophany. Disclosing the Mystery of Christ’s Baptism as far as is
possible, ΠΣ 6, 645–56 (ΠΑΕ 11, 506–34).
50 cha p te r 2

Latin Augustinian tradition, where it is pivotal. Additionally, Palamas seems to be

using ideas from Augustine when he discusses the Trinitarian image.4
Moreover, although the theology of the Trinitarian reflections has its roots in
the early Christianity and is sometimes used by the later Fathers, it does not occur
very often in late Byzantium.5 In particular, Palamas is one of the few late Byzantine
writers who were directly concerned with this topic, and wrote about it at length. If
one compares Palamas’ contribution to other relevant approaches from Byzantine
theologians, one realizes that Gregory usually treats as he does his theme in a
somehow more extensive and advanced way. Indeed, one can find in his approach
some uncommon, if not unique and original, positions. Last, but not least, Gregory
finds a way, mainly based on man’s reflections of the Trinity, to exalt the human rank
in comparison to the angels. And this is certainly very significant: man is placed
higher than the angels, for he images and reflects the Holy Trinity to a greater extent
than the angels do. This last point, which is the central aim of the current Part, will
be treated in detail in the next chapter. But these initial considerations guide us to
our first point.

1. The Human Intellect and its λόγος

The first Trinitarian reflection that Gregory explores is that of the Logos. Initially
in Ch. 34 he speaks about the divine nature, its unity, and its characteristics. His
terminology is taken, to a great extent, from Dionysiοs the Areopagite, the alleged
author of the Corpus Areopagiticum.6 Gregory comments that the divine nature
possesses goodness as its substance while all the goods one can find in the rational
creation are but reflections of this divine goodness, the latter’s goodness infinitely
transcending all the former goods.7
This chapter provides a basis for the presentation of the Trinitarian analogies. Thus,
in the next chapters Palamas passes from the Godhead to the three divine persons.
Now, he moves from the Corpus Areopagiticum to the theology of the Alexandrian
school. In the latter, the Godhead is perceived as Intellect (Nous) from which the
Word (Logos) proceeds as from a source.8 In Ch. 35 Gregory depicts the four
senses that the ‘word’ (λόγος) may have. First, there is the προφορικὸς λόγος, which
is expressed externally in sounds. This λόγος is moved by the intellect, even though
it does not belong properly to it, rather to the body. Furthermore, the mental image
of the sounds of a word before it is expressed externally is the ἐνδιάθετος λόγος.

4 This crucial subject is discussed in the relevant section of the current chapter, i.e. ‘The Presence of
St Augustine’.
5 The patristic context of this teaching is depicted in the relevant section of this chapter.
6 Sinkewicz (1988), 16–17. For the relevant references to Dionysiοs, see Sinkewicz (1988), 116–19 (e.g.
ὑπέρζωος καὶ ὑπέρθεος φύσις and ὑπεράγαθος ἀγαθότης).
7 For an analysis of Ch. 34 and an attempt to connect it with the Trinitarian reflections and the whole
Palamite system, see Wilkins (2003), 390–95.
8 Sinkewicz (1988), 17.
 I m ag o T r i nitatis : T h e T r i n i ta ri an Re f lect i o ns i n Man 51

Third, we have the λόγος ἐν διανοίᾳ; this is the mental concept that comes before
the expression in a word and is gradually shaped in the intellect. Finally, the λόγος
ἐμφύτως ἐν ἡμῖν ἐναποκείμενος τῷ νῷ, the naturally inherent λόγος, is ‘a word in the
sense of the knowledge latent or immanent in the intellect’, a ‘word naturally stored
up within our intellect’.9 Therefore, according to Palamas, we have the following
schema: λόγος ἐμφύτως ἐν ἡμῖν ἐναποκείμενος τῷ νῷ -> λόγος ἐν διανοίᾳ -> ἐνδιάθετος
λόγος -> προφορικὸς λόγος.
From the foregoing meanings, Gregory considers only the last one (i.e. the λόγος
ἐμφύτως ἐν ἡμῖν ἐναποκείμενος τῷ νῷ) to be a suitable analogy for the relation of the
divine Logos, the second person of the Holy Trinity, to God the Father, understood
as intellect. All the other types of word are related to materiality or temporality. But
this type offers a way to meditate on the Word’s generation from the Father, while
the Logos has His own perfect hypostasis. Though distinct, he is consubstantial to
the Father and perfectly identical to him. Moreover, this word ‘is in the sense of the
word naturally stored up within our intellect, whereby we have come into being from
the one who created us according to his own image (κατ᾿ εἰκόνα οἰκείαν), namely, that
knowledge which is always coexistent with the intellect’.10

Is Theology of the ‘logoi’ Present Here?

This is the first Trinitarian analogy of the image of God that Gregory mentions.
However, Palamas leaves the reader with an important question. What exactly does he
mean by this λόγος ἐμφύτως ἐν ἡμῖν ἐναποκείμενος τῷ νῷ? Some attempts to provide
a solution can be found in scholarship,11 but it seems that a definite answer cannot be
easily given. Moreover, a discussion has begun about the roots of Gregory’s approach.12
Thus, Hussey attempts to trace the source of Palamas’ use of the notion of logos here
to Maximos the Confessor’s elaboration of the logoi theology.13 Additionally, Wilkins
finds here some resonances with this Maximian theme.14 This is a very interesting

9 Ch. 35.1–16, 118–20 (53.26–54.6): …καὶ λόγος οὐ κατὰ τὸν ἡµέτερον προφορικὸν λόγον, οὐ νοῦ γὰρ
οὗτος, ἀλλὰ σώµατος νῷ κινουµένου· οὐδὲ κατὰ τὸν ἡµέτερον ἐνδιάθετον λόγον, φθόγγων γὰρ οἱονεὶ
τύποις κἀκεῖνος ἐν ἡµῖν διατιθέµενος γίνεται· ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ κατὰ τὸν ἡµέτερον ἐν διάνοιᾳ λόγον κἂν χωρὶς
φθόγγων ᾖ, ἐπιβολαῖς ἀσωµάτοις πάντῃ συµπεραιούµενος, κἀκεῖνος γὰρ µεθ’ ἡµᾶς ἐστι καὶ διαλειµµάτων
δεῖται καὶ χρονικῶν οὐκ ὁλίγων διαστηµάτων, διεξοδικῶς προϊὼν καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀτελοῦς πρὸς τὸ ἐντελὲς
συµπέρασµα προαγόµενος· ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν ἐµφύτως ἡµῖν, ἐξ οὗ γεγόναµεν παρὰ τοῦ κτίσαντος ἡµᾶς κατ’
εἰκόνα οἰκείαν, ἐναποκείµενον τῷ νῷ λόγον, τὴν ἀεὶ συνυπάρχουσαν αὐτῷ γνώσιν…
Cf. Sinkewicz (1988), 17.
10 Ch. 35.14–16, 120 (54.3–6) (emphasis added).
11 See, e.g. Wilkins (2003), 395–405 and Hussey (1972).
12 As mentioned above, the general patristic context of Palamas’ Trinitarian analogies will be analysed in
the relevant section of this chapter.
13 Hussey (1972), 86. For Maximos’ logoi, see Tollefsen (2008), 64–137. Törönen (2007), 127–42, 153–62.
Loudovikos (2010a), 53–122. Louth (2010), 77–84. Thunberg (19952), 72–79.
14 Wilkins (2003), 402–05. For an important recent approach, see Tollefsen (2012), 186–200 (mainly
190–92, 200).
52 cha p te r 2

path, but, in my view, it is difficult to find strong arguments in its support.15 It seems
to the author of this book that such a relation could not be easily proven, because
such references only appear very rarely, at least directly and explicitly.16 Palamas
was indeed aware of the λόγοι τῶν ὄντων, and he sometimes refers to them.17 Yet it
appears that he does not significantly exploit them, neither here, nor anywhere else.
Moreover, Tollefsen seems to be correct in finding problematic how Palamas does
not seem to make a clear distinction between the logoi and the divine activities.18
On the other hand, a very plausible justification for why Palamas does not utilise
further the logoi theology has been given recently by Fr Maximos Constas.19 The
latter argues that it was Barlaam who first appealed to the doctrine of the logoi. In
particular, as mentioned in the First Question of Triad I, namely in the beginning
of the hesychast controversy, ‘Barlaam claimed that the “inner principles (λόγοι)
of creation”, which are grounded in the “divine, primal, and creative mind”, have
corresponding “images” (εἰκόνες) in the soul’. Moreover, as Constas clarifies, Barlaam
‘believed that knowledge of these images could be obtained through science and
philosophy and would consequently lead to direct knowledge of God’.20 For this
reason, Palamas opposes such an opinion and argues that ‘it is “rather unfitting for
a man to believe that he has discovered the inner principles within the mind of the
Creator”, since Paul says: “Who can know the mind of the Lord?” (Rom 2:34)’. As
Constas notes, Palamas ‘concludes that, if one cannot know the inner principles of the
divine mind, then neither can one know their images by means of secular wisdom’.21
What could be added here is that St Gregory wonders some lines below: ‘How it
is possible for the wisdom of the flesh to grant the image of God to the soul?’22 In

15 Wilkins himself admits that the problem cannot be not readily solved. As he explains, he has ‘not
explored the possible sources for Palamas’s analogy of the procession of the word. However, we
are led to affirm the strong presence of a Maximian theme operative in Palamas’s conception of the
innermost logos in us and its relation to the divine Logos. At the same time, the position we have
arrived at is not merely Maximian; the Maximian theme is integrated into an intellectual analogy for
the divine processions, an analogy derived from a meditation on the trinitarian image of God in the
human person’ (Wilkins (2003), 405).
16 As Tollefsen (2012), 192 puts it, ‘There is one question that poses itself on the background of the Capita
150.87: can we draw any definite conclusions regarding a doctrine of logoi in Palamas? Perhaps not’. And
he continues, ‘It may a fortiori be doubted that Palamas has worked out for himself anything like the
metaphysics and cosmology of St Maximus. Even so, I also doubt that Palamas would have denied any
of Maximus’ teachings, even if he did not consciously integrate them into his own theological system.
It cannot, therefore, be taken for granted that he had a sophisticated doctrine of logoi’.
17 For instance, in his Ch. 87 he speaks about the logoi of God, the uncreated ‘predeterminations and
volitions’ (see Ch. 87.7–10, 184–86), though Palamas here refers to Dionysios, and not to Maximos.
For another passage (i.e. Tr. 1,3,40.6–8, 452 (199.16–20), referring to Maximos) which shows that
Palamas did know the logoi theology, see ch. 7.1.e of this book.
18 Tollefsen (2012), 191.
19 Constas (2013), 25–53, at 44–46.
20 Constas (2013), 44–45. Cf. First Question, ΠΣ 1, 359–60 (ed. Meyendorff, 5–7).
21 Constas (2013), 45. Cf. Tr. 1,1,2–3 (in particular, the exact reference to this argument is Tr. 1,1,2.7–11, 362
[11.13–17]).
22 Tr. 1,1,2.17–19, 362 (11.24–25): Ἡ τοίνυν τῆς σαρκὸς σοφία, πῶς τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ κατ’ εἰκόνα παρέξεται; cf. ch.
1.2.c of our book.
 I m ag o T r i nitatis : T h e T r i n i ta ri an Re f lect i o ns i n Man 53

other words, Palamas wants to argue that it is not possible to attain true knowledge
of God through merely human wisdom.
Consequently, Palamas seems to have tried to keep away from Barlaam’s teaching
regarding the logoi, so as to avoid appearing to be in agreement with him. Constas
seems to be correct when arguing that ‘Palamas’ seemingly summary dismissal of it’
is rather surprising,23 and when writing that
It is to be regretted that the scholastic-humanist assault on Hesychasm prevented
Palamas from developing Maximus’ doctrine of the logoi into an Orthodox
analogia entis, according to which God and his creatures would not be brought
under the same general category of being and which would account fully for
their irreducible differences. Instead Barlaam’s untenable claims for the ability of
unaided human reason to know the mind of God made it necessary for Palamas
to stress the discontinuity between human and divine reason and to reiterate
Maximus’ emphasis on the cessation of all cognitive activity—sense perception
and intellection alike—in the experience of union with God.24
In other words, as has been stated, if Palamas had not left aside the logoi theology,
he ‘might have developed an Orthodox version of analogia entis, more satisfactory
than what we find in St Thomas Aquinas’.25
However, notwithstanding the foregoing, in scholarship it is not often mentioned
that there is at least one passage where Palamas seems to clearly identify the logoi with
the activities. In particular, in Tr. 3,2,24 Palamas speaks about the divine activities,
calling them principles (ἀρχή/ἀρχαί), and writes the following: ‘All these principles are
nothing other than the logoi of beings and the exemplars (παραδείγματα), which are,
on the one hand, participable by beings, but (at the same time,) also beyond (those)
beings, for they exist and pre-exist in the creative intellect, and because everything was
made according to them’.26 Therefore, Romanides seems to be correct when arguing

23 Constas (2013), 45.

24 Constas (2013), 46 (the emphasis comes from the original text). About the ‘cessation of all activity’ in
theosis according to Palamas, see ch. 7.1.e of this book.
25 Louth, ‘Neo-Palamism: Fr John Meyendorff and some Greek neo-Palamites’, in Louth (2015), 187. As
Romanides (1991), 131 notes, in western theology ‘it is believed that there is an analogy of the being
(τοῦ ὄντος) and faith between the created essences, and the uncreated archetypal forms (εἰδῶν) or
ideas or reasons (λόγων), and, therefore, one is able to trace the realities around the divine essence
by penetrating, through the human reason, the essence and the universal concept of the beings (τὴν
καθ’ ὅλου ἔννοιαν τῶν ὄντων)᾿. Consequently, it seems that Romanides (same page, and passim in this
book) is correct in arguing that Barlaam was influenced by western theological categories, and tried to
apply them on Byzantine theology. However, this is a very complicated topic, a complete analysis of
which goes far beyond the scope of this book. What should be noted here is that even among western
theologians the analogia entis has been strongly criticized. An important example is Karl Barth. For
a relevant study, as well as whether there could be traced a real convergence between Barth and
Orthodox theology in terms of the notion of ‘analogy’, see the interesting article of Louth (2016).
26 Tr. 3,2,24.19–23, 675 (685.23–27): Καὶ μὴν αἱ τοιαῦται ἅπασαι ἀρχαὶ οὐδὲν ἕτερόν εἰσι ἢ οἱ λόγοι τῶν
ὄντων καὶ τὰ παραδείγματα, μεθεκτοὶ μὲν τοῖς οὖσιν, ἐξῃρημένοι δὲ τῶν ὄντων, ὡς τῷ δημιουργικῷ νῷ
ἐνυπάρχοντες καὶ προϋπάρχοντες, καθ’ οὓς γέγονε τὰ πάντα. I draw this passage from Romanides
(1991), 154.
54 cha p te r 2

that Palamas identifies the logoi of the beings with the divine activities.27 Furthermore,
it could be assumed that in his mind Palamas sees no difference between the logoi and
the activities; this could be one reason why he does not explore this topic further.
However, to sum up, this is a subject that requires more extensive research, for a
definitive word to be said.28 Therefore, let us now move on to the second Trinitarian
reflection in man. We will see that things are quite complicated here as well.

2. The ἔρως of the Intellect for its λόγος

So far we have traced the analogy of the Logos. Now, we look at Ch. 36 where Palamas
tries to find a suitable analogy for the Holy Spirit.29 He points out that, generally, it
is not possible to consider a word without spirit (πνεῦμα).30 Therefore the Divine
Word ‘possesses’ a Spirit, the Holy Spirit.31 Gregory refers here (‘συμπροϊὸν’) to the
consubstantiality of the Logos and the Spirit, because both have their origination
from the Father, as well as to their mutual eternal relationship.
Also in this chapter Palamas distinguishes different types of πνεῦμα, as he did
previously in his treatment of λόγος. First of all, we have the breath which comes forth
with the word when the latter is expressed through our lips: when someone speaks,
in every case we have a movement of the breath-respiration. But this is not a suitable
analogy for the Holy Spirit, because corporeality is involved here and, of course, in
God there is nothing corporeal.32 Second, the incorporeal spirit that accompanies
the immanent or discursive word is as well an unfitting analogy, because, as a motion
of the intellect, it is connected with temporality and incompleteness.33
Finally, there is the spirit as love-ἔρως. In particular the Holy Spirit is ‘the ineffable
love of the Begetter towards the ineffably begotten Word himself ’. Moreover, the Son

27 Romanides (1991), 154. Cf. his interesting relevant comments in this book, on pp. 131–32.
28 For a small, yet useful, comparative approach between Maximos’ logoi and Palamas’ uncreated
activities, see Thunberg (1985), 137–43. Thunberg regards Maximos to be a precursor of Palamas:
the logoi could be interpreted as energies in the Palamite sense, even Maximos never spoke as such
in an explicit way (see pp. 137–38). However, Thunberg, as he himself confesses (pp. 138–39), does
not bring forward enough evidence for his position. For an important discussion on the relationship
between the logoi and the activities, see Tollefsen (2008), 169–89 (part IV, ch. 4). See also, van
Rossum (1993).
29 Ch. 36, 120–22. For an interesting analysis of the analogy of the Spirit, see Wilkins (2003), 405–10.
30 Ch. 36.2–3, 120: …λόγον δὲ πνεύματος χωρὶς οὐδ’ ἄν τις νοῦν ἔχων ἐννοήσειε… Here Palamas is probably
inspired by St Gregory of Nyssa, Oratio Catechetica, 13M (ed. Mühlenberg, 8.18) who argues that ‘God
cannot be without his Word’ (μὴ ἄλογον εἶναι τὸν Θεόν). Or else, he may have found this idea in St John
Damascene, who used Gregory of Nyssa in the early part of his Expositio Fidei. For the meanings of
πνεῦμα, see Liddell and Scott (1996), s.v. πνεῦμα, 1424. Cf. Lampe (1961), s.v. πνεῦμα, 1097–104.
31 Ch. 36.3–4, 120: διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον ὁ ἐκ Θεοῦ Θεὸς λόγος συμπροϊὸν ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἔχει.
32 Ch. 36.5–7, 120: πνεῦμα δὲ οὐ κατὰ τὸ συνὸν τῷ ἡμετέρῳ διὰ τῶν χειλέων λόγῳ, σῶμα γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ δι’
ὀργανικῶν σωμάτων ἐναρμόζεται τῷ ἡμετέρῳ λόγῳ.
33 Ch. 36.7–11, 120–22: ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ κατὰ τὸ συνόν, εἰ καὶ ἀσωμάτως, τῷ καθ’ ἡμᾶς ἐνδιαθέτῳ καὶ κατὰ διάνοιαν
λόγῳ, κἀκεῖνο γὰρ ὁρμή τίς ἐστι τοῦ νοῦ, τῷ ἡμετέρῳ λόγῳ συνδιατεινομένη χρονικῶς καὶ διαστημάτων
δεομένη τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ ἐξ ἀτελοῦς προϊοῦσα εἰς τελείωσιν.
 I m ag o T r i nitatis : T h e T r i n i ta ri an Re f lect i o ns i n Man 55

also has this love for the Father and ‘also experiences this love towards the Begetter,
but he does so inasmuch as he possesses this love as proceeding from the Father
together with him and as resting34 connaturally in him’. From the Incarnate Word
we have learnt that the Spirit is a distinct hypostasis who belongs both to the Father
and the Son.35 Furthermore, the Spirit owes his being only to the Father, but is sent
forth (in the economy) from both the Father and the Son to those who are worthy.36
For Palamas, the clarification of the Holy Spirit as love is the suitable analogy
for the imago Dei. He explains this in the next chapter, describing the relation of the
intellect to its immanent knowledge (λόγος) as love and yearning (ἔρως and ἔφεσις):
‘Our intellect too, since it is created in the image of God, possesses the image of this
highest love in the relation of the intellect to the knowledge which exists perpetually
from it and in it, in that this love is from it and in it and proceeds from it together
with the innermost word’.37
In other words, it is precisely because our intellect is created kat’ eikona, that it
also possesses an ‘ineffable love’ like the Divine Intellect—i.e. God the Father—
possesses the Holy Spirit. Moreover, ‘The insatiable desire of men for knowledge
is a very clear indication of this even for those who are unable to perceive their
own innermost being’.38 That is to say, man’s lust for knowledge is a clear proof of
the intellect’s love towards its immanent knowledge (λόγος). Therefore, the love

34 Cf. John Damascene, Expositio fidei 8.173, ed. Kotter, 25: …καὶ ἐν Υἱῷ ἀναπαυόμενον.
35 As Sinkewicz (1988), 123 n. 58–59 indicates, Palamas refers here to the biblical passages Jn 15:26: ‘The
Spirit of Truth, who proceeds from the Father’ and Prov 8:30: ‘I was the one (i.e. Wisdom) who
rejoiced together with him’ (‘ἐγὼ ἤμην ᾗ προσέχαιρεν’). Regarding the second passage, Hussey (1972)
85 notes the following: ‘Gregory’s quotation is: ἐγὼ ἤμην ἣ συνέχαιρον αὐτῷ. This is probably a free
citation of Proverbs 8:30b—ἐγὼ ἤμην ᾗ προσέχαιρεν. The context of the passage in Proverbs celebrates
the excellence of wisdom and its presence with God before creation. Gregory’s alteration of the
prepositional prefix does some violence to the original text’.
36 Ch. 36.11–15 and 28–31, 122: ἐκεῖνο δὲ τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ ἀνωτάτω λόγου οἷόν τις ἔρως ἐστὶν ἀπόρρητος τοῦ
γεννήτορος πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸν ἀπορρήτως γεννηθέντα λόγον, ᾧ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐπέραστος λόγος
καὶ υἱὸς χρῆται πρὸς τὸν γεννήτορα, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς ἔχων αὐτὸν συμπροελθόντα καὶ συμφυῶς
ἐν αὐτῷ ἀναπαυόμενον… διὸ παρ’ ἀμφοτέρων καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀξίους πέμπεται, μόνου δὲ τοῦ πατρὸς
καθ’ ὕπαρξιν ὑπάρχον· διὸ καὶ παρ’ αὐτοῦ μόνου ἐκπορεύεται καθ’ ὕπαρξιν. Gregory here stresses the
fact that the Holy Spirit derives His existence only from God the Father, but is sent to the creation
from the Father through the Son. This is the standard opinion of the Byzantine Fathers and the
Orthodox Church. As is well known, Gregory was a fervent opponent of the Filioque. His most
representative texts are his two Apodictic Discourses (ed. Bobrinsky, ΠΣ 1, 23–153). For a recent
and succinct summary of his approach, with some insightful remarks and useful bibliography, see
Siecienski (2010), 145–47. For Palamas’ stance on the Filioque, see the important analysis of Larchet
(1995), 14–104. On the matter of the Filioque in general, see Gemeinhardt (2002). Siecienski (2010).
Alexopoulos (2009).
37 Ch. 37.1–4, 122: Τούτου τοῦ ἀνωτάτω ἔρωτος τὴν εἰκόνα καὶ ὁ κατ᾿ εἰκόνα τοῦ Θεοῦ κτισθεὶς ἡµῶν ἔχει
νοῦς πρὸς τὴν παρ᾿ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ διηνεκῶς ὑπάρχουσαν γνῶσιν, παρ᾿ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τοῦτον
ὄντα καὶ συµπροϊόντα παρ᾿ αὐτοῦ τῷ ἐνδοτάτῳ λόγῳ.
38 Ch. 37.5–7, 122: Καὶ τούτου δεῖγµα ἐναργέστατον καὶ τοῖς µὴ τὰ ἐνδοτάτω ἑαυτῶν δυναµένοις καθορᾶν ἡ
πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀκόρεστος ἔφεσις. Demetracopoulos (1997), 88 points out that Palamas
here alludes to the well-known first line of Aristotle’s Metaphysics: πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι
ὀρέγονται φύσει (see Τῶν μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ Α, 980a, ed. Jaeger, 1).
56 cha p te r 2

of the νοῦς for its λόγος images the ἔρως of the Father for the Son, i.e. it images the
Spirit. This is the second important reflection of the Holy Trinity in man: the other
crucial reason, along with the analogy of the Logos, illustrating how man is created
in the image of God.

3. The Patristic Context

In order to achieve a fuller understanding of Palamas’ teaching on the Trinitarian

reflections in man, the relevant patristic background must be examined. This will
be done in the current section.

a. From the Early Christian Era to St John Damascene

Initially, it should be underscored that the notion of a Trinitarian image, as already

presented, suggests a direct imaging of the Holy Trinity in the human soul or intellect.39
But this notion seems to be limited among the Greek Fathers; it was never developed
to a great extent.
Nevertheless, even in the early Christian era there were efforts to ground the
belief in a triune God by using human analogies. Thus, the Apologists, in the late
second century, exploited the terms ‘intellect’ and the ‘word’ which proceeds from the
intellect, in order to explain the relation between the Father and the Son. According to
them, first we have the internal word (ἐνδιάθετος λόγος), and second its externalized
form (λόγος προφορικός). Sinkewicz gives the following representative example
from Theophilos of Antioch (second century):40 ‘For before anything came into
existence God had this [i.e. τὸν λόγον τὸν ὄντα διὰ παντὸς ἐνδιάθετον ἐν καρδίᾳ Θεοῦ]
as his Counsellor, his own Intellect and Intelligence (νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν). When God
wished to make what he had planned to make, he generated this Logos, making him
external (τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἐγέννησεν προφορικόν)’.41
The Alexandrian tradition often exploited the Νοῦς-Λόγος analogy as well. This
can be traced through Origen,42 Dionysiοs of Alexandria,43 St Athanasios,44 and
St Cyril.45 In the fourth century this analogy is developed to include the πνεῦμα; the
Holy Spirit, which had already taken a central place in the Trinitarian controversies.
For example, St Gregory Nazianzen uses this analogy, in virtue of the existing

39 As Alfeyev (2005), 182 underlines, this notion is entirely Christian, with no roots at all in the
Hellenistic Tradition.
40 Sinkewicz (1988), 21.
41 See Theophilos of Antioch, Ad Autolycum 2.22 (PG 6, 1088B). For another relevant approach, see
Athenagoras, Legatio pro Christianis 10, PG 6, 909A.
42 De principiis 1.1.6, ed. Koetschau, 20–23. Origen, Com. in Ioan. 1.38 (42), ed. Blanc, 198–202 (or: ed.
Preuschen, 49–50).
43 In Athanasios, De sentetia Dionysii 23,6, ed. Opitz, 63–64.
44 Contra gentes 45.5–10, ed. Thomson, 122.
45 Thesaurus de sancta trinitate 6, PG 75, 80C.
 I m ag o T r i nitatis : T h e T r i n i ta ri an Re f lect i o ns i n Man 57

relation between sensible and intelligible realities. He argues that ‘we do know one
and the same nature of the Godhead, recognized by the characteristics unoriginate,
generacy and procession, on the analogy of our mind, word and spirit, to the extent
that intelligible realities resemble sensible ones and the most significant the least,
whereas no image quite arrives at the truth’.46 It is likely that the Nazianzen is the
first basic source on which Palamas draws.
St Gregory of Nyssa (fourth century) expands this analogy (Nous-Logos), though
stressing its inadequacies. He argues that in human nature can be found elements
that remind us of the Divinity.47 Thus he points out that the human word is from
the intellect, but has a distinct hypostasis; it is not identical to the intellect. The
same occurs with the Logos and God the Father: they share the same nature, but
the Logos is a distinct hypostasis.48 Moreover, the Spirit is a distinct person, though
consubstantial with both the Father and the Son.49 Of note is how the bishop of Nyssa
distinguishes the human word and spirit from the Logos and the Holy Spirit.50 So,
in a way, he is a forerunner of Palamas, who, as hinted above, distinguishes between
different types of word and spirit.
This teaching of St Gregory of Nyssa becomes a main source for St John
Damascene’s (seventh-eighth century) own contribution to the subject of the
Trinitarian reflections, in his On the Orthodox Faith, probably his major, and most
known, oeuvre.51 Moreover, in another work of his, John traces the basis of the analogy
between the human intellect, word, and spirit, and the Holy Trinity, in the imago
Dei. In particular he uses a psychological image of the Trinity consisting of intellect,
word, and spirit (νοῦς, λόγος, πνεῦμα).52 It has been noticed53 that John derives this
idea from Gregory Nazianzen54 and Maximos the Confessor.55 However, it should
be underlined that the connection of this Trinitarian analogy with the imago was

46 Hom. 23, Εἰρηνικὸς γ´ (De pace 3) 11, PG 35, 1161C–64A, trans. Sinkewicz (1988), 22: αὐτοὶ δὲ μίαν καὶ
τὴν αὐτὴν εἰδέναι φύσιν θεότητος, ἀνάρχῳ, καὶ γεννήσει, καὶ προόδῳ γνωριζομένην, ὡς νῷ τῷ ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ
λόγῳ, καὶ πνεύματι (ὅσον εἰκάσαι τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὰ νοητά, καὶ τοῖς μικροῖς τὰ μέγιστα, ἐπειδὴ μηδεμία
εἰκὼν φθάνει πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν).
47 Oratio Catechetica, 17Μ, ed. Mühlenberg, 12.4–8, trans. Sinkewicz (1988), 22: ‘As we have come to a
knowledge of the Word by proceeding anagogically from matters that concern us to the transcendent
nature, in the same way we can be brought to a conception of the Spirit, by contemplating in our
nature certain shadows and resemblances of his unspeakable power’.
48 Oratio Catechetica, 16M, ed. Mühlenberg, 11.12–12.3.
49 Oratio Catechetica, 17M, ed. Mühlenberg, 12.26–13.12.
50 Oratio Catechetica, 13M–17M, ed. Mühlenberg, 8–13.
51 Expositio fidei, 6–7, ed. Kotter, 15–17. For an analysis of the resemblances between Palamas’ teaching
and the Damascene’s one (and, moreover, Gregory of Nyssa’s Oratio Catechetica) on this point, see
Demetracopoulos (1997), 90–91.
52 De Imaginibus (Three Treatises on the Divine Images), III, 18, 20, ed. Kotter, 126–28. Cf. Idem, Expositio
fidei 26.16–21, ed. Kotter, 76.
53 Louth (2003), 97 n. 61.
54 Hom. 23, 11 (PG 35, 1161C).
55 Amb. 10, 106, ed. Constas, vol. 1, 320.17–322.3 (PG 91, 1196A), and Quaestiones et dubia 105.22–26, ed.
Declerk, 79–80.
58 cha p te r 2

not something widespread in the previous tradition.56 Nonetheless it had been used
before by Theodoret of Cyr (Cyrus)57 and St Anastasios the Sinaite.58

b. St Maximos the Confessor

But let us now turn our attention to St Maximos the Confessor (sixth-seventh century)
who, in the meanwhile, had also used the aforementioned analogy and seems to
be the basic source for both the Damascene and Palamas.59 Specifically, Maximos’
imago Trinitatis could be depicted as following.60 In Ambiguum 7 he argues that the
human νοῦς, λόγος, and πνεῦμα, that is ‘our whole self ’, should be conformed to
their archetype, ‘that great Intellect, Logos, and Spirit’, namely to the triune God.61
Obviously, this has to do both with the notion of the image and the kath’ omoiosin.
In addition, in Ambiguum 10 the aforementioned triad of the human soul is presented
again, ‘to the extent that this is possible’, as an image of the Trinity.62
Furthermore, some lines below in the same Ambiguum Maximos speaks about
some characteristics of the sanctified man that reflect a number of attributes of the
Holy Trinity: simplicity and unity, the habit of the virtues, and ‘laying aside the
condition of his naturally divided faculties thanks to the grace of God, with whom
he has become one’ (καὶ τὴν ἰδιότητα τῶν κατὰ φύσιν μεριστῶν δυνάμεων διὰ τὴν τοῦ
ἑνωθέντος Θεοῦ χάριν ἀποθέμενος). These characteristics reflect respectively the
divine unity and simplicity, the divine Goodness, and God’s unifying work.63 As
Thunberg observes,
the three functions seem to be easily recognizable as those of the Father, the
Son and the Spirit respectively—and we can also add that the second element,
characterized as the imitation of divine goodness, if we compare it with the

56 Sinkewicz (1988), 23. Let us note that St Augustine used some psychological triads in the image of
the Holy Trinity. It is generally maintained that he is a most possible source of Palamas. The whole
problematic of this issue is analysed in the relevant section of this chapter, i.e. ‘The Presence of
St Augustine’.
57 Quaestiones in Genesim 20.90–102, in Theodoret of Cyrus. The Questions on the Octateuch, vol. 1, 54–56
(= PG 80, 108AB).
58 See, for instance, Anastasii Sinaitae in Hexaemeron Anagogicarum Contemplationum Libros
Duodecim (In Hexaemeron), liber sextus, IV§ 3.359–75 [on Gen 1:26] and IV§ 5.389–91 [on Gen 1:27],
ed. Kuehn and Baggarly, 188 and 190 respectively. I am grateful to Prof. Joseph Munitiz for providing
me with the exact reference to this text of St Anastasios.
59 Sinkewicz mentions Maximos’ contribution, but only in passing. See Sinkewicz (1988), 24 n. 69.
60 For a detailed analysis of this issue, see Thunberg (19952), 129–32.
61 Amb. 7, 25.18–21, ed. Constas, vol. 1, 110 (PG 91, 1088A): ‘…our whole self will have returned to the
whole God as an image to its archetype’ (ὡς ἀρχετύπῳ εἰκόνι).
62 Amb. 10, 106, ed. Constas, vol. 1, 320.17–322.3 (PG 91, 1196A). As Cooper (2005), 100 remarks (and as
already noted before a while), ‘This triadic structure of the human being (nous, logos, pneuma) in
the image of its trinitarian archetype’ is also found in Maximos, Quaestiones et Dubia 105.22–26, ed.
Declerk, 79–80.
63 Amb. 10, 107.6–23, ed. Constas, vol. 1, 322–23 (PG 91, 1196B). For an English translation of Ambiguum
10, see also Louth (1996), 93–152; for the specific passage, see pp. 145–46.
 I m ag o T r i nitatis : T h e T r i n i ta ri an Re f lect i o ns i n Man 59

other texts we have studied, alludes also indirectly to the free development of
the likeness to God in man and to deification, seen as a divine incarnation in
human virtues.64
It is worth noting that here could be found many important similarities with Palamas’
teaching. For instance, as already mentioned in the Overview of the previous chapter,
Gregory vividly connects the likeness to God with the practice of the virtues and
the imitation of the divine goodness.65 Additionally, some relevant points will be
hinted at below, in the section regarding ‘The Spiritual and Ethical Dimension of
the kath’ omoiosin’ of ch. 4. It could even be supported that in this specific teaching
of Maximos we have a reference to the work of the divine activity and a seminal
form of the distinction between essence and activities.66 Besides, for Maximos the
attainment of the likeness is connected with the divine activity (energeia).67 This
is undoubtedly a similarity with Palamas’ theology, though Gregory insists on this
topic to a much greater extent.68

About the Distinction between Essence and Activities

At this point let us make a small parenthesis. Sometimes we seem to regard the
distinction between essence and activities in God as something that Palamas
simply took from the tradition, i.e. from the previous Fathers. But, if that were the
case, one would justifiably invite the following objection: why is it that it is only in
the Third Triad that he settles down to using it as the centre of his defence of the
hesychasts?69 It is widely accepted that Gregory wrote his Third Triad in about the
spring-summer of 1340, while the first two Triads around the spring of 1338, and the

64 Thunberg (19952), 131.

65 As Cooper puts it, ‘Thunberg has rightly recognized this holism when he points out that likeness
to God in Maximus is “consistently related to the life of virtues and the vita practica”’ (Cooper
(2005), 98; he refers to Thunberg (19952), 128). The connection of the image and likeness of God
to the practice of the virtues is a familiar theme in Byzantine theologians. See for instance Symeon
the New Theologian, Hymn. 44.93–213, ed. Koder, Paramelle, and Neyrand, 76–86. Here it is clear
that the likeness to God should be attained through the practice of the virtues. As Alfeyev (2005),
183 explains, for Symeon ‘one will never understand this image (εἰκών) unless one first purifies one’s
own image from passions. When one is purified by one’s good deeds, one becomes godlike and “the
perfect image of the Prototype”. Then the Holy Spirit is sent to man…’. Obviously, one can see a great
resemblance with Palamas’ relevant teaching (cf. our comments on the likeness to God according to
Palamas, in ch. 4 of this book).
66 However, a thorough research on this theme is beyond the scope of the current book. For the
‘logic’ of union and distinction in Maximos, which pervades almost the whole of his oeuvre, see the
important book of Törönen (2007).
67 See Cooper (2005), 98. For instance, Maximοs, in a beautiful and lucid way, connects the likeness
with the divine activity in Quaestiones et dubia 111,1, ed. Declerk, 170.
68 On how Palamas assimilated Maximos’ theology of theosis, see Savvidis (1997). On the theology of
the divine activities in Maximos, see the learned book of Larchet (2010), 331–421. For an interesting
review on this book, see Louth’s one (2011).
69 I owe this remark to Fr Andrew Louth.
60 cha p te r 2

spring-summer of 1339 respectively.70 After presenting the distinction between the

essence and activities in his Third Triad, Palamas uses it as a basic tool in setting forth
his theology, perhaps his most crucial argument. So, if he had simply taken it from
tradition, why didn’t he already use it from the very beginning of his defence of the
hesychast practice of prayer?
A possible explanation is that one can indeed find this distinction in the previous
tradition, but in a rather ‘latent’ form. In other words, some previous Fathers had
indeed spoken about such a distinction, but they had rather placed it in a different
context, and, perhaps, did not articulate it so explicitly.71 Besides, they had not faced
the same theological problems as Palamas; and, it is well known that the Fathers wrote
their treatises in order to confront the specific theological problems of their era. Of
course, this does not mean that previous Fathers had not used this distinction, but
only that they did not express it as clearly as Palamas felt it necessary.72 As Tollefsen
argues, ‘it is wise to remember that Palamas was the first Christian thinker who was
forced because of controversy into the extremely difficult task of exhibiting in precise,
philosophical language what earlier thinkers could allow themselves to sketch in
much broader terms’.73
Moreover, let us not forget that the distinction between essence and activities in
God is also found in the early writings of Palamas, even if not so explicitly as in his
third Triad. For instance, in Tr. 1,3 a central notion is that God is both invisible and
visible, communicable and incommunicable. This of course implies the aforementioned
distinction: man may have communion with the divine activities, not the essence.
Therefore, one would agree with Robert Sinkewicz that ‘The first enunciations of
the Palamite distinction between God’s essence and his energies occur even at this
early stage where the context is the nature of man’s knowledge of God. Here began
the great debate of fourteenth-century Byzantium’.74
But let us now continue tracking the theological milieu within which Palamas
develops his imago Trinitatis.

70 See Sinkewicz (2002), 139.

71 In this point—and especially regarding the possibility of finding passages in the Cappadocians that
resemble to the approach of Palamas—see the important article of Torrance (2009).
72 For how the doctrine of essence and activity was approached from previous Fathers, see the
very important discussion of Tollefsen (2008), 148–60 (and, for St Maximos specifically, see
pp. 160–69).
73 Tollefsen (2012), 195 (Tollefsen had already expressed this same opinion in his The Christocentric
Cosmology (2008), 148). It is very interesting that in this work Tollefsen regards the Palamite
distinction compatible both with the patristic tradition, as well as with Aristotelian philosophy.
The same happens with David Bradshaw’s Aristotle East and West [and also his ‘The Concept of the
Divine Energies’ (2006) (= Athanasopoulos and Schneider (eds) (2013), 27–49). Cf. Plested (2015),
303. For a significant recent effort to show that Palamas’ use of energeia is a traditional patristic
concept, see the learned book of Larchet (2010). For the topic of essence and activities in St Gregory
of Nyssa, and how man comes to knowledge of God through the uncreated divine activities, see
Xionis (1999).
74 Sinkewicz (1982), 240.
 I m ag o T r i nitatis : T h e T r i n i ta ri an Re f lect i o ns i n Man 61

c. St Symeon the New Theologian and Niketas Stethatos75

Recently, Bishop Alexander Golitzin has made a very interesting suggestion:76 he

has suggested that, as concerns Palamas’ imago Trinitatis, two other sources are the
most plausible, i.e. St Symeon the New Theologian (c. 949–1022)77 and, his disciple,
Niketas Stethatos (c. 1005–1085).78 In recent scholarship, as far as I know, it seems that
there is no other occasion of someone discussing this topic in detail or even making
a similar suggestion.79 Therefore, it would be very interesting to test its validity.
Golitzin, first points out that Symeon and Stethatos both made use of the triad
‘nous-logos-psyche’ as an analogy of the Holy Trinity. They, moreover, expanded
upon what Gregory Nazianzen had written. In other words, they built on this
triad, which had been used by the Nazianzen, offering their own insights.80 This
expansion Golitzin regards as Palamas’ most plausible source.81 Trying to prove this,
he assumes that Palamas had access to both Symeon and Niketas.82 As he mentions,
Gregory is ‘certainly aware of and mentions the New Theologian elsewhere in his
oeuvre’. Furthermore, Palamas undoubtedly knew the work of the Nazianzen, but
one can see that he also develops this work, with regards to the aforementioned
psychological triad. Golitzin believes that, ‘Palamas seems thus to be carrying on a
certain trajectory of thought to which his more proximate predecessors had already
contributed’.83
But let us now test this hypothesis, which, at first glance, gives the impression of
solving a difficult problem, i.e. what exactly are the sources of Palamas. Indeed, one
who studies Palamas’ teaching regarding the imago Dei, when reading this hypothesis,
receives the impression of having discovered something valuable. In what follows,
though, it is argued that, whereas this hypothesis-suggestion seems plausible, it is
not without certain problems and one cannot bring much evidence to support it.

75 This section (i.e. ch. 2.3.c), with some changes, was presented at the Seventeenth International
Conference on Patristic Studies held in Oxford, August 2015: see Chouliaras (2017).
76 Golitzin (2002), 182.
77 For his life and teaching, see Alfeyev (2005).
78 For Stethatos, a learned monk of the Stoudios monastery in Constantinople, see Hausherr (1928),
xv–xxxvii, and Nicétas Stéthatos, Opuscules et Lettres, ed. Darrouzès (1961), 7–39. Solignac (1982).
There is also a new edition of Stethatos’ Life of Symeon—which is the only direct biographical account
of Symeon that we have; see Greenfield (2013). This edition provides the best Greek text available—
uniting the advantages of the two editions we have so far, i.e. Hausherr’s (1928) and Koutsas’ (1996)
ones—as well as an excellent translation of this text. Moreover, it offers a very helpful introduction
and notes. For a review, see Louth’s (2013b) one.
79 It is worth noting that Sinkewicz, in his account of Palamas’ sources, does not mention Symeon or
Niketas at all (cf. Sinkewicz (1988), 21–34).
80 These will be presented in a moment.
81 Golitzin (2002), 182. Golitzin discusses Symeon’s psychological triad further in his important book
regarding the Life, Times, and Theology of St Symeon (see Golitzin (1997), 130–33). Nonetheless,
it seems that both in his article, as well as in the book, little evidence is brought to support this
suggestion.
82 However, as will be shown, this fact should not be taken for granted.
83 Golitzin (2002), 182. The author implies here Symeon and Niketas.
62 cha p te r 2

To begin with, let us consider how both Symeon and Niketas use the psychological
triad and, then, compare it with Palamas’ approach. Symeon the New Theologian has
indeed many interesting things to say about the image of God, in terms of its Triadic
reflections.84 First, he sees the human reason (λόγος) as the image of the divine Logos.85
Second, he regards the human soul as the image of God. This is done in the following
way: initially, he writes that the soul is the image of the Logos,86 but then he speaks
more generally, arguing that the soul is the image of God (and afterwards—some
lines below—of the Holy Trinity). This is stated in Christological terms:
He (the Logos) is coeternal with the Father and the Spirit.
In the same manner my soul is in His image,
For it has intellect (νοῦς) and reason (λόγος),
And it maintains them by nature
Undivided (ἄτμητα), without confusion (ἀσύγχυτα)
And consubstantial (ὁμοούσια):
The three are unified in one,
But are distinguished.87
In other words, the Father, the Son, and the Spirit have a common nature and are
undivided; but the same goes for the soul, the intellect, and the reason. Therefore,
the soul is in God’s image. Next, Symeon specifies his argument by writing that the
human soul is the imago of the Holy Trinity.88 In particular, the Holy Spirit abides
in the Father and proceeds from Him. The same applies to the human intellect, in
relation to the soul: the intellect is in the soul and proceeds from it.89 Furthermore,
the intellect gives birth to reason eternally and sends it out, making it familiar and
accessible to everyone. It is never separated from reason and, at the same time, it
gives birth to reason and keeps it within itself. But the same happens with God the
Father, who gives birth eternally to the Son and is never separated from Him.90
Accordingly, the soul is made kat’ eikona of the Holy Trinity.
Symeon, furthermore, has some powerful things to say concerning the imago,
insofar as it is regarded in its triadic manifestation. For instance, he evokes a new
(perhaps original?) triad91—which does not seem to come up again in Palamas—,
namely ‘God, soul, and body’. Symeon uses this triad to stress the image of God in

84 For a general presentation of Symeon’s imago theology, see Alfeyev (2005), 181–84. This work
provides the basis for the following analysis. For an interesting good presentation of some basic
points, see also Golitzin (1997), 147–56. For Symeon’s anthropology in general, see pp. 175–90 of
Alfeyev’s book. For a fuller view, see Lascaris (1969).
85 Hymn 44.30–31, ed. Koder, 72: κατ’ εἰκόνα οὖν τοῦ λόγου δέδοται ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος.
86 Hymn 44.35–37, ed. Koder, 72: λογικὴ εἰκὼν τοῦ λόγου.
87 Hymn 44.40–50, ed. Koder, 72–74. The trans. is from Alfeyev (2005), 183.
88 Hymn 44.63–92, ed. Koder, 74–76.
89 Hymn 44.74–78, ed. Koder, 76.
90 Hymn 44.79–92, ed. Koder, 76. In this last schema we see the traditional view—which reappears in
Palamas—of the Father as the divine Intellect (Nous) and of the Son as the divine Logos; the Λόγος
proceeds from the Νοῦς.
91 For this remark and the accompanying insightful thoughts I am grateful to Prof. Alexis Torrance.
 I m ag o T r i nitatis : T h e T r i n i ta ri an Re f lect i o ns i n Man 63

man and, in order to do so, he utilises Christological terminology again—indeed,

with a Chalcedonian nuance. It is worth citing the relevant passage:
We have thus demonstrated that, just as God is worshipped in Father, Son, and
Holy Spirit without confusion and without division, so in turn does man, without
confusion or division, become in God a god by grace in both his soul and body;
neither does the body turn into a soul, nor does the soul transform into divinity,
nor is God commingled with the soul, nor does the soul congeal with the flesh,
but God remains what he is as God, and the soul what it is by nature, and the body
such as it was fashioned, of clay. He [i.e. Christ] who has paradoxically bound
all these together, and has mingled what is both intelligible and immaterial with
clay, unites himself with both at once without confusion, and I myself become
according to his image and likeness… Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are the one
God Whom we worship. God, soul, and body is the human being made in the
image of God and is deemed worthy to be god.92
Here Symeon speaks of deification. He underlines that the deified man, while fully
united with God, preserves his own body and soul; these elements are not lost. It is
then, in theosis, that man truly becomes according to God’s image and likeness.93 This
new triad ‘God, soul, and body’ is, most likely, an original—even unique—approach.
To my knowledge, it does not appear in Palamas.
But a detailed treatment of Symeon’s imago theology cannot be pursued in the
current book. Let us now briefly look at Niketas Stethatos’ contribution to the
matter, continuing to test the proposed thesis of Golitzin.94 First, Niketas traces the
image in the tripartite division of man, as follows.95 God is worshipped in Father,
Son, and Spirit. But in God’s image, i.e. man, one can also trace three parts, namely
soul, intellect, and reason: through these three parts man venerates God. The three
divine persons are co-eternal and consubstantial (συναΐδιά τε καὶ ὁμοούσια) and there
is one God, who is divided in three persons, but in an undivided manner (καὶ εἷς
ἐστι Θεὸς ἀδιαιρέτως ἐν προσώποις τρισὶ διαιρούμενος). Likewise, in man, the three
elements—soul, intellect, and reason—are co-existent and consubstantial (συμφυῆ
τε καὶ ὁμοούσια). Accordingly, man is considered to be made in the image of God
exactly due to this tripartite division.96

92 Ethical Discourse 6.161–78, On dispassion and a virtuous life, ed. Darrouzès, 131–32. The translation is
borrowed from Golitzin (1996), 69–70 (with some modifications).
93 It is interesting that both Palamas himself seems to stress the fact that only in deification man truly
becomes according to God’s image and likeness. See, relevantly, our section in the next chapter
regarding ‘The Faculty of Self-Governance and Man’s Dominion over the Created World’.
94 In the following I am based on Niketas Stethatos, De anima (Περὶ ψυχῆς), ed. Darrouzès, 56–153 and
specifically on part ‘v’, pp. 82–86 (What does the ‘image and likeness to God’ mean and which is the
essence of the soul?). The first number in the reference indicates the chapter, the second the relevant
lines and the third the page in the critical edition.
95 De anima, 21.1–3, ed. Darrouzès, 82–84.
96 De anima, 21.4–14, ed. Darrouzès, 84.
64 cha p te r 2

Furthermore, Niketas parallels the origination of the Logos from the divine
Nous to the origination of the human word from the intellect: as the human reason
is born from the intellect impassibly (ἀπαθῶς) and unchangeably (ἀρρεύστως), and
remains inseparable from the intellect, in the same way one should understand the
origination of the Logos from God the Father.97 Again, this is what Symeon had
also argued; it is likely that Niketas borrows this idea from his teacher, Symeon.98 It
should be noted that Niketas calls the human reason ‘consubstantial and co-eternal
to the intellect’ (τῷ σῷ νοῒ ὁμοούσιός τε καὶ συναΐδιος),99 an expression which brings
to mind the well known reference of Palamas—and already mentioned above, in his
first Trinitarian analogy100—to ‘the word naturally stored up within our intellect…
that knowledge which is always coexistent with the intellect’ (‘τὸν ἐμφύτως ἡμῖν…
ἐναποκείμενον τῷ νῷ λόγον, τὴν ἀεὶ συνυπάρχουσαν αὐτῷ γνῶσιν’).101
In conclusion, Niketas locates the image of God in the ‘intellectual soul, the intellect
and the reason, the one and undivided nature, the coexistent and consubstantial
and undivided’.102 This happens because the intellect and the reason, both always
united with the soul, image the Son and the Spirit: the Logos and the Pneuma are
consubstantial and undivided, and they are never separated from the Father.103
As shown earlier, this triad, viz. νοῦς, λόγος, and ψυχή, is also used by Symeon
but, interestingly enough, it is not evoked in this form by Palamas. Gregory speaks
of nous-logos-pneuma and by ‘pneuma’, he does not seem to mean ‘soul’; he refers
rather to the ‘love’ (ἔρως) which exists both in the Trinity and the human soul. On the
one hand, the Holy Spirit is the eros of the Father towards the Son.104 On the other
hand, the human spirit (pneuma) is the eros of the intellect for its own immanent

97 Niketas Stethatos, Contre les Juifs, 9.16–23, ed. Darrouzès, 422.

98 Or, perhaps, from the previous patristic tradition, where one can find this argument expressed often.
99 As mentioned above, Symeon points that the divine Logos is ‘co-eternal’ with the Father and the
Spirit. The soul is also συναΐδιος with the intellect and the reason, and this is why the soul is made in
the image of the Logos. See Hymn. 44.40–44, ed. Koder, 72–74: ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος ἐκ Θεοῦ, συναΐδιός τε
ἔστι τῷ πατρὶ καὶ τῷ πνεύματι. Οὕτως οὖν καὶ ἡ ψυχή μου κατ’ εἰκόνα τούτου ἔστι…
100 See ch. 2.1.
101 Palamas, Ch. 35.14–16, 120. Another point where Palamas and Niketas seem to resemble is about
the ‘Written Word’. Both of them refer to the human word in a specific way: it exists in the intellect
and ‘takes up flesh’ through speaking and, especially, writing. Furthermore, they both relate this fact
with the Incarnation, the embodiment of the Divine Logos [it is the faculty of ‘sense perception’
(αἰσθητικόν) in Palamas; see ch. 3.3 of our book, for an analysis], for which man bears the image of
God to a greater extent than the angels; though in Niketas it is not placed in the same context. See
Palamas, Ch. 63.12–18, 158, and Stethatos, Contre les Juifs, 10.1–12, ed. Darrouzès, 424. This could be
indeed a possible point where Palamas is influenced by Stethatos. However, these two authors seem
to have a different goal: Stethatos tries to find a human analogy to ‘explain’ the Incarnation of the
Logos, and present it as an argument to the Jews. On the other hand, Palamas wants to exalt man over
the angels, in terms of the imago. For more on this, see ‘The Faculty of Sense Perception (αἰσθητικὸν)’
in the next chapter of this book.
102 De anima, 22.1–3, ed. Darrouzès, 84: Εἰκὼν γὰρ Θεοῦ ψυχὴ νοερά, νοῦς καὶ λόγος, ἡ μία καὶ ἀδιαίρετος
φύσις, ἡ ὁμοφυής τε καὶ ὁμοούσιος καὶ ἀχώριστος.
103 De anima, 22.3–10, ed. Darrouzès, 84.
104 Ch. 36.11–13, 122.
 I m ag o T r i nitatis : T h e T r i n i ta ri an Re f lect i o ns i n Man 65

λόγος.105 Moreover, Gregory identifies this pneuma with a power of the soul, its
vivifying power (ζωοποιὸς δύναμις), namely the power that moves the body.106
This new element, the introduction of ‘pneuma’, is a point where it seems that
Palamas deviates from the teaching of Symeon and Niketas and, one could even say,
the entirety of the previous tradition, adding something original. Of course, the triad
had also been used before in this form (nous-logos-pneuma) by certain Fathers, as
already mentioned,107 but it seems that St Gregory attributes a different meaning to
‘pneuma’: he connects the ‘pneuma’ with the ‘eros’ and the vivifying power. Despite
the fact that both of these approaches had already appeared in previous Fathers,108
Palamas seems to be offering something new here.
From the above statements it has been shown that Gregory’s approach does
indeed possess some similarities with Symeon’s and Niketas’ teaching. But there are
also some differences. For instance, Gregory does not exploit Symeon’s triad of ‘God,
soul, and body’; nor does he see the soul as the image of the Logos, as Symeon did.
At least as far I can tell, he only sees the human intellect as the image of the Logos.
In addition, St Gregory does not seem to follow Symeon in another very important
argument of his—unmentioned thus far—, namely in seeing a Trinitarian reflection
in ‘the unified function of the three faculties of the soul’, i.e. reason, irascibility, and
desire (‘logistikon, thymetikon, epithymetikon’).109

105 Ch. 37.1–4, 122. For an analysis, cf. ch. 2.2 of the current book.
106 See, for instance, Palamas’ Ch. 38 (ed. Sinkewicz, 124). Here Palamas argues that man, exactly because
he possesses a body and the soul’s vivifying power, has the image of God to a greater extent than the
angels. For an analysis of this power, see ch. 3.1 of this book.
107 Mainly Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory Nazianzen, Augustine, Maximos, and John Damascene. On
another occasion, it would be very interesting to research what exactly do these authors mean by
‘pneuma’. A possible explanation is that they simply refer to the ‘soul’, but there may be some other
connotations too. Niketas Stethatos for instance, in some places of his oeuvre, identifies the pneuma
with the human soul, the ‘intellectual and immortal’. See, e.g., Stethatos, Traité contre les Juifs, 8.5–6
and 9.4–5, ed. Darrouzès, 420 and 422 respectively. Moreover, often pneuma has the meaning of
divine grace, i.e. the grace of the Holy Spirit. Cf. Vlachos, (201410), 118–19.
108 For instance, see the contribution of Augustine, from whom Palamas borrows, most probably,
the notion of ‘love’ (see the next section of this chapter). At this point it is worth underlining
that when the Fathers use this psychological model (nous-logos-pneuma), they are not just going
through philosophical exercises or engaging in intellectual speculation. They are trying to find
analogies between man and the Holy Trinity, so as to explicate further the relationship between
the creature and the Creator. In addition, by this means they often try to explain their own spiritual
and mystical experiences. Golitzin (1997), 133 expresses this well, based on both Symeon’s and
Augustine’s contributions: ‘Symeon reaches for the analogy of the soul, almost instinctively, to
explain his experience. He wants an “inner” explanation of the Trinity which is based at once on his
own experience of himself, hard-won through the tempering of traditional asceticism, and on the
gratuitous gift of God’s self-revelation. This is not so very different from Augustine. He, too, struggled
and was also accorded an experience of the divine majesty, and he, too, then turned inward to find the
explanation for both’.
109 Symeon, Eth. 4.424–29, On the Graces and Gifts disclosed within dispassion (apatheia), ed. Darrouzès,
38. Cf. Golitzin (1997), 131. Golitzin argues, in the same page, that this passage is most probably
‘unique in Greek patristic literature’. There is, though, another passage which resembles it. It comes
from St Theoleptos of Philadelpheia (1250–1322), a late Byzantine bishop and ascetic (see the next
66 cha p te r 2

Consequently, it cannot be demonstrated with certainty from their points of

commonality that Palamas’ most likely sources are Symeon and Niketas. Besides,
these formulations had also been used much earlier than Symeon and Stethatos.
Moreover, it seems that the two aforementioned authors make wider use of the
Trinitarian reflections than Palamas.
But there is also another major question, related to our topic: did Palamas even
have direct knowledge of Symeon’s and Niketas’ corpus? Palamas’ teaching indeed
possesses many similarities to that of Symeon, mainly regarding the following
subjects: the vision of God, the divine light, deification, Eucharistic spirituality, and
Christocentrism.110 Meyendorff, moreover, believes that he surely relies on Symeon.111
Nevertheless, Palamas hardly ever mentions Symeon and Niketas; to my knowledge,
he mentions Symeon’s texts only once in his corpus, and only once does he refer
explicitly to Niketas’ Vie de Syméon.112 He refers rather to better known Fathers, such

subsection for details), and is found in his Monastic Discourses, Disc. 1, Discourse explaining the hidden
activity in Christ and showing briefly the goal of monastic profession [Λόγος τὴν ἐν Χριστῷ κρυπτὴν
ἐργασίαν διασαφῶν], 24.282–85, ed. Sinkewicz, 100: ‘In this way, then, prayer calls the powers of the
soul back from the dispersion caused by the passions, binds them to one another and to itself, uniting
the tripartite soul to the one God in three hypostases’ (Οὕτως οὖν ἡ προσευχὴ τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεις
ἀπὸ τοῦ διαμερισμοῦ τῶν παθῶν ἀνακαλουμένη καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλας καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν συνδέουσα, τὴν
τριμερῆ ψυχὴν τῷ ἐν τρισὶν ὑποστάσεσιν ἑνὶ Θεῷ οἰκειοῖ).
110 Alfeyev (2005), 277 n. 19. Meyendorff (1959a), 221 (= Meyendorff (1974a), 155). Meyendorff believes,
quite fairly, that ‘these elements of the personal and prophetic mysticism of Symeon are found
expressed in Palamas with a theological rigor’ not present in the New Theologian (Meyendorff
(1959a), 221; my translation). Moreover, Alfeyev (2005), 277 n. 19 notes that ‘in his teaching on
prayer Palamas was certainly influenced by the Method of Sacred Prayer and Attentiveness, ascribed to
Symeon’. The Method was an ascetic text that would go on to have a great impact on Hesychasm. It
was a short text, containing, among others, a psychosomatic technique to be used during the Jesus
Prayer; this text was attributed to Symeon by the thirteenth-century Hesychasts, and until 1927.
However, recent scholarship has shown that it is most likely not written by Symeon, despite the
fact that some of its points are very close to the latter’s teaching (see Alfeyev (2005), 276–77). It is
possible, though, that it sprung out from Symeon’s circle of students. For more details regarding the
‘Method’, see The Philokalia, vol. 4, 64–66.
111 This reality, namely that Palamas’ and Symeon’s teachings bear many similarities, along with the
possibility of Palamas being influenced by Symeon, is characteristically, though naively, expressed
through a seventeenth-century Jesuit’s statement, according to which Symeon was the ‘fons omnis
erroris Palamici’ (‘the source of all of Palamas’ errors’)! [Cited in Golitzin (1997), 140, who refers to
Holl (1898), 3].
112 Meyendorff (1959a), 221 n. 114 (= Meyendorff (1974a), 155). Meyendorff, in particular, mentions two
references to Symeon’s texts and one to Niketas’ Life. First, in Triads 1.2.12, 404–06 (99–101) Palamas
mentions explicitly Symeon and his Life. Moreover, he refers implicitly to the Method (which,
as mentioned before a while, is, most probably, not an authentic text). Palamas there argues that
Symeon’s life was almost from beginning to end a miracle and that he (i.e. Symeon) was glorified by
God through ‘supernatural miracles’. Moreover, Symeon’s writings are, according to Gregory, ‘writings
of life’ (συγγράμματα ζωῆς). In the same passage Palamas refers also to other great ascetic writers and
acknowledges himself as walking in the same tradition as them (ΠΣ 1, 404–05; ed. Meyendorff, 99).
From all the above, it is obvious that Palamas regarded Symeon highly. Furthermore, Meyendorff
also mentions another reference to Symeon. In particular he refers to an unedited text called Ἕτερα
Κεφάλαια (for the available Manuscripts, see his Introduction, 284). According to Meyendorff, this
text is the only occurrence in Palamas’ oeuvre that he speaks of his own personal experience of grace.
 I m ag o T r i nitatis : T h e T r i n i ta ri an Re f lect i o ns i n Man 67

as Gregory Nazianzen, Dionysiοs, Maximos, or John Damascene.113 This is quite

surprising, considering the proximity of the similarities between Palamas’ and Symeon’s
theology.114 Nevertheless, as Alfeyev underlines, ‘A convincing explanation of this
might be found in the fact that, being always involved in polemic, Gregory deliberately
limited himself to references to those Fathers who were authorities for his opponents,
whereas Symeon’s influence was considerable only in Hesychast monastic circles’.115
This is an interesting theory, but, in my view, not conclusive. First, scholarship needs
to clarify whether Palamas’ opponents were familiar with—and perhaps used—the
theology of Symeon and Niketas.116 Let us not forget that some of them were monks
(e.g. Barlaam) or well known ascetics (in the case of Gregory Akindynos). However, if
an initial hypothesis is to be formulated, this scenario does not seem very possible.117
But, second, why should one regard Palamas as ‘being always involved in polemic’?
For instance, in his sermons (Homiliai) to his flock in Thessaloniki Palamas does not
seem to refer explicitly to Symeon; these sermons, however, do not have a polemical
purpose. On the contrary, they are rather intended for the spiritual and ethical support
of the faithful and are presented in a rather irenic way. Moreover, by the time they
were delivered, the Hesychast turbulence had passed away; the Church had already
expressed her self-consciousness and endorsed the Palamite theology through the
relevant Synods and official texts. So, how can this absence be explained?118 Shouldn’t
he have made use, by that time, of the widely known and revered ascetic Symeon,
who belonged undoubtedly in the Hesychast climate?
A simple possible explanation would be that patristic and Byzantine sermons in
general do not cite difficult theological and monastic writings. But, does this lack,
perhaps, mean that Palamas did not in fact know well the work of Symeon? That

But this scenario bears some problems. First, as far as I know, this text cannot be traced in the critical
edition of Gregory’s corpus (i.e. Christou’s one, nor in the list of works that Sinkewicz (2002),
138–55 provides). Thus, as it seems, this text is not ascribed to Palamas from his critical editors,
despite Meyendorff ’s certainty of its authenticity (Meyendorff (1959a), 284: ‘il n’y a pas lieu, je crois,
de douter de leur authenticité’). It is noteworthy that Alfeyev, in his brief treatment of Symeon’s
aufnahme from Palamas, does not mention at all this alleged work of Gregory (Alfeyev (2005), 277–
78). Furthermore, from my point of view, the fact that nowhere else in his oeuvre does Palamas reveal
his own personal experiences, at least so directly, is a strong indication that this text does not come
from his pen. Nevertheless, this point needs much more research—most likely, paleographical—to
be fully clarified; but this goes beyond the scope of our book.
113 Cf. Golitzin (1997), 181.
114 Golitzin mentions another possible point of contact between Symeon and Palamas. The latter refers
to St Paul’s vision as a paradigm of seeing the divine light of the world to come (cf. ch. 7.1.a of our
book); but this had been already used by Symeon. See Golitzin (1997), 182 (and esp. n. 27).
115 Alfeyev (2005), 277; emphases added.
116 As it seems, Alfeyev does not discuss this subject in his book.
117 It is noteworthy that in the index of names of Alfeyev’s book neither of these two names (i.e. Barlaam
or Akindynos) appears.
118 It is striking that also in the Philokalia Symeon seems to have a rather ‘marginal’ place (I owe this
remark to Fr Andrew Louth); from his voluminous—and very important—writings, St Makarios
and St Nikodemos, the editors, chose only two for inclusion (see vol. 4 of the English ed. of the
Philokalia).
68 cha p te r 2

could be possibly attributed, for instance, to the fact that Palamas did not have direct
access to the relevant manuscripts. Is it, at last, clear that Gregory knew more than
Symeon’s Life, composed by Stethatos? To my view, this should not be at all taken for
granted. Anyway, it is difficult to definitively support the position held by Golitzin
that Palamas drew directly on the work of Symeon and Stethatos.119
To sum up, for all the above reasons, the ‘Symeon-Niketas’ case is not easily
proven and, therefore, the question about Palamas’ sources still remains quite open.
Nevertheless, Palamas indeed pursues the same line of thought as Symeon and
Niketas in virtue of the fact that he also provides an expansion to the traditional triad
nous-logos-pneuma, as they had already done, about three centuries before him, and
moreover, because he belongs, as they do, to this patristic tradition that one would
justifiably call, in Golitzin’s words, ‘ascetico-mystical’.120

d. St Gregory of Sinai and Theoleptos of Philadelpheia

But let us now move to another very interesting suggestion, regarding the patristic
context of Palamas’ imago Trinitatis. In particular, Sinkewicz has found two con-
temporary parallels to Palamas’ elaboration:121 Sts Gregory of Sinai (c. 1275 – 27
November 1346) and Theoleptos of Philadelpheia (1250–1322). Let us now examine
this suggestion. Gregory the Sinaite was a very important figure for the hesychast
revival in the fourteenth century.122 He was a well known ascetic who lived for many
years on Mount Athos, but in other regions too, mainly in a place called ‘Paroria’,
which is found on the mountains near the borders between the Byzantine Empire
and Bulgaria.
It is known that Palamas and the Sinaite were on the Holy Mountain of Athos
during the same period. But, among scholars, opposite views have been expressed
about whether they were in personal contact and to what extent. In particular, Balfour
has argued that Palamas was indeed the disciple of the Sinaite.123 Sinkewicz found his
arguments convincing and, moreover, concluded ‘that there was a direct dependence
of Palamas on Gregory of Sinai in the case of the doctrine of God’s image in man’.124
But the translators and editors of the English Philokalia maintained that many of the

119 Nevertheless, it is worth noting that, as Golitzin (1997), 136 points out, there are enough manuscripts
(of good quality) ‘which have come down to us from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries’. On the
other hand, there is indeed the possibility that Palamas knew this work (or some parts of it) through
the ‘oral tradition’. As far as I know, there has not been written any detailed essay regarding the
potential influence of the New Theologian on Palamas. Thus, the question remains open. Such a work
would be very useful and welcome. For a nice basic account of Symeon’s nachleben in later Eastern
Orthodox tradition (Byzantine, Russian and, also, contemporary), see Alfeyev (2005), 275–87.
Cf. Golitzin (1997), 136 and 182–83.
120 Golitzin (2002), 165, 167, 188.
121 See respectively, Sinkewicz (1988), 25–28 and 29–34.
122 About his life and teaching, see Rigo (2002), 35–130. Ware (1972), 3–22. Balfour (1982a). For a
succinct outline of his life and works, see The Philokalia, vol. 4, 207–11.
123 See Balfour (1984).
124 Sinkewicz (1988), 28.
 I m ag o T r i nitatis : T h e T r i n i ta ri an Re f lect i o ns i n Man 69

presented arguments from Balfour on the alleged relationship between Palamas and
the Sinaite ‘remain speculative’.125 Nevertheless, it is nowadays acknowledged that
Palamas did indeed know Gregory of Sinai personally and was acquainted with his
work.126 Furthermore, their theological angle is very similar.127 In general, the Sinaite
in his teaching insists both on the ‘active’ life and the ‘contemplative’ life, namely the
practice of the virtues and the continuous invocation of the Jesus Prayer respectively.128
But let us briefly check the Sinaite’s approach. In his Discourse on the Transfiguration,
Gregory of Sinai argues that ‘Man is the image and glory of the Trinity in that he
possesses essentially and hypostatically an intellect and word and spirit which belong
to a single nature and which are inseparable’.129 Moreover, Sinkewicz proved that
paragraphs 18–21 of this Discourse provide some close parallels to Palamas’ Homily
60, On the Holy Feast of Theophany.130 In both texts the main subject is the image of
God in man and, mainly, its triadic structure.
In particular, in paragraph 18 of his Discourse on the Transfiguration Gregory of
Sinai mentions three arguments that resemble Palamas’ approach: a) God the Father
is the Father of the Logos and ‘the transcendent Intellect beyond intellect’,131 b)
‘we shall see the archetype in the image and from our own selves the transcendent
one’,132 c) no one can see and know the Father unless the Son reveals Him, ‘as the
word reveals the intellect hidden in it and the intellect reveals in the spirit the word
which proceeds from it’.133

125 The Philokalia, vol. 4, 207 n. 2.

126 I am grateful to Prof. Antonio Rigo and Dr Rorman Russell for this remark.
127 The Philokalia, vol. 4, 208.
128 His works were published for the first time in the Philokalia, composed by St Nikodimos of the Holy
Mountain (1749–1809) and St Makarios of Corinth (or ‘Notaras’; 1731–1805) in Venice (1782). They
were also published again in the five-volume reprint in Greek (Athens, 1961, vol. 4, 31–88). For the
English translation, see The Philokalia, vol. 4, 212–86. Unfortunately, many of his works have not been
critically edited, as far as I can know. This lack had been already remarked, about forty years ago, by
David Balfour (1982b), 698 n. 141 (italics added), whose words remain still up to date: ‘What would
be even better, of course, would be a critical Greek text, with apparatus and biblical and patristic
references on one page, and a modern translation with explanatory notes on the other. But such
editions are unfortunately costly nowadays and the reading public for them is shrinking’. The last sentence
is particularly timely today. Due to the financial crisis, all over the world, the humanities in general
are indeed debased, in virtue of supporting more technical and practical orientated branches. But
this, of course, has a crucial impact on the values of contemporary life; modern man is extremely
orientated towards economy and technology, and seems to lose sight of the great and constant values
of life. Anyway, a critical edition of the Sinaite’s corpus would help us better understand his potential
influence on Palamas.
129 Discourse on the Transfiguration, par. 20.303–05, ed. Balfour, 664. The edition was published by Balfour
(1981) (the text is on pp. 644–80).
130 In particular, the sections 3 and 4 of this Homily; for the text, see ΠΣ 6, 647 (ΠΑΕ 11, 510–12). For
Sinkewicz’s analysis, see Sinkewicz (1988), 27–28.
131 Discourse on the Transfiguration, par. 18.240–41, ed. Balfour, 660: νοῦς ὁ ὑπὲρ νοῦν ὑπερούσιος.
132 Discourse on the Transfiguration, par. 18.252–53, ed. Balfour, 660: ἐν τῇ εἰκόνι τὸ ἀρχέτυπον, ἐξ ἑαυτῶν τὸ
ὑπερούσιον (the trans. is from Sinkewicz (1988), 27).
133 Discourse on the Transfiguration, 18.272–75, ed. Balfour, 660: ὡς λόγος τὸν ἐν αὐτῷ κρυπτόμενον νοῦν
καὶ νοῦς τὸν ἐξ αὐτοῦ προερχόμενον λόγον ἐν πνεύματι.
70 cha p te r 2

In paragraphs 19–20 the Sinaite develops his arguments in detail. Sinkewicz

summarizes the basic notions as following:
The intellect contains naturally the word which reveals it; the word possesses
by nature the intellect which begets it; and voice makes the word known, for it
is a living and revelatory energy of the word. This constitutes an analogy for the
Trinity, where in the Spirit the Son is known, in the Son the Father is known by
nature and substance, and in the Father the Son is known by causal relationship
and the Spirit by procession. But the Sinaite notes that certain qualifications are
necessary. It must be understood that the intellect experiences no dissipation
in its association with the word but rather belongs to the word naturally and
hypostatically. The word does not go forth and dissolve into the air. Rather it
refers to rationality itself, as it inheres hypostatically in the intellect. Nor does
spirit refer to a mere movement of the air. It is an essential living power which is
self-subsistent, comes forth in word and produces sound in the air.134
Moreover, Sinkewicz provided another passage of Gregory of Sinai which seems
very similar to Palamas’ own teaching. It comes from the Sinaite’s Acrostic Chapters:
‘In like manner there is in man intellect, word and spirit. Neither can intellect exist
without word nor without spirit; each subsists in the others and in itself. For intellect
speaks through the word and word is made manifest through the spirit. According
to this model man bears an obscure image of the ineffable and archetypal Trinity,
disclosing even now the divine image in which he is created’.135
From all the above Sinkewicz concludes that ‘the parallels are striking, especially
given the historical contemporaneity of the two writers’, and that ‘it is reasonable to
conclude that there was a direct dependence of Palamas on Gregory of Sinai in the
case of the doctrine of God’s image in man’.136 However, from my point of view, some
objections could be raised here. Surely one can trace some important similarities.
Nevertheless, our data are, perhaps, not so strong as to permit us to think about ‘striking
parallels’, or to be certain about ‘a direct dependence of Palamas’ on the Sinaite, in terms
of the imago Dei. Besides, such approaches were also found in the previous tradition.137
On the other hand, as far as Theoleptos’ approach is concerned, the following can
be briefly noted. He was the bishop of Philadelpheia, an important Byzantine city in
Asia Minor.138 As an ascetic personality, Theoleptos’ teaching has a deeply ascetical

134 Sinkewicz (1988), 27 (slightly modified; Sinkewicz writes ‘mind’ instead of ‘intellect’).
135 Κεφάλαια δι’ ἀκροστοιχίδος, λα´ (31), PG 150, 1248D, trans. Sinkewicz, 28, with some modifications
drawn from the trans. of the Philokalia, vol. 4, 218. Cf. Κεφάλαια δι’ ἀκροστοιχίδος, λβ´ (32), PG
150, 1249A.
136 Sinkewicz (1988), 28.
137 See, for instance, the approaches of the early Apologists, Gregory of Nyssa, the Nazianzen, or even
Symeon the New Theologian and Niketas Stethatos (all mentioned above, in this section). By the
way, do our texts permit for a knowledge, and use, of Symeon and Niketas from the Sinaite? But this
goes beyond the scope of our book.
138 For his life and the critical edition of his whole extant corpus, see Grigoropoulos (1996). For another
critical edition of the majority of Theoleptos’ writings, along with a useful introduction, an important
outline of his teaching and an English translation of the texts, see Sinkewicz (1992).
 I m ag o T r i nitatis : T h e T r i n i ta ri an Re f lect i o ns i n Man 71

and mystical nuance; and for this reason, his style is very much like that of Palamas.
In Theoleptos’ oeuvre hesychia (silence/quietude) and nipsis (vigilance) have a central
place. He is considered as a forerunner of the Hesychasts. It has been also suggested
that he used to be, for a period, the spiritual father of Palamas.139
Between his approach and Palamas’, some similarities can be found. Theoleptos
makes use of the triad ‘intellect, word, and love’ (νοῦς, λόγος, ἔρως/ἀγάπη),140 as
well as ‘intellect, word, and spirit’.141 He describes the activities of the three parts
of the soul, the fact that ‘the intellect seeks God through its own natural word’ and
that ‘the intellect with its word attains union with God in love’. Moreover, speaking
about Christ’s baptism in the Jordan, he refers to the tripartite image in man as an
‘obscure reflection of the Trinity’. Furthermore, he connects the imago Dei with
the Jesus prayer.142 Nevertheless, despite these similarities, it does not seem to
me very accurate to argue that ‘The coincidences are so felicitous that there can
be little doubt regarding the dependence of Gregory Palamas on the teaching of
Theoleptos of Philadelpheia’.143 Undoubtedly, there are close similarities, but, at
least in my view, they do not show for sure that Palamas borrows from Theoleptos.
However, it is very possible that Gregory knew the general oeuvre of Theoleptos and
was influenced by it.144
Sinkewicz makes, moreover, an attempt to trace the source of Palamas’ use of the
notion of the ‘eros’ in Theoleptos’ use. Indeed, it is very interesting the way Theoleptos
inserts the idea of ‘love’ in his analysis of the parts of the inner self.145 However, as
will be shown in the following section, St Gregory most likely borrows the use of
‘eros’ from St Augustine. But, as has been maintained, a possible version is that
Theoleptos’ use of the notion of ‘eros’ prepared Palamas for his own appropriation
of the relevant Augustinian theme.146
And a last question: which case is more likely to be true, the ‘Symeon-Niketas’
or the ‘Gregory of Sinai-Theoleptos’ narrative? I would opt for the second, but we
cannot be certain. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that Palamas makes use
of both these traditions, providing at last his own approach through a fruitful, and
sometimes original, combination of them.

139 Sinkewicz (1988), 33–34 initially supported the possibility of a direct relationship between Theoleptos
and Gregory, but later reconsidered his position. See Sinkewicz (1992), 11 and Sinkewicz (2002), 132.
Cf. Louth (2005), 50. In my view, this topic needs to be further examined for a definitive word to be
said.
140 Monastic Discourse (MD) 23, 1–2, 7, 13–14, 57–59, ed. Sinkewicz, 352, 354–56, 358, 380.
141 MD 1, 18, ed. Sinkewicz, 96.
142 For all these, see Sinkewicz (1992), 33.
143 Sinkewicz (1992), 33.
144 Cf. Louth (2005), 51.
145 MD 23, 13–15, ed. Sinkewicz, 358. For an analysis of Theoleptos’ approach here, see Sinkewicz (1992),
44–46.
146 Louth (2005), 56–57. I agree with Demetracopoulos (1997), 89 that Theoleptos too, possibly, borrows
this notion (‘eros’) from Augustine’s De Trinitate; but this requires a specific essay to be proved.
Sinkewicz does not mention at all the possibility of Theoleptos having been influenced by Augustine.
72 cha p te r 2

e. Imago Trinitatis: Why?

Now that we have established the patristic framework of Palamas’ approach, a crucial
question arises: why does Palamas prefer this approach to the imago Dei? In particular,
why does he give such an emphasis to man’s reflection of the Holy Trinity?
Sinkewicz offers an interesting explanation.147 Initially he gives two reasons why
the triadic character of the imago was not widespread in patristic literature. As is well
known, the controversies around the Trinity occurred in the fourth century. But the
debate on the image of God had started long ago, from the time of the apologists of
the second century, or even from the era of the New Testament. A great part of the
disputes involved questions about the location of the imago (soul, intellect, or body)
or its basic qualities (rationality, freedom of choice, and dominion over the world).
Moreover, the Cappadocians proposed a ‘cautious, apophatic reverence for
the mystery of God’, against Eunomios’ claim of perfect knowledge of God’s
essence. Therefore, Sinkewicz continues, they may have been hesitant to suggest
Triadic reflections as expressions of the imago Dei. In other words, they wanted to
fulfill a double aim: on the one hand to express the reality that God’s inner being
is totally unknown, thus striking at Eunomios’ main argument, and on the other
hand to avoid an ‘agnostic’ view, according to which man cannot have any direct
knowledge of God.
Barlaam fell into the latter trap, in the fourteenth century, going to the opposite
extreme of Eunomios. Consequently, Palamas may have found it indispensable to
stress the high dignity of the human person—his superiority to the angels—and
the potential for true and direct communion with God. One of Gregory’s main
means for doing this was his elaboration of the imago Trinitatis, a subject that was
latent in the tradition and needed further elaboration and development.148 In the
next chapter of this book, it will be shown how Palamas exalts the high rank of man,
in comparison to the angels, based on his imago theology. But so far an important
aspect of Palamas’ sources was left untouched, namely the possibility of Augustinian
influence, to which we shall now turn.

4. The Presence of St Augustine149

‘Since one of the wise and apostolic men says…’150

This section revisits the use of certain Augustinian expressions and passages in the
works of St Gregory Palamas, mainly regarding the Trinitarian reflections in man, the
imago Dei, and the notion of eros (love). Having already presented Palamas’ theology

147 Sinkewicz (1988), 24.

148 For the above, see Sinkewicz (1988), 24.
149 This section (ch. 2.4), with some changes, has been published in Analogia; see Chouliaras (2018b).
150 Contra Gregoras II, 43.10–14, ΠΣ 4, 296: …ἐπεὶ καί τις τῶν σοφῶν καὶ ἀποστολικῶν ἀνδρῶν φησιν…
(St Gregory Palamas referring, indirectly, to St Augustine).
 I m ag o T r i nitatis : T h e T r i n i ta ri an Re f lect i o ns i n Man 73

regarding the eros of the nous (intellect) for its logos,151 here we provide, first, a brief
review of the literature regarding the Augustinian presence in Palamas. Second, we
continue with our assessment of this presence. We demonstrate that Gregory does
indeed borrow phrases from Augustine, but he does not always use or incorporate
the latter’s ideas; sometimes (e.g. in the case of the Filioque) he even comes to the
opposite conclusion. In other words, despite similarities, one also finds crucial
differences between Augustine’s and Palamas’ relevant approaches. Finally, four
possible reasons—not often stressed in scholarship; the third probably mentioned
for the first time—are proposed to explain why Palamas takes up the notion of eros
from the Bishop of Hippo: a) the ‘eternal rest’ (ἀίδιος ἐπανάπαυσις) of the Holy Spirit
on the Son; b) his willingness to oppose to the Filioque; c) the appeal to a major
notion in Palamas’ anthropology, namely the ‘vivifying power’ (ζωοποιὸς δύναμις)
of the human soul; and d) the Holy Spirit’s ‘eternal resplendence’ (ἀίδιος ἔκλαμψις/
ἔκφανσις). In conclusion, it is argued that this endeavour of Palamas could also today
inspire Orthodox theology in its effort to engage in dialogue with Western thought
and in its attempt to articulate a genuine and persuasive voice in our era.

a. Reviewing the Literature

A very contentious subject in the recent literature has been the presence, or lack thereof, of
St Augustine in St Gregory Palamas’ writings,152 and especially in his theology concerning
the image of God.153 The well-known Roman Catholic scholar Martin Jugie was the first to
open the debate. In 1932 he argued that Palamas, in his theology of the divine processions,
and specifically in his Chapters, has a theory identical to that of Augustine and Thomas
Aquinas. As we saw, Palamas uses the notions of nous, logos, and pneuma and stresses
that the Holy Spirit is ‘the ineffable love of the Begetter towards the ineffably begotten
Word himself’.154 Jugie regards these considerations as quite ‘curious and unusual’ for
a fourteenth-century Byzantine theologian. He believes that Gregory borrowed them
either from Augustine’s De Trinitate, translated by Maximos Planoudes around 1280,155
or from Aquinas’ Contra Gentiles, translated by Demetrios Cydones in 1354.156

151 See ch. 2.1–3.

152 For an overview of the recent literature and some remarks that carry the discussion further, see
Flogaus (2008), 63–80. See also Demetracopoulos (1997), 83–85. Trizio (2006). For the general
reception of Augustine in Byzantium, see Trizio (2009). Lössl (1999). Lössl (2000). For two
interesting recent approaches, see Plested (2013), 29–44. Coman (2016), 25–51.
153 For Augustine’s imago Dei, see Boersma (2016) and Gioia (2008), 232–97.
154 Ch. 36.11–13, 122. Cf. Ch. 35 and 37–39.
155 For the critical edition, see that of Papathomopoulos, Tsabari, and Rigotti (1995). On this translation,
see Fisher (2008). For an important critical evaluation of this edition, with some very useful remarks
and corrections, see Raios (2001).
156 Jugie (1932), 1766–7. For the imago Dei according to Thomas Aquinas, see Merriell (1990). In this
book, Merriell regards Augustine to be the foundation of Aquinas’ relevant teaching. However, recent
scholarship rejects the possibility of an influence of Aquinas—or any other Scholastic theologian—
on Palamas, regarding the imago Dei. See Demetracopoulos (1997), 83 and 154 n. 222. Cf. Martzelos
(2015), 7–21; at 14–15.
74 cha p te r 2

Additionally, in 1959, Fr John Meyendorff expressed surprise to find a psycho-

logical image rather like that of St Augustine, in Palamas’ thirty-sixth Chapter.157
Moreover, in another context, he characterizes Gregory as ‘l’un des auteurs les plus
“augustiniens” de l’Orient chrétien’.158 Gregory’s point of view here is the doctrine of
grace: Palamas, as Augustine had already done in his anti-Pelagian writings,159 insists
on man’s incapability of reaching God by his own power alone.
A reaction comes from Edmund Hussey, in a paper of his in 1972.160 Initially he
presents his English translation of Ch. 35–37, and then discusses them in detail. He
admits that Jugie’s and Meyendorff’s observation of a ‘psychological’ trinitarian model
is, at first glance, justified. This applies especially to Ch. 36. ‘But’, in Hussey’s words,
‘the unexplained and abrupt transition from “word” to “knowledge” in Chapter 35,
and the equally abrupt and unexplained transition from “breath” to “love” in Chapter
36, suggest that Gregory has interwoven an “ontological” word-breath figure and a
“psychological” knowledge-love figure’.161
Hussey tries to prove that Gregory’s models are mainly ontological and not
psychological.162 The reason for this position is Hussey’s effort to stress the difference
between Palamas’ and Augustine’s psychological models. This effort is justified,
because there is indeed a divergence.163 Thus, he argues that Palamas does speak
about the word which is expressed externally in sounds (προφορικὸς λόγος), as well as
the mental image of the sounds of a word before it is expressed externally (ἐνδιάθετος
λόγος), and the mental concept that comes before the expression in a word and
is gradually shaped in the intellect (λόγος ἐν διανοίᾳ). However, the only suitable
analogy he finds to express the relation of the second person of the Trinity to God the
Father is the λόγος ἐμφύτως ἐν ἡμῖν ἐναποκείμενος τῷ νῷ, the naturally inherent λόγος,
that is, ‘a word in the sense of the knowledge latent or immanent in the intellect’, a
‘word naturally stored up within our intellect’.164 Hussey underlines that this is not

157 Meyendorff (1959a), 316 (= Meyendorff (1974a), 232).

158 Meyendorff (1959a), 175 (= Meyendorff (1974a), 118: ‘…one of the most “Augustinian” writers of the
Christian East’).
159 On this subject see the relevant study of Keech (2012).
160 Hussey (1972).
161 Hussey (1972), 85–86.
162 By ‘psychological’, we refer to elements that have to do with human psychology, such as thought, love,
soul, etc., whereas by ‘ontological’, to points related to the ontology-existence, such as the constitution
of the intellect. From my point of view, Wilkins provides a more worked and well-grounded—though
a little bit sophisticated and sometimes difficult to apprehend—interpretation of Palamas’ Ch. 34–38
than Hussey’s (see Wilkins (2003)). Moreover, Wilkins tries to prove in a more adequate way the
balance between the ontological and the psychological character of these chapters, contrary to Hussey
who gives a clear priority to the ontology. Here again, it seems that Wilkins is more objective. It is
noteworthy that Wilkins, in this article, traces some interesting similarities and divergences, between
Palamas’, Aquinas’, and Augustine’s teaching (divine goodness-unity, communion with God, etc.).
163 As Hussey (1972), 89 writes, ‘there is no question here of constructing a theology of the Trinity out
of any model, as Western theology has tended to do with the so-called psychological model’. Wilkins
(2003), 402 notes that the two most known triads of Augustine are ‘memory, understanding, and will’
(memoria, intelligentia, voluntas), and ‘mind, knowledge, and love’ (mens, notitia, amor).
164 Cf. Ch. 35.1–16, 118–20.
 I m ag o T r i nitatis : T h e T r i n i ta ri an Re f lect i o ns i n Man 75

just a psychological model, constructed according to human measures. We have to

understand the logos not only as a word or thought, but primarily as our point of
communion with God. This is the type of logos which reflects the second person of
the Trinity, who is generated from the Father.165
Robert Sinkewicz, as already remarked, offers a significant commentary on
Palamas’ Chapters. As far as the presence of Augustine is concerned, he does accept
the existence of similarities between the Chapters and Augustine’s Trinitarian
analogies at first.166 Nevertheless, he argues that, in virtue of these parallels, there is
a temptation to conclude that Palamas really assimilated some of Augustine’s ideas.
However, Sinkewicz is totally opposed to such an idea. He believes that, while Gregory
speaks of the knowledge immanent in the intellect, he does not equate this with the
intellect’s knowledge of itself (notitia sui).167 Moreover, Palamas mentions the relation
of the intellect to the knowledge naturally inherent in it, but he does not depict this
as the intellect’s wanting its self-knowledge (amor sui and voluntas sui).168 Last, but most
important for Sinkewicz, Palamas never concludes that the Holy Spirit is the relation
of love between the Father and the Son. ‘Faithful to the Church’s tradition, Palamas
maintained that the Holy Spirit is identical in every way with the divine goodness
(i.e. the divine nature) and with the Father and the Son, except in hypostasis. The
Spirit has his own perfect hypostasis, which is defined by its derivation from the
Father by procession’.169
Jacques Lison, some years later, shared with Sinkewicz the same hesitation in
seeing a direct influence of Augustine on Palamas, but unlike Sinkewicz did not want
to exclude the possibility of some ‘indirect’ influence. However, he also argued that
the relevant teaching of Palamas is not the same as Augustine’s.170 For this reason,
he believes that if there really is an Augustinian influence, it is merely superficial.171

165 Hussey (1972), 86. A very interesting topic for further research would be to examine whether the
theology of the λόγοι τῶν ὄντων is present here. Cf. our analysis of this point in ch. 2.1.
166 Sinkewicz (1988), 18.
167 Sinkewicz refers to Augustine, De Trinitate, IX.4.4 and XV.6.10; for a translation, see Matthews (ed.)
(2002) [trans. McKenna], 27–28 and 176–78.
168 Cf. Augustine, De Trinitate, X.11.18 and XV.3.5 [ed. Matthews (trans. McKenna), 58–59 and 171
respectively].
169 Sinkewicz (1988), 18. Wilkins (2003), 387–88 criticises Sinkewicz’s stance, reminding that Augustine,
in his De Trinitate, regards the Holy Spirit as a person, exactly in the same way as the Father and
Son, stressing the equality of the divine persons. Wilkins indicatively refers to De Trinitate, VII.4,6;
VII.6; V.9; I.7,13; VI.7. As it seems Wilkins is correct here, but one finds his claim too strict that
‘despite Sinkewicz’s erudition it is difficult to detect in his remarks the kind of deep understanding
of Augustine that would be required to assess whether in fact Palamas’s ideas bear any important
resemblance to them; rather they perpetuate a dubious and thoroughly apologetic caricature’
(Wilkins (2003), 388). However, for a more grounded rejection of Sinkewicz’s specific argument, see
Demetracopoulos (1997), 157–58, n. 230. Cf. Lössl (1999), 70. Lössl (2000), 280–81.
170 Lison (1994a), 89. Lison (1997). In this paper (p. 331), referring to Sinkewicz’s thesis, Lison rightly
declared that ‘Aucun argument ne nous semble en tout cas infirmer la possibilité d’une influence
augustinienne’ (‘In any case, it seems to us that no argument is able to [definitively] rule out the
possibility of an Augustinian influence’).
171 Lison (1997), 330.
76 cha p te r 2

However, in 1996–7 we have the first documented proofs about Palamas’ borrowings
from Augustine. In particular, Reinhard Flogaus172 and John Demetracopoulos,173
almost simultaneously but independently, identify a number of parallels between the
Greek translation of Augustine’s De Trinitate by Maximos Planoudes and Palamas’
oeuvre.174 After these discoveries, a direct Augustinian influence on Palamas cannot
be denied.175 However, let us now make some comments about what exactly this
influence may be.

b. Assessment: Augustine and the Notion of Eros

To summarize, we may draw the following conclusions. There is indeed a parallel in

Palamas’ and Augustine’s conceptions of the imago Dei.176 Nevertheless, one can find
some crucial differences. First, in order to express his Triadic analogies, Augustine
seems to base his ideas on human psychology.177 He finds Trinitarian reflections
present in the functions of the soul: initially in the triad intellect, understanding,
will, and then in the more developed form of memory, understanding, and love.178
On the contrary, Palamas most probably draws on a common patristic tradition,
though not much developed, which finds a Trinitarian image in the intellect (nous),
word or reason (logos), and spirit (pneuma).179 It seems that Palamas, having read
Planoudes’ translation, found some useful tools, which he exploited in order to
elaborate his views more fully.180 Therefore, we should speak instead of a borrowing
of words, not of ideas as such.181 As has been remarked, ‘Gregory’s borrowings do not

172 See mainly Flogaus (1997), 98–109, 140, 143–53, 155–57, 238–61. Flogaus (1996).
173 Demetracopoulos (1997), specifically 13–17, 52–54, 83–94, 115. For all the parallels between Palamas’
Chapters and Planoudes’ translation of Augustine’s De Trinitate, see pp. 183–93.
174 Mainly in Palamas’ Chapters, Homily 16 On the Incarnation, Contra Bekkos, and Ad Xenam.
175 This is admitted also by Sinkewicz, in his latest, and very important, work on Palamas (i.e. Sinkewicz
(2002), 131–88; at 163–64).
176 But why doesn’t Palamas ever mention his source, i.e. Augustine’s De Trinitate? For an interesting
justification and some plausible reasons, see Demetracopoulos (1997), 107–10. In general, a possible
explication would be that some Byzantines were facing Augustine with suspicion due to his support
for the Filioque; this fact may have prevented Palamas from explicitly mentioning his source.
Cf. Plested (2013), 59. However, it did not prevent him from indirectly referring—in another work—
to Augustine as ‘one of the wise and apostolic men…’ (‘ἐπεὶ καί τις τῶν σοφῶν καὶ ἀποστολικῶν ἀνδρῶν
φησιν…’); see Palamas, Contra Gregoras II, 43.10–14, ΠΣ 4, 296.
177 For how Augustine, through his reading of the Scripture, decides to call the Holy Spirit ‘Love’ and
‘Gift’ (and for some connections with contemporary Christian theology), see Levering (2014).
178 Louth (2013d), 118.
179 As already stated in ch. 2.3, this tradition is mainly carried by Gregory Nazianzen, Maximos the
Confessor, and John Damascene.
180 In another text of his (Contra Beccum), Palamas once refers to the Holy Spirit as ‘the communion and
love of the Father and the Son’ (κοινωνίαν καὶ ἀγάπην… τοῦ Πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ Υἱοῦ τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον).
See ed. Papaevaggelou, ΠΣ 1, 164.14–15. Here Gregory speaks of the procession of the Holy Spirit
from the Father alone.
181 With this agrees Flogaus (1998), 31. Amphilochios Radović, in his study on Palamas’ Triadology,
does recognize that Gregory’s psychological triad is an Augustinian one, but he stresses the different
way Palamas uses it. In particular, he comments that Augustine, based on this triad, concludes by
 I m ag o T r i nitatis : T h e T r i n i ta ri an Re f lect i o ns i n Man 77

extend to what is the live nerve of Augustine’s reflections—the Spirit as “something

common”, commune aliquid, to the Father and the Son’.182 Alexander Golitzin calls
this ‘a quietly selective appropriation’ and argues that
it is very clear that Palamas quite liked much of what he had read in De Trinitate
and, moreover, found that those sections which he particularly liked, all of them
from the latter part of Augustine’s work, could be easily and naturally engrafted
into already existing elements within Greek Christian literature in such a way as to
enrich and deepen the whole. In this regard, Gregory was a good deal bolder and
more confident of the strength of his tradition than are many modern Orthodox
theologians… Palamas did not then accept the whole of Augustine on the Trinity,
but only that (and it seems to have been quite a lot) which he appears to have felt
could be enfolded without rupture or strain into the already existent theological
Gestalt of the Greek East.183
That is why, from our point of view, one should not be puzzled by Palamas’ endeavour,
as often happens in recent scholarship.184

supporting the Filioque, whereas Palamas concludes the opposite. See Radović (1991), 53–54. Flogaus
(1998), 20–21 mentions something similar about Augustine’s understanding of Father and Son as one
principle of the Spirit: Palamas uses Augustine’s passage, but comes to the opposite conclusion, viz.
that the Father is the sole principle of both the Son and the Spirit. Flogaus refers to Augustine, De
Trinitate V, 13, 14 and Palamas, Ch. 132. Nevertheless, it should be noted that Augustine’s treatment of
the procession of the Holy Spirit is entirely unpolemical. He did not know that the Eastern Fathers
did not accept the Filioque; he thought that they also supported the same belief. Were he aware of
their stance, it is very possible that he would not have insisted so much on it, or that he would even
have expressed the opposite position. Cf. Louth (2013d), 119–20: ‘Augustine does not argue for
the Filioque against those who reject it, rather he takes for granted an understanding of the Spirit
who proceeds ex utroque, from both [cf. Daley (2001)]. Someone convinced of the doctrine of the
procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father alone might well have read these affirmations of the
procession ex utroque as referring to the procession of the Spirit in the Divine Economy, not within
the Trinity itself. Augustine does not work with a sharp distinction between theologia and economia
in the way the Greeks did, and continue to, nor did he know a creed that affirmed that the Spirit ex
Patre procedit—proceeds from the Father’. Therefore, one would agree with Demetracopoulos (1997),
156–57 n. 227 that we cannot know for sure what exactly Palamas believed about whether Augustine
supported the Filioque or not.
182 Louth (2013d), 118. Cf. Plested (2013), 43–44. As Ware (2015) points out, the analogy of the ‘mutual
love’ that St Augustine uses is developed by some Latin authors of the Middle Ages, mainly Richard
of St Victor (twelfth century). Moreover, it has a central place in the Trinitarian theology of some
Russian religious-philosophical thinkers, in the end of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, such as
Vladimir Solovyov, Fr Pavel Florensky, Fr Sergius Bulgakov, Nicolas Berdiaev, and Paul Evdokimov.
183 Golitzin (2002), 183–84.
184 Flogaus ((1998), 1–5 and (2008), 68–73) mentions some examples of scholars (not only Orthodox)
who thought that the theology of the Bishop of Hippo had many problems, and, for this reason,
tried to omit the possibility of an Augustinian influence on Palamas. For an interesting relevant
presentation, see also Plested (2013), 29–34, 44. In general, a very critical stance towards the theology
of St Augustine is held by the late Fr John Romanides. For instance, see Romanides (1991), 5–194
(passim). There, in many points (see, for example, pp. 17–18, 56–59), he argues that a great part of
Western theology has been influenced, through the centuries, by some erroneous points of the
theology of St Augustine and, for this reason, led to numerous problems. For instance, Romanides
78 cha p te r 2

c. Why Does Palamas Borrow the Notion of Eros?

We have have left the most important question for the end: why, at last, does Palamas
borrow the notion of eros from Augustine? To what end? Georgios Martzelos gives
two plausible reasons: first, Palamas, through eros, merely refers to the patristic
teaching of the ‘eternal rest’ (ἀίδιος ἐπανάπαυσις) of the Holy Spirit on the Son, in the
context of the intra-Trinitarian relationships.185 Second, Palamas tries to preclude any
possible interpretation of Augustine’s teaching supporting the Filioque (because, as
shown, Gregory uses this idea of eros to oppose the Filioque).186
Furthermore, it seems to me that there are two other important reasons, which
are rarely—if ever—stressed in the scholarly literature.187 Initially, through the notion
of eros Palamas is guided to the idea of the ‘vivifying power’ (ζωοποιὸς δύναμις) of the
human soul, namely the power of the soul that grants life to the body. We shall consider
this power extensively in ch. 3.1. It will be there shown that, as Sinkewicz explains,

finds a great problem in Augustine’s interpretation of the Old Testament theophanies (see, for
example, p. 58). It should be noted that Bradshaw (2004), 222–29 argues something similar (see ‘The
innovations of Augustine’). This whole stance of Romanides, though perhaps somehow exaggerated,
is very interesting. However, a detailed assessment of it and the arguments he brings to support it,
goes beyond the scope of this book [for several objections to the relevant positions of Romanides
and Bradshaw (and also Yannaras, who seems to walk on this same line of thought), see some of
the contributions in Papanikolaou and Demacopoulos (2008) (e.g., pp. 208–09, 212–13, etc.). For
Bradshaw’s response, see pp. 244–51 in the same book, and for his contribution, where he again
approaches critically some points in Augustine’s teaching, see pp. 227–43]. Recently, Vlachos (2009)
has maintained something similar. He finds many incompatibilities between De Trinitate and Palamas’
teaching; he therefore finds it very unlikely (almost impossible) for Gregory to have borrowed some
lines from it (see mainly pp. 7–9, 12–14, 16, 18, 19–20 of the aforementioned article). In particular, he
supports that Palamas could not possibly have used Augustine, because Barlaam, Palamas’ opponent,
was relying heavily on the Bishop of Hippo. However, as we mentioned, Palamas is sometimes only
using the words, not exactly the ideas of Augustine. Moreover, Vlachos presents three hypotheses:
first, that a specific abstract from the Chapters (Ch. 133.1–3: Θέσεις καὶ ἕξεις καὶ τόποι καὶ χρόνοι
καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον οὐ κυρίως ἐπὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ λέγονται, ἀλλὰ μεταφορικῶς. τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν καὶ ἐνεργεῖν ἐπὶ
μόνου τοῦ Θεοῦ ἀληθέστατα ἂν λέγοιτο), which is taken from the fifth chapter of De Trinitate, is
interpolated: someone other than Gregory has added it. Second, that the major part of the text was
indeed written by Palamas, but a posterior theologian, who knew the teaching of Augustine, added
whole paragraphs. Third, and most probable according to Vlachos, the Chapters is a work of a later
theologian, who knew the teaching of both Palamas and Augustine and made a synopsis of those.
Here, he makes two suggestions: either Theophanes of Nicaea (c. 1315/20–c. 1380/1) or Gennadios
Scholarios (c. 1398/1405–after 1472). However, from our point of view, these hypotheses are not likely
to be true, because both critical editors of the Chapters (i.e. Sinkewicz and Christou) have accepted
the authenticity of this text. Moreover, as we have seen, Palamas also exploits Augustinian expressions
in other texts, which undoubtedly derive from his pen (for instance in Contra Beccum). For a brief
response to Vlachos’ paper, see Martzelos (2015).
185 See, for instance, the relevant quotation from St John Damascene mentioned above: Expositio fidei
8.173, ed. Kotter, 25: καὶ ἐν Υἱῷ ἀναπαυόμενον [i.e. the Holy Spirit].
186 See Martzelos (2015), mainly 11, 18–21.
187 The following reason (i.e. the third one), as far as I know, has never before been proposed in
scholarship to explain why Palamas borrows the topic of eros. It is, most likely, underlined for the first
time in this book.
 I m ag o T r i nitatis : T h e T r i n i ta ri an Re f lect i o ns i n Man 79

‘[t]his human spirit or life-giving power in the body is an extension of the intellectual
love (νοερὸς ἔρως)’.188 For the present, let us only mention that for St Gregory the
ζωοποιὸς δύναμις is a basic means of explaining how man bears the image of God to
a greater extent than the angels. Moreover, it is closely connected with the human
body and occupies a major place in Palamas’ anthropology.189 Consequently, it could
be argued that, very likely, Palamas borrows the notion of eros from Augustine in
order to exalt the rank of the human person, via his imago Dei theology.
Last, but not least, one further reason could be invoked as to why St Gregory
borrows the notion of eros from St Augustine. It has been maintained that Palamas,
in his theology regarding the procession of the Holy Spirit, was probably influenced
by the views that Gregory of Cyprus had developed about fifty years earlier.190 The
latter argued two important things. First, one can say that the Holy Spirit is ‘of the
essence of the Son’ and thus refer to their consubstantiality, but the Father remains
the sole cause of the hypostatic existence of the Holy Spirit, in the same way as the
Father is the only source of the divinity; namely, the Spirit derives his existence only
from the Father.191 Second, however, the manifestation of the Holy Spirit from the
Son (ἐκ Πατρὸς δι’ Υἱοῦ) should not be taken only as the Spirit’s temporal mission
(ἀποστολή; i.e., in the economy), but also as the Spirit’s ‘eternal resplendence’ (ἀίδιος
ἔκλαμψις or ἔκφανσις; that is, at the level of theology).192 For this reason, according
to Gregory of Cyprus, one may say that the Holy Spirit is (or exists) from the Father
through the Son (ἐκ Πατρὸς δι’ Υἱοῦ; or even of the Father and of the Son), without,
however, admitting that the Spirit derives his existence from both the Father and the
Son.193 In particular, the expression ἀίδιος δι’ Υἱοῦ ἔκλαμψις signifies the property (or:

188 Sinkewicz (1988), 19; emphasis added.

189 This is what Sinkewicz (2002), 171 calls the pneumatological aspect of the imago Dei. In general, for
the soul’s ζωοποιὸς δύναμις according to Palamas, see his Ch. 38–39, and Homily 60, On the Holy Feast of
Theophany, ΠΣ 6, 645–56 (ΠΑΕ 11, 506–34). Cf. Sinkewicz (2002), 168–70.
190 Larchet (1995), 97, 99. Cf. Meyendorff (1959a), 25–26 (= Meyendorff (1974a), 13). Christou, ΠΣ 1, 17.
Plested (2013), 36–40 also sees Palamas as following this same line of thought. For a good analysis
of this topic, perhaps the best at this time, see Larchet (1995), 94–103. For Gregory of Cyprus and
his theology, see Larchet (ed.) (2012). Savvatos (1997). Papadakis (1983). Siecienski (2010), 140–43.
Alexopoulos (2011).
191 See, for example, Gregory of Cyprus, On the procession of the Holy Spirit, 270D–271A: Ἐπεὶ δὲ οὕτω,
παντί που δῆλον ὡς τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας λεγόμενον τοῦ Πατρός, καλῶς ἂν ἔχη καὶ εὐσεβῶς
καὶ ἐκ τῆς τοῦ Υἱοῦ λέγεσθαι. Μία γάρ, καὶ ὡς οὐσία οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως ποτὲ διαίρεσιν δέχοιτο… Διότι
δὲ μία, τὸ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας ὀμολογούμενον τοῦ Πατρὸς Πνεῦμα, καὶ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Υἱοῦ ὑπάρχον
ὁμολογεῖται. Πλὴν οὐ διὰ τοῦτ’ ἤδη καὶ ἐκ τῆς τοῦ Υἱοῦ ὑποστάσεως τὸ Πνεῦμα… For other relevant
references to this text of the Cypriot, see Larchet (1995), 97–98 n. 164.
192 For instance, see Gregory of Cyprus, On the procession of the Holy Spirit, 290C: …καὶ ἥκει [the
Holy Spirit] δι’ αὐτοῦ [i.e. the Son] καὶ ἀπολάμπει καὶ πέφηνε κατὰ τὴν προαιώνιον αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀίδιον
ἔκλαμψιν… For similar references to the works of the Cypriot, see Larchet (1995), 98–99 n. 165. For
an in-depth theological analysis of the ἀίδιος ἔκλαμψις according to the Cypriot, see Savvatos (1997),
180–228.
193 Cf. Siecienski (2010), 141–43. The theology of the Cypriot influenced greatly the Council of
Constantinople (Blachernae) in 1285. See, for example, the relevant Synodal Tome, which, besides, he
himself authored: Ἔκθεσις τοῦ τόμου τῆς πίστεως κατὰ τοῦ Βέκκου (PG 142, 240C): …δι’ Υἱοῦ γὰρ
ὁμολογουμένως αὐτὸς ἀιδίως ἐκλάμπει καὶ ἀναδείκνυται ὁ Παράκλητος… δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ τὴν εἰς ἡμᾶς
80 cha p te r 2

capability), which the Son eternally has, of sending the Holy Spirit within the context
of the divine economy, as an expression referring to the eternal life and communion
of the divine persons.194
Palamas takes up these two ideas in his Apodictic Discourses, though the second
one in a much more moderate way, and definitely not as explicitly as the Cypriot.195
In general, as far as I know, nowhere does Palamas in his oeuvre explicitly refer to the
ἀίδιος ἔκλαμψις or ἔκφανσις, about which Gregory of Cyprus speaks at length, or at
least to the extent and with the clarity of the latter. Although Palamas often uses the
word ἔκφανσις or its derivatives, it is not in the same context we are writing about
now (usually, he uses it in reference to the uncreated activities or to the vision of
the divine light196).197

χορηγίαν καὶ δόσιν καὶ ἀποστολήν… For a good and succinct discussion of the eternal ἔκφανσις of the
Holy Spirit, with references both to Church Fathers and modern theologians, see Bathrellos (2008),
140–47 and 153–57.
194 Savvatos (1997), 234.
195 For the first one, see mainly Apodictic Discourse II, 30, 62–68, 73, ed. Bobrinsky, ΠΣ 1, 105, 133–40, 144–
45 respectively; for similarities to the second one, see Apodictic Discourse II, 65, 69, 75–76, ΠΣ 1, 136–
37, 141–42, 146–47 respectively. Cf. Larchet (1995), 99 n. 167. It seems, therefore, that both Gregory of
Cyprus and St Gregory Palamas establish a connection between theology and economy, as far as the
procession of the Holy Spirit is concerned. However, there are two reasons why this connection is
not of the same type as that of which Latin theologians of their epoch spoke. First, the latter ignored
or rejected the distinction between essence and activities (energies). Second, they conceived the
procession of the Spirit based on his manifestation in the economy (for the above, see Larchet (1995),
102). Nevertheless, there is indeed a relation between theology and economy. But, as Larchet (1995),
102 notes, what is important, is to distinguish the energy of the Holy Spirit from his hypostasis, both
in theology and economy. Because, in both cases, what is manifested is not the hypostasis of the Spirit,
but his energy, the divine uncreated energy, ‘which, in reality, is the energy which shines forth or
radiates from the common essence of the three divine hypostases, from the Father, through the Son,
in the Spirit’ [ἐκ Πατρός, δι᾿ Υἱοῦ, ἐν Ἁγίῳ Πνεύματι]. Cf. Plested (2013), 38. Consequently, Gregory
of Cyprus and Gregory Palamas show that there is indeed a relation between, on the one hand, the
eternal manifestation and resplendence of the Holy Spirit from the Son, and, on the other hand, the
manifestation or mission of the Spirit from the Son to humanity (or to creation). Larchet stresses a
crucial theological reason for this: ‘the energy, of the Spirit, which is sent, manifested, breathed forth
[insufflée] and given to human beings, is nothing else than the divine uncreated energy; it is somehow
included [incluse] with the latter, which would radiate even if the world was not created and there
were no humans to receive it’. Thus, in the Fathers one can find ‘two modes of energetic manifestation
of the Spirit’, the eternal and temporal, if such a distinction can be drawn (Larchet (1995), 101).
196 See, e.g., Tr. 1,3,4.5–7, 413 (115.1–2; emphasis added): …καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς κρύφιον καὶ τὴν ἔκφανσιν
ἔχοντος, τὸ θειότατον καὶ πάντων καινότατον…, where Palamas argues that God’s manifestation
(ἔκφανσις) is truly a mystery.
197 Flogaus is correct in arguing that Palamas never refers to the Cypriot. However, Flogaus’ stance on
this matter does not seem to me very plausible, because he bluntly rejects the possibility of Palamas
being influenced by Gregory of Cyprus. In particular, Flogaus (1998), 17 writes that Palamas ‘…
explicitly repudiated the possibility of eternal revelation as a Latin impiety and understood revelation,
like creation, to be a temporal effect (ἀπoτέλεσμα) of the eternal energy. Obviously, Palamas’ stance
on the Filioque question was much more traditional, inflexible and unyielding to the Latin position
than that of the Cypriot. Very likely, he saw in the Patriarch’s attempt to mediate between East and
West in this crucial question a betrayal of the Orthodox position’. However, as Ware (2015) notes,
Palamas, in general, was not hostile to the Latin West.
 I m ag o T r i nitatis : T h e T r i n i ta ri an Re f lect i o ns i n Man 81

Nevertheless, it seems to me possible that Palamas, using the notion of eros, has in
the back of his mind the arguments of Gregory of Cyprus mentioned above.198 The
reason is that Palamas uses some expressions which at times resemble the Cypriot’s
approach. In particular, as shown above in ch. 2.2, for Palamas the Son possesses eros
(i.e. the Holy Spirit) as, first, ‘proceeding from the Father together with him [i.e. the
Son]’, and, second, ‘as resting connaturally in him’.199 This may indicate the fact that,
according to Palamas, the Spirit is manifested from the Father through the Son, not
only in economy, but also in theology.200
Consequently, it is possible that Palamas borrows his concept of eros from
Augustine, among other reasons, in order to underline the reality of the eternal
manifestation and resplendence of the Holy Spirit. But, even if this is true, he makes
this connection in a rather obscure way; he does not give us enough clues to state
our case in stronger terms.

d. Some Concluding Thoughts

This section dealt with the presence of St Augustine in St Gregory Palamas’ oeuvre,
with special attention given to reflections of the Trinity in man and the notion of
eros. It was hinted at that Palamas did indeed use some of Augustine’s own words,
but without fully incorporating his ideas.201 In particular, he cannot have borrowed

198 If this is true, it is a very important point, because, it is generally acknowledged that this position of
Gregory of Cyprus, if it were accepted by all sides, could be a solution to the vexing problem of the
Filioque. As Larchet (1995), 102 has argued, Gregory of Cyprus and Gregory Palamas developed ‘une
théologie orthodoxe du Filioque’. Plested (2013), 389 referring to Palamas, uses the same expression,
namely ‘an Orthodox filioque’. Savvatos (1997), 224–28, 235 mentions something similar. Siecienski
(2010), 147 makes a very interesting comment, which is directly related to our discussion: ‘While the
Latin doctrine remained heterodox, there was thus a sense in which the filioque could be interpreted
in an orthodox manner and not simply in reference to the economy. Palamas thus offered the
Byzantines a constructive alternative to the prevailing unionist and conservative tendencies of his
contemporaries, keeping alive the via media established by Maximus the Confessor and Gregory
of Cyprus. However, while Gregory’s theology was accepted by no fewer than three local councils
(often referred to as the Palamite councils of 1341, 1347, and 1351), it remained controversial enough
that at Ferrara-Florence its introduction was forbidden by the emperor’. Nevertheless, in my view, it
is a subject open for debate—namely whether Palamite theology was absent from Ferrara-Florence
because it was controversial among the Byzantines, or for diplomatic and political reasons; but we do
not have space to treat the subject in this book.
199 Ch. 36.11–15, 122; emphasis added: Ἐκεῖνο δὲ τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ ἀνωτάτω λόγου οἷόν τις ἔρως ἐστὶν
ἀπόρρητος τοῦ γεννήτορος πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸν ἀπορρήτως γεννηθέντα λόγον, ᾧ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ τοῦ πατρὸς
ἐπέραστος λόγος καὶ υἱὸς χρῆται πρὸς τὸν γεννήτορα, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς ἔχων αὐτὸν συμπροελθόντα
καὶ συμφυῶς ἐν αὐτῷ ἀναπαυόμενον.
200 Cf. Plested (2013), 36–37, where it is mentioned that ‘There are antecedents for this kind of language in
the Byzantine tradition: Maximus the Confessor’s intuition of the fundamental congruity of procession
“through” and “from the Son”; John of Damascus’ eternal “resting” of the Spirit in the Son; or Gregory
of Cyprus’ eternal “shining forth” of the Spirit through the Son’. For St Maximos the Confessor, see his
Letter to Marinus (PG 91, 136AD). For St John and Gregory of Cyprus, see above in this section.
201 As Wilkins (2003), 410 puts it, ‘this thunderbolt from the Augustinian sky seems but a passing squall
in the total pattern of Gregory’s thought’.
82 cha p te r 2

his triad nous-logos-pneuma from the Bishop of Hippo, because Augustine’s triads
are always some variant of mind-word-will or love.202 Undoubtedly, though, Palamas
located some parallels between his own thinking about the Triadic image and that of
Augustine, and found rather attractive the way in which Augustine gives love (ἔρως)
a central place.203
The reader, however, at this point, cannot help but wonder: how does the
interpretation of this section differ from those of J. Demetracopoulos, R. Flogaus,
and R. Sinkewicz? As shown, our text builds on the findings of Demetracopoulos
and Flogaus concerning the use of certain Augustinian passages from Palamas;
something that scholarship, in general, nowadays accepts.204 However, it seems that
the aforementioned scholars, despite their important contributions on the topic,
did not discover the deeper reasons and aims that motivate Palamas’ endeavour.
This is the gap that this section has tried to fill; it can be considered something of a
theological supplementum to their work.
To this end, we first referred to Martzelos’ relevant analysis and suggestion,
namely a) the ‘eternal rest’ (ἀίδιος ἐπανάπαυσις) of the Holy Spirit on the Son and
b) the rejection of the Filioque. Second, we proposed two other reasons as a likely
solution to the question at hand, namely c) the ‘vivifying power’ (ζωοποιὸς δύναμις)
of the human soul, a major notion in Palamas’ anthropology, and d) the Holy Spirit’s
‘eternal resplendence’ (ἀίδιος ἔκλαμψις).205 These are the four possible reasons (a–d)
suggested in this section as to why Palamas takes up Augustine’s notion of eros, and,
as far as the third reason is concerned, it is likely the first time that this has been
mentioned in scholarly literature.
In closing, if we may add a final word, we would note the following: what is
important for us today is to think about how Palamas’ endeavour could inspire
Orthodox theology in our own era. We saw that Palamas borrowed an important
notion from what most would consider a ‘heterodox’ environment. Does this entail
that Orthodox theology nowadays, being deeply based on its rich tradition (dogmatic,
liturgical, canonical, etc.), could indeed, at the same time, trace useful points in loci
that may seem ‘foreign’ at first sight? What exactly would this mean? How could it
be achieved? Would there not be certain hazards involved? And how could they be

202 Cf. Louth (2013d), 118: ‘Augustine’s triadic analogies seem to be derived from his understanding of
human psychology; he is looking for reflections on the Trinity in the operations of the souls, moving
from mind, understanding and will to the more adequate memory, understanding and love’.
203 In Sinkewicz’s words, ‘Although Palamas is wholly traditional in seeking a Trinitarian analogy in the
human person’s νοῦς, λόγος, πνεῦμα, he appears to develop this analogy further through the influence
of his reading of Augustine’s De Trinitate’ (Sinkewicz (2002), 170 n. 121).
204 As far as Sinkewicz is concerned, we mentioned that, he initially, in his early writings on Palamas,
rejected the possibility of an Augustinian influence, either direct or indirect; but he changed his
opinion in his later article in La theologie byzantine (2002). However, let us not forget that Sinkewicz
has rightly indicated some points of divergence between Palamas’ theology and that of Augustine;
cf. ch. 2.4.a of this book.
205 As far as I could know, reasons (c) and (d) have not been proposed by Demetracopoulos, Flogaus, or
Sinkewicz.
 I m ag o T r i nitatis : T h e T r i n i ta ri an Re f lect i o ns i n Man 83

overcome?206 Undoubtedly, St Gregory’s example has much to teach us, but what
exactly this entails will require further and more thorough examination.

5. Conclusions

In this chapter the Trinitarian reflections in man according to St Gregory were

presented. First, we saw the analogy for the Logos and, second, the reflection of the
Holy Spirit. The patristic background of Palamas’ teaching was illustrated and it was
shown that he draws mainly on Gregory Nazianzen, Maximos the Confessor, and
John Damascene. In addition, some other plausible scenarios were tested (i.e. about
a possible influence from Symeon the New Theologian, Niketas Stethatos, Gregory
the Sinaite, and Theoleptos of Philadelpheia). About the presence of St Augustine,
as far as the imago Dei is concerned, it was hinted that Palamas did indeed use some
of Augustine’s own words, but he did not fully incorporate his ideas. As shown,
Palamas located parallels between his own thinking about the Triadic image and that
of Augustine and found useful the way in which Augustine gives love a crucial place.
In this chapter was also underlined that the relevant texts of Palamas are very
difficult to fully interpret, for their author does not offer significant help to the
reader.207 Gregory is very laconic in explaining his thinking and does not give enough
evidence to interpret what he really has in mind. Therefore, it is difficult for us today
to fully understand what exactly he desired to express; our sources are limited.208
Moreover Palamas uses these triadic analogies only rarely in his corpus; as far as I
know only in Ch. 34–38. He does refer, however, to the Trinity as Intellect, Word, and
Spirit also in Homily 24, On Pentecost, but he does not mention there its reflection
in the divine image in man, nor does he see the Spirit as the love between Father
and Son.209 As has been highlighted, this whole approach is rather ‘peripheral to his
theological project’.210

206 For the moment, it suffices to say that a great Father and spiritual teacher of the Orthodox Church,
St Nikodimos the Hagiorite († 1809), despite being deeply rooted in Eastern spirituality, wrote some
of his most well-known texts (e.g., Unseen Warfare [Ὁ Ἀόρατος Πόλεμος]) by drawing heavily on
western theologians.
207 Cf. Tollefsen (2012), 187.
208 Wilkins’ interpretation, though insightful and very interesting, is not entirely sufficient, because it
is not very clear what exactly Palamas wants to express. As Wilkins (2003), 410 himself confesses,
‘The interpretations suggested above are hypothetical. Any would-be exegete of these passages has to
contend with the fact that they are simply underdetermined. This means no interpretation will be more
than probable; perhaps none will be more than simply plausible. I have attempted to shed light on
the exegetical difficulties by appealing to data beyond the text: namely, the realities of mind to which
Gregory is referring. I have supplemented this strategy by noticing the similarities between Gregory’s
statements and those of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, who asked similar questions in the context
of a similar mystagogy. Nevertheless, while I consider this approach exegetically valid and potentially
fruitful, I cannot claim to have verified my hypothesis about Gregory’s analogy for the divine processions.
I claim only that my reading is more plausible than the alternatives known to me’ (emphasis added).
209 Cf. Sinkewicz (1988), 18 n. 49.
210 Wilkins (2003), 412.
84 cha p te r 2

So, a question arises: does Palamas really regard these statements as crucial and
important? If the answer is affirmative, why doesn’t he use them more often in his
writings? A response would be that this approach is very sophisticated and would be
difficult for Palamas’ flock to comprehend. For instance, this may be why it is not used
in his Homilies from his time as Archbishop of Thessaloniki. Besides, Gregory’s main
aim in these Chapters is to articulate a theology of the divine processions, namely to
approach the generation of the Son and the ekporeusis of the Spirit. The reflections in
man seem to be just a means to interpret those processions. Nonetheless, this does
not diminish their value and their significance in Palamas’ thought.211

Rezeptionsgeschichte

Furthermore, it should be noted that an interesting research path would be to investigate

whether Palamas’ imago theology influenced later generations. This project will not
be pursued here in detail, but a small indication will be provided. In particular, as has
been recently underlined,212 there is indeed such a direct influence in the work of a
great ecclesiastical personality of the late Byzantine period, St Symeon of Thessaloniki
(second half of the fourteenth century–1429). Symeon argues that man images the
Holy Trinity and not simply some of Its properties. Particularly, the human intellect
images the Father, the human reason (or word) images the Divine Logos, and the
vivifying power (ζωοποιὸς δύναμις) of the intelligible soul images the Holy Spirit.213
Of note is Symeon’s use of the soul’s vivifying power, which gives life and motion
to the body:214 as will be shown in the next chapter of this book (ch. 3.1), this is the
same way that Palamas uses this notion.
Furthermore, according to Symeon, a second way in which man images the
Triune God is the fact that the human intellect gives birth to its reason (λόγος)
and also loves this reason. This reflects the Father’s origination of the Son and the
procession of the Spirit, because the Spirit is the living love (ἀγάπη ζῶσα) which
rests on the Son.215 Last, a third kind of imaging lies in how man seeks and explores
with his intellect and reason the truth regarding the divine Intellect and Logos.216
Consequently, Palamas has been correctly suggested as Symeon’s most possible

211 A huge emphasis on these analogies has been given in recent scholarship, maybe disproportional
to Gregory’s own intention. This is however justified, because the reflections in man are not very
commonly used in the late (and post) Byzantine theological world.
212 Bathrellos (2008), 190–91. It is on this work that the following presentation is based.
213 Symeon, Dialogue in Christ (Διάλογος ἐν Χριστῷ), PG 155, 40AC. Epistula ad fideles Orientis de pietate
(Ἐπιστολὴ εἰς στηριγμὸν εὐσεβείας ἤτοι κατὰ Ἀγαρηνῶν), ed. Balfour, 119.
214 Epistula ad fideles Orientis de pietate, 119.290–91: καὶ ζῶσα, ζωοποιὸν παρέχει τῷ σώματι δύναμιν, τὸ ἐκ
τοῦ Θεοῦ ζωοποιὸν προδήλως φανεροῦσα Πνεῦμα. Cf. some lines below (300–01): καὶ εἰ μὴ ζωοποιὸν
εἶχε δύναμιν διὰ τῆς νοερᾶς ψυχῆς ἄνθρωπος, οὐκ ἂν καὶ τὸ ὑλικὸν τοῦτο σῶμα ζῶν καὶ κινούμενον εἶχε.
215 Epistula ad fideles Orientis de pietate, 120.308–10: Καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα ὡς ἀγάπην ζῶσαν προέρχεσθαι
ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ λέγουσί τινες καὶ τῷ Υἱῷ ἀναπαύεσθαι, καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν δὲ τοῦτο ἔστιν ἰδεῖν.
216 Epistula ad fideles Orientis de pietate, 119–20.
 I m ag o T r i nitatis : T h e T r i n i ta ri an Re f lect i o ns i n Man 85

direct source, as far as Symeon’s imago Trinitatis is considered.217 It now remains for
scholars to discover whether other late or post-Byzantine authors are influenced by
the Palamite imago Dei.
Heretofore two basic reasons were sketched supporting why man has such a
strong resemblance to God, according to St Gregory: the analogy of the Logos and
of the Holy Spirit in the human person. In particular, Palamas stresses that man is so
highly exalted, that he bears within himself a reflection of the Holy Trinity. However,
as will be shown later on, Gregory believes that Trinitarian reflections can be also
detected in the angels, like in man. Therefore, a major question is raised now, which,
as stated in the introduction, is the main concern of this Part: who manifests the
imago more fully, man or the angels?

217 Bathrellos (2008), 190–91 n. 90. The third reason of imaging according to Symeon does not appear
in this specific and clear form, as far as I know, in Palamas’ teaching. Therefore, it is very possible that
it is an original idea, if of course Symeon has not borrowed it from the previous patristic tradition;
something that has to be searched further.
 Chapter 3

The Image of God in Man and the Angels

Introduction. The Superiority of Man: ‘τῶν ἀσωμάτων

ἀγγέλων μᾶλλον κατ’ εἰκόνα τοῦ Θεοῦ…’

So far we examined the ways in which man images the Holy Trinity according to
St Gregory. As far as the question posed just before, in the end of ch. 2, Palamas has a
firm answer: man is superior to the angels as far as the image is concerned, but inferior
to them in terms of the kath’ omoiosin. The latter will be addressed in more detail
below, in ch. 4. Now, regarding man’s superiority, this is based on three principles,
which share one common parameter: man’s corporeality, namely the human body.
In other words, Palamas fervently believes that man manifests to a greater extent the
imago Dei than the angels, due to his body, for three specific reasons: 1) the soul’s
vivifying power (ζωοποιὸς δύναμις); 2) the faculty of self-governance (τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν
ἀρχικόν); and 3) the faculty of sense perception (αἰσθητικόν). The examination and
analysis of these reasons is the purpose of the current chapter.

1. The Soul’s ζωοποιὸς δύναμις: The Pneumatological

Dimension

First of all, let us approach what Sinkewicz calls the pneumatological aspect of the
imago Dei.1 Palamas demonstrates this in Ch. 38. Initially he mentions that ‘the
intellectual and rational nature of the angels2 also possesses intellect, and word
from the intellect, and the love of the intellect for the word, which love is also from
the intellect and ever coexists with the word and the intellect, and which could be
called spirit since it accompanies the word by nature’.3 That said, Palamas argues
that the angels also have the imago, and that Trinitarian reflections can be also found
in the angels, as happens in man—as analysed in the previous chapter of this book.
However, there is a crucial difference. The spirit of the angels is not life-giving
(ζωοποιόν); it has no vivifying power, because the angels have no body. On the
other hand, the intellectual and rational human soul was created in conjunction

1 Sinkewicz (2002), 171.

2 For an interesting recent book on the teaching of some Christian writers about the angels, see
Muehlberger (2013).
3 Ch. 38.1–5, 124: Ἔχει µὲν οὖν καὶ ἡ τῶν ἀγγέλων νοερὰ καὶ λογικὴ φύσις νοῦν τε καὶ λόγον ἐκ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ
τὸν πρὸς τὸν λόγον ἔρωτα τοῦ νοῦ, ὃς καὶ αὐτός ἐστιν ἐκ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ σύνεστιν ἀεὶ τῷ τε λόγῳ καὶ τῷ νῷ
καὶ πνεῦµα ἂν καλοῖτο, ὡς τῷ λόγῳ φύσει συµπαροµαρτῶν.
88 cha p te r 3

(συνεκτίσθη) with an earthly body. For this reason, the soul has received from God
a spirit which is also ζωοποιόν, ‘through which it [i.e. the soul] conserves and gives
life to the body joined to it’.4 Consequently, ‘The intellectual and rational nature of
the soul, alone possessing intellect and word and life-giving spirit, has alone been
created more in the image of God than the incorporeal angels’.5
Through this observation Palamas attributes a lofty value to the human soul:
without the soul’s energy, the body has no life. He continues by arguing that the
human spirit, ‘the life-giving power in his body, is intellectual love (νοερὸς ἔρως);
it is from the intellect and the word, and exists in the word and the intellect, and
possesses both the word and the intellect within itself ’.6 As Sinkewicz explains,
‘This human spirit or life-giving power in the body is an extension of the intellectual
love (νοερὸς ἔρως)’.7 Obviously this view helps Gregory to stress the likeness of the
human spirit to the Holy Spirit, whο, as already analysed, is ‘the ineffable love of
the Begetter towards the ineffably begotten Word himself ’.8 Moreover, this spirit
is the soul’s loving bond with its own body (τοσοῦτο γὰρ ἐρασμίαν ἔχει δι’ αὐτοῦ
φυσικῶς τὴν πρὸς τὸ οἰκεῖον σῶμα ἡ ψυχὴ συνάφειαν), which is so intense, that the
soul never wishes to leave and be separate from the body ‘and will not do so at all
unless force is brought to bear on it externally from some very serious disease or
trauma’.9
It is noteworthy that here we see the importance with which Gregory regards
the human body: the soul ‘loves’ it to a great extent. Moreover, let us note that in
another context Gregory makes the following parallelism: the body’s death occurs
when it is abandoned by the soul’s ζωοποιὸς δύναμις. In the same way, the separation
of the human soul from God, namely from the Holy Spirit’s vivifying power, entails
the soul’s death.10 Therefore the soul plays for the body the role which the Spirit has
for the spiritual life of the soul. Consequently, the soul images the Holy Spirit. From
the above it is proved that for St Palamas ‘the image of God in the human person

4 Ch. 38.5–11, 124: ἀλλ᾿ οὐκ ἔχει καὶ ζωοποιὸν τὸ πνεῦµα τοῦτο, οὐδὲ γὰρ συνηµµένον εἴληφεν ἐκ γῆς παρὰ
Θεοῦ σῶµα, ἵνα καὶ ζωοποιόν τε καὶ συνεκτικὴν λάβῃ πρὸς τοῦτο δύναµιν. ἡ δὲ νοερὰ καὶ λογικὴ φύσις
τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐπεὶ γηΐνῳ συνεκτίσθη σώµατι καὶ ζωοποιὸν ἔλαβε τὸ πνεῦµα παρὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ, δι᾿ οὗ συνέχει
καὶ ζωοποιεῖ τὸ συνηµµένον σῶµα, παρ᾿ οὗ καὶ δείκνυται τοῖς συνιοῦσιν, ὅτι νοερός ἐστιν ἔρως τὸ τοῦ
ἀνθρώπου πνεῦµα… In the following lines it will be shown that Gregory probably relies here on
St John Damascene (for an analysis, see the next section) and on St Maximos the Confessor.
5 Ch. 39.1–4, 126: Ἡ νοερὰ καὶ λογικὴ φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς, µόνη νοῦν ἔχουσα καὶ λόγον καὶ πνεῦµα ζωοποιόν,
µόνη καὶ τῶν ἀσωµάτων αγγέλων µᾶλλον κατ᾿ εἰκόνα τοῦ Θεοῦ παρ᾿ αὐτοῦ δεδηµιούργηται.
6 Ch. 38.11–14, 124: ὅτι νοερός ἐστιν ἔρως τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου πνεῦµα, τὸ τοῦ σώµατος ζωοποιόν, ὅπερ ἐκ τοῦ
νοῦ ἐστι καὶ τοῦ λόγου ἐστί καὶ ἐν τῷ λόγω καὶ τῷ νῷ ἐστι καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔχει τόν τε λόγον καὶ τὸν νοῦν.
7 Sinkewicz (1988), 19. For the ‘intellectual love’ see our analysis in the previous chapter, regarding ‘The
ἔρως of the Intellect to its λόγος’.
8 Ch. 36.11–13, 122.
9 Ch. 38.14–17, 124.
10 Hom. 16, 7.117–21, ΠΣ 6, 186 (ΠΑΕ 9, 432–34). To the most venerable nun Xene 9.6–9, ΠΣ 5, 197. Of
course, however, Palamas believes in the immortality of the soul. He devotes all of Ch. 32 to this
matter. Cf. Mantzaridis (1984), 22–23. For an analysis of how Palamas sees the ‘death of the soul’—
what the Fathers call ‘spiritual’ or ‘intelligible’ (νοητός) death—, see Kesselopoulos (1986), 44–54.
 t h e i m ag e o f g o d i n man and t he ange ls 89

possesses a fuller and truer analogy for the Holy Spirit—who is the life-giving and
vivifying power of God’—, always in comparison to the spirit of the angels.11
A similar statement about this topic is also found in another place of the Palamite
corpus,12 in Homily 60, On the Holy Feast of Theophany,13 this time in a more elaborated
form. In this text Gregory preaches about the Baptism of Christ. First, he mentions
that in the creation of man by God, the Holy Trinity was made manifest. But in the
creation of all the other creatures only the Father and the Son were revealed. Moreover,
God gave to man ‘the breath of life’ (Gen 2:7). This for Gregory was the Holy Spirit.
In the same way, when human nature was ‘recreated in Christ’ (ἀναπλαττομένης ἐν
Χριστῷ), namely in the Baptism of Christ in the river of Jordan, the Holy Spirit was
manifested through His descent from heaven. Thus, again the salvific mystery of the
Holy Trinity was revealed. Therefore, according to Gregory, a Triadic manifestation
took place again.14 But now a question comes up: why and how is the mystery of
the Trinity revealed both in the creation and the recreation of man?

a. Man: An Initiate (μύστης) of the Intelligible Creation, and of the Holy

Trinity

In his effort to answer the aforementioned question, Gregory takes the chance
to highlight the lofty dignity of man: ‘Not just because man is, on earth, the only
initiate into this mystery and the only creature to venerate it, but because he alone is
according to the image of the Trinity’.15 Before examining how he supports the latter
argument, about the image, let us have a glance at the former idea, regarding the role
of man as initiate (μύστης). It is most probably borrowed from Gregory Nazianzen’s
In Theophania, where the Nazianzen points out that God created man ‘προσκυνητὴν
μικτόν, ἐπόπτην τῆς ὁρατῆς κτίσεως, μύστην τῆς νοουμένης’,16 or from John Damascene’s
Expositio Fidei, who uses exactly the same words as the Nazianzen.17 However, we
can detect a small difference. Both the latter and John call man an ‘initiate of the
intelligible creation’, whereas Palamas names him an ‘initiate of the Holy Trinity’. The
same occurs in the other two instances, to my knowledge, where Palamas exploits

11 Sinkewicz (2002), 170.

12 For this remark I am grateful to Prof. Joost van Rossum, who provided me with his ‘L’Eucharistie
chez saint Grégoire Palamas: l’homélie sur les saints et redoutables mystères du Christ’ (2003b) (see
mainly van Rossum (2003b), 187). Cf. Sinkewicz (1988), 21, 25.
13 See ΠΣ 6, 645–56 (ΠΑΕ 11, 505–35).
14 Hom. 60, 3–4, ΠΣ 6, 647–48 (ΠΑΕ 11, 510–12). Gregory uses this same argument, though more briefly,
in his Oratio Apodictica 2, 18.1–11, ed. Bobrinsky, ΠΣ 1, 95.
15 Hom. 60, 4.57–59, ΠΣ 6, 647 (ΠΑΕ 11, 512), trans. Veniamin, 495 (modified): Οὐ μόνον ὅτι μόνος
μύστης καὶ προσκυνητὴς ἐπίγειός ἐστιν αὐτῆς, ἀλλ’ ὅτι καὶ μόνος κατ’ εἰκόνα ταύτης (emphasis added).
16 Oratio 38.11, PG 36, 324A (= Oratio 45.7, PG 36, 632AB).
17 Expos. fidei, 26.26–27, ed. Kotter, 76. Cf. Louth (2002), 133–34. In the same line of thought Symeon
the New Theologian calls man ‘ζῷον ἐποπτικὸν τῆς ὁρωμένης κτίσεως, γνωστικὸν τῆς νοουμένης’
(‘a creature, contemplator of the visible creation, gnostic of the intelligible’), in Capita theologica
2, 23.20–21, ed. Darrouzès, 78.
90 cha p te r 3

this argument in his oeuvre, namely in Oratio Apodictica 218 and in Ch. 26:19 Palamas
again calls man μύστης of God, or of the Trinity.
Has he done this by accident, or does he have a theological purpose? The explanation
for this difference is, to my mind, that Palamas desires to stress the high rank of the
human person, both from the time of his creation, but mainly after the Baptism of
Christ (Theophania), which was the second creation of man. Moreover, he wants to
interpret how the Holy Trinity was revealed in the two creations: one reason is that
man not only is an initiate of the intelligible creation, namely of the angels and the
human soul, but also a μύστης of the Trinity, a guide that knows, even in part, and
instructs the Trinitarian mysteries. The latter prerogative, namely that man is an
initiate of the Holy Trinity, is evidently more significant than the former. Thus, the
slight modification of the Nazianzen’s and John’s words is probably not incidental.
Furthermore, a second question ensues: does Palamas believe that only man, in all
creation, is an initiate of the Holy Trinity? This would unequivocally help Gregory in
his effort to exalt man over the angels. However, it seems that he does not make use
of this argument. He only reaches the point of calling man ‘on earth, the only initiate
of the Trinity’ (‘μόνος μύστης καὶ προσκυνητὴς ἐπίγειός ἐστιν αὐτῆς’), leaving aside
the angelic nature, which is celestial and not earthly.20 Therefore, it is most probably
implied that for Palamas the angels are also considered as initiates of the Trinity. In
fact, in his mind, the angels may be truer initiates than man, because, as will be shown
below, the angels have the kath’ omoiosin in a purer way.21 Nevertheless, it could be
argued that Gregory leaves the reader here a bit confused.

b. Τhe Only Creature Made in the Image of God

Let us now turn our attention to the argument of Palamas that man is the only
creature made in the image of God. This argument is supported in the following
way. Initially two kinds of creatures are distinguished: rational creatures, i.e. angels
and humans, and the irrational animals. The latter have only a vivifying spirit, but
this is not self-subsistent. Moreover, they lack intellect and reason.22 The first part
of the aforementioned argument is further explained in Ch. 31, in the following way.
The ‘soul’ of the animals is the life of the body it animates. This life is dependent on
something else, i.e. the body, and is not self-subsistent. Thus, animals possess life
not as essence, but only as activity. ‘For the soul (of the animals) is seen to possess
nothing other than the activities operated through the body, wherefore the soul is

18 Oratio Apodictica 2, 18.3–5, ed. Bobrinsky, ΠΣ 1, 95: ἔδει δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου γενομένου μηδὲν τῶν
τῆς Τριάδος προσώπων ἀνεπίγνωστον εἶναι, ἧς ἐπλάττετο μύστης καὶ προσκυνητὴς ἐπίγειος.
19 Ch. 26.6–7, 110: κἀκείνου (τοῦ πλάσαντος, i.e. God) μόνου μύστης καὶ προσκυνητὴς εἴη.
20 Hom. 60, 4.58–59, ΠΣ 6, 647 (ΠΑΕ 11, 512); italics added.
21 See ch. 4.1 of this book.
22 Hom. 60, 4.60–62, ΠΣ 6, 647 (ΠΑΕ 11, 512), trans. Veniamin, 495: ‘Sensible and irrational animals have
only a living spirit, which is incapable of independent existence, and is completely devoid of intellect
or reason’ (Τὰ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητικὰ καὶ ἄλογα τῶν ζώων πνεῦμα μόνον ἔχει ζωτικόν, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τοῦτο καθ’
ἑαυτὸ ὑφίστασθαι δυνάμενον, νοῦ δὲ καὶ λόγου τελέως ἀμοιρεῖ).
 t h e i m ag e o f g o d i n man and t he ange ls 91

necessarily dissolved together with the passing of the body’. So, the soul of the animals
is mortal as the body is and it dies when the body dies.23 Consequently, the animals
are not created in the imago Dei.
As far as the angels are concerned, they are intelligible and rational, therefore
they possess intellect and reason. Nonetheless, they do not have vivifying spirit,
because they lack a body to be vivified. Therefore ‘man is the only creature who, in
the image of the tri-hypostatic Being, has intellect, reason and spirit which gives life
to his body inasmuch as he also has a body which needs to be infused with life’.24
From this point of view, only he is made kat’ eikona. Moreover, the revelation of the
Holy Trinity in the recreation of man, in the Baptism of Christ, reminds that the
Trinity is like ‘the archetype of the image in our soul’ (οἷά τινος ἀρχετύπου τῆς κατὰ
ψυχὴν ἡμῶν εἰκόνος).25 It is worth noting here that, for St Gregory, both the angels
and humans possess life as an essential part of their being, namely they are immortal.
However only man ‘possesses life also as an energy or activity which passes on life
and animation to his body’:26 man has the life-giving energy to vivify his body,
something that the angels do not possess. Thus, from the above he concludes that
man is superior to the angels, in terms of the imago, due to his corporeality.27

c. The Patristic Context

But here a crucial question arises: how was St Gregory guided to this idea of the
ζωοποιὸς δύναμις and why does he give it such importance? It is possible that
Palamas reached this argument through reflecting on the essence-activities (or
energies) distinction. God has, apart from his essence, his activities. Gregory now
refers to the life-giving energy of the Holy Spirit. Analogically, in the human soul,
apart from its essence, one can identify its life-giving energy, which is manifested in
how it vitalises the human body.28 Therefore, Palamas may insist on his argument
regarding the ζωοποιὸς δύναμις because it reminds him of his favourite distinction
between ousia and energeia.

23 Ch. 31, 114: Ἡ τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων ἑκάστου ψυχή, ζωή ἐστι τοῦ κατ’ αὐτὴν ἐµψύχου σώµατος· καὶ οὐκ
οὐσίαν, ἀλλ’ ἐνέργειαν ἔχει ταῦτα τὴν ζωήν, ὡς πρὸς ἕτερον οὖσαν, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ καθ’ αὑτήν. αὕτη γὰρ οὐδὲν
ἕτερον ἔχουσα ὁρᾶται, ὅτι µὴ τὰ ἐνεργούµενα διὰ τοῦ σώµατος∙ διὸ καὶ λυοµένῳ τούτῳ, συνδιαλύεσθαι
ἀνάγκη. θνητὴ γάρ ἐστι τοῦ σώµατος οὐχ ἦττον, ἐπεὶ πᾶν ὅπερ ἐστί, πρὸς τὸ θνητόν ἐστί τε καὶ λέγεται∙
διὸ καὶ θανόντι συναποθνήσκει.
24 Hom. 60, 4.64–66, ΠΣ 6, 647 (ΠΑΕ 11, 512), trans. Veniamin, 495: ἄνθρωπος δὲ μόνος κατ’ εἰκόνα
τῆς τρισυποστάτου φύσεως νοῦν ἔχει καὶ λόγον καὶ πνεῦμα τοῦ σώματος ζωοποιόν, ἐπεὶ καὶ σῶμα τὸ
ζωοποιούμενον.
25 Hom. 60, 4.68–69, ΠΣ 6, 647 (ΠΑΕ 11, 512), trans. Veniamin, 495.
26 Sinkewicz (1988), 16. Cf. Palamas, Ch. 32–33.
27 Palamas argues that man is the only creature made kat’ eikona also in Ch. 26.4–6, 108–10: µόνος γὰρ
(ὁ ἄνθρωπος) ἁπάντων ἐγγείων τε καὶ οὐρανίων ἐκτίσθη κατ᾿ εἰκόνα τοῦ πλάσαντος… Moreover in Ch.
40.1–4, 126 he points that the triadic nature of the soul (‘νοερά, λογική τε καὶ πνευματική’; intellectual,
rational and spiritual) is made in the image more so than others.
28 Let us remember that, for Palamas, one may find in the human intellect a distinction between its
essence and activities; cf. section 4.d in the introduction of this book.
92 cha p te r 3

Moreover, what is the patristic context of this idea? Is it found in any of the
previous Fathers? First, it should be noted that ‘giver of life’ (τὸ ζωοποιόν) is one of
the epithets attributed to the Holy Spirit in the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed.29
Second, Sinkewicz points to Theodoret of Cyrus’ (end of fourth-middle fifth century)
argument that the human soul ‘possesses within itself both a rational and an animating
faculty’ (καὶ τὸ λογικὸν καὶ τὸ ζωτικόν).30 However, Theodoret does not elaborate
on the notion of the ζωτικόν.
In addition, St Maximos the Confessor uses a similar notion, the κινητικὸν
αἴτιον, in his effort to prove that the human soul is not corporeal.31 He argues that
both the created world, i.e. the cosmos, and man have a relationship/reference to
an immutable cause. For the cosmos this cause is God, who naturally moves it. But
for man, in Thunberg’s words, ‘it is the substantial cause of movement (τὸ κινητικὸν
αἴτιον), which is fixed in itself but in relation to which the organic existence of the
body is moved’.32 This cause of the soul has the imago because, in relation to it, the
whole of man moves, as the whole cosmos does in relation to God.33
In particular, exactly due to this fixity, man reflects the world in his relationship
to God as the first Cause. Thus, this fixity is made kat’ eikona tou Theou and man
serves as a microcosm in how he mirrors the cosmos. Furthermore, as will be
hinted at in the following section regarding man’s dominion over the created
world, John Damascene uses some arguments very reminiscent of Palamas’.
Therefore, Palamas seems to be basing his thinking on those two authors (mainly
John), though the expression ‘ζωοποιὸς δύναμις’ of the soul, and at least in this
particular framework, it is probably a ‘system’ of his own invention.34 But these
remarks open the topic of the faculty of self-governance and its placement within
the framework of the imago.

29 ‘Καὶ εἰς τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ Ἅγιον, τὸ Κύριον, τὸ Ζωοποιόν…’. This word (ζωοποιόν) or its derivatives are very
very often used in the patristic literature, as well as and in the daily offices of the Eastern Orthodox
Church.
30 Theodoret, Quaestiones in Genesim 20.90–92, ed. Petruccione, 54 (PG 80, 108A). Cf. Sinkewicz (1988),
23.
31 Maximos, Epistle 6, PG 91, 429B–432A. It should be underlined that this resembles a traditional
Platonic argument, regarding the immortality of the soul and its moving power (e.g. in Phaedo and
Phaedrus). See, for instance, Bluck (1955), 29–32.
32 Thunberg (19952), 138.
33 Thunberg (19952), 138 argues that this cause of movement is ‘represented in principle by the mind’
and ‘at the same time bears the image of God’. Nevertheless, it seems to me that in the specific
extract (Ep. 6, PG 91, 429B–432A) Maximos speaks only about the soul, without arguing definitely
that the κινητικὸν αἴτιον is found in the intellect. However, it is possible that Thunberg has in
mind—though without mentioning it—another more helpful Maximian passage which clarifies the
subject.
34 It is possible, to my mind, that Palamas draws here also on Nemesios, a fourth-century bishop of
Emesa. But this requires to be searched further, so as to reach a safe conclusion. See his work De
natura hominis, ed. Morani (1987) (= PG 40, 504–817). For the English translation, along with a useful
introduction and comments, see the important edition of Sharples and van der Eijk (2008).
 t h e i m ag e o f g o d i n man and t he ange ls 93

2. The Faculty of Self-Governance and Man’s Dominion

over the Created World

The second important reason, for why man is superior to the angels in terms of the
image of God, is the faculty of self-governance and his dominion over the created
world. Palamas’ arguments are deployed in Ch. 62.35 Initially he stresses that in the
nature of the human soul is contained ‘on the one hand a faculty of governance and
dominion and on the other hand one of natural servitude and obedience’ (3–5).36
Moreover, God created the human will and the appetite together with the intellect,
so that the former elements, along with the body, are ordered by the intellect (5–9).
Gregory refers here to the intellect’s government of the will: the human will should
not be left unrestrained, but always guided by the intellect, so that it follows God’s
will. Nevertheless, man often deliberately decides to follow the path of sin. Thus he
is opposed, first, to God, who wants man to prefer virtue over sin, and, second, to
man’s—i.e. the intellect’s—ruling power.37
However, God granted man the privilege to rule over the earth,38 exactly because
of the faculty of dominion within him.39 Thus man has the right to govern the creation,
for he governs—or at least, is called to govern—his body and his internal self, namely
his psychological/internal movements. But the angels do not have such a faculty of
dominion, because they have no body. Therefore, Palamas connects the faculty of
governing the creation to man’s corporeality: ‘angels do not have a body joined to
them so that it is subject to the intellect’.40
He continues his analysis by mentioning that the good angels have obtained an
intellectual will which ‘is perpetually good and required no charioteer at all’, while the
fallen angels’ intellectual will is ‘perpetually evil’.41 This means that the angels have
no need of a power controlling their will, in contrast to man whose soul possesses
a ruling power. Consequently, the angels do not have the prerogative of ruling the
world that man has. To establish this, Palamas calls on the following example: Satan,

35 Ch. 62, 154–56.

36 Ch. 62.1–5, 154–56: Οὐ κατὰ τοῦτο µόνον µᾶλλον τῶν ἀγγέλων ὁ ἄνθρωπος κατ᾿ εἰκόνα πεποίηται Θεοῦ,
ὅτι συνεκτικήν τε καὶ ζωοποιὸν ἔχει δύναµιν ἐν ἑαυτῷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἄρχειν. ἔστι γὰρ ἐν τῇ τῆς καθ᾿
ἡµᾶς ψυχῆς φύσει, τὸ µὲν ἡγεµονικόν τε καὶ ἀρχικόν, τὸ δὲ φύσει δουλεῦόν τε καὶ ὑπήκοον.
37 Ch. 62.5–9, 156: θέλησις, ὄρεξις, αἴσθησις, καὶ ἁπλῶς ὅσα μετὰ τὸν νοῦν τῷ νῷ συνεκτίσθη παρὰ Θεοῦ,
κἂν ἡμεῖς ἔστιν ἐφ’ ὧν φιλαμαρτήμονι γνώμῃ μὴ τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ παντοκράτορος μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ
προσόντος ἡμῖν ἐμφύτως αὐτοκράτορος ἀφηνιάζωμεν.
38 This is a standard Biblical teaching; cf. Gen 1:28: ‘And God blessed them, and God said to them, “Be
fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea and
over the birds of the air and over every living thing that moves upon the earth”’.
39 Ch. 62.9–10, 156: ὁ μέντοι Θεὸς διὰ τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν ἀρχικὸν καὶ τῆς γῆς ἁπάσης παρέσχε τὴν κυριότητα.
Throughout the chapter Gregory calls this power of self-governing ἔμφυτος αὐτοκράτωρ (8–9) and τὸ
ἐν ἡμῖν ἀρχικόν (9–10).
40 Ch. 62.10–12, 156: ἄγγελοι δὲ συνεζευγμένον σῶμα οὐκ ἔχουσιν, ὡς καὶ ὑπεζευγμένον ἔχειν τῷ νῷ. As will
be shown in a while, Palamas here is, probably, drawing on St John Damascene. However, it will be
observed how Gregory’s approach is both similar to, and yet different from, John’s.
41 Ch. 62.12–14, 156: τὴν δὲ νοερὰν θέλησιν, οἱ µὲν ἐκπεσόντες διηνεκῶς κέκτηνται πονηράν, οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοὶ
διηνεκῶς ἀγαθὴν καὶ ἡνιόχου µηδαµῶς δεοµένην.
94 cha p te r 3

who is an angel, albeit a fallen one, had no dominion over the earth in the beginning;
the proof for that is that he had to steal it. It was not rightfully his, but man’s. After
the fall, ‘The good angels were appointed by the universal sovereign [i.e. God] to
keep watch over the affairs of earth’, until man is restored to the cosmos’ lordship,
to his proper rank.42 Consequently, the angels are servants and ministers, not only
of God, but of man as well.43
It is evident how clearly Palamas connects the ability of governing the world
with man’s true rank. The cosmos is of great value; hence man is able to govern it
only if his proper rank is maintained. When man lost his high dignity, he then lost
this ability, and angels were called in to replace him, though not exactly in the same
way. Therefore, it is absolutely essential that man be restored to his proper place. But
what does Palamas mean by referring to man’s restoration to the cosmos’ lordship,
to his proper rank? Undoubtedly Palamas refers to the re-establishing of a true
relationship with God, to walking again on the road of the kath’ omoiosin, namely
theosis. In order to activate the faculty of dominion and manifest truly the imago,
man has to be restored to his proper rank; he must obtain again his resemblance to
God. Thus, the kat’eikona, apart from being the foundation for the kath’omoiosin, is
also the effect of the latter. In other words, when man is deified, only then he is truly
restored to the true image.44
Let us point out, though, that Gregory does not explicitly call for such a
restoration, but rather this is inferred from the context of his sayings in the current
Chapter (62). Particularly, although he speaks about ‘the reduction of our rank
that ensued’ after the fall (17–18), he hastens to add that this reduction was not
‘complete because of God’s love for mankind’ (18–19).45 It is interesting how
Gregory is not fully disappointed by man’s fall. On the one hand, he mentions
the grave consequences that followed from it, namely the loss of his faculty for
dominion over creation, but on the other hand, he encourages man by stressing
that he could have this faculty restored again. Palamas provides strong motivation
for man to struggle. One could easily observe his diligent care as preacher and
pastor—his strong interest for his flock. Moreover, for Gregory the kat’ eikona
has not been entirely lost in the fall, but has only been corrupted.46 The same,
one would argue, occurs for the faculty of dominion, which is a basic parameter
of the imago.

42 Ch. 62.14–19, 156: τὸ δ᾿ ἐπίγειον κράτος ὁ µὲν πονηρὸς οὐκ εἶχεν, ἀλλ᾿ ἥρπασεν, ὅθεν δῆλον ὡς οὐκ
ἄρχων ἐκτίσθη τῆς γῆς. οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοὶ τῶν ἀγγέλων ἐπισκοπεῖν τὰ κατ᾿ αὐτὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ παντοκράτορος
προσετάχθησαν µετὰ τὴν ἡµῶν ἔκπτωσιν καὶ διὰ ταύτην τῆς ἀξίας, εἰ καὶ µὴ παντελῆ διὰ φιλανθρωπίαν,
καθαίρεσιν. Cf. Sinkewicz (1986b), 864–65.
43 Mantzaridis (1984), 20. Cf. Apostle Paul’s reference to the angels, in Heb 1:14: ‘for they are all
ministering spirits sent forth to serve, for the sake of those who are to inherit salvation’.
44 For the likeness to God, see ch. 4.
45 Ch. 62.18–19, 156: μετὰ τὴν ἡμῶν ἔκπτωσιν καὶ διὰ ταύτην τῆς ἀξίας, εἰ καὶ μὴ παντελῆ διὰ φιλανθρωπίαν,
καθαίρεσιν.
46 Cf. Palamas, Apod. 2, 9, ΠΣ 1, 85.30–86.2: ὡς ἂν ζωοποιήσας ἀνακαινίσῃ τὴν ἀμαυρωθεῖσαν εἰκόνα. Tr.
1,1,5.7–10, 365 (17.21–24).
 t h e i m ag e o f g o d i n man and t he ange ls 95

a. The Patristic Context

But what is the patristic context of Palamas’ approach? Initially, it is worth stating that
man’s dominion over the irrational creation has often been related to the divine image
in the patristic literature.47 Thus, it is used by Gregory of Nyssa, Cyril of Alexandria,
and the Antiochene school.48 Moreover, as Thunberg pinpoints, St Maximos the
Confessor considers it natural to man as a spiritual being ‘both to subordinate himself
to the Logos of God and to have dominion over the irrational part of himself ’.49
Additionally, Maximos relates the ‘self-governing and freewilling activity’ with the
image of God, and not with the likeness.50 Unequivocally one can see in this point
a great resemblance to Palamas’ teaching, though in this context Gregory does not
speak about subordination to the Logos.51 Consequently, it could be argued that the
following thoughts of Thunberg about Maximos might be also ascribed to Palamas:
‘Dominion, as a reflection of the image character of man, is, thus, realized already
when the human mind, which is primarily responsible for the manifestation of this
image, functions as the spiritual subject of the whole of man’.52
Furthermore, it is worth underlining that, like Palamas, Maximos also stresses
the high value of the body, by pointing to its importance for the imago. As Thunberg
again puts it, ‘The body is in Maximus… in different ways implied—not in the
localization of the image of God in man, but in relation to its realization—which
is to Maximus a necessary consequence of its recognition’.53 Therefore, Palamas is
most probably following this same line of thought by attributing great value to the
body through the kat’ eikona theology.

47 For instance, see what Alfeyev (2005), 184 n. 68 notes about Symeon the New Theologian and
the previous Fathers: ‘In his other writings Symeon also develops the idea that the image of
God in man consists of his dominant role in the universe. All these notions are borrowed from
preceding Fathers and reflect the traditional approach to the theme of God’s image and likeness in
man’ (emphases added). Alfeyev refers here to a) Hymn 33, where Symeon the New Theologian
connects the imago with man’s dominion over the earthly creatures and over his passions. See, ed.
Koder, 414.18–24 (‘The man, whom He created after His image and likeness…dominates over
the earthly [creatures]…and over passions—this is what is meant by “in the image”…’; the trans.
is from Alfeyev), and b) Discourse 35 (Action de grâces 1; ‘First Thanksgiving’), ed. Krivochéine, SC
113, 304.1–306.13.
48 Thunberg (19952), 120. Cf. Mantzaridis (1984), 20. For instance, for the dominant position of man
in the universe, see John Chrysostom, Hom. Gen. 8, 3, PG 53, 72; Cyril of Alexandria, Adversus
Anthropomorphitas (Κατὰ Ἀνθρωπομορφιτῶν), PG 76, 1068C–72A. For the imago Dei according to the
Antiochene tradition, see McLeod (1999).
49 Thunberg (19952), 120. Cf. Maximοs, Centuriae de Charitate (Four Centuries on Love), 2.83, ed. Ceresa-
Gastaldo, 134: Κατὰ φύσιν τοῦ ἐν ἡμῖν λογικοῦ μέρους τό τε ὑποταγῆναι τῷ θείῳ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ ἄρχειν τοῦ
ἐν ἡμῖν ἀλόγου μέρους.
50 See Quaestiones et dubia iii, 1.1–20, ed. Declerk, 170. He calls these activities respectively ‘τὸ
αὐτοδέσποτον καὶ αὐτεξούσιον’. Cf. Cooper (2005), 97–98.
51 This topic, however, probably arises in other places of the Palamite corpus.
52 Thunberg (19952), 120.
53 Thunberg (19952), 120.
96 cha p te r 3

It seems that this point, regarding the faculty of dominion—which, to my

knowledge, has not been adequately stressed by scholars54—, is important for Palamas’
understanding of the imago Dei and generally for his anthropology. Gregory argues
that man manifests the kat’eikona more fully than the angels, because, in contrast
to them, among others he disposes the faculty of dominion. Moreover, he has this
faculty in virtue of his corporeality. Therefore, man resembles more to God,55 who
is the general governor of all creation, exactly because he has a body.

b. Man and the Cosmos

Furthermore, in this same Chapter (62) Palamas expresses some views worth noting
about the relationship between man and the cosmos. First, he mentions that the angels
‘did not own power over the earth’ initially and were ‘not created as rulers of the
earth’.56 On the contrary, God ‘gave us lordship over all the earth’.57 This establishes
a closer affinity of man to the cosmos, than the angels have. Man is the sovereign of
the world, the angels are only its servants.
Moreover, Gregory argues that God granted man the potential of governing the
creation due to his internal faculty of dominion. By this is suggested, though not
explicitly stressed, that man should govern the world in the same way as he does
with his own will and appetite. But the God-like man always tries to conform his
own will to God’s will and generally to subordinate his internal movements to the
rule of the intellect. This is how he rules himself.58 Hence, analogically, it could be
said that man should try to rule the creation guiding it to the resemblance of God,
to divinization. And, of course, this implies that man ought to exert this faculty in a
way God would approve, that is not as a tyrant, but as God’s steward.
A major subject is raised here, that of the divinization of creation. As it is well
known, it is the patristic teaching that man, on his way to theosis, carries along with
him (συμπαρασύρει) the whole creation.59 Of course Palamas does not mention

54 For instance, Sinkewicz and Christou devote to it a simple reference in their commentary of the
Capita. See Sinkewicz (1988), 35 and Christou, ΠΣ 5, 19.
55 Ch. 62.1–2, 154: …μᾶλλον τῶν ἀγγέλων ὁ ἄνθρωπος κατ’ εἰκόνα πεποίηται Θεοῦ…
56 Palamas refers to Satan, who is an angel, in Ch. 62.14–15, 156: τὸ δ’ ἐπίγειον κράτος… οὐκ εἶχεν [the evil
one]… οὐκ ἄρχων ἐκτίσθη τῆς γῆς.
57 Ch. 62.10, 156: …τῆς γῆς ἁπάσης παρέσχε τὴν κυριότητα. Cf. Gen 1:28.
58 It is very interesting that this theological teaching about the imago Dei imbues the liturgical life of the
Church. See, e.g., the troparion of the Vespers of St Sabbas the Sanctified († fifth December): ‘You
[i.e., St Sabba] set your intellect as master over the deadly passions, keeping the image unharmed
through the ascetic life. Thus you rose into the perfect likeness, for bravely curbing nature, you
hastened to subject to that which is better, and made the body servant to the spirit. Therefore you
were revealed as the chief of those living the monastic life, a citizen of the desert, a master teaching
those who come to you, a perfect example of virtue…’ (the translation [slightly modified] is drawn
from http://lit.royaldoors.net/2014/10/29/december-5-2014-our-venerable-and-god-bearing-father-
sabbas-the-sanctified/; accessed 22.11.2019).
59 For a relevant text, with some implications for contemporary ecological problems, see Zizioulas
(2011), 133–41 (‘Proprietors or Priests of Creation?’).
 t h e i m ag e o f g o d i n man and t he ange ls 97

specifically this topic in the current Chapter (62), but perhaps he has this idea in
mind. Furthermore, he may have been influenced by the idea of man as microcosm
and cosmic mediator, which is widespread among the fathers. In this understand-
ing, man is regarded as a ‘small world’ (μικρὸς κόσμος), a mirroring of the whole
creation. In other words, some points can be discovered inside man that resemble
the outer cosmos, because ‘he bears within himself the elements of all creation’.60
And is not Gregory here making a parallelism between man’s internal world and
the cosmos, by mentioning that man ought to govern the creation in the same way
as he governs himself? Thus, even by allusion, Palamas seems to have in his mind
man as a microcosm.61
Besides, St Gregory exploits this notion in other parts of his work as well. For
instance, in Homily 26 he argues that in a paradoxical manner God recapitulates
(συγκεφαλαιωσάμενος) in man the whole creation, notwithstanding man’s
smallness: ‘He made man in a mysterious way, gathering together and, so to
speak, summing up all creation in one small creature’.62 In addition ‘That is why
he was last to be created, belonging to both the visible and invisible worlds and
adorning (ἐπικοσμοῦντα) them both’.63 Elsewhere Palamas supports that man
was created at the end of the whole process of creation so that the whole cosmos
could be recapitulated in him. Moreover, by his creation, sense perception and
the intellect were united.64
Furthermore, since both man and the cosmos have the same artificer, that is God,
they have a close affinity in virtue of their way of construction. However, they have
two significant differences: the cosmos is greater than man as far as size is concerned,
whereas man exceeds the cosmos by understanding and reason.65 Furthermore, man

60 Thunberg (19952), 132–33.

61 Τhe word ‘μικρόκοσμος’ does not seem to appear as such (i.e. in this specific form) in the Fathers, but
rather as ‘μικρὸς κόσμος’. Perhaps ‘microcosmos’ is a coinage of the Renaissance. For this remark I am
grateful to Fr Andrew Louth.
62 Hom. 26, Delivered at harvest time. Also concerning the spiritual harvest, 1.3–5, ΠΣ 6, 294 (ΠΑΕ 10, 152.6–
9), trans. Veniamin, 206: τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀπειργάσατο παραδόξως, εἰς ἓν καὶ βραχὺ πλάσμα συναθροίσας,
καὶ οἷον συγκεφαλαιωσάμενος τὴν ἅπασαν κτίσιν.
63 Hom. 26, 1.5–7, ΠΣ 6, 294 (ΠΑΕ 10, 152.9–12), trans. Veniamin, 206: Διὸ καὶ ὕστατον τοῦτον
ἐδημιούργησε, τῶν κόσμων ἀμφοτέρων ἐχόμενον καὶ ἀμφοτέρους ἐπικοσμοῦντα τοὺς κόσμους, τὸν
ὁρατὸν τοῦτον λέγω καὶ τὸν ἀόρατον…
64 Hom. 17, Explaining the mystery of the Sabbath and of the Lord’s day, 3.34–38, ΠΣ 6, 205 (ΠΑΕ 9, 488),
trans. Veniamin, 135: ‘[God] demonstrated a work worthy of his own Counsel… He crowned the
whole of creation, brought together into unity the senses and the intellect…’ (ἀλλὰ καὶ βουλῆς ἄξιον
ὑπέδειξεν οἰκείας ἔργον [i.e. the creation of man], συγκεφαλαιωσάμενος τὸ πᾶν, αἴσθησίν τε καὶ νοῦν
συναγαγὼν εἰς ἕν).
65 Hom. 26, 1.12–14, ΠΣ 6, 294 (ΠΑΕ 10, 154), trans. Veniamin, 206: ‘Man and the world were both the
work of the same Craftsman, and have much in common, but whereas the world is larger in size, man
is more excellently constructed’ (Ὡς γὰρ ἑνὸς τεχνίτου τῷ τρόπῳ τῆς κατασκευῆς ἄνθρωπός τε καὶ
κόσμος, οὕτω πολλὴν ἔχουσι πρὸς ἄλληλα τὴν συγγένειαν· ὑπερέχουσι δὲ ἀλλήλων, ὁ μὲν τῷ μεγέθει, ὁ δὲ
τῇ συνέσει). Perhaps a better rendering of the phrase ‘ὁ δὲ τῇ συνέσει’ would be that man exceeds the
cosmos ‘by understanding and reason’.
98 cha p te r 3

is incomparably more valuable than the whole cosmos.66 From the above it is shown
that Palamas does indeed make use of the notion of man as microcosm.67
We should also mention another important argument of St Gregory that is quite
relevant here. In at least one place in his corpus, he argues that the spiritual man—the
one who attains union with God and contemplates God—reaches God through divine
grace, carrying along with him ‘every kind of creature, as he himself participates in
everything and is also able to participate in the one who lies above everything, in
order for the image of God to be completed (or: fully manifest) (ἀπηκριβωμένον ᾖ)’.68
This passage has the following implications: First, man bears in him all the
elements found in creation, therefore man serves as a microcosm. Second, man is
united with creation by virtue of his body, but it is also possible that he be united with
God. Third, the human body has a role in man’s union with God; the body is not left
aside. And, fourth, in his union with God, man bears with him, and offers to God,
the rest of the material creation; in this way the image of God in man is completed
and fully manifest.69 This is, of course, another point where Palamas shows the
great importance of the material creation (cosmos), and at the same time, stresses
how crucial it is for man to respect and guard the creation. Meyendorff is correct
in arguing that in Palamas one finds ‘the elements of Christian materialism which,
instead of wishing to suppress matter which has revolted against the spirit through

66 Hom. 26, 1.15–19, ΠΣ 6, 294–95 (ΠΑΕ 10, 154). Here Palamas expresses his argument in a beautiful
and poetic manner (for the exact passage, see the beginning of the current book). Cf. trans. Veniamin,
206: ‘He (i.e. man) is placed in the world like a treasure inside a large house which is far more valuable
than the house containing it, or like an intricate and expensive vessel belonging to a king kept inside
his palace. The palace is made out of very large stones which are easy to find, whereas the vessel is
decorated with small stones, which are rare and very costly’.
67 St Maximos also uses this notion, and one could draw from his approach some important
implications regarding the ecological problem of our era. For a brief, but important, speculation of
this topic, see Tollefsen (2008), 228–29.
68 I am grateful to Fr Nikolaos Loudovikos for stressing this point to me. For the passage, see Palamas,
Κατὰ Ἀκινδύνου (Against Akindynos) 7,11,36.25–28, ed. Phanourgakis, ΠΣ 3, 488: ἄγελλος ὡς ἀληθῶς
ἄλλος ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς Θεοῦ γεγονῶς καὶ δι’ ἑαυτοῦ πᾶν εἶδος κτίσεως αὐτῷ προσαγαγών, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν
μετοχῇ τῶν πάντων καὶ τοῦ ὑπὲρ τὰ πάντα δὲ μεταλαγχάνειν ἦν, ἵνα καὶ τὸ τῆς εἰκόνος ἀπηκριβωμένον
ᾖ (the same passage is also found in other two places of the Palamite corpus, i.e. Epistolary
Discourse to the philosophers John and Theodore 18.23–26, ΠΣ 5, 239, and To the most venerable nun
Xene 59.18–21, ΠΣ 5, 224). See relevantly Loudovikos (2013), 132 [= Loudovikos (2010c), 42] (the
trans. of the aforementioned Palamite passage is borrowed from there). Here Loudovikos makes a
significant anthropological (and ecclesiological) remark: for Palamas, man, in order to reach God,
has to essentially be united with the creation—and, for this reason—with his fellow humans. In
Loudovikos’ own words, ‘horizontal participation becomes an absolute prerequisite of the vertical.
In ecclesiological terms, that means that it is only in the process of the realization of the ecclesial
dialogical/analogical synergetic communion, that elevation to God can be achieved’ (Loudovikos
(2013), 132). Moreover, this remark has a great value from an ecological point of view, and sheds some
light on Palamas’ understanding of man as a ‘priest of the creation’.
69 Cf. Hom. 26, Delivered at harvest time. Also concerning the spiritual harvest, 2.20–23, ΠΣ 6, 295 (ΠΑΕ
10, 154) [= Hom. 53, On the Entry into the Holy of Holies II, 56.842–44, ΠΣ 6, 580 (ΠΑΕ 11, 332)], trans.
Veniamin, 206: Πόσον οὐρανοῦ κρείττων ὁ ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς, ὃς εἰκών τέ ἐστι Θεοῦ καὶ Θεὸν οἶδε καὶ
μόνος τῶν ἐγκοσμίων Θεός, εἰ βούλεται, γίνεται, συναναφέρων τὸ σῶμα τῆς ταπεινώσεως;
 t h e i m ag e o f g o d i n man and t he ange ls 99

the effect of sin, gives it the place the creator assigned to it, and discovers the way
which Christ opened for it by transfiguring it and by deifying it in his own body’.70

c. St John Damascene: A Possible Source?

So far two reasons were indicated for man’s greater manifestation of the imago in
comparison to the angels: the ‘vivifying power’ and the faculty of self-governance.
It will be now argued that a similar approach can be found in the oeuvre of St John
Damascene. However, it will be shown that Gregory’s approach is both similar to,
and yet different from, John’s.
The latter presents how humans manifest the kat’ eikona to a greater degree than
the angels in two points of his treatise On the Two Wills in Christ (De duabus in Christo
voluntatibus; or Against the Monothelites), namely sections 16 and 30.71 Initially, he
mentions that the angels and human souls have some common elements in terms of
the image of God, namely life, understanding, and will. Yet the human soul manifests
in a deeper way the imago because of the body: in virtue of its ‘governing the body
and granting it life and movement and freely, in accordance with its own appetite or
will, leading the body and its irrational appetite, desire and aggression and instinctive
movement, and naturally ruling its own body as its own servant. Therefore, more than
the angels is the human being said to be in the image’.72 The two central notions here
are a) the governing of the body and the internal self, and b) the soul’s granting life
to the body. But these exactly are the two reasons, presented in the current chapter,
which Palamas invokes, in order to support the superiority of man over the angels
in terms of the imago: he makes an appeal to the faculty of dominion and the soul’s
ζωοποιὸς δύναμις.
Despite the great similarities—and in some cases nearly identical expres-
sions—shared by John and Gregory, we can still discern certain differences in their
approaches. First, John speaks about the λογικὴ ψυχή which grants life and movement
to the body (τούτῳ μεταδιδόναι ζωῆς καὶ κινήσεως).73 Gregory refers to the ‘νοερὰ καὶ
λογικὴ φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς’ which has received from God the life-giving spirit (ζωοποιὸν
πνεῦμα), ‘through which it conserves and gives life to the body joined to it’ (δι’ οὗ
συνέχει καὶ ζωοποιεῖ τὸ συνημμένον σῶμα).74 Additionally, this provides Gregory an
occasion to reflect on this spirit and to interpret it as intellectual love (νοερὸς ἔρως),75
a connection that John does not make.

70 Meyendorff (1959a), 222 (= Meyendorff (1974a), 156).

71 John also speaks about the superiority of man over the angels by virtue of his having a body—and his
ability to receive Holy Communion—in his Three Treatises on Divine Images (Orationes de imaginibus
tres), III, 26. But this extract will be analysed afterwards, in the section regarding man’s superiority to
the angels due to his participation in the Eucharist (ch. 3.4).
72 Volunt. 16.5–10, ed. Kotter, 199. The translation is drawn from Louth (2002), 122. For the original text
of John, see the table below.
73 Volunt. 16.3,6, ed. Kotter, 199.
74 Ch. 38.7–10, 124.
75 See ch. 2.2 of this book.
1 00 cha p te r 3

Furthermore, the Damascene speaks about the soul’s ‘governing of the body and
freely, in accordance with its own appetite or will (αὐτεξουσίως), leading the body
and its irrational appetite, desire and aggression and instinctive movement (ἄγειν
τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ἄλογον ὄρεξιν, ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ θυμὸν καὶ τὴν καθ’ ὁρμὴν κίνησιν), and
naturally ruling (φυσικῶς ἄρχειν) its own body as its own servant (ὡς ἰδίου φυσικοῦ
δούλου)’.76 Palamas, as shown previously, exploits these notions, but to different ends.
The relationship between these two authors, along with some parallels of content,
is depicted in the following schema:
Gregory Palamas John Damascene
[Ch. 62 (or 38, if indicated)] [Volunt. 16 (or 30, if indicated)]
ἡ δὲ νοερὰ καὶ λογικὴ φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐπεὶ τὸ ἐν σώματι πολιτεύεσθαι καὶ τούτῳ
γηΐνῳ συνεκτίσθη σώματι καὶ ζωοποιὸν ἔλαβε μεταδιδόναι ζωῆς καὶ κινήσεως (5–6)
τὸ πνεῦμα παρὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ, δι’ οὗ συνέχει καὶ
ζωοποιεῖ τὸ συνημμένον σῶμα (Ch. 38.7–10)
θέλησις, ὄρεξις, αἴσθησις, καὶ ἁπλῶς ὅσα μετὰ καὶ τὸ αὐτεξουσίως κατ’ οἰκείαν ὄρεξιν ἤτοι
τὸν νοῦν τῷ νῷ συνεκτίσθη παρὰ Θεοῦ, κἂν θέλησιν ἄγειν τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ἄλογον ὄρεξιν,
ἡμεῖς ἔστιν ἐφ’ ὧν φιλαμαρτήμονι γνώμῃ μὴ ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ θυμὸν καὶ τὴν καθ’ ὁρμὴν
τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ παντοκράτορος μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ κίνησιν (6–8)
τοῦ προσόντος ἡμῖν ἐμφύτως αὐτοκρά­τορος
ἀφηνιάζωμεν (5–9)
ἄγγελοι δὲ συνεζευγμένον σῶμα οὐκ ἔχουσιν, καὶ φυσικῶς ἄρχειν ὡς ἰδίου φυσικοῦ δούλου
ὡς καὶ ὑπεζευγμένον ἔχειν τῷ νῷ (10–12) / τοῦ οἰκείου σώματος (8–9) / ὁ γὰρ ἄγγελος
ἔστι γὰρ ἐν τῇ τῆς καθ’ ἡμᾶς ψυχῆς φύσει, τὸ οὐκ ἔχει φυσικὸν δοῦλον οὐδὲ φυσικῶς
μὲν ἡγεμονικόν τε καὶ ἀρχικόν, τὸ δὲ φύσει ἐστι δεσπότης (10–11) [cf. Volunt. 30.6–7,
δουλεῦόν τε καὶ ὑπήκοον (3–5) ed. Kotter, 216: κατὰ τὸ φύσει ἀρχικόν—
φύσει γὰρ ἔχει δοῦλον ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ σῶμα καὶ
ἐξουσιάζει αὐτοῦ]
Οὐ κατὰ τοῦτο μόνον μᾶλλον τῶν ἀγγέλων Διὸ καὶ πλέον τῶν ἀγγέλων κατ’ εἰκόνα ὁ
ὁ ἄνθρωπος κατ’ εἰκόνα πεποίηται Θεοῦ, ὅτι ἄνθρωπος (9–10)
συνεκτικήν τε καὶ ζωοποιὸν ἔχει δύναμιν ἐν
ἑαυτῷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἄρχειν (1–3)
ὁ μέντοι Θεὸς διὰ τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν ἀρχικὸν καὶ τῆς John does not mention something similar
γῆς ἁπάσης παρέσχε τὴν κυριότητα (9–10)

From this schema we can see that there are some similarities between Palamas’ and
John’s approach. Nevertheless, it should be acknowledged that these ideas are quite
usual in the Greek patristic tradition (e.g. Gregory Nazianzen, Maximos, etc.), so
one could not argue for sure that Palamas here relies exclusively on John. Besides,
there exist some differences, between their approaches. Gregory relates both the
faculty of self-governance and the dominion over the cosmos with the kat’ eikona,

76 Volunt. 16.6–10, ed. Kotter, 199, trans. Louth (2002), 122.

 t h e i m ag e o f g o d i n man and t he ange ls 101

whereas John, in this context, does not mention man’s lordship over the earth.77
However, John says something similar. He argues that both humans and the angels
are in the image of God on the grounds that they are rational, intellectual, and free;
nevertheless ‘the whole of creation finds its unity both in God and in human kind’.
Consequently, ‘the divine image is also manifest in the human role of being the “bond
of intellectual and sensible creation”, “which the Son of God was to become; for he
did not become an angel, but a human being”’.78
On the other hand, Gregory does not use explicitly this last idea of the Damascene,
namely man as a ‘bond’ (σύνδεσμος).79 However, as indicated above,80 he may have
in mind the notion of man as a microcosm. Thus, perhaps, there is also here similarity
with the Damascene (or, perhaps, again, Gregory the Theologian, Maximos, etc.).
Overall, it may be supported that Palamas’ treatment is more elaborate and advanced
than John’s. Perhaps he has borrowed John’s reflections, building his own insights
on them.
But we left for the end a very plausible suggestion: it is possible that Gregory did
not know the specific extract of John, even though, as indicated, there exist some
resemblances in it to his own teaching. Obviously, one cannot assume that Palamas
had read everything. In addition, it should be noted that the manuscript tradition of
De duabus in Christo voluntatibus is very thin: there are only two Athos manuscripts
that survive from earlier than the fourteenth-century.81 This is quite different from
the abundant attestation of Dialectica and Expositio fidei.82 So it may be possible that
Palamas did not in fact have access to De duabus voluntatibus.83

77 Nevertheless, John connects the image with human free will and human rule over the rest of creation
in De Imag. III, 20.4–7, ed. Kotter, 128, trans. Louth, 98: ‘For just as the intellect (the Father) and
the word (the Son) and the Holy Spirit are one God, so also mind, word [or: reason] and spirit are
one human being, in respect of its being both self-determined [or: free] and sovereign’ [Ὥσπερ γὰρ
νοῦς (ὁ πατὴρ) καὶ λόγος (ὁ υἱὸς) καὶ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον εἷς Θεός, οὕτω καὶ νοῦς καὶ λόγος καὶ πνεῦμα εἷς
ἄνθρωπος, καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτεξούσιον καὶ τὸ ἀρχικόν]. Some lines below, John cites Gen 1:28 (‘and have
dominion over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the air and over every living thing that moves
upon the earth’).
78 Louth (2002), 122 (from where the translation has been used). For John’s text, see Volunt. 30.8–11, ed.
Kotter, 216: καὶ κατὰ τὸ συνάγειν πᾶσαν τὴν κτίσιν—ἔν τε γὰρ τῷ Θεῷ ἑνοῦται πᾶσα ἡ κτίσις καὶ ἐν τῷ
ἀνθρώπῳ· σύνδεσμος γάρ ἐστι νοητῆς καὶ αἰσθητῆς κτίσεως καὶ ὅτι κατ’ εἰκόνα, οὗ ἔμελλε γίνεσθαι ὁ υἱὸς
τοῦ Θεοῦ· οὐ γὰρ ἄγγελος γέγονεν, ἀλλ’ ἄνθρωπος.
79 As Cooper (2005), 103 underlines, Nemesios is the first Christian author to stress the fact that man is
a ‘bond’, uniting in himself two ‘distinct orders of cosmic reality’, the intelligible and the sensible, the
rational and the irrational one.
80 See ch. 3.2.b.
81 Namely, Athous Dionys. 175 (thirteenth century), and Athous Laurae 283 (fourteenth century). See
Kotter, vol. 4, 161 (for all the Greek manuscripts, see pp. 161–62).
82 It has been suggested that these two works—which often appear in the manuscript tradition as one
work, i.e. the 150 Chapters of the Damascene—have probably guided Palamas to write his own 150
Chapters. See Louth (2005), 58–59 n. 12.
83 It should be noted, however, that the second ms. (i.e. Athous Laurae) was at Holy Monastery of
Megisti (Great) Lavra, where Palamas had lived for a period (namely c. 1316–c. 1320: see Sinkewicz
(2002), 132).
102 cha p te r 3

Of course, however, this does not preclude the fact that Palamas may have known
it (or some parts of it) through the so-called ‘oral tradition’, namely from material and
tradition passed down by word of mouth through generations. It should be noted,
though, that an important objection to the aforementioned statements would be the
fact that, nowadays, we have no way of knowing exactly how many copies were still
available in the fourteenth century when Palamas lived. Undoubtedly, one cannot
safely judge based only on what survives today. Thus, what survives today may give
us only an indication.
Hitherto, in our effort to fulfil the objective of the current chapter, we saw two
reasons for man’s place above the angels in the hierarchy, as far as the imago Dei is
concerned: the vivifying power of the soul and the faculty of dominion. In addition,
there is also another, no less important, cause: the faculty of sense perception, to
which we shall now turn our attention.

3. The Faculty of Sense Perception (αἰσθητικόν): the

Christological-Incarnational Dimension

Having depicted the pneumatological aspect of the imago Dei in the human person,
namely the soul’s ζωοποιὸς δύναμις, Palamas traces the Christological dimension in
Ch. 63. Firstly, he mentions that the triadic character of human knowledge places
man higher than the angels, as far as the image is concerned. This happens not only
because it is triadic (as God is Trinity), while in the angels it is not, but, moreover,
since ‘it encompasses every form of knowledge’.84 In particular, human knowledge
has three faculties: the intellectual or intuitive faculty (νοερόν, also referred to as
spiritual), the rational or discursive faculty (λογικόν), and the faculty of sense
perception (αἰσθητικόν).85 These faculties include every form of knowledge. What
is more, man is the only creature which possesses, apart from the other faculties,
the αἰσθητικόν. This faculty ‘is naturally joined to that of reason and has discovered
a varied multitude of arts, sciences and forms of knowledge: farming and building,
bringing forth from nothing, though not from absolute non-being (for this belongs
to God), he gave to man alone’.86

84 Ch. 63.1–4, 156: Εἴποι δ’ ἄν τις σὺν πολλοῖς ἑτέροις καὶ τὸ τριαδικὸν τῆς ἡµετέρας γνώσεως µᾶλλον
ἡµᾶς τῶν ἀγγέλων δεικνύειν κατ᾿ εἰκόνα τοῦ Θεοῦ, οὐ µόνον ὅτι τριαδικόν, ἄλλ᾿ ὅτι καὶ συµπεριβάλλει
γνώσεως ἅπαν εἶδος.
85 Ch. 63.4–6, 156: µόνοι γὰρ ἡµεῖς τῶν κτισµάτων ἁπάντων πρὸς τῷ νοερῷ τε καὶ λογικῷ καὶ τὸ
αἰσθητικὸν ἔχοµεν… Sinkewicz (1988), 17 suggests that Palamas merely associates every form of
λόγος (the four forms are mentioned in Ch. 35 and were presented in the section of the previous
chapter regarding the reflection of the Logos in the human soul, i.e. ch. 2.1) with each of the
faculties of the human knowledge. This is a very interesting association. Cf. Wilkins (2003),
400–01.
86 Ch. 63.6–10, 156: ὃ τῷ λογικῷ συνηµµένον εἶναι πεφυκὸς τεχνῶν τε καὶ ἐπιστηµῶν καὶ γνώσεων ἐξεῦρε
πολυειδέστατον πληθύν∙ γεωργεῖν τε καὶ οἰκοδομεῖν…
 t h e i m ag e o f g o d i n man and t he ange ls 103

a. Creation ἐκ μὴ ὄντων (‘Out of Nothing’)

Let us make a point here in parenthesis, for it is not without significance. Palamas argues
that man resembles God as far as the ability to create out of nothing is concerned.
However Gregory underscores a major difference: God brings forth from absolute
non-being, whereas man just ‘from nothing’.87 Thus he wants to stress that only God
creates ex nihilo (‘out of nothing’),88 while man does create something new, which
did not previously exist, but always from material already existing. For instance, man
creates objects from raw material. This argument, in my view, is important for Gregory’s
anthropology. He stresses, even though not explicitly, that man is created in the image
of God—and indeed to a greater extent than the angels—since he participates in God’s
characteristic of creating ἐκ μὴ ὄντων. In addition, man has the prerogative of participating
in this characteristic exactly because he possesses a body. Thus, this is another ground
for the superiority of man over the angels, regarding the imago, in virtue of the body.

b. The Human Person and the Incarnate Word

In the rest of Ch. 63, Gregory continues to lay out his arguments concerning the
faculty of sense perception. He maintains that God granted exclusively to man ‘that
not only could the invisible word of the intellect be subject to the sense of hearing
when joined to the air, but also that it could be put down in writing and seen with
and through the body’.89 In other words, because of the close link between these two
faculties, the rational and the αἰσθητικόν, man alone has the capacity of externalizing
the invisible word of the intellect through the voice,90 through writing, and through
the arts and sciences. That is to say, the invisible word of the human intellect is shown
with and through the body.91

87 Ch. 63.8–10, 156: …καὶ προάγειν ἐκ μὴ ὄντων, εἰ καὶ μὴ ἐκ μηδαμῶς ὄντων, τοῦτο γὰρ Θεοῦ, μόνῳ
παρέσχε τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ.
88 The doctrine of creation out of nothing is a basic dogma of Christian theology. For its roots and its
early development, see May (2004). For a recent account, see Blowers (2012), 167–87.
89 Ch. 63.12–15, 158: ἔτι γε μὴν καὶ τὸ τὸν ἀόρατον τοῦ νοῦ λόγον, οὐ µόνον ὑπ᾿ ἀκοῆς αἴσθησιν γίνεσθαι
ἀέρα ἐνηµµένον, ἀλλὰ καὶ καταγράφεσθαι καὶ µετὰ σώµατος καὶ διὰ σώµατος ὁρᾶσθαι παρέσχε τοῖς
ἀνθρώποις µόνοις ὁ Θεός.
90 Perhaps this sounds to the ears of the contemporary human person as an oversimplified approach. As
far as I know, science has not been able so far to interpret the great mystery about the exact mechanism
of how our ideas are transformed into words. Yet Palamas overtakes this problem simply by speaking
about ‘the invisible word of the intellect, which joined to the air, becomes subject to the sense of
hearing’; this would be a fair objection against Gregory’s teaching from the campus of a modern reader
(in addition, cf. Ch. 35.5–7, 120, where Palamas writes that the word expressed orally ‘does not belong
to the intellect but to the body moved by the intellect’). Nevertheless, Gregory’s basic aim is not to
explain from a scientific-physiological point of view the above mechanism; undoubtedly, he has neither
the knowledge, nor the means for such a query. His central purpose is to stress why man is made in the
image of God. That is, to underline that much of human characteristics remind us of the Holy Trinity.
91 Here Palamas is probably influenced by the logoi theology. According to it God has in his ‘mind’ the
logoi, the inner principles of all creatures. When the suitable time arrives, each creature comes to
being through God’s commandment, through the divine activity. Palamas is now speaking about the
104 cha p te r 3

But this, of course, brings to mind the Incarnation of the Word of God. The Λόγος
was invisible, until His embodiment. He was made visible, through taking on flesh.
And as St Gregory puts it, ‘Thereby God leads us to a clear faith in the visitation and
manifestation of the supreme Word through the flesh in which the angels have no part
at all’.92 This means that through the human activity of ‘embodying’ his invisible word
of the intellect, one can be anagogically guided to the mystery of the Incarnation of
the Divine Logos. But this does not happen with the angels, because they have no
body and they cannot externalize their inner word, as man is able to do. Therefore,
man manifests the image of God more than the angels. This for Palamas is another
argument in support of the superiority of man, in terms of the imago, again due to
his body.
It is not easy to find a parallel, in patristic literature, for this approach of Palamas,
at least to my knowledge. However, Niketas Stethatos—as already mentioned in the
previous chapter, regarding the patristic context of Palamas’ imago Trinitatis—presents
a very similar argument. He writes that as man makes his own word—which is
‘invisible and impalpable and bodiless’—‘incarnate’ and visible through letters, in the
same way God, wanting to recreate the damaged image of man, sent to the creation
His consubstantial Son and Word, ‘who is bodiless, invisible, impalpable and not
circumscribed’. And, in that way, ‘God the Word “dwelt” (ἐσκήνωσεν) in the Virgin
Mary, and was written (γραφείς) in her, as if by the finger of God upon the body
of Her (i.e. Mary), who is most pure, and was incarnate’. However, Stethatos does
not make any comparison to the angels, in this context.93 Could this be a possible
influence of Stethatos on Palamas? This is not an easy question to answer. The two
authors seem to have different goals: Stethatos wants to find a human analogy to
‘explain’ and interpret the Incarnation of the Logos. On the other hand, Palamas
wants to exalt man over the angels, in terms of the imago.

c. Some Concluding Thoughts

In conclusion, we have argued that Ch. 63 is exclusively written in order to exalt

man over the angels. As shown, it holds two direct comparisons between humans
and the angels, namely only man possesses the αἰσθητικόν, and only man, having a
body, points to the mystery of the Incarnation. The latter is vividly reminiscent of

inner human λόγος (word), which receives material form through the human activity. Thus one can
see here a relationship with the logoi. For a discussion on this matter, see the relevant sub-section in
‘The Human Intellect and its λόγος’ (ch. 2.1).
92 Ch. 63.15–18, 158: …πρὸς πίστιν ἐνάγων διαρκῆ τῆς τοῦ ἀνωτάτω λόγου διὰ σαρκὸς ἐπιδηµίας τε καὶ
ἐµφανείας, ὧν οὐδὲν οὐδαµῶς µέτεστιν ἀγγέλοις.
93 For the reference, see Stethatos, Contre les Juifs, 10.1–12, ed. Darrouzès, 424 (emphases added): Ὥσπερ
δὲ πάλιν τὸν ἴδιον λόγον σύ, ἀόρατον ὄντα καὶ ἀναφῆ καὶ ἀσώματον, σεσωματωμένον καὶ ὁρατὸν ποιεῖς
ἐν γράμμασι καὶ πρὸς οὓς αὐτὸν ἀποστέλλεις, οὕτω καὶ ὁ Θεὸς ἐπ’ ἐσχάτων τούτων ἡμερῶν βουληθεὶς
ἀναπλάσαι τὴν φθαρεῖσαν αὐτοῦ διά τῆς παραβάσεως εἰκόνα, ἐξαπέστειλε τὸν ὁμοούσιον αὐτοῦ Υἱὸν
καὶ Λόγον ἐφ’ ἡμᾶς, τὸν ἀσώματον, τὸν ἀόρατον, τὸν ἀναφῆ καὶ ἀπερίγραπτον… Καὶ Θεὸς ὁ Λόγος
ἐσκήνωσεν αὐτὸς ἐν αὐτῇ, γραφεὶς ὥσπερ δακτύλῳ Θεοῦ ἐν ταῖς σαρξῖν αὐτῆς ταῖς πανάγνοις, καὶ ἐγένετο
σάρξ…
 t h e i m ag e o f g o d i n man and t he ange ls 105

Palamas’ assertion that man is an initiate (μύστης) of God,94 as indicated above in

the previous section.95
What could be pointed out here is the very positive stance of St Gregory towards
the arts and sciences, and generally, knowledge and technology. He does not reject
human knowledge; far from it, he considers it very important. He even attributes to it
a constitutive role in man’s possession of the image of God. Additionally, Gregory sees
human knowledge and technology as a means of recalling the Incarnation; thereby
he exalts their role. Moreover, he does not regard physical knowledge and science
as something evil per se. On the contrary, he deems them important and essential
for our lives. However, often in his corpus, he points out that they may lead to false
and even disastrous actions. For this reason, he underlines that spiritual knowledge,
knowledge of the spiritual world, is superior to natural knowledge, knowledge of
the physical world.96
It is also very interesting that Palamas was aware of the main scientific develop-
ments of his day (e.g. in astronomy) and, when the latter were used in a way which
endangered the faith, to attack or degrade Christian theology, he responded.97 So
Palamas seems to be rather acquainted with the burning questions of his time. This fact
proves once more that his theological contribution is not merely abstract speculation,
but comes as a reaction to his time’s problems and questions: it is totally orientated
to the human person and its true needs. Besides, let us not forget that in the first half
of the fourteenth century a renewal of philosophical and scientific studies occurred.
This was part of the so-called ‘Palaeologan Renaissance’.98
Therefore, it could perhaps be argued that Palamas is a forerunner of ‘Modernity’
(the early modern period of modern history),99 namely a person that seems ready to
adapt and react to the radical changes (social, political, religious, etc.) that ‘Modernity’
would bring.100 He is not afraid to engage in dialogue with recent developments in the
sciences and arts, trying to get from them what he regards as healthy, and criticizing

94 See Hom. 60, On The Holy Feast of Theophany, 4.58–59, ΠΣ 6, 647 (ΠΑΕ 11, 512), trans. Veniamin, 495:
‘Not just because man is, on earth, the only initiate into this mystery and the only creature to venerate
it, but because he alone is in the image of the Trinity’ (Οὐ μόνον ὅτι μόνος μύστης καὶ προσκυνητὴς
ἐπίγειός ἐστιν αὐτῆς, ἀλλ’ ὅτι καὶ μόνος κατ’ εἰκόνα ταύτης).
95 It seems that a major subject here is how God could confide to sense perception something of
spiritual value. Several of the Fathers address this problem, among them Augustine in De Trinitate.
In another occasion, it would be very interesting to search whether there are parallels between
Augustine’s approach and Palamas’ one. See relevantly, Sinkewicz (1999). Lootens (2012). The
spiritual senses according to Palamas are examined in Part II of the current book.
96 The above points are depicted by Sinkewicz in his important article ‘Christian Theology and the
Renewal of Philosophical and Scientific Studies in the Early Fourteenth Century: The Capita
150 of Gregory Palamas’ [= Sinkewicz (1986a)]. For a comparison between physical and spiritual
knowledge, see ch. 5.4 of this book.
97 See again Sinkewicz (1986a).
98 On it, see Fryde (2000).
99 For this remark I am grateful to Fr Antonios Pinakoulas.
100 This point could be further explored through a detailed analysis of Palamas’ Homilies; but this falls
beyond the scope of the present book.
1 06 cha p te r 3

those aspects which he perceives as problematic.101 However, this whole point would
require its own essay to be fully investigated.
In conclusion, if Palamas lived in our days, he would unequivocally express his
great fear and sorrow for the wrong and dangerous use of knowledge and technology
by post-modern man. As it is well known, these basic elements of human civilization
are rarely understood in their theological sense due to contemporary society’s
secularization. On the contrary, they are often used for the abuse of creation and for
the destruction of the cosmos. To sum up, in Sinkewicz’s words,
When knowledge is perverted from its proper end, the dignity of man suffers
and the humanist enterprise itself is thwarted. Man starts to serve knowledge,
rather than knowledge serving man in the search for his true goal. Created in
the triadic image of God and called to grow once again into his likeness, man
occupies a unique place in the universe, serving only the Creator but never
debasing himself to the level of serving creation. In his advocacy of the high
dignity of man, Gregory Palamas must certainly be considered one of the great
humanists of the Palaeologan Renaissance.102
Sinkewicz’s words, written almost thirty years ago, if read in light of current global
problems, are more timely today than ever.

4. The Superiority of Humans over the Angels due to

Participation in the Eucharist103

So far in this chapter we saw the reasons for why man bears the image of God to a
greater extent than the angels by virtue of his having a body. It seems that Palamas’
approach is unique in Patristic literature; one cannot easily find a similar theology
used to exalt the rank of the human person. Nevertheless, among the Fathers, many
efforts were made to raise up man in comparison to the angels.104 Among them, one

101 Undoubtedly, also other Fathers could be brought as an example for this fact, e.g. Nemesios of Emesa,
the Cappadocians, Maximos the Confessor, etc.
102 Sinkewicz (1986a), 351. Of course, Sinkewicz does not refer to those ‘humanists’ that were opposed to
the Hesychasts.
103 This section (i.e. ch. 3.4), with some changes and additions, has been published in Sobornost; see
Chouliaras (2018a).
104 See, e.g., what Symeon the New Theologian writes in Hymn. 14.55–74, ed. Koder, 270–72, where he
presents the life offered to man by God—and specifically, the life of a priest and of an hegoumenos
(ἡγούμενος; the prior of a monastery)—as one which is higher than the angels (the reference is
found in Veniamin, 532). Moreover, the title of this Hymn is characteristic (see ed. Koder, 266):
‘Thanksgiving to God for the gifts that he was deemed worthy to receive from Him, and that the
dignity of being a priest and an hegoumenos causes awe even to the angels’ (Εὐχαριστία πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν
τῶν δωρεῶν ἕνεκα, ὧν παρ’ αὐτοῦ ἠξιώθη, καὶ ὅτι φρικτὸν καὶ ἀγγέλοις τὸ τῆς ἱερωσύνης καὶ ἡγουμενείας
ἀξίωμα). On another occasion it would be interesting to see further research conducted on this
tradition of exalting man over the angels; moreover, to see to what extent Palamas is influenced by it,
and, in general, what are the patristic roots for his exaltation of man.
 t h e i m ag e o f g o d i n man and t he ange ls 107

special, perhaps unique, case is that of St John Damascene. Let us look at his approach
and see whether Palamas follows this same line of thought.
John undertakes this connection in his Third Treatise on the Divine Images (De
Imaginibus III), 26.105 As known, in these treatises John tries to support the necessity
of venerating the holy icons over against the Iconoclasts, who did not accept the
veneration of icons at all. At this specific point of his work (III, 26), John, while
speaking about the correctness of icon veneration, takes the opportunity to stress the
superiority of man over the angels, because man can participate in the Eucharist.106
John argues that the Son of God became hypostatically ‘a human nature’, a man, and
not ‘an angelic nature’.107 Moreover,
Angels do not participate in, nor do they become sharers in, the divine nature,
but in divine activity and grace; human beings, however, do participate in, and
become sharers of, the divine nature, as many as partake the holy Body of Christ
and drink his precious Blood; for it is united to the divinity hypostatically, and
the two natures are hypostatically and inseparably united in the Body of Christ
of which we partake, and we share in the two natures, in the body in a bodily
manner, and in the divinity spiritually, or rather in both ways, not that we have
become identical [with God] hypostatically (for we first subsisted, and then we
were united), but through assimilation (κατὰ συνανάκρασιν) with the Body and
the Blood.108
Therefore, St John continues, those humans who preserve their union to God pure,
‘through the keeping of the commandments’, are greater than the angels.109 Although
‘our nature is a little lower than the angels because of death and the grossness of the
body’, ‘through God’s favor and union with him it has become greater than the angels’.110
It has been argued that ‘the way John develops here111 what is entailed by our
having bodies, that by virtue of reception of the Eucharist and consequent deification,

105 Entitled ‘Who first made images?’ See the critical ed. of Kotter, Contra imaginum calumniatores
orationes tres, PTS 17, 132–35. The following translations are taken from Louth (2003), 101–03.
106 On the mystery of the Eucharist according to St John, see Louth (2002), 183–85.
107 De Imaginibus, III, 26.47–49, ed. Kotter, 134, trans. Louth, 102–03: Οὐκ ἐγένετο φύσις ἀγγέλων υἱὸς
Θεοῦ καθ᾿ ὑπόστασιν, ἐγένετο δὲ φύσις ἀνθρώπου υἱὸς Θεοῦ καθ᾿ ὑπόστασιν.
108 De Imaginibus, III, 26.49–62, ed. Kotter, 134, trans. Louth, 103 (italics added): Οὐ μετέσχον ἄγγελοι
οὐδὲ ἐγένοντο θείας κοινωνοὶ φύσεως, ἀλλ’ ἐνεργείας καὶ χάριτος, ἄνθρωποι δὲ μετέχουσι καὶ κοινωνοὶ
θείας φύσεως γίνονται, ὅσοι μεταλαμβάνουσι τὸ σῶμα τοῦ Χριστοῦ τὸ ἅγιον καὶ πίνουσι τὸ αἷμα αὐτοῦ
τὸ τίμιον· θεότητι γὰρ καθ’ ὑπόστασιν ἥνωται καὶ δύο φύσεις ἐν τῷ μεταλαμβανομένῳ ὑφ’ ἡμῶν σώματι
τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἡνωμέναι καθ’ ὑπόστασίν εἰσιν ἀδιασπάστως καὶ τῶν δύο φύσεων μετέχομεν, τοῦ σώματος
σωματικῶς, τῆς θεότητος πνευματικῶς, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀμφοῖν κατ’ ἄμφω, οὐ καθ’ ὑπόστασιν ταυτιζόμενοι
(ὑφιστάμεθα γὰρ πρῶτον καὶ τότε ἑνούμεθα), ἀλλὰ κατὰ συνανάκρασιν τοῦ σώματος καὶ αἵματος.
109 De Imaginibus, III, 26.62–64, ed. Kotter, 134, trans. Louth, 103: Καὶ πῶς οὐ μείζονες ἀγγέλων οἱ
φυλάττοντες διὰ τῆς τηρήσεως τῶν ἐντολῶν εἰλικρινῆ τὴν ἕνωσιν;
110 De Imaginibus, III, 26.64–67, ed. Kotter, 134, trans. Louth, 103: Ἡ μὲν φύσις ἡμῶν βραχύ τι παρ’
ἀγγέλους ἠλαττωμένη διὰ τὸν θάνατον καὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος παχύτητα, ἀλλ’ εὐδοκίᾳ καὶ συναφείᾳ Θεοῦ
γέγονεν ἀγγέλων μείζων…
111 i.e. in De Imaginibus, III, 26.
1 08 cha p te r 3

humans are superior to angels, seems to be unparalleled’.112 And a question now arises:
does this argument also applies in Palamas’ case? Because he speaks a lot about the
superiority of the humans over the angels due to their body. In other words, could
we find a similar approach in his oeuvre? Does Palamas exalt the place of man over
the angels, in terms of human corporeality and the participation in the Eucharist?
Furthermore, does he make this approach in the context of his imago theology?
It seems that one could indeed detect some points with a similar nuance. In
particular, Palamas speaks about the superiority of the humans over the angels, due
to participation in the Eucharist, in two points of his Homily 56, On the Holy and
Dread Mysteries of Christ.113 The first reads:
Come, He [viz. Christ] says, those of you who have set your heart on eternal life,
eat My body and drink My blood (cf. Jn 6:53), that you may not only be in God’s
image, but, by clothing yourselves in Me, the King and God of heaven, you may
be eternal and heavenly gods and kings, feared by demons, admired by angels,
beloved sons of the celestial Father, living for ever, fairer than the children of men
(cf. Ps 45:2), a delightful dwelling-place for the sublime Trinity.114
And the second one:
from this sacred table, which, according to the psalm, Christ prepared for us
in the presence of His enemies (cf. Ps 23:5), the demons and passions, a spring
wells up giving rise to spiritual fountains, letting souls drink and leading them
up to heaven. It turns the angels’ faces towards its beauty, and in it is discerned
the manifold wisdom of God (cf. Eph 3:10), causing them to desire to look into
(cf. 1 Pet 1:12) the gifts bestowed upon us through this blood.115
In these extracts Gregory’s basic aim is to stress how great a privilege is man’s
participation in the Eucharist. It is of such high value that, among other things,
through Holy Communion, humans become θαυμαστοὶ ἀγγέλοις, namely admired

112 Louth (2003), 103–04 n. 93.

113 Περὶ τῶν ἁγίων καὶ φρικτῶν τοῦ Χριστοῦ μυστηρίων, ΠΣ 6, 604–14 (ΠΑΕ 11, 396–420). For a short
presentation and analysis of this Homily, see van Rossum (2003b). For how Palamas approaches the
mystery of Eucharist in general, see Lison (1994a), 183–93.
114 Hom. 56, 11.165–70, ΠΣ 6, 610 (ΠΑΕ 11, 412), trans. Veniamin, 465: δεῦτε λέγων φάγετέ μου τὸ σῶμα,
πίετέ μου τὸ αἷμα οἱ τῆς αἰωνίου ζωῆς ἐπιθυμητικῶς ἔχοντες, ἵνα μὴ κατ’ εἰκόνα μόνον ἦτε Θεοῦ, ἀλλὰ
καὶ θεοὶ καὶ βασιλεῖς αἰώνιοι καὶ οὐράνιοι ἐμὲ τὸν βασιλέα καὶ Θεὸν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ περικείμενοι, φοβεροὶ
μὲν δαίμοσι, θαυμαστοὶ δὲ ἀγγέλοις, υἱοὶ δὲ ἀγαπητοὶ τοῦ οὐρανίου Πατρός, ἀείζωοι, ὡραῖοι παρὰ τοὺς
υἱοὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων, τερπνὸν ἐνδιαίτημα τῆς ἀνωτάτω Τριάδος. The critical edition of the Homilies
(ΠΣ 6, 610) writes εἰσὶ δὲ ἀγαπητοί… (instead of υἱοὶ δὲ ἀγαπητοὶ…). This is most probably a
typographical mistake.
115 Hom. 56, 13.191–97, ΠΣ 6, 611 (ΠΑΕ 11, 414), trans. Veniamin, 465: ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς ἱερᾶς τραπέζης ταύτης, ἣν
ψαλμικῶς ‘ἡτοίμασεν ἡμῖν ὁ Χριστὸς ἐξ ἐναντίας τῶν θλιβόντων ἡμᾶς’ δαιμόνων καὶ παθῶν, ἄνεισι πηγὴ
πηγὰς ἀφιεῖσα νοητὰς καὶ ψυχὰς ποτίζουσα καὶ μέχρις οὐρανῶν ἀνάγουσα καὶ τῶν ἀγγέλων ἐπιστρέφουσα
τὰς ὄψεις πρὸς τὴν καλλονήν, ἐν ᾗ διορᾶται τὸ πολυποίκιλον τῆς σοφίας τοῦ Θεοῦ, παρακύπτειν αὐτοὺς
ἐπιθυμεῖν ἐνάγουσα εἰς τὰ χαρισθέντα διὰ τοῦ τοιούτου αἵματος ἡμῖν…
 t h e i m ag e o f g o d i n man and t he ange ls 109

by the angels.116 Moreover, the angels ‘turn their faces towards the beauty, inside
which the multifaceted wisdom of God is seen, which [beauty] urges them to wish
to look at the gifts that were given through this [Holy] Blood’. Therefore, in these
two ways, Palamas presents the angels to be amazed in front of the high dignity of
the Eucharistic mystery.117 Thus, it is implied that man is superior to the angels by
virtue of his participating in Holy Communion.
From the foregoing comparison regarding the Eucharist, two points seem to be
relevant to the question at hand regarding the possibility of a similar approach in
Palamas as in the Damascene, and relevant to the current chapter more generally.
First, here Palamas does not exalt man over the angels due to his body. But John
does this clearly. Therefore, indeed John’s approach ‘seems to be unparalleled’.118
Besides, John’s main target is to underline the superiority of human beings, in order
to justify the veneration of icons (in the same way, and now more justified, as the
Old Testament saints venerated the angels which appeared to them). On the other
hand, Gregory’s main aim here is to highlight the great importance of the Eucharist;
he mentions the angels only in passing.
At the same time, both approaches have an eschatological character. John believes
that humans ‘participate in, and become sharers of, the divine nature (θείας κοινωνοὶ
φύσεως), as many as partake the holy Body of Christ and drink his precious Blood’.
Additionally, he connects participation in Holy Communion—and consequently
man’s superiority—with the human body: ‘we share in the two natures, in the body
in a bodily manner, and in the divinity spiritually, or rather in both in both ways’.
Therefore humans are greater; besides, as John adds, ‘it is not said of them [i.e. angels]
in Scripture that they will be seated together with, or be partakers of, the divine
glory… not that they will reign together, nor that they will be glorified together, nor
that they will seat at the Father’s table…’, as happens with the saints, who are ‘sons
of God, sons of the kingdom and heirs of God and fellow-heirs with Christ…’119
On the other hand Palamas also with the idea of divinization in mind makes an
interesting remark speaking in the voice of Christ: ‘eat My body and drink My blood,
that you may not only be in God’s image, but… you may be eternal and heavenly

116 Hom. 56, 11.168, ΠΣ 6, 610 (ΠΑΕ 11, 412). This is reminiscent of a phrase which the Damascene uses in
his text we saw before a while: ‘For the angels stand with fear and trembling [μετὰ φόβου καὶ τρόμου]
before [that nature] seated on the throne of glory in Christ, and they will stand trembling at the
judgment’. De Imaginibus, III, 26.67–70, ed. Kotter, 134, trans. Louth, 103. However, the angels here are
full of awe in front of the glorified human nature of Christ, whereas in Palamas’ text they admire the
human beings who receive the divine communion.
117 It is noteworthy that Gregory, elsewhere, shows the angels to be dazzled during the creation of the
human soul, due to the imago and the likeness that it has, being unified (i.e. the soul) and possessing
intellect, reason, and spirit. Oratio Apodictica 2, 9.1–7, ed. Bobrinsky, ΠΣ 1, 85: Ἑώρων οἱ τῶν ἀγγέλων
ὀφθαλμοὶ τότε τὴν αἰσθήσει καὶ σαρκὶ συνημμένην τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴν καὶ Θεὸν ἄλλον ἑώρων, μὴ
γεγενημένον μόνον ἐπὶ γῆς δι’ ἀγαθότητα θείαν, νοῦν τε καὶ σάρκα τὸν αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ δι’ ὑπερβολὴν ταύτης
καὶ κατὰ Θεοῦ χάριν μεμορφωμένον, ὡς εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν σάρκα καὶ νοῦν καὶ πνεῦμα καὶ τὸ κατ’ εἰκόνα καὶ
ὁμοίωσιν θείαν τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχειν ἐντελῶς ὡς ἑνιαίαν οὖσαν ἐν νῷ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ πνεύματι.
118 Louth (2003), 103–04 n. 93.
119 De Imaginibus, III, 26.67–70, ed. Kotter, 134, trans. Louth, 103.
110 cha p te r 3

gods and kings, feared by demons, admired by angels…’120 Furthermore, it is worth

noting that through these words it is perhaps implied, even if not explicitly stated,
that man, participating in the Eucharist, passes from the state of the kat’ eikona to
that of the likeness (theosis) and eternal glory. Moreover, as is evident, his words
have an eschatological resonance.121
But now, a significant question arises: why does Palamas, in his effort to underline
the superiority of humans over the angels, not exploit the aforementioned arguments
of John? It is not an easy task to give a definite answer here. Perhaps Palamas wishes
to avoid the phrase ‘humans participate in, and become sharers of, the divine nature’
(‘θείας κοινωνοὶ φύσεως’), which, as shown, is central to St John’s argument.122 As is well
known, Palamas insisted that man participates only in the uncreated divine activity,
and not in the divine nature or essence. Of course, the latter, is in no way implied
by the Damascene; it is rather the former that he means.123 However, it is possible
for Gregory, in front of the danger of a misunderstanding, to have avoided this text.
But this is rather unlikely, because it is in fact a biblical quotation (i.e. 2 Pet 1:4).124
Besides, Palamas provides elsewhere an important exegesis of this verse,125 namely
in his treatise-dialogue Theophanes.126 This verse had been used by some of Gregory’s
opponents, Barlaam, Akindynos, and Gregoras, to prove that God-in-himself is
imparticipable, denying, of course, the distinction between essence and activities.
Contrariwise, Gregory’s main argument is that the divine nature (φύσις) and essence
(οὐσία) is both communicable/participable (μεθεκτή), and incommunicable/
imparticipable (ἀμέ­θεκτη).127

120 Hom. 56, 11.165–68, ΠΣ 6, 610 (ΠΑΕ 11, 412), trans. Veniamin, 465.
121 In the same line of thought, cf. his Hom. 56, 13.186–89, ΠΣ 6, 611 (ΠΑΕ 11, 414), trans. Veniamin, 465:
‘It makes us new instead of old and eternal instead of temporary; it frees us from death and makes us
like evergreen trees planted by the rivers of the water of the divine Spirit (cf. Ps 1:3), from which is
gathered fruit unto life eternal (cf. Jn 4:36)’ (Τοῦτο ἡμᾶς καινοὺς ἀντὶ παλαιῶν ποιεῖ καὶ ἀϊδίους ἀντὶ
προσκαίρων· τοῦτο ἡμᾶς ἀπαθανατίζει καὶ ἀειθαλεῖς ἀπεργάζεται, ὡς δένδρα παρὰ τὰς διεξόδους τῶν
ὑδάτων πεφυτευμένα τοῦ θείου Πνεύματος, ἀφ’ ὧν συνάγεται καρπὸς εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον).
122 De Imaginibus, III, 26.67–70, ed. Kotter, 134.
123 See, e.g., what he writes about man in his Expositio fidei 26.34–36, ed. Kotter, 76: ‘…deified, however,
by participation in the divine radiance and not transformed into the divine being’ (θεούμενον δὲ
τῇ μετοχῇ τῆς θείας ἐλλάμψεως καὶ οὐκ εἰς τὴν θείαν μεθιστάμενον οὐσίαν); trans. Louth (2002), 134.
Palamas mentions something similar in his Ch. 111.8–10, 210: οὐκ ἄρα τῆς θείας οὐσίας ἔνεστι μετέχειν,
οὐδ’ αὐτοὺς τοὺς διὰ τῆς θείας χάριτος τεθεωμένους· τῆς δὲ θείας ἐνεργείας ἔνεστι μετέχειν (‘Thus it
is not possible to participate in the divine substance, not even for those divinized by grace, but it is
possible to participate in the divine energy’).
124 ‘By which he has granted to us his precious and very great promises, so that through them you may
become partakers of the divine nature, having escaped from the corruption that is in the world because
of sinful desire’ (δι’ ὧν τὰ τίμια ἡμῖν καὶ μέγιστα ἐπαγγέλματα δεδώρηται, ἵνα διὰ τούτων γένησθε θείας
κοινωνοὶ φύσεως ἀποφυγόντες τῆς ἐν κόσμῳ ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ φθορᾶς); italics added. It is very interesting
that, to my knowledge, in his Homilies Palamas never refers to 2 Pet 1:4 (see the Biblical indices in ΠΣ
6, 707 and ΠΑΕ 9–11).
125 On how this biblical verse was accepted by the Fathers and what interpretation they gave, see the very
interesting paper of Russell (1988).
126 See ΠΣ 2, 236–43.
127 Theophanes 13, ΠΣ 2, 238.7–10.
 t h e i m ag e o f g o d i n man and t he ange ls 111

To reach such a conclusion he bases his arguments on St Maximos the Confessor,128

but on other Fathers as well (such as Sts Chrysostom, Basil the Great, Gregory of
Nyssa, and Athanasios). He argues that when we say that the divine οὐσία is μεθεκτή,
we are referring to the divine activity (πρόοδος, ἔκφανσις, ἐνέργεια). This is the solution
to the whole problem and, as Palamas stresses, it belongs to the consensus Patrum.129
However, it should be noted, the Fathers had many different ways of interpreting 2
Pet 1:4. But Palamas’ approach, in spite offering something new, is, in Russell’s words,
‘based on a sound exegesis of the text’.130 Moreover, this exegesis has been regarded
as authoritative in the Christian East from then on.131
To sum up, it should be admitted that it is very difficult for an absolute answer
to be given to this question, namely why Palamas does not use the aforementioned
argument of the Damascene, about the superiority of humans over the angels.
However, there is also another possible explanation: despite some resemblances,
it is very likely that Gregory did not have access to the relevant text of John. Let us
remember that the manuscript tradition of De duabus in Christo voluntatibus is very
thin.132 But the same goes for the treatises of St John against the iconoclasts.133 In
particular, there survives only one manuscript dated from before the fourteenth
century which contains Imag. III 26 (it should be also pointed out that it is the only
manuscript that contains all three treatises).134 Consequently, it could be maintained
that the most likely explication for why Palamas does not use the approach of the
Damascene, regarding our subject, is that St Gregory simply did not know St John’s

128 Although this quotation (2 Pet 1:4) was little used by Maximos, his theology proved very helpful for
Palamas to interpret the text at stake.
129 Theophanes 17, ΠΣ 2, 243.15–20.
130 Russell (1988), 66.
131 Russell (1988), 66. Occasionally, some Fathers are not so clear in their teaching regarding
man’s participation in God. This is the case, e.g., with St Symeon the New Theologian, whose
terminology on the matter of man’s union with God and deification often confuses the reader. In
particular, Symeon does not use the essence-activities distinction in the way Palamas does, that
is to say, so explicitly and consistently (on some comments about whether Symeon, through his
teaching, anticipates Palamas’ distinction between essence and activities, see Ware (2003)). For
instance, sometimes he implies that man participates in the divine οὐσία. However, in general, it
is accepted that for Symeon man participates only in God’s activities, while the divine essence is
incomprehensible. A justification for Symeon’s confusing terminology would be that this whole
problematic had not arisen by his era. Had it been indeed a problem already by then, he would
surely have been more careful in his teaching. For all these see Ware (2003), 19–22. Alfeyev (2005),
160, 215–25 (mainly 221). Cf. Symeon, Hymn 50.200–02, ed. Koder, SC 196, 170: ‘And so you should
think in the Orthodox way [φρονει̑ν ὀρθοδόξως] / That I become totally god by communion with
God [ὅλον με θεὸν τῇ Θεοῦ κοινωνίᾳ], / In assurance and knowledge, and not by substance, but by
participation [οὐχὶ οὐσίᾳ, μετουσίᾳ δέ]’ (the English trans. is drawn from Alfeyev (2005), 263). For a
recent article on this matter, see Biriukov (2015).
132 See the end of our section regarding ‘The Faculty of Self-Governance and Man’s Dominion over the
Created World’ (ch. 3.2).
133 Louth (2002), 199.
134 This manuscript is now found in Naples: Neapol. 54 (II B 16). See Louth (2002), 199 n. 22. Kotter,
vol. 3, 36–37.
112 cha p te r 3

approach.135 Nevertheless, of course, there is again the chance that Palamas may have
known it through the ‘oral tradition’—a possibility that cannot be excluded.

5. Concluding Remarks

From this chapter a very important conclusion can be made: man possesses the
image of God more fully than the angels, because of his corporeality. In particular, as
shown in the pneumatological dimension, the soul has been created more in God’s
image than the intellectual nature of the angels by virtue of its vivifying power.136 As
Sinkewicz correctly explicates Palamas’ argument, the angels, having word, intellect,
and spirit, but no ζωοποιὸν δύναμιν, reflect only the image of the immanent Trinity in
its internal relations. On the other hand, as the Christological dimension of the imago
implies,137 ‘in man the life-giving spirit communicates outside the intellectual sphere
towards the sensible world of the body, just as the life-giving Spirit in the Trinity
communicates life beyond the interior domain of the Godhead to the realm of the
saving economy’. In conclusion, the divine image in man has both a pneumatological
and an incarnational character. Furthermore, it reflects not only theology (θεολογία),
i.e. the inner being of the Trinity, but also the economy (οἰκονομία), i.e. the communion
of the Trinity ad extra, to creation.138
From my point of view this is a very significant point in Palamas’ anthropology. He
argues that the angels reflect only the theology, whereas man images both the theology
and the economy. But this means that angels reflect only ‘a part’ of the Holy Trinity—Its
inner world—, while man images the Trinity in Its ‘totality’. Undoubtedly this provides
man a very high dignity and places him above the angels in the hierarchical order.
Now it can be easily shown how great a value St Gregory attributes to the human
body.139 In particular, man manifests more fully the kat’eikona than the angels for
three reasons, all based on his corporeality: the soul’s vivifying power (ζωοποιὸς
δύναμις-the pneumatological dimension), the faculty of dominion, and the faculty
of sense perception (αἰσθητικόν-the christological dimension). If man did not have
a body, like the angels, he would not have such a great dignity.
Ιn this point a major question arises: why does Palamas feel the need to lay such
strong emphasis on the value of the human body? To give an answer, we must turn
our attention to Gregory’s era and to his theological aims. Undoubtedly, as mentioned

135 However, it should be noted again that, as mentioned in the end of ch. 3.2.c, nowadays we cannot
know for sure how many manuscripts survived in the era of Palamas. Therefore, what survives today
gives us just an indication.
136 Ch. 39.1–4, 126: Ἡ νοερὰ καὶ λογικὴ φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς, μόνη νοῦν ἔχουσα καὶ λόγον καὶ πνεῦμα ζωοποιόν,
μόνη καὶ τῶν ἀσωμάτων ἀγγέλων μᾶλλον κατ’ εἰκόνα τοῦ Θεοῦ παρ’ αὐτοῦ δεδημιούργηται.
137 See ‘The Faculty of Sense Perception’, in ch. 3.3.
138 For the above, see Sinkewicz (1988), 19. Cf. Sinkewicz (1986b), 865 and Sinkewicz (2002), 170.
139 The very positive stance of Palamas towards the human body, in relation to man’s spiritual senses,
will be analysed in ch. 7 of this book. In the current chapter are mentioned only these points of his
theology of the body which are related to the imago Dei.
 t h e i m ag e o f g o d i n man and t he ange ls 113

in the current chapter’s beginning, Palamas’ main goal is to establish man’s high rank
and value, so as to ground the potentiality of theosis. A means of accomplishing this is
by exalting the body. For Gregory, as shown, his corporeality provides man a greater
position in the hierarchy than the angels, and for this reason, he emphasises the body,
in order to underline man’s great value. It seems that Gregory is not fully satisfied by
the two arguments for man’s resemblance to God mentioned initially in the previous
chapter, namely the Trinitarian reflections in man, and needs some more evidence
on which to ground his opinion about man’s high dignity. He sees man’s superiority
by virtue of his corporeal nature as suitable means toward achieving this goal.
There is an additional crucial reason. Palamas saw the need to defend the body
against certain negative attitudes towards it in his epoch. In particular his opponents
were attacking the hesychasts’ claim that the human body participated in prayer and
in divine communion or the revelation of the Trinity to man through the uncreated
divine light (theophanies). So, for instance, Barlaam could not accept the participation
of the body in prayer. But these approaches entailed the danger of undervaluing
the body. Thus, for Gregory it is a datum that the body has a central role in prayer
and in the theophanies.140 Hence he stresses the importance of the human body, in
order to defend it and exalt it to its proper rank. One way to accomplish his aim is
through outlining and stressing the image of God in man and especially the role of
the body in his theology.
This fact, that an ascetic attributes such a central role to the human body, is very
crucial indeed. For this reason, one is puzzled when comes across the idea, sometimes
expressed in literature, that Palamite theology undervalues the body. For instance,
recently Stelios Ramfos141—a contemporary Greek philosopher who often writes
on theological matters—argued that the theology of Palamas is ‘suspicious of the
body and dismissive of reason’; it is ‘a world denying and anti-rational faith and a
decisive turn away from history’. Moreover, Ramfos believes that the Philokalia is
characterised by ‘a neglect of day-to-day reality’, and an ‘endemic antipathy to hard
work’, and that it represents ‘a world-denying form of Christianity’.142
With all due respect to Ramfos’ erudition and vast philosophical knowledge, one
wonders if he is reading the works of Palamas objectively (and of the Philokalia, in
general), when he writes that ‘For the neoplatonic thought on which the theology

140 This is a central idea for Palamas, which one can find in many points of his corpus. For instance,
see Triads 1.3.36–38, 447–49 (189–93). As Cooper (2005), 3 remarks, Gregory in this extract [Tr.
1.3.37.2–8, 448 (191.2–9)] evokes explicitly Maximos the Confessor as a patristic testimony ‘in defence
of the notably physical aspects of hesychast prayer when he affirms that it is “through this body and
by bodily means” that the faithful will behold the uncreated light of God’. This whole issue will be
analysed in Part II of this book, particularly, in ch. 7.
141 For a recent approach to Ramfos’ work (mainly regarding the ‘notion of personhood’), see Louth
(2015), 259–62.
142 For the above see, for instance, the book of Ramfos Τό ἀδιανόητο τίποτα (2010), 400–02 (the
translations are drawn from Plested (2013), 3). It should be noted that this book of Ramfos received
a lot of theological criticism, based on the fact that it does not grasp the real aim and ethos of the
Philokalia. See, for instance, Loudovikos (2010b). For a critical approach on some aspects of Ramfos’
work (but not on the aforementioned book), see Loudovikos (2010d), 115–52.
114 cha p te r 3

and the ascetic life of the Christian East was based and which Palamas was following
without knowing it, the physical body and its sensations are denied in favor of their
sprititual version’.143 It seems to me that an objective approach to the Palamite image
of God does not permit such an evaluation.144 Arguments presented in this chapter,
such as the ζωοποιὸς δύναμις and the αἰσθητικόν, point to a contrary conclusion
and show how great a value Palamas attributes to the human body and to physical
knowledge, as well as to the sciences and technology as well.145
As already stated, in his imago theology St Gregory does not simply wish to establish
why man is created kat’ eikona tou Theou or why he manifests the image more fully
than the angels. Ηis supreme goal is to stress the possibility of a strong God-human
relationship; the imago is just a means to this end. Therefore he goes on to pinpoint
that if man preserves the image, lives according to God’s will, and walks the road of
becoming like God (theosis), then the body ‘attains to the promised resurrection
and participates in eternal glory’.146 But this argument provokes the beginning of a
brief discussion about the kath’omoiosin.

143 Ramfos (2010), 401 (trans. mine).

144 In my view, the same may be applied in Palamas’ teaching on the spiritual senses. I hope that this is
shown, among others, through Part II of this book.
145 For an interesting article regarding the importance that Palamas attributes to the body, see
Archimandrite Efrem (2000a).
146 Ch. 39.15–17, 126: …δι᾿ αὐτῆς καὶ τὸ συνηµµένον ἀπαθανατίζει σῶµα, τῆς ἐπηγγελµένης ἐξαναστάσεως
κατὰ καιρὸν τυχὸν καὶ δόξης ἀϊδίου µετασχόν.
 Chapter 4

The καθ’ ὁμοίωσιν*

1. The Superiority of the Angels

So far it has been shown that Palamas deems man to manifest more fully the imago
than the angels, because of his corporeality. Nevertheless, St Gregory carefully argues
that the good angels, those who did not rebel against God, are ‘more worthy of honour
than we because they are without bodies and are nearer to the utterly incorporeal and
uncreated nature. Or rather, those among them who kept to their proper rank and
longed for the goal of their being, even though they are fellow servants, are honoured
by us and because of their rank are much more worthy of honour than we are’.1
Furthermore, the angels have preserved the perfection of the καθ’ ὁμοίωσιν and
for this reason they have a greater dignity than us: ‘even though we possess the image
of God to a greater degree than the angels, even till the present we are inferior by far
with respect to God’s likeness and especially now in relation to the good angels’; they
are much closer to the divine illumination. Besides, ‘the perfection of the likeness
of God is effected by the divine illumination that comes from God’.2 We can see
here how clearly St Gregory connects the likeness, i.e. divinization (theosis), with
the uncreated divine activity, since for Palamas the divine illumination is identical
to the divine activity: theosis is an effect of the uncreated ἐνέργεια.3 Here we have
a resemblance with, and a possible influence from, the teaching of St Maximos and

* In the Palamite corpus the likeness to God is closely connected with theosis. St Gregory’s teaching on
the latter has been extensively treated in many studies. For this reason, here only the most basic points
of the kath’ omoiosin will be mentioned, mainly those that are clearly connected to the imago. Let us
note that some basic elements were already mentioned in the Overview of Palamas’ Teaching (ch. 1).
For theosis according to Palamas, see Mantzaridis (1984). Russell (2004), 304–09. Russell (2006).
A. Williams (1999). Kesselopoulos (1986), 195–210.
1 Ch. 27.10–15, 110: …εἰ καὶ ἡµῶν τιµιώτεροι, ὡς σωµάτων ὄντες ἐκτὸς καὶ τῇ ἀσωµάτῳ παντάπασι καὶ
ἀκτίστῳ φύσει µᾶλλον ἐγγίζοντες· µᾶλλον δὲ οἱ μὲν φυλάξαντες τούτων τὴν ἑαυτῶν τάξιν καὶ τὸ πρὸς ὃ
γεγόνασι στέργοντες, εἰ καὶ ὁµόδουλοι, ἀλλ’ ἡµῖν τίµιοι καὶ ἡµῶν τῇ τάξει πολλῷ τιµιώτεροι.
2 Ch. 64.1–5, 158: Ἀλλ᾿ εἰ καὶ τὸ κατ᾿ εἰκόνα µᾶλλον ἡµεῖς τῶν ἀγγέλων ἔχοµεν καὶ µέχρι νῦν πρὸς τὸ καθ᾿
ὁµοίωσιν εἶναι τοῦ Θεοῦ πολλῷ ἐλαττούµεθα καὶ µάλιστα νῦν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀγγέλων. ἵνα γὰρ τἄλλα νῦν
ἀφῶ, ἡ τελείωσις τοῦ καθ᾿ ὁµοίωσιν εἶναι τοῦ Θεοῦ διὰ τῆς ἐκ Θεοῦ θείας ἐλλάµψεως τελεῖται. Cf. Ch. 77
and Sinkewicz (1988), 20.
3 For the subject of God’s nature, being, and activity (ἐνέργεια), and its history from the ancient
philosophy to the Neoplatonists, and to authors such as Augustine, Boethius, Aquinas, Dionysiοs
the Areopagite, Maximos the Confessor, and Palamas, see the important book of Bradshaw, Aristotle
East and West (2004). Cf. Bradshaw (2006; 2013 repr.). Tollefsen (2012). Especially for the ‘Palamite
synthesis’, see Bradshaw’s book, pp. 234–42.
116 cha p te r 4

St Diadochos of Photiki (a fifth century ascetic, whose works are also included in
the Philokalia).4
At another point, in Homily 24, On the Last Judgment, Palamas supports that
‘When God created Adam our forefather after his image and likeness, He put no
evil in him at all, but, together with his soul, breathed into him the grace of the Holy
Spirit which kept him new and preserved his divine likeness’.5 Therefore, it is divine
grace, the uncreated activity of the Holy Trinity, that keeps man conformed to the
kath’ omoiosin. But these considerations lead us to the spiritual and ethical dimension
of the likeness according to Palamas.

2. Spiritual and Ethical Dimension

Apart from arguing that the intellectual and rational nature of the soul has been
created more fully in the imago Dei than the incorporeal angels, Palamas adds
that ‘It possesses the image indefectibly even though it may not recognize its own
dignity nor think or act in a manner worthy of the one who created him [i.e man]
in his own image’.6 After the fall of the first-created humans and the subsequent
death of the soul through separation from God, the human being lost his likeness
to God, but preserved the image. If the soul rejects sin and practices the virtues, it
is illumined by God and it receives true and eternal life. Moreover, ‘Through this
life it receives also immortality for the body joined to it, for at the proper time the
body attains to the promised resurrection and participates in eternal glory’. But if
the soul prefers inferior things, it ‘inflicts shameful dishonour upon the image of
God’ and is alienated by God.7
The heavenly people, those who follow the will of God, are ‘Those who are
steadfast and immovable in their faith, who always abound in the Lord’s work and

4 As Thunberg (19952), 124 notes, for Diadochos ‘The perfection of the likeness is… effected only
through illumination, an illumination brought about by spiritual charity, which alone makes the
likeness to God perfect’. See Diadochos, Capita gnostica 89, Oeuvres Spirituelles, ed. des Places,
149–50.
5 Hom. 54, On the Last Judgment, 9.103–06, ΠΣ 6, 590 (ΠΑΕ 11, 360), trans. Veniamin, 448: Ὁ Θεὸς τὸν
Ἀδὰμ τὸν ἡμέτερόν ποτε προπάτορα κατ᾿ εἰκόνα καὶ ὁμοίωσιν ἑαυτοῦ κτίσας, κακίαν οὐδεμίαν ἐνέθηκεν
αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ μετὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνέπνευσεν αὐτῷ καὶ τὴν τοῦ θείου Πνεύματος χάριν, συντηροῦσαν αὐτὸν ἐν
καινότητι καὶ περιέπουσαν αὐτῷ τὴν ὁμοίωσιν.
6 Ch. 39.1–6, 126: …καὶ τοῦτ᾿ ἔχει ἀµεταποίητον, κἂν µὴ ἐπιγνῷ τὴν ἑαυτῆς ἀξίαν καὶ τοῦ κτίσαντος κατ᾿
εἰκόνα οἰκείαν ἀξίως φρονῇ τε καὶ πολιτεύηται.
7 Ch. 39.6–22, 126: …τὸ καθ᾿ ὁµοίωσιν εἶναι θείαν ἀποβαλόντες, τὸ κατ᾿ εἰκόνα οὐκ ἀπωλέσαµεν.
ἀποστέργουσα µὲν οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ τὴν πρὸς τὰ χείρω σχέσιν καὶ προσκολλωµένη δι᾿ ἀγάπης τῷ κρείττονι καὶ
ὑποταττοµένη τούτῳ διὰ τῶν ἔργων καί τῶν τρόπων τῆς ἀρετῆς, φωτίζεταί τε παρ᾿ αὐτοῦ καὶ καλλύνεται,
βελτιουµένη καὶ πειθοµένη ταῖς ἐκείνου βουλαῖς καὶ παραινέσεσι, παρ᾿ ὧν καὶ τὴν ὄντως ζωὴν τὴν
αἰώνιον ἀπολαµβάνει· δι᾿ αὐτῆς καὶ τὸ συνηµµένον ἀπαθανατίζει σῶµα, τῆς ἐπηγγελµένης ἐξαναστάσεως
κατὰ καιρὸν τυχὸν καὶ δόξης ἀϊδίου µετασχόν. µὴ ἀποποιουµένη δὲ τὴν πρὸς τὰ χείρω σχέσιν καὶ
ὑπόπτωσιν, παρ᾿ ἧς αἶσχος ἀτιµοποιὸν ἐµποιεῖ τῇ τοῦ Θεοῦ εἰκόνι, ἀλλοτριοῦται καὶ ἀποικίζεται Θεοῦ
τῆς ὄντως µακαρίας καὶ ἀληθινῆς ζωῆς, ὡς ἐγκαταλιποῦσα τοῦτον αὐτὴ πρότερον, ἐγκαταλιµπανοµένη
δικαίως παρὰ τοῦ κρείττονος.
 The καθ’ ὁμοίωσιν 117

bear the image of the heavenly (Adam) [i.e. Christ] through their obedience to
Him’.8 Thus steady faith and constant obedience to Christ imprint man with Christ’s
image. For this reason the saints ‘became living icons of Christ and the same as he
is, more by grace than by assimilation’.9 Furthermore, during their life on earth the
saints are human images of virtue (ἔμψυχοι γάρ εἰσιν εἰκόνες τῆς ἀρετῆς) and thus
they constitute ‘an incentive to virtue (προτροπὴ πρὸς ἀρετήν) for those who hear
and see them with understanding’.10
The triadic character of the divine image offers man a very high hierarchical
place: immediately after God, above all creation. But this high dignity must
be preserved through continual remembrance and contemplation of God. By
cultivating such a strong desire for God and close relationship with Him, the soul
receives ‘the mysterious and ineffable radiance of that [i.e. the divine] nature’.11
Here Palamas refers to the uncreated activity of the Holy Trinity, which enables
the soul to fully manifest the imago Dei and follow the way to the likeness with
God, which was lost in the fall. This activity transmits to the human person
love of God and all humanity. Obviously, we have here another example of how
the Palamite distinction between essence and activity applies to anthropology.
Besides, let us not forget that, for Palamas, participation in the divine activities
is a matter of degree, depending on man’s synergy with God. Nevertheless, if
we choose the sinful way, we damage our own soul, along with its ‘triadic and
supercosmic (ὑπερκόσμιος) world’; we destroy the imago Dei.12 As Sinkewicz
concisely concludes
Thus, the threefold structure of the divine image in the soul has a distinctly dynamic
character. It was created by God but is made manifest and preserved by grace. The
man who loves virtues returns to himself13 through the continual remembrance

8 Hom. 24, On Pentecost, 14.224–26, ΠΣ 6, 282 (ΠΑΕ 10, 116–18), trans. Veniamin, 197: Οἱ ἐδραῖοι καὶ
ἀμετακίνητοι τῇ πίστει, καὶ περισσεύοντες ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ τοῦ Κυρίου πάντοτε καὶ τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ ἐπουρανίου
διὰ τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν εὐπειθείας φορέσαντες. Palamas refers here (τοῦ ἐπουρανίου) to Christ, the ‘last
Adam’. This is clear from the previous paragraph of this Homily [in particular Hom. 24, 13.219–23, ΠΣ
6, 282 (ΠΑΕ 10, 116)], where the words of St Paul are mentioned about Christ as the last Adam and
the second man, the heavenly one and not the earthly (1 Cor 15:45.47–48).
9 Ch. 76.3–4, 170 (= Ch. 111.15–16, 210): καὶ ζῶσαί τινες εἰκόνες Χριστοῦ καὶ ταὐτό µᾶλλον αὐτῷ κατὰ τὴν
χάριν ἢ ἀφοµοίωµα. This is a quotation from St Maximos, Amb. 21, 15.24, ed. Constas, vol. 1, 444: καὶ
γενέσθαι ζώσας εἰκόνας Χριστοῦ… (PG 91, 1253D).
10 Hom. 28, On Saints Peter and Paul, 1.16–20, ΠΣ 6, 312–13 (ΠΑΕ 10, 202), trans. Veniamin, 220.
11 Ch. 40.1–12, 126–28: Ἡ µετὰ τὴν ἀνωτάτω τριάδα τριαδικὴ φύσις, ὡς παρ᾿ ἐκείνης κατ᾿ εἰκόνα ἐκείνης
πεποιηµένη µᾶλλον τῶν ἄλλων, νοερά, λογική τε καὶ πνευµατικὴ (τοιαύτη δέ ἐστιν ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη
ψυχή), φυλάττειν ὀφείλει τὴν ἑαυτῆς τάξιν καὶ µετὰ Θεὸν εἶναι µόνον καὶ τούτῳ ὑπεζεύχθαι µόνῳ
καὶ ὑποκεῖσθαι καὶ πείθεσθαι καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν ὁρᾶν µόνον καὶ κοσµεῖν ἑαυτὴν τῇ διηνεκεῖ τούτου
µνήµῃ καὶ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θερµοτάτῃ πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ διαπύρῳ ἀγάπῃ, δι᾿ ὧν θαυµαστῶς πρὸς ἑαυτὴν
ἐπισπᾶται, µᾶλλον δὲ ἐπεσπᾶτο ἦν ὅτε τὴν τῆς φύσεως ἐκείνης µυστικὴν καὶ ἀπόρρητον αἴγλην καὶ
τηνικαῦτα τὸ κατ᾿ εἰκόνα Θεοῦ καὶ ὁµοίωσιν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔχει, ἐπίχαρις καὶ σοφὴ καὶ θεία διὰ ταύτης
ἐκτελουµένη.
12 Ch. 40.12–28, 128.
13 Ch. 40.8, 126: θαυμαστῶς πρὸς ἑαυτὴν [the soul] ἐπισπᾶται.
118 cha p te r 4

of God14 effected by practice of the Jesus Prayer in conjunction with the hesychast
psycho-somatic method.15 Then, graced by the divine radiance, the soul recognizes
the image of God within itself and is drawn ever closer to his likeness.16

14 See, e.g., Ch. 40.6–7, 126: τῇ διηνεκεῖ τούτου μνήμῃ καὶ θεωρίᾳ.
15 Palamas presents the Jesus Prayer and the psycho-physical method as ways of achieving continual
remembrance of God, in, e.g., Tr. 1.2.7–8, 399–401 (87–91).
16 Sinkewicz (1988), 20.
 Conclusion
The Palamite εἰκὼν Θεοῦ: Palamas’ Dynamic of Thinking of
Man as Being in the Image of God

From all the above it is shown that the imago has a cardinal place in the teaching of
St Gregory Palamas. He uses it frequently in many ways and on different occasions.
In the current Part—after providing a short history of the kat’ eikona in the Bible
and the ecclesiastical writers—we attempted to understand Palamas’ thinking on this
topic. Our main aim was to show that, according to Palamas, man is greater than the
angels as concerns the imago, and, moreover, that this is due to his body.
As demonstrated, for Gregory, man stands at the peak of the created order. He
is placed immediately after God and is superior even to the angels, in terms of the
kat’ eikona. He was brought forth on the last day of creation, after all things; all the
sensible world was created for his sake. His creation in the image of God is a crucial
reason for his high dignity. The two primary consequences of the kat’ eikona are that
man is capable of receiving God and truly knowing Him; both of which are effected
through participation in the uncreated divine activities. Thus, it may be counted as
one of his original contributions his decision to view the imago and the resemblance
to God through the prism of the essence-activities distinction.
Moreover, Palamas vividly relates the imago to the Incarnation of the Logos. One
can see a close interaction in his mind, as far as the image is concerned, between
a) man made in the Trinitarian image of God, b) the Incarnate Christ, and c) the
Logos as the Image of God the Father. In addition, it is interesting that a cyclical
movement may be detected in his approach. First, he stresses the fact that only in
deification is man truly restored to God’s image and likeness. Even though man was
initially created in the image of God, this image was blackened and corrupted in the
fall. Hence the basic task of Christ is to restore the imago and guide man to theosis.
In this way, man re-obtains the lost image, and returns to his ‘first state’, to the life of
the first-created humans in Paradise. Here eschatology meets protology.1
Palamas, along with the majority of the Fathers, utilised many frameworks to
understand the image of God, without proposing one of them as the unique and
definitive interpretation. Moreover, he regards the kath’ omoiosin, the resemblance
to God, to be the most important goal for man; the imago is just the foundation,

1 These realities are brilliantly expressed at the second (fourth) Evlogitarion of the Memorial Service:
‘Of old you formed me from nothing and honoured me with your divine image, but because I transgressed
your commandment, you returned me to the earth from which I was taken; bring me back to your
likeness, refashioning my ancient beauty’ [trans. Lash (slightly modified) https://web.archive.org/
web/20160305221151/http://anastasis.org.uk/mat-sun.htm (accessed 20.11.16)].
1 20 co n clus i o n

the basic premise which grants him the opportunity to continue his pursuit of this
goal.2 This concern to secure the possibility of theosis motivates him to emphasize
the high place of man in the creation hierarchy, and he views developing the kat’eikona
theology as an important means to this end.
Palamas locates the kat’ eikona in the human intellect. Nonetheless he also ascribes
a crucial role to the body, in terms of the imago, to such an extent that his approaches
could be acknowledged as unique and without precedent in patristic literature. As
far as his conception of the image is concerned, in the above chapters we discerned
two main elements: first, how man images the Holy Trinity (namely the Trinitarian
reflections), and, second, how he is superior to the angels. According to Gregory,
man manifests the kat’eikona more fully than the angels for three reasons, which are
all based on his corporeality: a) the soul’s vivifying power (ζωοποιὸς δύναμις-the
pneumatological dimension), b) the faculty of dominion, and c) the faculty of sense
perception (αἰσθητικόν-the christological dimension). To sum up, I would fully agree
with Sinkewicz:
It should now be clear that Palamas’ teaching on God’s image in man is thoroughly
patristic in its foundation, for it draws upon a commonly used analogy for understanding
the Trinity and associates this with the doctrine of the image, as certain earlier writers
had done, at least tentatively. Gregory’s doctrine is also clearly a development both
in certain details and in its general thrust. The analysis of the four meanings of λόγος
in chapter 35 goes beyond the common distinction between internal and external
word. Most importantly, Gregory determined that there is a difference between the
divine image in man and the divine image in the angels, and this difference gives to
man a place in the hierarchy next after God and above the angels.3
To take this a step further, it could be argued that, for Palamas, the human image
is richer than the angelic, even though the angelic image is purer.4 In conclusion, it
would not be unfair to contend that Palamas’ kat’eikona theology is one of the most
advanced and developed approaches to the imago in the patristic tradition; perhaps
the most well-elaborated, alongside that of St Maximos. Gregory picks up all sorts
of resonances from his immersion in the Fathers and seems to exploit almost all the
available to him approaches, as well as providing his own original thoughts.

Some Implications

What then are we to make of all these? Do the aforementioned arguments have an
interest only from a patristic/scholarly point of view or are there broader implications
relevant to contemporary man? A first major implication is evident already: Palamas

2 It could be argued that in Palamas one observes an emphasis on the likeness to God, in contrast to
other Fathers who insist mainly on the imago.
3 Sinkewicz (1988), 24.
4 For this remark I am grateful to Fr Andrew Louth.
 co nclu si o n 121

shows great sympathy for and recognition of the value of the human body. This implies
that he also fully recognizes and respects, even exalts, all the human activities carried
out by means of the body: the quest of science for knowledge, biological needs, the
sexual relationship, etc. Palamas is a very humane ascetic; one that fully accepts the
psychosomatic union that constitutes the human being. Nevertheless, he underlines
that all these bodily actions have to be exercised in Christ, and in the way the Church
teaches, so as to preserve in the believer the image of God, and guide him towards
the restoration of the likeness. In a very important passage, Palamas remembers the
words of St Paul (1 Cor 6:19) and writes:
Brother, do you not hear the words of the Apostle, ‘Our body is the temple of the
Holy Spirit within us (1 Cor 6:19)’, and again, ‘We are the house of God’ (Heb
3:6), as God Himself confirms when He says, ‘I will dwell in them and walk in
them, and I will be their God’ (Lev 26:12; 2 Cor 6:16)? So what sane person would
grow indignant at the thought that his intellect dwells in that whose nature it is to
become the dwelling place of God [i.e. the body]? How can it be that God at the
beginning caused the intellect to inhabit the body? Did even He do so wrongly?
Rather, brother, such views befit the heretics, who declare that the body is evil
and created by the devil. As for us, we regard it as evil for the intellect to be [or:
be caught up] in material thoughts [or: to dwell on fleshly thoughts], but not for it
to be in the body, since the body is not evil [in itself].5
We shall try to develop more fully this subject of the body and its participation in the
spiritual life in the next Part of this book, regarding the ‘Spiritual Senses’, particularly
ch.7. But there are also, at least, three last questions that remain in need of clarification.

Isn’t the Imago located in the Human Body?

First, one would probably ask, after all: was it correctly supported in the beginning
of this Part that, according to Palamas, the imago is located in the human intellect,
and not in the body? Because, one could oppose the fact that in this book it is shown
that Palamas strongly connects the image with the body.
Yes, this is irrefutable, but this does not mean that Gregory locates the image in
the body. Let us remember the three main reasons why Palamas relates the imago
with the body, namely the Christological and Pneumatological dimensions, as well
as the Faculty of Self-Governance. All these reasons simply say that man images God

5 Tr. 1,2,1.1–12, 393 (75.8–20), trans. Gendle, 41 and The Philokalia, vol. 4, 332 (modified; emphases
added): Ἀδελφέ, οὐκ ἀκούεις τοῦ Ἀποστόλου λέγοντος ὅτι ‘τὰ σώματα ἡμῶν ναὸς τοῦ ἐν ἡμῖν ἁγίου
Πνεύματός ἐστι’, καὶ πάλιν ὅτι ‘οἶκος τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡμεῖς ἐσμεν’, ὡς καὶ ὁ Θεὸς λέγει ὅτι ‘ἐνοικήσω ἐν
αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐμπεριπατήσω καὶ ἔσομαι αὐτῶν Θεός’; Ὃ τοίνυν οἰκητήριον πέφυκε γίνεσθαι Θεοῦ, πῶς ἂν
ἀναξιοπαθῆσαί τις νοῦν ἔχων ἐνοικίσαι τὸν οἰκεῖον νοῦν αὐτῷ; Πῶς δὲ καὶ ὁ Θεὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐνῷκισε τῷ
σώματι τὸν νοῦν; Ἆρα καὶ αὐτὸς κακῶς ἐποίησε; Τοὺς τοιούτους λόγους, ἀδελφέ, τοῖς αἱρετικοῖς ἁρμόσει
λέγειν, οἳ πονηρὸν καὶ τοῦ πονηροῦ πλάσμα τὸ σῶμα λέγουσιν. Ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐν τοῖς σωματικοῖς φρονήμασιν
εἶναι τὸν νοῦν οἰόμεθα κακόν, ἐν τῷ σώματι δὲ οὐχὶ κακόν, ἐπεὶ μηδὲ τὸ σῶμα πονηρόν.
122 co n clus i o n

more than the angels, exactly because he possesses a body. Nowhere does he locate the
imago both in the body and the soul.6 Thus the image is located in the human soul.7
But, moreover, exactly because man possesses a body, this brings him nearer to God,
as far as the imago is concerned.8 Of course, as already stated, this does not mean that
Palamas undervalues the human body. On the contrary, it has been clearly shown
how great a value he ascribes to human corporeality. This will be further explicated
in Part II, there in terms of man’s spiritual senses.

Do the Angels, at Last, have the Image of God, or Not?

Among the Fathers, one can find various answers to this question. For instance,
Athanasios—contrary to, e.g., St John Damascene—bluntly denies that the angels
have the imago Dei.9 However, St Cyril of Alexandria says that the angels do have
the image of God.10
For Palamas the angels clearly possess the image of God. He states this explicitly
in Ch. 27: ‘…every intellectual nature is a fellow servant with us and is in the image of
the Creator, even though they be more worthy of honour than we because they are

6 It seems that Demetracopoulos (1997), 162 is correct in arguing that (as far as the αἰσθητικὸν is
concerned) ‘the imaging of God in man is clearly located not in the fact that man has bodily senses
and therefore sensible knowledge per se, but in his ability, through these (senses) and the knowledge
they provide (which [senses] constitute, in this instance, not a part but a conditio sine qua non of this
divine image), to imitate at a certain extent the creative activity of God-archetype—something that
angels, being bodiless, cannot do’.
7 Let us not forget the explicit way Palamas makes this clear, as analysed in ch.1.2: ‘it is not the bodily
constitution but the very nature of the intellect [nous] which possesses this image and nothing in our
nature is superior to the intellect. If there were something superior, that is where the image would be’
(Ch. 27.1–5, 110).
8 Niketas Stethatos has a similar view to that of Palamas. He argues that man’s royalty and self-ruling
power are not to be identified with the image, but are just peripheral characteristics of the image (τὸ
γὰρ βασιλικόν τε καὶ αὐτεξούσιον περὶ τὴν εἰκόνα ὁρᾶται καὶ εἴ τι τούτων ὅμοιον…) (De anima, 22.10–12,
ed. Darrouzès, 84). It is the same as the crown and the scepter of a king (καθάπερ καὶ τὸ διάδημα καὶ
τὸ σκῆπτρον περὶ τὸν βασιλέα), or as the soul’s qualities, such as the absence of a body, quantity and
form (ὥσπερ πάλιν καὶ τὸ ἀσώματον καὶ ἄποσον καὶ ἀσχημάτιστον περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς ψυχῆς); or,
moreover, as the white and black colour of the body. Knowing these elements, does not mean that we
know the essence of the soul and the body; we just know some characteristics of their essence (οὐδὲ
γὰρ ἐὰν γνῶμεν ταῦτα, ἤδη καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος καταλαμβάνομεν, ἀλλὰ τὰ περὶ τὴν
οὐσίαν αὐτῶν) (De anima, 22.12–17, ed. Darrouzès, 84–86). In addition, to resemble God is to practice
‘justice, truth, charity, sympathy and compassion’ (τὸ δὲ καθ’ ὁμοίωσίν ἐστι τὸ δίκαιον, τὸ ἀληθές, τὸ
εὔσπλαγχνον, τὸ συμπαθές, τὸ φιλάνθρωπον) (De anima, 23.1–2, ed. Darrouzès, 86). And Stethatos
continues: ‘In those who practice these virtues one can clearly see the image and the likeness of
God; on the one hand they walk according to their nature, but on the other, they are elevated above
the irrational animals, because of their high dignity’ (De anima, 23.2–6, ed. Darrouzès, 86: Ἐν οἷς οὖν
ταῦτα ἐνεργεῖ καὶ φυλάττεται, ἐν ἐκείνοις ὁρᾶται τρανῶς καὶ τὸ κατ’ εἰκόνα καὶ καθ’ ὁμοίωσιν, κατὰ φύσιν
μὲν δηλαδὴ κινουμένοις, κατὰ δὲ ἀξίαν τῶν ἀλόγων ὑπερκειμένοις).
9 Athanasios, De incarnatione, 13.28–29, ed. Thomson, 166. Cf. Louth (2002), 122.
10 See, indicatively, his Answers to Tiberius 14 [‘To those who ask if angels exist in God’s image’ (Πρὸς
τοὺς λέγοντας εἰ καὶ ἄγγελοι κατ’ εἰκόνα Θεοῦ)], ed. Wickham, 174–75.
 co nclu si o n 123

without bodies and are nearer to the utterly incorporeal and uncreated nature’.11 If
the angels did not also possess the image of God, Gregory would have underlined
it. Besides, Palamas supports that the angels have intellect, reason, and spirit. This
means that they also have the imago, because, as already shown, humans have the
imago, because they possess nous-logos-pneuma, kat’eikona of the Holy Trinity.12
Apart from these reasons, Gregory insists that humans have the image to a greater
extent (μᾶλλον) than the angels. Obviously, in order to make such a comparison, he
would have to have presupposed that the angels also possess the image.

Finally, Who Is Greater, Man or the Angels?

Palamas’ method may puzzle some readers. On the one hand he exalts man over the
angels exactly because of his corporeality. But, on the other hand, he exalts the angels
because they are bodiless and hence closer to God. Why does he have such a rather
strange approach? Might a problem be discovered here? In my view the answer is
negative. Palamas knows exactly what he wants to say and accomplish theologically.
His purpose is to exalt the place of the human person and to explain to his audience
how greatly endowed by his creator man is. However, Palamas knows well that humans
easily fall into sin and lose their way when seeking God. And in this way they also
lose their high dignity, even temporarily. Therefore, Palamas shows us our final goal,
our destination: where we should aim. This is likeness to God, in which the angels
undoubtedly surpass humans now. Besides, it is known that in the Fathers one sees a
progressive movement from the image to the likeness.13 This is also true for Palamas.
But what will happen in the ‘age to come’, in Paradise? This has to do with the
transformation of the body, and the spiritual senses. That prompts us to move to the
next Part, and explore the Palamite doctrine of ‘intellectual perception’ (αἴσθησις
νοερά), a notion that combines man’s spiritual union with God (νοερά) with his
bodily constitution (αἴσθησις).

11 Ch. 27.9–12, 110: σύνδουλος οὐκοῦν ἡµῖν ἐστι πᾶσα νοερὰ φύσις καὶ κατ᾿ εἰκόνα τοῦ κτίσαντος, εἰ καὶ ἡµῶν
τιµιώτεροι, ὡς σωµάτων ὄντες ἐκτὸς καὶ τῇ ἀσωµάτῳ παντάπασι καὶ ἀκτίστῳ φύσει µᾶλλον ἐγγίζοντες
(emphasis added).
12 See ch. 2 of our book.
13 For a characteristic example, see St Diadochos of Photiki, Capita 89, ed. des Places, 149–50.
 Part II

The Spiritual
Senses: Αἴσθησις νοερά
 O taste and see that the Lord is good; blessed
is the man who hopes in him.1

…the mysterious communion and inexpressible vision of the Mystery,

the mystical and ineffable contemplation and taste of the eternal light.2

…talking about God and encountering God are not the same thing.3

[…] the phrase ‘in the image’ implies a gift within man but at the same
time a goal set before him, a possession but also a destiny, since it really
does constitute man’s being, but only in potentiality [ἐν δυνάμει]. The ‘in
the image’ is a real power, a pledge which should lead to marriage, that
is, to hypostatic union, the unconfused but real and fulfilling mixture
and commingling [ἀνάκραση] of the divine and the human natures. Only
then does the iconic or potential being of man become real authentic
being. Man finds in the Archetype his true ontological meaning.4

1 Ps 33 (34):9 (8): γεύσασθε καὶ ἴδετε ὅτι χρηστὸς ὁ Κύριος· μακάριος ἀνήρ, ὃς ἐλπίζει ἐπ᾿ αὐτόν.
2 Tr. 1,3,42.9–11, 454 (203.23–25): …ἡ κρυφία τοῦ κρυφίου μετουσία καὶ ὅρασις ἀνέκφραστος, ἡ μυστικὴ
καὶ ἀπόρρητος τοῦ αἰωνίου φωτὸς θεωρία τε καὶ γεῦσις (emphases added).
3 Tr. 1,3,42.11–12, 453 (201.22–23): …περὶ Θεοῦ γάρ τι λέγειν καὶ Θεῷ συντυγχάνειν οὐχὶ ταὐτόν.
4 Nellas (1979), 38 (= Nellas (1987), 37).
 Chapter 5

Contextualising the Palamite Spiritual Senses

1. Introduction

Hitherto, the image of God in man according to St Gregory was examined. Now,
another very crucial subject of his anthropology will be approached: the ‘spiritual
senses’, or, what Palamas prefers to say, the αἴσθησις νοερά. This notion is very important
because it combines the bodily element (αἴσθησις) with the intellectual (νοερά).
Moreover, as will be shown, it occupies a very central place in Palamas’ thought.
Our main aim in this Part is to show that, for Palamas, the human body has a most
significant role in his theology of the αἴσθησις νοερά. This will be mainly shown in ch. 7.
Βut, in order to reach this aim, it is necessary that a) first, the Palamite teaching about
the spiritual senses be contextualised, namely placed in its historical and theological
context: this is done in ch. 5. There, initially the relevant literature review is presented,
as well as the teaching of Palamas’ opponents on this matter. After that a sketch of
Palamas’ reaction is depicted, which mainly has to do with the human knowledge of
God and the divine light; and b) second, the notion of the αἴσθησις νοερά be deeply
analysed. What is its background? Why does it have such a paradoxical name? What
is the role of the eyes of the soul, and what are the presuppositions of seeing the light?
These questions are approached in ch. 6.
Finally, in ch. 7 we examine the salient place of the body in man’s sensing of the
divine. The main issues that are pursued here are: What is the role of ecstasis, and
what is the relationship between apophasis and theosis? Does the passionate part
of the soul participate in theosis? What is the role of the heart? At last, what is the
place of the body in theosis, now and in Paradise? Finally, we present our conclusions,
along with a critical evaluation of some arguments of R. Sinkewicz regarding the role
of the body in the αἴσθησις νοερά.
The doctrine of the spiritual senses is found in many ecclesiastical writers, such
as Origen,1 Gregory of Nyssa,2 Evagrios, Augustine,3 Dionysiοs the Areopagite,4
Dorotheus of Gaza, Isaac the Syrian, John Climacus, Maximos the Confessor,5 John

1 For the relevant bibliography regarding the spiritual senses according to Origen, see mainly Rahner
(1932). Dillon (1986). Rudy (2002), 17–35. The most recent approach seems to be that of McInroy
(2012a). Here McInroy provides an interesting reassessment of some established opinions in
scholarship, regarding the Origenian spiritual senses.
2 Cf. Coakley (2012).
3 Cf. Lootens (2012).
4 Cf. Gavrilyuk (2012).
5 Cf. Aquino (2012).
130 cha p te r 5

Damascene, Symeon the New Theologian, etc., as well as in later, and even contem-
porary, theologians, such as Thomas Aquinas,6 Ignatius of Loyola, St Nikodimos of
the Holy Mountain,7 St Silouan the Athonite, Karl Rahner,8 Hans Urs von Balthasar,9
and Fr Sophrony Sakharov. The theology of the spiritual senses is an effort to explain
in words how man is able to perceive God, to sense the divinity, and through which
faculties this is achieved. In the words of Nicholas Gendle, ‘In the course of spiritual
maturation, the soul must develop faculties analogous to the sense organs of the body,
with which to perceive and discern the things of God…’10 Moreover, it is a topic that
has recently attracted a lot of scholarly attention.11

2. Reviewing the Literature

As far as Palamas is concerned, it could be said that there has not been a comprehensive
study that analyses in depth his teaching on the spiritual senses. However, some
important attempts have been made. First, John Meyendorff treated this topic at
some points in his seminal study Introduction à l’étude de Grégoire Palamas (1959).12
But, as mentioned in the literature review of this book, Meyendorff ’s approach is
not without some problems. Some of them have been pointed out by Romanides.13
This remark gives me the opportunity to say that several important thoughts about
Palamas’ spiritual senses may be also found in the latter’s Ρωμαῖοι ἤ Ρωμηοί Πατέρες
τῆς Ἐκκλησίας.14 However, Romanides does not write here specifically on this issue;
he, rather, offers his relevant ideas in passing, placing them in his general outline of
Palamite theology and spirituality, but without providing a systematic treatment of
Palamas’ αἴσθησις νοερά.
Second, in a very important article in 1999, Robert Sinkewicz approached the
concept of the spiritual senses in Palamas’ First Triad.15 In particular, Sinkewicz is
here based, almost exclusively, on Triad 1,3.

6 Cf. Cross (2012).

7 For instance, some important references to the spiritual senses may be found in St Nikodimos’ work
Ἐγχειρίδιον Συμβουλευτικόν, περὶ Φυλακῆς τῶν πέντε Αἰσθήσεων, τῆς τε Φαντασίας, καὶ τῆς τοῦ Νοός,
καὶ Καρδίας. Καὶ περὶ τοῦ ποῖαί εἰσιν αἱ πνευματικαί, καὶ οἰκεῖαι τοῦ Νοὸς ἡδοναί (1801). For an English
translation, see that of Chamberas (1989).
8 For Karl Rahner and Hans Urs von Balthasar, see the relevant paper of McInroy (2012b).
9 Cf. McInroy (2014).
10 Gendle (1983), 120 n. 33.
11 For a general overview of the idea of the spiritual senses in the Christian tradition, see Canévet
(1990). Canévet (2014). Rudy (2002). Gavrilyuk and Coakley (eds) (2012). In this last book an
extensive relevant bibliography is found (perhaps the fullest and most updated so far), in pp. 291–308.
There are also some studies dedicated to specific theologians; see, e.g., Coolman (2004) (‘William of
Auxerre’). McInroy (2014) (‘Balthasar’).
12 See mainly pp. 205–20 and 231–47. In the partial English trans. of this work by Lawrence (=
Meyendorff (1974a)), see mainly pp. 142–56 and 162–78.
13 See Romanides (1960–1 and 1963–4). For a brief presentation, see the literature review of this book.
14 Tome I, 51–194.
15 Sinkewicz (1999).
 co n t e x t ual i s i n g t h e palami t e spi ri t ual se nse s 131

Indeed, it seems that the most important contribution of Palamas, in terms of the
spiritual senses, is provided in Tr. 1,3. He there sets the groundwork for his teaching
and presents almost all of his basic arguments, which he uses again in his later works.
This is why our study will also have as its basic source Tr. 1,3. But, in addition, another
important text of Palamas will be considered, the Hagioretic Tome, as well as some
other texts of Palamas. However, this book will not follow an exegetical method,
presenting Palamas’ analysis of these texts chapter by chapter or verse by verse, but
a systematic one. In other words, it will try to bring together, highlight and discuss
his major theological claims regarding the spiritual senses. Having said this, passages
from the Greek text will be frequently quoted, so that the reader may have a direct
contact with Palamas’ own words. In this way, one may be better helped in his effort
to grasp the meaning of Palamas’ thoughts.
Our study takes into account Sinkewicz’s article, but also tries to examine the
whole subject in a much deeper way, through testing some of the latter’s claims;
besides this article is too small (only seventeen pages) to fully cover all the necessary
points. In general, although it is very important as a first approach to this topic in a
deep and systematic way, it remains but an initial endeavour, and, as will be shown,
not without certain problems.16
In addition, there are some points that Sinkewicz treats rather quickly, and others
that he does not develop to a significant extent. For instance, a deeper analysis is
required in matters such as how man becomes able to see the divine light, namely
the presuppositions for such vision, the difference between the illuminations
(Theophanies) in the Old and New Testament, the role of the heart, and how the
αἴσθησις νοερά is related to the human body. Furthermore, it should be pointed out
that, rather surprisingly, this article has not attracted significant scholarly attention;
this could be partially explained due to the fact that it may not be easily accessed.
However, this paper is indeed fundamental and definitive for any handling of the
νοερὰ αἴσθησις. Our book has profited a lot from it, and I am, therefore, grateful to
Sinkewicz. The latter visited this topic again three years later, i.e. in 2002, in his ‘Gregory
Palamas’,17 but he there seems just to summarize his findings of his previous article.
About ten years later, Tollefsen touched the issue of perception of the divine in
Palamas.18 Apart from providing some reflections on energeia and participation in
God according to Palamas, Tollefsen raises some important questions which are
closely related to our subject. First, he wonders what exactly the light on Mount
Tabor is, namely what is its ontological status (p. 201). Second, he asks: ‘by what
faculty of the soul do the apostles perceive it? In what way is the experience of light
adapted to a scheme of spiritual development? What is the role of the Holy Spirit in
the experience of light? What does the activity as light accomplish in the beholder?’
(p. 202). Third, ‘how could uncreated light be perceived by created beings?’ (ibid).

16 Some problematic points are analysed in the concluding remarks of ch. 7.

17 See, mainly, pp. 155–61.
18 See chapter 7 (‘The Theology of St Gregory Palamas’), in Tollefsen (2012), 185–206; mainly section
‘B. The Light of Mount Tabor’, pp. 201–06 of this book.
13 2 cha p te r 5

Fourth, ‘what happens to man’ in the divine union? (ibid). And, finally, how are we
to understand ‘the terminology of contemplation and vision’? (ibid).
These are indeed very central and crucial questions in one’s effort to trace the
Palamite αἴσθησις νοερά. And Tollefsen certainly provides some important thoughts
about them. However, his contribution is too brief, shorter than that of Sinkewicz,19
and, unfortunately, the reader gains just a superficial approach, not an in-depth
analysis.20 Nevertheless, it should be noticed that these questions undoubtedly
serve as a guiding point for our book too.
Furthermore, very recently, in 2014, Marcus Plested visited this subject in an
interesting article of his.21 He there examines the spiritual senses in many authors
such as Origen, Evagrios, Gregory of Nyssa, Dionysiοs the Areopagite, Macarios,
Diadochos of Photiki, as well as Maximos, John of Damascus, Symeon the New
Theologian, and Palamas. The importance of this article lies in the fact that it provides
both an idea of the patristic roots of the spiritual senses, and, at the same time, also

19 Tollefsen tries to answer these questions mainly in pp. 201–06. It is indicatively that he refers to
αἴσθησις νοερὰ καὶ θεία only once (see pp. 204–05).
20 Cf. our comment regarding Tollefsen’s chapter on Palamas in the beginning of our book (‘Literature
Review’). However, to tell the truth, the aim of this chapter (i.e. ch. 7 in Tollefsen’s book) is not
Palamas’ spiritual senses. It is primarily to show that the Palamite doctrine of the distinction
between essence and activities is not an innovation, but may be also found in previous Christian
thinkers; moreover, that it is philosophically sound. In my view, Tollefsen accomplishes this aim
well. Nevertheless, I was not persuaded by his evaluation that a ‘real’ distinction in Palamas’ mind is
problematic, as far as the essence and activities are concerned (Tollefsen here refers to Meyendorff ’s
relevant claim; see, e.g., p. 198: ‘Meyendorff is correct that there is a distinction between God’s
essence and his activities. The activities, however, are closely connected with what the divine
being is essentially. I somehow sense that the term “real” distinction may suggest too much of a
diversity, and I wonder if the whole question and perhaps problem of divine activity and creaturely
participation could not be viewed in a slightly different manner’). It seems to me that this is not just
a matter of interpretation of Palamas by later, or recent, theologians, but that it lies at the core of his
theology: the essence is totally united to the activities, whereas, in the same time, these two are not
identical. Besides, let us remember that Palamas’ opponents had the same problem with him. For
this reason, Palamas devoted many pages to ground and justify this distinction. But, on the other
hand, it is not possible to fully understand this reality through our mind. After all, it is a mystery
and, thus, it is primarily to be experienced, and not to be logically comprehended. A similar approach
to that of Tollefsen was recently attempted by Demetracopoulos, who claimed about a ‘mitigation’
of Palamas by his immediate followers: he regards that this may be found in their use of the kat’
epinoian distinction between essence and activities. Again, to his mind, this is in opposition to the
‘real’ distinction of Palamas. See, relevantly, Demetracopoulos (2011). Once more, it does not seem to
me valid to think that the ‘real’ distinction is problematic, and that the kat’ epinoian one of Palamas’
followers serves as a ‘mitigation’ of it. Russell (2012), 18–19 agrees with this evaluation. Here, Russell
provides his opinion, expressing, as he does, his desire to search further this topic in a forthcoming
study: it seems that this is done, at least partially, in his recent brief article, i.e. Russell (2015). To sum
up, this whole subject undoubtedly needs thorough research to be fully clarified; but, unfortunately,
this goes beyond the scope of this book. However, it is a very interestic topic, which would surely
deserve a serious endeavour, for a definite word to be said (to this end, one should take into
consideration the important article of Bradshaw (2019); unfortunately, it appeared too late for me to
incorporate its findings into the present book).
21 Plested (2017), at 311–12.
 co n t e x t ual i s i n g t h e palami t e spi ri t ual se nse s 133

how this theology was gradually shaped and developed during the Byzantine era.
However, its disadvantage is that all these are offered only in a very brief way. As far
as Palamas is considered, what directly interests this book, he is given only a very
tiny space, about one page, and, thus, only an extremely short sketch of the relevant
theology is provided.
To sum up, from this review of the secondary literature, we can see that a deep
and systematic study of the Palamite teaching on the spiritual senses is very much
needed. This is what we shall attempt in the current Part, always having in mind
our main aim, namely to show the crucial role that the human body has in Palamas’
understanding of the spiritual senses.
In his latest work on Palamas, Sinkewicz remarked that, as far as the spiritual
senses are concerned, ‘Although Palamas drew upon an earlier tradition, he clearly
gave it a new precision of meaning’.22 But the reader cannot help but wonder: is this
comment correct, and why? What did Palamas say exactly on the spiritual senses?
To what extent was he based on previous Fathers, and what was, if any, his original
contribution? Finally, what is the place of the body in his relevant theology? These
are the main research questions that this Part examines. But, first of all, let us briefly
look at the historical and theological context of this debate, as well as the relevant
teaching of the antihesychasts.

3. Triad 1,3 (Third Question): The Historical and Theological

Context, and the Teaching of Palamas’ Theological
Opponents

As Sinkewicz has explained, intellectual perception ‘can be defined in general as

the means whereby the human person experiences God or spiritual realities. More
specifically, in the controversy between Gregory Palamas and Barlaam the Calabrian,
it is the means whereby the human person knows God’.23 Moreover, as will be shown
over the course of this Part, for Palamas the spiritual senses are closely connected
with the issues of knowledge, divine illumination, perfection, intellectual perception
(αἴσθησις νοερά),24 and the participation of the body in spiritual realities.
First and foremost, it is very interesting to examine the reasons for why Palamas
feels forced to engage in dialogue about these issues.25 These reasons can be derived
from the preamble of Tr. 1,3, namely the Ἐρώτησις Τρίτη (Third Question).26 It should

22 Sinkewicz (2002), 159. Cf. Sinkewicz (1999), 390.

23 Sinkewicz (1999), 374.
24 For a brief discussion of the most adequate English translation of the αἴσθησις νοερά, see the
introduction of this book.
25 For a detailed analysis of the fourteenth-century discussion about man’s potentiality to know God,
see Meyendorff (1959a), 173–94 (= Meyendorff (1974a), 116–33). Rigo (1989). Sinkewicz (1982).
Swinburne (2013).
26 For some useful relevant points (as well as additional bibliography), cf. the second section in the
introduction of this book (regarding ‘The Historical and Theological Context’).
134 cha p te r 5

be noted that in the beginning of each of the three sections of Triad I, Palamas has a
monk asking a short question to set up the discussion which follows. Each section
is an effort to provide an answer to the corresponding question. Palamas uses this
means to show that he engaged in the hesychast debates only after having been
invited to do so by the Athonite monks.27 Thus, let us examine the Third Question
of the First Triad (i.e., Tr. 1,3).
In the beginning of this question St Gregory argues that those who write against
the hesychasts (τοὺς κατὰ τῶν ἡσυχαζόντων γράφοντας) are not in the position
to understand the hesychast teaching and life, because they have not gained the
experience which is derived only from spiritual struggle.28 In particular, he regards
them as lacking ‘knowledge’, which derives from a) ‘works’ (ἔργα) and b) ‘experience’
(πείρα) which is gained only through life (Palamas probably means ‘spiritual
life’), and which is ‘the only certain and irrefutable’ [i.e. source of knowledge].29
Moreover, they ‘absolutely refuse to listen to the Fathers’, they have ‘deviated
from the correct way’, and they calumniate the saints.30 But, more importantly,
they often contradict themselves: when they try to speak about illumination,
‘they regard as illusion every illumination which is said to be perceived through
the senses’. But, at the same time, they also argue that ‘every divine illumination
is sensibly perceived’.31
In addition, according to Palamas, those who oppose the hesychasts consider
symbolic (συμβολικούς) every illumination that happened in the Old Testament
before the coming of Christ, namely to the Jews and the Prophets. What is more
crucial, they clearly regard as sensible (αἰσθητὸν δὲ σαφῶς) the illumination at
the Mount Tabor, during the transfiguration of Christ, as well as the illumination
that took place during the descent of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost (Act 2:1–13).32
Moreover, for the antihesychasts knowledge is the only illumination that surpasses
the senses; thus they regard γνῶσις as superior to the (divine) light, and as the aim
of every contemplation.33 It goes without saying that for Palamas the above points
are extremely problematic from a theological point of view. In the following chapters
a thorough analysis of his standpoint will be undertaken.
It is noteworthy that, for a period, the antihesychasts—Barlaam included—spent
time living close to some hesychasts, so as to acquaint their teaching and life. Palamas
mentions that the former pretended to be their disciples, but were not ‘ready or quick
at learning’. For this reason, and in order to persuade them, the antihesychasts asked

27 Christou, ΠΣ 1, 336.
28 For a concise presentation of the basic points raised in the Third Question, see Sinkewicz (1999), 375.
29 Third Question.1–4, ΠΣ 1, 407 (103.1–4).
30 Third Question.4–8, 407 (103.6–10).
31 Third Question.8–11, 407 (103.10–13): …διὸ καὶ περὶ φωτισμοῦ λέγειν ἐπιχειροῦντες ἀπαγορεύουσι μὲν
ὡς πλάνην πάντα φωτισμὸν αἰσθήσει ληπτόν, οἱ αὐτοὶ δὲ καὶ πάντα φωτισμὸν θεῖον αἰσθήσει λέγουσιν
ληπτόν…
32 Third Question.12–16, 407 (103.13–18).
33 Third Question.16–18, 407 (103.18–20): Ὑπὲρ αἴσθησιν δὲ φωτισμὸν τὴν γνῶσιν μόνην λέγουσι, διὸ καὶ
ταύτην κρείττω τοῦ φωτὸς καὶ τέλος πάσης ἀποφαίνονται θεωρίας.
 co n t e x t ual i s i n g t h e palami t e spi ri t ual se nse s 135

the hesychasts to present to them in writing some of their teachings and practices.34
According to the former, the hesychasts suggested they entirely abandon the study
of divine Scripture, as something evil, and to be attached only to prayer. Through
prayer two aims are attained: a) ‘it is prayer that drives away the evil spirits which
become mingled with the very being of man’, and b) ‘these monks become inflamed
in a sensible manner, leap about and are filled with feelings of joy, without their souls
being in any way changed’.35 Furthermore, ‘They see sensible lights, and come to think
that the sign of divine things is a white colour, and of evil things a fiery yellow’.36
Palamas knows that Barlaam and the antihesychasts renounced the above states as
being demonic.37 He goes on to accuse the antihesychasts of not wanting to engage
in a real and sincere dialogue on these matters, of hiding their true purposes behind
complex formulations, and of changing their teachings often, so as to confuse their
readers and interlocutors.38 As the questioning monk of the Triads puts it, ‘…in their
writings they imitate the many convolutions and perfidies of the serpent, turning
back upon themselves in many ways, employing many ruses, and interpreting their
own words in different and contradictory manners. They do not possess the firmness
and simplicity of truth, but fall easily into contradiction…’39
For these reasons, Palamas regards the antihesychasts—in particular those who
reject the hesychast prayer and the divine illumination during it—as having fallen into
heresy, like Arius, the great heresiarch of the fourth century.40 Hence, he calls them
‘calumniators of the saints’ (συκοφάνται τῶν ἁγίων),41 and feels it a great necessity
to respond to their delusions and errors.
Having outlined the historical and theological context of Palamas’ teaching
concerning the spiritual senses, we can see that a major difference between the

34 Third Question.23–25, 407 (103.25–28): Λέγουσι δ᾿ ὅμως ὑποκριθῆναι μὲν μαθητιῶντας, ἀλλ᾿ οὐκ
εὐμαθεῖς, διὸ γραφῇ διδόναι τὰ παρὰ τῶν διδασκάλων πρὸς αὐτοὺς λεγόμενα λιπαρῆσαί τε καὶ πεῖσαι.
35 Third Question, 407.25–408.7 (103.28–105.5), trans. Gendle, 32: πάσης μὲν γραφῆς ἱερᾶς ὡς πονηρᾶς
ἀφεῖσθαι, προσανέχειν δὲ μόνῃ τῇ εὐχῇ, δι᾿ ἧς ἀπελαύνεσθαι μὲν τὰ πονηρὰ πνεύματα, συνουσιωμένα
ὄντα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἐκπυροῦσθαι δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς αἰσθητῶς καὶ σκιρτᾶν καὶ ἥδεσθαι, μηδὲν
ἀλλοιουμένης τῆς ψυχῆς.
36 Third Question.5–7, 408 (105.5–8), trans. Gendle, 32: …βλέπειν δὲ φῶτα τούτους αἰσθητά, σημεῖον δὲ
ἡγεῖσθαι τῶν μὲν θείων τὴν ἐπικεχρωσμένην λευκότητα, τῶν δὲ πονηρῶν τὸ οἷον πυρῶδες καὶ ξανθόν.
37 Third Question.8–9, 408 (105.8–10): Τοὺς μὲν οὖν διδάσκοντας αὐτοὺς φάναι ταῦτα γράφουσιν, αὐτοὶ δὲ
δαιμονιώδη ταῦτ᾿ εἶναι πάντα ἀποφαίνονται. For the above accusations against the Hesychasts, as well
as some other relevant, see Barlaam, Epistle 5, Second to Ignatios, 114–37, ed. Schirò, 323–24. For the
sources of Barlaam’s criticism of the hesychasts, and an analysis of them, see Rigo (1989), 39–103.
38 Third Question.8–20, 408 (105.8–21).
39 Third Question.12–18, 408 (105.12–18), trans. Gendle, 32: …καὶ διὰ πολλῶν ἄν τις ἐπισκέψαιτο
περιπίπτοντας οἷς κατηγοροῦσι καὶ μάλιστα τὸ πολυέλικτον καὶ δολερὸν τοῦ ὄφεως ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτῶν
μιμουμένους γράμμασι, πολλάς τε στροφὰς στρεφομένους καὶ πολλὰς ἐξελίττοντας πλοκὰς καὶ ἄλλοτε
ἄλλως καὶ ἐναντίως τὰ σφῶν αὐτῶν ἐξηγουμένους. Τὸ γὰρ ἑδραῖον καὶ ἁπλοῦν οὐκ ἔχοντες τῆς ἀληθείας,
εὐπερίτρεπτοί εἰσιν εἰς τἀναντία…
40 Tr. 1,3,1, 409–10 (107). In this section, the first of Tr. 1,3, St Gregory describes in a very eloquent way
the fact that heresy always tries to prove—in a deceitful, yet often successful, manner—its identity to
the truth.
41 Tr. 1,3,2, 410 (109–11).
1 36 cha p te r 5

hesychasts and their opponents lies in their doctrine concerning the knowledge of
God, and its relation to the divine light. In what follows, Palamas’ relevant response
will be analysed.

4. The Reaction of Palamas: Human Knowledge and

Divine Light

a. Palamas on Knowledge, and the State of the Question

First of all, let us make some comments on St Gregory’s stance towards human
knowledge. In scholarship, an accusation that is sometimes turned against him
is that he totally opposes human reason and knowledge. However, it should be
underlined that he does not fight philosophy or reason (λογική) in general, but
finds problems only in man’s wrong use of philosophy. This is clearly seen in many
places of his corpus. As an example one need only think of Tr. 1,3,12. Here Palamas
bases his argument on St Paul’s distinction in 1 Cor 2:14–15 between the ‘spiritual’
and ‘unspiritual’ (or: natural) man (πνευματικὸς καὶ ψυχικὸς ἄνθρωπος): 14 ‘Those
who are unspiritual [or: natural] do not receive the gifts of God’s Spirit, for they
are foolishness to them, and they are unable to understand them because they are
[only] spiritually discerned. 15 Those who are spiritual discern all things, and they
are themselves subject to no one else’s scrutiny’.
For St Gregory, a person who tries to find ultimate truth through his own thoughts,
discussions, and syllogisms, is not a spiritual person (πνευματικὸς ἄνθρωπος). On
the contrary, he is unspiritual (ψυχικός).42 The same could be said for him who tries
to teach about vigilance (περὶ νήψεως) without having attained silence and vigilance
in his intellect, or if one wants to prove through reason ‘the Good which is beyond
reason’ (τὸ ὑπὲρ λόγον ἀγαθόν). In a totally senseless manner he tries to observe
‘through natural knowledge the things that transcend nature’ (ἀφρόνως ὑπενόησε
φυσικῇ γνώσει τὰ ὑπὲρ φύσιν κατοπτεῦσαι). Besides ‘the depths of God’ are revealed
only through the Spirit (cf. 1 Cor 2:10).43
Therefore, as shown from the above, and from many other examples that could
be brought to bear on the topic, Palamas criticizes the wrong use of philosophy and
reason in general, namely when the latter are used in opposition to faith. For Palamas,
if reason is directed towards the achievement of good, then it is something necessary
for life and blessed.44 As he himself puts it elsewhere: ‘But someone thinking correctly
would not condemn ignorance in general, nor do we think that all knowledge is
good. Why should we consider knowledge an aim in everything that we do?’45 The

42 Tr. 1,3,12.10–14, 422 (135.5–9).

43 Tr. 1,3,12.17–27, 422 (135.12–23).
44 Cf., for instance, the faculty of sense perception, in Part I of this book (ch. 3.3), where Palamas speaks
very positively about human science.
45 Tr. 1,3,14.3–5, 424 (139.3–6): Ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ πᾶσαν ἀγνωσίαν ὑπ’ ἔγκλημα θοῖτ’ ἄν τις εὖ φρονῶν, οὐδὲ πᾶσα
γνῶσιν οἰόμεθα μακαριστόν. Πῶς οὖν πρὸς αὐτὴν ὡς πρὸς τέλος ἀφορῶντες πάντα πράξομεν;
 co n t e x t ual i s i n g t h e palami t e spi ri t ual se nse s 137

roots of Palamas’ stance towards philosophy, and human knowledge in general, can
be found in St Paul’s teaching, who distinguishes between ‘the teaching of human
wisdom’, and that of ‘the Holy Spirit’.46
On the other hand, as mentioned in the previous section, the opponents of the
hesychasts believed that man may attain union with God only through knowledge. In
particular, as Palamas points out, they argued that it is not possible to achieve perfection
and sanctity, unless one has found ‘true knowledge of the beings’. Moreover, this
knowledge is not possible to be found without ‘distinction, reasoning, and analysis’.47
In other words perfection is attained through the power of reason. However, Palamas
could in no way accept these ideas, and strongly opposed them. For him, the only
way to attain union with God is through divine illumination, communion with the
divine light. Hence, he very often contrasts human knowledge and the divine light,
trying to prove the superiority of the latter to the former. But this remark brings us
to the next sub-section.

b. Knowledge and Intellectual Illumination (νοερὸς φωτισμός)

First of all, it is interesting that Palamas does not disagree, in principle, with Barlaam,
as far as the possibility of attaining knowledge of God is concerned, namely man’s
potentiality to know something about God.48 Barlaam accepts knowledge of God, but
he does so as a vision accomplished through man’s reasoning powers. Palamas goes
even further: he accepts knowledge that comes through ‘direct revelation’, namely
through direct communion with God. Only the latter is true ‘theology’.49
In particular, St Gregory acknowledges that there is indeed knowledge about
God and the doctrines concerning Him: this contemplation is called theologia.50
Moreover, ‘the natural use and movement of the powers of the soul and the members
of the body is to effect reformation of the rational image’.51 Here Palamas refers to
the image of God in man which is reformed when man uses his soul and body in a
Godly manner. It is worth noting that Palamas mentions not only the soul, but also
the body, showing thus the great unity between the two, and, moreover, his great
respect and honour for the human body.

46 See, very indicatively, 1 Cor 2:13; a passage that Palamas refers to in Tr. 1,3,24. But this is a huge subject
(namely St Paul’s stance towards human wisdom), that requires an in-depth study and analysis, which
surely goes beyond the scope of this book.
47 Tr. 1,3,13.10–14, 423 (137.9–13): Φασὶ γὰρ μηδένα δυνατὸν εἶναι τελειότητός τε καὶ ἁγιότητος μετέχειν
τὴν ἀληθῆ περὶ τῶν ὄντων οὐχ εὑρηκότα δόξαν, εὑρηκέναι δὲ αὐτὴν ἄνευ διαιρέσεως καὶ συλλογισμοῦ καὶ
ἀναλύσεως ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν. Cf., e.g., Barlaam’s Epistle 1 to Palamas, ed. Schirò, 229–66.
48 Tr. 1,3,15.10–12, 425 (141.14–16): Ἀλλ᾿ ἡμεῖς περὶ μὲν τῆς γνώσεως οὐδὲν ἀντειπεῖν πρὸς αὐτοὺς
αἱρούμεθα∙ συνῳδὰ γὰρ λέγουσιν ἡμῖν, εἰ καὶ μὴ συνιᾶσιν ὅ τι λέγουσιν. Cf. the remarks of Christou, ΠΣ
1, 425 n. 3 and Meyendorff (1973²), 140 n. 6.
49 Christou, ΠΣ 1, 425 n. 3.
50 Tr. 1,3,15.12–14, 425 (141.16–18): Ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἡ περὶ Θεοῦ καὶ τῶν κατ’ αὐτὸν δογμάτων γνῶσις, θεωρία,
ὃ θεολογίαν ὀνομάζομεν.
51 Tr. 1,3,15.14–16, 425 (141.18–20): …καὶ ἡ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεων καὶ τῶν τοῦ σώματος μελῶν κατὰ
φύσιν χρῆσίς τε καὶ κίνησις ἀναμόρφωσιν ποιεῖται τῆς λογικῆς εἰκόνος.
138 cha p te r 5

However, Palamas hastens to add that ‘this is not the perfect majesty of the nobility
that comes from above, and the union beyond nature of light transcending light’.52
By so doing Palamas wants to distinguish theologia from theosis, namely theoretical
knowledge of God from vision of the divine light. Only through the latter may the
following two situations be attained: a) ‘safe theologizing’, and b) ‘the establishment
and movement, according to nature, of our powers of the soul and the body’.53 Here
Palamas seems to refer to the transformation of human nature and its return to its state
before the fall (‘according to nature’: τὸ κατὰ φύσιν). This is attained through vision of
the divine light. The antihesychasts, by having rejected it, ‘have also destroyed every
virtue and truth’.54 This element points us back to Palamas’ idea that man attains the
true image of God in theosis.55
For Palamas, divine illumination is superior to knowledge. As he writes elsewhere,
‘there is indeed an intellectual illumination (φωτισμὸς νοερός), visible to those whose
hearts have been purified, and utterly different from knowledge, though productive
(παρεκτικὸς) of it’.56 But what exactly, we may ask, is this ‘intellectual illumination’?
And why is it ‘productive’ of knowledge?
Palamas argues that illuminations occurred both in the Old and the New
Testament. However, he draws a major distinction between a) the light that shone
at the beginning of the creation, and the glory that Moses received on Mount Sinai;
and, on the other hand, b) the illumination that happens in the New Testament,
in the hearts of the faithful. He argues that if the former [i.e. (a)] was a ‘limited
knowledge’ (γνῶσις ἦν μετρία), then the illumination that appears in our hearts is a
superior illumination. The first light was accessible to the sensible eyes, thus it can
be called ‘sensible’. However, the second light can be called ‘intelligible’ (νοητήν),
‘for only the intelligible eyes have access to it, and because it is active within us’.57
But the glory that shone upon Moses’ face was not simply a sensible light. To
prove this Palamas brings an argument of St Macarios, that the saints have even
now in their souls a light, which is the glory of the light that Moses had in his face.58
Based on two relavant arguments, of St Maximos and St Neilοs, Palamas concludes
that ‘when the intellect has put aside the passions, then it sees itself as a light during
prayer, and is illumined by divine light’.59

52 Tr. 1,3,15.16–18, 425 (141.20–22): ἀλλ’ οὐ τοῦτό ἐστιν ἡ τελεία τῆς ἄνωθεν ἡμῖν εὐγενείας εὐπρέπεια καὶ ἡ
πρὸς τὸ ὑπερφαὲς φῶς ὑπερφυὴς ἕνωσις…
53 Tr. 1,3,15.18–20, 425 (141.22–25): …παρ’ ἧς μόνης ἐγγίνεται καὶ τὸ θεολογεῖν ἀσφαλῶς καὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν
ἑστάναι τε καὶ κινεῖσθαι τὰς ἐν ἡμῖν δυνάμεις τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος.
54 Tr. 1,3,15.20–21, 425 (141.25–26): ταύτην οὖν ἀναιροῦντες συνανεῖλον πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν καὶ ἀλήθειαν.
55 See, e.g., ch. 3.2 of this book.
56 Tr. 1,3,5.6–8, 415 (117.32–119.2), trans. Gendle, 34: …ἔστι φωτισμὸς νοερὸς τοῖς κεκαθαρμένοις τὴν
καρδίαν ἐνορώμενος, ἄλλος παντάπασι παρὰ τὴν γνῶσιν, ὃς καὶ παρεκτικός ἐστιν αὐτῆς…
57 Tr. 1,3,6.2–10, 416 (121.4–13): …Ἐκείνην μὲν οὖν αἰσθητοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ὑποκειμένην αἰσθητὴν ἀνάγκη
λέγειν, καθάπερ ταύτην νοητήν, νοητοῖς ὑποκειμένην ὄμμασι καὶ ἐντὸς ἡμῶν ἐνεργουμένην.
58 Tr. 1,3,7.11–14, 416 (121.14–17). Cf. Macarios, Homily 5, 11.438–42, ed. Dörries, PTS 4, 62.
59 Tr. 1,3,7.8–10, 417 (123.12–14): Συνήκας, ἀδελφέ, σαφῶς ὅτι νοῦς παθῶν ἀπαλλαγεὶς ὡς φῶς αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν
κατὰ τὴν προσευχὴν ὁρᾷ καὶ θείῳ περιλάμπεται φωτί;
 co n t e x t ual i s i n g t h e palami t e spi ri t ual se nse s 1 39

Moreover, St Gregory argues that the divine light could be called ‘hypostatic’
(ὑποστατικόν). Again he draws on Macarios: ‘the perfect illumination of the Spirit is
not only as it were revelation of thoughts, but is a sure and permanent illumination
of hypostatic light in [their] souls’.60 And Palamas also presents the hagiographical
passages that Macarios uses to support his thought: a) ‘For it is the God who said,
“Let light shine out of darkness”, who has shone in our hearts…’ (2 Cor 4:6); b) ‘…
Give light to my eyes, lest I sleep unto death’ (Ps 12 [13]:4 [3]); c) ‘O send out your
light and your truth; these led me, and they brought me to your holy mountain and
to your coverts’ (Ps 42 [43]:3); and d) ‘…The light of your face was made a sign
upon us, O Lord!’ (Ps 4:6).61
Based on this evidence Palamas contends that Macarios, by calling this light
ὑποστατικόν, showed clearly that knowledge is not the only illumination, because this
light also has ‘hypostasis’. Palamas probably wants to maintain that this light has ‘a
superior hypostasis’ than that of knowledge. Thus, this becomes for him an argument
against the antihesychasts. In Palamas’ own characteristic words, Macarios called
the divine light ὑποστατικόν so as to ‘stop up the mouth of them who consider only
knowledge to be an illumination, and thus divert the understanding of many people,
and first and foremost their own, by interpreting falsely as knowledge everything
that one could say about this light’.62 Furthermore, Palamas uses an argument that
he had used previously, namely that even knowledge could be called ‘light’, because
the former is produced from the latter.63
Nevertheless, no one has called knowledge that is approached by the senses ‘light’,
‘even if sometimes it constitutes a very safe (and sure) knowledge’: only knowledge
which is approached by the intellect and is rational (λογικήν) may be called ‘light’.64
Moreover, every creature that has ‘rational power’ is ‘intellectual light’.65 For instance,
this is true of the angels,66 and of the human intellect. Besides, the latter, ‘seeing itself,
it sees as a light’. Thus it sees an ‘intellectual light’.67

60 Tr. 1,3,7.13–16, 417 (123.18–21): ἡ τελεία τοῦ πνεύματος ἔλλαμψις οὐχ οἷον νοημάτων μόνον ἀποκάλυψίς
ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ ὑποστατικοῦ φωτὸς ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς βεβαία καὶ διηνεκὴς ἔλλαμψις. For the exact passage of
Macarios, see his Homily 58, 2,1.14–16, ed. Berthold, vol. ΙΙ, GCS 56, 183.
61 Tr. 1,3,7.16–22, 417 (123.21–27): …τὸ γάρ, ‘ὁ εἰπὼν ἐκ σκότους φῶς λάμψαι ὃς ἔλαμψεν ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις
ἡμῶν’, καὶ τὸ ‘φώτισον τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς μου μήποτε ὑπνώσω εἰς θάνατον’, καὶ τὸ, ‘ἐξαπόστειλον τὸ φῶς
σου καὶ τὴν ἀλήθειάν σου, αὐτά με ὁδηγήσουσιν εἰς ὄρος ἅγιόν σου, καὶ τό, ἐσημειώθη ἐφ᾿ ἡμᾶς τὸ φῶς
τοῦ προσώπου σου’…
62 Tr. 1,3,7.22–26, 417 (123.28–32): Ὑποστατικὸν δὲ εἶπεν, ἵν᾿ ἐμφράξῃ τὰ στόματα τῶν τὴν γνῶσιν μόνον
οἰομένων φωτισμὸν καὶ περιτρεπόντων τὴν τῶν πολλῶν διάνοιαν, καὶ πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων τὴν οἰκείαν, τῷ
μεταλαμβάνειν εἰς τὴν γνῶσιν παρεξηγουμένους πᾶν ὅτιπερ ἂν εἴποι τις περὶ ἐκείνου τοῦ φωτός.
63 Tr. 1,3,7.26–28, 417 (123.32–125.2). Cf. Tr. 1,3,3 and 5.
64 Tr. 1,3,8.1–3, 418 (125.3–6): …οὐδὲ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων προσγινομένην εἴδησιν, καίτοι γνῶσιν οὖσαν
ἔστιν ὅπου καὶ ἀσφαλεστάτην, φῶς πώποτέ τις προσηγόρευσεν, ἀλλὰ μόνην τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ λογικήν.
65 Tr. 1,3,8.4, 418 (125.6–7): Οὐδὲν γὰρ ὁρῶμεν λόγου δύναμιν ἔχον, ὃ μὴ νοερόν ἐστι φῶς.
66 Tr. 1,3,8.5–6, 418 (125.7–8).
67 Tr. 1,3,8.6–7, 418 (125.8–10): Ὅ τε νοῦς αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ὁρῶν, ὡς φῶς ὁρᾷ∙ τί τοίνυν καὶ οὗτος, εἰ μὴ νοερὸν
ἑαυτὸν βλέπει φῶς;
140 cha p te r 5

Furthermore, God, ‘who is beyond every intellectual light and super-substantially

transcends every essence’, ‘possesses in himself a mysterious and invisible character,
for there is no matter (ὕλη) capable of receiving the divine manifestation’.68 However,
based on the witnesses ‘of the saints who have seen and experienced the splendour of
God’, Palamas argues that also God may be seen as ‘intellectual light’ (ὡς φῶς ὁρᾶται
νοερόν), when He finds suitable and uncovered ‘matter’ (ἐπιτηδείας ὕλης): ‘this is
every intellectual and purified essence, which does not bring the cover of evil’.69 In
other words, the saints—and the angels—, who have purified themselves from sin,
may see God, and they see Him as intellectual light.
Here St Gregory refers to three New Testament passages:70 a) Mt 5:8: ‘Blessed
are the pure in heart, for they shall see God’; b) 1 Jn 1:5: ‘God is light’; and c) Jn
14:21,23: 21 ‘Whoever has my commandments and keeps them, he it is who loves me.
And he who loves me will be loved by my Father, and I will love him and manifest
myself to him; 23 Jesus answered him, “If a man loves me, he will keep my word, and
my Father will love him, and we will come to him and make our home with him”’.
In addition, Palamas maintains that God reveals himself to the purified intellect
‘as in a mirror’ (ἐν ἐσόπτρῳ), but ‘being in Himself invisible’. Besides, this always
happens when an image is seen through a mirror. In this case a paradox appears:
‘the image, although seen, remains invisible, and it is almost impossible to see (an
image) through a mirror and, at the same time, to see the object that forms this
image in the mirror’.71 For instance, if one sees a tree through a mirror, it is not
possible to be also looking at the tree simultaneously. The same happens in the case
of God. Man is seeing God ἐν ἐσόπτρῳ, but in fact not seeing God Himself. Palamas
implies here his favourite distinction between essence and activities in God: man
sees, and participates in, God’s activities, but not His essence.
This happens in this life to those who have purified themselves through love.
But in the age to come, God will be seen ‘face to face’. At this point Palamas draws
on St Paul’s words in 1 Cor 13:12: ‘For now we see in a mirror dimly, but then face
to face. Now I know in part; then I shall understand fully, even as I have been fully
understood’.72
St Gregory believes that ‘Those who have never experienced nor seen the
divine in no way believe that God is seen as light beyond light (ὡς φῶς ὑπὲρ φῶς)
but [believe that it] is beheld only rationally (λογικῶς μόνον θεωρεῖσθαι): these are

68 Tr. 1,3,8.7–12, 418 (125.10–15): Καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ παντὸς νοεροῦ φωτὸς ἐπέκεινα Θεὸς καὶ πάσης οὐσίας
ὑπερουσίως ἐκβεβηκώς… ἔχει μέν… τὸ κρύφιον καὶ ἀθεώρητον καθ’ ἑαυτόν, μὴ προκειμένης ὕλης τῆς
χωρούσης τὴν θείαν ἐμφάνειαν.
69 Tr. 1,3,8.12–17, 418 (125.15–21): ἡνίκα δ’ ἂν ἐπιτηδείας ὕλης ἀπερικαλύπτως ἐχούσης ἐπιλάβηται, τοιαύτη
δέ ἐστι πᾶσα νοερὰ κεκαθαρμένη φύσις, τὸ τῆς κακίας οὐκ ἐπιφερομένη κάλυμμα, τηνικαῦτα καὶ αὐτὸς
ὡς φῶς ὁρᾶται νοερόν, ὡς δι’ αὐτῶν τῶν καὶ παθόντων καὶ ἰδόντων λαμπρότητα Θεοῦ ἐδείξαμέν τε καὶ
δείξομεν ἁγίων.
70 Tr. 1,3,9.6–10, 419 (127.20–25).
71 Tr. 1,3,9.10–14, 419 (127.25–29): ἐμφανίζει δὲ ὡς ἐν ἐσόπτρῳ τῷ κεκαθαρμένῳ νῷ, τὸ καθ’ ἑαυτὸν ἀόρατος
ὑπάρχων∙ τοιοῦτον γὰρ ἡ ἐν ἐσόπτρῳ μορφή∙ φαινομένη οὐχ ὁρᾶται καὶ σχεδὸν ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν ὁρᾶν τε ἐν
ἐσόπτρῳ καὶ αὐτὸ κατὰ ταὐτὸ τὸ μορφοῦν τὸ ἔσοπτρον ὁρᾶν.
72 Tr. 1,3,10.15–16, 419 (129.1–2).
 co n t e x t ual i s i n g t h e palami t e spi ri t ual se nse s 141

like the blind who experience only the warmth of the sun, but do not believe those
who see and say that the sun is also radiant’.73 Obviously, St Gregory refers here to
the opponents of Hesychasm who argued that man is able to reach God through
knowledge, and denied the vision of the divine light. Moreover, ‘if the blind try to
teach those who are able to see (τοὺς ὁρῶντας) that the sun, the most luminous of
all sensible things, is not [in fact] light, then they will cause those who see by means
of their physical eyes to laugh’. Something similar happens to those who reject the
vision of the divine light: they will be lamented ‘not only by those who really see
intellectually (τῶν νοερῶς ὡς ἀληθῶς ὁρώντων), but also from those who believe
(and are trustful) in them (who see)’.74
In addition, those who deny the vision of the light will face two major consequences:
First, they do not accept and respond to God’s love (eros). In particular, God, ‘who
transcends all things, and is incomprehensible and ineffable’, ‘from an excess of
goodness towards us, humans (δι’ ὑπερβολὴν τῆς περὶ ἡμᾶς ἀγαθότητος)’, consents
to be participable by the intellect and ‘invisibly seen through His super-essential
and inseparable (ἀνεκφοίτητον) power’, therefore showing a clear and self-evident
(αὐτονόητον) love. But the opponents of Hesychasm do not respond to this love,
thus remaining ‘unable to love’ (ἀνέραστοι);75 2) Second, the antihesychasts do not
want to follow the teaching of the saints, and they also carry away with them those
people who are obedient to the saints, so they have companions with them when
‘they will see as fire, Him that they have not known as light’,76 nor believed in.77 This
statement, strict indeed—which though shows how dangerous, from a theological
and spiritual point of view, Palamas regards the denial of the direct vision of the

73 Tr. 1,3,10.16–20, 419 (129.2–7): Οἱ δὲ τῷ μὴ παθεῖν τὰ θεῖα, μηδ᾿ ἰδεῖν μηδαμῶς πιστεύοντες ὡς φῶς ὑπὲρ
φῶς ὁρᾶσθαι τὸν Θεόν, ἀλλὰ λογικῶς μόνον θεωρεῖσθαι, τυφλοῖς ἐοίκασιν, οἳ τῆς τοῦ ἡλίου θέρμης μόνης
ἀντιλαμβανόμενοι τοῖς ὁρῶσιν ἀπιστοῦσιν ὅτι καὶ φαιδρός ἐστιν ὁ ἥλιος.
74 Tr. 1,3,10.23–27, 419 (129.7–13). Εἰ δὲ καὶ τοὺς ὁρῶντας οἱ τυφλοὶ μεταδιδάσκειν ἐγχειροῦσιν, ὡς οὐ
φῶς ἐστιν ὁ ἐν αἰσθητοῖς φανότατος ἁπάντων ἥλιος, καταγέλαστοι μὲν οὗτοι τοῖς αἰσθητῶς ὁρῶσιν
ἔσονται. Ἐκεῖνοι δ᾿ οἱ τὰ παραπλήσια πάσχοντες περὶ τὸν τοῦ παντὸς ὑπερανιδρυμένον ‘τῆς δικαιοσύνης
ἥλιον’, οὐ παρὰ τῶν νοερῶς ὡς ἀληθῶς ὁρώντων μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τῶν πιστευόντων τοῖς ὁρῶσι
θρηνηθήσονται…
75 Tr. 1,3,10, 419.27–420.2 (129.13–19): …μὴ μόνον ὅτι τοῦ Θεοῦ δι’ ὑπερβολὴν τῆς περὶ ἡμᾶς ἀγαθότητος,
ἐκ τοῦ πάντων ἐξῃρημένου καὶ ἀλήπτου καὶ ἀφθέγκτου, πρὸς τῷ νῷ μεθεκτόν τε καὶ θεωρητὸν ἀοράτως
συγκαταβαίνοντος καθ’ ὑπερούσιον ἑαυτοῦ δύναμιν ἀνεκφοίτητον, αὐτοὶ μένουσιν ἀνέραστοι πρὸς τὸν
αὐτοπτικὸν καὶ αὐτονόητον ἐκεῖνον ἔρωτα… It should be noted, that, as Meyendorff (1973²), 128
n. 3 and Christou, ΠΣ 1, 419 n. 6 observe, the notion of συγκατάβασις as resulting to the mystical
knowledge is also found in St John Chrysostom, Ad Theodorum lapsum, I, 11, PG 47, 292. Ιt seems
very possible that Palamas had this passage in mind; cf. its end, which resembles Palamas’ teaching,
as presented earlier: κατοπτεύειν ἐξῇ τὸν βασιλέα αὐτόν, μηκέτι ἐν αἰνίγματι, μηδὲ δι’ ἐσόπτρου, ἀλλὰ
πρόσωπον πρὸς πρόσωπον, μηκέτι διὰ πίστεως, ἀλλὰ διὰ εἴδους (italics added).
76 Here Palamas draws on St Gregory the Theologian, Oration 21, 2, PG 35, 1084D.
77 Tr. 1,3,10.2–7, 420 (129.19–24): …ἀλλ᾿ ὅτι καὶ τοῖς πρὸς τὸ φῶς ἐκεῖνο χειραγωγοῦσι διὰ τῶν λόγων
ὑπὸ φιλανθρωπίας ἁγίοις οὐκ ἐθέλοντες ἕπεσθαι, κατὰ κρημνῶν φέρουσιν ἑαυτοὺς καὶ συγκατασπᾶν
ἐπιχειροῦσι τοὺς πειθομένους, ὡς ἂν δήπου κοινωνοὺς σχοῖεν ὅταν ‘ὡς πῦρ ἴδωσι’ κατὰ τὸν θεολόγον
Γρηγόριον ‘ὃν ὡς φῶς οὐκ ἐγνώρισαν’, οὐδὲ ἐπίστευσαν.
142 cha p te r 5

divine light—permits us to make some further comments about the divine light. In
particular to answer whether it is sensible,78 and whether it is identical to knowledge.

c. Is the Divine Light Sensible? Is it Identical to Knowledge?

To respond to the aforementioned questions, initially Palamas refers to the ‘fire’

that the sinners will suffer in the eschaton, and contends that ‘this fire [i.e. light]
is dark, or better identical to the threatened darkness’ (μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ ἠπειλημένῳ
σκότει ταὐτόν). He then brings to mind the words of the Lord who speaks of ‘the
eternal fire prepared for the devil and his angels’.79 Therefore, this light cannot be
sensible, for it has been prepared for the evil angels, who lack sensation (ἀμοιροῦσι
γὰρ αἰσθήσεως προητοίμασται τοῖς πονηροῖς ἀγγέλοις). Moreover, this darkness is not
simply ‘ignorance’ (οὔθ’ ἁπλῶς ἄγνοια τουτὶ τὸ σκότος). Here the words of St Paul are
invoked (Phil 2:11): ‘and every tongue confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory
of God the Father’.80 Palamas wants to stress here the fact that even the persons who
will ‘see the light as fire’ in the age to come they will have a clear knowledge regarding
the divinity of Christ. Thus, this darkness is not ἄγνοια, and, consequently, the light,
which is the opposite of the darkness, is not simply knowledge.81
St Gregory adds here some noteworthy thoughts. This light is not knowledge,
but is productive of the ‘ineffable and hidden knowledge of the mysteries of God’. It
is ‘the pledge (ἀρραβών) which is now seen by the purified in heart’.82 Therefore, it
is not simply knowledge, but ‘giver of the corresponding knowledge’. This ἀρραβών
is ‘light intelligible and intellectual, or better spiritual’. It is ‘spiritually made present
and seen’, and transcends all knowledge and virtue. Furthermore, this light is the
only giver of the perfection to Christians. Perfection does not arise from ‘imitation
or activity of the reason, but is the effect of revelation and of the grace of the Spirit’.83

78 Palamas offers a lot of arguments, patristic and biblical, to support his view that the divine light is not
sensible. But it falls out of the scope of this book to fully examine and analyse all these arguments.
Only the most important and characteristic of them will be approached in this Part.
79 Mt 25:41: ‘Then he will say to those at his left hand, “Depart from me, you cursed, into the eternal fire
prepared for the devil and his angels”’.
80 Palamas instead of ‘tongue’ (γλῶσσα) writes ‘flesh’ (σάρξ).
81 Tr. 1,3,10.7–18, 420 (129.24–131.4).
82 Tr. 1,3,10.18–21, 420 (131.4–8): …παρεκτικὸν δὲ μᾶλλον τῆς μυστικῆς καὶ ἀπορρήτου γνώσεως τῶν
μυστηρίων τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ ὁ ἀρραβὼν νῦν τοῖς κεκαθαρμένοις τὴν καρδίαν ἐνορώμενος. The idea of the
ἀρραβὼν τοῦ Πνεύματος, which is time and again mentioned by Palamas, is drawn from St Paul’s 2
Cor 1:22 and 5:5; and Eph 1:14. It is also often found in many patristic writings. For some of them, see
Christou, ΠΣ 1, 420 n. 4. Moreover, it is widely used in the Church offices. See, e.g., the penultimate
prayer in the Office Before Holy Communion: ‘Master, lover of humankind, Lord Jesus Christ, my God,
do not let these holy Mysteries be for my condemnation because I am unworthy, but rather for the
cleansing and sanctification of both soul and body and as a pledge of the life and kingdom to come…’
(emphasis added); trans. Lash (2011), 61–62.
83 Tr. 1,3,10.21–27, 420 (131.8–14): …οὐ γνῶσίς ἐστιν ἁπλῶς, ἀλλ’ ἀναλόγου μὲν γνώσεως χορηγός, αὐτὸς δὲ
φῶς νοητὸν καὶ νοερόν, μᾶλλον δὲ πνευματικόν, πνευματικῶς ἐγγινόμενός τε καὶ ὁρώμενος, ὑπεροχικῶς
ἐξῃρημένος πάσης γνώσεως καὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς ἐνταῦθα κατὰ χριστιανοὺς τελειότητος παρεκτικὸς
μονώτατος, οὐκ ἀπὸ μιμήσεως ἢ φρονήσεως προσγινομένης, ἀλλ’ ἀποκαλύψει καὶ χάριτι τοῦ Πνεύματος.
 co n t e x t ual i s i n g t h e palami t e spi ri t ual se nse s 143

This last argument is indeed crucial: Palamas’ theology is neither pietistic, based only
on the pursuit of human virtues and the establishing of a specific moral character,
nor humanist, based only on man’s own reason and effort. It is ‘synergetic’, based
on man’s good disposition and spiritual struggle in cooperation with God’s grace.

5. Concluding Remarks

In the beginning of this chapter, the historical and theological context of the Palamite
spiritual senses was delineated. Special attention was given to the contrast between
human knowledge and divine light. It was shown that the latter encompasses the
former and goes much further beyond it. However, as will be demonstrated in
the following chapter, the core of Palamas’ theology of the spiritual senses lies
elsewhere: in his favourite phrase αἴσθησις νοερὰ καὶ θεία (‘intellectual and divine
perception’). It is this phrase that comes up time and again when he wishes to stress
the potentiality of man to grasp the divine. Hence, it is to this topic that our attention
will now turn. The main research questions which will be pursued are the following:
what is the background of this phrase? Does it have patristic precedent, or is it of
Palamas’ coinage? Why does he use both the terms νοερά (intellectual) and αἴσθησις
(perception)? Aren’t they, somehow, contradictory? What are the eyes of the soul,
and how do they operate? And, finally, which are the presuppositions for seeing the
light? Let us now, therefore, examine these topics.
 Chapter 6

Αἴσθησις νοερά (Intellectual Perception)*

1. Inner or Intellectual Illumination

a. Introduction

Hitherto, it was clearly exhibited that divine illumination is superior to human

knowledge. As Palamas argues, ‘the illumination (φωτισμός) of God, born in us, does
[not] provide only knowledge or virtue’. It is something beyond these, for it is ‘light
intellectual, truly divine, different from knowledge and virtue’.1 And he adds: ‘This
light, which enlightens towards truth (τὸ δὲ φωτιστικὸν πρὸς ἀλήθειαν τοῦτο φῶς)
both the angels and those humans who have become equal to the angels (ἰσαγγέλων
ἀνθρώπων), is God Himself ’. Moreover, God ‘is truly a secret (ἀπόρρητον) light, and
is seen as light (καὶ ὡς φῶς ὁρᾶται), and renders those pure in heart light; therefore
He is called light’.2
But Palamas wonders what exactly we should call this power of man to be united
with God. In his words, ‘What then shall we call this power which is an activity
neither of the senses (μήτ’ αἴσθησις) nor of the intellect (μήθ’ ὅλως νόησις)?’ The
best answer he finds is what Solomon had many centuries before him provided, in
the Old Testament: ‘a perception [or: sensation] intellectual and divine’ (αἴσθησιν
δηλονότι νοερὰν καὶ θείαν).3 By using these two adjectives, Palamas continues, one
understands that this power is neither perception (αἴσθησις), nor intellection (νόησις),
‘for neither is the activity of the intelligence a sensation, nor that of the senses an
intellection’. Therefore, the νοερὰ αἴσθησις is something different.4
Or, perhaps, one could call this power ‘union’, but not ‘knowledge’ (ἕνωσιν ἀλλ’ οὐχὶ
γνῶσιν). To support his position, Palamas presents an argument of St Dionysiοs: ‘One
should realize… that our intellect possesses both an intellectual power (δύναμιν εἰς τὸ
νοεῖν) which permits it to see intelligible things (τὰ νοητά), and also the union (or: a
capacity for that union; τὴν δὲ ἕνωσιν), that transcends the nature of the intellect, by

* Elements from this chapter were presented at the Eighteenth International Conference on Patristic
Studies, Oxford, August 2019.
1 Tr. 1,3,40.9–13, 451 (197.16–20): …ἔστιν ἄρα καὶ φῶς νοερὸν ἀληθὲς θεϊκὸν παρὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν
γνῶσιν ἕτερον.
2 Tr. 1,3,40.14–18, 451 (197.22–26).
3 Tr. 1,3,20.21–24, 430 (153.4–7), trans. Gendle, 37 (modified).
4 Tr. 1,3,20.24–27, 430 (153.7–11), trans. Gendle, 37: Τῇ γὰρ ἀμφοτέρων συζυγίᾳ πείθει τὸν ἀκούοντα
μηδέτερον νομίσαι ταύτην, μήτ’ αἴσθησιν, μήτε νόησιν∙ οὔτε γὰρ ἡ νόησις αἴσθησίς ποτε, οὔθ’ ἡ αἴσθησις
νόησις∙ οὐκοῦν ἡ νοερὰ αἴσθησις ἄλλο παρ’ ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν.
146 cha p te r 6

which it is attached to the things that transcend it [viz. the intellect] (or: that are beyond
it; τὰ ἐπέκεινα ἑαυτοῦ)’.5 Through this passage St Gregory wants to stress two facts. First,
there are two faculties in the human intellect: the power of intellection (which is related
to dianoia, intelligence), and the power for ‘super-intellectual union’ (ἕνωσις).6 Second,
union with God—and, by extension, the νοερὰ αἴσθησις—is something that transcends
human knowledge and intelligence. As Sinkewicz explains, ‘The human intellect has
a capacity to think, through which it looks on conceptual things, and a unity which
transcends the nature of the intellect, through which it is joined to things beyond itself’.7
But a question arises here: what is the background of the ‘intellectual perception’?
Is it to be found in the previous tradition, or is it of Palamas’ coinage?

b. The Background

Let us now examine the term αἴσθησις νοερά in a deeper way. This tradition goes
back at least to Origen of Alexandria. Origen indeed discusses often the subject of
the spiritual senses in his oeuvre.8 Among others, he uses the phrase ‘αἴσθησιν θείαν
εὑρήσεις’, which he ascribes to Solomon, the author of the book of Proverbs.9 It
should be noted that when Palamas introduces the term αἴσθησις νοερὰ καὶ θεία, he
also ascribes it to Solomon.10 Hence Palamas most likely had in mind the aforemen-
tioned passage of Origen. The latter used this expression (‘αἴσθησιν θείαν εὑρήσεις’)
perhaps through a combination of Prov 2:5 (ἐπίγνωσιν Θεοῦ εὑρήσεις), and Prov 5:2
(αἴσθησιν ἐμῶν χειλέων).11 Moreover, Origen states that there is an analogy between
the physical and spiritual senses.12 This analogy was accepted by later Fathers, such
as St Gregory of Nyssa, St Diadochos of Photiki, St John of the Ladder13 etc.14 For
instance, St Gregory of Nyssa uses the aforementioned passage of Prov 5:2, in the

5 Tr. 1,3,20, 430.27–431.5 (153.11–16), trans. Gendle, 37 (modified): ‘Δέον… εἰδέναι τὸν καθ’ ἡμᾶς νοῦν, τὴν
μὲν ἔχειν δύναμιν εἰς τὸ νοεῖν, δι’ ἧς τὰ νοητὰ βλέπει, τὴν δὲ ἕνωσιν ὑπεραίρουσαν τὴν τοῦ νοῦ φύσιν, δι’
ἧς συνάπτεται πρὸς τὰ ἐπέκεινα ἑαυτοῦ’. Cf. Dionysiοs, On the Divine Names, VII.1, ed. Suchla, 194.10–12
(PG 3, 865C).
6 Sinkewicz (1999), 380.
7 Sinkewicz (1999), 380 (slightly modified; Sinkewicz writes ‘mind’ instead of ‘intellect’). This point
probably reminds us of the neo-Platonist Proclos (I owe this remark to Fr Andrew Louth). For
an interesting approach of the intellectual perception as Dionysian unity, see pp. 380–82 of the
aforementioned article of Sinkewicz.
8 The relevant bibliography regarding the spiritual senses according to Origen was mentioned in ch. 5.1.
The most recent approach seems to be that of McInroy (2012a).
9 See Origen, Contra Celsum, I.48 (PG 11, 749AB); VII.34 (PG 11, 1469B). The phrase sensum divinum is
also found in Origen’s De principiis, I.1.9 (PG 11, 129C); IV.37 (PG 11, 414A).
10 Tr. 1,3,20.21–24, 430 (153.4–7): …ὡς ὁ ὑπὲρ πάντας τοὺς πρὸ αὐτοῦ σεσοφισμένος Σολομών.
11 Christou, ΠΣ 1, 430 n. 2.
12 See, e.g., Contra Celsum, I.48 (PG 11, 749AD).
13 St John the Sinaite uses the phrase αἴσθησις νοερά. See, e.g, his Ladder 26, PG 88, 1020A: Νοῦς νοερὸς
πάντως καὶ νοερὰν αἴσθησιν περιβέβληται, ἣν ἐν ἡμῖν καὶ οὐκ ἐν ἡμῖν οὖσαν ἐκζητοῦντες μὴ παυσώμεθα.
Palamas mentions this passage in Tr. 1,2,4.9–11, 397 (83.8–10). Let us note that Migne, in his edition,
writes ἵν᾿, whereas Christou and Meyendorff ἣν. It seems that their choice is the correct one.
14 Christou, ΠΣ 1, 430 n. 2.
 Α ἴσθησις νο ερὰ ( I nt e llect ual Pe rce pt i o n) 147

context of a discussion of the spiritual senses, in a classical passage of his first homily
on the Song of Songs.15

c. Why the Term ‘νοερά’ (Intellectual)?

In Tr. 1,3,33 Palamas explains why the perception of the ‘ineffable divine goods’ is called
intellectual (νοερά). He presents four important reasons. In the first place, it is beyond
natural sense-perception (αἴσθησις), namely, it transcends natural senses.16 Second, the
intellect is the faculty which first receives the divine goods.17 Therefore, it is correct to
argue that ‘Palamas defines the intellect as the primary locus of the faculty of spiritual
perception’,18 or that ‘the intellect is the primary locus for the activity of grace’.19
Third, our intellect is elevated towards the First Intellect (i.e. God) and, according
to its own measure (or: capacity/progress) has communion with God. Palamas adds
here a crucial qualification: due to the elevation of our intellect, the body—since
it is united with it—is also transformed into a more divine state (πρὸς τὸ θειότερον
μετασκευάζεται). Here St Gregory speaks about the transformation of the human
person, and he adds that the transformation of the body is effected through the
intellect: δι’ αὐτοῦ. Moreover, Palamas continues by saying that this transformation
is a prologue, and a symbol, of ‘the absorption (κατάποσιν)20 of the body by the
Spirit’ in the age to come.21 This ‘absorption of the body’ is indeed a very central
notion in Palamas’ mind.22 It has an eschatological hue, which, however, sheds light
also to contemporary Christian life. And, fourth, a last reason: ‘it is not the eyes
of the body, but the eyes of the soul, that receive the Spirit’s power of seeing these
things’.23 For all these reasons, ‘we call this power intellectual (νοεράν), even though

15 Gregory of Nyssa, In Cantica Canticorum Homilia I, PG 44, 780C. Cf. Meyendorff (1973²), 152 n. 1. For
the teaching of St Gregory of Nyssa on the spiritual senses, see Coakley (2012).
16 Tr. 1,3,33.20–21, 444 (183.14–15): διά τε τὸ ὑπὲρ αἴσθησιν εἶναι ταῦτα φυσικήν.
17 Tr. 1,3,33.21–22, 444 (183.15–16): διὰ τὸ πρώτως τὸν νοῦν εἶναι τούτων δεκτικόν.
18 Sinkewicz (1999), 378 (slightly modified for reasons of consistency; Sinkewicz writes ‘mind’ instead of
‘intellect’).
19 Sinkewicz (1999), 386 (again with a slight modification, since Sinkewicz prefers ‘mind’ instead of
‘intellect’).
20 This language is probably influenced by 1 Cor 15:54 (ὅταν δὲ τὸ φθαρτὸν τοῦτο ἐνδύσηται ἀφθαρσίαν
καὶ τὸ θνητὸν τοῦτο ἐνδύσηται ἀθανασίαν, τότε γενήσεται ὁ λόγος ὁ γεγραμμένος· κατεπόθη ὁ θάνατος
εἰς νῖκος). For this remark I am grateful to Fr Maximos Constas.
21 Tr. 1,3,33.22–26, 444 (183.16–21): …καὶ διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν πρῶτον νοῦν ἀνάτασιν τοῦ ἡμετέρου νοῦ
οὗ κατὰ τὸ ἐγχωροῦν μεταλαγχάνων θείως, αὐτός τε καὶ δι’ αὐτοῦ τὸ συνημμένον σῶμα πρὸς τὸ θειότερον
μετασκευάζεται, δεικνὺς ἐντεῦθεν καὶ προοιμιαζόμενος τὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ πνεύματος ἐπὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος αἰῶνος
τῆς σαρκὸς κατάποσιν.
22 The transformation of the body has a long history in Christian thought. See, e.g., Phil 3:20–21: 20 But
our citizenship is in heaven, and it is from there that we are expecting a Savior, the Lord Jesus
Christ. 21 He will transform the body of our humiliation [Or: our humble bodies] that it may be
conformed to the body of his glory, by the power that also enables him to make all things subject to
himself (emphases added). Regarding the transformation of the body, see ch. 7.2 of this book.
23 Tr. 1,3,33.26–28, 444 (183.21–23): Οὐ γὰρ οἱ ὀφθαλμοὶ τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλ’ οἱ τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν ὁρῶσαν ταῦτα
δύναμιν τοῦ Πνεύματος λαμβάνουσι. About the ‘eyes of the soul’, see ch. 6.2.a of this book.
1 48 cha p te r 6

it is supra-intellectual’.24 But now a second question arises: why is this power also
called αἴσθησις (perception)?

d. Why ‘αἴσθησις’ (Perception)?

First of all, St Gregory argues that the giving of God’s mysterious grace is called one
of the following: ‘a) contemplation (θεωρία), which the fathers call “exceptionally
true” (ἐξαιρέτως ἀληθής), b) the activity that the prayer transmits to the heart,
c) the spiritual warmth and pleasure that derives from this activity [i.e. (b)], and
d) the joyful tear that grace gives’.25 Palamas adds that ‘The causes of all these are
mainly apprehended through intellectual perception (νοερᾷ… αἰσθήσει)’.26 And he
hastens to explain why he uses the term αἰσθήσει. He gives two reasons: a) First,
for ‘the manifest nature and clarity of the apprehension, its complete inerrancy and
freedom from images of the object formed in the mind’ [or: ‘because this perception
is manifest and clear, totally void of error and alien to imagination’].27 That is, when
man undergoes intellectual perception, then he knows exactly that he has sensed
something important. As Sinkewicz explains, ‘In spiritual perception there is an
unmediated apprehension of the object. There is a direct contact with reality as in
sense perception’;28 b) Moreover, because ‘the human body itself also participates
in the grace that operates through the intellect’.29
In addition, as Sinkewicz summarizes the above, intellectual perception ‘can be
said to have a sensible aspect in two senses: first of all… [it] has a certain analogy
in natural sense perception; and secondly, there are sensible effects of grace’.30 The
latter is a most crucial point for the Palamite teaching on the spiritual senses: the
body does have a role in spiritual perception.31 St Gregory continues arguing that
the body ‘is reformed according to this grace [which is active in accordance with the
intellect] and receives, itself, a certain sense (συναίσθησιν) of the mystery hidden in
the soul’.32 In addition, if some spectators see with their physical eyes the persons who

24 Tr. 1,3,33.28–29, 444 (183.23–24): διὰ ταῦτα νοερὰν αὐτὴν καλοῦμεν, ὑπὲρ νοερὰν οὖσαν.
25 Tr. 1,3,31.1–4, 442 (177.20–23): Τοιοῦτον γάρ τί ἐστι καὶ ἡ ‘ἐξαιρέτως ἀληθὴς’ ὑπὸ τῶν πατέρων
ὀνομαζομένη θεωρία καὶ ἡ τῆς εὐχῆς ἐγκάρδιος ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ ἐξ αὐτῆς πνευματικὴ θέρμη τε καὶ ἡδονὴ
καὶ τὸ ἐκ τῆς χάριτος θυμήρες δάκρυον. As Christou (ΠΣ 1, 442) notes, one finds the connection
between spiritual warmth, pleasure, and tears, often in the texts of the ascetical writers. E.g.,
cf. Diadochos, Capita 73, ed. des Places, 132.
26 Tr. 1,3,31.4–5, 442 (177.23–24): Τὰ γὰρ τούτων αἴτια νοερᾷ κυρίως καταλαμβάνεται αἰσθήσει.
27 Tr. 1,3,31.5–6, 442 (177.24–179.1) [trans. Sinkewicz (1999), 385]: Λέγω δὲ αἰσθήσει, διὰ τὸ τρανὸν καὶ
ἐναργὲς καὶ ἀπλανὲς πάντῃ καὶ ἀφάνταστον τῆς καταλήψεως…
28 Sinkewicz (1999), 385.
29 Tr. 1,3,31.7–8, 442 (179.1–2): …καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ὅτι καὶ τὸ σῶμα μεταλαμβάνει πως τῆς κατὰ νοῦν
ἐνεργουμένης χάριτος…
30 Sinkewicz (1999), 385.
31 This role is analysed in ch. 7 of the current book. However, it will be there shown (ch. 7.3) that
Sinkewicz’s position on this matter is not without certain problems.
32 Tr. 1,3,31.8–10, 442 (179.3–4): …καὶ μεταρρυθμίζεται πρὸς ταύτην καὶ λαμβάνει τινὰ συναίσθησιν αὐτὸ
τοῦ κατὰ ψυχὴν ἀπορρήτου μυστηρίου…
 Α ἴσθησις νο ερὰ ( I nt e llect ual Pe rce pt i o n) 149

undergo this mystery and possess grace, then the body (of the latter) communicates
to the former ‘a certain perception of what these persons undergo’.33
Palamas, referring to 1 Cor 13:12,34 writes: ‘What then? Shall we not see in the
age to come the invisible face to face, as it is written? Therefore, receiving now the
pledge [or: the first-fruits] and prelude of this (vision), those who are purified in their
hearts see the intellectual form (of God) that is coming to be in them [or: that is born
within them] and which is invisible to the (physical) senses’.35 The intellect is ‘an
immaterial nature’, and ‘a light relative’ to God, who is the superior light. Moreover,
through pure and true prayer the intellect is ‘totally elevated towards the real light’,
without turning back.36
Then, the intellect, ‘illumined by this first light Itself as the angels do [or: in a
manner appropriate to the angels],37 is already transformed in such a way as to
acquire angelic dignity’. Palamas continues arguing that in such a case the intellect
‘is shown as being in itself through communion what the archetype is by cause’.38 In
addition, the intellect ‘manifests in itself the splendour of this hidden beauty, and the
resplendent and unapproachable dawn’.39 This is what David was referring to, when
he wrote ‘And let the splendour of the Lord our God be upon us’.40 Palamas explains
that David wrote this line ‘intellectually sensing in himself ’ (νοερῶς αἰσθόμενος ἐν
ἑαυτῷ), namely through his faculty of intellectual perception.41

33 Tr. 1,3,31.10–12, 442 (179.4–7): …καὶ τοῖς ἔξωθεν αἰσθητῶς κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν ἐκεῖνον βλέπουσι τοὺς
κεκτημένους αἴσθησίν τινα παρέχει τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐνεργουμένων.
34 ‘For now we see in a mirror dimly, but then face to face. Now I know in part; then I shall understand
fully, even as I have been fully understood’.
35 Tr. 1,3,39.22–26, 449 (195.1–5): Τί δέ; Οὐ πρόσωπον πρὸς πρόσωπον ἐπὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος αἰῶνος ὀψόμεθα
τόν ἀόρατον κατὰ τὸ γεγραμμένον; Οὐκοῦν καί νῦν τούτου λαμβάνοντες τὸν ἀρραβῶνά τε καὶ τὸ
προοίμιον οἱ κεκαθαρμένοι τὴν καρδίαν ὁρῶσι τὴν αὐτοῖς ἐγγινομένην νοερὰν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀόρατον
αἰσθήσει μόρφωσιν. We are based here on the translation of Christou (ΠΑΕ 2, 231). Another rendering
of this passage could be suggested, given the fact that Palamas, in his Tr. 1,3, speaks very often about
a) man’s capability to ‘sense’ the divine, and b) the human body’s crucial role in this process (see
his νοερὰ αἴσθησις): ‘…those who are purified in their hearts see in a sensible way (αἰσθήσει) his [i.e.
God’s] intellectual and invisible form that is coming to be in them [or: that is born within them]’
(italics added). This is the translation that Meyendorff provides (‘Ceux qui ont le cœur purifié
reçoivent donc dès maintenant le gage et le prélude et en voient sensiblement la figure intellectuelle et
invisible qui se trouve à l’intérieur d’eux-mêmes’ [italics added]). However, the rendering of Christou
seems to me more valid from a philological (namely, grammatical and syntactical) point of view.
36 Tr. 1,3,39, 449.26–450.3 (195.6–11): Φύσις γὰρ ὢν ἄϋλος ὁ νοῦς καὶ φῶς συγγενές, εἰ χρὴ λέγειν, τῷ πρώτῳ
καὶ ἀνωτάτῳ καὶ μεθεκτῷ πᾶσι καὶ ἀπολελυμένῳ τοῦ παντὸς φωτί, καὶ διὰ τῆς πρὸς τὸ ὄντως φῶς ὁλικῆς
ἀνατάσεως, τῇ ἀΰλῳ καὶ ἀδιαλείπτῳ καὶ ἀπειλικρινημένῃ προσευχῇ, πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸν Θεὸν ἀνεπιστρόφως
ἀνανεύσας…
37 This point resembles Gregory the Theologian, Oratio 40, 5, PG 36, 364B.
38 Tr. 1,3,39.3–6, 450 (195.11–14): …καὶ οὕτω πρὸς ἀγγελικὴν ἤδη μετασκευασθεὶς ἀξίαν, ἀγγελοπρεπῶς ὑπ’
αὐτοῦ τοῦ πρώτου φωτὸς καταλαμφθείς, αὐτὸ φαίνεται κατὰ μέθεξιν, ὃ τὸ ἀρχέτυπον κατ’ αἰτίαν ἐστί…
Cf. Maximοs, Epistle 6, 5, PG 91, 429AB. Dionysiοs, De Divinis Nominibus, II, 6, ed. Suchla, 129–30.
39 Tr. 1,3,39.6–7, 450 (195.14–16): …καὶ δι’ ἑαυτοῦ φαίνει τοῦ κρυφίου κάλλους ἐκείνου τὴν ὡραιότητα καὶ
τὴν φανοτάτην καὶ ἀπρόσιτον αὐγήν…
40 Ps 89:17: καὶ ἔστω ἡ λαμπρότης Κυρίου τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡμῶν ἐφ᾿ ἡμᾶς…
41 Tr. 1,3,39.8–10, 450 (195.16–19).
150 cha p te r 6

2. Seeing the Divine Light

a. The Eyes of the Soul and the Experience of God

As explained thus far, intellectual perception is a notion that touches both the human
soul and the body. Palamas clarifies that the activity of this power is in no way material
or bodily, as he claims the opponents of the hesychasts believed. On the contrary,
it is ‘spiritual and secret’.42 Hence while Palamas does indeed accept the sensible
character (or, better, aspect/effect) of divine grace, he strongly rejects the idea that
divine grace is a sensible reality, namely that the divine activities are corporeal.43
But how, then, is one able to recognize the mysteries in which a Christian may
participate? This is done through ‘the experience of the eyes of the soul’.44 And what
exactly are the ‘eyes of the soul’ (ὀφθαλμοὶ ψυχῆς), and the ‘experience’ (πείρα) they
provide? Are they perhaps to be identified with the human mind or reason (διάνοια)?
Palamas is totally negative towards such an interpretation. He explains that διάνοια
exercises its faculties both on intellectual and on sensible things: it makes both of
them comprehensible through intellection.45
He provides two examples to clarify this point. First, he argues, if you bring to
mind a city (εἰ διανοῇ περὶ αυτῆς), without having already seen it, then you have
not personally ‘experienced’ this city just because you have thought about it (οὐ
τῷ διανοεῖσθαι ταύτην ἐν πείρᾳ γέγονας αὐτῆς). The same may be implied as far as
knowledge of God and the divine realities is concerned: ‘you have not experienced
them [only] by the fact that you have thought or theologized about them’.46
Second, as far as gold is concerned, ‘unless you sensibly (αἰσθητῶς) acquire it,
and sensibly have it in your hands, and sensibly see it, even if you bring ten thousand
times (μυριάκις) to your mind the concept of gold’, then you do not possess gold
in reality. Of note is the triple use of the adverb ‘sensibly’ (αἰσθητῶς): experience
(πείρα) of God is a kind of sensing. In a similar way, as with gold, ‘even if you think
ten thousand times of the divine treasures, unless you suffer [or: experience] the
divine realities, or see through the intellectual eyes, which are beyond intellection,
then [in fact] you do not see, nor have, nor possess something of the divine realities’.47
It should be underlined that St Gregory uses the word ‘possess’ (κέκτησαι):
through the spiritual senses man comes to a real knowledge of God, a real sensing of

42 Tr. 1,3,34, 444.30–445.5 (183.25–32): …τοῦ μὴ προσύλους καὶ σωματικὰς οἴεσθαι τὰς πνευματικὰς καὶ
ἀπορρήτους ἐνεργείας ταύτας…
43 Sinkewicz (1999), 386.
44 Tr. 1,3,34.12–14, 445 (185.8–10): …εἴσῃ αὐτῇ πείρᾳ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ὀφθαλμῶν οἵων ἀγαθῶν καὶ
μυστηρίων ψυχαὶ χριστιανῶν κἀνταῦθα κοινωνεῖν δύνανται.
45 Tr. 1,3,34.16–17, 445 (185.12–13): Αὕτη γὰρ καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ τὰ νοερὰ ἐπίσης διανοητὰ δι’ ἑαυτῆς ποιεῖ.
46 Tr. 1,3,34.17–21, 445 (185.14–17): …οὐ τῷ διανοεῖσθαι ταῦτα καὶ θεολογεῖν ἐν πείρᾳ τούτων γίνῃ.
47 Tr. 1,3,34.21–27, 445 (185.17–24): Καὶ καθάπερ χρυσόν, εἰ μὴ αἰσθητῶς κτήσῃ καὶ αἰσθητῶς ἔχεις ταῖν
χεροῖν καὶ αἰσθητῶς ὁρᾷς… κἂν μυριάκις περὶ τῶν θείων θησαυρῶν διανοήσῃ, μὴ πάθῃς δὲ τὰ θεῖα, μηδὲ
ἴδῃς τοῖς νοεροῖς καὶ ὑπεράνω τῆς διανοίας ὀφθαλμοῖς, οὔτε ὁρᾷς, οὔτε ἔχεις, οὔτε κέκτησαί τι τῶν θείων
ἀληθῶς.
 Α ἴσθησις νο ερὰ ( I nt e llect ual Pe rce pt i o n) 15 1

the divine. Therefore, it could be said that man ‘possesses’ God. Palamas clarifies the
reason that he uses the term ‘intellectual eyes’ (νοεροῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς), ‘for it is in them
that the power of the Spirit is implanted, through which [power] those things are seen’.
However, the vision of the divine light is beyond the intellectual eyes themselves.48
As Christou correctly notes, here Palamas draws a clear distinction between
theoptia, i.e. vision of God, and theologia, i.e. speaking and writing about God;49
what, in contemporary terms one would call ‘empirical’ (experiential) and ‘academic’
theology respectively. However, it is very interesting that Palamas in no way discards
theologizing (or academic theology); he totally accepts it, to the extent that it has as
its aim the vision of the divine light, theosis.

b. The Coordination of the Physical and the Spiritual Senses

A very important parameter of intellectual perception for Palamas is the fact that, in
some way, the physical and the spiritual senses cooperate. Let us look at his relevant
teaching. First, he argues that ‘The intellect naturally perceives one light, and sense
perception another’. These two ‘lights’ are different. Sense perception ‘perceives a
sensible light which manifests sensible things as sensible’.50 In other words, one needs
a sensible light, so as to be able to see. On the other hand, the light of the intellect is
‘the knowledge inherent in thoughts’.51 Therefore, ‘sight and intellect do not perceive
the same light; rather, each of them operates according to its own nature and upon
those things which are according to its nature’.52
Nevertheless, there is a point that somehow these two faculties seem to meet each
other, and, in a way, ‘coordinate’ with one other. This happens when man receives the
ineffable grace of God. As Palamas writes, ‘when those deemed worthy enjoy a share
of spiritual and supernatural grace, they see both with their sense perception and
their intellect the realities that transcend any sense perception and any intellect’.53
Palamas makes reference here to St Gregory the Theologian, so as to show that this

48 Tr. 1,3,34.27–30, 445 (185.24–27): Νοεροῖς δὲ εἶπον ὀφθαλμοῖς, ὡς αὐτοῖς ἐγγινομένης τῆς τοῦ Πνεύματος
δυνάμεως, δι’ ἧς ὁρᾶται ταῦτα, ἐπεὶ καὶ ὑπὲρ τοὺς νοεροὺς ὀφθαλμούς ἐστι τὸ πανίερον ἐκεῖνο θέαμα τοῦ
θειοτάτου καὶ ὑπερφαοῦς φωτός.
49 ΠΣ 1, 445. Palamas clearly makes the same distinction also in Tr. 1,3,42.
50 Tomos, 6, ΠΣ 2, 575.25–576.2, trans. Sinkewicz (2002), 187: Ἄλλου μὲν φωτὸς ὁ νοῦς, ἑτέρου δὲ ἡ
αἴσθησις ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι πέφυκεν∙ ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητοῦ καὶ τὰ αἰσθητά, ᾗ αἰσθητά, δεικνύντος…
51 Tomos, 6.2–3, ΠΣ 2, 576, trans. Sinkewicz, 187: τοῦ δὲ νοῦ φῶς ἐστιν ἡ ἐν νοήμασι κειμένη γνῶσις. This
reminds us of that ‘knowledge which is always coexistent with the intellect’, which Palamas mentions
in Ch. 35.14–16, 120: ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν ἐμφύτως ἡμῖν, ἐξ οὗ γεγόναμεν παρὰ τοῦ κτίσαντος ἡμᾶς κατ᾿ εἰκόνα
οἰκείαν, ἐναποκείμενον τῷ νῷ λόγον, τὴν ἀεὶ συνυπάρχουσαν αὐτῷ γνώσιν. For an analysis of this
notion, see the section regarding ‘The Human Intellect and Its λόγος’ (ch. 2.1).
52 Tomos, 6.3–6, ΠΣ 2, 576, trans. Sinkewicz, 187: Οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τοίνυν φωτὸς ὄψις τε καὶ νοῦς
ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι πεφύκασιν, ἀλλὰ μέχρις ἂν κατ᾿ οἰκείαν φύσιν καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἐνεργῇ ἑκάτερον
αὐτῶν.
53 Tomos, 6.6–8, ΠΣ 2, 576, trans. Sinkewicz, 187: Ὅταν δὲ πνευματικῆς καὶ ὑπερφυοῦς εὐμοιρήσωσι
χάριτός τε καὶ δυνάμεως αἰσθήσει τε καὶ νῷ, τὰ ὑπὲρ πᾶσαν αἴσθησιν καὶ πάντα νοῦν οἱ κατηξιωμένοι
βλέπουσιν…
152 cha p te r 6

whole situation is a mystery and cannot be adequately explained by the human mind:
‘God alone knows, and those who are acted upon in such a way’.54
Furthermore, speaking about the activation of intellectual perception, Palamas
makes in his Triads an interesting distinction between knowledge and light. He gives
the following example: when fire is covered by a material which is not transparent,
then it may warm this material, but not illumine it. In the same way, when the
intellect is covered by the passions, it may provide knowledge, but not light.55 Now
St Gregory tries to explain how the νοερὰ αἴσθησις may be activated. Initially he
argues that the intellect is, on the one hand, light. This light, as mentioned above,
may be contemplated (θεωρητὸν) through itself, the intellect.56 On the other hand,
the intellect is also a contemplative faculty (θεωρητικόν), for it is ‘the eye of the soul’.57
This is most probably drawn from St John Damascene, who writes that ‘as is the eye
for the body, in the same way is the intellect for the soul’.58
Palamas explains these statements through the following. In order for a human
person to see through his physical eyes, it is necessary that an external light shines
upon his eyes: for our vision to be activated, we need light. In the same way, ‘the
intellect, in which there is intellectual perception, cannot see and actualize itself,
unless the divine light illumines the intellect’.59
Additionally, Palamas clarifies this point further: ‘Just as physical vision, when it
is active, becomes itself light and is commingled with light and, first of all, sees this
light poured over all the objects that it sees, so too, in the same manner, the intellect,
when it fully actualizes its intellectual perception, becomes itself totally like light, and
is with the light, and together with this light it clearly sees the light…’.60 Moreover,
this takes place ‘in a way superior not only to the bodily senses, but also to everything
that is known to us, and, simply, (superior) to all beings’.61 As Sinkewicz notices,
here ‘the Platonic principle that like can only be known by like’ may be found. Thus,

54 Tomos, 6.9–10, ΠΣ 2, 576, trans. Sinkewicz, 187. Cf. Gregory of Nazianzus, Hom. 28, Περὶ Θεολογίας
(De theologia; Second Theological Oration), 19, PG 36, 52 B: ἀλλ᾿ οἶδεν ὁ τῶν προφητῶν Θεὸς, καὶ οἱ τὰ
τοιαῦτα ἐνεργούμενοι.
55 Tr. 1,3,9.18–21, 418 (127.1–5): Ὥσπερ δὲ τὸ πῦρ, ἂν ἐπικαλυφθῇ δι᾿ ὕλης οὐ διαφανοῦς, θερμαίνειν
μὲν αὐτὴν δύναται, φωτίζειν δὲ οὐχί, οὕτω καὶ ὁ νοῦς, ὅταν ἐπικείμενον ἔχῃ τὸ ζοφώδες κάλυμμα τῶν
πονηρῶν παθῶν, γνῶσιν μὲν παρέχειν δύναιτ᾿ ἄν, ἀλλ᾿ οὐχὶ καὶ φῶς.
56 Tr. 1,3,9.21–23, 418 (127.5–6): …μὴ μόνον φῶς ἐστιν ὁ νοῦς νῷ θεωρητόν, εἰ καὶ ἔσχατον τῶν τοῦτον τὸν
τρόπον ὁρωμένων…
57 Tr. 1,3,9.23–24, 418 (127.6–7): …ἀλλὰ καὶ θεωρητικόν, οἷον ὀφθαλμὸς ὑπάρχων τῆς ψυχῆς…
58 John Damascene, Expositio Fidei, 26.48–49, ed. Kotter, 77: ὥσπερ γὰρ ὀφθαλμὸς ἐν σώματι, οὕτως ἐν
ψυχῇ νοῦς.
59 Tr. 1,3,9.25–28, 418 (127.8–12): …ὥσπερ ἡ κατ’ αἴσθησιν ὅψις οὐκ ἂν ἐνεργείᾳ γίγνοιτο, μὴ ἔξωθεν
ἐπιλάμψαντος αὐτῇ φωτός, οὕτω καὶ ὁ νοῦς οὐκ ἂν ᾗ νοερὰν ἔχων αἴσθησιν ὁρώῃ καὶ καθ’ ἑαυτὸν
ἐνεργείᾳ γίγνοιτο, μὴ τοῦ θείου περιλάμψαντος αὐτὸν φωτός.
60 Tr. 1,3,9, 418.28–419.4 (127.12–18): Ὥσπερ δὲ ἡ ὄψις, ὅταν ἐνεργῇ, φῶς αὐτή τε γίνεται καὶ μετὰ τοῦ
φωτὸς συγγίνεται καὶ τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ πρῶτον ὁρᾷ τὸ φῶς πᾶσι τοῖς ὁρωμένοις περικεχυμένον, τὸν αὐτὸν
τρόπον καὶ ὁ νοῦς, ἡνίκ’ ἂν εἰς ἐντελέχειαν ἀφίκοιτο τῆς νοερᾶς αἰσθήσεως, αὐτὸς ὅλος οἷον φῶς ἐστι καὶ
μετὰ τοῦ φωτός ἐστι καὶ σὺν τῷ φωτὶ γνωστῶς ὁρᾷ τὸ φῶς…
61 Tr. 1,3,9.4–5, 419 (127.18–20): …οὐχ ὑπὲρ τὰς σωματικὰς αἰσθήσεις μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὲρ πᾶν ὅ τι τῶν
ἡμῖν γνωρίμων καὶ ἁπλῶς τῶν ὄντων πάντων.
 Α ἴσθησις νο ερὰ ( I nt e llect ual Pe rce pt i o n) 15 3

the intellect may see the light, because the former is also light. In this way, a great
likeness between God and the intellect is affirmed.62
Furthermore, Palamas speaks about the ‘implanted’ (ἐγγεγενημένην) spiritual
power in the eyes of those who see the divine light.63 In addition, he tries again to
make a parallelism between physical and spiritual vision. In the first case, when the
‘light’ that is in the eye is united to the sunrays, then it becomes fully actual light (φῶς
ἐντελεχείᾳ γίνεται), and thus the eye ‘sees the sensible things’.64 Probably Palamas
implies here that in the eye there is the power/potentiality to see the light, but this
power needs to be activated from an exterior factor, namely from the light that comes
from the sun.65 Maybe this is the reason why he chooses to use the word ἐντελεχείᾳ.
As is well-known, ἐντελέχεια has the meaning of ‘full, complete reality’, as opposed
to δύναμις, which describes the potentiality.66
In the same way, the intellect, ‘when it becomes one spirit with the Lord’ (1 Cor
6:17), ‘then it clearly sees the things of the spirit’.67 However, even in this situation
God remains invisible in a mysterious manner that the human mind cannot interpret.
Man does not see God in His totality, but sees to the extent that he has made himself
receptive of the Holy Spirit’s power.68 Again here the essence/activities distinction
is found, even in latent form: man does not see the essence of God, but only His
activities, and those according to man’s own progress, to the degree of his own synergy.
Worth noting here is that elsewhere St Gregory argues that the divine activities are
‘between’ man and God, something like an intermediary between creature and the
Creator: ‘…how is it possible that the participable entity [i.e. the divine activity] is
not between (μεταξύ) the participants and the imparticipable super-essentiality?’69
Consequently, Palamas argues that the divine light has a similar role as physical
light. In order for man to see the things around him, belonging to created reality, he
first needs the presence of physical light. In the same way, man needs the presence

62 Sinkewicz (1999), 386. This likeness brings to our mind the fact that the intellect is created in the
image of God (see ch. 1.2 of this book). Cf. the relevant comments in the ‘Epilogue’.
63 Tr. 1,3,17.1–3, 427 (145.4–6): …τὴν ἐγγεγενημένην πνευματικὴν δύναμιν τοῖς ὄμμασιν αὐτῶν.
64 Tr. 1,3,17.10–12, 427 (145.14–16): …ἡ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς αὐγή, ἑνωθεῖσα ταῖς ἡλιακαῖς αὐγαῖς, φῶς ἐντελεχείᾳ
γίνεται καὶ οὕτως ὁρᾷ τὰ αἰσθητά.
65 This reference to ‘the radiance in the eyes’ could be taken as an allusion to the theory of vision Plato
puts forward in the Timaeus, in which the eye has an inner radiance that reaches out and coalesces
with the light coming from the object. For this remark, I am grateful to Prof. David Bradshaw.
66 See Liddel-Scott, Lexicon (1996), 575 (s.v. ἐντελέχεια).
67 Tr. 1,3,17.12–14, 427 (145.16–18): …οὕτω τὰ πνευματικὰ τρανῶς ὁρᾷ.
68 Tr. 1,3,17.14–20, 427 (145.18–25): Μένει δ᾿ ὅμως καὶ ἐκεῖ τρόπον ἕτερον, ὑψηλότερον ἢ κατὰ τοὺς
χαμερπεῖς λογισμοὺς τῶν τοῖς πνευματικοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἀντιλέγειν ἐγχειρούντων, ἀόρατος ὁ δεσπότης∙ οὐ
γὰρ ἑώρακέ ποτέ τις τὸ πᾶν τῆς καλλονῆς ἐκείνης …οὐδὲ γὰρ ὅσον ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνο, ἀλλὰ καθόσον ἑαυτὸν
ἐποίησε δεκτικὸν τῆς τοῦ θείου Πνεύματος δυνάμεως, κατὰ τοσοῦτο βλέπει.
69 Tr. 3,2,24.17–19, 675 (685.21–23): …πῶς οὐ μεταξὺ τῶν μετεχόντων καὶ τῆς ἀμεθέκτου ὑπερουσιότητος
ἡ μεθεκτὴ ὀντότης; It should be noted here that many religious and philosophical systems are
concerned with how to bring in contact the Creator with the creatures, and break the existing,
between them, gap. For a relevant article, with special mention to the sophiological controversy in
twentieth-century Russian thought, and particularly between Fr Sergii Bulgakov and Fr Georges
Florovsky, see Louth (2013e).
154 cha p te r 6

of God’s uncreated light, in order to see the divine realities. Thus, it could be argued
that here ‘the divine Light is not the object but the means of vision and in this role
it retains a pneumatological function’.70 This means that, through the divine light,
the Holy Spirit illumines man.
Furthermore, as Palamas states elsewhere, this light is ‘the gracious [or: delightful]
and holy vision of the stainless souls and intellects’, namely the angels. ‘Without it,
even the intellect could not see, even with its intellectual perception, when united to
those beyond it, despite the fact that the intellect disposes the faculty of intellectual
perception, just as the eye of the body cannot see without physical light’.71 Accordingly,
Sinkewicz is correct in arguing that ‘This would indicate that spiritual perception
is a potentiality or capacity within the soul or intellect, which is actualized by the
presence of the divine Light’.72
Trying to support the aforementioned arguments, Palamas says that true knowledge
could be called ‘light’ (φῶς). He is based on the words of St Paul: ‘For it is God who
said, “Let light shine out of darkness”, who has shone in our hearts to give the light
of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Christ’ (2 Cor 4:6). Dionysiοs
calls this light νοητόν (intelligible),73 whereas Macarios calls it νοερόν (intellectual).74
It is noteworthy that in this passage, some words below, Macarios also refers to the
αἴσθησις νοερά explicitly.75
Palamas again refers to Macarios. The latter called ‘immortality’ (ἀθανασία) the
glory that shone upon Moses’ face.76 Palamas comments that this occurred despite the
fact that Moses’ face was mortal.77 For St Gregory this is a reference to the αἴσθησις
νοερά. According to him, Macarios argued two things: a) as the bodily eyes see the
sensible Sun, in a similar way the faithful see the intellectual light (τὸ νοερὸν φῶς)
through the eyes of the soul (διὰ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ὀφθαλμῶν); and b) this light (i.e. the
νοερόν) ‘will be manifested and scattered’ on our bodies, in the age to come, and it

70 Sinkewicz (1999), 378.

71 Tr. 1,3,46.7–10, 458 (211.26–29): …ψυχῶν δὲ καὶ νόων ἀσπίλων εὔχαρι καὶ ἱερὸν θέαμα, οὗ χωρὶς οὐδ’ ἂν
νοῦς ᾗ νοερὰν ἔχων αἴσθησιν ὁρῴη, τοῖς ὑπὲρ ἑαυτὸν ἑνούμενος, καθάπερ οὐδὲ ὀφθαλμὸς σώματος τοῦ
κατ’ αἴσθησιν φωτὸς χωρίς.
72 Sinkewicz (1999), 381 (slightly modified; Sinkewicz writes ‘mind’ instead of ‘intellect’).
73 Tr. 1,3,3.24–26, 411 (111.14–17): …καὶ ὁ μέγας Διονύσιος, ‘ἡ τοῦ νοητοῦ’, φησί, ‘φωτὸς παρουσία ἑνωτικὴ
τῶν φωτιζομένων ἐστίν, εἰς μίαν καὶ ἀληθῆ συνάγουσα γνῶσιν’. For the exact form of Dionysiοs’ text,
which is a little bit different, see the critical ed.: De Divinis Nominibus IV. 6.9–10, ed. Suchla, 150: οὕτως
ἡ τοῦ νοητοῦ φωτὸς παρουσία συναγωγὸς καὶ ἑνωτικὴ τῶν φωτιζομένων ἐστί…
74 See Macarios, Homily 2, 10,5.24–26, ed. Berthold, I, 20: ἐκ τῆς ἐνεργείας οὖν γνώσῃ τὸ ἐλλαμφθὲν εἰς
τὴν ψυχὴν σου νοερὸν φῶς, εἰ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐστιν, ἢ τοῦ σατανᾶ ἐστιν.
75 Macarios, Homily 2, 10,5.26–27 and 2–3, ed. Berthold, I, 20 and 21 respectively (italics added): ἀλλὰ καὶ
αὐτὴ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐὰν ἔχη διάκρισιν, εὐθέως ἐκ τῆς νοερᾶς αἰσθήσεως γινώσκει τὴν διαφοράν… οὕτως ἡ ψυχὴ
ἐκ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῆς νοερᾶς καὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας γνωρίζει τὰ τοῦ πνεύματος χαρίσματα καὶ τὰ τοῦ σατανᾶ
φαντάσματα.
76 See Ex 34:29: ‘When Moses came down from Mount Sinai, with the two tables of the testimony in
his hand as he came down from the mountain, Moses did not know that the skin of his face shone
because he had been talking with God’.
77 Tr. 1,3,3.5–6, 412 (111.24–26): …εἰ καὶ τῷ θνητῷ περιήστραψε προσώπῳ τότε…
 Α ἴσθησις νο ερὰ ( I nt e llect ual Pe rce pt i o n) 15 5

will ‘beautify’ them (ὃ κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τῆς ἀναστάσεως προκύψαν καὶ ἐπιχυθὲν τοῖς
σώμασιν ὡραϊσμένα καὶ ταῦτα δείξει τῷ αἰωνίῳ φωτί).78
However, in this point, an important issue comes up: are there any specific
presuppositions for the vision of the divine light?

c. Ascesis, Detachment, Purification: The Presuppositions of Seeing

the Light

Palamas believes that there are undoubtedly presuppositions for a person to see
the light. Above all, in order for a person to attain the vision of the divine light it is
necessary to have ‘the powers of the soul gathered together as far as possible, and
to have made sober the guarding of the reasoning (διανοίας)’.79 This person initially
lives ‘meditating in his intellect what is according to nature and pleasing to God’, and
then surpasses himself and receives the Holy Spirit, ‘which knows what is God’s as
the human spirit (knows) what is within’.80
St Gregory supports that the faithful who see the divine light ‘receive spiritual
eyes and have the mind of Christ (cf. 1 Cor 2:16); through them [i.e. these eyes]
they see the Invisible, and conceive (νοοῦσι) the Inconceivable’.81 ‘For God is not
invisible in himself, but (is invisible) to those who conceive and see through created
and physical eyes’.82 That is, if one wants to see God, one has to remove himself
from a worldly way of living and thinking. This of course does not mean for Palamas
that one has to necessarily become a hesychast, but that one has to live spiritually,
pursuing the virtues and avoiding sin. In addition, Palamas wonders: ‘Would not
God evidently communicate the contemplation of His grace to those whom He
has joined Himself as a governing (or: authoritative) member?’83 Therefore, the
invisible God becomes visible to the persons that are truly connected with Christ
and those who correctly follow Him.
Moreover, Palamas argues that the vision of the divine light is not a natural
property of humans; it is not something that all humans are able to do at all times as

78 Tr. 1,3,3.6–12, 412 (111.26–113.5). Palamas presents these two arguments as a part of a single Macarian
treatise. However, it seems that he has borrowed them from different texts of Macarios. Indicatively,
for the first argument see Homily 34.2–6, ed. Dörries, PTS 4, 260, and for the second see Homily 2
(Aus Typus III), 1, in Sermones 1–22, 24–27, ed. Klostermann and Berthold, 7.11–16. The role of the
body in the age to come is examined in ch.7.2.b of the current book.
79 Tr. 1,3,16.10–12, 426 (143.15–17): …καὶ τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεις ὡς ἐνὸν συναθροίσας καὶ νηφάλιον
ἐπιστήσας τὴν τῆς διανοίας ἐπισκοπήν…
80 Tr. 1,3,16.12–15, 426 (143.17–20): …πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν καὶ θεαρέστοις διαζῇ κατὰ νοῦν
θεωρήμασιν, εἶθ’ ἑαυτὸν ὑπεραναβὰς ἐν ἑαυτῷ λάβοι τὸ ἐκ Θεοῦ Πνεῦμα, ὃ οἶδε τὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ ὡς τὸ
πνεῦμα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ… Cf. 1 Cor 2:11.
81 Tr. 1,3,16.23–25, 426 (143.29–31): Πνευματικοὺς γὰρ λαμβάνουσιν οὗτοι ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ νοῦν ἔχουσι
Χριστοῦ, δι’ ὧν καὶ βλέπουσι τὸν ἀόρατον καὶ νοοῦσι τὸν ἀπερινόητον.
82 Tr. 1,3,16.25–27, 426 (143.31–145.1): …οὐ γὰρ ἑαυτῷ ἀόρατός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς διὰ κτιστῶν καὶ φυσικῶν
ὀφθαλμῶν καὶ λογισμῶν νοοῦσι καὶ ὁρῶσιν.
83 Tr. 1,3,16.27–29, 426 (145.1–3): Οἷς δ’ ὁ Θεὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐνήρμοσεν ὡς μέλος ἡγεμονικόν, πῶς οὐχὶ δι’ ἑαυτοῦ
καὶ τὴν τῆς ἑαυτοῦ χάριτος ἐμφανῶς παράσχοι θεωρίαν;
156 cha p te r 6

a faculty deriving from human nature.84 However, ‘Ηe who does not see understands
that he is himself incapable of vision because not perfectly conformed to the Spirit
by a total purification, and not because of any limitation in the Object of vision’.85
In other words, it is not the case that God may not be seen at all, but that man has
not been totally purified. The basic prerequisite for seeing the light is that one has
to have conformed himself to the Spirit through purification. As Sinkewicz explains,
‘Although the faculty of spiritual perception exists potentially in each person, it is often
obscured by sin, the veil of darkness or the dark veil of the evil passions. Purification
is then necessary before one becomes receptive to the power of the Spirit’.86
But how does man know when he truly sees the light? Palamas gives an interesting
answer: ‘…when the vision comes to him, the recipient knows well that it is that light,
even though he sees but dimly…’. And he knows that ‘from the impassible joy akin
to the vision which he experiences, from the peace which fills his intellect, and the
fire of love for God which burns in him’.87 In other words, man knows that he sees
the light from the effects that he observes in his existence, namely joy, peace, burning
love within him, etc.88 Or, to put it another way, one knows that he sees the light by
feeling his spiritual senses ‘activated’ and manifested in himself.
Moreover, man receives the vision of light ‘in proportion to his practice of what
is pleasing to God, his avoidance of all that is not, his assiduity in prayer, and the
longing of his entire soul for God’.89 In this way man is always ‘being borne on to
further progress and experiencing even more resplendent contemplation’.90 Finally,
man ‘understands then that his vision is infinite because it is a vision of the Infinite,
and because he does not see the limit of that brilliance; but, all the more, he sees
how feeble is his capacity to receive the light’.91
Palamas insists that in order for man to see the divine light, he has to overcome
all human pleasures and be totally given over to God, through obedience to his

84 Tr. 1,3,22.6–7, 433 (157. 18): Πάντοτε δ’ ἑνὶ ἢ πᾶσι τὸ ἄπειρον τοῦτο οὐχ ὁρᾶται. Cf. Gendle (1983), 123
n. 44.
85 Tr. 1,3,22.7–9, 433 (157.18–21), trans. Gendle, 39: Ὁ δὲ μὴ ὁρῶν συνίησιν ὡς αὐτὸς ὁρᾶν ἀδυνατεῖ μὴ
τελείως δι’ ἐντελεστέρας καθαρότητος ἐναρμοσθεῖς τῷ Πνεύματι, ἀλλ’ οὐχὶ τὸ ὁρώμενον λαμβάνει πέρας.
86 Sinkewicz (1999), 379.
87 Tr. 1,3,22.9–13, 433 (157.21–25), trans. Gendle, 39: Ὅτε τοίνυν τὰ τῆς θεωρίας ὑποβέβηκεν, ἐκ τῆς
πηγαζομένης ὁμοίας ἀπαθοῦς τῷ ὁρῶντι θυμηδίας καὶ γαλήνης νοερᾶς καὶ τοῦ ἀνακαιομένου πυρὸς τῆς
πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν ἀγάπης, ἀκριβῶς οἶδεν ὁ ὁρῶν ὅτι τοῦτό ἐστιν ἐκεῖνο τὸ φῶς, εἰ καὶ ἀμυδρότερον ὁρᾷ.
88 This topic is analysed in ch. 7.2 of our book.
89 Tr. 1,3,22.14–16, 433 (157.25–159.1), trans. Gendle, 39: …καὶ κατ᾿ ἀναλογίαν δὲ τῆς θεαρέστου πράξεως,
τῆς τε τῶν ἄλλων πάντων ἀποχῆς καὶ τῆς προσοχῆς τῆς προσευχῆς καὶ τῆς πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν ἐκ ψυχῆς ὅλης
ἀνανεύσεως…
90 Tr. 1,3,22.16–17, 433 (159.1–2), trans. Gendle, 39: …ἐπὶ τὰ πρόσω φερόμενος ἀεὶ καὶ διαυγεστέρας
πειρώμενος τῆς θεωρίας. Cf. the interesting comment of Gendle (1983), 123 n. 45: ‘Palamas here takes
up another leading theme of Gregory of Nyssa: epektasis, the inexhaustible character of the vision of
God as rooted in the infinite nature of the Divine. Even in the Age to Come, there can be no end to
the good things that God has to reveal; so the soul is always in via, always moving on᾿.
91 Tr. 1,3,22.17–20, 433 (159.3–6), trans. Gendle, 39: …κἀντεῦθεν τὸ ἄπειρον συνίησιν τοῦ ὁρωμένου ὅτι
ἄπειρον καὶ τῆς μὲν λαμπρότητος ἐκείνου πέρας οὐχ ὁρᾷ, τῆς δ’ ἑαυτοῦ πρὸς φωτοληψίαν ἐπιτηδειότητος
ἐπὶ μᾶλλον ὁρᾷ τὸ ἀδρανές.
 Α ἴσθησις νο ερὰ ( I nt e llect ual Pe rce pt i o n) 15 7

spiritual guides.92 Thus, the hesychast, ‘is, so to speak, captured by this love (i.e. for
God)’.93 Elsewhere he maintains that one who abandons earthly goods does this
‘looking towards the hope of theosis’.94 Man examines all his actions and thoughts
to see whether they pull him down to earth, or they help him achieve this life which
is ‘superior to all these, and really intellectual, and unmixed with earthly things’.95
Elsewhere Palamas writes that the ascetic, through detachment from earthly matters,
‘attaches his intellect to the uninterrupted prayer to God, and, through it (i.e. prayer)
becomes totally of himself’. Then he finds ‘the ascent to the heavens (ἄνοδον εἰς οὐρανοὺς
εὑρίσκει)’, and ‘the impalpable darkness (τὸν ἀναφῆ τῆς κρυφιομύστου σιγῆς, ὡς ἄν τις
εἴποι γνόφον)’.96 In this situation ‘man has totally gone out of himself, and is entirely
given to God’. Moreover, ‘man sees the glory of God and contemplates divine light’.
But this light ‘is very little subject to the senses, inasmuch as they are indeed senses’.97
But what if one falls into delusion? How may one know whether he sees the divine
light indeed, or something else, a demonic imitation of that light? Palamas answers
that man should be united to the Church and to the saints, as well as closely following
the words and directions of the Fathers.98 Thereby he will avoid the aforementioned
danger. But let us now turn our attention to an important aspect of the spiritual
senses, namely the theophanies.

d. The Illuminations in the Old and New Testament: Symbolic or Real?

The interpretation of the divine illuminations in the Old and New Testaments
occupies a central place in Palamas’ theology of the spiritual senses, and, mainly,
whether they were symbolic or real. He frequently visits this subject and presents
some very interesting points regarding God’s apparitions, the theophaniai.99 Initially,
they take place ‘according to a different dispensation that is contrary to both divine
and human nature’. In other words, ‘they appear in a manner that is different from
both divine and human nature and, so to speak, according to us and beyond us, so that
there is no name that could literally indicate them’.100 With these thoughts, Palamas

92 Tr. 1,3,44, 455.28–456.10 (207.13–26): …Ὁ τῇ τῶν χρημάτων κτήσει καὶ τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων δόξῃ καὶ τῇ
τῶν σωμάτων ἡδονῇ διὰ τὴν εὐαγγελικὴν ἀποταξάμενος ζωὴν καὶ δι᾿ ὑποταγῆς τῶν ἐν τῇ κατὰ Χριστὸν
ἡλικίᾳ προηκόντων τὴν ἀποταγὴν ταύτην βεβαιώσας, ὁρᾷ ἐν ἑαυτῷ σφοδρότερον ἀνακαιόμενον τὸν
ἀπαθῆ καὶ ἱερὸν καὶ θεῖον ἔρωτα καὶ Θεὸν ὑπερφυῶς ποθεῖ καὶ τὴν ὑπερκόσμιον πρὸς τοῦτον ἕνωσιν.
93 Sinkewicz (1999), 379.
94 Tr. 1,3,52.18–21, 462 (221.20–23): …πρὸς τὴν ἐλπίδα τῆς θεώσεως βλέπων…
95 Tr. 1,3,44.10–26, 456 (207.26–209.12): …τὴν ὑπὲρ ταῦτα καὶ ὄντως νοερὰν ζητεῖ καὶ τῶν κάτω ἀμιγῆ
ζωήν…
96 Tr. 1,3,46, 457.26–458.2 (211.12–20): …συνάπτει τὸν νοῦν τῇ ἀδιαλείπτῳ πρὸς Θεὸν εὐχῇ, καὶ δι’ αὐτῆς
ἑαυτοῦ ὅλος γεγονώς…
97 Tr. 1,3,46.5–7, 458 (211.24–26): Ὅλος δ’ οὕτως ἑαυτοῦ ἐκστὰς καὶ ὅλος γενόμενος Θεοῦ, δόξαν ὁρᾷ Θεοῦ
καὶ φῶς ἐποπτεύει θεῖον, ἥκιστα αἰσθήσει ᾗ αἰσθήσει ὑποπίπτον. For ecstasis, see ch. 7.1 of this Part.
98 Palamas discusses this subject in, e.g., Tr. 1,3,48–49.
99 In this subsection only the main points of this huge topic will be analysed.
100 Tr. 1,3,4.8–11, 413 (115.4–6): ἑτέρῳ γὰρ παρὰ τὴν φύσιν τήν τε θείαν καὶ ἀνθρωπίνην θεσμῷ διαφαίνονται
καί, ὡς εἰπεῖν, καθ’ ἡμᾶς ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς, ὡς μηδὲ ὄνομα δηλωτικὸν αὐτῶν κυρίως εἶναι.
1 58 cha p te r 6

wants to argue that union with God, which operates through man’s spiritual senses,
is something that surpasses human measures and cannot be explained; it remains a
mystery, and cannot be fully explored.
To support his argument, Palamas refers to the visit of the angel to Samson’s
parents, Manoah and his wife, in the Old Testament. In particular, Manoah and his
wife were amazed because they did not know who their visitor was. Thus they asked
the angel about his name. The angel replied ‘Why do you ask this, my name? Even
by itself it is amazing’ (θαυμαστόν).101 Palamas concludes from this dialogue, that
the vision of God is also marvellous (θαυμαστή), because it is incomprehensible and
nameless (or: impossible to be named). Therefore, it is a true mystery.102 Furthermore,
even if the vision of God is superior to negation, the words that one uses to interpret
and express this vision are inferior to the ascent via negation. For this reason, this
interpretation proceeds by means of examples or analogies.103 That is, whatever one
says about union with God cannot adequately express the reality. This is why one
usually adjoins the word ‘as’ (ὡς), in order to articulate the similarities, ‘for the vision
is ineffable and beyond every naming’.104
But what did the antihesychasts claim about the illuminations of the Old Testament?
They believed that they had a symbolic character. However, Palamas replies, this
fact shows exactly that there is indeed a ‘holy illumination’ (ἱερὸς φωτισμός), whose
symbol the aforementioned illuminations are.105 Thus, quoting three passages from
Sts Neilοs,106 Isaac the Syrian and John Chrysostom respectively, he contends that
God’s appearance to Moses on Mount Sinai was a symbol of His appearance to
the intellect during the time of prayer, when the intellect sees its own situation
(κατάστασιν), or purity (καθαρότητα).107
Additionally, in Tr. 1,3,11 Palamas refers again to Moses, and the glory that
shone upon his face, quoting a lengthy passage from Macarios.108 Here the central
notions are the following: the illumination of the Spirit, which is distinguished from
knowledge, the glory of the face of Moses, the Ιncarnation of Christ, and the glory
that the faithful receive in the New Testament. After that, St Gregory concludes

101 Jds 13:18.

102 Tr. 1,3,4.12–14, 413 (115.8–10): …ὡς καὶ τῆς ὁράσεως οὐχ ἧττον οὔσης θαυμαστῆς καὶ πρὸς τῷ ἀλήπτῳ
καὶ τὸ ἀνώνυμον ἐχούσης.
103 Tr. 1,3,4.14–17, 413 (115.10–13): Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ εἰ καὶ ἡ ὅρασις κρεῖττον ἢ κατὰ ἀπόφασιν, ἀλλ’ ὁ ἑρμηνεὺς
ἐκείνης λόγος ἀποδεῖ τῆς κατὰ ἀπόφασιν ἀνόδου, παραδειγματικῶς ἢ κατὰ ἀναλογίαν προαγόμενος.
104 Tr. 1,3,4.16–19, 413 (115.12–15): …παραδειγματικῶς ἢ κατὰ ἀναλογίαν προαγόμενος, διὸ καὶ τὸ ‘ὡς’,
ὁμοιωματικὴν φέρον σημασίαν, συνηρτημένον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον ἔχει τοῖς ὀνόμασιν, ὡς ἀρρήτου καὶ
ὑπερωνύμου τῆς ὁράσεως οὔσης.
105 Tr. 1,3,6.10–12, 415 (119.5–8): Φασὶ γάρ, ὡς αὐτὸς εἶπες, συμβολικοὺς εἶναι τοὺς ἐν τῷ πάλαι νόμῳ
φωτισμούς. Ἐκεῖνοι τοίνυν τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ δεικνύουσιν ὡς ἔστιν ἱερὸς φωτισμὸς οὗ γεγόνασιν αὐτοὶ
σύμβολον.
106 In fact, scholarship has shown that it is a work of Evagrios where Palamas refers to.
107 Tr. 1,3,6, 415–16 (119–21) (where also the references to the aforementioned three patristic works may
be found).
108 In particular, Palamas uses passages (either directly or paraphrasing them) from Macarios, Homily
58, 1, ed. Berthold, II, 182–83.
 Α ἴσθησις νο ερὰ ( I nt e llect ual Pe rce pt i o n) 1 59

that the illuminations that occurred in the Old Testament, which were sensible
and symbolic (αἰσθητοὺς καὶ συμβολικοὺς φωτισμούς), ‘symbolized and prefigured
(προϋπέγραψαν) the illumination of the Spirit in the souls of those who—through
deeds and truth (τῶν ἔργῳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ)—believe in Christ’.109
Heretofore, in this subsection the main points regarding the divine illuminations
in the Old and New Testament were approached. However, if one reads carefully the
work of Palamas, he will realize without difficulty that St Gregory attributes great
importance to the light of the Transfiguration of Christ on Tabor, and its interpretation.
Hence, it is there that we shall now turn our attention to.

e. The Light of the Transfiguration of Christ

First of all, St Gregory knew about the antihesychasts’ claim that ‘the light which
shone about the disciples on Tabor110 was a phantasm and a symbol of such a kind
that it comes into being and passes away, but possesses no genuine existence’.111
Moreover, they did not regard this light as being ‘beyond all understanding’, but
as ‘an activity inferior to understanding’. These arguments, for Palamas, are totally
unacceptable, for he believes that they contradict the opinions of the Fathers.112
For him, the light of Tabor is the divine light, the divine activity, uncreated and
eternal. It is not a symbol, but a distinct reality, a genuine existence. It is, of course,
a mystery and beyond all understanding, and not, as Barlaam supported, ‘inferior
to understanding’. As Sinkewicz notes, ‘Barlaam would now go so far as to say that
knowledge is the only supersensory illumination; only knowledge could be the goal
of contemplation. Consequently, the hesychast experiences constitute a false and
deceitful illumination because they involve the pursuit of sensory experience’.113
Palamas refers to the following words of St John Damascene:
He [i.e. Christ] was transfigured, therefore, not by assuming what he was not,
nor by changing into what he was not, but by manifesting to his own disciples
what he was, opening their eyes and making of the blind those who could see.
For while remaining in the identical state in which he appeared previously, he
was now seen by his disciples in a manifest way.114

109 Tr. 1,3,12.26–29, 421 (133.20–23): Βλέπεις, ἀδελφέ, πῶς τὸν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἔργῳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ
πιστευόντων εἰς Χριστὸν φωτισμὸν τοῦ Πνεύματος οἱ ἐν τῷ παλαιῷ προϋπέγραψαν αἰσθητοὶ ἐκεῖνοι
φωτισμοί;
110 Cf. Mt 17:1–8. Mk 9:2–8. Lk 9:28–36.
111 Tomos, 4, ΠΣ 2, 572.19–573.1, trans. Sinkewicz, 185–86: Ὅστις τὸ ἐν Θαβωρίῳ τοὺς μαθητὰς
περιαστράψαν φῶς φάσμα λέγει καὶ σύμβολον τοιοῦτον, οἷον γίνεσθαι καὶ ἀπογίνεσθαι, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ κυρίως
εἶναι…
112 Tomos, 4.1–3, ΠΣ 2, 573, trans. Sinkewicz, 186: …καὶ οὐχ ὑπὲρ πᾶσαν νόησιν, ἀλλὰ χείρω νοήσεως
ἐνέργειαν, σαφῶς ἀντιφθέγγεται ταῖς τῶν ἁγίων δόξαις.
113 Sinkewicz (2002), 157.
114 Tomos, 4.12–17, ΠΣ 2, 573, trans. Sinkewicz, 186: Μεταμορφοῦται τοίνυν, οὐχ ὃ οὐκ ἦν προσλαβόμενος,
οὐδὲ εἰς ὅπερ οὐκ ἦν μεταβαλλόμενος, ἀλλ’ ὅπερ ἦν τοῖς οἰκείοις μαθηταῖς ἐκφαινόμενος, διανοίγων
τούτων τὰ ὄμματα καὶ ἐκ τυφλῶν ἐργαζόμενος βλέποντας. Μένων γὰρ αὐτὸς ἐν ταυτότητι, παρ’ ὃ
1 60 cha p te r 6

Here the Damascene mentions something crucial for our subject: Christ ‘opened the
eyes’ of his disciples, so that they could see Him in His glory. This is a very important
point regarding the Palamite doctrine of the spiritual senses. As already shown,
Palamas speaks about the ‘implanted power’ in the eyes of the disciples, namely the
power that God gives to man so that the latter may sense the divine realities.
Based on this, Palamas argues that the ‘most perfect’ vision of God is as light.115
This is how Moses saw God, and almost all of the prophets, particularly those who
saw Him as ‘a vision of reality and not an illusive dream’.116 Palamas admits that these
visions had a symbolic character. Nevertheless, this is not the case for the vision of
Tabor: this was not a symbolic light, ‘which comes to being and then dies’. On the
contrary, the light of Tabor ‘has the value of the second coming of Christ’. Moreover,
it will eternally illumine ‘those deemed worthy in the ages without end’.117
Thus, St Gregory calls the divine light ‘not sensible’, but ‘intellectual’ (νοερόν).
The word νοερόν is probably borrowed from Wis 7:22, where Solomon refers to the
Holy Spirit.118 Here Palamas notes a contradiction into which the antihesychasts fall.
On the one hand, they regard the light of Tabor as sensible, and on the other hand,
they attack the hesychasts of claiming to see a sensible light in their prayer. Moreover,
they point their finger at ‘all those who find a sensible element in the divine graces’.119
In other words, although they deem the light of the Transfiguration sensible, they
totally reject the sensible side of God’s grace, namely the fact that the grace of God
may have an impact on man’s body.120 Therefore they destroy the basis of Palamas’
understanding of the spiritual senses, namely of the potentiality of man’s—as both
soul and body—total communion with God. And in Palamas’ eyes this is indeed very
dangerous. This is why he wonders: ‘Do you see how very insecure [or: uncertain]
and changeful [or: readily besetting] they are? They seem to be awesome [or: skilful]
in calumniating [or: speaking ill], but not in seeing something good!’121

τὸ πρὶν ἐφαίνετο, [ἕτερον] νῦν τοῖς μαθηταῖς ἑωρᾶτο φαινόμενος. Cf. John Damascene, Homilia in
transfigurationem salvatoris nostri Jesu Christi (Τοῦ μακαρίου Ἰωάννου πρεσβυτέρου τοῦ Δαμασκηνοῦ λόγος
εἰς τὴν Μεταμόρφωσιν τοῦ Κυρίου καὶ Σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ), 12, ed. Kotter, vol. 5, 450.17–22.
115 Tr. 1,3,26.8–11, 437 (167.5–9): …ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὡς φῶς εἶναι τὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ τελεωτάτην θέαν.
116 Tr. 1,3,26.12–14, 437 (167.9–11): …οἷς ὕπαρ, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ὄναρ ὤφθη. The trans. of ὕπαρ and ὄναρ is drawn
from Liddell-Scott Lexicon (1996), pp. 1853 and 1230 respectively.
117 Tr. 1,3,26.14–22, 437 (167.11–21): Συμβολικὰ δ᾿ ὅμως ἅπαντ᾿ ἔστω τὰ ἱερὰ θεάματα ἐκείνων καὶ τοιαῦτα
οἷα περ βούλοιντ᾿ ἂν οἱ ἀντιλέγοντες ἡμῖν∙ ἀλλ᾿ οὐχὶ καὶ ἡ τοῖς ἀποστόλοις ἐν Θαβὼρ ἀποκαλυφθεῖσα
ὄψις τοιοῦτο συμβολικὸν ὑπῆρχε φῶς, ὡς γίνεσθαι καὶ ἀπογίνεσθαι∙ τῆς γὰρ μελλούσης δευτέρας τοῦ
Χριστοῦ παρουσίας ἔχει τὸ ἀξίωμα καὶ τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ περιαυγάζον διηνεκῶς ἔσται τοὺς ἀξίους κατὰ τὸν
ἄληκτον αἰῶνα… Palamas refers here to Sts Dionysiοs and Basil the Great.
118 Ἔστι γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ πνεῦμα νοερόν, ἅγιον, μονογενές, πολυμερές, λεπτόν, εὐκίνητον, τρανόν, ἀμόλυντον,
σαφές, ἀπήμαντον, φιλάγαθον, ὀξύ, ἀκώλυτον, εὐεργετικόν…
119 Tr. 1,3,27, 437.26–438.3 (167.26–29): …καὶ κατηγοροῦντες πάντων τῶν αἰσθητόν τι τῶν θείων λεγόντων
χαρισμάτων. Palamas shows that the divine light is not sensible also in Tr. 1,3,35.
120 For the impact of grace on the human body, see ch.7.2 of this Part. For a critical evaluation of some
relevant arguments of Sinkewicz, see the concluding remarks of ch. 7.
121 Tr. 1,3,27.4–6, 438 (169.1–3): Ὁρᾷς τὸ ἀβέβαιον καὶ εὐπερίστατον αὐτῶν; Δεινοὶ γάρ εἰσιν ὡς ἔοικε κακῶς
λέγειν, ἀλλ’ οὐχὶ καλόν τι συνορᾶν.
 Α ἴσθησις νο ερὰ ( I nt e llect ual Pe rce pt i o n) 161

The spiritual vision at Tabor is ‘ineffable, and invisible through sense perception’.122
It is not perceived through the sense faculties which are deprived of the ‘power of the
rational soul, for this power is the only one receptive of the Spirit’s power, through
which the light of grace is seen’.123 That is, the power of the human soul receives the
power of the Holy Spirit, and through it the soul sees the light.
Finally, elsewhere Palamas argues that a) the light of Tabor, b) the light that
‘purified souls’ see in this life, as well as c) the light that the saints will perceive in
Paradise, are one and the same reality.124 Moreover, he maintains that the light on
Tabor shone from the flesh of Christ ‘as if from a disc’. In addition, due to God’s
will, it shone in a brighter way, so that the disciples see it through their physical
eyes too. Furthermore, it was also seen ‘through the heart of those who had their
heart purified’.125 As Sinkewicz explains, ‘Although the apostles saw the Light of the
transfigured Christ on Tabor with their bodily eyes, this took place not naturally but
by the mediation of some other power, since the Taboric Light was ineffable and
invisible to the natural faculties of perception… The vision of God is thus received
through the agency of a special charism of grace’.126 And this is the νοερὰ αἴσθησις.

f. The Potentiality of Seeing the Divine Light in this Life: a Christological

Dimension

In Tr. 1,3,38 Palamas presents an important Christological argument to support the

fact that man may see the divine light in this life. Initially, he there wonders: if the
divine light, which transcends every perception, was seen through the physical eyes

122 Tr. 1,3,35.1–3, 446 (185.28–30): …τὴν ἐν Θαβὼρ γεγενημένην ἄρρητον καὶ ἀόρατον αἰσθητικῇ δυνάμει
πνευματικὴν ἐκείνην συνεκάλεσεν ὄψιν.
123 Tr. 1,3,35.8–13, 446 (187.5–10): …ὡς αἰσθητηρίοις ἀντιληπτὴν εἶναι, μὴ δυνάμει λογικῆς ψυχῆς
ἀντιλαμβανομένοις, ἣ μόνη δύναμις δεκτική ἐστι τῆς τοῦ Πνεύματος δυνάμεως, δι’ ἧς τὸ φῶς τῆς χάριτος
ὁρᾶται.
124 Tr. 1,3,43.10–13, 455 (205.28–31): Ἆρ᾿ οὐ γέγονε καταφανὲς ὡς ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτό ἐστι τὸ θεῖον φῶς, τό τε τοῖς
ἀποστόλοις ἐν Θαβὼρ ἑωραμένον καὶ ταῖς κεκαθαρμέναις νῦν ἐνορώμενον ψυχαῖς καὶ ἡ τῶν μελλόντων
αἰωνίων ἀγαθῶν ὑπόστασις;
125 Tr. 1,3,43.19–24, 455 (207.4–9): …τὸ φανότερον ἐν Θαβωρίῳ διαυγάσαν, ὡς καὶ ὀφθαλμοῖς σώματος
ληπτὸν γενέσθαι, ὡς ἠθέλησεν, ὃ καὶ τοῖς τὴν καρδίαν ἔχουσι τότε κεκαθαρμένην πᾶσι δι’ αὐτῆς
ἐβλέπετο, τοῦ προσκυνητοῦ σώματος ὡς ἀπὸ δίσκου τινὸς φρικτῶς ἐξαστράπτον καὶ τὴν καρδίαν αὐτῶν
περιαστράπτον; Some lines before (Tr. 1,3,43.16–19, 455 [205.34–207.3]) Palamas refers to a passage
which he ascribes to St Basil, but which Christou cannot identify (see ΠΣ 1, 455 n. 4); Meyendorff
does not make any comment at all regarding the possible author of it: ‘διεφαίνετο οἷόν τι φῶς θεῖον
διὰ ὑελίνων ὑμένων, τουτέστι διὰ τῆς ἐξ ἡμῶν σαρκὸς τοῦ Κυρίου, ἡ θεία δύναμις αὐτοῦ διαυγάζουσα τοῖς
ἔχουσι τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς τῆς καρδίας κεκαθαρμένους’ (emphasis added). However, Palamas indeed
seems to be drawing directly on a work which in Migne’s Patrology is ascribed to St Basil the Great,
namely Homilia in Sanctam Christi Generationem, PG 31, 1473D: Ἐφαίνετο γάρ, ὥσπερ φῶς δι’ ὑελίνων
ὑμένων, διὰ τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου σώματος ἡ θεία δύναμις, διαυγάζουσα τοῖς ἔχουσι τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς τῆς
καρδίας κεκαθαρμένους… This Homily was once placed among the dubia of St Basil, but is now
regarded in scholarship as authentic. See relevantly DelCogliano (2012), 31–32 n. 5.
126 Sinkewicz (1999), 377. Palamas refers again to the notion of ‘symbol’ in Tr. 3,1,14, making an
interesting distinction between ‘natural’ (φυσικόν) and ‘not natural’ (μὴ φυσικόν).
162 cha p te r 6

(αἰσθητοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς)—and it was indeed seen in this way—, does not this entail
that it was also seen through ‘the intellectual eyes’ (νοεροῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς)?127
Otherwise, this would mean that the soul is something evil ‘that cannot be
combined with good’, or that it is something good, but inferior to the body. Because
‘How would it be that the soul is not inferior to the body, if the body is capable of
partaking and perceiving of the light of God, whereas the soul is not?’128 If the soul
does see God in light through the mediation of the human body, then the latter,
which is ‘material and mortal’, would be more familiar to God and ‘closer to Him’.129
Obviously, this is not the case for Palamas: for him the body is what participates
in the divine light through the mediation of the soul. Additionally, it must be said
that, whereas Palamas holds the human body in high esteem, he regards the human
soul to be superior.
Furthermore, Palamas makes the following claim: the Transfiguration of Christ on
Tabor was a preamble of the glorious theophany of God in the age to come; the latter
will be visible to man (ὁρατῆς). But the Apostles on Tabor ‘were deemed worthy to
receive [this vision] through their bodily eyes’. Therefore, ‘why cannot those purified
in heart receive even now the preamble and pledge of God’s theophany, which will
then occur through the (human) intellect?’130 In other words, if the Apostles saw the
light of Tabor through their physical eyes, this entails that they also saw it through
their intellectual eyes. Therefore, man may indeed see the light of God through his
soul’s eyes, if he has first purified his heart. In this way, it is indeed possible to see
God in this life.
To prove this, Palamas brings to the fore a very important Christological argument.
Christ, through His Incarnation, united his divine hypostasis, the hypostasis of the
Logos, with human nature. Moreover, he received an ‘animated body and an intel-
lectual soul’ (σῶμα λαβὼν ἔμψυχον καὶ ψυχὴν ἔννουν).131 But, even more importantly
for Palamas’ argument, Christ is also united to the human hypostases of all of the
faithful. With each of them He is ‘commingled’ through communion in His divine

127 Tr. 1,3,38.19–24, 448 (191.21–26): Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ᾿ εἴπερ αἰσθητοῖς ὤφθη ὀφθαλμοῖς τὸ θεῖον καί ὑπὲρ πᾶσαν
αἴσθησιν ὑπάρχον φῶς—ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ ὤφθη, καθάπερ καὶ οἱ τοῖς πνευματικοῖς ἐκείνοις ἀνδράσιν
ἀντιλέγοντές φασι, κατὰ τοῦτ᾿ ἐκείνοις καὶ ἡμῖν ὁμολογοῦντες)—∙ εἴπερ οὖν τὸ φῶς τὸ θεῖον σωματικοῖς
ὤφθη ὀφθαλμοῖς, διατί μὴ καὶ νοεροῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ὀφθήσεται;
128 Tr. 1,3,38.24–29, 448 (191.27–32): Ἢ πονηρόν τι πρᾶγμα ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ ἀσυνδύαστον τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ
ἀνεπαίσθητον αὐτοῦ, ὃ μηδὲ τῶν παντόλμων κακοδόξων πώποτέ τις εἴρηκεν; Ἢ καλὸν μέν, κρεῖττον
δὲ τὸ σῶμα ταύτης; Πῶς γὰρ οὐχ ἧττον ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ σώματος, εἴπερ τὸ μὲν σῶμα μεταληπτικὸν καὶ
ἀντιληπτικόν ἐστι φωτὸς Θεοῦ, ἡ ψυχὴ δ᾿ οὐχί;
129 Tr. 1,3,38.29–32, 448 (191.32–193.4): Πῶς δ᾿ οὐ τῆς ψυχῆς συγγενέστερόν τε καὶ προσεχέστερον καὶ
μᾶλλον ἐγγίζον Θεῷ τὸ σῶμα τουτὶ τὸ ὑλικόν τε καὶ θνητόν, εἴπερ δι᾿ αὐτοῦ μὲν αὕτη μεσιτεύοντος ἐν
φωτὶ Θεὸν ὁρᾷ, ἀλλ᾿ οὐχὶ τοῦτο δι᾿ αὐτῆς;
130 Tr. 1,3,38, 448.32–449.4 (193.4–9): Εἰ δὲ καὶ προοίμιον τῆς ἐν δόξῃ μελλούσης ὁρατῆς Θεοῦ θεοφανείας
ἡ ἐν Θαβωρίῳ τοῦ Κυρίου μεταμόρφωσις, καὶ ταύτην οἱ ἀπόστολοι ὀφθαλμοῖς σώματος λαβεῖν
κατηξιώθησαν, διατί μὴ καὶ τὸ προοίμιον καὶ τὸν ἀρραβῶνα τῆς κατὰ νοῦν αὐτοῦ θεοφανείας ὀφθαλμοῖς
νῦν λήψονται ψυχῆς οἱ κεκαθαρμένοι τὴν καρδίαν;
131 As Christou (ΠΣ 1, 449 n. 1) notes, these expressions were initially used by the Fathers against the
theologians influenced by Apollinaris of Laodicea († 390). Apollinaris argued that Christ had a
human body, and a ‘lower’ soul (i.e. a soul without its rational part), but not a human intellect. The
 Α ἴσθησις νο ερὰ ( I nt e llect ual Pe rce pt i o n) 163

Body, through the Eucharist. Therefore, ‘Christ is united in one body with us and
makes us a temple of the whole divinity’. Palamas refers here to St Paul’s Col. 2:9:
‘For in him dwells all the fullness of the Godhead bodily’.132
For this reason, Christ ‘illumines the souls of those who worthily participate’ in
Him through ‘the divine radiance of His body which is inside us’. This will be done in
the same way that Christ illumined the bodies of the Apostles on Tabor. But herein
lies an important difference. On Tabor, the body of Christ, ‘which had the source
of the light of grace’, was illuminating from outside (ἔξωθεν) those deemed worthy,
for it was not yet mixed with them (μήπω φυραθέν). ‘And through the sensible eyes,
it was sending in the illumination’. However, now the body of Christ ‘appropriately
illumines the soul from within’, for ‘now it is commingled with us and exists in us’.133
Hence Palamas wishes to stress the fact that man is now able to see the divine light
in a manner superior to the Apostles on Tabor.

3. Concluding Remarks

In this chapter the αἴσθησις νοερά (intellectual perception) was examined. As shown,
this notion combines in itself both the spiritual and the bodily. In other words,
although it is beyond natural sense-perception (αἴσθησις), it touches both the soul
and the body. However, the latter has to be transformed so that it may participate
in the spiritual realities.
Furthermore, as demonstrated, St Gregory stresses the central place that ‘expe-
rience’ (πείρα) has in the spiritual struggle: it is this experience—which is different
from reasoning (διάνοια), the power of thinking—that permits man to discern the
reality of his communion with the divine life, that he sees God and not a lesser light
or trick of the evil one. Moreover, Palamas speaks about the coordination of the
physical and the spiritual senses, as well as the ‘implanted’ (ἐγγεγενημένην) spiritual
power in the eyes of those who see the divine light. Thus, referring to the Light of
the Transfiguration of Christ he argues that the disciples saw it through the ‘eyes’ of

place of the intellect had been taken by the Logos, the second person of the holy Trinity. His teaching
was condemned as heretical in the Second Ecumenical Council, in 381 (Constantinople I). For him,
as well as the Orthodox reaction to his work, see, indicatively, Kelly (19684), 289–301.
132 Tr. 1,3,38.4–14, 449 (193.9–20): …ἀλλ᾿ ὢ θαύματος οὐδεμίαν ἀπολείποντος ὑπερβολήν, καὶ αὐταῖς ταῖς
ἀνθρωπίναις ὑποστάσεσιν ἑνοῦται, τῶν πιστευόντων ἑκάστῳ συνανακιρνῶν ἑαυτὸν διὰ τῆς τοῦ ἁγίου
σώματος αὐτοῦ μεταλήψεως, καὶ σύσσωμος ἡμῖν γίνεται καὶ ναὸν τῆς ὅλης θεότητος ἡμᾶς ἀπεργάζεται—
καὶ γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ τοῦ Χριστοῦ σώματι ‘κατοικεῖ πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος σωματικῶς’—…
133 Tr. 1,3,38.14–21, 449 (193.20–28): …πῶς οὐχὶ διὰ τῆς θεϊκῆς αὐγῆς τοῦ ἐν ἡμῖν σώματος αὐτοῦ τὰς
ψυχὰς περιαστράψας φωτίσει τῶν ἀξίως μετεχόντων, ὡς τῶν μαθητῶν ἐν Θαβὼρ καὶ τὰ σώματα ἐφώτισε;
Τότε γὰρ μήπω φυραθὲν ἡμῶν τοῖς σώμασι τὸ τὴν πηγὴν ἔχον τοῦ φωτὸς τῆς χάριτος ἐκεῖνο σῶμα τῶν
ἐγγιζόντων τοὺς ἀξίους ἔξωθεν ἐφώτιζε καὶ διὰ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ὀμμάτων ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν εἰσέπεμπε τὸν
φωτισμόν∙ νῦν δ’ ἀνακραθὲν ἡμῖν καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν ὑπάρχον εἰκότως, ἔνδοθεν περιαυγάζει τὴν ψυχήν. A similar
view is expressed by St John Damascene in his Homily on the Transfiguration, 2.38–40, ed. Kotter, PTS
29, 438: Οὐκ ἔξωθεν ἡ δόξα τῷ σώματι προσεγίνετο, ἀλλ’ ἔνδοθεν ἐκ τῆς ἀρρήτῳ λόγῳ ἡνωμένης αὐτῷ
καθ’ ὑπόστασιν τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου ὑπερθέου θεότητος.
1 64 cha p te r 6

their soul, but also, in a mysterious manner, through their physical eyes too. Finally,
the presuppositions of seeing the light were mentioned: ascesis, detachment, and
purification of the heart.
However, a crucial question remains unanswered: how is it possible for man to see
the divine light and be united with God? What is the basic requirement, and through
which ‘process’ is this vision and union attained? Palamas would answer, through
ecstasis, a ‘going out’ of one’s self. Hence, this is where our attention will be now
directed. Here we shall try to prove the second point that this book pursues, namely
that the human body has a central role in Palamas’ theology of the spiritual senses.
 Chapter 7

Vision through Ecstasis and the Role of the Body

1. Ecstasis: Surpassing One’s Self1

a. Vision through Self Transcendence

As already mentioned thus far, during intellectual perception man ‘truly sees neither
by the intellect nor by the body, but by the [Holy] Spirit’.2 That is, man sees through
the grace of the Holy Spirit, and not through his body. This is not a bodily action.
Moreover, man knows that he sees ‘supernaturally a light which surpasses light’.
However, ‘he does not know by what organ he sees this light, nor can he search out
its nature, for the Spirit through whom he sees is untraceable’.3 Thus, in the vision of
the divine light, man knows that he truly sees the light, but cannot explain exactly
either the nature of this vision, or through which faculty it is attained.
To support his argument, St Palamas quotes Apostle Paul. The latter, referring
to his vision of the divine light, writes in 2 Cor 12:2: ‘I know a man in Christ who
fourteen years ago was caught up to the third heaven—whether in the body or out
of the body I do not know, God knows’. Palamas explains here that St Paul did not
know exactly ‘whether it was his intellect or his body which saw’.4 In other words,
what was the faculty through which he was seeing, his intellect or his body? Palamas
gives the following answer: St Paul does not see as when one sees through his
physical sense perception, namely through physical vision. However, he does see,
and, moreover, ‘his vision is as clear as or clearer than that by which the sight clearly
perceives sensibilia’.5 That is to say, St Paul does indeed see in a specific way, and,
moreover, he does see in a very clear way. Αs Gendle explains, this vision ‘is neither

1 The following paper was based on this section (namely ch. 7.1): ‘St Gregory Palamas on the Spiritual
Senses: Ecstasis, Apophasis, Theosis, and the Passionate Part of the Soul’, presented at the Inaugural
Conference of the International Orthodox Theological Association (IOTA) in Iasi, Romania, 9–12
January 2019 (Theological Anthropology & Moral Theology Section; session on Emotions, Passions, and
Virtue).
2 Tr. 1,3,21.24–25, 431 (155.5–6), trans. Gendle, 38: Τότε γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὁ ἄνθρωπος Πνεύματι, ἀλλ’ οὐχὶ
νῷ, οὐδὲ σώματι ὁρᾷ.
3 Tr. 1,3,21.25–28, 431 (155.6–10), trans. Gendle, 38: Καὶ ὅτι μὲν ὁρᾷ φῶς ὑπὲρ φῶς ὑπερφυῶς οἶδεν
ἀκριβῶς∙ τίνι δὲ τοῦθ’ ὁρᾷ, οὐκ οἶδε τότε, ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ἐξετάζειν δύναται τὴν τούτου φύσιν, διὰ τὸ
ἀνεξιχνίαστον τοῦ Πνεύματος δι’ οὗ ὁρᾷ.
4 Tr. 1,3,21, 431.28–432.2 (155.10–14), trans. Gendle, 38: …οὐκ ᾔδειν εἴτε νοῦς ἦν, εἴτε σῶμα τὸ ὁρῶν.
5 Tr. 1,3,21.3–4, 432 (155.14–15), trans. Gendle, 38: Ὁρᾷ γάρ, οὐκ αἰσθήσει μέν, ὡς ἡ αἴσθησις δὲ τὰ αἰσθητὰ
τρανῶς καὶ τρανότερον ἢ αὕτη.
166 cha p te r 7

intellection nor sense perception, but transcendental knowledge, directly infused

by the Holy Spirit alone’.6
Furthermore, in Palamas’ own words, ‘He sees by going out of himself, for through
the mysterious sweetness of his vision he is ravished beyond all objects and all objective
thought, and even beyond himself ’.7 Palamas maintains here that man sees the divine
light through ἔκστασις or ἁρπαγή, namely ravishing beyond all objects. Ecstasis is indeed
a central point in the mind of the chief authors of the Christian mystical tradition.
Even St Paul refers to this: ‘I know a man in Christ who fourteen years ago was caught
up to the third heaven (ἁρπαγέντα ἕως τρίτου οὐρανοῦ)…’ (2 Cor 12:2). Moreover,
‘And I know that this man was caught up (ὅτι ἡρπάγη) into paradise—whether in the
body or out of the body I do not know, God knows…’ (2 Cor 12:4). And it should
not be forgotten that all these facts refer to ‘visions and revelations of the Lord’ (2 Cor
12:1), namely St Paul is speaking about his vision of the divine Light.
As Palamas states elsewhere, ‘Our intellect goes out of itself, and thereby is united
to God, but in so doing surpasses itself ’.8 Thus, in ecstasis, the intellect goes beyond
itself and lives a reality different from that of the normal and everyday. In a similar
way ‘even God goes out of Himself, and thereby is united to our intellect, but in
condescension’. And he does this out of his great love for humans.9 Furthermore,
Palamas makes another interesting statement: he argues that ‘Under the effect of the
ecstasy’, one ‘forgets even prayer to God’.10 To support this he refers to an interesting
passage of St Isaac the Syrian.11
In general, ecstasis is the situation whereby man goes out of himself, that is he is
detached from worldly things, so as to meet God. As Gendle puts it,
Ecstasis in the Greek Fathers need not imply any kind of paranormal psycho-
logical state or loss of consciousness. It is (literally) a ‘going-out’ from oneself,
a self transcendence under the influence of love and divine grace. It enables a
supernatural mode of cognition of divine things, which is mystical knowledge,
after one has ceased to know and see through the functions of the discursive
intellect and the senses.12

6 Gendle (1983), 123 n. 36.

7 Tr. 1,3,21.4–7, 432 (155.15–18), trans. Gendle, 38: Ὁρᾷ δ’ ἑαυτὸν ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ ὁρωμένου γλυκυθυμίας
ἀπορρήτου ἐκστάντα τε καὶ ἁρπαγέντα οὐ μόνον παντὸς πράγματός τε καὶ νοήματος πραγμάτων, ἀλλὰ
καὶ ἑαυτοῦ.
8 Tr. 1,3,47.11–12, 458 (213.1–2): Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἡμέτερος νοῦς ἔξω ἑαυτοῦ γίνεται καὶ οὕτως ἑνοῦται τῷ Θεῷ,
ἀλλ’ ὑπὲρ ἑαυτὸν γινόμενος.
9 Tr. 1,3,47.12–17, 458 (213.2–8): Ὁ δὲ Θεὸς καὶ αὐτὸς ἔξω ἑαυτοῦ γίνεται καὶ οὕτω τῷ καθ’ ἡμᾶς ἑνοῦται νῷ,
ἀλλὰ συγκαταβάσει χρώμενος∙ ὥσπερ γὰρ ἔρωτι καὶ ἀγαπήσει θελγόμενος καὶ δι᾿ ὑπερβολὴν ἀγαθότητος
ἐκ τοῦ ὑπὲρ πάντα καὶ πάντων ἐξῃρημένου ἔξω ἑαυτοῦ ἀνεκφοιτήτως γινόμενος, καὶ κατ’ αὐτὴν τὴν ὑπὲρ
νοῦν ἕνωσιν ἡμῖν ἑνοῦται. As Christou (ΠΣ 1, 458 n. 2) notes, the fact that God condescends so that
man may see God is also found in Chrysostom, De Incomprehensibili dei natura III, 3, PG 48, 722, and
Maximos, Cap. theol. 1, 31, PG 90, 1093D–96A.
10 Tr. 1,3,21.7–8, 432 (155.18–19), trans. Gendle, 38: Καὶ αὐτῆς ὑπὸ τῆς ἐκστάσεως ἐπιλανθάνεται τῆς πρὸς
Θεὸν δεήσεως.
11 Tr. 1,3,21.8–18, 432 (155.19–30).
12 Gendle (1983), 122 n. 24.
 vi s i o n t h ro u g h ec s tas i s and t he ro le o f t he b o dy 1 67

Therefore, it could be said that through ecstasis man moves from perceiving with the
physical to the spiritual senses.13

b. Intellectual Perception Superior to ‘Abstraction’ and ‘Negation’

(Apophasis): Theologia and Theoptia

So far it was shown that the light of God is seen as intelligible (νοητόν) from the
intellect, through the νοερὰ αἴσθησις.
Therefore the light of knowledge can never be said to be intellectual (νοερόν),
while that light is, as it were, intellectual when it is active and as intellective
(νοητόν) when it is seen by the intellect through the intellectual perception, and
approached by rational souls removes from them their customary ignorance,
returning them from a multitude of seeming opinion to uniform knowledge.14
Here Palamas refers to St Dionysiοs the Areopagite, who argues that ‘the Good [i.e.
God] is called “intelligible (νοητόν) light”, for it fills with intelligible light every
supra-celestial intellect, removing every ignorance and delusion from the souls in
which it is born’.15 Therefore, Palamas continues, one may distinguish between two
different elements: a) knowledge, which appears when ignorance has been removed,
and b) the intelligible (νοητόν) light, which is able to cause this knowledge.16 For this
reason the intelligible light is present in the ‘supra-celestial intellect’: to this person
that has ‘surpassed himself ’ (τῷ ὑπεραναβάντι ἑαυτόν).17
But to whom does Palamas refer with the phrase τῷ ὑπεραναβάντι ἑαυτόν? Do we have
here again a reference to ‘ecstasis’? The answer is affirmative. Here St Gregory exploits
his favourite method of comparing man with the angels. Palamas argues that not only
does the intellect of the angels surpass itself, but the human intellect also has this ability,
if the latter is made angelic through impassibility, purified through ascesis. The human
intellect happens then to receive the divine light, and is made worthy of theophany.18 In

13 Romanides (1991), 146 is correct in noticing that the Christian ecstasis is very different from the
Platonic one or the ecstasis that one finds in religious movements relative to ‘mysticism’ (e.g., in
Buddhism, Taoism, Indian religions, Islam, etc.).
14 Tr. 1,3,3.12–17, 412 (113.6–11): Τὸ γοῦν φῶς τῆς γνώσεως ‘νοερὸν’ οὐδέποτ᾿ ἄν τις φαίη, τὸ δὲ φῶς ἐκεῖνο
καὶ ὡς νοερὸν ἔστιν ὅτε ἐνεργεῖ καὶ ὡς νοητὸν διὰ νοερᾶς αἰσθήσεως ὐπὸ τοῦ νοῦ ὁρᾶται καὶ ταῖς λογικαῖς
ἐγγινόμενον ψυχαῖς τῆς κατὰ διάθεσιν ἀγνοίας ἀπαλλάττει ταύτας, εἰς μονοειδῆ γνῶσιν ἀπὸ τῶν πολλῶν
ἐπιστρέφον δοξασμάτων.
15 Tr. 1,3,3.17–22, 412 (113.11–16): …‘φῶς νοητὸν ὁ ἀγαθὸς λέγεται, διὰ τὸ πάντα μὲν ὑπερουράνιον νοῦν
ἐμπιπλάναι νοητοῦ φωτός, πᾶσαν δὲ ἄγνοιαν καὶ πλάνην ἐλαύνειν ἐκ πασῶν αἷς ἂν ἐγγένηται ψυχαῖς᾿.
Cf. Dionysiοs, On the Divine Names 4,5, ed. Suchla, 149.
16 Tr. 1,3,3.22–24, 412 (113.17–19): Οὐκοῦν ἄλλο μὲν ἡ γνῶσις, ἡ καὶ τῆς ἀγνοίας ἀπελαυνομένης
ἐπιγινομένη, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ νοητὸν φῶς, ὃ παρεκτικόν ἐστιν αὐτῆς.
17 Tr. 1,3,3.24–26, 412 (113.19–20): Διὸ καὶ τὸ μὲν νοητὸν φῶς τῷ ὑπερουρανίῳ νῷ ἐμφανῶς ἐγγίνεται,
τουτέστι τῷ ὑπεραναβάντι ἑαυτόν.
18 Tr. 1,3,4, 412.30–413.2 (113.26–29): Ὑπεραναβαίνει δὲ ἑαυτὸν οὐκ ἀγγέλων μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνθρώπινος
νοῦς, ἀγγελοειδὴς δι’ ἀπαθείας γεγονώς∙ οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῦ φωτὸς ἐκείνου τεύξεται καὶ θεοφανείας
ὑπερφυοῦς ἀξιωθήσεται.
168 cha p te r 7

this supernatural vision man is not seeing the essence of God, but he sees God through
a divine revelation, according to man’s own measure, his progress in the spiritual life.19
Moreover, this vision is not effected through negation—because man is indeed
‘seeing something’—, but in a manner superior to negation (κρεῖττον δ’ ἢ κατὰ
ἀπόφασιν). St Gregory adds that God is not only beyond knowledge, but also
beyond ‘ignorance’.20 By so doing, Palamas wants to stress God’s transcendence. It
should be noted that Dionysiοs the Areopagite uses some similar argumentation,
and even the word ὑπεράγνωστος, indicating Palamas’ likely dependence on him
here.21 Furthermore, God’s manifestation (ἔκφανσις) is truly a mystery, ‘the most
divine and extraordinary’,22 because His apparitions, although sometimes symbolic,
remain unknown in their transcendence.23
Furthermore, Palamas argues that ‘when the saints contemplate this divine light
within themselves, seeing it by the divinising communion of the Spirit, through the
mysterious visitation of perfecting illuminations—then they behold the garment
of their deification’.24 Perhaps here he draws a) on Evagrios, who argues that ‘It is
a sign of impassibility, that the intellect begins to see its own light…’;25 or b) on
St Diadochos of Photiki, who mentions that ‘…when [the intellect] begins being
frequently activated by the divine light, it becomes all transparent, to the point of
being able to richly see its own light…’26 St Gregory continues arguing that when
the saints ‘behold the garment of theosis’, their intellect is ‘glorified and filled by the
grace of the Word, beautiful beyond measure in His splendour’.27 And this happens
in a similar way ‘as the divinity of the Word on the mountain glorified with divine
light the body conjoined to it’.28 This is an important point. St Gregory argues that

19 Tr. 1,3,4.2–3, 413 (113.29–31): …τὴν μὲν τοῦ Θεοῦ οὐσίαν οὐχ ὁρῶν, Θεὸν δὲ ὁρῶν διὰ θεοπρεποῦς
ἐκφαντορίας ἀναλόγου ἑαυτῷ. Cf. Dionysiοs the Areopagite, De Coelesti Hierarchia (On the Divine
Hierarchy), 3.1–5, ed. Heil and Ritter, PTS 36, 22.
20 Tr. 1,3,4.3–5, 413 (113.32–115.1): …κατὰ ἀπόφασιν μέν, οὔ—ὁρᾷ γάρ τι—κρεῖττον δ’ ἢ κατὰ ἀπόφασιν, τοῦ
Θεοῦ μὴ μόνον ὑπὲρ γνῶσιν ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπεραγνώστου ὄντος…
21 See, e.g., Dionysiοs, On the Divine Names, I,4 and I,5, ed. Suchla, 115.6–18 and 116.7–13 respectively.
22 Tr. 1,3,4.5–7, 413 (115.1–2): …καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς κρύφιον καὶ τὴν ἔκφανσιν ἔχοντος, τὸ θειότατον καὶ πάντων
καινότατον…
23 Tr. 1,3,4.7–8, 413 (115.2–4): …ἐπεὶ καὶ αἱ θεοειδεῖς ὄψεις, κἂν συμβολικαὶ ὦσιν, ὑπεροχικῶς ἔχουσι τὸ
ἄγνωστον.
24 Tr. 1,3,5.20–23, 413 (115.16–20), trans. Gendle, 33: Ὅταν δ᾿ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς οἱ ἱεροὶ ἄνδρες τὸ θεοπρεπὲς ἐκεῖνο
θεωρῶσι φῶς, ὁρῶσι δ᾿ ἡνίκα τύχωσι τῆς θεουργοῦ κοινωνίας τοῦ Πνεύματος κατὰ τὴν ἀπόρρητον τῶν
τελεσιουργῶν ἐλλάμψεων ἐπιφοίτησιν, τὸ τῆς θεώσεως αὐτῶν ὁρῶσιν ἔνδυμα…
25 Evagrios, Λόγος Πρακτικός (Practicus), ch. 64, ed. A. Guillaumont and C. Guillaumont, SC 171, 648
(PG 40, 1232A): Ἀπαθείας τεκμήριον, νοῦς ἀρξάμενος τὸ οἰκεῖον φέγγος ὁρᾶν, καὶ πρὸς τὰ καθ᾿ ὕπνον
φάσματα διαμένων ἥσυχος, καὶ λεῖος βλέπων τὰ πράγματα.
26 Diadochos, Capita, 40.5–7, ed. des Places, 108: Ὅτι ὁ νοῦς, ὅταν ἄρξηται πυκνῶς ὑπὸ τοῦ θείου φωτὸς
ἐνεργεῖσθαι, διαφανής τις ὅλος γίνεται, ὥστε τὸ ἑαυτοῦ φῶς αὐτὸν πλουσίως ὁρᾶν, οὐ δεῖ ἀμφιβάλλειν.
Palamas refers to Diadochos, using this argument, also in Tr. 1,3,7.21–25, 416 (121.25–123.1).
27 Tr. 1,3,5.23–25, 413 (115.20–21), trans. Gendle, 33: …τοῦ νοῦ δοξαζομένου καὶ τῆς ὑπερκάλου
πληρουμένου ἀγλαΐας ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ Λόγου χάριτος…
28 Tr. 1,3,5, 413.25–414.1 (115.21–23), trans. Gendle, 33: …καθάπερ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ Λόγου θεότητος θεοπρεπεῖ
φωτὶ τὸ συνημμένον ἐπὶ τοῦ ὄρους ἐδοξάσθη σῶμα.
 vi s i o n t h ro u g h ec s tas i s and t he ro le o f t he b o dy 169

the intellect of the deified person is glorified, in a similar way as the body of Christ
was transfigured on Mount Tabor.29 Thus, this is another Christological dimension
of the spiritual senses.30
After having presented this argument, Palamas gives an interesting exegesis of
two biblical verses: a) Jn 17:22: ‘The glory that you have given me I have given them,
so that they may be one, as we are one’, and b) Jn 17:24: ‘Father, I desire that those
also, whom you have given me, may be with me where I am, to see my glory, which
you have given me because you loved me before the foundation of the world’. But,
Palamas wonders, ‘How can this be accomplished corporeally, now that He Himself is
no longer corporeally present after His ascension to the heavens?’31 In other words,
how is it possible that his disciples be where he is, given that he is not bodily present
in this world? The answer that our author provides is that this fact ‘is necessarily
carried out in an intellectual fashion (νοερῶς)’. And this happens when the ‘intellect
becomes supercelestial, and, as it were, the companion of Him who passed beyond
the heavens for our sake’.32
Then, obviously in theosis, the intellect is ‘manifestly yet mysteriously united to
God and contemplates supernatural and ineffable visions, being filled with all the
immaterial knowledge of a higher light’.33 That is, the intellect is united to God and
receives divine knowledge, which comes from the Light of God. In this situation
man is not contemplating sacred symbols, accessible through his physical senses,
nor is it that he comes to know important elements of theology, e.g., a variety of
passages from the Scripture. Rather his intellect ‘is made beautiful by the creative
and primordial Beauty, and illumined by the radiance of God’.34
St Gregory wants to stress here the fact that man, in theosis, is not just seeing some
symbols, or not just acquiring knowledge—even knowledge related to the Bible, which
is, undoubtedly, greatly important—but undergoes something much higher: he is
illumined by the light of God and united with Him. More precisely, the deified person
has a direct apprehension of the divine realities, which are often symbolically revealed

29 Most probably, Palamas borrows this idea from St Neilοs, Epistolae, II, 74, PG 79, 233A.
30 Cf. ch. 6.2.f of this book.
31 Tr. 1,3,5.1–6, 414 (115.23–28), trans. Gendle, 33: …Τοῦτο δὲ πῶς ἂν γίγνοιτο σωματικῶς, μηκέτι
σωματικῶς αὐτοῦ παρόντος μετὰ τὴν εἰς οὐρανοὺς ἀνάληψιν;
32 Tr. 1,3,5.6–7, 414 (117.1–3), trans. Gendle, 33 (slightly modified): Τελεῖται τοίνυν κατὰ πᾶσαν ἀνάγκην
νοερῶς, ὁπηνίκα γεγονὼς ὁ νοῦς ὑπερουράνιος καὶ οἷον ὀπαδὸς χρηματίσας τοῦ ὑπεραναβεβηκότος δι᾿
ἡμᾶς τοὺς οὐρανούς…
33 Tr. 1,3,5.8–11, 414 (117.3–6), trans. Gendle, 33: …ἐμφανῶς καὶ ἀπορρήτως ἑνωθείη τῷ Θεῷ ἐκεῖ καὶ
τῶν ὑπερφυῶν καὶ ἀπορρήτων ἐπιτυγχάνοι θεαμάτων, πάσης ἀΰλου γνώσεως, ὑψηλοτέρου φωτὸς
ἀναπιμπλάμενος…
34 Tr. 1,3,5.11–14, 414 (117.6–9), trans. Gendle, 33: …οὐχ ὡς αἰσθητῶν συμβόλων ἱερῶν θεωρός, οὐδ’ ὡς
ἱερογραφικῆς ποικιλίας ἐπιγνώμων, ἀλλ’ ὡς τῷ καλλοποιῷ καὶ ἀρχικῷ καλλωπιζόμενος κάλλει καὶ τῇ
τοῦ Θεοῦ λαμπρυνόμενος λαμπρότητι. Here Palamas draws directly on Dionysiοs the Areopagite.
The latter, however, refers to the angels. See, Dionysiοs, On the Divine Hierarchy, VII.2.5–9, ed. Heil
and Ritter, 29: θεωρητικὰς δὲ αὖθις οὐχ ὡς αἰσθητῶν συμβόλων ἢ νοερῶν θεωροὺς οὐδὲ ὡς τῇ ποικιλίᾳ
τῆς ἱερογραφικῆς θεωρίας ἐπὶ τὸ θεῖον ἀναγομένας, ἀλλ’ ὡς πάσης ἀΰλου γνώσεως ὑψηλοτέρου φωτὸς
ἀποπληρουμένας καὶ τῆς τοῦ καλλοποιοῦ καὶ ἀρχικοῦ κάλλους ὑπερουσίου καὶ τριφανοῦς θεωρίας ὡς
θεμιτὸν ἀναπιμπλαμένας…
170 cha p te r 7

in the Scripture and the Divine Liturgy.35 Therefore, it could be maintained that for
Palamas personal communion with God is a situation superior to both studying the
Bible—and knowing its very important teachings—, as well as exploring and decoding
the theological symbolisms hidden in the Liturgy. Again, theoptia is superior to theologia.
Here, the following point should be kept in mind. As mentioned in the first chapter
of this part, after some antihesychasts had lived, for a period, in close proximity with
some hesychasts, they argued that the latter proposed to them to fully abandon the
divine Scripture, as something evil, and to practice only the prayer (προσανέχειν δὲ
μόνῃ τῇ εὐχῇ).36 However, this stance could in no way be found in the teaching of
Palamas. For him the Bible holds a most central place in man’s spiritual life.37 Besides,
the great respect of the hesychasts towards Scripture is proved by the triptych
presented by them—in the Tomos, through the pen of Palamas—assuring the reader
of the correctness of their approach. In particular, they claim that their teaching is
grounded on three pillars: a) on the Holy Scripture, b) on the teaching of the Fathers,
c) on their ‘meagre experience’.38 Nevertheless, here Palamas does underline the fact
that union with God is much superior to the study of Holy Scripture.
But now one would wonder: why does Palamas feel the need to so strongly stress
the difference between apophasis and theosis? This question gives us the opportunity
to study in a deeper way the relationship between those two parts of the spiritual life.

c. Apophasis, Theosis, and the Passionate Part of the Soul

The answer to the aforementioned question is most likely to be found in Barlaam’s

extreme apophaticism. As has been stated, for him ‘The only knowledge available is
limited to knowledge of God from creation or the ascent by negations’.39
Most likely for this reason, in Tr. 1,3,21, as well as in some other points of his
oeuvre, Palamas feels the need to clarify that union with God cannot be identified
with ‘the ascent through the negative way’. By extension, it could be said that theosis
is not identical to apophatic theology. The latter differs from the former in three
important ways: a) ‘it lies within the powers of whoever desires it’; b) it is not capable
of transforming ‘the soul so as to bestow on it the angelic dignity’; and c) ‘While
it liberates the understanding (διάνοια) from other beings, it cannot by itself effect
union with transcendent things’.40

35 Gendle (1983), 122 n. 13.

36 Question 3, ΠΣ 1, 407.25–408.7 (103.28–105.8).
37 This becomes apparent through many works of his; e.g., his Homilies. He there displays a deep
knowledge of the Bible, as well as his immense respect and love towards it.
38 Tomos, 6, ΠΣ 2, 576.11–13, trans. Sinkewicz, 187: Ταῦτα ὑπὸ τῶν γραφῶν ἐδιδάχθημεν, ταῦτα παρὰ τῶν
ἡμετέρων πατέρων παρελάβομεν, ταῦτα διὰ τῆς μικρᾶς ἐγνώκαμεν πείρας.
39 Sinkewicz (1999), 374.
40 Tr. 1,3,21.12–16, 431 (153.24–28), trans. Gendle, 37: Καὶ μή τις ὑπολάβῃ τὴν διὰ τῶν ἀποφάσεων ἄνοδον
ἐνταῦθα λέγειν τοὺς μεγάλους. Ἐκείνη γὰρ παντός ἐστι τοῦ βουλομένου καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν οὐ μετατάττει
πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀγγέλων ἀξίαν καὶ χωρίζει μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων τὴν διάνοιαν, ἕνωσιν δὲ οὐ δύναται μόνη πρὸς
τὰ ἐπέκεινα ποιεῖν.
 vi s i o n t h ro u g h ec s tas i s and t he ro le o f t he b o dy 17 1

In other words, ‘the ascent through the negative way’ is something that man may
attain based on his own efforts (e.g., knowledge, intellectual powers, etc.), if he desires
it. However, it is not identical to union with God, which is a very special gift of the
Holy Spirit. As Gendle puts it, ‘The cardinal point about the via negativa is that it is
neither a species of agnosticism nor itself the vision of God, but rather a necessary
preliminary process of mental detachment from created things which provides an
image of the otherness of divine ones’.41
But here another question is raised: what does Palamas mean by stating that divine
union transforms ‘the soul so as to bestow on it the angelic dignity’? He explains this
in the following lines arguing that ‘purity of the passionate part of the soul effectively
liberates the intellect from all things through impassibility, and unites it through
prayer to the grace of the Spirit; and through this grace the intellect comes to enjoy
the divine effulgence, and acquires an angelic and godlike form’.42
This passage provides us with very important information. First, the prerequisite
of man’s union with God is the purification of the soul’s passionate part, namely
the transformation of the passions. This is attained through ascesis, an idea very
common in the Palamite corpus. It is worth noting that, as Kesselopoulos points
out, Palamas follows the Platonic division of the soul into three parts or powers:
the reasoning-irascible-desiring faculties (logistikon, thymikon, and epithymitikon).
These powers are cured through Christ’s Incarnation.43 The logistikon refers to νοῦς,
the thymikon to θυμός and the desiring to ἐπιθυμία (desire). Moreover, in the texts of
Palamas one may see that these notions are often used interchangeably.44
Second, this purification leads to impassibility, which ‘liberates the intellect from
all things’: this is detachment from the worldly way of thinking and acting. Third,
through impassibility and prayer the intellect is united to the grace of the Holy Spirit.
Fourth, through this grace the intellect enjoys the divine goods. And thus, finally, the
intellect ‘acquires an angelic and godlike form’; man becomes like the angels, who
always see God, and even like God Himself. This is theosis.
For this reason, according to Palamas, ‘the Fathers, following the great Dionysiοs,
have called this state “spiritual sensation [or: perception]” (αἴσθησιν πνευματικήν), a
phrase appropriate to, and somehow more expressive of, that mystical and ineffable
contemplation’.45 However, Dionysiοs does not seem to use the phrase αἴσθησις
πνευματική in his oeuvre. As Paul Gavrilyuk notes in his article on Dionysiοs’ spiritual

41 Gendle (1983), 123 n. 30.

42 Tr. 1,3,21.16–20, 431 (153.28–155.2), trans. Gendle, 37: Ἡ δὲ καθαρότης τοῦ παθητικοῦ μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς,
πάντων διὰ τῆς ἀπαθείας ἐνεργῶς χωρίσασα τὸν νοῦν, ἑνοῖ διὰ τῆς προσευχῆς τῇ τοῦ Πνεύματος χάριτι,
δι’ ἧς ἐν ἀπολαύσει γίνεται τῶν θείων μαρμαρυγῶν, ἐξ ὧν ἀγγελοειδής τε καὶ θεοειδὴς καθίσταται.
43 Palamas, To nun Xene, 29, ΠΣ 5, 208.
44 Kesselopoulos (1986), 57.
45 Tr. 1,3,21.20–23, 431 (155.2–5), trans. Gendle, 37–38 (modified): Διὸ οἱ μετὰ τὸν μέγαν Διονύσιον
πατέρες ‘αἴσθησιν πνευματικὴν’ προσηγόρευσαν αὐτήν, ὃ καὶ αὐτὸ κατάλληλόν ἐστι καὶ ἐμφανικώτερόν
πως τῆς μυστικῆς ἐκείνης καὶ ἀπορρήτου θεωρίας. It is interesting that, as shown from this passage,
as well as from other references made to Dionysiοs, St Gregory regards the author of the Corpus
Dionysiacum to indeed be St Dionysiοs the Areopagite, the Apostolic Father and disciple of St Paul.
172 cha p te r 7

senses, ‘contrary to Palamas’s observation, in his extant writings Dionysius does not
use such expressions as “spiritual perception” (αἴσθησιν πνευματικήν), “the eyes of
the heart” or “the eyes of faith”, previously deployed by Origen, Pseudo-Macarius,
Ephrem the Syrian and other patristic authors. Dionysius draws most of his terms
that qualify non-physical perception from the sphere of intellection’.46 However,
it should be noted that also Diadochοs of Photiki (fifth century) uses the phrase
αἰσθήσει πνεύματος.47
As shown hitherto, a basic prerequisite for the participation of the body in the
divine realities is that the intellect be cleansed (κεκαθαρμένῳ νῷ). Moreover, the
passionate part of the soul should be ‘transformed and sanctified, but not reduced
to a state of death’.48 This is an issue of the utmost significance. The opponents of
the hesychasts understood impassibility (ἀπάθεια) to be ‘the habitual mortification
of the passionate part of the soul’. However, Palamas argued something contrary:
ἀπάθεια is the passionate part’s ‘habitual activity directed towards superior things,
once it has entirely turned away from evil and turned towards the good in that it has
renounced evil habits and has acquired a wealth of good ones’.49
Palamas visits again this topic in Tr. 2,2,19. He there writes that the truly impassible
person is ‘thus not the man who has killed the passionate part of his soul… for
such a one would have no momentum or activity to acquire a divine state and right
dispositions and relationship with God’.50 But this should happen exactly because
he will have ‘mortified’ his passionate part. Moreover, a little earlier Palamas had
even supported the following:
But we, oh philosopher, were not taught that this is impassibility, namely the
mortification of the passionate [part of the soul], but in moving it from evil
to good [or: from a worse to a better state], and directing its energies [or: its
habituated energy/activity] (καθ’ ἕξιν ἐνέργειαν) towards divine things, [when
the passionate has] totally turned away from evil things and turned toward good
things, and for us the impassible man is one who no longer possesses any evil

Nevertheless, as is known, this is not accepted by recent scholarship: the author of the Areopagitic
Writings is most probably a Christian theologian of the late fifth to early sixth century who lived in
Syria. See Louth (2001a), 14.
46 Gavrilyuk (2012), 87.
47 Diadochos, Capita 15, ed. des Places, 92.
48 Tomos, 6.13–15, ΠΣ 2, 575, trans. Sinkewicz, 187: …τῷ κεκαθαρμένῳ νῷ καὶ αὐτὸ [i.e. τὸ σῶμα] τὰ θεῖα
πείσεται καταλλήλως ἑαυτῷ, μετασκευασθέντος καὶ ἁγιασθέντος, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ καθ᾿ ἕξιν νεκρωθέντος τοῦ τῆς
ψυχῆς παθητικοῦ…
49 Tomos, 6.1–7, ΠΣ 2, 575, trans. Sinkewicz, 187: Ὅστις …τὴν τοῦ παθητικοῦ καθ’ ἕξιν νέκρωσιν
ἀπάθειάν φησιν, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὴν ἐπὶ τὰ κρείττω καθ᾿ ἕξιν ἐνέργειαν ὁλικῶς ἀπεστραμμένου τὰ πονηρὰ καὶ
ἐπεστραμμένου πρὸς τὰ καλά, ὡς τὰς πονηρὰς ἕξεις ἀποκτησαμένου καὶ ταῖς ἀγαθαῖς μὴ πλουτήσαντος…
Palamas also refers to this subject in Tr. 3,3,15. Αs has been noticed (see Louth (2015), 186), he there
argues ‘against Barlaam’s understanding of apatheia as killing the passionate part of the soul, asserting
that “lovers of good things work a transformation [metathesis] of this faculty, not its killing [or
mortification: nekrosis]”’.
50 Tr. 2,2,19.12–14, 527 (361.29–30), trans. Gendle, 54: Οὐχ ὁ νεκρώσας τοίνυν, ἐπεὶ καὶ πρὸς τὰς θείας ἕξεις
καὶ σχέσεις καὶ διαθέσεις ἔσται ἀκίνητός τε καὶ ἀνενέργητος…
 vi s i o n t h ro u g h ec s tas i s and t he ro le o f t he b o dy 17 3

dispositions, but is rich in good ones, ‘who is marked by the virtues, as men of
passion are marked by evil pleasures…’51
And he continues, providing some important and clarifying thoughts, namely that
the impassible man is
he who has tamed [or: subjected] his irascible and desiring parts, which constitute
the passionate part of the soul, to the faculties of knowledge, judgement and reason
in the soul, just as men of passion subject their reasoning to the passions. For it
is the misuse of the powers of the soul which engenders the terrible passions,
just as misuse of the knowledge of created things engenders the ‘foolish wisdom’
(1 Cor 1:20).52
Furthermore, St Gregory argues that if one uses the three powers of the soul (i.e. the
reasoning-irascible-desiring faculties) in a proper way,
then through the knowledge of created things, spiritually understood, one will
arrive at knowledge of God; and through the passionate part of the soul, which
has been orientated towards the end for which God created it, one will practise
the corresponding virtues: with the desiring [faculty], one will embrace love,
and with the irascible, one will acquire patience.53
Finally, such a person will have subordinated the passionate part to the intellect and,
through uninterrupted remembrance of God, reaches total love for both humans and
God. To quote a lengthy, yet very characteristic, passage of Palamas, such a person is he
who has put that part of his soul under subjection, so that by its obedience to the
intellect, which is by nature appointed to rule,54 it may ever tend towards God, as
is right, by the uninterrupted remembrance of Him. Thanks to this remembrance,
he will come to possess a divine disposition, and cause the soul to progress towards
the highest state of all, the love of God. Through this love, he will accomplish the

51 Tr. 2,2,19, 526.24–527.1 (361.9–17), trans. Gendle, 54 (modified): Ἀλλ’ ἡμεῖς οὐ τοῦτ’ εἶναι ἀπάθειαν
ἐδιδάχθημεν, ὦ φιλόσοφε, τὴν τοῦ παθητικοῦ νέκρωσιν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν χειρόνων ἐπὶ τὰ κρείττω
μετάθεσιν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ τὰ θεῖα καθ’ ἕξιν ἐνέργειαν, ὁλικῶς ἀπεστραμμένου τὰ πονηρὰ καὶ
ἐπεστραμμένου πρὸς τὰ καλά, καὶ οὗτος ἡμῖν ἀπαθής, ὁ τὰς πονηρὰς ἕξεις ἀποκτησάμενος καὶ ἐν ταῖς
ἀγαθαῖς πλουτήσας, ὁ ‘οὕτω ποιωθεὶς ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ὡς οἱ ἐμπαθεῖς ταῖς μὴ καλαῖς ἡδοναῖς’… As Christou
(ΠΣ 1, 527 n. 1) notes, this last sentence is a direct quotation from St John the Sinaite, Ladder 29, PG
88, 1149A.
52 Tr. 2,2,19.1–6, 527 (361.17–23), trans. Gendle, 54 (modified): …ὁ οὕτως ὑποτάξας τὸ θυμικόν τε καὶ
ἐπιθυμητικόν, ἃ συναμφότερά ἐστι τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς παθητικόν, τῷ γνωστικῷ καὶ κριτικῷ καὶ λογιζομένῳ τῆς
ψυχῆς ὡς οἱ ἐμπαθεῖς τῷ παθητικῷ τὸ λογιζόμενον∙ παράχρησις γάρ ἐστι τῶν δυνάμεων τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ τὰ τῶν
παθῶν ἀποτρόπαια φύουσα, καθάπερ καὶ τὴν ‘μεμωραμένην σοφίαν’ ἡ τῆς γνώσεως τῶν ὄντων παράχρησις.
53 Tr. 2,2,19.6–12, 527 (361.23–29), trans. Gendle, 54 (modified): …εἰ δέ τις καλῶς ταύταις χρῷτο, διὰ
μὲν τῆς γνώσεως τῶν ὄντων πνευματικῶς ἐκλαμβανομένων τὴν θεογνωσίαν πορίσεται, διὰ δὲ τοῦ τῆς
ψυχῆς παθητικοῦ, δι’ ὃ πρὸς Θεοῦ πεποίηται κινουμένου, τὰς καταλλήλους ἀρετὰς ἐργάσεται, τῷ μὲν
ἐπιθυμητικῷ τὴν ἀγάπην ἐνστερνιζόμενος, τῷ δὲ θυμοειδεῖ τὴν ὑπομονὴν κατακτώμενος.
54 Let us remember that one of the reasons for man’s superiority over the angels in terms of the imago
Dei is his faculty of self-governance, namely when the intellect guides man’s internal self towards
God’s will (see ch. 3.2 of this book).
1 74 cha p te r 7

commandments of Him whom he loves, in accord with Scripture (cf. 1 Jn 4:7–21

and 5:1–5), and will put into practice and acquire a pure and perfect love for his
neighbour, something that cannot exist without impassibility.55
As a result of the above, it is clear that the opponents of the hesychasts provided a
strange and problematic anthropology; one that, in the eyes of Palamas, bears many
dangerous theological consequences. For this reason, he decided to enter into this
debate and author so many works dealing with these issues.

d. Angels, Humans, and the Vision of the Light

As mentioned above, Palamas argued that divine union transforms ‘the soul so as to
bestow on it the angelic dignity’.56 This idea permits us to make a small parenthesis
and add a few notes on the angels and their vision of the divine light.
First of all, he argues explicitly that the angels do indeed see the divine light.57
Moreover, he frequently connects this back to his favourite comparison between
humans and the angels. For instance, in Tr. 1,3,5, referring to Dionysiοs, he reminds us
that ‘the ranks of supracosmic spirits above are hierarchically filled, in a way analogous
to themselves, not only with the first-given knowledge and understanding, but with
the first light in respect of the sublimest triadic initiation’.58 This means that the
angels are granted not only knowledge, but also receive the divine Light of the Holy
Trinity. However, ‘Not only do they [the angels] participate in, and contemplate, the
glory of the Trinity, but they likewise behold the manifestation of the light of Jesus
(ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς Ἰησοῦ φωτοφανείας), revealed to His disciples on Thabor’.59 Again the
Christological dimension is brought to the fore.
Moreover, once more Palamas seems to have been influenced by Dionysiοs.60 As
has been pointed out, Dionysiοs, in De coelesti hierarchia 7.2–3, ascribes immediate

55 Tr. 2,2,19.14–22, 527 (361.31–363.8), trans. Gendle, 54–55: …ἀλλ᾿ ὁ τοῦθ᾿ ὑποτάξας, ὥστε διὰ τοῦ
πείθεσθαι τῷ νῷ, φύσει λαχόντι τὴν ἡγεμονίαν, πρός Θεοῦ ἀγόμενον ᾗ δέον, ἀνατείνεσθαι διὰ τῆς
ἀδιαλείπτου μνήμης τοῦ Θεοῦ πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν καὶ δι᾿ αὐτῆς εἰς ἕξιν ἀφικνεῖσθαι τῆς θείας διαθέσεως
καὶ εἰς ἀρίστην ἕξιν προβιβάζειν ταύτην, ἥτις ἐστὶν ἡ πρός Θεὸν ἀγάπη, δι᾿ ἣν πληροῖ κατὰ τὸ λόγιον
τὰς τοῦ ἀγαπωμένου ἐντολάς, ἐξ ὧν διδάσκεται καὶ ἐνεργεῖ καί κτᾶται τὴν εἰλικρινῆ τε καὶ τελείαν πρὸς
τὸν πλησίον ἀγάπην, αἷς μὴ συνεῖναι τὴν ἀπάθειαν, τῶν ἀδυνάτων. Cf. Kesselopoulos (1986), 58–59.
For more details about the impassibility according to Palamas, see Kesselopoulos (1986), 174–83.
Meyendorff (1959a), 208 (= Meyendorff (1974a), 144–45).
56 Tr. 1,3,21.14–15, 431 (153.26–27), trans. Gendle, 37: …τὴν ψυχὴν… μετατάττει πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀγγέλων
ἀξίαν…
57 See, e.g., Tr. 1,3,35.21–24, 446 (187.20–23).
58 Tr. 1,3,5.14–19, 414 (117.10–15), trans. Gendle, 33: Τὸν αὐτὸν γὰρ τρόπον καὶ αἱ ἀνωτάτω τάξεις τῶν
ὑπερκοσμίων νόων ἀναλόγως ἑαυταῖς, κατὰ τὸν οὐρανοφάντορα καὶ ὑποφήτην τῆς κατ’ αὐτὰς Ἱεραρχίας,
οὐ μόνον πρωτοδότου γνώσεως καὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρώτου φωτὸς πρὸς τῆς ἀνωτάτω τριαδικῆς
τελεταρχίας ἱεραρχούμεναι πληροῦνται…
59 Tr. 1,3,5.19–21, 414 (117.15–17), trans. Gendle, 33: …καὶ οὐχὶ τῆς τριαδικῆς μόνης δόξης μέτοχοι γίνονται
καὶ θεωροί, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς Ἰησοῦ φωτοφανείας, ἣ καὶ τοῖς μαθηταῖς ἐν Θαβὼρ ἀπεκαλύφθη.
60 Cf. Dionysiοs, On the Divine Hierarchy, I.3, ed. Heil and Ritter, 8–9 (mainly p. 9.5–6). Dionysiοs, On
the Divine Names, I.4, ed. Suchla, 114.7–115.5.
 vi s i o n t h ro u g h ec s tas i s and t he ro le o f t he b o dy 17 5

intuition only to the highest ranks of the angels, whereas Palamas ascribes it to the
purified human intellect as well. This fact proves again the angelic character of the
νοῦς.61 Consequently, it may be supported that Palamas exalts man to a greater extent
than Dionysiοs, regarding the possibility of direct contact with God.62
Palamas continues adding some details about the angels and their communion
with God: ‘Judged worthy of this vision, they are initiated into Him, for He is Himself
deifying light: They truly draw near to Him, and enjoy direct [or: first] participation
in His divinising rays’.63 Following from this we can conclude that: a) the angels are
deemed worthy of the vision of the divine light; b) they are initiated (μυοῦνται) into
Christ, ‘for He is Himself deifying light’; c) they enjoy first participation in Christ’s
divinizing rays (ἐν πρώτῃ μετουσίᾳ γινόμεναι). Therefore, it could be argued, the
angels participate in the divine light in a more ‘direct’ way than humans.
So far, in these subsections the pre-eminence of the vision of God over theology was
brought to the fore. Be that as it may, however, there is also another crucial parameter
regarding intellectual perception: for the vision of the divine light to be attained, ‘the
cessation of all intellectual activity’ is required. But this calls for a deeper examination.

e. Cessation (ἀπόπαυσις) of all Ιntellectual Αctivity

In Tr. 1,3,17 Palamas presents a very important passage of Dionysiοs the Areopagite:
‘Such a union of those divinised with the light that comes from on high takes place
by virtue of a cessation (ἀπόπαυσιν) of all intellectual activity’.64 Based on this passage
St Gregory argues that contemplation (θεωρία) ‘is not the product of a cause or a
relationship [or: an analogy], for these are dependent upon the activity of the intellect’;
it rather ‘comes to be by abstraction, without itself being that abstraction; if it were
simply abstraction, it would depend on us, and this is the Messalian doctrine…’.65
As already stated, the Messalians argued that man may reach God through his own
powers, without needing the mysteries of the Church.66 Therefore, θεωρία
is not simply abstraction and negation; it is union and divinisation which occurs
mystically and ineffably by the grace of God, after the stripping away of everything

61 Sinkewicz (1999), 379.

62 Let us remember that in Part I of this book (ch. 3) we saw Palamas exalting man over the angels, in
terms of the image of God, due to man’s corporeality.
63 Tr. 1,3,5.21–24, 414 (117.17–20), trans. Gendle, 33–34: Μυοῦνται γὰρ τῆς θεωρίας κατηξιωμέναι ταύτης,
θεουργὸν φῶς ὄντα καὶ αὐτόν, ὡς ἀληθῶς αὐτῷ πλησιάζουσαι καὶ τῶν θεουργικῶν αὐτοῦ φώτων ἐν
πρώτῃ μετουσίᾳ γινόμεναι.
64 Tr. 1,3,17.26–28, 427 (147.3–6), trans. Gendle, 34: ‘κατὰ γὰρ ἀπόπαυσιν πάσης νοερᾶς ἐνεργείας ἡ τοιάδε
γίνεται τῶν ἐκθεουμένων πρὸς τὸ ὕπερθεν φῶς ἕνωσις’, ὡς ὁ μέγας λέγει Διονύσιος… Cf. Dionysiοs, On
the Divine Names, I, 5, ed. Suchla, 116.14–117.1.
65 Tr. 1,3,17, 427.28–428.4 (147.6–10), trans. Gendle, 34 (modified): …κατ’ αἰτίαν μὲν οὐκ οὖσα ἢ κατὰ
ἀναλογίαν, ἐπεὶ ταῦτα κατ’ ἐνέργειάν ἐστι τοῦ νοῦ, κατὰ δὲ ἀφαίρεσιν οὖσα, ἀλλ’ οὐκ αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὖσα
ἀφαίρεσις∙ εἰ γὰρ ἀφαίρεσις ἦν μόνον, ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἂν ἦν…
66 Cf. the second section (regarding the ‘historical and theological context’) at the introduction of this
book.
176 cha p te r 7

from here below which imprints itself on the intellect, or rather after the cessation
(ἀπόπαυσιν) [of all intellectual activity]; it is something which goes beyond
abstraction (which is only the outward mark of cessation).67
Again, St Gregory underlines the need of detaching oneself from the worldly things,
so as to attain θεωρία. As Gendle puts it, ‘there must be a stripping of the mind
(which does require human effort), a kind of mental ascesis, in order that God, who
transcends all concepts (and their negations), may freely make Himself known’.68
Based on these facts, Palamas goes on to say that every believer is called ‘to
separate off God from all His creatures [or: to conceive of God as separate and
radically different from all creatures / to distinguish God from all the creatures]’, for
God is the creator. However, only those who have purified their heart and received
the divine grace are granted, as ‘an experience and a divinising end’, ‘the cessation of
all intellectual activity and the resulting union with the light from on high’.69
Here Palamas wants to stress the fact that the vision of the divine Light is something
granted only to those who have made great progress in the spiritual life.70 Moreover,
it is a πάθος, namely it is something that man ‘undergoes’. Even the disciples were
granted only a brief vision of the Light, during the Transfiguration of Christ on
Mount Tabor. What is important is that the disciples were ‘disengaged by ecstasy
from all perception of the senses or intellect, admitted to the true vision because they
have ceased to see, and, by their submission to unknowing, endowed with sensing the
supernatural realities’. However, ‘they have indeed seen’, but ‘their organ of vision was,
properly speaking, neither the senses nor the intellect’.71 As he writes in Tr. 2,3,36, the

67 Tr. 1,3,17.6–11, 428 (147.12–17), trans. Gendle, 34–35 (modified): Οὔκουν ἀφαίρεσις καὶ ἀπόφασις μόνη
ἐστὶν ἡ θεωρία, ἀλλ’ ἕνωσις καὶ ἐκθέωσις, μετὰ τὴν ἀφαίρεσιν πάντων τῶν κάτωθεν τυπούντων τὸν νοῦν,
μυστικῶς καὶ ἀπορρήτως χάριτι γενομένη τοῦ Θεοῦ, μᾶλλον δὲ μετὰ τὴν ἀπόπαυσιν ἢ καὶ μεῖζόν ἐστι τῆς
ἀφαιρέσεως∙ ἀπεικόνισμα γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ἀφαίρεσις τῆς ἀποπαύσεως ἐκείνης.
68 Gendle (1983), 122 n. 22.
69 Tr. 1,3,17.11–15, 428 (147.18–22), trans. Gendle, 35 (modified): Διὸ καὶ τὸ χωρίζειν πάντων τῶν κτισμάτων
τὸν Θεὸν παντός ἐστι πιστοῦ∙ ἡ δὲ πάσης νοερᾶς ἐνεργείας ἀπόπαυσις καὶ ἡ μετ’ αὐτὴν πρὸς τὸ ὕπερθεν
φῶς ἕνωσις, οἷόν τι πάθος οὖσα καὶ τέλος θεουργόν, μόνων ἐστὶ τῶν κεκαθαρμένων καὶ κεχαριτωμένων
τὴν καρδίαν.
70 Palamas speaks very often about the need of purifying one’s inner self, through obedience to the
Lord’s commands. This is indeed a most central notion in his theology. See, e.g., Tr. 1,3,19.17–20, 430
(152.30–153.3).
71 Tr. 1,3,17.15–21, 428 (147.22–29), trans. Gendle, 35 (modified): Καὶ τί λέγω τὴν ἕνωσιν, ὅτε καὶ ἡ πρὸς
βραχὺ θέα τῶν ἐκκρίτων τέως ἐδεῖτο μαθητῶν, καὶ τούτων κατ’ ἔκστασιν γεγονότων πάσης αἰσθητῆς καὶ
νοερᾶς ἀντιλήψεως καὶ τῷ μηδόλως ὁρᾶν εἰσδεδεγμένων καὶ τῷ πάσχειν ἀγνώστως τῶν ὑπὲρ φύσιν τὴν
αἴσθησιν προσιεμένων; Ἀλλ᾿ ὅτι μὲν οὗτοι καὶ εἶδον καὶ οὐχὶ κατ’ αἴσθησιν ἢ νοῦν κυρίως εἶδον, σὺν Θεῷ
προϊόντος τοῦ λόγου δείξομεν (emphasis added). The phrase τῶν ὑπὲρ φύσιν τὴν αἴσθησιν προσιεμένων
is translated by Gendle (p. 35) as ‘endowed with supernatural senses’. However, it seems to me more
accurate to render it as ‘endowed with sensing the supernatural realities’: Palamas does not speak
here about the ‘supernatural senses’ (though this is where he implicitly refers to), but rather about
‘the feeling/sensing of the realities beyond nature’. Most probably Gendle is misguided here from
Meyendorff ’s (p. 146) relevant translation as ‘revêtus de sens surnaturels’.
 vi s i o n t h ro u g h ec s tas i s and t he ro le o f t he b o dy 17 7

vision of the divine light is accomplished through the Holy Spirit, ‘for it is performed
after the cessation (ἀπόπαυσιν) of the intellectual activities’.72
Indeed, Palamas argues that the saints, who see the divine light, ‘in place of the
intellect, the eyes and ears …acquire the incomprehensible Spirit and by Him hear,
see and comprehend’. Moreover, the angels and the angelic humans see God through
the power of the Holy Spirit, ‘if all their intellectual activity has stopped’.73 Therefore
this vision is not a sensation, namely the result of sense perception, for the saints do
not apprehend it through the relative sense organs, i.e. the physical senses. Moreover,
this vision is not intellection (νόησις), namely the result of human reason (διάνοια),
‘since they do not find it through thought or the knowledge that comes thereby, but
after the cessation of all intellectual activity’ (κατὰ ἀπόπαυσιν πάσης νοερᾶς ἐνεργείας).
Thus, this vision ‘is not the product of either imagination (φαντασία) or reasoning
(διάνοια); it is neither an opinion nor a conclusion reached by syllogistic argument
(οὔθ’ οἷον συμπέρασμα συλλογισμῶν)’. Moreover, the intellect ‘does not acquire it
simply by elevating itself through negation’.74
Elsewhere Palamas refers to a passage of Neilοs the Ascetic, which in fact is
attributed to Ilias the Presbyter (and Ekdikos), a late eleventh or early twelfth century
ascetic writer, whose work is found in The Philokalia, under the title of A Gnomic
Anthology:75 ‘When the intellect is self-concentrated, it contemplates neither the
objects of sense-perception nor those of the rational faculty; on the contrary, it
contemplates pure intellects and the rays of divine light flowing with peace and
joy’.76 Let us note some important points of this passage: a) during contemplation
the intellect is self-concentrated, that is, gathered into itself; b) then, it contemplates
neither the sensible nor the intelligible things; c) finally, it sees the divine light. These
remarks resemble what Palamas says about the ‘cessation of all activity’, so that the
intellect be able to see the divine light.
Based on the aforementioned quote from Ilias the Presbyter, Palamas maintains
that ‘contemplation goes beyond all action, way of being (ἤθους), and reasoning’.77
Finally, St Gregory refers to an important passage of St Maximos: ‘He who has made

72 Tr. 2,3,36.5–7, 570 (459.21–23): Ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ μετὰ τὴν τῶν νοερῶν ἐνεργειῶν ἀπόπαυσιν τελεῖται, πῶς ἂν
τελεσθείη, εἰ μὴ διὰ Πνεύματος;
73 Tr. 1,3,18.22–26, 428 (149.1–5), trans. Gendle, 35: Νῦν δ᾿ ἆρα συνορᾷς ὅτι τὸ ἀκατάληπτον ἀντὶ νοῦ
καὶ ὀφθαλμοῦ καὶ ὤτων εὐμοιροῦσι Πνεῦμα, δι’ οὗ ὁρῶσι καὶ ἀκούουσι καί συνιᾶσι; Νοερᾶς γὰρ πάσης
καταπαυσαμένης ἐνεργείας, τίνι ὁρῶσιν ἄγγελοί τε καὶ ἄνθρωποι ἰσάγγελοι Θεὸν, εἰ μὴ τῇ τοῦ Πνεύματος
δυνάμει;
74 Tr. 1,3,18, 428.26–429.2 (149.5–12), trans. Gendle, 35: Διὸ καὶ ἡ ὅρασις αὐτοῖς αὕτη αἴσθησις μὲν οὐκ
ἔστιν, ἐπεὶ μὴ διὰ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων αὐτῆς ἀντιλαμβάνονται, νόησις δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπεὶ μὴ διὰ λογισμῶν
ἢ τῆς δι᾿ αὐτῶν γνώσεως, ἀλλὰ κατὰ ἀπόπαυσιν πάσης νοερᾶς ἐνεργείας εὑρίσκουσιν αὐτήν˙ οὔκουν,
οὐδὲ φαντασία ἐστίν, οὐδὲ διάνοια, οὐδὲ δόξα, οὔθ᾿ οἷον συμπέρασμα συλλογισμῶν. Οὐδὲ διὰ τῆς κατὰ
ἀπόφασιν ἀνόδου μόνης ὁ νοῦς ἐπιτυγχάνει ταύτης.
75 Part III, 4. For the English translation of the passage, see The Philokalia, vol. 3, 47.
76 Tr. 1,3,40.23–25, 451 (199.2–6): ‘Εἰς ἑαυτὸν’ γάρ, φησίν, ‘ὁ νοῦς συναγόμενος, οὐδὲν οὔτε τῶν κατ’ αἴσθησιν
οὔτε τῶν κατὰ λογισμὸν θεωρεῖ, γυμνοὺς δὲ νόας καὶ θείας αὐγάς, βλυζούσας εἰρήνην τε καὶ χαράν’.
77 Tr. 1,3,40.26–27, 451 (199.6–8): Εἶδες τὴν ὑπερανῳκισμένην ἔργου τε καὶ ἤθους καὶ λογισμοῦ παντὸς
θεωρίαν;
1 78 cha p te r 7

his heart pure will not only know the inner essences of what is sequent to God and
dependent on Him but, after passing through all of them, he will in some measure
see God Himself ’.78 Worth noting is that this passage, among some others too,
shows that Palamas did know the logoi theology, though he does not seem to exploit
it significantly in his oeuvre.79
Finally, it is worth noting that when Palamas speaks about the ἀπόπαυσις πάσης
νοερᾶς ἐνεργείας, he does not mean that man comes to a passive situation where he
does nothing at all: what a contemporary reader would call something like nirvana.80
This is why Palamas blames the antihesychasts who ‘in their ignorance imagine that,
after the abstraction from beings, there remains only an absolute inaction (ἀργίαν)’.
On the contrary, Palamas explains that this is ‘an inaction surpassing all action’.81
The reason is that through this ἀργία (inaction), man attains union with God, which
is undoubtedly the most important goal of man; and surely, the greatest ‘action’.
It is worth noting that elsewhere Palamas calls union with God the ‘supra-intel-
lectual vision’ (ἡ ὑπὲρ νοῦν ὅρασις), namely in Tr. 2,3,48.82 In doing so, he intends
to give an answer to Barlaam, who argued that ‘there is not any vision superior to
the natural intellectual activities’.83 In his response, first, St Gregory maintains that
‘if our intellect was not able to surpass itself, then there would not be any vision and
intellection beyond intellectual activities’.84 However, the intellect ‘does possess this
capacity (δύναμιν) which God sets in operation (εἰς ἐνέργειαν) during prayer and
thereby the intellect is united to God, only through it [i.e. this capacity]’. This allows
him to conclude there is indeed ‘vision beyond intellection’.85
To support his argument he refers to a key Dionysian passage,86 mentioned
above.87 Subsequently, he concludes ‘that this faculty of henosis is beyond the

78 Maximos the Confessor, Cap. Th., 2, 80, PG 90, 1161D, trans. from The Philokalia, vol. 2, 158: Ὁ τὴν
καρδίαν καθαρὰν ἐργασάμενος, οὐ μόνον τῶν ὑποβεβηκότων καὶ μετὰ Θεὸν γνώσεται τοὺς λόγους, ἀλλὰ
καὶ αὐτῷ ποσῶς μετὰ τὴν τῶν ὅλων διάβασιν ἐνορᾷ. Palamas changes the last sentence of this passage,
by mentioning ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸν ἐνορᾷ τὸν Θεόν; see Tr. 1,3,40.6–8, 452 (199.16–20).
79 For a brief analysis on whether Palamas uses the logoi theology in his corpus, see ch. 2.1 of the current
book.
80 This is also underlined by Meyendorff (1959a), 237–39 (= Meyendorff (1974a), 169–70).
81 Tr. 1,3,19, 429.31–430.2 (151.12–14), trans. Gendle, 36: …τὴν πλάνην ἀφαιροῦντες τῶν μετὰ τὴν ἀφαίρεσιν
τῶν ὄντων ἀργίαν εἶναι τελείαν ἀμυήτως οἰομένων, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὑπὲρ ἐνέργειαν ἀργίαν.
82 I draw this remark from Sinkewicz (1999), 381.
83 Tr. 2,3,47.9–10, 580 (483.4–5): Ἡμεῖς δὲ σκεψώμεθα πόθεν ὁ φιλόσοφος κατασκευάζει ὡς ὑπὲρ πάσας τὰς
νοερὰς ἐνεργείας ὅρασις οὐκ ἔστιν…
84 Tr. 2,3,48.7–9, 581 (485.7–9): …εἰ μὲν οὐκ εἶχεν ὁ ἡμέτερος νοῦς ὑπεραναβαίνειν ἑαυτόν, οὐδ’ ἂν ἦν ὑπὲρ
τὰς νοερὰς ἐνεργείας ὅρασις καὶ νόησις.
85 Tr. 2,3,48.10–13, 581 (485.9–13), trans. Sinkewicz (1999), 382 (modified): …ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ταύτην ἔχει
τὴν δύναμιν καὶ κατὰ ταύτην μόνην κυρίως ἑνοῦται τῷ Θεῷ, δι’ αὐτοῦ κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τῆς προσευχῆς
προϊοῦσαν εἰς ἐνέργειαν, ἔστιν ἄρα ὑπὲρ τὰς νοερὰς πάσας ἐνεργείας ὅρασις, ἣν ὅρασιν ὑπὲρ νόησίν
φαμεν.
86 Tr. 2,3,48.25–28, 581 (485.26–29): ‘δέον’ γάρ, φησίν, ‘εἰδέναι τὸν καθ’ ἡμᾶς νοῦν, τὴν μὲν ἔχειν δύναμιν εἰς
τὸ νοεῖν, δι’ ἧς τὰ νοητὰ βλέπει, τὴν δὲ ἕνωσιν ὑπεραίρουσαν τὴν τοῦ νοῦ φύσιν, δι’ ἧς συνάπτεται πρὸς τὰ
ἐπέκεινα ἑαυτοῦ’. Cf. Dionysiοs, On the Divine Names, VII.1, ed. Suchla, 194.10–12 (PG 3, 865C).
87 Ιn Tr. 1,3,45, 456.27–457.2 (209.14–16).
 vi s i o n t h ro u g h ec s tas i s and t he ro le o f t he b o dy 17 9

natural intellectual operations and that it constitutes a link (σύνδεσμος) between

the intellect and God, which is superior to the faculty which links the intellect to
creatures, namely knowledge’.88 It is interesting that again Palamas underlines the
fact that it is God who activates the power of the intellect to surpass itself; and this
is achieved through prayer. Οnce more, the crucial notion of synergy between man
and God is brought to the fore.

f. Drawing the Intellect Into the Heart: ‘ἡ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν στροφὴ καὶ
τήρησις’

In Tr. 1,3,45, apart from citing the very important Dionysian passage mentioned
above,89 Palamas also refers to St Maximos’ relevant scholion.90 Based on these points,
Palamas offers some important thoughts as far as the human intellect is concerned.
First, the nous is ‘the highest of our faculties, the sole perfect, unifying substance,
entirely without division among our faculties’ (or: the only perfect and simple and
totally inseparable from all the other human elements essence).91 Second, the nous
‘defines and unifies the convolutions in thought by which science possesses certainty’.
Therefore, it could be said that it is ‘the form of forms’ (ἅτε εἶδος οὖσα τῶν εἰδῶν).
Palamas probably wants to stress with this rather difficult phrase that the intellect is
the highest human faculty.92
Furthermore, through the convolutions of thought the intellect ‘descends into
diversified life’, for ‘it communicates its activities to all the other faculties’.93 However,
the nous has also another, major, activity (ἐνέργειαν). It has the capability to activate
this activity through itself (ἐνεργοίη καὶ καθ’ ἑαυτόν), ‘for the intellect is able to
stay in itself; this (activity) is attained when the nous is detached from the matters
related to man’s life’, the earthly and inferior things.94 Then, the nous resembles an
equestrian (ἔφιππος): the latter has a special power to charioteer (ἠνιοχεῖν). However,
he does not activate this power in two cases: a) when he is not on horseback, but

88 Sinkewicz (1999), 382 (modified). Cf. Tr. 2,3,48.28–32, 581 (486.29–487.4): ᾟ μὲν οὖν ὑπεραίρει τὴν
τοῦ νοῦ φύσιν, ὑπὲρ πάσας ἐστὶ τὰς νοερὰς ἐνεργείας καὶ γνῶσις οὐκ ἔστι καθ᾿ ὑπεροχήν, ᾗ δὲ σύνδεσμός
ἐστι νοῦ τε καὶ Θεοῦ, κρεῖττον ἀσυγκρίτως τῆς συνδούσης τὸν νοῦν πρὸς τὰ κτιστά δυνάμεως, δηλαδὴ
τῆς γνώσεως.
89 Dionysiοs, On the Divine Names, VII.1, ed. Suchla, 194.10–12 (PG 3, 865C). Cf. the previous seb-
section (ch. 7.1.e) of this book.
90 Maximos, Scholia, PG 4, 344A.
91 Tr. 1,3,45.3–4, 457 (209.17–18), trans. Sinkewicz (1999), 381: …τὸ ἀκρότατον τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, τὴν μόνην
τελείαν καὶ ἐνιαίαν καὶ πάντῃ ἀμερῆ τῶν καθ’ ἡμᾶς οὐσίαν…
92 Tr. 1,3,45.4–8, 457 (209.18–22), trans. Sinkewicz (1999), 381: …ἣ καὶ τοὺς κατὰ διάνοιαν ἀνελιγμούς,
ἐν οἷς καὶ τὰ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἔχει τὴν ἀσφάλειαν, σχεδὸν κατὰ τὰ ἑρπυστικὰ τῶν ζώων ἐν συναγωγῇ
καὶ διαιρέσει προϊόντας, καὶ ὁρίζει καὶ ἑνοποιεῖ, ἅτε εἶδος οὖσα τῶν εἰδῶν. Sinkewicz (1999), 381, quite
justifiably, regards the description of the intellect mentioned in Tr. 1,3,45 as ‘strongly Platonist’.
93 Tr. 1,3,45.8–10, 457 (209.22–24): Εἰ γὰρ καὶ πρὸς αὐτοὺς καὶ δι’ αὐτῶν πρὸς τὴν πολυμερῆ κάτεισι ζωὴν ὁ
νοῦς, προϊσχόμενος τὰς ἐνεργείας πᾶσιν…
94 Tr. 1,3,45.10–13, 457 (209.24–28): …ἀλλ’ ἔχει δήπου καί τινα ἑτέραν κρείττονα ἐνέργειαν, ἣν αὐτὸς ἂν
ἐνεργοίη καὶ καθ’ ἑαυτὸν, ἅτε μένειν καὶ καθ’ ἑαυτὸν δυνάμενος, ἐπειδὰν μερισθῇ τῆς ποικιλοτρόπου
ταύτης καὶ πολυειδοῦς καὶ χαμερποῦς διαίτης…
1 80 cha p te r 7

also, b) when guiding a horse, ‘he does not abandon his whole self to the necessary
diligence to guide it’.95
In a similar manner, continues Palamas, our intellect may ‘undergo (γένοιτ’ ἄν)
the greater and higher activity’, ‘if it is not totally and always turned towards the
inferior things’. However, ‘this is much more difficult than what an equestrian has to
do, for the intellect naturally has its connection with the body and is strongly united
to corporeal knowledge, as well as to the relationships of this life, which are intricate
(πολυτρόποις) and difficult to discard’.96
But what exactly is ‘the activity that the intellect attains in itself ’? St Gregory
writes that it is ‘the turning towards itself and vigilance’. It should be noted that this
is what the hesychasts call ‘drawing the intellect into the heart’.97 Through it, Palamas
continues, ‘the intellect transcends itself, and may be united with God’.98 Of note
is that Palamas uses a strong word to describe the potentiality of man’s union with
God: καὶ Θεῷ συγγένοιτ’ ἄν. As known, the verb συγγίγνομαι is used to describe a
very close connection between two persons.99

g. Case study: St Stephen’s vision

Hitherto, the most important points concerning intellectual perception were mentioned.
But one would now wonder: is there any specific text of Palamas, where one could
see the most characteristic of them gathered together? The answer is affirmative:
one only has to read St Gregory’s commentary of St Stephen’s vision. One can read
this commentary even as a kind of case study of Palamas’ theology of the spiritual
senses illustrating in particular the theology already outlined above.

95 Tr. 1,3,45.13–17, 457 (209.28–211.3): …ὥσπερ δῆτα καὶ ὁ ἔφιππος ἔχει τινὰ ἐνέργειαν τοῦ ἡνιοχεῖν
διαφερόντως κρείττω, καὶ οὐχ ἡνίκ’ ἂν ἀποβαίη μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐφ’ ἵππου ὢν καὶ ἅρματος, ἐνεργήσειεν ἂν
καθ’ ἑαυτὸν αὐτήν, εἰ μὴ ὅλον ἑαυτὸν ἑκὼν ποιοίη τῆς τοῦ ἡνιοχεῖν ἐπιμελείας.
96 Tr. 1,3,45.17–22, 457 (211.3–9): Καὶ νοῦς τοίνυν, εἰ μὴ ὅλος καὶ ἀεὶ περὶ τὰ κάτω στρέφοιτο, γένοιτ’ ἂν
καὶ τῆς κρείττονός τε καὶ ὑψηλοτέρας ἐνεργείας, εἰ καὶ μακρῷ δυσχερέστερον ἐφίππου, ἅτε φύσει τὴν
μετὰ σώματος ἔχων συμπλοκὴν καὶ ταῖς σωματοειδέσι γνώσεσι συμπεφυρμένος καὶ τοῖς ἐκ τοῦ τῇδε βίου
πολυτρόποις καὶ δυσαποβλήτοις σχέσεσι.
97 Palamas refers to this also in some other points of his oeuvre. See, e.g., Tr. 1,2,3–8. On ‘drawing the
intellect into the heart’, see Bradshaw (2009). It is very interesting that this situation is observed
to take place in the lives of many saints. One of them is St Maximos of Kapsokalyvia. For his life
and teaching, see the interesting article of Ware (1988). See particularly p. 425: ‘Theophanes also
states, “He [i.e. St Maximos] had prayer always moving uninterruptedly and speaking in the mouth
of his heart together with his intellect (νοῦς)”. This suggests that, to use the accepted Hesychast
terminology, Maximos had made his intellect descend into his heart, thus uniting the two and turning
his prayer into “prayer of the intellect in the heart”’.
98 Tr. 1,3,45.22–25, 457 (211.9–11): Τῆς οὖν καθ’ ἑαυτὸν ἐνεργείας γενόμενος ὁ νοῦς, ἥτις ἐστὶν ἡ πρὸς
ἑαυτὸν στροφὴ καὶ τήρησις, δι᾿ αὐτῆς ὑπεραναβαίνων ἑαυτόν, καὶ Θεῷ συγγένοιτ’ ἄν. Cf. Tr. 1,2,5. It
is worth noting that the aforementioned arguments, namely those in Tr. 1,3,45, are found, in almost
exactly the same words, in Hom. 53, 58, ΠΣ 6, 581–82 (ΠΑΕ 11, 336–38). As Sinkewicz (2002), 153 and
138 (respectively) notes, Homily 53 (On the Entry of the Theotokos into the Holy of Holies II) was written
in 1333, whereas Triad I in the spring of 1338, namely five years later.
99 See Liddel-Scott Lexicon (1996), 1660 (s.v. συγγίγνομαι).
 vi s i o n t h ro u g h ec s tas i s and t he ro le o f t he b o dy 181

Palamas presents this very interesting commentary in Tr. 1,3,30. The relevant
passage (Act 7:55–56) reads as following: ‘55 But he, full of the Holy Spirit, gazed into
heaven and saw the glory of God, and Jesus standing at the right hand of God; 56 and
he said, “Behold, I see the heavens opened, and the Son of man standing at the right
hand of God”’. Initially Palamas wonders: ‘Is it possible for the [human] sensing
power to arrive at the supra-celestial realities?’100
That is, how was it possible for St Stephen to have seen this divine vision through
his physical faculties? Because, what is most important, although he was seeing from
below on the earth, ‘he saw not only Christ, but even His Father’.101 ‘For how is it
possible to have seen at the right of Him the Son, unless he was also seeing Him
[i.e. God the Father]?’ And Palamas continues: ‘Do you see that the invisible [i.e.
God] may be seen from the purified in heart?’ However, ‘[this is] not [done] in a
sensible, nor in an intelligible, manner, nor through the negative way, but through
an ineffable power’.102
And St Gregory adds something crucial: ‘For the sublime majesty and the glory
of the Father are in no way accessible to the physical senses’.103 As if Palamas wants
to stress that something else is required: the activation of the spiritual senses, man’s
intellectual perception. Moreover, Palamas argues that the position of Christ at the
right hand of the Father, that St Stephen saw, was something symbolic. Nevertheless,
his vision was not symbolic.104 Let us remember that Palamas accepts that some
visions in the Old Testament were indeed symbolic.105 But this is not the case with
St Stephen’s vision. Moreover, Christ ‘condescended to reveal His own glory to him
[i.e. Stephen] who was still in his body, but who had abandoned also his soul for the
glory of His [i.e. God]’.106
Furthermore, Palamas clarifies that ‘Through abstraction (Ἀφαιρεματικῶς)
man cannot see or conceive anything; [however,] he [i.e. Stephen] did indeed
see the glory of God’.107 In addition, if this vision were intelligible (νοητή), then
‘it should have been either through cause or analogy’.108 But this would mean that
we could also think over (ἀναλογιζόμεθα) Christ’s glorified position at the right

100 Tr. 1,3,30.21–23, 440 (175.7–8): Ἔστι τοίνυν αἰσθητικὴν δύναμιν μέχρις αὐτῶν φθάνειν τῶν
ὑπερουρανίων;
101 Tr. 1,3,30.23–24, 440 (175.8–10): Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὗτος κάτωθεν ἐκεῖσε ἀπὸ γῆς ἑώρα, καὶ τὸ μεῖζον, ὡς οὐ τὸν
Χριστὸν μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν αὐτοῦ Πατέρα.
102 Tr. 1,3,30.23–28, 440 (175.8–14): Πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἐκ δεξιῶν αὐτοῦ ἑώρα τὸν υἱόν, εἰ μὴ καὶ αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον
ἔβλεπεν; Ὁρᾷς ὅτι ὁρᾶται ὁ ἀόρατος ὑπὸ τῶν κεκαθαρμένων τὴν καρδίαν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ αἰσθητῶς, οὐδὲ
νοητῶς, οὐδὲ ἀφαιρεματικῶς, ἀλλ’ ἀρρήτῳ τινὶ δυνάμει;
103 Tr. 1,3,30, 440.28–441.1 (175.14–16): Τὸ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ὕψους ὑπερβάλλον καὶ ἡ δόξα τοῦ Πατρὸς οὐδαμῶς
προσίεται τὴν αἴσθησιν.
104 Tr. 1,3,30.2, 441 (175.16): Συμβολικὴ δ’ ἡ στάσις ἦν, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἡ ὅρασις.
105 See, relevantly, ch. 6.2.d of this book.
106 Tr. 1,3,30.7–9, 441 (175.22–23): …τὴν οἰκείαν δόξαν εὐδόκησεν ἀποκαλύψαι ἔτι ὄντι ἐν σαρκί, τῷ καὶ τὴν
ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐκείνου δόξης προεμένῳ.
107 Tr. 1,3,30.9–10, 441 (175.24–25): Ἀφαιρεματικῶς δὲ οὐκ ἔνι τι ὁρᾶν, οὐδὲ νοεῖν∙ ἐκεῖνος δὲ ἑώρα δόξαν
Θεοῦ.
108 Tr. 1,3,30.10–11, 441 (175.25–26): Νοητὴ δ’ εἴπερ ἦν ἡ ὅρασις ἐκείνη ἢ κατ’ αἰτίαν ἢ κατὰ ἀναλογίαν…
1 82 cha p te r 7

hand of God the Father. Yet this is not how Stephen saw his vision. In Palamas’
words, ‘Why would it be necessary for him to look up steadfastly into heaven, and
the heavens be opened, if this vision were only knowledge which is intelligibly
(νοητῶς) acquired?’109
Hence the question remains: ‘In which manner, then, did Stephen the Protomartyr
see this vision, if he did not see intelligibly or sensibly or by negation, and if he did not
conceive of the divine things either by deduction or by analogy?’110 And St Gregory
replies: ‘I shall clearly tell you: spiritually (πνευματικῶς), as I have said for those
who see the pure light through revelation, and as, besides, many of the Fathers have
said before’.111 In this way, Palamas shows the close connection between the vision
of Stephen, and that of the hesychasts who see the divine light as a gift from God. In
Palamas’ mind St Stephen is a forerunner of the hesychasts.
To support his position about Stephen seeing spiritually (πνευματικῶς),
Palamas refers again to St Luke’s Acts 7:55, mentioning that ‘Stephen was full of
faith and Holy Spirit’. And Palamas concludes: ‘You also, if you render yourself
full of faith and the Holy Spirit, will be able to see spiritually those things that are
invisible even to the intellect’.112 However, he continues by making an allusion to
the antihesychasts, ‘if you are totally empty of faith, you will not even believe in
them who confess that they have seen [i.e. the light]’. Nevertheless, ‘if you have
a mediocre faith [or: even a moderate amount of faith], you will hear with piety
those who recount to you, by experience, the mysteries, as far as this could be
possible…’113
This last point, about the ‘μετρίαν πίστιν’, shows that Palamas acknowledges that
the majority of the Christians of his era belong to this group—as also happens to
be the case nowadays—, and tries to address them too: on the one hand he presents
the height to which they could be elevated, but on the other hand, he helps them
not be frustrated by their low faith, or by the fact that the divine light has not yet
been made accessible to them.
In the sections above it was often shown that both the soul and the body play a
role in the νοερὰ αἴσθησις. However, the place of the body in intellectual perception
was not fully analysed; is it true that it has a central role? This is what we shall try to
demonstrate in the following, and last, section.

109 Tr. 1,3,30.11–20, 441 (175.26–177.2): …εἰ γνῶσις ἦν ἡ ὅρασις μόνη, νοητῶς προσγινομένη;
110 Tr. 1,3,30.20–22, 441 (177.2–5): Πῶς οὖν ἑώρακε ταῦθ’ ὁ πρωτομάρτυς ἐκεῖνος, εἰ μήτε νοητῶς εἶδε, μήτε
αἰσθητῶς, μήτ’ ἐξ ἀποφάσεως, μήτε κατ’ αἰτίαν ἢ ἀναλογίαν διανοούμενος τὰ θεῖα;
111 Tr. 1,3,30.22–25, 441 (177.5–8): Ἐγώ σοι παρρησίᾳ ἐρῶ˙ πνευματικῶς, ὡς καὶ τοὺς τὸ ἀκήρατον φῶς δι᾿
ἀποκαλύψεως ὁρῶντας εἶπον, ὃ καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν πατέρων πρότερον ἐξεῖπον.
112 Tr. 1,3,30.25–29, 441 (177.8–13): …Καὶ σὺ τοίνυν, ἂν πλήρης πίστεως καὶ Πνεύματος ἁγίου καταστῇς, τὰ
καὶ νῷ ἀόρατα πνευματικῶς θεάσῃ.
113 Tr. 1,3,30.29–35, 441 (177.13–19): …εἰ δὲ κενὸς εἶ παντάπασι τῆς πίστεως, οὐδὲ τοῖς μαρτυροῦσιν ὃ
ἑωράκασι πιστεύσεις. Πίστιν γὰρ ἔχων μετρίαν, εὐλαβῶς ἀκούσῃ τῶν διηγουμένων κατὰ τὸ ἐγχωροῦν ἐκ
τῆς πείρας τὰ ἀπόρρητα…
 vi s i o n t h ro u g h ec s tas i s and t he ro le o f t he b o dy 183

2. The Road from the Soul to the Body

a. The Spiritual Dispositions Imprinted (ἐνσημαινομένας) on the Body

A very crucial argument of Palamas presented hitherto is that ‘both the human body
itself participates in the grace that operates through the intellect’.114 This was mentioned
as one of the reasons to explain why he uses the word αἴσθησις (perception) in his key
notion of αἴσθησις νοερά.115 To support his position he presents a very crucial argument
at the Hagioretic Tome. He maintains that the spiritual dispositions (πνευματικὰς
διαθέσεις) which come from the charisms of the Spirit ‘in the souls of those who are
making progress in God’ (ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῆ… χαρισμάτων τοῦ πνεύματος), ‘show their
effects [or: are imprinted] (ἐνσημαινομένας) on the body as the result of the charisms
of the Spirit’. Moreover, Palamas knows that the antihesychasts did not accept this
reality, and for him this denial leads to heresy.116 The basic word here is ἐνσημαινομένας,
a rather rare word. What exactly does it mean? Does Palamas use it again in his corpus?
According to the Liddel-Scott Lexicon the verb ἐνσημαίνω (which, among others,
had been used by Aristotle in his De Anima) has mainly the following connotations:117
a) contain a signification, imply; b) report, signal (Pass., to be indicated or expressed);
c) give notice of, intimate; d) give signs one to another; e) impress or stamp upon
(Pass., to be imprinted).
The word ἐνσημαίνεται (or its derivative forms) appears nine times in the Palamite
corpus:118 six of those instances in the Triads (four times in Tr. 1,3 [sections 33, 41
(twice), 42], once in Tr. 2,2 and once in Tr. 2,3), while the other occurrences are
a) in the Hagioretic Tome, 6; b) in the Fourth Antirrhetic Treatise against Akindynos,
14, 36; and c) in the Epistle to the most holy hieromonk Paul Asanes, 2.119 Thus, this
word appears initially in the Triads, and then comes up again in three other texts.
Palamas provides a justification, and an answer to objections, about the
ἐνσημαινομένας τῷ σώματι πνευματικὰς διαθέσεις in different places of his corpus.
So, in Tr. 1,3,33 he argues that the effects of the spiritual realities are manifested not
only in the soul, but also in the body. In particular he there stresses the fact that ‘the
purifying mourning’, which is lived through the grace of God, is not manifested only

114 Tr. 1,3,31.7–8, 442 (179.1–2): …καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ὅτι καὶ τὸ σῶμα μεταλαμβάνει πως τῆς κατὰ νοῦν
ἐνεργουμένης χάριτος…
115 See ch. 6.1.d in this Part.
116 Tomos, 6.1–3, ΠΣ 2, 575, trans. Sinkewicz, 186–87 (modified): Ὅστις τὰς ἐνσημαινομένας τῷ σώματι
πνευματικὰς διαθέσεις ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τῶν κατὰ Θεὸν προκοπτόντων χαρισμάτων τοῦ Πνεύματος οὐ
παραδέχεται…
117 Liddell-Scott Lexicon (1996), 573 (s.v. ἐνσημαίνω).
118 Data retrieved from the TLG; online accessed July 2016.
119 ΠΣ 5, 248.1. In this Epistle to Asanes the verb ἐνσημαίνεται seems to mean ‘imply’, ‘indicate’, ‘signify’,
‘declare’ or ‘symbolize’. Moreover, it is not placed in the context of the spiritual senses, but has
to do with the calling (κλῆσις) to the Christian life (and, in particular, to the monastic ‘schema’
[σχῆμα], which is the subject of this epistle). It should be noted that this text is difficult to be dated.
A suggestion has been made by Christou, placing it in the years 1347–8 (cf. ΠΣ 5, 146). Sinkewicz gives
the date 1334, but also adds a question mark (without further details): see Sinkewicz (2002), 147.
1 84 cha p te r 7

in the human soul, but through the soul it is also transmitted to the body and the
bodily sensations.120 And a clear proof for this ‘are the tears full of pain of those who
mourn for their sins’.121 Palamas wants to argue here that repentance and mourning
for one’s sins, is not something that takes part only in the human soul or spirit. It may
begin there, but is also transmitted to the body; and thus also lived by the body and
the bodily sensations. Therefore, Palamas wonders, ‘why shouldn’t we also accept
with reverence the proofs [or: signs] of spiritual pleasure, for these signs are [also]
manifested (ἐνσημαινόμενα) in (and through) the bodily sensations’?122
St Gregory invokes here the words of Christ, ‘Blessed are those who mourn, for
they shall be comforted’.123 Christ blesses those who mourn, because they will receive
joy (χαρά), ‘the fruit of the Spirit’. But in this consolation (παράκλησις) the body
takes part too, in many ways. These ways are known to them who have ‘experienced
these facts’ (οἱ ἐν πείρᾳ γεγονότες). Moreover, they are also revealed (and made
known) to those persons who meet them, through various external signs, such as
‘their gentle (soft) ethos, sweet tear[s], grace-filled meetings of those who come to
them’.124 Taking all the above into consideration, it seems to me that Sinkewicz is
correct when arguing that ‘Gregory’s concern is to show the progression of grace
from internal activity to exterior manifestation’.125

b. Participation of the Body in Theosis: Now and in the Age to Come

Now Palamas makes an important remark: it is not only the soul that takes part
in the ‘pledge of the goods to come in the future’, but also the body, which walks
together (συνδιανύον) with the soul along the road of the Gospel, which leads to the
blessings of eternity.126 This is a crucial point in Palamas’ teaching. Man, during his

120 Tr. 1,3,33, 443.28–444.1 (181.24–27): Εἰ δὲ καὶ τὸ κατὰ Θεὸν καθάρσιον πένθος οὐκ ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν μόνον
τελεῖται τῶν ἀγωνιζομένων, ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ ταύτης καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν κατὰ σῶμα διαβαίνει αἴσθησιν…
121 Tr. 1,3,33.1–3, 444 (181.27–28): …—καὶ δεῖγμα τούτου ἐναργὲς τὸ κατώδυνον τοῖς ἐφ’ ἁμαρτήμασι
πενθοῦσι δάκρυον—…
122 Tr. 1,3,33.3–5, 444 (181.28–30): …διατί μὴ καὶ τὰ τῆς κατὰ Πνεῦμα θείας ἡδονῆς τεκμήρια, ταῖς
χωρούσαις τοῦ σώματος αἰσθήσεσιν ἐνσημαινόμενα, εὐλαβῶς παραδεξαίμεθα;
123 Mt 5:4: Μακάριοι οἱ πενθοῦντες, ὅτι αὐτοὶ παρακληθήσονται.
124 Tr. 1,3,33.5–12, 444 (181.30–183.6): Τί δὲ καὶ ὁ Κύριος, οὐ διὰ τοῦτο ‘μακαρίζει τοὺς πενθοῦντας’, ἐπειδὴ
‘παρακληθήσονται’, τουτέστι τὴν χαράν, τὸν καρπὸν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἕξουσι τοῦ Πνεύματος; Ἀλλὰ τῆς
παρακλήσεως ταύτης καὶ τὸ σῶμα μεταλαγχάνει πολυτρόπως. Ὧν τοὺς μὲν ἴσασιν οἱ ἐν πείρᾳ γεγονότες,
οἱ δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἔξωθεν ὁρῶσι δῆλοι τὸ προσηνὲς ἦθος, τὸ γλυκὺ δάκρυον, ἡ χαρίτων γέμουσα τοῖς
προσιοῦσιν ἔντευξις κατὰ τόν ἐν ᾌσμασιν εἰπόντα, ‘κηρία μέλιτος ἀπὸ στόματός σου στάζουσι, νύμφη’.
Here Palamas refers to the Song of Songs, i.e. Song 4:11 (with some alteration): ‘Your lips distil honey,
my bride’. St Gregory speaks about the spiritual pleasure that is transmitted both to the body also in
other parts of his texts; cf., e.g., Tr. 2,2,10.
125 Sinkewicz (1999), 385. Again, however, cf. the critical assessment of Sinkewicz’s relevant approach, in
the concluding remarks of this chapter.
126 Tr. 1,3,33.13–15, 444 (183.6–8): Λαμβάνει γὰρ οὐχ ἡ ψυχὴ μόνον τὸν ἀρραβῶνα τῶν μελλόντων ἀγαθῶν,
ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ σῶμα τὸ συνδιανύον τὸν πρὸς ταῦτα τοῦ εὐαγγελίου δρόμον. For some other references to
Fathers (namely Sts Basil, Athanasios, John of the Ladder, and Isaac) to support the fact that the body
participates in the sweetness that the soul receives from prayer, see Tr. 1,3,1, 410.18–411.8 (109.16–28).
 vi s i o n t h ro u g h ec s tas i s and t he ro le o f t he b o dy 185

effort here on earth to attain union with God, has a foretaste of some of the beauties
that he will experience in his life in Paradise. But this effort for union with God is
not made only by the soul. Man is not only ‘spirit’, he is also ‘body’, and this body
participates in man’s spiritual struggle. This is shown through a special word that
Palamas chooses to use: τὸ συνδιανύον. Here one traces the complementarity and
cooperation that exists between soul and body. In Palamas’ mind there is no room
for hostility between body and soul. It could even be maintained that the human
body ‘has the right and privilege’ to also foretaste in this life some of the blessings
of the age to come.127
But Palamas goes even further: if one rejects this fact, ‘then one is also rejecting the
participation of the body in the future age’.128 His argument is simple: if we believe
that the body is really going to participate then in those mysterious blessings, it follows
therefore that it will also take part, καταλλήλως ἑαυτῷ, in the divine grace which is
given to the intellect in this life.129 Some important points should be highlighted
here. First, the human body, according to Palamas, participates in the goods of the
age to come; it takes part in the eternal communion with God. Consequently, it
must also participate in union with God during this earthly life as well. It is not
possible for theology to reject either of these two facts; if this happens, one produces
a problematic theology.
Second, Palamas uses the phrase ‘καταλλήλως ἑαυτῷ’. What exactly does this mean?
One would suggest the following: the καταλλήλως ἑαυτῷ refers to man’s synergy with
God, to the extent that man cooperates with God, that is, how much each human
person permits God to act upon him. This is of course closely related with ascesis.
Therefore, the καταλλήλως ἑαυτῷ may also mean ‘as much as man has progressed in
his spiritual life’. However, there may be also another, very interesting, dimension.
The human body, as it is now created, has some restrictions in perceiving God. For
this reason, it will be ‘transformed’ at the Resurrection of Christ, so as to have full
communion with God. Most probably the καταλλήλως ἑαυτῷ refers to this deficient
reality of the current world, of fallen human nature. This seems to be the reason why
Fr John Meyendorff translates this phrase as conformément à sa nature (‘in accordance
with/compatibly with its nature’).130
The same parallelism, namely between the participation of the body in the ‘ineffable
goods’ now and at that time is also found in the Hagioretic Tome, utilising even certain
identical expressions. However, the καταλλήλως ἑαυτῷ is there replaced by the word
τὸ ἐγχωροῦν. This most probably means ‘according to the body’s potentiality, or to the
extent that the body is capable of συμμετέχειν Θεῷ, of participating in God’. The text
reads as following: ‘the body… will doubtless participate even now as far as possible

127 For a relevant recent article, see Harper (2015).

128 Tr. 1,3,33.15–16, 444 (183.8–10): ὁ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο λέγων, καὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι αἰῶνι μετὰ σώματος
ἀπαναίνεται διαγωγήν.
129 Tr. 1,3,33.16–19, 444 (183.10–13): Εἰ δὲ καὶ τὸ σῶμα συμμεθέξει τότε τῶν ἀπορρήτων ἐκείνων ἀγαθῶν, καὶ
νῦν δήπου συμμεθέξει καταλλήλως ἑαυτῷ τῆς ἐνδιδομένης πρὸς Θεοῦ χάριτος τῷ νῷ.
130 Meyendorff (1973²), 182. Christou seems to give a similar rendering in his modern Greek translation
(i.e. in ΠΑΕ 2, 221).
186 cha p te r 7

(κατὰ τὸ ἐγχωροῦν) in the grace communicated mystically and ineffably by God to the
purified intellect and it will experience the divine realities in a manner appropriate to
it’.131 Behind the phrase ‘τὰ θεῖα πείσεται’ Dionysiοs the Areopagite is hidden: to the
latter is attributed the famous dictum οὐ μόνον μαθῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ παθῶν τὰ θεῖα.132 It
should be noted that, as already seen, this is a phrase that Palamas uses frequently.133
Now St Gregory refers to a noteworthy passage of Diadochos of Photiki:
In those who have detached themselves from the goods of this life for the sake
of the goods to come, the intellect, because of its freedom from worldly care,
acts with vigour and perceives (ἐπαισθάνεται) the ineffable divine goodness
and, according to the measure of its advancement, it also communicates to the
body its own goodness. Such joy that then arises in the soul and in the body is
an infallible reminder of the incorruptible life.134
The important point here is that the intellect, ‘according to its own progress’, transmits
also to the body this goodness that it perceives.135 This is a clear indication of how
communion with God is also transmitted to the body. In other words, how the
body has a crucial role in the operation of the spiritual senses. Of note is the usage
from Diadochos of the word ἐπαισθάνεται. This likely influenced Palamas in his own
usage of the term αἴσθησις νοερά. Besides, as stated above, Diadochos uses the phrase
αἴσθησις τοῦ πνεύματος.136 Consequently, for the above reasons, Sinkewicz seems to
be correct when he maintains that, for Palamas, in this present life ‘the body and its
natural senses have no direct perception of God. The body’s perception of the divine
is mediated through the soul or the intellect’.137

c. Moses, St Stephen, and St Mary of Egypt

Up to now it was maintained that the body participates in the spiritual realities. To
support his relevant arguments Palamas brings three testimonies to bear on the

131 Tomos, 6.9–14, ΠΣ 2, 575, trans. Sinkewicz, 187: Εἰ γὰρ συμμεθέξει τότε τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ σῶμα τῶν
ἀπορρήτων ἀγαθῶν, καὶ νῦν δήπου συμμεθέξει κατὰ τὸ ἐγχωροῦν τῆς χορηγουμένης μυστικῶς καὶ
ἀπορρήτως ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ χάριτος τῷ κεκαθαρμένῳ νῷ καὶ αὐτὸ τὰ θεῖα πείσεται καταλλήλως ἑαυτῷ,
μετασκευασθέντος καὶ ἁγιασθέντος…
132 De divinis nominibus 2, 9, ed. Suchla, PTS 33, 134.1–2.
133 See, e.g., Tr. 1,3,34, 445.21–27 (185.17–24).
134 See Tomos, 6, ΠΣ 2, 575.19–25, trans. Sinkewicz, 187 (slightly changed): ‘ὁ νοῦς εὐρώστως διὰ τὴν
ἀμεριμνίαν κινούμενος τῆς θείας ἀρρήτου χρηστότητος αὐτὸς ἐπαισθάνεται καὶ τῷ σώματι, κατὰ τὸ
μέτρον τῆς ἑαυτοῦ προκοπῆς, τῆς οἰκείας χρηστότητος μεταδίδωσιν∙ ἡ δὲ τοιαύτη ἐγγινομένη χαρὰ τότε
τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τῷ σώματι, ὑπόμνησίς ἐστιν ἀπλανὴς τῆς ἀφθάρτου βιότητος’. The passage that Palamas
provides is slightly different from what the critical ed. gives (= Diadochos, Capita 25, ed. des Places,
97). However, the meaning is not altered. Diadochos argues something similar also in his Capita 79
(p. 137).
135 Tomos, 6.21–23, ΠΣ 2, 575.
136 Diadochos, Capita 15, ed. des Places, 92.
137 Sinkewicz (1999), 386 (slightly modified; Sinkewicz writes ‘mind’ instead of ‘intellect’). For the
transformation of the body in the age to come, so that it may partake in the vision of the divine light,
see ch. 7.2.e.
 vi s i o n t h ro u g h ec s tas i s and t he ro le o f t he b o dy 187

issue: Moses, St Stephen, and St Mary of Egypt. First, as is well-known, when Moses
returned from his encounter with God οn Mount Sinai, his face shined to such a great
extent, that those who were looking at him with their physical eyes were not able to
bear ‘the abundance of this light’.138 Moreover, Palamas states that this light occurred
because ‘the inner brilliancy of the intellect was outpoured also to the body’.139
Second, ‘in a similar way did the physical face of St Stephen appear like the face
of an angel’.140 Palamas clarifies this further: from inside, Stephen’s intellect acquired
an angelic aspect, for it was united to the divine light, ‘in a mysterious participation’,
‘either directly or by consent’ (εἴτε κατ’ ἐπιβολὴν εἴτε κατὰ παραδοχήν). And this
union took place in a way ‘similar and proper to the angelic life’ (ἀγγελομιμήτως τε
καὶ ἀγγελοπρεπῶς).141
Third, Palamas refers to the life of St Mary of Egypt (c. fourth-fifth centuries
[?]).142In her Life it is mentioned that,143 during her prayer, she ‘was elevated above the
ground, sensibly and as really being moved’. According to Palamas this happened for
the following reason: ‘because of the fact that her intellect was elevated, both her body
was also elevated, and having abandoned the earth, it was seen as if it were aerial’.144
All these three examples show, according to Palamas, that the human body is
very much influenced by the progress and movement of the intellect and, moreover,
it participates in the divine grace. But now, an interesting Christological argument
regarding the human heart and the spiritual senses must be presented.

d. A Christological Dimension

In his effort to stress the great affinity and connection between the human soul and
heart, St Gregory writes the following: when ‘the soul is warmed by and rather put

138 Cf. Ex 34:29–35: 29 Moses came down from Mount Sinai. As he came down from the mountain
with the two tablets of the covenant in his hand, Moses did not know that the skin of his face shone
because he had been talking with God. 30 When Aaron and all the Israelites saw Moses, the skin of his
face was shining, and they were afraid to come near him…
139 Tr. 1,3,31.12–15, 442 (179.7–10): Οὕτω Μωσέως ἔλαμψε τὸ πρόσωπον, τῆς ἐντὸς λαμπρότητος τοῦ νοῦ
κἀπὶ τὸ σῶμα περικεχυμένης, καὶ τοσοῦτον ἔλαμψεν ὡς μηδὲ τούς αἰσθητῶς προσβλέποντας αὐτῷ πρὸς
τὴν περιουσίαν τῆς αὐγῆς ἐκείνης ἀτενίζειν ἔχειν.
140 Cf. Act 6:15: ‘And all who sat in the council looked intently at him, and they saw that his face was like
the face of an angel’.
141 Tr. 1,3,31.15–20, 442 (179.11–15): Οὕτως ὤφθη τὸ αἰσθητὸν πρόσωπον Στεφάνου ὡσεὶ πρόσωπον ἀγγέλου∙
καὶ γὰρ ἔνδοθεν αὐτῷ ὁ νοῦς ἀγγελομιμήτως τε καὶ ἀγγελοπρεπῶς, εἴτε κατ’ ἐπιβολὴν εἴτε κατὰ παραδοχὴν
ἑνούμενος τῷ ὑπερανῳκισμένῳ τοῦ παντὸς φωτὶ κατὰ μέθεξιν ἀπόρρητον, ἀγγελοειδὴς ἐγίγνετο.
142 For the life of St Mary, as well as useful relevant bibliography and a translation of her published Vita,
see Kouli (2006).
143 Cf. Kouli, 79, where the testimony of Abbas Zosimas is presented: ‘He swore <to us>, calling upon
God as the witness of his words, that when he saw that she was prolonging her prayers, he raised his
head up a bit from the ground and saw her elevated about one cubit above the earth, hanging in the
air and praying in this way’.
144 Tr. 1,3,31.20–23, 442 (179.15–19): Οὕτως ἡ Αἰγυπτία, μᾶλλον δ’ οὐρανία, Μαρία μετέωρος γέγονε καὶ τὸ
σῶμα εὐχομένη τοπικῶς καὶ αἰσθητῶς, καὶ γάρ, ὑψουμένου τοῦ νοῦ, συνανυψώθη καὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τῆς γῆς
ἀπαναστὰν ὤφθη ἐναέριον.
188 cha p te r 7

into motion [or: excited] from the irresistible love of the only Desirable, also the
heart is put into motion [or: excited]’. Then, the heart experiences some ‘spiritual
leaps’, which ‘prove the communion of grace’, namely the fact that the grace of God
is communicated from the soul to the heart. Palamas argues that this is something
like a preparation—or, rather, anticipation—of the soul for the second coming of
Christ, in the eschata; He ‘who will come on the clouds in His Body, as promised’.145
Of note is that Palamas relates the participation of the human body—here, the human
heart—in the spiritual senses with Christ’s second coming in his Body—and therefore,
Christ’s now being in His body, in the heavens. Thus, in the mind of Palamas the
human body is somehow related to the body of Christ.
In a similar way, when man prays intensely, and ‘when the intelligible fire appears,
and the intelligible flambeau is ignited, and, through spiritual contemplation, the
intellect elevates the love [for God] in a flame reaching high into the air’, then ‘also
the body is made light and warm’. In this case, those who see this person believe
‘that he has come out of the fire of a sensible furnace’.146 In this last point, Palamas
explicitly refers to St John Climacus.147 Worth noting is that St Gregory uses some
important keywords, which clearly place the whole discussion in the context of his
doctrine concerning the spiritual senses: a) ἀναφανέντος, b) ἀναφθείσης, c) καὶ τὸ
σῶμα κουφίζεταί τε καὶ διαθερμαίνεται, and d) τοῖς ὁρῶσιν.
At this moment Palamas presents a very important argument: he gives a clearly
Christological dimension to his theology of intellectual perception. In particular
he refers to the prayer of Jesus to the Father in Gethsemane.148 As mentioned in
Lk 22:44, ‘In his anguish he prayed more earnestly, and his sweat became like great
drops of blood falling down on the ground’. Palamas believes that Christ’s sweat is a
clear sign of the warmth that one feels only when one is intensely praying; and this
warmth is sensibly perceived in one’s body.149
And now St Gregory refers to the opponents of the hesychasts: ‘What will they now
respond to this, those who argue that the warmth produced from prayer is demonic?

145 Tr. 1,3,32.24–28, 442 (179.20–25): Οὕτω τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνθουσιώσης καὶ οἱονεὶ συγκινουμένης τῷ ἀσχέτῳ
ἔρωτι τοῦ μόνου ἐφετοῦ, καὶ ἡ καρδία συγκινεῖται, σκιρτήμασι πνευματικοῖς τὴν κοινωνίαν τῆς χάριτος
ἐνδεικνυμένη καὶ ὥσπερ ἐνθένδε ὁρμωμένη πρὸς τὴν μετὰ σώματος ἐν νεφέλαις κατὰ τὸ ἐπηγγελμένον
τοῦ Κυρίου ὑπαντήν. Cf. Mt 24:30: ‘Then the sign of the Son of Man will appear in heaven, and then all
the tribes of the earth will mourn, and they will see “the Son of Man coming on the clouds of heaven”
with power and great glory’. Mk 13:26. Lk 21:27. 1 Thes 4:17.
146 Tr. 1,3,32, 442.28–443.6 (179.25–31): Οὕτως ἐν τῇ συντόνῳ προσευχῇ, τοῦ νοητοῦ πυρὸς ἀναφανέντος καὶ
τῆς νοητῆς λαμπάδος ἀναφθείσης καὶ εἰς μετέωρον φλόγα διὰ πνευματικῆς θεωρίας τοῦ νοῦ τὸν πόθον
ἀνεγείραντος, καὶ τὸ σῶμα παραδόξως κουφίζεταί τε καὶ διαθερμαίνεται, ὡς ἀπὸ πυρὸς αἰσθητῆς καμίνου
τοῖς ὁρῶσιν ἐξιέναι δοκεῖν, κατὰ τὸν συγγραφέα τῆς πνευματικῆς ἀναβάσεως.
147 Cf. Ladder 28, PG 88, 1137C.
148 The interpretation of the Gethsemane prayer caused many doctrinal disputes during the Monothelite
controversy (seventh century). For an important analysis of how this prayer was approached both
prior, as well as during, the Monothelite controversy, see Bathrellos (2004), 140–47.
149 Tr. 1,3,32.6–8, 443 (179.31–181.2): Ἐμὲ δὲ καὶ ὁ κατὰ τὴν προσευχὴν ἱδρὼς Χριστοῦ τὴν ἐγγινομένην
αἰσθητὴν τῷ σώματι διδάσκει θέρμην ἐκ μόνης τῆς ἐκτενοῦς πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν δεήσεως. Here Palamas
seems to be influenced from Diadochos: see, e.g., his Capita 25 and 79, ed. des Places, 97 and 137
respectively, where the latter speaks about the transmission of grace from the intellect to the body.
 vi s i o n t h ro u g h ec s tas i s and t he ro le o f t he b o dy 189

Or rather, will they teach that one ought not to pray vehemently or intensively, so
that the body—according to the soul’s combat—not receive the warmth which for
them is forbidden?’ For this reason, he claims that the antihesychasts teach a totally
wrong method of praying, one that does not transform man or render him ‘close or
similar to God’ (θεομίμητον).150
Here, the acquisition of a spiritual gift, warmth, is clearly given an ascetical
dimension. This is why Palamas now adds something important. First, he reminds the
reader that man, in the fall, violated God’s commandment and deserted Him in the
pursuit of pleasure (ἡδονήν). He then argues that when man ‘expels pleasure through
the pain of ascesis that one voluntarily’ chooses to follow, ‘then man tastes divine
pleasure—which is free from pain—through intellectual perception (νοερᾷ αἰσθήσει)’.
Furthermore, this pleasure ‘transforms the body also to render it compatible with
divine and impassible love’.151 But a very crucial question arises here: what exactly
is this ‘transformation of the body’?

e. Τhe Transformation of the Body

A very important notion in Palamas’ spiritual senses is the so-called ‘transformation’

of the human body, so that it may participate in spiritual realities. In his Tr. 1,3,36
Palamas offers many useful insights on it. Initially, he wonders: ‘How can bodily
sensation [i.e. the faculty of sense perception] become aware of this light which is
not properly sensible?’152 He answers that this may be attained through the power of
the Holy Spirit. Besides, it is through this power that the Apostles saw the light on
Tabor. This light ‘was shining not only from the flesh that carried in itself the Son,
but also from the cloud which carried in itself the Father’.153 Palamas wants to stress
here that the glory of Christ shone both from His body and His divinity.
Now St Gregory quotes the words of the Apostle Paul (1 Cor 15:44): ‘It is sown
a physical body, it is raised a spiritual body. If there is a physical body, there is also a
spiritual body’.154 This passage points the difference that will occur between this life
and life in the eschaton, as far as the human body is concerned. At present the body
is physical (ψυχικόν), but at that time it will be spiritual (πνευματικόν). Therefore,
Palamas refers to the transformation of the body. And he adds that in Paradise man

150 Tr. 1,3,32.9–15, 443 (181.2–10): Τί δὴ πρὸς ταύτην φήσουσιν οἱ δαιμονιώδη τὴν ἐκ προσευχῆς
ἀποφαινόμενοι θέρμην; Ἢ καί τοῦτο διδάξουσι μὴ ἐναγωνίως, μηδ᾿ ἐκτενῶς προσεύχεσθαι, ἵνα μή, κατὰ
λόγον τοῦ κατὰ ψυχὴν ἀγῶνος, καὶ τὸ σῶμα τὴν ἀπηγορευμένην αὐτοῖς ἐπιδέξηται θέρμην; Ἀλλ᾿ οὗτοι
μὲν ἔστωσαν διδάσκαλοι τῆς μὴ πρὸς Θεὸν ἢ τὸ θεομίμητον φερούσης, μηδὲ μετασκευαζούσης πρὸς τὸ
κρεῖττον τὸν ἄνθρωπον εὐχῆς.
151 Tr. 1,3,32.15–20, 443 (181.10–15): Ἡμεῖς δ’ ἴσμεν ὡς καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν, πρὸς ἣν φεῦ ηὐτομολήσαμεν τῆς
ἐντολῆς ἀφηνιάσαντες, διὰ τῆς ἑκουσίου κατὰ τὴν ἐγκράτειαν ὀδύνης ἀπωθούμενοι, κατὰ τὴν προσευχὴν
αἰσθήσει νοερᾷ γευόμεθα τῆς θείας καὶ ἀμιγοῦς ὀδύνης ἡδονῆς, ἧς θαυμασίως καὶ τὸ σῶμα πρὸς τὸν
ἀπαθῆ καὶ θεῖον ἔρωτα μετασκευασαμένης…
152 Tr. 1,3,36.9–10, 447 (189.10–11): Ἀλλὰ πῶς αἴσθησις σωματικὴ φωτὸς ἀντιλήψεται μὴ κυρίως αἰσθητοῦ;
153 Tr. 1,3,36.10–14, 447 (189.11–15): …οὐκ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐν ἑαυτῇ φερούσης τὸν Υἱὸν σαρκὸς μόνον ἀπαστράπτον,
ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐν ἑαυτῇ φερούσης τὸν Πατέρα τοῦ Χριστοῦ νεφέλης.
154 σπείρεται σῶμα ψυχικόν, ἐγείρεται σῶμα πνευματικόν. ἔστι σῶμα ψυχικόν, καὶ ἔστι σῶμα πνευματικόν.
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will be able to see the divine light because his body ‘will be spiritual, and it will see
spiritually’.155 In other words, through its transformation, the body will be able to
sense the spiritual realities spiritually, in a spiritual manner.
But here a question arises: is it easy for humans to understand in this life their
capacity for union with God? Palamas would have a negative answer to this matter.
He believes that our bodily situation renders it difficult to realize the existence of
the νοερὰ αἴσθησις. To prove this, he mentions something similar: he argues that it
is difficult for us to even realize that we have an intellectual soul, because of the fact
that the power of the ‘flesh’ is so strong in humans.156 On the other hand, however,
in Paradise, the body ‘will be hidden, as it were, because humans will acquire [or:
will be transformed to] the angelic dignity’.157
Furthermore, St Gregory continues, the body ‘will become [very] thin, to such
an extent that it will no longer appear material at all’. In such a state the body ‘will
not obscure the intellectual activities’. This will happen due to a total ‘victory of the
intellect’. ‘For this reason’, Palamas concludes, ‘humans will delight in the divine
light also with their bodily sensations’.158 In other words, the body will be, as it were,
absorbed by the intellect. It will become spiritual, and thus, at that time, man will
see the divine light through his body too.
St Gregory refers explicitly to a passage of St Maximos, which seems to play an
important role in Palamas’ own theology of the spiritual senses. In particular, in his
Theological Chapters Maximos argues that, in the divine Kingdom, in Paradise, the
soul will become
god by participation in divine grace, ceasing from all activity of intellect and sense,
and at the same time suspending all the natural operations of the body. For the
body is deified along with the soul through its own corresponding participation

155 Tr. 1,3,36.14–18, 447 (189.15–19): …πνευματικὸν δ’ ὂν καὶ πνευματικῶς ὁρῶν τῆς θείας εἰκότως
ἀντιλήψεται αὐγῆς.
156 Tr. 1,3,36.18–22, 447 (189.20–25): Καὶ ὥσπερ νῦν ἔργον ἐστὶν ἰδεῖν ὡς ἔχομεν νοερὰν ψυχήν, καθ’ ἑαυτὴν
ὑφεστάναι δυναμένην διὰ τὴν παχεῖαν ταύτην σάρκα καὶ θνητὴν καὶ ἀντίτυπον ἐπηλυγάζουσαν καὶ
κατασπῶσαν, σωματοειδῆ τε καὶ φανταστικὴν μάλιστα καθιστῶσαν τὴν ψυχήν, διὸ καὶ τὴν κατὰ νοῦν
νοερὰν ἀγνοοῦμεν αἴσθησιν… It seems to me that Meyendorff gives an incorrect translation as far
as the phrase ‘Καὶ ὥσπερ νῦν ἔργον ἐστὶν ἰδεῖν ὡς ἔχομεν νοερὰν ψυχήν’ is concerned. In particular,
he translates it as following: ‘Aujourd’hui nous pouvons réellement voir que nous avons une âme
intellectuelle qui possède une existence propre dans…’ In other words, he regards that the phrase
ἔργον ἐστὶν should be translated as ‘we can indeed [or: really] (see)…’ However, according to the
Liddell-Scott Lexicon (1996) (p. 683, s.v. ἔργον) the phrase ἔργον ἐστὶν followed by an infinitive (as
here: ἰδεῖν) has the meaning of ‘it is hard work, difficult to do’. For this reason, Christou seems to give
the correct rendering in his modern Greek translation (ΠΑΕ 2, 227): ‘And as now it is difficult for us to
see that we have a rational soul…’ (emphasis added). Moreover, Kontostergiou (in Romanides (ed.),
(1991), 425) gives the same modern Greek rendering.
157 Tr. 1,3,36.22–25, 447 (189.25–28): …ὡσανεὶ τὸ σῶμα κρυβήσεται εἰς ἀγγέλων κατὰ τὸ Εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ
Χριστοῦ μεταποιηθεῖσιν ἀξίαν. Cf. Mt 22:30. Mk 12:25. Lk 20:36.
158 Tr. 1,3,36.25–28, 447 (189.28–31): …διαλεπτυνθήσεται γάρ, ὡς μηδ’ ὕλην ὅλως εἶναι δοκεῖν, μηδ’
ἐπιπροσθεῖν ταῖς νοεραῖς ἐνεργείαις, ἐκνικήσαντος τοῦ νοῦ. Διὰ τοῦτο καὶ σωματικαῖς αἰσθήσεσιν
ἀπολαύσονται τοῦ θεϊκοῦ φωτός.
 vi s i o n t h ro u g h ec s tas i s and t he ro le o f t he b o dy 191

in the process of deification. Thus God alone is made manifest through the
soul and the body, since their natural properties have been overcome by the
superabundance of His glory.159
Based on this passage, Palamas makes the following significant comments: First, ‘God
is invisible to creatures, but is not invisible in Himself ’.160 In Paradise, however, man
will see God, but in fact God will be ‘the One who sees’ (ὁ Θεὸς ὁ βλέπων ἔσται).
Furthermore, this will take place not only through our human soul, but also through
our body. ‘For this reason, we shall see the divine and inaccessible light, in a most
clear way, also through our bodily organs’.161
St Gregory argues that in the eschata man will be totally united with God, and
thus be able to see Him. Moreover, in this vision of God the whole human person
will participate, both soul and body. Τhis will be done through what St Maximos
described in the aforementioned passage, namely a cessation of ‘all activity of
intellect and sense, and at the same time suspending all the natural operations of the
body’.162 This entails an ‘overcoming of the natural properties [or: activities]’. Then,
the divinization of the body occurs (συνθεωθέντος αὐτῇ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογοῦσαν αὐτῷ
μέθεξιν τῆς θεώσεως). Undoubtedly, these points show how great a value Palamas
attributes to the human body.163
Furthermore, St Gregory points out two significant passages of St Macarios which
are relevant to our topic.164 According to Palamas, the first reads: ‘The deiform image
of the Spirit, which is now imprinted on us (νῦν ἔνδον ὥσπερ ἐντυπωθείσα), will make
(ἀπεργάσεται) then [in Paradise] also the body—which is external (ἔξω) [in relation
to the soul]—deiform (θεοειδές) and celestial’.165 And the second: ‘God, reconciled
with humans, restores (ἀποκαθίστησι) the soul which has truly believed—although

159 Maximos, Cap. Th., 2, 88, PG 90, 1168A, trans. from The Philokalia, vol. 2, 160. Palamas gives the
passage in this form [Tr. 1,3,37.2–8, 448 (191.2–9)]: ἡ ψυχὴ… γίνεται Θεὸς τῇ μεθέξει τῆς θεϊκῆς
χάριτος, πασῶν τῶν κατὰ νοῦν τε καὶ αἴσθησιν αὐτὴ τε παυσαμένη καὶ τὰς τοῦ σώματος συναποπαύσασα
φυσικὰς ἐνεργείας, συνθεωθέντος αὐτῇ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογοῦσαν αὐτῷ μέθεξιν τῆς θεώσεως, ὥστε μόνον
τὸν Θεὸν διά τε τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος τότε φαίνεσθαι, νικηθέντων αὐτῶν, τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τῆς δόξης
τῶν φυσικῶν γνωρισμάτων.
160 Tr. 1,3,37.8–10, 448 (191.9–11): Ἐπεὶ τοίνυν… τοῖς κτιστοῖς ἀόρατος ὁ Θεός, ἑαυτῷ δὲ οὐκ ἀόρατος…
161 Tr. 1,3,37.10–13, 448 (191.11–14): …τότε δὲ οὐ μόνον διὰ τῆς καθ’ ἡμᾶς ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τοῦ σώματος,
ὢ τοῦ θαύματος, ὁ Θεὸς ὁ βλέπων ἔσται, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ διὰ σωματικῶν ὀργάνων τότε τὸ θεϊκὸν καὶ
ἀπρόσιτον φῶς τηλαυγῶς ὀψόμεθα…
162 πασῶν τῶν κατὰ νοῦν τε καὶ αἴσθησιν αὐτὴ τε παυσαμένη καὶ τὰς τοῦ σώματος συναποπαύσασα φυσικὰς
ἐνεργείας.
163 About Palamas’ approach to the ‘cessation of all intellectual activity’, see ch. 7.1.e of this Part. For the
stance of St Maximos the Confessor on the human body, see the important book of Cooper (2005).
164 Tr. 1,3,43, 454.26–455.5 (205.15–22): ‘ἡ θεοειδὴς τοῦ Πνεύματος εἰκὼν νῦν ἔνδον ὥσπερ ἐντυπωθεῖσα,
καὶ τὸ σῶμα θεοειδὲς ἔξω τότε καὶ οὐράνιον ἀπεργάσεται’. Καὶ πάλιν˙ ‘τῇ ἀνθρωπότητι καταλλαγεὶς ὁ
Θεός, ἀποκαθίστησι τὴν πιστεύσασαν ἐν ἀληθείᾳ ψυχήν, ἐν σαρκὶ οὖσαν ἔτι, εἰς τὴν τῶν οὐρανίων φώτων
ἀπόλαυσιν καὶ τὰ νοερὰ αὐτῆς αἰσθητήρια τῷ θείῳ πάλιν φωτὶ τῆς χάριτος ὀμματοῖ, ὕστερον δὲ καὶ αὐτῷ
τῷ σώματι περιβαλεῖ τῇ δόξῃ’. Palamas mentions both of these passages in a different form than what
appears in the critical edition available nowadays. However, he does not seem to alter their meaning.
See relevantly below for the references to the critical edition.
165 Cf. Macarios, Homily 58, 3,2.12–16, ed. Berthold, ΙΙ, 185.
1 92 cha p te r 7

it is still in the body (ἐν σαρκὶ οὖσαν ἔτι)—to the pleasure of the celestial lights, and
gives sight again to its intellectual senses (καὶ τὰ νοερὰ αὐτῆς αἰσθητήρια… ὀμματοῖ)
through the divine light of grace; after that [i.e. in the Resurrection] He will enclose
with glory even the body itself ’.166 It is worth noting that, in this context, Palamas
seizes the opportunity to argue that ‘the spiritual person consists of three elements:
grace of the heavenly Spirit, rational soul, and earthly body’.167 In addition, as already
mentioned, he again describes the vision of Tabor as a ‘preamble and pledge of the
age to come’.168

f. The Role of the Heart

Finally, there remains a last issue to be examined: what is the role of the human heart
in the activation of the spiritual senses? As already exhibited, St Gregory is opposed
to those who believe that ‘knowledge of beings and ascent to God may be attained
through profane wisdom’.169 For him, these two are attained only through the grace
of God. He refers again to an important text of St Maximos: ‘When God comes to
dwell in such a heart, He honors it by engraving His own letters on it through the
Holy Spirit, just as He did on the Mosaic tablets’ (cf. Ex 31:18).170 Then Palamas refers
to the words of St Paul in 2 Cor 3:3: ‘And you show that you are a letter from Christ
delivered by us, written not with ink but with the Spirit of the living God, not on
tablets of stone but on tablets of human [or: fleshly] hearts’.171 Citing this passage
St Gregory wonders: ‘Where are those who regard the inner heart insusceptible of
God?’172 In other words, the heart is where the grace of God is received.
To support his position St Gregory refers to a key text of St Macarios: ‘…the
heart directs and governs all the other organs of the body. And when grace pastures
the heart, it rules over all the members and the thoughts. For there, in the heart, the
intellect (νοῦς) abides as well as all the thoughts of the soul and all its hopes. This is
how grace penetrates throughout all parts of the body’.173

166 Cf. Macarios, Homily 58, 3,3, ed. Berthold, II, 185.20–186.6: …καὶ τὰ νοερὰ αὐτῆς αἰσθητήρια πάλιν
ἀποκαθίστησι… καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐν τῇ ἀναστάσει ἀποκατασταθήσεται τὸ σῶμα εἰς τὴν ἀθάνατον καὶ
ἄφθαρτον δόξαν…
167 Tr. 1,3,43.24–26, 454 (205.12–14): Ἄλλως τε καὶ ὁ πνευματικὸς ἄνθρωπος ἐκ τριῶν ὑφέστηκε, χάριτος
Πνεύματος ἐπουρανίου, ψυχῆς λογικῆς καὶ γηΐνου σώματος. Christou (ΠΣ 1, 454 n. 4) notes that this
trichotomic division of man goes back to the Apologists (mainly Tatianos) and Irenaeus.
168 Tr. 1,3,37.13–15, 448 (191.14–17).
169 Tr. 1,3,41.9–10, 452 (199.21–23): Ποῦ εἰσιν οἱ διὰ τῆς ἔξω καὶ μωρανθείσης σοφίας τὴν γνῶσιν τῶν ὄντων
καὶ τὴν πρὸς Θεὸν ἄνοδον δογματίζοντες;
170 Cap. Th., 2, 80, PG 90, 1161D–64A, trans. from The Philokalia, vol. 2, 158: ἐν ᾗ γενόμενος ὁ Θεός, ἀξιοῖ
τὰ ἴδια γράμματα διὰ τοῦ Πνεύματος ἐγχαράττειν, καθάπερ τισὶ πλαξὶ Μωσαϊκαῖς… Palamas writes
ἐγχαράττεσθαι instead of ἐγχαράττειν. See Tr. 1,3,41.10–13, 452 (199.23–25).
171 οὐκ ἐν πλαξὶ λιθίναις, ἀλλ’ ἐν πλαξὶ καρδίαις σαρκίναις. Palamas writes καρδίας, instead of καρδίαις.
172 Tr. 1,3,41.13–16, 452 (199.25–29): Ποῦ εἰσιν οἱ τῆν ἐντὸς καρδίαν ἀνεπίδεκτον Θεοῦ λογιζόμενοι…;
173 Macarios, Homilies, 15, 20.283–87, ed. Dörries, 139, PTS 4, trans. Maloney, 116: ἡ γὰρ καρδία ἡγεμονεύει
καὶ βασιλεύει ὅλου τοῦ σωματικοῦ ὀργάνου, καὶ ἑπὰν κατάσχῃ τὰς νομὰς τῆς καρδίας ἡ χάρις, βασιλεύει
ὅλων τῶν μελῶν καί τῶν λογισμῶν∙ ἐκεῖ γάρ ἐστιν ὁ νοῦς καὶ ὅλοι οἱ λογισμοὶ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ ἡ προσδοκία
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Moreover, St Gregory presents another important text of St Maximos, which

perhaps influenced the former in his own use of the words ἐνσημαινομένας:174 ‘A pure
heart is one which offers the intellect (νοῦν) to God free of all images and form, and
ready to be imprinted only with His own archetypes, by which God Himself is made
manifest’.175 Based on this, Palamas argues that knowledge which comes by means of
divine illumination is superior to profane knowledge: ‘How can the intellect, which
is free of all images, and which is imprinted with God’s archetypes, not be superior
to the knowledge which is derived from beings?’176 Perhaps St Gregory here again
has in mind the theology of the logoi.177
Furthermore, Palamas argues that ‘imprinting the intellect with the divine
and secret signs of the Holy Spirit’ is far superior to ‘the ascent of the reasoning
(διανοίας) towards God through negation’.178 Again St Gregory here emphasises the
superiority of theoptia over theologia, because the former is attained through the light
of God: ‘talking about God and meeting God are not the same thing’.179 Palamas
is clear that theosis is something impossible, if seen only in the context of common
human measures: ‘To possess God in one’s self, and be purely related to God, and
be commingled with the pure and unadulterated light, as far as it is attainable for
human nature, belongs to the sphere of the impossible’.180
However, in order for theosis to be achieved, it is essential that: a) man be
purified through virtue; b) ‘man go out of himself or better, beyond himself ’; c)
‘man abandon sensation, as well as every sensible thing’; d) and ‘man be elevated
above thoughts and intellection and knowledge derived from these’.181 Then ‘we are
totally given over to the immaterial and intellectual activity of the prayer, and receive

αὐτῆς, διὸ καὶ διέρχεται εἰς ὅλα τὰ μέλη τοῦ σώματος. Palamas instead of the last phrase (i.e. from καὶ ἡ
προσδοκία…) writes ἐκεῖ τοίνυν δεῖ σκοπεῖν, εἰ ἐνέγραψεν ἡ χάρις τοὺς τοῦ Πνεύματος νόμους. See Tr.
1,3,41.16–21, 452 (199.29–201.3).
174 For this word (ἐνσημαινομένας) see the relevant sub-section of this chapter (i.e. ch.7.2.a).
175 Maximos, Cap. Th. 2, 82, PG 90, 1164A, trans. from The Philokalia, vol. 2, 158 (slightly modified):
Καρδία ἐστὶ καθαρά, ἡ παντάπασιν ἀνείδεον τῷ Θεῷ καὶ ἀμόρφωτον παραστήσασα τῆν μνήμην∙ καὶ
μόνοις τοῖς αὐτοῦ ἔτοιμον ἐνσημανθῆναι τύποις, δι’ ὧν ἐμφανὴς πέφυκε γίνεσθαι. Palamas gives the
passage in a slightly different form: Καρδία καθαρὰ ἐστὶν ἡ παντάπασιν ἀνείδεον παραστήσασα τὸν
νοῦν τῷ Θεῷ καὶ μόνοις τοῖς αὐτοῦ ἕτοιμον ἐνσημαίνεσθαι τύποις, δι’ ὧν ἐμφανὴς πέφυκε γίνεσθαι. See
Tr. 1,3,41.21–25, 452 (201.3–8). As Meyendorff (p. 200 n. 3) and Christou point out (ΠΣ 1, 452 n. 6),
Maximos takes this text directly from Mark the Ascetic, Cap. de temperantia, 24, PG 65, 1064B.
176 Tr. 1,3,41.4–5, 453 (201.14–16): Πῶς γὰρ ὁ ἀνείδεος νοῦς, ὁ καὶ τοῖς θείοις ἐνσημαινόμενος τύποις, οὐχ
ὑπεράνω τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν ὄντων γνώσεως;
177 For a discussion of this issue, see ch. 2.1 of the current book.
178 Tr. 1,3,42.6–8, 453 (201.17–19): Ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς δι’ ἀποφάσεων πρὸς Θεὸν ἀνόδου τῆς διανοίας τὸ θείοις καὶ
ἀπορρήτοις τὸν νοῦν ἐνσημαίνεσθαι τοῦ Πνεύματος τύποις κατὰ πολύ διενήνοχε.
179 Tr. 1,3,42.8–12, 453 (201.19–23): …περὶ Θεοῦ γάρ τι λέγειν καὶ Θεῷ συντυγχάνειν οὐχὶ ταὐτόν. Cf. ch.
7.1.b.
180 Tr. 1,3,42.20–22, 453 (203.2–4): Θεὸν δ’ ἐν ἑαυτῷ κτήσασθαι καὶ Θεῷ καθαρῶς συγγενέσθαι καὶ τῷ
ἀκραιφνεστάτῳ φωτὶ κραθῆναι, καθ’ ὅσον ἐφικτὸν ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει, τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστίν…
181 Tr. 1,3,42.23–26, 453 (203.4–8): …εἰ μὴ πρὸς τῇ δι’ ἀρετῆς καθάρσει καὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἔξω, μᾶλλον δὲ
ὑπεράνω, γενοίμεθα, καταλιπόντες μὲν πᾶν ὅ τι τῶν αἰσθητῶν μετὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως, ὑπεραρθέντες
λογισμῶν καὶ διανοιῶν καὶ τῆς διὰ τούτων γνώσεως…
1 94 cha p te r 7

the ignorance which surpasses all knowledge, and are filled in it [i.e. ignorance]
with the superior splendour of the Spirit’. In this state, ‘we will be invisibly seeing
the prizes of the nature of the immortal world’, of Paradise.182 The goal of spiritual
contemplation is ‘the mysterious communion and inexpressible vision (ὅρασις)
of the Mystery, the mystical and ineffable contemplation and taste (γεῦσις) of the
eternal light’.183 Of note is the usage of such strong words as ὅρασις and γεῦσις, which
show the importance that Palamas lays on the activation of man’s spiritual senses,
so that one may see God.

3. Concluding Remarks: Is the Participation of the Body

a ‘Created Effect of Grace’? An Assessment of some
Arguments of Sinkewicz

In this chapter the vision of the divine light through ecstasis and the role of the body
were examined. It was shown that the vision of the light is attained through self
transcendence, which is superior to abstraction or negation (apophasis). In other
words, the superiority of theoptia to theologia was stressed. Moreover, in intellectual
perception (αἴσθησις νοερά) the body does have an important role. Thus, in Palamas’
mind, the theology of the spiritual dispositions imprinted (ἐνσημαινομένας) on
the body has a central place in how divine grace shows its effects on the human
body. These include, e.g., the peace that a hesychast feels, joy, bodily warmth, heart
palpitations, etc. Nevertheless, the body has to be transformed, both in this life and
in the eschaton, so as to participate in the divine realities.
On the basis of what has been mentioned so far, two claims of Sinkewicz need
to be scrutinized. Both of them are expressed in his important article on Palamas’
Concept of Spiritual Perception (1999), and refer to the eschatological dimension of
the αἴσθησις νοερά. First, speaking about ‘the absorption of the flesh by the Spirit in
the future age’, Sinkewicz supports that ‘Because sensible experiences are involved,
the body’s transformation in the present age can be ascribed to a created effect of
grace’.184 Second, he maintains that
the eschatological spiritual perception of the body, according to Palamas, is
primarily concerned with the vision of the divine Light. Since the divine Light
is non-sensible, the body must undergo a transformation or divinization. This
is the same transformation that takes place in the soul during the present life.
However, even now the body receives a foretaste or pledge of these future goods
in the sensible experiences of grace and the transformation effected thereby. The

182 Tr. 1,3,42.26–30, 453 (203.8–12): …ὅλοι δὲ γενόμενοι τῆς ἀΰλου καὶ νοερᾶς κατὰ τὴν προσευχὴν
ἐνεργείας, καὶ τυχόντες τῆς ὑπὲρ τὴν γνῶσιν ἀγνοίας, καὶ πλησθέντες ἐν αὐτῇ τῆς τοῦ Πνεύματος
ὑπερφαοῦς ἀγλαΐας, ὡς ἀθανάτου κόσμου γέρα φύσεως ἀοράτως καθορᾶν.
183 Tr. 1,3,42.9–11, 454 (203.23–25): …ἡ κρυφία τοῦ κρυφίου μετουσία καὶ ὅρασις ἀνέκφραστος, ἡ μυστικὴ
καὶ ἀπόρρητος τοῦ αἰωνίου φωτὸς θεωρία τε καὶ γεῦσις.
184 Sinkewicz (1999), 388.
 vi s i o n t h ro u g h ec s tas i s and t he ro le o f t he b o dy 195

eschatological and present transformation of the body are different in kind. The
latter is a created effect of grace, whereas the former involves divinization.185
It could be said that at least two main assertions can be uncovered here: the first having
to do with a ‘created effect of grace’, and the second with the two forms, or types, of
bodily transformation. It seems that the second argument contains, and presupposes,
the first. To my mind Sinkewicz’s approach is not without certain problems.186 First
of all, a problem may be found in the phrase ‘the body’s transformation in the present
age can be ascribed to a created effect of grace’. On the one hand, as laid out in the
current Part of this book, there are indeed some effects of divine grace which are
shown or manifested (‘imprinted’) in the body. These can be acknowledged as created
effects of grace. In other words, whereas the divine activity is uncreated, some of its
effects on man are created.187 But why is that? Because man, both soul and body, is
created, namely he is a creature of God. Besides, Palamas himself speaks about the
warmth that the body feels during prayer, or the joy, peace, etc., the bodily levitation
of St Mary the Egyptian,188 or even about the sweat of Christ in Gethsemane.189 All
these may be recognized as created effects of grace.
In general, it is not false to say that creation, the world, is a created effect, or
product, of an uncreated divine activity. However, this would be problematic, if
it were understood in such a way as to diminish the idea of uncreated grace, and
ultimately make this grace itself created.190 This would, of course, be in no way
acceptable to Palamas. Moreover, a problem is found in the fact that Palamas, as far
as I know, does not specifically mention anywhere that the body’s transformation
in the present age is a created effect of grace. If this were the case, wouldn’t he have
mentioned it? Perhaps he avoids this, for he sees the danger of reducing the divine
activities to something created.

185 Sinkewicz (1999), 389.

186 I am grateful to Fr Maximos Constas for discussing this topic with me and helping me with his
instructive observations.
187 This is an indispensable qualification, because there are also other effects which are not created,
e.g. theosis, which is, besides, an effect of the divine activity. Meyendorff handles with the topic of
‘created grace and uncreated grace’ in his Introduction, i.e. Meyendorff (1959a) 230–32 (= Meyendorff
(1974a), 162–64).
188 In the synaxaria (the lives of the saints), one may find other similar situations. For instance, in the Life
of St Maximos Kapsokalyvites (fourteenth century), the saint was seen flying somewhere over the
Holy Mountain. For a very interesting account of his life, and the theological and historical context of
his era, see Ware (1988).
189 Ιt seems that, according to Palamas, Christ’s human sweat is indeed a created effect of the uncreated
grace, for it is related with, and manifested on, Christ’s human body, which was created (despite
totally connected with the Divinity). See relevantly, ch. 7.2.d of this book.
190 This would be similar to the way that some western theologians interpret the divine θελήματα not
as divine ‘wills’, but as the ‘products of the divine will’. For instance, Blowers and Wilken (2003),
61 translate theia thelemata as ‘products of the divine will’. However, Bradshaw (2004), 205 n. 64
is correct in noticing that ‘This would make them creatures, whereas in fact they are principles of
creation, preexisting collectively in the Logos’. I draw these remarks from Fr Maximos Constas
(2014), vol. 1, 481–82 n. 30, and I am grateful to him for calling them into my attention.
196 cha p te r 7

In order to support his thesis, which he deems definitive,191 Sinkewicz refers to

Tr. 1,3,28 where Palamas argues that all sensible things are created.192 However, the
reason why Palamas mentions this is to explain that the light of God is not sensible.
This is obvious when one reads this chapter of the Triads. The same could be also
maintained for the second passage that Sinkewicz provides (i.e., in Tr. 1,3,27). In
particular, Palamas says there that ‘nothing sensible is eternal’.193 However, again
Palamas refers to the fact that the divine light is timeless, therefore non sensible.
And here lies a mystery: whereas it is not sensible, the divine light can be sensibly
perceived by man. This is accomplished through man’s spiritual senses.
In addition, in order to sustain his argument, Sinkewicz states that ‘The hesychast
prayer experiences are definitively sense perceptible since they can be perceived by
others who see οὐκ αἰσθητῶς’.194 To support this he mentions two examples. First,
that of Moses, namely the fact that the light that shone from his face was seen from
those who were close to him, and, as shown above,195 Palamas maintains that this
light occurred because ‘the inner brilliancy of the intellect was outpoured also to the
body’.196 Second, an aforementioned197 passage from St John of the Ladder, who
argues that when the ‘intelligible fire’ appears, during intense prayer, then ‘also the
body is made light and warm’. Moreover, those who see this person regard ‘that he
has come out of the fire of a sensible furnace’.198
However, it should be underlined here that those people ‘who see οὐκ αἰσθητῶς’
do not perceive the ‘hesychast prayer experiences’—that which in the first example
only Moses perceives—, but simply some external signs, or effects, of this prayer. As
Sinkewicz himself clarifies elsewhere in his article, this means that ‘there is something
which can be perceived externally through the senses by those who have seen the
saints who possess this grace’.199 The examples of Moses, St Stephen, and St Mary
of Egypt all affirm this reality.
As far as the second statement of Sinkewicz is concerned, there is indeed a
difference regarding the transformation of the body now and in the future age.
Palamas is clear on this, when he says that the absorption of the body will happen
only in the age to come, and not in the present, and that the body will be divinized
only in Paradise. However, it seems to me that it is not correct to totally exclude
theosis from this current life. To speak the truth, the transformation which the body

191 Sinkewicz (1999), 388 n. 68 writes: ‘This is clear from what Palamas says in…’, and he then cites Tr.
1,3,27–28.
192 Tr. 1,3,28.19–20, 439 (171.29–30): Τί δὲ τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὐ κτίσμα;
193 Tr. 1,3,27.22, 438 (169.20): Καὶ μὴν οὐδὲν αἰσθητὸν ἀΐδιον.
194 Sinkewicz (1999), 388 n. 68.
195 In ch. 7.2.c of this Part.
196 Tr. 1,3,31.12–15, 442 (179.7–10): …τῆς ἐντὸς λαμπρότητος τοῦ νοῦ κἀπὶ τὸ σῶμα περικεχυμένης…
197 In ch. 7.2.d of this Part.
198 Tr. 1,3,32, 442.28–443.6 (179.25–31): Οὕτως ἐν τῇ συντόνῳ προσευχῇ, τοῦ νοητοῦ πυρὸς ἀναφανέντος καὶ
τῆς νοητῆς λαμπάδος ἀναφθείσης καὶ εἰς μετέωρον φλόγα διὰ πνευματικῆς θεωρίας τοῦ νοῦ τὸν πόθον
ἀνεγείραντος, καὶ τὸ σῶμα παραδόξως κουφίζεταί τε καὶ διαθερμαίνεται, ὡς ἀπὸ πυρὸς αἰσθητῆς καμίνου
τοῖς ὁρῶσιν ἐξιέναι δοκεῖν…
199 Sinkewicz (1999), 385.
 vi s i o n t h ro u g h ec s tas i s and t he ro le o f t he b o dy 197

undergoes in this life is strongly connected with theosis. In other words, whereas it
is somehow different from divinization in Paradise, it is indeed communion with the
divine activities, and thus participation in theosis. Consequently, it could be argued
that it is a ‘first stage, or first step, of theosis’, what one could call an ‘anticipation of
theosis’, namely a preparation for theosis in the eschaton.
To put it in another way, it is a foretaste of theosis in this present life. Besides,
theosis is not a static state or condition. On the contrary, it is a process, even if one
refers to the future, eschatological state: even in the age to come, there is growth.
Therefore, the process or experience of theosis unfolds along a much larger continuum.
Although the topic in general is a mystery, and, thus, may be not fully understood by
our mind, it seems to me that this interpretation is not inconsistent with the thought
of Palamas. Besides, this is what he refers to when he speaks about the ‘pledge’ of
future goods.
Furhermore, Sinkewicz writes that ‘the eschatological spiritual perception of
the body, according to Palamas, is primarily concerned with the vision of the divine
Light’.200 However, one may ask, why does Sinkewicz ‘narrow’ the vision of the light
only to the eschatological sphere? Isn’t intellectual perception closely related to the
divine light even in this life? The goal of the hesychast is to perceive God; and this
is attained through seeing the light.
To sum up, there does not seem to be any real need to make this kind of distinction
between a ‘created effect of grace’ and ‘divinization’, as far as the transformation of
the body is concerned.201 Moreover, and, not least, this introduces a dichotomy
between the two that does not seem to be accurate. The grace that affects the body
of the saint in this life is not a different grace than the grace of divinization, in either
this life or the next one. Consequently, this seems to be mistaken, and not consistent
with what Palamas wants to argue.

200 Sinkewicz (1999), 389.

201 It is worth noting that Sinkewicz does not seem to repeat these arguments in his later, brief and
synoptic, but perhaps more mature, account of Palamas’ intellectual perception, namely his ‘Gregory
Palamas’, 131–88 (see, mainly, pp. 155–61), which appeared three years after his aforementioned article,
i.e. in 2002.
 Conclusion
The Palamite αἴσθησις νοερά: Palamas’ Dynamic of Thinking
of Man as a Being which may ‘Taste’ God

In scholarship, it is usually noticed that the notion of the spiritual senses is widely
used by the Fathers. However, as it seems, there is an aspect of this issue that has
not been much explored: the fact that this concept is very often found also in the
liturgical texts of the Eastern Orthodox Church. For instance, in the Prayer of the
Gospel, the priest reads: ‘Master, Lover of mankind, make the pure light of your
divine knowledge shine in our hearts and open the eyes of our mind to understand the
message of your Gospel… For you are the illumination of our souls and bodies…’1 It
is noteworthy that this prayer has some important phrases—such as the eyes of the
mind (διάνοια), the shining of the light of God’s knowledge, the illumination of both
soul and body—, which clearly point to the activation of man’s spiritual senses from
God, and which remind us of Palamas’ own approach.
The same could be said for, e.g., the Third Prayer of the Matins: ‘Enlighten the eyes
of our understanding, lest we ever sleep unto death in sins…’2 Or, also, the Twelfth
Prayer of the same office: ‘Make the true sun of justice shine in our hearts; enlighten
our intellect and guard all our senses, so that, walking uprightly by day in the way of
your commandments, we may reach eternal life…’3 Moreover, in the first Prayer of
the Ablution, in Baptism, the priest says: ‘Master and Lord… be well pleased for the
illumination of your face to shine for ever in his/her heart…’4 Many other relevant
occurrences could be mentioned, both liturgical and hymnographical, but a fuller
presentation goes beyond the scope of the present book.
St Gregory Palamas was, initially, a priest-monk, and then became a bishop. He
celebrated very often the Divine Liturgy and the other offices of the Church. Therefore,
he surely knew the above references in the offices well, regarding the great importance

1 Ἔλλαμψον ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ἡμῶν, φιλάνθρωπε Δέσποτα, τὸ τῆς σῆς θεογνωσίας ἀκήρατον φῶς, καὶ τοὺς
τῆς διανοίας ἡμῶν διάνοιξον ὀφθαλμοὺς εἰς τὴν τῶν εὐαγγελικῶν σου κηρυγμάτων κατανόησιν… Σὺ γὰρ
εἶ ὁ φωτισμὸς τῶν ψυχῶν καὶ τῶν σωμάτων ἡμῶν…, trans. Lash (2011), 30 (italics added).
2 …φώτισον τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς τῶν διανοιῶν ἡμῶν, μήποτε ὑπνώσωμεν ἐν ἁμαρτίαις εἰς θάνατον…, trans. Lash,
https://web.archive.org/web/20160305221151/http://anastasis.org.uk/mat-sun.htm (accessed 22.11.19).
3 …λάμψον ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ἡμῶν τὸν ἀληθινὸν ἥλιον τῆς δικαιοσύνης σου· φώτισον τὸν νοῦν ἡμῶν καὶ
τὰς αἰσθήσεις ὅλας διατήρησον, ἵνα ὡς ἐν ἡμέρᾳ εὐσχημόνως περιπατοῦντες τὴν ὁδὸν τῶν ἐντολῶν σου,
καταντήσωμεν εἰς τὴν ζωὴν τὴν αἰώνιον…, trans. Lash (slightly modified), https://web.archive.org/
web/20160305221151/http://anastasis.org.uk/mat-sun.htm (accessed 22.11.19).
4 Αὐτός, Δέσποτα Κύριε, τὸν φωτισμὸν τοῦ προσώπου σου ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ αὐτοῦ (αὐτῆς) ἐναυγάζειν διὰ
παντὸς εὐδόκησον…, trans. Lash, https://web.archive.org/web/20160305185715/http://anastasis.org.
uk/baptism.htm (accessed 22.11.19).
200 co n clus i o n

of man’s spiritual senses. Undoubtedly, he also knew the relevant texts and passages
from the Fathers, which he time and again quotes. All these references, both patristic
and liturgical, surely influenced him to a great extent in the articulation of his relevant
theology. Besides, as shown in this Part, the αἴσθησις νοερά is indeed a central idea in
his thought, and vital to his effort to provide a theological defence of the hesychasts.
As demonstrated, intellectual perception refers both to the soul and the human
body. It is undoubtedly a powerful notion, which describes the great potentiality of
man for union with God. In my view, it would not be false to argue that it provides the
cornerstone and basis for the whole of Palamas’ theological anthropology, since, for
St Gregory, the main goal of man is to attain union with God, to participate in theosis.
In the current Part, first, the historical and theological context of this notion was
briefly presented, as well as the stance of the opponents of the hesychasts. Then, some
special issues were examined, such as the relationship between human knowledge
and divine light, the inner illumination and its meaning, the vision of the light and
its presuppositions, the important place of ecstasis, and, finally, the major role that
the body plays in the vision of spiritual realities.
Indeed, through its participation in the νοερὰ αἴσθησις the human body obtains
great value. The body is not just a passive spectator in man’s spiritual struggle. On
the contrary, it has a very crucial role to play: if the body is used well, in a way
that is God-pleasing, it is a great assistant to man in his efforts toward union with
God. Moreover, through this union, the body participates in man’s communion
with divine grace, both now and in the future age. While every human being has
the potentiality for this νοερὰ αἴσθησις, only those who purify their inner self, and
follow the commandments of Christ, may experience its activation.
This notion (αἴσθησις νοερά) was used by previous Fathers, even in the first centuries
of the Christian era. However, Palamas, by placing it in the context of the hesychast
controversy, gives it a fresh new content and meaning.5 It seems that this is justified
through the above analysis. Furthermore, it is impressive that these experiences of the
hesychasts, as Palamas describes them, are to be found also in our own time, in the lives
of certain holy persons. For instance, similar accounts from the lives of Sts Seraphim
of Sarov, Paisios of Mount Athos, Porphyrios of Kapsokalyvia, Joseph the Hesychast,
Silouan the Athonite, Sophrony Sakharov and others, could be easily found and presented.
Finally, it would be of great scholarly interest to compare the Palamite spiritual senses
with other relevant approaches of medieval or, even, modern theologians. For instance, in
his text on John Wesley’s6 doctrine of the spiritual senses, Mark Mealey has argued that
‘As an example, Gregory Palamas’s account of spiritual senses is remarkably similar to
Wesley’s, though it is very unlikely that Wesley had read Palamas’.7 Therefore, it would be
worth investigating whether this remark and other similar are correct, and to what extent.8

5 Sinkewicz (2002), 159. Cf. Sinkewicz (1999), 390. Tollefsen (2012), 206.
6 John Wesley (1703–1791) was an Anglican cleric who founded the Methodist movement in the
Church of England, along with his brother Charles.
7 Mealey (2012), 256.
8 To this end, one should take into consideration the following PhD dissertation, which explores the
place of the sanctifying experience of God in the work of these two theologians: Bailey (2011).
 Epilogue
From the Image of God to the αἴσθησις νοερά

This book dealt with two central ideas in the anthropology of St Gregory Palamas:
the image of God and the spiritual senses. Finally, three conclusive thoughts are
worthy of noting here. First, as shown, in his treatment of the spiritual senses Palamas
undoubtedly has in mind the fact that man is made in the imago Dei. This is evident
from some of his central arguments.1 For instance, we first saw Palamas’ reference
that God reveals himself to the purified intellect ‘as in a mirror’ (ἐν ἐσόπτρῳ) (Tr.
1,3,9).2 Second, the intellect is ‘an immaterial nature’, and ‘a light relative’ to God, the
superior light. The intellect may become in itself, through communion with God, what
the archetype is by cause (Tr. 1,3,39).3 Third, in the age to come a transformation
to the bodily organs will occur, and, thus, man will see the divine, non-sensible light
even through his body (Tr. 1,3,37).4
This last point entails that even the body will acquire then a kind of likeness
to God. But, it could be argued that, such a likeness is inherent in the body even
through its very creation, for the body participates in the vision of the light even
in this life. In addition, we should keep in mind that in the relevant sections of this
book, namely in Part I, we presented man’s superiority over the angels in terms of
the image of God due to the human body. Therefore, the following idea may lie in
Palamas’ mind: the image of God is inherent in man, both soul and body, but man’s
final goal is to achieve likeness to God. In this road he passes through the νοερὰ
αἴσθησις, either now, or in Paradise.
Second, this notion, i.e. of intellectual perception, refers both to the soul and the
body. However, at that time, in Paradise, the body will be absorbed by the spirit, and
acquire a totally spiritual consistency. But this does not mean at all that the body is
devalued. On the contrary, in this book, it was clearly shown that Palamas attributes
a great value to the human body.
Third, as has been stated, and as shown throughout this book, Palamas, through
his oeuvre, distinguishes two ways of knowing: ‘a natural mode of intellection and a
further mode superior to the latter’. Moreover, it should be acknowledged that ‘The
opponents are wrong in thinking there is only one’.5 Obviously, the second way is
intellectual perception, the potentiality of man to be united with God. What now

1 See, relevantly, Sinkewicz (1999), 387.

2 In ch. 5.4.b.
3 See ch. 6.1.d.
4 See ch. 7.
5 For these two quotations, see Sinkewicz (1999), 380.
202 e p i lo gue

comes to our mind is that some central attributes of our own intellectual climate,
which are often called post-modern, resemble the stance of the antihesychasts.
Nowadays, there is often an effort (from political parties, movements, independent
thinkers, etc.) to persuade us that the most important power of man is his ability
to think.6 It seems that Descartes lives on; cogito ergo sum is still a central motto in
the life of post-modern man.7
However, Palamas would totally disagree with such a one-sided and unqualified
approach, and herein lies his importance as a contributor to the anthropological
discussions of our epoch. His most important gift for us today is his strong insistence
on the potentiality of man’s union with God, namely theosis: of the transition from the
image of God, to the kath’ omoiosin, the acquisition of the likeness, and the activation
of his νοερὰ αἴσθησις. This book is only a small and initial effort in our endeavour
to carefully study Palamas’ relevant line of thought, and its importance for today.

6 Cf. the epistemological view in Philosophy called ‘rationalism’, which sees reason as the main source
and test of knowledge.
7 Cf. the relevant comments in the Introduction of this book.
 Bibliography

Ancient and Medieval Authors1

Novum Testamentum Graece, critical edition of the New Testament from E. and E. Nestle,
K. Aland et al., Stuttgart, 261981.
Pietersma, A. and B. G. Wright (eds) (2007) A New English Translation of the Septuagint
and the Other Greek Translations Traditionally Included Under that Title, New York.

Gregory Palamas

Γρηγορίου τοῦ Παλαμᾶ Συγγράμματα [Gregory Palamas’ Writings] (P. K. Christou et al.
[critical edition], 6 vols [the sixth, and last, volume was edited recently, i.e. in 2015],
1962–2015, Thessaloniki [= ΠΣ] (this is the critical edition of the whole of the Palamite
corpus).
— vol. 1 (1962, 19882 and 20103), ed. P. K. Christou, B. Bobrinsky, P. Papaevaggelou,
J. Meyendorff: Λόγοι Ἀποδεικτικοὶ δύο / Ἀντεπιγραφαί / Ἐπιστολαὶ πρὸς Ἀκίνδυνον καὶ
Bαρλαάμ / Ὑπὲρ τῶν ἱερῶς Ἡσυχαζόντων [Oratione Apodictici (De processione spiritus
sancti orationes duae) / Contra Beccum (Refutatio inscriptionum Vecci) / Epistulae ad
Acindynum et Barlaam / Pro hesychastis]
— vol. 2 (1966 and 19942, repr. 2010), ed. P. K. Christou, G. Mantzaridis, N. Matsoukas,
V. Pseftogas: Πραγματεῖαι καὶ Ἐπιστολαὶ γραφεῖσαι κατὰ τὰ ἔτη 1340–1346 [Tractatae et
Epistulae]
— vol. 3 (1970 and 20102), ed. L. Kontogiannis, V. Phanourgakis, introduction by P. K.
Christou: Πρὸς Ἀκίνδυνον Ἀντιρρητικοὶ (A´–Z´) [Contra Acindynum]
— vol. 4 (1988), ed. P. K. Christou, V. Phanourgakis, V. Pseftogas: Δογματικαὶ Πραγματεῖαι
καὶ Ἐπιστολαὶ γραφεῖσαι κατὰ τὰ ἔτη 1348–1358 [Dogmaticam Tractatae et Epistulae
1348–1358]
— vol. 5 (1992), ed. P. K. Christou: Kεφάλαια ἑκατὸν πεντήκοντα / Ἀσκητικὰ συγγράμματα /
Eὐχαὶ [Capita physica, theologica, moralia et practica CL]
— vol. 6 (2015), ed. V. S. Pseftogas: Ὁμιλίαι [Homilies] (critical ed.). For the Homilies
I also refer to vols 9–11 of ΠΑΕ [ed. Christou et al., 1985–6, Thessaloniki, vols 9–11,

1 Fortunately, all the works of Palamas have been digitalized and can be accessed online through the
TLG (http://stephanus.tlg.uci.edu/index.php). This is indeed very important, because it gives the
opportunity to a wide public to become aware of the Palamite corpus. Moreover, it is a great aid to
scholarly work. As far as Palamas’ Homilies are concerned, it should be noted that the TLG does not
use the recent critical edition of Pseftogas (in ΠΣ 6), but rather that of Christou, in ΠΑΕ 9–11 (Online
TLG accessed 20.9.2019).
2 04 bi bl io gr a p hy

Ἕλληνες Πατέρες τῆς Ἐκκλησίας (ΕΠΕ) 72, 76, 79 respectively; vol. 9 (1985): Ὁμιλίαι
Α´–Κ´, vol. 10 (1985): Ὁμιλίαι ΚΑ´–ΜΒ´, vol. 11 (1986): Ὁμιλίαι ΜΓ´–ΞΓ´]: this
edition, although not a critical one, was regarded the more appropriate, until the
recent critical edition of Pseftogas appeared. For an older edition of these sermons,
see S. Oikonomos, Τοῦ ἐν Ἁγίοις Πατρὸς ἡμῶν Γρηγορίου Ἀρχιεπισκόπου Θεσσαλονίκης
τοῦ Παλαμᾶ, Ὁμιλίαι ΚΒ´. Αἷς προσετέθησαν ὅ τε ἐπιστολιμαῖος Λόγος πρὸς Ἰωάννην
καὶ Θεόδωρον τοὺς φιλοσόφους καὶ τέσσαρες Εὐχαί, 1861, Athens. For a recent English
translation, see Saint Gregory Palamas: The Homilies, edited and translated from the
original Greek with an introduction and notes by C. Veniamin [with the assistance of
the Monastery of St John the Baptist, Essex, England], 2009, Waymart.
Γρηγορίου τοῦ Παλαμᾶ Ἅπαντα τὰ Ἔργα, ed. P. K. Christou et al., introduction, text, trans.
(in Modern Greek), commentary (this edition uses the critical texts, where available),
11 vols, 1981–6, Thessaloniki, EΠE 51, 54, 61, 63, 87, 88, 120, 121, 72, 76, 79 respectively) [=
ΠAE].
Grégoire Palamas. Défense des saints hésychastes, ed. J. Meyendorff, introduction, texte
critique, traduction et notes, 19732 [1959], Louvain, Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense.
Études et documents 30–31. English trans. of a number of extracts (but often with
some problems) by Gendle (1983) [as far as the Triads (Ὑπὲρ τῶν ἱερῶς ἡσυχαζόντων)
are concerned, we first refer to Christou’s edn (i.e. in ΠΣ 1, 20103 [19621], Thessaloniki)
and then, in parentheses, to Meyendorff ’s one (19732 [1959], Louvain); e.g. Tr. 1,3,27.22–
24, 438 (169.20–22). It should be here noted that the 1973 edition is an anastatic reprint
of the 1959 one. For the trans. of the Triads we use the editions of Meyendorff (French)
and Christou (Modern Greek; ΠAE 2, EΠE 54). Moreover, for Triad I, the modern
Greek translation of D. D. Kontostergiou is sometimes very useful (it is found in
Romanides (ed.) (1991), 196–467)].
Gregorio Palamas, vol. 1: Atto e luce divina: scritti filosofici e teologici, introduzione,
traduzione, note e apparati di E. Perrella, con la collaborazione di M. Zambon
(Teofane), S. Georgopoulos (Sono Barlaam ed Acindino), E. Greselin (Vita di
Palamas) Milan, 2003. Vol. 2: Che cos’e l’ortodossia: capitoli, scritti ascetici, lettere, omelie,
introduzione, traduzione, note e apparati di E. Perrella, con la collaborazione di
C. Costalonga… [et al.] (2005). Vol. 3: Dal sovraessenziale all’essenza: confutazioni,
discussioni, scritti confessionali, documenti dalla prigionia fra i turchi, introduzione,
traduzione, note e apparati di E. Perrella, con la collaborazione di M. Meletiadis
(2006).
The One Hundred and Fifty Chapters: A Critical Edition, Translation and Study, edited
and translated by R. E. Sinkewicz, 1988, Toronto, Studies and Texts 83 [for Palamas’
Chapters (Capita 150) we use this edition, referring to the relevant chapter, lines and
pages. For instance, Ch. 56.2–9, 148–50 means: Chapter 56, lines 2–9, pp. 148–50 in
the edn of Sinkewicz. We also use Sinkewicz’s trans. of the Greek text. Moreover, when
we write Ch. 32, 114–16, we refer to ch. 32, which one can find in pages 114–16 of the
aforementioned edition].
 b i b li o graphy 205

Other Authors

Anastasios of Sinai, Anastasii Sinaitae in Hexaemeron Anagogicarum Contemplationum

Libros Duocecim (C. A. Kuehn and J. D. Baggarly, S. J. eds [with a Foreword by J. A.
Munitiz, S. J.], 2007, Rome, Orientalia Christiana Analecta 278, 2–486).
Aristotle, Metaphysica (Werner Jaeger, 1957, New York, Oxford Classical Texts).
Athanasios of Alexandria, De sentetia Dionysii (H.-G. Opitz, Athanasius Werke, vol. 2.1, 1940,
Berlin, 46–67).
— Contra Gentes and De Incarnatione (R. W. Thomson [ed. and trans.], 1971, Oxford,
Oxford Early Christian Texts, 2–132 and 134–276 respectively).
— Epistula I ad Serapionem (K. Savvidis, Athanasius Werke, Band I/Teil 1: Die
Dogmatischen Schriften. Lieferung 4. Epistulae I–IV Ad Serapionem, hg. von D. Wyrwa,
2010, Berlin/New York, 449–534 [= PG 26, 529–608B]).
Athenagoras, Legatio pro Christianis (PG 6, 889–972C).
Augustine, De Trinitate 8–15 (G. B. Matthews, Augustine: On the Trinity. Books 8–15, trans.
S. McKenna, 2002, Cambridge, Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy).
Barlaam the Calabrian, Epistles (G. Schirò, Barlaam Calabro, Epistole Greche. I primordi
episodici e dottrinari delle lotte esicaste, 1954, Palermo, Testi e Monumenti 1, 229–330).
Basil (the Great) of Caesarea, Homilia in sanctam Christi generationem (PG 31, 1457C–76A).
Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis (O. Stählin, Clemens Alexandrinus, vol. 2, Stromata
Buch I–VI, 1906, Leipjig, GCS 15, 3–518).
Cyril of Alexandria, Adversus Anthropomorphitas (Kατὰ Ἀνθρωπομορφιτῶν) (PG 76, 1065–
132).
— Thesaurus de sancta trinitate (Ἡ βίβλος τῶν θησαυρῶν περὶ τῆς ἁγίας καὶ ὁμοουσίου
Tριάδος) (PG 75, 9–656).
— Answers to Tiberius and His Companions (L. R. Wickham [ed. and trans.], Cyril of
Alexandria. Select Letters, 1983, Oxford, Oxford Early Christian Texts, 132–79).
Cyril of Jerusalem, Catecheses (PG 33, 331–1060).
Diadochos of Photiki, Capita gnostica (Capita centum de perfectione spirituali) (É. des
Places, SJ, Diadoque de Photicé, Oeuvres Spirituelles. Introduction, Texte critique,
Traduction et notes, 1955, Paris, SC 5 bis, 84–183 [this is the edition used in our book;
for another edition, see J. E. Rutherford, One hundred practical texts of perception and
spiritual discernment from Diadochos of Photike, 2000, Belfast, Belfast Byzantine Texts
and Translations 8].
Dionysiοs the Areopagite, De Coelesti Hierarchia (On the Divine Hierarchy) (G. Heil
and A.M. Ritter, Corpus Dionysicacum II: Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita. De Coelesti
Hierarchia, De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia, De Mystica Theologia, Epistulae, 1991, Berlin and
New York, PTS 36, 7-210).
— De Divinis Nominibus (On the Divine Names) (B.R. Suchla, Corpus Dionysicacum I:
Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita. De Divinis Nominibus, 1990, Berlin and New York, PTS 33,
107-231).
Epiphanius of Cyprus, Panarion (= Adversus haereses) (K. Holl, Epiphanius (Ancoratus und
Panarion), vol. 3, Panarion Haer. 65–80, De Fide, 1933, Leipzig, GCS 37, 8–526).
Eusebius of Caesarea, Contra Marcellum (E. Klostermann, Eusebius Werke 4, 1906, Leipzig,
GCS 14), 1–58.
206 bi bl io gr a p hy

Evagrios, Centuria Gnostica [Kephalaia Gnostica (Propositions on Knowledge)]

(A. Guillaumont [ed. and trans.], Les six Centuries des ‘Kephalaia Gnostica’ d’Évagre le
Pontique, 1958, Paris, PO 28.1, 15–257. For a recent English trans., with introduction and
commentary, see (below) Ramelli (2015).
— Λόγος Πρακτικός (Practicus) (A. Guillaumont and C. Guillaumont, Évagre le Pontique.
Traité pratique ou le moine, vol. 2, 1971, Paris, SC 171, 482–542, 546–86, 590–620, 624–712).
Gregory Nazianzen, Eἰρηνικὸς γ´ (De pace 3) (Hom. 23) (PG 35, 1152–68A).
— Περὶ Θεολογίας (De theologia; Second Theological Oration) (Hom. 28) (PG 36, 25C–72C).
— Eἰς τὰ Θεοφάνεια (In Theophania) (Hom. 38) (PG 36, 312–33).
— Eἰς τὸ ἅγιον Πάσχα (In sanctum Pascha) (Orat. 45) (PG 36, 624–64C).
Gregory of Nyssa, Περὶ κατασκευῆς ἀνθρώπου (De opificio hominis) (PG 44, 124D–256).
— Λόγος Kατηχητικὸς (Oratio Catechetica) (E. Mühlenberg, Opera Dogmatica Minora:
Oratio Catechetica, 1996, Leiden, GNO 3.4, 9–106).
Gregory the Sinaite, Kεφάλαια δι’ ἀκροστοιχίδος (Capita valde utilia per achrostichidem;
Acrostic Chapters) (PG 150, 1240–300B).
— Λόγος εἰς τὴν ἁγίαν Mεταμόρφωσιν τοῦ Kυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Xριστοῦ (D. Balfour (1981),
644–80).
Isaac the Syrian, Ἀββᾶ Ἰσαὰκ τοῦ Σύρου. Λόγοι Ἀσκητικοί (M. Pirard, 2012, Mount Athos).
John Chrysostom, In Genesim (Homiliae 1–67) (PG 53, 23–385 and PG 54, 385–580).
John Climacus, The Ladder of Divine Ascent (PG 88, 631–1164).
John Damascene, Expositio fidei [Ἔκδοσις ἀκριβὴς τῆς ὀρθοδόξου πίστεως; On the Orthodox
Faith], (P. B. Kotter, OSB, Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos, 2, Expositio fidei,
1973, Berlin, PTS 12, 7–239.
— Contra imaginum calumniatores orationes tres [Three Treatises against those who Attack
the Icons, or: Against the Iconoclasts] (B. Kotter, OSB, Die Schriften des Johannes von
Damaskos, 3, Contra imaginum calumniatores orationes tres, 1975, Berlin, PTS 17, 65–200)
[English trans. (with introduction) by Louth (2003)].
— De duabus in Christo voluntatibus (On the Two Wills in Christ or Against the Monothelites)
(B. Kotter, OSB, Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos, 4, Liber de haeresibus. Opera
polemica, 1981, Berlin, PTS 22, 173–231).
— Homilia in transfigurationem salvatoris nostri Jesu Christi (Tοῦ μακαρίου Ἰωάννου
πρεσβυτέρου τοῦ Δαμασκηνοῦ λόγος εἰς τὴν μεταμόρφωσιν τοῦ κυρίου καὶ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν
Ἰησοῦ Xριστοῦ) (B. Kotter, OSB, Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos, 5, Opera
homiletica et hagiographica, 1988, Berlin-New York, PTS 29, 436–59).
Macarios, Sermones 1–22, 24–27 (E. Klostermann and H. Berthold, Neue
Homilien des Makarius/Symeon, I, Aus Typus III, 1961, Berlin, Texte und
Untersuchungen 72, 1–113, 128–58).
— Ὁμιλίαι Πνευματικαί [Homiliae Spirituale 50] (H. Dörries, E. Klostermann, and
M. Kroeger, Die 50 geistlichen Homilien des Makarios, 1964, Berlin, PTS 4, 1–322). For an
English trans., see Maloney (1992).
— Sermones 64 (collectio B) (H. Berthold, Makarios/Symeon Reden und Briefe, 2 vols, 1973,
Berlin, GCS 55–56, 1:3–265, 2:3–219).
Maximos Planoudes, Aὐγουστίνου Περὶ Tριάδος βιβλία πεντεκαίδεκα ἅπερ ἐκ τῆς Λατίνων
διαλέκτου εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα μετήνεγκε Mάξιμος ὁ Πλανούδης (M. Papathomopoulos,
I. Tsabari, G. Rigotti, Editio Princeps, 2 vols, 1995, Athens, Library A. Manousi 3).
 b i b li o graphy 207

Maximos the Confessor, Ambigua (N. Constas [edn and trans.], On Difficulties in the
Church Fathers: The Ambigua, vols 1–2, 2014, Cambridge, Mass., Dumbarton Oaks
Medieval Library 28–29, 1:62–450; 2:2–330) (= PG 91, 1031–418C). The first vol.
contains the Ambigua to Thomas and the Amgigua to John 1–22, whereas the second one
the Ambigua to John 23–71.
— Capita theologica et oeconomica (PG 90, 1083–1176).
— Centuriae de Charitate (Four Centuries on Love) (A. Ceresa-Gastaldo, Massimo
Confessore. Capitoli sulla carità. Editi cridicamente con introduzione, versione e note, 1963,
Rome, Verba Seniorum N. S. 3, 48–238).
— Epistolae (PG 91, 363–650C).
— Mystagogia (Mystagogy) (PG 91, 657B–718).
— Quaestiones et dubia ( J. H. Declerk, Maximi Confessoris Quaestiones et dubia, 1982,
Turnhout, CCSG 10, 3–170).
Michael Choniates, Prosopopoiia, Dialogues on soul and body (PG 150, 1347–72; Latin trans.
in PG 150, 959–98).
— Letters (F. Kolovou, Michaelis Choniatae Epistulae, 2001, Berlin, Corpus Fontium
Historiae Byzantinae [Series Berolinensis 41]).
Neilοs, Epistolae (PG 79, 82–582C).
Nemesios of Emesa, On the Nature of Man (M. Morani, Nemesii Emeseni, De natura hominis,
1987, Leipzig, Bibliotheca scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana [= PG
40, 504–817]). For the English trans., along with a useful introduction and comments,
see the important edition of Sharples and van der Eijk (2008).
Niketas Stethatos, Vita Simeonis (R. P. H. Greenfield [edn and trans.], Niketas Stethatos:
The Life of Saint Symeon the New Theologian, 2013, Cambridge, MA-London,
Dumbarton Oaks Medieval Library 20) [for two older editions, see Vita Simeonis Novi
Theologici, in Hausherr (1928), 1–230, and Koutsas (1996), 46–390].
— De anima (Περὶ ψυχῆς) ( J. Darrouzès, Nicétas Stéthatos, Opuscules et Lettres
[introduction, critical text, translation and notes], 1961, Paris, SC 81, 64–152).
— Contre les Juifs (Λόγος κατὰ Ἰουδαίων) ( J. Darrouzès, Nicétas Stéthatos, Opuscules et
Lettres [introduction, critical text, translation and notes], 1961, Paris, SC 81, 412–43).
Origen, Commentarius in Iohannem (E. Preuschen, Origenes Werke, vol. 4, Der
Johanneskommentar, 1903, Leipjig, GCS 4) [see also the edition of C. Blanc, Origène,
Commentaire sur Saint Jean, Tome I (Livres I–V), Texte Grec, avant-propos, traduction et
notes, 1966, Paris, SC 120].
— De Principiis (Περὶ ἀρχῶν) (P. Koetschau, Origenes Werke, vol. 5, 1913, Leipjig, GCS 5).
Symeon of Thessaloniki, Dialogue in Christ (Διάλογος ἐν Χριστῷ) (PG 155, 33–176C).
— Epistula ad fideles Orientis de pietate (Ἐπιστολὴ εἰς στηριγμὸν εὐσεβείας ἤτοι κατὰ
Ἀγαρηνῶν) (D. Balfour, Ἁγίου Συμεὼν Θεσσαλονίκης (1416/17-1429), Ἔργα θεολογικά
[critical edn with introduction], 1981, Thessaloniki, Analecta Vlatadon 34, 111–37).
Symeon the New Theologian, Capita theologica 2 ( J. Darrouzès, A. A., Syméon le Nouveau
Théologien, Chapitres théologiques, gnostiques et pratique: introduction, texte critique,
traduction et notes, 1957, Paris, SC 51, 71–79).
— Discourse 35 (Action de grâces 1; ‘First Thanksgiving’) (B. Krivochéine, Syméon le Nouveau
Théologien, Catéchèses 23–34, Action de grâces 1–2: introduction, texte critique et notes
[traduction par J. Paramelle], Tome III, 1965, Paris, SC 113, 304–28).
208 bi bl io gr a p hy

— Ethical Discourse 4, On the Graces and Gifts disclosed within dispassion (apatheia), and
Ethical Discourse 6, On dispassion and a virtuous life ( J. Darrouzès, A. A., Syméon
le Nouveau Théologien, Traités Théologiques et Éthiques: introduction, texte critique,
traduction et notes, vol. 2 [Eth. 4–15], 1967, Paris, SC 129, 8–76 and 120–55 respectively).
— Hymns 1–15 ( J. Koder, Syméon le Nouveau Théologien, Hymnes, 1–15, vol. I [French trans.
by J. Paramelle], 1969, Paris, SC 156).
— Hymns 16–40 ( J. Koder, Syméon le Nouveau Théologien, Hymnes, 16–40, vol. II [French
trans. and notes by L. Neyrand], 1971, Paris, SC 174).
— Hymns 41–58 ( J. Koder, Syméon le Nouveau Théologien, Hymnes, 41–58, vol. III [French
trans. and notes by J. Paramelle and L. Neyrand], 1973, Paris, SC 196).
The Philokalia (Φιλοκαλία) (Nikodemos of the Holy Mountain of Athos and Makarios of
Corinth, Φιλοκαλία τῶν ἱερῶν Νηπτικῶν συνερανισθεῖσα παρὰ τῶν Ἁγίων καὶ θεοφόρων
Πατέρων ἡμῶν, Venice, 1782. The second edition appeared in Athens in 1893; some texts
of Patriarch Kallistos on prayer were added there. A third edition was published in
Athens by the Astir Publication in vols 1–5 [1957–1963]. Here was based the English
trans. of G. E. H. Palmer, P. Sherrard and K. Ware, The Philokalia: The Complete Text,
compiled by St Nikodimos of the Holy Mountain and St Makarios of Corinth, vols 1–4,
London, 1979, 1981, 1986 and 1995 respectively [vol. 5 is in preparation]. The texts of
the original Φιλοκαλία are all in Greek and were written between the fourth-fifteenth
centuries; only two of them were initially written in Latin and then translated into
Greek during the Byzantine era. Some works are also found in J. P. Migne’s Patrologia
Graeca and Patrologia Latina [for these data, see The Philokalia, vol. 1, 11–12]).
Theodoret of Cyrus, Quaestiones in Genesim (Theodoret of Cyrus. The Questions on the
Octateuch, vol. 1, On Genesis and Exodus, Greek text revised by J. F. Petruccione
[English trans. with introduction and commentary by † R. C. Hill], 2007, Washington,
DC, The Library of Early Christianity 1, 2–221 [PG 80, 77–226]).
Theoleptos of Philadelpheia, Monastic Discourse 1 [Λόγος τὴν ἐν Xριστῷ κρυπτὴν ἐργασίαν
διασαφῶν] (R. Sinkewicz [critical edn, trans. and study], Theoleptos of Philadelpheia. The
Monastic Discourses, 1992, Toronto, Studies and Texts 111, 84–108) [for the critical edn
of his whole extant corpus, see Grigoropoulos (1996)].
Theophilos of Antioch, Ad Autolycum (PG 6, 1023B–168A).

Liturgical Texts

Lash, E. (2011), Ἡ Θεία Λειτουργία τοῦ ἐν Ἁγίοις Πατρός ἡμῶν Ἰωάννου τοῦ Xρυσοστόμου. The
Divine Liturgy of Our Father among the Saints John Chrysostom [translation], Chipping
Norton.

Modern Authors

Agachi, A. (2013) The Neo-Palamite Synthesis of Father Dumitru Stăniloae, Newcastle upon Tyne.
Alexopoulos, T. (2009) Der Ausgang des thearchischen Geistes: Eine untersuchung der
Filioque-Frage anhand Photios᾿ ‘Mystagogie’, Konstantin Melitiniotes᾿ ‘Zwei Antirrhetic’
und Augustins ‘De Trinitate’, Göttingen.
 b i b li o graphy 209

— (2011) ‘Die Argumentation des Patriarchen Gregorios II. Kyprios zur Widerlegung des
Filioque-Ansatzes in der Schrift De processione Spiritus Sancti’, Byzantinische Zeitschrift
104.1, 1–38.
Alfeyev, H. (2005) St Symeon the New Theologian and Orthodox Tradition (Oxford Early
Christian Studies), New York.
Anatolios, K. (2004) Athanasius (The Early Church Fathers), New York.
Athanasopoulos, C. (ed.) (2015) Triune God: Incomprehensible but Knowable—The
Philosophical and Theological Significance of St Gregory Palamas for Contemporary
Philosophy and Theology [Proceedings of the International Conference ‘St Gregory
Palamas: The Theological and Philosophical Significance of his Work’, Thessaloniki,
2012], Newcastle upon Tyne.
— and C. Schneider (eds) (2013) Divine Essence and Divine Energies. Ecumenical Reflections
on the Presence of God in Eastern Orthodoxy, Cambridge.
Aquino, F. D. (2012) ‘Maximus the Confessor’, in Gavrilyuk and Coakley (eds) (2012),
104–20.
Bailey, G. P., ‘Growing into God: a consideration of the relation between the experience
and theology of sanctification, in dialogue with John Wesley’s theology of perfection
and Gregory Palamas’ theology of deification’ [unpublished doctoral dissertation,
University of Cambridge, 2011].
Bakker, M. (2013) ‘Into the Abyss of the Unconscious’, Communio Viatorum 55.3, 255–75.
— (2015) ‘Maximus and Modern Psychology’, in P. Allen and B. Neil (eds), The Oxford
Handbook of Maximus the Confessor (Oxford Handbooks), Oxford, 533–47.
Balfour, D. (1981) ‘Saint Gregory the Sinaite: Discourse on the Transfiguration. First
critical edition, with English translation and commentary’, Θεολογία 52.4, 631–81.
— (1982a) ‘Saint Gregory of Sinai’s Life Story and Spiritual Profile’, Θεολογία 53.1, 30–62.
— (1982b) ‘The Works of Gregory the Sinaite’, Θεολογία 53.3, 698–710.
— (1984) ‘Was St Gregory Palamas St Gregory the Sinaite’s Pupil?’, SVTQ 28, 115–30.
Barrois, G. (1975) ‘Palamism Revisited’, SVTQ 19.4, 211–31.
Bathrellos, D. (2004) The Byzantine Christ. Person, Nature, and Will in the Christology of
Saint Maximus the Confessor (Oxford Early Christian Studies), Oxford.
— (2008) Σχεδίασμα Δογματικῆς Θεολογίας. Mέ βάση τό συγγραφικό ἔργο τοῦ Ἁγίου Συμεών
Θεσσαλονίκης († 1429), Athens.
Behr, J. (2000) Asceticism and Anthropology in Irenaeus and Clement (Oxford Early
Christian Studies), New York [repr. 2007].
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Index

Scriptural References

Genesis Proverbs
1:26 2, 38, 40n37, 41, 43, 58n58 2:5146
1:26-2735n2 5:2146
1:2758n58 8:355n35
1:28 93n38, 96n57, 101n77
2:789 Song of Solomon
3:2144 4:11184n124
5:1-335n2
9:635n2 Wisdom of Solomon
7:24-2835n2
Exodus
3:544 Matthew
31:18192 5:4184n123
34:29154n76 5:8140
34:29-35187n138 7:1244
17:1-8159n110
Leviticus 22:30190n157
26:12121 24:30188n145
25:41142n79
Deuteronomy
6:417 Mark
9:2-8159n110
Psalms 12:25190n157
1:3110n121 13:26188n145
4:6139
12 (13):4 (3) 139 Luke
23:5108 6:3144
33 (34): 9 (8) 127n1 9:28-36159n110
42 (43):3 139 20:36190n157
45:2108 21:27188n145
89:17149n40 22:44188
224 in d e x

John 5:5142n82
4:36110n121 6:16121
6:53108 12:1166
14:21,23140 12:2 165, 166
15:2655n35 12:4166
17:22169
17:24169 Ephesians
1:14142n82
Acts of the Apostles 3:10108
2:1-13134
6:15187n140 Philippians
7:55-56181 2:11142
3:20-21147n22
Romans
2:3452 Colossians
1:1535n6
1 Corinthians 2:9163
1:20173
2:10136 1 Thessalonians
2:11155n80 4:17188n145
2:13137n46
2:14-15136 Hebrews
2:16155 1:346n77
6:17153 1:1494n43
6:19121 3:6121
13:12 140, 149
15:44189 1 Peter
15:4543n52 1:12108
15:45.47-48117n8
15:48-4944 2 Peter
15:54147n20 1:4 2, 110-1

2 Corinthians 1 John
1:22142n82 1:5140
3:3192 4:7-21174
4:435n6 5:1-5174
4:6 139, 154

Citations from the Fathers and other Ancient Texts

Anastasios of Sinai Aristotle

In Hexaemeron Anagogicarum De Anima 404b17-8 35n4
Contemplationum liber sextus IV§3 and 405b1535n4
IV§558n58 Ethica Eudemia 1235a5-9 35n4
 i nd e x 225

Metaphysica / Metaphysics (Τῶν μετὰ Diadochos of Photiki, Capita gnostica

τὰ φυσικά) Α, 980a55n38 15 172n47, 186n136
25 186n134, 188n149
Athanasios of Alexandria 40168n26
Contra Gentes 45.5-10 56n44 73148n25
De Incarnatione 13.28-29 122n9 79 186n134, 188n149
De sentetia Dionysii 23,6 56n43 89 116n4, 123n13
Epistula I ad Serapionem 42n51
Dionysios the Areopagite
Athenagoras, Legatio pro De Coelesti Hierarchia
Christianis56n41 I.3174n60
III.1-5168n19
Augustine, De Trinitate VII.2.5-9169n34
I.7,1375n169 De Divinis Nominibus
V.975n169 I.4  168n21, 174n60
V.13,1477n181 I.5  68n21, 175n64
VI.775n169 II.6149n38
VII.4,675n169 II.9186n132
VII.675n169 IV.5167n15
IX.4.4  75n167 IV.6154n73
X.11.18  75n168 VII.1 146n5, 178n86, 179n89
XV.3.575n168
XV.6.1075n167 Epiphanius of Cyprus,
Panarion 7036n10
Barlaam the Calabrian
Epistle 1 to Palamas137n47 Eusebius of Caesarea, Contra Marcellum
Epistle 5, Second to Ignatios135n37 I,436n18

Basil (the Great) of Caesarea, Evagrios

Homilia in sanctam Christi Centuria Gnostica (Kephalaia
generationem, 1473D 161n125 Gnostica) 6.7337n23
Λόγος Πρακτικός (Practicus) ch. 64
Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis 168n25
5.14.94.5-637n24
Gregory Nazianzen
Cyril of Alexandria, Homily 23, 11 57n46, 57n54
Adversus Anthropomorphitas, Homily 28, 19152n54
1068C-72A95n48 Homily 38, 11 89n16
Answers to Tiberius 14 122n10 Homily 38, 13 42n47
Thesaurus de sancta trinitate 6, Homily 45, 7 89n16
80C56n45 Homily 45, 9 42n47

Cyril of Jerusalem, Catecheses 4,18 36n16 Gregory of Nyssa

De opificio hominis20n141
2 26 in d e x

In Canticum canticorum oratio 1 22, 16,1845n68

147n15 17,3 39n34, 97n64
Oratio Catechetica 19,1427n180
13M54n30 21,1744n60
13M-17M57n50 24 83, 116
16M57n48 24,13117n8
17M57n47.49 24,14117n8
2697
Gregory Palamas 26,1 97n62-3.65, 98n66
Against Bekkos (Contra Beccum)11n77, 26,2 33n1, 41n40, 98n69
 76n174.180, 78n184 26,3 45n69, 46n70
Against Gregoras II, 43.10-4 72n150, 28,1117n10
76n176 36,143n57
Antirrhetics against Akindynos 3745n69
4,14,36183 4245n69
7,11,3698n68 45,5 44n58, 45n64
Apodictic treatises 55n36, 80 53 45n69, 180n98
First 53,55-624n155
Prologue  122n.127 53,56 24n156-8.160.162, 25n164-5,
3542n50  33n1, 41n40, 98n69
Second 53,58180n98
8 41n39, 43n52 54,9116n5
9 44n62, 94n46 109n117 56108
18 89n14, 90n18 56,11 108n114, 109n116, 110n120
30, 62-8, 73 80n195 56,13 108n115, 110n121
65, 69, 75-6 80n195 60 46, 49, 69, 79n189, 89
Epistle to the most holy hieromonk Paul 60,3-489n14
Asanes, 2 183 60,4 89n15, 90n20.22, 91n24-5,
Epistolary Discourse to the philosophers 105n94
John and Theodore 18 98n68 60,1946n74
Hagioretic Tome (Tomos) 131, 183, 185 60,2046n75-6
Prologue 17n117.119, Letter to Daniel of Ainos, 5 28n188
18n121-3 One Hundred and Fifty Chapters
119n128-9 2439n33
2 19n130.133, 20n134-5 26 90, 91n27
3 20n138-140, 21n142 27 41n39, 115n1, 122, 123n11
4159n111-2.114 31 90, 91n23
6  151n50-3, 152n54, 170n38, 3288n10
 172n48-9, 183n116, 32-391n26
 185, 186n131.134-5 3450
Homilies 34-8 49, 74n162, 83
4,1246n72-3 35 50, 51n9-10, 64n101, 73n154,
11,241n39  74n164, 102n85, 103n90, 151n51
1445n69 35-774
16 11n77, 76n174 36 54-5, 64n104, 73n154, 74,
16,788n10 81n199, 88n8
 i nd e x 227

37 55n37-8, 65n105 1,3,10 22n146, 140n72, 141n73-5.77,

37-973n154 142n81-3
38 65n106, 87, 88n4.6.9, 99n74, 100 1,3,11158
38-9 4n10, 79n189 1,3,12 136, 159n109
39 44n61, 88n5, 112n136, 1,3,13137n47
114n146, 116n6-7 1,3,14136n45
40 91n27, 117n11-3, 118n14 1,3,15 137n48.50-1, 138n52-4
62 93, 94n42.45, 96n55-7, 100 1,3,16155n79-83
63 64n101, 102-4 1,3,17153n63-4.67-8, 175, 176n67.69.71
64115n2 1,3,18177n73-4
76 38n30, 117n9 1,3,19 176n70, 178n81
77115n2 1,3,20 22-3, 145n3-4, 146n5.10
8752n17 1,3,21 22, 165n2-5, 166n7.10-1, 170,
111 38n30, 110n123, 117n9  171n42.45, 174n56
13277n181 1,3,22156n84-5.87.89-91
13378n184 1,3,24137n46
Triads in defence of the holy hesychasts 1,3,26160n115-7
(Tr.) 1 130, 134, 180n98 1,3,27 160n119.121, 196
1,1: First Question 52 1,3,28196
1,1,2 45n66, 52n21-2 1,3,30 181, 182n109-13
1,1,2-352n21 1,3,31 148n25-7.29.32, 149n33,
1,1,5 44n63, 94n46 183n114, 187n139.141.144,
1,1,2045n65 196n196
1,1,2245n67 1,3,32 188n145-6.149, 189n150-1,
1,2,1 21n145, 121n5 196n198
1,2-315n110 1,3,33 147, 148n24, 183,
1,2,3 27n181-4, 28n186, 180n97  184n120-2.124.126, 185n128-9
1,2,4146n13 1,3,34 150n42.44-7, 151n48, 186n133
1,2,5 28n188, 29n192-3, 180n98 1,3,35 160n119, 161n122-3, 174n57
1,2,7-8118n15 1,3,36 113n140, 189, 190n155-8
1,2,1266n112 1,3,37 113n140, 191n159-61,
1,3: Third Question133-6  192n168, 201
1,3 4, 16n114, 60, 130-1, 133-6, 1,3,38 161, 162n127-30, 163n132-3
149n35, 183 1,3,39 149n35-6.38-9.41, 201
1,3,1 135n40, 184n126 1,3,40 52n17, 145n1-2, 177n76-7,
1,3,2135n41 178n78
1,3,3 22n146, 139n63, 154n73.77, 1,3,41 27n182, 192n169-70.172,
 155n78, 167n14-7 193n173.175-6
1,3,4 80n196, 157n100, 158n102-4, 1,3,42 127n2-3, 151n49, 193n178-81,
 167n18, 168n19-20.22-3, 192n170 194n182-3
1,3,5 138n56, 139n63, 168n24.27-8, 1,3,43 161n124-5, 191n164, 192n167
 169n31-4, 174, 175n63 1,3,44157n92.95
1,3,6 138n57, 158n105.107 1,3,45 26n178, 178n87, 179,
1,3,7 138n58-9, 139n60-3, 168n26 180n95-6.98
1,3,8 139n64-7, 140n68-9 1,3,46 154n71, 157n96-7
1,3,9 140n70-1, 152n55-7.59-61, 201 1,3,47166n8-9
228 in d e x

1,3,48-9157n98 28188n147
1,3,52157n94 29  73n51
2,2183
2,2,10184n124 John Damascene
2,2,19 25n169, 172, 173n51-3, De Duabus in Christo voluntatibus111
174n55 16 99, 100
2,2,2529n192 16.3,699n73
2,2,2628n190-1 16.5-1099n72
2,2,298n41 16.6-10100n76
2,3183 30 99, 100
2,3,15 25, 26n172.174.176-7 30.1-336n9
2,3,3113n93 30.6-7100
2,3,36 176, 177n72 30.8-11101n78
2,3,47178n83 De Imaginibus III 99n71, 107
2,3,48 178, 179n88 18,19-2042n47
359-60 18,2057n52
3,1,14161n126 18, 23-4.29-30 42n50
3,2,24 53, 153n69 26.47-9107n107
3,3,15172n49 26.49-62  107n108
Theophanes 26.62-4107n109
13110n127 26.64-7107n110
17111n129 26.67-70 109n116.119, 110n122
26 38n29, 42n48, 46n78, 110 Expositio fidei
To the Nun Xene 11n77, 76n174 2.1240n37
988n10 6-757n51
29 25n168, 171n43 8.173 55n34, 78n185
5998n68 13.7542n50
26.16-2157n52
Gregory the Sinaite 26.26-789n17
Acrostic chapters 31-2 70 26.34-6110n123
Discourse on the Transfiguration69, 26.48-9152n58
209 Homilia in transfigurationem salvatoris
2069n129 nostri Jesu Christi
18 69n131, 69n132, 69n133 2163n133
12160n114
Isaac the Syrian, Homily 45 25n171
Macarios
John Chrysostom Homiliae Spirituale 50
Ad Theodorum lapsum, I 141n75 5.11138n58
De incomprehensibili dei 12.1418n123
natura III166n9 15.20 20n140, 27n182, 192n173
In Genesim Homiliae 8 36n18, 95n48 17.218n123
34155n78
John Climacus, Ladder Sermones
26146n13 2,7155n78
 i nd e x 229

2,10,5 154n74, 154n75 22.12-7122n8

58,1158n108 23.1-2122n8
58,2,1139n60 23.2-6122n8
58,3,2191n165 Vita Simeonis 61n78, 66
58,3,3192n166 Λόγος κατὰ Ἰουδαίων
8.5-665n107
Mark the Ascetic, Capita de 9.4-565n107
temperantia 24193n175 9.16-2364n97
10.1-12 64n101, 104n93
Maximos the Confessor
Ambigua Origen
7, 25.18-21 58n61 Commentarius in Iohannem
10, 106 57n55, 58n62 I,38(42)56n42
10, 107.6-23 58n63 II,1638n25
21, 15.24 38n30, 117n9 Contra Celsum
Capita theologica I.48 22, 146n9, 146n12
1,31166n9 VII.34146n9
2,80 178n78, 192n170 De Principiis
2,82193n175 I,1,656n42
2,88191n159 I,1,9146n9
Centuriae de Charitate 2.83 95n49 I,3,638n25
Epistle 6 92n31 IV, 37 146n9
Letter to Marinus81n200
Mystagogia 17  38n25 Philokalia (Φιλοκαλία), see also General
Quaestiones et dubia Index 70n135, 121n5, 177n75, 178n78,
3,195n50  191n159, 192n170, 193n175
105,22-6 57n55, 58n62
111,159n67 Symeon of Thessaloniki
Scholia 179n90 Dialogue in Christ, 40AC 84n213
Epistula ad fideles Orientis de pietate
Michael Choniates, Prosopopoiiai, PG 119.290-1, 300-1 84n214
150, 1361BC 41 120.308-1084n215

Neilοs, Epistolae, II, 74 169n29 Symeon the New Theologian

Capita theologica 2, 23.20-1 89n17
Nemesios of Emesa, De natura Discourse 35, 304.1-306.13 95n47
hominis92n34 Ethical Discourse 4.424-9 65n109
Ethical Discourse 6.161-78 63n92
Niketas Stethatos Hymns
De anima 14.55-74106n104
21.1-363n95 3395n47
21.4-1463n96 44
22.1-364n102 30-162n85
22.3-1064n103 35-762n86
22.10-2122n8 40-464n99
23 0 in d e x

40-5062n87 Theoleptos of Philadelpheia

63-9262n88 Monastic Discourses
74-862n89 Disc. 1, 18 71n141
79-9262n90 Disc. 1, 24 66n109
93-213 59n65 Disc. 23, 1-2.7.13-4.57-9 71n140
50.200-2 111n131 Disc. 23, 13-5 71n145

Theodoret of Cyrus, Quaestiones in Theophilos of Antioch, Ad Autolycum

Genesim 2.2256n41
20.90-292n30
20.90-10258n57

Ancient and Modern Authors

Adam 45, 116-7 Bathrellos, D. 80n193, 84n212, 85n217,

Agachi, A. 6n22 188n148
Akindynos, Gregory 67, 98n68, 110, 183 Behr, J. 36n14
Alexopoulos, T. 55n36, 79n190 Berthold, H. 139n60, 154n74-5, 155n78,
Alfeyev, H. 56n39, 59n65, 61n77, 158n108, 191n165, 192n166, 206
62n84.87, 66n110, 67, 68n119, 95n47, Biriukov, D. 111n131
111n131 Blanc, C. 56n42, 207
Ambrose of Milan 36n17 Blowers, P.M. 19n132, 20, 103n88,
Anastasios of Sinai 58 195n190
Anatolios, K. 42n51 Bluck, R.S. 92n31
Aquino, F. D. 129n5 Bobrinsky, B. 55n36, 80n195, 89n14,
Aristotle 12, 15, 35n4, 55n38, 183 90n18, 109n117, 203
Arius, heresiarch 135 Boersma, G. P. 73n153
Athanasios of Alexandria 36n8, 37, Bradshaw, D. 12n88, 13n90, 15, 29n193,
42n51, 56, 111, 122, 184n126 60n73, 78n184, 115n3, 132n20, 153n65,
Athanasopoulos, C. 2n6, 60n73 180n97, 195n190
Athenagoras 56n41 Canévet, M. 130n11
Augustine 10-13, 15, 36n17, 50, 58n56, Chouliaras, A. 35n1, 61n75, 72n149,
65n107-8, 71-79, 81-83, 105n95, 115n3, 106n103
129 Christou, P.K. 4n9, 5, 5-6n18, 7, 16n113,
Bailey, G. P. 200n8 17n115, 25n168, 26n177, 27n181, 33n1,
Baggarly, J.D. 58n58, 205 38n29, 41n40.44, 42n48, 67n112,
Bakker, M. 28n187 78n184, 79n190, 96n54, 134n27,
Balfour, D. 68-9, 84n213, 206-7 137n48-9, 141n75, 142n82, 146n11.13-4,
Barlaam the Calabrian 6-8, 14, 18-19, 148n25, 149n35, 151, 161n125, 162n131,
25, 45, 52-3, 67, 72, 78, 110, 113, 133-5, 137, 166n9, 173n51, 183n119, 185n130,
159, 170, 172n49, 178, 203 190n156, 192n167, 193n175, 203-4
Barrois, G. 9 Clement of Alexandria 36n11, 37-8
Basil (the Great) of Caesarea 15, 43, Coakley, S. 3n7, 129n2, 130n11, 147n15
111, 160n117, 161n125, 184n126 Coman, V. 73n152
 i nd e x 231

Constas, M. (N.) 20n134, 38n30, Garrigues, J.-M. 9n49

52-3, 57n55, 58n61-3, 117n9, 147n20, Gavrilyuk, P.L. 129n4, 130n11, 171,
195n186.190, 207 172n46
Coolman, B.T. 130n11 Gemeinhardt, P. 55n36
Cooper, A.G. 58n62, 59n65.67, 95n50, Gendle, N. 5n15, 27n179, 45n65, 130,
101n79, 113n140, 191n163 156n84.90, 165-6, 170n35, 171, 176, 204
Corcilius, K. 23n153 Gennadios Scholarios 78n184
Cross, R. 130n6 Georgi, F. 46n71
Cyril of Alexandria 36n8, 37, 56, 95, Georgopoulos, S. 204
122 Gioia, L. 73n153
Cyril of Jerusalem 36 Golitzin, A. 7n35, 13-4, 61, 62n84, 63,
Daley, B. 77n181 65n108-9, 66n111, 67n113-4, 68, 77
Declerk, J.H. 57n55, 58n62, 59n67, Gould, G. 37n19
95n50, 207 Greenfield, R.P.H. 61n78, 207, 215
DelCogliano, M. 161n125 Gregoras 72n150, 110
Demacopoulos, G.E. 78n184 Gregory Nazianzen 4, 42n47, 56-7, 61,
Demetracopoulos, J. 7n35, 11, 40n38, 65n107, 67, 70n137, 76n179, 83, 89, 90,
41n42.44, 42n46, 55n38, 57n51, 71n146, 100, 152
73n152.156, 75n169, 76, 77n181, 82, Gregory of Nyssa 4, 8, 15, 20, 22, 35n3,
122n6, 132n20 36n11, 43, 54n30, 57, 60n73, 65n107,
De Saint-Exupéry, A. 2 70n137, 95, 111, 129, 132, 146, 147n15,
Diadochos of Photiki 4, 116, 123n13, 156n90
132, 146, 148n25, 168, 172, 186, Gregory the Sinaite 10, 68-71, 83
188n149 Greselin, E. 204
Dillon, J.M. 129n1 Grigoropoulos, I. 70n138, 208
Dionysios Areopagite 4, 7-8, 13-5, 18, Halleux, A. de 9-10
29, 50, 52n17, 67, 115n3, 129, 132, 145, Harper, D. 185n127
146n5.7, 149n38, 154, 160n117, 167, 168- Harrison, N.V. 33n4, 36n9.12.18, 40n37
9, 171-2, 174-5, 178-9, 186 Hatzinikolaou, N. 2n4
Divry, É. 13n91 Hausherr, I. 8n36, 61n78, 207
Dörries, H. 20n140, 27n182, 138n58, Holl, K. 66n111
155n78, 192n173, 206 Houdret, J.P. 9n49
D-Vasilescu, E.E. 33n4 Hussey, E. 34n9, 49n1-2, 51, 55n35, 74,
Edwards, M. 33n4 75n165
Efrem, Archimandrite 23n153, 24n163, Isaac the Syrian 25, 129, 158, 166,
26, 28, 29n192, 114n145 184n126
Epiphanius of Cyprus 36n10 John Chrysostom 36, 95n48, 111,
Eusebius of Caesarea 36 141n75, 158, 166n9, 208
Evagrios 4, 8, 37, 129, 132, 158n106, 168 John Climacus (of the Ladder) 4,
Fisher, E. 73n155 129, 146n13, 173n51, 188
Fitschen, K. 19n127 John Damascene 4, 36n9, 40n37,
Flogaus, R. 11-2, 13n96, 15, 73n152, 76, 42n47.50, 43, 54n30, 55n34, 56-8,
77n181.184, 80n197, 82 65n107, 67, 76n179, 78n185, 81n200, 83,
Florovsky, G. 8-9, 37n19, 153n69 88-9, 92-3, 99-101, 107, 109-11, 122, 130,
Fryde, E. 105n98 132, 152, 159-160, 163n133
23 2 in d e x

Jugie, M. 9, 41n44, 73-4 97n61, 99n72, 101n78.82, 107n105-6,

Kaldellis, A. 42n45 108n112, 109n118, 111n133-4, 113n141,
Kappes, C.W. 45n69 120n4, 122n9, 146n7, 153n69,
Keech, D. 74n159 172n45.49, 206
Kelly, J.N.D. 163n131 Macarios 4, 8, 18, 20, 27, 37, 43n55, 132,
Kern, C. 6 138-9, 154, 155n78, 158, 191-2
Kesselopoulos, A. 10, 18n120, 23n154, Makarios of Corinth 67n118, 69n128,
25n168-9, 27, 29n193, 44n59, 88n10, 115, 208
171, 174n55 Maloney, G.A. 27n182, 192n173, 206
Klostermann, E. 36n18, 155n78, 205-6 Mantzaridis, G. 2n6, 6, 9, 28, 33n4,
Kolovou, F. 42n45, 207 36n11, 43n53, 88n10, 94n43, 95n48,
Kontogiannis, L. 203 115, 203
Kontostergiou, D.D. 190n156, 204, 219 Marshall, B.D. 10n59
Kotter, P.B. 101n81, 107n105, 111n134, Martzelos, G. 5n13, 73n156, 78, 82
206 Matsoukas, N. 28n188, 203
Kouli, M. 187n142-3 May, G. 103n88
Koutsas, S. 61n78, 207 McInroy, M.J. 129n1, 130n8-9.11, 146n8
Koutsouris, D. 16n113 McKenna, S. 75n167-8, 205
Krivochéine, B. 6, 95n47, 207 McLeod, F.G. 95n48
Kroeger, M. 206 Mark the Ascetic 193n175
Kuehn, C.A. 58n58, 205 Matthews, G.B. 75n167-8, 205
Lampe, G.W.H. 54n30 Maximos Planudes 11, 13, 73, 76
Larchet, J.-C. 10n68, 13n91, 23n153, Maximos the Confessor 4, 8, 11, 14-5,
55n36, 59n68, 60n73, 79n190-2, 80n195, 18, 20, 38, 43, 51-3, 54n28, 57-9, 59n65-8,
81n198, 215 60n72, 65n107, 67, 76n179, 81n198.200,
Lascaris, A.F. 62n84 83, 88n4, 92, 95, 98n67, 100-1, 106n101,
Lash, E. 34n5, 119n1, 142n82, 199n1-4, 111, 113n140, 115, 117n9, 120, 129, 132, 138,
208 166n9, 177-9, 190-3
Le Guillou, M.-J. 9n49 Mealey, M.T. 200
Levering, M. 76n177 Meletiadis, M. 204
Lévy, A. 13n91, 214 Merki, H. 35n3
Liddell, H.G. and R. Scott 54n30, Merriell, D.J. 34n6, 73n156
160n116, 183n117, 190n156 Meyendorff, J. 2n6, 5-9, 12, 14, 16n113,
Likoudis, J. 45n69 21n145, 26n177, 41n44, 45n69, 52n20,
Lison, J. 6n20, 10-2, 75, 108n113, 214-5 53n25, 66, 67n112, 74, 79n190, 98,
Lootens, M.R. 105n95, 129n3 99n70, 130, 132n20, 133n25, 137n48,
Lossky, V. 9, 42n46 141n75, 146n13, 147n15, 149n35, 161n125,
Lössl, J. 12, 73n152, 75n169 174n55, 176n71, 178n80, 185, 190n156,
Loudovikos, Ν. 10n59, 13n91, 51n13, 193n175, 195n187, 203-4
98n68, 113n142 Michael Choniates 41-2
Louth, A. 3n7, 7n35, 10n68, 11n72, Morani, M. 92n34, 207
14n98.102, 15n107, 22n147-8, 33n4, Moses 17, 138, 154, 158, 160, 186-7, 196
38n26-8, 51n13, 53n25, 57n53, 58n63, Muehlberger, E. 87n2
59n68-9, 61n78, 67n118, 71n139.144.146, Mühlenberg, E. 54n30, 57n47-50, 206
76n178, 77n181-2, 82n202, 89n17, Munitiz, J.A. 58n58, 205
 i nd e x 233

Nadal, J.C. 9n49 Rigotti, G. 73n155, 206

Neilοs 138, 158, 169n29, 177 Ritter, A.M. 14, 169n34, 174n60, 205
Nellas, P. 33n4, 35n5-6, 36n9, 37n24, Romanides, J.S. 7, 12n82, 14, 25n167, 53,
44n59, 127n4 54n27, 77-78n184, 130, 167n13, 190n156,
Nemesios of Emesa 4, 92n34, 101n79, 204
106n101 van Rossum, J. 12, 13-4, 54n28, 89n12,
Niketas Stethatos 4, 61-8, 70n137, 71, 108n113
83, 104, 122n8 Rudy, G. 129n1, 130n11
Nikodimos of the Holy Russell, N. 2n6, 5n13, 14, 36n8, 38n25,
Mountain 69n128, 83n206, 130, 208 69n126, 110n125, 111, 115, 132n20, 217, 222
Obolensky, D. 19n127 Rutherford, J.E. 205
Oikonomos, S. 5n17, 204 Savvatos, C. 79n190.192, 80n194,
Opitz, H.-G. 56n43, 205 81n198
Origen 22, 37, 38n25, 56, 129, 132, 146, Savvidis, K. 11, 42n51, 59n68, 205, 215
172 Schirò, G. 135n37, 137n47, 205
Palmer, G.E.H. 22n149, 208 Schneider, C. 60n73, 209-10, 215
Pannenberg, W. 33n3 Sharples, R.W. 92n34, 207
Papadakis, A. 79n190 Sherrard, L. 2n6, 9n44, 216
Papademetriou, G.C. 10 Sherrard, P. 22n149, 208
Papaevaggelou, P. 76n180, 203 Siecienski, A.E. 55n36, 79n190.193,
Papanikolaou, A. 78n184 81n198
Papathomopoulos, M. 11n73, 73n155, Sinkewicz, R.E. 2n6, 4n8, 5n12.18,
206 6, 10-3, 16n113, 18n126, 19n131, 22-3,
Patterson, P.A. 37n19 24n155, 34, 39n33, 41n44, 42n48,
Perrella, E. 5n16, 204 45n66, 49n1, 50n6.8, 51n9, 55n35, 56,
Petruccione, J.F. 92n30, 208 58n56.59, 60, 61n79, 67n112, 68-72,
Phanourgakis, V. 98n68, 203 75, 76n175, 78, 79n188-9, 82, 83n209,
Pietersma, A. 203 87-8, 89n11-2, 91n26, 92, 94n42, 96n54,
Pinakoulas, A. 105n99 101n83, 102n85, 105n95-7, 106, 112,
Pino, T.A. 7n35 115n2, 117, 118n16, 120, 129-33, 134n28,
Pirard, M. 25n171, 206 146, 147n18-9, 148, 150n43, 152, 153n62,
Plested, M. 5n13, 13n91, 19n127, 154, 156, 157n93, 159-60, 161, 170n39,
37n21, 43n55, 60n73, 73n152, 175n61,178n82, 179n88.92, 180n98,
76n176, 77n182.184, 79n190, 80n195, 183n119, 184, 186, 194-7, 200n5, 201n1.5,
81n198.200, 113n142, 132, 216 204, 208, 217
Podskalsky, G. 11n71 Siouti, A. 26n177
Preuschen, E. 38n25, 56n42, 207 Solignac, A. 61n78
Pseftogas, V. 5n17, 16n115, 17n117, 203-4 Sorabji, R. 23n153
Radović, A. 9, 76-7n181 Stählin, O. 37n24, 205
Rahner, K. 129n1, 130, 216 Stamoulis, C. 37n19
Raios, D.K. 73n155 Stăniloae, D. 6, 208
Ramelli, I.L.E. 37n23, 206 Steenberg, M.C. 36n14
Ramfos, S. 113, 114n143 Stephen, St 180-2, 186-7, 196
Rigo, A. 18n124, 19n127, 68n122, Stewart, C. 19n127
69n126, 133n25, 135n37 Stiernon, D. 5n13, 6n18
23 4 in d e x

Suchla, B.R. 146n5, 149n38, 154n73, Tsabari, I. 73n155, 206

167n15, 168n21, 174n60, 175n64, van der Eijk, P.J. 92n34, 207, 219
178n86, 179n89, 186n132, 205 Venediktos, Hieromonk
Swinburne, R. 133n25 Haghiorite 2n6
Symeon of Thessaloniki 84-5 Veniamin, C. 5n13.17, 24, 25n164-5,
Symeon the New Theologian 59n65, 27n180, 33n1, 39n34, 41n40, 44n58.60,
61-8, 70n137, 71, 83, 89n17, 95n47, 45n64.68-9, 46n70.72-6.78, 89n15,
106n104, 111n131, 130, 132 90n22, 91n24-5, 97n62-5, 98n66.69,
Takarides, G. 23n153 105n94, 106n104, 108n114-5, 110n120-1,
Tatianos 192n167 116n5, 117n8.10, 204
Theodoret of Cyrus 58, 92 Vlachos, H. 17n115, 23n153, 65n107,
Theoleptos of Philadelpheia 4, 10, 78n184
65n109, 68, 70-1, 83 Ware, K. 1, 8-10, 22n149, 23n153,
Theophanes of Nicaea 78n184 25n166, 28n187, 68n122, 77n182,
Theophilos of Antioch 36n8, 56 80n197, 111n131, 180n97, 195n188, 208,
Thermos, V. 28n187 216
Thomas Aquinas 9-10, 12-3, 34n6, 53, Wendebourg, D. 10
73, 74n162, 83n208, 115n3, 130 Wickham, L.R. 122n10, 205
Thomson, R.W. 56n44, 122n9, 205 Wilken, R.L. 195n190, 209, 212
Thunberg, L. 15n112, 33n4, Wilkins, J.D. 34n9, 49n1-2, 50n7, 51,
36n7.13.15.17.19, 37n19-20.23, 38n32, 52n15, 54n29, 74n162-3, 75n169, 81n201,
43n53, 51n13, 54n28, 58, 59n64-5, 92, 95, 83n208.210, 102n85
97n60, 116n4 Williams, A.N. 10n59, 12, 23n153, 115, 210
Tollefsen, T.T. 3n7, 15, 23n152, 51n13-4, Williams, R.D. 9
52, 54n28, 60, 83n207, 98n67, 115n3, Wright, B.G. 203
131-2, 200n5 Xionis, N. 60n73
Toma, Ş.L. 6n22 Yangazoglou, S. 5n13.16, 13, 42n49,
Törönen, M. 51n13, 59n66 44n59
Torrance, A. 60n71, 62n91 Yannaras, C. 9, 78n184
Townsend, L.D. 12n88 Zambon, M. 204
Trizio, M. 73n152 Zizioulas, J. D. 96n59

General Index

abstraction 167, 175-6, 178, 181, 194 cessation of all , see cessation
activation (of the spiritual senses) 3, cognitive 53
152, 181, 192, 194, 199-200, 202 created effects of 195
active (-ated) 69, 138, 148, 152-3, 156, creative 122n6
167-8 divine 3, 26, 52-4, 59-60, 103n91,
activity(-ies) 15, 22, 71, 90-1, 95, 104, 107, 110-1, 115, 132n20, 150, 153, 159,
115, 121, 131, 140, 142 195, 197
and divine light 159 essence and , see essence
and grace 107, 147, 184 human 104
and the passionate part of the soul 172 in Christ 66n109
 i nd e x 235

intellectual / of the intellect apophasis (-tic), see also negation 2, 72,

(nous) 20, 25-6, 28, 145, 147, 175- 129, 165n1, 167, 170, 194, 221
180, 190-1, 193 archetype 69, 127, 149, 193
natural 20 God as 43-4, 58n61, 122n6, 193, 201
of intellectual perception 150 Holy Trinity as 58, 91
of the Holy Spirit 17, 116 Logos-Christ as 42n49, 46
of the Holy Trinity 117 Ascension 44n60, 169
of the prayer 148, 193 ascent
of the senses 145 to God/the heavens 157, 192
translation in English (energeia) 3n7 via (by) negation 158, 170-1, 193
uncreated 17-9, 26, 29, 39, 54n28, 80, ascetic (-ism/-al) (or ascesis) 2, 6, 13,
110, 115-7, 119, 195 18, 28, 65n108-9, 66n110.112, 67-8, 70,
αἴσθησις νοερά, see intellectual 96n58, 113-4, 116, 121, 148n25, 155-7, 164,
perception 167, 171, 176-7, 185, 189, 193n175
analogia entis 53 Athos, Mount (see also Holy
analogy / analogies (see also Mountain) 17, 68, 101, 200
reflections) 52n15, 53n25, 158, 175, 181-2 αὐτεξούσιον (αὐτεξουσίως) 36, 43,
between man and the Holy 95n50, 100, 101n77, 122n8
Trinity 49, 51, 65n108 baptism 6, 11, 34n5, 49n3, 71, 89-91, 199
for the divine processions 83n208 Bible (biblical) 4, 6, 8, 17, 35, 55n35,
Holy Spirit 54-5, 85, 89 69n128, 93n38, 110, 119, 142n78, 169-70,
human 56, 64n101, 104 bishop 17, 42n45, 57, 61, 65n109, 70, 73,
Logos and God the Father 51, 54, 56, 77n184, 78n184, 82, 84, 92n34, 199
74, 83, 85 body 12n88, 18-9, 161, 207
mind, word, and spirit (nous, logos, and angels 2, 4n10, 33, 40, 79, 87,
pneuma) 57-8, 82n203 91, 93-6, 99, 103-4, 106-9, 112, 115-6,
nous-Logos 57 119-23, 200
of the ‘mutual love’ 77n182 and imago Dei/likeness to God 9,
of the soul 65n108 21, 36-8, 40-2, 63, 65, 79, 84, 87, 91,
physical and spiritual senses 146, 148 93-6, 99, 100, 103-4, 106-9, 112, 114,
Trinitarian (Triadic)/of the Holy 116, 119-22, 200-2
Trinity 49-50, 51n12, 57, 61, 64, 70, and intellect/nous, see also intellect/
75-6, 82n202-3, 83-4, 120 nous 20-1, 23n152, 27-8, 29, 33,
angelic 120, 149, 167, 170-1, 174-5, 177, 36-7, 40-1, 50, 72, 79, 88, 93, 99-100,
187, 190 103-4, 147-8, 152, 154, 165, 172, 180,
nature 90, 107 183, 187-92, 196
angels 33, 149, 154, 158, 169n34, 187 and soul 1, 3, 7, 23n152.153, 27-8, 36,
and humans 2-3, 4n10, 16, 25n169, 40-1, 62-3, 65, 72, 78, 84, 87-92, 99,
33-4, 38-9, 40, 43, 47, 49-50, 64n101, 116, 121-2, 137-8, 142n82 147, 150, 162-
65n106, 72, 79, 85, ch. 3, 115-6, 119-23, 4, 181-2, 185, 191-2, 195, 199-201
139, 140, 142, 145, 167, 171, 173n54, and spiritual senses/perception
174-5, 177, 201 (αἴσθησις νοερά) 2-3, 4n11, 16,
nature of the 87, 112 20n136, 23n152, 129-31, 133, 148-50,
animals 90-1, 122n8 154, 162-9, 172, 182, 184-90, 194,
apatheia 65n109, 172n49, 208 200-2
2 36 in d e x

and the creation 98-100, 103 life in 8

of Christ, see Christ living icon of Christ (the saints) 38,
participation in grace/spiritual life 117
7n32, 11, 88, 113-4, 116, 121, 148, 160, Lord 142, 147n22
162, 183-5, 190, 192, 194-7, 200 man as the image of 38, 47, 117
participation in prayer 6, 10, 113, 184, mind of 155
participation in theosis (now and in nature(s) 45, 63, 89, 109n116, 142,
Paradise) 21, 29, 41, 63, 98-9, 113-4, 162
129, 155n78, 160, 184-6, 190-1, 194-7, relationship with man 47, 109, 117,
200-2 155, 163, 184, 200
spiritual dispositions imprinted on Resurrection 9, 185
(ἐνσημαινομένας) 183-4, 193-4 restoration of the image of God 44,
transformation of 99, 123, 147, 186, 119
189-92, 194, 196-7 sweat of Christ in Gethsemane 188,
Bogomils, see also 195
Messalianism 19n127 the last Adam 117
Buddhism 167n13 Transfiguration of 7, 14, 69, 99, 134,
Bulgaria 68 159-63, 169, 176
Byzantium (-ine) 8, 12, 13n91, 42n45, Christology 13
50, 53n25, 55n36, 59n65, 60, 65n109, 67- Chalcedonian 63
8, 70, 73, 76n176, 81n198.200, 82n204, commandment(s) 103n91, 107, 119n1,
84-5, 133 140, 174, 189, 199, 200
canonization 14 communication 1
cessation (ἀπόπαυσις) consubstantial 51, 54, 57, 62-4, 79, 104
of all cognitive activity 53 contemplate (-ion) 26, 57n47, 58n58,
of all (intellectual) activity 175-7, 191 69, 89n17, 98, 117, 127, 132, 134, 137, 148,
Chapters (Capita 150; cf. Ιndex of 152, 155-7, 159, 168-9, 171, 174-5, 177,
citations from the Fathers) 4, 6, 10, 188, 194
11n77, 15n110-1, 24n155, 34, 39n36, cosmology 52n16, 60n73
42n46, 49n1, 73, 74n162, 75, 76n173-4, cosmos, see also world 6, 13, 92, 94,
78n184, 84, 101n82 96-8, 100, 106
Christ (see also Jesus, Logos, councils, synods
Word) 35, 46n72, 66n109, 154, Council of Constantinople
181, 192 (Blachernae, 1285) 79n193
archetype 42n49 Council of Ferrara-Florence
as the Image of God 35, 38, 45 (1438-9) 81n198
Ascension 44n60 Palamite councils of 1341, 1347, and
Baptism 49n3, 71, 89-91 1351 81n198
Body and Blood of 7, 99, 107-9, 161, Second Ecumenical Council
163, 169, 188-9 (Constantinople I, 381) 163n131
coming of 134, 160, 188 creation 37, 39-40, 46, 50, 52, 55n35.36,
follow 33 80n195.197, 89-91, 93-8, 101, 104, 106,
Incarnation, see Incarnation below 112, 117, 119-20, 138, 195, 201
in (into) 18, 89, 116-7, 109, 121, 159, ‘carrying’ the creation towards
165-6, 175 theosis 41n41, 96
 i nd e x 237

ἐκ μὴ ὄντων (ex nihilo/out of Church 34, 92n29, 199

nothing) 103 Fathers 5, 34, 77
intelligible 89-90 theology/teaching 11, 16
in the image of God 33, 39, 43, 45, tradition 68n119
109, 119 spirituality 4n11, 83n206
knowledge of God from 6, 19, 26, ecclesiastical 19n127, 39n35, 84, 119, 129
170 ecclesiology 1, 7, 9, 15, 98n68
creature(s) 1-2, 26, 39, 43, 45, 53, 65n108, ecological 96n59, 98n67, 98n68
89-91, 95n47, 97-8, 102, 103n91, 105n94, economy 69n128
132n20, 139, 153, 176, 179, 191, 195 economy, divine (economia) 55, 77n181,
cross 33, 41n39 79-81, 112
darkness 139, 142, 154, 156-7 ecstasis 3, 16, 20n136, 129, 157n97, 164-
death 6, 88, 107, 110n121, 116, 139, 172, 199 182, 194, 200
deification/deify (see also divinization, ecumenical perspective 10-1
theosis) 2, 6, 7n34, 9, 11-2, 14, 18-20, education 1
59, 63, 66, 94, 99, 107, 110n123, 111n131, emperor 81n198
119, 168-9, 175, 190-1 energy, divine, see also activity
deiform 191 (-ies) 3n7, 11n69, 12n88, 19, 28, 40,
demons (or demonic) 108, 110, 135, 54n28, 59-60, 70, 80n195.197, 88, 91,
157, 188 110n123, 131, 172
desert 96n58 epithymitikon, see also desiring 25, 171
desiring, see also epithymitikon 25, 171, Eros 64-5, 71-84, 141
173 eschatology 46, 109, 110, 119, 147, 194-5,
development 12, 59, 103n88 197
of (or: within) the tradition 8, 16, eschaton (or eschata) 142, 188-9, 191,
34, 72, 120 194, 197
spiritual 131 essence, see also essence-activities,
devil 121, 142 ousia 14, 19, 25, 28, 37n21, 53n25,
dialogical/analogical synergetic 63n94, 72, 79, 90, 122n8, 140, 179
communion 98n68 essence-activities (energies) distinction
διάνοια, see also reasoning 23-5, 51, see also activities 7, 9, 13n90.92, 16,
54n33, 74, 139n62, 150, 155, 163, 170, 177, 19, 28, 59-60, 80n195, 91, 110-1, 117, 119,
179n92, 193, 199 132n20, 140, 153, 168
discern (-ment) 108, 130, 136, 163 essences see also logoi 53n25, 178
disciple(s) 61, 68, 134, 159, 160-1, 163, Eucharist (-ic) 11, 66, 89n12, 99n71,
169, 171n45, 174, 176 106-12, 163
Divinity 57, 63, 79, 107, 109, 130, 142, exegesis/exegetical 14, 22, 83n208,
163, 168, 189, 195n189 110-1, 131, 169
divinize (-ation) (see also deification, existence 2, 24-5, 26n175, 34n5, 55n36,
theosis) 7, 13, 14, 20, 26, 96, 109, 56, 74n162, 79, 90n22, 92, 156, 159, 190
110n123, 115, 175 of the body 191, experience 18, 24, 55, 67n112, 70,
194-7 132n20, 134, 163, 170, 176, 182, 184-6,
dream 160 188, 200
Eastern (Orthodox) deifying 7n34
Christian (-ity) 13, 15 hesychast 159, 196, 200
23 8 in d e x

mystical 9, 13, 65n108 hesychia 71

of grace 66n112 Holy Mountain (see also
of the Holy Spirit 11 Athos) 16n115, 17, 68, 69n128, 130,
of the (uncreated) light 7, 131, 140-1, 195n188, 208
156 Homilies (Palamas’ Sermons; cf. Index
of (union with) God/spiritual of Citations from the Fathers) 4,
realities 53, 133, 150-1, 197, 200n8 5n17, 11n77, 15n110, 39n36, 84, 105n100,
sensible/sensory 150, 159, 194, 196 108n114, 110n124, 170n37, 203
spiritual 4n11 human person 1, 3, 8-9, 15-6, 21, 27, 40,
faculty 20-3, 25, 27, 28n187, 29, 40n37, 49, 52n15, 72, 79, 82n203, 85, 88, 90, 102-
43n55, 58, 65, 92, 130-1, 146-7, 149, 3, 105-6, 117, 123, 133, 147, 152, 185, 191
150-2, 154, 156, 161, 165, 171, 172n49, hypostasis 4, 51, 55, 57, 75, 80n195, 139,
173, 177-9, 181 162
of (self-)governance/ icon 107, 127
dominion 25n169, 43n56, 63n93, of Christ, see also Christ 38, 117
87, 92-102, 111n132, 112, 120-1, 173n54 of the Holy Trinity 9
of sense perception of the soul (the body) 37n21
(αἰσθητικόν) 38n31, 64n101, 87, veneration 107, 109
102-6, 112, 120, 136n44, 189 Iconoclasts 107, 111, 206
father, spiritual (of Palamas) 71 iconognosts 45
Filioque 13n92, 55n36, 73, 76n176, identity, human 40n37
77n181, 78, 80n197, 81n198, 82 illumination(s) 159, 163, 168, 199-200
freedom, free will 13, 18, 36, 40n37, 43, divine 13, 19, 115, 116, 133-5, 137-9,
59, 72, 95, 99-101, 110n121, 148, 176, 186, 145, 193,
189, 193 in the Old and New
grace 6, 10-11, 12n82, 19-20, 27, 28n187, Testament 7n34, 131, 134, 138, 157-9
34n5, 38-9, 43, 45, 58, 63, 65n107.109, image of God (or κατ’ εἰκόνα
66n112, 74, 95n47, 98, 107, 110n123, 116- Θεοῦ) 2-4, 10, 16, 21, 29, Part I,
8, 142-3, 147-51, 155, 160-1, 163, 165-6, 129, 137-8, 153n62, 175n62, 201-2
168, 171, 175-6, 183-8, 190, 192, 194-97, angels see especially 122-3
200, 207 background 35-8
Hagioretic Tome (Tomos) of 1340 imago Trinitatis/Trinitarian image of
(cf. Index of Citations from the God 49-85
Fathers) 4, 16-7, 131, 170, 183, 185 in man and the angels ch.3
heart (or καρδία) 2, 6, 8, 15-6, 18, 20-1, locus 40-2
23, 26-9, 43, 44n58, 56, 108, 129-31, 138- the Logos as the Image of God 37-9,
40, 142, 145, 148-9, 154, 161-2, 164, 172, 42-46
176, 178-81, 187-8, 192-4, 199 Incarnation (of Christ) 6-7, 11n77, 25,
heresy (heretical) 18, 19n127, 121, 135, 38, 45-7, 55, 59, 64n101, 76n174, 102-5,
163, 183 112, 119, 158, 162, 171
hesychasm/(anti)hesychast(s) 2, 3, Indian religions 167n13
5-8, 10-1, 13-4, 16-8, 20-1, 29, 52-3, 59-60, initiate (μύστης) 89-90, 105, 175,
66n110, 67-8, 71, 106n102, 113, 118, 133-9, inner
141, 150, 155, 157-60, 170, 172, 174, 178, being (of God, of Holy Trinity) 72,
180, 182-3, 188-9, 194, 196-7, 200, 202-4 112
 i nd e x 239

brilliancy of the intellect 187, 196 illumination (φωτισμός)

explanation of the Trinity 65n108 love (ἔρως)
heart 192 perception (αἴσθησις νοερά)
(or intellectual) illumination 145-9, irascible, see also thymikon 25, 171, 173
200 Islam 167n13
principles (word, logoi, Jesuit 66n111
essences) 52, 103n91, 104, 178 Jesus (see also Christ, Logos,
radiance 153n65 Word) 44n60, 140, 142, 147n22, 174,
quiet 27-8 181, 188
self 71, 176n70, 200 Jordan, river of 71, 89
intellect see also nous (νοῦς) 7, 16, 18, judgment 24, 109n116, 116, 173, 175
21-5, 39n33, 49, 53-4, 75, 96-7, 136, kat’ epinoian 132n20
139-141, 145-7, 162-3n131, 182, 193 καρδία, see heart
and angels 90-1, 109n117, 112, 123, knowledge 20, 45, 51-3, 55, 57, 64, 74-5,
167-8, 171, 174-5, 187, 105-6, 111n131, 133-4, 151, 154, 166-9,
and ascesis/will/passions 25, 93, 174, 177, 182, 194
96n58, 138, 152, 157-8, 167, 171-5 active 69
and body 20-1, 27-9, 33, 36, 41, 50, ascetic 96n58, 114
93, 103-4, 121-2, 147-9, 151, 165, 183, contemplative 69
185-191, 196 human/physical 19, 45, 53, 55, 102,
and ecstasis 165-7 105-6, 114, 121, 122n6, 136-7, 139, 141-
and heart 8, 15, 20, 26-9, 179-180, 3, 145-6, 152, 158-9, 171, 173, 179-80,
192, 199 192-3, 200
and imago Dei 29, 36-7, 40-1, 55, 57, of God/the divine 2-3, 6, 10, 13, 16,
72, 84, 96n58, 112, 120-2, 153n62, 201 17, 19, 22, 26, 52-3, 60, 72, 105, 129,
and light 149, 151-6, 162, 167-9, 175-9, 136-9, 141-3, 150, 193, 199,
190, 201 of God from/through the
and logos (λόγος)/Logos 10, 50-1, creation 6, 26, 170, 173,
54-8, 62, 64-5, 69-71, 73-6, 83-4, life
87-8, 91, 101n77, 104n91, 109n117, in Christ, see Christ
123 liturgical, see liturgy
and reasoning (dianoia), see life-giving (or: vivifying) power of the
reasoning/dianoia soul, see soul
and soul 23n153, 28, 36, 56, 62-4, light 149, 152, 193-4, 199
92n33, 152 divine 3, 16-7, 20n136, 22n146, 23,
essence and activities 28, 91n28 66, 67n114, 80, 113, 129, 131, 134,
intellection 22, 53, 145-6, 150, 166, 172, 136-9, 141-3, 150-7, 159-169, 174-7, 182,
177-8, 193, 201 186n137, 187, 190-2, 194, 196-7, 200
intellective (νοερός) 21-2, 37n21, eternal 127
167 hypostatic 139
intelligible (νοητός) 22, 57, 63, 84, intellectual (νοερόν) 18, 22n146, 139-
88n10, 89-91, 101n79, 138, 142, 145, 154, 140, 145, 154, 167
167, 177, 181-2, 188, 196 intellective (νοητόν) 167
intellectual (νοερός), see the following intelligibile (νοητόν) 22n146, 138,
words at this Index 142, 154, 167, 182
24 0 in d e x

physical/sensible 135, 138, 142, 151, Metropolitan 1-2, 9

153-4, 160, 201 miracle 1
symbolic 160 modern
uncreated 7, 11, 18, 113n140, 131, 154 man 2, 69n128, 103n90, 106, 202
vision of the 129, 131, 138 psychology 28n187
liturgy (-ical) 34, 82, 96n58, 170, 199- scholars (-ship) 4, 5n18, 6, 9-10, 15,
200, 208 49
logikos 37-8, 46-7 society/era/age 1, 5n13, 20n137, 202
logistikon, see also reasoning 25, 65, 171 theologians 34, 77, 80n193, 200
Logos (see also Christ, Jesus, translation 5n16, 69n128, 185n130,
Word) 17, 50-1, 52n15, 54, 56-8, 69, 190n156, 204
83, 95, 162, 163n131, 195n190 Modernity 105
as the (undeviating) Image of God/ monastic 13, 66n109, 67, 71n140,
the Father 37-8, 40, 42, 46-7, 119 96n58, 183n119
consubstantial to the Spirit 54, 62, Monothelite controversy 188n148
64 mountain 68, 139, 154n76, 168, 187n138
incarnate 38, 44-6, 56, 64n101, 104, negation (-ive), see also apophasis 158,
119, 162 167-8, 170-1, 175-7, 181-2, 193-4
man made in the image of the New Testament 7n34, 35, 42, 72, 131,
Logos 38, 46, 62, 64n99, 65, 84-5, 138, 140, 157-9, 203
102n85 nipsis 71
logos/logoi see also essences 26, 51-4, nous (νοῦς) see also intellect 10, 22-5,
103-4n91, 178, 193 27, 39n33, 50, 55n37, 56, 58, 61, 64-5,
love (or ἔρως) 10, 18-9, 21, 43-5, 54-6, 68, 69n131.133, 71, 73-4, 82, 138n59,
64, 65n108, 71-6, 79-84, 87-8, 94, 99, 139n67, 146n13, 149n36, 151n50.52,
108, 117, 140-1, 142n82, 156-7, 166, 169, 152, 154n71, 165n4, 166n8, 167n18, 168,
170n37, 172n49, 173-4, 188-9, 199, 207 169n32, 171, 175, 177, 178n84, 179n93,
Manuscripts 5n14.18, 6, 66n112, 68, 180, 186n134, 187n141, 193n176
101, 111-2 and dianoia (reasoning) 26
Athous Dionys. 175 101n81 and heart (kardia) 8n41, 192
Athous Laurae 283 101n81 and the body 20n140, 21, 41, 122n7
Neapol 54 111n134 and the image of God 33, 36-38, 40-
marriage 127 1, 76, 98, 101, 122n7, 123
Mary, Mother of God (Theotokos) 24, essence and activities 16, 28, 179
45, 104, 180n98 Nous and Logos 38, 56-7, 62, 64
Mary of Egypt 186-7, 195-6 ‘the image of the Image’ 37-8
material (materiality) 21n145, 24, 51, nous-logos-pneuma (intellect, reason
63, 98, 102-3, 104n91, 121, 149-50, 152, [word], and spirit) 57-8, 64-5, 68, 71,
162, 169, 190, 193, 201 73, 76, 82, 91, 101, 109n117, 123
Maximos of Kapsokalyvia 180n97, nous-logos-psyche 61, 64
195n188 obedience 93
medicine 1 to Christ / to the Lord’s
Messalians (-ism) (see also commands 117, 176n70
Bogomils) 18-20, 175 to spiritual father/elder 18, 156-7
metaphysics 52n16, 55n38 to the intellect 173
 i nd e x 241

Old Testament 17, 35, 46, 78n184, 109, pneumatology

134, 145, 158-9, 181 in Palamas 10, 13
ousia, see also essence 12n88, 91 pneumatological aspect of the imago
participation 6, 11, 14-5, 21n144, 23n152, Dei 79n189, 87, 102, 112, 120-1, 154
26, 29, 39-40, 98n68, 99n71, 106, 108-9, prayer 10, 11, 15, 34n5, 66n109.110, 113,
110n123, 111n131, 113, 117, 119, 121, 131, 138, 142n82, 148, 156-8, 160, 166, 170-1,
132n20, 133, 172, 175, 184-5, 187-8, 190, 178-9, 180n97, 184n126, 187-9, 193, 195,
194, 197, 200 199, 208
patience 173 Gethsemane 188
Paul, apostle 35, 44, 52, 67n114, 94n43, intellectual 28, 180n97
117n8.10, 121, 136-7, 140, 142, 154, 163, Jesus 10, 66n110, 69, 71, 118
165-6, 171n45, 189, 192 monastic/hesychast 13, 60, 113n140,
Pentecost 43n57, 83, 117n8, 134 135, 196
perception of the heart 6, 18
intellectual (αἴσθησις νοερά) 3, 13, psychophysical/psychosomatic
21-4, 123, 125, 129-33, 143, ch.6, 183, method of 6, 118
186, 189, 194, 197, 199, 200-1 pure/true 18, 149
sense, see faculty, sensation unceasing 7
spiritual 2-3, 12-3, 16, 22-3, 27n179, priest 106n104, 199
147-8, 154, 156, 172, 194, 197 of the creation 96n59, 98n68,
person 1, 3, 17-20, 23n152, 36, 42n45, process/procession 52n15, 57, 70, 73,
66n110, 66-7n112, 70, 84, 105, 121, 75, 76n180, 77n181, 79, 80n195, 81n200,
142, 148-50, 155-6, 167, 169-70, 172-3, 83n208, 84, 203
180, 184, 188, 196, 200 providence 26
divine 40, 45, 50-1, 57, 63, 74-5, 80, psychology 1, 10, 28n187, 57, 58n56, 61,
163n131 62, 65n108, 74-6, 82n202, 93, 166
human, see human person psychophysical method of prayer 6,
spiritual/ unspiritual 136, 192 118n15
personalism (‘existentialism’) 7n35 rational (rationality) 2, 19, 21, 24, 27,
personhood 28n187, 113n141 36-7, 38n25, 43, 50, 70, 72, 87-8, 90-2,
perfection 46, 133, 137, 142, 209 95, 99-103, 113, 116, 122n8, 137, 139-40,
of the likeness to God (καθ’ 161, 162n131, 167, 177, 190n156, 192,
ὁμοίωσιν) 115, 116n4 202n6
Peter, apostle 117n10 reason 24-5, 45, 53, 62-5, 76, 84, 90-1,
Philokalia (Φιλοκαλία), cf. Index of 97, 101n77, 102, 109n117, 113, 123, 136-7,
Citations from the Fathers 39n33, 142-3, 150, 173, 177, 202n6
17n116, 22n149, 23n153, 39n33, 66n110, reasoning (or διάνοια/dianoia), see also
67n118, 68-9, 70n135, 113, 116, 121n5, 177, logistikon 22-6, 28n187, 34, 51, 54n33,
178n78, 191n159, 192n170, 193n175 74, 137, 139n62, 150, 155, 163, 170-1, 173,
philosophy (-er) 4, 5n16, 13n90, 14-5, 177, 179n92, 193, 199
21, 23n153, 35, 52, 60, 65n108, 77n182, reconciliation 191
98n68, 105, 113, 115n3, 132n20, 136-7, reflections (see also analogy/analogies)
153n69, 172, 202n6 renunciation 18
pleasure 18, 46, 148, 156, 173, 184, 189, repent (repentance) 10, 13, 19, 184
192 restore (-ation) 44-5, 94, 119, 121, 191
242 in d e x

Resurrection (see also Christ) 9, 114, passionate part of the 129, 170-4
116, 185, 192 powers/activities/functions of
revelation 7, 9, 19, 65n108, 80n197, 91, the 27, 65, 71, 76, 93, 137-8, 155, 171
113, 137, 139, 142, 166, 168, 182 vivifying (or life-giving) power of
sacraments (sacramental) 6-7, 9, 11, 18 (ζωοποιὸς δύναμις) 65, 73, 78,
saint(s) 2, 5-6, 14n103, 17, 19, 34n5, 38, 79n189, 82, 84, 87-92, 99, 102, 112,
43n57, 44n59, 89n12, 109, 117, 134-5, 120
138, 140-1, 157, 161, 168, 177, 180n97, Spirit, Holy, see also pneumatology 17-
195n188, 196-7, 204 8, 40, 42, 54-7, 59n65, 62-4, 65n107,
Scripture 34, 41, 76n177, 109, 135, 169- 73, 75, 76n177.180, 77n181, 78-85, 88-9,
70, 174 91-2, 101n77, 116, 121, 131, 134, 137, 153-5,
secular/secularization 52, 106 160, 161, 165-6, 171, 177, 181-2, 189, 192-3
sensation (αἴσθησις), see also perception, spirituality 4n11, 14, 17n115, 66, 83n206,
intellectual (αἴσθησις νοερά) 23-5, 130
27n184 93n37, 97n64, 100, 103n89, symbol (-ic/-ism) 7n34, 134, 147, 157-
109n117, 114, 123, 129, 130n7, 134n31.33, 60, 161n126, 168-70, 181, 183n119
139n64, 142-3, 145, 147-8, 149n53, Taoism 167n13
151n50, 154, 157n97, 162n127, 163, 165n5, taste (γεῦσις) 17, 127, 185, 189, 194, 197,
171, 176n71, 177, 181n103, 183-4, 186, 189- 199
90, 191n159.162, 193, 199n3 tear(s) 148, 184
senses technology 1, 69n128, 105-6, 114
coordination of the physical and the theologia 77n181, 137-8, 151, 152n54, 167,
spiritual 151-5 170, 193-4, 205-6
physical/natural 12n88, 19, 24, 27-8, theology
97n64, 122n6, 134, 139, 145, 147, 149, academic 151
157, 166, 169, 176-7, 181, 186, 196, 199 and economy, see economy, divine
spiritual 2-4, 12, 16, 21, 23, 26-7, 29, apophatic, see also apophasis 170
105n95, 112n139, 114n144, 121-3, 129- Byzantine 12, 53n25
35,143, 146-58, 160, 163-4, 165n1, 167, Christian 1, 33-4, 36, 76n177, 103n88,
169, 172, 176, 180-1, 183n119, 186-90, 105
192, 194, 196, 199-201 dogmatic 42n47, 82
simplicity 58, 135 natural 26n175
sin 27, 43, 93, 99, 116, 123, 140, 155-6 Orthodox 1, 11, 42n46, 53n25, 73, 82
original 6, 13n92 Palamite/Palamas’ 2n6, 3, 5n13, 8-11,
Sinai 138, 154n76, 158, 187 13-4, 15n110, 21, 23n152, 45n69, 49,
soul (or ψυχή) 1, 3, 7, 9, 22-5, 27-8, 33, 59-60, 67, 72, 81, 82n204, 84, 106, 113,
36-7, 40-1, 43-5, 49, 52, 56, 58, 62-6, 129-33, 143, 157, 164, 176n70, 180, 188,
72, 74n162, 99, 100, 102n85, 108, 190, 200
109n117, 112, 116-8, 122, 130-1, 135, 137- patristic 28n187, 37
9, 148, 154, 156, 159-65, 167, 181-92, Roman Catholic 11
194-5, 199-201, 207 Trinitarian 77n182
and body, see body Western 53n25, 74n163, 83n206,
eyes of 3, 16, 129, 143, 147, 150-1, 154, 195n190
162 Theophania 42n47, 89, 90
of the animals 90-1
 i nd e x 243

theophany 46, 49n3, 69, 78n184, Trinity, Holy (see also analogy,
79n189, 89, 105n94, 113, 131, 157, 162, 167 archetype) 2-3, 9, 16, 40, 47, 49-51,
theoptia 151, 167, 170, 193-4 56-8, 61-2, 64, 65n108, 69-72, 74-5, 77,
theosis (see also deification, 81, 82n202, 83-5, 87, 89-91, 102, 103n90,
divinization) 2n6, 3, 7, 9, 11, 14, 26, 105n94, 108, 112-3, 116-7, 120, 123,
29, 36, 40-1, 53n24, 59n68, 63, 94, 96, 163n131, 174
110, 113-5, 119-20, 129, 138, 151, 157, 165, truth 17, 44, 55n35, 57, 84, 122n8, 135-6,
168-71, 184, 193, 195n187, 196-7, 200, 202 138-9, 145, 159
Thomism 12 union with God, see theosis, deification,
thymikon, see also irascible 25, 171 divinization
TLG (Thesaurus Linguae virtue 10-1, 17-8, 20, 40n37, 43-4, 58-9,
Graecae) 183n118, 203n1 69, 93, 96n58, 116-7, 122n8, 138, 142-3,
tradition 10, 16, 34-5, 42n46, 72, 77, 145, 155, 165, 173, 193
80n197, 82, 106n104, 120 vision 9, 11, 20n136, 25, 28, 66-7, 80,
ascetical/mystical 13, 65n108, 127, 131-2, 137-8, 141, 149, 151-6, 158,
66n112, 68, 166 160-2, 164-6, 168-9, 171, 174-8, 180-2,
Church 34, 75 186n137, 191-2, 194, 197, 200-1
manuscript 5n14, 101, 111 of the light, see light
oral 68n119, 102, 112 vivifying (or: life-giving) power, see soul
patristic 5n13, 8, 10n67, 17n118, 22, warmth (physical/spiritual) 141, 148,
27n179, 36-8, 39n35, 47, 50, 56, 58-60, 188-9, 194-5
62n90, 64n98, 65, 68n119, 70-2, 76, wisdom 26, 45, 52-3, 55n35, 108-9, 137,
81n200, 85n217, 95n47-8, 100, 120, 173, 192
130n11, 133, 146 Word (see also Christ, Jesus,
philosophical/Hellenistic 56n39, Logos) 21, 50-1, 54-5, 57, 64n101, 69,
92n31 73, 83, 88, 101n77, 103-4, 168
theological/spiritual 11n69 world, see also cosmos 1, 14n103, 22,
transcendence 13, 18, 50, 57n47, 69, 136, 23n152, 24, 39, 42n45, 43n56, 46n73,
138, 140-2, 145-7, 151, 161, 168, 170, 176 63, 69n128, 72, 80n195, 84n211, 92-4,
self 18, 28n187, 165-7, 180, 194 96-7, 98n66, 105, 110n124, 111n132, 112-
Transfiguration, see Christ 3, 117, 119, 155, 166, 169, 171, 176, 185-6,
transportation 1 194-5
Triads (Pro hesychastis; cf. Index of ψυχή, see soul
Citations from the Fathers) 4, 5, 7, 15,
21, 27n179, 39n36, 59, 135, 152, 183, 196